2002

**Traditional argumentation broadened.**

Linda Carozza

*University of Windsor*

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TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTATION BROADENED

by

Linda Carozza

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
through the Department of Philosophy
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts at the
University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

2002

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Abstract

This thesis addresses whether it is a mistake to limit the traditional conception of argument to that which is explicitly verbalized. Frans H. Van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst’s Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation (1984, 1992, 1993) is used as an exemplar of the verbal-oriented approach, since it is recognized as being influential in the field of argumentation. Pragma-Dialectics rests on the Speech Act theories of John L. Austin (1962) and John R. Searle (1979); and thus, implicit in the argumentation model are rules relating specifically to the use of language. A challenge is thus presented to the theory by introducing and discussing two modes of argumentation that tend to divert from the use of language, specifically the visual and the emotional.

A “visual argument” gets its strength primarily from a visual image. A visual argument makes a claim of some sort and has a reason or reasons for that claim. Plus, the argument is both communicated to an audience and is linguistically explicable. Referred to are three articles that positively address the possibility of visual argumentation, those of David S. Birdsell and Leo Groarke (1996), J. Anthony Blair (1996), and Leo Groarke (1996). Particular advertisements that relay arguments visually are also addressed.

Four types of emotional argumentation are discussed. They are: (1) emotions used to express an argument, (2) an emotion used as a reason for an argumentative claim, (3) an arguer appealing to the emotions of an audience, and (4) an arguer inducing an emotion in her audience. In describing these types of emotional argumentation the works of Michael A. Gilbert (1997), Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (1995, 1996), and Douglas N. Walton (1992) are addressed. Drawing from a theory of gender and language, moral criteria in language
outlined by Maryann Neely Ayim (1997) is used in order to demonstrate a system of language that would automatically account for emotional arguments.

In determining whether (A) Pragma-Dialectics can handle visual and emotional arguments, (B) Pragma-Dialectics can be modified to address visual and emotional arguments, or (C) Pragma-Dialectics is too limited a theory to make room for visual and emotional arguments, it is decided that the Pragma-Dialectical model can address both visual and emotional arguments with some minor modifications or additions to its theory.
Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my parents,

Giuseppe and Eva Carozza --

for their continual support

throughout my studies at

the University of Windsor.
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1.1 Argument and Argumentation

People always have held and always will hold different views. Although this may result in countless misunderstandings and disagreements, it is a wonderful phenomenon since it provides us with a world diverse of ideas, feelings, attitudes, positions, and experiences. The study of argumentation is useful in contributing to our understanding of humanity as multifarious. Argumentation is both a common and integral aspect in our lives.

When we hear the term 'argument,' we can each associate a particular meaning or description of it. I asked a few people what they considered to be an argument. Some responses were, “a dialogue between two people with differing opinions,” “a disagreement,” “a point of view that you are persuading people of.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines 'argument' as, “1 an outward sign: evidence. 2 a reason given for or against a matter under discussion. A statement made or a fact presented in support of or in opposition to a proposal or opinion. A form of rhetorical expression intended to convince or persuade. 3 the act or process of arguing, reasoning, or discussing,” among other senses. If anything, the conceptions of argument people have and the varying definitions in Webster’s show that the term is broadly construed.

When we enter into the field of argumentation scholarship, we are confronted with the same situation. The term 'argument' is defined differently by different theorists of argumentation. Furthermore, we have both the terms 'argument' and 'argumentation'
presented to us. Instead of distinguishing different theorists’ definitions of ‘argument’ or ‘argumentation,’ I will make clear the definitions of each term that this thesis rests on. In no way do I attempt to limit our knowledge or practice of the two terms; rather, my overall goal of this project is to broaden the accepted practice of argumentation.

1.2 Argument and Argumentation Defined

There are various schools in argumentation theory. An argumentation theorist who provides conceptions of the term 'argument' which relate closely to my conceptions of argument and argumentation is Daniel J. O’Keefe.

O’Keefe distinguishes between two types of argument. Argument₁ is an argument characterized as “a kind of utterance or a sort of communicative act” (Daniel J. O’Keefe, 1977, 121). It can be thought of as a claim and its reason. An argument₂ is described as “a particular kind of interaction” (121). Argument₂ denotes the process of arguing, or the act of making arguments for a certain claim. Thus in argument₁ an argument is treated as a thing, and in argument₂ an argument is treated as an act.

O’Keefe’s two conceptions of argument are used in this work to distinguish between an argument and argumentation. His definition of an argument₁ can refer to an argument. An argument is a thing, a stance an interlocutor adopts. An argument₂ can be associated with argumentation. It involves the process of individuals developing and expressing their viewpoints to each other. We can all make arguments (argument₁), and we can all engage in argumentation (argument₂), though they do not necessarily occur at the same time. For instance, an individual can formulate an argument regarding a certain issue and not express it. Or, two interlocutors can attempt to engage in argumentation and
never succeed in putting forth arguments for or against an issue. A successful argumentative interaction, however, necessarily requires arguments; in other words, an argument requires at least one argument.

There are various types of argumentation we can engage in. Douglas Walton outlines eight types of argumentative dialogue in his paper, “What is Reasoning? What is Argument?” (1990). They include: critical discussion, debate, inquiry, negotiation, planning committee, pedagogical, quarrel, and expert consultation (Douglas Walton, 1990, 413). According to Walton, each type of argumentative dialogue has its own goals and benefits. In the chart that Walton provides, there are listed several types of dialogue that I think any theory of argumentation should account for. And, aspects of almost all the dialogue types are important in argumentative discourse. For instance, the goal for a planning committee, to reach a joint decision, is important for interlocutors in argumentative discourse.

Walton shows that there are indeed various types of argumentation we can encounter. The type of argumentative situations I address encompass a range of different dialogue types and their initial situations, goals, and benefits. I address arguments that arise out of conflict and differences of opinion between interlocutors. The goal of argumentation I want to concentrate on is not so much to convince or persuade another interlocutor; but, rather, to learn other views and for interlocutors to collaboratively agree upon an outcome. Thus, arguments that can be settled definitively (with facts or data) are not my concern. Rather, I refer to arguments of controversy, where there is no definitive solution, and conclusions can be re-addressed and changed at any time. Interlocutors are encouraged to justify their viewpoints, but more importantly emphasis is placed on
understanding other views; this includes not only the arguments other interlocutors present, but also their methods of presenting the arguments. As well, I want to place more emphasis on understanding the views presented, and not on which view “wins.”

1.3 The Pragma-Dialectical Model

In this thesis I concentrate specifically on Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst’s Pragma-Dialectical approach to argumentation. A few characteristics of argumentation theory that apply to Pragma-Dialectics, depicted in Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory, are: it is a verbal activity (words are written or spoken to form arguments); it is a social activity (people are necessarily involved); it is an activity of reason (arguers must provide rational accounts of their positions); it is an activity intended to justify one’s standpoint or refute someone else’s (Frans H. Van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, Snoeck F. Henkemans, et al. 1996, 2-4).

1.4 Traditional Conception of Argumentation

When I refer to the “traditional model of argumentation,” there are certain characteristics that apply. The most prevalent characteristic I associate with traditional argumentation theories is the need for verbalization. Arguments are recognized insofar as they are written or spoken. With such an intense focus on the verbalized expression of arguments, the relationship between arguers and the context of the argumentative discourse are not given enough consideration in the resolution of disputes. Traditional argumentation theories also incorporate arguments as activities of “reason,” where arguers are encouraged to justify their own viewpoints and refute other views. These two
characteristics also inhibit the relationship between arguers and the context of the
argument, as well as the ways that arguers present their arguments. The traditional
conception of argumentation, to which I attribute Pragma-Dialectics, needs to be
broadened so that its neglected aspects are accounted for.

1.5 Inquiry and Influence

The motivation behind this thesis is twofold. First, there is the conviction that
visual arguments and emotional arguments are legitimate types of argumentation. Second,
there is the worry that traditional argumentation theories do not allow for the possibility of
either visual arguments or emotional arguments. I have chosen the contemporary theory
of Pragma-Dialectics as an exemplar of traditional argumentation theory. On the face of it,
it seems that Pragma-Dialectics is committed to arguments that are solely verbalized, and
this seems to rule out any possibility of visual or emotional arguments. Thus, I address
whether or not it is a mistake to limit the traditional conception of ‘argument’ to that
which is explicitly verbalized. I present a challenge to Pragma-Dialectics by introducing
and discussing two modes of argument that tend to be neglected: the visual and the
emotional.

A major influence in my study of argumentation theory, specifically the less
prominent modes of arguing I address in this thesis, is my exposure to feminist analyses of
argumentation and communication. Authors such as Maryann Neely Ayim (1997) and
Deborah Tannen (1982) claim that women and men tend to have different communication
styles, and I believe traditional argumentation tends to advocate those communication
styles typically associated with men. Although I do not directly deal with this issue of
gender and argumentation, in essence I aim to broaden the scope of argumentation so that it can accommodate the neglected styles of communication, those associated with women.

1.6 Thesis Outline

In the following chapter an exposition of Pragma-Dialectics is provided. I briefly outline different aspects of the theory, and specifically concentrate on how the Pragma-
Dialectical theory is committed to the explicitization/verbalization of arguments. I refer to at least three of the major works of Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 1993), the founders of Pragma-Dialectics. This gives the reader a sense of the nature of Pragma-Dialectics. I refer to parts of the Pragma-Dialectical theory that might inhibit visual or emotional arguments. For instance, the theory focuses on speech acts, thus it is concerned with the use of language in arguments.

Chapter Three sets out the case that visual arguments are indeed possible. Recent theoretical work on the topic of visual argumentation shows that some visual images can relay visual arguments, and visual arguments can be analyzed in the same manner that we analyze verbal arguments. In other words, the tools of traditional argumentation theories can be applied to visual arguments as well. Some of the authors addressed in this chapter are David S. Birdsell and Leo Groarke (1996), David Fleming (1996), and J. Anthony Blair (1996). Examples of their visual arguments with analyses are provided. I give my own view of visual arguments and demonstrate their nature with a couple of examples of visual arguments in advertising. The descriptions and discussion of visual arguments in Chapter Three leads me to later challenge whether Pragma-Dialectics can handle visual arguments.
In Chapter Four I show that emotional arguments exist. Recent works on emotional argumentation, which claim that emotions can be a part of argumentative discourse, are addressed. There are different types of emotional argumentation, and in discussing the ideas of Michael A. Gilbert (1997, 1998), Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (1995, 1996), and Douglas Walton (1992), I outline four kinds of arguments that depend on emotion in some way. Examples and analyses of emotional arguments are provided. At the end of Chapter Four, I shift the focus from argumentation theory specifically to Maryann Neely Ayim's work on the moral parameters of language (1997). She discusses four moral criteria in language, and I think this model of language use allows for the inclusion of arguing in more ways than that of traditional verbalization. In other words, implementing Ayim's system of language use naturally incorporates emotional argumentation. The discussion and elaboration of emotional arguments in this chapter leads to my question of whether Pragma-Dialectics can accommodate emotional argumentation.

In Chapter Five I determine whether (A) Pragma-Dialectics, as it stands, can handle visual and emotional arguments, and if not, whether (B) Pragma-Dialectics can be modified to address visual and emotional arguments, or (C) Pragma-Dialectics is too limited a theory to make room for the relatively "new" modes of visual and emotional arguments.

My hypothesis is that Pragma-Dialectics, as the theory stands, does not make room for the acceptance of visual and emotional arguments. The main reason for this presumption rests on the fact that the foundations of Pragma-Dialectics are rooted in Speech Act Theory, and thus it cannot escape the restrictions of language. Although I hope that we can rework a few aspects of Pragma-Dialectics so that it is able to address
visual and emotional arguments, my suspicion is that the last of the three choices above will occur -- that Pragma-Dialectics is too limited a theory to address visual and emotional arguments.

First I recapitulate Chapters Two to Four -- focusing on the points that relate specifically to my inquiry -- then I confront my hypothesis in Chapter Five. I offer a visual argument and address whether Pragma-Dialectics could work with it. The same is done with emotional argumentation; I offer an emotional argument and address how Pragma-Dialectics would handle it. This helps determine whether Pragma-Dialectics can handle visual and emotional arguments, can be modified to address visual and emotional arguments, or whether it is too limited a theory to make room for the relatively “new” modes of visual and emotional arguments.

Contrary to my initial expectations, I discover Pragma-Dialectics has a positive response to each of the visual and emotional challenges. It thus seems likely that Pragma-Dialectics can accommodate visual and emotional arguments.

1.7 In the End

Argumentation can teach us how to express our views effectively. It can teach us to respect opinions and thoughts other than our own. It provides us with a means of listening and interpreting others. It can help us mediate discussions between interlocutors. The study of argumentation that I want to provide should result in a system that allows us to be aware of the different methods of arguing (and I concentrate on those modes of argumentation that tend to be neglected) and learn to respect and understand them. It should result in a broader definition of argumentation.
Table One: Eight Types of Argumentative Dialogue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Dialogue</th>
<th>Initial Situation</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Critical</td>
<td>Difference of Opinion</td>
<td>To Convince Other Party</td>
<td>Understand Positions Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Debate</td>
<td>Adversarial Contest</td>
<td>Persuade Third Party</td>
<td>Clarification of Issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Inquiry</td>
<td>Lacking Proof</td>
<td>Prove or Disprove Conjecture</td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Negotiation</td>
<td>Conflict of Interest</td>
<td>Maximize Gains</td>
<td>Settlement and Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Planning</td>
<td>Collective Action</td>
<td>Joint Plan or Decision</td>
<td>Airing of Objections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Required</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Pedagogical</td>
<td>Ignorance of One Party</td>
<td>Teaching and Learning</td>
<td>Spread of Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Quarrel</td>
<td>Personal Conflict</td>
<td>Hit Out Verbally</td>
<td>Venting of Emotions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Expert</td>
<td>Need for Expert Advice</td>
<td>Decision For Action</td>
<td>Second-hand Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Two
An Exposition of Pragma-Dialectics

Scholars of argumentation are interested in how argumentative discourse can be used to justify or refute a standpoint in a rational way. In our opinion, argumentative discourse should therefore be studied as a specimen of normal verbal communication and interaction and it should, at the same time, be measured against a certain standard of reasonableness.

(van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, 5).

2.1 Background of Pragma-Dialectics

Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst began their development of Pragma-Dialectics, a theory of argumentation, in the late 1970s. Situated in the department of Speech Communication at the University of Amsterdam, van Eemeren and Grootendorst, along with their colleagues, have developed a program that encompasses both a dialectical approach and, latterly, a rhetorical analysis of argumentation. Some of their colleagues, who also write in this area, include Antoine Braet, Eveline Feteris, Peter Houtlosser, Bert Meuffils, Agnes van Rees, and Francisca Snoeck Henkemans.

The Pragma-Dialectical approach of van Eemeren and Grootendorst is rooted in, among other influences, the speech act theories of J. L. Austin and John Searle. It relies heavily on the actual practices of arguers and especially on their verbal assertions. Their theory models arguments as critical discussions -- dialogues between disagreeing parties who discuss together to try to resolve their disagreement in a rational way -- and in doing so aims to foster the resolution of the differences of opinion among arguers. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have developed a theory where the study of language use or verbal communication, its pragmatic element, and the study of critical dialogue or interaction, its dialectical element, are integral. Michael A. Gilbert writes of the Pragma-Dialecticians,
"Thus their approach is pragmatic because they are concerned with the practical task of arguing, and dialectic because they see argument as a social process occurring between two arguers" (Michael A. Gilbert, 1997, 19).

As I already mentioned in Chapter One, I refer to the Pragma-Dialectical theory as an exemplar of traditional argumentation. I will present a twofold challenge to the theory. First I will discuss visual arguments in Chapter Three and then emotional arguments in Chapter Four, both of which lead to the address of my actual challenge in Chapter Five: can a theory that focusses so heavily on verbal explicitization integrate these modes of arguing? In this chapter, I will outline the aspects of the Pragma-Dialectical model of argumentation that I think are important, in order to have a grasp of Pragma-Dialectics adequate to the purposes of my project. The major works of van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s that I will refer to are Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984), Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies (1992), and Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse (1993) written with Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs.

2.2 The Pragma-Dialectical Definition of Argumentation

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s conception of “argumentation” is equivalent to what we would call an argument. It involves arguers defending their positions or refuting others’ positions. They write, “argumentation is a speech act consisting of a constellation of statements designed to justify or refute an expressed opinion and calculated in a regimented discussion to convince a rational judge of a particular standpoint in respect of the acceptability or unacceptability of that expressed opinion” (Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, 1984, 18).
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst specifically define some of the terms they use in their definition above. An “expressed opinion” is the subject of the argumentation at hand; it can refer to the facts, ideas, theories, actions, or attitudes over which the arguers disagree. An “expressed opinion” is verbally expressed in the speech acts of the arguers. For instance, Alex and Jordan engage in an argumentative discussion where the expressed opinion is “the tree blossoms in the summer.” This is the proposition over which the arguers disagree.

One’s “standpoint” is also known as one’s point of view. It is the verbalized attitude of a speaker that refers to her agreement, disagreement, or neutrality with an expressed opinion (1984, 5). Arguers can have one of three different standpoints. An arguer can have a positive standpoint, which is a committedness to an acceptance of an expressed opinion. An arguer can have a negative standpoint, which is a committedness to a denial of an expressed opinion (1984, 5). Van Eemeren and Grootendorst also claim that an arguer can be undecided with respect to the expressed opinion and thus have an undecided or no standpoint (1992, 15). For instance, in the argumentative discussion between Alex and Jordan above, Alex maintains that “trees blossom during the summer.” This is a positive standpoint since Alex agrees with the expressed opinion. Jordan claims that “trees do not blossom during the summer.” This is a negative standpoint since Jordan disagrees with the expressed opinion. An undecided standpoint would involve an arguer not agreeing that trees blossom during the summer and not agreeing that they do not blossom during the summer. The arguer does not take a position.

A “rational judge” is the language user to whom the argument is addressed. This language user must assess the acceptability or unacceptability of arguments based on their
success in resolving disputes. For instance, an argument in support of a positive standpoint should adequately justify an expressed opinion, while an argument in support of negative standpoint should adequately refute an expressed opinion (1984, 5). Knowing that there is a language user who assesses the success of an argumentative discourse should encourage interlocutors to advance in argumentative discussions that are as adequate as possible.

2.3 Objectives of the Pragma-Dialectical Model

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have five objectives of argumentation in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984, 4). First, they focus on the relationship between the speaker giving an argument and the listener accepting an argument. They want to clarify what speech acts are being performed during argumentation. They want to draw guidelines for analyzing argumentation and making unexpressed premises explicit. They also want to formulate behaviour rules which provide arguers with a code of conduct in discussions (1984, 3-4). These objectives allow for a systematic approach to marketplace (everyday) arguments as well as provide a pragmatic, dialectic, and ideal model of argumentation.

2.3a A Pragmatic Model: Speech Acts

Pragma-Dialectics develops a theoretical conception of the use of language in discussions of disagreement, which helps to discover the problems inhibiting agreement. Integrating speech act theory in their theory of argumentation is crucial to the Pragma-Dialectical account of argumentation.
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst borrow definitions of Speech Act Theory from its founders Austin and Searle. Speech Act Theory views language as a form of verbal action. The “illocutionary”/“perlocutionary” acts distinction is important to Pragma-Dialectics. An illocutionary act is the performance of a speech act. The illocutionary act carries the communicative aspect of language. Thus the arguing that occurs during an argumentative discourse is composed of illocutionary speech acts (1984, 19). An illocutionary act is successful if the listener understands the speaker’s standpoint. A perlocutionary act is the act of bringing about the effect intended by an illocutionary’s act (1984, 19). In an argumentative context, then, the speaker’s act of convincing or persuading an interlocutor is a perlocutionary act. A listener’s acceptance or rejection of a speaker’s standpoint is considered the perlocutionary effect. It harbours the interactional aspects of language and is associated with the act of convincing.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s recapitulation of Speech Act Theory is more detailed than the brief description I have provided. The point of importance in attaching the Pragma-Dialectical model to language, specifically to Speech Act Theory, is the underlying commitment it reflects to pragmatics.\[1\]

2.3b A Dialectical Model

The dialectical approach (like a rhetorical approach) focuses on the process of argumentation. However, van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s dialectical approach requires rules of conduct in order to resolve disputes between arguers in a rational way and to ensure that speech acts are properly applied to respective arguments. As they write, “the crux of a dialectical approach is that argumentation is regarded as an attempt to defend a
standpoint in respect of an expressed opinion against the critical reactions of a rational judge in a regimented discussion” (1984, 18). In other words, the interaction of speech acts between arguers with conflicting views is the focus of a dialectical model of argumentation.

