Endarkened Governance: A Genealogical Analysis of the Pentagon Papers and The Global Intelligence Files

Palmer Taylor
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Endarkened Governance: A Genealogical Analysis of the *Pentagon Papers* and *The Global Intelligence Files*

By

Palmer Taylor

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Criminology
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts
at the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

2014

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Endarkened Governance: A Genealogical Analysis of the Pentagon Papers and The Global Intelligence Files

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May 1, 2014
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis and that no part of this thesis has been published or submitted for publication.

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ABSTRACT

Using Stratfor’s intelligence networks and geopolitical analytics, StratCap, an Emerging Markets/Global Macro Hedge Fund, holds a competitive financial market advantage. This analysis of WikiLeaks’ *The Global Intelligence Files* contrasts the *Pentagon Papers*’ “Public Statements” and “Internal Documents” of the Kennedy administration. A Foucaultian genealogical approach exposes a development in governance beyond neoliberalism, entitled ‘state market-security.’ This is contextualized under an *info-politics* model. Overall, governmentality cannot accurately reveal both data sets, but merging endarkened governance (de Lint, 2004, 2008) into its framework can. This constitutes invisible practices administered by states and corporate security agencies that reveal secrecy-bureaucracies. Thus, how do the data sets reflect the practices of endarkened governance? Do welfarism and neoliberalism function to create the conditions for the disciplinarization and securitization of governance? This thesis argues that, in the securitization ethos, the practices and procedures of state market-security are best exposed through the analysis of endarkened governance texts.
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DEDICATION

For Katie: your unquestionable love and support will be forever cherished.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
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<td>EM</td>
<td>Emerging Markets</td>
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<td>ESFS</td>
<td>European System of Financial Supervisors</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FCPA</td>
<td>Foreign Corrupt Practices Act</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIIPS</td>
<td>Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Government or the Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>Info-politics</td>
<td>Information-politics</td>
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<td>MCS</td>
<td>Municipal Corporate Security</td>
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<td>NARA</td>
<td>National Archives and Records Administration</td>
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<td>NRO</td>
<td>National Reconnaissance Office</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAND</td>
<td>Research and Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEC</td>
<td>United States Securities and Exchange Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spatio-temporal</td>
<td>Spatial and temporal</td>
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<td>StratCap</td>
<td>Strategic Capital Investment Fund or StratCap Management Investment Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stratfor</td>
<td>Strategic Forecasting Incorporated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

After former President Richard M. Nixon retrieved a court injunction stopping the New York Times from publishing the Pentagon Papers, Daniel Ellsberg circulated parts to 25 newspapers in June 1971 (Sifry, 2011: 28–29). Ellsberg, a former US military analyst who released the texts while at the RAND Corporation, helped end the Vietnam War. His whistleblowing provided confirmation of the extent of US involvement in Vietnam that was concealed by successive administrations (Weiskopf and Willmott, 2013: 470). In part, this thesis examines the Papers’ “Justification of the War” with the comparison of the “Public Statements” and “Internal Documents” of the Kennedy administration. The “Public Statements” are referred to as surface texts, and the “Internal Documents” are referred to as hidden texts. Julian Assange, the editor-in-chief and spokesperson for WikiLeaks, recalled Ellsberg saying, “Courage is contagious”; when someone engages in an intelligently designed act, it encourages others to follow (Sifry, 2011: 25). Subsequently, upon the release of WikiLeaks’ The Global Intelligence Files, the information age represents securitization over populations, businesses, states, and markets. The hacker group ‘Anonymous’ obtained over five million emails from Stratfor, a US global intelligence-based organization. WikiLeaks distributed the emails on February 27, 2012 to reveal “Stratfor’s web of informers, pay-off structure, payment-laundering techniques and psychological methods …” (WikiLeaks, 2013b). This thesis examines StratCap, an EM/Global Macro Hedge Fund that holds a competitive financial market advantage by using Stratfor’s intelligence networks and geopolitical analytics.

States and corporate security agencies collect information to promote their policies, but a shadow state/corporate security agency operates by negation. It promotes
the policies through the selective disclosure of information, the timing and quality that ensures a pre-cleared agenda (de Lint, 2008: 311). This is understood as ‘endarkened governance.’ Expanded secrecy and production of disinformation through national security executives are features of endarkened governance, involving a “secrecy-bureaucracy,”¹ information security protocols, and national emergency exceptionalism (de Lint, 2004: 148). Foucault (2007) raises the problem of the secret. If enemies and rivals gained the knowledge that the state must develop of itself, the state would be in danger of losing some of its effects. Consequently, inquiries are needed that are coextensive with the exercise of administration, but a codification of what can and cannot be published is also necessary (Foucault, 2007: 355). Like dark matter, what has been called “invisible” or “secret” state/corporate security is credited with a capacity to govern conduct (de Lint, 2008: 309). Endarkened governance is defined as: invisible practices and procedures that expose a secrecy-bureaucracy as revealed by informational leaks. Altogether, ideas about the Vietnam War and the intelligence/geopolitics hedge fund venture were to be obfuscated from the public. For one, the foreword in the “Internal Documents” of the Kennedy administration notes that,

This volume contains a collection of internal U.S. Government documents and position papers regarding U.S. policy towards Vietnam. … Those classified materials that are included, however, were circulated at the highest levels of the Government and either bore directly on the process of policy formation or were decision-making instruments (National Archives and Records Administration, 2011e: V.B.4.I: a).

For another, WikiLeaks’ front page letter on their website confirms,

¹ This refers to such bureaucracies that are open, or where their existence is well known, but keeps their practices and procedures secret from the public domain. Also, the term ‘bureaucracy’ is not limited to non-elective state officials. This term is defined as a state or business administration that has a complex organizational structure in governance.
Stratfor’s use of insiders for intelligence soon turned into a money-making scheme of questionable legality. The emails show that in 2009 then-Goldman Sachs Managing Director Shea Morenz and Stratfor CEO George Friedman hatched an idea to “utilise the intelligence” it was pulling in from its insider network to start up a captive strategic investment fund (WikiLeaks, 2013a).

Until recently, secret texts have not been available or used to represent modes of governance. The emergence of secret texts has not been problematized by governmentality studies, thereby representing a gap in the scholarship. On its significance to critical criminology, this thesis explores the changing landscape of how market-security is achieved and maintained by contemporary corporate security intelligence firms. ‘Market-security’ refers to securing trades of assets within a financial market. It can be in capital markets, with stock and/or bond markets, money markets, and derivatives markets, to name a few (Investopedia, 2014a). It mainly refers to “state-driven” forms of market-security, but can also include corporate security (i.e. non-state agencies). How corporate security uses intelligence for future investment knowledge by having a financial capital edge over the competition is the inclination. And how state and corporate bureaucracies form a symbiosis of market-security is key.

According to de Lint (2008: 308), “black sites, black programs (including surveillance), and black budgets are known unknowns: we know they are there gathering inertia and pushing and pulling the political. However, these pushes and pulls cannot be fully hypothesized by their effects.” When political information is leaked, a genealogical analysis through a Foucaultian lens offers insight. Foucault’s ‘history of the present’ approach is adopted as what has taken place in the past, to what is currently being made of the past, and to prospects of the future (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995: 32).


The first question that shapes this thesis is: how do the Papers’ Kennedy administration and Files’ StratCap reflect the practices and procedures of endarkened governance? These will be identified and analyzed in the research findings and analysis sections. One finding this thesis arrives at is how state market-security is a whole-of-government approach that allows the state to collaborate with the corporate sector. From this, Foucault (2008d: 286) questions: “what will government be concerned with if the economic process … is not in principle its object?” The state indoctrinates corporate agencies and programs to customize impactful market politics. Why play on an even field when intelligence can predict future market trends? This is not neoliberalism. As well, StratCap as a productive technology of Stratfor reflects conditions of “supervising” the market. The market does not wholly supervise the political.

The second question that shapes this thesis is: does welfarism function to create the conditions for the disciplinarization of governance, and does neoliberalism function to create the conditions for the securitization of governance (Deukmedjian, 2013a: 53)? To answer the first half of the question, yes, welfarism does function to create the conditions for the disciplinarization of governance. This is expressed in the research findings and analysis sections with the Kennedy administration. The practices reveal an alignment with welfarism. Regarding the second half of the question, yes, there are conditions for the securitization of governance; however, there is a misalignment with neoliberalism. The research findings and analysis sections point to StratCap as the dawning of a new development, but one that is not absolutely definitive or clear. ‘State market-security’ is the brainchild of welfare and neoliberal models. If this is not exclusively welfarist or neoliberal, but an invention or offspring of both, what is this called? What is beyond
neoliberalism? These questions should be asked especially after the financial crisis of 2008/2009. Here, a competitive market sphere is no longer levelled with clear boundaries and rules. State/corporate collusion rigs markets to produce a hyper-reality of economics.

This thesis contributes to governmentality studies by exploring how endarkened forms of governmental discourse represent practices. Our current governing ethos features independent corporate security agencies, and states outsourcing corporate security, but cannot be revealed by a governmentality framework. Thus, in the securitization ethos, the practices and procedures of state market-security are best exposed through the analysis of endarkened governance texts.

2. RELEVANT SCHOLARSHIP

Echoing Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ metaphor, Foucault (2008d: 286) regards economics as “a science lateral to the art of governing.” One must govern with economics, alongside economists, and by listening to the economists, but economics must not be the governmental rationality itself (Foucault, 2008d: 286). The market is an arena of democracy, a sphere of consumer choice where producers are efficient and competitive by prices and where goods are directed to their best uses (Loader, 1997: 380). The market is said to provide opportunities through which corporate security agencies can be held accountable to the public as consumer representatives. Freed of state interference and bureaucratic “red tape,” the unfettered market will instil the need to regulate the quality of service delivered to clients (O’Connor, Lippert, Greenfield, and Boyle, 2004: 151). By the 1970s, the expansion of the free trading environment and the internationalization and global volatility of capital challenged the Keynesian formula; the market model emphasized growth and productivity at the cost of equity and political democracy.
(Simeon, 1987: 179). Normatively speaking, neoliberalism engenders competitive market efficiency, the role of individuals in determining economic outcomes, and distortions associated with state intervention and regulation of markets (Palley, 2005: 20). Ferguson (2009: 171) urges not to refer to neoliberalism as an abstract, external, causal force that decimates local livelihoods. It must not be referred to as a characteristic of a global meta-culture of our deregulated, insecure, speculative times. Neoliberalization should be perceived as a dominant pattern of incomplete and contradictory regulatory transformations, not as a coherent system or typological state form (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner, 2009: 104). It is imprecise to say that neoliberalism is a causal factor; it is a mentality. Ultimately, the ‘classical liberalism’ explanation for state economic involvement has focused on the “market failure” of monopoly, public goods, and externalities. This leads to suboptimal provision (i.e. there may be too little or too much production), calling for state intervention through regulation, taxes, and subsidies, or control of production (Palley, 2005: 27). Classical liberalism problematized market manipulation and monopolization, undermining the function of the ‘invisible hand,’ which needs to be minimized through regulation. In turn, there is a “state failure,” neoliberal counter-argument: though markets may fail, having the state remedy it may be worse, owing to bureaucratic inefficiencies and lack of market-styled incentives (2005: 27). The ordoliberals say we should “adopt the free market as [the] organizing and regulating principle of the state, from the start of its existence up to the last form of its interventions” (Foucault, 2008a: 116). One unanswered question though is: how does neoliberalism promote “a state under the supervision of the market rather than a market supervised by the state” (2008a: 116)? Is neoliberalism the appropriate subject in this
question? The current alternative form of governance seems to be state market-security.

Welfarism insisted that state intervention mitigates the market’s self-reinforcing failures (Davies and McGoey, 2012: 79). A ‘welfare state’ is a state in which administrative and political power is used to modify market forces by: guaranteeing minimum incomes irrespective of the market value of work or property; narrowing the extent of “social contingencies” (e.g. sickness, old age, or unemployment) which lead to individual and family crises; and ensuring that all citizens are offered the best social services (Briggs, 1961: 288). Additional principles include distributive justice and substantive equality existing beyond minimum economic security, and that there be a commitment to “social solidarity” (Social Planning Council of Welfare, 1985: 55). The population was envisioned under national apparatuses with sovereign-state competition for health, welfare, and the productive capacities of nation states (i.e. biopolitics). Biopolitics is the attempt to rationalize the problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a given population, such as health, birthrate, and life expectancy (Foucault, 2008e: 317). Competition with communist states through efficiency and freedom instead of inefficiency and suppression was also imagined (Deukmedjian, 2013a: 64–65). Moreover, the welfare model aligns with the concept of equilibrium. Welfare states assumed the responsibility of being the guarantor of security, but the contract between state and citizen was no longer valued. The drain on individual incomes and on national finances was unwarranted, responsibility was being stifled, risk-

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2 This is also referred to as “dispositif.” Agamben (2009: 14) defines an apparatus as anything that has the capacity to “capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings.” The concrete modes in which the apparatuses act within the relations, mechanisms, and “plays” of power are to be investigated (as cited in Agamben, 2009: 6).

