1-26-2016

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Brent Patrick Taylor

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“that was the day them folks was like, we ain’t afraid no more”

A Community Case Study of the Ferguson Uprising

By

Brent Patrick Taylor

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of Psychology
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts
at the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

2016

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by

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November 13, 2015
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis and that no part of this thesis has been published or submitted for publication.

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ABSTRACT

The Ferguson Uprising was ignited by the August 2014 police killing of a Black teen in a St. Louis, Missouri suburb. In order to understand the Uprising, a community case study method is utilized which combines an analysis of the historical, political and economic context of Ferguson and North St. Louis County with an interpretive phenomenological analysis of interviews with 10 Ferguson area residents who participated in the Uprising. The study began by asking why such a militant uprising occurred in Ferguson. Through a reflexive process the study expanded to ask questions about the meanings community members held of the uprising and life in its aftermath. A series of meta-narratives tell the collective story of the participants. Through the combination of methods, a story emerges which demonstrates the racism, greed, and violence of the local bourgeois power elite and the stubborn resistance of ordinary people to this corrupting power.
DEDICATION

To Michael Brown Jr., James Boyd, Kajieme Powell, Dillon Taylor, VonDeritt Myers Jr., Antonio Martin and the rest of the over 1,100 brothers and sisters of all colours killed by U.S. police in 2014.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Ms. Kayla Lee, my research assistant who accompanied me to Ferguson for the participant interviews.

My committee members, Dr. Shelagh Towson, Dr. Reza Nakhaie, and Dr. Kathryn Lafreniere.

Dr. Dusty Johnstone for her guidance and unique ability to focus my eccentric research style.

My Mother, Father, Aunt Bobbi, and Uncle Finley.

I would also like to acknowledge the fearless and tireless Ferguson rebels as the inspiration for my scholarship and thank the people of Ferguson and North St. Louis County for their hospitality, openness and insight, without which this study would not have been possible.
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“that was the day them folks was like, we ain’t afraid no more”

A Community Case Study of the Ferguson Uprising

Prologue

“Wake up people! Stop pretending and acting like y’all don’t see this shit.

[Right.]

These people are literally killing these people.

[Yea.]

So they can shut the fuck up.

[Yea, yes indeed.]

And if the people don’t start fucking seeing this, guess what? They gonna be next. These people don’t want nobody to tell this story. It’s bad enough it’s already out.”

—Interview participants discussing the murders of two possible Grand Jury witnesses to the Michael Brown killing.

Introduction

"One day, to everyone’s astonishment, someone drops a match in the powder keg and everything blows up." —James Baldwin, from Fifth Avenue, Uptown (Baldwin, 1960)

The August, 2014 Ferguson Uprising was a spontaneous community rebellion ignited by the police killing of an unarmed Black working class teen named Michael Brown in the St. Louis suburb of Ferguson, Missouri (Bosman & Goldstein, 2014; Patrick 2014; Vaughn, 2014). In social psychology literature, events like the Ferguson
Uprising are known as ‘collective actions’ (Van Stecklenburg & Klandermans, 2007). The present study seeks to describe the historical, political and economic context in which the uprising took place, as well as what this context and the uprising itself meant to those who experienced them, and through these descriptions, to advance the general understanding of collective action, and advance the understanding of collective actions presently being taken against police violence in the wake of the Ferguson Uprising.

My interest in the Ferguson Uprising began when I started attending demonstrations there several weeks after the beginning of the uprising. Several months later, I began this research. A reflexive process unfolded as the study progressed from a secondary literature review to a process of interviewing Ferguson-area residents who supported and took part in the uprising. At the same time I was coming into contact with increasing numbers of Ferguson-area residents because of my own political activity in Ferguson. As often happens in qualitative research, and particularly research that occurs in the context of being a participant and an observer of a phenomenon, the focus of inquiry shifted as a response to new information and new perspectives.

Through this process, I settled on the following research questions: What were the general social conditions found in the Ferguson and metro St. Louis meso- (community) level ecological environment immediately prior to the uprising in terms of housing, economy, education and law enforcement? How were these conditions related to historical and contemporary social policies? What were the most important outcomes of the uprising? What meanings did 10 interview participants who supported and took part in the uprising give to their involvement in the uprising and to the meso-level conditions
found in their community before the uprising? What meanings do these community members hold of the aftermath of the uprising? What do they think the future holds?

In order to answer the research questions this investigation employs a community case study method which is intended to be “particularistic, descriptive and heuristic” (Merriam, 1998), or “revelatory” (Yin, 1993), rather than focused on a single thesis question or variable.

The study has two main components: Method One is an analysis of the historical, political, and economic context of Ferguson and the St. Louis metro area as well as some of the events and processes that occurred during and directly after the uprising. This analysis involved the collection and examination of various archival data. Method Two is an interpretive phenomenological analysis of the interviews I conducted with 10 Ferguson-area residents. The approach of the investigation is multidisciplinary; a multidisciplinary approach was necessary because individuals, the focus of psychological interest, must decide whether or not to participate in collective actions, however, these individual decisions are made in the context of historical and sociological parameters and affordances.

Together, Methods One and Two are presented in narrative form, and sub-organized thematically. Method Two has an overall narrative structure that weaves the descriptions given by the interview participants into three meta-narratives. Through the combination of methods, a story emerges which demonstrates the racism, greed, and violence of local St. Louis and national power-elites and the stubborn resistance of ordinary people to this corrupting power.
The end-goal of this research is not to produce a single thesis statement, to develop hypotheses for future research, or to modify existing social psychological theories of collective action. Rather the goal is heuristic: to provide answers to the research questions through my own interpretation as a researcher, and in so doing, leave it up to the reader to either develop hypotheses, question existing models of collective action, or to apply the conclusions to political action. However, in the discussion section I will clarify what I think are some major conclusions of the investigation. The present study is meant to be action or applicable research, the aim of which is to help further the interests of social movements against racism, police violence, and capitalism as well as provide some suggestions for future action based on what was found in the research.

The report is broadly structured in the following way: (a) a conceptualization of the events in Ferguson and a review of social psychological definitions and theories of collective action; (b) a detailed description of the methodology employed in this investigation; (c) an analysis of the historical antecedents of the Ferguson Uprising, the social context in which it took place, and some details of the uprising and its key outcomes; (d) an interpretive phenomenological analysis of the interview data collected from Ferguson-area residents; (e) a discussion of some of the possible implications of this study as well as its limitations.

**Literature Review**

**Why Ferguson ‘Uprising’?** In the present investigation, the events that occurred in Ferguson from August-December 2014 are described as an ‘uprising’. The choice of this descriptor is deliberate. Scholars (perhaps following the lead of law enforcement and
the mass media) have often fallen into the conceptual trap of characterizing such events as ‘race riots’ or simply ‘riots’ (Baldassare, 1994; Hundley, 1967; Olzak & Shanahan, 1996). The uprising in Ferguson did contain activities that could be characterized as ‘rioting’, e.g., setting fires, commandeering private property, and engaging in various confrontations with authorities. However, it also contained less militant activities like street protests, marches and rallies, as well as non-militant activities like prayer vigils and cook-outs (Geigerich & Bowen, 2014; Johnson, 2014).

In order to be inclusive of all the violent and nonviolent, and the transgressive and normative activities that occurred during that time, the term ‘Ferguson Uprising’ is used. This term is derived from both the use of the descriptor ‘uprising’ by the local Black press in St. Louis (Vaughn, 2014) and from the term ‘Los Angeles Uprising’ which has been used to describe what are popularly, and pejoratively, known as the 1992 ‘Los Angeles Riots’, an event that actually included a similar variety of activities as the Ferguson Uprising (Libcom, 1992). The term ‘uprising’ provides an overall heading to characterize the various activities which were described above in order to shed the label of ‘riot’; it resists the parsing of the violent and the non-violent activities and the legitimization of those that are non-violent; it makes salient the overt political character of all the activities; it gives legitimacy and dignity to actors who have been tried in the media as social deviants.

**Defining Collective Action.** The present investigation builds upon previous social psychological research on the correlates and determinants of collective action. However one of the problems in the area of collective action study has been to define what exactly collective action is and how to differentiate between its varying forms and
content (Wright, 2009). This problem is of particular importance in terms of conceptualizing the events in Ferguson and describing and interpreting the social psychology of the participants.

According to Wright (2009), an individual “engages in collective action any time she or he acts as a representative of [a] group and where the action is directed at improving the conditions of the group as a whole” (p. 860) with collective action defined as “any action that aims to improve the status, power, or influence of an entire group” (Van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009, p. 646). The term ‘collective action’ is more or less synonymous with ‘social movement’ (Opp, 2010).

Social Identity. These conceptions of collective action are rooted in theories about social and collective identity, and these theories constitute the primary framework for most contemporary research on the social psychology of collective action (Van Stecklenburg & Klandermans, 2007). From this prior research on identity, it can be concluded that an episode of the type that occurred in Ferguson is not possible without collective identity and collective identity is not possible without individuals who have a social identity as part of a collective: “in order to engage in collective action the individual must recognize [their] membership in the relevant collective” (Wright 2001, p. 413). Social identity refers to self-definition, the cognitive aspects of an individual’s identification with a certain social group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979); collective identity refers to the cognitions that individuals share with a group (Taylor & Whittier, 1992). The correlation between social identity and participation in collective action has been demonstrated numerous times (e.g. Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodriguez, & de Weerd, 2002; Sturmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jorger, 2003).
Identity is constructed, fluid, and contingent upon dynamic social conditions. As the Elaborated Social Identity Model holds: “identities should be understood not simply as a set of cognitions but as practical projects… identities and practice are in reciprocal interaction, each mutually enabling and constraining the other” (Drury, Cocking, Beale, Hanson, & Rapley, 2005, p. 310). Collective identity is an emergent phenomenon: “Identity is not a given fact, identity is a practical accomplishment” (Van Stecklenburg & Klandermans, 2007, p. 135).

Collective action is not possible without collective identity and individual recognition of collective identity (social identity). In addition, identity is fluid and constructed, based on practical conditions, and emerges from changing social circumstances. Psychological identity is shaped by past social development, and it also potentiates emergent social forces.

**Group Processes.** There is an important relationship between group processes and the social psychology of identity and collective action (Hirsch, 1990). Social psychologists often rely on sociological terminology and concepts, particularly those related to the Dynamics of Contention Model (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Van Stecklenburg & Klandermans, 2007). The Dynamics of Contention Model defines collective action as contentious, transgressive (non-normative or outside of normative political channels) “episodic, public, collective interactions among makers of claims… [these] claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants” (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 5).

**Form and Content of Collective Actions.** While there is an extent to which the above conceptualizations of collective action are valid and are necessary to understand
social movements, their explanatory power is limited as they relate to the events in Ferguson. The Ferguson Uprising was indeed a collective action or an episode of contention, and it fits with the above conceptualizations, as far as they go. However, although the events in Ferguson could be described as a ‘contentious episode of collective action’, this description could also be applied to the dynamics of, for example, Kristallnacht, or Operation Desert Storm. Although some scholars believe that “different forms of contention… result from similar mechanisms and processes” (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 4), Wright disputes this claim: “what happens when we consider that some forms of discriminatory actions…are also collective action, or that military action might fall within this purview…of… our broad psychological definitions of collective action?” (Wright, 2009, p. 877). On this basis, Wright suggests that “theorists [need] to develop a clearer and more elaborated framework that can capture key distinctions among… many different forms of collective action” (Wright, 2009, p. 873).

Broad social-psychological and sociological conceptualizations of social movements discern the most general form of collective actions, but fail to draw distinctions based on content. This failure can obscure important qualitative differences because: “Apart from each other, form and content, no matter how finely chiseled or precisely depicted, are only amputated fragments of reality” (Gollobin, 1986, p. 207). It is imperative to bring in contextual factors that can help to enrich descriptions in order to understand qualitatively different types of collective action and the social psychological processes that are a part of those actions. While some kind of collective identity is a necessary condition for collective action, and collective actions of varying forms may have some similar aspects, the objective political-economic conditions and the
relationship of collective action participants to those conditions, gives these identities and actions content. In this sense the homogeneous term ‘collective action’, as applied broadly to all manner of heterogeneous events has limited validity.

**Connection between Objective Processes and Subjective States.** Despite the importance of social movements in the contemporary history of 21st century North America, there has been a paucity of social-psychological research on collective action participation in the last several decades (Wright, 2009): “students of social movements have… neglected social psychology [and] social psychologists have neglected to study… social movements” (Van Stecklenburg & Klandermans, 2007, p. 195). Relative to the area of contemporary collective action research there is an even greater paucity of research on the subjective experience of objective chrono (historical), macro (institutional) and meso-level factors (Bronfenbrenner, 2009; Klandermans, 1996; Van Stecklenburg & Klandermans, 2007): “Social psychological approaches… often lack proper work on socio-political contexts” (Corcoran, Pettinicchio, & Young, 2011, p. 577). For example, an entire 2009 issue of *Social Issues* which focused on the social psychology of collective action did not have a single article which specifically linked objective chrono, macro, or meso-level factors to subjective experience (Van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009).

However, this has not always been the case. There was a substantial amount of social psychological inquiry into the connection between objective political-economic factors and the subjective processes that led to individual participation in the 1960s Black-led U.S. urban rebellions (e.g. Abeles, 1976; Davies, 1969; Sears & McConahay, 1970). Despite the relative lack of actual contemporary research, there is scholarly
inquisitiveness about the connection between objective processes and subjective states, and calls for further investigation of this relationship are common in the contemporary social movement field: “The relation between objective conditions, grievances and mobilization is perhaps the most hotly debated theme in the literature on social movements and social problems” (Koopmans & Duyvendak, 1995, p. 235). Van Zomeren posits “a key challenge for our field is to learn from and be inspired by models of objective factors that predict the occurrence of collective action” (Van Zomeren, 2013, p. 385). Opp characterizes the entire study of collective action as an understanding of what accounts for its genesis from both the individual and the macro level, what he calls a ‘structural-cognitive model’ (Opp, 2010). Van Zomeren states further that “[T]he key challenge is to bridge subjective (psychological) and social (structural) perspectives on when, why, and how people in engage in social protest… this is not just a theoretical concern -- a greater understanding of the interplay between individual and social conditions that foster mobilization has important practical consequences as well” (Van Zomeren et al., 2008, p. 504).

However, there is a barrier in social psychology which concerns its individual level of analysis: “Because of its universalistic theories [social psychology]… tends to be ahistorical… theories are not always good in taking the context of individual behaviour into account and in theorizing about how contextual factors impact on social psychological mechanisms” (Van Stecklenburg & Klandermans, 2007, p. 195). This is primarily due to the fact that social psychology research artificially restricts itself to an individual level of analysis. But Vygotsky cautioned that: “[when] thinking is conceptualized outside of concrete reality, it naturally becomes a movement of phantoms,
a parade of dead delirious figures, a dance of shades” (Rieber, & Carton, 1987, p. 88).

This is why the present investigation takes a multidisciplinary approach that triangulates individual level phenomenological data with macro and meso-level contextual data on the same questions.

There is interest in seeing such a multidisciplinary approach to this issue in the field of collective action research: “we see a future for a dynamic (interdisciplinary) social-psychological approach to collective action exploring both individual as well as collective processes in social movement participation that goes beyond a static individual level of analysis.” (Van Stecklenburg & Klandermans, 2007, p. 196). However, the importance of social-psychological processes internal to the individual cannot be dismissed: “the external provides the conditions for the internal to manifest and develop its inherent, basic nature” (Gollobin, 1986, p. 104); “external conditions will be efficient solely to the extent to which they succeed in modifying those inner processes” (Bunge, 2012, p. 336).

**Relevant Social Psychological Theories of Collective Action**

**Deindividuation Theory.** “Theories of deindividuation propose that it is a psychological state of decreased self-evaluation and decreased evaluation apprehension causing antinormative and disinhibited behavior” (Postmes & Spears, 1998, p. 238). Admittedly, deindividuation did not originally appear in the literature review for this study. Its inclusion was a response to a theme discussed by the interview participants that concerned the misunderstanding they felt many outside observers had of their activities. A comment from Keith Ablow, a psychologist who appeared on a Fox News discussion about the Ferguson Uprising sums up the academic origins of much of this
misunderstanding: “People wearing the masks have no identity and are empty inside” (Allon, 2014). Some people saw all the mayhem unfolding on the streets of Ferguson and attributed it to a lack of self-control and morals, and lurking in the shadows is the racist ‘ghetto underclass’ theory of Moynihan and Wilson (Moynihan, 1965; Wilson, 1989), a mythological account of the cultural pathologies of low-income Black people.

In some respects, this misunderstanding is an excellent commentary on the origins of deindividuation theory: “the idea of [LeBon’s] maddening crowd was born of social, economic and political challenges to the status quo in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.” (McPhail, 1991, p. 1). Since in LeBon’s conception the masses were ignorant and deviant, there had to have been a simple explanation for their sudden unrest that did not involve recognizing their intelligence and humanity. As should be apparent to the reader by the completion of this report, the Ferguson rebels held sophisticated understandings of the social context they were living in, and why they were taking the actions they did in response to this context.

However, there is something to be said for the role of group processes on the ‘crowd behavior’ of individuals, and the role emotional affect plays in individual participation in collective actions (Reicher, 1996). These are important considerations in several of the theories and models of collective action described below.

**Relative Deprivation Theory.** Relative deprivation theory has been one of the most popular theories used to explain the social psychology of collective action participation (Rudig & Karyotis, 2014). The ideas on which relative deprivation theory is based were first found in the writings of Marx and de Tocqueville (Davies, 1962; Gurney & Tierney, 1982) and empirical tests conducted with U.S. soldiers by Stouffer, Suchman,
DeVinney, Star, and Williams, (1949). The theory was formalized by Davis (1959) and reached its height of prominence in the study of the 1960s U.S. urban rebellions (Gurney & Tierney, 1982). The theory holds that when individuals perceive they are materially, politically or socially deprived as compared with their own past experiences, another group, other individuals within their own group, or an ideal state of being, they may feel a sense of injustice which can lead to frustration and anger, and this emotional reaction is associated with participation in collective action (Runciman, 1966; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984).

According to relative deprivation theory, participation in collective action is likely to occur in a context where one experiences deprivation that is perceived to be connected to one’s membership in a particular group (Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). The basic premise of relative deprivation theory is that “people’s attitudes, aspirations, and grievances largely depend on the frame of reference within which they are conceived” (Runciman, 1966, p. 10). The association of feelings of relative deprivation with collective action participation has been demonstrated numerous times (Rudig & Karyotis, 2014; Runciman, 1966). However when analyzed as a direct causal factor for collective actions, relative deprivation has not fared as well (Spilerman, 1970; Olzak & Shanahan, 1996; Rudig & Karyotis, 2014). Relative deprivation theory is valuable because it demonstrates that an individual’s conceptions of justice or other standards are conditioned by factors in their ecological/social environment and that a divergence of expectations and actualities produces negative psychological states.

However, there are problems with relative deprivation theory as it relates to collective action participation (Gurney & Tierney, 1982; Taylor 1982). First, in order to
experience relative deprivation an individual must be conditioned to have aspirational or upwardly comparative expectations (Correll & Ridgeway, 2003). In addition, the theory does not explain, in a causal sense, why, in the last instance, an individual actually participates in collective action; in other words, individuals do not feel deprivation and then decide to undertake collective action without an intervening process (Rudig & Karyotis, 2014). Notwithstanding the above issues, relative deprivation has been shown to be strongly associated with past events similar to the Ferguson Uprising (Crosby, 1979; Rudig & Karyotis, 2014). However, there are likely a variety of other social psychological factors that accounted for the type of collective action participation taken by Ferguson community members.

Resource Mobilization Theory. Resource mobilization theory is another theory used to explain collective action participation from both a social psychological and a sociological perspective. The theory became popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s partly as a refutation of, or alternative to, relative deprivation theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). From the social psychological perspective, resource mobilization theory emphasizes rational choice and efficacy as the primary psychological variables determining collective action participation (Jenkins, 1983). Resource mobilization theory holds that individuals are only likely to participate in collective action if they feel that it is possible to derive tangible benefits from participation, or otherwise alter social, economic or political conditions (in a word, efficacy) (Van Stecklenburg, 2007; Van Zomeren, 2013). The theory also recognizes that the material, organizational, or even psychological resources available to individuals impact their sense of efficacy, and therefore their potential to participate in collective actions (Calhoun-Brown, 1996). In
addition, some resource mobilization theorists propose that individuals make a cost-benefit analysis (a ‘rational choice’) before they participate in collective action, weighing the personal benefits that can be derived from participation against the possible benefits of non-participation, or the accrual of benefits to non-participating group members or ‘free riders’ (Opp, 2010).

Some resource mobilization theorists do not generally recognize social problems as the primary determinants of collective action or even as having an objective existence, maintaining that social problems only exist in the eye of the beholder (Koopmans & Duyvendak, 1995). Some others take a deterministic view that the existence or non-existence of resources or affordances determine individual participation in social movements as opposed to objective social problems pushing or forcing people to take part in them (Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977): “socio-structural conditions hinder or afford whether individuals view collective action as an appropriate and efficacious strategy” (Tajfel, 1978 p. 379).

Despite this limitation, resource mobilization theory is important for emphasizing that external social, economic and political opportunities and rewards, how individuals perceive possible solutions to social problems, and how they perceive the resources available to them to achieve these solutions, are important factors in determining collective action participation.

**Social Identity Model of Collective Action.** There are points of unity and overlap between the above theoretical approaches to collective action participation; i.e. social identity theory, relative deprivation theory, and resource mobilization theory. The most well articulated amalgamation of these theories is the ‘social identity model of
collective action’ (SIMCA). The SIMCA model was developed through a meta-analysis of collective action literature by Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears (2008). SIMCA holds that the relationship between social identity, perceived injustice, and perceived efficacy is what propels individuals to take part in collective actions and that these factors account for most of the variability in individual participation in such actions (Corcoran et al., 2011; Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

SIMCA is constructed out of parts of social identity theory, relative deprivation theory, and resource mobilization theory and has four key aspects. First, in harmony with the general conceptualizations of collective action previously discussed, SIMCA posits that group identification predicts collective action. Second, using aspects of relative deprivation theory, SIMCA holds that perceptions of group-based injustice predict collective action, particularly when this feeling of injustice includes affective components like anger. Third, using aspects of resource mobilization theory, the model holds that group efficacy beliefs, or the extent to which individuals think that collective action can be successful in altering social conditions, predicts individual participation in collective action. Fourth, SIMCA holds that social identity is the primary or cardinal social psychological basis for collective action and that social identity bridges group based injustice and group efficacy beliefs (van Zomeren et al., 2008).

SIMCA explains important aspects of the social psychology of collective action. The contribution of social identity to collective action is fundamental, and feelings of injustice tied to collective identity, and comparison to other groups, are also indispensable to understanding collective action. Efficacy is fundamental to any human activity because it is doubtful people would attempt to do things or to set goals they
thought were impossible to accomplish; the strength of efficacy varies relative to perceived resources. SIMCA is important because it connects these theories of collective action together into a three-dimensional model and demonstrates that individual participation in collective action is based on a fluid interaction between collective identity, collective feelings of injustice, efficacy and how individuals perceive the social world (Van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009).

The limitation of SIMCA is that it offers no explanation of how its four aspects are shaped by objective social circumstances or how collective actions differ qualitatively in content or according to the motivations of participants. Like the conceptualizations of collective action discussed earlier, SIMCA’s universalism eventually reaches a limit. SIMCA cannot differentiate between qualitatively different forms of collective action and creates a strange taxonomic category that can include, for example, both military actions and anti-war demonstrations.

Van Zomeren concedes some of these issues including the observation that SIMCA does not connect to any particular aspects of the political-economic environment: “although SIMCA integrates four core motivations to undertake collective action, it is not grounded in a larger theory about human functioning… what is missing, really, is the big picture” (van Zomeren, 2013, p. 385). SIMCA’s universalism is evident in the following statements: “collective action… does not have to be large or focused on the powers that be” (van Zomeren, 2013 p. 378); “the psychological definition further makes clear that collective action is not only about rare revolutions but also about everyday activism” (van Zomeren, 2013, p. 379). No distinction is made between uprisings like the one in Ferguson, and reactionary, elite-sanctioned styles of collective action like KKK rallies,
Nazi Pogroms, or the ‘affluent’ type of collective actions that are characteristic of New Social Movement Theory like, for example, the movement to keep the program ‘Jericho’ on television, or consumer movements that pressure companies to release new products (Buechler, 1995).

In light of this possible limited validity: “it is now time for scholars to focus on questions that require new theorizing and novel ways of thinking” (van Zomeren, 2013, p. 384). The remainder of the literature review is an explication of several theories of collective action participation that have not yet been amalgamated into three-dimensional models like SIMCA. These theories may help to specify the role of social contexts in fostering individual participation in collective actions and how these contexts result in what may be collective actions with qualitatively different content, but which outwardly appear to fit within within the parameters of the universal collective action category. Conceptual and theoretical specification is needed so the sameness of heterogeneous events, and individuals’ roles in them, do not obscure crucial differences.

**Rising Expectations Theory.** In the mid-19th century Marx and de Tocqueville independently pioneered the ideas that would become the ‘rising expectations’ and ‘relative deprivation’ theories of the mid-20th century (Davies, 1962; Gurney & Tierney, 1982; Marx & Engels, 1955; De Tocqueville, 1856). In the context of social movements, the rising expectations and relative deprivation theories provide a link between macro and meso-level processes and social psychology: “These key propositions are social psychological: they identify elements in individual experience that may link societal processes of economic change and political turmoil” (Taylor, 1982, p. 25). However the two theories are not synonymous; expectations are the psychological basis for deprivation
Relatively higher or lower expectations may also be responsible for the intensity of perceived deprivation.