2.3c An Ideal Model Of Argumentation

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s Pragma-Dialectical account of argumentation is both descriptive and normative. It is descriptive since it deals with real arguments, which thus provides it with an empirical basis. The authors write that “these results of empirical research are interesting in their own right; in pragma-dialectics, however, they are primarily turned to account in developing educational methods for moving argumentative practice towards the theoretical ideal of critical discussion” (1996, 310). Studying normal verbal communication and interaction between conflicting parties, then, provides the raw material for a normative theory.

The Pragma-Dialectical theory is normative since it presents a model that critical discussions should follow. Yet even though the rules model an ideal system of resolution-oriented discourse, van Eemeren and Grootendorst maintain that they offer guidance to actual arguers who wish to resolve a dispute (1996, 311).

2.4 Features of the Pragma-Dialectical Model

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s approach to argumentation has four main features. These are the “externalization,” “functionalization,” “socialization,” and “dialectification” of argumentation. The first feature, externalization, claims that disputes
must be resolved verbally, that is by written or spoken language of the subject being probed. Interlocutors in discourse should concentrate on arguers’ verbal statements or speech acts; their opinions must be expressed and explicit (1984, 6). Concentrating on externalized information does two things. First, the externalization feature forces arguers to make their thoughts explicit, making their “internal” thoughts “external.” Second, it prevents interlocutors in argumentative disputes from psychologizing others. In other words, a listener must not assume more than what the speaker has put forth. A listener cannot determine that the speaker means to prove something other than what has been verbalized. When interlocutors are in the middle of an argumentative discussion, they cannot make judgements about others’ unexpressed feelings or thoughts. We can only deal with what is externalized.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst state that “terms like thought or idea can also be considered as indicators of psycho-pragmatic primitives, which enable us to speak meaningfully about phenomena that are specifically connected with people” (1984, 6). They warn against the danger of accepting psycho-pragmatic primitives that do not directly relate to statements made. However, “the content of the postulated intentions, thoughts or ideas is determined by the information communicated by the speaker” (1984, 6). According to Pragma-Dialectics, we should be careful about attributing to a speaker what the speaker actually verbally communicates, since we cannot know with certainty what someone believes apart from what they verbalize to us. Furthermore, if an interlocutor commits to a proposition, then it is fair to hold her to it -- for instance, even if she did not initially see all its implications.
The second feature, functionalization, ensures that the issue at stake is treated as a *purposive activity*. The analysis of arguments should be concerned with both the structure of argumentative discourse and verbal activity. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst write, "the argumentation theorist should regard argumentation as a language usage process which has run its proper course only if certain conditions have been met in the performance of the speech act argumentation" (1984, 7). In other words, they are concerned not only with the result of an argumentative interaction, defended or refuted standpoint, but with the process of laying out speech acts as well. In this way, then, they view argumentation as much an activity as it is a product. The functionalizing element of argumentation regards argumentation as a process of language use and, in so doing, ensures that speech acts have been successfully performed.

Argumentative discourse occurs in everyday, common, language. If we were to focus solely on the products of arguments, we would dismiss people's methods of arguing. In order to determine whether an arguer has successfully argued her viewpoint, it is important not to overlook or dismiss the process of argumentation. The process includes arguers performing speech acts which pertain to the standpoint. Thus, it is important not to overlook the ways language is used in colloquial speech in order to achieve the effect of justifying or refuting an expressed opinion. The functionalization feature can provide for a method of recognizing and clarifying argumentation techniques.

The third feature, socialization, deals with the communicative and interactive elements of argumentative discourse. Argumentation is viewed as a bilateral process between a speaker and a listener. The speaker presents an argument to the listener, who adopts the position of a rational judge. If the listener is not convinced of the speaker's
argumentation, then she is encouraged to respond to the argument by assessing the role of a speaker, "so that a dialogue is initiated" (1984, 9). Arguments are not only about the standpoints presented, but about the back and forth process of interlocutors acting as both speaker and listener as well. Thus, a successful argument requires that interlocutors assume the position of both speaker and listener. For instance, Jackie, the listener, has to listen to Peter's arguments, as Peter is the speaker. If Jackie rejects Peter's arguments, this shifts her into the position of speaker, while Peter adopts the position of listener.

This model of argumentation also applies to one-person arguments. If an individual is undecided about a particular issue, then she may enter into what van Eemeren and Grootendorst term an "interior dialogue" (1984, 9). An individual may doubt a standpoint and consequently offer alternatives or reactions to those doubts. The social aspect of the Pragma-Dialectical theory is still evident since different standpoints are considered.

The last feature, dialectification, deals with resolving disputes. If the listener is not convinced of the speaker's standpoint, then she is entitled to react to the speaker's statements, and so an argumentative discourse develops (1984, 9). Argumentation is successful when the listener accepts the argumentation of the speaker. In either case, a critical discussion evolves as the listener critically assesses and responds to the speaker's standpoints.

The dialectical approach van Eemeren and Grootendorst envision provides that argumentation be part of a critical discussion about expressed opinions, where interlocutors are at odds with each other. A simple form of argumentation involves an
arguer advancing a standpoint that is simply met with doubt (1992, 17). For example, an arguer asserts that all Air Canada flights result in delays. The listener may not agree with this statement, but she does not disagree with it either. An example of a complex argument could involve the first arguer advancing a pro-standpoint, and the second arguer advancing a contra-standpoint. For instance, if the first arguer claims that “all Air Canada flights result in delays,” then the second arguer would disagree with this standpoint and claim that “not all Air Canada flights result in delays.” This process of argumentation allows for an interaction involving speech act exchanges, which is pivotal for Pragma-Dialectics (1984, 17).

2.5 Four Stages of Argumentative Discourse in Pragma-Dialectics

The Pragma-Dialectical model of argumentation has a four stage model for the resolution of an argumentative dispute. The stages are the “confrontation” stage, the “opening” stage, the “argumentation” stage, and the “concluding” stage.

A disagreement, or potential disagreement, initiates the confrontation stage. If there is no obvious disagreement, doubt, or contradiction of views, then there is no need for a critical discussion (1993, 26). For instance, Mrs. Carson states to the rest of her family that they are going to spend the entire weekend cleaning the house together. If no one responds negatively to Mrs. Carson’s statement, then there is no difference in opinion and thus no need for a critical discussion. However, if Mrs. Carson’s son replies that he has already made plans with his friends for Saturday, then there is an obvious disagreement that needs to be discussed.
In the opening stage, arguers determine whether or not they have enough common ground, which includes common background or shared values, to discuss and resolve their differences of opinion. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst, it could be the case that the individuals involved recognize that there is a dispute and choose to leave it at that (1984, 85). In other words, the arguers agree to disagree with each other. If identifying that there is an obvious disagreement is not enough, then the arguers must share the hope of entering into critical discussion in order to solve the conflict at issue (1993, 26-27). Using the example of the Carsons above, Mrs. Carson may decide to defend her statement, while her son prepares to attack it. Mrs. Carson, then, assumes the role of a protagonist, while her son assumes the role of an antagonist. This, of course, would imply that both parties wish to discuss and resolve the conflicting plans for the upcoming weekend.

In the argumentation stage, an arguer who is the protagonist must defend her standpoints against the refutations of the antagonist. This is where the actual “arguing” takes place. Mrs. Carson would thus need to provide solid reasons for her son to change his plans and stay home and help the family around the house. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst would label Mrs. Carson the protagonist of a standpoint, “the Carsons will clean the house as a family,” which implies that she must defend her view by offering pro-argumentation to justify it (1984, 86). As the antagonist, Mrs. Carson’s son would need to seriously doubt and question Mrs. Carson’s statement. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, along with Jackson and Jacobs, claim that a protagonist’s argumentation can vary from simple to extremely complex (1993, 27). Thus, depending on the
antagonist’s objections, new argumentation can be elicited from the protagonist. Without the first three stages, a critical discussion cannot occur.

In the fourth stage, or the concluding stage, the arguers decide whether the antagonist has raised enough doubt about the standpoint to force the protagonist to withdraw it, or alternatively the arguers may decide that the antagonist has not raised enough doubt about the protagonist’s standpoint, and consequently the objections must be withdrawn. In the former case, the resolution is in favour of the antagonist, since the protagonist’s standpoint has been withdrawn. In the case of the latter, the resolution of the argument is in favour of the protagonist, since the doubt of the antagonist is withdrawn (1992, 35).

Continuing with the Carson example, Mrs. Carson may answer her son’s objections by stating that her son always makes plans with his friends, and missing one weekend with them is not a big deal. Furthermore, he is a part of the household and should not get out of doing some necessary chores. For these reasons, Mrs. Carson is not retracting her proposition that everyone stay in and clean up around the house on the weekend. Her son may not have any objections and thus has to assent to her argument. This is one possible outcome of the Carson argument; the protagonist convinces the antagonist. It could also have been the case that the antagonist raised enough doubt so that the protagonist gives up her standpoint. If the arguers cannot agree on a suitable conclusion, then the critical discussion has not led to a resolution of the differences of opinion, and the arguers must agree that no resolution was found (1993, 27).
2.6 Communicative and Interactional Aspects of Pragma-Dialectics

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst believe argumentation scholars should be concerned with argumentation in colloquial speech. This is simply to say that everyday, marketplace, arguments are important to the Pragma-Dialectical model. In *Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies*, van Eemeren and Grootendorst provide an elaborated restatement of their theory. At one point, they specifically concentrate on the features of argumentative discourse as a form of communication and interaction. According to their theory, the speaker in an argument must necessarily verbally communicate her intentions or beliefs. It is not up to the listener to assume what the speaker really means to express. As the authors write, "unless we can ask for clarification, we must base our interpretation on the verbal presentation as has arisen, and try to find the interpretation of utterances that are obscure, opaque, or vague that fits best into context" (1992, 22). A listener, thus, can only work with what the speaker makes verbally explicit. If the speaker’s standpoint is not clear, the listener needs to ask for clarification.

Furthermore, both speaker and listener have certain commitments when engaged in argumentative discourse. For instance, a speaker must abide by her standpoints, and if she makes a statement, she must then provide support for that statement if it is requested. As well, a listener is expected to genuinely aim at understanding a speaker’s point of view.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst distinguish between communicative effect and interactional effect. A speaker’s utterances, which include such things as questions, promises, or statements, carry the communicative aspect of argumentation. In expressing herself, the speaker communicates with a listener by using speech acts. A speaker, then, communicates her intentions via the words she speaks or writes. By communicative effect,
van Eemeren and Grootendorst have in mind the speaker’s “understanding a speech act is the communicative effect that is aimed at by the speaker” (1992, 27). The extent to which a listener understands a speaker’s speech act is the communicative effect of argumentation. A listener’s response, whether it is a smile, a request for more information, agreement, or disagreement, is the interactional aspect of argumentation. The authors write of the difference, “As a rule, the speaker will also hope to achieve an interactional effect: that the listener accept the speech act that is performed or respond in a certain way” (1992, 27).

Even though the communicative and interactional aspects of speech acts are not entirely independent from each other, since a speech act a speaker performs can carry out both functions, this does not mean that the communicative effect of understanding is necessarily followed by the interactional effect of accepting a speaker’s standpoint.

2.6a Rules of Communication

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst set out certain rules of communication intended to optimize the communication. These rules are intended to avoid problems of miscommunication, misunderstandings, unclear standpoints, or any ambiguity in a discourse of argumentation. “Be clear, honest, efficient and to the point” is the Principle of Communication that grounds all their rules (1992, 50). Some of their rules include “do not perform any incomprehensible speech acts” and “do not perform any insincere speech acts” (1992, 50-51). These rules allow standpoints to appear clear and honest and are necessary since a listener is more likely to accept or commit herself to a standpoint that the speaker distinctly and sincerely advocates. Two other rules are “do not perform any superfluous speech acts” and “do not perform any futile speech acts” (1992, 51). These
rules encourage efficiency in argumentation encounters. In order for arguers to remain on task, or to the point, there is the rule “do not perform any speech acts that do not appropriately connect to proceeding speech acts” (1992, 52). Each of these rules, if followed, provides for a lucid, genuine, and productive way for interlocutors to argue.

2.7 Dialectical Reconstruction

It is inevitable that “real” arguments may not progress smoothly, or that arguers may not argue paradigmatically. For these less than ideal cases of argumentation, Pragma-Dialecticians offer detailed analyses. An analysis of an ordinary, everyday disagreement, for instance, has the effect of making a “real argument” appear more like an “ideal argument,” so that dialectical reconstruction can be applied.

Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs outline four rules of reconstruction which are needed in the analysis of argumentative discourses. When an analyst dialectically reconstructs a discourse of argument, she is expected to apply the rules of transformation to the speech acts which are relevant to the resolution of the disagreement at stake. A reconstruction of an argument concentrates on the point in question, the positions each party takes with respect to the point in question, whether protagonist or antagonist, the arguments that each party puts forth with respect to respective standpoints, and the structure of argumentation each party puts forth (1993, 60).

A dialectical reconstruction of argumentation involves four transformations: “deletion,” “addition,” “permutation,” and “substitution.” In order for any transformation to occur, it is imperative that the standpoints of the arguers are made verbally explicit. An
analyst must first depict the main issue at stake and then determine which positions the arguers have taken with respect to that issue. From this point, an argumentation analyst can begin to apply the transformations and analyse the argument.

The transformation of deletion allows the analyst to reduce arguments to concise statements which relate to the conflict's resolution. Van Eemeren et al. offer an extended example of a mediated session between a divorcing couple each of whom is seeking custody of their child (1993, 63-66). In this case, the wife (Genie) and husband (Fred) argue over futile points. For instance, Fred drove his car off a small cliff, and there is a dispute over the height of the cliff. The analyst omits discussion over how high the cliff actually was, since it has no bearing on the custody of the child. Redundant or irrelevant information, therefore, is deleted from the argumentative discourse (1993, 61).

The transformation of addition permits the analyst to complete elements of the discourse that are relevant to the dispute, but have been left unexpressed. Implicit data is made explicit and missing steps are displayed, which allows the analyst to fill in any enthymemes that may be present in the discourse (1993, 61). For instance, if Arguer A offers an opposing standpoint from Arguer B, then an analyst might indicate that Arguer A doubts Arguer B's standpoint. In the custody case, the mediator must continually ask Fred and Genie why they should each receive custody of their son Jonathon, since they are not forming their arguments coherently.

In the transformation of permutation the elements of an argument are rearranged. In this step, argumentative elements are placed in an order that shows the resolution process of the argument. The natural elements of marketplace argument are arranged to fit the “ideal” model in this transformation (1993, 62). For instance, the mediator
reconstructs the dialogue between Fred and Genie in the custody example by claiming that Genie argues that she should have custody of the child, and Fred argues that he should have custody of the child even though the discussion did not begin with their establishing that their standpoints were at odds.

The last dialectical transformation, substitution, provides for the production of clarity. Analysts replace ambiguous or vague statements with clear phrases (1993, 62). The husband in the mediated session denies his wife’s accusations more than once. Through the transformation of substitution, the mediator concludes that Fred’s denials can actually be attributed to his assertion, that Genie is unfit to have custody over Jonathan. Through substitution the mediator clearly articulates the ideas of the arguers involved.

In order to resolve differences of opinion, argumentation analysts need to be aware of arguers’ conflicting standpoints, arguers’ positions, arguers’ arguments, the structure of arguments, and the argumentation schemes used. The authors believe that the guiding principles of dissecting and reconstructing arguments aid analysts in setting out all these components (1993, 61-62).

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst also lay out rules for a code of conduct that rational discussants should follow. These rules regulate argumentative discussions. One of their rules states that if an arguer advances a standpoint, then she is expected to defend it if her listener asks her to do so. Another rule states that an arguer must defend her standpoint by advancing arguments that relate to that particular standpoint (1992, 208). Van Eemeren and Grootendorst state eight other rules for critical discussion (1992, 208-209), as well as possible violations of these rules that result in fallacious argumentative moves. For instance, an arguer who evades the burden of proof violates the
first rule I stated above. These rules provide for efficient and rational argumentative discussions for the Pragma-Dialectical model.

2.8 Key Points of Pragma-Dialectics

The points I have discussed above compose a small portion of the Pragma-Dialectical account of argumentation founded by van Eemeren and Grootendorst. The following sums up the above exposition of Pragma-Dialectics.

In argumentation, participants are encouraged to speak freely. By using speech acts, arguers justify or refute expressed opinions. Since listeners are deemed “rational judges,” a speaker must provide an accurate and truthful argument. Furthermore, if a listener challenges a speaker’s claims, the speaker must attempt to defend her standpoint. The speaker is successful in doing so if the listener accepts the claim, when it is a pro-argumentation, or rejects the claim, when it is a contra-argumentation. If the speaker and listener cannot agree on a suitable conclusion, then they will have to agree on a difference of opinion.

The Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation seeks to model the resolution of differences of opinion among individuals. An argument is resolved when each party involved in the dispute presents a cluster of speech acts that support each respective standpoint in the critical discussion. Furthermore, van Eemeren and Grootendorst develop certain features and stages that are important to the process of argumentative discourse they advocate.

The Pragma-Dialectical model of argumentation has been influential in argumentation scholarship. I have chosen the theory as an exemplar of traditional
argumentation theories. What I do in the next two chapters is discuss alternative types of argumentation models, then return to the theory of van Eemeren and Grootendorst and address whether the Pragma-Dialectical model can make room for alternative models of argumentation, or whether it is too stringent a model to adapt to newer argumentation theories.

Note

[1] "Pragmatics" is the theory of language use. It relies "... on the distinction between speaker meaning and linguistic meaning, it aims to characterize the nature of communicative intentions and how they are expressed and recognized" (The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 869).
Chapter Three
Visual Argumentation

The media have created an imbalance between professional persuaders and a public untrained in evaluating visual persuasion. . . . we need systematic methods for training students to detect, analyze and evaluate visual images (Rutledge 204-205).

3.1 The Growing Importance of Visual Arguments

One of the problems of treating arguments as exclusively verbalized exchanges of information is that it neglects other modes of argumentation prevalent in our culture. We are at a point when the mass media is an extremely important system in our society. More specifically, my concern with visual argumentation stems from the business of advertising. John Berger writes, “all of us see hundreds of publicity images every day . . . In no other form of society in history has there been such a concentration of images, such a density of visual messages” (John Berger, 1977, 129). This is not a recent quotation; it comes from the late 1970s. Almost thirty years later, the amount of visual communication, and the modes of presenting them, have only increased. With this in mind, I think it is important to alter our traditional definitions of ‘argument’ and ‘argumentation’ in order to realize and address visual arguments.

In this chapter I will discuss the works of argumentation theorists Birdsell, Groarke, Fleming, and Blair. Each author presents a different stance with regard to visual argumentation. While Birdsell and Groarke provide positive responses to common critiques of visual arguments, Fleming and Blair are more sceptical in their understanding of visual argumentation. Fleming’s definition of ’argument’ precludes the possibility of visual arguments. Blair is not as quick to ward off the possibility of visual arguments as is
Fleming. For Blair, as long as certain criteria are met, criteria derived from O’Keefe’s “argument,” a visual argument may be possible. Aside from Fleming, the authors present different examples of visual images that are argumentative in advertisements, paintings, cartoon strips, and sculptures.

Groarke and Blair do not disagree that visual argumentation is possible. In fact, both apply the rules of verbal-oriented argumentation to visual argumentation. Groarke provides what he calls logical analyses of visual images and believes that as long as there is a discernible premise and conclusion, a visual image can provide an argument. While Blair has more requirements than Groarke for a discernible argument through visual images, for instance an attempt to communicate the claim and reason, he also applies rules of the verbal-oriented approach of argumentation to visual arguments. Both authors conclude that visual arguments are entirely possible as long as they follow the respective definitions of ‘argument’ Groarke and Blair hold. I will discuss the ideas of both authors in this chapter.

We can find visual arguments in a wide array of contexts, such as advertisements, cartoon strips, sculptures, paintings, and miming. There are different forms of visual argumentation. The two that develop throughout this chapter are arguments that are entirely pictorial, and arguments that have words accompanying pictures. In the latter, argument is conveyed via a combination of words and pictures, but both types of visual argumentation rely on still images. Another example of a visual argument could be found on a movie screen or ballet stage where visual images are in motion.

Though it seems that we are confronted with a considerable amount of visual stimuli, visual arguments are still treated as extraneous to the traditional definition of
argumentation. In this chapter I will first discuss different theories of visual argumentation that both accept and reject the possibility of visual arguments, and second I will provide advertisements from a current issue of a popular magazine that present visual arguments and develop analyses of them. Both these tasks will lead to discovering whether Pragma-Dialectics -- what I propose as a traditional theory of argumentation -- can make room for visual arguments.

In discussing visual argumentation, my goals are both to outline a type of argumentation that tends to be neglected and to demonstrate its importance in our lives today. To be more clear, I think visual arguments are a growing form of communicating arguments and traditional argumentation theories need to acknowledge them.

3.1a Visual vs. Verbal?