3 This refers to achieving a balance between state/corporate political objectives and public/civil rights. Please refer to Figure 1. The x and y-axes of info-politics in the ANALYSIS section under V. Towards an Info-Politics Model for a further exploration.
taking inhibited, entrepreneurship penalized, and dependency induced (Rose, 2000: 327–28). While states imposed restrictive monetary policies and cut expenditures, private businesses were assuming state-based roles. What was seen as the failure of Keynesianism was acclaimed as a virtue by neoliberals, reasserting power by global capital on the liberalization of the market (Clarke, 2005: 58). Through endarkened policies or agendas set by states/corporate security agencies, conditions of possibilities reflect spatio-temporal differences. While neoliberalism and welfarism are types of governmentalities, current scholarship has not considered endarkened governance discourse. The hidden rationales and mentalities are important when analyzing the governance of the present. Disinformation in surface texts can be accepted as false truths.

The security market represents its consumers as sovereign subjects. Market actors are assumed to respond in an economically rational fashion (and spontaneous fashion by creating demand) by alleviating anxiety (Goold, Loader, and Thumala, 2010: 4). Loader (1999: 381) has argued that people imagine that the ‘criminal Other’ has been foiled, put-off, repelled, or defeated; hence, the consumption of policing and security concludes with pleasure and anxiety. Yet, Brown and Lippert (2007: 604) argue that if the pleasure of foiling criminal outsiders were lacking, greater feelings of insecurity might follow. Providing security by interfering with the market system alludes to greater insecurity between the privileged and the under-privileged (Hayek, 1944: 134). What thresholds must be crossed before people and organizations resort to the security market (Loader, 1999: 379), interpreting it as an obligation amongst individuals, businesses, and states? At present, although justice continues to be imperative to the liberal democratic ideal, the element of governing and its mode of communication is not law or sovereignty but
security and control (de Lint, Virta, and Deukmedjian, 2007: 1631; cf. Foucault 2000a). Agamben’s (2005) ‘state of exception’ comes to mind in opposing equilibrium and the right to preserve security. That the state of exception has now become the rule (Agamben, 2005: 9) is an oxymoron. Even sovereign authority is not fully included within the law; power retains an unmediated capacity to impose rule (Huysmans, 2008: 172). Ultimately, Zedner (2000: 211) captures the essence of security, where it has “less to do with personal safety than the insulation of residential, work, consumption, and travel environments from ‘unsavoury’ groups and individuals.” To that end, deregulated barriers between state and businesses have produced “efficient” security (i.e. rationalizing resources and maximizing the output of their members) in place of “effective” security (i.e. adequate information exchanges on issues and on the resources to solve them) (Dupont, 2004: 79–80). Details on how corporate security legitimizes their management of resources never have been seen from raw, first-hand data before.

Nodes may comprise individuals, groups, organizations, or states, collaborating to mobilize resources (Shearing and Johnston, 2010: 501; Braithwaite, 2004: 300). O’Reilly (2010: 196) argues that rather than focusing on “who is pulling the strings,” an analysis on the “ties that bind” must be underlined when exploring the state-corporate sphere. He observes that a progression from ‘Cold War’ to ‘Economic War’ has occurred, whereby espionage on behalf of the state blurs into espionage on behalf of corporations (O’Reilly, 2010: 201; see Sheptycki, 2000: 12–13). Corporate governance is “effective” since the market naturally filters out the less competitive. Brodeur’s (1983) ‘high policing’ concentrates on the state and dominant political actors, beyond the collection and dissemination of criminal intelligence into economics and politics (as cited in O’Reilly &
Ellison, 2006: 641). O’Reilly and Ellison (2006: 642) contend that, “the authority of non-state power structures is increasingly upheld by ‘private’ high policing actors, particularly in the corporate sphere.” Deukmedjian (2013a: 68) reminds us that while networks are not new, we are witnessing greater horizontal interagency and intra-agency practices. Hierarchical networks are disciplinary-surveillance assemblages, functioning through peacekeeping, order maintenance, and order reproduction, whereas security surveillance functions through a grid of war and defence (Deukmedjian, 2013a: 55). And while strides have been made to understand the governmental functions of corporate security, access to data beyond formal methodological probes has been absent.

Between liberal and totalitarian states lies the difference between territorial states, national security states, and governmental states. Territorial states are concerned with the protection of territorial sovereignty, and security and governmental states are concerned with the control of populations and power through information management (de Lint, 2004: 142). Governing through intelligence is the cutting or re-cutting of the political through information management, or the control of politically actionable information (de Lint, 2008: 291). Understanding the effects, not causes, are integral to how states and corporate security implement strategies to achieve political objectives. On the whole, scholars must cease to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it “excludes,” it “represses,” it “censors,” it “abstracts,” it “masks,” it “conceals.” In fact, “power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault, 1977: 194). The “truth” surrounding both data sets can be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, and circulation of statements (Foucault, 1984b: 74). Many scholars have detailed the ways in which
states and corporate security agencies have practiced governance on the surface, by exploring actors, institutions, modes, and spatio-temporal settings. But beneath the surface, the level of endarkened governance has been untapped.

Valverde (2010: 20) argues that critical criminology studies on ‘security’ have not coherently articulated the relationship between security techniques, logics of security projects, and scale and jurisdiction. It is the intention here to articulate how market-security is achieved and maintained internationally by a corporate security intelligence firm. A secondary aim of this thesis is to see how (and if) the data sets reflect welfare and neoliberal rationalities and mentalities; to see how power produces. However, as Lippert (2005: 6) notes, neoliberalism and welfarism are merely types of governmentality; they cannot be equated to theoretical frameworks. The terms are problematic when they are understood as totalizing or systematizing, as approaching a societal condition. This avenue suggests that endarkened practices may be normative tactics that govern other domains, subjects, and forms of conduct (Lippert, 2005: 8).

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1. Governmentality

Studies of governmentality are concerned with how thought operates within our organized ways of doing things, our regimes of practices, and with its ambitions and effects (as cited in Dean, 2010: 27; see Foucault, 1991). This thesis examines how states reinforce population management, and how corporate security agencies reinforce entrepreneurial management. If the term ‘governance’ signifies any “strategy, process, procedure, or program for controlling, regulating, or managing problems [at any level]” (Lemke, 2007: 53), endarkened governance must be included. Foucault identified
technologies that formed the present, since they function in the present or give rise to problems and solutions that do (Garland, 1997: 195). ‘Governmentality’ means:

The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security (Foucault, 2000a: 219–20).

Wood and Shearing (2006: 3) use the concept ‘mentality’ to refer to sets of ideas that are used to make up society and that make claims about how society operates. Governmentality is a framework for analysis where governance goes on whenever individuals or groups seek to shape their own conduct or the conduct of others (Walters, 2012: 11). Hence, the political lens is mainly concerned with market speculations, or a ‘governmentality of uncertainty’ (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 106–7).

The governmentality literature gives a certain priority to “how” questions. It directs scholars to attend to the practices of state that form the basis on which problematizations are made and what happens when we govern and are governed (Dean, 2010: 39). Governmentality’s shift from the ‘Keynesian welfare state’ toward deregulated policies and neoliberal political projects took place (Lemke, 2007: 45). Along that line, states are linked to the activities of expertise, whose role is not one of weaving social control, but of enacting attempts at the calculated administration of conduct through local tactics (Rose and Miller, 2010: 273). The three tendencies of the market include: the reduction of costs, the reduction of the profit of the enterprise, and the provisional, localized tendency to increased profit, either through a reduction of prices or by an improvement in production (Foucault, 2008b: 138). Foucault (2008a: 121) alludes that “one must govern for the market, rather than because of the market.”
Similar to the focus of Lippert and Walby (2012: 440) in their study of Canada’s MCS, demonstrating mentalities by which nodes govern, technologies and techniques used to achieve goals, resources they access, and the organizational structure in which security governance is conducted are imperative. Garland (1997: 201) recommends explaining the pattern of effects, including failures and unanticipated consequences, more so than atomizing state programmes. Equally important is to show how security is a multiplicity of governance processes that are dynamic and internally contradictory (see Valverde, 2010: 5). As a critique, it has been argued that governmentality studies have fallen short of recognizing the temporal and spatial variety of different cultures of enterprise, from time to time, from context to context (Marttila, 2013: 27). However, this thesis aims to capture the spatio-temporal differences by questioning what conditions in the past reflect state governance in the welfare state, and what conditions in the present reflect state/corporate governance in the neoliberal state. So ‘political capital’ derives from actors to the machinery of the state and their capacity to direct it toward their own objectives (Dupont, 2004: 85). The harnessing of secrecy for state power is matched by corporate enterprises. Companies are aided in sealing information from the public by intellectual property law, other proprietary rights, freedom of information legislation and secrecy acts, and by states afraid of the substance of their relationships with corporations circulating (de Lint, 2004: 147). Accordingly, the governmentality framework that many highly distinguishable authors have contributed to requires a more complete picture, consisting of hidden texts that reveal shadowed governance.

4. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH PROCEDURES
The methodology that this thesis adopts is a genealogical one. It attempts to look at the political and economical conditions of practices. Foucault did not historicize the subject, in fabricating a subject or entity that evolves through history. It is not the search for origins, but shows the plural, and sometimes contradictory, relationship between truth and power (see Foucault, 1984a). Genealogy regards,

... a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history (Foucault, 1984b: 59).

The methodology regards a history of the present that represents abstracted rationalities in the actual practices and discourses (Garland, 1997: 204), from which secrecy emerges. Similar to Foucault (2000b: 326), the objective is to create a history of the different modes by which human beings are made subjects by endarkened governance.

History is a practice undertaken in a particular present and for reasons linked to that present. For no matter how much historical writing is about aspects of the past, and refers to events, irruptions, discourses, and social practices that can be given a certain space-time, it is in an activity that is linked to its current uses (Dean, 1994: 14). The present may be represented as a certain era of the world, distinct from others through inherent characteristics or by a dramatic event (Foucault, 1984c: 33). However, one must be cautious when describing techniques or programs as neoliberal or welfare since it indicates their lineage. For one, this tends to blur governmentality’s specificity in identifying how the state is formulated, how it problematizes, and what techniques it uses. For another, it lends itself to a “cookie-cutter explanation” in identifying any program with neoliberal elements as essentially neoliberal to account for its nature or existence (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde, 2006: 97–98). Rather than singling out a few
processes as explanatory factors, this thesis constructs the singular event as a ‘polyhedron’ of intelligibility, or multiple axes of meaning, the number of whose faces is not finite or given in advance (Foucault, 1991: 77; as cited in Walters, 2012: 18).

Investors, strategic and tactical intelligence analysts, subscribers, the legal system, assets, and geopolitical instruments are some conditions for StratCap to be able to function as, and within, a market. This is in parallel to Foucault’s (2008b: 141) notion of agriculture, where population, technology, training and education, the legal system, land availability, and climate are not directly economic and they do not affect market mechanisms directly, but are conditions for agriculture to function as (and within) a market. Governmentality frames how agents are assembled within specific powers and how domains are constructed as governable (Dean, 2010: 39).

Instead of deducing concrete phenomena from universals, or starting with universals as a grid for certain concrete practices, Foucault (2008c: 3) starts with concrete practices and passes universals through its grid. The conditions listed above (e.g. investors, subscribers) are the concrete practices that will have universals (e.g. neoliberalism) pass through them. This thesis views how mechanisms of power are invested, utilized, transformed, and extended by mundane rules and regulations and forms of world war influence and global intelligence (see Foucault, 1980: 99). Foucault would find out how groups of things happened as they did, how they were, what or who they were, and how the structures and distributions of power come to be configured (Scott, 2009: 355). It is important to note that the data sets are texts that are governmental by nature. They represent the ways in which governance is exercised.