Expectations are extrapolations from previous experience which manifest as implicit or explicit anticipations or predictions of the quality of one’s future experience or circumstances relative to prevailing personal or social standards (Davies 1969; Quintero, 2014; Taylor, 1982). Standards are sources of value expectations (Gurr, 2012) or meaningful criterions of judgment (Stone & Cooper, 2001) that are themselves relative (Correll & Ridgeway, 2003; Quintero, 2014). Standards could be based on many criteria such as self-standards, cultural standards or local standards. These standards are not absolute, but are relative to the development of economic forces and resultant aspects of the social superstructure (e.g., cultural, political, juridical, moral) (Marx, 1904). Standards are mental representations of the current state of social development and mediate the relationship between expectations and evaluations (Quintero, 2014). When an individual evaluates events, and their expectations are not met or are disconfirmed, the result is "the conscious experience of a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and present actualities" (Schaefer, 2008, p. 69).

In order to explain the contradiction that the strongholds of the French Revolution were the areas that had experienced the highest rate of positive social development in the preceding years, de Tocqueville (1856) proposed that increasing social development itself actually provided fertile ground for popular revolt: “it would appear that the French found their condition the more unsupportable in proportion to its improvement… Evils which are patiently endured when they seem inevitable become intolerable once the idea of escape from them is suggested”; “nations that have endured patiently and almost
unconsciously the most overwhelming oppression often burst into rebellion against the yoke the moment it begins to grow lighter” (p. 214). In other words, the general historical trajectory of expectations is to rise; expectations rise relatively, in relation to various social factors.

Marx provided further explanation: “Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature” (Marx & Engels, 1955, p. 94). According to Marx, expectations are shaped by objective social forces in class society: “the relations of production in which the bourgeoisie moves do not have a simple, uniform character but rather a dual one… in the same relations in which wealth is produced, poverty is produced also; that in the same relations in which there is a development of the forces of production, there is also the development of a repressive force” (Marx, 1955, p. 133). In other words, in a class society, inequality is the objective basis for rising expectations; no matter how much the conditions of the masses improve, when these conditions are viewed relative to the lifestyles and entitlements of the elite, they are found wanting. Marx saw that capitalism increased social development in numerous ways both politically and economically: “The rapid growth of productive capital brings about an equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social wants, social enjoyments” (Marx, 1956, p. 94). However, partly because of rising expectations: “in proportion as capital accumulates, the situation of the worker, be his payment high or low, must grow worse” (Marx, 2015, p. 313).

Rising expectations could mean one of two things: 1) Either the psychological expectations that have grown in a period of social development continue to flourish after
its reversal, or 2) psychological expectations outpace the rate of social development. In either case “manifest reality breaks away from anticipated reality” (Davies 1962, p. 6) for the individual.

The first meaning of rising expectations points to a localized explanation where uprisings like the one in Ferguson “are most likely to occur when… objective economic and social development is followed by a… sharp reversal” (Davies, 1962, p. 5), what Davies (1969) referred to a s a J-curve (an upside down ‘J’ where the stem represents a growth curve, and the hook represents a reversal of the growth curve). For example, because of a particular set of developments in St. Louis, particularly in the manufacturing sector, the city was for a time one of the biggest and wealthiest in the U.S. However, ultimately, because of capitalism’s general logic “the coercive laws of competition” (Marx, 2015, p. 161), the locally specific result was mass deindustrialization, St. Louis became one of the fastest shrinking and most impoverished cities in the U.S. (Jones & Baybeck, 2004; Moskop & Currier, 2015). In this scenario, rising expectations theory would predict that expectations rose with social development and stayed high in the downturn, resulting in deprivation.

The meaning of rising expectations theory would suggest that U.S. Black communities in general are experiencing rising expectations which are outpacing social development, and that Ferguson was simply the first in a series of such actions focused on redressing this imbalance. This interpretation would suggest that there were indeed localized factors that led to Ferguson becoming the opening salvo in a general Black-led rebellion across the U.S., but that these localized factors do not necessarily make Ferguson unique or point to any particular reversal of working class social fortunes.
Rather, Ferguson was a case of dialectical interaction between chance and necessity. The occurrence of a similar uprising in Baltimore in April 2015 gives credibility to this explanation (Rector, Dance, & Broadwater, 2015).

**Reflection Theory.** Reflection theory helps to explain how objective social and ecological conditions in a class society shape expectations. Reflection theory was first articulated as such by Lenin (Katvan, 1978; Lenin, 1927), elaborated in the field of pedagogy by Vygotsky (Au, 2007; Wertsch, 1985), and further developed in related theories by Piaget (Gollobin, 1986). Reflection theory elaborates the relationship between cognition and social/ecological (material) reality. It is essentially an ecological theory (Bronfenbrenner, 2009) of psychological development with a primary emphasis on social class. Lenin was interested in how ‘spontaneous’ rebellions, strikes, riots etc. were realized vis-a-vis the working class coming to a state of ‘consciousness’ about its objective conditions (Lenin, 1973).

The main propositions of reflection theory are: “cognition is a reflection of the external world by human consciousness;… reflection is a definite, fundamental, and universal property of matter while consciousness is the highest degree of development of that property;… true cognition is an adequate reflection of reality, and social practice is the criterion of truth” (Katvan, 1978, p. 87). As Marx and Engels wrote: “Consciousness is… from the very beginning a social product” (Marx & Engels, 1963, p. 158); reflection theory posits that understanding of this social reality as well as collective actions based on that understanding, even if it is an inchoate understanding, are inevitable. Lenin thought that riots, strikes, rebellions etc. were, as reflection theory would predict, spontaneous outbursts of embryonic class-consciousness, or an expression of oppressed
people’s nascent awareness that they were members of an exploited class within an exploitative class society (Lenin, 1973). The limitation of reflection theory, as with rising expectations theory, is that they are one-dimensional, and have not yet been connected to a model of collective action like SIMCA.

**Zone of Proximal Development.** Vygotsky introduced the concept ‘Zone of Proximal Development’ (ZPD) in reference to pedagogy and educational psychology as an aspect of “a general analysis of child development” (Chaiklin, 2003, p. 45). He defined ZPD as “the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers” (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86). The ZPD is a temporal and cognitive period of development during which a child is able to achieve the mastery of a task or a concept only with the help or prompting of a teacher, as they are unable to do it on their own. A very general interpretation of this concept, as a general aspect of the development of any process, offers an important way of understanding how an individual may reach a certain stage of development that includes collective action participation.

There are three general aspects of ZPD (Chaiklin, 2003): 1) Generality, where ZPD is not related to any particular set of developments but rather to development in general (Chaiklin, 2003). 2) Assistance, which refers generally to some thing giving a process direction, and applying a certain amount of stimulus to push it in this direction. 3) Potential of a process: “the presence of certain maturing functions” (Chaiklin, 2003, p. 43) which are the potential target of an intervention and which could move them to a higher level of development. An assumption of dialectical materialism is that all
development of things or processes, whether child development or the development of collective action, operates under the same very general laws (Gollobin, 1986). Vygotsky was applying dialectical materialism to the field of educational psychology, and in so doing identified the usefulness of the second law of dialectics -- quantity into quality (Au, 2007; Gollobin, 1986) -- in understanding human behaviour. This concept could therefore be applied to the study of individual participation in collective action. The zone of proximal development is in some ways analogous to the build-up of kinetic energy -- with a sudden push, like the police killing of a youth, this potential energy could turn into actual energy and be unleashed upon the authorities seen as responsible for the injustice.

Suddenly Imposed Grievance Theory. Suddenly imposed grievance theory posits that some new quantity of oppression, an objective expression of injustice, could break the equilibrium or inertia of everyday cognition and result in qualitative psychological or behavioural change: “resignation converted into insurgency” (Nepstad, 1997, p. 471). According to suddenly imposed grievance theory (Gamson, 2011; Walsh, 1981), an acute unjust event results in a transition where a quantitative increase in oppression (the unjust event) leads to a qualitative breakthrough: a psychological “leap…” [a] ‘break in continuity, to [a] ‘transformation into the opposite’” (Lenin, 1958, p. 359) where, for example, formerly terrorized community members turn into fully empowered rebels. The ‘moral shock’ (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995) of the acute event becomes “expressed in [a] form of political consciousness” (Gamson, 2011). This new political consciousness is the end of a process of development: “For all things the gradual begins and ends in the non-gradual, the sudden” (Gollobin, 1986, p. 152). Furthermore
“Once the process is set in motion, the social control actions of authorities may fuel it by suddenly imposing new grievances” (Gamson, 2011, p. 464).

Suddenly imposed grievance theory contrasts with other theories of collective action participation found in social psychology literature: “The resource mobilization perspective regards discontent as a constant rather than a variable, and ignores cases where suddenly imposed major grievances generate organized protest” (Walsh, 1981) or “objective conditions as such have little explanatory power” (Koopmans & Duyvendak, 1995, p. 335).

Similar to rising expectations theory and reflection theory, suddenly imposed grievance theory is one-dimensional and as of yet lacks a three-dimensional connection to other social psychological theories or models.

**Method**

The overall methodology for the present investigation is a community case study; the case study has two principal components: Method One is an analysis of the historical and contemporary meso-level conditions in Ferguson and metro St. Louis. Method Two is an interpretive phenomenological analysis of semi-structured interviews with Ferguson-area residents who supported and took part in the uprising.

**Research Paradigm**

No researcher can start from scratch without assumptions about the nature of the reality they are studying: “we must make a beginning: and a beginning, as primary and underived, makes an assumption, or rather is an assumption” (Hegel, 2010, §1). Whether implicitly or explicitly, every research method is shaped by a philosophical paradigm
(Olsen, 2004; Scotland, 2012), or a set of a priori assumptions: “advocates of a
perspective might pursue a research program without ever acknowledging it explicitly
and without being aware of it” (Opp, 2010, p. xiv). Despite the frequent omission of such
views in research contexts: “Nothing is more fundamental in setting our research agenda
and informing our research methods than our view of the nature of the human beings
whose behaviour we are studying” (Simon, 1985, p. 303).

Although a principal component of the methodology of the present study is
phenomenological, and I found this method to be extremely useful in understanding the
people who participated in the Ferguson Uprising, it does not follow that I accept the
philosophical or ideological parameters of social constructionism or symbolic
interactionism on which phenomenology as a philosophy or an ideology is predicated
(Smith, 1996). I have taken a materialist and dialectical paradigmatic approach to the
research questions, rather than a philosophically idealist or metaphysical paradigmatic
approach (Gollobin, 1986; Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006; Lenin, 1927).

The ontological approach of this study is materialist: “the external world exists
independently of consciousness and is primary… consciousness is dependent, derivative”
(Gollobin, 1986, p. 59). In this view, social problems are real and are connected to
objective social processes; it is the representations or interpretations of these social
processes that can be, to varying extents, reflective and constructed. Social problems
“depend on the human brain for their cognizance, but not for their objective existence”
(Gollobin, 1986, p. 304). Therefore social movement activity must also have a basis in
these objective social processes: “Just as reality is real, so reality is logical” (Piaget,
1930, p. 301). This view is distinct from those of extreme constructionism, relativism,
and symbolic interactionism, all of which tend to view social problems mainly as the
products of constructed meanings (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988; McPhail, 1994; Olsen
2004).

Husserl and Heidegger developed phenomenology within the confines of idealist
philosophy (Larkin & Thompson, 2012; Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006; Lenin, 1927). As
with phenomenology, the materialist dialectics (scientific philosophy) of Marx, Lenin and
Gollobin value the meanings that individuals give to events (people do “interpret and
understand their world by formulating their own biographical stories into a form that
makes sense to them” (Brocki & Weardon, 2006, p. 88)), and similar to Heidegger do not
“ignore the subjectivizing influences of language, culture, ideology, expectations or
assumptions” (Rennie, 1999, p. 6). However, in the last analysis, material reality exists
outside of consciousness and sets the parameters for human consciousness; consciousness
is derivative from material reality (Gollobin, 1986; Lenin, 1927). Alternatively, Husserl
and Heidegger “Bracket… out the whole question of whether a reality exists which is
separate from us” (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006, p. 105).

Epistemologically, or in the sense of how we know what we know, the dialectical
materialist paradigm holds that knowledge is shaped by an interaction between subject
and object (Piaget, 1972) but that subject and object are not collapsible in to one thing
(Gollobin, 1986; Lenin, 1927) Although a dialectical materialist view perhaps shares the
contention of Husserl or Heidegger that humans and their consciousness are a “part” of
reality or “embedded” in it (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006, p. 105), such a view would
reject Husserl’s negation of the distinction between subject and object (Gollobin, 1986;
Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006.) In materialist dialectics, there are both relative and
universal aspects to knowledge. This epistemological approach is distinct from those of constructionism and positivism, which respectively cling to the poles of the subject-object dialectic. Furthermore, given this interaction between subject and object, an investigation aiming to achieve an understanding of people engaged in a social process can overlook neither the objective social conditions nor the meanings that people construct based on these conditions (Olsen, 2004).

“Scientific activity cannot be separated from ‘communal or social activity’, which strictly speaking, is moral activity. Far from being external or alien to science, moral and ethical problems are ‘entwined in it’” (Churchich, 1994, p. 11). I am driven by a pro-working class theory of value (axiology); what is ‘good’ is justice for those who are oppressed and exploited by capitalist class relations and the ideology of racism (or ‘race’ as a variant form of ascriptive status) -- an inseparable aspect of capitalist class relations, at least in the U.S. My general support for the aims of the Ferguson rebels cannot be separated from this research, nor can my personal experience of police harassment and violence.

The methodology of the current study is shaped by the latter paradigmatic considerations and the idea that “the choice of approach should be based on the goals of the research” (Johnson, Burrows, & Williamson, 2004, p. 364). In terms of phenomenological versus empirical approaches, one approach looks only at ‘meaning’ and the other approach looks only at ‘causal’ relations between variables. Olsen (2004) states that the use of variables “stops us from looking more closely at the complex, differentiated underlying social reality” (p. 5). Given the subject-object dialectic, and the needs of the present study to use a methodology that elucidates the relationships between
objective conditions, a precipitating event, and a collective political struggle in a psychologically relevant manner, the study demands an examination of objective material conditions in addition to the meanings given to it (phenomenology) by the people living in those conditions.

People who experience the social issues under study should play a role in research: “nothing about us without us” (Charleton, 1998, p. Title). However, these people do not have a monopoly on the truth even though they are involved in shaping it. Cooperation is needed between investigators and investigated, as well as balance between phenomenology and political-economic reality: “the connectedness of things requires that inquiry should always be orientated toward completeness of connections, to all-sidedness as opposed to one sidedness” (Gollobin, 1986, p. 95). The current investigation asks social psychological questions that are inseparable from historical and sociological processes, and in general, social processes as a totality. To answer the research questions, the objective social context of Ferguson and metro St. Louis had to be analyzed, the research participants had to be asked what they think about the connections between their own frame of mind and the social context they live in, and the interactions and contradictions between the former and the latter had to be analyzed as well.

The present study has an action research orientation, but featured only elements of participatory action research. These elements of participatory action were co-learning, cooperative knowledge production, and consciousness raising (Israel, Schulz, Parker, & Becker, 1998) however, these were only by-products of the interviews. This outlook emphasizes the political nature of knowledge production, that knowledge creation should have roots in the experiences of ordinary people, that it should be directed towards social
change, and that the ultimate aim of research should be human liberation from class and race-based exploitation and oppression (Esterberg, 2002).

**Community Case Study**

The overall approach for the current investigation is a multidisciplinary community case study of the Ferguson Uprising that used two methods of data collection and analysis. Method One involved the collection and analysis of a data set of archival materials related to the historical and contemporary political-economic and social context of Ferguson and metro St. Louis. Method Two involved the collection and interpretive phenomenological analysis of a data set composed of in-depth interviews with 10 Ferguson-area residents who supported and took part in the uprising. As per the research questions stated in the introduction, the overall aim of the current investigation is to describe the political, economic and social context of Ferguson, to describe the meanings given to these conditions and to the Ferguson Uprising by people who were supporters of and participants in the uprising, and to interpret those meanings in the context of the political-economic and social context of Ferguson, as well as relevant social psychological theories of collective action participation.

According to McGloin (2008): "The case study methodological approach provides an intensive, in-depth method of enquiry focusing on a single real life case while using a variety of sources of evidence" (p. 53). The case study method has also been referred to as “in-depth study of an individual situation, institution, or process (Gilliland & McKemmish, 2004, p. 183). In the parlance of phenomenologists, the case study is ‘idiographic’ in the sense that it focuses on a single event in a single place (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006). Case study research is utilized by researchers “seeking to describe,
explore and/or explain complex and dynamic social systems” (Yin, 2003, p. 13), and allows researchers to “reveal the multiplicity of factors [which] have interacted to produce the unique character of the entity that is the subject of study” (Yin, 2003, p. 82). The case study method is a form of empirical inquiry that facilitates the exploration of unknown relationships between a phenomenon and the context in which it occurs (Yin, 2003). The key aspect of case study research is that it investigates a single phenomenon: an “intensive study of a single unit… a spatially bounded phenomenon… observed over a delimited time period” (Gerring, 2004, p. 342). Yin calls this a ‘revelatory case’ (Yin, 2003). The ‘unit’ (phenomenon), or the focus of case study research can be an individual person, a group of people, or an event or episode (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006).

Merriam (1998) describes the unique features of the case study approach as particularistic, descriptive and heuristic and this is how the present study should be conceptualized. The particularistic (idiographic) aspect comes from the focus on a discrete event, situation or, in this case, an episode of collective action. The descriptive aspect refers to the end product of the research, which should paint a picture that is as all-sided as possible rather than one-sided. The heuristic aspect refers to the case study’s effectiveness in enhancing the reader’s understanding of a phenomenon in such a way that the study extends the reader’s experience. This can also refer to the verisimilitude of the study, or its effectiveness in making the subject matter seem real to the reader (Creswell & Miller, 2000).

Yin (1993) describes this type of case study as descriptive. Gerring (2004) notes that many of the most influential case studies in the social sciences have been primarily descriptive. However, this descriptive aspect does not mean that the researcher has to
enter the research as a blank-slate nor does it negate interpretation. Yin (1993) suggests that in descriptive case studies, the researcher should begin with a thorough knowledge of theories and how they may apply to the phenomenon that is being studied. There is no such thing as ‘pure’ description as researchers have to make numerous interpretive decisions. The proper method is for the researcher to be reflexive about these decisions.

The case study approach is very flexible because it can “accommodate a variety of research designs, data collection techniques, epistemological orientations and disciplinary perspectives” (Corcoran, Walker, & Wals, 2004, p. 10). Gerring (2004) suggests that in some senses the case study can be properly understood as an approach rather than a method with ossified rules. Corcoran et al. (2004) suggest that regardless of the epistemological approach of the researcher, the case study method is an appropriate strategy for providing an in depth description of a phenomenon.

Although this is a community case study, ultimately the level of analysis is the individual. The end-goal is to describe why or how individuals chose to take part in or support the uprising, what their experience of their social environment was or is, as well as other aspects of their lives related to the uprising. Method One serves to describe the context in which these decisions and meanings were made.

This type of community case study approach has been used to study, for example, place attachment in urban neighbourhoods (Corcoran, 2002), the role of unpaid work in maintaining communities (Side & Keefe, 2004), the relationship of municipal governments to urban communities (Owusu & Afutu-Kotey, 2010), and prisoner perspectives on inmate culture in New Mexico and New Zealand (Winfree, Newbold, & Tubb, 2002). The community case study approach has also been used to study urban
collective action like that in Ferguson. Auyero and Moran (2007) used a case-study type method in which contemporary local circumstances were analyzed along with ethnographic data in order to understand the 2001 food riots in Argentina. The authors argued for the need to look at broad data about the context of the food riots but also to look at the dynamics of the episodes from the perspective of those impacted. Webster (1974) used a descriptive case study to attempt to understand the 'consciousness' of community members in the Durban, South Africa uprising of 1949. Because of the post hoc nature of the case study he did not have access to the participants however he attempted to reconstruct their perspectives through media accounts and interviews from the time period. Abudu, Raine, Burbeck, and Davison (1972) and Ransford (1968) used case study inquiry to examine the 1965 Watts uprising in Los Angeles, and Useem (1997) used a case study type method to study the Los Angeles Uprising of 1992. More recently, Farrar (2002) used a case study to understand community unrest in England.

**Method One: Archival Data and Analysis**

Method One is an analysis of archival data reported in a narrative form, and could be characterized primarily as a case study in and of itself, as it is an “in-depth study” of a community (Gilliland & McKemmish, 2004, p. 183). Essentially it is a case study that is part of a case study (a data set within a larger corpus). The analysis of archival data is descriptive; however the mere choice of what information to include or exclude is itself a form of interpretation.

The data were organized in an iterative manner that depended to some extent on themes or topics that emerged from the Method Two findings, and also according to what I found important or interesting. When themes or topics arose in the interview data that
social data could be used to shed light on, then more of those particular data were collected and emphasized. The final form of the Method One results is narrative, as the results have “sequence and consequence” and to some extent, the data were “selected, organized, connected, and evaluated as meaningful for a particular audience” (Riessman, 2005, p. 1). That audience is the interview participants, members of the Ferguson community, and more broadly those who supported or are interested in the uprising, regardless of geographical location.

The overall role of Method One in the case study was to provide more perspective in order to strengthen the results through triangulation (McGloin, 2008; Olsen, 2004), and to serve as a means to interpret the interview data.

There are many studies that have used such an archival approach to help build descriptive or other kinds of case studies. Kubrin and Weitzer (2003) used quantitative data regarding socioeconomic conditions as well as narrative accounts of homicide incidents in a case study of retaliatory homicides in St. Louis. Galster and Mikelsons (1995) used phenomenological data combined with archival documents in a case study of neighbourhood conditions confronting youth in Washington, D.C. Gandelman, Piani, and Ferre, (2012) looked at the physical aspects of neighbourhood deterioration and correlated them with participants’ attitudes to study quality of life in a neighbourhood case study.

The most important aspect of an archival case study of a community is to set parameters on how large of a geographical area to focus on (level of analysis), what type of social indicators to study, and what type of documents to use (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003). The most important of these parameters is choosing a level of analysis (Abadie &
Gardeazabal, 2003). The geographical parameters of the present investigation were defined as the city of Ferguson and the North St. Louis County area it is situated in. The focus defaulted to covering the census tracts contained within eastern Ferguson, particularly the cluster of low-income apartments flanking West Florissant Avenue where the uprising started. The census tract is the smallest unit of analysis for which there are available demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau (Galster & Mikelsons, 1995). However, public policy is not created for census tracts, it is created on the municipal, county, state and federal level. There are policies created on all of these levels that impact the census tracts that encompass eastern Ferguson. This investigation defaulted to a focus on this meso-environment; however, to the extent that the local Ferguson environment is impacted by larger macro or chrono-level factors (Bronfenbrenner, 2009), these factors were also explored. An example of a macro or chrono-level factor is the historical impact of U.S. federal low-income housing policies on eastern Ferguson.

The second parameter is to define what social indicators are included. The collection of archival materials in the present study have the following areas of focus: contemporary economic and political history, housing policy, educational policy, and law enforcement policy, as well as a brief overview of 20th century history of Ferguson, and to the extent they have impacted the social context of Ferguson, North St. Louis County and metro St. Louis.

The third parameter is to define the data sources. In the present study, both primary and secondary sources were utilized. The sources of the materials were limited to: U.S. Census Bureau materials, investigative newspaper and magazine articles; whitepapers; scholarly journal articles; scholarly books; Federal investigations; and municipal,
county, state, and national government websites and policy documents that can be found on these websites.

**Method Two: Interviews and Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis**

**Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis.** This interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA) involved looking for cross-sectional narratives, thematically analyzing the narratives, and interpreting the themes based on the findings in Method One as well as the findings of the literature review. There are two major aspects to IPA. The first aspect is the “the phenomenological requirement to understand and ‘give voice’ to the concerns of the participants” (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006, p. 102). This can be considered a ‘first order’, ‘descriptive’ or ‘representative’ account. The second aspect is “the interpretive requirement to contextualize and ‘make sense’ of these claims from a psychological perspective” (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006, pg. 102). This can be considered a ‘second order’ account given in light of other information or theory that is known about the subject matter the participants are discussing. This means that IPA is not strictly descriptive; owing to the second order analysis, IPA goes “a little further” than mere description (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006, p. 113). IPA can provide an “insiders perspective” on a phenomenon that people are experiencing (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006, p. 103). This requires reflexive analysis of the point where description ends and the interpretation begins and acknowledgement that the analysis cannot be “truly neutral” (Larkin & Thompson, 2012, p. 104) owing to the subjectivity (largely the ideology, philosophy and experience) of the investigator. However, from the materialist perspective, this subjectivity does not imply that the knowledge produced is solely relative; rather that knowledge has both relative and universal characteristics (Gollobin,
1986). It should also be said that merely sifting through the interview data, looking for narratives within it and identifying themes is also a form of interpretation.

There were two aspects to the second order analysis of the IPA in the present investigation. The first aspect was to interpret the voices of the participants in the context of the political-economic and social characteristics in the Ferguson area as found in Method One. The second aspect was to interpret those voices in the context of what is known about the social psychology of collective action as was found in the literature review.

