
Lauriston E. Johanson

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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RÉCEVE
'UnManley' Persuasion: COVERAGE OF THE MANLEY GOVERNMENT IN JAMAICA
BY THE NEW YORK TIMES, TIME AND NEWSWEEK BETWEEN 1972-80:

by

Lauriston E. Johanson

A thesis
presented to the University of Windsor
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
in The Department of Communication Studies

Windsor, Ontario, 1984
(c) Lauriston E. Johanson, 1984
DEDICATION

Dedicated to the memory of Aunt Ivy whose life was characterized by extraordinary kindness and gentleness and who left me with a priceless legacy of Faith and Encouragement.
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examined the coverage of the Manley Government by the New York Times, Time and Newsweek, three publications widely acknowledged to be powerful and prestigious agenda-setters in North America and internationally. The analysis was located within the wider framework of cultural and economic imperialism; the struggle of Third World countries to define for themselves a developmental path of self-sustaining growth and national sovereignty; and America's responses to perceived threats to its geopolitical interests in its own hemisphere. In all of this the role of information is seen to be crucial.

The thesis used as its springboard charges made by Manley that his government had been systematically destabilized and that coverage in the American press was an important factor in the destabilization process. Both a quantitative and a qualitative approach were used in conducting the study. The quantitative approach involved a thematic content analysis of all stories written on Jamaica and appearing in the publications selected between 1972 when Manley came into power and 1980 when he lost the election. The qualitative aspect of the research utilized Rank's schema of categories for the analysis of persuasive or propagandistic communication along with McRide's concept of distortion.
The New York Times accounted for the overwhelming percentage of the coverage. The peak years of coverage were 1974, 1976 and 1980 where U.S. interests seemed to be at stake and where there was concern over Jamaica's political direction. In all three publications there was strong emphasis on Jamaica's economic decline; political instability/crime and Manley's relations with Castro/Cuba. Little attention was paid to Manley's successes in redressing the imbalances in Jamaican society. Seaga was portrayed as being better equipped to deal with Jamaica's problems. In addition, the way the information was packaged conformed to methods used in the dissemination of propaganda.

The overall findings supported Manley's allegations and the findings of others that the coverage by these publications was unfavorable and propagandistic.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to some very special people whose support lessened the burdensome pressures experienced in undertaking this project. To 'Dearest Mer' who is peerless as a sister, friend, confidante, shrink and (tor)mentor. To Joan and Fenton who responded unhesitatingly to my S.O.S.

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Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Stanley Cunningham, Dr. Richard Lewis and Dr. Walter Soderlund, my committee members, for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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Chapter I

HANLEY'S ALLEGATIONS

1.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW

One of the central issues that has emerged in the North/South dialogue in recent years is the imbalance in the world information system. The debate is integrally linked to the imbalance in the international economic system, and reflects as well a growing militancy on the part of the Third World in the decolonization process. According to Masmoudi (1979:185), Tunisia's Permanent Delegate to UNESCO, "...the establishment of a new world information order must be considered as the essential corollary of the new international economic order." Similarly Smith (1980:14), noted that:

the question of information now lies at the heart of the world economy and cannot be separated from the other conflicts and issues of which international and national politics are composed.

In the case of the international economic system, profits flow from the Third World to the industrialised countries. In the case of the world information system, the reverse seems to hold true: the argument is made that there is a one way flow of information from the developed to the developing world. Communication scholars and Third World spokesmen alike, have voiced concern that the global flow of
news is dominated by the four Western wire services—Agence France-Presse, the Associated Press, Reuters and United Press International. Boyd-Barrett (1980:15), pointed out that:

The services of the 'Big Four' agencies eventually affect to a greater or lesser degree, a total world daily newspaper circulation in excess of 450 m and a world broadcast audience well in excess of 1,283 m persons.

Hester (1974:207) made a similar point earlier when he said,

No newsgathering operations influence more persons throughout the world than do the complex multi-million dollar activities of the global news agencies. Hundreds of millions of persons each day receive a large part of their news through the efforts of a handful of world news agencies.

The one-sided reliance on the news agencies, it is argued, results in bias, distortion, and the sensational presentation of events happening in the Third World. Emphasis is on the aberrational and unusual to the exclusion of more positive developments. According to Aggarwala (1979:180), the wire services provide only a "single perspective" on world news because of their all pervasive obsession with so-called 'action' or 'spot' news and not with 'soft' or 'development' news...Disasters, famines, corruption, wars, political intrigues and civil disorders do make for action packed...copy while economic and social development is a very slow... process.

Matta (1979:109), quoted ex-Venezuelan president Rafael Caldera as saying that:

perhaps the phrase 'no news is good news' has become 'good news is no news'. Only the most deplorable incidents receive prominent attention or nothing is mentioned about literary or scientific achievements...little is said about economic achievements.
In all of this, the United States has become the prime focus of hostility in the debate because of its pre-eminence as a super-power and because of the fact that the distribution of media products internationally is basically controlled by American interests. (Boyd-Barrett; Tunstall; Shayon; 1979) Another reason is its pervasive, worldwide network of news agencies. (Lent, 1977:46)

The concept of the "free flow of information" advocated by the United States came under increasing scrutiny by the early 1970's, according to Gunter (1978). He said that traditional adversaries were joined by the emerging nations and by the western allies at times, in advancing three areas of concern. These were:

1. the threat to "national sovereignty" implied by U.S. pre-eminence in computers, remote sensing and communication technology.
2. the "cultural imperialism" reflected in U.S. exports of publications, film and television.
3. the "bias" of American news agency coverage of foreign affairs.

Gunter further argued that

[the dominant position of the U.S. in world communication markets seems to be but one example of U.S. power in an economic system regarded by critics as inequitable and self-perpetuating. (1978:143)]

American economic and cultural domination prompted Schiller (1969) to argue that America has emerged as the new imperial
power in this century. He noted that its global economic and communications network work together to ensure its continued dominance. In Schiller's words,

the emerging imperial network of American economics and finance utilizes the communication media for its defense and entrenchment wherever it exists already and for its expansion to locales where it hopes to become active. (1969:3)

He graphically added that American mass communications have become the "pillar of the emergent imperial society."

Messages 'made in America' radiate across the globe and serve as the ganglia of national power and expansionism. The ideological images of 'have not' states are increasingly in the custody of American informational media. (1969:147-8)

In a later work Schiller (1976) pursued these themes more vigorously. He argued that with the advance of national independence movements in the Third World, "American managers of empire" have increasingly turned their attention to the ideological sphere. According to him,

American imperialism has been developing complementary, if not alternate strategies and instrumentation for safeguarding its unstable and increasingly menaced global positions. The ideological sphere receives ever more attention. (1976:3)

Schiller further argued that within the system of administration and control, "...techniques of persuasion, manipulation, and cultural penetration are becoming steadily more important and more deliberate in the exercise of American power." Schiller's observations regarding American expansionism working in tandem with and being enhanced through its communications network are perhaps nowhere as glaring as in the case of Latin America.
Beltran and Cardona (1979), for example, in summarizing a wide body of research on U.S. information flow in Latin America found that U.S. television and radio networks were the main direct capital investors in Latin American media. American advertising agencies operating on behalf of multinationals were also important financiers of Latin American media and led the field in most of the countries of the region.

The firm of McCann Erickson, for instance, controlled virtually all the advertising in Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador. Ford, Standard Oil, Shell and Coca-Cola accounted for between 30 and 45 percent of all Argentine television advertising (1979:36). Beltran and Cardona also found that the U.S. news agencies managed 80 percent of the international news in Latin America and in many countries a significant percentage of national and regional news is controlled by these agencies. They declared that the agencies slanted and distorted issues in Latin America. They quoted a study of the coverage of the UPI in the February 1974 meeting of the Latin American Ministers of Foreign Relations with Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, which concluded in part that: "[t]he UPI selects information on Latin America according to a criteria of interest that coincides with the structure of U.S. domination." (1979: 52)

A number of other studies have reiterated the point that American international news coverage reflects American
interests. Lent (1977), drawing upon a number of studies pointed out that American international news coverage and usage are often determined by considerations of U.S. international diplomacy, national government and military policies and historical-cultural heritage. An analysis of the coverage of the Tonkin Gulf incident in Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report, he said, were always written to serve United States interests. (1977:47)

Lent also pointed out that coverage and usage of international news by United States mass media are often crisis oriented. Drawing from a study of the post-martial law period in the Philippines in three international magazines, he said that whereas the British and Hong Kong periodicals concentrated on New Society developmental programs, especially those of an economic nature, the United States magazine gave the most play to the Muslim conflict in Mindanao. (1977:48)

In a similar vein, Gans (1979:31) argued, that foreign news is treated with less detachment and more explicit value judgments than would be considered justifiable in American domestic news. He also made the oft-repeated claims that the U.S. press in its foreign coverage, emphasized wars, coups d'état and major disasters. Gans argued also that nations become newsworthy when their activities affect Americans or American interests. Expanding further on this he noted,

[w]hen a country’s foreign policy comes into conflict with American foreign policy, political or economic, or when individual politicians who are known to be particularly anti-American come to power, even small countries may appear in the foreign news. (1979:31)
1.2 THE PROBLEM

It is against this background of the issues involved in the world flow of information, U.S. dominance, and the widely acknowledged bias in U.S. publications of foreign news that we introduce the problem for consideration in this thesis. This thesis will examine U.S. press coverage of the Michael Manley government between 1972-80 to see if it too manifests the failings and distortions already identified by scholars in the case of other developing nations. Before proceeding further however, it might be appropriate to sketch out in broad outlines the Jamaican situation.

Between 1972-80, Jamaica under the leadership of Michael Manley and the People's National Party (PNP), embarked on a developmental path that was from the point of view of many, bold, enterprising and controversial. Armed with a moral indignation and what he felt was a historical mandate, Manley challenged the unjust foundations on which Jamaican society rested. He confronted the hitherto inviolable bastions of privilege in the society; sought to dismantle outdated and moribund institutions; and initiated sweeping changes more in keeping with his conception of a just and equal society.

Manley saw the problems facing Jamaica as integrally linked to the prevailing system of economic imperialism. The struggle to put Jamaica on a path of self-reliance and to turn it into a society that would provide all its citizens
with a standard of living conducive to human dignity, had to be fought at both the local and international level.

Manley's dreams for Jamaica ended however in a stunning electoral defeat in 1980 by the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), led by Edward Seaga. Recalling his experiences in a recently published book, *Jamaica: Struggle in the Periphery*, (1982), Manley attributed his failure to the collusion of local and international forces bent on keeping the status quo intact. In examining the causes of defeat, he claimed that the U.S. media played a crucial role in harming his government by unsympathetic and distorted representation. He even singled out James Reston of the *New York Times* as beginning a process of negative journalism that never ceased until his defeat in 1980.

To justify this allegation Manley recalled a meeting with Henry Kissinger in 1976. One of the issues discussed was Cuban involvement in Angola and Jamaica's position on it. By then, Manley had established diplomatic ties with Cuba and called for the lifting of the U.S. embargo against Cuba. What Kissinger sought from Manley was at least neutrality on the Cuban presence in Angola. Manley refused, pointing out that according to his sources in Africa (Nyerere and Kaunda), Cuba's presence in Angola was a principled one, and was based on Agostinho Neto's appeal for help. Publicly Manley came out in support of Cuba. According to him,
soon after the news that Jamaica was supporting Cuba, a Kissinger confidante, James Reston of the New York Times wrote a vicious and utterly inaccurate article about Jamaica. The article marked a turning point in Jamaica's image in the United States. Reston's wild charges about violence in Jamaica, the alleged presence of Cuban troops and Cuban secret agents, all added up to an impression of a Cuban take-over. This started off a chain reaction in the U.S. press which never ceased until we were finally defeated in the elections of October 1980...all aid to Jamaica suddenly slowed to a virtual halt. The pipelines suddenly became clogged. (1982:117)

Manley's extreme and passionate charge cannot easily be dismissed as 'sour grapes' or conspiracy-mongering because it raises serious questions about the quality and possible bias of the U.S. media in its commentary and assessment of Manley and Jamaica. After all, it seems to accord with commentaries already cited having to do with Third World coverage. Furthermore, Manley's charges also deserve attention because they indict a newspaper that is regarded as one of the most prestigious in the world and which symbolizes the acme of American journalism. (Merril, 1968) To compound the seriousness of his charges, Manley directly implicated Reston, a journalist according to Halberstam (1979), of unquestioned integrity and professionalism. In Halberstam's words,

[n]e [Reston] had become by the early fifties, the journalist that all the young reporters in America admired and wanted to work for...he, by the quality of his work and his personal status and conduct seemed to represent what journalism might become, a serious and respected profession.
But even though Manley's allegations have been substantiated by others in looking at Third World coverage in general, many could argue that he could not possibly be objective in his assessment of Reston and the New York Times, given the fact that his passionate dreams for Jamaica crumbled before his eyes. They could take the position that Manley was only seeking 'scapegoats' in Reston and the Times for his own failure. They could also argue that the graffiti scrawled on the walls of many of Kingston's buildings at the time saying, "I.M.F.—Is Manley Fault," and "The Poor Can't Take No More," were eloquent testimonies to his unpopularity and the widespread disillusionment of many Jamaicans.

Despite the possibilities, however, that Manley's charges may have been motivated by nothing more than the rancor of defeat they cannot be dismissed too cavalierly. Cuthbert (1979) in a study of American and Canadian press coverage of Jamaica in 1976 and early 1977 gives pause for thought. The American papers she examined included the Miami Herald, Washington Post, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe, Buffalo Evening News, and Time and Newsweek. These publications were chosen on the basis that they represented the section of the United States from where the majority of Jamaica's potential investors and tourists come.

Cuthbert found that an impressive 70 percent of U.S. stories, (N=189), were negative while only 7 percent were
positive. Politics and Violence/Crime were given priority coverage. The majority of the political stories were negative because they had cold war overtones or were linked with violence. Jamaica's link with socialist countries were emphasised while at the same time coverage played down its traditional ties with capitalist countries. The overall picture painted of Jamaica according to Cuthbert, was a "...politically divided and unstable, crime torn society with almost no redeeming features." (1979:102) Cuthbert's study provides support for Manley's complaint, enough at any rate to indicate that his is not a voice in the wilderness.

1.3 THE PROBLEM REFINED

This brings us more closely to the problem that is of specific concern to this thesis—viz. coverage of the Manley government by the New York Times, Time and Newsweek between 1972-80. All three publications are chosen on the basis that they are universally regarded as powerful and prestigious agenda setters in the United States and in the international community. In the case of the New York Times, an added reason is that Manley directly singled it out as an early and prime offender.

A number of commentators on American media have attested to the power and prestige of these publications as agenda setters. Of the three, the New York Times has consistently come in for high praise as a paper. According to Gans
(1979:179), "The Times is treated as the professional setter of standards, just as Harvard is perceived as the standard setter of university performance." He pointed out that when editors and producers are uncertain about a selection decision, they will check how, and whether The Times covered the story, and include it in their television programs and magazines.

Bagdikian (1959) and Rubin (1979), corroborate Gans' assessment of the New York Times as being the pre-eminent pace-setter in American media. Bagdikian pointed out that editors at Time and Newsweek use the New York Times as a source. Rubin also noted that if the New York Times has tremendous influence on other newspapers it has even greater impact on television. He cited the case of a CBS correspondent in Bonn who leaked his stories to The Times correspondent when they had been rejected by his editors. After reading the story in The Times, however, his editors in a complete about-face would then instruct him to do the story. (1979:200) The New York Times in and of itself therefore, is a powerful and prestigious paper whose power is magnified by the agenda setting role it plays for other media, especially television, which according to Larson (1979:136), is the dominant source of international news in the United States. The magnitude of The Times' influence can be gauged by the fact that news which is a prime time event on television reaches over 60 million viewers.
Newsweek and Time as we said before, are also very important agenda setters. Newsweek and Time at about the beginning of Manley's term in office had a weekly domestic circulation of 2 and 3.7 million respectively. (McDougall, 1972) Moreover, Time magazine's international circulation is 1.3 million (Rubin, 1979). Bagdikian (1959), said of Time,

[for millions of middle class Americans it is the interpreter of national and world affairs...The U.S. Information Agency last year distributed 1.8 million copies free in 56 foreign countries as part of the American propaganda effort.

According to McDougall (1972:61), Time sends free copies to Congressmen and from its own surveys claims that it is the favorite of bankers, brokers, Pentagon officials, doctors, college presidents and persons listed in Who's Who in America. McDougall pointed out too that Newsweek also sends free copies to all Congressmen, Supreme Court Justices, top officials in the Executive Branch, top corporate officers and other important people. Since both magazines send free copies to influential people it seems safe to say that this probably enhances their roles as agenda setters and shapers or informed opinion.

1.4 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

Having established that these three publications are important agenda-sets with wide readership, the next thing that must be established is the purpose of the study. Manley's allegation and Cuthbert's study are not necessarily
indicative of press coverage during Manley's full term of office. Recall that Cuthbert's study only looked at 1976 and the early months of 1977. Manley's charge also needs much more evidence to substantiate it. Recall that he claimed that the Reston article started off a chain reaction in the U.S. press that supposedly never ceased until his defeat in 1980. He was saying, therefore, that there was sustained negative press coverage in the U.S. media for a period of almost five years. One of the aims of this thesis therefore, is to see if that allegation holds true for these publications. In order to do so, this thesis will examine the coverage during the entire period of Manley's government. In this way we will be able to ascertain fully whether the issues and patterns of the coverage changed over time or whether, as Manley suggests, there was sustained negative coverage. From this we should be able to determine whether these publications in their tone and emphases were guilty of bias and distortion.

The points raised are pertinent concerns in light of the fact that Cuthbert (1979), identified specific examples of bias, distortion and inaccuracies in these three publications. The New York Times, for example, had such headlines as "Jamaica Votes on How Far Left It Will Go"; "Political Violence in Slums of Jamaican Capital has Subsided but Island is a Time bomb." (1979:98-100) Cuthbert also drew examples of bias from the newsmagazines, pointing out that there
was "...frequent use of emotive words which resulted in a blurring of the lines between fact and opinion." Manley's election victory in 1976 was heralded by *Time* magazine as "Castro's Pal Wins Again" (p. 104); and an interview given by Manley to Arnaud De Borchgrave, a senior editor at *Newsweek* when compared with the original interview published in the Jamaican *Gleaner*, showed that it "...had been cut and rearranged so as to create a very different picture from the actual interview." (p. 106)

But Cuthbert and Manley are not the only ones who found the coverage of these publications to be slanted. Phillips (1976:815-17), writing in *Christian Century* quoted a March 17, 1976 *New York Times* article by James Reston, as saying:

Fidel Castro's Cuban government, according to high officials of the Ford Administration, has entered into an agreement to train police forces of Jamaica, and is also increasing its political contacts with black revolutionary elements elsewhere in the Caribbean basin.

Phillips then quoted statistics by the Jamaican Minister of Security, Keble Munn, who said that of 163 police and military personnel trained outside Jamaica in 1975, 129 were trained in England, 17 in Canada, 7 in the U.S., and 2 in Cuba.

The reported bias in the *New York Times* coverage of Jamaica is not all that anomalous. Other studies have diagnosed bias in *New York Times* coverage. Kriesberg (1946:540), in a study of Soviet news in the *New York Times* found that news that placed the Soviet Union in an unfavorable light
received more attention than news that was sympathetic. In the unfavorable reports there was a tendency, he said, to use unwarranted headlines, loaded words, and questionable sources of information. Only when Soviet interests paralleled American interests was more sympathetic attention given to the Soviets.

In a more recent study of *New York Times* coverage of 18 Southern African nations for the first six months of 1960, 1965, 1970 and 1975, Charles, Shore and Todd (1979:151-2) found that Angola was "barely present" until 1975 when it gained independence and began to experience "internal crisis." The same held true for Rhodesia and Zaire. Rhodesia was barely mentioned until 1965, 1970 and 1975, when the country declared its independence and began to experience increasing racial tensions. Zaire's coverage was concentrated in 1960 and 1965 when it was making the transition from a Belgian colony to an independent nation.

The authors noted that each of these three nations, received peak coverage when it was undergoing transition, accompanied by violent political incidents. Coverage centered on that process and was primarily concerned with civil disorders and revolutions.

Over the years *Time* and *Newsweek* have also been criticized for the way they report events. In a number of cases both are perceived as basically the same. Halberstam (1979:363), said both were prejudiced but *Newsweek* was a blander version of *Time*. 
Friedrich (1964) and McDougall (1972), also argued that *Time* and *Newsweek* are similar. Top executives at *Newsweek* are "alumni" of *Time*. McDougall (1972:58), pointed out that both magazines cover the same fields and each has basically the same style, with the main difference being that "*Time* usually interprets events with more positive authority than the less cocksure *Newsweek*.

Bagdikian (1959:10), said of *Time*, that it "...confidently issues the news like Moses Revealing the Divine Word and *Newsweek* duplicates *Time*'s air of knowing it all." Bagdikian also charged that both magazines make "little distinction" between "...what is rumour, what is wishful thinking and what is personal thinking." (1959:13)

Friedrich (1964), similarly noted the disturbing tendency of the newsmagazines to equate facts, news and truth. He said both magazines have a style of writing where statistical blanks are left for a checker to fill in. In cases where no statistic is available, the researcher is instructed to make an educated guess. In one example he offered, an editor wrote on a piece of copy: "There are 60 trees in Russia." According to Friedrich,

[t]he researcher took a creative delight in such an impossible problem. From the Soviet government she ascertained the number of acres officially listed as forests; from some Washington agency she ascertained the number of trees per acre of forest. The result was a wholly improbable but unchallengable statistic for the number of trees in Russia. (p.63)
The basic purpose of facts in magazines he argued, is to provide an appearance of documentation for what are essentially essays.

The commentators on the newsmagazines also argue that objectivity is not one of their virtues. Kobler (1965:29), asserted that *Time* is a monument to subjective journalism, noting that at the outset of his career, Luce rejected objectivity as a journalistic ideal. Bagdikian (1959:10), in making a similar point quoted from a piece entitled "The Fetish of Objectivity", appearing in an issue of *Time*. The piece said in part,

one of the most treacherous journalistic cliches is that a news story should always 'let the facts speak for themselves.' Thoughtful newspapermen know that the facts alone seldom can, that they speak clearly only when they are told in proper order and perspective and thus interpreted by an honest journalist..."

On the surface this position seems to be reasonable. What Bagdikian seems to be implying, though, is that this position has been used by *Time* to give itself wide latitude in interpreting the facts. This attitude has had serious consequences for American politics and foreign news. In these areas according to Bagdikian,

*Time*’s reporting appears to be governed by an iron rule: when the facts fit the mold of *Time*’s wishes, the reporting can be superb; when they do not fit the mold, *Time*’s reporting can be so distorted as to raise serious questions about responsibility in mass communications.

Kobler (1965:29), in asking whether *Time* was fair, answered that it depends on the area. "Where facts do not clasa with
preconceptions *Time* steers a relatively straight course." This generally applies, he said, to the sections on Art, Music, Religion and Education. But in its national and foreign news coverage he said, policy often intervened. Republicans are seen as "valiant knights" and Democrats as "knaves and burros."

Thomas S. Matthews, a defecting editor from the ranks of *Time* said of the coverage of Adlai Stevenson in 1952:

> [t]he distortions, suppressions and slanting of political news seemed to me to pass the bounds of politics and to commit an offense against the ethics of journalism. The climax was a story on Adlai Stevenson which was a clumsy but malign and murderously meant attack. As editor, I had taken over the editing of cover stories, so I was able to scotch that particular snake but Luce was appealed to and that was the last political story I was allowed to edit. At that point I decided to resign. (Kobler, 1965:31)

Gardner (1959:65), labelled *Time* "The Weekly Fiction Magazine." He argued that to criticise *Time* as a newsmagazine is to miss the point because that is exactly what it is not. He denounced it as "melodramatic fantasy", "crude fiction" and that it ought to be analyzed as a poor work of art "...if we are to understand that what we have been lightly dismissing as flaws of bad reporting are positive stylistic and plot devices of melodramatic fiction."

These strong, often virulent criticisms describe *Time* under the editorship of Luce. The magazine it has been argued has mended its ways. Halberstam (1979:549), argued that it has become a fairer magazine with the promotion of Head-
ley Donovan to Luce's chair as Editor-in-Chief. Donovan according to Halberstam, sought to edge the magazine closer to the center, the aim being not to "...remove Time from its essential viewpoint and from all ideology but to tone it down slightly to make it fairer within that viewpoint."

One improvement Halberstam noted was that whereas in the past reporters had no say over copy, the magazine has become more accountable to them by checking with them before a story is printed. Kobler (1967:30-1), nevertheless questioned whether Donovan's elevation would fundamentally change Time's policy. He quoted Luce as saying,

Donovan of course will make the final decisions on policy. But he will consult the Senate. And I wouldn't have picked Donovan to succeed me if he hadn't been simpatico.

whether Time has improved or not, it is clear that from the evidence marshalled here we do have a genuine case for examination.

To sum up then, we have touched on the unequal flow of information and the argument that the Third World is seriously misrepresented as a result of this. More specifically, we have identified a number of relevant background themes: America's pre-eminence as an economic power which is buttressed by its equally powerful global communications network; bias in American media resulting from the fact that

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1 Donovan is no longer Editor-in-Chief of Time. The position is now occupied by Henry Grunwald with whom Donovan worked closely to bring much needed improvement to the magazine according to Halberstam.
events in the Third World are often reported from the viewpoint of American strategic interests. Hanley's allegation and the findings by Cutbert that suggested that it was something more than sound and fury. Finally, we cited credible sources testifying to the noticeable degree of bias in the publications we propose to examine.

All of this provides, as it were, a template against which we can gauge the coverage of the Manley government by The New York Times, Time and Newsweek. It suggests, moreover, that there probably was or could have been slanting and distortion in the coverage of the Manley government by the print media in the U.S.

1.5 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

In its examination of the coverage by these three publications, the thesis will adhere to the following outline. The study will be divided into three sections. Section I has already identified the problem arising from Manley's charges and it has done this against the background of a number of commentaries on U.S. press coverage.