In *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology* (1986), W.J. Thomas Mitchell addresses the subject of images and broaches in particular the question of the difference between pictures and words. In the first part of the book, Mitchell demonstrates and discusses how an image can be broken down to a “family tree” of sorts (W.J. Thomas Mitchell, 1986, 9-10). According to Mitchell, there are several things that we term “image,” for instance, a picture, a map, or a memory. An image is described by Mitchell as “likeness, resemblance, similitude” (1986, 10). The various branches of an image include the graphic, the optical, the perceptual, the mental, and the verbal.[1] Each of these branches of an image is integral to a particular academic discipline. For instance, an art historian would have interest in the graphical while a literary critic would be interested in verbal imagery (1986, 10).
An important point Mitchell makes is that the graphic (pictures) and the verbal (words) are simply different types of images. Neither should be ranked above the other, nor should they be set against each other. Just as a word or a string of words is representative of something in the world, so is a picture. I think Mitchell's idea regarding verbal and visual images is a significant point that should be applied to argumentation theory. If a string of words expresses an argument, then perhaps a visual image can express an argument as well. Thus, it may be possible for arguments to be solely verbal, solely visual, or have both visual and verbal elements, with neither element ranked "better" than the other.

3.2 Birdsell and Groarke -- Developing a Theory of Visual Argumentation

In 1996, Argumentation and Advocacy, the journal of the American Forensic Association, published a two-part special issue devoted to visual argumentation. In the first article the guest editors, David S. Birdsell and Leo Groarke, wrote, "these special, two issues are motivated by the conviction that argumentation theorists do not pay enough attention to the visual components of argument and persuasion. A better understanding of these components is especially important if we want to understand the role of advertising, film, television, video, multi-media, and the World Wide Web in our lives" (David S. Birdsell and Leo Groarke, 1996, 1). The visual aspects of argumentation are not given as much attention as the verbal since many argumentation scholars focus on verbalized argumentative discourse (1996, 1). In doing so, they do not recognize other possible arguments, whether they are entirely visual, or a combination of verbal and visual images.
Birdsell and Groarke claim that visual argumentation is both prevalent in our lives and too important to dismiss.

Birdsell and Groarke address particular concerns with visual arguments. The first concern is that visual arguments can be vague and ambiguous. For this reason, visual images are considered less precise than words. Birdsell and Groarke reply to this criticism by pointing out that words and sentences can also be vague and ambiguous (1996, 2). Gilbert uses the same point to support alternative modes of arguing. Gilbert writes, “there is nothing that guarantees the transparency of linguistic utterances -- we constantly misunderstand and misinterpret each other -- so why should such a demand be made for nonlinguistic expressions?” (1997, 80). Birdsell and Groarke assert that an appreciation for the “possibility of visual meaning and the limits of verbal meaning” (1996, 2) will initiate an acceptable theory of visual argumentation.

Another criticism of visual arguments is that pictures or graphics cannot be taken at face value. However, Birdsell and Groarke claim that neither can words and verbalized arguments (1996, 5). They give an example of a verbal argument that cannot be taken at face value:

Jonathon: Do you think the faculty will get a raise this year?

Maryann: Oh, sure. Now that we have a growing deficit, enormous new demands on our operating budget, flat revenues, and a government hostile to public education, I expect 15%! (1996, 5).

The argument Maryann makes in this example cannot be taken at face value. Firstly, her proofs alone do not lead to the conclusion that the faculty will get a raise in pay, and secondly there is more going on in this argument than Maryann’s verbal proclamation.
Birdsell and Groarke write, "Assuming that there has never been a raise as significant as 15%, the contextually initiated will recognize that Maryann’s response should not be taken at face value" (1996, 5). Maryann’s tone of voice might indicate her sarcasm, but just on the basis of her conflicting evidence and literal conclusion, we can be sure that Maryann actually believes that, "No, the faculty will not get a raise this year."

This example also supports Birdsell and Groarke’s claim that “there is no reason to assume that a visual image must conduct its contributions to argument in perfect isolation” (1996, 5). In Maryann’s case, sarcasm accompanied her words in order to make an argument. Thus different elements may be incorporated into visual argumentation that might render the argument vague (whether it is intended or not); this however can occur in any form of communication.

Birdsell and Groarke claim that pictures alone may not always result in arguments; words might be involved in combination with images. They give an example of an anti-smoking poster (see Figure 3.1). The argument in this poster, which is straightforward according to the authors, is made by an amalgamation of both the verbal and the visual. Birdsell and Groarke summarize the argument as, “You should be wary of cigarettes because you could get hooked and -- like a fish on a lure -- endanger your health” (1996, 3). This example happens to be a clear and straightforward one with the words and picture working together to make an argument.

A third concern with visual arguments that Birdsell and Groarke address is a criticism voiced by David Fleming, whose ideas I discuss in more detail below. According to Fleming, the distinction between visual premises and conclusions in argumentation theory is not well developed (1996, 5). Birdsell and Groarke do not disagree with
Figure 1. Anti-smoking Poster, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1976).

Figure 3.1

*Argumentation and Advocacy, 33, 2.*
Fleming's concern, but their response is simply that since we have not taken seriously the possibility of visual argumentation, a well developed theory of visual arguments has not yet been accomplished. Furthermore, Birdsell and Groarke report that we have accepted enthymematic arguments, verbal arguments that have a missing premise, since the influence of Aristotle (1996, 7). The same can be done for visual argumentation as well.

Birdsell and Groarke establish three prerequisites for the foundation of visual argumentation. The first is to accept the possibility of visual meaning. The second is to make an effort to consider visual arguments in their specific context. The last prerequisite is to recognize representation and resemblance in argumentation (1996, 8). Once we adhere to these three prerequisites, we can begin to identify arguments in visual images as well as understand their context.

3.3 Fleming and Blair -- Can Visual Images Amount to Arguments?

I briefly mentioned a criticism of David Fleming's above that Birdsell and Groarke address. Fleming asserts that pictures cannot amount to arguments in his paper, "Can Pictures be Arguments?" (1996). To begin, he defines an "argument" as a human act that both claims and supports ideas. In order to have an argument, there necessarily needs to be a disagreement of views. And, language is inherent in an argument according to Fleming (David Fleming, 1996, 13). His definition of argument is similar to the previously characterized traditional conception of argument in that they both rely on the written or spoken word.

According to Fleming, a picture is an image that is iconic of the external world (1996, 11). Recall that Mitchell regards visual images and verbal images as
representations of the world. Thus, Mitchell and Fleming agree that a picture is symbolic of something in the world. Fleming, however, does not think that pictures and words have the same effect of resemblance, claiming that pictures "show" us something while words "tell" us something. This leads Fleming to question whether or not a graphical image, since it lacks verbal language, can be argumentative. For Fleming a picture cannot provide a succinct and obvious "conclusion" since "a picture typically functions as a simultaneous whole rather than a sequence of bits" (1996, 14). Fleming also claims that there is no apparent "disagreement" at work in a picture, which would prevent the possible distinction between opposing claims and their respective evidence. Furthermore, without any words to determine the exact argument, we are not able to look at a picture, determine the argument being made, and actually refute or oppose it.

Fleming's definition of the term 'argument' reveals whether or not a visual image can be an argument. His definition of an argument automatically precludes any non-verbalized form of argumentation; there can be no visual argument. If there are no words present, then there is no argument verbalized, for Fleming. Fleming writes, "it might be said that I define argument in such a way that it has a built-in bias towards linguistic forms. But that is precisely my point, the traditional conceptions of argument reflect an inherent connection to a particular kind of speech act, and to dissociate the term from that act would strip the concept of its most important qualities" (1996, 20). Fleming wants to retain the traditional conception of argument he has adopted. If we do this, then it is impossible to make room for visual argumentation.

Fleming claims that a picture could be an argument, if the term 'argument' were drawn out (1996, 19). I believe we need to broaden our definition of an argument and
modify traditional conceptions of it. The disagreement I have with Fleming’s work comes down to whether or not we can broaden the term ‘argument.’ We cannot necessarily disagree on whether or not a specific picture could be an argument since Fleming cannot conceive of an argument as something other than words. Pictures may help words (1996, 19), but they cannot stand alone as arguments. For Fleming, arguments are always verbalized.

J. Anthony Blair’s account of visual argumentation is not as limited as Fleming’s account. Blair contributes to the growing literature of visual argumentation in his paper, “The Possibility and Actuality of Visual Arguments” (1996). Developing a definition of a visual argument requires us to decide whether or not the current model for verbal arguments can be extended to include the visual (J. Anthony Blair, 1996, 24). Blair uses O’Keefe’s definition of an argument, argument₁ (mentioned in the Introduction). Blair summarizes some of the characteristics of argument₁: a claim is made, there is a reason for the claim, the reason is linguistically explicable, and there is an attempt to communicate the claim (1996, 24).

Argument₁ has two important implications for the discussion of visual argumentation. The first implication is that arguments are propositional; a claim has to be made for an argument to occur. The second implication is that arguments are not necessarily verbalized. As Blair writes, “That means we have to be able to state or restate them in language, not that they have to be expressed in language in the first place” (1996, 25). Blair’s idea of argumentation, unlike Fleming’s, does not preclude the possibility of visual argumentation. If a visual image makes a claim and the reasons for that claim can be explained linguistically, a visual argument is possible.
Blair describes visual arguments as "propositional arguments in which the propositions and their argumentative function and roles are expressed visually, for example by paintings and drawings, photographs, sculpture, film or video images, cartoons, animations, or computer-designed visuals" (1996, 26). Blair notes that though visuals can be expressive of propositions, it is more difficult to find visuals in which there are claims and reasons for those claims. In order to label a visual image as argumentative, we need that image to communicate a claim and reasons for that claim, just as we expect from primarily verbalized arguments. However, Blair writes that the visual image might communicate reasons for an unexpressed claim (1996, 26). Or, a visual image might communicate a claim with unexpressed reasons. This allows for visual arguments with a missing premise or conclusion; it does not however mean an argument does not exist.

Blair discusses visual images in paintings and sculptures, static advertisements, commercials, and cartoons. Since my own interest of visual argumentation is in advertising, I will focus on that section of Blair’s work. Blair provides a detailed analysis of an eight-page Benetton advertisement that he claims offers an argument against racism (1996, 29-33). Without reiterating Blair’s entire investigation of the advertisement, I will summarize his concluding remarks regarding visual argumentation in advertisements.

The Benetton advertisement incorporates three double-page visual spreads. The first spread depicts three human hearts labelled “white,” “black,” and “yellow.” The next spread has a black girl and a white girl hugging each other. The third spread shows a white hand handcuffed to a black hand. The advertisement appeared in special issues of The New Yorker Magazine on “Black in America” (April 29 and May 6, 1996). In that context, each of these visual images, according to Blair, suggests anti-racism. From the
picture of the labelled hearts, we have the premise that we are all the same under our skin. The second visual image of the young girls hugging suggests that racism is not an inborn attitude, rather it is a learned attitude. The last visual image of the handcuffed hands suggests that the races cannot escape each other in this world. Each of these premises, relayed visually, leads to the argument that racism is unjustified and should be ended (1996, 31).

The Benetton advertisement is a model case of the advertising ploy according to Blair. An advertisement is created so that it will evoke the viewer to either identify with or have good feelings about it. The viewer then transfers the identification or feelings with the advertisement to the company or product (1996, 32). Thus, an obvious argument for the product may not be at work. Blair writes, “The ad works best by being an argument at the superficial level, but above all by not being an argument at the deeper, affective level” (1996, 33). Consequently, someone flipping through the pages of The New Yorker magazine will see the Benetton advertisement and associate with Benetton and its products a feeling of anti-racism.

This particular Benetton advertisement offers an argument against racism. The six pages of visual images are preceded by a page that is all black and followed by a page that is all white. The only bright colour in all of the eight pages -- the green Benetton logo is found in each of the three visual spreads. The audience thus associates Benetton with anti-racism. Blair’s discussion of this advertisement thus encompasses two separate matters that are actually occurring: 1) there is an argument against racism, 2) the values associated with anti-racism are unconsciously associated with Benetton. To be sure, there is no argument for Benetton products.
I agree with Blair; a lot of the arguments made in advertising include unconscious, psychological identifications with the selling product. I would even assert more emphatically than Blair that the advertisers of Benetton purposely manipulate their audience. We need to be more aware of how visual arguments affect us, the audience. There is a psychological pull at work in this advertisement that hooks people into buying Benetton products by associating Benetton products with a particular state/feeling. My concern in this project is not so much with the unconscious associations an audience might make with particular visual images. Rather, the point I want to make is that visual images can be representative of arguments, and Blair’s account of the Benetton advertisement takes it to be an example of a visual argument.

Blair reports that the power of visual images tends to be limited, given that only one side is presented in a static visual image. Since the visuals in advertisements are pictures of a single point in time, we may be presented with a certain claim, but not always its opposing claims. Thus, we are not aware of any sense of “disagreement” in visuals. According to the different properties of an argument that Blair outlines, a sense of “opposing views” is not included. Though Blair is aware that a static visual image may not present the “whole story,” he still leaves room for the possibility of visual argumentation, whereas Fleming does not.

Blair concludes that visual arguments are certainly possible and they do not differ significantly from verbal arguments (1996, 34). Just as a verbal argument is linguistically explicable, requiring a claim and reasons for that claim, so is a visual argument. According to Blair visual advertisements can work by offering a visual argument that disguises the “psychological sell” that might also occur; ergo there is a visual argument.
3.4 Groarke’s Response

In the previous section I discussed the ideas of both Fleming and Blair. Fleming’s work represents the cluster of theorists who hang onto traditional modes of argumentation without being open to a change, a broadening of the term ‘argumentation.’ His rigid definition of ‘argument’ precludes the possibility of visual argumentation. Blair uses a definition of ‘argument’ that actually allows for the possibility of visual argumentation. In his paper, “Logic, Art and Argument” (1996), Groarke seems to have the most optimistic outlook for visual argumentation.

Without doubt, visual images have a substantial and influential role in our lives today. For this reason, we need to develop a theory of visual argumentation, not only for the purposes of demonstrating the existence of visual argumentation, but for the purpose of teaching us how to discern and evaluate these types of arguments as well. We have countless theories of verbally-oriented argumentation, and consequently most of us are adept at detecting verbal arguments. We need to broaden the field of argumentation scholarship so that visual arguments are not considered “alternative,” “rare,” or even “inexistent.” Groarke begins his paper by claiming, “Most informal logic texts and articles assume a verbal account of reasoning. It defines ‘argument’ as a set of sentences. In the present paper I broaden the definition to take account of ‘visual’ arguments which are communicated with non-verbal visual images” (Leo Groarke, 1996, 105).

One of the problems of accepting the possibility of visual arguments that Groarke points out is that the verbal and the visual have been considered irreconcilably distinct (1996, 106). It is impossible to make room for visual argumentation in the current accepted model of verbalized argumentation. However, as already discussed above,
Mitchell shows us that words and pictures are both representative of the world; neither is ranked higher or better than the other. If verbal elements can result in propositions about our world, perhaps visual elements can as well. In order to accept arguments that are primarily visual, verbal arguments cannot be considered the only acceptable and correct way of expressing arguments.

According to Groarke, it is misleading to claim that a visual image is a form of persuasion, not argument, because it tends to be more emotional and ambiguous than verbal claims. He writes, “it is a mistake to conclude that visual images are instruments of persuasion which must be distinguished from arguments, which are understood as attempts to rationally convince” (1996, 107). Groarke offers some reasons to support this claim. The association of emotion and vagueness with visual images has been exaggerated. We must not forget that many verbal claims are vague and use emotional language as well, yet they are still considered argumentative. Furthermore, there are visual arguments that have both premises and a conclusion, and so they can be analysed according to a model of reasonable convincing, or argumentation, not just persuasion (1996, 107).

Groarke maintains, as one of his starting points for his account of visual argumentation, that the rules applying to verbal accounts of arguing are certainly applicable to visual accounts of arguing. To view visual images as products of entertainment, seduction, or persuasion, instead of arguments worthy of logical analysis “reflects a failure to adapt logical tools to visual contexts rather than the inherent nature of visual images themselves” (1996, 108). There is probably no better way to demonstrate Groarke’s point than to recapitulate and discuss an advertisement he analyses.
Groarke uses a Dutch poster that advocates opportunities for women at the University of Amsterdam (See Figure 3.2). The black and white photograph contains three seemingly important-looking men visually blocking the main entrance of the University of Amsterdam. The men appear calm, but in a situation of control or power. The ad also reads “UVA FOR WOMEN.” Groarke writes, “it is a ‘statement’ which effectively makes the point that, ‘we want more women at our university’ and ‘still have a long way to go in this regard’” (1996, 111). He provides a logical analysis of this advertisement/poster. The premise, which is visual, is “The University of Amsterdam’s three chief administrators are all men” (1996, 111). The conclusion is “The University needs more women” (1996, 111). Though there are words in this poster, the primary mode of expression is visual, and Groarke shows that the poster can amount to an argument.

Learning to assess visual images allows us to treat them with more than an aesthetic eye, or laughter or disdain -- a point which Groarke makes (1996, 114). Groarke concludes that he is not advocating that all visual images function argumentatively; nor has he discussed all the types of visual images that do present arguments. He also acknowledges that a more detailed account of visual argumentation is needed, and “The most important point is that these studies must be rooted in a fundamental change in attitude that makes argumentation theorists more conscious of the visual when they discuss argumentation from both a theoretical and practical point of view” (1996, 124). For Groarke, visual argumentation should be developed by extending our rules for primarily verbal oriented arguments to visual arguments.
Figure 3.2

University of Amsterdam Poster.

*Informal Logic, 18, 112.*
3.5 What is a Visual Argument?

A visual argument is an argument that gets its strength primarily from a visual image. This does not mean that no other form of expression is possible in a visual argument. For instance, a visual argument can certainly have words accompanying the visual image. Some advertisements are a prime example of visual argumentation. The arguments of advertisements with no words are made solely through their visual contents. Arguments in advertisements that have slogans accompanying them are relayed with a combination of both words and visual images. For the most part, commercial advertisements are never exclusively relayed through words; this is why I have chosen to discuss the arguments found in advertisements in the next section of this chapter. My basic definition of a visual argument is thus an argument that is primarily expressed via a visual image.

One of the differences between the approaches of Fleming, Blair, and Groarke is that Groarke addresses visuals with or without words present, while the former theorists deal only with visual images. The ideas of each of these theorist's contribute to my overall understanding of a visual argument.

Though we have broader theories of argumentation today, the established system of traditional arguments, which are necessarily verbalized, remains the starting point for visual argumentation. Since arguments have been made through words traditionally, the advocacy of a new mode of argumentation, for instance arguments that are expressed primarily through visual images, are thought of as non-verbalized types of argument. Visual arguments are different from verbal arguments only in their expression, and so it is possible to have primarily verbal arguments, primarily visual arguments, or arguments that
have a combination of verbal and visual elements. Standards for verbally expressed arguments should not preclude visual arguments, and vice versa.

I think that some, but not all of the properties Blair mentions as belonging to O'Keefe's argument, are evident in visual arguments. A visual argument, like any type of argument, needs to make a claim of some sort that is both linguistically explicable and communicated to a listener or audience. Furthermore, there needs to be at least one reason, if not more, to support the claim. Unlike Blair, though, I do not think that the reasons need to be "overtly expressed." In fact, I think it may often be the case that the claim or reasons in visual arguments are purposely unexpressed. They are, in effect, unexpressed premises, or an unexpressed conclusion. Consequently, the audience must derive the claims or its reasons from the visual image. We need a theory of visual argumentation in order to help us uncover the subtle arguments of visual communication.

Visual images in advertisements are prime examples of relaying arguments. This notion of missing claims or reasons in visual arguments will be evident in my analysis of a Clinique advertisement below.

Groarke's work is important since he uses aspects of what I consider to be the traditional model of argumentation and transfers them to the analysis of visual arguments. He shows that it is possible to conceive of a theory of visual argumentation.

The amount of visual images used for communication purposes in our culture is on the rise. From television depictions, theatrical events, computer graphics, modern art, video games, personal styles, advertising, and so on, we are immersed in visual stimuli. Some of these visual images can advance legitimate arguments. The idea of "broadening" our understanding of argumentation repeated throughout this project is just as much a
broader attitude towards possible arguments, as it is a broadening of argumentation theory.

I mentioned above that all the theorists I address contribute to my understanding of visual argumentation. The works of Birdsell and Groarke, Blair, and Groarke suggest that argumentation can be expanded. However, Fleming cannot conceive of the possibility of visual argumentation because his definition of an argument is so stringent, it precludes the possibility of any argument that is not verbally expressed. If I adopted his definition of an argument, then I would have to agree that there is no room for visual arguments. Fleming represents the traditional theory of argumentation that I aim to dispel in this project.