**Narrative Analysis.** The overall mode of organization in Method Two, and indeed this entire report is narrative. “Narratives represent storied ways of knowing and communicating”; “What makes… texts ‘narrative’ is sequence and consequence: events are selected, organised, connected, and evaluated as meaningful for a particular audience. Storytellers interpret the world and experience in it; they sometimes create moral tales” (Riessman, 2005, p. 1). Unlike many approaches to research, I have put my political beliefs, experiences and axiology front and centre. Therefore in addition to narrative sequencing, the story of the Ferguson Uprising is told to some extent as a moral tale. To put this ‘moral tale’ in social psychological terms, I found clear lines of demarcation between anti-social behaviour, as displayed by the power elite and law enforcement authorities, and pro-social behaviour, acted out by Ferguson community members and protesters. The manner in which sequence and consequence are presented in this report is reflective of the phenomenological requirement to give voice to and interpret the participants on their terms. Narrative analysis is an aspect of the overall IPA that emerged
inductively from the actual process of analysis and was not planned a priori. This process is explained further in the results section.

**Thematic Analysis.** In the present investigation, thematic analysis is a component of the larger interpretive phenomenological analysis because IPA is reported in thematic form. Thematic analysis is a method for “identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 6). This method entails searching “across a data set to find repeated patterns of meaning” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 15) or subjecting the data to “qualitative analysis for commonly recurring themes” (Braun & Wilkinson, 2003, p. 30). Themes are identified through a process of “careful reading and re-reading of the data” (Rice & Ezzy, 1999, p. 258). In the present study thematic analysis was used to look for themes within individual interviews as well as cross-sectionally (Larkin & Thompson, 2012).

Thematic analysis is often characterized as a component of other methodological approaches such as grounded theory or discourse analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Ryan & Bernard, 2000). Thematic analysis has been used as an aspect of case studies in a variety of topics, for example, adolescent therapy (Floersch, Longhofer, Kranke, & Townsend, 2010) and youth literacy development (Lam, 2000). Braun and Clark (2006) view thematic analysis as a method with philosophical flexibility, that is independent of any particular theory or epistemology, and which can be applied in a variety of theoretical and epistemological approaches. “Through its theoretical freedom, thematic analysis provides a flexible and useful research tool, which can potentially provide a rich and detailed, yet complex account of data” (Braun & Clark, 2006, p. 5). However, given this
flexibility, it is important that researchers make their paradigmatic assumptions explicit (Holloway & Todres, 2003).

Themes or patterns within a data set can be identified in two ways in thematic analysis. The first is the inductive, data driven or ‘bottom-up’ approach (Boyatzis, 1998; Frith & Gleeson, 2004). Patton (1990) characterizes this approach as being primarily derived from the data itself. The themes that come out of this approach may have very little relationship to prior theory or to the questions the investigator asks the participants. In the inductive approach, data are coded without an a priori coding scheme and without an attempt by the researcher to fit the data into their own theoretical understanding of the phenomena under study (Braun & Clark, 2006). Alternatively, a purely theoretical, deductive, or ‘top down’ way of approaching a thematic analysis would entail fitting all of the gathered data into an a priori coding scheme (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). That approach is characterized as theory or analyst-driven. The approach to thematic analysis used in the present study utilized the inductive, data-driven approach of Boyatzis (1998) as well as the deductive approach. The deductive aspect emphasized interpreting the data in terms of the findings of the literature review and the findings of Method One.

As Yin (1993) has acknowledged, whether the inductive or the deductive approach to thematic analysis is used, in practice it is probably unrealistic for a researcher to completely disassociate their analysis of data from previous theoretical knowledge or personal bias, and Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest that it is impossible for a researcher to operate in an “epistemological vacuum” (p. 12). In the case of the present study, I was immersed in personal experience and study of Ferguson for more than a year. However,
Yin (1993) thinks that ultimately, prior theory is generally good for a descriptive case study.

**Interview Details.** I, along with a research assistant conducted in-depth interviews with Ferguson-area residents, all but one of whom participated in the uprising, and all of whom supported the contentious claims made by their fellow Ferguson-area community members against state-sponsored agencies, especially the police. The interviews were semi-structured in the sense that there were definite questions or prompts, but in practice the interviews had more resemblance to open-ended conversations, with my assistant and I remaining for the most part on the listening end. The interviews were purposively designed to facilitate this type of verbal exchange. The content of the data collected was often narrative and always rich with meaning. Our role as interviewers was to gather information pertinent to the study but also to make the participants feel at ease as if they were in a free conversation, rather than responding to rote questions.

**Research Assistant.** I have a dual in-group/out-group role in the Black community; I am White but I have lived in segregated Black communities. In theory, racialized perceptions held by participants, or even myself could have affected the quality of interviews in terms of getting ‘accurate’ responses. The participants’ perceptions of me may not have been congruent with my sense of self-identity and this perception could have biased the participant’s responses (for example not being as honest or forthcoming as they would be with a Black interviewer). Also, I am not consistently recognized as White, particularly when in the context of segregated, predominately Black areas. On the other hand, delegating the interview work out to a Black interviewer could have also
resulted in certain set of responses that may have been biased. In addition to racial considerations, since I sought to interview female participants, I thought they may be more comfortable, honest and forthcoming if a female interviewer was present. Therefore, I sought out a Black female research assistant, Ms. Kayla Lee from Purdue University-Calumet. We interviewed the participants as a dyad, one White and one Black, one male and one female. I thought this would negate bias in either direction and result in better data. The research assistant was an activist colleague of mine and was familiar with the Ferguson uprising, having been a participant.

There is no way of telling if this ‘accuracy’ was achieved (in hindsight, we could have asked the participants). However there were several indications that the multiracial dyad was a good choice and also that the racial perceptions of the participants towards me were not consistent (in other words sometimes I was recognized as White and sometimes as ‘unknown’).

Perhaps equally important, the research assistant was able to help me recollect and become more aware of the circumstances and context of the interviews that were not audio recorded. The presence of a second interviewer also made the trip to St. Louis and the interview process much more enjoyable and rewarding.

**Trust.** In the months since the Ferguson uprising began, I attempted to build a rapport with some community members and built trust by participating in demonstrations and lending support to protesters. Furthermore, vicarious trust was built more broadly in the community as a result of the activities of my activist/organizer colleagues. This undoubtedly had a positive impact on the interviews.
Participants. This sample consisted of 10 participants. Prior to the data collection I had planned to make a final determination as to the size of the sample on the basis of theoretical saturation, or the point in the data collection when additional participants are not providing any new insights (Bowen, 2008). However due to logistical constraints, saturation was (probably) not reached and 10 participants were all that could be obtained. Participants in the interviews included eight Ferguson residents and two residents of the immediate area around Ferguson. It should be noted here that Ferguson is not a large suburb in size or population and, from my observations, there is a great deal of exchange between Ferguson residents and those in the surrounding suburbs and St. Louis city. This is described in more detail in the Method One findings.

The participants were all over 18. Using freely-consenting adults simplified both the institutional ethics approval process and the ethics of recruitment.

The participants included two women and eight men. Females and males played leadership roles in the uprising equitably, and the general participation was multi-gendered (Pearce, 2014). Therefore in terms of recruitment, gender parity was the goal. However, the sample ended up being disproportionately male despite our efforts to specifically ask recruiters for female participants.

All of the participants were Black. As is described in more detail in the Method One findings, the cluster of low-income apartments in eastern Ferguson where the uprising started are highly (but not completely) segregated (Bogan et al., 2014). Non-Black participants were not excluded, but it was unlikely they would be included. Although the uprising became multi-racial, including White Ferguson residents, and Black, Latin, Asian, White and American Indian college students and workers from all
over the St. Louis metro area and the United States (Kiekow, 2014), virtually all the local protesters who started the uprising were Black (Geigerich & Bowen, 2014). As the present study concerns the genesis and mobilization of the uprising from its social epicentre, and particularly those who gave it the most energy, naturally the recruiting focused on Black Ferguson-area residents, particularly those who live in eastern Ferguson.

Other than the above aspects, the only inclusion criterion was that the participants took part in some aspect of the uprising or otherwise supported those who challenged state authority. This participation included attending street protests, political organizing activity, property destruction and re-appropriation, or any other of the cluster of activities that formed the totality of the uprising. Participants who engage in political activity as a full time occupation, often in addition to work or family responsibilities are referred to as ‘activists’.

**Recruitment.** I had built up a network of contacts in the Ferguson area since August 2014, and several people from this base of contacts acted as recruiters who helped to initiate a snowball sample. This snowballing or chain referral sampling was purposive, and there were several mechanisms in place to attempt to achieve a maximum variation sample. Several demographic variables -- specifically age, gender and socioeconomic status – would likely impact the participants’ views on the topic, so achieving maximum variation would have helped to achieve theoretical saturation. Although neither saturation nor gender parity was achieved, the sample of 10 interview participants included an interesting mixture of workers, students and activists from several social groups, all of whom had working class backgrounds.
The snowball sample started from two separate contacts. This was to provide some assurance that we would not interact with just one single social group. We were successful in this endeavour with recruitment branching off into two different social groups, one of which contained mostly activists and the other containing mostly workers and students who were not activists. The participants represented a fairly wide age range from 18 to 32.

Three people whom we attempted to recruit declined to be interviewed (one woman and two men). There were no specific reasons given for this except for one case where the person thought that an acquaintance was better suited to give an interview and that their thoughts or concerns would be properly covered by this acquaintance.

**Consent and Confidentiality.** There were two components to the consent process. The first was consent to the interview process itself. The second was consent to be audio-taped. Consent to both these components was verbal. The rationale for verbal consent was that, owing to the criminalization of the uprising by law enforcement, it most likely would have been considered a breach of trust to ask the participants to sign their names on an official document. Verbal consent also ensured ongoing confidentiality as there is no written record of any individual’s participation or identifying information. The participants were offered a letter containing information on consent, confidentially, and ways to contact myself and research supervisor if they had any concerns. Most of the participants were not very interested in the consent forms and were extremely open to being interviewed once they knew the our intentions.

**Anonymity.** Anonymity was not possible for several reasons. The first reason, obviously, was that the interviews were face-to-face. Second, the nature of the snowball
sampling technique meant that participants deliberately or inadvertently disclosed their participation to others they helped recruit to the study. Third, the recruiters could assume the participation of the next person in the snowball. Fourth, given the collective nature of the Ferguson community, there were always other people around when the interviews were conducted, and oftentimes other people who were not the subject of the interviews would join in the conversation (which yielded some interesting data). No participant saw this as a problem, and in fact, other people were welcomed into the interviews. Because of this collective approach the participants took to the interviews, several participants were interviewed in natural groups.

Confidentiality. Confidentiality was and will continue to be rigorously upheld (with the exception of the above-mentioned factors). The full contents of the interviews will not be disclosed to anyone except for the participants, the investigator, the research assistant, and the research supervisor. The audio recordings are and will continue to be kept in a locked file cabinet in a secure location on a flash-drive and not connected to any server. They will be kept in storage up to the successful completion of the thesis. They will be destroyed upon publication to make sure that the confidentiality of the research participants is maintained. Non-redacted or non-masked field notes will also be destroyed upon publication.

One problem that arose owing to the focus of the current investigation on Ferguson is that the location of the participants could not be masked. However, to the extent that it was possible without compromising the accuracy of the data, every effort was taken in the data analysis to mask or delete any identifying information.
The Interview Process. The collection of qualitative data took place in the form of in-depth, but loosely structured interviews. The term ‘semi-structured’ interview may imply more structure than what actually happened in these interviews, while the terms ‘informal’ or ‘open-ended’ interview may imply less structure than what actually happened. To be specific, each interview had certain aspects it shared with the others, but also had parts that were open-ended or specific to one participant. In this sense they were more like themed conversations. The interview style was iterative, and participant responses affected how questions or prompts were asked and which questions or prompts we asked next. Furthermore, the questions for the interviews were reframed or adjusted depending on what was learned in the interviews that preceded them. The interviews were carried out in a form that was more conversational and reciprocal than a formal interview. For example, there were times when the participants took over the interviews and started asking us various personal or political questions. There were other times when everyone broke out into laughter or made jokes together. There are certain factors that facilitated this: first, trust; second, verbal consent; third, the site of the interviews being in a familiar atmosphere; fourth, the fact that we had been a part of the protests and generally supported the contentious claims made by protesters. There was no minimum or maximum length to the interviews. The interviews began from the time verbal consent was obtained and they ranged in length from just a few minutes for the shortest interview to over an hour for the longest ones. The interviews averaged perhaps 40 minutes, but some participants were not as verbose as others, and some had to stop the interviews because of already scheduled commitments.
Questions. The questioning always began in the most general terms. The interviews were iterative and to some extent open-ended, so for the most part, they did not take the exact direction shown below. The general rule was to try not to ask any leading questions, and to be as general as possible at the beginning, allowing the participants to create their own narrative.

The participants were not able to review their interviews after they were transcribed for the purposes of the analysis. This is because of logistical issues (most importantly the fact that they are located in another city than myself) and personal preference (no invitation was offered and no one requested it). They were asked to think carefully about what they said and sometimes were asked to re-state their thoughts for our clarity.

Table 1

List of Questions

Tell me about your experience living in Ferguson.
Tell me about your experience living in Ferguson before Michael Brown was killed.
Tell me about any general thoughts you have about Ferguson/North County.
Do you have any general thoughts about the Michael Brown killing? About the community reaction to the killing?
Do you have any thoughts on the Ferguson police before the Michael Brown killing generally?
What were people’s mentality/feelings about the police before Michael Brown got killed?
What was the relationship between the police and community members?
How did you find out about the Michael Brown killing?

Tell me about the Michael Brown killing. How did you feel when you heard the news that he had got killed?

What did you think?

What did you do?

Who did you talk to?

How did this change as you got more information?

Tell me about the reaction to the killing.

Tell me about your reaction to the killing.

Are you from Ferguson or North St. Louis County; the metro St Louis area, the city of St. Louis? How long have you lived there?

How old are you?

Did you go to school in Ferguson/North County?

Do you live around West Florissant Avenue?

Does your family live in North County?

Compensation. Compensation should not be coercive. The Common Rule, which is a set of U.S. federal regulations designed to protect research participants, mandates that investigators should "minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence" (Staff Report, 2012). Many professionals who sit on research ethics review boards think that offering money as an incentive is coercive (Largent, Grady, Miller, & Wertheimer, 2012). I agree with this viewpoint. Therefore compensation was planned in the following manner: Upon first meeting with a potential participant, we obtained their explicit agreement to participate in the interviews in principle. After this agreement was obtained,
the participants were offered a meal at a local restaurant of their choice as a bonus for participating. In this manner, the compensation was not an inducement to participate, and participation was assumed to be un-coerced from the standpoint of compensation.

Moreover, food is a practical need of community members, and the sharing of food has been shown to facilitate conversation and create an amenable environment (Duke, Fivush, Lazarus, & Bohanek, 2003; Forthun, 2008).

In practice, only a few participants took the food compensation. There were several reasons for this. Several participants declined because they would not be able to share the food with their family members. Several others just didn’t want food. Several others actually offered and gave us food. By the end of the interview process (the last few participants) we decided to discontinue offering the food as incentive, because it was not working as planned, and people were happy to give interviews with no compensation. However other incentives were provided like giving several people rides to nearby locations.

*Location of Interviews.* Whether or not participants chose to accept the food, they were given the choice of where they wanted to conduct the interview: in a private or public location of their choice, at the restaurant where the food was procured, or at a central location secured for the interview process. In practice, almost all of the participants wanted to be interviewed in the exact location where we met them. These locations consisted of a front yard, a back yard, a restaurant, in a car, a participant’s house, and a community centre.

*Debriefing.* Participants were to be ‘debriefed’ at the end of the interview. In practice I just offered to answer any questions they had at any time during the interview
process, especially at the end. Participants were offered a list of community resources (which no one took) and given contact information so they could request a completed analysis of the data or voice any concerns.

**Field Notes.** As was alluded to in earlier sections, field notes were taken based on our recollections of the interviews. These notes included the individual circumstances of each interview (e.g. details of recruitment, location of interview, details of compensation), any aspects of the interview which were not apparent from the audio recording (e.g. demeanour or attitude of the participant), and our personal feelings or thoughts about the interview. We did not take written notes during the interviews.

**Saturation.** Tuckett (2004) suggests that “the point of data or information redundancy is comparable to data saturation… sampling continues until no new information is forthcoming or nothing new is heard in the case of interviewing…the point of data saturation is contingent upon concurrent data analysis and data collection” (p. 3). Saturation can be a controversial concept and there is some question as to whether or not it can be achieved (Bowen, 2008; O'Reilly & Parker, 2012). Much of the controversy surrounds negative cases (completely novel and unique cases) and participants who give very influential results (O'Reilly & Parker, 2012). There is no doubt that negative cases and influential participants exist. What if an influential participant was the one that we would have interviewed next if we had not stopped interviewing? On the other hand, there is actually some point at which new information becomes sparse (Tuckett, 2004). There were no truly negative cases among the participants interviewed for the current investigation; however each participant did give a unique perspective. There were some very important statements that were only given by one or two participants. As per the
theory of saturation, the first participants provided more new information than later participants. It is likely that by interviewing more participants, more new information would have been gained in the form of codeable data points; however it is not clear that new themes would have been uncovered.

Baum (2002) suggests that it takes 12-20 participants to achieve a maximum variation sample with saturation (p. 176). The present investigation achieved 10 participants. There is no doubt that some potentially influential participants were missed and total description of all meanings would probably have remained elusive no matter how many participants we interviewed. However, despite the lack of saturation, the goal of the interviews -- to extract rich descriptions of the meanings given to the Ferguson uprising from sample of Ferguson-area residents -- was achieved.

**Process of Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA).** There is often a lack of explanation as to how exactly data are analyzed in qualitative research (Tuckett, 2005). Therefore, what follows is a detailed description of the process. The process of analysis is often iterative and reflexive (Tuckett, 2005), and indeed the current analysis was subjected to minor amendments during the process. Some of the reflexive components of this process are found within the results section so the reader can understand the context in which certain research decisions were made.

There are an array of extant process models for IPA and thematic analysis. To some extent, owing to the inductive nature of this analysis, the method used in the present investigation was idiosyncratic. However, some highly cited models of qualitative analysis anchored this analysis. The process outlined here is a synthesis of Tuckett’s (2005) five-phase model, Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six-phase model (both processes of
thematic analysis), and also Larkin and Thompson’s (2012) model for doing IPA. Braun and Clarke’s (2006) and Larkin and Thompson’s (2012) models are extensive sets of general guidelines, while Tuckett’s (2005) study shows the process taken in an actual study. The three models are compatible but emphasize different aspects of thematic analysis or IPA (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Fereday & Muir Cochrane, 2008; Larkin & Thompson, 2012; Tuckett, 2005). Several other perspectives are present as well, notably that of Crabtree and Miller (1999), who used a combination of inductive and deductive techniques. This analysis had eight distinct phases: 1. pre-data collection, 2. data collection, 3. transcription, 4. familiarization/reading, 5. coding, 6. narrative development, 7. theme generation, and 8. reporting.

Although the current IPA is presented as a step-by-step procedure, the process was not totally linear and involved an overall iterative and reflexive process or “an ongoing reflexive dialogue on the part of the researcher… with regards to these issues, throughout the analytic process” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 10). Analysis should not be a linear process where the analyst just moves from one stage to the next. Instead, it should be a more recursive process, where the analyst moves back and forth as needed (Ely, Vinz, Downing, & Anzul, 1997). Tobin and Begley (2004) refer to this reflexivity and recursiveness as ‘interactivity’ and suggest that it should be applied throughout any process of qualitative analysis. Analysis should involve constantly moving backward and forward between the entire data set, the coded extracts of data that are being analyzed, and the final reporting of the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).

As a general rule, meticulous data organization is crucial throughout the entire analysis (Tuckett, 2005). Higginbotham, Albrecht, and Connor (2001) suggest that this
data organization is an iterative process that emerges through an interaction with the data. This was definitely the case in the present analysis. When it came down to actually doing the analysis, I had to go through a fairly lengthy process of trial and error, particularly in the preliminary coding phase. There was a great deal of stopping and starting and going back through the transcripts to clarify the process.

1. Pre-data collection. For all practical purposes, analysis begins at the start of a study, even before data are collected (Rice & Ezzy, 2000; Straus and Corbin, 1998). This occurs the moment that the researcher begins to engage with the literature (Rice & Ezzy, 2000). “The process starts when the analyst begins to notice, and look for, patterns of meaning and issues of potential interest in data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 15). Given my previous experiences as a participant in the Ferguson uprising, in-depth conversations with numerous residents, and rigorous study of Ferguson, this process of analysis had indeed started before the actual data collection. There are varying positions taken by scholars about engaging with the literature prior to the analysis. Some think this practice can result in an inordinate focus on some aspects of the data while other crucial aspects are ignored (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006). Yin (1993) suggests that in descriptive case studies, the researcher should begin with a thorough knowledge of theories and how they may apply to the phenomenon that is being studied. Furthermore, exposure to prior theory can also help to "enhance sensitivity to subtle nuances in data" (Straus & Corbin, 1998, p. 49).

While prior knowledge of a topic is important in developing a study (Yin, 1993), this prior knowledge can also bias the researcher from a very early point (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Reflexivity must therefore begin at the inception of the study, and the
researcher must be aware of potential bias (Hertz, 1996). This factor weighed heavily on the questions that were created for the interviews and the manner in which the interviews were conducted in the present study. I tried to remain aware of potential biases and attempted, through a reflexive process, to create an interview process that minimized bias and maximized the ability of the participants to create their own narratives.

2. Data Collection. Rice and Ezzy (2000) call data collection a ‘first run’ at viewing the data (p. 196), and this constitutes a distinct phase for several reasons. First, a chance is afforded to counter bias by clarifying with the participants through direct feedback what they meant when they said certain things (Luborsky, 1994). In this case, clarification only happened during the interviews, and there was no formal review phase afterwards.

Next, a ‘thematic log’ was kept during the research (Tuckett, 2005), which was composed of conceptual memos to aid in later analysis. Also, a field notebook with observational and other notes was kept (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973; Tuckett and Stewart, 2004). Field notes help to identify non-verbal behaviour that may be important to the context of the interview. Field notes can also assist in the reflexive process in case mistakes are made by the interviewer, or some type of changes need to be made to the interviews. The presence of a research assistant was more valuable than field notes or logs because we discussed each interview afterwards, and this solidified my memories of the contexts of the interviews. Because of the interactions with the research assistant, I have a remarkable recollection of the interviews.

Purposive sampling is most successful when review and analysis are done simultaneously with data collection (Olsen, 2004). Part of an iterative analysis that begins
in data collection involves understanding the point when the researcher has gathered enough information. Although saturation was not achieved, my research assistant and I walked away from the interview process with a satisfaction of the richness of the data that was collected.

3. Transcription. The transcription process for the current investigation was extremely labour intensive because of the average length of the interviews. Each interview was transcribed verbatim. Bird (2005) refers to transcription as a “key phase of data analysis within interpretative qualitative methodology” (p. 227). Boyatzis (1998) characterizes transcription as how the analyst first gets close to the data. It is the first way of gaining familiarization with the whole data set and it should not be looked at as a laborious process or a waste of time but rather as an opportunity. Braun and Clark (2006) advise that the transcript should be a rigorous, verbatim account of everything said in the interview, and that while there are ‘systems’ of transcription, there does not necessarily have to be a particular a priori scheme for doing them.

Braun and Clarke (2006) note that writing is a crucial aspect of the entire process of thematic analysis and that the researcher should not wait until the last phases of analysis to begin writing but should do it throughout. Writing should begin with jotting down thoughts and potential coding schemes, and continue throughout the whole process of thematic analysis. Miles and Huberman, (1994) refer to this as 'thematic identification' or 'memoing' (as distinct from the memoing that may take place writing field notes) (p. 56).

4. Familiarization/Reading. This phase is distinct from transcription but also distinct from the process of explicitly developing codes -- although code generation is not
out of the question. Writing may go on at this time, and ‘open codes’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 63) ‘tags’, ‘memos’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 56), or ‘marginal remarks’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 66) can be created, but there should be a distinct period of reading and rereading that follows transcription and precedes code generation. Larkin and Thompson (2012) refer to this stage as a ‘free coding’ stage where the initial subjective reactions of the reader or the influence of preconceptions are taken into account.

This stage was very uncomfortable and daunting because I, at least at first, was at a loss as to whether coding would actually be a part of the process, or what the codes would look like. After some deliberation and review of my prior research work, I decided that coding would be necessary in order to capture the meanings conveyed by the participants as well as to develop themes.

5. Coding. This stage generally begins once the data have been thoroughly read and the analyst is familiar with them. Following Braun and Clarke (2006) the coding was divided into two distinct stages. In the first stage, all of the previous familiarization with the data that had been written in notes, tags, and memos, and the initial lists or inventories of ideas about the data and what was interesting about them were used to test out ideas for codes. The various remarks and memos represented the inchoate coding scheme (Tuckett, 2005).

The coding was done on a computer and different colour fonts and highlighters were used to illuminate potential codes. Several copies of the transcript were used so that different schemes could emerge. Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest three tips for this phase: 1) To code for as many things as possible, 2) To not look at each code as completely discrete from the information which precedes or follows it -- in other words,
to take into consideration the context of the extract, and 3) To recognize that individual data extracts may fit into several different codes.

Tuckett (2005) suggests a specific method to characterize a code 1) To ask what is described by the extract, 2) To ask what it means, 3) To ask why you think it means what it means, 4) To ask what this particular coded extract means in relation to other coded extracts, particularly those that are from the same data item (interview). Going through this process with each piece of coded data should result in what Tuckett (2005) calls an ‘embryonic theme schema’ (p. 83).