I. Data Sources
In 2011, the US National Archives and Records Administration and the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Presidential Libraries released the complete report of the *Pentagon Papers* with online accessibility (National Archives, 2012). Of the nearly 7,000-pagination range, the “Justification of the War” section was chosen because it had a compare and contrast feature that was befitting for this research. This feature included two sections (“Public Statements” and “Internal Documents”) that have common volumes in the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations. Kennedy was chosen because his ‘New Frontier’ initiatives represented the pinnacle of the welfare state, out of the three administrations. To name a few programs pushed by Kennedy include: education, equality for women, automation, tax cuts, the Peace Corps, unemployment, Medicare, housing, agriculture, and health (see Bernstein, 1991 for further reading). To historicize the subject as being the most recent of those three administrations to have had political-military involvement in Vietnam is to go against the genealogical approach. Welfare universals pass through concrete phenomena in all cases anyway since the three administrations were under the guise of the welfare state. In all, the 651 pages of Kennedy’s public statements and internal documents were read, highlighted, established into themes, and arranged into levels of significance. How this data set reflects the practices and procedures of endarkened governance, and whether there were conditions for the disciplinarization of governance were points of significance. If a text did not reflect either one or both, then it was represented as having a limited impact on governance. It did not represent power effects to the same degree of the chosen texts. As an aside, the Roosevelt administration only had volumes in the “Internal Documents” section, while the Johnson administration only had volumes in the “Public Documents”
section. The administration chosen had to have common volumes in both sections to compare the surface texts to the hidden texts. Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ initiatives and Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ initiatives were still integral to the welfare state.

5,543,061 emails were distributed on WikiLeaks as *The Global Intelligence Files*. WikiLeaks built an investigative partnership with more than 25 news media organizations and activists to inform the public about these texts (WikiLeaks, 2013a). A cursory look was conducted of all 502 release names, under “List of Releases,” to find relevant patterns that could be sanctioned and further researched. StratCap was eventually stumbled upon, a strategic investment hedge fund that uses the intelligence it was pulling in from its insider network (i.e. Stratfor) (2013a). By entering a keyword search of “StratCap” into the database search field, 2,320 total emails were generated. The research procedure for this data set is what follows. Clicking through all 2,320 emails and copying down the email ID (or the attached filename) was completed if it reflected the practices of endarkened governance. And whether there were conditions for the securitization of governance was another point of significance. If an email did not reflect either one or both, then it was represented as having a limited impact on governance. It did not represent the same degree of power effects of the chosen emails. Conducting a “Search by Terms in Email” from all original email IDs to generate duplicates commenced. For each case, the email ID that had the most content (i.e. the most replies or forwards) was chosen for final examination. This was a means to potentially get at emails with the greatest impact on governance. The final email ID list was set at a total of 37.

Both data sets sometimes labelled their texts with disclaimers: the *Papers* denote, “TOP SECRET – Sensitive,” or “CONFIDENTIAL,” while the *Files* denote, “THIS IS
Still, endarkened governance as a concept, based on both data sets alone, will not capture the complete essence of either bureaucracy. Even the semantics found in the Papers and Files are at times mundane, as not all texts represent governmentalities or produce power effects. The mundane texts were dismissed as potential research findings for final examination of this thesis.

5. RESEARCH FINDINGS

I. The Pentagon Papers: The Kennedy Administration

This first section of the research findings consists of the Pentagon Papers’ public and internal texts of the Kennedy administration. Subsection A lays the backdrop of how the US government supported the GVN through various sustainability and productivity efforts. The hidden and surface texts aligned in content regarding social welfare. Subsections B and C mostly focus on hidden texts surrounding US fiscal policies and US governmental functions, with financially managing and governing the GVN. Field teams were given authority over the expenditures of funds, and integrating social sustainability with political councils. Next, subsection D exposes Kennedy as being ambivalent towards protecting but tolerating Vietnam. In supporting President Diệm’s neutral and independent government, the Kennedy administration also wanted the preservation of a pro-Western orientation. Lastly, subsection E deals with forms of resistance by a coup d’état, the ARVN, and the US government. How the Papers’ Kennedy administration reflects the practices of endarkened governance is what follows. All of the subsections are constructed as a ‘polyhedron’ with multiple axes of meaning about what endarkened

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4 See APPENDIX A: EXAMPLES OF MUNDANE SEMANTICS.
governance reveals about transparency. The practices reveal an alignment with welfarism, functioning to create the conditions for the disciplinarization of governance.

A. Sustainability & Productivity: Supporting Basic Infrastructure

In a November 3, 1961 memorandum, it was noted that social improvements should follow, “particularly when an area becomes ‘white’ with emphasis on improved schools and medical facilities” (NARA, 2011i: 355). US sustainability efforts in foreign countries were a priority in policy decisions. On April 22, 1963, Secretary Dean Rusk spoke of the efforts and effects of infrastructure:

Thousands of Vietnamese were moved into the highlands to raise industrial crops. Rubber production rose, and new plantings of better varieties promised still higher production for the future. Sugar production doubled in 1958. South Viet-Nam was soon producing enough rice to resume exports. … Various small industries were established. Textile production rose from near zero to near self-sufficiency. Electric power nearly doubled. Per capita national income rose by 20 percent.

Thousands of new schools were built. Between 1956 and 1960, enrollment in the elementary schools rose from 400,000 to 1,500,000. The expansion of health facilities included new hospitals and 3,500 village health stations. Rail transportation was restored. Roads were repaired and improved, and three new major highways were built (2011s: C-32).

We see a correlation with a May 6, 1961 Task Force Report that highlights the commitment level of the US to a long-range economic development plan. How the above results were produced were substantiated by a plan of action from the following assessments and recommendations towards infrastructure sustainability in Vietnam:

(a) Agriculture - A 20 per cent increase of agricultural output is a feasible 5-year goal. Expanded extension service, additional agricultural credit facilities and greater use of fertilizer are called to meet this objective.
(b) Health Services - Present deficient facilities should be expanded through training of additional physicians, nurses, and technicians to provide for staffing of hospitals and local health centers.
(c) Education - Priority should be accorded to accelerated teacher-training programs with an augmented technical-vocational education program.
(d) Fishing - The deficient protein content of the Vietnamese diet can be inexpensively augmented by the provision of additional larger and specially
equipped fishing boats to provide for greater range and more efficient processing of cath.

(e) Roads - There exists an urgent need for further development of secondary road systems in the rural areas to permit more efficient marketing of agriculture products as well as to assist in exploitation of presently untapped forestry resources.

(f) Public Administration - To obtain effective government direction of essential public services, public administration training should be augmented at the national, provincial and local levels.

(g) Industrial Development - The present Industrial Development Center could be used to expand light industry, through additional resources and the improvement of managerial, entrepreneurial and technical skills (2011b: 117–18).

Specifically, (a), (d), and (e) place an importance on agricultural production.

According to U. Alexis Johnson, the reason why “the great powers” desire to flank Southeast Asia is because it provides “a lush climate, fertile soil, rich natural resources, a relatively sparse population in most areas, and room to expand. … It is especially attractive to Communist China, with its burgeoning population and its food shortages” (NARA, 2011v: C-28). Blocking Communist imperialism from access to territorial and agricultural production was clear. “[M]uch of the U.S. aid to South Vietnam in the years right after 1954, (estimated at over $1-billion), went to rehabilitate the agrarian economy and to settle some 900,000 refugees” (2011w: 24).

Deputy Director of Vietnam Working Group, Theodore J.C. Heavner, conceptualized the involvement of the US in South Vietnam in terms of a moral commitment. The Vietnamese, “on the frontier of the free world, are fighting not just for themselves but for all men who wish to remain free. I believe the 300-500 casualties they suffer each week is a precious contribution to the security of the whole free world” (NARA, 2011c: 40). The Vice President of the US concluded that the greatest danger Southeast Asia offers to nations like the US is not the momentary threat of Communism

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5 With an annual inflation rate of about 3.66%, this translates to $8,663,531,598.51 by 2014 standards.
itself, but “hunger, ignorance, poverty and disease. We must – whatever strategies we evolve – keep these enemies the point of our attack, and make imaginative use of our scientific and technological capability in such enterprises” (2011h: 163).

B. US Fiscal Policies & Recommendations “Behind the Curtain”

There was a need to implement fiscal policies to Vietnam by the Washington Task Force. In particular, it was urgently communicated to send in “a practical economic team, which should include representatives of U.S. business, to work out with the Vietnamese effective plans to speed up national development, give Vietnam a better tax structure, and establish a sound basis for foreign investment” (NARA, 2011w: 30). A National Security Action memorandum proposed direct instructions to move authority and funds into a rural development-civic action program. It would include impact projects undertaken by teams working with local communities, costing roughly $3–5 million. Directors of field teams would be given authority over the expenditure of funds, including use of dollar instruments to purchase local currency on the spot (2011l: 149).

Law and sovereignty hold true as the viable way to govern populations. The defence support of regular and para-military forces was given primacy over the need to rectify the growing gold and dollar reserve position of the GVN to avoid inflation (NARA, 2011k: 48). Moreover, early monetary reform was strongly advised as another source of revenue, with the Country Team recommending realistic steps to ameliorate the adverse economic effects of defence support (2011k: 48–49). In another case, a Vietnamese advisor conceded that it was impossible for the US to provide the Vietnamese with piasters.6 The main source of piaster revenues was for the GVN to

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6 This was a form of currency used by the GVN, which was later replaced by the đòng.
provide for a higher piaster return per dollar of US economic aid imports. It was thought that, “such an increase in piaster return per dollar of US economic aid would cause a rise in prices, [and would] create an irresistible demand for broad-based wage increases” (2011j: 175). Even though tension was thought to surround a wage-price spiral, the problem was acknowledged to be more political than economic (2011j: 175).

C. US Governmental Functions “Behind the Curtain”

Vice President Johnson’s trip to Vietnam was focused on obtaining agreement on how the US and Vietnam should view Vietnam’s security, “including the range of political, economic, and military actions required to preserve the freedom and integrity of that country” (NARA, 2011l: 145–46). Kennedy assured Diệm “continued interest in the social advancement and economic betterment of [his] people,” assisting armed forces in health, welfare, and public works activities in the villages (2011a: 134). Developing, political and economic conditions [will] create a solid and widespread support among the key political groups and the general population for a Vietnam which has the will to resist Communist encroachment and which in turn stems from a stake in a freer and more democratic society (2011l: 145).

A broad range of community development activities in the political and economic field was expressed. “Not only should roads, wells, schools, etc., be pushed forward, but village political councils should be created and an imaginative communications system should be established, geared to bring the rural people of Vietnam into the body politic” (2011b: 111). This draft was a program of action to prevent communist domination of the GVN; again, the dichotomy of the state and the public is non-existent.

Transparency is what exists between the state and public bodies. The hidden text sees the encouragement of the GVN to continue liberalizing its public information policies. This helps to “develop a broad public understanding of the actions required to
combat Communist insurgents and to build public confidence in the GVN’s determination and capability to deal with the problem” (NARA, 2011k: 50). By comparison, the surface text sees Kennedy commenting at a news conference:

Q. Mr. President, do you feel that you have told the American people as much as can be told, because of the sensitivity of the subject? Is that right?
THE PRESIDENT: … We have increased our training mission, and we have increased our logistics support, and we are attempting to prevent a Communist take-over of Vietnam. … We are attempting to make all of the information available that we can, consistent with our security needs in the area. So I feel that we are being as frank as we can be, and I think what I have said to you is a description of our activity there (2011o: C-17–C-18).

A program of action addressed to Kennedy called for increasing the population’s participation in, and loyalty to, free government in Vietnam, through improved communication between the government and the people (2011k: 53). The invisible practices are consistent with the literal and syntax components of visible statements.

D. Protecting & Tolerating Vietnam: A Trait of Ambivalence?

Kennedy’s address to the United Nations in 1961 reassured members that the US seeks for itself no base, territory, or special position in Vietnam:

We support a truly neutral and independent Laos, its people free from outside interference, living at peace with themselves and with their neighbors, assured that their territory will not be used for attacks on others, and under a government comparable (as Mr. Khrushchev and I agreed at Vienna) to Cambodia and Burma (NARA, 2011m: C-13).

Then a talking paper for the Chairman of the JCS for a meeting with Kennedy, produced roughly four months after the above address, highlighted that, “the preservation of a pro-Western orientation” was one extremely important objective to bestow upon the Diệm government (2011t: 438). There is one discourse saying that Laos should be neutral and independent without interference from other countries, and a second discourse that vouches for a preservation of Western customs and norms. Were the US governmental
functions, fiscal policies and recommendations, and infrastructure proposals politically
defensive tools against Vietnam? There were some strategies, such as psychological
programs to exploit “Communist brutality and aggression in North Vietnam” (2011k: 53).

In a September 9, 1963 NBC interview (NARA, 2011n: C-41), it was asked: “Mr.
President, in respect to our difficulties in South Viet-Nam, could it be that our
Government tends occasionally to get locked into a policy or an attitude and then finds it
difficult to alter or shift that policy?” Kennedy acknowledged that,

Yes, that is true. … So we are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the
area against the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the
Government there. That produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which
exposes us to some criticism (2011n: C-41).