3.6 Analyses of Advertisements

The best way to demonstrate the possibility of visual argumentation is probably by discussing examples of visual arguments. The Mercedes-Benz advertisement, for which I am about to provide an analysis, was found in an August 2001 issue of Vogue Magazine (see Figure 3.3). On the right page, of the double-page spread, a group of children stare at a showcased, shiny, silver Mercedes-Benz. On the left page, there are a ball and a scooter that the children seem to have left behind, and an ice cream truck is parked along the side of the Mercedes-Benz building; there are no people on the left side of the advertisement.

The main claim this advertisement seems to make is found written in the copy of the advertisement, “Perhaps the most desirable car in the world.” The evidence for this claim is also presented; however, visually. The children in this picture, who are probably between four and six years old, not only forget to play with a scooter or ball in order to stare at the Mercedes-Benz, but they do not even care about the singing ice cream truck a
Perhaps the most desirable car in the world.

**Figure 3.3**

*Mercedes-Benz Advertisement.*

*Vogue Magazine, August 2001.*
few feet away. Since children between the ages of four and six years typically spend their
days playing, and they typically run out to the ice cream truck when it arrives, advertisers
are showing their audience not only that the Mercedes-Benz is admired even by those who
cannot possibly have the car, but that these children will stop playing and going about their
“childhood business” in order to stare at the car. Even for these children, nothing is better
than the Mercedes-Benz. Another point is that all the people in this picture are lumped
together in one small area in order to stare at the car. Thus, the car is admired by
everyone in the advertisement. For these two reasons -- that everyone admires the
Mercedes-Benz, and that even those who cannot possibly have one would give up aspects
of their lives to gawk at one through a window -- one should realize how desirable a
Mercedes-Benz is.

Though the advertisement has a slogan to accompany its picture, the argument is
made primarily via its visual effect. Even without the words, “Perhaps the most desirable
car in the world,” the argumentative claim comes across clearly. The children in this
picture drop everything in order to gawk in admiration at the Mercedes-Benz. The
messages underlying the argument, however, are not as clear. Some of the messages this
visual argument might be sending its audience are: it is never too early to start planning for
a Mercedes-Benz, one should strive towards the attainment of a Mercedes-Benz, and
nothing is better than owning a Mercedes-Benz. Furthermore, the message is sent to
everyone. The advertisers place high-rises and houses in the background of the
advertisement; there are white and black children. Thus, whatever race you are, and
whatever social class you fit into, if you have a Mercedes-Benz it will be admired by all.
The Mercedes-Benz advertisement, then, does convey an argument, and it does so primarily via its visual content. I think there are instances where visually expressed criteria are not as overt as verbally expressed criteria. The claim, that Mercedes-Benz is a highly desired car, is overtly expressed since it is written on the left side of the visual spread, but the evidence for this claim is less overt. The evidence is expressed in the visual content of the advertisement; however, the audience has to consciously determine what the evidence for the claim is, since it is not obvious without making connections between claims and possible reasons.

Tacit claims or reasons in visual arguments in advertising are not rare. In fact, in presenting advertisements that are ambiguous, advertisers employ a rhetorical ploy to recruit their audience. Thus, a viewer of an advertisement that presents an ambiguous argument is forced to construct the argument. In doing so, the viewer must (a) read or study the advertisement, and (b) participate in the construction of its argument by filling in the missing claim or reason(s).

The next advertisement I analyse, for a Clinique skin care product, was also found in the August 2001 issue of Vogue Magazine (see Figure 3.4). Though there are verbal slogans in small print on the bottom and side of the one page advertisement, the argument is still made primarily through its visual effect. There is a newly hatched baby chick perched on top of a container of the Clinique cream.

In our culture, the chick is representative of both birth, or beginnings, and a “good looking” woman. The advertisers of Clinique claim that using this particular Clinique product, Clinique total turnaround visible skin renewer, will not only bring you back to your youthful days when your skin was young and fresh, but overall it will make you look
Figure 3.4

Clinique Advertisement.

better too. Thus, the claim made in this visual argument is that you need to use Clinique total turnaround visible skin renewer, and the reason is so that you and your skin will appear young and fresh again. It is not exactly clear whether or not the chick is symbolic of youth or beauty, or both, but that does not mean an argument is not present. The argument is purposely ambiguous.

To ensure their argument, the advertisers for this Clinique product have linguistically explained at the bottom of the advertisement: “Find more ways to look better, longer at www.clinique.com.” We can be sure that this product is supposed to make us look younger, not feel younger. Even without these words though, the “young chick” gets that message across pretty clearly. Underlying the argument further is the message that looking younger is better.

The world of advertising is massive, to say the least. We are presented with advertisements, like the two discussed above, daily through avenues such as the television, newspaper, magazines, or billboards. I am not claiming that all advertisements make arguments, but I do think that we need a better understanding of visual argumentation to ascertain the arguments that are present in advertisements as we flip through a magazine or view a billboard on our commute to or from work. Nearly all advertisements aim to sell a product, directly or indirectly, and we should be aware of the arguments that advertisers present to us. There is a reason why many people actually envy the Mercedes-Benz, or why women try countless cosmetic products that promise to erase any sign of age on their skin. I do not think many people consciously contemplate the visual arguments advertisements present to us. If this is the case, the underlying messages in advertisements are also not understood. I think being able to decipher the possible arguments can help
loosen the grip advertisements have on their audience. A greater awareness of visual argumentation, especially those that are ambiguous, could result in a better understanding of the visual advertisements presented to us.

3.7 Visual Argumentation Recapitulated

There may be more argumentation scholars who deal with visual arguments, but the few authors I have cited in this chapter generally agree on some assumptions of visual argumentation. Each of the authors refers to some conception of traditional argumentation in order to account for visual arguments. Aside from Fleming, who retains a definition of 'argument' that precludes any form of argument that is not verbalized, Birdsell, Groarke, and Blair contend that some of the rules for traditional argumentation can be transferred to visual argumentation.

Although the authors do not agree on all the rules, I will outline some of the basic ideas of visual argumentation that I think Birdsell, Groarke, and Blair would agree on. In a visual argument, there must be a claim and at least one reason for that claim that are communicated to their audience visually. According to Birdsell and Groarke, both the claim and the reason do not have to be obvious in the presented argument, since just as verbal arguments can have missing parts, so can visual arguments have a missing premise or conclusion (1996, 7).

As I mentioned earlier, theory on visual arguments is not very extensive, but the authors discussed above demonstrate the existence of visual arguments. Thus, there is a need to broaden our conception of argumentation altogether, so that it can both
encompass visual arguments, and result in a well developed account of visual argumentation.

In Chapter Five I revisit “visual arguments” and determine whether the Pragma-Dialectical model of argumentation can address visual images which present arguments.

Notes

[1] The following diagram is similar to the one found in Mitchell’s book, *Iconology* (10).

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Image</th>
<th>likeness</th>
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<tr>
<td>pictures</td>
<td>mirrors</td>
<td>sense data</td>
<td>dreams</td>
<td>metaphors</td>
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<td>statues</td>
<td>projections</td>
<td>“species”</td>
<td>memories</td>
<td>descriptions</td>
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<tr>
<td>designs</td>
<td>appearances</td>
<td>ideas</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

[2] This is an idea that I have taken from Michael A. Gilbert. In his book *Coalescent Argumentation*, Gilbert claims that there are at least four possible modes of argumentation. They are: the logical, the emotional, the visceral, and the kisceral. In an argument one of these modes is usually relied on more heavily than the others; and, thus, it determines what mode of argument is at work. For instance, an emotional argument is an argument that relies heavily on the use or expression of emotion (Gilbert, 1997, 79, 83). A visual argument is an argument that relies primarily on a visual image.
Chapter Four
Emotional Argumentation

The fact that in many circumstances emotions are more efficient persuasive tools than intellectual thinking has significant educational implications. There is a long tradition that criticizes the role of emotions in moral behaviour and hence considers controlling emotions -- even to the extent of almost abolishing them -- as an important educational task. Since I believe that emotions have an important functional role in our life, I must oppose this tradition (Ben-Ze’ev, 1995, 198).

4.1 An Introduction to Emotional Arguments

My first thoughts regarding emotional argumentation arose while reading Michael A. Gilbert’s book, Coalescent Argumentation (1997). Reading Gilbert’s work prompted me to pay closer attention to the actual ways in which we argue with each other day in and day out. Convinced that we argue in emotional ways more than we do “logically,” I paid particularly close attention to the theories of any argumentation scholars I read, in order to discover whether or not they addressed emotionally-oriented arguments. I found that though some argumentation theorists included talk of emotions in argumentative discourse, they did not give the mode of argumentation as much recognition as it deserves. Emotions are inherent in us, and consequently we cannot strip ourselves of emotion. If this is the case, we cannot strip emotions from argumentative discourse either.

In this chapter I will discuss the literature of Gilbert, Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, and Douglas Walton. Each of these authors provides a different view of emotions in communication and argumentative discourse. My own view of emotional argumentation is an amalgamation of all the theories recapitulated and discussed throughout this chapter,
with the works of Gilbert and Ben-Ze’ev as the starting premises for my overall argument regarding emotional argumentation.

After laying out the ideas of Gilbert, Ben-Ze’ev, and Walton on emotional arguments, I will introduce the work of Maryann Neely Ayim who outlines a framework of language use that incorporates emotions into conversational and argumentative discourses. Ayim’s work is not in the field of argumentation, however it does offer a framework where emotional argumentation can be easily implemented. Ayim’s work presupposes that emotional arguments are legitimate. Her framework of language use, if utilized by all, would provide for a system in which emotional arguments are treated as more natural and acceptable, instead of alternative.

Arguments that depend on emotion in some way need to be recognized as credible arguments, and not cast aside as alternative ways of arguing. Though scholars of argumentation agree that emotions can certainly be involved in argumentative discourse, emotional arguments are still not given the same recognition as traditional argumentation. Emotions should not be considered extraneous to the term ‘argument.’ Furthermore, what needs to be recognized is that it is entirely appropriate for emotions to play a role in argumentation.

When I use the terms ‘emotional argumentation,’ or ‘emotional argument’ what I am referring to is a type of argument in which emotions play a key role. The “emotional mode” is a label I use to refer to any argument that encompasses the use of emotion in one of these ways: the use of emotions as reasons for a claim, the use of emotions to express arguments, arguments which appeal to the emotions of an audience, and arguments which induce an emotion in an audience. Though there may be other types of emotional
arguments, for this project I will work with these four. Thus, in describing the main points of each author, and in outlining different examples of emotional argumentation, at least four main types of emotional argumentation seem apparent. In the following paragraphs I will explain in more detail what I mean by each type of emotional argument.\footnote{[1]}

In an argumentative discussion an arguer can put forth an emotion as a legitimate reason for her claim. It may be a reason for a belief or an action. For instance, if someone feels a sense of excitement, or a boost of adrenaline, at the thought of riding high-speed rides, then that is a good reason for her to spend a day riding roller-coasters at an amusement park. Or, if someone has a fear of doctors, so that she panics and sweats when she thinks of going to visit a doctor, then that may be a good reason to resist accompanying a friend to the hospital. In this type of emotional argumentation, experiencing the emotions is integral to the emotional arguments. Thus, feeling the excitement or fear in the examples discussed above is necessary.

However, there are cases where the two emotions above can result in faulty, or bad, reasoning. For instance, just because someone gets excitement from high-speed rides does not mean that she should drive her car at 140 kilometres per hour down a residential street. As well, a fear of doctors is not a good enough reason to avoid an annual physical check-up. These types of emotional arguments are common in our lives, and in certain cases, they provide good reasons for an arguer's claim. In other cases, an emotion may not always be a legitimate reason for a claim. Thus, depending on the context of a particular emotional argument, the emotional reasons may range from weak to strong. For the most part, arguments in which emotional reasons are provided deal with “practical”
matters, as opposed to "theoretical" matters. They are reasons for an arguer's beliefs and opinions, or reasons to substantiate a particular action.

An arguer can express her claim with emotions such as anger, frustration, or excitement. An argument expressed with emotion incorporates such things as eye movement, body language, and tone of voice. The expression of emotion in argumentative discourse may be a good indication of important aspects of arguers and their arguments. By expressing arguments emotionally, an arguer communicates her commitment to her claim, her feelings of sincerity regarding the issue at stake, and perhaps hidden feelings that she is harbouring about the issue. For example, imagine two co-workers engaging in an argument about abortion. The first worker calmly discusses the pro-life movement, while the second worker expresses her position of pro-choice with great emotion. She raises her tone of voice; she cries; she keeps on repeating her claim that one should be able to choose whether or not an abortion is appropriate for her. It may be the case that the first worker is naturally a calm and collected arguer, while the second worker is tends to react more emotionally when discussing controversial issues. It could also be the case that the second worker has had a personal experience with abortion that causes her to act in such a strong emotional manner. The display of emotion shows how important the pro-choice movement is to the second arguer.

A speaker can also put forth an argument that is meant either to appeal to the pre-existing emotions of the audience or to induce emotion in an audience. In these cases, an arguer may not express herself emotionally, and she may not even use emotions as reasons for her overall claim. Rather, after assessing the members of her audience, she may provide an argument that appeals to the emotions of the audience so that her conclusion
may be accepted. Appeals for charity often use this type of emotional argumentation. In order to get audience members to donate money to a specific cause, depictions of the cause may be described in detail so that the audience pities the subject and consequently donates money, food, or some other sort of aid. This type of emotional argument appeals to the pity of the audience. I will also discuss arguments in which the arguer induces emotion in an audience. I specifically refer to inducing fear in an audience. For instance, showing an audience an x-ray of an Ecstasy user’s scalp, which appears to have a hole in the scalp, may frighten an audience member from trying the drug Ecstasy. This type of emotional argument evokes the emotion of fear in its audience.

There are not too many argumentation theorists who would dispute that emotions can be involved in arguments, but this concession does not ensure that they embrace and discuss arguments that are primarily emotional. In this chapter I want to discuss an avenue of argumentation in which arguments are not always verbalized, not by any means an activity of reason, and not evidently justified with standpoints. These are emotional arguments and have been treated as peripheral to argumentative dialogue, but really deserve more credit since they are well represented in common, everyday arguments.

4.2 Gilbert’s Multi-Modal Model of Argumentation

In Coalescent Argumentation (1997), Michael Gilbert challenges what he calls the “Critical-Logical Model” of argumentation. The Critical-Logical Model, he says, maintains that “the best examples of reasoning are linear and careful. Extraneous material such as emotional content, power relationships, and the social consequences of the argument are separated from its text or transcript in order that the argument itself can be
examined” (Michael A. Gilbert, 1997, 48). According to the Critical-Logical Model, arguments must follow certain rules so that they meet acceptable standards of reasoning. This rule-oriented approach Gilbert claims separates arguments from arguers, context, social situations of arguers, and, most important for this chapter, from the emotions. The Critical-Logical Model focuses on an argument as a thing rather than an argument as a process. According to Gilbert, the Critical-Logical Model does not address real arguers in real situations of argumentative discourse, and so he argues that this narrow definition of ‘argument’ needs to be expanded to include arguers (1997, 42).

What Gilbert has termed the “Critical-Logical Model” is very similar to what I have already referred to as “traditional” argumentation theories. These conceptions of argument tend to separate an argument from its arguer, which results in a “skeleton” or “basic frame” of an argument. We may have a verbal representation of an argument, but we have lost important characteristics such as context, arguers’ intentions, and the relationship between arguers. When we analyse solely an argument’s skeleton, we are only interested in the evidence or reasons for a claim. According to Gilbert, this conception of argument needs to be expanded so that other aspects of argumentative discourse can be considered. I have chosen Pragma-Dialectics as an exemplar of the Critical-Logical Model, since it considers a good argument to be discernible through words, whether they be spoken or written, without the inclusion of such things as emotions or the social outcomes of an argument. For the purposes of analyzing and evaluating arguments, we need these “extra” components of arguers and their arguments. I do not think there can be an argument without a context specific to its arguers and situation.
In the field of argumentation scholarship, Gilbert’s theory has been considered somewhat radical, since it deviates from the norm of argumentation theories. Gilbert introduces alternative modes of argumentation which he admits may be non-logical, but he claims that they are still clear components of an argument (1997, 82). His alternative modes of arguing encompass components of human interaction and communication that are not wholly represented in a Critical-Logical, or traditional, model of argumentation (1997, 42). Yet, Gilbert’s examples of these alternative modes of argumentation are natural, marketplace occurrences.

Gilbert’s model of argumentation has four modes of arguing, the traditional logical mode and three alternative modes. Two of these alternative modes are beyond the scope of this project, and including them would present a digression. In this thesis I am referring to Gilbert’s conception of emotional argumentation. According to Gilbert, “these four categories provide a taxonomy that enables the argumentation scholar to classify according to the mode of communication relied on most heavily” (1997, 79). For Gilbert, a mode of argumentation can refer to both the manner in which an argument is expressed and the reasons for claims made in argumentative discourse (1997, 83). Gilbert does not advocate that arguments be carried out in one particular mode exclusively; instead, he introduces a multi-modal model of argumentation which suggests that arguments involve a combination of different modes, each prevalent at a different time in a given argumentative discourse (1997, 81). Thus, he believes that it is rare for an argument to occur in a single mode. Although one mode is usually more prevalent than all the others, a given argument can have a combination of different elements in it.
4.2a Emotional Reasons and Emotional Expression

Gilbert writes “emotional arguments are arguments that rely more or less heavily on the use and expression of emotion” (1997, 83). He presents examples of arguments where he says reasons for claims, and/or the mode of presenting an argument are essential components of the argument (1997, 82). Thus, he thinks there are different types of emotional argument. According to Gilbert, emotional grounds or premises of a claim and the delivery of emotions during an argumentative discourse are both instances of emotional argumentation.

There is a varying spectrum of emotional arguments. An argument can have purely emotional displays or hardly any emotions present at all in the discourse. In order to distinguish between emotional versus non-emotional arguments, I will provide a situation of argumentative discourse that has both types of arguers. Two students in a religion class discuss the existence of God. Student Z claims that no one really knows if God exists. Student A believes God exists, and she provides her reasons for believing so in a calm but persistent manner. Student Z is still not exactly sure whether or not God exists. As she begins copying some notes off the blackboard, she shrugs her shoulders and mutters that Student A is probably wrong. Student A, not ready to let the discussion end without getting her point across, swivels her chair so that it is closer to Student Z, she asks Student Z to look at her for a minute, and she reiterates the reasons for her claim that God exists while she maintains eye contact with Student Z. When Student A finishes explaining her argument, she pauses for a moment and then she asks Student Z with earnest, “now do you see what I am saying?” Student Z, already back to writing her notes, replies, “sure.”
In this argumentative situation, although Student A remains calm she actually expresses an emotional argument. An emotional argument cannot be equated with just a frenzied state. There is a spectrum of emotions that can be relayed or used (for instance, joy, excitement, anger, sadness, disappointment, among others) with a number of different states ranging from great agitation to amazing calmness. Though both Student A and Student Z conduct themselves calmly, Student A is more insistent and eager to get her argument across. Her body language and eye contact with Student Z exemplify the importance of the argument to her. Meanwhile, Student Z remains aloof and uninterested in the argument.

Emotional arguments communicate important aspects between an arguer and her argument, such as the degree of commitment, depth, feeling, and sincerity involved in the argumentative discourse. These aspects of emotional argumentation are rhetorical moves. They capture how arguers (who argue genuinely) feel about certain views or aspects of an argument at stake, which in turn has an effect on the listener. For instance, an arguer who presents herself passionately shows that she is committed to her view. She presents a more convincing argument, and she also presents a more credible argument to her listener. It goes without saying that an arguer who presents herself emotionally simply as an act -- in order to manipulate her audience -- does not present a legitimate argument, and thus there is no genuine commitment to her argument, and the argument's credibility is ineffectual.

Emotional arguments cannot always be adequately reduced to words, or a verbal skeleton, since in doing so the strength and meanings of the emotional arguments can be lost. Gilbert offers an analogy; "it is like translating poetry from one language to another
-- some of the sense may well be there, but the very heart of the poem is likely lost” (1997, 84). Thus, if we reduce a primarily emotional argument solely to its verbal content not only do we imply that arguers should not use emotion, but we also lose the strength of the argument and run the risk of losing the true meaning of the interaction.

According to Gilbert, humans are prone to emotional arguments (1997, 84). An emotional argument has important aspects. The amount of emotion used usually demonstrates the importance of the argument to the arguer. The arguer shows that she is attached to the outcome of the argument, which means that the arguer believes what she advocates. Thus, the use of emotion can show whether or not the arguer is committed to her viewpoint and is sincere about her argument. These components of emotional argumentation are pivotal in understanding both the situation of the arguer and the seriousness of the argument. As Gilbert writes, “emotion often tells us what people believe, and, more significantly, that there is more going on behind their words” (1997, 84). This does not imply that all emotional arguments have the effect of being more convincing. There are other elements involved in argumentation. If an arguer provides emotional reasons in her argument, but she is erratic in expressing them, then her argument may not be very convincing. Emotions are not the only indicators of convincing arguments.