Section II will further elucidate and elaborate on the contextual backdrop by means of a two-tiered analytic approach encompassing the domestic (Jamaican) and international aspects of the problem. Chapter 2 will therefore deal with the historical context of Jamaica, Manley's perceptions or Jamaica's problems, his responses and subsequent develop-
ments under his leadership. Chapter 3 in a more systematic and theoretical fashion, will take up the issue of Western press coverage of the Third World, focusing especially on the Western concept of news, its inadequacy in reporting foreign affairs issues and other personal and organizational constraints under which foreign correspondents labor which contribute to bias in the news. The emerging concept of 'development journalism' put forward by Third World leaders and scholars will be introduced as a criterion with which to measure the Western concept of news.

Section III will focus directly upon the coverage of the Manley government in the publications selected. Chapter 4 will spell out an appropriate methodology; Chapter 5 will present the quantitative findings of the study with commentaries on the significance of the findings and whether or not they conform or deviate from the observations of others who examined coverage of the Third World.

Chapter 6 will be a qualitative analysis of the coverage in which the emphasis, tone, tenor and use of language will be examined. This chapter in other words, will be examining the latent aspects of the content of the coverage. Finally, Chapter 7 will give an overall summary of the findings and draw conclusions.
1.6 SECTION II—THE CONTEXTUAL BACKDROP
Chapter II

JAMAICA AND MANLEY'S DREAM

"To know the past is to understand the present." Michael Manley— The Search For Solutions.

2.1 GUUNDER FRANK'S CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY

Gunder Frank (1969:4), in his examination of the causes and conditions of underdevelopment, put forward the thesis that the "development of underdevelopment" in the Third World is "...in large part the historical product of past and continuing relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries." He argues that these relations are an essential part of the structure and development of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole, and suggests that economic development in the underdeveloped countries can occur only independently of these relations.

Frank criticizes traditional development theory for its ahistoric perspective and for assuming that development can take place in the underdeveloped areas if technology, capital, values and institutions, are transferred from the metropole. This newer, critical perspective has gained wide
currency among Third World leaders and scholars whose efforts in trying to lift their countries out of the underdevelopment rut are frustrated by burgeoning unemployment, poverty, malnutrition and an ever-widening chasm between the North and the South.

They have begun to argue that colonial exploitation and contemporary imperialism have served to produce structurally deformed, dependent economies with little or no infrastructural base for development. They argue also that development efforts continue to be stymied by an international economic system that favours the rich countries.

Manley's analysis of, and proposed solutions to Jamaica's problems, were grounded in this perspective. His starting point was the country's three-hundred year history as a British colony and its relationship to the contemporary system of economic imperialism. As a British colony Jamaica was basically a plantation society supplying mainly sugar to Britain. In return the country served as a captive market and dumping ground for Britain's manufactured goods. The profits from sugar went to financing Britain's industrial revolution. Manley in describing the process and effect of colonialism said,

[There never was any attempt to produce what was needed but only to produce what someone else needed. Trade did not involve a calculated exchange involving surpluses but the importation of virtually everything that was produced. Finally, the surplus which a group normally uses to increase its production was largely exported in the form of profit to the center of colonial power. Hence at every single level of importance the natural eco-]
nomic process was diverted, thwarted, frustrated and ultimately destroyed... (1982:25)

The economies of the Caribbean continue to exhibit the same structural features of the old colonial regimes. Powell (1973:11), in an examination of the problems of economic development in the Caribbean quotes from a work by Lewis Gordon which said that Caribbean economies were characterised by:

[f]oreign ownership and control in the major sectors of oil, sugar, banking, insurance, mining and manufacturing; external decision-making with respect to investment and allocation of resources by the head offices of the big multi-national corporations; structural unemployment and underemployment combined with high salary/wage levels in privileged sectors; separation between local extraction of raw materials and overseas manufacture of the finished product; lack of indigenous technology; and the concentration of overseas wealth in orientated industries that does little to absorb the labour surplus inherited from the old plantation economy.

The social structure arising out of plantation society and expatriate economic control was a steeply hierarchical, color-conscious, status-ridden, European-focused social order (Lowenthal, 1973:xvii). At the top of the social pyramid were the white planters/slave-owners; in the middle a brown-skinned group resulting from miscegenation and at the bottom the black slave population. In time, whiteness came to be associated with power, prestige and privilege while blackness connoted inferiority, degradation and powerlessness. The brown group which later formed the educated intelligentsia that made up the middle class considered them-
selves superior to the blacks and copied the racial and cultural attitudes of their white counterparts.

Jamaican social structure therefore reflected extremes of privilege and exploitation with strong colour/class correlations accompanied by attitudes that militated against any sense of national unity. This social structure and these attitudes are still present in Jamaican society with only slight modifications. As Nettleford notes, the fact remains that even today one is still able to have 'whiteness' connotes privilege, position, wealth...This attitude is particularly evident among many who form the large majority of the population and who happen to wear that colour of skin long associated with poverty, manual labour, low status and ignorance. (1970:21)

Continuing, Nettleford notes that, against a background of unemployment, and disparities of economic wealth and educational opportunities, the 'many' often connotes a differentiation according to now people look. In the minds of many Jamaicans it is still a poor black, a middle-class and privileged brown man and a rich or wealthy white man. (1970:24)

Manley in his assessment of Jamaican society said that it is a society that is "...desperately unequal, a society that is stratified, that is divided into classes and is based upon small areas of extreme poverty and exploitation." (1976:43)

Compounding these problems was the "psychology of dependence" which for Manley, was the most "insidious, elusive and intractable of the problems which we inherited." (1974:21). Before and since Independence all the herculean efforts of Jamaican statesmen to combat this attitude failed. Addressing himself to the issue Manley said,
one has only to select areas at random to see the
insidious, pervasive effects of the colonial ex-
perience. Neither did the heroic call to racial
pride of a Marcus Garvey; nor the momentous march
to independence under Norman Manley nor even the
collective experience of self-discipline of the
modern trade union movement by Alexander Busta-
mane... make more than a dent upon the problem.
(1974:21)

When Manley came to power in 1972, then, Jamaica was
basically a neo-colony in terms of its international trade
relations and had not advanced much beyond the 19th century
in terms of its internal social relations. In more recent de-
cades the locus of its trade relations had shifted from Brin-
tain to the United States; and multi-national corporations
controlled the most important areas of the economy. These
areas included the bauxite, tourist and banking sectors.

The most striking example of the country's neo-colonial-
status was in the bauxite industry. This resource, which is
the most important of Jamaica's natural resources, is mined
exclusively by North American companies. The ore is trans-
ferred to smelting plants in Canada and the United States
where it is processed into aluminium. Until Manley decided
to negotiate for part ownership of the industry and an in-
crease in levies, successive governments received only a
royalty for the extraction of the ore. This royalty was
small in comparison to the value added for the final product
which went to the companies. In addition, investment and
production decisions rested with the parent companies. They
therefore had the power to decide whether to expand or cut back on production without reference to government's development plans.

Girvan, in his assessment of the role of the bauxite industry in generating growth in the Jamaican economy, concluded that the industry did not generate the growth that it could have because the local share in the export value of the bauxite was well below the total export value. Generalizing Jamaica's experience to other Third World countries, Girvan said

[What happens in effect is that multi-national corporations integrate the mineral resources...with their metropolitan facilities, and thereby with the metropolitan economies. Simultaneously these resources are divorced from the local economies. Decision-making, organization, financial capital, capital goods and intermediaries come from abroad; output, depreciation and profits go abroad. What is left for the local economy is the payments associated with the minimum obligations incurred by extracting the mineral resource...The contribution to the development process made by the mineral resource in the form of inter-industry transactions, and the accumulation of technology and capital, are overwhelmingly appropriated by the metropolitan economy. (1971:98)]

The same pattern where corporate profits continued to be siphoned off to the metropolitan countries repeated itself in the banking and tourist sectors. In a real sense, therefore, governments up to the time of Manley's new policies had no real control over the economic affairs of the country.
At the local level things were not any better since the Jamaican corporate economy was controlled by an oligarchy of twenty-one families. According to Reid (1977:15),

concentration of power and control of the corporate economy lies in the hands of minority ethnic elites and is mainly dispersed through 21 families and their interest groups.

This group had emerged from the plantation system as large land owners or were engaged in commercial activities such as import/export trading. Through inter-marriage and interlocking corporate directorships they were able to cement a structure of group control over major financial institutions and public corporate firms. In addition, members of this group have their own law firms that represent their interests.

The Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), which led the country through the first decade of Independence hardly addressed itself to these fundamental issues in the society. Although Jamaica registered spectacular growth by Third World standards there was widespread poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, unemployment and an overall lack of opportunity for the predominantly black masses at the base of the social pyramid. The JLP pursued a variation of the classical structural-functionalist model of development where it was felt development was only possible by encouraging foreign capital and technology to invest in the country.

This model has come to be known as the 'Puerto Rican model' and is based on the special relationship of aid,
guaranteed markets and massive investment that Puerto Rico has with the United States. The objective of the Puerto Rican model is the development of a manufacturing sector to produce the goods that were traditionally imported from the developed countries. This process is called 'import substitution.' In return for the capital, technology and know-how, the country in which the investment is made provides tax incentives and guarantees security for the foreign investor's investments—'security' meaning the ability to ship out profits. Along with this, governments would have to guarantee a stable political climate.

The major drawback of this model however, is the fact that the manufacturing sector that these measures ought to stimulate is in reality a pseudo-manufacturing sector. Local inputs are not utilised in the "manufacturing" process and there is exclusive reliance on the import of raw materials. Thus the manufacturing process is nothing more than an assembly of the products in the country, masking the fact that no real change has taken place in terms of dependence on imports.

In the first ten years of Jamaica's independence (1962-72), the model worked fine by any standard of statistical measurement (Manley, 1982:33). Gross National Product grew at an annual rate of 6.5 per cent per annum; about 115 factories were established providing 15,467 new jobs involving an investment of $70 million. Bauxite production rose
from 7,495,000 tons a year in 1962 to 12,784,000 tons in 1973 and the number of hotel beds grew from 7,471 to 17,944. (1982:33)

Despite these figures, however, the social experience according to Manley was quite different. Unemployment grew from 12 percent in 1962 to 24% in 1972 with the rate for women and youth in excess of 30%; 40% of the adult population was functionally illiterate and child malnutrition was over 30%. (1982:33/34). Overall, therefore, this model of development resulted in an increase in Jamaica's trade gap and the chasm widened between rich and poor in the society. As Manley put it,

behind the glittering indicators of success lay stark facts. Unemployment was increasing. Social services reflected little improvement. The degree of economic dependence was actually increasing rather than decreasing. Finally the traditional problem of exporting surplus to foreign owners remained unchanged because the new industries were also foreign. (1982:37)

The phenomenon of an increase in GNP at the same time as the mass of the population remains in abject poverty is certainly not new in the Third World. Scholars of development and under-development have begun to question the notion that GNP is an accurate indicator of development. Seers (1973:6/13) in his exploration of the meaning of development argues that GNP while not a good indicator of development is used by economists and politicians because it provides a single, comprehensive, quantifiable measurement which can be analysed in terms of output and expenditures.
He points out that an increase in GNP does not necessarily mean greater employment through which the individual can satisfy the basic needs of food, shelter and clothing.

Citing Trinidad as an example, he said that although per capita income averaged more than five per cent per annum between 1953 to 1968, unemployment showed a steady increase to more than ten per cent of the labour force. One of the crucial factors in the process of development, then, as Seers points out is the question of income distribution. Regardless of a rise in GNP, if there is no equitable distribution of wealth then inequality in society will remain. Thus he argues that equality should be an objective itself in the development process and this is dealt with through the policy of equitable distribution of income.

The real and important questions to ask concerning development are: “What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality?” (1973:7) According to him,

“[i]f all three of these have declined from high levels then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result "development" even if per capita income doubled. (1973:7)

By Seers' argument, therefore, to label the obvious increase in GNP in Jamaica as "development" would be a misnomer.

Manley's concept of the situation was similar to Seers' and he captured the mood of the people, raised their hopes
and expectations in 1972 by campaigning under the slogan "Better Must Come". The JLP government had become increasingly distant and bankrupt of ideas as poverty, unemployment and malnutrition increased among the people. As one journalist observed,

when the PNP promised 'power for the people',...a government of participation, they touched a responsive chord at all levels. When they...proposed priority attention to social welfare they articulated the desires of the workers and crystallised the needs of the masses. (Senior, 1972:8)

For Manley, Jamaican society could not begin to advance until there was a total transformation in attitudes, economic and social relations. Political leadership had to be bold and imaginative in tackling the problems that Jamaica faced. The "...magnitude of the economic and attitudinal restructuring..." which Jamaica's condition demanded, he said, made it clear that the "...politics of conservatism and tinkering..." were not only "...irrelevant to our situation but represent an intolerable default of responsibility...Nothing less than transformation can provide answers to the dilemmas within which we are...trapped." (1974:23)

According to him, change had to operate at three levels—"...at the psychological and attitudinal level which involves...mass education; at the structural level which involves...social and economic organization; at the political level which involves...mobilization." (1974:60)
2.2 **Manley's Political Philosophy**

Manley's attempt to restructure Jamaican society came out of a profound philosophical commitment to the notion of equality.

According to him,

> "The more that I have thought about the morality of politics, the more there has emerged for me a single touchstone of right and wrong; and the touchstone is to be found in the notion of equality." (1976:38)

Equality for him meant that everyone in the society should start off with a sense of equal worth and be valued accordingly. Therefore, the basis of the egalitarian and just society was one that ensured equality of opportunity for all. Since education was the means by which individuals bettered themselves, he felt the onus was on society to ensure that all individuals, whatever their social background, receive an education.

By so doing, he argued, the foundation of the egalitarian society would be laid where individuals would rise or fall in the social hierarchy according to work and talent. Parental accomplishment would therefore not automatically confer a privileged status on children. According to him,

no society can approach the organization of equality except within the framework of a single, integrated educational system. This is so because equality must imply...that it is possible for a man to rise as high as his innate talents permit...This means that the children of attorneys, doctors, prime ministers...and street cleaners must go through one stream of basic, primary, secondary and tertiary education. (1976:39/40)
Manley's commitment to equality and parliamentary democracy merged in the ideological framework of democratic socialism. He felt that the ideals of democracy and socialism could be welded together to build a nation of equal rights and opportunities. He argued,

[d]emocracy aims to give each person an equal chance to play a part in the free election of governments and the making of policy in the nation. Socialism is designed to give to each person an equal opportunity in life to pursue happiness, to achieve fulfillment and to contribute to the nation. Therefore, democracy and socialism must go together to build a nation where people have equal rights and opportunities. (1976:157/8)

The brand of democratic socialism he sought to build had to take into consideration Jamaica's Westminster parliamentary tradition and become a guide for achievement. According to him,

[It]he democratic was to be given equal emphasis to the socialist, because we were committed to the maintenance of Jamaica's traditional and constitutional plural democracy; and more importantly, because we intended to do everything in our power to deepen and broaden the democratic process of our party and in the society at large... In addition we intended to pursue...a non-capitalist path of development to distinguish experiments like ours from the neo-colonial capitalist model of the Puerto Rican type and the Marxist-Leninist model of the Cuban type. (1984:123)

He dismissed protagonists of a one-party state in Jamaica as being more impatient than understanding of Jamaican society. The "natural tendency" of Jamaican people he said, was to be individualistic "... to accept that the vote is the natural end-product of dispute and that a majority decision is conclusive of an issue." (1974:27/8) Thus, he continued,
"...arguments about one party as against multi-party states begin with the supreme disadvantage of irrelevance in the Jamaican situation..."

Rather, change had to take place within the context of the Westminster model "...where the historical experience reflects a profound distrust or authority and where it is entirely legitimate to organize opposition to the government."

'(1974:28/31) Manley's abhorrence of totalitarianism was complete, his commitment to democracy non-negotiable. In his words,

I prefer the democratic method...because when I feed the question of political method into the equation of equality it seems to me that the democratic method is more likely to afford an opportunity for equality than any totalitarian system yet devised. (1974:28)

On a record made by him and distributed in 1972 he said,

'I am opposed to communism passionately, I am opposed to all forms of totalitarian governments passionately...My commitment to democratic processes, to collective consultation is an unshakeable commitment. I believe in the democratic party system in Jamaica...Democracy is a system of participation or it is nothing...Democracy will survive to the extent that a nation solves the problem of equitable distribution of wealth as between its citizens; the Free World will survive to the extent that it solves the gross inequality of wealth as between nations. It is the role of the PNP in history to be the agent of change in Jamaica, change in the name of justice...What I would like is to bring into the political mainstream all the people of talent and energy to be found in Jamaica...I challenge all Jamaicans to rise up and help Jamaica out of its crisis. (Senior, 1972:64)

Commenting on Manley's socialism, J. Daniel O'Flaherty writing in Foreign Policy said, "Manley's brand of socialism
maintains the democratic political structure left behind by the British and it respects human rights." (Summer 1976:139) Jamaican socialism he said, was

a vehicle or self assertion against a colonial past and a mechanism for the creation of national pride and purpose...Far from being a mass movement of the underprivileged or the proletariat, Jamaican socialism is the product of the ideological development of the British educated leadership of the PNP—especially the P.M. (p. 141)

Underscoring the essential differences between Jamaica's and other brands of socialism, O'Flaherty said,

there is no official party newspaper. There are no effective nation wide organizations for mobilizing youth or other sectors of the population behind the government. There is no systematic and pervasive propaganda machine... (p.142)

The democratic socialist path that Manley therefore envisaged for Jamaica was a middle path between the American and Soviet concept of social organization. He sought to amalgamate the best features of both systems and to make it relevant and effective for Jamaica. Capitalist exploitation and Communist totalitarianism were equally unwelcome in Jamaican society. In an address to the National Executive Council of the PNP on Sept. 28, 1975 Manley said,

[we do not regard Democratic Socialism as a transitional phase between Capitalism and Communism. On the contrary, we believe that Democratic Socialism is an objective in itself...we believe that the great danger of the capitalist system was its social consequence of exploitation. We believe that the great danger of communism is that it can lead to over-centralization and that there lurks always an inherent danger to individual liberty. (1976:171)
It is against this background, therefore, that the claims of Manley's political opponents and others who accused him of having communist intentions must be judged.

To sum up then, Jamaica inherited social and economic problems as a result of its colonial past. Up until 1972 a developmental path was pursued that continued to enshackle the country in the imperialist/neo-colonial web. Little was done to address the fundamental imbalances in the society and Manley came to power with a mandate to address these ills. He responded to the challenge within a philosophical framework of democratic socialism especially suited to the peculiarities of the Jamaican situation.

2.3 DOMESTIC POLICIES

Manley's domestic policy began and ended with four basic commitments. These were to create an economy that would be more independent of foreign control and more responsive to the needs of the Jamaican people; to work for an egalitarian society both in terms of opportunity and in making people feel that they were of equal worth and value; to develop a truly democratic society which went beyond voting for a party every five years; and finally to give Jamaicans a sense of pride in their African heritage which as he said, unhappily symbolised only the stigma of slavery. (1982:39) His domestic policies therefore encompassed the economic, political and social spheres of the society.
His boldest and perhaps most dramatic move was a levy on the bauxite companies which increased Jamaica's revenues from $25 million to $225 million. A system was devised whereby Jamaica's revenues from the bauxite companies was tied to a percentage of the price of aluminium ingot on the world market. By indexing the price of ore to the price of the finished product, Manley hoped to achieve some parity with the price of manufactured goods. Without this price indexing Manley felt that Third World countries would always experience trade deficits because while the price of raw materials remained fixed on the world market, the price of manufactured goods reflected inflationary spirals.

In addition to this, Manley began negotiations with the bauxite companies for 51 percent ownership of the industry which up until then was 100 percent wholly owned by the multi-national corporations. A quarter million acres of land owned by the bauxite companies was also to be repatriated. The government also acquired hotels and foreign owned sugar estates. Sugar cooperatives were established on the newly acquired sugar estates. The role of the public sector in the management of the economy was expanded. The government took over the running of the public utilities and consulted with the private sector on economic strategies for overall national development. Price controls and subsidies for basic food items were established and luxury import items were banned. There was, in addition to this, encouragement in ar-
eas where Jamaica could become self reliant and self-sufficient. In all or this, moreover, was a "...firm and unwavering commitment to the preservation and development of a strong private sector" according to Manley. (1982:43) He said that although the government did not believe in a pure free enterprise model of development, they saw the private sector as having a particular place and fulfilling a particular role. That place, however, was to be permanent and the role to be dynamic. (1982:43) These were only a few of the measures that he instituted to put the economy on a path of self-sustaining growth.

In the social sector he instituted income redistribution measures by increasing the property taxes of the wealthy who, like their counterparts elsewhere, had always found loopholes to avoid paying taxes. Increased revenues were channelled into the building of low income housing, day-care centres, clinics and schools. Laws were promulgated giving women maternity leave with pay and equal pay for equal work. Laws discriminating against illegitimate children and workers were repealed. Education was made free for all Jamaicans from the primary through to the university level thereby making education a function of merit rather than privilege. To complement this a literacy campaign was begun. Major land reform programmes and experiments in cooperative farming were also carried out. To supplement an already overworked police force, citizens were mobilized to help protect their neighborhood by the formation of home guard units.
Politically he sought to mobilize the people by imbuing them with a sense of pride, patriotism and a belief in the collective destiny of all Jamaicans. People were actively encouraged to participate more fully in the policy making process through the establishment of Community Councils. The franchise was extended to 18-year-olds and through the establishment of School Councils, students in secondary schools were encouraged to make inputs into the curriculum and the overall running of the schools. In short, Manley's policies reflected his commitment to change and transformation in the society; to critically examine old notions and to actively engage Jamaicans in the challenging but creative task of nation-building.

2.4 FOREIGN POLICY

Manley's foreign policy initiatives were an extension of his domestic policies. Just as he challenged the status quo in Jamaican society, so too did he challenge the status quo at the international level. Political independence in the Third World for him was only the beginning to genuine national sovereignty. Genuine sovereignty was only possible if it was accompanied by economic independence. The only hope for Jamaica and other Third World countries caught within the web of imperialism was to form a "common economic diplomacy" in order to challenge the economic hegemony of the developed nations. Jamaica, therefore, had to strengthen its regional
and international links with other developing countries. According to him, the ability of the Caribbean to achieve progress goes beyond regionalism to the necessity for the developing world as a whole to evolve a common strategy with regard to its economic dealings with the metropolitan nations. The imperative of the future must be the search for a common economic diplomacy in which the Caribbean must be concerned about the fate of Ghana's cocoa as Ghana should be concerned about the fate of Caribbean sugar. When we consider the inherent economic power of the United States, Great Britain, the European Common Market and Russia, we see what India, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean are up against. (1976:180/81)

In the Third World had any hope of developing, he felt it was absolutely vital to change the world economic system and in international forums he was tireless in advancing this cause. Accordingly, he supported the Non-aligned movement; cultivated trading links with other Third world nations, Eastern Europe, Cuba and China while at the same time maintaining and strengthening links with America, Britain and Canada. In his words Jamaica's foreign policy objectives were:

- to avoid being sucked into the East/West polarization and play our part in the building of a third non-aligned political force; to do everything that lay in our power to encourage increasing attention by the Third World to questions of economic strategy and to the pursuit of policies that would strengthen our hand in negotiations with developed countries; press our colleagues to take advantage of every opportunity for economic cooperation amongst themselves. (1982:66)

In addition to seeking to change the world economic system, Manley supported liberation movements in Southern Africa,
Latin America and elsewhere. Lewis (1983:149), in an examination of the government's foreign policy between 1977 and 1980, observed that these efforts were diplomatic maneuvers conducted by the government to seek financial resources for the declining economy and to arrive at new arrangements of a combined political and economic nature designed to concretize the country's independence and non-alignment.

The single, most controversial aspect of Jamaica's foreign policy according to Manley was Jamaica's friendship with Cuba and consistent defense of that country's rights to "...normal, unretreated membership of that part of the family of nations that occupies the Western Hemisphere." (1982:69) According to him, many thought that his Cuban policy was a "quixotic mistake" or that he had secret communist designs. Others felt that he had come under Castro's spell and was making Jamaica Moscow's satellite through its relationship with Cuba. Dismissing all of this as "poppycock", Manley argued that the question of Cuba's relationship with America went to the heart of the question of the kind of world Jamaica wanted to inhabit.

He said that Jamaica's sovereignty was at stake if the United States could continue to "bully", "ostracise", "blockade", and maintain a military base on Cuban soil. He was equally against the taking of American hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In sum, then, Manley's foreign policy was based on an assumption of princi-
plied relations with all nations; respect for national sovereignty and the justice of the Third World cause for better terms of trade with the metropolitan countries. Manley's foreign policy did not please the U.S. Establishment. "In due course" he said, "they were to make known the exact extent of that displeasure. In this they were not unlike the local oligarchy. They were to make a formidable combination." (1982:70) This brings us to an examination of the reactions to both his domestic and foreign policy.

2.5 CONSEQUENCES

Manley's challenge of the status quo locally and internationally was met with growing uneasiness, alarm and hysteria. The local oligarchy and middle class ably assisted by the Daily Gleaner formed a solid phalanx of resistance behind the Jamaica Labour Party led by Edward Seaga. Manley was accused of communist intentions; of wanting to impose a Cuban-type totalitarian society. His attempts to build community councils as one measure in democratising the society and the establishment of the home guard to combat crime were seen as communist devices.

Referring to the protests over the home guard, Manley said, "[i]mmessant propaganda was maintained to the effect that the home guard was being established to replace the regular police force as the first step in an elaborate communist take-over." (1982:85) The communist smear did, howev-
er, prove effective. An estimated $300 million in domestic capital was spirited out of the country; professionals and businessmen lert in droves; factories and businesses closed down.