Boyatzis (1998) suggests a process of inductive coding where a given data extract is seen as a code before it is interpreted as a certain meaning -- recognizing it as an important extract and as something distinct prior to a process of interpretation (Boyatzis, 1998; Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2008). This is what essentially separates the first stage of coding from the second stage. Boyatzis (1998) calls a code “the most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon” (p. 63).

As per the interpretive phenomenological approach, the coding was carried out in both an inductive and a theoretical manner: “Coding will to some extent depend on whether the themes are more ‘data-driven’ or ‘theory-driven’ -- in the former, the themes will depend on the data, but in the latter, you might approach the data with specific questions in mind that you wish to code around.” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 18). The entire data set was coded. However at some point, owing to the heterogeneity of the different interviews (or the lack of ‘reliability’ or homogeneity between them) I realized that coding was taking away meaning rather than adding to it.
6. Narrative Development. At the point when I became frustrated with coding I went to the opposite extreme and looked for the largest chunks of meaning I could find in a cross-sectional view of the data. These big chunks became the meta-narratives. The narrative development was completely spontaneous and I did not even know that I had actually done it until I spoke with a colleague. As is discussed in the results section, the meta-narratives were temporally structured and emerged from a coding scheme where I had coded for the time period participants’ had referenced in a given comment.

7. Theme Development. Once the meta-narratives were developed, the thematic analysis stage began. The actual practice of theme development was so recursive that all of the remaining stages basically collapsed together at this point. However, for the purposes of explication, I will stay with the stage organization scheme. Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2008) call this stage ‘connecting codes’ (p. 89). Tuckett (2005) calls it 'code consolidation' (p. 83) where the field notes (observational and theoretical notes) are brought together with the initial codes and 'theme schemas' emerge (p. 83). Most of the emerging themes fit cleanly into the meta-narratives (with some exceptions). Because the meta-narrative development fell outside of the processes of IPA and thematic analysis I was using, I followed Braun & Clarkes (2006) advice that “you need to retain some flexibility, and rigid rules really do not work” (p. 10).

What exactly is a theme? There are a variety of different answers to this question. The most general answer may be that a “theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.10). Ryan and Bernard (2000) believe that “themes are abstract (and often fuzzy) constructs the investigators identify
before, during, and after analysis” (p. 780) whereas Ely et al. (1997) have characterized themes as ‘reside[ing]’ in the data (p. 205). “An account of themes ‘emerging’ or being ‘discovered’ is a passive account of the process of analysis, and it denies the active role the researcher always plays in identifying patterns/themes, selecting which are of interest, and reporting them to the readers” (Taylor & Ussher, 2001). Therefore analysis is not just a matter of giving a ‘voice’ to the participants (Fine, 2002). Another consideration is to ask where the themes actually exist. Do they exist at the ‘sematic or explicit’ level, or at the ‘latent and interpretive’ level (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 13; Boyatzis, 1998). The truth is probably that themes do have an independent existence, but the analyst creates them to some extent also. The analyst constructs themes, however, without building blocks to make these constructions, the constructions would not be possible. In addition, different theme organizations could be found by different analysts with different perspectives.

The important thing for the reader to know about this part of the analysis is that it became highly recursive and interactive. I ‘discovered’ themes by beginning to write the results section and I then used these themes to organize the meta-narratives. This involved a process of creating ‘candidate’ themes and sub-themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 20). The candidate themes and subthemes were written about and then merged or parsed further depending on what relationship large passages taken from the interviews had to each other. This process resembled Braun and Clarke’s (2006) ‘reviewing themes’ stage or what Crabtree and Miller, (1999) call ‘corroborating’ and ‘legitimating’ of the coded themes (p. 170). Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2008) suggest a recursive and reflexive process for this phase (interactivity) (Tobin & Begley, 2004), where the analyst
searches through the notes from the previous stages to make sure that the themes are representative of the original coding scheme and data analysis. If they are, then the themes have legitimation.

Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest a series of characteristics about what counts as a theme. 1) “A patterned response within the data set” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 10). 2) Themes do not have to be a certain size, or appear a certain amount of times necessarily; the ‘keyness’ of a theme is not totally dependent on quantifiable measures, what is more important is that it relates to something important in terms of the research questions. 3) A theme might be more or less prevalent, it may factor heavily in some data items, or not at all in others. In ‘negative cases’, it may appear in only one data item. Patton (1990) suggests that themes should have internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity -- in other words that the themes should have clear identity (internal coherence) and also that themes as a whole are clearly distinct from each other.

At the end of this phase, it turned out that some candidate themes were not really themes, other candidate themes collapsed into each other, and still others turned out to be separate themes. Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest this phase concerns “identifying the ‘essence’ of what each theme is about” (p. 22). Also “it is important to consider how [the theme] fits into the broader overall ‘story’ that you are telling about your data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 23).

8. Reporting. Braun and Clark (2006) include reporting as a phase although some other scholars do not. It has been included here simply because the act of reporting is how I really made sense of the data. I relied heavily on large passages of data and mixing and matching these together into different thematic schemes. At some point there was no
distinction between stages and I was just writing; at this point the process was completely recursive.

Some other considerations for reporting are creating clarity as to: 1) What has been done in the analysis?, 2) Why it has been done?, and as Attridge-Stirling (2001) suggests is most important, 3) How the analysis was done. Many researchers do not give enough details about the analysis in their write-ups and this is problematic because there is a trustworthiness issue with many forms of qualitative inquiry in the first place (Attridge-Stirling, 2001; Creswell & Miller, 2000). Lack of details can merely exacerbate this suspicion. I doubt that this method could be exactly replicated, but at least I am disclosing what I did.

Finally, Patton (2002) suggests that the report should be very rich in details of the participant’s own words in quotes. This increases the verisimilitude for the reader and also increases the trustworthiness of the account. I have included a large amount of direct quotes form the participants.

**Results**

There are two major sections in the overall results section that correspond to the two principal research methodologies employed in this investigation. The first section contains an analysis of the archival data collected for Method One -- the social and political-economic contextual background of Ferguson and metro St. Louis, and the Ferguson uprising. The second section contains an analysis of the interview data collected for Method Two -- an interpretive phenomenological analysis of the interview data.
This results section also includes elements of what might customarily go into a discussion section, particularly as concerns my own reflexive commentary. The reasoning behind this is for the reader to understand why and how I made decisions in the analysis process, and how I personally responded to certain data. This is particularly important since I have not only described, but also interpreted the collected data on multiple levels.

**Method One: Social Context of the Ferguson Uprising**

The collection of the data analyzed in Method One involved both inductive and deductive processes. The data collection started from a definitive point and worked deductively in a logical progression, as one set of findings often implied the existence of another as of yet undiscovered set. However, other data were collected or reemphasized after the Method Two data collection as a response to topics discussed by the participants in the interviews.

The Method One findings are interpreted in several ways. The data are interpreted from a historical materialist perspective, and similar to the analysis of the interview data, the findings and analysis are organized in a narrative manner, with a thematic sub-organization. In addition the data that were chosen for this section, the way they were organized, and what points were emphasized are a reflection of the my own biases. The findings are constructed from a critical perspective of capitalist political-economy and political institutions, and an axiological perspective that values the lives and interests of ordinary working class people over those with power and wealth.

The analysis relies heavily in some places on several pieces of investigative journalism and investigations that have been published since the uprising. My intention is to present this information from a unique perspective and to put the information in a
context in which it has not previously been seen. The analysis is not intended to be encyclopedic or comprehensive, but rather to aid in the interpretive phenomenological analysis of the interview data and to familiarize the reader with the historical, social and political economic context of contemporary Ferguson.

**Brief History and Geography of Ferguson and North County**

“I Love Ferguson”—*Motto of the group ‘Friends of the City of Ferguson’, a community booster club formed in the aftermath of the Brown Shooting* (Friends of the City of Ferguson, 2015).

Ferguson is located in St. Louis County, Missouri 12 miles from downtown St. Louis city. It is situated in an area of St. Louis County called ‘North County’ which is distinctive from the rest of St. Louis County geographically, being north of Olive Boulevard, demographically, with a majority Black population, and socio-economically, with a relatively large blue-collar working class. (Duncan, 2008; U.S. Census Bureau, 2015d). North County is fragmented into dozens of small post World War II suburbs (‘postage stamp municipalities’) that form a patchwork—a drive of a few miles can take one through six or more of these small municipalities (Gordon, 2008). At only 6.2 square miles in area and with a population of 21,111, Ferguson is one of the largest of these suburbs (Balko, 2014; U.S. Census Bureau, 2015b). Within this patchwork of modest working class neighbourhoods, there are pockets of relative affluence and relative poverty, however North County is above all suburban, with green lawns, strip malls and wide tree-lined streets.

Ferguson itself is reflective of North County’s socioeconomic mosaic. Some areas, especially the western and central areas of Ferguson, are majority White but
racially integrated with middle-income Black and White neighbours living on the same streets, while some areas, particularly the poorest, are zones of apartheid segregation of Blacks (Massey, 1993; Rodden, 2014). The cluster of low-income apartments flanking West Florissant Avenue in the far eastern corner of Ferguson where the Brown killing took place is one of the segregated Black areas (Bogan, Hollinshed, & Deere, 2014; Bogan & Moskop, 2014).

Before the Civil Rights movement and especially before World War II, North County was a hostile place for Blacks. Blacks were largely restricted from living there and their activities while there were strictly curtailed. As Rothstein (2014) has shown, this was achieved through “racially explicit zoning” that limited the housing choices of Blacks to demarcated areas within St. Louis city. Legally binding residential covenants between property owners and realty companies excluded Blacks from most other areas (Rothstein, 2014). After World War II, government subsidies from the Veterans Administration and the Federal Housing Administration for suburban housing largely excluded potential Black homeowners. A variety of tactics including gerrymandering municipal boundaries and spot zoning were implemented to distance Black residential areas from White ones, particularly affluent White neighbourhoods (Rothstein, 2014). In fact, the existence of North County’s ‘postage stamp municipalities’ are explained to a large extent by various racial exclusion policies (Gordon, 2008). In the 1950s and 1960s ‘urban renewal’ and ‘slum clearance’ policies were used to move Blacks to certain areas of St. Louis city, particularly away from downtown development projects (Rothstein, 2014). Many Blacks that did inhabit St. Louis County during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century were live-in domestic servants, or lived in very small enclaves. As late
as the 1960s, Ferguson was known as a ‘sun-down’ town, meaning that Blacks were not generally allowed to be there at night (Johnson, 2015). As Rothstein (2014) has suggested, official public policy is, to a large extent, at the root of Ferguson’s segregation, and the segregation patterns of the past have laid some of the basis for the segregation patterns of the present. However, Ferguson was settled by large numbers of Blacks long after the Jim-Crow type laws discussed above were abolished, and in addition, the present segregation more precisely targets low-income Blacks. Therefore the roots of Ferguson’s current pattern of apartheid segregation has public policy roots closer to the present time, and, as has been found in the present analysis, this segregation is continually reinforced, often through ostensibly ‘liberal’ housing policies (Rosin, 2008).

Over the last 30 years the people living in Ferguson and North County have experienced a series of crises and opportunities that have yielded dramatic economic and demographic changes that shape their contemporary reality.

**Deindustrialization and ‘White flight’**.

"Unions were strong and the working-class earned good and lived well."—North County resident reminiscing about the heyday of industrialization (Lee, 2014).

When North County was developed after World War II, it was largely populated by White blue-collar workers who had left St. Louis city and who worked at places in the county such as General Motors, McDonnell-Douglas and Emerson Electric Corporation (Duncan, 2008). Using Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration loans (which were mainly given to Whites), they moved into sprawling new neighbourhoods filled with two and three-bedroom ranch homes (Brown, Carnoy, Duster, Currie, & Oppenheimer, 2003). When the population of St. Louis County peaked in 1970,
it was 97% White (Duncan, 2008; Gallagher, 2013). At the time, the St. Louis metro area had the second largest auto industry in the United States behind Detroit, and the defense and electrical industries were also substantial (Shoup, 2009). In the 1950s and 60s, White workers were given preference in jobs and especially in housing. However in the 1970s, in the wake of the political victories of the Civil Rights Movement and the legal defeat of Jim Crow laws, many Black workers began to move out of St. Louis city and into North County’s residential areas and factories (Galster & Hill, 2012). For many Blacks this initial migration into the North County suburbs did not come without a personal and collective fight against racism and discrimination (Brown et al., 2003). All residential areas and job opportunities were not immediately open to integration, and even today, while more opportunities have opened up for Blacks with higher incomes, education and skills, the choices for low-income Blacks are limited, especially by the continued devastation wrought on the public education system in North County (Crouch & Bock, 2014).

No sooner had Blacks begun to integrate into St. Louis County than industrial downsizing began in the 1980s and accelerated in the mid- to late-2000s (Jones & Baybeck, 2004). Boeing International laid off thousands when it absorbed McDonnell Douglas in 1997. The Ford Motor Company Hazelwood Plant in North County was shut in 2006, and the Chrysler St. Louis North plant was closed in 2009. Many of these jobs were either not replaced at all or were replaced by low paying retail jobs or high-skill jobs which were inaccessible because of racial discrimination and the low quality of public education institutions available to many Blacks (Crouch & Bock, 2014; Hopper, 2002; Shoup, 2009).
Although North County has had a well-earned reputation for anti-Black prejudice, and the contribution of racism to the social life of the area should not be minimized, ‘White flight’ attributed primarily to racism is more myth than reality (Jones & Baybeck, 2004). The White population base of North County, and especially the grown-up children of industrial workers, primarily fled deindustrialization, a pattern that impacted White and Black Americans across most of the Midwest and Northeast beginning in the 1970s and that has continued until the present. Deindustrialization led to a slow attrition of the White population, leaving an ageing population that had declined to 65,000 by 1990 (Duncan, 2008). Owing to low-income housing policies, Black families from St. Louis city continued to be pushed into North County, which increasingly suffered from a lack of economic opportunity. North County began to take on the demographic characteristics which had developed decades prior in St. Louis city -- on the one hand, large numbers of young Black families sometimes headed by single mothers, and on the other, ageing Whites who chose to stay or low-income Whites who could not leave (Moskop, & Currier, 2015).

As the area schools declined, they were not preparing the increasing numbers of Black children for the economic opportunities that did exist in North County (Crouch & Bock, 2014). Several of the biggest corporations in the world such as Express Scripts, Emerson Electric and Boeing International have a substantial presence in North County. However, years after the start of the 2008 recession, an abundance of Black youth in Ferguson find themselves unemployed (Kneebone, 2014). Perhaps ironically, the world headquarters of Emerson Electric Corporation sits on a hill overlooking West Florissant Avenue, the scene of the Ferguson uprising and also the area containing the apartment
complex where Michael Brown was killed. However, as will be shown below, the irony with Emerson Electric does not stop there.

**Contemporary Ferguson and North County**

**Suburban migration.** The in-and-out migration trends in North St. Louis County that began in earnest in the 1970s picked up speed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, particularly in the context of the housing and mortgage boom as well as Federal and State low income housing programs. To some extent this migration mirrored national and regional trends. A comparison of 2000 and 2010 U.S. census data shows that in aggregate, Black Americans had undertaken one of the biggest internal migrations in history, perhaps rivaling the ‘Great Migrations’ from South to North of the twentieth century (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015e). In the 2000-2010 period, Blacks had moved in large numbers, particularly from chronically depressed areas in Midwest cities to the suburbs of these cities where relatively few had previously lived (Sullivan, 2011; U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). Ferguson was characteristic of this trend—in 1990 Ferguson was 75% White and 25% Black, but by 2010 it had become almost 70% Black and 30% White (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015b). Interestingly, the Black-led urban rebellions of the 1960s occurred near the completion of the second great Black migration from the Southern states to the industrial and manufacturing hubs of the Northeast, Midwest and West Coast (Sears & McConahay, 1970).

**The real estate boom and sub-prime lending.** The real estate boom that began in the late 1990s dramatically reshaped the demographics of North County. Mortgage lending opened up to Black families in a way that was unprecedented in U.S. history, and many seized the opportunity to leave St. Louis city or suburban apartments, while at the
same time many remaining White retirees saw an opportunity to sell their ageing homes (Gallagher, 2013). North County’s population went from 61% White in 1990 to 69% Black by 2000, while at the same time the overall age-range became much younger (Duncan, 2008). In addition, the number of adults with college degrees in North County increased from 36% to 44% from 1990 to 2000, demonstrating the upward mobility of many of the Black newcomers. North County’s population stabilized in 2000 at 65,000 (Duncan, 2008).

Major problems began in 2006 when the proliferation of subprime lending resulted in large numbers of failed loans. The problem was the worst in areas with more Black residents (Duncan, 2008; Gallagher, 2013). North County was the epicentre of the resultant foreclosure crisis in the St. Louis metro area and the socioeconomic status of the area changed dramatically because of this (Duncan, 2008; Shoup, 2009). There was a 30% increase in housing costs from 2000-2006 owing to the high interest rates on subprime loans which comprised over 50% of total loans sold in North County from 2004-2007 (Duncan, 2008; Gallagher, 2013). From 2004-2008 there were over 3,000 foreclosures amounting to 14% of all homes, and from 2010-2012, a further one in 11 homes were foreclosed upon (Duncan, 2008; Gallagher, 2013). The foreclosure crisis destroyed the dream of suburban prosperity for many Blacks as well as Whites who had bought homes in North County. The crisis continued in North County even after other areas in the region had recovered (Gallagher, 2013). Area school districts were hit by a loss in property tax revenue, contributing to two of the school districts in North County losing their academic accreditation, including the Normandy district that served parts of Ferguson, and which Michael Brown graduated from (Gallagher, 2013; Meares, 2014).
The small North County municipalities made up for the seemingly devastating tax revenue loss from industrial downsizing and the foreclosure crisis, and compounded by the growth in maintenance costs of their aging infrastructure, by a combination of raising property taxes on homeowners and draconian enforcement of municipal codes (Balko, 2014; Hopper, 2002). This strategy was tantamount to preying on their own population. Drivers were pulled over and ticketed at a staggering rate, and because of the patchwork of small suburbs, workers had to travel across multiple jurisdictions to get to work and shop. These drives become like running a gauntlet (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015). Not paying tickets or not showing up at municipal court resulted in arrest warrants and jail time. Today, there are more warrants in some North County municipalities than there is population (Balko, 2014; Harvey, McAnnar, Voss, Conn, Janda, & Keskey, 2014), and a federal lawsuit charges that municipal jails, including Ferguson’s, are nothing more than ‘debtors’ prisons’ (Hampel, 2014). The full extent of this problem was unknown to most people outside of the St. Louis metro area until the Department of Justice (DOJ) Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, discussed in more detail below, was released early in 2015 (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015).

**Low-income housing polices.** “After they tore those projects down, a lot of people started coming from everywhere, everywhere, man”—Louis Smith, retired Ferguson resident, referring to impact of the destruction of subsidized housing in St. Louis city (Bogan et al., 2014).

While deindustrialization was reaching its apex and the housing boom went bust, there was another trend emerging—North County was zoned as a destination for low-income housing (Bogan & Moskop, 2014; Bogan et al., 2014). The Section 8 voucher
program was created by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in large part as an outcome of the 1966 Gautreaux lawsuit against HUD and the Chicago Housing Authority which alleged that Blacks living in subsidized housing were almost universally forced to live in segregated, high poverty inner-city neighbourhoods (Rosin, 2008). The Section 8 program was intended to spread families receiving housing subsidies around metropolitan areas by giving vouchers to low income residents which allowed them to move into market rate housing and pay a share of their income while housing agencies covered the balance. (Bogan & Moskop, 2014; Rosin, 2008; U.S. HUD, 2015).

The proliferation of Section 8 vouchers accelerated in the late 1990s and 2000s under HUD’s ‘Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere’ (HOPE VI) program which ironically, given its name, mandated the systematic destruction of inner-city public housing. This policy eventually moved hundreds of thousands of people out of inner cities like St. Louis and into suburbs like Ferguson (Bogan et al., 2014; Rosin, 2008). In St. Louis city this process began in 1974 with the demolition of the now notorious Pruitt-Igoe Public housing complex (Rothstein, 2014). With the legal defeat of Jim Crow-style residential segregation heralded nationally by passage of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, and locally in metro St. Louis with the 1974 United States v. City of Blackjack decision, more and more areas of North County were opened up to low-income as well as middle-income Black families (Gordon, 2008; Metropolitan, 2015).

Although the Section 8 program began as a way to change the spatial distribution of poverty, it resulted in the re-creation of concentrated poverty in new places (Bogan & Moskop, 2014). As official toleration for public housing waned, and inner-city housing
markets began to take off in the late 1990s, Section 8 vouchers became a way to move undesirable populations (mostly low-income Blacks) out of cities and into new areas that were not politically powerful enough to stop the influx of poor residents (Bogan & Moskop, 2014). Regional business and political leaders made conscious decisions to pack North County with low-income Black residents. Concentration of poverty developed in North County much the same as it had done in North St. Louis city decades earlier (Gallagher, 2013; Moskop & Currier, 2015).

There were several reasons for this concentration of low-income Blacks: it is voluntary for landlords and realty companies to accept Section 8 vouchers and many refuse to honour them, housing agencies gave recommendations for residents to move to certain areas, there was a reality and a general perception of anti-Black racism in many parts of metro St. Louis, and most importantly, politically weak municipalities were zoned for low-income housing and politically powerful ones resisted. From 2000 to 2010 the number of extreme poverty census tracts in North County (>40% poor) increased from 0 to 2, and high poverty tracts (>20% poor) increased from 10 to 24. The census tract that includes eastern Ferguson, where the uprising took place, accrued more Section 8 renters than any other tract in the state of Missouri, and 99% of those renters were Black (Bogan & Moskop, 2014). According to the 2009-2013 American Community Survey, 25% of Ferguson’s population lives below the federal poverty level (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015).

Another low-income housing program, low income tax-credits, exacerbated the concentration of poverty further as the credits effectively acted as an incentive for realty companies to house as many poor residents as possible. Realty companies and other
powerful economic interests focused the proliferation of these tax-credits on municipalities like Ferguson (Young, 2014). The credits are a complex scheme, but essentially, the more low-income tenants who are housed, the more subsidies are acquired by the realty company housing them. For example, each unit in the 300+ unit Northwinds complex in eastern Ferguson yields an average of $63,700 in tax credits over a ten-year period, an incredible amount when one considers that the realty company is also collecting market-rate rent on top of this (Bogan & Moskop, 2014). This incentive to house low-income residents often resulted in landlords and realty companies refusing to renew leases for White and Black residents who made too much money to qualify for subsidies, thus increasing racial and economic segregation. In effect, Section 8 vouchers and low-income tax credits made it highly profitable to segregate low-income Blacks and concentrate poverty. Some of Missouri’s leading Democrats including Senator Claire McCaskill (who often showed her face around the Ferguson protests) have made a small fortune from these tax credits, while at the same time seeking to harvest votes from the same people who are the object of this policy (Topaz, 2014; Young, 2014).

Many low-income Blacks moved to the suburbs to create a better life for themselves and their families. Some achieved this goal, but as time went on, they became victim to the emergent logic of racist housing polices, particularly the Section 8 and low-income tax credit programs. As more and more low-income Blacks moved from St. Louis city and elsewhere, the apartments in eastern Ferguson around West Florissant Avenue went from being nearly all White to nearly all Black in the space of less than 15 years (Bogan et al., 2014).
These apartment complexes quickly succumbed to many of the endemic problems that are associated with concentrated poverty, including crime (Bogan, & Moskop, 2014). The change was so rapid that long-term residents of Canfield Green, Northwinds, and the other sprawling apartment complexes in the area could see the changes in quality of life happen before their eyes (Bogan et al., 2014).

Policing and Social Control

*Overview of police violence against citizens in the U.S.* It is a regular occurrence for Black youth, and for that matter working class people in general, including Whites, to be killed in the streets by U.S. police (Killed by Police, 2015). In the wake of the Ferguson uprising, several organizations began counting police killings in the U.S. through crowd-sourcing local media reports. The results have shown that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), formerly the only organization keeping count of such killings, had been drastically undercounting the killings (Killed by Police, 2015). Recently, the FBI has counted, on average, 400 ‘justifiable homicides’ by police on civilians each year (Lowery, 2014). In 2014, the organization Killed by Police (2015) reliably counted over 1,100. The actual number may be higher still. The Guardian newspaper also began counting police killings in the same crowd-sourcing manner, and in addition, breaking down the numbers by state and racial group. At the time of the submission of this report (late-2015), the Guardian has already counted over 1,000 police killings of U.S. citizens in 2015. Of the over 900 cases where the race of the victim has been identified, 53% were White (of 62% total population), 26% were Black (of 14%), and 17% were Latino (of 18%) (The Counted, 2015; U.S. Census Bureau, 2015e). This is empirical evidence that Black citizens are disproportionately killed by police, but also
evidence that Whites and Latinos are also being killed at alarming numbers that are astronomically higher than in, for example, European countries (Killed by Police, 2015; The Counted, 2015). In other words, even if police killings were racially proportionate, the U.S. would still have one of the highest rates of such killings in the world.

In Ferguson, there are two patterns of police excess that are clearly visible. One is the type of social control seen in most other similar low-income segregated Black neighbourhoods (Alexander, 2012). The other kind, perhaps in quantitative scale unique to St. Louis County, and which was thoroughly exposed in the DOJ Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, is the use of law enforcement as a municipal revenue generation machine (Harvey et al., 2014; U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015).

Social Control. “I am wondering if it’s just for safety or just to cage us in?”—Rochelle Jackson, Ferguson Northwinds Apartments resident referring to the metal fence surrounding her apartment complex (Bogan et al., 2014).