Consider the example of a student, Alice, pleading with her English professor for an extension on the due date of her term paper. Alice explains that her father has Alzheimer's disease, and lately his condition has deteriorated to the point that he now needs to be taken care of continually. Alice now takes care of her father when her mother is at work, and so her time that was usually spent studying is being divided between
studying and care-giving. She desperately needs a few more days to finish her paper. After hearing this explanation, Alice’s professor, while sympathetic to Alice’s position, states that she can hand in her paper a few days later, but with a small penalty. Alice takes a deep breath, she stares down at her lap, and she whispers her “gratitude.” When she looks up at her professor, in an attempt to further explain her need for this extension, Alice explains that she has always been a good student, and she is not used to struggling with her school work. With a quivering voice, she admits that she is seeing an academic counsellor because of the effects of her role in the family changing. In the end, Alice’s professor decides to give Alice an extension without penalty.

This example of Alice and her English professor portrays the element of emotion in argumentation. Though Alice verbally explains her situation, the strength of her argument comes from the emotion she expresses. The way she initially pleads with her professor, the relief and gratitude she expresses after receiving an extension -- even though she will still be penalized, her bodily actions, her eye contact, and especially her tone of voice show the importance she places on receiving an extension on her English term paper. The professor receiving this argument should be aware of the sincerity of Alice’s plea and the importance of getting an extension on the paper. Furthermore in order to grant or deny Alice an extension, the professor has to decide whether or not Alice’s argument is worthy of an extension. In other words, the professor must decide whether or not Alice’s reasons for her request are strong or weak. If Alice had walked into her professor’s office, asked for an extension, rolled her eyes when the professor was not inclined to give her an extension, and then walked out of the office, it might seem that Alice did not sincerely
care about receiving an extension. Consequently, the professor would not need to reconsider her denial of Alice’s request.

We could maintain that whether or not an interlocutor believes or cares about the arguments she puts forth, arguments are still being presented and they should be considered irrespective of the interlocutor’s feelings. Not only is it difficult to do this, but I want to argue that it is both difficult to detach emotions from an arguer’s communication style and unrepresentative of the argumentative interactions we have daily. The manner in which Alice expresses her case is more likely to convince her professor that she really should receive an extension. Instead, if Alice had casually asked for an extension, providing her professor with the same explanation for needing some more time to write her paper, and then simply walked out of the professor’s office when he declined her request, her case would not be as effective. The importance of receiving an extension on writing the term paper would not come across as strongly as her primarily emotional display above.

If all arguments took place in an aloof-type setting, where arguers had no relationships with each other, and they had nothing at stake in an argument, then maybe we could separate arguers from their arguments. I think, however, that a lot of everyday-type arguments get their strength and purpose from those who advocate them. Gilbert writes, “argumentation is a subspecies of the more general category of human communication” (1997, 79). His account of the emotional mode of argumentation provides a more natural approach to argumentation. When we separate the emotional content from an arguer and the argument at stake, we might end up stripping the argument of important points. In other words, the emotions used in arguments are significant to
both the actual argument and the arguer’s commitment to the argument, as well as having an effect on the listener. Thus in accepting and dealing with emotional argumentation, not only is the basic argument taken into consideration, but so are the arguers involved and the manner in which they express their claims.

Gilbert presents an example of an emotional argument in his book:

Jill: But why should I marry you, Jack?


Now, suppose we add a specific context to this situation. Jack and Jill have been living together for just over three years. One night during dinner, Jack asks Jill to marry him. Jill is taken by surprise, and the two of them end up expressing their feelings for one another. Jill notes that they have been living together for so long, they are definitely comfortable together; and, thus she questions why they even need to bother with a formal ceremony. The way Jill sees it, a wedding ceremony takes time and money to celebrate a relationship the couple has already established. Jack insists that the two should get married anyway. Exasperated, Jill asks, “But why should I marry you, Jack?” (1997, 83), to which Jack responds while grabbing hold of Jill’s hands and looking deep into her eyes, “Because I love you as life itself” (1997, 83).

Jack both expresses his argument for him and Jill to marry emotionally, and he provides an emotional reason, his love for Jill, for his argument. This is an example where an extensive list of non-emotional accounts of “why should I marry you” would not have the same effect as Jack’s emotional display and emotional grounds for his argument. Jack could come up with countless reasons, such as: because we are compatible, because we have great times together, because I like the way you dress, because you understand me,
and because we could build a wonderful life together. Reciting a list of reasons in an unemotional manner might not have the same effect as his single emotionally charged, “I love you.” In fact, I think the list of various reasons distorts the argument, taking away the emotional force of the argument and rendering a more disinterested and impersonal plea for marriage. The way Jack looks into Jill’s eyes, the way he squeezes her hands, and the soft tone of his usually burly voice give his argument a primarily emotional nature.

Again, there is no dispute among theorists that humans are without doubt emotional creatures who will express themselves emotionally from time to time. However, Gilbert’s concept of an emotional argument needs to be considered as a part of the mainstream conception of argumentation, instead of an “alternative” mode. Whether an interlocutor tries to express an inexplicable feeling or desire, or reveals a facial expression full of emotion; or, whether one sighs, sobs, blushes, or flares with anger during argumentative discourse, messages are being sent. The fact is that we do express ourselves emotionally, and this needs to be recognized in addition to traditional, solely verbalized accounts of argument. Emotions play a legitimate role as reasons for argumentative claims and as a way for arguers to express themselves.

4.3 Ben-Ze’ev’s Account of Argumentation

In his paper, “Emotions and Argumentation” (1995), Aaron Ben-Ze’ev answers three specific questions. Do emotions constitute a certain kind of argumentation? Do emotions constitute rational argumentation? Do emotions constitute efficient argumentation? He asserts that each of these questions can be answered in the affirmative (Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, 1995, 189).
Ben-Ze’ev makes a distinction between argument and argumentation that is much like O’Keefe’s distinction between argument₁ and argument₂ (discussed in the Introduction). An argument is equivalent to a set of propositions, where there is a premise (or premises) that leads to a conclusion. Argumentation, on the other hand, is a communicative act where there are incompatible positions and arguers substantiate their own positions. There are critical aspects of argumentation: it is a communicative act, there are incompatible positions, and the substantiation of a claim is present (1995, 189).

Ben-Ze’ev writes that in typical argumentation, “the communicative context is that of speech acts, the incompatible positions are explicitly presented, and the substantiation involved is that of a few-steps process of intellectual reasoning” (1995, 189). This is much like the description of Pragma-Dialectics provided in the first chapter. In the Pragma-Dialectical model arguments are constituted by speech acts; they presuppose disagreement between interlocutors who must express their arguments verbally; argumentation analysts rearrange argumentative dialogue so that a clear path of reasoning is discernible. Ben-Ze’ev’s account of “typical” argumentation is much like Gilbert’s “Critical-Logical Model” and my description of “traditional” argumentation.

According to Ben-Ze’ev, there are times when argumentation takes a less typical form. He writes that in such cases “the communicative context is not that of speech acts, the incompatible positions and premises are not explicit, and the substantiation is not through a reasoning process” (1995, 189). This description of certain argumentative discourses coincides neatly with Gilbert’s view. There are methods of arguing that are not always clear, and are not wholly accepted by traditional argumentation theories. Not only
do we need to recognize that there are other ways of communicating, but we also need to acknowledge them as acceptable forms of arguing. Performing speech acts, then, may be acceptable for certain forms of argumentative discourse, but not all types. Ben-Ze’ev claims that when a form of argumentation becomes common, we tend to view it as having an implicit pattern that must be followed (1995, 189). Maybe this can be said for traditional argumentation, or more specifically the Pragma-Dialectical model; we become accustomed to a certain conception of argumentation and treat it as an exclusive method.

4.3a The Use of Emotion in Argumentation

Ben-Ze’ev argues that emotions are complex attitudes composed of four aspects. “Cognition” is the information regarding a given circumstance. “Evaluation” assesses personally the significance of this information. “Motivation” is composed of human desires and the readiness to act in the given circumstance. And, the “feeling” element expresses the person’s state (1995, 190). If we reduce arguments to the feeling component, or the cognition aspect, then it becomes difficult to categorize emotion as a type of argumentative discourse. It is important to note that emotions are not just feelings, according to Ben-Ze’ev. Only when we take the evaluative function into consideration can we make a connection between emotions and argumentation (1995, 190).

Ben-Ze’ev’s account of emotional argumentation is about emotions used as reasons for a claim or action. His conception of emotional arguments is more complex than Gilbert’s, though, in that there are particular requirements. He gives an example of these basic components of emotion at work in his paper, “Typical Emotions” (1996). The example reads, “When John envies Adam for having better grades, John has some
information about Adam’s grades, evaluates his inferior position negatively, and wishes to abolish this inferiority” (1996, 237). In this example, the cognitive element involved is John’s knowledge of Adam’s grades. John’s assessment of Adam’s grades and his conclusion that he is inferior to Adam, is the evaluative element. The motivational element is composed of John’s desire to remove the inferiority he has identified between himself and Adam. Finally, the feeling element involved is John’s envy.

In order to categorize John’s envy as an emotion, Ben-Ze-ev believes that each of these four components of emotion is needed. For instance, John knowing about Adam’s grades, the cognitive element, and his feeling of envy, the feeling element, are not enough to categorize an emotion. John’s assessment of inferiority and his desire to remove that inferiority are also imperative. This emotion does not on its own constitute argumentation, but it can cause John to “act” in a manner that relates to argumentation. For instance, John’s envy may cause him to study harder and earn better grades than Adam. His envy may cause him to study with Adam, so that he can learn from Adam’s study habits. Or, it could even cause John to stay away from Adam, so that he does not feel any inferiority. Any of these actions would reduce John’s feeling of envy. John’s envy is reason enough for him to study harder, study with Adam, or stay away from Adam altogether.

Ben-Ze’ev shows that his definition of argumentation can still be asserted when emotions are at work. Ben-Ze’ev believes that argumentation is a communicative act, with a sense of incompatibility between interlocutors, in which one aims to substantiate her claims through an interactive process. When emotions that involve the four components of cognition, motivation, evaluation, and feeling are communicated, there are incompatible
positions between interlocutors, and interlocutors prove their claims through an interactive process, then according to Ben-Ze’ev, an argumentative context based on emotions can develop.

Suppose John decides to quit his part-time job. John’s mother is upset with John’s decision to quit his job and asks John for an explanation. John claims that he is quitting his job because he needs to spend more time studying. John’s mother is not satisfied with this reason, and she responds by saying that John’s grades have always been fine and this is not a good enough excuse to quit his job. Realizing that his mother is not going to let this matter drop so easily, John begins explaining that he wants to earn better grades, like Adam. His feeling of inferiority to Adam with respect to his grades is being expressed, which constitutes the communicative element in this argument. John wants to quit his job, and his mother does not want him to quit; this demonstrates the incompatibility of their positions. John and his mother continue to communicate their views with each other. In this case, John has presented an argument. His claim, that he is quitting his job, is actually based on his feeling of envy; thus, it is an emotional argument.

Emotions are sociable when they are communicated. If interlocutors are sensitive to others’ emotions, then the context of the argument and the situation of arguers is considered in a given discourse. Emotions can also be used to express viewpoints. Ben-Ze’ev points out that people who do not speak the native language in any given place can still communicate with others; for instance, through eye contact. There is an emotional way of communicating that is largely universal (1995, 191). To claim that miscommunicating or misunderstanding emotions is a negative risk of emotional argumentation is not a good enough criticism to dismiss its importance in argumentation
theory. We misunderstand all forms of communication daily, whether verbal, physical, or any other kind. The possibility of misunderstanding emotional arguments does not imply that emotional arguments are worth less than any other form of communicating.

In an argumentative discussion interlocutors require the substantiation of viewpoints. In other words, a speaker needs to justify her claims to the listener, and the listener needs to understand them. When we deal with arguments that are primarily emotional in nature, it may not be so easy to neatly justify an arguer’s claims. It is difficult to substantiate a claim without words, when we are mostly accustomed to communicating with words. However, in certain emotional arguments, words are not necessarily the primary focus. Ben-Ze’ev writes of emotional arguments, “their assumed substantiation is to be found in the profound nature of the emotional communication” (1995, 191). Since our emotional states carry implicit claims, then they should be taken into consideration.

The problem, which Ben-Ze’ev points out, is that emotional arguments involve personal logic that is not always accepted in traditional argumentation (1995, 192). Consider again the example of Alice pleading for an extension on her paper. Alice wants to do well in her English course. Her personal logic directs her to ask for an extension and to do so in a particular manner. Her special circumstances compared to the other students in her English class who also have to hand in term papers, expressed by her tone of voice and body language, may not be accepted as an adequate justification from the perspective of traditional argumentation. Once the traditional argumentation theories are expanded, then the now alternative types of argumentation will be acknowledged as mainstream.
4.3b Emotional Arguments are Rational and Efficient

Ben-Ze'ev shows that emotions used as reasons can constitute a type of argumentation, but this should not be confused with emotions being a part of an argumentative discourse. Like Gilbert, Ben-Ze'ev categorizes emotional grounds for a claim under emotional argumentation. In other words, for there to be an emotional argument, then there must be an emotion used as a reason for a claim. If an emotion has certain criteria, such as the cognitive, evaluative, motivational, and feeling element, and an interlocutor expresses this emotion, establishes incompatible positions with another interlocutor, and aims to justify her claim through an interactive process, then emotional argumentation is possible.

Consider the following example to put Ben-Ze’ev’s account of emotional argumentation into perspective. A group of environmental activists are upset with a logging company that is clear-cutting trees in a park. They communicate their anger, which is defined by Ben-Ze’ev as a negative evaluation of one who is considered to have imposed harm on people (1996, 239), by staging a protest. The protest is meant to demonstrate to the public, and more importantly to the logging company, that the “positions” of the environmentalists and the logging company are incompatible (while the activists want to preserve the park’s trees, the loggers are concerned with making a profit, so they are clear-cutting). The environmental activists want the loggers to stop clear-cutting trees; in other words, they want the loggers to change their “position.” In this case, anger motivates the protests of the environmental activists, and the protests succeed in communicating this anger. Thus, the claim of the protesters, to ensure the preservation of the park and its trees, may be based on certain core beliefs they may harbour; for
instance, we should not engage in destroying trees because it hinders the wildlife in the park. Furthermore, their emotional plea is substantiated via the communication of the protests.

The environmentalists’ argument can be summarized as such:

1) We feel very strongly that the logging company needs to stop clear-cutting.
2) We are going to carry out a long, and costly to the logging company, protest campaign.
3) In the long run, it will be cheaper for the logging company to accommodate us.
4) Since profit is the company’s decisive motivator, the logging company should stop clear-cutting.

According to Ben-Ze’ev’s theory, this example would constitute an emotional argument. The environmental activists exhibit the emotion of anger, and the commitment they have to this anger, which entails each of the four elements of an emotion previously discussed. Briefly, the cognitive element involved is the environmentalists’ knowledge of the loggers’ work in clear-cutting trees. The evaluative element is at work in the environmentalists’ assessment of the logging company’s plans, and their conclusion that the logging company’s activities are immoral. The motivational element is composed of their will to stop the immoral act of clearing the park’s trees. And, the feeling element involved is their anger. The protests are successful in expressing the emotion of anger, conveying the incompatibility of positions, and justifying their claims interactively.

Ben-Ze’ev also shows that emotions can be rational. They are not rational in the sense that they are “intellectual,” since emotions are inherent in personality and not intellect according to Ben-Ze’ev; instead they are rational in the sense that they are functional (1996, 193). This means that emotions constitute a functional response in a
given situation. Emotions do not necessarily follow any specific rules, they adapt to their surroundings, and understanding them is not a process we perform intellectually; rather, we do so sensibly (1996, 194). Ben-Ze’ev writes, “when one is angry with the right person to the proper extent at the right time, one acts in accordance with what reason dictates, but not because of it. Here anger speaks with the same voice as reason, but this does not mean that we employ reason through deliberate, intellectual processes” (1996, 194). Thus, emotions are rational insofar as they are functional, and they are functional insofar as they sensibly coincide with the given circumstances.

Ben-Ze’ev believes that as well as constituting argumentation and being rational, emotional arguments are efficient since they are common and their persuasive power is great (1996, 197). Emotional arguments are practical and are associated with arguers who are ready to act. Emotional accounts of argumentation hold arguers’ values and attitudes, which portray the sincerity of argumentative discourses. There is a time and place for emotional argumentation that needs to be recognized and accepted.

This does not imply that all emotions are communicated easily. There are cases where emotions are misunderstood or improperly relayed, just as our verbalized argumentative discussions are misunderstood. Advocating the inclusion of emotion-based arguments into mainstream argumentation theory is important because it broadens our scope of the field and makes it more practical.

4.4 Walton’s Use of Emotion in Argumentation

The final argumentation theorist that contributes to this discussion is Douglas Walton. In The Place of Emotion in Argument (1992), Walton claims that certain appeals
to emotion have a legitimate place in argumentative dialogues (1992, 1). Though, in some cases, appeals to emotion can lead to fallacious arguments, in other cases of critical dialogue or negotiation, appeals to emotion can contribute positively to the goals of the argument at stake (1992, 25). Walton specifically focuses on four emotional arguments and determines when they are properly or improperly used. The four emotional arguments Walton discusses are an *argumentum ad populum*, an appeal to popular sentiment, *argumentum ad misericordiam*, an appeal to pity, *argumentum ad baculum*, an appeal to threat or force, and *argumentum ad hominem*, personal attacks against other arguers. Rehearsing two out of the four appeals to emotion, the *argumentum ad misericordiam* and *argumentum ad baculum*, will be enough to substantiate my point.

In some arguments, the display of sentiment is just as important as facts. An *argumentum ad misericordiam*, or an appeal to pity in argumentation, may be fallacious in some cases, but helpful in other instances, according to Walton. When an arguer appeals to pity in presenting her argument, she is “playing” with the emotions of the audience. A common appeal to pity we are confronted with is a charitable appeal. Whether via a letter in the mail or a television commercial, advertisements asking for financial help for the poor who starve to death in another part of the world play on the audience’s pity. Walton writes that the audience’s response “should include the emotion of pity, and it should be a basis for action” (1992, 114). Granted, in some instances using emotions to appeal to the pity of an audience can be manipulative, but in other cases it can serve to help the audience understand how important the issue or claim is to the speaker. Thus, as Walton points out, there is a need to define what kinds of appeal to pity are reasonable or fallacious (1992, 140).
In an appeal to pity the arguer uses the pitiful consequences of not doing a certain action as a reason to perform that action. For instance, in continuing with the charity example, recall a television commercial asking for child sponsors. These commercials focus on the life of a single child or a group of children who are in severe states of distress because of starvation and lack of medical care, among others causes. Statistics such as the number of children who starve each day, who develop diseases, and the number who actually die from starvation and lack of medical attention are offered. Then there is a plea for help. By donating money, you can sponsor and save a child from starving to death. Charitable appeals as such are appeals for immediate, necessary, action. By not donating money, these dire circumstances continue to plague these innocent children. This particular appeal to pity is a reasonable appeal -- there are children who die from starvation, and thus aid is needed to prevent death among poor children from continuing to occur. In an appeal to pity, then, great emphasis is placed on the outcome of a possible action.

There are different ways of defining an *argumentum ad baculum*, but generally it refers to an argument that appeals to threat, force, or fear (1992, 144). Walton discusses cases in which the *argumentum ad baculum* is fallacious or not. My concern though is not with discussing the fallacies arguers may commit but rather with how this appeal to emotion can work successfully in argumentative discourse. When an arguer appeals to threat in an argumentative encounter, she might succeed in leading her audience to respond in a certain desired manner. The same applies to an appeal to force or threat of force in argumentation -- an arguer might succeed in having her audience respond in a
desired outcome. I will not be addressing appeals to threat or force in this project. What I will focus more specifically on is the use of emotion in inducing fear in an audience.

Walton refers to the following example (1992, 146):

An insurance salesman, who has come by to “inform” a client of the advantages of buying a policy proceeds to describe the plight of another man who did not have a policy. This man’s house burned down, and he then suffered terrible hardships, according to the salesman, who goes on to describe these hardships in graphic and lengthy detail. [2]

In this situation the insurance salesman alludes to the ominous possibilities that can occur if his client does not buy the discussed policy. In evoking the emotion of fear in his client, the salesman is trying to demonstrate the troubles that can arise if his client does not buy this policy for protection. In this way, his argument comes across more strongly than it would if he had just made the claim that his client would be prudent to purchase the particular insurance policy.

As I mentioned above in discussing the argumentum ad misericordiam, there are cases where an argumentum ad baculum can also be manipulative. A prime example would be the arguments of certain advertisements. Advertisers may try to “scare” their audience into buying a certain product or staying away from another.