The bauxite companies, according to Manley, systematically reduced production in retaliation against the levies he had imposed. (1982:103) These actions were accompanied according to Manley by a "...ceaseless stream of provocative, manipulative and patently dishonest propaganda from the opposition." By 1975 he said

the Gleaner was on the warpath...it was already sounding a strident cacophony of abuse and sowing the seeds of discord and suspicion wherever it could. From that time on the Gleaner was in fact indistinguishable from the opposition, its tactics similar to the notorious El Mercurio in Chile. (1982:134)

Throughout these years, he said, "...incidents of every kind large or small, grave or trivial were seized upon to create an impression of corruption. Lies and misrepresentations were plentiful..." (1982:172)

The conduct of the Gleaner was in many regards not surprising. It too is owned by the local oligarchy and is a staunch voice for conservative interests in the society. Manley's charges regarding the reprehensible conduct of the Gleaner were supported by a study conducted by Cuthbert in 1976. She examined the role played by the Gleaner after the government announced its policy of "democratic socialism", its friendship with Cuba and its support of the MPLA in Angola. Cuthbert found that
[In spite of the government's insistence that it believes in democratic socialism, that it is forging a political philosophy appropriate to Jamaica and not copying any foreign model, many Gleaner columnists, letters and features do not distinguish between various types of socialism and sometimes not even between socialism and communism. (1976:53)]

Cuthbert noted that some of the Gleaner's tactics included reprinting negative articles about Jamaica from foreign publications such as Newsweek, the Wall Street Journal and the Miami Herald. There were also negative features on socialist countries and about socialism; editorial page prominence was given to anti-communist features with over 90% of the published letters to the editor being anti-socialist. The overwhelming majority of Gleaner columnists, Cuthbert pointed out, engaged in "...negative and destructive criticism and ridicule." (1976:53-4)

An eloquent example of the Gleaner's position was seen in March of 1979 when Manley decided to visit the Soviet Union. In an editorial entitled "Communism, No!" the Gleaner asserted that

[Under the guise of being non-aligned, Mr. Manley has been strengthening Jamaica's ties to the Soviet-Cuban axis to such an extent that Jamaica now automatically follows the Cuban line in world issues...Mr. Manley... appears to be mortgaging us to Soviet-Cuban expansionism...We for our part will not follow him on the road towards colonial status under Soviet-Cuban communism. Neither will the majority of Jamaicans--Christian and non-Christian alike. (Lewis, 1983:157)]

The striking similarity between the position of the Gleaner and Seaga's views is evidenced by O'Flaherty's com-
mentary on Seaga's opposition to Manley's policies. According to O'Flaherty,

the major argument of Edward Seaga...a Harvard educated businessman of Lebanese descent...immaculately dressed and well groomed in the manner of an American banker...and appearing to be the essence of the increasingly conservative and alarmist middle class from which he draws his support is that 'Manley is a tool of Castro.'

Continuing, O'Flaherty pointed out that

Seaga argues that Jamaica is being systematically Cubanised...Manley's ultimate objectives, Seaga believes, are the creation of a one party socialist state...and thorough regimentation of the society, with an advance commitment to support Cuban positions in international affairs. (1978:149)

Seaga's efforts at undermining the Manley government was not confined to Jamaican soil. Lewis (1983) pointed out that by 1977 Seaga had begun to internationalize the campaign against the government. By the end of that year, Lewis said that he had devised a strategy to influence the Carter administration away from its sympathetic view of the objectives of the Manley administration and to garner support for his party.

At a breakfast meeting with U.S Congressmen in October 1977, Seaga advanced the view that Cuba had become a dominant and significant influence in the Caribbean and began to supplant the Puerto Rican model as an alternative model of development. Cuba's influence, he argued, was magnified by the fact that Jamaica and Guyana had entered into relations of solidarity with that country. Because of the political-cultural homogeneity of the English speaking Caribbean, what
happened in one would influence what happened in the others. He argued that as in the case of Guyana, Jamaica was about to lose its multi-party democratic system.

The question that Seaga posed was what could the United States do to counter these negative trends. As Lewis noted, he touched on the use of "...aid either by the United States or by international aid and financial institutions as a manipulative instrument to influence policy." (p. 153) He also proposed that the U.S. should aid organizations such as his party, whose ideology was congruent with the American view or the world, to form an effective countervailing force with parties of similar persuasion.

These views, as Lewis noted, gave the relatively new American administration a view of what its attitudes should be and formed the basis of the party's policies on its resumption of office towards the end of 1980. In summing up the reasons for the opposition he encountered, Manley argued that the real and abiding cause of the problem was to be found in what we were doing to alter the basic relationships in Jamaican society and to shift the centre of power away from the wealthy apex towards the democratic base. (1982:37)

The confrontation between the JLP and the PNP over the path the country should pursue, resulted in a scale of violence unprecedented in Jamaica's history. Durkheimian anomie replaced the norms and values that held the society together. Seven hundred and fifty people died in the months leading up to the 1980 general elections. Roy McGann, a member
of parliament and PNP candidate was among the victims. It was a time of collective paranoia and horror where people went to bed with the chatter of machine gun fire in their ears and woke up to news reports confirming more body counts.

The JLP and PNP claimed their victims, but according to Manley the campaign of violence was waged by his opponents to spread panic, chaos and give the impression that the society was collapsing. Manley argued that the PNP had nothing to gain by violence since it was the government that lost credibility if it seemed that it could not provide security for its citizens. Referring to the ground the PNP lost due to the violence in the 1980 elections, Manley said,

[the more violence spread fear, the harder it was for us to carry our side of the arguments. It was we who had lost ground, we who were the victims of the rumours and the propaganda. We would have had to be insane to want to increase the impression of a society collapsing. On the contrary, it is precisely this impression which had helped put us behind. (1982:193)]

The unfolding of events in Jamaica led many people to believe that the CIA was helping in the efforts to destabilize the Manley government. The U.S. government strenuously denied these charges, according to Manley, but the events that took place in Jamaica between 1976 and 1980 were strikingly similar to those leading up to the overthrow of Allende in Chile. (1982:223) In September of 1976 Philip Agee, a former agent of the CIA, came to Jamaica and named 12 operatives who were stationed in the island at the time.
Although the question of CIA involvement in Jamaica is still a matter of conjecture, what was obvious was that the JLP had large sums of money to spend on its massive campaign. It had also developed close relations with some of the most right-wing elements in the U.S. political system. As Manley pointed out, Seaga's relations with people like Congressman Larry McDonald of Georgia were notorious. (1982:194) Referring to the massive expenditures the JLP made on advertisements, Manley said,

[...] taking every allowance for what the JLP could raise from the local oligarchy and the overseas-migrant population, it is simply not on the card that they could have raised money by ordinary means to match the level of their expenditures. They obviously had a godfather or godfathers somewhere in the international system. (1982:194)

Whether the U.S. establishment sanctioned CIA involvement or not they were displeased and nervous about Manley's clear non-aligned policy, his aggressive anti-imperialist stance and his friendship with Castro. The reaction of the U.S. administration must be seen against the background of the Carter administration coming under increasing pressure domestically because of events on the international scene. The Soviets had invaded Afghanistan, the Cubans were in Angola and Ethiopia, Nicaragua was in a state of upheaval and there was the imbroglio of the American hostages in Iran. Lewis (1983:161-2) reasoned that

[...] these difficulties gradually led to a hardening of American administration and congressional attitudes to the Soviet Union and Cuba, and to those expressing affinity with Cuban or Soviet positions on issues relating to events in, for example, Angola and Ethiopia.
Lewis noted that the Carter administration was especially bitter over a speech by Manley at the Non-aligned Conference in Havana in September of 1979. Manley lauded the Russian Revolution, denounced American intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean in the post-war era, denounced the blockade of Cuba and defended the right of the Puerto-Rican people to self-determination. According to Lewis

[t]he unhappiness of an already beleaguered American government was now reflected in a series of reports in the American press suggesting that further assistance to the Manley government would not necessarily be in the interests of the United States. (p.103)

In recalling the response to his speech, Manley said that he met with Philip Habib, President Carter's special representative for Latin American Affairs and Bob Pastor, a member of the National Security Council in December of 1979. Pastor equated the general anti-imperialist tone of his speech with an anti-U.S. position. Their conversation touched on relations with Cuba; Manley's position on multinational corporations; the role he could play in the Caribbean; the U.S. position on Grenada. On all of these issues there was no agreement. According to Manley,

[as] they left I was sure that the discussion had accomplished nothing. There was nothing that I could concede, no ground that I could offer to yield because the positions we held flowed from a set of principles and a body of experience. (1982:179)

He said that Jamaica represented an enigma to many U.S. policy makers. The 'hawks' saw him as a communist surrogate
of Moscow via Havana, whereas to the 'doves' of the liberal establishment it was not that simple. The country was obviously democratic with freedom of speech and of the press; respect for human rights, property and a vigorous opposition. Yet at the same time as Manley put it, "...the position was frankly anti-imperialist, aggressively non-aligned, openly trying to maintain good relations with Latin America, with Western Europe, and with Washington and Ottawa, but equally with Moscow and Havana." (1982: 180)

By the 1980 general elections the Manley government was almost completely isolated from Jamaican middle-class and financial interests. It had also become estranged from the United States which meant in effect, that the pipeline to Western money markets for loans and aid were no longer open. The proverbial straw that broke the camel's back was the breaking off of negotiations with the I.M.F. with whom the government had constantly wrangled since 1976 over economic policies. The government sought a third mandate in 1980 but by then the energy and political will of the Jamaican people were sapped. The euphoria that accompanied Manley's victories in 1972 and 1976 evaporated before the avalanche of the forces described.

The economic hardships that came with the withdrawal of investments from the country, the violence and the communist smear translated into a crushing defeat at the polls in 1980. Champagne corks popped in Washington according to Man-
ley at the news of his defeat and the hawks' celebrated. (1982:237) Seaga was given the honor of being the first official overseas visitor to be invited by President Reagan; David Rockefeller was named chairman of a special committee to mobilize U.S. investment in Jamaica and the IMF which continually made almost impossible demands on the Manley government negotiated one of the most favourable packages ever worked out with any government anywhere. (1982:212) The threat to the status quo was averted for the time being. In his final assessment of the response to his government, Manley argued that it was beyond question that Jamaica was destabilised. "Any objective review of the sequence of events from 1976 to 1980" he said, "reveals the matter as impatient of debate." (1982:213)
Chapter III
WESTERN PRESS COVERAGE

"To be imprisoned inside the misinterpretation and misunderstanding of others can be a withering form of incarceration." Anthony Smith—The Geopolitics of Information.

The consistency with which events in the Third World are portrayed from a crisis-oriented, sensational point of view seems to reflect more than just a lack of understanding of Third World issues by Western reporters. For is it merely the limitations of the international news gathering system even though these are important factors that go to shape foreign coverage. What seems to be the nucleus of the problem is the definition of what constitutes news itself. The decision as to the newsworthiness of an event, what to report and how to report it, seems to be guided by a general conception of news by editors, reporters and news organizations.

This chapter seeks to explore the philosophical underpinning of what constitutes news and the ramifications this has for the shaping of foreign policy. It argues that there are too many inadequacies in current practices associated
with international coverage, and suggests that there needs to be a much needed reconsideration of what constitutes news. Finally, the concept of "development journalism" put forward by Third World leaders and scholars is introduced.

3.1 THE PREVALENT CONCEPT OF NEWS

To the question "What is News?" the answer is neither easy nor straightforward. In fact, both the question and the answer seem to pose an existential dilemma to newsmen. Bay-dikian notes

[1]t is still possible to irritate most journalists by asking for a definition of news. Though they spend their lives producing it, journalists with few exceptions do not understand what causes certain events to be accepted as news and others not. (1974:122)

In a similar vein, Sigal (1973:1), argues that one of the big troubles with news is that nobody knows what it is and what it means. The implication of this, according to him, is the absence of universally shared criteria for distinguishing news from non-news. What is much more evident and relatively straightforward, however, is the recognized prevalence in most western news media of a minimal and relatively superficial concept of what constitutes news.

Among media practitioners, a consensus of opinion seems to indicate that whatever is novel, whatever is sensationalistic and deviant, qualifies as news. The classic formulation of news as Sigal notes is that of New York Sun editor, John B. Bogart. According to Bogart, "...when a dog bites a
man that is not news but when a man bites a dog that is news."

Bagdikian (1974:132) says that the major element in deciding what becomes news is "...novelty, change, or something that society does not expect. The discovery of conditions and events not in common understanding is often considered a pioneering and exciting step by journalism."

Gans (1979:149) quotes a "top producer" as saying, "...the role of journalists is to report...when things go awry, when institutions are not functioning normally." This definition of news according to Gans "...awards importance to a wide variety of natural, social and moral disorder stories." Rosenblum (1979:7) in his definition says that, "[i]n a general sense news is the exceptional, something out of the ordinary which threatens, benefits, outrages, enlightens or titillates."

3.2 CRITIQUES

The Western, and specifically the U.S. concept of news, has been roundly criticized by scholars and even practitioners in the Western media. They argue that too often the news is one dimensional, and lacks breadth and perspective. It is necessary, as they see it, to overhaul the definition especially in the area of foreign coverage.

Rubin (1979:205-6), in his analysis of foreign coverage quotes Kruglak as saying,
The traditional American news report is one-dimensional. It is ideal for reporting a fire, a traffic accident or a gang-slaying. The emphasis is on what the reporter sees or has obtained from original sources. Seldom is he interested in the events leading up to the dramatic events. The important thing is to get a vivid description of it.

The complex issues involved in international news reporting, however, requires more than just a recounting of events within the typical news format of the "5 W's" of journalism. A notable critic of this practice is James Reston. Reston (1966) argues that the story format, in which the most dramatic fact appears first and is then followed by paragraphs of decreasing importance, tended to "...sharpen and inflate the news." It encourages, according to him, not a balanced, but a startling presentation of the news, based on the "...Christ, now the wind blew!" lead. This approach, Reston claims, was "...fine for the news of wrecks or murders, but was a limiting and distorting device as news on foreign policy become more and more complicated." (p.557)

Reston asserts that the atmosphere created by the media in America does not encourage "calm reflection" or "wide perspectives." The "American police blotter definition of news..." according to him, "which is the news of violence and contention, of the unusual rather than the usual..." is not yet adequate for reporting foreign news. (p.553-9) Reston argues that with the challenge of television, the role of the modern newspaper should be one of "thoughtful expla-
nation." The problem for newspapers though according to Reston, is that we have not kept our definition of news up to date. We are pretty good at reporting 'happenings,' particularly if they are dramatic; we are fascinated by events but not by the things that cause the events. We will send 500 correspondents to Vietnam after the war breaks out and fill the front pages with their reports, meanwhile ignoring the rest of the world, but we will not send five reporters there when the danger of the war is developing and even if we do, their reports of the danger will be minimized by editors and officials alike, as 'speculation' and hidden back among the brassiere ads, if they are not hung on the spike. (1966:569)

Reston reminds us that rebellion, revolution and war start with ideas; that ideas are news and that newsmen tend to "...minimize the conflict or ideas and emphasize the conflict in the streets without relating the second to the first." (p.570) His recommendation to people in the news business is to see the wider perspectives of the news, "...the causes as well as the effects, what is going to happen in addition to what governments do." (p.569)

Reston is not alone in advancing these perspectives regarding foreign coverage. Bray (1974), argues similarly, that the media's definition of news is unnecessarily anachronistic. According to him, "...it is the element of perspectives that is most missing from media's coverage of foreign affairs." He avers that the media (print and television), suffer from the "fire engine syndrome" where editors demand stories with victims, heroes and above all else, action. The preoccupation with the breaking story, ac-
cording to him, has detracted from the equally important and additional responsibilities of investigation and reflection in the foreign affairs field. Bray asserts that

all one can say is that it is possible to count on the fingers of one hand the important investigative stories in foreign affairs in recent years... And it is worth recalling that one of the biggest of them all -- Seymour Hersh's expose of the My Lai massacre -- was produced by a tiny news service and that no major newspaper was interested in publishing it in the first place." (p. 117-8)

But it is the media's default on its reflective responsibilities that Bray suggests should concern us most. The problem in part he suggests, is that news stories seldom address questions like "does this make sense?" and "what kind of case can be made for or against it?" He notes for example, that in complex issues like SALT II or trade relations with the Soviet Union, newspaper readers are treated to "... an all but incomprehensible account of who has most recently said what." While agreeing that these are important elements in a news story, he argues that they can only be understood in the light of the whole. "And the whole", according to Bray, "is not getting through to readers who are treated to an extended discussion of the symptoms without being told very much about the malady." (p. 119)

Bray recommends to editors and publishers the need to reflect on the desirability of a "... somewhat different definition of 'news'." The public he asserts, needs a sense of how things fit together; and he asks rather despairingly whether it was too much to expect that "... in a full column
story, two or three paragraphs be systematically devoted to summarizing the background or to suggesting that something does or does not make sense?" (p. 125)

3.3 OTHER FACTORS

While it has become apparent that at the root of the problem of foreign coverage is the philosophic conception of what constitutes news, there are other factors that compound the problem. These can be referred to as personal and organizational factors. Bagdikian (1974: 123) sums up these factors as

a growing body of professional standards, received conventions, individual tastes of editors, budgetary constraints, editors' and writers' perceptions of their audience, internal and external rivalries, technology, business office pressures on content, government relations between journalists and their sources, and the shifting conception of what is legitimate for entry into the news net.

The concern here, then, is with those personal and organizational factors as they relate to, and influence foreign coverage. In considering the personal factors first, the concept of socialization has to be taken into account. Blake and Haroldsen (1975: 67) define socialization as "... a life-long socio-psychological process in which the individual makes as part of himself the norms, values and behavior patterns that his society emphasizes." Journalists like everyone else are, to a large extent, products of their environments. Their perceptions will therefore be governed by the cognitive framework mapped out for them by their soci-
ties. In their coverage of events in other societies, they cannot help but see and interpret things against the background of their experiences and values shaped in the cultural setting in which they were nurtured. Social psychologists have long recognized that individuals will perceive things according to their predispositions, interests and values and have referred to this as 'selective perception.'

Editors, as well as reporters, are affected by these same factors and it is with them that the final say rests as to what will be published. Gans (1979:85) says that "...the top editor or producer, and his assistants have the power to decide what gets into print or on the air, at what length and in what order." Sigelman (1973:145) makes a similar point when he states that "...what to cover and who to cover...gives the superior control over content, the play the story will receive and the perspective from which it will be covered." Editors also through their revisionary power, he points out, "...do change substantive aspects, even the entire thrust, of a news story."  

2 A blatant example of this was given by James Aronson in The Press And The Cold War: Otto Fuerbringer, then managing editor of Time magazine discarded a story filed by Charles Moir on the war in Vietnam and dictated instead a story that was more in keeping with what Fuerbringer wanted to hear. The article was in total contradiction to other reports being sent by the wire services, the major television and radio networks according to Aronson. (p.200-202)
Bagdikian (1974:124), making the point that what people will hear and see as 'news' is determined by executives "...conditioned by their own perceptions of the world and their readers," says the following:

[In the U.S. these executives are almost all middle aged, middle class, white males. They have usually achieved positions of status in their communities and their personal and social lives tend to reflect the values and goals of their peers. This tends to insulate them from other segments of society and from social change that does not immediately affect upper middle class life.]

Dealing with the impact of publishers on content, Breed (1955:326) says that "(i)n practice... the publisher does set news policy and this policy is usually followed by members of his staff." Publishers are in many cases conservative Republicans and editors in hiring journalistic staff keep in mind the predilections of publishers. (Bagdikian, 1974:124) Reporters thus come to see that newspaper policies are "...simply extensions of the political philosophies of the newspapers' publishers." (Sigelman, 1973:135)

The process of setting down policy according to Sigelman (1973), Bagdikian (1974), and Breed (1955) is a very subtle one and virtually imperceptible. Reporters absorb the norms of the newsroom and the newspaper's policy almost by a process of osmosis. Sigelman found that the socialization process in the newsroom was highly diffuse and informal. Young reporters come to know company policy through informal contact with more experienced newsmen who become role models and who by then have fully internalized the ethos of the pa-
per. The new reporter also learns from editorial revisions and conferences.

Reporters do conform to policies even though this means a curtailment of their autonomy. Breed advanced a number of reasons why they conform. These were fears of institutional sanctions or of being fired; feelings of obligation and esteem for superiors; upward mobility aspirations and the fact that the American Newspaper Guild which is the largest formal organization of newsmen, does not interfere with internal matters of policy.

Deadlines and budgetary constraints also influence foreign coverage. Rosenblum (1979: 9) dealing with the effect of budget on foreign news reporting said that it costs between $80,000 and $140,000 to keep a single American abroad not counting communication expenses. This results in what he calls "parachute journalism" where, in order to save expenses, journalists are rushed to cover an event when it breaks. They often "...end up in places they have never seen before, with no knowledge of the language, the customs or the background to the story they are covering." Rosenblum points out that the nationals who speak English and who act as sources are usually a small elite who give a disjointed picture. Failing that, journalists have to rely on American embassy officials who have their own views as to what is going on.

Foreign correspondents also work under severe deadline pressures and this is heightened as a result of the competi-
tion between their respective news agencies and newspapers for publishing the 'big' story. This also limits the time they have to acquaint themselves with the background of a story except for the most rudimentary facts. According to Rosenblum (1979:80)

correspondents are always pressed for time. Deadlines are stipulated in hours and minutes. On the biggest of stories, an agency man endures shame if he trails his competitor by seconds...Reporters are pushed not only by their competitive manias but by their editors' obsessions with being first and fullest, however that may affect the overall reportage of a breaking story. Ethics require a correspondent to wait long enough to be certain of his basic facts, but there is no rule about understanding the background.

Rosenblum points out that some reporters simply make up details when deadlines near. He recounted an incident where two reporters agreed to do this during the coverage of an African rebellion. They could only get as far as a river separating them from a town held by guerrillas and so both agreed to write what they could see from across the river. One kept his side of the bargain but the other with a more vivid imagination wrote an account of how he "...breasted the crocodile infested river, extracting himself from giant snapping jaws while rending off native spears...how he reached the other bank, watched the battle and then had to slug a few guerrillas to escape back across..." His story got front page billing and when confronted by his colleague, he responded, "I couldn't help it. Something just came over me, and my fingers were writing by themselves." (p.51)
Yet another factor that influences foreign coverage is the decreasing number of full-time U.S. foreign correspondents and the fact that they are concentrated in the developed countries. According to Lent (1977:49), the number of full-time U.S. foreign correspondents decreased by 28 percent from 929 in 1969 to 676 in 1975. Fifty-one percent were headquartered in Europe. Asia was second with 23 percent, the overwhelming majority being stationed in Hong Kong and Japan. Most of the rest of the Third World received only sporadic coverage and only, as was pointed out earlier, when there was 'bad' news.

3.4 IDEOLOGY

In our discussion of the personal and organizational factors that influence foreign coverage it is also necessary to take into consideration the fact that media organizations function within the larger framework of the ideology of their societies. Gerbner (1964:313), argued with keen insight that:

[Media]s instruments of world communication national media represent authoritative voices of their society...Every newspaper presents a fragmented and synthetic image of the world. It highlights its own set of significant realities from its own social and cultural vantage point.

The question of ideology is generally overlooked, however, because of the dominant view that the role of the media in western society is to inform, enlighten and entertain. Most importantly, the media is seen as protecting democracy
by acting as a countervailing force against the encroachment on individual liberty by governments (Siebert, 1956). The media is therefore credited, in the popular jargon of the day, as being "the fourth estate." These perceived roles endow the media with tremendous moral authority, and exempt them in large measure, from being criticized as purveyors of an ideological viewpoint. Marxist scholars however, have not hesitated to criticize the Western media in this regard. They argue that mass media in capitalist society reinforce the power and ideology of a small capitalist elite. These scholars hold to Karl Marx's dictum that

[t]he ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production. (1978:64)

What we have here then, are two compelling but diametrically opposed viewpoints regarding the role of the media in capitalist society. Gurevitch et al (1982:1) give a succinct comparison of the pluralist and Marxist view of the role of media in society. The pluralist notion is that society is a complex of competing groups where no one group is dominant. Political decisions are reached through a process of bargaining and negotiation between groups. Within that pluralist schema, media organizations are seen as autonomous and independent of the state, institutionalized pressure groups and political parties. Media managers are also said
to be autonomous, allowing a considerable degree of flexibility to media professionals. Audiences are seen as using and manipulating the media for gratifying their needs.

On the other hand, as Gurevitch points out, Marxists see capitalist society as one in which the capitalist class dominates the rest of society. Media are seen as operating in an ideological arena in which various class views are fought out within the context of the dominating class. Media professionals, although enjoying the illusion of autonomy, have really been socialized into and have internalized the norms of the dominant class. Media, therefore, do much to provide an interpretive framework consonant with the interest of the dominant class; and so audiences lack a genuine access to alternative ideas to contest these views.

Miliband (1973:197) argues in a similar vein that "...the notion of pluralist diversity and competitive equilibrium is superficial and misleading..." and that "...mass media are a crucial element in the legitimation of capitalist society." The crucial characteristic of most newspapers in the capitalist world, he argues, is their hostility to the Left and their overwhelming conservatism. At the core of their commitment to conservatism, he points out, lies "...a general acceptance of prevailing modes of thought concerning the economic and social order and a specific acceptance of the capitalist system...as natural and desirable."
The role and character of mass media in capitalist society is not surprising, according to Miliband, "(g)iven the economic and political context in which they function." Thus they cannot help being agents for the dissemination of ideas and values that affirm rather than challenge existing patterns of power and privilege. Breed (1955:334) argues that newspaper policy usually protects property and class interests and thus the strata and groups holding these interests are better able to retain them. This results in the maintenance of the existing system of power relationships in the society. Gans, notes too, that

the news supports the social order of public, business and professional upper middle class, middle-aged and white male sectors of society... the news is also supportive of private enterprise, the prestigious professions and a variety of other national institutions, including the quality universities. (1979:61)

Other scholars such as Mills (1967) and Domhoff (1967) have argued convincingly that the American corporate economy is controlled by a small capitalist elite which also owns some of the most influential mass media in the country. These include The New York Times, The Washington Post, and Time Inc. under whose umbrella Time, Life and Sports Illustrated magazines are published. According to Domhoff "...by controlling every major opinion-molding institution in the country, members of the upper class play a predominant role in determining the framework within which decisions on im-
portant issues are reached." (1967:83) 3

This diagnosis has special significance in that in international coverage as much as domestic reportage, American media reflect their class character and their ideological biases. As Gans (1979), shows us foreign news explicitly suggests that democracy is superior to dictatorship especially if it follows American forms. It is consistently critical of communist and democratic-socialist economies; and although it favours 'democracy' over 'dictatorship' it shows greater indulgence for right wing political movements. Aronson (1970:20) succinctly and acutely notes that:

[t]he American press is committed to the American way of life under capitalism. Any other way—particularly the socialist way—is equated with sin and devilry.

