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UMI
TRACING THE EMERGENCE OF CORPORAL PHASE DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISHMENT IN A MODERN SOCIETY: THE ARGENTINE CASE
(1969-1979)

by

Michael V. Agostinis

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
through the Department of Sociology
in Fulfilment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts at the
University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada
1997

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Abstract

The focus of this research is to develop a social theory explaining why corporal phases of discipline emerge in recent modernized societies. This theory is generated from the historical analysis of Argentina throughout the years 1969 to 1979. Within this time period, a state developed terror apparatus was utilized between 1976 and 1979 to eliminate all forms of subversion.

The theoretical bases of this research stem from two major sources. Michel Foucault's work in Discipline and Punish (1979) aided in the formulation of ideological arguments and Immanuel Wallerstein's World-systems theory assisted the structural analysis.

In general, this research pays close attention to a nation's ability to satisfy both world market demands and domestic class demands. A nation which cannot appease both sets of demands will experience heightened levels of social conflict. Violent, organized and sustained conflict will contribute to the emergence of corporal phase discipline. This research carefully traces the relationship between the world-economy, internal dissent and an emerging phase of corporal discipline.
I would simply like to dedicate this work to all my family and friends who have supported and encouraged me throughout my life and throughout this process. Special thanks to my father Claudio, mother Mary Ellen, sister Angela, grandparents Eva and Vittorio, friend Paul and fiancé Elisabeth.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (Argentine Anti-Anticommunist Alliance or Triple A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AE</td>
<td>Agrupación Evita (Evita Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C de O</td>
<td>Comando de Organización (Organizational Command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGE</td>
<td>Confederación General Económica (General Economic Confederation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGT</td>
<td>Confederación General del Trabajo (General Labour Confederation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGT-A</td>
<td>Confederación General del Trabajo de los Argentinos (General Labour Confederation of the Argentines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (People's Revolutionary Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESMA</td>
<td>Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada (Navy Mechanics School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAL</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación (Armed Forces of Liberation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAP</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (Peronist Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Revolutionary Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Juventud Peronista (Peronist Youth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTP</td>
<td>Juventud Trabajadora Peronista (Peronist Working Youth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUP</td>
<td>Juventud Universitaria Peronista (Peronist University Youth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>Movimiento de Inquilinos Peronistas (Peronist Tenants Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVP</td>
<td>Movimiento de Villeros Peronistas (Peronist Shanty-Town Dwellers Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Partido Auténtico (Authentic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (Workers Revolutionary Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UES</td>
<td>Unión de Estudiantes Secundarios (Secondary Students Union)</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The utilization of torture¹ and corporal methods of discipline by numerous nations throughout the contemporary world has been well documented. Amnesty International (1984) listed over 98 governments during the late 1970's and early 1980's that widely used corporal punishment as a means of social control. These figures are too high to ignore and one must ask: Why do phases of corporal discipline persistently re-emerge in many of today's modernized nations?

In general, traditional criminological theories have historically situated corporal modes of punishment in pre-industrial, pre-modern societies. "Disciplinary theorists"²

¹ Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture (1984) has given a legal and universal definition of torture, stating that it is "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity."

² The term "disciplinary theorists" will act as a general label for Foucault,Ignatieff, Linebaugh, and Rusche & Kirchheimer. This grouping solely refers to the ability of all the theorists to agree that a shift from a pre-modern society to a modern society correlated to a shift in the disciplinary modes. The label "disciplinary theorists" is not to imply that Foucault, Ignatieff, Linebaugh and Rusche & Kirchheimer agree on all theories, histories or arguments regarding modes of discipline.
such as Foucault (1979), Ignatieff (1978), Rusche & Kirchheimer (1968), and Linebaugh (1992) have thoroughly traced the historical development of punishment in western society, and although each of these theorists employs differing frameworks, there remains one concept that all agree on. All have claimed that a shift in the mode of discipline, from a corporal to a carceral mode, corresponded to a shift from a pre-modern to a modern society.\textsuperscript{3} This theoretical stance poses a problem as many modernized areas of today's global system experience phases of corporal discipline that should be characteristic to only pre-modern societies.

Yet despite the contemporary inappropriateness of traditional mode of discipline theories, some arguments from these theories remain valuable to this particular research. Foucault (1979) in particular provided a thorough ideological discussion about the aims and objectives of different modes of discipline. Therefore, this research will consider Foucault's ideas about the objectives of corporal discipline and how attainment of these objectives achieve a wider field of social control under certain social circumstances.

Beyond these contributions, Foucault can not aid in

\textsuperscript{3} For the purposes of this research the term \textit{pre-modern} can refer to a pre-capitalist, pre-industrial, feudal type society. Alternatively, the term \textit{modern} can refer to a capitalist, industrial, technologically advanced society with complex organizations and social structures.
explaining how phases of corporal punishment emerge in a modern society. Therefore, it will be necessary to supplement Foucault's contentions with other theoretical arguments. This work will utilize Immanuel Wallerstein's World-systems theory to better understand the structural specifics of the chosen case study.

The case study for this work shall be Argentina (1969-1979), where it is estimated that from 1976-1977 some 8,000 to 20,000 people were methodically made to disappear by the Proceso military regime during the "Dirty War" (CONADEP, 1986:xiv). Most of these individuals were tortured prior to their secret execution. The high number of victims, the compact time period and the availability of literature, qualifies the Dirty War as a useful case study for this work.

Therefore, the major tasks of this research are to highlight the processes that contributed an emerging corporal phase of punishment during the Dirty War and to develop more generalized conclusions in order to explain similar phenomena in other modern societies. This paper suggests that since the world-system itself is the common domain of all global nations, other cases can experience similar social development resulting from world interaction and circumstances. Argentina only assists in the broader explanation.

As a final word, it should be mentioned that never
before have Foucault's theories and the World-systems approach been melded to provide an explanation of the Argentine case. Prior to this work, most social theorists forwarded purely structural arguments dwelling solely upon the internal mechanical workings of Argentina itself. Such theories addressed issues of hegemonic crisis, political disfunction, class conflict, domestic economic policy and military ideologies (Rouquie, 1987; Peralta Ramos, 1992; Faucher and Fitzgibbons in Franks, 1989; Smith, 1989; Schmitter in Lowenthal, 1976). But by including ideological arguments (stemming from a Foucaultian basis) alongside the historical specifics of both the case study and world context, this work provides a richer explanation while remaining unique.

**Methodology and Methodological Concerns**

The development of theory from one historical case study compels this research to employ a methodology of Comparative History as the Contrast of Contexts (Skocpol & Somers, 1980). Contrast-oriented historical sociology attempts to bring out the unique features of each case, showing how these unique features affect the working out of general social processes. Broad themes and orienting questions are used to lead a researcher in drawing particular contrasts and act "as frameworks for pointing out differences between or among cases" (Skocpol & Somers, 1980:178).
Unlike the purely descriptive functions of history, historical social analysis seeks to interpret past events for the purpose of generating theory. Therefore, this type of research looks beyond the factual narrative and seeks to analyze social processes within and between different historical periods.

The case study to be analyzed in this work will be Argentina between 1969 and 1979. Within this time period, three distinct intervals will be examined so that comparisons can be made between periods. Within each time period, four topic areas will be discussed: Argentina's economy, labour movement, terrorist development and the methods of social control. At the end of each period, this research will characterize the emerging phase of punishment. Therefore, three distinct phases of punishment will be determined within the case. These phases should be viewed as part of a process, much like the progressive development of an economy, labour movement, or guerrilla movement.

It should also be noted that this paper does refer to phases of punishment and not modes of punishment. A mode of punishment is characterized by the duration of homogenous disciplinary practices and structures in a society. These structures and practices operate at the base level of

'* The term terrorist often carries with it a negative connotation, yet this thesis only wishes to use the term interchangeably with guerrilla(s). Whether guerrillas are terrorists or not is always arguable and this thesis wishes to avoid such a discussion altogether.
society, touching on all aspects of social life. A phase of punishment also operates at the base level of society touching on all social aspects, but, because it is an emerging phenomenon, it can not be considered durable (it may phase out). A phase of discipline emerges from new social needs and structures and will remain in place as long as these needs and structures persist. If a phase of discipline endures, keeping the control field maximized and suitable for the society it regulates, it can eventually be considered a mode of punishment.

At this point it is important to address possible methodological shortcomings of the historical approach. For instance, the use of one in-depth case study may raise some criticism regarding sample size. Yet the concern of comparative historical sociology is not to find similar one dimensional results in many cases, but to find in depth, meaningful conclusions in a particular case or cases. Therefore, Skocpol (1984:362) supports work based on one in depth case study as she suggests that the Comparative Method may "be applied to a single historical case or to two or more cases."

The fact that there "are no mechanical recipes for proper methods of historical sociology," may also leave this type of methodology open to criticism (Skocpol, 1984:361). Criticism regarding the reliability and validity of relevant data will always plague qualitative measures, but this does
not discredit historical sociology. Stinchcombe (1978:24) suggests:

It is not about the traditional epistemological question of verifiability, and of why science based on facts is better than theology based on speculation. Instead it is about the use of facts to improve ideas, to make them richer, more flexible, more powerful.

Addressing questions of reliability, this paradigm remains less concerned with the exact reproduction of results by other researchers. Because historical sociology deals mainly with non-quantifiable variables, such as events and trends in a society, the exact reproduction of the experiment is not possible. Also, because of the interpretive nature of this methodology, conclusions will always vary from researcher to researcher. Therefore, historical sociology asserts that when other researchers follow a similar course of investigation, like concepts and conclusions will be reached (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).

Another methodological dilemma might concern the historical sources utilized by this research. In general, most of the data for this work will be derived from secondary sources. Secondary sources can sometimes be open to criticism as edited texts may possibly be biased. The fact that many original documents from the "Dirty War" have been destroyed, that a vast amount of Argentine literature and files are only to be found in South America, and the researcher's lack of knowledge regarding Spanish, presents a problem in attaining useful primary source documentation.
Yet Skocpol (1984:382) finds no flaws in relying on secondary data as she states:

From the point of view of historical sociology, however, a dogmatic insistence on redoing primary research for every investigation would be disastrous; it would rule out most comparative-historical research. If a topic is too big for purely primary research— and if excellent studies by specialists are already available in some profusion—secondary sources are appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a given study.

Furthermore she states that "no individual can master world history from primary sources" (Skocpol, 1984: 287).

In terms of secondary sources, this research will rely on historical accounts such as those given by Hodges (1988) *Argentina, 1943-1987*, Smith (1989) *Authoritarianism and the Crisis of the Argentine Political Economy*, and Gillespie (1982) *Soldiers of Perón* to provide insight on important national events. Also, books written explaining the economy of Argentina (such as policy and practice as well as the ramifications of policy), will be used in this analysis. Some of these secondary economic sources include Pion Berlin's work in *The Ideology of State Terror: Economic Doctrine and Political Repression in Argentina and Peru* (1989) and Peralta Ramos' book *The Political Economy of Argentina* (1992).

Regarding primary sources, *Nunca Más* (CONADEP, 1986) as prepared by Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People provides verbatim accounts of torture by victims of the Dirty War. By examining the accounts given in *Nunca*
Más, deliberate patterns may be established about the abduction and torture of an individual. Two other primary sources include the *Buenos Aires Herald* and *Quarterly Economic Review of Argentina* (Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), 1969-1980). The *Buenos Aires Herald* is an English language newspaper that throughout the Dirty War was very outspoken in reporting abductions and political struggles. The *Quarterly Economic Review of Argentina* is an intelligence journal that reported on current political, social and economic conditions of Argentina. Information drawn from 1969 to 1980 editions also include discussions regarding civil unrest, the labour movement, terrorism, and Argentine/World economic relations.

At this point then, this research will make use of the comparative historical method to analyze the Argentine case in light of domestic and world circumstances. Once these circumstances have been determined and traced, this paper will attempt to provide an explanation as to what allows a corporal phase of discipline to emerge in a modern society.
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

The purpose of this section is to introduce the two theoretical foundations of this paper. The first theory was initially generated from the work of Michel Foucault (1979) and the second by Immanuel Wallerstein (1979; 1983). Foucault's work traces the historical development of discipline and punishment in Western society and forwards compelling ideological arguments. Wallerstein's theories are more economically grounded and seek to explain social phenomenon within the context of a world market system. The two theories by themselves are very unlike, but both provide valuable insights to this work in a unique way. Therefore, a short synopsis of both theoretical stances should be put forth.

Mode of Discipline Theories

Michel Foucault, within his work entitled Discipline and Punish (1979), set out to characterize and trace the development of punishment over the last four centuries in European society. More specifically, he addressed the historical decline of corporal punishment in pre-modern society and the gradual utilization of carceral discipline in modern society beginning at the end of the eighteenth century. Each mode of discipline, whether corporal or carceral, operated within a particular ideology which always strove to accomplish higher levels of power over society.
The concept of "power" itself, is perhaps one of the most unique features of Foucault's theoretical stance when tracing the historical development of discipline. For Foucault, power in society is not possessed by any certain class, government or entity, it is merely a concept that binds everyone caught in a social system. Foucault (1978:93) explains:

One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society... [power] must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate, it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable.

In addition Foucault asserts that there can be no power without "knowledge". Therefore, power and knowledge are inseparable and any increase in one will automatically infer an increase in the other. In simpler terms, as information increases within a particular field, power over that field will also increase. Foucault (1979:27) explains these concepts in the following:

...power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.

The corporal mode of discipline, situated in the feudal mode of production, increased power/knowledge through
administering punishment upon the body of the condemned. Corporal discipline sought the use of torture, body pain, the public spectacle and death as ritualistic vehicles and symbols of power over the malefactor and society. Thus, as chaotic as it might seem, corporal punishment served specific purposes and was subject to proper calculation. Foucault himself states that "torture is a technique...not an extreme expression of lawless rage" (1979:33).

Foucault (1979) outlined three criteria within the corporal mode of discipline to intensify power/knowledge over the criminal and, to a broader extent, society. These criteria assert that corporal punishment must produce a certain degree of pain such that it is measurable and calculated in its exactness; that it mark the victim, thus branding him or her with infamy; and that it be spectacular, allowing all to see the ordeal as a triumph for the sovereign and law (Foucault, 1979:33).

Through these specific aims, corporal punishment uses the individual to increase the power/knowledge field within a social system. Through using the first criterion, the production of calculated body pain, power over the body of a malefactor produces an increase of knowledge. This might be best explained through an example. By torturing a suspect, information (or knowledge) can be gathered about other criminals or a confession can be obtained. Principles such as these have been cited in modern texts as can be found in
the S-21 Interrogator's Manual:

The purpose of torturing is to get their responses. It's not something we do for the fun of it. Thus, we must make them hurt so that they will respond quickly. (Crelinsten and Schmid, 1995:35)

Foucault's second and third criteria address the use of the marked body to affect the social mind. Torture seeks to inscribe social power upon the corpus of the malefactor. This is done within the contexts of the public spectacle for all to see. These inscriptions serve as symbols of power and mark not only the body of the condemned but the minds of onlookers. Social control or power over society is achieved through terrific visual symbols of power. Foucault (1979:49) states:

The ceremony of punishment, then, is an exercise of terror...to make everyone aware, through the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign. The public execution did not re-establish justice; it reactivated power.

As Foucault (1979) continued his analysis of the European penal system he traced an historical trajectory whereby punishment shifted in a way that allowed power/knowledge to increase within the social body through evolving institutions and new techniques of discipline. By the early 1800's, many of society's basic organizations and bureaucracies emerged as distributors and integrated channels of power, allowing social discipline to become less corporal but more intrusive. Ways of achieving social compliance also similarly developed within social organizations. Much like the prison, many other
institutions sought to regulate and mould the individual into a "productive" citizen. Foucault (1979:228) asks, "is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?" (also see Ignatief, 1978).