As the mass proliferation of Section 8 vouchers and low income tax credits that were described above began to have deleterious effects on the quality of life in eastern Ferguson, Ferguson and other North County municipalities responded with an oppressive policing regime that was part of a coordinated program of social control (Rosin 2007; U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015). The city, in partnership with the realty companies that own the large apartment complexes which receive residents with housing vouchers, put up concrete barriers to block traffic and gates to control access to the apartment complexes. The city and the realty companies initiated random police inspections of housing units to enforce municipal codes like occupancy restrictions on live-in boyfriends and drug-free rules. Police presence was stepped up, and many young people
became caught up in dragnets for municipal offences and other petty crimes, which also fed the revenue machine. The physical movement of many local residents was severely restricted (Balko, 2014; Bogan et al., 2014). To help with these social control efforts, the Ferguson police department received millions of dollars’ worth of military equipment from federal agencies. This equipment would later be used to put down the uprising (Gonzalez, 2014). Because of racial discrimination and limited budgeting for personnel -- and despite the increase in Black population -- most of the Ferguson police force remained White and came from communities outside of Ferguson. It became more and more of a regular occurrence, all the way up to the Brown killing, for young men to be stopped on the street by the police with little or no justification (Harvey et al., 2014; U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015).

**Revenue generation.** “they don’t want nothing but your money” – North County resident describing the illegal revenue generation machine exposed by the DOJ Investigation (Harvey et al., 2014).

In 2014 the ArchCity Defenders Municipal Courts White Paper first sounded the alarm to the general public, documenting what was already known to most North County residents -- that the municipal governments in many jurisdictions were using policing to generate revenue. The DOJ on the other hand, did not undertake its investigation until after the uprising, so it was being reactive instead of proactive. However the DOJ investigation was in some ways more thorough because it was able to coerce testimony from Ferguson city officials. The DOJ found that through its enforcement practices, the Ferguson Police Department (FPD) “violates the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and federal statutory law” (U.S. DOJ
Civil Rights Division, 2015, p. 1). It also found that these illegal enforcement practices were “shaped by the City’s focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs” (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015, p. 2) and further that “Ferguson’s police and municipal court practices both reflect and exacerbate existing racial bias, including racial stereotypes” (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015, p. 2).

The DOJ found that far from being simply overzealous, that the excessive practices of the FPD were part of a conscious and concerted effort on the part of the city government to “harvest” revenue from its citizenry (Johnson, 2015). The DOJ found that “Patrol assignments and schedules are geared toward aggressive enforcement of Ferguson’s municipal code”; “Officer evaluations and promotions depend to an inordinate degree on ‘productivity’” and that officers were “routinely disciplined for not meeting standards of revenue generation” (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015, p. 11). The “correct volume” of law enforcement was presented in Ferguson City documents in terms related to revenue generation, rather what was necessary to promote public safety (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015, p. 11). For example, tickets for “manner of walking in the roadway” and “failure to comply” were several of the largest revenue generators and were more likely to be given to Black residents (Harvey et al., 2014; U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015)

The revenue generating operation was massive: “In 2013 alone, the court issued over 9,000 warrants [for arrest] on cases stemming in large part from minor violations such as parking infractions, traffic tickets, or housing code violations”; “Ferguson’s municipal court routinely issues warrants for people to be arrested and incarcerated for failing to timely pay related fines and fees” (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015, p. 3).
The DOJ investigation also found that in the years leading up to the Brown killing, the number of tickets issued had increased substantially every year.

The DOJ uncovered documentation that showed just how egregious and calculated these efforts were: For example, the City Finance Director wrote to the Police Chief in 2010 that “unless ticket writing ramps up significantly before the end of the year, it will be hard to significantly raise collections next year… Given that we are looking at a substantial sales tax shortfall, it’s not an insignificant issue” (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015, p. 2). The City manager said in 2013 “each month we are setting new all-time records in fines and forfeitures” (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015, p. 12). In March 2011, “the [Police] Chief reported to the City Manager that court revenue in February was $179,862.50, and that the total ‘beat our next biggest month in the last four years by over $17,000’ to which the City Manager responded: ‘Wonderful!’” (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015, p. 11).

**Ferguson’s Economic Base.** At less than seven square miles and with less than 22,000 residents, Ferguson is home to a corporate office park, a community college, major retail areas with ‘big box’ anchors like Home Depot, Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club, a downtown business district, and several other small retail districts and stable middle to high income neighborhoods scattered throughout its jurisdiction. In addition to all this Ferguson is home to Emerson Electric Corporation (Johnson, 2015; Snyder, 2014).

Emerson Electric is one of the biggest corporations in the world, and the second biggest in metro St. Louis, ranking #121 on the 2014 Fortune 500 list. Emerson took in $24.7 billion dollars in revenue in 2014, and maintains worldwide operations with over 200 manufacturing locations (Snyder, 2014). Happily, the company was recently named
one of the United States’ Top 100 Corporate Citizens by *Business Ethics* magazine (Johnson, 2015). Emerson has its own Charitable Trust, managed by its executive vice president Patrick Sly. It has contributed over $33 million dollars to a variety of recipients including the United Way (Snyder, 2014). Emerson’s world headquarters, employing 1,300 workers, is located at 8000 West Florissant Avenue and lies entirely within the municipal boundaries of Ferguson. Depending on how one measures distance, the Emerson corporate campus sat just yards or feet from the centre of the Ferguson Uprising, or as the company spokesman Mark Polzin said “a little up the road from the main activity” (Snyder, 2014). It would be reasonable to presume that being such a large company in such a small town that Emerson must ‘draw a lot of water’ in Ferguson, as the saying goes. In truth, Emerson was not only situated near the geographic center of the uprising, but has very quietly been near the center of all of the recent history of Ferguson.

*Emerson Electric.* Recall from above the DOJ investigation’s conclusion that the Ferguson city council and managers had colluded with the police department and the municipal court to raise millions of dollars through the ticketing and harassment of working-class Black residents, and that “Ferguson’s law enforcement practices are shaped by the City’s focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs” U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015, p. 2). All of this policing activity took place within the vicinity, or in some cases within the view of the Emerson headquarters. While millions of dollars were being raised through this illegal campaign, Emerson, with $25 billion dollars in yearly revenue, was recently paying no more than $68 thousand dollars ($68,000) in property taxes to the city of Ferguson each year (Johnson, 2015). To put that in perspective, that $68,000 dollars would barely cover the cost of Officer Darren Wilson’s
salary of $46,000/year, the annual price of maintenance and gas for the police SUV he used to accost Michael Brown, and the gun and bullets he shot him with (Larimer, 2014).

Emerson’s low tax rate is partly the result of Missouri’s ‘Hancock Amendment’, which was developed through the machinations of a lobby group called the Taxpayer Survival Association (which included Mel Hancock, the amendments namesake, who later became a U.S. congressman). The Hancock Amendment required “any increase of local taxes, licenses, or fees to be approved by a citywide referendum” (Johnson, 2015). It would be reasonable to wonder why the city of Ferguson has never forced Emerson to pay more taxes despite the fact that, under the Hancock Amendment, they are allowed to do so.

Interestingly, the DOJ report and the Ferguson Commission missed this small detail about Emerson’s contribution (or lack thereof) to Ferguson’s municipal revenue, and even failed to acknowledge Emerson’s existence (except in the Ferguson Commissions case, thanking Emerson for their contributions to its activities, as well as the presence of one of their executives and a host of their law, non-profit and business partners serving as commissioners) (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015; Ferguson Commission 2015). The same omission has been committed by virtually all of the major media (the Atlantic Magazine excepted) and, as far as the I know, the legion of non-profits established in the name of the uprising, as well as established local civil rights organizations.

There is some reason to suspect that Emerson has benefited from making eastern Ferguson a destination for low-income housing residents. For tax purposes, Emerson’s Ferguson campus is appraised according to its ‘fair market value’ or the value of what
another firm would be willing to pay for it. According to company spokesman Polzin:

“Our location in Ferguson affects the fair market value of the entire campus” (Johnson, 2015). In an objective sense, the lower the property values are around the Emerson campus, the lower Emerson’s taxes are: “By this reasoning, the condition of West Florissant Avenue explains the low valuation of the company’s headquarters” (Johnson, 2015). In a bi-directional sense, the opposite is also true: “The rock-bottom assessment value of the Ferguson campus helps ensure that West Florissant Avenue remains in its current condition, year after year” (Johnson, 2015). Although Emerson’s public relations team has been quick to point out the large tax-deductible contributions it has given to programming for local youth since the rebellion, and “all that Emerson has done in the community over the years” (Johnson, 2015), in fact, their low tax valuation takes away what otherwise would likely be the biggest source of property tax revenue for the Ferguson-Florissant school district.

Special Tax Districts. Many of the other major businesses in Ferguson are also taxed at low rates, and in the case of the ‘big-box’ retail destinations, special rates:

“These companies all came to town in 1997 through… tax increment financing—known… by the acronym TIF. Along with low appraisals and tax abatements, TIF districts are one of Missouri’s principal tools for encouraging new development” (Johnson, 2015). TIF bonds are a complex scheme. In effect, the city of Ferguson borrows money by selling bonds and uses this money to improve properties (connecting them to public services like roads and sewerage) for their use by private investments (like retail). The bonds are supposed to be offset by an increase in property tax revenue generated by the new businesses. However, if the increases in property tax revenue
created by the new private investments are not enough to offset the cost of the bonds (which in most Ferguson TIF districts they are not), the city is on the hook for paying them off (Johnson, 2015). Large banks hold the bonds for which they are legally guaranteed payment based on the city of Ferguson’s ability to raise revenue. The city’s ability to increase revenue is based on its ability to pull over and ticket motorists, issue fines to homeowners, and collect regressive taxes on electricity and cell phone use.

Given all that has been discovered about how Ferguson works, and has been presented here in the current investigation, one could ask the question if it is just a coincidence that the area around West Florissant Avenue was chosen to become the leading recipient of section 8 renters in the state of Missouri; certain property owners had a vested interest in maintaining a low property value in the area, and the State of Missouri had a vested interest finding places to warehouse thousands of low-income residents. Moreover, the densely populated apartment complexes around the busy thoroughfare of West Florissant Avenue also made a fine revenue-hunting ground for the the Ferguson municipal government and police department, enabling them to entrap low-income residents and replace the revenue lost because of the virtual tax-free status of local businesses. More investigation of these correlations is needed to draw conclusions.

The scene in Ferguson was set for a tragedy. That tragedy would begin to unfold on Saturday, August 9th, 2014 just before noon.

**The Brown killing.** "That could have been my son lying out there"—Kevin Edwards, father of a Ferguson college student who was falsely detained by police near Canfield Green Apartments (Bogan et al., 2014).
On Saturday August 9th 2014 at 12:00 PM, 18 year-old Michael Brown and his friend 22-year-old Dorian Johnson were walking down the middle of Canfield Avenue, a street which runs through the middle of Canfield Green, one of the highly segregated working class apartment complexes in Ferguson (Patrick, 2014; St. Louis County Police Department, 2014). A White Ferguson municipal police officer named Darren Wilson drove past the two youths in a police SUV and commanded them to get out of the street and on to the sidewalk. Brown and Johnson refused to comply with the order, and Wilson stopped and reversed the SUV to position near the youths (Patrick, 2014; St. Louis County Police Department, 2014). Wilson and Brown began to struggle with each other with Wilson still in his vehicle and Brown outside of the vehicle at the driver’s side window of the SUV. Within seconds a gunshot was fired hitting Brown in the thumb at which time he and the officer disengaged (Bosman, Robertson, Eckholm & Oppel, 2014; St. Louis County Health, 2014; St. Louis County Police Department, 2014). Brown and Johnson ran down the street, while Wilson exited the SUV and began chasing them. Johnson hid behind a car but Brown kept running. Wilson continued to chase Brown at a distance and then fired 11 more shots striking Brown three times in the head, two times in the chest, and three times in the right arm (Bosman et al., 2014; St. Louis County Health, 2014; St. Louis County Police Department, 2014). Brown most likely died when the last shot hit him on the top of the head. He fell almost 154 feet from the front wheel of Wilson’s SUV. (Bosman et al., 2014). Johnson yelled “they killed my friend” and ran away from the scene towards his apartment (Bosman et al. 2014; St. Louis County Police Department, 2014). The entire confrontation lasted less than 90 seconds (Patrick, 2014).
All the noise and commotion had attracted the attention of numerous residents who were in the vicinity at the time. Dozens witnessed all or part of the shooting. Even more witnessed the immediate aftermath as they came outside or onto their balconies when they heard the shots (Bosman et al., 2014; State of Missouri v. Darren Wilson, 2014). An angry crowd immediately began to gather. At 12:07 PM, a Ferguson police officer called over his radio: “Get us several more units over here. There’s gonna be a problem” (Patrick, 2014). The uprising had started; the entire social organization of the neighbourhood, most notably the community’s relationship to the authorities, and to each other as neighbours, had changed within a space of less than 10 minutes.

**The Ferguson Uprising.** "I fucking hate Ferguson"—*Ferguson teen during the uprising* (Nazaryan, 2014)

No attempt was made by the authorities to revive Brown or remove his body from the street where it lay for over four hours. The police violently prevented Brown’s mother and father from inspecting or touching his body (Bosman & Goldstein, 2014). In the interviews carried out for this investigation, this was a major point for the participants. As the Ferguson police brought in backup from the numerous surrounding suburbs as well as the St. Louis County police, the crowds grew and turned increasingly militant with each passing hour. The authorities’ violent attempts to disperse the crowds, involving the deployment of automatic weapons and police dogs, only caused more anger as people from outside the immediate area of the killing also began to converge on the scene (Thorson & Geigerich, 2014).

Over the next 48 hours numerous demonstrations and street protests were held, stores in the area were looted and burned, shots were fired by police and at police, and
Ferguson and St. Louis County law enforcement agencies unleashed a staggering array of military grade weaponry including armoured personnel carriers, flash grenades, rubber bullets, and tear gas in an attempt to suppress it all (Geigerich & Bowen, 2014; Gonzalez, 2014).

The situation continued to escalate for weeks. After the first five days the U.S. Attorney General’s Office took official notice, and the Missouri Governors office put the Missouri State Highway Patrol in charge of Ferguson (Neuman, 2014). This national and state response involved putting Black leadership in charge of the law enforcement forces in the person of Missouri State Patrol Captain Ron Johnson (Eric Holder, the Black U.S. Attorney General, under the command of Barrack Obama, was monitoring the response from Washington). At first, Johnson tried to calm the situation by marching side by side with the protesters and repeating platitudes about his own Black son “Who wears his pants sagging” (Neuman, 2014). When this proved ineffective in calming the militancy of the rebels, the authorities unleashed even more violence on the Ferguson community (Blackwell, 2014). The National Guard was deployed to suppress civil unrest for the first time since the 1992 Los Angeles Uprising (Roberts & Swaine, 2014). People from all over the St. Louis area and the country converged on Ferguson to support the protests. The ranks of the supporters included Black, White, Latino, Asian and American Indian; male, female; young and old.

Although they waned in intensity after the first month, the demonstrations never stopped for a single day and on November 24th 2014, the uprising went into full throttle again when a Grand Jury refused to indict Officer Wilson on charges of murder. Although the intense, militant struggle was shorter lived in November than in August and
September, the property destruction and police repression were much more intense. The night following the Grand Jury announcement of November 24th, scores of businesses in Ferguson and North County were looted or burned to the ground (Davey & Bosman, 2014). The following day, the 3,000 Missouri National Guard who had been deployed to St. Louis in preparation for the Grand Jury announcement were fully activated all over metro St. Louis, especially along West Florissant Avenue, and street demonstrations were banned (Davey & Fernandez, 2014).

Through various methods, the Ferguson/North County community’s struggle for justice related to the killing of Michael Brown has continued in varying forms up to the time of this writing. Most notably, the December police killing of another Black youth, 18-year-old Antonio Martin, just a few miles from Ferguson in Berkeley, Missouri, resulted in several days of militant struggle there. This included physical attacks on police, property damage and demonstrations (Staff Report, 2014). Interestingly, Berkeley, also a part of North County, is very similar to Ferguson demographically as well as in a political-economic sense (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015a). Ferguson residents rallied in solidarity with the Baltimore Uprising in April 2015 in response to the police killing of Freddie Gray, as well as the concurrent mass protests in New York City against the police killing of Eric Garner. In August 2015, around the anniversary of the Michael Brown killing, mass demonstrations kicked off again in Ferguson including marches, rallies and other events of various kinds (Alcindor, 2015).

The results of the interviews with Ferguson-area residents reported in Method Two below contain many more details of the violence used against them by law enforcement, as well as the tactics the rebels used in order to bring attention to their
situation, avenge the death of Michael Brown, and attempt to dismantle the racist institutional structure which was responsible for his death. In order to provide some context for the interview data, a few more details are needed of events that happened during and after the uprising.

**Counter-Insurgency**

*Extrajudicial Violence?* The street violence employed by law enforcement agencies to suppress the uprising is well known as the images have been seen around the world (Seib & Masters, 2014). However, evidence also exists which suggests the possibility of an even more violent paramilitary response by the power-elite that involved a pattern of terror, extrajudicial killings and concealment. The following are several cases that warrant this suspicion.

On August 12, a few days after the beginning of the uprising, Mya Aaten-White was shot in the head by an unknown assailant as she was returning to her car from a protest in Ferguson (Lussenhop, 2014). She survived the attack, however, the police and media response to the shooting was puzzling. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported: “It appeared to be a drive-by shooting. Police said they were looking for four or five men” (Schremp-Hahn, 2014). However Ms. Aaten-White never told the police or the media anything about a drive-by or four or five men. Actually the police never interviewed her or followed up on the case at all. Her attorney said: “I've talked to both the St. Louis County Police Department and Ferguson...they have no record...no file number, no report" (Lussenhop, 2014). The doctors and nurses who treated Aaten-White informed her that during her surgery law enforcement officers arrived at the hospital and took
possession of the bullet the doctors had just pulled out of her forehead (Lussenhop, 2014). The subsequent whereabouts of the bullet have never been ascertained.

Later in the evening that Aaten-White was shot, and just up the road, St. Louis County Police fired into a crowd of 30 fleeing people and hit a nineteen year-old named Esrail Britton who they claim pointed a gun at them. The police recovered a ‘stolen gun’ from the scene (Schremp-Hahn, Bell & Currier, 2014). Britton was initially charged with assault on an officer but was then released by a judge without bond a few weeks later, to the ire of the County Police (Byers, 2014). However, Britton was arrested again and put back in jail several months later, and at the time of this writing remains in jail pending trial on the original charges.

On the night of the unrest following the Grand Jury decision on November 24th, a 20-year-old named Deandre Joshua was found dead inside his car near Canfield Green. He had been shot in the head and then set on fire (Healy, 2014). Although there are rumours concerning his status as a Grand Jury witness, I cannot confirm this from a reliable source. Since the Grand Jury witnesses maintained confidentiality or even anonymity, it may not be possible to ever determine if he was a witness or not. However a family member said he was a friend of Michael Brown and Dorian Johnson: “All three of them hung out every day” (Glawe, 2015). The circumstances concerning his murder remain a mystery, however some of his family members believe that the police may have been involved: “The arrows have to point somewhere”, said a family member (Glawe, 2015).

Next there is the mysterious and ominous appearance in Ferguson, both after the Grand Jury decision on November 24th, and during the 1st Anniversary protests in August
2015, of an armed militia group called the ‘Oath Keepers’. After the Grand Jury decision was announced, a platoon of men, heavily armed with automatic weapons and wearing military fatigues, stationed themselves on rooftops along South Florissant Road, basically adjacent to the Ferguson police station (confusingly, South Florissant Road is a completely different street than West Florissant Avenue, which is about a mile east) (Heffernan, 2014). This area had been the site of many demonstrations throughout the uprising. Some business owners along the street had welcomed the Oath Keepers and even given them keys to obtain access their roofs. The authorities (at the time Ferguson was under a Missouri state of emergency as well as under National Guard occupation) allowed the armed group to stay until November 29th (Heffernan, 2014).

The connection between all of these shootings, murders and paramilitary activity, which by no means are limited to the cases described above (for example the unexplained death of Shawn Gray (Schremp Hahn, 2014); the police shooting of another of Michael Brown’s friends, 18-year old Tyrone Harris at the 1st anniversary protests on August 9th (Swaine, 2015); and threats made by the Missouri chapter of the Ku Klux Klan -- who were allowed to broadcast the message on live TV -- to use “lethal force” against Ferguson protesters (Workneh, 2014)) are at present unknown, and because of the lack of a comprehensive investigation on the part of law enforcement or the mass media, the connection between all of these events have only become the subject of unverifiable rumour.

**Co-optation.**

“The way to carry out good propaganda is never to appear to be carrying it out at all”—*George Crossman* (Saunders, 2000, p. 1)
There is also some evidence, or at least some unexplained correlations, which suggest the possible existence of a campaign of structural violence (“violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations” (Galtung, 1969, p. 168)) against the Ferguson uprising and its participants, the aim of which was at a minimum, the demobilization of the uprising. At worst, this campaign aimed to co-opt the uprising, assimilating it into a strategy to implement neoliberal policy reforms (Franklin, 2015).

According to the participants’ descriptions later in Meta-Narrative Three, this campaign of structural violence against the uprising may have been more effective in dissolving it than the documented state-sanctioned violence, and the possible extrajudicial violence. The interview participants, particularly those who identified as full-time activists, talked extensively about the deleterious effects that outside organizations (usually non-profits) had on the uprising, and were insistent that the movement was split, weakened, and even destroyed by the infusion of enormous amounts of cash and influence by these organizations who were, ostensibly, working to advance the interests of the uprising.

Worse yet, not only was the Ferguson community’s grassroots social movement demobilized, but the uprising may have, incredibly, been turned into a neoliberal policy attack on Ferguson and North County (Franklin, 2015). This section deserves much more space than it is being given here so the main focus will be on one organization -- Teach for America (TFA). TFA represents a bridge between many of the ‘left’ activist groups (notably Black Lives Matter) who converged on Ferguson during the uprising, and the national and metro St. Louis power-elite, most notably, Emerson Electric Corporation
(the analysis is limited to TFA’s connection to Emerson, however, TFA also receives national funding from The Walton Family Foundation- of the Wal-Mart Fortune, Wells Fargo Bank, ExxonMobil and Monsanto, among many other bourgeois patrons) (Teach for America, 2015a).

TFA describes its mission as “to enlist, develop, and mobilize as many as possible of our nations most promising future leaders to grow and strengthen the movement for educational equity and excellence” (Teach for America, 2015b). Others have described TFA as being “at the center of a massive scheme, backed by powerful donors, for corporate takeovers of public schools everywhere -- not just in the US, but around the world… playing an indispensable role in enabling the proliferation of charter schools -- schools run by private businesses with public funding” (Franklin, 2015). TFA dispatches its 11,000 member corps of recent graduates from elite U.S universities to take teaching positions in troubled school districts -- teaching positions that would otherwise be filled by a union member (Hootnick, 2014).

With all of Emerson’s influence on the social life of Ferguson, it is interesting that the protests during uprising were never targeted at the company. Emerson’s spokesman, Mark Polzin stated in August, 2014 that “the company is operating normally and there have been no incidents” (Snyder, 2014). Perhaps this is because of Emerson’s apparently close ties to local law enforcement; again, spokesman Polzin stated in August, 2014 that: “The leadership and security teams for Emerson Electric have also been regularly in touch with local authorities while staff are being kept updated on potential safety issues and problems related to increased traffic” (Snyder, 2014). Beyond this safety net cast on Emerson by local law enforcement, the present investigation contains no other proof that
any other group or organization protected Emerson from exposure to the uprising (or exposure of any kind, for that matter).

However, as the Urban League of Metropolitan St. Louis and the St. Louis chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) were two of the leading established civil rights organizations working in Ferguson during the uprising, it is interesting that Patrick Sly, the Executive Vice President of Emerson, sits on the board of the St. Louis Urban League, and NAACP national board member John Gaskin III, a spokesman for the St. Louis NAACP, was, during the uprising, quoted as saying Patrick Sly that “is one of the most genuine men that you could meet in this town” (Coy, 2014; Emerson, 2015). Sly was likely already familiar with the St. Louis NAACP, as the former NAACP president worked at Emerson for 32 years, finishing as the corporate director of affirmative action and equal employment opportunity (Ross, 2014). Emerson’s connection to civil rights activists does not stop with Urban League and NAACP; Emerson is the founding corporate sponsor of KIPP St. Louis Charter School -- in partnership with Teach for America (KIPP St. Louis, 2015; Teach for America, 2015).

The executive director of TFA St. Louis, Brittany Packnett, and TFA alumnus DeRay McKesson, are two of the most visible leaders of the Black Lives Matter movement, which, somehow, is what the national movement against police violence started by the Ferguson and Baltimore uprisings is now referred to as by the major media. Another TFA alumnus, St. Louis alderman Antonio French, was, on August 9th, 2014, one of the first visible political leaders on the scene in Ferguson. He was followed the next day by Packnett. Soon after this McKesson quit his $120,000/year job as a human
resources director at Minneapolis Public Schools and moved to Ferguson (Franklin, 2015). “Mckesson was present with Antonio French and Brittany Packnett the day Teach For America began its Ferguson campaign in earnest on August 21st, 2014. He joined French in publicizing the event on twitter” (Franklin, 2015). Packnett defended her strictly altruistic motives for joining the protests: “on August 10th, the day after Mike Brown was killed, I stood in my own community of North St. Louis County, without the permission of my superiors, alongside hundreds of people who had been gathering since the day before, to have our questions answered, share our all-too-familiar grief, and demand justice for Mike Brown because it was very simply the right thing to do” (Packnett, 2015).