This anti-socialist bias in the American press has special significance. Michael Manley's government was unabashedly socialist in its aims and policies. In assessing the coverage of his government, it is important to be mindful of the enduring and widespread press bias against the socialist ethos. It is also necessary to be mindful of the fact that too often and too easily moderate socialist governments are made to seem just as suspect and unworthy as the more extreme forms further down the leftist spectrum.

3 This notion of massive influence through corporate and media ownership has been updated and compellingly demonstrated by Bagdikian's The Media Monopoly (1983).
3.5 FOREIGN NEWS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Reflections upon the issues of bias and sensationalism in foreign news is not just an academic exercise. The media influence the public by the way they emphasise and report issues. This is especially so in the area of foreign coverage where the public generally has no other point of reference to judge what is being reported other than what is supplied by the agencies and news services of their own respective countries. And yet, the publics that the media influence are crucial to the survival of the Third World. These publics include investors, policy makers in organizations like the IMF, World Bank, government officials responsible for foreign policy decisions and ordinary citizens who augment foreign exchange earnings through tourism.

The media therefore become powerful shapers of the destiny of Third World countries by the influence they have on the decisions of powerful organizations and people. By the very nature of their work they become political organizations in themselves. A report sponsored by the United States Information Agency supports this point when it states that:

[the decisions made by Western business and government leaders about foreign aid, trade and on military and foreign policy issues, based on news from the Western news agencies, can have great impact on the weak nations of the developing world. (1979:58)]

Using the analogy of a mirror, Cohen makes a similar point when he states that:

the glass that the press holds up is refractive rather than reflective and the beams that come out
of it strike the policy makers as well as the larger public... The readers, in particular, include both the members of the press itself and those who dwell in the policy making structure... those who manage the prism are also managed by it. (1963:133)

Sigal (1973:185) argues too that the content of news itself affects policymaking. According to him, news organizations select the sights and sounds that Washington will sense the next day. They thereby shape official perceptions of the environment. In Sigal's words

[j]which stories make the news and which do not can affect what officials as well as citizens of the United States know about current political developments. What the press reports about these developments can often shape how the government responds to them... Information in the press can gradually alter the perceptions of policy makers, the array of politically viable options for dealing with a situation, or the arguments they make in behalf of options, ultimately affecting what the United States government does. (p.xiii)

Pollock (1981:xiii), focusing specifically on the correspondent and the enormous influence he/she wields, notes that

[i]n the initial phases of a 'critical event', when happenings are ambiguous, opinions unformed, and policy amorphous, the personal attitudes of a handful of correspondents may exert influence of global proportions on the shaping of public and official responses.

Pollock named reporters like David Halberstam of the New York Times, Neal Sheehan of UPI and Malcolm Browne of AP all of whom had enormous impact on the formation of policy regarding the Vietnam War by the impact they had on domestic public opinion.
3.6 DEVELOPMENT JOURNALISM

Third world leaders and scholars, aware of the influence of the Western press and chagrined at the bad press they continue to experience, have been seeking for improvements. One of the solutions they have offered is a different kind of journalism referred to as 'development journalism.'

The notion of development journalism arose out of a relatively new and developing discipline within the field of communication in the Third world called 'development communication.' The traditional approach of policy-makers in the Third world was to foist innovations on people in the rural areas without consulting them as to their needs. With the failure of projects, often involving millions of dollars, policy-makers soon realized that communication was a vital part of the development process. They therefore sought to harness the potentialities of the media in motivating people and in transforming perceptions and values that were inimical to their development goals. At the same time, the media were seen as opening lines of communication between the people and the planners. In short, the "top-down" perspective gave way to the more workable "bottom-up" approach and this is where the concept of development journalism was applied. As Sinha (1978:24), points out,

"...development journalism...pushes for awareness towards various ideas and programs set afoot for desirable socio-economic changes in a society or nation."
The concept of development journalism, as it applies to international coverage, utilizes these same basic principles. Scholars and leaders in the Third World argue that the media in the developed countries could aid in the process of development in the Third World. This could be achieved, they argue, by focusing on the efforts being made to overcome problems in their countries and by providing information on techniques other countries have employed in tackling a particular problem. For example, information on how a particular country tackled literacy or housing shortages, could give other Third World nations ideas on how to accomplish this. Perhaps, more importantly, audiences in the developed countries could be given a fuller and more realistic grasp of Third World issues.

In a sense, the concept of development journalism is not very different from the proposals put forward by Bray or Reston for providing more background or perspectives in stories on foreign affairs. The similarities of their views with the concept of development news can be judged by Aggarwala's (1979:181) description of development news. According to him:

[...] it is not identical with 'positive' news. In its treatment, development news is not different from regular news or investigative reporting... In covering the development news beat, a journalist should critically examine, evaluate, and report the relevance of a development project to national and local needs, the differences between its impact on people as claimed by government officials and as it actually is.
This kind of journalism he points out could lead to the "humanization" of international news and help to "...lower the walls of intense suspicion and distrust that have arisen between Third World political leaders and the media."
3.7 SECTION III—THE COVERAGE
Chapter IV

METHODOLOGY

Because this thesis concerns itself not only with the frequency with which themes occurred, but also with the sometimes more intangible elements at work in distorted communication, both a quantitative and a qualitative approach were used in conducting the study. The quantitative approach involved a thematic content analysis of the stories written on Jamaica and appearing in the three publications selected, between 1972 when Manley came into power, and 1980 when he lost. The objective here was to identify the themes and issues that the publications focussed on during the period Manley was in office. For the New York Times, the index was consulted. Microfiche materials and periodical indices were used to locate Time and Newsweek articles.

A preliminary scanning of the material provided clues for the construction of the coding sheet, the categories and themes that were included in it. The major categories comprised Economic Decline; Political Instability/Crime; Domestic Policy/Achievements and Foreign Policy. Crime was not categorized separately from Political Instability since no clear distinction could be drawn as to where one began and the other ended. Likewise, there was no clear separation

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between Domestic Policy and Achievements since most of Manley's policies were implemented for the first time and so could reasonably be construed as achievements.

The themes that were clearly relevant for the respective categories were included in those categories. Themes that stressed economic ill-health were placed under the category of Economic Decline. These included, for instance, bankruptcy, unemployment, inflation, increased borrowing/international debt, foreign exchange shortage, shortages in consumer items and devaluation of the Jamaican dollar.

The category of Political Instability/Crime encompassed themes that stressed or implied that the government had lost control of the situation in Jamaica, could no longer govern effectively and was in the process of setting up an authoritarian society. Themes falling in this category included violence of any sort (shootings, killings, rapes), Cuban style Communism/Socialism, Cuban infiltration/interference, charges of CIA/JLP collusion and destabilization attempts by the former, the State of Emergency, fears of dictatorship, political paralysis/chaos, PNP instigated violence/terrorism.

The Domestic Policy/Achievements category embraced basically those programs that Manley initiated to better the lot of the people. These programs were outlined in Chapter two and included among a host of others, free education, low income housing, land reform, literacy and a minimum wage.
Democratic socialism was included in this category because that was the philosophic base on which Manley structured his programs. The term 'social programs' was also included in this category because a number of articles used it as a catch-all phrase in referring to Manley's programs.

The Foreign Policy category included themes that dealt with Jamaica's relations with other countries and its championing of causes having international significance. These included Manley's non-alignment position, his friendship with Castro/Cuba, support for a new international economic order, support for African liberation struggles, and the diversification of trading links to include Eastern Europe and China.

Themes falling within the Domestic and Foreign Policy categories were coded according to tone/tenor: i.e., as being positive, negative or neutral. This was determined largely by the context in which the theme was mentioned. Thus, if a theme fell in the Domestic Policy category and this was seen as contributing to the country's problems, then it would be coded as negative. It was coded as positive if it was seen as contributing to the betterment of the country, and as neutral if there were no value judgments. In the Foreign Policy category, a theme was judged negative if Manley's foreign policy initiatives were interpreted as part of his overall Communist designs; positive, if these positions were seen as advancing the Third World cause for more
just relations with the developed nations, and neutral if there was no obvious or implied value-judgment.

The final section of the coding sheet made provision for the coder's overall impression of the article as it related to Manley or Seaga. For instance, an article was judged positive for Manley if he was portrayed as grappling effectively with the problems confronting him, or if there was an attempt to give a sympathetic understanding of the problems he faced. It was judged negative if he was portrayed as inept or when doubt was cast as to his real intentions for Jamaica. Articles, when they dealt with Seaga, were coded as positive if he was seen as a better alternative to Manley, and negative if he was seen as contributing to the overall upheaval in the society. Again, the general context in which either personality was mentioned, along with the use of adjectives, served as guides. (cf. Appendix 1)

To test for inter-coder reliability, thirteen stories were arbitrarily selected from the three publications over the eight year period. The stories were independently coded by the researcher and two other judges. Using Holsti's formula

\[
2M \frac{1}{N1 + N2}
\]

where \(M\) equals the number of decisions in which coders agree and \(N1, N2\) stand-
ing for the number of coding decisions made by each, overall intercoder reliability worked out reassuringly to be 0.94. Suggestions for tightening up the coding sheet were made and incorporated in a revised form.

The qualitative aspect of the research addressed itself to the actual use of language, rhetorical devices, the tone or tenor, and the emphasis in these articles. Rank's schema of categories (1977; cf. Appendix 2) for the analysis of persuasive or propagandistic communication along with McBride's (1980) 'concept of distortion turned out to be particularly useful frameworks for this part of the study. Rank's schema is a graphically assembled pattern or overlay, as it were, of action types which reappear time and time again in propaganda and persuasive communication. At the same time, it is a wieldy summary or synopsis of many persuasion strategies diagnosed in the authoritative but more diffuse studies by such scholars as Jacques Ellul (1973) and David Altheide (1980).

Rank's model is broadly divided into two basic categories of "Intensify" and "Downplay". The "Intensify" category, in turn, comprises sub-categories of Repetition, Association and Composition.

Repetition intensifies by utilizing easily identifiable slogans, names, or signs, that imprint themselves on the consciousness of the receiver with the intention of evoking fairly predictable responses. For example, anything labelled
'Communist', at least from the North American viewpoint, evokes unwelcome notions of authoritarianism, repression and the violation of basic rights and freedoms, while at the same time doing relatively little to inform. Association intensifies a message by linking an idea, product or person with something that is loved and desired; or feared and hated. An example of association would be the establishment of a link between Manley and Castro; or of 'democratic socialism' with 'Communism.' Composition intensifies by the way messages are arranged. In the case of verbal communication, this would involve the choice and sequence of words in sentences, and in some cases the pictures that accompany them. And, just as compellingly, the captions which do so much to interpret visuals for the reader.

The "Downplay" category embraces the sub-categories of Omission, Diversion and Confusion. Omission downplays by concealing the full truth of an issue. This is accomplished with the aid of half-truths, quotes taken out of context and by the exclusion of necessary background. Diversion downplays by distracting focus or diverting attention away from key issues. Emotional attacks, assorted appeals and the use of the "red-herring", or non-issues are popular means of diversion. Confusion downplays by making things too complex and involuted for easy understanding. Confusion can result from faulty logic, contradictions, inconsistencies, indeed by anything that blurs clarity.
McBride (1980:158), in his analysis of the factors that create distortion in news reports, argued that this occurs when inaccuracies or untruths replace authentic facts; or when a slanted interpretation is woven into the news report...through the use of pejorative adjectives and stereotypes...when news is cobbled together from random facts and presented as a whole, or partial truths are assembled to form the appearance of a complete truth; when facts are presented in such a way as to cause misinterpretation by implication...when events are presented in a way that stirs unfounded or exaggerated doubts and fears with the aim of conditioning subsequent action by individuals or even whole communities and governments.

There are, of course, a number of other ways in which news can be slanted that McBride did not mention. These include the use of unattributed sources, generalizations, unfounded speculation, sensational headlines and the use of an incomplete statistical picture to buttress claims, thereby giving an impression of authenticity. The abovementioned qualities that manifest themselves in distorted communication are not mutually exclusive; they can (and often do) occur simultaneously or in different combinations.

The publications were analyzed on a chronological basis in order to pin-point the shirts, the issues and themes that surfaced during the period of Manley's government. Because their number was relatively small, all of the newsmagazine articles were analyzed and their similarities noted.

The case of The New York Times was different. The sheer volume of stories (127), precluded an analysis of each and
every story. Instead, the researcher focussed on the analyt-
ic pieces and editorials. A few hard news items were includ-
ed however where they seemed particularly useful in making a
point.
Chapter V

QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS

Of the three publications the *New York Times* accounted for the overwhelming percentage of the coverage. This amounted to 86.4 percent of the stories. *Newsweek* and *Time* accounted for 7.5 percent and 6.1 percent of the stories respectively. The primacy of *The Times* in the coverage may be due to the fact that it is a daily publication while the news magazines are weekly publications. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the coverage by the publications.

Table 2 shows the distribution of stories over the years. The years with the greatest concentration of coverage were 1974 (17%), 1976 (23.8%) and 1980 (24.5%). In all three years, U.S. interests were at stake. Manley initiated the bauxite negotiations in 1974. 1976 and 1980 were election years characterised by political violence and concern over Jamaica's political direction. These years of peak coverage, accord with the observations made in earlier sections of the thesis to the effect that U.S. coverage tends to focus on periods when there is crisis, or where its interests are directly affected.

Table 3 shows the distribution of stories in the respective story type categories. There was little difference
between 'hard news' (46.9%) and analytic pieces (45.6%). In terms of possible impact however, the analytic pieces were more important since they interpreted the events in Jamaica for the reader. In many instances, the quality of the interpretation left much to be desired. The full extent of this will become evident in the qualitative analysis. The 'hard news' items were basically short 'spot' items announcing the occurrence of a particular event. The wire services were responsible for the hard news items while The New York Times, Time and Newsweek were responsible for the background pieces.

Table 4 indicates that the most important source as to volume and analysis was the 'Special to NYT' features (29.9%), followed by those features written by Correspondents (15%). The fact that the New York Times specials were the most important source indicates again the primacy of The Times in the coverage. The paper, it seemed, relied mostly upon its own reporters. Note, however, that the wire services combined accounted for 34% of the stories.

Table 5 illustrates that unemployment (10.2%), borrowing/international debt (10.8%) and foreign exchange shortage (10.3%) were the most salient themes in the Economic Decline category. Special attention should be paid to the fact that problems with the IMF which were a constant headache for the government, were among the least mentioned themes. This theme accounted for only 3.3 percent of the total responses.
As noted earlier, one of the major issues in the 1980 elections, was the fact that the government had broken off negotiations with the IMF because its policy prescriptions would have reversed the government's attempt to carry out its social programs. Unemployment, international debt, and foreign exchange shortage were, as noted earlier, endemic features of the economy as a result of its 'structural dependency.' The flight of capital exacerbated the problems of unemployment, international debt, and foreign exchange shortage, but it cannot be said that they were caused by government policy. The qualitative analysis will show that the government's policies were blamed for the economic decline. Overall, 40.8% of the stories dealt with themes related to economic decline.

The data in Table 6 show the themes that were emphasized in the Political Instability/Crime category. Here, there was strong emphasis on shootings/killings (24.5%), violence (22.4%), and Cuban style Communism (13.8%). Perhaps the most important point to note is that among the low salience issues were charges of CIA destabilization by Manley (3.1%), CIA/JLP collusion (1%), and the attempted coup (2%). These issues were of deep concern to the Manley government between 1976 and 1980. The coup attempt, for instance, was treated with evident skepticism and this was apparent from the fact that it was referred to as the 'alleged coup.' In contrast to this, the theme of PNP violence/terrorism ac-
counted for 6.1 percent of the themes in this category. The PNP was therefore given greater prominence as the instigator of violence in the society. Based on these figures, the odd conclusion that one is forced to draw is that the government was conducting violence against itself. Overall, 46.2% of articles dealt with themes related to political instability/crime.

The breakdown of themes in Table 7 demonstrates clearly that Manley's most important domestic policies designed to redress the imbalances in the society received the least attention. Mention of these policies fell below 6 percent. The publications focussed instead on the bauxite levies (20.1%), democratic socialism (16.6%) and the government's move to increase Jamaica's participation in multi-national corporations (9.4%). These issues had direct implications for North American corporations and for what was considered to be U.S. strategic interests. The issue of the bauxite levies was treated however with more equanimity than the issue of democratic socialism. Table 8 shows that 28.6 percent of the stories that mentioned the bauxite levies were negative compared to 87 percent of the stories that mentioned democratic socialism (Table 9). Overall, 41 percent of the stories dealing with domestic policies were negative while 20.9 percent were positive (Table 10).

Turning to the treatment of Manley's foreign policy (Table 11), it is clearly seen that the overwhelming concern
was with Manley's friendship with Castro/Cuba. This issue accounted for 50.5 percent of the responses in this category. Here the publications reflected the concerns of the U.S. administration who saw Manley's ties with Castro/Cuba as a threat to its strategic interests in the Caribbean. Table 12 indicates that 59.2 percent of the stories that mentioned Manley's relations with Castro/Cuba were negative while only 0.7 percent was positive. Table 13 indicates that the overall treatment of foreign policy issues was more negative than positive despite the fact that 52.6 percent of the stories fell in the neutral category. The articles that dealt specifically with Manley was conspicuously negative (52.4%) as seen in Table 14. In contrast, 75 percent of the articles that dealt with Seaga were positive (Table 15).

In sum then, the quantitative findings indicate that the New York Times had more extensive coverage of the Manley government than the other publications. There was strong emphasis on the economic decline; shootings/killings, violence and Cuban style Communism. The PNP was portrayed as the instigator of violence in the society while Manley's charges or destabilization were downplayed. Manley's most important domestic policies designed to redress the imbalances in the society got very little attention while his friendship with Castro/Cuba was given prominence. This relationship was largely seen as negative. Overall, Seaga was portrayed more positively than Manley.
### TABLE 1

Breakdown of Coverage by Publications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsweek</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>147</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2

Breakdown of Coverage Between 1972–80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>77</td>
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<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>147</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3

Frequency of Story Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Story Type</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard News</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel Feature</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>147</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 4

**Frequency of Source**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NYT Specials</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondent</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Mentioned</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPI</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aguters</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guest Columnist</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syndicated Columnist</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>147</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5

**Theme Count and Percentages Related To Economic Decline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percent of Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrowing/int'l debt</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For. exchange shortage</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism decline</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation/price increase</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline in production</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortage of goods</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recession</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bankruptcy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Problems with IMF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget deficit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devaluation of S</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slums</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline in exports</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Responses</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Percent of Responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shootings/killings</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>24.5</td>
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<td>violence</td>
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<td>Cuban style Communism</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of Emergency</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP violence/terrorism</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban infiltration</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA destabilization</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>political paralysis</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<td>government corruption</td>
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<td>demonstrations</td>
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<td>robberies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>rapes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terrorism</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA/JLP collusion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rears of dictatorship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Responses</td>
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**Table 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bauxite levies</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic socialism</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shares in MNC's</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land reform</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalization</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low income housing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum wage</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free education</td>
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<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal pay for women</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-reliance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social programs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment program</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar-coops</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public spending</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. participation in econ.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker participation</td>
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<td>1.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income redistribution</td>
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<td>School feeding program</td>
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<td>0.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>School building program</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternity leave with pay</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Councils</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of franchise</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Responses</strong></td>
<td>139</td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
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</table>

**Table 8**

Breakdown of Bauxite Levies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>67.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Responses</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
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</table>
TABLE 9

Treatment of Democratic Socialism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
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TABLE 10

Overall Treatment of Domestic Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>29</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
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<td>41.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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TABLE 11

Theme Count and Percentages Related to Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friendship with Castro</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-alignment</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of African Liberation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Int'l Economic Order</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-imperialism</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other diplomatic ties</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with other Socialist countries</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C'bean Regional Cooperation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total responses</td>
<td>87</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
### TABLE 12

**Treatment of Relations with Castro/Cuba**

<table>
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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>38.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>59.2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Responses</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
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</table>

### TABLE 13

**Overall Treatment of Foreign Policy Issues**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Neutral</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
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<td><strong>Total Responses</strong></td>
<td><strong>97</strong></td>
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### TABLE 14

**General Tone of Article Regarding Manley**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>Negative</td>
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<td>52.4</td>
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<td><strong>Total Responses</strong></td>
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### TABLE 15

**General Tone of Article Regarding Seaga**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>75.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
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</table>
Chapter VI

A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES, TIME AND NEWSWEEK.

"What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer." Francis Bacon—Essays I. Of Truth.

6.1 TIME AND NEWSWEEK

The quantitative analysis by identifying stress and accent upon themes gave only a partial understanding or outline, as it were, of the complexities of the issues under consideration in this thesis. Jacques Ellul (1973), points out that quantitative methods are inadequate for measuring the effects of propaganda as it takes place within a sociological context and operates increasingly on the qualitative level of intensities. According to him, "[t]he mathematical methods... can be applied only within very narrow limits, and to problems that generally have had to be taken out of context." To reduce a situation to precise figures, according to him, necessarily entails the reduction of the phenomenon to its simplest state thereby eliminating the complexities and subsidiary aspects that may actually be the most important. (p.275) This chapter, through a more discursive,
qualitative examination of language and description will attempt to provide a more complete picture of the tapestry that has been woven.

The first article on Manley appeared in the August 21, 1972 issue of Time. Manley had just come into power and the article was very positive and optimistic about his prospects in office. It noted that he was seen by many Jamaicans as an appropriate successor to his father, former Prime Minister Norman Manley, who had helped lead the country to independence in 1962. The article described Manley as "energetic and articulate" adding that he had "brought new confidence, style and warmth to the traditionally conservative island politics." Continuing, it said that

he has used his office to persuade his countrymen to shed some of the unhappier legacies of British rule...Manley has set himself no less a task than that of freeing his countrymen from the colonial assumption that 'somebody else is going to do it all for me.'

Documenting some of the problems Manley raced the article pointed out that

Jamaica, like most Caribbean islands, is beset by an unholy trinity of poverty, malnutrition, and unemployment. The islands' economies are often tied to single crops...that fetch low prices on world markets. They cannot mechanize agriculture to cut costs and raise incomes because that would only aggravate unemployment which runs as high as 25% in Jamaica.

It nevertheless ventured the opinion that Manley had made a promising start by appealing to

Jamaica's own economists to find original solutions to the country's economic ills...Manley is seeking to lessen Jamaica's reliance on exports of
primary products and increase industrial processing, mining and tourism."

A rather engaging picture of Manley and his wife accompanied the article with the words "Love Power." It is important to keep this article in mind as it provides a measuring stick against which to judge subsequent articles.

The next *Time* article on Jamaica appeared on August 6, 1973—almost one year later. The thrust of the article was the boorishness of Vincent DeRoulet, the American Ambassador to Jamaica, whom Manley had declared *persona non grata*. This action was taken, the article explained, because of the Ambassador's allegation before a Senate foreign relations committee that he had made a "deal" with Manley that the U.S. would not intervene in the 1972 elections in return for Manley's guarantee that he would not nationalize the bauxite industry. The article was quite unsympathetic to DeRoulet whom it described as not having "even modest talents of discretion." The overall impression was that Manley, "Jamaica's new and progressive," Prime Minister was justified in the step he took.

By 1974 Manley had begun negotiations with the bauxite companies for increased levies—part of his original solution to the country's ills. *Time* came out with an article entitled "Battling Over Bauxite" on July 8, of that year. The article argued that the "eightfold increase" in taxes and royalties on bauxite foreshadowed "difficulties industrialists may encounter...in dealing with poor countries"
that possess vital raw material." The article, however, gave the Jamaican viewpoint. "In Jamaican eyes, Manley's power play is only an attempt to redress a neocolonialist relationship." It elucidated further on this by noting that the Jamaican share on each ton of bauxite had dropped from $2.83 in 1971 to $1.61 in 1973 as a result of a complicated tax system. In addition to this, it pointed out that the bauxite companies "could determine how much ore they would mine and export without consultation with Jamaican authorities."

A key phrase in the article however was "Manley's power play." The impression came through that Manley was somehow the antagonist and the multinational corporations his victims. This impression was fortified when Manley was said to have "demanded" that the aluminum companies renegotiate their contracts. When the talks broke off Manley "professed" astonishment at the companies' attitude and "rammed" through Parliament the new taxes.

The next Time article was a piece on the 'Gun Court' instituted by Manley to combat gun crime in the society. The article was headlined "Stalag in Kingston" and appeared on September 23, 1974. [It hardly seems necessary to articulate the images of Hitler and Nazi repression conjured up by the word "Stalag." ] The opening paragraph was equally sensational. It asserted that

[1]he crime rate in Jamaica had sky-rocketed. Armed gangs roamed the streets of Kingston, filling the night with the sound of echoing gunfire. Reported shootings had risen 1,500% in ten years and it seemed that crime was vying with tourism as Jamaica's No. 1 industry.
It cannot be denied that crime was and continues to be a serious problem in Jamaican society. The impression, however, that the society was inundated with crime seemed overstated. No source was given for the statistic, which rendered it suspect, and the elevation of crime to the status of an industry was as tenuous as the status of the statistics. The Gun Court was graphically described "[w]ith its guard towers and barbed--wire fences painted blood--red" as a "Hollywood back--lot version of a World War II concentration camp." Towards the end of the story it was acknowledged that the Gun Court was effective in curtailing crime but the article added that its constitutionality was being challenged by the Jamaican Bar Association.

Conspicuously absent from the report was any background informing the reader of the reasons for the crime. Consequently the reader's impression was that the society was infested with crime and this was being fought with the aid of fascist techniques. The article was accompanied by a picture of the Gun Court.