In terms of developing disciplinary techniques, many institutions proceeded to implement such things as increased surveillance, rigid training and normalizing the individual through examinations. Foucault (1979:178) produces a number of other examples as to how these institutions set forth to better regiment, normalize, discipline and punish the individual:

The workshop, the school, the army were subject to a whole micro-penalty of time (lateness, absences, interruptions of tasks), of activity (inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of behaviour (impoliteness, disobedience), of speech (idle chatter, insolence), of the body ("incorrect" attitudes, irregular gestures, lack of cleanliness), of sexuality (impurity, indecency).

The end goal of integrated institutional discipline and punishment was to penetrate deeper into the social body, while accomplishing a more subtle and latent presence. This allowed power to intensify, as well as broaden, so that more citizens were regulated at a more efficient level. In terms of discipline, power no longer visibly manifested itself on the marked tortured corpus of the malefactor (as in pre-modern times), but instead power attempted to attain a character of omnipresence. Foucault (1979:81) states that what was needed was a "homogeneous circuit capable of
operating everywhere." By relocating power away from the inscribed body into the deepest recesses of the social, with all its relations, conflicts and institutions, the aim of power was "not to punish less, but to punish better" (Foucault, 1979:82).

The relocation of discipline in modern society, from the body of the convict to a web of interacting social structures, was linked by many disciplinary theorists (Ignatieff, 1978; Linebaugh, 1992; and Rusche & Kischheimer, 1968), to a shift in the mode of production. Rusche and Kischheimer contended that "every system of production tends to discover punishments which correspond to its productive relationships" (1968:5). Thus, they proposed that sanctions centered upon the body were widely used and available during the feudal epoch as punishments of death helped to reduce an overpopulated labour force. In addition, Rusche and Kischheimer (1968) asserted that since the malefactor usually had no money or property to forfeit for a crime, the body became the only possession accessible to the state to levy a punishment.

With the development and growth of 18th century capitalism came the increase of money and property among the upper and middle classes. This set the stage for a new and necessary mode of punishment suitable for the economic situation at hand. This situation called for law not to only be a defender of rights and the sovereign but
increasingly of property and goods (Ignatieff, 1978). In essence, as property and capital accumulated within the bourgeois and middle classes, sovereign law (which mostly dealt with capital offenses) evolved into bourgeois law (which concerned itself mostly with the regulation and protection of personal assets). Thus, with the new emphasis on property as the object of law came a new system of discipline necessary to protect the economic stakes of the upper and middle classes (Ignatieff, 1978). Yet this new disciplinary mode had to remain subtle enough as to not aggravate class conflict.

The basis of capitalism itself helped to provide bourgeois law with effective control over society while also diminishing class conflict. The appeal of capitalism was that it basically allowed a worker to freely sell his or her labour to an employer for a term acceptable to the employee. Because of these new ideologies of freedom and the guarantee to every citizen of the right to acquire and protect personal property, capitalist statutes put forth the idea of equality for all before the law. But in truth, new law only served those who owned property, the bourgeois class. Essentially, class conflict was more latent but still present as Foucault (1979:86) explains:

With the new forms of capital accumulation, new relations of production and the new legal status of property, all the popular practices that belonged, either in a silent, everyday, tolerated form, or in a violent form, to the illegality of rights were reduced by force to an illegality of property... the
The economy of illegalities was restructured with the development of capitalist society. The illegality of property was separated from the illegality of rights. This distinction represents a class opposition...

Furthermore, the shifting mode of production not only changed the focus of law, but subsequently a wider range of criminals appeared to be the subject of statutes. Because property became the new center-piece of law, criminal prosecution of the lower classes increased dramatically (Ignatieff, 1978). As a consequence, the focus of legislation was no longer the murderer or rapist but the thief, the highwayman, the pickpocket, and the fraud.

This wider range of criminality, Ignatieff (1978) asserts, was undoubtedly generated from the creation of a free labour market. Within the capitalist framework ties between the worker and master, as found in the practice of apprenticeship, were loosened. Once a worker was able to sell his or her labour through a contractual arrangement a situation developed whereby traditional employer supervision disappeared leaving a wage earner without supervision at the end of a work day and during winter off-season months. Because of this economic arrangement, much of the wage earning population was without an income during parts of the year. Unemployed, unsupervised, and therefore undisciplined by a paternalist master, released workers were left only the option of thievery. Under pressure from a middle class that requested a secure, stable society, the state itself became responsible for the discipline of the beggar and thief.
Yet typical harsh punishments of the pre-1800's, prescribing such penalties as death and transportation, seemed cruel not only in the eyes of the law reformers but for society in general. As a result of the shift in the object of law and the criminal, a new mode of discipline and punishment began development early in nineteenth century. It is here that Foucault (1979) and Ignatieff (1978) place the prison as the preferred means to punish. Gaols sought to reform the malefactor through prayer and scheduled regimentation, attempting to produce a more sociable and docile citizen. This goal spread out to other social institutions, expanding control to all levels of society.

Therefore, theorists suggest that early in the 1800's, the power/knowledge field of control shifted to allow discipline to deeper penetrate the social body. Discipline no longer manifested itself in the tortured body of the condemned but within the institutional framework of society. The school, army, factory, and the prison were all closely developed as each embodied the disciplinary ideologies of obedience and respect for hierarchy. Ignatieff (1979:184) conveys these thoughts in the following:

A fundamental contradiction lay at the heart of English agrarian society in the period of the Industrial Revolution. Its rulers wanted it to be both capitalist and stable, traditionalist and hierarchical...they advocated an economy which implied mutually antagonistic classes, but did not want it to disrupt a society of ordered ranks.

It is in this context that the introduction of the treadwheel, the silent system, and the bread and water diet should be located. The strictness of
these new measures reflected the desires of magistrates and politicians in the 1820's to restore an older, nostalgically remembered social stability in a market economy.

This stabilizing shift in discipline attempted to regiment the individual and subjugate him or her to the hegemony of the ruling capitalist classes. In essence, the capitalist mode of production called for a new form of discipline that not only monitored criminal activity but subtly coerced all in society to submit to the capitalist ideology of hard work and complacency towards authority. Foucault states:

...it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection... the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjective body." (Foucault, 1979:25).

The carceral mode of punishment serves the modern-capitalist mode of production by outputting productive, law abiding citizens without the use of extreme force.

World-Systems Theory

Disciplinary theories regarding the historical transition of punishment are convincing but problematic when applied to the modern context. Some of these theories have suggested purely economical arguments, stating that a shift in discipline corresponded to a shift in the mode of
production (to capitalism). Yet many modern capitalist societies still experience phases of corporal punishment. Therefore, this thesis turns to the world-capitalist system itself for possible answers as to why corporal punishment re-emerges in modernized nations. More specifically, this research will utilize the world-systems approach, as developed by Immanuel Wallerstein and his associates, to better understand how the world-system may influence a nation's internal processes at a particular time.

According to Amin, Arrighi, Frank and Wallerstein (1990), the world-capitalist economy has been in a process of continuing evolution since the sixteenth century. The world-system itself is a social system and can be characterized as a total structure whereby any and all parts are interdependent and interactive with each other. Since the system is self-contained, all competitive action and reaction within it leaves the system in a constant state of flux, causing the location and intensity of economic activity to continuously change (Wallerstein, 1979).

With these general propositions in place, it makes sense that any analysis of a nation or geographical area cannot truly be accurate without first understanding its position in the world-system at a particular time of

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* Foucault is an exception to this statement. Foucault's arguments are less economic than they are social. For Foucault, the shift in the mode of production (from feudal to capitalist) is only one aspect of a society moving from pre-modern to modern status.
interest. Amin et al. (1982:9) forward this analytical stance by stating:

We believe that we cannot make an intelligent analysis of the various states taken separately without placing their so-called internal life in the context of the world division of labor, located in the world-economy. Nor can we make a coherent analysis that segregates "economic," "political," and "social" variables.

Furthermore, when working within the guidelines of the world-systems approach, we should accept the proposition that any zone, whether it be a community, city, province or country, is limited in its choices of action by the system itself. Since all economic, social and political zones compete for dominance of the system, it follows that a particular state will always have outer forces acting upon it. This in itself allows for only a limited range of mobility and choice. Wallerstein (in Blomstrom & Hettne, 1984:190) explains this relationship in the following:

All systemic analysis denies the real autonomy of parts of a whole. It is not that there are not particularities of each acting group. Quite the contrary. It is that the alternatives available for each unit are constrained by the framework of the whole, even while each actor opting for a given alternative in fact alters the framework of the whole.

The mode of operation the world-system appears to undertake seems to be dialectical, one of constant action-adjustment-reaction. The ability of any particular state to manipulate the system depends on its relative hierarchical power on the capitalist market. Wallerstein (1979) states:

Within a world-economy, the state structures function
as ways for particular groups to affect and distort the functioning of the market. The stronger the state machinery, the more its ability to distort the world market in favor of the interests it represents. Core states have stronger state machineries than peripheral states.

The world-system then appears to have evident spatial/geographic implications, such that as each zone attempts to manipulate the world-system, the locus of economic activity and relative strength of each zone changes. But the system as a whole is also subject to temporal cycles (both long and short term) that affect all zones at each moment (Wallerstein, 1979 and 1983; Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1982). Wallerstein and others have identified regular fluctuating supply and demand trends as short term cycles, while long term cycles reflect large intervals of "expansion" and "stagnation" in the world-system, sometimes lasting for decades (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1982).

The importance of the longer type cycles is crucial, since often during periods of "transition" from expansion to stagnation (or vice-versa) the position of any country in the world-system can change dramatically. As a result, Wallerstein and Hopkins (1982:67) have concluded that "periods of transition are marked by particularly acute expressions of class conflict and repression, particularly in peripheral areas." The most recent transition into a cycle of stagnation has been identified as beginning in 1967 with the decline in post-World War II United States
hegemony, and lasting well into the late 1980's (Amin, Arrighi, Frank and Wallerstein, 1982; Harris, 1986). This particular world level transition is of particular importance to this research, since global, economic stagnation likely affected the internal dynamics of Argentina between 1969-1979.

Prior to analysing the Argentine case, one should be familiar with Argentina's relative socio-economic circumstances. Argentina's economic development leading up to 1969 had demonstrated a high level of industrialization, modernization, and capitalist inclusion into the world market.

In addition to economic advances, Argentine society had a high level of technical skill, education, public bureaucratization, and media exposure. Formal political structures were developed upon democratic lines and political interests were voiced through a great number of organizations and parties.

Lastly, Argentine law reflected a sophisticated and modern society by demonstrating formality, fairness, regularity and security as found in a Constitution. In general, Argentina's legal system was similar to Canada's and the United States', although some slight deviations were present. For example, a suspect could be held incommunicado for up to eight days, and details of a case could be suppressed from ten to twenty days (Carrío, 1989). Examples of constitutional legality can be reviewed within the selections of Appendix 1.

All aforementioned modern characteristics developed in a gradual fashion. The Argentine social, legal and political structures were influenced by the nation's European
heritage, and affordable through economic prosperity. In fact, up to 1950, Argentina's viability on the world market, continuously improved, therefore bettering social life in the nation, and minimizing class conflict. Yet after 1950 to the beginning of this analysis, the productivity of the Argentine economy within the world market generally declined. As a result by 1969 real threats to Argentina's internal stability were evident and operating.

Chronology of Presidents:
June 29, 1966 -- June 17, 1970: Gen. Juan Carlos Onganía
March 26, 1971 -- May 24, 1973: Gen. Alejandro Lanusse

The Argentine Economy

Beginning in 1966, the principal economic goals of the Argentine military government were "the rapid modernization and restructuring of the country's productive system and the achievement of a more competitive insertion in the world economy" (Smith, 1989:60). From 1966 to 1969, extensive government involvement had allowed high increases in the concentration and centralization of capital, the majority of which belonged to foreign investors (O'Donnell, 1988; Gillespie, 1982). As a result, the economy continued to perform well as "inflation was down, growth up and the currency was stable" (Erra, 1993:52). This success depended on three major factors: 1) the performance of Argentina's agricultural exports, used to finance the industrial project; 2) the continued subordination of labour to the industrial bourgeoisie; and 3) the subordination of small and medium sized domestic industries to large transnational capital.

It is during 1969 that the economic prosperity Argentina had enjoyed from industrialization began to
reverse (Norden, 1996). Economic policy stressed a reliance on Argentine exports as well as heavy borrowing to help create an industrial sector capable of self-sufficiency and competitiveness on the world market. But, heavy borrowing caused Argentina's foreign debt to become overwhelming. Peralta Ramos (1992:59) best explains what occurred:

The increase in imports over the period could not be balanced by the increase in exports, and as could have been foreseen, the ensemble of subsidies to production in the more capital-intensive branches had an adverse effect on state finances and the foreign debt.

The burden of this debt thwarted increases in Argentine profits as payments exceeded surpluses (Norden, 1996). With this situation the domestic economic sectors who had financed the industrial project over the years were unable to receive promised financial benefits from the industrial plan (Smith, 1989). Throughout 1966 to 1969, the agricultural sector endured steep taxes and export tariffs to offset profits from currency devaluations while labour bore wage freezes as well as political exclusion. Policies such as these directly transferred finance out of the agricultural and labour sectors and into industry (Peralta Ramos, 1992).

Until 1969 both the labour and agricultural sectors did not place any sufficient political or economic pressure upon the Argentine state despite a consistent loss of income. But as the Argentine economy slipped into a recession the agricultural and industrial elite made a political split and
labour rose up in violent protest (beginning with the Cordobazo)." By the end of 1969, social and political "instability resulted in capital flight and defensive actions on the part of all economic actors" (Erro, 1993:64).

Internationally isolated (by world-capital investment) and facing an internal crisis, Argentine economic policy in 1970 deserted the industrial project for a nationalist platform. This was an attempt to win domestic political approval (Pion Berlin, 1989). Despite having little financial resources, the government extended concessions to every economic sector, attempting a truce rather than developing efficient policy (Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), 1971:(4)). This only worsened the situation.

From 1970 until May of 1973 foreign reserves persistently dropped, reflecting Argentina's dwindling position in the world market (EIU, 1970:(1); 1971:(1); 1972:(2)). The continued flight of foreign capital coupled with a poor balance of trade' contributed considerably to

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6 The Cordobazo was a social explosion that occurred in the industrial city of Cordoba, May of 1969. The incident was spurred on by rank and file labour and students, and was eventually quelled through troop deployment. The Cordobazo is significant because it was the catalyst for the instability Argentina experienced throughout the 1970's.

7 Export levels during the period reached record highs even though agricultural exports of beef and grains were well below potential. Because agricultural exports declined and industrial imports increased during the period, Argentina suffered a poor but positive balance of trade in 1970 and 1972 (79 and 28 million dollars respectively), and incurred a loss during 1971 (128 million dollars). (EIU, 1972:(1); 1973:(4)14)
Argentina's world market decline. By 1972, the cost of living skyrocketed, and the Argentine economy was caught in an inflationary tailspin. The Quarterly Economic Review of Argentina (EIU, 1972:(3)1) best described Argentina's predicament by the end of 1972:

Economic policy lacks a consistent political base, business confidence is at a low ebb and the economic outlook is gloomy. The government does not appear to be able to control the ever-growing fiscal deficit and the rate of inflation continues to soar unabated.

The Labour Movement

The success of Argentina's economy by 1967 can partly be attributed to the many sacrifices endured by the wage earning sectors throughout the 1960's (Pion Berlin, 1989). By 1969, government and industrial initiatives allowed inflation to eat away at working-class real wages, dropping them below 1966 levels (Smith, 1989). In general, economic recovery was well on its way but labour itself did not prosper from the revival.