TFA alums and staff were working together on the ground in an official campaign from the very beginning of the uprising. Two other facts are interesting: 1) TFA helped in the effort to fire most of the teachers and to charterize (i.e. privatize) the entire New Orleans Public School system after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, making it the first major city in the nation to dissolve all its public schools (Kimmett, 2015; Vanacore, 2011) (this was one of the case studies that Naomi Klein used in Disaster Capitalism which explicated how private interests converge on disaster areas in order to gut and privatize public institutions (Klein, 2007)). 2) Brittney Packnett, along with Richard McClure of the St. Louis Regional Board of TFA are two of the 17 commissioners on the Ferguson Commission, a think tank chartered by Missouri Governor Jay Nixon to come up with policy recommendations to address the grievances of the Ferguson community in the wake of the Brown killing and the uprising. Furthermore, Emerson’s Patrick Sly along with Gabriel E. Gore, a partner in the Dowd Bennett law firm, which represents Emerson
(Dowd Bennett, 2015), also sit on the commission. McClure co-chair’s the Commission along with Rev. Starsky Wilson, the President and CEO of the Deaconess Foundation, which works very closely with the Emerson Charitable Trust on a variety of projects in St. Louis -- including the KIPP charter school network (Ferguson Commission, 2015; KIPP St. Louis, 2015).

TFA alums Packnett and McKesson are also part of Black Lives Matter, a supposedly radical organization fighting for ‘Black Liberation’ (Craven, Grim, & Reilly, 2015). Actually Black Lives Matter is a cluster of organizations (including, for example, Organization for Black Struggle), most of which are funded by either the Ford Foundation, billionaire financier George Soros’ Open Society Foundation, or both (Perry, 2015; Riddell, 2015). The Ford Foundation (of the Ford Motor Company fortune) has a long history, going back to the 1950’s, of co-opting U.S. social justice movements, especially those led by Blacks (Domhoff, 2005; Schecter, Ansara, & Kolodney, 1968).

The Ford Foundation also has a similarly storied history of working directly with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Petras, 2001; Saunders, 2000; Schecter, Ansara, & Kolodney, 1968). The former president of the Ford Foundation, Richard Bisell, who later went on to become the Deputy Director for Plans (i.e. covert operations) of the CIA, once conceded the purpose of the Ford Foundation was not “so much to defeat the Leftist intellectuals in dialectical combat as to lure them away from their positions by aesthetic and rational persuasion” (Saunders, 2000, p. 140).

All of these connections demand some explanation, but it is beyond the scope of this investigation to draw any conclusions. However, from the perspective of Ferguson community members like the interview participants in the present study, it is hard to see
how the social network described above could have had a positive influence on the situation in Ferguson.

**Outcomes of the Uprising.** The interview participants talked extensively about the outcomes of the uprising, and the meanings they took from it. This will make up the better part of Meta-Narrative Three. What will be discussed here are several of the objective outcomes of the uprising to set the context for the interview data.

First, as concerns Officer Wilson, as was mentioned above, the Grand Jury chose not to indict him (State of Missouri v. Darren Wilson, 2014). Afterwards, he resigned (was not fired) from the Ferguson Police Department (Larimer, 2014). The Grand Jury was unusual as the “proceedings resembled a trial rather than a grand jury proceeding…” The transcripts show that… while other witnesses were subject to extensive and aggressive cross-examination… Mr. Wilson was not rigorously cross-examined… They were openly skeptical of the testimony of others... the prosecutors cross-examined potential prosecution witnesses, probing for inconsistencies in their testimony… There were about 60 witnesses called during almost 75 hours of proceedings, resulting in almost 5,000 pages of transcript. Most grand juries see only one witness per case: the arresting officer. As a result of the number of witnesses the grand jury took far longer to reach its decision than do most grand juries.” (Fagan & Harcourt, 2014). The DOJ conducted a separate investigation that also exonerated Officer Wilson (Criminal Section of the DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015). His whereabouts are now unknown (Halpern, 2015).

The DOJ Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, which was emphatic in its promotion of community policing for Ferguson (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015) resulted in some changes to the Ferguson Police Department. To my knowledge, as
of the submission of this report, the revenue generation machine has not started back up full throttle, although this remains a major problem in North County as a whole (Reilly, 2015). Owing to a lack of revenue from ticketing, Ferguson is presently in deep revenue trouble and in possible danger of bankruptcy (Deere, 2015).

Ferguson has hired a Black interim police chief, Andre Anderson (Nobles III, 2015). Anderson has stated that he intends to use practices recommended by the Obama administration’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (community policing) “to cultivate relationships that we know and hope will reshape our direction in the city of Ferguson” (Nobles III, 2015). In addition to the Black police chief, Ferguson voters elected two Black members to the city council (Eligon, 2015). These new leaders have inherited the legacy of the old ones; it is not yet clear if they will usher in permanent changes. The existence of Black city officials has made virtually no difference in the practices of other North County municipalities (Reilly, 2015).

The depopulation of Canfield Green Apartments could have possibly been included in the extrajudicial violence section. Since the uprising, the apartment complex has been virtually emptied of residents: “Filing eviction cases and taking Canfield Green residents to court for back rent isn’t unusual, according to court filings. In 2013, Lipton Properties filed 73 cases against Canfield residents. Before Brown’s death, 43 cases had been filed in 2014. But after the shooting, an additional 50 suits were filed to finish out the year, including 24 in December alone, after a grand jury decided not to indict Wilson” (Bogan & Moskop, 2015). “They went on this crusade to evict everybody in there, anybody that was late,” said one resident (Bogan & Moskop, 2015). I witnessed this depopulation when Ferguson residents showed me almost completely vacant buildings in
Canfield Green. The owner, Lipton Group, has not claimed responsibility for the increased evictions (Bogan & Moskop, 2015).

Finally, as was touched on above, the Ferguson Commission, a think tank tasked by the State of Missouri with making policy recommendations to settle the grievances of Ferguson and North County community members in the wake of the Brown killing and the uprising submitted a “People’s Report ... Not a Typical Commission Report” called Forward through Ferguson: A Path to Racial Equity” (recall all the personalities on the Commission listed above). The report was prefaced with the statement “make no mistake: this is about race” (Ferguson Commission, 2015, p. 8). The commission suggested 189 policy recommendations, and although there was substantial discussion about racial equity, and the laudable goal of ‘ending poverty’ was an aspiration of its policy reforms (Ferguson Commission, 2015, p. 135), eliminating Tax Increment Financing (TIF), or, as per the Hancock Amendment, holding a referendum calling for the City Ferguson to amend its municipal tax code in order to be able to collect more taxes from certain large corporations within its jurisdiction, were not on the list of recommendations (Ferguson Commission, 2015). How they will fund the campaign achieve racial equity to end poverty is unclear since no new revenue generation streams were suggested.

Method Two: Interviews and Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis

After I coded the interview data set and went through some of the beginning stages of thematic analysis, it became clear there were three common temporal touchstones within each of the individual participants interviews. The temporal touchstones the participants used in order to express meaning were 1) things before the uprising, 2) things during the uprising, and 3) things after the uprising (what at the time
of the interviews was the present). These three temporal touchstones gave the data “sequence”, “consequence” (Riessman, 2005, p. 1), and made it narrative, so I chose to interpret and report the data within the tripartite temporal structure. The narrative structure afforded me a basis to a cross-sectionally analyze the interview data, which resulted in the three temporal touchstones becoming three meta-narratives (‘cross-sectional’ and a ‘meta-narrative’ imply the results of the analysis are presented as an amalgamation of the individual narratives found across the entire data set).

Together, the three meta-narratives have a logical progression that tells a story: 1) Living with police oppression prior to the Michael Brown killing and the uprising. 2) The circumstances of the Michael Brown killing and the uprising. 3) The outcomes or aftermath of the Michael Brown killing and the uprising.

Using thematic analysis, each meta-narrative was further structured by superordinate themes. There were a number of themes within each of the three meta-narratives, and in some cases, a number of sub-themes within each of these superordinate themes; the sub-themes represent further heterogeneity within each superordinate theme.

The themes and subthemes were both created and analyzed using interpretive phenomenological analysis. The scope of the phenomenological interpretation was limited to two areas: 1) the findings of Method One -- the political-economic context of the contemporary history of Ferguson, and 2) the social psychological theories of individual collective action participation that were described in the literature review, 3) several other theoretical perspectives like pro-social/anti-social behaviour that were important to understand the data and 4) my own understanding of the significance of the data from these points of view.
This process of analysis was to some degree inductive. I did not initially intend to code the interview data, nor to do a narrative analysis. However in the beginning stages of the analysis I found it helpful to do line-by-line coding in order to extract meaning from the data. The coding was vital as I discovered that certain temporal references kept coming up over and over again in the participants’ descriptions of various events and states of mind. Consequently, I began to look at the data in much larger chunks according to these temporal references and that is where the meta-narratives came from.

Almost a year had passed between the Michael Brown killing and subsequent uprising (August 9-December, 2014), and the time the interviews were conducted. By that time some level of normality had returned to Ferguson and North St. Louis County and community members were preparing for the August 9th anniversary of the Brown killing. These circumstances impacted the content of the interview data such that a great deal of the data that was gathered consequently focused on life in the aftermath of the uprising and concerned its outcomes.

It is likely that the timing of the interviews and the circumstances surrounding them had afforded the participants time to reflect on the outcomes and achievements of the uprising and the realities of life post hoc. It may have also reflected the needs of the participants to talk about the present situation in Ferguson. In spite of the fact the planned questions were asking more about the origins of the uprising and the uprising itself, in practice the participants tended to shift the discussions toward the aftermath and outcomes of the uprising. This was possible because the interviews were purposively designed so that the participants could create their own narratives with minimal direction.
The consequence of the open-ended nature of the interviews was that not only were the participants afforded the opportunity to tell the story that they wanted to tell at the time, given the circumstances, but also, in response to this, I was obliged to shift the focus of the study substantially. As often happens in qualitative studies, the actual practice of doing research resulted in unexpected findings and these findings lead to new areas of focus. Being able to describe both the origins and the outcomes of the uprising has added value to this study.

**Notes on presentation.** The manner of presentation is a form of interpretation. The data are presented here in a particular way that requires some commentary. There are an abundance of direct quotes from the participants -- more than what may be customarily found in a report of a qualitative analysis. Some quotes were written within the text when I felt they represented homogeneity within the theme, sub-theme or among the participants, or when they were particularly poignant. Other quotes are found in tables under each theme or sub-theme section. The quotes in the tables represent further heterogeneity above the level of the sub-theme. Several direct quotes that are particularly representative or poignant are found at the beginning of each meta-narrative section. These quotes are presented in a full, unedited form that hopefully will act to increase the verisimilitude of the narrative for the reader.

Maximizing the number and size of quotes was purposive in two ways: 1) To create a visual separation between the voices of the participants and my interpretation in order to give more voice to the participants to represent themselves. This should also make it easier for the reader to see what the participants themselves are saying without it being lost in my interpretation and to come to their own conclusions as to whether the
data have been properly represented. 2) To increase the overall verisimilitude of the results presentation.

There are several other necessary points to make about the presentation: 1) Participants were identified by number in the transcripts, however the data is presented in the analysis without specifically identifying each participants comments. I was concerned that if one individual participant’s direct quotes were cross-referenced together, it may pose a small risk to confidentiality. However, I have included some information about the source of each quote when it impacts the meaning, for example, whether the quote was made by a male or a female or whether they made the comment in relation to their status as an activist or as a community member. I used a variety of descriptors for each participant so cross-referencing is not possible. 2) Related to the latter point, information that could threaten the confidentiality of the interview participants has been redacted or replaced with more general terms and placed in brackets ([word]). 3. Three dots (…) symbolize that a direct quote has been edited. The vast majority of the time this has been done to cut out qualifiers like ‘you know what I’m saying’ or ‘you dig’ or ‘you know’ etc. In other cases it has been done to cut out telltale words that a participant uses which could be used to cross-reference their direct quotes. 4. Bolded text (text) within quotations belongs to the interviewers. Unless interviewer comments add context to direct quotes, they have been removed with no indication. 5. Slang words or other references that may not be understood by the reader are translated in brackets ([word]). 6. If someone else who was not the person being directly interviewed contributed to the conversation, those comments will appear in squiggly brackets ({comment}).
Participant reactions to the interviews. Overall, the interview participants were honest, forthcoming, and in general, happy to speak with us. This honesty is represented by one participant saying “Am I being 100 [100% honest] on this motherfucker? You asked me to be 100 right? Am I being 100?” Later when I offered the same participant a break from the interview to do a task he said “I don’t need no break cause I’mma break it down to you all the way I can.”

There was evidence that the interviews raised critical consciousness among some participants; one person said: “I’mma start asking myself these questions… Cause now I’m ready to go… You ain’t even gotta ask me nothing, I’mma tell you about a lot of this bullshit.” and another said “I wanna think of something at this table that’ll take me out of town and to a table with some strangers… So this could even change my life or theirs, you don’t know what this could do to me after I leave.” I said to the participant “hopefully, you know talking about this kind of stuff will… raise some consciousness…” and he replied saying “And some hope, it should, to know people care.”

Several participants were interested in the outcome of the project. One participant said “will the world be able to read what you got to say?... How you gonna broadcast it?... What’s gonna be the process?…” This participant was concerned that I was going to “just… turn this piece of paper into your teacher… and then go to the next assignment…” He asked “Do you got time to do something else? Go deeper? Continue this?” In addition, many of the participants were very emotionally open with us. Several participants began crying when describing police violence against protesters in the
uprising. I was reciprocally influenced by this emotion and I was very inspired by some of the comments.

**Living with police violence in prior to the uprising**

“...And when it hit the fan, it was so much shit that happened because of that, that you really couldn’t even mourn Michael Brown. You dig what I’m saying? Mmm-hmm. You had to mourn us hurting a million times before that. You dig what I’m saying? Cause...

I’m [middle age] bro, you heard me, [middle age]. I been harassed by Ferguson, Florissant, Hazlewood, St. Louis city, St. Louis County, way before Mike Brown. Yea. You see what I’m saying? So when that hit the fan it was like, damn, that’s fucked up, it’s another one down. You dig what I’m saying? Your saying like, he kind of

**represented all the struggle people were going through?** No. His loss represented that struggle. He didn’t. His loss did. And like I said, we was going through that way before, the Mike Brown situation. You dig what I’m saying? I had already been flagged and harassed before that. Mmm-hmm. But his loss is what opened people eyes.”—*worker describing his perception of the Michael Brown killing, the uprising, and his experience as a North County resident*

Unsurprisingly, one of the major meta-narratives that emerged from the interviews was about the excessive, violent and racist behaviour of the Ferguson Police Department as well as other law enforcement agencies operating in North County prior to the Ferguson Uprising. This law enforcement behaviour has been widely exposed, particularly in the U.S. Department of Justice Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015), as well as the ArchCity Defenders
report on the municipal courts (Harvey, et al. 2014), both of which were described in the Method One results section.

Owing to the thoroughness of the latter investigations, and the fact that this rogue law enforcement behaviour is no secret to North County residents, the present study cannot reveal much new information on this topic. However, given the “phenomenological requirement to understand and ‘give voice’ to the concerns of the participants” (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006, p. 102) and represent their views, it is necessary to give a description of what was one of the most important topics for them. Furthermore, the descriptions gathered from Ferguson-area residents for the present study provide an independent validation of the DOJ and the ArchCity Defenders findings.

Because of my past experiences with and knowledge of police behaviour, when I began going to Ferguson to participate in demonstrations I was not surprised by residents’ descriptions of violent and racist law enforcement practices. However, after living in Chicago so long, I was accustomed to a type of oppression in low-income segregated Black neighbourhoods which involved an interracial managerial class including White as well as Black police officers, city managers, court personnel, and politicians. In these places, anti-Black racism and disparities in the treatment of Black communities are not hidden, however Whites, Blacks, and even Latinos often times participate equally in the systems that perpetuate it. However, as I learned more about Ferguson and North County, I gradually realized that Ferguson is a different type of place than I was used to. Ferguson was (although this is changing presently) run by a predominately White, and to varying extents, openly racist managerial class (U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015). Even as a long-time anti-racist activist and a scholar of
American history, I was surprised by how racist and monochromatic Ferguson’s managerial class was. However, as was reported in Method One, Black elites are not totally absent in this managerial system, and some other North County suburbs that are in some respects similar to Ferguson, like Berkeley and Pagedale, are largely managed by Black elites (Millward, 2014).

I was also struck by the ubiquity of police violence in St. Louis. Perhaps it just felt more ubiquitous because the salience of police violence had increased due to the past year’s events in the St. Louis metro area. However, I experienced several incidents of being very close, either spatially or socially, to police shootings during and shortly after conducting the interviews for this study. In the first incident we were conducting an interview with an activist when a call came through saying that a youth who was shot by the police the day before -- and whom the participant had just referenced less than 10 minutes before -- was at a hospital in St. Louis and the police were not letting the mother in. The next incident was on August 9th, 2015, when I attended demonstrations in Ferguson commemorating the 1st anniversary of the Michael Brown killing. A youth was shot and critically injured by the police just yards away from the protest.

Within this collective narrative of life in Ferguson before the Michael Brown killing, I extracted four themes: 1) Personal descriptions of pervasiveness of police excess, violence, and racism; 2) Feelings of mistrust and cynicism towards law enforcement and municipal government; 3) Tension between strictly racial interpretations of police violence and other interpretations; 4) Unequivocal interpretations of police violence as racist.
Pervasiveness of police excess, violence, and racism. The participant narratives were full of descriptions of police excess, violence and racism in Ferguson and North County; for example one Ferguson resident said:

“I think if you talk to just about anybody that was out here before the DOJ came down and they started describing—everybody knew that this was the order of things; the police stop people… I call it performing armed robberies on tax-paying citizens. Cause that’s what they’ve been doing…’ Police do have a gun… they do rob you for some money… you can’t contest it, you gotta give it up… So it’s a armed robbery in all counts… the community, they know about it.”

It is helpful to keep in mind when reading the following descriptions that all of the interview participants were full time workers, students, activists or volunteers -- not criminals. This caused extra frustration for participants; one working father said:

“when [my child] tell me [they] hungry, [they] don’t understand daddy ain’t got no money. All [they] know is [they] hungry. And when you put that in a perception to, okay well, I gotta work a little harder, it might be 4 in the morning when I come home cause I had to take me some extra hours… I shouldn’t get fucked with by the police, because I’m coming home at 4 o’clock in the morning.”

Table 2 below describes interview participants’ experiences of excessive, violent and racist law enforcement practices in North County. These experiences happen to people all over the country, particularly to Black people living in low-income segregated neighbourhoods (Alexander 2012; Killed by Police, 2015). A good example is the ostensibly discontinued ‘stop and frisk’ program in New York City (Bostock &
Fessenden, 2014; Gelman, Fagan, & Kiss, 2007). However the situation in Ferguson that has been documented in the DOJ report and the Municipal Courts White Paper, described in the preceding section, may be beyond the norm, even when compared to police excesses committed elsewhere in the U.S.

Table 2

Pervasiveness of police excess, violence, and racism.

1. “A lot of people knew it uh, it was racist out here. But up until the killing of Mike Brown, uh… they really didn’t know the extent. Ferguson police department need to be dismantled. All those racist-ass cops in there. It’s fucked up. Profiting. Pulling all these Black people over, people are scared to cross the border, right there at the uh, the highway, off into the county. Afraid -- somebody waiting to pull us over. They’d rather go around the outskirts all the way around than just go through here -- cause they waiting for us. They making money off of us.”—female activist

2. “it felt profiling… I would get pulled over at times I was walking with a hood on. A copper got out and told me he wanted me to run, just so he could chase me… he was like I was hoping you was gonna run. Like for what? I guess he was bored.”—young man

3. “I mean, I been beat up by the police before over nothing, and I know a lot of niggas that have… Luckily we can live to talk about it, you know what I mean?”—male resident

4. “if they go in the neighborhoods to do something, aw bro, they get dirty bro. They’ll get real dirty. I’m talking about… they even threatened my mama, cause my mama just walked up to them… somebody done threatened my mama cause my mama just walked up to them while they was talking to me….My mama just wanted to see what was going on with her baby… That’s all she wanted to know… ‘why y’all got me in custody?’, ‘what’s the problem?’... ‘are you detaining me?’, that’s the stuff my mama was asking cause she can ask that. Cause I’m a minor at the time when this happened… She can ask that… I’m talking about they done got to taking they pistols out… Yea, just for walking up trying to see if they was gonna detain me man.”—young man

5. “who’s to say how many of them people that was out there standing up for Mike Brown, before Mike Brown died had already got harassed by the boy [Officer Wilson]? They may not have died… They may have gotten beat on and other kinds of shit… I know I done came out a lot of money on police charges. Tickets and bullshit that I should not even got fucking flagged for. But just because I don’t wanna deal with the hustle and the fight about handling that, I go on ahead and pay them… So they done got away with it… Motherfucker ain’t have no business flagging me. But I ain’t have no insurance that
And now I gotta pay that ticket… Which is some bullshit because he ain’t have no reason to flag me. He flagged me because he wanted to. Ain’t that how that shit go bro? {Hell yea.} Instead of flagging me and asking me for my I.D. -- {And then they find a reason why.} Right. {They flag you first and then they find a reason why.} Instead of flagging me and asking for my license and registration, you flagging me and asking me to get out the car… You ain’t said nothing to me else other than step out of the car. Why am I getting out the car? It’s entrapment to ask the passenger in my car for a I.D… What is you talking to him for? You flagged me. But that ain’t how that shit work. And I wish you would say, ‘man you ain’t got no right to ask them for shit’. Now you resisting. Now we in that category. **So the situation can’t get nothing but worse basically…** From the moment you get pulled over, huh, from the moment you can see them lights in that motherfucking back of that car, don’t you bro? It can’t do nothing but get worse.”—several workers in a dialogue

6. “How do you explain to your African-American little black boy… how to uh, act when he go out and when he see a police officer. Some of these kids are scared to death of the police. {They not supposed to… that’s how I was} You are not supposed to be afraid of somebody that’s supposed to protect and serve you. Keep your hands out your pocket, make sure you have nothing metal in your pockets, if they ask you to do something, do it. If they say something… ‘Yes sir, no sir’. Just so you won’t get shot. And if they say put your hands up, put them up… That don’t mean you ain’t gonna get shot… These little black kids are scared of the police… Running. Some of them would rather run than to avoid… any type of interaction with a po-po now. Cause you’ll die. I mean, even if you doing the right thing, you could *still* die.”—mother

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*Mistrust and cynicism towards institutions.* The interview participants expressed that the arbitrary nature of law enforcement violence, like that described above, has destroyed their confidence in law enforcement as well as local government, and has delegitimized the entire institutional structure of Ferguson and North County; a male activist said:

“I’mma say this about Ferguson and North County: I think they’re a bunch of corrupt individuals that work together to prey on the weak and the less fortunate; and I think that’s the reason why Ferguson was exposed the way they were, because of the… lack of understanding of how to deal with a multitude of Black
individuals, who, really aren’t about violence but are about, you know, just living their everyday lives, trying to perform in life doing whatever they do.”

A few participants commented that perhaps not all individual police officers are bad. However, almost all of the participants went beyond just a criticism of individual police officers, and described the entire state power structure as corrupted far beyond the actions of a few rogue officers or officials; a young activist said: “they was always doing they job description cause it wasn’t never to protect and serve the people. You know to protect the buildings, huh, and serve these corporations… or these franchises.”

Participants described how the reality of living in a situation like this results in fear, alienation, and terror; for example, in response to my question a male worker said:

“tell me just like your general thoughts about Ferguson before the Michael Brown killing. Just what are the first things that come into your mind… Stay away. Stay away… just like every city it’s certain municipalities you don’t go in… and Ferguson is one of them. Ain’t get no simpler than that. But you have to live here right? Yea, so you creep in and out of here… You keep coming out here to take interviews, you gonna learn, you gonna have to creep in and out of here. Whether you wanna meet them [the police] they gonna meet you… Trying to go to work, trying to come home from work, maybe just trying to come home, might be trying to go get groceries… That ride is that deal… It’s very well known.”

Table 3 shows a variety of comments that demonstrate this theme.
Mistrust and Cynicism Towards Institutions

1. “I know for a fact the way that the system is ran, they gonna have a job to do—a job description to carry out… their job description most of the time was not to protect the people. Harass certain people, not treat certain peoples equal… Breaking the bill of rights and all this kind of stuff man. It’s always been like that.”—male activist

2. “I don’t know how police is trained. They trained to kill first? Damn. Just like the streets, shoot first and ask questions later. Probably get that from the police.”—young worker

3. “they ain’t no heroes, they doing dirt… they act like they gang-banging or something, basically that’s what the polices be acting like, you know what I’m saying.”—young resident

4. “you wouldn’t call them to help you? No. But then again, I wouldn’t call no police… Ferguson or not… Cause I have been in my situation in Ferguson, I done been in my situation with, all the other municipalities… And St. Louis County, St. Louis city, Florissant, all that, I done been in them predicaments… So would I call them to help me? No. I’d rather be me.”—worker in response to my question

5. “You do just as wrong as I do, you just don’t get caught. And your word is bond, but mine just… his against yours. Mine’s against his. So I gotta go get a lawyer to prove my innocence, but he can say one thing -- I’m guilty. I’m going to prison for the rest of my life. How is that so? What laws give you the right to do so? I thought it was, uhm, you innocent until proven guilty? We guilty before we even get locked up. They got they lights on. They got they guns, they holsters already unloosened, ready to shoot. We guilty already… We ain’t innocent. Why the statue of liberty got that blind-ass—they talking about justice is blind, yea, justice is blind; when it comes to black folks, it is.”—male activist

6. “You killing them kids and you killing the younger youth, and thinking it’s like a hunting game… like we’re numbered. We don’t do that… I mean, we don’t hunt them down like that, why would they do it to us? We’re no better than them, and they no better than us.”—same

7. “I wouldn’t put nothing past these policemen. Nothing at all.”—student

Tension in participants’ attributions of police violence. The descriptions given above by the interview participants speak to the reality and perception of anti-Black racial bias woven into the institutional structure of Ferguson and for that matter, the entire St. Louis metro area. However, within other passages a tension is visible that
speaks to issues with law enforcement that go beyond race. In some participants’
descriptions of police violence there is a question as to whether this oppression is strictly
a racial issue or also involves other factors.