Time supplied no coverage in 1975. Noticeable too was the fact that Newsweek provided no coverage of Jamaica until 1976. Its first article on Jamaica came out on January 12, 1976. It was entitled "The New Jamaica" and was accompanied by two pictures. The largest was a reprint of a picture from the Jamaican Gleaner showing a group of demonstrators bearing placards, one of which read: "THE ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE"
MUST BE CRUSHED. SOCIAL CHANGE IS A MUST.\textsuperscript{a} The caption for this photo read "Jamaican demonstrators: Democracy is alive and well despite violence and a rush to radical socialism." (emphasis added) The general tone of this article, however, was at odds with the statement that democracy was 'alive and well.' Another picture on the same page showed a voluptuous "bunny" waitress serving a tourist. The caption for that picture read "The good life at a Jamaican resort: the vacancy rate was rising." On the following page of the article there were two maps and a picture of Manley meeting a group of people. One of the maps was a map of Jamaica showing the areas where bauxite mining, tourism, sugar cane plantations and political violence were concentrated. The map accurately depicted that the violence was concentrated in Kingston. This might seem to be a small point but it should be kept in mind for future reference. The other map gave a picture of Jamaica's geographical position in the Caribbean relative to Cuba and Cuba's position relative to Florida.

The article opened with the murder of a political supporter of Manley noting that "he was only one victim in a series of political murders that has turned part of Kingston's fetid tar-paper slums into a mini Belfast." The article went on, however, to link the violence to Manley's "program of socialist reform":

the shootings and muggings have alarmed foreign visitors---and confirmed the fears of many Jamaicans that Manley and his program of socialist reform spell trouble.
No reason was given for this conclusion. Instead, the article went on to note that Manley was "hard at work trying to convert Jamaica's British style government into a left-wing worker's paradise." Reference was made to his visit to Cuba and his policies were blamed for the flight of foreign capital and prosperous Jamaicans. With unflattering paint-strokes the article noted that despite unemployment, inflation and strikes Manley was not at all fazed. "The radical reformer cheerfully regards the multiple crises facing Jamaica as 'a great opportunity for social engineering.'" With evident skepticism towards Manley's policy of democratic socialism, it said, "Manley and the PNP have drawn up a set of ambitious social blueprints. They aim to install what Manley calls 'democratic socialism.'" The format of this last phrase in referring to Manley's political philosophy, is significant: the great majority of the articles in alluding to Manley's democratic socialism repeatedly included the words in 'scare-quotes' as if to imply that there really was, or may be, nothing at all democratic about the political system he was trying to establish. It posed as objective quotation, but it had the subtle nudge of innuendo.

Further on, the article described Manley as "[t]all, attractive and articulate...a classically aristocratic champion of social and political radicalism." Seaga was contrasted as a man of more conservative views and less flamboyant style. He was quoted as saying that Manley was leading
the country "into the Communist system and the Communist ideology." Seaga's assertion was strengthened by the observation of the article that the labor unrest combined with the political violence and "Manley's flirtation with Fidel Castro" had left the country uneasy about its future. It ended by speculating that "Manley may become more radical with the passage of time" and that "pressing economic and social problems will invite ever more drastic solutions." The reader was therefore left to doubt that Jamaica would remain a democratic society for long.

This article foreshadowed in many respects the tenor of the coverage by the magazines for the rest of Manley's term in office. From here on, both publications ceaselessly referred to his links with Castro, emphasized the violence in the society and blamed his policies for the decline in the economy. Relatively little effort was made to place the Jamaican situation within the larger context of international events such as the recession, the impact of oil price increases on Third World economies, or Manley's claims that the violence in the society was an orchestrated attempt to destabilize his government.

In May of the same year (1976), Newsweek came out with an article entitled "Castro's Peace Corps." The article dealt with the Cuban technical and construction personnel who were helping Jamaica and Guyana in the building of dams, houses, and schools. The theme of the article was that Cas-
tro had changed his tactics from exporting revolution through guerrilla warfare to accomplishing the same goal by peaceful means. According to the article "Like the 1960's Castro failed miserably when he tried to export his revolution through guerrilla warfare. This time he may have a better idea." The article portrayed Manley as an "unabashed admirer of Castro's accomplishments," and quoted Seaga as saying that more Cubans were in Jamaica than were necessary for the construction projects. In his estimation that left "200 Cuban nationals whose purpose cannot be accounted for."

To add credence to Seaga's claims, the article went on to note that "American officials say they have proof that some of the Cubans entering Jamaica as construction workers are in fact intelligence agents." The "American officials", according to the article, noted that the Cuban Embassy had expanded, and that Cuban literature was beginning to seep into the country. It said also that "many people" in Jamaica were beginning to fear that Jamaicans travelling to Cuba for vocational training were "being politically indoctrinated."

It went on to note that Manley's "critics" felt that he was running the risk of "unarmed subversion by Castro...and that the implications for American interests could be grave." The story was accompanied by two photos—one showing Cuban construction workers in Jamaica and the other a picture of a fence with a slogan saying "TO HELL FIDEL TO HELL MICHAEL CUBANS GO HOME." This gave the impression that the Cubans
were not welcome in Jamaica, a false impression, because their doctors and workers were seen as helping in the development of Jamaica. The caption for the abovementioned picture read "A slogan attacking Castro and Manley in Kingston: Is Cuba bent on peaceful subversion in the Caribbean?" The overwhelming impression given by the article was that Castro really was bent on peaceful subversion in the Caribbean. Furthermore, the allegations attributed to "many people" and "American officials" about political indoctrination in Cuba, and the presence of Cuban intelligence agents posing as construction workers, were not substantiated. The strategy of attributing negative perceptions and views on Manley to unnamed sources was frequently employed by the article. There were recurring references, that is, to "many people", "economic experts", "intelligence sources" etc. To the sceptical reader, it is just as likely that these were proxy voices for articulating the magazines' views.

*Time* placed Jamaica on its agenda again on June 26, 1976. Borrowing a line from a popular reggae song at the time, the article wasHeadlined "Jah Kingdom Goes To Waste." It opened with Manley's allegations of CIA attempts to destabilize the society and his concern over the unprecedented level and scale of violence in the society. The article then referred to the U.S. Ambassador's protest over the allegation along with a denial by William H. Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs. Afte-
or nullifying Manley's allegations by invoking these authoritative sources, the article went on to give what it termed "[a] more plausible explanation for Jamaica's unrest." This, it said, was "...Manley's efforts to turn the island republic into a socialist state." It went on to assert that "[e]ven the Prime Minister's supporters concede that the economy is in a shambles." Without spelling out who the "Prime Minister's supporters" were it artfully avoided the obligation to provide evidence to back up its assertion. Rather, it cited statistics to buttress its claims that the economy was in a "shambles"—implying that proof of the latter was proof of the first assertion that Manley was turning the island into a socialist republic. Unemployment, it said, was running at 22% and foreign exchange earnings had declined 40 to 60% below 1975. The statistics might be credible but the argument was made earlier in this thesis that the news magazines use statistics to lend authenticity to what are essentially essays, and in such a way as to blur all too easily the distinction between news, information, opinion and propaganda.

Manley was re-elected to office in 1976 on a larger mandate than his 1972 victory, capturing 48 of 60 seats in Parliament. Both magazines dealt with his election victory publishing stories simultaneously on December 27. The Newsweek article entitled "Heavy Manners" opened with refer-

* The title was taken from a popular reggae song at the time extolling the virtues of discipline. The term 'manners' in
ence to the State of Emergency, the "epidemic of political violence", and the "turbulent election campaign." The article went on to assert that "[m]any of Manley's critics fear that he will soon make heavy manners the order of the day in Jamaica." On this note of authoritarianism, the article said in the same breath that "[s]ince taking power in 1972, Manley has moved his country leftward toward "democratic socialism" and has struck up a firm friendship with Cuba." It said that his election victory had given him "a mandate for more socialism and for stern law-and-order measures." The article then went on to invoke the recurrent themes of violence, murder and the economic decline. It ended up speculating that the economic problems "could possibly touch off a wave of resentment against his regime" which "may explain why Manley appeared to be in no hurry last week to end the island's state of emergency."

The newsmagazines did not hesitate to speculate in their coverage. Oftentimes the articles were couched in such a way as to suggest that Manley could possibly become more authoritarian with the passage of time. In this way doubts were continually sown as to Manley's real intentions and served to undermine whatever Manley had said to assuage misgivings as to where he was taking Jamaica. The result was that Seaga's accusations of Communism had more credibility.

Jamaica at the time was a slang expression for discipline. The imposition of the State of Emergency by Manley to curb violence in the society was said to put gunmen under man-

ners.
than Manley's disclaimers. The Newsweek article was accompanied by two pictures—one of Manley celebrating his victory and the other of steel-helmeted troops on patrol. The caption read "Manley celebrates, troops patrol in Kingston: A mandate for socialism?" The effect of the picture and the caption with its rhetorical question, along with the article, suggested that Manley was truly on his way to creating an authoritarian socialist regime in Jamaica.

Time's article of the same date was simply headlined "Castro's Pal Wins Again." The article opened with a quote attributed to Manley saying that "[w]e are not going to be ruled by violence but by heavy manners. No one can hold us back. We know where we are going." These statements, according to the article, were the campaign promises of Prime Minister Michael Manley "despite little evidence to back up anyone of them." But the quote attributed to Manley is really a textbook example of decontextualization. And this can be seen from an October 1980 Gleaner supplement reviewing election issues over the years. The supplement pointed out that for the 1976 elections, the government's platform was in fact the "sabotage of the economy by local capitalists, JLP propaganda that the PNP was a totalitarian party bent on introducing a Communist state in Jamaica", and allegations as well, by the government, of CIA instigated violence. Another issue, according to the Gleaner supplement, was the government's charge of bad press reports in the internation-
al press designed to destroy the confidence of the people in the government (p.4).

Against this background, the opening statement attributed to Manley begins to make sense. Taken out of context, it implied both that Manley did not know where he was going and the gullibility of the electorate to being taken in by these promises. As the article said, "Manley's pitch was apparently convincing enough." The election it was claimed, was fought between the "socialist PNP and the free enterprise opposition Jamaica Labour Party." What we really have here though, is an effective use of labels more designed to persuade than to inform and in which the complexities of socialism are reduced to authoritarianism while (American styled) democracy is linked with the beneficial image of free enterprise. From here on, reference to the PNP was preceded by the term 'socialist' while the 'JLP was characterized as standing for 'free enterprise'. The election campaign, the article said, "caused an explosion of violence and random killings from the ghettos of West Kingston to all of Jamaica." (emphasis added). This last assertion was blatantly inaccurate and clearly at odds with the January 12, 1976 Newsweek article in which the map of Jamaica had shown that the violence was concentrated in Kingston. The Time article went on to report that "[p]oliticized young thugs stalked the streets of Kingston...assaulting supporters of the other side", clearly implying that these "thugs"
were Manley's supporters. What it failed to point out, was that both parties employed elements of the lumpen-proletari- at to harrass each other's supporters. The impression created then, was that PNP supporters alone were the insti- gators of violence in the society and that Manley was indeed ruling by violence. Note also the use of highly emotive words and phrases such as "thugs", "stalked", "exlosion of violence", and "random killings."

Blaming Manley for Jamaica's "political chaos" and "economic disorder" the article said "[f]or the past two years he has been committed to what he calls 'democratic so- cialism'—meaning buying into the island's bauxite industry and lavish doses of public spending on labor-intensive road building and land reform." Against the background laid out in Chapter Two of this thesis, this can only be a gross over-simplification of Manley's policy of democratic social- ism. Once again, figures of unknown origin were used to buttress the point that the economy had declined due to Man- ley's policies. "Income from tourism had dropped $120 million in 1975 to an expected $90 million this year...inflation is running at nearly 15%...while the unem- ployment rate on the island is 27%..." The article concluded somewhat skeptically by musing how "Manley plans to restore both prosperity and tranquillity to his troubled, gealike country." It is worth commenting as well on the descriptive differences between the Time article of 1972 and this later
one. Back then, the country was afflicted by the "unholy trinity of poverty, malnutrition and unemployment" for which Manley was trying to find "original solutions." But in 1976, no longer enamored with Manley's "original solution" of democratic socialism, Time had transformed Jamaica into a "gemlike" country ruined by Manley, the "unabashed admirer of Fidel Castro." This same sort of discrepancy in perceptions is also evident in the April 21, 1980 Newsweek article:

Jamaica was brimming with untapped potential when Michael Manley became its Prime Minister in 1972. The island's rich soil, bountiful bauxite deposits and lush tourist attractions seemed to make it the perfect place for his dream of democratic socialism. But Manley embarked on a spending spree that has brought his country to the verge of bankruptcy....

In February 1977 Newsweek published two articles in the same issue, (Feb. 28), written by Arnaud DeBorchgrave. One of those articles was the interview referred to earlier by Cuthbert, which she said, was cut and rearranged to give a totally different picture from the full interview that was published in the Gleaner. The thrust of the first article headlined "Cuba's role in Jamaica" made very strong claims that Cuba was indeed involved in subversive activities in Jamaica. This piece of intelligence according to DeBorchgrave had been gathered from "sources", none of whom he identified. DeBorchgrave's opening salvo was that "most observers" were surprised at Manley's 1976 victory, given the state of the economy. According to him, his investigation
revealed that victory was made possible by the direct support of the Cuban Secret Service and former CIA agent Philip Agee. In DeBorchgrave's words, "after several weeks of investigation, I can report that Manley's triumph was made possible, in part, by the direct support of Cuba's secret service,...(DG) and by some help from Philip Agee,...the former CIA man who has become one of the agency's harshest critics."

DeBorchgrave said his sources ranged from "senior intelligence men in Britain, France and Venezuela, to non-CIA sources in the U.S. and, in Jamaica itself, to former Special Branch intelligence officials recently fired by Manley." DeBorchgrave's revelation from these so-called "sources" was that "Fidel Castro's grand design calls for a Marxist axis running across the Caribbean from Guyana to Jamaica to Havana." Had DeBorchgrave read his own publication's piece on the Cuban construction workers in Jamaica, in the May 31, 1970, issue he would not have had to go to so much trouble for this bit of information. That article "(May 31), had a "lawyer who belongs to Manley's growing middle-class opposition" as saying,

Jamaica and mainland Guyana are at opposite ends of a necklace of islands that stretches across the Caribbean...If Cuba ever gets control of them Trinidad, Barbados, the Leeward and Windward islands and even parts of South America could fall into place.

The striking similarity between the views of the "lawyer" and DeBorchgrave's "senior intelligence men", seems a
little too close for coincidence. After DeBorchgrave made
us privy to what his "sources" had to say, he went on to as-
sert that the Cubans were steadily building their influence
in Kingston; that their embassy was the biggest in town and
that "two thirds of its staff are said to be DGI agents." No
sources are identified for "are said to be." Jamaica is
pictured as being steadily infiltrated and taken over by the
Cubans. "Cuban airliners shuttle in and out at all hours,
loading and unloading crates and people with no questions
asked and no records kept..."

Manley was described as returning "starry-eyed" from a
visit to Cuba in 1975 and since then had "relied heavily on
Castro's aid and advice." According to DeBorchgrave, his
"sources" also charged that Manley had followed a "Cuban de-
signed strategy to undercut the opposition Jamaica Labour
Party...with a combination of violence and mudslinging
charges that it was linked to a CIA 'plot' against Jamaica." DeBorchgrave without substantiating these charges went on to
quote Seaga that "Manley has set out to build 'nothing short
of a Marxist police state.'" He went on to note that accord-
ing to his "sources", the army would not be able to stand up
to the 20,000 member people's militia (the home guard refer-
red to earlier), being organized by the Prime Minister. Re-
ferring to the Cuban construction workers, DeBorchgrave said
that they were "proselytizing among the Jamaicans in their
spare time." He ended by speculating that "[w]hether Manley
intends it or not, Jamaica could become the next country to go Marxist."

Appearing immediately after this article was an excerpt of an interview with Manley by DeBorchgrave. DeBorchgrave asked a number of leading questions having to do with the collaboration of PNP radicals with the DGI and Agee; the applicability of aspects of the Cuban system to Jamaica; and the JLP and CIA attempts to destabilize the society. Despite the fact that Manley responded well, the interview in many ways, served to buttress the first article: DE BORCHGRAVE: People who know you well say that in 1975 you returned from your meeting with Fidel Castro a changed man. What is it you admire most about the Cuban system, and what part of it do you feel is applicable to Jamaica? MANLEY: All sorts of things. Before I went there, I myself had been grappling with how you use the educational system to create a whole new set of responses in a society: how to get rid of the elitist system, give the people pride, confidence...The Cubans are also creating a democratic structure within a one--party state..." DeBorchgrave's question confirmed the assertion in the preceding article that Manley had indeed returned "starry--eyed" from Cuba whereas Manley's response seemed to be a confession of authoritarian tendencies.

U.S. President Jimmy Carter was elected in 1977 and in the early years of his administration sought a rapprochement with Cuba; and with the help of Andrew Young, a close friend
of Manley, sought to ease the tensions between Washington and Kingston. *Time's* article of August 22, 1977 dealt with this and was the last article on Jamaica by either magazine until 1979. The article entitled "Spreading the Carter Gospel" noted that not since John F. Kennedy's days did Latin Americans get the attention they were now getting from Carter who "...was busy trying to patch up frayed relations and win new friends elsewhere south of the border." The article recussed very positively on the effectiveness of Young as an ambassador for the U.S. in the region. It noted that aid to Jamaica and Guyana was going to be increased adding that

Relations with both countries have been strained in recent years, partly because of the leftist convictions of Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica and Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana, and partly because of the two leaders' independent stance in pursuing good relations with Cuba.

Two pictures accompanied the story—one of Senator Frank Church conferring with Fidel Castro and the other with Manley and Young obviously enjoying a good joke together. The caption of that picture read: "The message: past difficulties would not stand in the way of common agreement." On that note, Jamaica was given a respite for seventeen months by both magazines.

Jamaica returned to the agenda of the magazines in 1979 after a flare up over an increase in gas prices and Washington's increasing nervousness over events in Latin America. *Newsweek's* January 22, issue focussed on the gas price in-
creases. Headlined "Jamaica: Mean Streets", it said that ri-
oting had broken out in Kingston and Montego Bay as a result
of a price increase in gasoline from $1.82 U.S. to $1.94 a
gallon. According to the article "[t]he public reaction was
almost instantaneous. Jamaicans formed shouting, fist-wav-
ing bands and erected roadblocks of boulders and overturned
vehicles." It then went into great detail painting a picture
or "marauding groups armed with machetes and knives": of
people being gunned down and of hotel reservations being
cancelled. What it failed to point out was that the riot had
been instigated by a group affiliated to the Jamaica Labour
Party calling itself the National Patriotic Movement. In-
stead, it sought to link the outbreak of violence to bad
economic conditions making it seem that it was a widespread
spontaneous outbreak.5

Towards the end of 1979 (Oct. 22), the entire 'World'
section of Time was devoted to Cuba and its role in Latin
America and the Caribbean. In a piece entitled "Troubled
Waters" the magazine dealt with the fact that Washington had
become "troubled" at the "new mood of anti-imperialism in
the Caribbean directed against the big brother to the north"
and it lamented the fact that "[t]oday... the Caribbean can
no longer be considered an 'American Lake'..."

5 An interesting aside is that since Seaga has been in off-
ice the Jamaican dollar has been devalued 77% against the
U.S. dollar and gas prices have increased to over $3.00
U.S. The current rate of exchange is approximately $1.00
U.S.to J$4.00
Focussing on Jamaica, (just weeks after Manley had upset the Carter Administration with his October Havana speech), the article said that U.S. policymakers were watching the growing Cuban influence in Jamaica "where socialist Prime Minister Michael Manley has pursued increasingly close ties to Castro's government." It declared that despite U.S. aid to Jamaica amounting to $23 million U.S., "the country remained "an economic basket case second only to Haiti in the hemisphere." The article attributed "sacred riots in the streets of Kingston" to joblessness, noting that the "exodus of doctors lawyers and technicians" resulted from "the lack of opportunities." The riots, as noted before, were instigated by a group affiliated to the JLP; and doctors, lawyers and technicians were certainly not the ones in Jamaica suffering from a lack of opportunity. Indeed, they were the ones who could afford to migrate in the first place because they had the means to do so.

Continuing, the article claimed that the Cuban Ambassador to Jamaica, Ulises Estrada, had been identified by "western intelligence sources as an agent of the DuI." "British intelligence" was then quoted as saying that Manley was "walking a perilous tightrope" and that in order to "avoid being overthrown" he probably had to move Jamaica "even further left." Again, the reader was left with no indication as to who would overthrow Manley; and the dominant impression created was that Manley was losing control in a
politically volatile situation that could erupt at any moment.

This article marked another shift in the coverage by the magazines. By 1980, as mentioned before, the government found itself with its back against the wall—estranged from the U.S.; unable to obtain further financing from Western bankers; and at home, facing mounting violence; an increasingly strident anti-communist campaign by the opposition and calls for an election. With all of these factors confronting him, Manley was forced to call an election. Through effective lobbying at the international level, Seaga was able to convince the U.S. that he would be a better alternative to Manley and this was reflected in the coverage up to the 1980 elections.

*Newsweek* in its April 21, 1980 issue came out with an article entitled "Manley Will Have To Pay the Piper." The thrust of the article was that Manley had brought his country to the verge of bankruptcy as a result of his "pell-mell surge toward socialism" financed by the International Monetary Fund. It noted that the IMF and Western bankers had refused any further aid and that Cuba with "its own economy slumping was in no position to help." The article, in describing Manley's situation, said "the piper is demanding payment just when his political powers seem to be ebbing" and that he was "gambling that the IMF or some other angel will bail Jamaica out." Ironically enough, from the point of
view of the Manley government and other Caribbean analysts, the IMF was neither an "angel" nor interested in "bailing" Manley out. On the contrary, it was the refusal of the IMF to make any further concessions to Manley that had already forced him to call the elections.

In June of the same year, Newsweek published another article headlined "Manley's Day of Judgment." The article continued with its theme of the grim economic situation. Under a picture of Manley talking to supporters the caption read: "Manley takes some soundings in the countryside: An ugly blight of strife and stagnation." The article said that the economic crisis had been building up ever since "leftist Manley took office in 1972." It quoted "economic experts" as predicting that the financial squeeze would result in "'Haitianization' — a permanent slide back to a primitive barter and subsistence economy." The upcoming election was portrayed as a "battle between two distinct types of leadership and visions of Jamaica's future." Manley was described as a "charismatic man" who "preaches the gospel of democratic socialism at home and non-alignment abroad." In contrast, Seaga was said to be "a cool Harvard—educated technocrat who places his faith in the market economy and ties with the West."

As the elections approached closer, Seaga did indeed emerge in the coverage as the cool, Harvard—educated, financial wizard and technocrat. He was seen as moderate, fav-
ouring ties with the West—"West" implying the U.S.—efficient and having the capability to restore prosperity to Jamaica. Manley, on the other hand, was seen as a demagogue who had destroyed Jamaica's bright prospects with his monumental economic blunders. Worse still, he was portrayed as no longer having control over the situation in the country nor over the "ideologues" in his party who were pushing for closer ties with Cuba. As the article noted "In his own PNP...Manley is losing ground to ideologues like party secretary D.K. Duncan and Finance Minister Hugh Small, who want more radical domestic programs and closer links with Fidel Castro's Cuba." The article ended on the note that a PNP victory would probably accelerate the flight of capital...middle class businessmen and lead to a continued impasse with the international financial community. A Seaga triumph might restore investor confidence and give the nation the psychological boost it needs to start down the road to recovery.

Here then, was a clear signal on the part of Newsweek to the international community that Manley was not worth supporting and that Seaga was a better alternative.

The last article by either magazine before the election was published by Newsweek on November 3. Headlined "A Bloody Campaign," the article focussed on the violence and blood-letting that accompanied the election campaign. It opened with three vignettes, all of them focussing on killing. The first had security forces killing two men who allegedly fired on a political meeting held by Seaga. The sec-
ond one dealt with the funeral of Roy McGann, a PNP candidate who was killed. The third with the brutal killing of two volunteer workers for the JLP by gunmen who broke down their doors and shot them in the head. The article was accompanied by three photos. Two showed Seaga and Manley on the campaign trail with the caption: "Manley, Seaga on the stump: 'A classic choice between capitalism and Communism may be a watershed for the Caribbean.'" The third photo showed a political meeting with a caption that read: "Bodyguards at a PNP rally: Politics causes a dozen deaths a day."

The article opened on the note that the election was one of the fiercest electoral campaigns in the history of the English-speaking Caribbean. A "U.S. analyst" was quoted as saying that the election was "a classic choice between capitalism and Communism"—again, a simplification and an exaggeration. Again, both Seaga and Manley were contrasted. Manley was described as a "dynamically attractive leader who, counselled by his friend Cuban President Fidel Castro, has been pushing the country toward what he calls 'democratic socialism.'" (emphasis added) Seaga's "Harvard-educated" background was once again emphasized along with his advocacy for private enterprise and foreign investment. The article said that he wanted a "substantial victory so that he can save Jamaica from what he considers to be Manley's ruinously spendthrift programs and dangerous ties with the Cubans."
Continuing, the article dealt with allegations made by Seaga and Manley respectively that the Cubans and the CIA were involved in Jamaica. Seaga, it said, "insists the Cubans are supporting Manley's party by training socialist commandos in Jamaica and supplying them with arms." He was quoted as saying, "It is Castro who is the instigator of violence here...Manley is only the puppet of Castro." For his part, the article said, Manley "implied that Seaga is manipulated by the CIA, which he says is desperate to end Jamaica's drift to socialism." Note here now, under the guise of giving Manley's side of the story, he is actually made to admit that Jamaica is drifting to socialism. It is worth remarking as well that Manley's allegation (but not Seaga's), is prefaced by the term "he says", thereby encouraging a seed of doubt in the reader's mind. Seaga's claim therefore commands more credibility, at least in North American eyes, with his background of moderation, his Harvard connection and his advocacy of closer ties with the West.