While catering to the needs of industry, Onganía's economic policy antagonized labour up to 1969 (Peralta Ramos, 1992). Policy focused on increasing transnational capital to develop new industry as well as cutting government spending through the elimination of numerous state-sector jobs.

* The annual increase in the cost of living for 1969 was estimated at 12.7%. Through gradual increases, by 1972 it was estimated at 64.1%. (EIU, 1971(4):12)
Layoffs of government employees aroused white-collar militancy throughout the late 1960's. Throughout 1967 to 1969, white-collar, state-employed unionists were the most active in opposing government initiatives. This militancy contributed to the radicalization of hourly workers in the industrial sector who had also been experiencing steady declines as a result of the military's industrial project (Smith, 1989).

From its onset in 1966, the Onganía regime produced substantial anti-labour legislation, such as a three year wage freeze enacted in 1967, laws making easy the 'intervention' of maverick unions and mandatory arbitration to preclude strikes (Smith, 1989). Other tactics included the repression of labour demonstrations, conciliation through small wage increases, and keeping the General Confederation of Labour (CGT) politically immobile through cooption.

By 1969, Argentine rank and file employees were generally disgusted with the erosion in real wages, the inability of the CGT to acquire improvements in working-class benefits, the influx of foreign multinational companies dominating the industrial sector and a growing preference among union officials to substitute militancy for

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The word "intervene" or "intervention" refers to the replacement of upper managers in an organization or institution by government appointed officials (see Moyano, 1995:18). This is strictly an Argentine concept.
bargaining (Hodges, 1988). Peralta Ramos (1992: 45,50) sums this argument well in the following:

Indeed, the loss of wage-negotiating power on the part of the union bosses, and their capitulation to the political project of the 1966 military coup, generated a growing opposition on the part of the labor rank and file to union leaders...by abandoning strikes and national work stoppages, and harassing the more combative labor activists, the union bosses only provoked an unprecedented radicalization within the labor movement.

Labour radicalization eventually organized into a rebel faction within the CGT known as CGT de los Argentinos (CGT-A). The CGT-A was highly instrumental in sparking an explosive social challenge against the military regime during and shortly after the Cordobazo. A number of factors made the CGT-A a volatile organization by 1969.

First, its early rank and file membership consisted of hostile state-sector employees deeply affected by government cuts to services (Smith, 1989). Second, its clasista ideology ran directly counter to the regime as it advocated militancy, anti-imperialism, popular government, class confrontation and nationalism (Hodges, 1988). Third, the CGT-A was well rooted in industrialized cities such as Cordoba and Rosario far from the center of CGT command in Beunos Aires (Smith, 1989). This provided rank and file members autonomy from co-opted union bureaucrats and the element of surprise in staging rallies.

The Cordobazo occurred on May 29, 1969. Beginning as a student and labour demonstration led by the CGT-A, it
quickly transformed into a major riot joined by citizens from all classes (Smith, 1989). Indeed, the middle class, small business, agro-export, professionals and students had, like labour, been agitated by the deteriorating politico-economic conditions (Moyano, 1996). Each sector, since 1966, had made considerable sacrifices to finance the industrial project without having any effective political input (Pion Berlin, 1989).

Following the Cordobazo, the number of social protests and labour strikes increased dramatically (Smith, 1989; Hodges, 1988; Pion-Berlin, 1989). Labour militancy peaked in October and November of 1970 as a series of three general strikes occurred and reached an 80-95% absentee count (EIU, 1971:(1)6). Furthermore, each new labour demonstration had a greater propensity to transform into a spontaneous violent social protest (Peralta Ramos, 1992). By 1972, factory occupations, open-ended strikes and hostage takings became more frequent, and with the upsurge in guerrilla terrorism (beginning in 1970) the political and economic sectors were all but crippled (ibid).

Labour's effectiveness in mass spontaneous strikes and demonstrations allowed for sharp wage increases between 1969 and 1973. Although this does represent successive victories won by labour, these wage increases did not in fact better working-class living conditions. Between 1969 and 1972, wage increases never outpaced the cost of living as they
were always absorbed by higher prices for products. This push-pull relationship sent the Argentine economy into an inflationary spiral which continuously replenished the discord directed by society toward the military regime.

By the end of 1972, the character of the Argentine labour movement had changed dramatically since its pre-1969 status. Rank and file mobilization replaced the historical reliance of workers upon the union bureaucratic elite. Free from the binding hierarchical structure of union organization, rank and file labour stimulated unorganized, random popular mobilization throughout the country.

The Guerrilla Movement

It wasn't until after the Cordobazo in May of 1969, that organized domestic terrorism began to emerge as a new mode of protest in Argentine society (O'Donnell, 1988; Erro, 1993). Although guerrilla groups had been in the early making since 1968, all organizations mainly concentrated on training and resource accumulation until the beginning of 1970.

By 1970, four major and two minor guerrilla organizations had become actively known. The major

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10 For example, in 1970 the Argentine state granted a 14% wage increase while the yearly figure for the Cost of Living (COL) reached 23%. By 1972, a general wage increase of 15% was matched to a year-end 64.1% raise in the COL. (Quarterly Economic Review of Argentina, 1971.(4):12; 1972.(2):6; 1973.(1):6.)
organizations were known as the Montoneros, Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), and Peronist Armed Forces (FAP), while the Descamisados and Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL) remained short lived minor groups (Moyano, 1996). All factions did contribute to the armed struggle, but particular attention should be given to the Montoneros since their organization went beyond terrorism to develop into a political and social movement.

Much like the CGT-A had developed out of radicalized labour, the guerrilla movement found its roots in a young and radical middle class (Peralta Ramos, 1992). Financial losses, mixed with depletions in political and cultural autonomy, pushed the majority of middle class youth towards the national populist movement by 1970 (Gillespie, 1982; Hodges, 1988). Denied political representation and cultural freedom (through media censorship and tight control over university curricula), guerrilla warfare against a repressive regime made sense to many of the middle strata. And although each guerrilla organization adhered to different political and strategic ideologies, all operated under the basic tenets of nationalism, anti-imperialism and the struggle for a revolutionary government (Erro, 1993).

In 1969 guerrilla operations begun with only a handful of combatants. Moyano (1996:102) speculates that in 1969 approximately 120 terrorists functioned inside Argentina, with one third of this population working within the
Montonero organization.

Before 1970, most guerrilla operations focused on resource accumulation and the destruction of transnational capital (Smith, 1989). By concentrating on the occupation of factories, schools and small towns as well as bombing foreign owned property, terrorists made the government appear weak to both investors and the already volatile Argentine society (Gillespie, 1982).

In May 1970, the Montoneros received full publicity for the sensationalized abduction of ex-president Pedro Eugenio Aramburu. This not only attracted public awareness of the guerrillas, but increased the military's response. Having suffered incredible losses due to a botched operation at La Calera, the Montoneros were all but eliminated by government forces by August 1970. As a result the Montoneros remained relatively inactive for the remainder of the year and shifted the focus of their movement. It is during this time that the Montoneros utilized their new found popularity to begin making political allies and rebuild their armed units (Gillespie, 1982).

The Montonero leadership sought consolidation both with society and other political organizations. In appealing to the everyday citizen, the Montoneros did not preach political, ideological or class differentiations. Instead, the organization took a nationalist stance identifying with all Argentines struggling for a popular government and
social justice. By mid-1971 the Montoneros began extending to other organizations as they initiated talks with the Peronist Youth (JP), militant unionists and other terrorist commandos (Gillespie, 1982).

Throughout 1971 the Montoneros regained their capacity to sustain sufficient armed propaganda as well as increase the popularity of their movement (Moyano, 1995). By mid-1972 Montonero political activity flourished as the organization publicly endorsed Perón to lead a popular revolution. By this time the Montoneros had accumulated enormous sums of arms and finance, and were able to draw 100,000 supporters to Peronist-Montonero demonstrations (Gillespie, 1982).

By the end of 1972, the guerrilla forces numbered about 600 (Moyano, 1995:103). The total terrorist acts for the period 1969 to May 1973 had reached 1,759 (ibid:56). Attacks during this period were widespread, involving almost all provinces within the country, especially Buenos Aires, Cordoba, and Santa Fe (Moyano, 1995:52). Most attacks took the form of bombings (48.61%) while the remainder generally targeted property and the theft of arms (ibid:56). In an effort to remain unalienated from the public, only 7.34% of rebel attacks involved murder during this period (Moyano, 1995:56). Indeed, until May 1973, the guerrillas did maintain public support (O'Donnell, 1988).
Phase of Punishment and Social Control

The Onganía regime (1966-1970) has been characterized by Skidmore and Smith (1989) as the most repressive government in Argentine history up to that point. The goals of the regime included a complete transformation of Argentina's economy, political system and society. Argentina's economic transformations and subsequent failures have already been accounted. Therefore it is the purpose of this section to, 1) outline the methods of social control used by the regime and, 2) characterize the phase of punishment for the period 1969-1973.

i) social control through legality and consent

At the onset of 1969, the Argentine democratic political apparatus had long been disassembled and restructured to provide a bureaucratic-authoritarian type system (O'Donnell, 1988). In "depoliticizing" society, provincial and national legislatures were closed, political parties were banned, Supreme Court judges were dismissed, and many pre-1966 upper and middle level bureaucrats as well as technocrats had been replaced (Smith, 1989).

Manipulation of the political structure by a military government was not uncommon to Argentine history, but perhaps the most distinct characteristic of this period was the creation of policies that attempted to transform Argentine values, culture and society. Developed early in
1966 by the regime, these policies reflected a sacred mission on the part of Ongania to change a "decadent" society into a Christian nation (Lernoux, 1980). Moyano (1995:18) describes the situation throughout the period:

Ongania genuinely believed he had the sacred duty to reshape and remoralize his country. The Argentine population might have remained indifferent, just as it had when political activity was banned, were it not for the fact that the government's crusade... appeared grotesquely medieval to a nation obsessed with replicating the latest European fads and cultural patterns.

This crusade was generally known as the "onslaught of culture" and throughout the late 60's until 1973 it particularly targeted the middle class (Moyano, 1995:18). The focus of the onslaught was morality and communism. Thus, cultural hot spots, (theatres, cafes, ill-lit night clubs) were watched and sometimes closed for indecency or subversion (Moyano, 1993; Gillespie, 1982). Censorship committees were in charge of press releases, as well as television and radio programming (Moyano, 1993). Some newspapers were even closed for leftist reporting or political satire.11

The crusade also sought to transform the education system. The eight national universities had been placed under strict military control since the 1966 coup leaving student political activity banned, and student rallies

11 For example, a broadly circulated magazine called Tia Vicenta was closed down by the regime for a satirical cartoon of Ongania as a walrus (Graham-Yooll, 1984).
illegal and often put down with force (Gillespie, 1982). Academic curricula had been cleansed of political and free thought, and a campaign against "morally lax" scholars left many educators threatened or often expelled (Erro, 1993). Gillespie (1982:63) characterizes these educational reforms:

In theory a drive against "communist infiltration" in practice an assault on academic freedom and an attempt to reform higher education in the interests of the dominant economic groups.

These policies persisted throughout 1969-1973, but along with these came an increase of legislation curbing the upsurge of terrorism and social protest from 1970 onward. For example, in 1970 the death penalty was reinstated for acts of kidnapping and terrorism (North American Congress on Latin America, 1975), and in 1971, the Law for the Repression of Terrorism was passed to confront radicals within the civil service, school system, and other middle class sectorial groups (Smith, 1989).

In 1971, court and prison reforms were enacted to fight terrorism. A federal court system was created in order to indict those individuals who had committed crimes in numerous provinces. Under the old provincial structure, information and indictments could not be shared between independent regional courts (Moyano, 1995). Between May, 1971 and May, 1973 the use of judicial reform paired with harsher legislation allowed the regime to imprison 600 suspected terrorists while many more awaited trial (Norden, 1996:42).
Penal reform included the creation of maximum security prisons (Moyano, 1995). Prior to 1971, the Argentine criminal code never included political prisoners in its categorization of detainees. Guerrillas listed within the "political prisoner" classification were kept separate from common criminals at Rawson Prison (Moyano, 1995). A consequence of this policy was that it allowed communication and new networks to form between guerrillas while serving their sentences.

ii) social control through illegality and coercion

There is evidence that between 1969-1973 violence was used as a means of social control by Argentine security forces. Two types of violence occurred: 1) state endorsed repression used to disperse riots, and 2) violence against individuals for political beliefs and/or actions (but not state endorsed).

The use of repression to quell social unrest is well documented throughout 1969-1973. The Cordobazo (1969), Rosariazo (1969), the second Cordobazo (1971), Mendozazo (1972) and the Rocazo (1972) were all dispersed through para-military force (Hodges, 1988). Violence in these instances was used momentarily to regain control. Momentary, violent confrontations used in specific instances do not reflect a fully developed and homogeneous new phase of punishment.
Violence against individuals suspected of guerrilla sympathies or activities did occur between 1969 and 1973. Death squad activity had existed throughout the period and there is evidence that these groups were staffed partly or wholly by active members of security forces (Moyano, 1995). These groups were self initiated and there is no evidence that the upper echelons of government ordered the operations of these squads during this time period (Gillespie, 1982). Supporting this claim, Norden (1996:43) states that between 1969 to 1973, "the government's mode of combatting guerrilla warfare remained primarily legal and non-violent".

Between 1966 and 1973 there was a daily average of 0.13 death squad assaults, providing a total of 205 extra-legal attacks from 1969 to May 1973 (Moyano, 1995:78; Norden, 1996:75). These figures, when compared to the periods 1973-1976 and 1976-1979, are minimal (as will be seen). Attacks were initiated by private groups and assaults usually involved bombing the property of suspected left-wing activists or sympathizers. Very few attacks involved murder (Norden, 1996).

In light of the preceding discussion, discipline in Argentina from 1969-1973 remained within the contexts of a Carceral mode. Non-violence, the use of institutional means, and legality (procedures of arrest, trial, conviction and sentencing) are principal indicators of the carceral mode. Indeed, both terrorists and common criminals, were
officially expected to be handled through the carceral means just stipulated. Evidence supporting this claim has been put forth by Moyano (1995:106) as her research indicates that 90.02% of guerrilla losses were due to capture and imprisonment. There were some exceptions to the general practices of carceral mode discipline, since some minimal death squad activity did occur as well as police brutality during a suspect's first days in custody (Carrio, 1989). Yet these instances were not patterned and extreme violence causing death or mutilation was not endorsed by state leaders during the period.
Phase 2: The Transitional Phase of Discipline and Death
Squad Activity (May, 1973 to March, 1976)

Chronology of Presidents:
July 15, 1973--October 11, 1973: Raúl Lastiri
October 12, 1973--June 30, 1974: Juan Domingo Perón
July 1, 1974--March 23, 1976: Isabel Perón

The Argentine Economy

Entering 1973, the Argentine economy was paradoxical. A sizeable positive balance of trade was expected, yet inflation at the end of 1972 was at 64.1% (EIU, 1973:(1)). The price-wage spiral continued to accelerate and by May of 1973 inflation was at 50.0% with an expected yearly average of 80% (EIU, 1974:(1)).

Shortly after taking office on May 25, 1973, elected Peronist president Héctor Cámpora introduced the Act of National Compromise, also known as the Social Pact, to battle the chaotic economy. The pact was a formal truce between the CGT (labour), the CGE (domestic business) and the Argentine government. It boosted wages while freezing commodity prices, introduced domestic market protectionism and encouraged growth through income redistribution and increased consumption (Pion Berlin, 1989; Hodges, 1988; EIU, 1975:(3)).