The US is essentially supporting a government that they do not want to support, but do so
to protect the area. Almost two years prior to this interview, the hidden texts reveal that
the political circles were disgruntled with Diệm. The President from the United States
Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, said that, “It is a cliché that there is no
alternative to Diệm’s regime. This is politically naïve” (2011d: 416). Furthermore:

Where one man has dominated the scene for good or ill there never seems to be.
No one considered Truman an alternative to Roosevelt. … This is an optical
illusion arising from the fact that the eye is fixed on the visible figures. It is a
better rule that nothing succeeds like successors (2011d: 416).

History showed that change did in fact happen. Kennedy assumed that Diệm would be
safely exiled from the nation, but was assassinated by a CIA-backed coup d’état. The
chances of a non-Communist assassination or coup attempt against Diệm was predicted
by the Director of Central Intelligence to be “better than even” (2011u: 534).

E. Resistance for Liberation?
At the State Department in August 1963, Roger Hilsman, the President’s advisor, commented that the generals were not moving unless they were pressed by a revolt from below. Ambassador Nolting warned that, “in the uncoordinated Vietnamese structure anything can happen, and that while an organized successful coup is out, there might be small flurries by irresponsible dissidents at any time” (NARA, 2011g: 541). In one rolling wave of aggression and demonstration for political change, the US did not interfere with the coup that did eventually come into fruition. Eight days prior to the coup, Ambassador Henry Lodge sent a letter to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy that argued why the US should not thwart a coup:

We should remember that this is the only way in which the people in Vietnam can possibly get a change of government. Whenever we thwart attempts at a coup, … we are incurring very long lasting resentments, we are assuming an undue responsibility for keeping the incumbents in office, and in general are setting ourselves in judgment over the affairs of Vietnam (2011f: 591).

Stepping back in time to April 1961 represents the idea that a coup against Diệm’s regime and an assassination was lurking in the minds of politicians and state agents. In a proposition for unification within Vietnam, liberation was a central theme. By introducing teams of Free Vietnamese into the North would create the means for the people to liberate themselves against Communist controls and coercion. “Hope could be awakened by taking actions against symbols of Communist power: the railroad, the cement plant, and the modern printing plan in Hanoi” (NARA, 2011w: 31). Further, the internal liberation movement was to be affiliated with the government of South Vietnam, for which it would develop in the North along the lines of a political revolution. The goal was to free “the North of Communist control and eventually [unify] a Free North with a Free South” (2011w: 31). Fast-forward nine months to the Viet Cong ordering villages to
dig trenches and prepare combat villages in Communist-controlled areas. They would collect money from the peasants and plantation owners to finance the war against the state, and create a rice tax to build up supplies for future operations. “The campaign to assassinate all who try to implement this Government of Vietnam’s policies in the country-side is being intensified” (2011t: 431). A CIA liaison provided the ARVN monetary compensation for carrying out the coup. President Kennedy’s State of the Union Address revealed that: “The systematic aggression now bleeding that country is not a ‘war of liberation’ -- for Viet Nam is already free. It is a war of attempted subjugation -- and it will be resisted” (2011r: C-15). To exert a war of liberation against Diệm was widely communicated in the hidden texts though.

Kennedy’s speech at the Trade Mart in Dallas sums up resistance. Kennedy alludes to the subordinates critically questioning dominant power as a political struggle. This speech was never delivered on November 22, 1963, the day he was assassinated:

[This] Nation’s strength and security are not easily or cheaply obtained, nor are they quickly and simply explained. There are many kinds of strength and no one kind will suffice. Overwhelming nuclear strength cannot stop a guerrilla war. Formal pacts of alliance cannot stop internal subversion. Displays of material wealth cannot stop the disillusionment of diplomats subjected to discrimination (NARA, 2011q: C-45).

II. The Global Intelligence Files: StratCap

This second section of the research findings consists of the Stratfor emails from The Global Intelligence Files, concerning StratCap. Subsection A succinctly portrays StratCap’s role as a productive technology within Stratfor, in transfiguring intelligence for competitive financial market gains. The niche of StratCap is found in subsection B, with StratCap’s promise to fulfill accurate market predictions for their clients, settling

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7 See APPENDIX B: STRATFOR’S KEY MEMBERS & THEIR ROLES.
into the mindset of some of the executives. Following this, subsection C explores a specific example of predicting future markets with trading hard commodities, and the relationship with key players in the investment arena. Subsections D and E view potential business opportunities in Middle Eastern, Asian, and European markets. Business in the UAE, Turkey, Japan, China, Georgia, Ukraine, Greece, the EU, Eastern Europe/Balkans, and Cyprus further show how the role of corporate security intelligence is changing. Subsection F looks at the uncharted territory StratCap travels through with its risky business practices. Implications around state market-security are raised, including: intelligence sharing, legal, intellectual, and moral tensions between StratCap and Stratfor, administrative organization, and faith in analysts to predict the yield curve. How the Files’ StratCap reflects the practices of endarkened governance is seen below. All of the subsections are constructed as a ‘polyhedron’ with multiple axes of meaning about what endarkened governance reveals about secrecy. The practices do not reveal an alignment with neoliberalism, but that there are conditions for the securitization of governance.

A. StratCap: Transfiguring Intelligence

Stratfor’s goal is to “acquire, organize, analyze and distribute intelligence to its customers.” Customers range from published products that focus on international affairs, to Fortune 500 companies wanting to understand the international system, to the special relationship with StratCap (Stratfor, 2012cc: 2939187). Accordingly, Stratfor has two domains of expertise: the international system, where the political, economic, and military systems interact and influence each other, and the ability to acquire information globally through an over-watch system and intelligence operations. Further, its organization draws information in three ways:
1: A robust monitoring service that gathers published materials in multiple languages. …

2: Overt collections, in which analysts and executives cultivate and build relationships with official sources.

3: Covert collections in which individuals not known to be connected with Stratfor collect information from both official and unofficial sources (2012cc: 2939187).

Overt collections have an inherent bias in that knowing who the source is and what their interests are rarely provides any intelligence of value. Investors are then surprised because the source misled them or the source did not know of the intelligence (2012cc: 2939187). By contrast, personnel whose relationship is not known to Stratfor carry out covert collections. These are natives or long term expatriates in their areas. They maintain a network of sub-agents who do not know who they are working for, providing over watch (i.e. early warning on new events not yet known outside a small circle) (2012cc: 2939187). In addition, there are a group of operatives not known to the company that are trained in moving into a location and acquiring information. Covert collections yield the most value in obtaining information (2012cc: 2939187).

StratCap uses Stratfor’s intelligence and analysis to “trade in a range of geopolitical instruments, particularly government bonds, currency and the like in the world’s emerging markets” (Stratfor, 2012hh: 4020681). In an email by Morenz to Steward, the Principal at Capital Financial Resources (an investment and insurance agency in Austin, Texas), the business plan overview was outlined. Investors will be outside the company, StratCap has an exclusive arrangement to leverage the unique collection and analysis techniques of Stratfor to create an EM/Global Macro Hedge Fund, and the standard 2% management fee and 20% carried interest will be charged to clients. Morenz projects that StratCap will have $1 billion under management within five years,
where $40 million in revenue and a market value of $200 million will be the result (2012l: 2932383). Viegas denotes that hedge fund investors only look for “edge,” and “if you ask someone to tell you what is Stratfor’s “edge” to make global investment decisions based on their methodology, it does not come across” (2012o: 3887857). He discredits using email as a communications tool for fast financial markets. The alternative would be instant messaging when interfacing with human assets (2012o: 3887857).

Strategic and tactical intelligence have significant differences, as explained by Friedman in an email to analysts for training purposes. The former is focused on geographic areas, like regions or countries, and is built around language and cultural skills. The latter is focused on subject matter, like military, explosives, intelligence organizations, organized crime, or cyber attacks, and is built around knowledge of the subject (Stratfor, 2012q: 400413). Nevertheless, sometimes there are no events on which to report. Friedman expounds that the company must separate the noise from the significant: “I’m content letting some days go quieter than others. Then when we shout, we get their attention” (2012q: 400413). Readers may devalue what is being said if Stratfor writes to quota, insofar as it elevates the trivial to the important. “In the short run you can hype your numbers. In the long run, you lose credibility. Every piece we do needs to pass the significance test” (2012q: 400413).

“Money means a lot, so does travel, professional recognition, respect and the ability to do their work in a [creative] and exciting fashion” (Stratfor, 2012b: 2953497). The failure of the CIA is that it is too big and has too much money, according to Friedman (2012b: 2953497). Thus, the mandate for success depends on the following:

Ability to profit in both up and down markets: we will have low/negative correlations to traditional market indices and other hedge funds. Our ability to
predict crisis … will allow us to protect our client[’s] capital in tough markets and
capitalize on a non-consensus view.
Capital preservation: we will achieve outsized returns without deploying
traditional leverage and execute our public market trades in the most liquid asset
classes around the world (fixed income, currencies, commodities, equities).
Asymmetric risk / reward investment philosophy: our non-consensus views will
allow us to construct asymmetry and optionality in our trades. … We will exploit
inefficiencies and volatility in global markets.
Transparency: our philosophy will prioritize our investor[’s] needs and
requirements for disclosure to our portfolio exposures (2012aa: 2952466).

One particular example of Stratfor’s measure of success is the networked
relationship with the US government. Stratfor was asked to help the USMC and other
state intelligence organizations to teach them Stratfor practices and train them in
“becoming government Stratfors” (Stratfor, 2012hh: 4020681). This is an honour because
“the professional intelligence community is acknowledging us as being the gold standard
of [intelligence, and] we are being asked to use our honest and unhedged views to support
what is for Stratfor-an American company-its homeland” (2012hh: 4020681). Friedman
continues: “Our first lesson to the government is that intelligence organizations exist to
make decision makers uncomfortable, not to make them feel better about their decisions”
(2012hh: 4020681). Seven weeks prior to this announcement, in a weekly executive
report, Friedman was in Britain for a meeting with Kazakhstan’s foreign minister. The
‘intelligence channel’ in this case was how Kazakhstan is a critical energy producer and
the major power in Central Asia. He then spoke of the Marine initiative, where a 10-
person delegation flew in for this meeting. One of them\(^8\) controls the budget for the
defense intelligence, including NSA, DIA, and NRO (2012u: 408421). Present at the
meeting were the Marines, Special Operations Command, and the Office of
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. The funding will come from the third group,

\(^8\) Friedman estimates that “this woman controls about 80 percent of the American intelligence budget”
(Stratfor, 2012u: 408421).
the contract will run through the second group, so the first group get to ride free (2012u: 408421). One of Stratfor’s tasks is to train analysts in the DOD, starting with the Marines. The contract will be dual use: they can use what they learn, which can be “expanded to training projects of value to us with access to hundreds of analysts” (2012u: 408421). In the grand scheme, there is a benefit that is more than immediate money: “…having this gig is the ultimate in branding--when the Defense Department needed help in intelligence, they came to Stratfor. It runs the other way [too], but most of the world thinks we are CIA anyway so let’s capitalize” (2012u: 408421). Lastly, this initiative dovetails with StratCap: “It is our basic skills and intellectual capital that is needed (intelligence for [StratCap], analysis for DOD)” (2012u: 408421).

B. Predicting Future Markets

This subsection explores the philosophy of StratCap and its promise to fulfill accurate market predictions. “Financial markets are often dominated by psychology,” Viegas remarks (Stratfor, 2012ii: 3831904). This is a major theme that can last for days, months, or years. In 2008 through 2009, markets lived in fear with risk aversion.

I bring this up because information can impact individual security prices with varying intensity depending [on:] 1) value or uniqueness and 2) depth of market or scale. This point is very important for what we propose to do at StratCap because we need to understand what our ‘edge’ is and how we can add value (2012ii: 3831904).

Viegas inquires as to how they would use Stratfor intelligence to check whether the economic data is going to start turning negative. He believes that politics in Washington are divisive and the debt ceiling debate is likely to get more problematic. ‘Intelligence edge’ may not be there, but if they could know that the Washington situation was likely to seriously deteriorate, then it could be a lucrative trade (2012d: 400381).
In an email sent to the analysts at Stratfor, Friedman displays what constitutes economics for Stratfor. Approaching financial problems is twofold: benchmarking the process against historical events and focusing on the lowest level of economics (i.e. the production, consumption, and movement of goods) (Stratfor, 2012e: 2203109).

The most natural form of geopolitical economics is what was called “input-output modeling,” the physical process of the economy, what goes in and what comes out, added to which is supply chain--where it goes. … The physical movement of things, and their availability, gives us a real sense of the household [of economics] and is about what the economy is really about, which is consumption and production (2012e: 2203109).