The article went on to document the bankruptcy of the economy buttressing it with statistics. "Unemployment nationwide is 40 percent...City markets are short of necessities such as oil and soap, and in dangerously short supply of basic foods such as rice, sugar, beans and corn." What it failed to mention here was that although there were shortages, this was exacerbated by hoarding on the part of supermarket operators. Soon after Seaga won, these items reappeared on the shelves.
The election is now history. Seaga vanquished Manley at the polls, taking 51 of the 60 seats in Parliament. His victory represented the widest margin of victory ever gained by a political party in the history of Jamaica. The magazines gloated over his victory, interpreting it as a blow to Cuban adventurism in the Caribbean and a repudiation of Communism in Jamaica. Both magazines came out simultaneously with articles on Seaga's victory on November 10, 1980.

The Newsweek article headlined "Seaga Knocks Out the Left" opened with the oft-repeated theme that the election was the most important one in Jamaica's history and offered a "dramatic choice between Prime Minister Michael Manley's 'democratic socialism' and Edward Seaga's promise to resurrect private enterprise." Here again, was a misleading insinuation that Manley had discouraged private enterprise. Seaga's victory was described as a "stunning repudiation of Manley's eight-year socialist experiment..." and "a major strategic blow to Castro, who had closely advised Manley and was making small but steady inroads into the politically vulnerable Caribbean." A "knowledgeable American observer in Kingston" was quoted as saying, "Jamaica was one of Cuba's best prospects...Now all Fidel really has left is Grenada."

The article went on to state that Seaga's promise was "to give the boot to Cuban Ambassador Ulises Estrada..." and to seek financial aid. The "likely candidates" for Seaga's call for aid the article said, were "the United States, for-
eign banks, multinational corporations and the International Monetary Fund...—ironically, the very same agencies that Manley and others had charged were responsible for under-development in the Third World. The article ended on the gratuitous note that "Seaga's mandate was so sizeable that the prospects for a civil war seemed greatly reduced..." and that if he could stop the shooting then he would have taken "at least one step toward fulfilling his campaign slogan: 'Deliverance is near.'" Accompanying the article were two photos—one with Seaga embracing his mother with a caption which read: "A victory hug from mother: Cubans go home." The other showed three men in the foreground with guns drawn and a figure in the background walking towards a group. The caption read: "Violent vote: Seaga's guards return fire while the candidate (dark suit, rear) heads for cover." Seaga's face was not discernible.

Time's victory article was entitled "Voting Under the Gun", accompanied by a flyer saying "Mayhem and poverty figure in Seaga's big win." This article was also accompanied by two photos. The first showed Seaga being hoisted by jubilant supporters. The second pictured Manley with a stern expression and waving arms addressing a rally. The caption read: "A breeding ground of resentment"—suggesting that Manley, in his demagoguery, was planting seeds of resentment in the people or expliciting resentment that already existed in the "breeding ground."
The article opened with a report of the jubilation of Seaga's supporters who "rang brass bells in celebration." "Swooning youths," it said, "snaked through dances of joy" and "[p]arty workers embraced one another tearfully." As in the Newsweek article, the Time article noted that with Seaga's victory "the island nation had taken a sharp turn in its political course: away from Manley's pro-Cuban 'democratic socialism' toward Seaga's pro-U.S. conservatism." Similarly, the election was characterized as a choice between "Manley's Third World socialism vs Seaga's Western-backed free-enterprise monetarism." Seaga's financial capabilities were emphasized and his victory was attributed in part, to his ability to attract foreign investment. "Since Seaga is a former official of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the outcome (of the elections) also seemed to be a vote of confidence in his ability to attract foreign investment." The article argued that Manley's loss was a result of his sinking the country into an "economic morass." It did, however, show uncharacteristic generosity towards him by noting that he had made "some significant contributions to Jamaica" through the "minimum wage, free education, equal pay for women, newly built health centers and 40,000 units of low income housing." This was the first and only time that any of Manley's achievements were mentioned over the entire period of coverage by either magazine. Previously, as noted earlier, his policy of 'democratic socialism'
as the magazines put it, was seen as ruining the country. Much was said about his ‘ruinously spendthrift policy’, his ‘spending spree’, and his ‘pell mell surge toward socialism’. Nothing was said of his concrete achievements until his defeat.

The magazines wound up their coverage of Manley on the note that with Seaga’s victory, the ugly spectre of Communism had been exorcised from Jamaica and the country could now look forward to peace, prosperity and progress under free-enterprise and the blessings of the new Reagan administration. Overnight, Jamaica had become a ‘blue chip’ investment in the estimation of one magazine, and its ‘bright prospects’ that had been considerably dimmed under Manley’s ‘socialist experiment’ were now beginning to shine again.

The November 24, 1980 Time article pursued these themes. Headlined “No to Chaos” with a flyer that read: “Moving back to moderation”, the article featured Seaga’s views on the Caribbean; U.S. policy; the Reagan Administration and Cuba. The article opened on the note that “[t]he political winds are blowing from left to right in the Caribbean.” Seaga’s victory was, in the magazine’s opinion, “the most dramatic shift” where “voters ousted the eight-year-old government of Prime Minister Michael Manley, a charismatic, pro-Cuban socialist whose inefficient policies had helped bring his once prosperous island to the edge of bankruptcy.” [Recall, however the 1972 Time article which had Manley con-
fronting the "unholy trinity of poverty, unemployment and malnutrition.")

Again, the article underscored Seaga's Harvard education, his American birth and his experience as an international economist. In the magazine's words, "Manley's successor is Edward Seaga, 50, American born, Harvard-educated." He was also "[a]n experienced international economist whose campaign promised closer ties with the U.S." and "had already obtained financing from commercial banks to cover the country's $157 million debt through the end of the year." What the magazines did, in effect, was to begin an international public relations campaign on Seaga's behalf.

The article noted also that tourism had begun to pick up, that shootings had tapered off and that Jamaican professionals "who went into exile during the hard time of Manley's rule" were beginning to return home.

Newsweek's December 15 article was even more explicit in linking Seaga's victory with Jamaica's economic recovery. The article declared that "[i]n the five weeks since Seaga's landslide victory...Jamaica's long-slumping economy has already begun to loom up." It noted that Seaga was busy wooing private investment in the U.S. and that "bankers and businessmen were plainly interested in what he had to say." An "insider" was quoted as saying that Seaga in his negotiations with the IMF was likely to "get such a good deal it would have bailed out even Manley." The article went on to name a number of U.S. investors interested in Jamaica—a-
among them Maidenform Co., Gulf and Western and Tesoro Petroleum Corp. John Lethshaw, executive vice-president of E.F. Hutton and Co. was quoted as saying that "Jamaica is a ground-floor opportunity" and that he was not the only one "bullish on Jamaica." The article pointed out that if its politics was stable "Jamaica looks to many like a blue-chip investment." The advantages to the investor were reeled off, these being "a large underemployed English speaking work force, close access to the United States, an efficient infrastructure...two modern international airports and modern water ports." Continuing, the article said in the long run "Seaga himself may be the island's biggest commercial asset," quoting a "potential investor" as saying that "it has Eddie Seaga. He's a financial man; he's one of us." (emphasis added)

In sum then, the evidence seems to be overwhelming that the newsmagazines were negative, simplistic, biased and sensational in their coverage of Manley. Their reportage and analysis clearly exemplified a cluster of practices and techniques which scholars have shown to be standard devices in the business of propaganda or mass persuasion. Wittingly or unwittingly, intentionally or otherwise, these accounts systematically emphasized some features of the political situation and downplayed others. In what is a textbook application of Rank's intensify/downplay model of persuasion, the newsmagazines repeatedly used language and simplistic
formulas which did more to induce impressions than to inform. Slanted language, emotion-laden words and innuendo abounded. The information published was highly selective, the omissions damning. Violence, poverty, social unrest, economic disarray—these were what readers learned about; but in only one instance were any of Manley’s positive contributions acknowledged, and that concession was made only after his defeat. Statistics quoted to document Manley’s drift towards social anarchy certainly seemed compelling, but their reliability is suspect. There was no recognition of the very great differences between Castro-type communism or communism in general, and Manley’s very moderate brand of democratic socialism which was not at all unsympathetic to Jamaican-owned business and small scale businesses.

Manley could only appear guilty by association with Castro, Cuba and Communism. He was constantly labelled as being charismatic—a benediction that just as easily implied that he was a demagogue. He was consistently pictured exhorting crowds of people thereby confirming in the reader’s mind his power as a rabble-rouser. Edward Seaga never faltered as ‘Mr. Clean.’ He was portrayed as cool, efficient and with his Harvard education, possessing the qualities needed to save Jamaica from Manley’s debacle. One of his most notable characteristics was his conservatism and his pro-western bent—meaning his pro-U.S. proclivities.
Above all, the portraits were simplistic and the descriptions of events bereft of context and history to the point that one may safely conclude that misunderstanding and falsehood were better served than truth.

But even though the newsmagazines exhibited bias in their coverage of Manley, they represented only 13.6% of the coverage. The *New York Times* accounted for the greatest amount of the coverage. The analysis therefore turns to this publication to see what it actually said about Manley.

6.2 **NEW YORK TIMES**

Jamaica did not come in for serious mention in *The Times* until 1974 when Manley decided to increase the taxes paid by the bauxite companies. *The Times'* attitude towards Manley's decision was best summed up in an editorial on May 20, 1974. The editorial explored the ramifications of Manley's move and drew parallels with the quadrupling of oil prices by the OPEC nations. According to the editorial, "(t)he action by Jamaica will be a crucial test of whether the example provided by the oil cartel can be imitated by other commodity exporters." Jamaica was singled out as the "key member" of the newly formed International Bauxite Association (IBA), and that it alone was pressing for "the big hike in the bauxite price." The editorial noted with apprehension that if Jamaica's "price boost" stuck, the IBA could well become a price-fixing cartel on the OPEC model. "The
world may not have time," it said, "to see whether long run market forces will eventually restore equilibrium to the prices set by a growing list or would-be international monopolists..." (emphasis added). The introduction of "indexing" by the commodity producers, it continued, "could become a perpetual motion machine which is bound to disintegrate in a crash." "This appears to be precisely the sort of indexing that the oil and now bauxite producers have in mind." (emphasis added)

What then was a legitimate call by Manley for a fairer price for Jamaica's most important natural resource was seen as an unreasonable demand by The Times and a move to deliberately destroy the international free-pricing system. The rest of 1974 into 1975 dealt with the bauxite issue.

The really damaging press reports on Jamaica began in 1976 when violence broke out in the slums of West Kingston on the eve of the opening of a meeting of IMF and World Bank officials in Kingston. In the appendix to his book Jamaica: Struggle in The Periphery, Manley broke down in chronological order a series of events in 1976 in what he called his 'Destabilization Diary'. This event was one of those mentioned by him. As his diary noted, the violence "provides for a number of sensational articles filed by a large corps of foreign journalists who are in Kingston for the IMF meeting." (1982:22n). The reports he said, resulted in a spate of tourist cancellations.
Leonard Silk, *New York Times* correspondent, filed a story headlined, "Jamaica Worried By Slum Fighting" with a flyer which read: "Outburst in Kingston While IMF Meets Stirs Fears of a Wider Outbreak." This story appeared on January 8. Silk's lead opened on the note that violence had "flared in the slums of Kingston and some Jamaicans fear that if it intensifies it could result in civil war." The reference to the fear of imminent civil war seems exaggerated since Jamaicans themselves could not explain the reason for the sudden outburst of violence, much less speculate about the possibility of civil war.

Silk went on to note, however, that the flare-up seemed "to be related to an effort to embarrass and weaken the Manley government at a time when it is host to a meeting of the International Monetary Fund." The significance of this observation was nevertheless buried as Silk went on to give more background to the story. He argued that one of the issues in the violence involved "communism and capitalism", and that one of the factions—the PNP—was "anti-white and anti-colonialist." Silk supported this with the fact there was a peaceful demonstration outside the hotel protesting the presence of a South African observer at the conference citing placards which read: "Crush U.S. imperialism and Local traitors", and "Out with Pigs." In reality, the issues did not involve "communism and capitalism." It involved the use of scare tactics to place the accusation of communism on the agenda of the international press. Furthermore, although the PNP was staunchly "anti-colonialist" it was not "anti-white." The
demonstration outside the hotel was in fact a protest against apartheid and the invasion of Angola by South Africa—a move supported by the United States.

The most damaging aspect of Silk's story was perhaps a letter he quoted which, he said, appeared in the Daily Gleaner or that morning. The letter was allegedly written by a "Jamaican businessman who is leaving the island." The letter said:

[we live behind bars like birds in cages, can't go out at night or anything. We have been called names which we dare not mention here. Our daughters have been raped in broad daylight. Is this the government that we voted for three years ago? Inflation is rampant and getting worse. Is this the change we wanted?

The letter in fact gave Silk's observations regarding "communism and capitalism" a compelling ring of truth, and unwittingly or unwittingly, Silk's story aided and abetted his own observation that the violence was calculated to embarrass and weaken the government.

In many ways too, this report set the stage for the kinds of reports published in The Times during Manley's term in office. Gradually the government and the PNP came to be stigmatized as the perpetrators of violence in the society; and the issues of violence and communism came to occupy centre-stage. Perhaps most significantly, it signalled the kind of incestuous relationship that the Gleaner had with the international press which perceived the Gleaner as the only independent media voice in Jamaica fighting against the abrogation of rights and freedoms. In effect, Manley was caught in a pincer movement between the international press and the Gleaner. Not only did the Gleaner reprint the ne-
gative articles appearing in the international press but the international press picked up the *Gleaner*'s propaganda and disseminated it to the rest of the world.

The violence continued unabated and two policemen were shot and killed while on duty at the American Embassy in Kingston—another event recorded in Manley's 'Destabilization Diary.' A report filed by AP on January 9, said the policemen were killed in a "wave of anti-American violence" which "swept the Jamaican capital where world finance leaders are attending the International Monetary Fund meetings." Once again, the report was seriously misleading. There was no evidence to indicate that this was a "wave of anti-American violence." The Silk story mentioned earlier along with one filed by Ralph Blumenthal on February 29, noted quite correctly that the violence was confined to the ghetto areas of West Kingston. Silk said, "the violence has largely been confined to the areas known as Jones Town and Trench Town", and in Blumenthal's words, "the violence never did spill over to the tourist resorts or other parts of this Caribbean island."

The efforts to paint a correct picture that the violence was confined to a small area of Kingston seemed to be outweighed by reports in the international press that Jamaica was in flames. A January 8, 1976 entry in Manley's 'Destabilization Diary' noted that:

*[The nature of the reports appearing in the overseas press prompts Deputy Prime Minister David Coore and the National Security Minister to call a press conference primarily for the foreign journalists. They make clear that the violence is restricted to a small area of Kingston and not the entire country as the reports suggest. But the damage is already done. Tourist cancellations continue to pour in. (1982:227)*]
Tourist cancellations were not the only damage done to the Manley government. Reports began to appear in the *New York Times* questioning the ability of the government to effectively curb the violence by focussing on the growing uneasiness in the business community and upon opposition charges that the government was drifting towards Communism. Ironically too, when the government declared the state of emergency to curb the violence, it was suggested that this was being used as a tool to curb the opposition. This will become evident later.

On February 2, violence again erupted in the Western section of Kingston and was again recorded in Manley's *Destabilization Diary*. On February 4, Ralph Blumenthal of *The Times* filed a story headlined, "Three Political Killings Stir New Fears Over Jamaica's Course." Blumenthal observed that "the latest flare-ups have reinforced a growing uneasiness in the business community and other sectors over the course of the four-year-old Government of Prime Minister Michael Manley and its ability to control the island's complex political tensions." This marked the beginning of doubt about Manley's real intentions for Jamaica. In time this doubt became a huge grey cloud hanging over the Manley government. Blumenthal noted that the government was beset on the one hand by the "radical demands of its pro-Communist youth wing" and on the other by the charges of the "conservative Jamaica Labour Party" of "a drift towards Communism." The so-called "pro-Communist youth wing" of the PNP was certainly quite vociferous in pressing the government to move more decisively in carrying out
its social reforms and at times strongly condemned the local oligarchy. To say, however, that they were "pro-Communist" was an overstatement which blurred the complex socialist spectrum in Manley's following.

Blumenthal went on to point out, though, that Manley repeatedly "affirmed his allegiance to a democratic two-party system with a permanent place for private enterprise" and mentioned some of the programs the government had initiated to "narrow the gap between the rich and the poor." Now, it is worth mentioning here that many of the stories filed by the New York Times correspondents were not as blatantly biased as those that appeared in the newsmagazines. But for all that, they often did more to promote ambiguity than a truthful balance. They would, for instance, refer to the unease over the government's course, quote Manley affirming his faith in democracy noting that he was doing something for the poor in the country; and then they would quote Seaga to the effect that the government was indeed going communist. Thus, instead of gaining clarification of the issues the reader was left in a state of doubt and confusion as to what was really going on. Objectivity seemed, therefore, to be employed as a "strategic ritual" (Tuchman, 1971), and in the process, clear, understandable interpretation was submerged. A story filed by Ralph Blumenthal on February 29 gives a perfect example of this.

This story so confounded the author that he resorted to asking two educated Canadians to read it and give their impressions. Each read the story separately and were unaware of the other's
impression. Both concurred that the story was confusing; that overall a doubtful picture was painted of Manley; that they were not sure of Manley's leanings towards Communism; that power and control was slipping from his hand, and that his social reforms were not too successful. The story in question had a nine column headline extending right across the page which read: "Political Violence in Slums of Jamaican Capital Has Subsided but Island Is a 'Time Bomb.'" Later in the story, it was learned that the phrase 'Time Bomb' was reportedly part of a quotation made by Manley to a "foreign diplomat" regarding the high unemployment among the 60 percent of the population under 30 years of age. The headline within the context of the violence in the society suggested less truthfully, however, that the society could explode at any moment.

The article opened on the note that although the violence had subsided it had left behind "widespread concern over violent undercurrents exposed by the disturbances" and that "serious tensions" were "clearly gnawing at the four-year-old Democratic Socialist government of Prime Minister Michael Manley." Blumenthal went on to note that the two questions that occupied Jamaica were: "how democratic it will remain and how socialist it will become." He pointed to Manley's Third World non-alignment policy and his growing ties with Cuba; Manley's "repeated assurances" of his firm commitment to a multi-party political system—factors according to Blumenthal "he says..." rule out Communism for Jamaica." (emphasis added)
After Blumenthal's prefatory "he says" remarks, he returned in the following paragraph to the doubts of the Labor Party "and other critics--including some disquieted Western diplomats...about the Manley Government's willingness or ability to control extreme leftists." (emphasis added). Continuing, Blumenthal said, "[h]ardly a day passes without opposition charges often bannnered in the press [the *Gleaner*?], that Jamaica is stumbling or being led into Communism under the influence of Cuba." He went on to add that the very fact that "Communism is under debate here has unsettled many of the island's businessmen and professionals some of whom had started to send their assets abroad." The truth of the matter is that Communism per se was never a real issue of debate in Jamaica. More correctly, it was an accusation levelled by Manley's political opponents.

Blumenthal then returned to the issue of the political violence and its negative impact on the tourist industry, noting that there was no danger to tourists. "Strolls day after day through downtown Kingston and the slum districts and through the North Coast beach resorts indicated that the island remains safe for tourism..."---an impression already eroded by the headline of the story. From here, Blumenthal switched back to what "critics" pointed out were "contradictory faces of the Manley Government" noting that a bill was under consideration that was largely interpreted as an attempt to muzzle the opposition, and that Manley's call for community defense groups (the home guard) was seen as a call for a "party militia." He again returned to the point
that "Western diplomats" were troubled by the actions of the PNP youth wing "whose name has appeared on some virulently anti-American leaflets and party newspaper articles." Manley was said to have told American officials that "he must tread carefully in containing the leftist elements in his party" but according to Blumenthal "the Americans remain skeptical that the youth group is acting on its own." The suggestion was that the actions by the youth-wing were sanctioned by Manley or that he had only a very tenuous control over them.

Blumenthal touched on the disparity in wealth in the society and Manley's efforts to deal with that through the minimum wage, a literacy campaign, his employment and housing programs. In the same breath, however, Blumenthal added: "[b]ut while the wealthy continue to enjoy their hilltop villas and drive heavily taxed cars...the poor seem to be on a treadmill", implying that Manley was not doing enough. Blumenthal seems to have missed the point that it was some of these same social policies that resulted in the accusations of Communism. He then noted that the economic forecast for the country was cloudy given the fact that there was a surplus of bauxite on the world market, a fall in the price of sugar, a drop in tourism, and a drain on the island's resources as a result of the flight of capital. In the penultimate paragraph a "leading diplomat" of a country whose "visas were in growing demand" was quoted as saying "[e]veryday there's somebody on this sofa wanting out."
Despite an effort to be comprehensive, Blumenthal failed to interpret the issues adequately. Instead, the evidence was used to support the views of unnamed, supposedly authoritative sources. In addition, this story conformed to another aspect of distorted communication. The reader is overwhelmed with the range and complexities of the issues to such an extent, that understanding was extremely difficult if not impossible. Blumenthal seems to be presenting the different angles of the story, but with the aid of his sources has scattered doubt throughout. Manley's "repeated assurances" of a firm commitment to democracy qualified by "he says", were neutralized by the doubts of "Western diplomats", "critics", "the press" and "opposition." Yet, throughout the story Blumenthal maintains the appearance of objectivity and comprehensiveness.

In many cases The Times' analytic pieces conformed to the format adopted by Blumenthal. It is worth remembering Ellul's argument that information is an essential element of propaganda and that it is virtually impossible to distinguish between propaganda and information. (1973:112). Ironically, Ellul also made a distinction between being "more" and "better" informed, but remarked that intellectuals (e.g. the readership that The Times attract), are the ones most susceptible to propaganda, particularly if it employs ambiguity.

The February 29 Blumenthal article was followed by James Reston's article of March 17 which appeared on the editorial page with a headline which read "Castro And The Caribbean." The theme
of the article was Cuba's militant policy in Latin America and the Caribbean and the threat that this posed to U.S. interests. The article opened with the observation that

Fidel Castro's Cuban government according to high officials of the Ford Administration has entered into an agreement to train the police force of Jamaica and is also increasing its political contacts with black revolutionary elements elsewhere in the Caribbean basin.

Manley, referring to this article in his 'Destabilization Diary', noted that this claim was totally false. Even Blumenthal in a March 21 article Headlined "Cuba Is Discussing Aid For Jamaica", was candid enough to point out that in an interview with Kehle Munn, the Minister of National Security, Munn "categorically" denied Reston's charges. Munn, according to Blumenthal, pointed out that all training of Jamaica's police force was done by Jamaicans. Munn was quoted as saying that: "In the last year 163 of his men attended training programs overseas. Of these...129 went to Britain, seven to the United States, 17 to Canada, two to Japan, one to Australia and two to Cuba." It is worth mentioning, however, that the Blumenthal article was not geared to clearing up Reston's charges as evidenced by the headline and a lead which said:

"New contacts between Jamaica and Cuba among other nations on the question of aid for the Jamaican security forces reflect growing concern in Jamaica and elsewhere over the island's inability to cope with any serious internal disturbances."

The request for technical aid has been, and continues to be a part of the multi-lateral agreements that Jamaican governments have with other nations. Britain, Canada and the United States
have traditionally been the countries upon which Jamaica has relied. When Cuba became involved, however, this was regarded as ominous. There was no cause for alarm over the fact that most of Jamaica's military personnel trained at Sandhurst. It is worth mentioning, too, that the Reston article appeared after Manley met with Kissinger who sought neutrality on the Cuban involvement in Angola.

After Reston made his misleading charges, he went on to argue that the U.S. was not as vigilant in protecting its vital interests in its own hemisphere as was the Soviet Union and China in theirs. The Reston article did mark a turning point, at least in *The Times* coverage of Jamaica. Reston lent his influential voice to those of the opposition in Jamaica, the doubts sown by earlier *Times* reports and the misgivings of "high officials" of the U.S. administration. For the first time a direct link between Manley and Castro was posited. This link came to assume greater and greater prominence to the point that it became firmly established on the agenda of *The Times* and translated as a threat to the vital interests of the U.S. In this, the interests of the opposition and local oligarchy, the international press and the U.S. administration all found common ground, as Manley argued in his own subsequent analysis.

On Sunday March 21, a story appeared on the front page of *The Times* reiterating Reston's themes. The article, written by David Binder was headlined "Cuban Influence in Caribbean Aises, Worrying U.S. Officials". Binder opened on the note that in the
assessment of "top-ranking" United States policy makers, Cuba had gained "considerable influence" in the Caribbean, and was enjoying regional support for its "military ventures" in Africa. The article singled out Jamaica and Guyana as the "principal friends in the region of Prime Minister Fidel Castro", noting that both countries "endorsed Cuba's intervention" in Angola. The article said that the Ford Administration had begun to "examine the implication for United States security as a result of the expanding influence in what had been largely a United States sphere." In reference to Manley, the article went on to note that there were 83 Cubans in Jamaica helping in the building of a dam, a school and a factory. "A United States official" was quoted as saying that "[w]ith 20 percent unemployment in Jamaica it makes you wonder why they need Cuban construction crews." "United States officials" were also said to be worried that Jamaica's grave and deteriorating economic situation "may drive Mr. Manley to assume authoritarian powers."

What began to emerge then, was a gradual build-up of Manley as someone to be wary of; someone who could possibly become authoritarian with the passage of time. The same pattern of speculation had occurred in the newsmagazines. The emphasis on Jamaica's economic decline served to give the reader plausible reasons why Manley could go Communist and to suggest that he was not in control of things.

The escalating violence in the society forced the government to call a state of emergency in June of 1976. Pearlle Charles,
the Deputy Leader of the JLP, and two other JLP candidates, along with a PNP candidate were detained by the security forces. Manley noted in his 'Destabilization Diary' that a document was found code-named 'Operation Werewolf' written by Peter Whittingham, one of the detained JLP candidates and an ex-army officer, aimed at overthrowing the government. This entry said:

[one of the documents discovered headed 'St. Ann Area', lists 22 trained men, 100 submachine guns, 12 barrels of gunpowder and 50,000 anti-government pamphlets. The documents are in Whittingham's own handwriting... (1982:234)]

It is worth inserting here some current evidence that has just surfaced confirming that the CIA was indeed involved in Jamaica. The April 1984 issue of Harper's published a chronicle of covert operations by the CIA worldwide between 1963 and 1983. The list was prepared by Tom Gervasi, director of the Center for Military Research and Analysis. According to Gervasi, the CIA organized a military coup to overthrow the Manley government in 1976. Between 1970 and 1979, he said, the Agency supported three attempts to assassinate Manley and between 1979-1980 financial pressure was applied by the Agency to "destabilize the government of Michael Manley." Gervasi also noted that in 1979-80 the CIA organized a campaign of propaganda and demonstrations to defeat the government in the elections. During those years Manley had repeatedly made charges that Jamaica was being destabilized by local and international conspirators but these charges were dismissed. Instead, Seaga's assertions were emphasized giving the impression that Manley was using these charges as a ploy to inti-
mitigate the opposition. A July 16, 1976 story by Ralph Blumenthal bears out these points.