The financial burden of the Social Pact fell upon the Argentine business community and international industrialists (Erro, 1993). While companies accepted a
commodity price freeze, wage earners were awarded an across
the board pay increase of 16% (Peralta Ramos, 1993:64). As
expected, profits diminished under this policy and as a
result, the level of international and domestic investment
slowly decreased throughout the period (EIU, 1975:(3)).

By the end of 1973, the Argentine economy had made a
considerable turn-around. This resulted from the initial
performance of the Social Pact and successful world trade.
Inflation quickly decelerated as the year-end cost of living
reached 43.8% (EIU, 1974:(1)5). This is a noteworthy
achievement as inflation actually decreased from May to

The balance of trade for the year reached $960 million
due to import decreases and excellent profits in both the
beef and grains markets (EIU, 1974:(2)10). Good beef and
grain profits were due to elevated world demand and high
prices (ibid). Yet despite success in these agricultural
sectors, production of beef and grains were well below
potential capacity. This would deeply affect the Argentine
economy in the following year.

Entering 1974, the economy looked as though it had the
makings of an economic miracle. Success would depend on the
continuance of three major factors: good trade performance
on the world market; class cooperation through adherence to
the Social Pact; and control over internal dissent
(terrorism and social protest). By the end of 1974, control
over these three conditions ebbed.

Developments in the 1974 world economy coupled with internal agricultural problems hindered Argentina's balance of trade dramatically. Due to the OPEC oil crisis, petro-import prices increased sizeably and a general trend of world inflation occurred (Erro, 1993). As a result, Argentine imports during 1974 increased remarkably at a time when Argentine agricultural export revenues began to decrease (ibid). Droughts affecting grain harvests, inept production processes, and a ban on Argentine beef within the European Economic Community (EEC)\textsuperscript{12} were all contributors to the decline in Argentine export profits.

The probable effects of the world market on Argentina's sensitive economy were immediately noted as the Quarterly Economic Review (EIU, 1974:(2)1) reported that year:

If the rising trend of world prices continues there will be increased pressure on domestic prices and it is unlikely that the Social Pact will withstand the inevitable demands for wage and price increases.

As predicted, the Social Pact did begin to disintegrate in 1974 due to world inflationary pressure. Argentine businesses couldn't continue operating with increasing input costs while prices remained frozen, and by April, the Peronist government introduced a "flexible price" policy (Erro, 1993). This naturally allowed a push-pull effect to

\textsuperscript{12} The EEC was the largest consumer of Argentine beef, purchasing 70\% of Argentine beef exports (Gillespie, 1982:128)
occur between wages and commodity prices throughout 1974 and 1975.

The Argentine economy collapsed in 1975 resulting from a mismatch of domestic economic policy in light of world market conditions. The Social Pact had created an enormous disparity between Argentine prices and real world prices. This in effect, "bottled" latent inflationary pressure until 1975 when the Social Pact was completely abandoned (Pion Berlin, 1989).

In addition, the Social Pact had sought income redistribution for the working-class in a time when Argentine resources were scarce. Redistribution without resources led to increased public spending and a bulging budget deficit (Erro, 1993). The Argentine government attempted to deal with its deficit through printing an excess amount of currency (Pion Berlin, 1989).

Overprinting of currency decreased the value of the Argentine peso on the world market. With the peso worthless, trade performance poor and government spending increasing, proper servicing of the foreign debt had become an uphill battle since mid-1974. By the end of 1975 "Argentina was... on the brink of ceasing payments on its foreign obligations, thereby seriously endangering its ties to the international economy" (Smith, 1989:230).

Ending 1975, yearly inflation reached 334.8% while investment and trade surpluses remained low (EIU,
1976:(1)6). By the coup of March 1976, the Argentine economy lay in ruin as first quarter inflation reached an 800% yearly rate while the March figure alone predicted an annual figure of 17,000% (Bennett & Simpson, 1985:35; Smith, 1989:230).

The Labour Movement

Entering office in May 1973, the Peronist government's future success relied heavily upon quick and positive results from the Social Pact. Essential for a prosperous Pact was a strong and unified labour movement, subservient to the central leadership of the CGT (Smith, 1989). This was quite a task since sporadic rank and file mobilization during the period 1969-1973 had left the labour movement split, weak and disrupted by May of 1973 (Jelin, 1979).

The Peronist party was historically a pro-labour party. Thus, the Social Pact was believed to be and introduced as pro-labour legislation. But after the initial inducements of the Pact had quickly eroded away, it was obvious that labour did not benefit from the National Agreement. Receiving an initial 16% across the board wage increase labour agreed to: 1) decline requests for further wage increases; 2) have no wage motivated strikes; and 3) abandon collective bargaining for mandatory conciliation (Gillespie, 1982; Peralta Ramos, 1992:64).

Essentially, the accord halted labour mobility, as the
North American Congress on Latin America (1975:90) concluded that the Social Pact is not an agreement between workers and businessmen, dominated by workers, as it should be, and controlled by the government, but rather a tool to freeze the struggle of the working class.

Indeed, the Social Pact had been designed to impede labour requests for wage hikes. Control over wages was imperative to curb inflation. Yet, by centralizing the Pact on wage issues two consequences developed. First, because collective bargaining rights were surrendered in the Agreement, rank and file workers viewed union leaders as useless as they had no routes to vie for further concessions (Jelin, 1979). Second, since wage issues were unnegotiable, rank and file workers began to push for new demands at the in-plant level through independent rank and file formations (ibid). New issues were beyond CGT jurisdiction, and involved (for example) requests for improved working conditions, better social services and the reinstatement of sacked employees.

During May to October 1973, the number of disputes involving independent labour committees increased. During these disputes, many independent committees were recognized by the Ministry of Labour as legal formations despite the CGT being the official in-plant union. This allowed independent committees to forward more local level demands out of the jurisdiction of the CGT, which in turn, strengthened the in-plant committees while injuring the CGT
leadership's credibility in the eyes of workers (Jelin, 1979).

At the onset of Juan Perón's presidential term in October 1973, independent committees were at the peak of their existence. Reluctant to use physical repression, Perón employed labour legislation to weaken rank and file formations as well as unify the labour movement under the CGT. The Law of Professional Associations (1973), Law of Redundancy (1974), and Law of Compulsory Arbitration (1974) were all enacted for these purposes (Hodges, 1988). Under these laws, a national union could overturn local level decisions; deem any rank and file dispute illegal; intervene regional unions not complying with national union directives; fire excess personnel; and outlaw wage motivated strikes (Pion Berlin, 1993; Hodges, 1988).

Despite these legal measures, rank and file strikes throughout 1973-74 rose sharply. From the inception of the Peronist government to Perón's death in July 1974, Argentina experienced 39 labour strikes per month on the average (Pion Berlin, 1989:87). During this time, important and influential unions were able to negotiate voluntary, but not technically legal, supplementary wages (Erro, 1993).

Such increases openly defied and worked against the anti-inflationary measures of the Social Pact (which by mid-1974 had utterly failed). Rank and file militancy rose throughout the first half of 1974, pressuring the CGT
leadership to push for high wage increases (Jelin, 1979). Sizeable increases were granted in both May and November, but accelerated inflation caused average wages in December 1974 to fall below May 1972 levels (Peralta Ramos, 1992:64).

Isabel Perón inherited the presidency in July 1974. Facing a national crisis, she utilized repressive tactics to force compliance amongst labour's rank and file. First, a strict adherence to pre-mentioned labour legislation permitted the CGT to more frequently intervene against dissident unions, fire militants, prohibit wage motivated strikes and suspend the legal status of maverick unions (Jelin, 1979). Second, secret, para-military death squads, such as the Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (AAA) and Comando de Organización (C de O), developed to eliminate labour militants and repress labour activities (Pion Berlin, 1989). Peralta Ramos (1992:65) describes the aims of these squads:

Acting covertly, but having access to certain state resources... groups threw themselves into the savage repression, abduction, and murder of labor activists and Peronista militants. Conflicts in the factories and street demonstrations would suddenly be violently repressed by undercover "para-police" groups actually operating under state protection.

Both consensual and non-consensual tactics were effective. Between July and November 1974 the strike average had fallen to 11.6 per month (Pion Berlin, 1989:87). By August of that year, factory occupations had practically disappeared and between August and October, independent
unions as well as dissident leaders had been purged from the labour movement (Jelin, 1979; Pion Berlin, 1989).

With independent opposition to the CGT eliminated, the union leadership found itself bound by conflicting interests. The CGT was officially part of the Peronist government, while it also was responsible for making demands upon the state in favour of the rank and file it represented (Erro, 1993).

As inflation quickly ate away at working-class real wages in the first five months of 1975, the CGT leadership was pressured to lobby its own government for substantial wage increases during a time of limited resources (Smith, 1989). Hesitant to injure either labour or the government, the union did not mobilize its rank and file workers or officially denounce the state. CGT indecision steadily boosted worker hostility toward the union leadership and the state. Thus, rank and file mobilization grew but remained relatively contained until May 1975 (Jelin, 1979).

From June 1975 onward, all control over rank and file mobilization was lost (ibid). The deadline for a national agreement between the CGT and government had passed by May 31, public services and fuel had increased by 100% and the cost of living had increased in June and July by 71% and 35% respectively (Jelin, 1979:245). Although reluctant, Isabel Perón granted a 150% pay increase across the board to avoid a CGT-endorsed forty-eight hour strike scheduled for the end
of June (Smith, 1989).

From July 1975 until the coup of March 1976, the weakened Peronist government could do nothing to control labour's rank and file (Jelin, 1979). Because the rising cost of living never allowed real wages to increase, labour mobilization was constant (Smith, 1989). In this way a new type of labour militancy emerged much different from that of the previous period. First, conflicts occurred within the most highly industrialized cities of the nation, including Buenos Aires. Second, the most serious conflicts now occurred within the historically powerful and consolidated unions such as those belonging to the metallurgical and automotive sectors (Peralta Ramos, 1992).

The Guerrilla Movement

Between 1973-1976 two tendencies developed within the guerrilla movement; Movementalist and Alternativist (Gillespie, 1982). Near the beginning of the period, Movementalists, such as the Montoneros, gained legal incorporation into the political structure, attempting to win popular concessions through proper Peronist channels. Alternativists, such as the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), were reluctant to buy into the Peronist project from the outset and remained steadfast to the armed struggle. By mid-1974, the Movementalists had been completely driven out of the Peronist structure and quickly re-joined the
Alternativists in the armed confrontation. By the end of 1974 all guerrilla groups had joined either the Peronist Montoneros or Guevarist ERP (Hodges, 1988).

In May 1973, Peronist president elect Héctor Cámpora, who belonged to the radical left, passed a multitude of pro-civil liberalizing policies. This legislation permitted many of Onganía's anti-terrorist laws to be abolished, the Federal Police's "Department for Anti-Democratic Information" was closed with its files destroyed, and all political prisoners were immediately pardoned through an amnesty law (Hodges, 1988). As a result of amnesty, 371 guerrillas were released and permitted by law to organize (Moyano, 1995:34; Norden, 1995).13

Most noteworthy of Cámpora's government was its inclusion of the armed left into the Peronist power structure. Although greatly outnumbered by Peronist moderates, the Montoneros occupied seats at all state levels (Gillespie, 1982).

The Montoneros also emerged as the representative political body of the popular Peronist bases throughout 1973. This was, in part, due to a merger between the Montoneros and Peronist Youth (JP); the JP being the largest and most active Peronist political organization since the

13 40,000 protesters gathered outside Devoto prison on the eve of Cámpora's inaugural to pressure him into releasing all political prisoners (Moyano, 1995:35). Hastily, Cámpora complied.
1940's. Together, the JP-Montoneros increased their socio-political depth by parenting at least six other popular organizations, representing university and working youth (JUP, JTP, UES), women (AE) and the poor (MVP, MIP) (Hodges, 1988). This populist coalition became known as the Tendencia Revolucionaria or "Tendency".

Despite initial organizational inroads, the Montoneros were never able to sustain a strong leftist influence over the Peronist political structure. This was further reinforced upon Juan Perón's return in September 1973 as Perón quickly sided with the conservative elements in his movement (Deutsch & Dolkart, 1993). Since Perón had no intention of fulfilling his revolutionary promises, it was necessary for him to dispose of the armed left within and outside his movement. This included those JP-Montoneros already in the power edifice and the active guerrilla forces of the ERP (who had managed to perform 208 attacks between May and September 1973) (Moyano, 1995:36). The purge was carried out through a multifaceted approach using many structures and techniques. The military was utilized to hunt down the ERP (and later Montoneros), legislation was enacted, and death squads were developed to intimidate and eliminate the Tendency.

In September 1973 the ERP was outlawed and in January 1974 eight JP-Montonero federal deputies were forced to resign. That same month the JP boycotted a meeting with
Perón and members of the right-wing youth. The left's boycott showed withdrawal of support for the president, but an official break between the JP-Montoneros and Perón occurred during the 1974 May Day celebration. Although this break was evident, neither Perón or the JP-Montoneros declared an official armed war (Gillespie, 1982).

Juan Perón died July 1, 1974 allowing his wife Isabel Perón to ascend from the vice-presidency to the presidency. Immediately upon her taking of office the purging of the Peronist left within the Movement violently intensified (Norden, 1996). With the emergence of paramilitary squads, and the total exclusion of the Tendency from the Peronist political structure, the Montoneros officially returned to the armed struggle in September 1974 (Gillespie, 1982).

During 1974, 804 guerrilla operations occurred (Moyano, 1995:36). This increase can be attributed to a number of factors: 1) the Peronist left's loss of political inclusion; 2) the Montoneros' return to the offensive; and 3) provocative state violence toward the armed left, labour movement and student associations. By November 1974, the conflict had become so widespread that the government declared a state of siege (Hodges, 1988). This strengthened the war capabilities of the military, police and subsequently, the death squads.

The guerrillas by 1975 were at the peak of their struggle. Armed Montoneros numbered at approximately 5,000
and group effectiveness was enhanced through organizational changes. Regional zones were developed (to give the appearance of a nation-wide threat), safe houses and meeting places were created, print and munition shops as well as training facilities were constructed. In addition, military ranks were established and an intelligence division called the "Servicio de Informaciones Montoneros" was developed. Lastly, the Montoneros were well funded through their political fronts and a major kidnapping in February 1975 worth sixty million dollars (Gillespie, 1982).

During 1975 Argentine guerrillas tallied 723 attacks and were responsible for 179 military deaths (Moyano, 1995:36; Norden, 1996:59). As a result of this continuing upsurge, Isabel Perón requested military support in February 1975 and the Montoneros were outlawed in September of the same year (Hodges, 1988). ERP operations dropped off during 1975 as its rural cells were crushed in Tucumán and a botched operation at Monte Chingolo cost the ERP 100 combatants (Graham-Yooll, 1984). In addition, ERP combatants were easy targets for para-military death squads since every PRT member was also an ERP guerrilla.¹⁴

In general, guerrilla operations between May 1973 and March 1976 increased and took on a new character. During this period, the Argentine armed left performed 1,935

¹⁴ The Worker's Revolutionary Party (PRT) was the political branch of the PRT-ERP. All registered PRT members were in some way integrated into the armed ERP (Hodges, 1988:115).
operations (Moyano, 1995:56). Of these, a higher number of terrorist assaults were directed at people instead of property. Between 1969 and 1973, operations involving murder or kidnapping reached 12.09% while increasing to 32.09% between 1973 to 1976 (Moyano, 1995:50).

Also during the period, operations occurred in almost every province of the country. This gave the guerrillas an appearance of a wide-spread, national movement (Moyano, 1995:52). Attacks also tended to be more spectacular and larger in scale, involving twenty or more assailants at a time. Lastly, a higher number of assaults tended to target state security personnel. As a result, 248 Argentine security officers were murdered by guerrilla forces during the years 1973-1975 (Norden, 1996:59).