What does Stratfor write about when predicting future markets? The answer is: “Economics in the classical sense, with a focus on assets, liabilities and debt, and never on debt to revenue” (2012e: 2203109). Stratfor also emphasizes classical economics on political economy; that is, when the political system does something meaningful (although rare). “Adam Smith understood that there is no such thing as a free market. All markets are political in nature and in a crisis, the market does not dictate, but the political system does” (2012e: 2203109). Friedman contradicts himself when he comments that they write forecasts when they have some basis for forecasts but will never forecast markets. He later argues: “From an analytic point of view we will be producing models that explain the underlying moment that determine what the financial markets will do” (2012e: 2203109). This apparently requires an enhanced focus on what he calls “the deep structures of the system” (2012e: 2203109), but goes no further to develop this concept.

The philosophy of Stratfor cites that economics as a discipline is a failure. Its failure to be predictive is rooted in the fact that it regards politics as alien to economics. Econometric models fail to be predictive because politics defines economic life, and because politics is predictive but not quantifiable (Stratfor, 2012cc: 2939187). Then what
is the framework for trading and investments? After returning from a trip to New York, Friedman sends an email to Morenz about quantitative models of trading. Traders view the market as a set of mathematical relationships, where their job is to constantly establish ‘asymmetric,’ or low risk, high return trades. As more traders are seeking asymmetry, they have no choice but to go with the math and ignore conviction (2012s: 3022786). Friedman fears that an unsustainable climax is approaching:

Too much money is doing the same thing at the same time for genuine asymmetries to exist. Plus, as we saw in 2008 and the quants, external events can overwhelm them. But even with external events excluded, the asymmetries have to diminish toward zero because with everyone doing the same thing and thinking the same way, asymmetries are unsustainable (2012s: 3022786).

Morenz replies to Friedman soon after by reminding him that Stratfor is breaking the mould by having information others do not. “We are, by definition, going to be placing uncorrelated trades,” because Stratfor has to have some sort of conventional trading process matched with intelligence-based analytics (2012s: 3022786).

C. The Gold Standard: Trading Hard Commodities

One area that StratCap gravitates towards is buying and trading hard commodities; so this short subsection lends insight on how these investment talks commence. A forwarded email from Morenz to Vessels outlined some current market themes, one of them being gold:

Recently, South Korea announced that it had purchased 15 tons of gold in November [2011], thus quadrupling its gold as percentage of total reserves. What does your intelligence say about other sovereigns doing the same? Is gold buying as reserves likely to continue, accelerate or slow down? How great is the desire of countries with large and growing reserves to diversify away from the dollar and [E]uro and into gold? (Stratfor, 2012ee: 2985769).

Haddad, a portfolio manager at Soros Fund Management, who manages approximately $500 million in a global macro trading strategy, first sent this email to Morenz. Since
2003, Haddad has been a member of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee, a group that meets quarterly to advise the Board of the Federal Reserve and the United States Treasury on market-related issues. He is a founding member of The Treasury Market Practices Group, a committee sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and comprised of market professionals that promote best practices in Treasury markets (2012bb: 2924358). The state-corporate symbiosis becomes clear.

Copper, another hard commodity, was depicted in an August 2011 portfolio review as their worst performer since they instituted it. “But I agree with the long-term thesis and it [being] structured as a long-term option that … depreciates very fast …” Viegas said (Stratfor, 2012dd: 2910262). He claims that now that they own it and if they can get the trade right, they can make 25 to 50 times their investment: “(remember - we are betting that China will force destocking of Copper at $8000 to $7000/ton and we believe … that copper prices would collapse) …” (2012dd: 2910262). StratCap needs to maintain dialogue with the China analyst who gave them this insight and make sure the thesis remains valid (2012dd: 2910262).

D. Business Opportunities I: Middle Eastern & Asian Markets

Subsections D and E outline potential business opportunities in Middle Eastern, Asian, and European markets. Before these two subsections begin exploring the kaleidoscope of StratCap’s practices, an explanation as to why they do not, and will not, penetrate the US market is important to clarify. Morenz declared that StratCap might be in need of a US policy position and economic prowess, to which Friedman disagreed. Not doing work on the US is a decision that goes back to Stratfor’s founding because: too many people already do it; it is impossible to do it without being accused of bias; and
there is a lack of expertise (Stratfor, 2012ff: 3020968).

At this point we are moving to dominate international reporting. Diverting our attention into [US] domestic is something we really need to discuss and on which I would vote no with current information and resources. How we secure [US] domestic information for [StratCap] is less complex as there are other good market oriented outfits doing that. We will own a sphere where there is little [competition] and much potential profit. I’m not excited about a sphere where there is huge information flows (2012ff: 3020968).

Markets that are of little competition with much potential profit that StratCap can capitalize on are Middle Eastern and Asian markets. UAE real estate would be a top sector interest for investment, with UAE politics being the primary source of information, specifically Abu Dhabi’s ongoing support for Dubai. According to Viegas, the “GCC region has relatively shallow markets, so there is not too much to be active in[,] most of what we’d look to do would probably have a government sector angle” (Stratfor, 2012k: 4010950). This is based on the premise that Abu Dhabi controls the UAE and has plenty of money: “There are many [tradable] companies and sovereign instruments in the UAE” (2012k: 4010950). Jordan is less relevant because it has very few tradable assets. In a separate email, Viegas comments on Turkey being a well developed capital market. Local research done by companies like IS Investment are widely available, so the real value comes from talking to the locals (2012j: 3857749). “IS Investment provides Corporate Finance, Investment Advisory, Asset Management, Brokerage and Research services to domestic and foreign investors” (IS Investment, 2003). Viegas wanted a more detailed analysis on a specific company, sector, or state security for acquiring insight into something that is going to become an “event” (Stratfor, 2012j: 3857749).

Transitioning to potential business opportunities in Asian markets, Japanese and Chinese markets will be focused on, along with a special project in Anaklia, Georgia. In
the same email sent by Haddad about current market themes, in the subsection, *The Gold Standard: Trading Hard Commodities*, Japan was noted as facing significant rebuilding, demographic, and deficit to GDP issues. He asked whether Stratfor’s intelligence expects any major changes in Japan’s macroeconomic policy to address its many issues. He asked if there are changes to currency policy or additional monetary easing (Stratfor, 2012ee: 2985769). Elsewhere, in a Reuters article link sent from analyst Sung, the Blackstone Group, a global investment and advisory firm, raised more than 2.5 billion Yuan for its first Yuan-denominated fund. Since then, rival private equity firms The Carlyle Group and TPG Capital, along with merchant banking groups at Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs have started their own Yuan-denominated funds, in hopes to raise more than 21 billion Yuan total (Vaughan, 2011; as cited in Stratfor, 2012f: 4253970). Stratfor researcher Taylor said that if they do see a trend, there is no reason not to use private equity as an indicator for the market, as such investments make up a huge proportion of the market. “[It] is a sign that the company isn’t bearish on China, but I’d stop short of saying they are bullish” (Stratfor, 2012f: 4253970). These funds could exist to capitalize on the devaluation of the Yuan (2012f: 4253970).

Analyst Bell confirmed that Australia’s corporate watchdog has launched an insider-trading probe into several executives of private Chinese firm, Hanlong Mining.

China has previously discussed diversifying its foreign-exchange reserves, which currently stand at about $3.2 trillion, away from the U.S. dollar, making it an attractive potential partner for institutions and governments that need a cash infusion. Though exports to Europe remain relatively strong amid a weak global economic recovery, concerns persist that European economic turmoil may have domestic ramifications at a sensitive time for China (Stratfor, 2012i: 3892542).

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9 Downward price movement in the stock market.
10 Upward price movement in the stock market.
Richmond, Director of International Projects and the China Director, said that in investing in Europe, the focus is on China purchasing debt of the GIIPS. China is only concerned in purchasing stressed Euro-debt if it can get collateral (2012i: 3892542).

Anaklia, Georgia is part of the Asian-European boundary and is seen as an impending lucrative investment. StratCap would facilitate discussion with potential American investors in this project that entails a tourist haven with participation from American hotel/casino operators (Vessels, 2011: 2-3). There are incentive offerings that include the Georgian government committing to reduced or no profit or property taxes for 15 years for the construction of hotels (2011: 4). The seaside resort area is projected to be the next tourism hub of the Black Sea, as well as a premiere destination for the gaming industry (2011: 3). The business proposal summary concludes with how attractive the opportunity for a hotel and casino development in a strategic resort destination is; how there is a strong commitment, including an incentive package from the state, to the development of the project; and how StratCap’s knowledge of the Georgian political process and key individuals involved in the project are advantageous (2011: 7).

E. Business Opportunities II: European Markets

Meredith Friedman recapped in a weekly report to Stratfor executives how Ukrainian sources in their database are inactive; reviving old sources and building out new ones was stressed. She introduced a financial analyst in the Ukraine (who was a gateway to dozens more just like him) to a Stratfor analyst. They “watch the Ukrainian and Polish markets and business, natural resources and energy and are on the cutting edge of their industry. … They also read STRATFOR every day” (Stratfor, 2012y: 2926940).
With internal chatter surrounding Greece’s financial crisis, Zeihan wrote an email to analysts in November 2011. A Greek referendum on whether to continue with austerity\textsuperscript{11} would almost certainly fail. It may be the Greek government’s negotiation tactic, but there is only one path that would come from a failed referendum: no austerity means no bailout funds, and no bailout funds means a near-immediate default\textsuperscript{12} (Stratfor, 2012gg: 1017759). Three steps out of seven from Zeihan are shown to give insight into what the European states must do to prepare for the Greek referendum if the Euro is to survive. First, transfer all non-Greek-held Greek sovereign debt to a disposal facility, likely one managed by the European Central Bank. A Greek default would make all of these assets worthless, so this would be a preemptive bailout for any entities unlucky enough to still be holding Greek debt (2012gg: 1017759). Second, facing a financial crisis, the Europeans would have to force a recapitalization of the European banking sector of hundreds of billions of Euros. “It may well cost France its AAA rating and almost certainly force a deep recession …” (2012gg: 1017759). Third, the ECB has been purchasing stressed state debt at the margins to reduce the financial pressure on the Eurozone’s weaker states (i.e. Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy). This is in violation of EU treaties. “Between the referendum deadline and the immediate need, the issue of ‘monetization’\textsuperscript{13} … will likely be forced into a crucible” (2012gg: 1017759).

Viegas explains that the investment thesis for Eastern Europe/Balkans is one of causality. StratCap has lost about $100,000, which is frustrating given that, “supposedly

\textsuperscript{11} State policies used to reduce budget deficits.
\textsuperscript{12} In this case, Zeihan refers to ‘sovereign default:’ the failure to repay national debt.
\textsuperscript{13} Generally speaking, purchasing debt increases the nation’s money supply; thus, debt becomes money.
“Stronger” nations like Slovenia have gotten murdaiized\textsuperscript{14} relative to their rating (“AA”) whereas a crappy little economy like Albania (rated “B”) is unchanged. Why? It’s market technical” (Stratfor, 2012dd: 2910262). He continues:

Hence, our trader instinct tells us that this relationship cannot hold and that when the supporting technical factor at work (namely EM fund inflows) reverses that the bottom will fall out of bonds like the one in Albania. Meanwhile being short here is very low risk and the gains are potentially very high. … [D]oes it sound right or wrong, what level of conviction does the research team [have] in supporting my core view? … [A]ssuming we are in agreement, then I need to be made aware of ongoing economic and political issues impacting these countries (2012dd: 2910262).

In the same portfolio review, Viegas features a position on Cyprus. He believes that the banks will not intervene since Cypriot banks can raise enough capital on their own to cushion the impact of economic contraction between Greece and Cyprus. Even if Cyprus requires an ESFS bailout, the risk at 70 cents or lower for Cypriot government bonds seems very low. Cyprus can continue to fund itself and that a new state will be fiscally prudent, but stubbornly supportive, of self-corrective measures. This will inspire confidence in the markets, where the bond should be materially higher; thus, he would buy $3 million Cyprus bonds (Stratfor, 2012dd: 2910262).

\textit{F. Risky Business}

If I understood the idea correctly, we are creating a hedge fund that seeks to gain a competitive advantage by exploiting a) Stratfor’s intel network - i.e. using information no one else has, and b) our unique geopolitical analytical skills - i.e. using information everyone could have if they cared enough. … [A]ren’t those the two pillars of our publishing model? Is there a risk that Stratfor publishing our regular pieces will compromise the exclusivity of our analysis and the profitability of our forecasts for StratCap? (Stratfor, 2012x: 400459).