Headlined "Jamaica's Emergency Rule Reduces Political Violence" the article opened on the note that:

[Ste]rning emergency rule by the leftist government here has kept the peace between violent political factions... but disorders still threaten this Caribbean island 90 miles south of Cuba. (emphasis added)

Unlike the newsmagazines who suggested doubt by putting 'democratic socialism' in scare quotes, The Times characterized Manley as 'leftist'. This too was misleading as it failed to qualify in what sense Manley's government was leftist. Russia and Cuba are also leftist governments but, as pointed out earlier, the differences between these and Manley's brand of socialism were significant.

Blumenthal went on to note that the government had charged that Jamaica was being "destabilized" by foreign and domestic conspirators.----using the scare quote formula to imply doubt. Blumenthal neglected to mention that on June 29 the Prime Minister had announced in Parliament the discovery of the 'Operation Werewolf' conspiracy. Even if there was skepticism around the existence of foreign conspirators, there was hard evidence now that there were domestic conspirators. Blumenthal instead referred three times in the story to opposition charges that the government was using "its sweeping police powers to intimidate critics as national elections approach." The overall impression again was that the government was becoming authoritarian and that its charges of destabilization was ungrounded.
On July 17, Blumenthal had another story on the front page of the business section headlined "U.S. Investors Uneasy As Jamaica Moves Left." The article said that a half-dozen executives of leading American Corporations with interests in Jamaica had met with U.S. Embassy officials to discuss the outlook for continued investment. The executives, he said, "received little comfort and left with a grim assessment of the situation." An unnamed "financial officer for a large American Corporation with extensive interests in Jamaica" was quoted as saying that "we don't want to get caught like the boys in Cuba, where they could take out a suitcase and that's it." Blumenthal noted also that the apprehension of businessmen was further heightened by the government's assumption of emergency powers to curb political violence but that "the more conservative opposition has also been cowed." The article ended on a note of uneasy speculation. It said "some Americans are feeling concern for their safety although kidnapping or assassination has not so far been a problem." It is simply not clear that Americans were at any time under any danger, but Blumenthal's statement seemed to enhance his previous assertion that the island was indeed a 'Time Bomb.'

One of the most blatantly misleading reports was also published in 1976. A Reuters report was published on November 3 under a nine column headline, entitled "Jamaican Opposition Leader and Ex-Premier Shot At From Office of Ruling Party but are Uninjured." The article said that Seaga and Hugh Shearer "came under shotgun fire when their campaign motorcade passed a local headquarters of the ruling People's National Party." It went on to note that "sources close to the Ja-
maica Labour Party said Mr. Seaga was thrown into a state of shock by the shooting and was under mild sedation." The article went on to paint a graphic picture of how Seaga and Shearer escaped: "[t]heir supporters surrounded them to give them protection before chasing the gunmen and burning down the (PNP) office." It went on to argue that although partisans of both parties were gunning each other down, both Manley and Seaga were considered safe from assault or assassination. That "assumption", it said, was "shattered by the shot-gun blast fired yesterday at the 46 year old opposition leader". The article speculated on the possibility of civil war and the impact of such an event on the rest of the Caribbean, particularly Cuba. It ended on this note:


[n]o one can predict what Cuba's reaction might be if the Manley Government, one of its few friends in the Caribbean, seems threatened by violent overthrow. Nor what the American reaction would be to a Cuban involvement.

Two days later, another Reuters article came out buried on the bottom of page two and much shorter with the headline, "Jamaicans Deny Report Of Attack On Party Chief." The article said that a government official and a Labour Party spokesman denied that Seaga had come under fire. Edward Cowan, a Times correspondent, in an article on November 29 touching on the government's charge that it was being misrepresented in the American and Canadian press, used the first Reuters report as an example. Cowan, representing the government's position, said: "[a] particularly irritating episode occurred early in November. The Reuters agency reported that Mr. Seaga...had come under gunfire during a political motorcade. A spokesman for Mr. Seaga said later that they had not been fired upon." Continuing, Cowan said:

[t]he initial dispatch appeared in a number of newspapers. The New York Times carried it at length under a headline
that ran across the top of an inside page. Three [sic] days later, Reuters sent a much shorter corrective article. The Times printed it under a one-column headline. An aide to Prime Minister Manley complained the other day that the corrective dispatch had not been given equal prominence.

Interestingly enough, the headline of the Cowan article read: "Choice for Jamaicans: Ties With Third World or Whole World."—as if to imply that Manley was not or might not be interested in maintaining ties with the West. Thus, even though Cowan attempted to clear up one issue, another was introduced that sustained the momentum of doubt. Once again, this was part of a recognizable pattern in The Times' coverage.

The prominence given to the story that Seaga had come under gunfire was very much in keeping with portraying the government and the PNP as instigators of violence in the society. It is true that partisans on both sides committed atrocities against each other, but the JLP's atrocities were downplayed. For example, later in 1976, Ferdie Neita, a PNP candidate was shot and critically wounded, and in 1980 Roy McGann, another PNP candidate was killed. On both occasions the PNP was seen as the aggressor. The December 14 AP dispatch reporting the shooting of Neita waited until the seventh paragraph to name the candidate or his party affiliation. Rather, the article pointed up the fact that the government had imposed "censorship" on political advertisements, adding as well that the two newspapers and radio stations had served notice that they would defy the orders. Seaga was quoted as saying that the order to ban political ads was a political tool "...to stifle comments which I might make which the government suspects will damage their own position." The article gave the impression that the government was not acting fairly; and that it was using
the state of emergency to silence critics on the pretext that it was trying to curb violence in the society. The shooting of the PNP candidate, it seemed, was incidental.

The story reporting the slaying of McGann in 1980 was again filed by AP. The article headlined "Jamaican Candidate Slain In 'Political Confrontation'" had both parties blaming each other for the killing. It said that McGann was killed in an exchange of gunfire between his bodyguard and security forces manning a roadblock with JLP supporters. Manley's side of the story in Jamaica: Struggle In The Periphery was that McGann was driving home supporters when they ran into a mass of JLP supporters who blocked their passage. According to Manley, a police party arrived, drove through the PNP and JLP groups, took up positions and opened fire. McGann, he said, could be heard frantically calling over PNP party radios "I am Roy McGann, the Minister don't shoot" (1982:197-198). The AP report depicting McGann as the aggressor was similar in that respect to the JLP and Gleaner versions of the incident. As Manley noted:

[The JLP and the Gleaner propaganda machine went into action immediately... the little group which McGann had been trying to shepherd home had grown into a hostile PNP force threatening a peaceful merry-making JLP gathering... The JLP and the Gleaner version had McGann shooting at the JLP. So far from regretting the death of a minister (of government), to say nothing of the outrage that the death should have caused, McGann was described as an aggressor. (1982:198)

As stated earlier, there is reason to suspect that the international press followed Gleaner versions of events in Jamaica and this might have helped to skew reports.

As the 1976 elections approached, the government was represented as more leftist and the opposition as more conservative. There was the
impression, too, that the 1976 elections would offer a "fateful" choice between how "socialist" Jamaica would become and how "democratic" it would remain. An article filed by Edward Cowan on December 12 suggested quite strongly that the government would go more socialist. Headlined "Jamaica Votes on How Far Left It Will Go", it had a flier which read "The Prime Minister Has Promised to Press on With Socialism." The article was accompanied by a close-up of Manley looking stern and determined. There were two other pictures—one of a supporter wearing a hat covered with buttons of PNP candidates, the other of a group marching with two banners which said, "JAMAICA FORWARD. CUBA FOREVER." The article focussed on the upcoming elections and the unease that permeated Jamaica as it prepared for it. It alluded to the state of emergency as the 'measure of unease' in the country and had Seaga asserting that the emergency had "netted more of his supporters than the government's" — an assertion, according to Cowan, which "neutral journalists believe is probably true." Actually, these so-called 'neutral journalists' overlooked the fact that the state of emergency was called on evidence that there were plans to destabilize the society, and that the opposition was directly implicated. The article touched on Manley's relations with Cuba pointing out that the presence of Cuban construction workers had "added to fears and charges that Mr. Manley would lead Jamaica to a form of Castroism." The article with its headline, pictures and general content did nothing to clear up these doubts. Rather, it confirmed these "fears and charges."

By far the most balanced article on Jamaica in 1976 was one entitled "Many Problems Affect Jamaican Economy" which appeared on Decem-
It dealt with the problems of the Jamaican economy, putting them within the context of the world-wide recession and what the government was doing to combat them. Jamaica, it said, like "many underdeveloped lands" was "heavily dependent on resources which were subject to fluctuations in prices on the world market." It noted also that the recession had caused bauxite shipments to tumble, the price of sugar to fall on the world market, and a tapering off of tourism. Pointing out that the government was as serious about managing the economy as it was about improving the "social and economic conditions of the disadvantaged", the article said that in order to protect the jobs of workers, the government had "pumped money into hotels, taking partial or full ownership to keep them open." It noted also that the government had promised to come out with a national development plan, adding that although Seaga accused the government of mismanagement, in the ten years from 1962 "that the Laborites governed with Mr. Seaga as Finance Minister they produced only a single economic blue-print, the five year plan of 1963."

The 1976 elections took place with the PNP gaining a larger mandate than in 1972. The Times came out with an editorial to the effect that the Jamaican people had made a "clear-cut choice" and perhaps it would be in U.S. interests to support Manley. It also noted that Jamaica could help in stabilizing the Caribbean region. By then, of course, the Carter administration had taken office and had a new policy of rapprochement in the Caribbean and Latin America. The editorial said:

Jamaica's fourth general election since Independence offered the voters a clear-cut choice and they delivered a clear-cut verdict: a landslide for Prime Minister Michael Manley's People's National Party (PNP).
The editorial without failing to note that "[i]t was unfortunate that the election was held under a state of emergency" nevertheless admitted that "the dimensions of the FNP victory left no doubt that most Jamaicans want Mr. Manley to continue to lead the country toward his own brand of democratic socialism."

The editorial, perhaps with a touch of suspicion, went on to note that "a large majority of Mr. Manley's own people believe his assertion that Communism 'is just not part of the stream of our history' and rejected the opposition's allegation that his developing ties with Cuba threatened to move the country toward Communism." The editorial touched on Manley's accusation of CIA attempts to 'destabilize' Jamaica, indicating its own doubt about Manley's charges by the use of scare quotes, but noted that Manley's intention to seek improved relations with the U.S. "ought to elicit a positive response from the Carter administration." It ended on the note that "[a] stable Jamaica making steady progress on its social and economic problems would be an influence for stability in a restless Caribbean" and that "[i]t is clearly in the best interests of the United States to assist in this process." Jamaica's links to Cuba, it said "over the long run...might prove to be an asset for peace in the region rather than a liability."

This editorial marked another shift in the coverage by The Times. For most of 1977 the spirit of rapprochement that the Carter Administration adopted was reflected in The Times to its credit. An article by Graham Hovey on December 7 headlined "U.S. Policy Gives New Emphasis To Caribbean, Especially Jamaica" dealt with this theme. It pointed out that Manley's democratic socialism, his cordial relations
with Castro and his non-alignment on issues between the Soviet Union and the West "had been considered problematic by the Nixon and Ford Administrations." It said, however, that from the outset "the Carter administration sent signals that it was not worried about Mr. Manley's socialist views or his friendship with Cuba." It also noted that Washington regarded Manley "not merely as a leader in the Caribbean but as an articulate spokesman for all underdeveloped nations." It then went into details about a U.S. supported IMF aid package for Jamaica to help it ease its balance of payment problems.

It is important to realize that with The Times' sanction of the Manley government, no doubt encouraged by the Carter Administration, the IMF was also willing to make concessions. Later, the disenchantedment of the Carter Administration was reflected in negative reports and a tightening up of IMF conditions, which forced Manley to call the elections. With the U.S. being the linchpin in the Western economic system, it is not at all unlikely that other powerful institutions in the system took their cues from the U.S. After all, the IMF provides a 'seal of approval' for international bankers to lend money. And as Schiller (1976:3) has argued, the information apparatus works in tandem with the economic system to maintain hegemony. For the time being however, The Times' coverage shifted from Jamaica's links to Cuba, violence and economic decline, and focused on what Manley was doing to redress the imbalances in Jamaican society. A July 26 feature for example concentrated on a person by the name of Dorothy Dobson who for the first time in her life was earning $21.20 through the employment program instituted by the government. The article listed a number of
social programs that Manley had begun to benefit poor people like Dobson; and quoted her as saying, "I hope and pray that everything he [Manley] does will turn out right. He is the first Prime Minister to help the poorer classes. He is going down to the grass-roots level and helping the small people."

The article was remarkable in that for the first time in the coverage of The Times, someone was interviewed who came from outside the socio-political establishment. The article also did not hide the fact that the economy was in trouble but it sought to provide reasons and place them in context. It noted, for instance, that drought had hurt farming and that although doctors had emigrated not many were upset because "in the first place they never treated the masses of Jamaicans."

The most significant story for 1978 was a guest column by Manley in which he carefully explained Jamaica's position vis-à-vis the United States within the context of the Cold War and Third World solidarity. Manley defended both Jamaica's rights to diversify its relationship and the necessity for restructuring the world economy. On the issue of the conduct of multi-national corporations, he said that Jamaica's and the Third World's response to U.S. administrations was dependent on whether the U.S. could make "imaginative accommodations" to the aspirations of the Third World, or whether it would spring automatically to the defense of American corporations "regardless of particular circumstance." Above all, he argued for Jamaica's right to pursue its own economic, social and political development including the democratic socialist path that had been chosen. He also affirmed
Jamaica's right to "be friends with other peoples and other nations, insisting that they too respect our independence and sovereignty, and refusing ever to moderate the extent of our friendship for any one people or nation as the price of the friendship of any other people or nation." Little else was reported on Jamaica for 1978, but to The Times' merit it had for a time supplied some balance in its coverage and use of sources.

The Times' 1979 coverage opened on the note of the JLP-led demonstrations over the increase in the price of gas which resulted in six people being killed. Nothing significant was said of Jamaica until September 30 when a story appeared, written by correspondent Ann Crittenden. Headlined "Jamaican Economy Is Speeding Exodus", the story dealt with the emigration of professionals. According to Crittenden, the exodus was compared by some "with the flight of the middle class from Cuba after the revolution." She said that the middle class had turned against the government because of its emphasis on building a "socialist" society, pointing out that their departure was threatening the country's development. Like other correspondents before her who used the Gleaner as a source, Crittenden referred to a cartoon in the Gleaner which showed Manley "telling the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, then visiting Kingston, that Jamaican emigrants could leave by plane rather than by boat."

Another Crittenden article, published on October 1 and headlined "Economy Shaky Jamaican Chief Has Tough Balancing Act", outlined the grim economic situation and the difficulties faced by Manley in overcoming these problems. Crittenden noted that Manley had set off a new
round of speculation by his Havana speech at the Third World Conference. This, she said, "rang alarm bells in Washington" within the context of the leftward shift in the Caribbean and the alleged presence of Soviet combat brigades in Cuba. The speech, according to Crittenden, also inspired the opposition and Jamaican businessmen to warn that the government was moving the country inexorably into the communist camp.

This article signalled yet another shift in *The Times* coverage. The themes of Communism, economic decline, political instability and violence that had lain relatively dormant from 1976 were gradually resurrected. This would become even more apparent in 1980. Crittenden's story also revived the same doubts conjured up in 1976. In the first part of her story she portrayed Manley as a complex, enigmatic, contradictory man, presiding over a society beset with equally complex problems, and having to do a balancing act to please the radical and conservative elements in the society. In the second part of her story, she gave the impression that under these pressures, Manley was giving in to the radicals.

Focussing on Manley, Crittenden described him as "tall, lean, strikingly handsome" and "one of the most charismatic leaders in the developing world rivalled only by his close friend Fidel Castro." According to Crittenden, Manley was "a bundle of tantalizing contradictions walking a tightrope between his socialist ideals and the conservatism of much of his people, between his radical followers and the capitalists whose loans and investments Jamaica desperately needs." "A research scientist at the University of the West Indies" was quoted as
saying, that "[t]he man is an enigma—he fits no psychological category"; and "a senior Western diplomat" said, "[e]veryone is asking what kind or man né is, what engines him. All we want is a bottom line."

Crittenden gave the impression that Manley in order to maintain control had to make concessions to the "left." According to her,

"[i]n what analysts here say is an effort to hang on to followers of the left who are taking the brunt of the economic crisis, Mr. Manley recently appointed D.K. Duncan as Party Secretary. His constituency lies among the radical youth and he is expected to mobilize the local party membership into militant cadres in preparation for the elections."

(emphasis added). She also noted that the government had "bolstered the Home Guards a community based militia whose members now equal those of the police and National Defense Force." Now, the home guard, as said before, was a citizens' organization to assist in protecting neighborhoods. It is simply false to portray it as a quasi-military body (i.e. militia) with the lingering impression that it could be commanded by Manley if he chose to move towards Communism. Crittenden also touched on the presence of Cuban construction workers in Jamaica who were "ostensibly building schools and manning hospitals and other public institutions." (emphasis added). Against the background of Manley's contradictory character and the fact that Duncan was supposedly mobilizing 'militant cadres', and Cuban workers of dubious intent, the message began to emerge that Manley was inching forward to totalitarianism.

A December 2, 1979 article by Jo Thomas, The Times' bureau chief in Miami, reinforced this perception of Manley. The article headlined "The Cloud of Censorship Is Darkening The Caribbean" dealt with the increasing pressure on journalists and newspapers from governments in
the Caribbean. Jamaica was included among the countries mentioned. According to the article, "[i]ndependent newspapers in English-speaking Jamaica and Guyana are publishing under great duress." It said that relations with the 145 year old Daily Gleaner, "a critic of Mr. Manley's friendly relations with Cuba", had deteriorated. The government, it said, had accused the Gleaner of "lying, partisan reporting" and the Gleaner, which the article duly pointed out, operated the only publications in Jamaica not financed by the government, accused the government of trying to intimidate it. The article said that the Freedom Commission had advised the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) that the paper's position was "extremely delicate." Although the headline of Thomas' story suggested that censorship was being imposed on the Gleaner, she never adduced any evidence to back that up. She only stated that the Prime Minister had joined a group of protestors outside of the Gleaner to protest the Gleaner's demand that Ulises Estrada, the Cuban Ambassador, be declared persona non grata.

It is quite true that there was no love lost between the Gleaner and the government, but in that relationship the Gleaner had the government on the defensive with the theme of Communism. Furthermore, Oliver Clarke, a wealthy land-owner and leading businessman in Jamaica, was the Managing Director of the Gleaner and was a member of the executive of IAPA. The editor of the Gleaner, Hector Wynter, was a former chairman of and candidate for the JLP. Under the previous JLP Government he had served as a Cabinet Minister and a Diplomat. Manley in his 'Destabilization Diary' notes also that it is "public knowledge since 1963" that IAPA has connections with the CIA. According to him "[t]he Board of IAPA includes four executives from the notorious Chilean newspaper El Mercurio --- Augustin Edwards, Hernan Cubillos, Rene Silva Espejo and Fernando Leniz. Cubillos has since served as Foreign Minister of the Chilean Junta." (1982:226, 231)
any attempt to impose censorship on the *Gleaner* would have been a suicidal move on the part of the government, since that would have played into the hysteria being created by the opposition around the issue of Communism. The purpose of the article seemed to be to present the *Gleaner* as the defender of democracy and to muster sympathy and support for it at the international level. In any case, as noted earlier, there is enough evidence to suggest that the *Gleaner* and the international press seemed to have developed an incestuous relationship.

By 1980, all the themes emphasized in 1976 were resurrected: Manley's link with Castro; doubts as to his intentions and his capacity to effectively govern the country; the economic decline; violence which broke out again; and the PNP as instigators of violence and terrorism in the society. Perhaps the only difference was the degree: the headlines appearing in *The Times* were more sensational; the details of murder and mayhem more graphic. Easily the most balanced and insightful article on Manley in 1980 was a piece by Andrew Young which appeared on January 16. Sadly, it was the last attempt by *The Times* to portray Manley sympathetically.

The Young article headlined "In Jamaica They Say 'No Problem!'" dealt with Jamaica's international role and its grave economic problems, exacerbated by an alienated middle-class. Young opened on the note that "Jamaica is the keystone of the Caribbean, a leader of the Third World, a powerful voice in the British Commonwealth and...the Non-aligned tactician in the United Nations Security Council." He noted that the Jamaican government maintained its honor and credibility
everywhere in the world except "at home in the middle class...and in the United States, its powerful neighbor." Touching on Jamaica's failure to measure up to the IMF's "rigid prescription required for continued assistance", Young noted that international inflation and oil prices had to be taken into consideration. "The country's oil import bill has grown from $44 million in 1972 to $880 million at present...and this has exacerbated all political and social problems."

Turning to Manley's development strategy, Young said, "Mr Manley insists that neither a Marxist Cuban nor a capitalist Puerto Rican model of development is adequate to Jamaica's needs and he is determined to forge an authentically Jamaican pattern of development." Young noted, however, that this "rugged determination" was often misinterpreted in the United States and "Washington's relations with Kingston have been strained by different perceptions of world changes." According to Young, this was especially true "during the Kissinger years when Jamaica opposed South Africa's invasion of Angola as an extension of racism and colonialism in Africa." Young pointed out that the Carter administration had won respect for its policies in the Caribbean, but with renewed Soviet world-wide aggression, and the issue of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, the Administration viewed the Caribbean "through a cold-war prism placing more emphasis on Cuba than on the broad problem of poverty that besets the entire Caribbean." Young went on to argue that "if the IMF demands the layoff of thousands of workers, the resulting tension could not honestly be blamed on Cubans though they no doubt would benefit from the chaos." He ended on the note that Manley was making succesful efforts to increase trade and tourism and refer-
red to the new found dignity and easy ambience in Jamaica which enabled Jamaicans under any crisis to say 'No problem.'

A March 5 analytic piece on Jamaica by Frances Fitz-Gerald entitled "Political Winds in Jamaica" was in stark opposition to the article by Young. The emphasis of the article was upon the social and economic chaos and the real possibility of the government crumbling, or worse still, unleashing terror on the society in order to maintain power. It noted that Manley's call for elections had "done a great deal to allay a growing sense of panic—a growing fear that the economic decline would lead to a coup, and a right or left wing dictatorship." Fitz-Gerald raised doubts about the freeness and fairness of the elections pointing out that Edward Seaga had "issue[d] dire warnings that the Government will unleash terrorism to stop them [JLP] from winning", and adding that "their [Seaga/JLP] suspicions are not wholly unreasonable." Fitz-Gerald went on to assert that

"[E]ven according to Mr. Manley's ideological supporters, [a phrase that has the familiar ring of the newsmagazines], corruption and...acts of political revenge are worse than ever, and the Government has at least on occasion turned its police, military and intelligence services to political ends.

Fitz-Gerald never substantiated any of these grave charges. The story was a striking example of many of the propaganda techniques discussed earlier. There were unnamed sources, speculation, the use of highly charged, emotion-packed words and outright falsehood.

The government's decision to cut off negotiations with the IMF made it a pariah in the international money-market. A May 5 article by Ann Crittenden headlined "New Funds Still Elude Jamaica" reported that: "[t]he debt-plagued Jamaican government...unable to se-
cure new loans to avoid the prospect of default on its foreign debt. She noted that banks had refused to extend any more money and were 'waiting to see...whether the democratic socialist government of Prime Minister Michael Manley will be ousted by the more conservative Jamaica Labour Party.' By then, the message was that the days of the Manley government were numbered.

Accompanying Manley's call for elections was the familiar pattern of internecine violence in the society. At a fund-raising dance held by the JLP in Manley's constituency five people were killed, cut down by a machine-gun. Whoever committed the act compounded the impression that the PNP and the Government were indeed unleashing violence and terrorism on the society. The event got front page prominence in _The Times_ in a story filed by Jo Thomas headlined "Jamaica, Swept by New Unrest, Hopes to Manage Until Elections." 7

As noted earlier, both sides committed horrors against each other, but the PNP casualties were generally minimized while those of the JLP were played up. As Manley (1982:196) noted,

> the major JLP tragedy at the time, the shooting at Gold Street, was built up day after day by the _Gleaner_... As killing after killing took place affecting PNP supporters on a scale unheard of in our previous political history, the news stories always managed to bury the political affiliation of the dead and their identity in the fine print.

Jo Thomas, the correspondent who filed the aforementioned story, was responsible for a number of other stories painting a grim economic and political picture and usually accompanied by sensational headlines. Her articles both recorded and played upon the fears, sorrows

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7 The incident was dubbed the 'Gold Street Massacre' by the _Gleaner_ and the opposition.
and suspicions of the public. On May 14, Thomas filed another story headlined "As Jamaicans Rich or Poor Discuss Politics The Topic Is Money and the Mood Fearful." The article was accompanied by a picture of Seaga at a funeral comforting the weeping family of a victim in the 'Gold Street Massacre.' The article looked at Jamaica through the eyes of Jamaicans from different social strata. All, with the exception of a "high ranking official of the Manley administration", expressed negative views. The mother of a fisherman shot and killed at Gold Street was quoted as saying, "I have nine children—had nine... he was the seventh. He paid for his sister Elaine to take a commercial course, $300 a term. Now he's gone there's no way to do it." "The scion of an old Jamaican business family" referred to the government bureaucracy as "a disaster, a millstone around our necks." "A banker" was worried that "[i]f Manley is re-elected Manley will have a Communist model", and a "British couple", living in retirement on the North Coast, was said to have blurted out involuntarily in conversation, "[o]ur Prime Minister has gone mad. Absolutely mad."