Overall, guerrilla organizations from May 1973 to March 1976 tended to be less politico-military (as they were prior to 1973) and increasingly militaristic (Moyano, 1995). Because the guerrillas abandoned their grassroots political work, concentrated solely on the warlike aspects of the revolution, and favoured human targets, societal perception and acceptance of the guerrillas changed to disfavour (Hodges, 1988).

In addition, most living in Argentina around 1975 only wanted a return to economic prosperity, social stability, and an end to widespread violence. The persistence of the guerrillas and their damaging affects upon Argentina as a
whole provoked a fair share of social dislike toward terrorism. In short, many Argentines may have not liked the performance of Isabel Peron's government, but many also knew the guerrillas were very much responsible for the economic and social decline. Social desperation and public disfavour of terrorism may have allowed the Argentine government greater, unchecked freedom in the creation of a clandestine repressive apparatus.

Phase of Punishment and Social Control

Along with the return of Peronist democratic rule in May 1973 came a heated conflict between differing Peronist factions. Immediately, competition to control the Peronist government occurred between the institutional left or "Tendency" (JP-Montoneros), the moderate right (the union leadership, the business community) and the ultra-right or hardliners.

The Tendency believed that the Peronist state would support populist interests based upon a multi-class coalition and socialist ideology. The left also believed Perón would reduce the level of international capitalist involvement within the economy and begin a policy of "independent capitalism" (Hodges, 1976:116). Perón's government did form a populist, multi-class alliance but under the same political and economic structures and leadership. Thus, Perón sided with the conservative,
moderate elements of his movement. This subsequently provoked an increase in ultra-left terrorism and public criticism from the Tendency.

From May 1973 to March 1976 new means were introduced by the Peronist government to control the leftist Tendency, labour, media, universities, and guerrilla forces. A definite shift in the phase of discipline occurred, as legal/consensual means of social control were amalgamated with illegal/non-consensual methods.

i) social control through legality and consent

Early in the Peronist incumbency, legislation was utilized to regulate volatile social sectors. As mentioned previously, the Social Pact (May, 1973), Law of Professional Associations (November, 1973), and the Law of Compulsory Arbitration (January, 1974) were all utilized to control the labour movement. The Law of Redundancy (January, 1974) was also used to fire undesireables in the labour movement and universities. Lastly, the ambiguous Act of Obligation to the National Security (January, 1974) empowered the Federal Minister of the Interior to remove any elected official for the sake of "national security" (Hodges, 1988).

Due to the gradual increases in terrorism throughout 1973-1976, harsher laws were enacted to eradicate guerrilla forces. In January 1974, Perón revised the Argentine Criminal Code through the Penal Reform Bill (Gillespie,
1982). Included in this legislation were twenty-one amendments that increased the maximum terms of imprisonment for political crimes such as kidnapping, arms and explosives manufacturing, armed assault, and inciting collective violence (Hodges, 1988).

In response to Montonero terrorism in September 1974, Isabel Perón initiated further legal and semi-legal mechanisms to aid security forces in combating the armed left. In November 1974 a "state of siege" was declared which empowered the Federal and local police forces with arbitrary arrest privileges (Gillespie, 1982). Thus, suspected guerrillas or leftist sympathizers were vulnerable to capricious arrests and indefinite detention. By October 1975, both the Montoneros and ERP\textsuperscript{15} were declared illegal and by December 1975 the Montoneros' political front, the Authentic Party (PA), was outlawed (Gillespie, 1982).

In October 1975, the military was given legal authority to "wipe out subversive elements in all parts of the country" by any means necessary (\textit{Buenos Aires Herald}, 1975a). This was granted through Decrees 2771 and 2772, signed by Isabel Perón (ibid). In addition, the National Council of Internal Security was created, during the same month, for immediate endorsement of any anti-subversion operations the military deemed necessary. This council also

\textsuperscript{15} The ERP was outlawed in September 1973 (Gillespie, 1984).
granted the military command over the Federal Police in the repression of terrorism (Hodges, 1988).

Accompanying the Law of Redundancy in January 1974 came the Law of the University to de-politicize education (Hodges, 1988). The act not only disallowed politics in the university but was used to dismiss staff or students engaging in political activity. Curricula were altered throughout 1974 propagating Peronism and denouncing previous military regimes (Erro, 1993). By October 1974, all sixteen national universities had been "purified" with fifteen of these institutions controlled by military administrators (Gillespie, 1982). By July 1975, 4,000 lecturers had been fired and 1,600 students imprisoned (ibid).

In terms of media control, Héctor Cámpora stated in June 1973 that "there will not be any censorship during my government" (La Nación, June 7, 1973 in Graham-Yooll, 1984:27). But by September 1973, the Peronist administration stressed self-censorship amongst reporters (Gillespie, 1982). One year later, the Anti-Subversive Law determined that any journalists or editors reporting information aiming at "altering or eliminating institutional order" were to be imprisoned for up to five years (Gillespie, 1982:190). This legislation whole-heartedly repressed reports about guerrilla groups or the police war against them. By the end of 1974 all television channels were controlled through a government link up; government run
radio stations were not allowed to play "leftist" singers; private radio and television stations were fined for ERP coverage; all communications were centralized through a new government agency; and advertising was regulated to minimize foreign commercials (Graham-Yooll, 1984). By August 1975 at least seven leftist publications had been closed, and the media were mainly used by the state as a propaganda tool (Gillespie, 1982; Hodges, 1988).

ii) social control through illegality and coercion

In January 1974, Juan Perón stated the following:

If we cannot depend on law, we shall have to do without it ourselves and apply direct sanctions, as they do...If we have no law, we shall take another route, and I assure them that, if we are forced to confront violence with violence, we have more means at our disposal to put it down, and we shall do so at any price...We shall proceed in accord with necessity, by whatever means. If there is no law, then we shall act outside the law, and we shall do so violently (Peralta Ramos, 1992:67).

In terms of social control, the most noteworthy attribute of the Peronist government was its introduction of illegal methods of discipline to supplement the Criminal Code. The highlight of this evolving phase of punishment was the emergence of paramilitary death squads operating through the Federal Police and organized by the Federal Ministry of Social Welfare under José López Rega.

Some evidence of armed right-wing activity can be found during Cámpora's incumbency although the actual development of police death squads should be linked to Juan Perón and
López Rega. Despite these origins, it wasn't until Isabel Perón's term of government that the death squads truly flourished in violence (Gillespie, 1982).

The squads themselves were composed of active and reactivated Federal police officers (Moyano, 1995). To remain free of official harassment, efforts were made to coordinate operations with local police precincts (Gillespie, 1982). Overall, the methods of these squads were at least as brutal as those employed by the guerrilla forces (Norden, 1996).

The objectives of the death squads were as follows: 1) to publish death lists of prominent figures (those in the arts, sciences or politics for example) and "invite" these individuals to leave the country; 2) attempt to control labour militancy through repression; and 3) to physically eliminate opponents of the regime (Moyano, 1995). It should be noted that while the military concentrated on the elimination of guerrilla forces in a semi-legal way, the death squads were set to eliminate all opponents of the regime by any means. Opponents, being a broad term, could mean reporters, educators, politicians, priests, etc.

Early evidence of death squad activity during the period May 1973 to March 1976 occurred at Ezeiza Airport in June 1973. At least sixteen people were killed and 433 were wounded when members of the C de O death squad fired upon the JP-Montonero masses awaiting the return of Perón
(Moyano, 1995:152; Hodges, 1976). Many of these gunmen were later identified as employees of the Federal Ministry of Social Welfare and Federal Police, which were respectfully controlled by Minister José López Rega and Chief Alberto Villar (Hodges, 1976).

The first official evidence of state involvement in death squad activity can be found in the Reserved Document (September 1973). This secret order was signed by Juan Perón and commanded security forces to make war against terrorists and Marxist subversives infiltrating the Movement (Gillespie, 1982). The first overt death squad was the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA) and it was officially launched November 21, 1973 during an assassination attempt on Radical Party Senator Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen (Gillespie, 1982).

Throughout 1974, death squad activity targeted all walks of life. Those of the theatre, cinema, sports world, press, university and political arena were all subject to threats and violence by right wing squads (Hodges, 1976). Yet throughout this period, paramilitary policies "were designed to curb the influence of the Peronist left and to establish an equilibrium with the Peronist right wing" (Hodges, 1988:110). This changed during Isabel Perón's presidential term.

Starting in July 1974, Executive restraint over paramilitary death squad activity diminished. Under the
influence of her ultra-right advisers, Isabel Perón sought to crush left wing activities altogether (Moyano, 1995). By September of 1974 over 200 individuals had been murdered by police death squads (Gillespie, 1982:153). In that same month, an average of one political death occurred every nineteen hours; many of these were at the hands of the Triple A (Moyano, 1995:80). With the introduction of a state of siege in November 1974, police were given a greater advantage in attaining access to opponents. Thus, with less "legal red-tape" paramilitary squads averaged 50 leftist kills per week by early 1975 (Norden, 1996:48).

In total, between May 25, 1973 and March 23, 1976, 1,988 right-wing attacks were recorded by Moyano (1995:82). Of these attacks 1,165 (58.60%) were murders and 458 (23.04%) were kidnappings (ibid). These figures suggest that right-wing paramilitary squads existed primarily to engage in attacks against individuals and to do so in mass scale. Having said this, and acknowledging the fact that these groups were extensions of the Peronist government, one can conclude that a new phase of discipline and punishment was emerging within the Argentine security apparatus during this period.

In general, the carceral phase of punishment which persisted throughout 1969 to May 1973, began to evolve into a new phase of punishment during the period of May 1973 to March 1976. For the purposes of this thesis, this new phase
shall be called a **Transitional** phase of punishment.

Characteristic of the transitional phase is the supplementation of carceral structures and methods of control with corporal methods. The corporal methods of the transitional phase are facilitated through select, autonomous para-military groups which may be called "death squads". The government not only is aware of these squads but is also responsible for their development, funding and incorporation into the system of discipline. Also, because these groups are new, covert and fairly distanced from the government (publicly), their operations and organization may not be coordinated to form a an omnipotent terror apparatus.
Phase 3: The Absolute Phase of Discipline and the Proceso Terror Apparatus (March, 1976 to 1979)

Chronology of Presidents:

The Argentine Economy

The bloodless coup d'état of March 24, 1976 had been expected and was long over due in light of the deteriorating situation brought on during Isabel Perón's final months. With the coup came a new political leadership and subsequently, a new economic policy. The economy by this time was in shambles. Inflation for the first quarter of 1976 was at an 800% annual rate, financial and industrial capital was in flight, and trade operated at a negative balance (Bennett & Simpson, 1985:35; EIU, 1976:4).

The first initiative of the military government was complete reform of the economic structure to attain three main goals: (1) monetary and fiscal equilibrium (i.e. reduce inflation and the deficit); (2) higher economic growth; and (3) reasonable income distribution (Erro, 1993; Pion Berlin, 1989).

To obtain these goals specific reforms were necessary in the financial, industrial, agricultural and labour markets. In terms of fiscal equilibrium, the government depended upon cuts in government spending to decrease the deficit. Therefore, state-run enterprises were better administrated and geared toward profits, taxes were strictly
enforced, social programs slashed and subsidies were cut for many urban industries (Smith, 1989).\textsuperscript{16}

Laissez faire reforms in financial markets attempted to achieve monetary equilibrium and investment incentives. Financial institutions were decentralized, interest rates were freed, and deposits were government guaranteed (Peralta Ramos, 1992). These measures quickly attracted foreign investment, as high interest rates provided lucrative profits.

In combination with appealing financial markets and government fiscal responsibility, economic growth depended upon: low inflation; competitive industrial prices; and increased agricultural output. The key to this plan involved a liberal or free market economic philosophy as Smith (1989:234) explains:

The centerpiece of the "New Political Economy" was a far reaching "opening" and reinsertion of Argentina's domestic economy into the world economy...only by making the economy as a whole more internationally competitive, it was argued, could the condition be created for a more stable and dynamic model of accumulation...

World penetration was facilitated through the reduction of protective tariffs. These policies deeply affected domestic industry as Argentine industrial products were made

\textsuperscript{16} It should be noted that although the government did cut expenses in state-run businesses, it approximately doubled the level of military spending throughout 1976-1979 when compared to the previous Peronist incumbency (Norden, 1996:94).
to compete with foreign imports. The focus of this policy was to bring industrial prices down (to battle inflation) and increase industrial efficiency. Other liberal industrial policies included the abolition of price controls and new laws set to entice highly technical foreign industries (Smith, 1989).

Free market policies conversely provided an advantage to the agricultural markets. Export taxes were removed, prices were de-regulated, and farm products were allowed to be directly sold from the Argentine producer to world buyers (Smith, 1989). As a result, agricultural exports and prices increased during 1976/77 and 1977/78 (EIU, 1976:(3); 1977:(2)).

In regards to national income redistribution, wages were controlled and frozen by the state while collective bargaining rights were suspended. This brought about an almost immediate 30% decrease in real wages for Argentine labour (Erro, 1993:104).

The results of new policies varied for each economic sector. Undoubtedly, the greatest profiteers from new liberal reforms were those members of the financial community. Unregulated interest rates soared, providing lucrative profits to lenders. This brought about an influx of foreign investment, as Argentine interest rates were substantially higher than international rates. In addition, Argentine financial institutions recycled foreign loans to domestic
borrowers at even higher rates, allowing both foreign and domestic institutions to make enormous profits. Over time, financial capital tended to concentrate in the few Argentine banks with foreign lending contacts. This monetary strength permitted the Argentine economy to be vulnerable to the interests of both the domestic and international financial bourgeoisie (Peralta Ramos, 1992).

Hindered the most by new free market policies were Argentine small and medium sized industries. Because large scale firms had access to finer technology and foreign finance, smaller companies were unable to compete (Peralta Ramos, 1992). Technology allowed mass quantities to be produced for less cost, while foreign loans were considerably cheaper than domestic ones. Many industries also engaged in black market activity and speculation (via stock accumulation), taking full advantage of the industrial decline (Hodges, 1988). In general, throughout the period Argentina de-industrialized as "new capital was invested in banks and financial institutions rather than industry" (Hodges, 1988:200).

Overall the results of Argentina's new economic policies throughout the period March 1976-1979 were admirable. By 1978, the gross domestic product improved, investment increased, foreign reserves accumulated and the balance of trade grew (EIU, 1978:(1); 1978:(4)). In addition, the rate of inflation greatly diminished although
never falling below 130% per annum (EIU, 1977-1980). The financial price for these improvements was a compounding foreign debt. In 1976 Argentina's total debt had been approximately eight billion dollars, by 1979 it reached nineteen billion dollars and at the end of 1980 it rounded twenty-seven billion dollars (Erro, 1993:120).

By 1979 economic policy had over emphasized finance while at the same time, down-sized industry. This created a situation of "productivity without profits and profits without productivity" (Hodges, 1988:200). Despite a positive balance of trade throughout the period, speculative borrowing, lack of production and an overvalued peso caused a foreign debt crisis by the end of 1979 (Gillespie, 1982). By 1980, Argentine financial markets began to collapse, capital took flight, unemployment rose and a twenty-seven billion dollar debt had been amassed (Erro, 1993:120).

The Labour Movement

Prior to the March coup, rank and file labour mobilization was out of government and CGT control. Work stoppages, wage demands, demonstrations, hunger marches, work to rule tactics and high absenteeism decreased production considerably and pressured the economy (EIU, 1976:(3); Gillespie, 1982). Also, the CGT was considerably weakened structurally as Jelin (1979:249) explains:

At the time of the military coup, trade union structure, apparently so strong and powerful some
months earlier, lay practically in ruins. This labour situation had the CGT and other Argentine unions welcoming the military coup (Erro, 1993).