Watch Officer Lanthemann asked these questions to Friedman in an email dated August 2011. Essentially betting against the market, asserting that privatization would raise

\textsuperscript{14} Figuratively speaking, this is a slang term used to express being murdered and brutalized.
investor confidence in economic outlook, then publishing an analysis was a concern of his. Lanthemann questioned whether it was a risk by sharing a valuable piece of information in a premature way. However, he does admit that publishing intelligence may not yield the influence necessary to change market trends, and that StratCap’s investment strategies may not be so obviously discernible from Stratfor’s pieces (2012x: 400459). Roughly one week after this email was sent, Friedman spoke to StratCap’s vision and potential risk of not capitalizing at peak moments. Stratfor has no choice but to grow, or else someone larger with deep pockets will enter the market they have created. The only protection is market share; to be so dominant a force that no one challenges them and their own deep pockets. Readers who are interested in what Stratfor has to offer, people with high standards in production and less forgiveness for mistakes, and customers who will buy the publication and not the mystique are the targets (2012hh: 4020681). He assures everyone that there is not a legal, intellectual, or moral tension between Stratfor and StratCap. StratCap is interested in broad ideas, but mostly in obscure nuggets picked up by intelligence that are usually of little interest to general readers (2012hh: 4020681).

The legal and administrative relationships of StratCap and Stratfor have to be worked out and reviewed by ‘compliance officers,’ people who make certain that they do not violate any regulations (Stratfor, 2012hh: 4020681). In a December 2011 international weekly report from Friedman to the executives, he called to internally designate a compliance officer responsible for overseeing all FCPA compliance for Stratfor. He also wanted to find out if the same person can oversee StratCap and Stratfor, since the former will already have a compliance officer to ensure SEC regulations are followed (2012z: 376926). Morenz notes that it is legal to get intelligence on foreign
countries and trade on it subject to FCPA, but it is illegal to capture intelligence on business and trade on it based on laws ranging from insider trading to intellectual property theft (2012cc: 2939187). Meredith Friedman reaffirms that StratCap does not want to ask questions of people directly employed or doing consulting work who have proprietary information from the company they want to trade with (2012p: 4005399).

To convert assets from intelligence into money, Friedman made Kuykendall understand there is a place in this world where Anglo-American law does not apply. “In the world [Morenz] wants to enter, Anglo-American law doesn’t apply and lawyers are regarded as interesting kidnap opportunities” (Stratfor, 2012r: 398855). What sorts of deeds would be committed outside US jurisdiction? Credence is found from Boudra, a newly hired analyst. Questions in Morenz’s banking experience in wealth management in illicit investment were evident: “[H]ow are banks purchased? How are projects/countries in one part of the world funded by countries in another? What does it mean when the US gives money in the form of aid to another country?” (2012c: 4590972).

Even though Stratfor is hierarchical in terms of business organizational management structure, Morenz sees risk if people are not informed. He wishes to decentralize information flow (Stratfor, 2012g: 2949654). Early on, Friedman welcomed Morenz on board since it would,

(a) allow me to build the company[,] (b) have an opportunity to participate in StratCap both financially and intellectually[,] (c) that I would retain control of Stratfor and of the money we accepted for purchase of stock[,] and (d) that management difficulties would be reduced by your presence on our board … (2012m: 399714).

With Morenz’s purchase of stock, increased spending money from Stratfor’s reserve will build the intelligence and publishing capability necessary for Stratfor and the foundation
for StratCap’s intelligence support. The single pool of money has been used to spend Stratfor reserves on “building our capabilities, the [$]2.25 million (less mounting legal fees) as a cash reserve and for marketing” (2012m: 399714). Friedman realizes that he must be aware of where he is drawing the money.

Lastly, the entire risk of the business itself is laid before Morenz with one simple question. Strube was, at the time, the Director of the Teacher Retirement System of Texas. He was responsible for managing the hedge fund strategy, due diligence, and portfolio construction (Finalternatives, June 11, 2012). Strube is more of a consultant in fleshing out some real issues that stand in the way of launching StratCap:

Your competitive advantage would be in determining how your analysts price fundamentals versus what the market is implying for fundamental pricing. i.e. Why do you think your analysts are better at predicting the shape of the yield curve versus Mr. Market? (Texas Retirement System of Texas, 2012: 2933192).

6. ANALYSIS

This section takes the themes presented in the research findings and critically analyzes how the *Pentagon Papers*’ Kennedy administration and *The Global Intelligence Files*’ StratCap reflect the practices of endarkened governance. The transparent public and internal texts in the *Papers* and the arcane market mentality in the *Files* connect the ‘polyhedron’ of what endarkened governance reveals. After these two subsections, subsection *III* views how we arrived at the present through the genealogical approach. This answers the second major question posed in the introduction: yes, welfarism does function to create the conditions for the disciplinarization of governance; and yes, there are conditions for the securitization of governance, but a misalignment with neoliberalism. This form of governance is state market-security. Subsection *IV* argues to fill the void in governmentality studies through the merging of endarkened governance,
and a critique on its usage. Subsection V contextualizes this thesis by using an info-politics model. It depicts: the conditions of discipline (transparency) and security (secrecy); how the practices of the bureaucracies align with welfarism, and misalign with neoliberalism; and how endarkened governance problematizes governmentality.

I. Kennedy’s Transparent Public & Internal Texts

The surface texts aligned with political and economic objectives, as indicated by US politicians and members of the state, with the hidden texts circulated amongst entrusted political circles. The concept of ethnocentrism lies in the subtext of many of these statements, both in surface and hidden texts. “Whitening” an area in supporting public infrastructure, like schools, suggests almost a ‘White Man’s Burden’ in acculturating South Vietnam. By providing foreign aid, it was noted that the US placed a heightened importance on sustaining agriculture. With the rich natural resources, the US wanted to give South Vietnam the tools, knowledge, and means of access needed for increasing agricultural output. These are blatant welfare state objectives that heed under Foucault’s concept of biopolitics: “hunger, ignorance, poverty and disease” (NARA, 2011h: 163) were the momentary threats. Furthermore, all angles are covered under a ‘moral commitment’ mentality with giving Vietnam a better tax structure; placing defence support over the need of growing gold and dollar reserves to avoid inflation, where the wage-price spiral was more political than economic; and enlisting state for the public so as to bring the rural people into the body politic. It is not a surprise that the state was deeply involved in the lives and decision-making process of populations for their betterment as a political and economic continuum. There were no stunning revelations that undercut the foundations of democracy. Concepts like “freedom,” “social
advancement,” and “welfare” were woven into the tapestry of remarks.

In one case, a trait of ambivalence arose because one discourse said that Laos should be neutral and independent without interference from other countries, and a second discourse said that the US vouches for a preservation of Western customs and norms. One could analyze this disconnect as seeing Vietnam as a Cold War pawn in the chess game of communist and democratic ideologies. Another analysis offers a causality explanation: Laos can only be neutral and independent once Western customs and norms are preserved. However, this second analysis still hints at the acculturation from the US. In another case, a trait of ambivalence followed the US when they claimed to support Diệm, but was doing so to defend against Communism. The CIA-backed coup d’etat was the result. If the main objective was to sustain the lifeworld of Vietnam with US aid and recommendations and ward off Communism, it did not matter that political circles were disgruntled with Diệm. If those two objectives were achieved, the US would have been content. There were no hidden agendas that did not correlate with the public transparency in media outlets, news conferences, and speeches.

The last subsection, *Resistance for Liberation?*, viewed political change through a coup for rights and freedoms. Knowing that the US could have prevented it from occurring, there was a need for change, so they decided to let the coup run its course. The US did provide monetary compensation for the ARVN to carry out their actions, and promised not to interfere. Kennedy tried to contextualize what ingredients were needed for such a tipping point to occur: “The systematic aggression now bleeding that country is not a ‘war of liberation’ -- for Viet Nam is already free. It is a war of attempted subjugation -- and it will be resisted” (NARA, 2011r: C-15). It was a culture of fear that
was trying to be conveyed, where Kennedy said that subjugation was being attempted on the people. Was Vietnam’s market originally free? By definition, liberation means to be set free from subjugation; the former follows the latter. If the population saw Diệm as an oppressive leader before the coup took place, it would be considered a war of liberation. It was not as if Diệm was thought to subjugate his population in the near future, and the Vietnamese people and US government began to see ingredients of a tyrannical state formulating. Guerrilla war, internal subversion, and the disillusionment of diplomats subjected to discrimination can overcome nuclear strength, formal pacts of alliances, and displays of material wealth (2011q: C-45). It may be a cliché, but the power of the people, with their pockets of aggression, great numbers, and ideas of freedom overrule that which is seen as oppressive governance. This has to be shown for people to understand the effects, to assemble, and then carry out actions.

Inclusive of this thesis is to show the need for transparency between states and populations, to see more clearly the practices and procedures of states as depicted in the Pentagon Papers. States need populations to govern so as to uphold the integrity of such values and norms that it wishes to maintain. Altogether, the lens of governance analyzed was that of the Kennedy administration. To comment on other well-known texts considered to be cover-ups and lies that were associated with the Vietnam War would be to go outside this boundary. To the extent of the Kennedy administration, discipline over security certainly prevailed in terms of how governance was to be administered. Specifically, economists, cabinet members, politicians, directors of field teams who had authority with expenditures of funds, the Country Team, and other “advisors” were tasked with collectively bettering Vietnam. The main purpose of exploring the Papers
was to anchor in thought how we arrived to the present ‘state market-security.’ Lines of
descent give detailed histories of when, where, under what circumstances things came
into being, how they come to seem coherent, and how they change (Walters, 2012: 118).

II. The Arcane Market Mentality of StratCap

Corporate security needs populations to provide security to, to withhold security
from, to entice to buy their products from a consumer standpoint, and to be the eyes and
ears for intelligence purposes. Markets are only a number’s game, with profits building
out of the energy of people; no people means no emerging markets, which means no
profits. Quite simply, StratCap is a hedge fund that uses intelligence under Stratfor for
immediate gains in future financial investment knowledge. They have a financial capital
dge over existing competition by looking to emerging markets. Furthermore, hedge
funds are risk-seeking investment funds, where hedge fund managers charge investors
operational costs and performance fees (Investopedia, 2014b). Certain subscribers to
Stratfor have access to the intelligence put forth by monthly newsletters and dailies.
There are no surprises that well communicated, accurately predicted intelligence
increases readership and profits. But when the intelligence is used for an elite group of
investors to bet on the market, Stratfor, via StratCap, has granted strict privileged access.
EM/global macro and event-driven hedge funds are the strategies employed by StratCap.
As explained, covert collections yield greater value in obtaining leading information, as
opposed to overt collections, which is obvious since intelligence is based on this very
premise. StratCap presents itself as a cryptic force, but the strategies used to invest in
certain opportunities is private and should be left to hedge fund managers and investors.

One question posed earlier was, how does neoliberalism promote “a state under
the supervision of the market rather than a market supervised by the state” (see Foucault, 2008a: 116)? Corporations and states are churning the market to wield it how they see fit. The DOD initiative contract, funded by the Office of Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and run by Special Operations Command, was to serve a dual purpose. Stratfor can use what they learn to expand training projects of value to them with access to hundreds of analysts for StratCap, all while providing analysis for the DOD, giving them world-wide branding recognition (Stratfor, 2012u: 408421). In layman’s terms, the population pays taxes that go directly to the state; the state spends a portion of the taxes on hiring Stratfor for their intelligence services for security; and this state “investment” benefits StratCap by using its intelligence gathered for their contracted operations for its hedge fund practices. It is a cycle of funding security while gaining market “edge.” Following the market crash of 1929, the SEC stabilizes the economy through regulatory measures to prevent another crash, enforce federal securities laws, “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation” (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2014). This is discipline over the financial sector (cf. Völz and Wedow, 2011; Iannotta, 2011). Dissimilarly, post-2008 saw a need for intelligence to drive state policies, not statistics. If national security is to secure at all costs and provide the greatest good for the greatest number (echoing Jeremy Bentham) in keeping populations safe, what happens when the private sector bends the rules? What happens when insider trading or intellectual property theft become accepted as the new normal? After all, they are for-profit and built around competitive business atmospheres.

Friedman claims that StratCap produces models that explain the underlying moment that determine what the financial markets will do. All markets are political in
nature and in a crisis, for which the political system dictates predictions on investments, not the market (Stratfor, 2012: 2203109). Politics defines economic life, so who better than intelligence analysts to connect patterns and trends in information? Consequently, uncorrelated trades will be placed from nuggets of information dismissed by other readers, investors, or corporate security firms. StratCap would rather own a sphere where there is little competition with much potential profit, instead of spheres, like the US, where there are vast information flows (2012ff: 3020968). Despite this ideal market niche, information silos are presented as an organizational issue. Here, information silos are information management systems that are unable to communicate in a timely fashion with other systems; this may include the various analyst departments within Stratfor, for example. It is still a hierarchical command-and-control model, but the fact that StratCap will be kept small signifies how every resource will be concentrated on. This marks the failure of the CIA since it is too big and has too much money, and is therefore wasteful, according to Friedman (2012b: 2953497). A decentralization of information to break these barriers was expressed, but is common to have these in most intelligence firms.