A worker started a dialogue with another worker who was present during his
interview that symbolizes this tension:

“So is there any doubt in your mind that the [Brown] shooting was racially
motivated? Naw, I know it was racially motivated. If Michael Brown was White,
that wouldn’t have happened. That, to me, that’s kind of obvious. You know, I
feel like that shit don’t happen to White boys. So, for example old boy -- {What
type of White boys do you mean?... White boys, what you mean?} White boy -- I
mean shit, that White boy that just killed all them people in that church. They
took him peacefully. {What about them White boys that act like they Black, they
get harassed just like we do bro} Do they get shot and killed? Naw, they ain’t
really, that’s what I’m talking about. That shit don’t happen to them… I’m just
telling my truth, that’s how I feel about the shit.”

Other reasons for police harassment were not necessarily suggested as mutually
exclusive to racism, but rather as operating in addition to racism. Participants talked
about issues of poverty, or the combination of poverty and race, or a general divide
between police and citizens, police and poor citizens, or police and black citizens; a
worker said:

“The war ain’t a racial war right now. That’s not the war. Now if we was living in
the 70s, in the 60s, maybe even the early 80s, then we can talk about race… But
what it is, is poverty. Understand that. Poverty does not come in one colour no
more. Poverty is coming in many different colours: Asians, Blacks, Mexicans—motherfucking White folks… poverty is coming.”

The heterogeneity of these views can be seen in Table 4.

Table 4

*Police Violence and Oppression Goes Deeper than Race*

1. “How do you feel about… adding more Black cops…? Naw, black cops, it ain’t about racism. I don’t know, you never know what a Black cop will make a White cop do… you never know… that conversation in the car before they get out… could change somebody’s life… They both wanna go home tonight. They both gotta protect each other first… So at the end of the day… can’t say Black people will make a difference because they still gotta look out for they-self… Cause they take that to heart -- the pledge I mean. They ain’t gonna not go home; they going home. Far as they shoot you or not.”—young worker responds to a question by the research assistant

2. “So when you were talked to by them before do you feel like it was racially motivated or—Naw, and you can be, man you could be Black, purple, pink, Mexican… and they on your head… they do you dirty, regardless. Motherfuckers—I ’m talking about… man they dirty bro… If they feel like it… I guess they gotta have a certain amount of people they lock up… Man that nigga, will straight kill—he’ll throw some weed on you man. They’ll throw some weed on you. Fuck around and throw a gun, a dirty gun, like ‘ooh where you get this from?’ ‘I just seen you put that down man’… they be on that for real… That ain’t just the TV… they be over there on that for real.”—young resident responds to a question by the research assistant

3. “It is a Black and White thing but it ain’t… Like, expand on that. It’s Black and White but it ain’t. It’s more police against Blacks. But at the same time, White people gonna get away with a little more shit than Black people, like I said, you know… I’m saying, its police. {Its basically just what happened, it already been citizen versus police.}”—several workers in a dialogue

4. “poverty is where you have most of your fucked-up-ass police… because we are in those kind of areas, we get treated differently. When you put everybody that’s on section 8… in a section 8 area. That’s gonna be a highly, a highly, patrolled area… Should those people get treated any different? No. But because we are in those kind of areas, we get treated differently. When they pull me over, I’m already guilty, or I already got something going wrong.”—male worker
Unequivocal interpretations of police violence as racist. For other participants there was little nuance about the racism question. For example a male activist said:

“they talking about justice is blind, yea, justice is blind; when it comes to Black folks, it is. Look at us man -- I’m saying Black folks because you don’t see White folks getting gunned down in the middle of the street.”

This is not to say these participants would not validate any of the views above; we did not specifically ask them. However, certain participants were more likely to make racial attributions for police violence than, for example, to attribute it to poverty; for example a female activist said: “I’m not gonna say we may not carry guns; all the other races carry guns. But y’all target us, y’all killing us.”

Overall, the participants split down the middle on this issue. The passages that are found in Table 5 make the racial matter primary in a way that some of the comments in Table 4 do not.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unequivocal Interpretations of Police Violence as Racist</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. “they got a mini-genocide against us… and don’t nobody even see it… They don’t even see it. They got a mini-genocide against Blacks. Look it up. Look on--pick up them pictures. Go do your homework, look at them signs. Look at each and every last one of those people that was killed by police officers from every country and every state. Tell me that—and the majority of them are what? Black.”—male activist</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. “What we want to tell you guys is stop killing us… Could you understand -- stop killing us. You… kill a whole lot of other races, but you target us. I don’t care you have killed—they have killed so many innocent, innocent little kids. I mean we bring you a bulletin board, all these—seriously, all these little black kids dead. Y’all had to kill them?”—female activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. a worker said: “with all of this, with the Mike Brown thing, its about the racist issue”—male worker</td>
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As can be seen from some of the findings shown in Method One, the empirical data support both sides of this tension between and within the participants. Within the St. Louis metro area, it is almost always Blacks who are killed by the police (Killed by Police, 2015). However, looking nationwide, the majority of people killed by police are White (53% nationwide) (The Counted, 2015; U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). In some regions, nearly all the victims are White, while in others most of the victims are Latino (The Counted, 2015). Although there are not enough data on the income level of victims of police violence, there is some evidence (for example, based on the census tract victims are killed in) that these victims are disproportionately low-income, and that on a national level, income level may be equally or even more predictive of victimization than race (Killed by Police, 2015; U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). However, in the St. Louis metro area, race is highly predictive of victimization by police. While Blacks comprise 25% of the metro population, almost all of the victims of police violence in metro St. Louis are Black (Killed by Police, 2015). It is unclear from the data how income level and race interact in St. Louis metro police killings, however, such killings are overwhelmingly likely to take place in low-income neighbourhoods (Killed by Police, 2015, U.S. Census Bureau, 2015d).

In Meta-Narrative Two, which interprets the meanings participants gave to the uprising and its origins in relation to social psychological theories on collective action, the views and descriptions found in Tables 2-4, and the tensions or symbiosis between race and poverty factor prominently as concerns social identity, relative deprivation, and rising expectations theories.

**Origins of the Ferguson Uprising**
“Because on that night of August the ninth when, I saw this lady which was, Ms. McSpadden, had a sign and I seen it read—said: ‘they just executed my son.’ I lost everything; I just dropped my hands, now -- and if you think I’m lying, I used to live with this young man, and he’ll tell you. Me and him both, we went out in Ferguson, on West Florissant, and never returned back home, and we fought for justice.”—resident/activist describing his reaction to the Brown killing

This section provides the opportunity to focus on some of the original questions proposed for this investigation. These questions focused on the distal and proximal origins of the Ferguson uprising in relation to social psychological theory. Despite the tendency of many participants to talk about the aftermath of the uprising, a wealth of information was gathered regarding it’s emergence, emanating directly from the scene where Michael Brown lay for over four hours after he was killed by Officer Wilson. As can be seen from the passage above, the participants gave candid, vivid and powerful descriptions of their participation in the uprising.

This section contains the most pure form of interpretive phenomenological analysis because the words of the participants are interpreted in the context of social psychological theory. The analysis here is limited primarily to those social psychological theories discussed in the literature review. However, as with all of the Method Two results they are also interpreted in the context of the Method One findings. The analysis will move from the most proximal social psychological factors related to individual participation in the uprising, such as affect and suddenly imposed grievance theory, to more distal factors like relative deprivation and rising expectations theories. Put another way, the analysis moves from the social psychological factors involved in collective
action participation that are most related to the scene of the Michael Brown shooting to those that are more related to the overall social context of Ferguson and North County. The temporal focus of interest for this section is principally in the first hours and days of the Ferguson Uprising, although, because the narratives the interview participants created were not entirely limited to the same scope, there are certain parts that branch out to other temporal periods.

**Collective Action.** In explaining their understanding of the origins of the uprising and the sequence of events that was initiated on August 9th by the interaction of law enforcement personnel and Ferguson community members, the interview participants described a series of events similar to those detailed in the Method One results. The scene of the Michael Brown shooting was the nexus point the uprising radiated from, and its beginning can be symbolized by the contents of a police radio call from the shooting scene: “There’s gonna be a problem” (Patrick, 2014). This initial stage of the uprising resembled what Lenin referred to as ‘spontaneity’, and what Nepstad (1997) referred to as the moment where “resignation [is] converted into insurgency” (p. 471). During the four and a half hours that, in the words of a female participant, “their child” lay on the street, community members began to engage in collective action, acting as “representative[s] of [a] group… where the action[s are] directed at improving the conditions of the group as a whole” (Wright, 2009, p. 860) and “aim[ing] to improve the status, power, or influence of [the] entire group” (Van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009, p. 646).

The participants described how in the beginning of the uprising there were few recognizable leaders and the community acted under collective leadership; for example an activist said: “yea, and it wasn’t no leaders, this is all real, real people, everyday
people that came to converge initially”. A resident said he: “didn’t have me a group a little dudes… that I was trying to coach… They did that on they own. And they stood up for it, and they made a real big statement.”

The participants also described how the collectivity of the group heightened the situation from an angry crowd to an insurgency; a male worker said:

“It snowballed into something bigger to where older people was like damn, okay, now we want to tell them how to do this. Now we wanna teach them how to move in these streets… But they [the youth] wasn’t hearing it no more… cause they was already doing it.”

Table 6 shows several more descriptions of the initiation of this collective action.

Table 6

Spontaneous Collective Action

1. “I came out the next morning, early morning, and came down there. And I’ve never left and I’ve been a activist, a protester ever since. I was like this shit got to change. This just has to change. And if after seeing all these people, coming together… I’m like man this shit is real, it is time…”—an activist describing their response to the Brown shooting

2. “So the memorial that was in the middle of the street -- and you can ask anybody this - the memorial that was built in the street, it was to cover up the blood stain that was in the middle of the street. Because… he was killed right in the middle of the street, like literally like, right there. So people started putting this stuff in there -- that’s how the Mike Brown memorial… came into existence right in the middle of street. And the people did that… really recognizing what was going on.”—a resident describing community members’ reactions to the Brown shooting on August 9th

3. “Cops came back down—so the one cop car… act like he was getting ready to run over the candles and the stuff in the middle of the street. And this one guy -- I don’t who it was, I was standing back a little bit, but I could see somebody jump on the police car and was like ‘back the fuck up’… ‘y’all ain’t doing this’… And so, uhm, the police car just stayed right there for a while, and like, they was telling us to disperse, and go back in our homes and all this bullcrap. Ain’t nobody was listening; we was like ‘hell no’… actually people was chanting ‘I am Mike Brown’… that was the regular people man. And we was
just like… ‘I am Mike Brown’… everybody just kept chanting ‘I am Mike Brown’, ‘I am Mike Brown’, and they was loud, I’m talking about, it was like—and right then, that was when the fear of the police… you could see that the fear that in them… cause people had been afraid of the police for so long… so long, and I could tell that these folks—cause I was out here—like cause when the cops used to do crap that they did, I used to buck at these cops, and niggas used to be like ‘you crazy, you don’t talk to police like that’. I was like ‘shit, I’m a free American, I ain’t do nothing’. And they talking about ‘man… da da da’ and they’d, you know, be real quiet about this like, crap that they do to people here. So that was a breaking point for them. That’s why that will forever be ground zero, right there in Canfield. Because that was the day them folks was like, we ain’t afraid no more.”—the same resident describing the Brown shooting scene further

**Suddenly Imposed Grievance Theory.** There were two major events related to the uprising that could be considered suddenly imposed grievances. The first was the killing of Michael Brown on August 9th, and the second was the Grand Jury decision not to indict Officer Wilson on November 24th. There were numerous participant descriptions that suggest the validity of suddenly imposed grievance theory as an explanation for individual participation in the uprising, and also that these two events indeed fit the description of suddenly imposed grievances. Both parts of the theory, first, where a devastating event causes a ‘moral shock’, and second, where the authorities compound the grievance through attempts to restore order, are clearly delineated in the interview data. Participants returned over and over again to the fact that Michael Brown’s body lay in the street for over four hours after he was killed, giving validation to part one of suddenly imposed grievance theory; a young man described why he joined and stayed in the uprising:

“Hell naw, y’all left him dead for over four hours. You think we just supposed to turn our backs to just turn the other cheek and just… awe it—he was the wrong—man, fuck y’all. That’s how I felt. And that’s why I didn’t give up, I straight… I held on, you know. I straight held on.”
A resident stated categorically that the police actions after the killing were the principal reason for the uprising, giving validation to part two of suddenly imposed grievance theory, he said:

“it wasn’t that it was just here [it wasn’t necessarily anything special about Ferguson as compared to other places where there is a lot of excessive police violence], it’s just that what happened… and that goes back to that night. So the police… they had all them people at gunpoint, they wouldn’t let people come down there just wanted to see what the heck was going on. So they build up the frenzy, by the police presence and not letting people come in; people twittering; you had somebody got locked up in the middle of West Florissant. Then the police finally get the body up off the ground and they put the sheets up, had guns at everybody, so they really pissing off the immediate community -- the people from Canfield, and Northwinds and… surrounding areas and people that just got family that live up in here.”

This resident also felt that the first major act of property destruction on the part of the rebels, the burning of the now famous QuickTrip gas station, was a direct response to police violence:

“That’s why they went so hard on them people cause they was occupying the street, it was getting later and later… the protesters ain’t do nothing, they was just occupying the street. The cops start shooting tear gas at them, start shooting rubber bullets at them -- this was the Sunday night, this was the 10th… And so when the Quick Trip got destroyed that was because -- well they started shooting at people… people started running. So you got a crowd of people, people were
pissed off cause the cops just was damn shooting at them. And so that’s when the mayhem ensued.”

The one participant who said he did not take part in the protests (although he supported the protests) anticipated the effects that suddenly imposed grievances could have on him and that is why he stayed away:

“Yea I ain’t wanna have no problems. I know it’s peaceful movements with it, but, I’d say that it’s a… tense situation, where… somebody could easily set you off -- if somebody could, you know, you protesting and the police saying—I don’t want nobody in my face, I’m out here on some peaceful stuff and you come at me like… with the riot gear telling us to—man I didn’t wanna be involved with none of that that. So… I stayed to myself, I didn’t need—I don’t need nobody provoking me to do nothing, I ain’t trying to provoke them to do nothing… I stayed out of that shit.”

Table 10 shows participant descriptions of moral shock after the killing of Mike Brown and Table 11 shows participant descriptions of the grievance being compounded by the efforts of the authorities to restore the status quo.

Table 7

*Moral Shock.*

*Mike Brown Shooting:*

1. “Oooohhh, start answering calls, got on Facebook. I’m looking… a young boy been dead -- been shot dead in Canfield. He was laying out there for like four and a half hours. I mean I’m all on social media… I’m looking at thousands and thousands of people at the QuickTrip. They turned up out there… and I’m like this can’t be true. And I’m steady reading and I’m calling. I’m like is this true what I’m hearing—a little boy just got killed
in Canfield and they had got him out there just laying on the pavement in blood?”—
female activist explaining how she first heard of the Brown shooting

2. “it’s just because I know what—what was going on, you know, I understood what they did. Mike Brown laid in the street for over four hours… That’s a modern day lynching… to a conscious person, they know what’s going on… so I understood what was happening, I knew what that was about. That was a scare tactic… So they commit murder in the middle of a neighborhood street… to tell people, you step out of line, we gonna kill you.”—male resident

3. “Well the community had already knew from the beginning, okay. That’s why, see everybody knew, there was like 20-30 witnesses that seen it happen. You know what I’m saying? But what they did was discredit the witnesses. So the community knew; like I had folks tell me what happened that was out here that seen it… So the community knew; we knew what was going on before they even took the body off the ground.”—same

4. “I knew they was gonna say… they was gonna have to say he did something… it was either the police was gonna go to jail, which we know damn well that wasn’t gonna happen… Or, the -- shit, they would come up with a good excuse like they tried to… but they didn’t come up with no good excuse cause 99 cents [the price of each of the cigarillos Brown was later accused of stealing] is not a reason for a nigga to die at all… Nobody should have died…”—student explaining how he knew the authorities were going to try to incriminate Brown after his death

Grand Jury Decision:

1. “So… but when I heard the final jury it was just like… it’s just like now watch, look what’s fonna happen now, you know what I’m saying?”—young worker

Table 8

Grievance Compounded by Intervening Authorities.

1. “they had three guys like fully masked up with assault rifles, the big ones, you know what I’m saying, with the gun—the bullets that you see, you know. They sitting on top of there with these big-ass guns on top of fire trucks -- I ain’t never seen no cop sitting on top of no fire truck… But that’s what they was. And it was kinda crazy. But people was like pissed off mad…”—participant who was at the shooting scene early on

2. “And so, cause when the people came out… they tried to say it was some -- you know the police was, uh, to where—and—cause maybe somebody did shoot some guns. I don’t know, we didn’t come down here at that time. When we got here… they had tons and
tons of cops out there. They got guns pointed at the people at this point... and then so they wind up lowering their guns but they had all the cops with they guns looking at all of the people and stuff and... nobody went to go try mess with this boy in the middle of the street.”—same

3. “And people looted... which brought in heavy police presence and police presence brought in even more people. And like the more police it was, the more people came. Like they were inciting it almost? Mmm-hmm. I don’t know man, it’s a psychological thing for real. And I can feel, like you can feel it man like, sirens and tanks and tear gas and all this—the dogs and shit like that. I was like what the fuck? Y’all killed him in the streets and y’all want us to just go home, and to go back to our lives?”—young male activist

4. “That’s exactly what I seen... with my own eyes. That’s exactly what I seen. And I ain’t never seen that not a day in my life. I’m talking about police still all bad. We ain’t doing but you know what I’m saying, one injustice—why y’all throwing tear gas for? What y’all pointing that big-ass AR [automatic weapon] at us for?... We ain’t doing nothing.”—a young resident who was at the shooting scene early on

Affect. When speaking about the origins of the uprising, the participants described a series or set of interrelated affective states -- a sense of personal anger (Table 9), collective anger and collective unity (Table 10) and a then a sense of fearlessness with regards to the intervening authorities (Table 11) -- which are correlated with a series of heightening confrontations between community members and law enforcement personnel.

In many of the descriptions given by the participants, anger and fearlessness occurred in conjunction with sophisticated understandings of the overall political situation and the political and social consequences of their actions. The participants explained that the Ferguson rebels actually had an overall strategic goal to their actions that was, at the least, to stop the excessive and racist police violence being unleashed upon them, while others even wanted to dismantle the entire political-economic structure which begets racist police violence. Their individual actions were tactical, involving a
deliberate cognitive process based on a sophisticated understanding of the social context and an overall strategy.

Participants described emotional affect, especially anger, as being present during initiation of the uprising; for example a female activist said: “cause when we came out in the streets on ground zero -- we call it ground zero -- we were angry, we were extremely mad… about everything that was happening down in Ferg”. Table 9 shows more participant descriptions of emotions they felt or witnessed in the immediate aftermath of the Brown shooting.

Table 9

**Personal Emotions**

1. “**were you uhm, out there immediately, did you see that immediate reaction that people had?** Yea, I seen it. Not the immediate reaction at the Quick Trip; I was there as it was coming down to burn up, but, yea, the anger. The anger was in the crowds of people, the energy; and every crowd of people was, so encouraged to the point where you wanted to stick together and make something positive come out of this… If it was damaging, or staying up there all night. Something was wrong about that, so somebody needed to do something. Direct this, knock over this, act—temper tantrum; that’s what young people do when something happen like that, they have temper tantrums, kids throw temper tantrums… I hate when the question is ‘why do you think they did that?’ C’mon man, you killed a young teen… especially young Black teens is gonna be dramatic. Let them kill several of them, that was just one. What if three of them would have died?”—*young worker responds to my question*

2. “**So when Michael Brown was killed can you tell us a little bit about how the community reacted?** Obvious how the community reacted {laughter}, it was all on CNN and all like that, everybody was… I ain’t gonna say everybody, but, you know, people that was wilin’ [behaving wildly] out. Everybody was upset about it though pretty much damn near the whole, you know, as far as the Black community, everybody was upset about it.”—*a male worker responds to a question from the research assistant*

Several participants also described affective states brought on by collective activities, or being a part of the collective; for example a male activist said:
“I came right to Ferguson. When I came out to Ferguson, I never left. Came straight out here and stayed out here. Every day. Every night. Didn’t leave… Why? Why leave man… it’s just so exciting its like we was in a, a festival or something, and we didn’t want to go. And that’s how it was, you was seeing all these different people, had actually rallied for the same reasons. You know for most of us that was out here, you know sometimes it just like its, I’mma say… like it’s unreal. That it happened. Unreal? Like you wouldn’t like -- I couldn’t believe it, unless I seen it. Until I seen it. And when I seen it, that’s when I knew it was real.”

Table 10 shows more descriptions of affective states brought on by participation in collective activities during the uprising.

Table 10

*Emotions Related to Collective Behaviour*

1. “I don’t know how that happened, I ain’t even gonna lie to you. They just liked the way we was all together, it was so many of us. I ain’t gonna lie, I ain’t never seen that many people come out of these complexes… these little apartment complexes, that’s what made them do it, it was so many of them and eventually, it got to start coming from all the way down there from the City, they got to coming from everywhere in St. Louis.” — *young male resident*

2. “So you mentioned, uh, all the people out there, so what inside yourself like, **sustained you to stay out there, protesting**? The people. The people. And the fact that the police presence was heavy as it was… and I wanna say what y’all -- man what you gonna do, shit? All our people out here. What you gonna do? You gonna kill me dead right here?... That’s what was running through my mind, like I told you like a warrior mentality kind of clicked in. Where I couldn’t—where I couldn’t just back down. I couldn’t just go home, go in front of the TV and watch. I left like a day and a half, and I couldn’t stay away.” — *an activist responds to my question*

3. “Well from my point of view it was really like uh… F- the police… The community reaction was F- the police, cause that’s who did it. Ain’t nobody mad at the community…
they mad at the enforcement. It was just more… being socially together on one thing. A lot was people was yelling F- the police… and little dudes do whatever it was they wanted to do.”—young worker

Interview participants also described a sense of fearlessness and willingness for self-sacrifice during the uprising; for example a male activist said:

“Boy, I was really fired up. Really ready to fight. Really ready to die. Know how they say people go to war to die for they country?… Shit, I was ready to got to war to die for my protesting… Seriously was.”

Table 11 shows more participant descriptions of fearlessness during the uprising.

Table 11

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<th>Fearlessness</th>
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<td>1. “I mean this should have been happened, from the first killing, but a lot of people scared, don’t wanna come out, don’t wanna lose they jobs, don’t wanna be seen on camera… {Man, fuck all that.}”—dialogue between a female and male activist activists</td>
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<td>2. “The last protest down here was so powerful; they had the tanks on West Florissant right. And they said—they told us uh, ‘you all need to disperse and get out of the street’. We locked arms, and it was like something like in a movie, we just moved forward, we just moving forward, forward- ‘we will be forced and so and so and so and so’. They ain’t have to do nothing like give us that warning like ten times last time, they sent the tear-gas on, some of them sicked the dogs out on us. A lot of us knew what was fonna happen now. We didn’t give a damn. {We didn’t care.}”—another dialogue between a female and a male activist</td>
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<td>3. “I’m not gonna say I wasn’t kind of leery about going out there; I didn’t give a damn. I was ready to die. I didn’t care. Shoot me… with your bullets, tase me, with your tasers…”—female activist</td>
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<td>4. “I told them [the police], I said what y’all gonna do? Shoot me right here? Well do it! Shoot me. Shoot me! They like get down, I’m like no, you make me get down. Shoot me. I can’t stand nowhere?”—male activist</td>
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**Resource Mobilization Theory.** There are two main aspects to resource mobilization theory (RMT) this investigation is concerned with. The first aspect concerns efficacy, or the degree to which collective action participants feel they can change some condition or set of conditions, often in relation to their perception of available resources. The second aspect concerns rational choice, or the extent to which individuals make cost-benefit analyses of their participation in a collective action.

There were some interview data that validated the efficacy aspect of RMT, some indirect, and others direct. The participants described that the Ferguson rebels had a strategy to attempt to dismantle the institutional structures they perceived were oppressing them, that this strategy was composed of tactical actions from protesting to property destruction, and that available resources were mobilized to that end. The Ferguson rebels were involved in goal directed behaviour, and collective action was the means to achieve definite ends. Other participants specifically referenced that their behavior was goal-directed; for example, one student said: “Yea, yea, it was like, we gonna change something.”

The data that related to ‘rational choice’ was mixed and full of contradictions; however, from these contradictions emerge discernable patterns of collective action behaviour, or non-behaviour. The participants, half of whom were activists, and all of whom except one participated in the uprising, spoke of choices which would be considered ‘irrational’ within the rational choice paradigm. For example, repeating a quote from above by a female participant: “I’m not gonna say I was kind of leery about going out there; I didn’t give a damn. I was ready to die. I didn’t care. Shoot me… with
your bullets, tase me, with your tasers…” The same participant also said later in the interview that:

“We gonna get on them front-lines, we gonna hold them front-lines. We gonna stay there, if we have to die, pass out, however, we gonna be down there, we have to do this. For our kids; we got a whole ‘nother generation of young kids”

and another participant said “we don’t give a fuck about us.” These comments show a lack of concern about ‘free riders’ as well as a lack of concern about personal safety.