Immediately upon the military’s seizure of government, the CGT and other major unions were intervened, funds were frozen, strikes were made illegal, collective bargaining was banned and wages were frozen. In addition, leading Peronist politicians and trade unionists were imprisoned, the 62 Peronist organizations within the CGT were dissolved and the Labour Code was revised to make easier the removal of labour militants (Hodges, 1988; Gillespie, 1982).

In general, the labour goals of the Proceso government were to decrease wages, keep employment high\textsuperscript{17}, increase worker productivity and break union power. This strategy was sought within the parameters of keeping labour resistance at a minimum.

Indeed, the military were initially successful in their labour aims. By the end of September 1976, real wages had dropped to 50\% of 1974 levels (Gillespie, 1982:230). In addition, by 1977 labour shared only 29.0\% of the national income, which compared with the 1975 figure of 47.5\%, was a significant loss (Hodges, 1988:201). Labour's financial forfeits throughout the period eventually eliminated wages as a contributory factor to rising inflation (Peralta Ramos,

\textsuperscript{17} The military government believed that low unemployment would reduce guerrilla membership (Norden, 1996).

Up to 1979, unemployment levels continued to drop, reaching an Argentine record in the final months of 1978. Beginning in 1979, this pattern reversed and unemployment began to rise due to the de-industrialization process (Erro, 1993).

Industrial worker productivity throughout the period steadily rose. Peralta Ramos (1992:73) claims that between 1976 and 1983 the annual rate of increased productivity was 4.97% (while wages increased at an annual average of 0.23%).

The government not only achieved its labour goals, but it also succeeded with little resistance. The state reduced labour opposition through three strategies. The first tactic, having already been touched on, involved an attack on labour political channels. Peralta Ramos (1992:72) explains this occurrence:

With the elimination of the leaders of the union rank and file, the disintegration of the unions, and the elimination of political parties, there was no political way for the working class to forward its demands.

The second method created divisions within the working-class itself through high wage disparities between and within various labour sectors (Hodges, 1988). Smith (1989:263) explains:

The neo-liberal economic strategy undermined the power of organized labor through policies that widened wage differentials across and within economic sectors. This tended to create a segmented labor market and deepened the working class's structural heterogeneity, while a growing stratification of
life-styles and consumption patterns tended to make collective action across class boundaries more difficult.

The third tactic the Processo government utilized to weaken labour's organizational power involved the use of repression. Repression was facilitated through violence and a number of anti-labour decrees such as the Industrial Security Decree, the Law of Redundancy and a new Law of Professional Associations. Both violent and legalized types of repression against labour will be discussed later in the section that deals with social control between 1976 and 1979.

The use of violent repression and legislation did debilitating the collective mobilization ability of the labour movement, but some minimal resistance did occur at the rank and file level during the period March 1976 to 1979. Between September 1976 and November 1977 a number of illegal strikes were incited by a collection of ten small unions calling themselves the "Commission of 10". This collective grew, and became the "Commission of 25" which was responsible for the first general strike against the regime in April 1979. By November 1979, the Commission of 25 spearheaded the task of returning the CGT to legality (Hodges, 1988).

During the period of March 1976 to the end of 1979, there were approximately 100 strikes in both 1976 and 1977, while 1978 had 40 strikes and 1979 witnessed 190 (Erro, 1993:114). Out of all these protests there were only 17
incidents involving violence (Moyano, 1995:72). These figures are minimal compared to the period May 1973 to March 1976, whereby labour was responsible for 266 instances of violence, accounting for 47.5% of all collective violence in the Peronist period (Moyano, 1995:70).

The Guerrilla Movement

In March 1976, Argentine guerrilla forces were militarily effective, numerous and continually aggressive. The Montoneros were the driving force behind the guerrilla campaign during this period and their attacks focused primarily on the police and corporate elite. By the March 24 coup, Argentine society was witnessing approximately one political killing per every five hours (Gillespie, 1982).

Upon seizing power, the military junta immediately released a formal document announcing the objectives of the regime. This document emphasized the enormity of the guerrilla threat and a need to combat that threat through an "integrated multifaceted approach" (Norden, 1996:58).

With this declaration, the rebel forces were fully aware of the government's forthcoming anti-guerrilla campaign, but two misconceptions regarding this campaign deeply hindered the Argentine guerrillas. First, rebel forces assumed that much like the previous period, urban guerrillas would be engaged by the police. Contrary to this belief, the anti-guerrilla campaign was instead initiated by
the military and supplemented by the police. As a result of mistargeting, the Montoneros never compiled enough key enemy losses to better their cause (Gillespie, 1982).

The second guerrilla misconception assumed that the state would utilize some violence but also continue to use legal-overt methods to battle terrorism. The guerrillas did not expect an efficient network of corporal punishment to extract all information on terrorism and to eliminate anyone suspected of guerrilla involvement. Gillespie (1982:244) explains the guerrillas' predicament in the following:

The methods used by the Argentine Armed Forces to eradicate "subversion" took the Montoneros by surprise. They expected fierce armed confrontations in the streets, vehicle checks, raids, house-by-house searches, and mass detention, but assumed that the latter would be as before: about ten days to endure torture before the detention was legalized, followed by the re-establishment of contact with one's family and organization. Only slowly did they detect the new repressive infrastructure and methods: officially-sanctioned but clandestine concentration camps and torture centres, plus special units based on the military services and police whose function was to abduct, interrogate, torture, and kill.

The use of corporal techniques on captured guerrillas provided the military a mass of information. Vulnerabilities within the Montonero organization itself led to the abundance and destructiveness of the acquired information. Weaknesses included a lack of structural and informational compartmentalization and an expectation for captured combatants to withhold knowledge until death. The later of these flaws was unreasonable since interrogators had unlimited time, were free of judicial harassment, and
were not obliged to produce a body (Gillespie, 1982).

Estimates regarding guerrilla operations for the years 1976 to 1979 vary only slightly between sources. In 1976, guerrilla forces performed approximately 600 missions and were responsible for at least 293 security personnel murders (Gillespie, 1982:237; Norden, 1996:59). Munitions workshops were fully operational and finances for the campaign was adequate (Gillespie, 1982). Guerrilla losses for 1976 were high as approximately 1,000 were killed (ibid). Near the end of 1976, the Economist Intelligence Unit (1976:(4)3) described the Montonero situation:

...the Montonero organisation admits that the military forces have practically eliminated their leadership, that their apparatus has been dismantled and that they have not been able to recruit new members, which has forced them to rely on foreign elements. Their tactics now are to attack individuals, which implies little risk and also finds wide coverage in the press.

In 1977 guerrillas were responsible for seventy military deaths (Norden, 1996:59). Yet guerrilla losses continued to soar as Gillespie (1982:238) estimates Montonero casualties at 2,000 by March 1977. As a result of its diminishing membership, the Montoneros expanded production of anti-regime propaganda and attempted to connect with the labour movement. Under conditions of severe repression, labour flatly rejected Montonero affiliation since guerrilla activities could not complement trade unionism in the fight for labour's interests (Hodges, 1988).
Entering 1978, guerrilla troops were weak, and almost all attacks involved assassination. That year, only eighteen members of the security forces were killed by terrorists (Norden, 1996:59). Logistical production had halted, guerrilla requests for a cease fire were denied, and by August 1978 over 4,500 Montoneros were either dead, imprisoned, or abroad\(^\text{10}\) (Gillespie, 1982). Erro (1993:122) describes the guerrilla condition in mid-1978:

After some significant military successes in 1977 and early 1978, it is generally felt that the terrorist groups no longer posed a threat to the sovereignty of the nation and that continuing insurgency actions were primarily desperate publicity stunts.

In November 1979, inspired by increased labour mobilization, an awaited guerrilla counter-offensive was initiated (Gillespie, 1982). Orchestrated by Montoneros returning from abroad, this last effort to destabilize the government was a disaster. Failure was due to guerrilla organizational splits and the superiority of the Argentine armed forces. That year, guerrillas tallied only seven military kills, and by the end of 1979 all active terrorism had been eradicated (Norden, 1996:59).

Based on newspaper analyses performed by Moyano (1995), general trends regarding the guerrilla movement can be determined for the period March 1976 to 1979. Moyano

\(^{10}\) Abroad Montoneros make contact with other international terrorist organizations (like the Palestine Liberation Organization) for the purposes of training for a large counter-offensive against the Argentine military in 1979 (EIU, 1978(4)).
(1995:50) recorded 708 terrorist attacks during this period. The majority of these assaults involved five or less combatants, and never had the number of guerrillas exceeded twenty in any one attack (ibid:54). In addition, attacks increasingly concentrated within two locations: 37.64% occurred in the federal capital of Buenos Aires (population approximately three million) and 49.44% occurred in the province of Buenos Aires (ibid:52). This indicates the inability of guerrilla forces to continue a wide spread, national movement.

In addressing guerrilla attacks against individuals, there is a substantial increase for the period March 1976 to 1979. Moyano (1995:56) calculates that 43.79% of guerrilla attacks during this period were murders. This is much greater than the figure of 24.85% calculated for the period May 1973 to March 1976 (ibid).

**Phase of Punishment and Social Control**

Beginning March 24, 1976 the military government initiated a legal process which set out to radically reorganize Argentine society, politics, economy, and morality. These goals were outlined under a specific act entitled

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19 Attacks in Buenos Aires province most likely occurred just outside the city limits of Buenos Aires. The area surrounding the city of Buenos Aires is known as the Greater Buenos Aires Area whose population was approximately ten million people.
Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (National Re-organization Process). It is from the Process Act that the military government acquired its name "Proceso". High priorities of the Proceso included the eradication of subversion and its "causes", social and legal order, and the enforcement of Christian morals and national security (Buenos Aires Herald, 1976b).

Proceso objectives were obtained through many methods, some under the premise of legality and others through clandestinity. As a general trend, this period not only witnessed a substantial increase in corporal forms of control, but a growing preference to utilize these forms. As a result, Argentina suffered 2,000,000 emigrations; 5,182 legal detentions; 5,000 murders and; approximately 15,000 disappearances during the Proceso (March 1976 to December 1983) (Bennett & Simpson, 1985:141; Pion Berlin, 1989:97). The majority of the imprisonments, deaths and disappearances occurred between 1976 and 1978 (Norden, 1996).

i) Social control through legality and consent

On March 24, 1976, the new military government immediately decreed the Act for the National Reorganization Process to capture political and legal control of Argentina. Under this legislation, the national Congress and provincial legislatures were dissolved, while the principal political parties and associations (Peronist party, JP, PA, CGT and
CGE) were outlawed, and their leaders arrested (Buchanan, 1987; Hodges, 1988). Judicially, the Supreme Court was reconstructed, all lower courts and Provincial High Courts were suspended, and the office of the Attorney General was closed. Contrary to the Argentine Constitution, new Supreme Court justices vowed on appointment to uphold all the articles and objectives of the Proceso (CONADEP, 1986).²⁰

Operating under Article 23 of the Argentine Constitution (regulations regarding a state of siege), the junta promptly invoked 34 anti-terrorist communiques to facilitate mass arrest (Buenos Aires Herald, 1976c). Some of these included: the suspension of basic legal rights, (i.e. habeas corpus); the imposition of curfews, identification checkpoints, and transportation restrictions; random searches and raids on both public and private areas; assembly laws prohibiting large gatherings (twelve or more people); and the surrender of all guns, ammunition, explosives and gunpowder (Buenos Aires Herald, 1976c; Buchanan, 1987). Under these new restrictions, 1,800 individuals were arrested within two days of the coup (Hodges, 1988:193). That number rose to 4,000 after a week and reached 10,000 by mid-April (ibid).

²⁰ A rich discussion regarding Proceso legislative tactics is beyond the scope and limitations of this section. For further legal documentation exemplifying the usurpation of the Judicial functions by the Proceso please refer to Appendix 1.
system, the military developed a new system of justice that could fulfil its needs. This system needed to: 1) deal with the increasing number of political detainees; 2) legitimize new legislation for the war against subversion; and 3) enforce military law. As a result, a military tribunal system was developed to deal solely with political crimes (Corradi, Fagan and Garreton, 1992). These tribunals were constructed under the Code of Military Justice which operated under the conditions of war. Under Tribunal law, the traditional legal system had no authority over the military and was restricted to only trying non-political criminal cases rather than cases dealing with national security (Hodges, 1988).

The Proceso government also developed new laws to complement the powers it received from "state of siege" legislation. New laws increased presidential control by providing powers to the Executive out of its jurisdiction. This contradicted the Argentine Constitution (see Appendix 1). Both the Statute of June 18, 1976 and the Institutional Act (September 1, 1975), granted authority to the Executive that under the Constitution exclusively belonged to the Judiciary. With these provisions, entire control of arrest and detention belonged to the junta (Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1980).

Aside from laws to battle terrorism, further decrees
were developed throughout this period to control specific social sectors believed to be prone to "subversion". Labour, the arts, education and media were all targeted. The three military forces divided surveillance on these areas equally. This was referred to as the 33.3% rule (Bennett & Simpson, 1985).

To control labour, the Industrial Security Decree (September 1976) was enacted to outlaw strikes and all forms of collective action, while the Ley de Prescindibilidad (Law of Redundancy, April 1976) removed job protection for state employees (Gillespie, 1982). As a result of the Redundancy Law, over 200,000 public servants were fired between 1976 and 1980 for reasons of service, national security or redundancy (Pion Berlin, 1989:113). Also, a new Law of Professional Associations (November, 1979) was created to further increase the Minister of Labour's power to close unions, disqualify union leaders, seize funds and modify labour statutes. The Law of Professional Associations also outlawed the CGT (leaving local unions without a national center of command), made union membership voluntary, and restricted union federations from raising funds at any time (Pion Berlin, 1989).

Much like the American experience of the 1950's, many Argentine artists in television, radio, cinema and music were threatened and blacklisted as communists (Bennett & Simpson, 1985). These areas of entertainment were
rigorously censored and many more radio and television programs were piped in from the United States (ibid).

In its educational reforms, the Proceso government stressed morality and attempted to limit liberal ideas. Buchanan (1987:365) summarized these ideological renovations:

The educational system was overhauled in order to rid it of "class-oriented," "secular humanist," and other "subversive" subjects and to reestablish the primacy of traditional Roman Catholic values. Psychoanalysis, sociology, and political science were eliminated from many university curricula on the grounds that they were Marxist sciences. Students and faculty suspected of harboring subversive tendencies were expelled and often arrested.

The rationality for this type of educational reform was based on the belief that the university was the breeding ground for terrorism. Terrorists only took the permissive and liberal atmosphere of the university to the next level. Military rationale suggested that by eliminating the "nest" no more subversive insects could be "hatched" (DuBois, 1990:321).

With these doctrines in hand the military proceeded to develop legislation to purge all libraries of indoctrinating literature (Decree 20.216), as well as dismiss all educators deemed dangerous (Order 572) (Bennett & Simpson, 1985). As a result, 1,500 lecturers from the University of Buenos Aires and 3,000 secondary school educators were sacked in the first five months of the Proceso government (ibid:210).

Containment of media and communication was achieved
through directives for self-censorship and government regulation. Within hours of the coup, the Argentine Journalists' Federation was intervened; international press associates were ordered out of the country; regulations stipulated that all reports prior to print were to be submitted to the government; and journalists were to follow a set of new self-censorship guidelines under legislation entitled "Principles and Procedures To Be Followed by Mass Communications Media" (CONADEP, 1986; Bennett & Simpson, 1985:234).