In the beginning of this chapter I mentioned four types of emotional argumentation -- the last two were appealing to emotion and evoking emotion in an audience. An argumentum ad misericordiam appeals to preexisting emotions of an audience, and an argumentum ad baculum evokes emotions of an audience.
In the next section of this chapter, I shift the pace from discussing actual theories that aim to discuss and legitimize emotional argumentation to a model of language use that integrates emotional arguments. I will discuss the work of Ayim, who is not here writing as an argumentation theorist, but she does address language use. In applying moral standards to language, she builds a model of language use that, if put into practice, actually incorporates the uses of emotional argumentation discussed above.

4.5 Ayim's Moral Parameters in Language

Maryann Neely Ayim's work on gender differences in language (1997) discusses four moral criteria she believes are exhibited in women's language patterns. They are language as caring, cooperative, democratic, and honest. Though it is not my intention to deal with gender differences in argumentative practice, Ayim's work offers important criteria for a broader, more inclusive, system of communicating arguments. She presents a style of communicating that could easily incorporate Gilbert's and Ben-Ze'ev's systems of emotional argumentation.

Ayim, as I understand her, claims that we can enhance our morals by investigating and augmenting the moral properties of our language. By exposing the different conversational techniques men and women use, Ayim argues for

a linguistic community in which people are expected to treat other people as ends in themselves, in which people will actually care about other people and their hopes and desires, in which people can truly cooperate with others in a democratic context that refuses to tolerate the oppression of particular individuals or groups of individuals, and in which people can find
the courage and count upon the security required to speak with honesty about themselves, other individuals, and the community as a whole (Maryann Neely Ayim, 1997, 134).

The “linguistic community” Ayim advocates rests on the extent to which each of the moral criteria, which she associates typically with women, are met. This linguistic community complements emotional argumentation. Ayim’s theory emphasizes the performance of certain actions in following the four moral criteria, such as treating people as ends in themselves and learning to care about their hopes and desires (from which it follows that we develop a genuine concern for the person). I will show how adapting to two of her criteria -- language as caring and cooperative -- can result in an awareness of the importance of emotional argumentation.

4.5a Two Moral Criteria

With her first moral criterion, language as caring, Ayim demonstrates the concern that our everyday conversations can result in the use of rude language which offends a listener, and direct imperatives which impede a listener's autonomy (1997, 124). Ayim reports studies that demonstrate women’s language as exemplifying features of caring, whereas men’s style of conversing tends to be more aggressive. For instance, the studies show that women tend to be better at interpreting non-verbal clues; women tend to have a greater concern for a speaker’s psychological stance; women’s language tends to be more comforting and supportive (1997, 120). Thus, adopting language that is more caring can permit the inclusion of emotionally expressed arguments since language users would be
more in tune with both listening and understanding others, as well as deciphering emotional cues.

With the second moral criterion, language as cooperative, Ayim claims that women’s speech patterns tend to be more cooperative than men’s. Instead of being concerned with matters such as who “wins” a given conversation, women tend to be concerned with achieving an outcome that is fair for all the participants involved. Ayim’s depiction of the sexes’ language patterns coincides with Deborah Tannen’s descriptions (1990). Since men tend to be concerned with status, as shown in Tannen’s work, they tend to be concerned with “winning” in their conversations as well. Both Ayim and Tannen describe men’s speech patterns as typically more aggressive. They both also mention that men usually engage in conversation with a bargaining style, as opposed to engaging in a friendly discussion. Since women tend to be looking for connection, understanding, and agreement, as Tannen demonstrates (Deborah Tannen, 1982, 29, 167), they aim to treat all discourse participants fairly. Thus, adopting a more cooperative approach to language would allow for the inclusion of emotional arguments because this approach requires arguers to respect others’ views, and consequently respect their ways of expressing these views as well.

In discussing her moral criteria in language use, Ayim pays particular attention to the differences between men’s and women’s communicating patterns. I think that advocating the style that Ayim attributes to women is advantageous to emotional argumentation. It allows for a less hostile, more inclusive style of argumentation and coincides nicely with the works of Gilbert, Ben-Ze’ev, and Walton.
4.5b Argumentation Theorists and Ayim

To claim that emotional arguments occur within everyday discourse and that they should be recognized and accepted is the emphasis of this chapter. In discussing the literature of the argumentation theorists above, it is apparent that emotion can occur within argumentative discourse in a few ways. Firstly, emotions can be used as reasons for a claim in an argument; both Gilbert and Ben-Ze’ev make this point. Secondly, arguers can make use of emotion in order to express their viewpoints, as reported by Gilbert. The emotional expression of arguments is important to the communication process involved between arguers. Thirdly, an arguer can appeal to the emotions of the audience as shown with Walton’s discussion of an appeal to pity. And, the last type of emotional argumentation that I referred to is a situation in which the arguer evokes emotion, specifically fear, in her audience. Ayim’s discussion of the moral criteria in language may not directly relate to argumentative practice, but she presents a style of communicating that seems to automatically include Gilbert’s, Ben-Ze’ev’s, and Walton’s systems of emotional argumentation. Requiring us to adopt a more caring and cooperative approach in communicating would result in our recognition of the importance of being able to understand emotionally-centered arguments.

The two moral criteria of language discussed above can somehow relate to the four modes of emotional argumentation I address, if only to portray the broader range of acceptance that Ayim’s preferred language patterns offer. I will be brief in relating language as caring and cooperative to emotional argumentation in order to demonstrate that Ayim’s moral criteria recognizes the importance of emotional arguments.
The effects of caring language, the first moral criterion, in communication are important for both recognizing and engaging in emotional argumentation. They would allow for some of the necessary elements of emotional argumentation -- to interpret others’ non-verbalized messages, to be sensitive to others’ social positions, and most importantly to treat argumentative discourse as a means of listening to, and understanding, other views. Thus, adopting a more “caring” language system can allow for the inclusion of emotionally expressed arguments. If an arguer is in tune with her surroundings, and aims to understand others’ views, then she can better interpret eye movement, body language, and voice intonations in argumentative discourse. One of Gilbert’s goals is to “focus on agreement, on consensus, on attachment, on inclusion” (1997, 63). If we concentrate on understanding other views instead of just advocating our own, then we are more apt to include a greater range of expressing information in argumentative encounters. Like Ayim, Gilbert agrees that certain modes of communication are generally set aside as unimportant in argumentative practice. For this reason he contends, “there must be a moral onus on the part of argumentation theorists, especially in their normative role of argument judges and critical thinking teachers, to see that such modes are incorporated into mainstream teaching, research, and consideration” (1997, 52).

Treating argumentative discourse in a more “friendly” instead of competitive manner, derived from the second moral criterion -- language as cooperative -- would also facilitate the inclusion of emotional arguments in mainstream argumentation. Traditional argumentation theories tend to focus on arguers’ verbal justifications of their standpoints. This is much like a “bargaining style” of arguing. Arguers who exemplify characteristics attributed to traditional argumentation usually engage in a back and forth bargaining style
until one of the positions has been adequately justified or refuted. This results in a “right/wrong” or “winner/loser” situation. To engage in argumentation in a more cooperative or friendly manner still results in arguers developing their respective standpoints, but there is more emphasis on understanding and especially including other views. Like the effects of the first moral criterion, cooperative language would allow arguers to be more accepting of non-verbalized messages; and, it would be sensitive to others’ methods of making and expressing a claim. More specifically, instilling a cooperative element in language usage would allow for an emotional reason in argumentation, since cooperation entails a mutual consensus between arguers to understand and connect with each other.

My discussion of Ayim’s work does relate more to the use of emotion that Gilbert and Ben-Ze’ev address -- emotional reasons and expression in argumentation. I think it is safe to say that she provides a broader conception of communication than they do, and it would thus motivate a model of communication and argumentation which could easily accept Walton’s use of emotion in arguments too. The ideas of Walton’s that I referred to show us instances of argumentation that are not focused on the sole justification of a standpoint. Instead, through descriptive scenarios the arguer demonstrates to her audience the possible unattractive circumstances of an action or situation; thus, evoking a sense of fear or sympathy in her audience. It can be argued that an arguer who appeals to the pity or fear of her audience, without being manipulative, aims to have her audience understand the circumstances of a situation. For instance, charitable appeals appear so dire because they are intended to make their audience understand an unfortunate situation.
If this transformation in language patterns that Ayim outlines were to take place, then there would most likely have to be changes, or expansions, made to the traditional model of argumentation as well. Ayim’s moral criterion of caring in language results in less aggressive styles of communicating. If this element of caring in language were implemented, then the revelation of feelings and emotions would be integral to argumentation analysis. Or, if discourse participants were more interested in connecting with others, if “winning” or being “correct” were not always the primary concern, then different goals of argumentation discourse could develop. These additions to argumentation would allow for arguers to be more in tune with others’ social states. This would broaden the “traditional” argumentation theory. For instance, defending a certain claim, which is paramount in traditional argumentation, could be one of several different argumentation goals. Another goal might be to strengthen human relationships, or develop standpoints together through the coalition of all the views of the discourse participants. Most of all though, Ayim’s discussion of adopting a more inclusive “linguistic community” necessitates a change in attitude towards communicating with others, and it is this change that can encourage the acknowledgement of emotional arguments.

4.6 Emotional Argumentation Summarized

The literature on emotional argumentation is not extensive, but in reading Gilbert, Ben-Ze’ev, and Walton, I have outlined a few different patterns of the use of emotion in argumentative discourse. An arguer can put forth an emotion as a legitimate reason for a claim. For instance, if Derek is afraid of water, then that is a good reason for Derek not to
go swimming. This, however, does not ensure that all emotional reasons for argumentative claims are legitimate. For instance, if Derek is afraid of water, does that mean he should never take a shower? When an arguer uses an emotion as a reason for her viewpoint, then it needs to be considered a fairly good reason. This might mean that there needs to be a guide of some sort applied; a guide that distinguishes between strong (legitimate) and weak (illegitimate) emotional reasons in argumentation.

Another type of emotional argument occurs when an arguer expresses herself emotionally. An arguer may communicate how important a claim is, her degree of commitment to that claim, how sincere she is about the claim, or even hidden feelings she may have about the claim, when she expresses herself emotionally. Arguers who express themselves with great emotion tend to be considered too illogical -- a reaction against emotion -- to make a relevant argument. In concentrating on the verbalization and defended claims of arguments, traditional accounts of argumentation tend to neglect the emotional context that may be at work in arguments. The emotions, as well as other elements such as personal relationships or social situation, are considered peripheral to the argument at stake. But I have argued that an argument needs to be taken seriously whether or not its arguer rationally verbalizes and justifies her claims.

An argumentum ad misericordiam, or an appeal to pity, occurs when an arguer appeals to the emotion of pity in her audience. An argumentum ad baculum occurs when an arguer appeals to force, threat, or fear. In this chapter I focused specifically on an argument in which an arguer evokes the emotion of fear in her audience. In neither of these cases does an arguer necessarily have to express herself emotionally or even present a claim that is emotional. In both these types of emotional argumentation the arguers do
however present strong or drastic cases, since they involve in appealing to the preexisting emotion of pity in the audience or in frightening the audience to move it to accept the intended claim. These emotional uses of argumentation, used honestly, can present strong cases for a cause. However, it is just as easy to present a manipulative argument when appealing to or evoking an audience's emotions. Thus, though I contend that these uses of emotional argumentation should be more "accepted" in argumentation theory, there are limits to their use as well.

All the theorists discussed throughout this chapter would agree that communicating arguments with the use of emotion can have positive outcomes. Gilbert, Ben-Ze'ev, and Walton believe that the use of emotion is just another method that an arguer can employ in argumentative discourse, one that should not be considered extraneous to the argument at stake. Thus, emotional reasons and displays should not be considered atypical.

Ayim's work can be related to argumentation theory, specifically the inclusion of emotional argumentation into mainstream argumentation, in a few ways. It advocates respect for the expression of personal feelings in argumentation; it allows for individuals to be able to provide emotions as legitimate reasons in argumentation; it ultimately implies that emotional argumentation not only should be taken into consideration, but that it is legitimately used as well. Stripping away the emotion used in argumentation results in an inadequate view of argumentation. We argue emotionally, and this should be acknowledged and incorporated into argumentation theory. It is difficult to disassociate arguers from their arguments when the arguers are emotionally involved in their arguments. It should follow that there is a concern not only to resolve the argument at
stake, but to ensure that all parties involved in an argument are satisfied. Arguments conveyed through emotion thus have a social aspect that cannot be ignored.

Having presented the theories of the authors in this chapter, I now turn back to the Pragma-Dialectical model and question whether or not it can make allowances, or alter its theory, so that both visual images and emotions can be incorporated into accepted argumentative practices. It is obvious that, on the surface, Pragma-Dialectics does not deal with either visual or emotional ways of communicating standpoints. What I plan to do in the next chapter is investigate whether the rules mapped out for traditional communication can also work for visual images and the emotions.

Notes

[1] I am indebted to Professor J. A. Blair for suggesting these different types of emotional arguments.

Chapter Five
A Pragma-Dialectical Response to Visual and Emotional Arguments

The very premiss of contemporary critical reasoning is that everything must be defended, justified, and explicated without recourse to situational or contextual or personal information, and while there has recently been a softening of this stand, the core view that argument be pursued in an orderly and reasonable manner is still strongly entrenched. True, in the heavily discourse analysis influenced Pragma-Dialectic approach, one can work with a relatively chaotic argument, but the task of that working is to form it into a structure identifiable as a critical inquiry. It may be found in a natural state, but is then molded into an object meeting the purposes of the investigator. The ideology is that an argument is an artifact, a thing that can be examined, categorized and judged in isolation from its surroundings .... (Gilbert, 1997, 41).

5.1 How Would Pragma-Dialecticians Respond to Visual and Emotional Arguments?

In this final chapter I answer the question posed earlier, in the Introduction, Can Pragma-Dialectics make room for visual and emotional arguments? First I recapitulate the major attributes of the Pragma-Dialectical model. This condensed summary of Pragma-Dialectics draws a picture of the major argumentative structures that visual and emotional arguments must face. Though my major contention with Pragma-Dialectics is the theory’s emphasis on verbalization, I briefly outline other problems that might limit Pragma-Dialectics in terms of handling visual and emotional arguments.

Then, I summarize the major attributes of Visual Argumentation and Emotional Argumentation. My recapitulations of visual and emotional arguments will also be concise -- I will outline the major attributes of each theory. First I present a “visual challenge” to Pragma-Dialectics. In other words, I take what I think are integral aspects of visual argumentation theory and determine whether Pragma Dialecticians could handle them. A sure way to help determine whether the Pragma-Dialectical Model can make room for
visual arguments is to test Pragma-Dialectics with concrete examples. I provide a visual argument and address whether the features of Pragma-Dialectics can apply to the argument, can be moderately altered to adequately address the visual argument, or cannot be addressed by Pragma-Dialectics at all.

Then I present an "emotional challenge" to Pragma-Dialectics. I refer to Gilbert's paper, "Prolegomenon to a Pragmatics of Emotion," which actually discusses a way for emotions to be viewed in the Pragma-Dialectical Model. I also present an example of an emotional argument to test whether Pragma-Dialectics can address emotional arguments, can be modified to address emotional arguments, or simply cannot make room for emotional arguments in the parameters of its theory. This final chapter thus connects the material of the preceding three chapters -- Pragma-Dialectics, Visual Argumentation, and Emotional Argumentation.

5.1a Main Aspects of Pragma-Dialectics

The Pragma-Dialectical approach to argumentation is rooted in Speech Act Theory. It is primarily concerned with the use of language, or the interaction of speech acts, between arguers. With this in mind, the components of their argumentation theory somehow relate back to language use.

Each of the theory's features -- externalization, functionalization, socialization, and dialectification -- are descriptive of the model of language arguers should use to express their arguments. "Externalization" ensures that arguers verbally express their claims; this forces all thoughts regarding a claim to be made explicit. "Functionalization" treats the process of arguing about any given issue as a purposive activity. "Socialization" involves
that arguments be communicated in an interactive dialogue between arguers. The feature of "dialectification" requires that critical discussions be conducted in order to resolve disputes. In all four features, the process of laying out arguments via speech acts is integral.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's four stages of argumentation -- confrontation, opening, argumentation, and concluding -- also pivot around the use of language in expressing arguments. Discussants first determine a disagreement or potential disagreement in the "confrontation stage"; this needs to be done by each party expressing a conflicting view. In the "opening stage" the arguers determine whether or not they have enough common background to discuss an issue, or whether they should agree to disagree. During the "argumentation stage" the interlocutors defend or refute standpoints. In the "concluding stage" the arguers decide who has put forth the best argument. None of these stages can occur without the explicitization, or verbalization, of arguments.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst outline a number of rules. They have guidelines that should be followed in order to avoid miscommunications or misunderstandings between arguers. For instance, arguers should not perform insincere speech acts, and they should aim to be clear in their argument's expression. They have rules of conduct for rational discussants that should be followed for achieving efficient argumentative discussions. When these rules are broken, then fallacies occur. For instance, an arguer must defend her standpoint if asked by an opposing arguer. If she avoids proving her argument, then she commits a fallacy.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst also team up with Jackson and Jacobs in providing dialectical reconstructions that argumentation analysts can implement. An analyst
concentrates on the issue over which arguers disagree. She pays attention to the arguments each interlocutor advances and the overall structure of their arguments as well. An analyst can delete unnecessary parts of an argument or add missing parts to an argument. She can rearrange an argument's layout, or she can replace vague arguments with clearer language. The operations of “deletion,” “addition,” “permutation,” and “substitution” are thus also concerned with the language each arguer utilizes to express her argument.

A central contention of Pragma-Dialectics, as I see it, is the emphasis van Eemeren and Grootendorst place on the explicitization of arguments. The authors develop a model that concentrates on determining what speech acts are uttered by each arguer, and whether or not the listener verbally assents to the speaker’s argument. They set up a system of rules that arguers should follow in order to ensure that they conduct themselves in a way that is conducive to the explicitization of arguments. They outline a model that develops guidelines for analysts to assess the verbal exchange between arguers, including guidelines for analysts to make arguers’ unexpressed premises verbally explicit. Their theory of argumentation, as they describe it, necessitates and depends on the verbalization of premises and conclusions in argumentation.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s intense focus on the verbalization of arguments inhibits the possibility of different types of argumentation, specifically the visual and emotional types of argumentation discussed in this project. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst should allow for other means of displaying an argument that are also explicit, just not necessarily verbalized.
5.1b Main Aspects of Visual Argumentation

I began my discussion of Visual Argumentation in Chapter Three by claiming that visual images and verbal proclamations are analogous to each other. They should not be ranked against each other, since verbalizing a claim and demonstrating a claim via a visual image are simply different methods of expression. Neither should necessarily be considered more effective than the other. Instead, both methods of expressing oneself should be acknowledged and understood as separate and advantageous methods of expressing arguments depending on the particular argumentative context.

Groarke shows that visual arguments, like verbally expressed arguments, can be made up of premises and conclusions. The problem is that the premises and conclusions of visual arguments tend to be ambiguous. There might be no evading ambiguous visual arguments (even with the broadening of argumentation theories), since visual arguments tend to sometimes rely on the expression of claims and reasons via ambiguity. For Groarke, the logical tools applied to arguments that are verbally expressed can also be applied to visual arguments. We need only to be accepting of the possibility of visual images presenting argumentative claims.

Though Blair and Groarke present compatible theories of visual argumentation, Blair’s work is more detailed. Some of Blair’s criteria for a visual argument that I agree with are: the visual image must present a claim; there need to be reasons for that claim -- whether implicit or explicit; the reasons must be linguistically explicable; the claim and its reasons must be communicated to others.

In order to accept visual arguments, verbally expressed arguments cannot be considered the only “correct” way of expressing arguments. It has been shown that it is
plausible that there are visual arguments. Given that visual arguments exist, it thus follows that a theory of argumentation could address visual arguments. Exactly how argumentation theory could deal with visual arguments is a topic that needs address in another project. A fundamental change in attitude can make us more aware of the possibility of visual images composing arguments.

5.1c Main Aspects of Emotional Argumentation

Emotions cannot be considered extraneous to argumentation. There are several ways in which emotions play a key role in the process of arguing. The four types of emotional argumentation that I discuss in Chapter Four are: (1) emotions used in the expression of arguments; (2) emotions used as reasons for arguments; (3) an appeal to the emotions of an arguer’s audience; (4) an arguer inducing the emotions of an audience.