With the picture of Seaga comforting the distraught family, the sympathy evoked for the mother who lost her son and the other quotes--all these added up to a picture that the government, in addition to being violent, was beyond salvage. Seaga's 'Mr. Clean' image gained lustre.

On May 18, another article by Jo Thomas appeared on the front page of the business section of The Times. Headlined "Jamaica a Tropical Paradise On the Edge of the Inferno" the article again focussed on political and economic chaos. The article was accompanied by a
close-up picture magnifying a stern looking Manley. It is worth mentioning as well, the quick succession in which these articles began to appear. Neither the North American reader nor Jamaica was given much respite. Regarding the up-coming elections, Thomas said,

[The choice will be between Mr. Manley's leftist People's National Party and the opposition Jamaica Labour Party of Edward P.G. Seaga which favors free enterprise and contends that Mr. Manley has ruined the country.]

Again the false impression was left to linger that Manley did not favor free enterprise. Again the Communist connection was invoked.

"Anti-Government graffiti abounds demanding 'K.G.B. Out' and 'D.G.I. Out." Thomas chose not to mention the other graffiti connecting Seaga to the C.I.A. A particularly droll one spelled out 'C.I.A.G.A.'

A little surprisingly, the same Jo Thomas came out with an article on June 3 that was very much at odds with the general impression that Jamaica was on the "Edge of the Inferno." The article headlined "Jamaica's Northern Shore Is A World Away From Politics" dealt with the idyllic setting of the North Coast far removed from the violence in Kingston. Noting that the political unrest did not impinge on the tourist, Thomas wrote

[It is not easy to feel unwelcome in Jamaica, even in Kingston... Jamaicans have managed to retain a sense of humor, a tolerance and a generosity that means that even in the poorest dwelling a visitor will be offered the only chair. (emphasis added)]

Positive and favorable images like these, however, were few and far between. In June of 1980, the security forces nipped in the bud what they discovered was an attempt to overthrow the government. The individual responsible had decidedly right-wing views and had been campaigning earlier for the formation of a new political party led by
him. The Times gave scant attention to this incident. The wire services in their reports of the incident dubbed it the 'alleged plot.' Manley had informed the nation that the security forces had informed him of an "alleged conspiracy" and so the wire services went on to use that phrase in a way that betrayed their own skepticism. Instead, attention was paid to Seaga's assertion that the conspiracy charge was an attempt by Manley to create a national emergency and discredit his opponents.

The next story that gained front page prominence in The Times was again written by Jo Thomas. It appeared on July 5 with the headline "Gunmen In Jamaica Hit Home of U.S. Aide"—with a ticker stating "Embassy Official Had Been Named by Critic as an Agent of CIA." According to the article the home of N. Richard Kinsman was fired upon after he and 14 other embassy personnel were identified as C.I.A. agents. The disclosure it said, was made by Louis Wolfe, co-editor of a publication in Washington called Covert Action Information Bulletin. Wolfe, the article said, identified Kinsman as the chief of station in Jamaica, and "accused the CIA of trying to undermine the socialist government of Jamaica." Wolfe also said that the Kingston CIA station was the largest in Latin America.

Subsequent reports did not clear up Kinsman's identity or role in Jamaica. A small article appearing immediately after the July 5 story, said, that the State Department had identified Kinsman as a "political officer" in the Embassy at Kingston, and a July 6 story by Thomas, said that Kinsman was a "diplomat." Kinsman's complicity in covert operations in Jamaica, gained credence however, when the July 6 article
noted that he did not report the matter to the police. Interestingly enough, the July 6 story entitled "Jamaicans Weathering Economic and Social Storm" made concessions that the banks still had foreign exchange; that shortages of goods had abated; that businesses and factories were still operating; and that registration of voters was taking place for the elections.

The real import of the article however, was to raise doubts about the growing evidence of CIA involvement in Jamaica. In doing so, it made a concession that there had been a modicum of improvement. How it went about creating doubt about CIA involvement was somewhat involuted. It said that there had been unsupported allegations that Cuba and America were interfering in Jamaica's affairs. It nevertheless said that the name of the Cuban Ambassador, Ulises Estrada, had been "spray-painted on walls all over Kingston with accusations that include 'Killer!'" It also said that there were references on the walls to the Cuban intelligence service, some of whose members had been identified by Seaga. So in appearing to let the CIA off the hook, it raised doubt as to whether the Americans and Cubans were indeed involved, but left the reader with the flimsiest of evidence that the Cubans were indeed involved by noting that Seaga had named some Cuban agents. Unlike Wolfe, however, who actually named names, the article did not name any Cuban agents. The only Cuban whose name was mentioned was Estrada, the Ambassador. The article failed to mention that the graffiti targeted at the Cuban Ambassador were just as likely part of the opposition's strategy of harassment designed to pressure Manley on his relations with Cuba.
On July 12, Thomas returned to the theme of violence in the society with an article headlined "Jamaican Campaign Going On Amid Rising Violence." The article was accompanied by a picture of Manley lecturing at a podium. The lead paragraph painted a depressing picture of horror:

"The daily count of dead and wounded in the violence in the Kingston slums has become a statistic as commonplace as the weather report. Recently a youth was stabbed to death and set afire by killers who fought off horrified passers-by; a child was shot in school; and a police station was attacked with guns and bottles."

The article stated that the origins of the violence was not clear but went on to add that Seaga (once again) was accusing the government of stirring up the violence in order to declare a state of emergency to curtail the opposition's campaign. The article then recorded the charges and counter-charges by both the PNP and JLP that Cuba and America was involved in Jamaica. Seaga was quoted as saying that "[there is growing fear of a military solution], and that he was apprehensive of the government calling upon Cuba or Cuban-trained Jamaicans for help. Manley was quoted less believably, as saying, that it was easy to portray that the country was in flames but that it was not in flames. The article refuted this observation however by noting that at the time of the interview Manley was not aware that "the home of a United States official was machine-gunned", referring to the Kinsman episode.

Once again this article, as in others, gave Seaga's views more prominence and credibility than Manley's views. One strategy was to quote Manley and then to nullify in large measure what he said by quoting Seaga or making observations that suggested that Manley was
out of touch with the situation in Jamaica. Where Manley's claims were not directly impugned, evidence was marshalled to give Seaga's perceptions more credibility. For instance, the graphic picture of violence painted in the lead paragraph, and the shooting up of Kinsman's home encouraged the impression that the island was in flames when Manley said it was not. An example showing that evidence was marshalled to support Seaga was clearly seen in this article. The article said that before coming to Kingston, the Cuban Ambassador, Ulises Estrada, had a military career in Africa and that he had a "High level Communist Party assignment in Havana in the department that among other duties, has close contact with guerrilla movements in Latin America". Seaga was then quoted as saying that Cuba was sending agents to Jamaica disguised as teachers and doctors. Referring to the attempted coup in June, Seaga was again quoted as dismissing it as a "comic opera coup."

Yet when Manley was quoted he came off looking weak and uncertain. The article noted for instance, that when Manley was asked about the Wolfe allegation of CIA activities in Jamaica he said

I am not going to make any charges against anybody if I can't prove them, and I can't prove anything against anybody. But anybody who has lived through Jamaica in the last year knows that there is a calculated and deliberate destabilization program at work. And I am not saying that the CIA is involved in destabilization.

The reader is left with the impression then that Manley himself is confused; that CIA involvement is indeed doubtful; and that Kinsman was wrongfully accused. Seaga's views however, are consistent with what seems to be plausible evidence that the Cubans were involved in espionage activities in Jamaica. His views were also consistent with his charges that the government had intentions of silencing the opposition.
On October 26, four days away from the elections, Thomas came out with an extensive piece on Jamaica. The article attempted to sum up all the issues at stake in the up-coming elections, but resulted more in confusion than clarity. The article was accompanied by two pictures—one of Manley looming large with fingers pointing, addressing a political rally. The other was a reprint of the photo taken of Seaga at the funeral of a victim in the 'Gold Street Massacre.' The picture showed him hugging a weeping woman. The caption read: "Opposition Leader Edward Seaga comforts a relative of a murdered party worker." Manley seemed strong and aggressive, while Seaga appeared to be warm and humane.

Headlined "Political Storm Over Jamaica", the article compared and contrasted Manley and Seaga. The article said of Seaga that "wherever he campaigns he draws the young and unemployed who call 'Another Moses. Lord give us another Moses to lead us out of the land of bondage that Mr. Manley and his people have put us under." Seaga was said to be a "thoughtful man whose introspection is often mistaken even by his friends as coldness." It noted, however, that his lack of warmth did not dampen the ardor of his admirers who "[w]hen they can...hug him, or dance about him or pick him up and pass him above the crowd." A number of Seaga's contributions to Jamaica were documented, among them the transformation of a slum area in his constituency into a "planned model community." This was said to be "an accomplishment his admirers like to cite contrasting it with Manley's constituency which has remained a festering sore, filled with garbage and the rusting hulk of cars used as barricades against marauding gun-men."
In contrast to Seaga, Manley was described as a "warm, handsome, charismatic and spell-binding speaker." It noted that "where Edward Seaga sees details, Michael Manley sees visions." The reader, in effect, was being told that Manley was only a visionary and a spell-binder, while Seaga was a practical man able to accomplish things. Manley's attempts to restructure the society were noted but his successes were qualified. In one place Thomas noted that:

In 1972 the People's National Party Government which came in with an enormous reservoir of goodwill and a great sense of urgency began trying to remake life in Jamaica. For the first time, students could have free education at all levels, and laws were established providing for a national minimum wage, equal pay for women...maternity leave...

Elsewhere in the article, she remarked that:

Jamaica today is poorer than when he (Manley) took office with a society disintegrating in many painful ways, and an island that once epitomized Caribbean tranquility to many outsiders is being torn apart by discord and despair.

Thus, within the same article, Manley's achievements were diluted.

Thomas touched on the fear of Communism, Manley's relations with Castro and the resultant flight of the middle class. "A bank president", who asked to remain anonymous, was quoted as saying that:

If the next eight years are the same as the past eight years, I see a swing to the left...I see no choice but going the communist route... I believe in democracy and capitalism. I'm one of those people who might have to go.

The issue of foreign interference was dealt with, giving the usual competing charges by Seaga and Manley of Cuban and CIA involvement respectively. The article ended on the note that:

it is clear that the United States feels more comfortable with the Labor Party whose leaders are effusive in their warmth to Americans and fear the Cubans and that the Cubans feel more comfortable with the People's National Party whose leaders are fond of the Cubans and chilly and suspicious of the Americans.
The overall impression of the article was that Manley's achievements did not amount to much; that the society was disintegrating and that Seaga had the pragmatic capability of transforming blueprints into concrete attainments. Manley, on the other hand, was seen as a visionary incapable of helping even his own constituents languishing in poverty.

Seaga's election victory received front-page prominence in the October 31 publication of The Times. The story filed by Jo Thomas was headlined "Opposition wins Jamaica Voting, Easily Defeating Manley's Party." Seaga was quoted as saying that the restoration of the economy would be his first priority and predicted that within three years, the country could be restored to "a reasonable level of buoyancy."

Over the next few weeks, subsequent articles focussed on the shift that could be expected in Jamaica's foreign policy, the return of business confidence and economic growth. The tenor of these reports was upbeat and optimistic. A November 1 article headlined "Victory in Jamaica Exceeds Forecast--Labor Party Appears to Win 51 or 60 Seats in Parliament--Vast Policy Changes Expected", dealt with these themes. It was accompanied by a picture of a tired Manley, looking dejected. The article noted that the magnitude of the victory had stunned the PNP and that the JLP victory was expected to bring "significant changes in the conduct of the economy and foreign policy." It went on to note that the election "removed from power one of President Fidel Castro's closest friends in this hemisphere, and relations between Jamaica and Cuba are now expected to cool at best." Business leaders in Jamaica, it said, "rejoiced over what they saw as a bright future."
Manley was quoted as saying, "What we did...was challenge the power of the Western economic structure. This is one country that tried to challenge hegemony and was not successful." Seaga was quoted as saying that his Government would pursue a "balanced foreign policy" and that "we are not one of the non-aligned countries tied to the coat-tails of any super-power."

Seaga was featured in another article on the same day (Nov. 1), entitled "For Jamaica, A Deft, Fiery Politician—Edward Philip George Seaga." He was described as a "thoughtful, quiet man difficult to picture as a politician until one realizes that he never forgets a name or until one sees him lifted onto the shoulders of exuberant admirers." Continuing, it described him as "a deft strategist who was as tireless in his successful electoral campaign as he was relentless as leader of the opposition." It listed a number of his credentials, among them, governor of the World Bank and board member of the International Monetary Fund and Inter-American Development Bank. The impression was that he was eminently qualified to assume the leadership of Jamaica.

Perhaps the most important commentary on Seaga's victory was a November 5 editorial entitled "Deliverance in Jamaica." The editorial noted that although Seaga's electoral campaign of "Deliverance" might have promised too much, his victory was "nonetheless a deliverance of sorts." It went on to argue that

[a] left-wing regime in a key third-world country had been buried by an electoral landslide—and without any heavy breathing from Washington, much less "destabilizing tricks" like those that once helped topple an elected government in Chile.
The editorial credited "Jamaicans alone" with Manley's defeat and dismissed his charges of destabilization arguing that the true villains were more impersonal. "This fiery populist", it said, "ascribes his defeat to the machinations of private bankers and the International Monetary Fund. But the true villains were more impersonal." It went on to argue that Jamaica had relied too heavily on "huge injections of capital, cheap energy and rising exports and tourism." It noted that oil prices had increased, world trade had dwindled and because of the violence, tourists had "stayed away in droves." Manley was also said to have "played his part." "He imposed heavy surtaxes on baux- ite...feuded with businessmen and boosted Cuba, without tangibly improving his political appeal."

The truth of the matter is that Manley never did feud with businessmen. He was at pains to encourage them to invest in the country providing them with tax incentives and easily available credit. It would have been more correct to say that businessmen feuded with him but at this stage of press coverage that would have been too much to expect.

The same editorial described Seaga as a "Harvard-trained free- marketeer and no friend of Fidel Castro" who "skilfully capitalized on these discontents." Touching on the problem of violence in the society, it ended on the note that "Seaga's skills as healer and peacekeeper will be needed as his financial and economic talents". It said "[I]f Jamaica can find itself out of the killing-ground deliverance would then in fact be near."
The coverage for 1980 tapered off on the note that there was re-
named confidence, that bankers had begun to extend lines of credit and
that negotiations had re-opened with the IMF for a $500 million loan.
Though not as blatant as the newsmagazines, the evidence does indicate
that The Times was equally biased against Manley and that it frequent-
ly used emotion-laden, misleading and even sensationalistic language.
Though attempting to be, or appearing to be objective—it is not al-
ways easy to tell the difference—the coverage generated an overall
negative image of Manley and a good many doubts about his competence
and good faith. Against the background of Jamaica's colonial history
and Manley's reconstructionist philosophy, it is hard to resist the
conclusion that the career of this coverage was unfair, influential,
and harmful. Too often, the analytic pieces failed to provide an in-
depth treatment of the issues involved in such a way as to respect the
particular needs of Jamaica and its position in world affairs—a
failing diagnosed by Bray and others as being a common one in interna-
tional press coverage.

There were some reports that were good examples of 'development
journalism' when events in Jamaica were placed within the larger con-
text of events in the world, and when efforts were made to use sources
with opinions different from the prevailing views of the local oli-
garchy. But these efforts pale in comparison to the barrage of nega-
tive reports.

As the 1980 elections came closer and closer, the suitability of
Manley and his party was downplayed in the proportion that Seaga was
made to seem more and more credible. The overwhelming impression too,
was that the JLP were victims of violence and terrorism. This was reinforced by the impression that the government was falling apart and that in order to maintain power, it was resorting to the techniques of force and suppression. Submerged was the fact that the government had tried mainly to curb the violence.

The same strategies at work in the newsmagazines were also evident in *The New York Times*' coverage: the use of emotionally-freighted words, innuendo, misleading imputations and ascriptions, truncated descriptions which gave the appearance of explanation, but which in reality did more to reinforce impression. Visuals and graphic language credited Seaga with warmth and concern and depth, but too often reduced Manley to the image of an ineffectual lightweight and spell-binder. In particular, a network of strained and oftentimes unfounded associations linked Manley and the PNP with violence, authoritarian intent, an unhealthy alliance with the international forces of Communism—in short, with a climate of fear. In a word, the *New York Times*' coverage may safely be characterized as one of mass persuasion or propaganda with just enough instances of fair coverage (e.g., Andrew Young's analysis, concessions here and there by Thomas) to enhance the credibility of its messages.

Finally, it seems safe to say in hindsight, that the reports in the newsmagazines were distillates or paraphrases of the themes in *The Times*, an observation that seems quite plausible given the fact that *The Times* sets the agenda for the magazines. It is any wonder, then, that Manley should have placed *The Times* in his firing line when he set out to diagnose and record the causes of Jamaica's destabilization?
Chapter VII
CONCLUSIONS

"It is not the lie that passeth through the mind, but the lie that sinketh in, and settleth in it, that doth the hurt." Francis Bacon—Essays 1. Of Truth.

This thesis set out to examine the press coverage of Manley's government as presented by three high profile U.S. publications—The New York Times, Time and Newsweek. In particular, a special effort was made to confirm or disconfirm the charge made by Manley and others that U.S. press coverage was systematically distorted, biased and negative in its portrayal of Manley. The selection of these three U.S. publications was dictated not simply by the specificity of Manley's charges against The New York Times, but even more so by the acknowledged agenda setting role and influence that these publications exercise.

The examination of the coverage was conducted against a broad background comprising three perspectives:
1. A compact history recapitulating Jamaica's socio-economic adversities as a Third World country, and in particular its neo-colonial dependency upon developed Western nations and multi-national corporations.

2. A fair and honest attempt to appreciate the political philosophy, goals and achievements of Michael Manley and the PNP.

3. An assessment of the weaknesses and failures of international and Western press coverage of lesser developed nations.

Using both quantitative and more discursive qualitative research methods, it became apparent that The New York Times, Time and Newsweek provided an unfair and distorted picture of Manley and the PNP in a way that was perceptibly propagandistic. Emphasis was clearly placed upon the negative elements of the Jamaican situation. Manley's relatively modest version of democratic socialism was interpreted as being akin to or allied with Cuban or Soviet Communism, a political commitment that was seen as pushing Jamaica towards socio-economic suicide. The guilt and incompetence imputed to Manley and the PNP was made to seem all the worse by a discernible focus upon the themes of instability, and by reporting the fears and suspicions of conservative opponents who continually alleged a drift towards totalitarianism. Manley's friendship with Castro, his non-alignment policies and anti-imperialistic stance were interpreted as
inimical to the geo-political interests of the U.S. Indeed, the gravity with which developments in Jamaica were viewed by the U.S. can probably be judged by the recent disclosures of covert CIA operations in Jamaica.

The coverage by these three publications between 1972-1980 was heavily characterized by the sorts of techniques acknowledged by many (e.g. Ellul, Bank, Altheide) as being constituents of mass persuasion or propaganda. These included: the repetition of unfavorable, fearsome themes (e.g. Communism, violence, murder, suppression, bankruptcy); the use of emotionally charged words; the selective use of truths and half-truths; innuendo; unfounded allegations and the use of unnamed sources; the convincing but questionable use of statistics; the obfuscation of complex issues; simplification; generalizations and decontextualization. There were, of course, instances of fair and truthful coverage which did more to inform the reader but which, at the same time, did as much or more to enhance the credibility and authority of the unfavorable coverage. Whether or not these persuasive techniques were deliberate and intentional, while certainly relevant, is not the issue here. The fact is, they were there as structuring constituents in the text.

Did the press coverage, as Manley charged, contribute to the destabilization of his country? Causality, of course, is always a difficult connection to pin down in the realm of socio-political action. But this analysis of newspaper and
newsmagazine coverage, if nothing else, provides a wealth of circumstantial evidence—dovetailing with that of others—to suggest that Michael Manley was very close to the truth when he accused the North American press of shaping an image of Jamaica and thereby influencing its (mis)fortunes.

The fact is, there did emerge some telling circumstances which certainly have the very real look of effects or consequences. Investors did withdraw investments from the economy; tourism declined conspicuously; and the IMF and international bankers expressed lack of confidence in the Jamaican economy. Sadly enough, results such as these exacerbated the very ills that Manley had wanted to remedy, and fuelled the credibility of his opponents' criticisms.

It seems safe to say, then, that Manley's charges of bias and harmful reportage do have a good deal of substance. These conclusions, as well, augment and amplify the diagnosis by others that press coverage during the Manley regime was decidedly lop-sided and unfavorable. The thesis also augments a substantial and growing body of research that clearly demonstrates that the domination of the world flow of information by a few powerful national and multi-national media in the developed countries, continues to have harmful consequences for Third World governments. The troubling prospect that we are left with in the face of all of this, is that Third World countries bent on extricating themselves from the web of cultural and economic imperialism, may well
have these attempts frustrated by the quality of press coverage and analysis coming out of Western developed nations, and in particular the U.S.

Since this thesis opened with Manley it is perhaps fitting to leave him with the last words whose disturbing ring should give us much to reflect upon.

As the propaganda war continues, the communist label provides a convenient point of departure for the attack on any movement seeking to change things. Socialism is dealt with as a form of guilt by association. In the end, people are put in a position to choose between one system or the other, between God and the Devil... economic, financial, technological, political and psychological pressure is maintained on developing countries, particularly in the Western hemisphere, to choose. Not to be with the West is to be against 'God'. To be with the East would certainly reveal an alignment with the 'Devil'... most Third World people do not wish to be with either the West or East... (1982:63-64)
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"Three Political Killings Stir New Fears Over Jamaica's Course."


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"Political Winds In Jamaica." March 5, 1980.


"As Jamaicans Rich or Poor Discuss Politics, the Topic is Money and the Mood Fearful." May 14, 1980.


"Jamaicans weathering Economic and Social Storm." July 6, 1980.


"Jamaican Candidate Slain In 'Political Confrontation.'" Oct. 15, 1980.


"Victory In Jamaica Exceeds Forecast." Nov. 1, 1980.

"For Jamaica a Deft, Fiery Politician--Edward Philip George Seaga."

"Deliverance in Jamaica." Nov. 5, 1980.


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Appendix A

CODING SHEET
INTENSIFY

Repetition

Intensifying by repetition is an easy, simple, and effective way to persuade. People are comfortable with the known, the familiar. As children, we love to hear the same stories repeated; later, we have “favorite” songs, TV programs, etc. All cultures have chants, prayers, rituals, dances based on repetition. Advertising slogans, brand names, logos, and signs are common. Much education, training, indoctrination is based on repetition to imprint on memory of the receiver to identify, recognize, and respond.

Association

Intensifying by linking (1) the idea or product with (2) something already loved/desired or (3) the intended audience. Thus, need for audience analysis: surveys, polls, “market research,” “consumer behavior,” psychological and sociological studies. Associate by direct assertions or indirect ways: metaphorical language, allusions, backgrounds, contexts, etc. Terms describing common subject matters used to link: Flag-Waving, God-on-Our Side, Plain Folks, Band-Wagon, Testimonials, Tribal Pride, Heritage, Progress, etc.

Composition

Intensifying by pattern and arrangement uses design, variations in sequence and in proportion to add to the force of words, images, movements, etc. How we put together, or compose, is important: e.g. in verbal communication the choice of words, their level of abstraction, their patterns within sentences, the strategy of longer messages. Logic, inductive and deductive, puts ideas together systematically. Non-verbal compositions involve visuals (color, shape, size); aural (music); mathematics (quantities, relationships) time and space patterns.
Omission
Downplaying by omission is common since the basic selection/omission process necessarily omits more than can be presented. All communication is limited, is edited, is slanted or biased, to include and exclude items. But omission can also be used as a deliberate way of concealing, hiding. Half-truths, quotes out of context, etc. are very hard to detect or find. Political examples include cover-ups, censorship, book-burning, managed news, secret police activities. Receivers, too, can omit: can “filter out” or be closed minded, prejudiced.

Diversion
Downplaying by distracting focus, diverting attention away from key issues or important things; usually by intensifying the sideshows, the non-related, the trivial. Common variations include: “hairsplitting,” “nit-picking,” “attacking a straw man,” “red herring”; also, those emotional attacks and appeals (ad hominem, ad populum), plus things which drain the energy of others: “busy work,” legal harassment, etc. Humor and entertainment (“bread and circuses”) are used as pleasant ways to divert attention from major issues.

Confusion
Downplaying issues by making things so complex, so chaotic, that people “give up,” get weary, “overloaded.” This is dangerous when people are unable to understand, comprehend, or make reasonable decisions. Chaos can be the accidental result of a disorganized mind, or the deliberate flim-flam of a con man, or the political demagogue (who then offers a “simple solution” to the confused.) Confusion can result from faulty logic, equivocation, circumlocution, contradictions, multiple diversions, inconsistencies, jargon or anything which blurs clarity or understanding.
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## ECONOMIC DECLINE

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## POLITICAL INSTABILITY/Crime

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Nationalization

Bauxite levies/taxes

Majority share in MNC's

literacy

free education

income redistribution

minimum wage

employment program

equal pay for women

maternity leave/pay

self-reliance

land reform

sugar coops

public sector participation in econ

worker participation in

Community councils

school feeding program

school building program

low income housing

extension of franchise

public spending

democratic socialism

social programs
FOREIGN POLICY  Pos (3) Neu (2) Neg (1)

Non-alignment

anti-imperialism

friendship with Castro/Cuba

Support of African liberation

New Econ. Order (NIEO)

C'bean regional cooperation

Boycotts

Diplomatic ties/visits

Relations with other Socialist countries

General Tone of Article re Manley/Manley's Govt.

positive (3)
neutral (2)
negative (1)

General Tone of Article re Seaga

positive (3)
neutral (2)
negative (1)
Appendix B

RANK'S SCHEMA
VITA AUCTORIS

Lauriston Johanson is a Jamaican. He graduated from the University of the West Indies in 1981 with a B.A. (Hons.) majoring in Communication Studies. His academic interest is in the area of Communication and National Development in the Third World.