These edicts, mandated through communiqué 19 of March 24, 1976, included the following directive (CONADEP, 1982:363):

anyone who by any means emits, spreads or propagates news, communiques or images with a view to upsetting, prejudicing or demeaning the activity of the Armed, Security, or Police Forces will be liable to a punishment of up to ten years in prison.

A more explicit directive was privately issued to the press a month later (Graham-Yooll, 1984:123):

as from today 22/4/76, it is forbidden to inform, comment or make reference to subjects related to subversive incidents, the appearance of bodies and the death of subversive elements and/or members of the armed and security forces in these incidents, unless they are reported by a responsible official source. This includes victims of kidnappings and missing persons.

Failure to comply to the above mentioned directives could lead to a number of sanctions. Thus, many newspapers were closed by the government, some lost government advertising contracts, and a large number of journalists
were arrested and imprisoned (Graham-Yool, 1984; Bennett & Simpson, 1985).

**ii) social control through illegality and coercion**

In light of the material just discussed, it is evident that tight control over all facets of the Argentine society was sought by the Proceso government. Strict legislation also existed in the two previously discussed time periods, but a substantial difference lies between the Proceso period and prior periods regarding corporal punishment and terror. In the previous periods corporal forms of discipline existed but it was not until the period 1976-1979 that corporal discipline became the main method of control. The corporal shift was enabled through modifying the organizational structure of the terror apparatus, and by expanding the range of abduction targets.

Commencing on the March coup, the Argentine security forces were re-organized under the military on a nationwide level. Prior to this re-organization, corporal discipline was produced by autonomous, self directed and unorganized police death squads. But during the Proceso, corporal discipline was administered by local military and police units while remaining accountable to a centralized military bureaucracy. This ensured a wide spread, spontaneous use of corporal discipline while also ensuring some control of operations. Pion Berlin (1989:103) explains:
The terrorist operation was decentralized yet always under the firm grip of the military junta. This mixture of local action and central authority cut through bureaucratic red tape to expedited the elimination of political opponents without permitting the leviathan to get out of control.

The Argentine Army, Navy, Air Force and Federal Police each operated a "Task Force" (TF) division responsible for overseeing "arrest" operations, and interrogation procedures. These general Task Force divisions were named and parcellled in the following order: Federal Police (TF1); Army (TF2); Navy (TF3)\(^\text{21}\) and; Air Force (TF4) (Bennett & Simpson, 1985).

Within each of these Task Forces were numerous groups that performed subversive arrests. These groups were called "patotas" (CONADEP, 1986). The patotas were widespread and many, operating in overlapping areas in numerous locations about the nation (Buchanan, 1987). Each patota utilized six to twenty men during an arrest. These officers were always heavily armed, usually out of uniform and many times drove unmarked cars (usually a Ford Falcon) (Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1980; CONADEP, 1986).\(^\text{22}\)

In addition to a Task Force division, each of the four

\(^{21}\) TF3 operated out of the Navy Mechanics School (ESMA) in Buenos Aires. It is believed that of the 5,000 abductees which passed through this secret detention center only four to five percent survived (Bennett & Simpson, 1985:104).

\(^{22}\) The Ford Falcon was the standard Argentine government vehicle during the 1970's.
security forces operated an "Intelligence Service" (SI) division. These divisions were named and parcelled in the following order: Federal Police (Federal Coordination, Intelligence and Counter-intelligence of the Federal Police (ICIA)); Army (SIE); Navy (SIN) and; Air Force (SIA) (Amnesty International, 1980; Bennett & Simpson, 1995). Intelligence units were responsible for distinguishing subversive targets, centralizing information, and keeping accurate records of a prisoner's location, interrogations transfers and fate. Information was never shared between differing Intelligence Services, yet all information from each SI unit was centrally recorded at an agency located within the Federal Ministry of the Interior. This agency was called the Service of State Information (SIDE) (Bennett & Simpson, 1985).

Anti-subversive operations did not reside only in the Task Forces and Intelligence divisions of the four major security forces. All provincial, district and municipal police forces created Task Forces and Intelligence divisions similar to those of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Federal Police. These units were also obliged to report to SIDE (Buchanan, 1987).

Equipped with an operational division and intelligence division the security forces were re-structured to acquire mass information and perform brutal tasks. Believing to be engaged in a real war, the goals of the military were to
identify and deal with all enemies of the state. Initially, operations targeted guerrilla groups, only to later included all militants and eventually anyone with left-wing sympathies. Anyone suspected of belonging to these categories was vulnerable to the corporal methods of abduction and disappearance.

The main function of the patota was to perform a ritualistic abduction and to facilitate an individual's disappearance. An abduction usually occurred at an individual's home during dark hours. During an abduction, security forces would forcefully enter a suspect's dwelling, torture the individual and then ransack the residence (CONADEP, 1986). Once these series of events were complete, the abductee was blind-folded ("walled up") and taken to a detention centre for further interrogation (ibid). These detention centres were the backbone of the new terror apparatus.

Military detention centres (MDC's) were designated for "regularized" prisoners. Regularized individuals were acknowledged as detainees and were held under the disposition of the Executive Power through legislation. MDC's were primarily used to interrogate and intimidate possible subversives (Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1980).

Secret Detention Centres (SDC's), also known as "chupaderos" (sucking up centres) were reserved for
individuals not regularized under legislation. Any abducted person held at a clandestine centre was in danger of harm since the military denied the existence of such institutions and hence of anyone inside them. The majority of SDC inmates eventually "disappeared" (Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1980).

There were two types of SDC's during the Dirty War, Prisoner Assessment Centres (PAC) and Transit Camps (TC). The PAC was used to hold a detainee for a lengthy period of time. Inside a PAC an individual was regularly tortured until all information was collected and enough punishment had been administered. Once a prisoner had outlived these uses his or her fate would be determined. Two ends were possible: a prisoner would leave the PAC regularized or be killed (CONADEP, 1986).

Transit Camps were used to hold individuals for a brief period to facilitate transfers and processing. Such people would include new abductees, those about to be released, or those placed under the disposition of the National Executive. Torture also occurred in TC institutions, but usually as a means of softening up a new detainee to abstract preliminary information (CONADEP, 1986).

CONADEP (1986) has determined that at least 340 SDC's operated during the Proceso. Typically, the conditions inside these centres were inhuman. Cells were miniature, unventilated, damp, hot, and deprived of natural light.
Prisoners were always hooded, shackled, and forbidden to talk or move. Bathroom and food privileges were allotted three times daily but were often deprived altogether (Amnesty International, 1980; CONADEP, 1986).

Inside the SDC's, all attempts were made "to break down the captives' identity" (CONADEP, 1986:52). This was done through torture of the body and mind. Torture of the body included beating, electrical shock, burning, rape, suffocation through water submersion, and elaborate variations of these methods. Psychological techniques included mock execution or maiming, witnessing a family member's torture, and spatio-temporal deprivation (CONADEP, 1986; Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1980).

For many of those caught in the rituals of the new terror apparatus, the end result was death. After the Proceso government left office, mass graves were discovered within abandoned SDC's and numerous cemeteries throughout Argentina. Tests have shown that many of these individuals were tortured prior to death (CONADEP, 1986).

Murder was facilitated during "transfers," "shoot outs," abductions, assassinations and inside the SDC's. Those killed during "prison transfers" were usually told they were being sent to a regularized prison, then were drugged, boarded on a plane and dropped over the Atlantic ocean. "Shoot outs" were usually fictions created to cover
up execution style killings during capture. Individuals produced by the military after one of these fictitious confrontations often showed signs of torture prior to death (Amnesty International, 1980; CONADEP, 1986).

During 1976 and 1977, 4,105 and 3,098 Argentines (respectively) officially disappeared at the hands of security forces (Norden, 1996:59). Compared to the years 1974 and 1975, when 46 and 359 respective disappearances were reported, a substantial difference is observable (ibid). This difference suggests two important conclusions. First, a widening of the subversive target range and second, a general increase in the use of corporal discipline to gain control. It should also be noted that disappearances declined in 1978 and 1979, with figures of 964 and 181 respectively (ibid).

Unlike preceding governments, the Proceso battled terrorism in a new and extended manner. Going beyond the harsh laws developed to keep journalists, labourers and educators controlled, the military included these and other groups as subversive targets in need of elimination (Buchanan, 1987).

Labour alone accounted for 48.1% of the 8,960 disappearance cases documented by Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People (CONADEP, 1986:368). Particular targets were workers belonging to large and powerful trade unions in either the industrial or public
sector (Pion Berlin, 1989). Of the total persecuted unionists, one of every three was an industrial worker and one of every four was a public servant (Pion Berlin, 1989:113). Buchanan (1987:372) describes violence against labour in the following:

[Union] leaders and activists were killed, disappeared, imprisoned, and exiled...they numbered in the thousands. There were executions in the factories, and physical and psychological violence designed to terrorize the workers.

The attack against the media resulted in approximately forty disappearances and twenty nine deaths of journalists between March 1976 and March 1978 (Graham-Yool, 1984:153). In total, journalists accounted for 1.6% of those killed by the military during the Dirty War (Bennett & Simpson, 1985:403).

Second only to labour, the education system also suffered many losses. Teachers accounted 5.7% of the disappearances while students portioned 21.0% (Bennett & Simpson, 1985:403).

The most obvious targets of terror were the guerrilla groups who had long destabilized the Argentine nation. The desire to eliminate rather than imprison these groups is evident when comparing guerrilla "kills" and "captures" during different time periods. Between 1976 and 1979, 71.12% of guerrilla losses were due to "shoot out" kills while 28.88% of the losses were attributed to capture (Moyano, 1995:106). A large difference surfaces when
looking between 1973 and 1975 since only 15.29% of guerrilla losses were due to kills, and 83.84% were due to capture (ibid). This large disparity is not accidental; it follows the outline of the corporal campaign.

In general, the Transitional phase of punishment developed within the prior period had fully transformed by the beginning of the Proceso government. Having just examined the general reforms made to the political and juridical structure in the period from March 1976 to 1979, as well as the increased and preferred use of corporal methods of discipline, a new and ultimate phase of discipline matured. This phase shall be called the Absolute phase of discipline and punishment.

To have an Absolute phase of discipline the following must exist: 1) an unrivalled and single Authority over all existing social structures (i.e. justice system, education, politics, economy, etc.); 2) the Authority can autonomously select the forms of social control engaged in; 3) the Authority depends greatly upon widespread, organized corporal discipline to increase the field of social control; 4) corporal targets are randomly selected; 5) by utilizing corporal discipline on a mass scale, the Authority achieves total (absolute) control over all geographical areas by transcending government and social structures; and 6) transcendence is achieved by corporal rituals and symbols which produce fear through the idea of body pain.
CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION

The purpose of this section is to forward a discussion which analyzes the three historical periods traced in the case study using the Foucaultian and World-systems theoretical frameworks. World-systems theory provides a structural analysis linking world level circumstances to a nation's economic performance and social situation. Foucault's model explains how corporal discipline redistributes power/knowledge within a society experiencing particular types of violent class struggle. By integrating both theoretical stances, this discussion hopes to show how the world-system may contribute to new forms of violent class struggle that may only be contained through a shift in social discipline.

From 1966-1969, Argentina enticed foreign investment, increased industrialization and sought further insertion into the world market. To maintain this economic path, the military government was obliged to keep its own citizenry subservient to world market demands. Therefore, labour was repressed (to minimize wage demands), domestic businesses was sacrificed for large foreign corporations, and Argentine agriculture was forced to fund industrialization. This arrangement was secured through political demobilization, stiff legislation and instances of repression.

By 1969, domestic class needs were not provided for the sake of competitiveness on the world market was challenged
by popular mobilization. The first instance of this challenge was instigated by rank and file workers in the city of Cordoba, May 1969.

From the Cordobazo to 1973, all Argentine social classes mobilized in a constant, violent struggle against the state for increased national resources. Yet the nature of social mobilization throughout the period 1969 to May 1973, was notably different from mobilization of history past. Although previous rebellions included demonstrations, general strikes, and riots, never before had popular dissent included organized terrorism. Guerrilla attacks began early in 1970.

Argentine guerrillas during the period of 1969 to May 1973 acted in a poltico-military capacity and did very well at de-stabilizing the Onganía regime. Guerrilla operations targeted foreign corporations nationwide, driving imperialist investment away from the Argentine economy. In addition, covert, sporadic, spectacular manoeuvres were supplemented with newly formed Montonero political alliances (such as the Montonero-JP organization). These alliances were instrumental in the development of grass roots mobilization. Grass roots struggles (connected to either the JP-Montoneros or the rank and file labour movement) were hard to contain since they operated at base local levels and outside the management of state structures.

Terrorism itself, as a new form of struggle, was very
difficult to control, pinpoint, or penetrate due to the nature of its methods and the capabilities of carceral mode discipline. First, the guerrilla movement operated outside the carceral control field based on a network of non-violent social structures and techniques. In other words, carceral discipline was not suited to contain social struggles emerging from underground, violent sources. Second, even if a terrorist was captured, the methods of trial and imprisonment allowed the accused to remain silent; this prevented the accumulation of useful information on other guerrilla group members. And third, because convicted terrorists were placed into a penitentiary, true elimination of the guerrilla threat was not guaranteed since future release was feasible.

Due to a mismatch in the mode of social discipline (carceral) and the type of mobilization that was emerging throughout the period 1969-1973, control over conflict was not possible. Carceral discipline depended upon functional modern type structures to subtly entrap the citizenry in the power/knowledge field of discipline. But carceral mode control could only function properly when social struggle remained within the modern, everyday, non-violent institutions of a stable society.

Social conflict after 1969 did remain outside the control field of carceral mode structures, as guerrilla operations and grass roots mobilization were violent,
spontaneous and wide spread. Without the means or the power to control violent dissent of this nature and magnitude, social rebellion continued to increase throughout 1969 to May 1973. In turn, this unrest alienated Argentina from further world-capital investment and its economy dwindled. Economic decline provoked the escalation and expansion of social rebellion and a continuous cycle of dissent moved along.

The cycle of dissent persisted throughout the period 1969 to May 1973 bringing the Argentine society to the point of crisis. By the end of the period, Argentina's economy was caught in an inflationary tail spin and slipping within the world market. Guerrilla operations occurred nation wide, targeting property associated with foreign capital. In addition, rank and file labour remained militant, and uncontrollable through CGT channels, while general unrest and popular protests lingered as massive threats. What was needed in Argentina was a means to halt the cycle of dissent which began in 1969. A cycle which remained unmanageable through modern carceral structures and would persist unless economic improvements and/or new forms of discipline were introduced to re-establish an effective field of control.

Both economic improvements and new forms of discipline did emerge during the period May 1973 and March 1976. During this period, social class expectations remained very demanding upon the newly elected Peronist state. But
despite the populist ideology of Peronism, the link between the world-system and the Argentine economy always dictated the internal characteristics of Argentine society. This becomes more apparent once the period May 1973 to March 1976 is examined.

Beginning in May 1973 the Cámpora government (May–September) made considerable improvements in the economy and effectively lessened social dissent. Both the labour and economic situation improved due to the anti-inflationary influence of the Social Pact. As for the guerrilla movement, it too was lulled (except for the ERP) through an approach of amnesty and leftist political inclusion. With socio-economic decline ebbed, the cycle of dissent outlined in the period 1969 to May 1973 was broken and Argentina set on a path of economic recovery.

But economic improvement could only be sustained if the world-system did not make any detrimental shifts that would destabilize Argentine markets and if internal class conflict was inhibited. Any lapse in either of these two areas would re-start the cycle of dissent that occurred between 1969 and May 1973.