Gilbert’s overall idea of emotional argumentation is fairly general, but he seems to advocate two different senses of emotional argumentation. He shows that emotional expressions can be used in the process of argumentative discussions. Thus, arguers are not limited to expressing their arguments in any single, accepted, correct manner. Happiness, anger, sadness, frustration, among other emotions can be used to express a claim. Furthermore, the use of emotion may actually help a listener understand just how important a claim may be to a certain arguer. Gilbert also claims that there are arguments where an emotion can be used as a reason for a claim. If Lauren feels a sense of guilt whenever she passes a homeless person on the street, then that may be a good reason for Lauren to either avoid certain streets or give the homeless people she passes some money. Ben-Ze’ev agrees with the second use of emotion in argumentation. He outlines a more
detailed theory where emotions are used as reasons for arguers’ claims. Ben-Ze’ev’s requirements for successfully presenting an emotional argument are more technical, since he stipulates particular aspects of an emotion that must be present: the four elements of cognition, evaluation, motivation, feeling.

Walton discusses both appealing to an audience’s emotions, as well as inducing emotions in an audience. In the former, an appeal to pity works by using the pitiful consequences of either performing or not performing an action as a reason for doing so. A sincere appeal to pity can help an arguer demonstrate to her listeners how important a claim is. In an appeal to fear, an arguer demonstrates to her audience the dire possibilities that can arise from doing or not doing a particular action. Thus, while an appeal to pity implores a listener either to do or to not do something, an appeal to fear actually scares a listener either to do or to not do something.

Emotional arguments are not rare; we present and listen to emotional arguments frequently. There are times when emotions may be used in a fallacious or manipulative manner, but this can be the case with any type of argumentation. It is especially important to understand the manner in which we argue emotionally mainly because we are emotional beings and we cannot be expected to separate from our emotions specifically when we argue. Ayim’s moral criteria of language was referred to in order to portray a system in which language usage automatically includes emotional methods of arguing. Developing a broader theory than those ones presented in Chapter Four can help our understanding of the possibility, detection, and understanding of emotional arguments.
5.2 Initial Hypothesis

Before I began this inquiry my initial hypothesis was that there would be obvious incompatibilities between Pragma-Dialectics and Visual and Emotional Argumentation, what is generally considered “alternative” forms of arguing. There are obvious reasons to assume that Pragma-Dialectics cannot handle visual or emotional arguments.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst develop a theory of argumentation that incorporates Speech Act Theory. They are concerned with how and what an arguer communicates to her listeners via speech acts. In other words, the verbalization of arguments is integral.

The feature of externalization poses obvious problems for visual and emotional arguments. In focusing specifically on what is verbalized in argumentative discourse, the authors overlook other methods of expressing ideas. Their theory gives priority to what an arguer voices over other unspoken occurrences in an argument, the expression of emotions through tears or frowns in arguments are prime examples. These examples, among others, might be related to the argument at stake, but they are not considered as important as verbal proclamations to the Pragma-Dialectic theory of argumentation, unless an analyst picks up on them and translates them into words.

The externalization of arguments is supposed to achieve the effect of making an arguer’s beliefs or commitments into an external argument. This is mainly achieved for the purpose of resolving a dispute among individuals. If we rely only on the verbally explicit speech acts of an arguer, though, without penetrating the possible arguments underlying the surface of an argumentative discourse, then we could end up entertaining pseudo-arguments and never the real argument at stake. This applies specifically to
emotional arguments. For instance, an arguer might feel uncomfortable expressing her actual viewpoint and might stick to “surface” arguments, those arguments that do not have much commitment attached to them. In other words, what is being argued may not really be the issue at stake. Concentrating on just the verbal proclamations of an argumentative encounter overlooks the emotions, which may cause us to miss the real point at issue.

Consider the following example of two roommates, Rose and Cathy. It is Saturday night, and the two women almost always go out Saturday night. Rose asks Cathy if she wants to go watch a movie at the theatre. Cathy answers, “no.” Rose suggests heading out to the local bar, where they usually hang out. Cathy declines that suggestion as well. Rose offers a few more ideas to which Cathy also dismisses. The subject matter of this particular argumentative discourse is deciding where Rose and Cathy should hang out Saturday night. While Rose offers several suggestions, in Pragmat-Dialectic terms she offers positive standpoints, Cathy negatively responds to each of them. Finally, assuming Cathy just does not feel like going out, Rose says that they could just stay home and watch television instead. As Cathy walks to her bedroom door, she mutters that she is going out, and Rose can stay at home and watch television if that is what she feels like doing. Thus, the two women agree with the expressed opinion of their argument, that they want to go out on Saturday night. However, while Rose offers several standpoints, in order to find common ground with Cathy, the two cannot agree on a plan for the evening.

This is a case in which what is being argued is not exactly the issue at stake. For Cathy, there are deeper, hidden emotions that affect her negative response to all of Rose’s suggestions. Cathy is actually upset with Rose because Rose has not paid for their
groceries in over a month. If Rose continues to concentrate solely on Cathy’s verbal responses though, Rose might miss the real point at issue for Cathy: Cathy is upset with Rose because she is not sharing their common expenses, and thus though Cathy does want to go out as they usually do on Saturday nights, she does not want to assent to any of Rose’s ideas because at some level Cathy feels that agreeing to any of Rose’s suggestions would imply that she is not upset with Rose anymore. Rose and Cathy’s argument about where to hang out Saturday evening masks the real issue at stake for Cathy. In order to determine why Cathy is being unusually disagreeable, Rose needs to concentrate on indicators other than Cathy’s verbalizations. For instance, Cathy’s body language, tone of voice, or her unwillingness to compromise should suggest to Rose that something deeper is affecting Cathy.

Perhaps having a different argumentation perspective could modify the focus on resolving an argument to understanding the arguers involved. Without this modification of perspective, I do not think emotional arguments specifically can be accepted as credible ways of arguing, since this modification allows arguers to focus less on verbalizations and more on other indicators such as, whether the argument is coherent, whether there is pertinent missing information, or whether the arguer’s physical and emotional stances appear in accordance with her verbal statements. Using these other tools of argumentative discourse, in addition to the ones that focus on language, can help discussions of conflict run more smoothly and, more importantly, more broadly — so that different methods of argumentative expression are encouraged, developed, and accepted in argumentation scholarship. Pragma-Dialectics does not concern itself with these other parts of
argumentative discourse, and so it would seem that incorporating visual and emotional arguments into this model seems unfeasible.

An analyst is responsible for providing an overview of an argument, and it is based on what she deems is part of the resolution process. An analyst can add to or delete information from the argument at hand. This is problematic for two reasons: (1) the concern of an analyst is mainly with language, and (2) an outsider of the relationship between arguers may not always know what is irrelevant or necessary to prove either interlocutor’s point. For instance, an interlocutor may think that a certain elaboration or clarification is needed to support an expressed opinion. If an analyst deletes this information, the argument may not be presented properly. On the other hand, an analyst can run into problems by adding information as well.

Marketplace argumentation is loaded with incompletely expressed arguments (those arguments that having a missing claim or reasons). If arguers have a common background, not shared by the analyst, then their shared history may present aspects in the argument that the analyst has not penetrated. Language cannot be expected to fully explain and convey arguments, especially to an outsider of an argument. The concentration on verbalized statements, deleting ones that seem irrelevant and adding ones that seem relevant, seem to exclude visual or emotional types of argumentation.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst outline rules for communication and rules for efficient argumentation. Their rules of communication are meant to make indirect speech acts direct. In other words, they provide rules that encompass the principles of being clear, honest, and efficient, so that an arguer is encouraged to voice what she actually means. Examples of these rules are: do not perform incomprehensible speech acts, and do
not perform any insincere speech acts. Their rules of communication focus specifically on the nature of speech acts in argumentation.

They also provide rules that should be followed in critical discussion. These rules are also restricted to the nature of speech acts. For instance, an arguer should be able to defend her standpoint, a listener should be able to question an arguer’s standpoint, and argumentation should relate to the standpoints made. When these ten rules are violated, arguers have committed fallacies. The argument, according to Pragma-Dialectics, has not been conducted in an efficient manner. The problem with both the rules of communication and critical discussion is that they focus specifically on speech acts, the verbalization of arguments, and this must obviously hinder the process of arguing in a different manner (visually or emotionally).

For van Eemeren and Grootendorst then, the role of the speaker and listener (to convince and be convinced), the complex relationships between sentences and communication (speech acts), the process of reconstruction performed by the argumentation analyst, and especially the rules that arguers must follow in presenting efficient arguments are all important and necessary constituents of resolving an argument. Each of these constituents of Pragma-Dialectics has an intense focus on language which seems to inhibit other forms of arguing.

I will now present the challenges of Visual and Emotional Argumentation to the Pragma-Dialectical mode of Argumentation.
5.3 A Visual Challenge

Both the works of Blair and Groarke, in analyzing static visual images and developing arguments with premises and conclusions, lead me to change my initial expectations of a "too restrictive argumentation theory." From these authors I have adapted a definition of visual argumentation that is not very radical or unimaginable at all. A visual argument is primarily expressed via a visual image, though there may be other elements accompanying it. There must be an ascertainable claim and at least one reason, whether it is overtly expressed or not, to support the claim. Furthermore, the argument must be linguistically explicable and communicated to an audience.

Pragma-Dialectics relies on a system of argumentation that requires dialectical exchanges. Two or more parties must therefore communicate ideas back and forth. Visual arguments do not occur in the exact same manner, but they can also be dialectical to a degree. The first way visual arguments can be dialectical is when what occasions a visual argument might be that it is a dialectical response to an expressed standpoint. The second way a visual argument can be dialectical is when a visual image presents an argument, and then it is up to the audience to engage in argumentation. For instance, if a viewer disagrees with a visual argument and has an alternative, better argument to offer, then an argumentative discussion can develop. If there is another viewer who can defend the visual argument, then when an opposing view is voiced, the dialectical process is easily discernible. However, a single viewer who has a problem with a visual argument can adapt the role of both protagonist and antagonist, and thus follow a dialectical pattern of argumentation as well.
The Pragma-Dialectical account of argumentation necessarily requires the use of speech acts in conveying arguments; thus arguments are necessarily linguistically expressed. I suggest that the expression of arguments via the use of speech acts is one way of laying out an argument, while the expression of arguments via the use of visual images is another way -- the two are parallel to each other. While the use of speech acts provides for arguments that are linguistically expressed, and visual images function primarily through their graphical content -- both methods of argumentation can provide arguments that are linguistically explicable. In other words, an arguer can choose to present her argument in any manner (verbally, visually, emotionally, among others). When we recapitulate or discuss these arguments, we succeed in establishing that these arguments are in fact verbally explicable. We can describe a visual image, even though it is not expressed verbally; thus it is verbally explicable.

Here is a more detailed and technical explanation of a possible visual argument, using the main components of a traditional, verbalized, argument. A visual argument can present an argument, a pro or contra standpoint. The conflict of opinion is not represented in the image, since it is a snapshot of a single moment. Instead the audience of the visual image assumes the opposing view. A static image can only do so much; if it does present an argument, the opposing view is discerned by the viewers. An argument presented through a visual image must be linguistically explicable. In other words, the argument may not be verbalized, but we must be able to verbally describe it. Finally, in order to develop a dialectical interaction between the interlocutors that are at odds with each other, there must be an actual individual who can ascribe to the argument presented in the image. For instance, if a Tide detergent advertisement relays a standpoint, in order for a viewer to
take issue with the standpoint and engage in argumentation there needs to be another individual who is a proponent of Tide’s argument (for instance, a Tide representative, or a Tide consumer). All the prerequisites that I outlined for an argument to occur are found in visual arguments, but in a different manner than in a verbal argument. The most difficult hurdle for visual argumentation seems to be the problem of presenting opposing views in its argument. However, in a single instant of a verbal argumentative encounter, we cannot know the opposing views automatically; instead, a dialogue develops and opposing standpoints are discerned. We cannot expect a static visual representation to relay more than one point of view, unless there is a succession of static visuals. The visual image communicates a standpoint. It is up to the audience to interact and develop an argumentative discussion.

5.3a Can Pragma-Dialectics Handle Mercedes-Benz’s Visual Argument?

I now provide an analysis of the same Mercedes-Benz advertisement I provided in Chapter Three. I have already shown that the visual image in this spread presents a visual argument. I will now focus less on the overall analysis of the visual image and its message and instead provide direct correlations between the characteristics of an argument, just relayed in the section above, and the actual visual argument Mercedes-Benz presents (refer to Figure 3.3).

The two page spread presents the claim that a Mercedes-Benz is probably the most desirable car in the world. There are two reasons for this claim: every person depicted in this advertisement admires the Mercedes-Benz, and every person in this advertisement gives up aspects of their lives in order to gawk at the Mercedes-Benz through a window.
If a viewer decides to take an opposing view, for instance “Mercedes-Benz is not one of the most desirable cars in the world,” then a conflict of opinion has arisen. The Mercedes-Benz advertisement only presents the initial standpoint, it is up to the audience to take issue with the standpoint or not. The argument Mercedes-Benz makes has already been linguistically explained (briefly above, and in more detail in Chapter Three, Section 3.6). Even though the argument is presented through the help of a visual image, it can still be verbally explicated. Finally, a dialectical process of argumentation between two or more interlocutors can progress once there are both an interlocutor who can agree with and represent the argument presented in the advertisement, and an interlocutor who has a conflict of opinion with the advertisement’s argument. This communicative and interactive process of defending and refuting the argument Mercedes-Benz makes should result in either the arguers justifying Mercedes-Benz’s positive standpoint -- that the car is the most desirable in the world, or refuting the expressed opinion with the opposing negative standpoint -- that the car is not the most desirable car in the world. In either case, it is the visual depiction of the entire advertisement that helps depict an argument (its claim and reasons) and initiates the argumentative dialogue. The same characteristics that apply to verbally expressed arguments in the Pragma-Dialectical model have been met in this visual argument, just not in the exact same manner.

It is possible to express, ascertain, communicate and interact with (in a dialectical manner) visual arguments. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s features of argumentation can work with visual arguments. We can ensure that visual arguments are explicit ("externalization"), that there is a dialectical exchange aimed at resolving opposing views ("dialectification"), that the process of arguing is emphasized as important.
("functionalization"), and that there is an interactive process between arguers
("socialization").

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s stages of argumentation can also function with visual arguments. At the confrontation stage of the Mercedes-Benz argument, a positive standpoint -- "Mercedes-Benz is probably the most desirable car in the world" -- is expressed and consequently questioned by its viewers. At the opening stage, the different standpoints of the protagonist and the antagonist are voiced, and the arguers determine whether they have enough common ground to carry out an argument. For instance, if the arguers cannot agree on what visual argument Mercedes-Benz presents, then they cannot argue with each other since they are not discussing the same issue. At the argumentation stage, the arguers defend their claims and refute the opposing claims. Finally, at the concluding stage, the arguers determine whether they have resolved the argument. So, either the arguer who defends the pro-standpoint of Mercedes-Benz adequately justifies this claim, or the antagonist adequately refutes Mercedes-Benz’s claim.

It is easy to accommodate the Pragma-Dialectic features and stages to visual arguments. The problem we face, though, is applying the rules that van Eemeren and Grootendorst prescribe for communication and critical discussion. These rules focus specifically on language -- the use of language, and the adequacy of the expression of language. The rules, as they stand, cannot handle visual arguments.

However, I think that either modifying these rules so that they are not so stringent, or adding a new set of rules that apply specifically to visual arguments, can be easily managed. One of the communication rules is: do not perform any insincere speech acts. This rule functions to prohibit dishonest arguments. If we either replace "speech acts"
with “claims,” or add another rule that addresses argumentative claims expressed in any manner, then the mode of visual argumentation can also be addressed by Pragma-Dialectics.

The same applies to van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s rules of critical discussion. Their rules of critical discussion tend to focus on the standpoints arguers advance. A standpoint is the verbalized attitude of a speaker. If the definition of a standpoint can be modified to encompass the “attitude of a speaker” expressed in any manner, instead of the “verbalized attitude of a speaker,” then the rules can actually address visual arguments. For instance one of their critical discussion rules is: an arguer’s attack of a standpoint must actually relate to that standpoint. By broadening the definition of a “standpoint,” Pragma-Dialecticians can address more than just verbalized arguments.

In summary, visual arguments can be handled by the Pragma-Dialectical model. Arguments depicted in visual images are not necessarily linguistically expressed, but they are linguistically explicable. For instance, the reasons for the claim Mercedes-Benz makes are not linguistically expressed, but I did linguistically explain them. The argumentative claims are simply presented by visual images, and it is up to the audience to take issue with them. This is no different than a primarily verbally-expressed argument -- Jerry cannot have an argument with Eric if Eric does not doubt or disagree with Jerry’s viewpoint. I have shown in this section that van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s features of argumentation can be applied to visual arguments. Furthermore, the four stages of argumentation in the Pragma-Dialectical model can also be applied to visual arguments. The Mercedes-Benz advertisement presents an argument that has all four stages at work. What seriously hinders Pragma-Dialectics from being able to handle visual arguments are the rules
outlined for clear communication and efficient critical discussion. I think, however, it is possible to rectify the Pragma-Dialectical model, thus broadening it so that it applies to other types of argumentation, by altering some rules and implementing new ones altogether.

5.4 An Emotional Challenge

In Chapter Four, I discussed four possible types of emotional argumentation. In this section, however, I will be referring specifically to arguments that are expressed emotionally.

In his paper, “Prolegomenon to a Pragmatics of Emotion” (1998), Gilbert claims that emotions are ordinary and integral aspects of argumentation, and we should use interpretive and analytical tools similar to those used in what he terms the “critical-logical” approach of argumentation when dealing with emotional argumentation (1998, 1). Gilbert discusses the four features of van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s model, and how emotions can fit nicely into these foundations of Pragma-Dialectics.

The socialization feature of Pragma-Dialectics assumes that argumentative discourse occurs between two or more interlocutors, and thus argumentation is both a communicative and an interactive activity. There is necessarily a bilateral discussion that occurs between the speakers and listeners involved (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 9). In order for the other three features of argumentation to occur, it is necessary for argumentation to be a social activity. Arguments must be expressed to others (“externalization” feature); arguments under investigation are treated as purposive activities (“functionalization” feature); argumentation necessarily involves a back and forth
dialogue between listeners and speakers ("dialectification" feature). The feature of socialization applies to emotional argumentation, just as it does to a primarily verbalized argument, since the emotions must be communicated to listeners.

The feature of externalization provides interlocutors with an argumentative environment that allows arguers to be able to express any standpoint they wish and for interlocutors to focus only on what other interlocutors have outwardly expressed or externalized (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, 107, 10). Gilbert writes of this requirement, "But, of course, an arguer’s words are not sufficient to express meanings or communicate messages. We speak enthymematically, we communicate non-linguistically. The selfsame words can have completely different meanings depending on how and when and where they are delivered" (1998, 2). In other words, during an argumentative discussion interlocutors may not always verbally explicate all premises, proof, and conclusions since a common context allows interlocutors to understand points that are not necessarily stated. Verbalizing our thoughts or reactions is not always inherent in argumentative discussions either. We may sigh, make a facial expression, or react physically to the issue at stake. The context and relationship between a particular argument and its arguers is important as well. For instance, arguers may use sarcasm or irony, which means that verbalized statements cannot be taken at face value. Arguers who have a personal relationship with each other will probably be better able to detect sarcasm. Arguers who do not have a personal relationship, however, may not detect sarcasm as easily. Paying attention to tone of voice, eye movements, and physical manoeuvres is important.
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have limited argumentation theory by permitting only externalized information to be considered by interlocutors, thereby avoiding the complications for their theory caused by the challenging examples of visual and emotional arguments. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst avoid dealing with emotional arguments. In Chapter Four I have already presented the case that emotional arguments exist, and if this is the case then traditional argumentation theories, specifically van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s, need to be broadened.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst need to broaden their scope of what can be considered “expressive.” We may express ourselves emotionally in an argumentative encounter, and this should be permissible, acceptable, and taken into consideration. Gilbert writes, “if linguistic assertions form the core for information communicated in the logical mode, can emotional expressions do the same for the emotional mode? And, the answer is, of course, yes” (1998, 2). Emotions are an important aspect of argumentation according to Gilbert. Not only are they a means for interlocutors to express themselves, but they can also be used to clarify linguistic communication (1998, 2). Thus, if emotions are made explicit in argumentation, they should not be ignored.

In discussing the topic of emotional argumentation, the question arises of whether interlocutors are expected to know what another interlocutor is feeling. In van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s model, only that which is verbally expressed is taken into consideration. The same would apply for emotional argumentation, only that which is emotionally expressed is taken into consideration. Interlocutors may suspect that another interlocutor harbours an unexpressed feeling, or has certain beliefs due to deeper feelings;
however, unless they are expressed those unexpressed emotions cannot be taken into consideration in the argument’s evaluation.