Betting against the market and asserting that privatization would raise investor confidence in economic outlook, then publishing an analysis that says the same thing was a concern of Lanthemann’s (Stratfor, 2012x: 400459). Timing is key to publishing the material for readers/consumers to gain that piece of intelligence they were scanning for. But by the same token, that piece of intelligence is also meant for the extremely wealthy: hedge funds are exclusive investments for wealthy investors. StratCap will give investors the first look so that they can be paid the operational costs and performance fees drawn into their contracts. It is not that StratCap is sharing information in a premature way as it
is about timing the release of intelligence found before other hedge fund managers, news media outlets, corporations, or politicians do. In one case, the Anaklia, Georgia Project was oriented towards American investors to build a tourist destination as American hotel/casino operators. Incentives from the state and StratCap’s claim to pristine knowledge on the Georgian political process and key individuals in the project raises two questions. If StratCap’s role between American investors and the Georgian government were of investor liaison and political liaison, would these two roles conflict in achieving a happy medium? American investors would be looking for a top dollar return on their investment and the Georgian government would be looking for increased tourism (thereby depositing wealth into their economy and creating wider business contacts). An equilibrium for both sides must be achieved; if one fails, the other will fall. Second, what do Stratfor’s practices say about corporate security? What functions must be taken on by corporate security agencies to achieve success? Their roles in this case include: hedge fund manager, investor liaison, political liaison, tourism expert, gaming industry expert, hotel/casino building property expert, financial expert, and so on. Is this how multifaceted an intelligence agency needs to be to contract business projects?

As networked contacts of Morenz, two key consultants outside of Stratfor/Cap’s agency raise questions in their association with whom they work (and have worked) for in giving financial advice and inquiries. Why would Haddad, a member of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee, a group that advises the Board of the Federal Reserve and the United States Treasury, ask if other sovereigns are quadrupling their gold percentage? Why would this same founding member of The Treasury Market Practices Group, a committee sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, ask about the
trend in gold buying as reserves? Why would he ask of the trend for countries to diversify away from the dollar/Euro and into gold (Stratfor, 2012bb: 2924358)? Additionally, why would Strube, a former Director of the Teacher Retirement System of Texas ask, “Why do you think your analysts are better at predicting the shape of the yield curve versus Mr. Market?” (Texas Retirement System of Texas, 2012: 2933192)? Markets do not predict. Corporate governance determines the influence of market trends. This explains why analysts are better at predicting the shape of the yield curve than the very thing they are predicting. Ultimately, this web of networked contacts of Morenz’ is important to see because at the centre of this web is his banking/financial experience in wealth management. “How are banks purchased? How are projects/countries in one part of the world funded by countries in another? What does it mean when the US gives money in the form of aid to another country?” (Stratfor, 2012c: 4590972). Black sites, black programs, and black budgets raise red flags with accountability and regulatory oversight.

III. The Genealogical Approach: Arriving at the Present

Kennedy’s public statements and internal documents were virtually identical in policy matters, political opinions, and personal opinions. There is no state today like there was in the early 1960s. Future markets will not withstand the folds of pressure built by the animosity of disgruntled people. In effect, the infrastructure will collapse on its own, as seen in the 2008/2009 financial crisis. This is known as a ‘Minsky Moment,’ where a market fails or falls into crisis after an extended period of market speculation or unsustainable growth (Investopedia, 2014c). The scope of this thesis situates the disciplinary ethos of the Kennedy administration to arrive at the securitization ethos of StratCap. What conditions allowed for its development and function? The thesis’ section
on the relevant scholarship worked backwards in setting the stage for security and discipline with their associated mentalities and rationalities for the market. Disciplinary state functions were transparent: quantitative statistics and methods used by states and scholars were available to the public through governmental reporting and scholarly verification (Deukmedjian, 2013b: 7). Moreover, the teams analyzing and making recommendations for policy were assigned tasks to correct instances of deviations. While discipline allows significant deviations to occur to identify subjects for corrective action, security allows insignificant things to happen to identify threats (2013b: 7).

The once central power-holding institution that regulated human capital in a centripetal manner has converted into the centrifugal-mannered concept of nodes. The regulatory state contrasts old style hierarchical command and control modes of regulation through the ‘public-bureaucratic welfare state,’ with new style decentred regulation through non-state agencies in networks and hybrid alliances (Crawford, 2006: 450). This emphasizes unrestrained entrepreneurial and financial risk-taking behaviours; therefore, the security apparatus must protect the market (Deukmedjian, 2013b: 10). This may suggest that there is a drain on the resources or strength that the state has provided in the past. The state now cannot provide substantial security to subjects and spaces (and to the market, more broadly). The state is more of a manager that leads to military, economic (fiscal), political, and security ends that take place outside itself. To put it as an analogy, StratCap equates to the US Treasury, while Stratfor equates to the FBI, CIA, NSA, and corporate security firms for hire. This is a new trend, but the mentality that “private does it better” is not. In explaining Blackwater’s purpose, Erik Prince (founder) stated that, “We are trying to do for the national security apparatus what FedEx did for the Postal
Service” (as cited in House of Representatives, October 2, 2007: 2). If FedEx is a private postal service alternative for the US Post Office, and Blackwater is a private security services contractor alternative to the US military, then Stratfor is a private geopolitical intelligence alternative that will train analysts in the DOD. This is but one practice that Stratfor performs that seems to be one of the most lucrative. They not only gain intelligence for training the DOD to fulfill their contractual obligations, but intelligence gained via the colossal amount of resources available can be used for StratCap’s purpose. Information to investor clients could be stored from the training sessions to be later sold by StratCap, as alluded by Friedman. In short, the stark contrast between the state in the 1960s and corporate security today represents the shift in mentality from discipline to security. The history in between is absent, but by looking at two points in history, the conditions of possibility can be seen for these data sets to exist in their respected ethos. The different rationalities to mentalities is posed as a “how?” question. The “why?” question is drawn from the understanding of the shift in features of governance: states performing disciplinary practices of welfare transition into corporate security in securitizing intelligence and financial markets.

Practices and discourses are of importance for this thesis, not the search for origins. This thesis does not trace the lineage of the welfare state, the neoliberal state, and its gradual progression into this current form of governance throughout history. Since the ethos of discipline reflects transparency, the surface texts needed to be compared to the hidden texts for the Pentagon Papers. The Global Intelligence Files were solely needed to examine how a corporate security agency operates. Because the ethos of security reflects opacity, surface texts would be of limited use since they do not reveal the
underlying practices. It would reproduce the disinformation by public relations committees, news media outlets, and frankly other scholars. The history of the present approach organized the different modes by which human beings are made subjects by endarkened governance’s modus operandi. Finally, Foucault (1984a: 83) remarks that thinking of “emergence” as the final terms of a historical development should be avoided. The emergence of state market-security is not the final stage. The textual evidence may appear as a culmination, but are actually episodes in a series of subjugations.

**IV. Merging Endarkened Governance with Governmentality: Filling the Void**

Morenz asks Kuykendall and both Friedmans, “[W]hy are you all so comfortable [with the] use of email to transmit sensitive info?” (Stratfor, 2012n: 2933318). It is suggested by de Lint (2004: 135) that corporate security agencies should become skilled in communicating using code: an ‘esoteric message’ for those in the know, and an ‘exoteric message’ to pacify or agitate ignorant masses. The esoteric message functions as endarkened governance: it avoids ratcheting down policy to mere populism, and fits with the bureaucracy’s invisible security protocols (de Lint, 2004: 135). Generally, endarkened governance’s terminology does not necessarily have to have a negative connotation. Just because Kennedy proposed an action to Vietnam that was not necessarily conniving, it could still be considered endarkened governance since it was kept classified as a top-secret text, signalling its function as invisible policy.

This thesis does not argue that endarkened governance is the alternative to governmentality by placing both theoretical frameworks on opposing terms. Endarkened governance should not be conceptualized as a binary opposition to ‘enlightened’

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15 See subsection *IV. Merging Endarkened Governance with Governmentality: Filling the Void* for a more in-depth analysis on this argument.
governance. It is argued that endarkened governance must be incorporated into the very premise of governmentality. This is why the public statements were directly compared to the internal documents when researching the *Pentagon Papers*. They both served the purpose of seeing if what was said in the surface texts aligned with the hidden texts. Ultimately, governmentality reveals how agents are assembled within specific powers and how domains are constituted as governable and administrable (Dean, 2010: 39). However, if researchers must rely on informational leaks, something has to change. Present leaks may either confirm or deny what has been accurately written in the past on state and corporate security practices. What is taken as truly raw data should be the epitome of governmentality: the governance of the present.

If scholars wish to research how a bureaucracy portrays its practices and procedures on the surface with what the public discourse says, then governmentality as a theoretical framework would suffice. But Foucault claimed that society has a political economy of truth of what kinds of discourse are true, what the mechanisms and sanctions are for distinguishing true from false, the techniques for acquiring truth, and the status of those who say what is true (Foucault, 1980: 131; as cited in Shiner, 1982: 384). If transparency is assumed in all governmentality studies, then this framework is flawed because we live in the age of opacity. Governmental discourse can be endarkened. Granted, this very trait of endarkened governance is a double-edged sword: these texts would only be available if they get leaked in the first place.

At this point, some questions linger. How will researchers know if some textual findings (through qualitative or quantitative methodologies) are endarkened? Aside from the blatantly obvious hidden texts found from WikiLeaks, some findings from the surface
texts may actually reflect hidden texts without researchers knowing. Elsewhere, the endarkened governance definition stated earlier fits the parametres of this thesis. Yet, future research may want to include other bureaucracies that administer governance, not just states and corporate security agencies. It is the art of expression in conveying the metaphors across to readers that is imperative. Lastly, would a text be considered ‘endarkened’ if a video that was withheld by the state was eventually leaked online, but was later found to have been tampered with? The hidden texts would not reveal present governance, therefore. Then how can researchers anticipate and check for crafted lies?

5. Towards an Info-Politics Model

This thesis is multi-layered with three exploratory levels. (1) The political and economical conditions of discipline and security create the basis for which: transparency correlate with discipline, and secrecy correlate with security. (2) The practices of the bureaucracies signal an alignment with welfarism (i.e. the state in the Pentagon Papers), and a misalignment with neoliberalism (i.e. Stratfor/Cap in The Global Intelligence Files). (3) Endarkened governance problematizes governmentality studies in that it relies too heavily on transparent texts. This subsection gives a contextualization of these aspects through the proposed model of info-politics.

Deukmedjian (2013b: 2; see Assange, Appelbaum, Müller-Maguhn, and Zimmerman, 2012) argues that over the past half-century a new politics has emerged: one surrounding the privacy versus the identifiability of populations, and the transparency versus the secrecy of states. The figure below depicts info-politics as having two dimensions, with x and y-axes. The x-axis sees privacy and identifiability oppositions. Regarding privacy rights, the very act of leaking classified texts is considered a tool of
resistance in revealing endarkened governance’s mode. Identifiability makes populations visible through state and corporate security strategies and tactics, like meta-data surveillance. The y-axis also sees two opposing variables: secrecy and transparency. Secrecy maintains state/corporate political objectives, coinciding with the identifiability variable, where this dimension can be summarized as hidden texts. A demand for transparency in governance by the public, alternatively, coincides with the privacy variable, where this dimension can be summarized as resistance. Ellsberg was the vessel of transparency in times of heavy-handed state intervention, whereas WikiLeaks is a vessel of transparency in times of state market-security.

![Figure 1. The x and y-axes of info-politics](image)

Whilst all four variables, both axes, and both dimensions are important to understand the balance between state/corporate political objectives and public/civil rights, the y-axis is the most applicable axis here. The ‘transparency’ variable and the ‘secrecy’ variable can be juxtaposed with the Kennedy administration and StratCap. Transparent states align with the disciplinary ethos; therefore, the surface texts mirrored the hidden texts. The genealogy illustrated the transition to state market-security initiatives. The hidden texts are an invisible security protocol unbeknownst to the public that had
emerged in times of a call for transparency. In an ideal world, symmetry between the y-axis would embrace the practices on behalf of states and corporate security agencies with a required commitment to transparency. Liberalism was always about finding the right balance between two spheres of state and market, public and private, the realm of the king and the proper domain of the merchant. Achieving equilibrium aside, this info-politics model serves as a depiction of this three-levelled thesis.