Juan Perón realized the delicacy of the situation; every social class wanted quick economic rewards from the world market while Argentina was suppose to operate within a nationalist political ideology. These two goals were incompatible and therefore leftism had no real place in the
Peronist plan. What was needed was a new form of discipline that could limit the left's political mobilization, while also contain social dissent stemming from politico-economic exclusion.

Early in the Peronist government, new structures and methods of discipline were developed to ensure internal security. Police death squads were primarily utilized to eliminate leaders of dissent and to create a climate of fear around political action. By introducing corporal techniques and structures such as these, the Argentine system of discipline increased the field of control over those social elements responsible for instigating mobilization (i.e. union delegates, political activists, student associations, etc.).

In 1974, the use of corporal techniques began to rise considerably as a consequence of world-system developments that strained the Social Pact and ultimately the Argentine economy. The OPEC oil crisis, an EEC ban on Argentine beef and a decline in Argentina's agricultural exports set the Argentine economy into another inflationary tailspin. This development reactivated the cycle of dissent characteristic of the period 1969 to May 1973. Yet in the Peronist period (1973 to 1976), the cycle advanced farther than the period 1969 to May 1973, as Argentina witnessed much more social violence and economic decline.

Between 1974 and 1975, violent social mobilization was
mainly produced by the guerrilla movement. The police, death squads and the CGT bureaucracy had managed to control the mobilization of the labour movement and other social classes, but were still unable to effectively penetrate the guerrilla forces. Having been allowed in the past to organize, accumulate resources and dwell within the government, the guerrillas by 1975 seemed deeply entrenched within all areas of Argentine society and capable of striking effectively anywhere.

The state response to guerrilla mobilization during the period 1973 to 1976 was a violent police counter attack. Yet by using this methodology, ending the cycle of dissent could only achieved through the total eradication of the guerrilla forces. Again, neither the police or death squads were equipped to penetrate the guerrilla groups despite their increased utilization of corporal phase techniques. This was due to the decentralized structure of the police on a national level and the absence of a uniform plan of action against the guerrillas.

Near the end of 1975, the economy, labour, and guerrillas were beyond state control and as a result the military became more involved in the battle against dissent (especially the guerrillas). Unlike the police between 1973-1975, the Argentine military did not use corporal discipline in an erratic and unorganized form. Anti-guerrilla operations were highly structured, routinized
refined and extremely corporal. Corporal operations included the immediate killing of guerrillas, the torture of captured guerrillas, and the murder of tortured guerrillas.

In March 1976, the military took full control of the Argentine state allowing their anti-guerrilla methods to be enacted at a national level. Therefore, during the period March 1976 to 1979 Argentine social discipline fully transformed to coincide with the violent transformations that had evolved in society throughout 1969-1976. This paper has titled the period March 1976 to 1979 the Absolute phase of discipline.

In the Absolute phase of discipline, corporal punishment went beyond purely terrorist targets. Because, terrorism was so covert, emerged from unlikely sources, attacked spectacular targets (i.e. military outposts), and remained nation wide, the military believed that subversion was everywhere at all times.

To neutralize the guerrillas, the military also had to remain omnipresent and re-establish a field of control that encompassed every Argentine. Since carceral structures and techniques no longer penetrated the social mind, corporal discipline employed fear as a new method of control. This fear emerged from abductions, torture, murder and the disappearance of individuals everywhere in the nation. The operational strategy of the Argentine Absolute phase (1976-1979) should be outlined.
The Absolute phase of discipline emerged to redistribute power/knowledge throughout a society whose social struggles were no longer solved within modern, non-violent carceral forums (i.e. political or legal processes). Therefore, power/knowledge was transferred away from declining carceral mode institutions and reinvested into new loci. These loci were the bodies of "subversives," "communists," and enemies of the state.

Using Foucault's basic arguments, corporal methods attacked the body in order to allow the field of control to penetrate society (or the social mind) with fear. Social fear itself is created through corporal symbols and rituals.

The ritual activates power/knowledge, it is the methodical drama whereby power/knowledge is transmitted from the drama to a new locus. This locus is a corporal symbol. Corporal symbols, are physical manifestations of power/knowledge that widen the field of social control by acting as "satellites" of fear. Symbols are numerous in a corporal phase society; this allows the web of social control to be spun between each and all fear producing symbols. Examples from the case study further explain corporal rituals and symbols.

Violent power rituals in Argentina during the period March 1976 to 1979 included processes such as abduction, disappearance, torture, and execution. In terms of social control, each ritual created corporal symbols to mark the
absolute power of the patotas over the anyone's body. These symbols maintained social control because they reminded onlookers of the threat of body pain. The utility of corporal symbols can be found in their ability to remain disturbing, intimidating and terrific through visible means. For example, a soldier, an emergency siren, the sight of a police vehicle, a ransacked home, a security precinct, a located tortured body or the empty dinner chair of a disappeared person could evoke strong psychological fears while also symbolize absolute social power over the body.

The examples just put forth only illustrate a few fear producing symbols. It is important to understand that social life in Argentina was surrounded by an indeterminate number of reminders of Absolute power at all times. Symbols could be outright discernable while others operated latently, affecting the subconscious. Regardless, a climate of fear constantly surrounded and penetrated every Argentine at every moment. Through absolute corporal discipline, power/knowledge regained geographical and psychological omnipresence as the social control web was re-spun between symbols and rituals rather than institutions.

This paper also considers the potency of official government denial of a clandestine terror apparatus. One must remember that all the while corporal rituals and symbols persisted in Argentina, the government denied involvement in extra-legal activity. This increased the
intensity of fear within the social mind, and therefore the field of control over society.

Because the Proceso government denied its involvement in the Dirty War, Argentine society was unable to discern the truth from fiction. The citizen was forced to live in a state of double social being, always confused and unable to make sense of the situation (Schepet-Hughes, 1993). For instance, the government claimed not to be involved in abducting individuals, yet state agents were witnessed performing ritual abductions; people were being arrested but did not show up inside regularized prisons; the military was fighting guerrillas but politicians, activists and professionals were disappearing. With this situation, no individual knew who was watching, who was to disappear next, or who the abductors were. Schepet-Hughes (1993:229) describes the effects of such a situation as she states:

The blurring of fiction and reality creates a kind of mass hysteria and paranoia that can be seen as a new technique of social control in which everyone suspects and fears every other: a collective hostile gaze, a human panoptican is created.

Under these conditions most Argentines were best to remain quiet and unchallenging, since those responsible for the corporal rituals and symbols could remain suspected but not absolutely identified. Without knowing who exactly was monitoring the public, one had to "behave" at all times or risk abduction.

As a final argument, the Absolute phase of discipline
also served a more practical purpose through penetrating the guerrilla movement. Carceral methods used in the past could not acquire the information (knowledge) necessary to properly infiltrate terrorist forces. But within the parameters of corporal discipline, the body was utilized to actually increase knowledge (and therefore state power). Therefore, this paper asserts that corporal methods attempted to invest power into the body (through torture) for the pragmatic purpose of gathering information. Once corporal techniques attained all possible information from a body, that information could be re-invested into society. Re-invested information took the form of another abduction. Through these cyclical investments of power/knowledge the Proceso eliminated violent subversion throughout the nation. Control over violence allowed the military government an opportunity to restabilize the social, political and economic sectors within the country after 1978 but at the cost of many innocent human lives.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS

The concern of this paper has been to explain why a corporal phase of punishment emerges in a modern society which has long depended on carceral mode institutions, structures and techniques to contain class struggle. From the theoretical frameworks employed, the case study, and the preceding discussion, a few general conclusions can be drawn regarding this concern.

First, there exists strong evidence that shifts in the world-economy may cause substantial economic decline and subsequent periods of heightened class conflict within a modern nation. If economic decline is so substantial that a nation seemingly down-shifts in its position within the world-economy than class conflict may be more dramatic, direct and violent. These ideas are consistent with the theoretical assertions of Wallerstein and Hopkins (1982).

The development of open class conflict in a modern society does not immediately suggest that the mode of discipline will make a transition. Carceral mode solutions such as political inclusion or an economic miracle can reduce class conflict. Yet miracle-like solutions are difficult to achieve and without such innovations new forms of conflict may evolve.

The development of grassroots social mobilization in a nation will make successful challenges to the system of carceral discipline. Because social mobilization is
generated from disconnected and localized sources during grassroots activity, the ability of non-violent state structures to preclude spontaneous mobilization is limited.

If grassroots dissent is accompanied by covert, organized centres of armed resistance, then effective social control through carceral mode networks becomes even less possible. This is due to the underground nature of guerrilla groups and the ability of these groups to remain outside the control field of modern-type carceral mode structures. To redistribute a field of control over both guerrilla and grassroots dissent, shifts in social discipline may occur. If indeed a transition does begin, the carceral mode of discipline will begin integrating corporal techniques and structures into the disciplinary apparatus.

During this transition, both carceral and new corporal forms of discipline would be utilized to re-establish control over violent dissent. Distributed through new structures, such as death squads, corporal punishment eliminates leaders of dissent and averts possible dissidents from mobilizing. Therefore early death squads may quell grassroots areas of dissent, such as the labour movement, neighbourhood organizations, and leftist political bodies through fear.

But, corporal discipline administered by death squads may not cease the activities of terrorist cells. This is
due to the limited structure, strategy and resources of extra-legal police formations and the covert abilities of guerrilla groups. Police death squads are decentralized, used strictly to eliminate individuals, gather local intelligence and operate without full backing of the legal system (this limits available resources).

During the Transitional phase of discipline the cycle of dissent may escalate despite a wider field of control over grassroots mobilization (labour, students, etc.) This is usually the product of increased corporal violence between inpenetrable guerilla forces and security personnel. As violence magnifies, the national economy may further deteriorate, world market viability may become non-existent and grassroots uprisings may again emerge nationwide. Under these conditions, the re-establishment of social control is impossible through non-violent, democratic means and sporadic corporal discipline. Therefore, social discipline at this point may completely shift toward a total phase of corporal punishment. Total transition is achieved in the Absolute phase of discipline.

The Absolute phase of discipline may penetrate all social, geographical and psychological areas of a nation through violent symbols rather than structures and institutions. To the public, the marked bodies of subversives and other physical reminders act as symbols of the random power social punishers have over all individuals.
The body, as a symbol of power, places disturbing images and fears in the social mind. In this manner, corporal discipline spreads the field of social control over everyone, at all times in all areas of the nation, without the need for security forces to be physically present. The idea of pain, repulses contemplations of protest against the state.

Lastly, the Absolute phase of discipline may have an ability to fully penetrate covert cells of armed resistance no longer controllable through carceral mode techniques and structures. A coordinated, centralized, nation wide network of corporal discipline provides security forces with the extra-legal resources needed to quickly acquire mass information on guerrilla groups. This type of discipline also allows the government to permanently eliminate all terrorists.

To conclude then, this work suggests that corporal phase discipline does emerge from specific social circumstances occurring within and without of a nation. A modern society experiencing violent social, economic and political transformations may be unable to maintain a wide field of control over society through carceral mode means. This becomes more true as society continues to violently transform.

Therefore on a parallel line of development as violent social change, social discipline will also shift to suit the
new situation at hand. This shift is necessary since social discipline always seeks a maximum field of control over society. Through time, corporal techniques will be integrated and increasingly used to halt violent sources of dissent (terrorists or grassroots mobilization). Once an Absolute phase of corporal discipline is initiated, all forms of dissent may be deposed. If indeed dissent is halted and consistently contained then a wider field of control within a changing modern society has been achieved.
Implications

As a final note, this work forwards only one major implication regarding modes of social discipline and punishment. If further historical research is to be done regarding the development of corporal phases of discipline in modern societies, than social scientists must remain sensitive to the circumstances of the world-system. These circumstances limit the choices of actors within a given region. Therefore a national economy, the structure of government or the type of social discipline does not develop out of pure choice, but out of choices narrowly limited by circumstances beyond national boarders.

Having said this, future research on similar cases (such as Germany in 1939 or Chile in 1973) should make a considerable effort to link the world-system to a nation's economy and then link the economic performance of that nation to the development of social movements within the country (i.e. labour, guerrillas). Social discipline, will shift to match the development of social movements. This is true for this work and it should also be true for the results of similar research.
Appendix (A): A Selection of Legislation Protecting Argentine Citizens' Rights

a) The Argentine Constitution (Article 23) states:

during a State of Siege, Constitutional guarantees are suspended, but the President shall not convict or apply punishment upon his own authority, and his power shall be limited with respect to persons, to arresting them or transferring them from one point of the nation to another, if they do not prefer to leave Argentine territory. (Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1980:139)

b) The Argentine Constitution (Article 5) separates the state into three distinct and autonomous divisions. The jurisdiction of each of division must not be invaded by either of the two remaining branches. The three powers are the Executive, Congress, and the Judiciary. (Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1980)

c) The Argentine Constitution (Articles 86, 94, 95, 100) states:

The Judicial power of the Nation is exercised by the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as Congress may establish. The judges of the Supreme Court and of the lower federal courts are appointed by the Executive, with the Senate's consent; but in no case may the President exercise judicial functions, assume jurisdiction over pending cases, or reopen those decided. (Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1980:14)

d) Argentina belongs to the United Nations and the Organization of American States. From these international bodies extend human rights decrees that all members have sworn adherence to. Respectfully, these laws are the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Article 18 of the American Declaration states (Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1980:119):

Every accused person is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. Every person accused of an offense has the right to be given an impartial and public hearing, and to be tried by courts
previously established in accordance with preexisting laws and not to receive cruel, infamous or unusual punishments.

Similar concepts can be found within the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man states (Donnelly, 1993:106):

Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.

Article 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 17. -2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.


The Judicial power of the Nation shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may establish in the territory of the Nation.


nobody...shall be arrested except upon a written order issued by competent authority...

g) Article 18 continues (Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1980:181):

The death penalty for political offenses, all kinds of torture and beating are forever abolished. Prisons shall be healthy and clean, used for security and not for the punishment of the prisoners confined therein...

h) In 1956, the Supreme Court ruled (Carrio, 1989:188):

Article 18 of the Constitution requires due process before an inhabitant of the nation can be punished or deprived of his rights, and such due process is
absent if the affected party to the proceedings is not given adequate opportunities to be heard, or is otherwise prevented from exercising his rights.

i) In 1891 the Supreme Court ruled the following regarding habeas corpus (Carrio, 1989:114):

It is an express command of the Constitution that nobody can be imprisoned without a written order of competent authority... so all persons in any way restricted in their personal freedom may resort to the courts... and if it is found that the restriction has not been imposed by competent authority, an immediate release must be granted.
Appendix (B): Examples of the Proceso's Absolute Control Over Legality

It is important to note that laws after the coup were decreed by the junta, not congress or the judiciary, and upheld by the Military Tribunals. Executive supremacy over judicial functions is contrary to the Constitution.


b) The Statute of June 18, 1976 established laws regarding persons harming the supreme interests of the nation. This again invaded judicial division jurisdiction (Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1980:139):

the Military Junta shall determine to whom the Statute applies and what measures are to be taken; these measures include confinement in a place determined by the Executive, while such persons are at its disposal.

c) The Institutional Act of September 1, 1977 extended Presidential powers beyond state of siege legislation by:
   1) granting Executive power to administer an arrest order.
   2) granting Executive power to determine the detention of an individual.

Measures such as these are not illegal under Constitutional state of siege legislation, but, Executive powers of arrest and detention are meant to be utilized for short periods of time in order to build a case against an individual and then bring him or her to trial. The Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1980:140) determined the following:

While it is true that the Argentine Constitution places no time-limit on detentions ordered by the Executive, and prohibits sentencing by the President himself, this type of detention has in practice became a true penalty, without legal due process, since individuals are kept indefinitely under the Executive.
Bibliography


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