The functionalizing element of Pragma-Dialectical Model regards argumentation as a process of language use, and thus it ensures that speech acts have been successfully performed (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 7). The feature of functionalization treats argumentative discourse as a purposive activity; arguments are encouraged to run smoothly so as to result in a solution. The functionalization feature can also work for emotional argumentation. Some indicators of emotional expression are voice tone, body language, and eye contact. The feature of functionalization could be transferred to emotional argumentation. Since emotional expression is indicative of an arguer’s concern, commitment, or feeling for a standpoint (Gilbert, 1998, 3), the functionalization element would allow arguers to be aware of any unexamined criterion that applies to resolving a dispute. For instance, an interlocutor may sense that her dispute partner is extremely concerned about the issue at stake but for some reason is holding back; she can discern this from the deep emotion her dispute partner is expressing -- for instance, fear. The functionalization element would work towards the needed externalization of unexpressed emotions. Though van Eemeren and Grootendorst include the feature of functionalization to ensure that certain conditions regarding the performance of speech acts have been met, the same idea can be applied to emotional arguments. A set of guidelines could be implemented that would guide emotional argumentation in a fruitful way as well.

The feature of dialectification requires a listener either to accept the pro-argumentation or to reject the contra-argumentation of the speaker. In either case, a critical discussion evolves as the listener critically assesses and responds to the speaker’s
standpoints. Consequently, the arguers alternate between the roles of listener and speaker. A dialectical argument should result in a critical discussion between interlocutors involved. Gilbert writes “dialectification stresses the logical, linear basis of the Pragma-Dialectical programme” (1998, 3). He introduces a new feature, “emotionalizing,” which would take non-verbal and non-logical aspects of an argument seriously.

5.4a Gilbert’s “Principle of Pragmatic Emotionalization”

Emotionalizing involves two major aspects: paying attention to emotional consistency and looking for emotional cues as to how committed an interlocutor is to her standpoint (1998, 4). In the first aspect, emotional consistency, an interlocutor is expected to express emotions that coincide with any verbal proclamations that are made. According to Gilbert, “Determining when a dispute partner’s stated position is consistent with her observed emotional reactions can be a major indicator of how one is proceeding and how one ought to proceed in a particular argumentation” (1998, 4). Thus, if one communicates emotionally and verbally, then the two must be consistent for an effective argument. The second aspect of emotionalizing ensures that an interlocutor does not have varying degrees of commitment to her standpoint. Knowing to which degree an arguer is committed to her standpoint (for instance, very strongly or indifferently) can help make finding a solution less difficult. According to Gilbert, “An argument will be entirely different if one’s opposer is vehemently in opposition or merely considering the alternatives” (1998, 4). Often, the emotional cues in an argument (from tone of voice to actual linguistic cues such as choice of words) are the most reliable indicators of consistency and commitment, and thus Gilbert places such emphasis on them in emotional argumentation.
Even without Gilbert's development of emotionalizing, the idea of dialectification can still be attributed to emotionally expressed arguments. Simply, even when arguments are expressed with emotion, interlocutors are still expected to consider the expression seriously. Is the speaker or the expresser of an argument making sense? Is her emotional display a form of drama, or is it genuinely felt? Dealing with emotional argumentation still involves a dialectical process between the listener and speaker of an argument, and so emotional displays must also be assessed critically.

Gilbert writes that "emotional argumentation is just like any other form of argumentation and needs both descriptive and prescriptive investigation" (1998, 7). Just as verbally-oriented theories of argumentation have been extensively developed, primarily emotionally-oriented arguments also require such development. Gilbert states his "Principle of Pragmatic Emotionalization," which he describes as a foundation for emotional argumentation. It reads,

Given that a communicator is presenting an emotional message that is inconsistent with the logical message, then the recipient may assume that the logical message may not be reliable, and/or the complete message may be compound, and/or the goals of the communicator may have been misidentified, and/or the communicator's position may not have been fully exposed (1998, 7).

This principle of Gilbert's can address the inconsistencies that occur between the verbal and non-verbal expressions of an arguer. Disguised emotions can be deciphered when words and an interlocutor's demeanour seem to conflict, or the arguer seems insincere. In this case an interlocutor may not be aware of, or may be trying to hide, an
emotion she harbours. This emotion can be teased out or discovered through argumentative dialogue. An arguer may be sincere, but there seems to be more behind her expressed standpoints. Or, an arguer may not express her full standpoint. A theory of emotional argumentation, which pays attention to the inconsistencies in our verbal and non-verbal expressions, can help sort out some problems of argumentative discussions.

5.4b Can Pragma-Dialectics Handle an Emotional Argument at the Office?

The best way to concretize the application of Pragma-Dialectics to emotional argumentation is to present an example. Consider two individuals, at the office on lunch break, debating the issue of capital punishment. The first interlocutor, Terry, calmly claims that capital punishment is wrong, immoral. Terry believes that we cannot kill a murderer because it is a contradictory action, and that is not an example we need to put fourth in society. Terry states that we cannot claim at one point that murder is wrong, and then have the government perform capital punishment. Furthermore, the act of preparing and actually killing someone is demoralizing to the person and society at large.

The second interlocutor, Lesley, gets flustered and begins to shout that capital punishment is good; it could be successful in deterring crime. Terry then rationally asserts a few more supports for his argument. The argument continues to float back and forth between the interlocutors. They both, although Terry more so, offer reasons for their arguments.

In this situation, Terry decides that there is more reasoning behind Lesley’s highly emotional display of argumentation. While Terry is giving reason after reason against capital punishment, Lesley seems to just get more and more upset. While Terry remains
disassociated from the argument, Lesley becomes more personally involved. With some probing on Terry’s part, Lesley reveals that his cousin was brutally killed, and it would be just if the murderer was killed in return. Lesley bases his argument on personal experience, and it is his display of emotion that demonstrates to Terry that there is more going on behind Lesley’s words.

Though my initial intention was to produce an example of argumentation that leaned towards the opposite extreme of van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s model, it really does not. The rules of Pragma-Dialectics warn against displays such as Lesley’s. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst are correct in claiming that interlocutors should give reasons for their positions. Their theory runs into problems when it claims to ignore emotional accounts and concentrate only on verbal, rational justifications alone. With probing, on Terry’s part, or by an argumentation mediator, Lesley’s emotional response to Terry’s standpoint can be understood without standing the test of rational justification. Furthermore, Lesley’s emotional cues are flashing indicators that there is more going on behind Lesley’s statements. Terry’s probing actually discovers that Lesley is emotionally attached to his claim because he has had a close relative murdered. Furthermore, discovering this information shows Terry that Lesley’s argument is concerned more with punishing offenders, while Terry is more concerned with the position of society. Incorporating emotional accounts into Pragma-Dialectics would allow for a more broadly construed, and thus applicable, approach to argumentative discourses.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst could easily mend their theory to incorporate this instance of emotional argumentation. Gilbert’s work discussed above shows that the features of Pragma-Dialectics can easily address emotional argumentation. As I showed
with the Mercedes-Benz argument, the four stages of the Pragma-Dialectical model can also apply to other forms of argumentation. There seems to be no reason to think that van Eemeren and Grootendorst could not mend their theory to accept these other types of argumentation. The only problems we are faced with are those posed by the rules van Eemeren and Grootendorst outline. As they stand, the communication and critical discussion rules cannot properly address emotional arguments. However, by either redefining the rules or adding new rules that work in the same nature as the existing ones, emotional arguments can be handled by Pragma-Dialectics. To see how implementing redefined or new rules altogether can broaden the Pragma-Dialectical model is a task for another project, but I will suggest some examples of what I mean by redefined or new rules.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst claim that the “Principle of Communication,” which states that an arguer be clear, honest, efficient and to the point (1992, 50), underlies their Communication Rules. Their first rule of communication is “Do not perform any incomprehensible speech acts” (1992, 50). This rule can be altered in such a way so that it is still in line with the Principle of Communication, yet it is applicable to different types of argumentative discourse. For instance, the rule can read “Be clear in expressing claims or reasons for those claims so that they are not incomprehensible to others.” Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s rule specifically applies to verbalized proclamations (“speech acts”), while the revised rule can be attributed to proclamations of any kind (whether they be verbally, emotionally, or visually expressed).

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have another set of rules for ensuring that critical discussions are efficient. The first of these ten rules reads “Parties must not prevent each
other from advancing standpoints or casting doubt on standpoints” (1992, 208). For this rule to apply to a broader range of argumentative discourses, then either the definition of a “standpoint” needs to be changed, since it applies only to that which is verbalized, or a new rule altogether, that would account for other types of argumentation, needs to be implemented. I will introduce a new rule altogether that has the same purpose as this first rule for critical discussion, but it can be applied to a broader range of arguments. The rule would read “parties must not prevent each other from expressing viewpoints or casting doubt on expressed viewpoints.” While van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s rule ensures that arguers are permitted to verbally express any viewpoint and cast doubt on any verbally expressed viewpoint, the rule I introduce allows arguers to express (in any way) their viewpoints and cast doubt on viewpoints that are expressed (again, in any way). The revised rule and this new rule I offered above are examples of how the Pragma-Dialectical model can apply to a broader range of arguments.

Emotional arguments can also be handled by the Pragma-Dialectical model of argumentation. Emotions that affect the argumentation at stake may not be linguistically expressed. What is important to recognize, however, is that some arguments hinge on the emotional stance of an arguer. In order to understand the emotions at work in an arguer’s claim and reason(s), Gilbert states that we need to be aware of the arguer’s consistency between what is verbalized and what emotions are expressed, and how committed the arguer is to her standpoint. The element of consistency ensures that arguers present clear argumentative claims. The element of commitment helps arguers to eventually reach a mutual agreement. What causes problems for the Pragma-Dialectical model being able to handle emotional arguments are the rules van Eemeren and Grootendorst formulate for
clear communication and efficient critical discussions. Changing some of these rules, and adding new rules that specifically address emotional arguments leaves Pragma-Dialectics with no serious problems in addressing emotional arguments.

5.5 A Broader Characterization of Argumentation

In Chapter One I outlined van Eemeren and Grootendorst's definition of argumentation as "a speech act consisting of a constellation of statements designed to justify or refute an expressed opinion and calculated in a regimented discussion to convince a rational judge of a particular standpoint in respect of the acceptability or unacceptability of that expressed opinion" (1984, 18). This characterization does not permit argumentation that is not specifically verbalized to be a part of argumentation, but altering some of the terms could provide for a more inclusive definition.

An expressed opinion is the issue over which arguers have a dispute or conflict of opinion. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst claim that this is verbalized in argumentation. I do not want to limit the issue at stake to verbalized information; as long as it is expressed in some manner. In most cases it is likely that arguers will verbally explicate their expressed opinions or argument at stake. In other cases, this should not have to necessarily be the case. For instance, it is supper time at the home of the Smith family. Mr. Smith calls out, "dinner time, kids," and as his two children walk into the kitchen he asserts, "we're having vegetable soup tonight." Jamie raises his eye brows, looking at the table to make sure his father has told the truth, that soup is for dinner. He stares at his dinner bowl, then at his dad, and with a scowl he walks back to his room. Jamie did not have to say anything, yet we can still figure out that he is not eating the vegetable soup for
dinner. Furthermore, everyone in the Smith family knows that Jamie does not particularly enjoy vegetable soup, so his physical retreat from the kitchen area expresses his point -- that he is not eating vegetable soup.

The expressed opinion in this example is “the Smith family is eating vegetable soup for dinner.” Both Mr. Smith and Jamie are making standpoints, or expressing their respective points of view. Mr. Smith has a positive standpoint expressed verbally, “we are eating vegetable soup for dinner.” Jamie has a negative standpoint expressed physically, he is not eating the vegetable soup for dinner. This would be considered the initial disagreement, Stage One of the Pragma-Dialectical Model. Mr. Smith then calls Jamie to return to the kitchen for supper. Jamie returns to the kitchen and claims that he does not like vegetable soup, and thus he will not eat it. Mr. Smith responds by stating that Jamie needs to eat a healthy meal, implying that the vegetable soup is healthy. Agreeing with his father, that he should eat a healthy meal, Jamie gathers the whole wheat bread, lettuce, tomatoes, and cucumbers, and he proceeds to make a vegetarian sandwich.

This is an example of a typical marketplace argument that we encounter in our day-to-day lives. The shared background and relationships between the Smith family members contribute to the understanding of the dynamics at work. If Jamie’s parents are aware that Jamie does not like vegetable soup, then his departure from the kitchen is most obviously a negative response to the dinner’s menu. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst also write that there must be a discussion which would convince a rational judge, the audience, as to who has a better argument. In this case, Mr. Smith states that a reason for eating the soup is because it is a healthy dish, and Jamie should eat a healthy supper. Jamie agrees that he should eat food that is healthy, but instead of sitting down and eating the soup he begins
making a sandwich. Thus, Jamie demonstrates that he can eat a healthy dinner, that he enjoys. The point I want to make with this particular example is that not all aspects of an argument need to be verbalized. Jamie expresses his initial standpoint, that he will not eat vegetable soup, physically; furthermore, his physical retreat from the kitchen is not incoherent. Jamie also expresses a counter-argument to his father’s reason for eating soup (because it is healthy), by physically showing that dishes other than vegetable soup can also be healthy; this non-verbal aspect of the argument is also coherent.

A problem with the definition of argumentation that limits the expression and procedure of arguing is the constriction of ascribing argumentation to speech acts. Speech acts entail the use of language, which further entails the necessity for verbalization. I am not arguing that arguments to which van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s account clearly applies can never take place, but rather that it is one of the several different ways arguments are orchestrated. Their idea of argumentation tends to limit other types of argumentative expression to occur. A broader characterization of argumentation, following the main terms of Pragma-Dialectics, is as follows: “Argumentation is an activity arising from a disagreement or conflict of opinion between two or more interlocutors. Standpoints and arguments supporting or opposing the opinion at stake may be expressed using any mode of communication. The interlocutors should engage in argumentation in a manner such that if there are any rational judges present, or an audience, they would be convinced of the acceptability or unacceptability of the expressed opinion in question.”
5.6 Final Remarks

The purpose of this thesis was to determine whether (A) Pragma-Dialectics, as it stands, can handle visual and emotional arguments, and if not, whether (B) Pragma-Dialectics can be modified to address visual and emotional arguments, or (C) Pragma-Dialectics is too limited a theory to make room for the relatively “new” modes of visual and emotional arguments. I had hypothesized that the Pragma-Dialectical Model would probably not be able to address other forms of argumentation, specifically the visual and emotional.

My investigation of visual and emotional argumentation, and their applications to the different aspects of Pragma-Dialectics has proven contrary to my hypothesis. For the most part, important characteristics of van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s theory can easily address visual and emotional arguments. What does need to be changed or revised are some of their basic starting definitions (for instance, standpoint, argument, and so on) and the rules they outline for communication and critical discussion. With these modifications the modes of visual and emotional argumentation can be included into the scope of possible arguments for Pragma-Dialectics.

The Pragma-Dialectical Model of argumentation addresses critical discussions that work toward resolving a difference of opinion among interlocutors. Critical discussions, however, can develop out of non-verbalized arguments. Whether we have a visual image or a written paragraph presenting Mercedes-Benz’s argument, that Mercedes-Benz is the most desired car, in either case it is understood and can be deliberated by interlocutors critically. Whether Lesley expresses himself with or without emotion, he still expresses the same argument. The methods of presenting arguments may vary from one context to the
next. Nevertheless, the colloquial speech -- everyday conversations and arguments -- that Pragma-Dialectics concerns itself with, should be broadened to include visual and emotional displays of argumentation.

Besides some minor revisions in their starting definitions, the biggest hurdle for Pragma-Dialecticians, who I have used as exemplars of traditional argumentation theories, is not so much a restructuring of their theories, but rather a change in attitude towards possible arguments is needed. Accepting that arguments can be primarily visual or emotional in nature might be the most difficult step.
Chapter Six
Conclusion

6.1 Inquiry Revisited

This work investigates whether “traditional” argumentation, as I have labelled it, can address what are typically considered “alternative” types of arguments. “Traditional” arguments are rooted in the need for verbalization. Their goal is primarily for an arguer to successfully convince her listener of a point of view that is expressed verbally. The two structures of argumentation that I have addressed, visual and emotional arguments, are not dependent on the explicit verbalization of arguments. The goal of visual argumentation is to relay a claim in a creative, and sometimes purposely ambiguous manner. The goals of emotional argumentation are more complex, since there a number of different types of emotional arguments, but in some way the use of emotion is integral to the given argument.

Overall, I propose that the main idea of challenging traditional argumentation with visual and emotional arguments is to suggest that argumentation theory as a whole should have a “broader” focus. I use Pragma-Dialectics as an exemplar of traditional argumentation theory because it depends on the use of language to express arguments. Visual and emotional arguments are examples of arguments that stray from the traditional conception of argument, and it is one of my intentions throughout this thesis to demonstrate that these instances of argumentation are not rare -- and thus they should not be thought of as “alternative.” Our culture is a growing “visual” one; we are immersed with visual images continually. It only makes sense that we learn to distinguish which visual images present us with arguments. We engage in emotional argumentation

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frequently -- when we interact with family and friends, or discuss issues that are important to us. Arguments thus need to be considered in a wider array of objectives than that of successful verbal persuasion, for instance. Incorporating visual and emotional arguments into argumentation theory assumes that we are more accepting of the different techniques that are available for us to argue with.

In detailing Pragma-Dialectics, Visual Argumentation, and Emotional Argumentation, and then challenging the first with the latter two, I think we can conclude that Pragma-Dialectics, a theory that remains loyal to the traditional conception of argumentation (to necessarily argue verbally as a means of persuasion), can be slightly altered in order to incorporate more types of argumentation. For instance, Pragma-Dialectics is too stringent a theory as it stands because it imposes rules that necessitate verbally explicit arguments. However, by either altering the major definitions of their theory, or adding rules that encompass a broader range of argumentative contexts -- they can make room for "other" arguments. Thus, while my initial hypothesis was that Pragma-Dialectics cannot handle visual arguments or emotional arguments, it is not entirely impossible for the theory to make room for a broader range of arguments.

6.2 Traditional Argumentation Broadened

A problem specifically with van Eemeren and Grootendorst's definition of ‘argumentation’ is that its commitment to speech acts inhibits any other types of arguments. In Chapter Five I outlined their idea of argumentation and proposed a characterization of argumentation that is more broadly construed, thus it allows for more
arguments than those that can relate to speech acts. This is the characterization of
“argumentation” I would like to end with:

Argumentation is an activity arising from a disagreement or conflict of opinion
between two or more interlocutors. Standpoints and arguments supporting or
opposing disagreements may be expressed using any mode of communication. The
interlocutors should engage in argumentation in a manner such that if there are any
rational judges present, or an audience, they would be convinced of the
acceptability or unacceptability of the expressed opinion in question.

This definition uses some important terms of Pragma-Dialectics, but in a manner that does
not inhibit a broader range of argumentative discourse.

In conclusion, I think that argumentative discourse is an extremely important
division of communication. And since it is pretty safe to conclude that we communicate
with each other at some point or another, the study of argumentation has its significance.
A broad theory of argumentation can encompass a variety of different tools to help us in
both communicating, and more specifically arguing with each other. It can instruct us how
to express our views effectively -- through whatever means of arguing we are inclined to
subscribe to (whether it be specifically verbal, visually, emotionally, among others). This
broaden theory of argumentation can stress the importance of respecting opinions and
thoughts other than our own -- this actually assumes that we be open to methods of
arguing that are not like our own. It provides us with a means of listening and interpreting
others. It can outline techniques that help us mediate argumentative discussions between
interlocutors. The study of argumentation should result in a system that allows us to be
aware of the different methods of arguing, specifically the visual and emotional arguments

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as explained here. There elements have been undervalued, yet they offer much more depth to argumentation.

We can decide that different theories work for different types of argumentative discourse, and that should be adequate enough. For instance, van Eemeren and Grootendorst deal only with verbally expressed arguments, Gilbert’s work can be referred to for emotionally oriented arguments, and so on. I think, however, that any single argument can encompass a wide range of argumentative strategies. Not all interlocutors employ a single mode of expressing and interpreting arguments. For instance, one who argues in an explicitly verbal manner cannot expect her opposing arguers to do the same. Moreover, the rules for the more traditional arguer are not the same as her opposing arguer who happens to argue in a more emotional manner. In arguing in different manners, then, arguers may establish arguments with different implicit rules. Implementing an argumentation structure that acknowledges and deals with more than just one method of arguing can broaden not only argumentation theories, which is what I am after, but also our knowledge and understanding of argumentative discourse.
References


Vita Auctoris

Linda Carozza was born to Giuseppe and Eva Carozza on April 23, 1977 in Toronto, Ontario. Following her education at St. Patrick’s Catholic Elementary School in Brampton Ontario, Linda graduated from Robert F. Hall Catholic Secondary School in Caledon East, Ontario in 1995. Linda studied as an undergraduate at York University in North York, where she obtained a Bachelor of Arts Degree with a specialization in Philosophy in 2000. She is currently a candidate for the Master of Arts Degree at the University of Windsor and expects to graduate in the Spring of 2002. Meanwhile, Linda is beginning her Ph.D. studies in Philosophy at York University. Her areas of interest in Philosophy are Argumentation Theory and Feminism.