7. DISCUSSION

I. Information Leaks as a Means of Resistance?

When governance becomes increasingly endarkened through states and/or corporate security agencies, information leaks form a means of resistance. Historically, power was embedded in organizations and institutions, organized around a hierarchy of centres. New networks dissolve and disorganize hierarchical centres though. Contemporary information networks of capital, production, trade, science, communication, human rights, and crime bypass the nation-state, which has stopped being a sovereign entity altogether (Castells, 2000: 19). It is not Kennedy’s notion of guerrilla war, internal subversion, and the disillusionment of diplomats subjected to discrimination that forms today’s resistance. ‘State market-security’ is the brainchild of welfare and neoliberal models, for which the call for transparency has emerged as a tool of resistance. Unfortunately, Marxist explanations abruptly end here. The suppressed and the suppressors are polar opposites that point out the obvious: WikiLeaks is the check and balance on bureaucracies that retain secrets. Using a genealogy to analyze how political and economical conditions in the past have shaped the present, and using endarkened governance to comprehend how events unfold from hidden texts is the beginning. “What
is the next evolutionary stage after neoliberalism?” is a complex question.

The term ‘resistance’ can refer to Scott’s (1992) concept of ‘hidden transcripts,’ in that we are dealing with a realm of political struggle from the subordinates critically questioning dominant power. The term ‘infrapolitics’ waged by subordinate groups is beyond the visible end of the spectrum (Scott, 1992: 183). The act of leaking is considered a form of resistance beyond the political spectrum, obtained and used by the subordinates (i.e. the general population) against the dominants (i.e. state and corporate security agencies). People may use informational leaks to ratify decisions and change policies. This idea begs the question of whether it is actually resistance that frames the change in law. However, while it is important to seek functions of resistance, or hidden transcripts, this is not the focus. To explore the act of leaking as resistance, a genealogical view must first unfold with texts that expose secrecy-bureaucracies. Beginning with this inductive approach could point to research on leaking as resistance.

Sifry (2011: 189) calls for more information, plus the Internet’s power to spread it beyond centralized control, as the best defence against opacity and cryptic behaviour. Increased transparency is a necessary condition for the revival of trust. Raw state data alone is not all we need; contexts, stories, narratives, analyses, and engaged citizens are all vital too (Sifry, 2011: 133). After ideas and motives are used to awaken the masses of what the state market-security practices are, the tipping points for change can be isolated.

II. Revisions & Considerations for Future Research

Governmentality studies must incorporate endarkened governance as a viable theoretical framework to study hidden texts of bureaucracies that have a stake in governance. Scholars address questions that are relevant within the frameworks guided
by current forms of governance, but that does not mean that social research has to be subservient to the state (Alasuutari, 2010: 151). A critical approach should identify weaknesses of truth. If there is no finite reasoning or ultimate truth to reach in interactions through textual analysis, then a constructionist paradigm seems the most plausible to use. The world becomes crystallized based on the constructed nature of politics. Moreover, although this was not a traditional thematic analysis, a thematic analysis has limited interpretative power beyond mere description if it is not used within a theoretical framework that anchors analytic claims (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 97).

One critique of the methodology includes a mismatch of content in the data sets. Why not examine the *Pentagon Papers* with WikiLeaks’ *Afghan War Diary* (war-time rhetoric), or the *Church Committee* with *The Global Intelligence Files* (intelligence-led rhetoric)? It does not matter if the informational data sets misalign in content, for both texts convey once-hidden practices that reveal secrecy-bureaucracies. Clandestine remarks, ideas, and thoughts expressed can be, and most likely were, communicated outside the confines of these texts, at any rate. Other critiques remain. Researchers can only research hidden texts if they have been leaked, sometimes limiting topics of interest. Ethics must not be crossed with researchers actively infiltrating (hacking) websites, emails, reports, or documented texts, to name a few, of privately owned databases. Jeremy Hammond, political activist and online hacktivist, was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison and three years of supervised release for pleading guilty to one count under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The 10-year sentence for hacking Stratfor’s servers was denounced by Hammond as a “vengeful, spiteful act” designed to put a chill on politically-motivated hacking (Pilkington, November 15, 2013). Other cases have
been widely publicized, so at what cost will hacktivists continue to deliver raw data to the public? It is an understatement that ethics on behalf of hacktivists needs to be considered. Policy recommendations can only come to fruition or be entertained if what has been found has been comprehended by other scholars, news media outlets, moral entrepreneurs and other leaders of group demonstrations, politicians, and the public. Another issue is that too much information is disseminated for researchers to efficiently go through. Research for this thesis was at times a meticulous, daunting, and time-consuming process. Generating a manageable data set is integral for organization. And, occasionally, the *Files* database and the WikiLeaks website were taken offline for maintenance. Projected research timelines must take this into consideration.

8. CONCLUSION

In the securitization ethos, the practices and procedures of state market-security are best exposed through the analysis of endarkened governance texts. Our current ethos reveals states outsourcing corporate security, and with independent corporate security agencies, but cannot be revealed by a governmentality framework. Overall, this thesis contributes to governmentality studies by exploring how endarkened forms of governmental discourse must be merged. It reveals the changing landscape of how market-security is achieved and maintained by contemporary corporate security intelligence firms. In essence, addressing the two questions raised in the introduction section helped shape the organization of the thesis: how do the *Pentagon Papers* Kennedy administration and *The Global Intelligence Files* StratCap reflect the practices and procedures of endarkened governance?; and does welfarism function to create the
conditions for the disciplinarization of governance, and does neoliberalism function to create the conditions for the securitization of governance (Deukmedjian, 2013a: 53)?

First, the relevant scholarship section began with a critique of economics as a governmental rationality, then to the features of neoliberalism and welfarism. It worked backwards to set the stage for security and discipline, nodal networks, and governing through intelligence. By exposing the gaps in the literature, it was concluded that endarkened practices might be normative tactics that govern other domains, subjects, and forms of conduct (Lippert, 2005: 8), with no signs of neoliberalism or welfarism. Second, the theoretical framework section gave a concise understanding of governmentality. This was done by providing definitions, a brief literature review of scholars in the field, critiques, and explanations for why endarkened governance must be included. Third, the methodology and research procedures section detailed the genealogical approach and its theoretical orientation. The data sources subsection described how the Kennedy administration and StratCap were chosen and organized for final examination.

The research findings for the *Papers* comprised: the backdrop of how the US government supported the GVN through sustainability and productivity efforts, the hidden texts surrounding US fiscal policies and US governmental functions towards the GVN, Kennedy’s ambivalence towards protecting but tolerating Vietnam, and the forms of resistance by a coup d’état, the ARVN, and the US government. Subsequently, the research findings for the *Files* comprised: StratCap’s role as a productive technology within Stratfor, StratCap’s niche to predict future markets, examples in trading hard commodities and business opportunities, and StratCap’s risky business practices and implications. The analysis section viewed how the *Papers* and *Files* connect the
‘polyhedron’ of what endarkened governance reveals about the present. The Papers anchored in thought how we arrived to the current ‘state market-security’ form of governance. This genealogical approach answered: yes, welfarism does function to create the conditions for the disciplinarization of governance; and yes, there are conditions for the securitization of governance, but a misalignment with neoliberalism. The analysis section also made arguments for filling the void in governmentality studies through the merging of endarkened governance, and contextualized this thesis by info-politics.

The discussion section questioned whether informational leaks are a means for resistance, with the following concepts considered: power and state market-security, avoiding a Marxist lens, using a Foucaultian lens, trends in corporate espionage, ‘hidden transcripts,’ and a call for raw state data, contexts, stories, narratives, analyses, and engaged citizens. The subsection on revisions and considerations for future research was a reflexive look at studying hidden texts of bureaucracies that have a stake in governance. A critique in the mismatch of the data sets, limited availability of hidden texts, ethics, and the challenges of organization and timelines followed.

This genealogy revealed that state market-security rigs markets to produce an inflated, artificial hyper-reality of economics. Further research in ‘state market-security’ will hopefully define new faces of the polyhedron known as ‘endarkened governance.’ Its features need to be understood to understand present governance. This thesis enacted as an introduction to using endarkened governance in the governmentality framework to reveal practices not seen in neoliberalism. Impactful market politics are “supervised” by the state; the market does not supervise the political. This is not the traditional “open market,” “free trade” neoliberalism known to scholars. Admittedly, this thesis raises more
questions than answers. In the end, these data sets are mere drops in a sea of leaked texts, or windows on endarkened governance, that reveal murky politics.
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APPENDIX A: EXAMPLES OF MUNDANE SEMANTICS

One example of how the Pentagon Papers were mundane includes a news conference on May 8, 1963, when Kennedy answered a question about committing militarily to Vietnam but not to Laos. It is a general answer that does not get at any underlying implications as to how or why one is militarily advantageous over the other. It is quite vague. Kennedy responds,

Because the situations are different. That’s why the remedy has been different. We have had a commitment for a good many years to the integrity of South Vietnam. We are anxious to maintain the neutrality of Laos. It may not be possible to do so and it may be necessary to seek other remedies. But we have adopted what we considered to be, considering the geography, the history, the nature of the threat and the alternate solution – we’ve adopted for each country what we regarded as the best strategy. And we’ll have to wait and see what happens on them (NARA, 2011p: C-30–C-31).

An example of how The Global Intelligence Files were mundane includes one of the weekly reports from George Friedman to the executives. The report called to plan processes for “current realities of Stratfor,” provide a more collegial management style, “build out Stratfor,” “support StratCap,” require enthusiasm and commitment from the executives to the staff members, implement a hiring surge, and meet executives on a regular basis (Stratfor, 2012v: 2921290). These comments and directions are commonplace semantics for any given corporate head to communicate to his/her employees. Including this would merely regurgitate the normative, routine activities of any given corporation.
APPENDIX B: STRATFOR’S KEY MEMBERS & THEIR ROLES

At the time of release by WikiLeaks’ *The Global Intelligence Files*, George Friedman was the CEO of Stratfor and Chairman of StratCap. He claimed that he would be the main architect of the relationship (i.e. the flow of intelligence from Stratfor to StratCap), along with marketing, as he dubs his key role “information architect” (Stratfor, 2012a: 1216677). He is also responsible for designing and running the intelligence, analytical, and writing groups that produce the Stratfor products (2012h: 2931653). Don Kuykendall was the Chairman of the Board and President of Stratfor. He wanted to form an equal partnership with Friedman and Shea Morenz. In a heated email to Morenz, Kuykendall expressed his opinion about confining a Texas-based law firm to structuring deals and keeping out of the business side of it: “Your Jackson Walker guy consulted you on ownership interest????? Huh? [W]hat the hell does he know about what you, me and George are planning? I have a thousand examples of why lawyers should keep in their legal sand box” (2012t: 2919265). Enter Shea Morenz: previously a Managing Director in the Investment Management Division and Region Head for Private Wealth Management for the Southwest Region with Goldman Sachs & Co. (Stratfor: Global Intelligence, 2013). An email by Friedman entitled, “Labor Day Review of Where We Are,” introduces Morenz as StratCap’s president:

First, [Morenz] made an investment in Stratfor designed to give us the capital needed to build our staff and our marketing. Second, he proposed a new venture, StratCap, which would allow us to utilize the intelligence we were gathering about the world in a new but related venue-an investment fund. … Shea invested over $2 million in Stratfor and more in StratCap. In return he took a seat on Stratfor’s board and a minority position in Stratfor, whose control remains in Don’s and my hands (Stratfor, 2012hh: 4020681).

Kendra Vessels was appointed as Vice President of International Projects. There
are large areas of the company that do not have to do with publishing, such as StratCap, the United States Marine Corps project, and Stratfor’s relations with foreign potentates (Stratfor, 2012w: 4723072). She is in charge of the non-publishing projects that are external and sensitive to Stratfor, and is in constant communications with Friedman in reporting and speaking for him (2012a: 1216677). In relations to StratCap, her most important duty is to design the system connecting intelligence with StratCap’s traders (2012w: 4723072). Meredith Friedman, the wife of George Friedman and Chief International Officer, runs intelligence services for Stratfor and has the responsibility of reorienting capabilities toward StratCap needs. Sources run directly from her to StratCap or through a briefer. Peter Zeihan, the Vice President of Analysis, works with Friedman in developing models for interfacing intelligence and trading decisions. Korena Zucha is a trained and experienced briefer, overseeing the briefing process developed for StratCap and emerging as the primary contact between the two organizations. Also, Melissa Taylor supports Zucha. Alfredo Viegas is a trader who experiments with the use of intelligence to create portfolios (2012a: 1216677). Darryl O’Connor became Chief Marketing Officer, leaving behind his COO position to Jenna D’Illard, who merges the business side with the intelligence side. Reva Bhalla became Deputy Director of Strategic Intelligence, and Nate Hughes became Deputy Director of Tactical Intelligence (2012w: 4723072).
VITA AUCTORIS

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