Most of the comments in Table 11 which fell under the ‘fearlessness’ theme also demonstrated ‘irrationality.’ The participants never indicated concern about ‘free riders’; for example one older activist said: “We do what we do for our children, and for the better equality of our race. It’s not about a personal thing, this is about us as a whole. It’s not about ‘I’ in team, its about us.” This is evidence that there was an awareness on the part of the protesters that their sacrifices would benefit others who were not making the level of sacrifice they were. However, participants also made comments that showed a cynicism about sacrificing for people who ‘sold out’ or joined the movement for personal gain; for example one activist said:

“Its crazy man… its breathtaking to see it unfold like this. It hurt me for the most part cause, I came out here with a genuine attitude to stand up even if it cost me my life. Then you looking back on it like you was gonna lose your life for people that was going to walk away when they got a pay-cut”.

The limited amount of interview responses concerning people who did not take part in the rebellion supports a calculated or ‘rational choice’ being made not to participate (although there is a focus in this study on militant activities in this study,
‘participation’ does not imply only militant street protesting or property destruction but could mean something as innocuous as attending a prayer vigil). For example, rational choice is evident from a short dialogue between a female participant and another person present at an interview: “a lot of people scared, don’t wanna come out, don’t wanna lose they jobs, don’t wanna be seen on camera… {Man, fuck all that}.” Opportunism should not be applied across the board to all people who did not take part in the uprising. There may have been numerous reasons why people did not take part and it is likely not all of them were opportunistic or selfish reasons. For example the participant who did not take part in the uprising because he did not want to be provoked by the authorities may have been thinking more of his collective responsibility to his family as he mentioned they could have suffered if he would have been arrested or hurt.

Some of the data do however suggest that there may have been a darker and more opportunistic side to rational choice calculations made by some people who decided to join the uprising. There is every indication to suppose from the Method One findings that the motives of the uprising participants who came from the community, at least at the beginning stages of the uprising, were altruistic. Also, some interview participants spoke in appreciation of the many outside supporters who joined the uprising for altruistic reasons. However the participants talked at length about the most cynical forms of opportunism engaged in by some outside activists, and politicians (see Divisions Between Protesters). So it may be presumed, based on the interview data, that there were opportunists who did in fact make rational choice calculations about their participation. From the very beginning of the uprising, and increasingly as the struggle became protracted, there were many people who got involved for personal gain. As can be seen in
the Method One findings there were many people or groups that seem to have come out just to advance their interests; e.g. Teach for America alums Antonio French, Britney Packnett, and DeRay McKesson. These newcomers joined the list of usual suspects like Jesse Jackson (Operation PUSH), Al Sharpton (National Action Network) and Cornel West (Democratic Socialists of America) who regularly exploit tragedies for personal gain or notoriety. There is every reason to believe that various power-elites not only encouraged but facilitated this type of ‘rational choice’ behaviour. As can be seen both from the results of Method One as well as from the words of the interview participants (see Divisions Between Protesters) it may have been opportunism more so than the ultraviolent behavior of law enforcement and paramilitarys, or the onset of winter, which was the main factor that led to the dissolution of the rebellion.

**Social identity.** It is evident from the words of the interview participants found in Tables 2-4 that a constellation of interrelated social identities, which form part of larger collectively held identities, existed in symbiosis with one another and these identities played an important role in the social psychological processes that led to individual collective action participation. This finding is in concordance with established social psychological theories and models of social movement participation, particularly van Zomeran, Postmes and Spears (2008) SIMCA model. As can be seen particularly in Tables 2, 3 and 5, Black social identity was a salient factor in the meaning-making processes of all the participants. However, as a psychological mobilizing force for collective action of the type that emerged in Ferguson on August 9th, participants described Black social identity as functioning in symbiosis with a class identity that could be characterized as ‘working class,’ ‘low-income’ or ‘poor.’ The difference can be seen
in how one resident spoke about people who came to Ferguson for a highbrow Urban League-sponsored event that attracted wealthy Blacks and others from outside the community:

“Like for real… so you got all of these dag-gone, clean niggas -- you can excuse my language, you can take out the nigga part, you can leave it in there, I’m serious, I would not care. But all these clean niggas, that ain’t never been in no ghetto, don’t know the struggle that we go through… They always tell a nigga go get a job. Where the jobs at? Okay. But they all come down there with they clean—they even had valet parking out there man.”

Black, working class social identity may be further related to neighbourhood or community affiliation, as the same participant goes on to say regarding the same event: “but you wanna set up your shop in Ferguson with a bunch of out-of-towners.” However, in other participant comments, out-of-towners who came to Ferguson with altruistic motives in solidarity with actual community members were welcomed; a woman said: “we thank them for being in solidarity with us. Uh, for all the people that prayed for us, for all the people that came down to see about us…” The participants expressed that the salient aspects of personal identity related to Ferguson residents’ individual participation in the uprising were Black, working-class (or low-income or poor), and non-law-enforcement. Neighbourhood identity (living in the area around West Florissant Avenue, particularly the Canfield Green Apartments) was also important in the very beginning or formation of the uprising.

It is clear that a sense of Black identity, and moreover, Black identity in the context of being part of a historically oppressed group, were vital factors in the Ferguson
It is doubtful that without a collective Black, working-class identity there would have been a Ferguson Uprising, regardless of other circumstances (although conversely, without the segregation and racism found in Ferguson it is doubtful there would be a strong Black, working-class identity; in this sense, identity is both a source of oppression as well as a resource).

**Relative deprivation.** Most of the participants described a feeling of race or class-based (or both) feelings of relative deprivation as an impetus for their participation in the uprising. Many of the comments in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 concern in some way feelings of relative deprivation in relation to Whites, e.g. “If Michael Brown was White, that wouldn’t have happened.” Other comments concern relative deprivation in relation to wealthier people or those who live in affluent neighbourhoods, and were sometimes severed from those of race, e.g. “poverty is where you have most of your fucked-up-ass police… because we are in those kind of areas, we get treated differently.” Table 12 below shows more participant descriptions of feelings of relative deprivation. In most of these passages it is clear that race is a salient deprivation factor. However, it is difficult (perhaps futile, if race is defined as an expression of a class relationship rather than a sui generis form of oppression (Reed & Chowkwanyun, 2012)) to parse race from class. For example, in the following quote, the participant was talking about race, but it is difficult to not see a class aspect to his comment:

“We all could get a piece of the same pie, all you gotta do is be willing to share it. I can give it to you, you can give it to me, and I can give it to somebody else, and the trend can keep going. But when you wanna be selfish and… hold it in cement

Table 12

*Relative Deprivation.*

1. “All we want is equality, justice and change. Treated equally, treated respectfully… given a fair chance.”—*older activist*

2. the same activist said: “I’m not saying all our people are good. I know, every race got a bunch of bad seeds in they race. What race doesn’t? That all happens. But what we’re saying is just because we have some bad seeds out, that don’t mean all of us are bad. That don’t mean you can pull your gun out, and your club out, and just decide to gun us down, because you think we’re bad people.”—*same*

3. “I’m gonna fight for what I know. And that’s on me to be, you know, equal, you know, I’m not gonna never be equal in the system that we live in, the society that we live in. It’s impossible. Cause it wasn’t built for me to be equal. That’s what you understand, you know you try to make yourself, you try to put yourself in place… in a society or in a community that does not accept you. You not accepted because… not simply because of what you did in past but simply because we was -- it was meant to be this way. It was always meant to be this way…”—*younger male activist*

4. “Don’t put me in a court of law because you feel that I’m wrong. I can put you in a court of law just—while you wearing your badge. You do just as wrong as I do, you just don’t get caught. And your word is bond, but mine just… his against yours. Mine’s against his. So I gotta go get a lawyer to prove my innocence, but he can say one thing -- I’m guilty. I’m going to prison for the rest of my life. How is that so? What laws give you the right to do so?”—*resident*

*Rising Expectations and Reflection.* If rising expectations theory is understood as a J-curve (Davies, 1969), where general social conditions improve in a variety of measurable ways, that material and political expectations of individuals rise along with this improvement, and then some set of conditions occurs which reverse the social gains while the expectations remain high, resulting in expectancy disconfirmation and
consequent collective action participation -- there is no validation of this from the participants.

However, Davies J-curve, while a valid theory to explain a variety of historical events (Davies, 1962) is a very mechanical interpretation of Marx’s dialectical concept of rising expectations. If rising expectations theory is conceptualized in the Marxist dialectical sense (Marx, 1956), that given the constantly increasing forces of production found in capitalist class society, which are positively correlated with increasing bourgeois democratic political liberalization, and where rising expectations are a consequent psychological reflection of this increase in material and political wants and desires forged through the ever-increasing forces of production found in capitalist class society, that, in general, expectations rise relative to economic and political developments, and that these rising expectations are the basis for deprivation -- there is quite a bit of validation for that in the data. For example, looking at most of the passages in Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8, as well as the comments in Table 12, almost every one of these passages contains an expectation that some right or entitlement is being denied, e.g., “shit, I’m a free American”; “All we want is equality, justice and change”; “I’m gonna fight for what I know. And that’s on me to be… equal”; “I thought it was, uhm, you innocent until proven guilty?” This denial of rights or entitlements that the participants feel they should have leads to deprivation based on class, e.g., “poverty… because we are in those kind of areas, we get treated differently”, or race, e.g., “that shit don’t happen to White boys,” and consequently leads to what one participant thought was an inevitable clash with the authorities responsible, e.g., “Conflict. Conflict. Killings. Race riots. Wars.” A male activist summed all this up one statement:
“don’t take our dreams away from us cause you think that -- if I become successful I don’t deserve it. How come I don’t? I did just as much as you did. I might not have got the highest honors that you got. But I just went—I went to school; I graduated, I scraped past, just like you did. So what makes you better? Cause you upheld the law? I might not work to upheld the law—I do uphold the law: a law of justification. Justice. Freedom. Pride. Respect. That’s what we uphold. I don’t uphold it by myself. I got help in this; we uphold that. And if you can’t uphold that, when it comes to dealing with us, then we gonna have to hold you accountable for what you do.”

As can be seen from the participants’ comments above, sometimes expectations are predicated on racial comparison, sometimes on class comparison, or on community comparison. However, as reflection theory posits, all of these expectations of rights and entitlements do not just appear out of nowhere but are forged in the crucible of some kind of collective political experience over many years or even generations. Speaking of Black Americans in general, as a group, no other group has gone through so many revolutionary changes in their relationship to the productive forces of American capitalism. The masses of Black Americans have moved from being indentured/slave labourers (1621- circa 1700), to slave labourers (circa 1700-1865), to a temporary status as first-class citizens under reconstruction and radical reconstruction (1865-circa 1877), and back to second-class citizens under Jim Crow laws (circa 1877-1965) (Bennett Jr., 2003). For many Blacks, especially those with lower socio-economic status, including many of the low-income Black workers in Ferguson and North County, the end of the Civil Rights movement ushered in a purgatory between first and second-class citizenship that has
endured to the present. All of these changes revolutionized the quality and magnitude of the political and material expectations Black Americans could expect to enjoy.

**Zone of Proximal Development.** The zone of proximal development theory would suggest that the all of the factors already existed for individual collective action participation, and all it would take is a precipitating event, like the Michael Brown killing, to push people into action. Table 13 below shows some participant comments that suggest the uprising was just waiting to happen or at least that it did not surprise them; for example a worker said:

“I did expect… for the shit to get out of hand. Michael Brown was a man that was in his situation… And his situation came out into a tragedy. You dig what I’m saying?... But whether that had been Michael Brown or John Doe, people was tired. So of course this gonna happen.”

However looking through Meta-narrative Three (see Positive Outcomes), there is even more to suggest that the positive phenomena that emerged in the uprising like increased community unity (see Table 17), better interpersonal relationships (see Table 18), positive role-taking (see Table 19), and positive personal characteristics like pride, integrity, and dedication -- in a word all of the characteristics which made the Ferguson community so effective in fighting for justice -- already existed in a zone of proximal development before the uprising. The participants related that all of these positive outcomes of the uprising had seeds and roots before the uprising, emerged in full bloom during the uprising, and since the uprising have actually been maintained to varying extents. As is argued in Meta-Narrative Three, it is the maintenance of these positive
outcomes that offers the greatest evidence that there was potentiality for them before the uprising.

Table 13

Zone of Proximal Development

1. “we had this fighting spirit the whole time cuz, you know what I’m saying its just that… we ain’t never put it into this, you know what I’m saying? Its just that… bro, we been out here bro… Motherfuckers they be dedicated to everything they do… Its just that we always, we put our dedication into the negative, when you put the same dedication in to the positive… motherfuckers will be surprised what you come up with. Cause that was all our dedication into the… into the positive. Know what I’m saying. That was all our dedication into the positive, now we… now everybody see that man…”—young male resident

2. “I’m just surprised that it went to that level. I’m not even surprised that that happened. I was surprised that it went to the level that it went to… [After] After the fact and everything, all the publicity and all that it got. I was surprised about that. But I wasn’t surprised about that happening for real.”—young worker

3. “You can only put a pit-bull in a yard so many times and make him fight… until he be always wanting to fight… you put this motherfucking pit-bull… in his cage to fight everyday… what do you think that pit-bull gonna do? He gonna fight. Should you blame the breed of dog? No. Blame the motherfuckers who’s putting that dog in that situation.”—male resident

Justification for Violent Protest. There were a few themes, i.e., ‘justifications for crowd violence or attacks on private or public property’ and ‘feeling misunderstood’, which emerged that did not fit cleanly into either into Meta-Narrative Two or Three, nor did they form a cohesive meta-narrative themselves. However these themes do have some relationship to each other and to the “Madding Crowd” theory that has gripped the right-wing imagination about collective actions ever since the days of LeBon.

Table 14 shows ways in which some interview participants justified or came to terms with violence emanating from the protesters side. There is a tension between
attacks on property being part of a tactic to attack the bourgeois-dominated political structure and the reality that these were also acts of desperation stemming from the necessities imposed on some community members by poverty; one young resident said:

“Motherfuckers was on it, shit, they wanted justice, shit, motherfucker wanted justice, for real… we ain’t do no faking. I’m talking about they got to burning down places and everything. Burning down, you know what I’m saying, they was taking money from Ferguson since Ferguson wanna take life, we gonna take money… That’s what it was, it wasn’t nothing about… ‘oh we want some free stuff’ or nothing like that. It was about damaging what Ferguson built. Your saying people were very conscious of that shit, like the people were engaging in that kind of stuff? Yea, yea, they was—they knew what the word was… I mean… if we fonna, you know what I’m saying, burn this place down… we might as well, get, you know, we might as well—who am I to just burn all this stuff and I’m broke? I might as well take it out before I burn it down, but I’m still burning the place down… cause… they causing hell so we causing hell.”

There is a further tension between justifying these activities and an acknowledgment that in some ways they resulted in a negative outcome for the community.

Table 14

Looting and Property Destruction.

Justifications:

1. “So now it done happened to them and now they burning shit down. Can I blame them? No…. In all honest to god truth, I don’t blame none of them young cats who did what they did.”—male worker
2. “I came up a lot off of it. You know what I mean? Homeboy hit the __________. Got a lot of __________... That ain’t what it was supposed to be about. But that’s what came out of it. I uh, I looked at the news bro. That day that it happened. And they was showing the film in the Wal-Mart, and dude was riding down the Wal-Mart on a bike, down the aisle, on a bike, with a pack of diapers and a shotgun. On a bike. That’s a kind of man that I respect though. Cause he went and got his arms, and he took care of them babies. You dig what I’m saying? He wasn’t in there trying to take car parts, all that bullshit. He went in there and got diapers and bullets. So people needed stuff... They needed shit... And, I’m not mad at them for going to get it... Any opportunity, yea, you gonna get it. You dig what I’m saying?”—resident

Consequences:

1. “We hurt ourselves more than we hurt them. We burnt down everything that we need. You know what I’m saying? We burnt down everything we need. Ain’t burn down shit that they wanted or needed.”—male worker

2. “instead of me being so I’ll wake up and get my gas in the morning… I’ll get my gas tonight. Instead of being able to wake up and say, okay the car battery went dead, I’m gonna need some jumper cables, now I gotta walk a hundred miles to get some jumper cables… Taco Bell ain’t open past 9 o’clock now. Everybody know about a late night burger… Man that’s what fucked me up though, the only thing that do stay open is the liquor store. That the only thing that stay open late now.”—same

For many people in the world outside of Ferguson, particularly those who may have already harbored prejudice towards Blacks, and particularly low-income Blacks, the images of looting and arson came to represent the uprising and became a justification for the violent response of the authorities and an excuse not to take the demands of the protesters seriously. On the other hand, without the property destruction, the uprising may not have gotten the serious attention it did get from the power-elite.

Misunderstood. Another popular chant from the uprising was a call and response chant yelled in a frantic cadence where the call was “they think it’s a game” and the response was “they think it’s a joke.” On the one hand it was an affirmation by the protesters that they were serious and expected to be taken seriously. It can also be
interpreted as a frustration on the part of the protesters that they were often not taken
seriously enough and were misunderstood by both the police, the managerial group who
ran the city and the county, and many members of the larger American society. The
interview participants related that they were hurt by, and resentful of, the negative
perceptions and mischaracterizations of many people both within and outside of
Ferguson. Fed by sensationalistic media reports, and often fueled by racism, many
Americans saw only madness and destruction in the actions of the rebels; a female
activist said:

“But at the same time, you know, on the newsroom, oh, you look at the radio
station -- listen to the radio stations and look at the, uh, news footage, they
portrayed us to be bad people. We want justice. You guys can say whatever you
wanna say, but we’re living this.”

However as can be seen in Table 14, even the massive destruction of property in
the Ferguson area was perceived to have had some political purpose by some of the
interview participants.

Although it was actually a small part of the total uprising, the burning and looting
came to represent the uprising for many, and was also one of the most misunderstood
aspects, particularly among those who already harbored prejudice against Blacks. In the
commentary of the participants there is a theme of looking for understanding from the
outside world, but often not receiving it; one male activist spoke about how the public
sees only the negative aspects of the uprising and not the positive outcomes:
“And see that’s the thing—I was—remember how I was telling you that, that’s the things where we do that everybody don’t see. They always talk about the bad in us, but they don’t never give us the credit for the good that we do”

Whether the property destruction was justified or not, it was a part of an uprising which was, at once an attempt by many of the rebels to take power over their own lives and the institutions that impact them, as well as a cry for attention and help from the outside world; a dialogue between two male workers expresses this:

“I would say that’s like a example of how a young Black men get treated that you know a lot of people don’t see… that situation could have been a eye opener for people who don’t know that stuff… like the other side of it… Like I said, like all of us, I know everybody right here been in the situations like that but luckily we walked out, alive {Mmm-hmm… We done been in a couple together} Right… So luckily we can live to talk about it and he [Michael Brown] lost his life over it, but… some people will never know that side… That would be my opinion… like open somebody else’s eyes. Just tell them to look a that type of situation as, you know what I mean, some of the stuff we gotta deal with.”

Table 15 shows more participant descriptions of feeling misunderstood.

Table 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Misunderstood or Misrepresented by the Media and Racists</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. “it was highly televised… but… I don’t, you know, a lot of stuff was mis-represented though. I feel like. I feel like… Uh, yea its kinda hard to get into…”—male worker</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. “they say we’re a bunch of thugs that have no guidance, no direction into what were doing;”—older activist</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
3. “When a lot of people look at us, aw, they smile and say ‘they stupid’. No, were not stupid, we’re doing something that you need to be out here doing. You just don’t understand the roots of it. We do.”—same

4. “if we -- if we a bunch of thugs, I don’t think thugs would [have a positive effect on] children. You don’t do that—children don’t get hooked to thugs like that. Don’t wanna go home. To go home and then come back. If we’re thugs then… don’t they supposed to be walking around here throwing up gang signs talking about they gonna kill something? I guarantee you don’t hear them kids saying none of that.”—an activist describes his mentoring activity

5. “Its all on the TV, its all on the news. Man the way they was portraying it on the news, man it was like, it was unreal. I’m like that is not what’s going on, but you know they depicted it the pictures and the videos and making it seem like these guys are crazy, the rioting and looting and destroying and… The only thing people was doing was standing up for they-self. Like they say, naw people should have never looted, but I mean like everything happened the way it was supposed to happen.”—young activist

6. “… they showing it, trying to make you feel a certain way. You see how the news make you try to feel a certain way about things? How do you think the news was—How do you feel like the news was trying to spin it? Mainly everyone watching the news cause they do what they do, but it was the people they was showing live; people that had they own opinions. That part was just… devastating. Like why would they feel like that? Some people just was hating, just hatred, showing hatred.”—young male worker

7. “We’re not no motherfucking terrorist group. Terrorists blow shit up. We ain’t blowing up nothing. We blowing shit up, yea we blowing shit—we blowing up our community trying to uplift our community with this positivity. Yea, that’s what we’re doing”—male activist

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**Outcomes of the uprising and life afterwards**

“You know afterwards was long time. Know what I’m saying? Afterwards really took a long time… cause he [Michael Brown] still lives on, you know what I mean? It’s no afterwards, it’s history. He still here, this ain’t afterwards, you know what I’m saying, it’s continuous. It’s still going. We still wanna know more”—young male resident

Meta-Narrative Three is focused on descriptions of the time period after the uprising. Within this meta-narrative, the interview participants talked largely about the outcomes of the uprising and the current realities of life in Ferguson one year on. There
were three superordinate themes: positive and/or pro-social outcomes of the uprising (with a number of sub-themes), negative and/or anti-social outcomes (with a number of sub-themes), and emerging from this positive/negative dichotomy, an insistence among many of the participants that the struggle in Ferguson is not over and the community will continue to fight for justice.

Whether or not the positive outcomes of the uprising outweighed the negative ones for interview participants is unclear because we didn’t ask them this question and no one commented specifically on it. Most of the participants expressed some type of satisfaction with the positive outcomes of the uprising, however, they also expressed that local law enforcement and government continue to function as an oppressive force in their lives, so the ending, at least as it stands presently, is not a happy one. In varying degrees, all of the participants thought that the fight for justice must continue because their grievances had not been settled.

Positive and/or pro-social outcomes. Pro-social behavior is voluntary behavior with the purpose of benefiting others (Eisenberg & Miller, 1990). The interview participants discussed a number of positive and pro-social outcomes of the uprising which largely concern ways that community members (and often the participants themselves) positively expressed themselves, internally evolved, or became better as a result of the uprising.

Some of the participants related that either these qualities of the community always existed, or that the potential for them was always there in the community, but they were just waiting to be expressed or actualized. This actual/potential dialectic suggests some usefulness to seeing the emergence of different aspects of the uprising through the
zone of proximal development theory. It is reasonable to assume that, while some positive things actually did come out of the uprising, it is likely there were many latent potentials that became manifest under the right circumstances. This is one of several participant descriptions that makes reference to the actual/potential dialectic; an activist said:

“We a good community. You know what the thing about our community is -- it’s just that…if you have a group of people such as our community, and if you have nothing for them to turn to, or rely on, or give them hope… you gonna have a bunch of people who gonna go out there in the society and do a lot of shit out of frustration, out of misunderstanding, out of misguidance, and out of want. But when you provide something for them that they can say, okay, it’s not the best, but I can work with it… it looks like it can give me a chance for doing something better than what the fuck I was just doing out there.”

Several other participants made specific reference to the actual-potential dialectic discussed above in terms of positive community characteristics. One young man said:

“we had this fighting spirit the whole time… its just that… we ain’t never put it into this”.

An activist and resident said that he thought some changes may have already been happening before the uprising as well:

“actually before the killing man, things was actually starting to change a little bit. It was starting to be a little bit gooder like… we actually had… all the people that used to live in this little circle we all used to watch each other’s houses and stuff. We used to come outside and like have little cookouts and little things… it wasn’t
like organized but we was still like… as a community like kind of working
together like little pockets… helping Canfield… We was already starting to like I
said, turn a corner. And people was starting to like… be a community.”

The participants’ descriptions of their ongoing fight for justice (see “We Ain’t
Done”) are very similar to accounts of the type of community and political growth that
emerged from the 20th century Civil Rights movement, sometimes called ‘spillover’
(Isaac & Christiansen, 2002; Meyer & Whittier, 1994).

Some of the chants the protesters used in Ferguson demonstrations described
some of these positive developments that occurred during the uprising. For example, the
chant described below was usually shouted in unison by protesters before or during
confrontations with law enforcement. There are two parts to the chant: the first part is
shouted in the cadence of ‘Na Na Hey Hey Kiss Him Goodbye’:

we ready [na na na na],
we ready [na na na na],
we ready [hey hey hey],
for y’all [goodbye].

Then while most of the crowd continues with the ‘we ready’s’, a second layer is
added between the ‘we ready’s’ where several people shout

[We ready]… Motivation!;
[we ready]…. Dedication!;
[we ready]… Squad Shit!;
[For y’all].
The ‘we ready’s’ mean ‘we’ are ‘ready’ to confront the police. ‘Squad Shit!’ was a reference to the core group (squad) of local protesters. There are several descriptions given below by participants that describe ‘motivation’ and ‘dedication’ to the uprising.

*Less police harassment.* The Method One findings suggested that revenue generation was one of the biggest sources of police harassment in Ferguson, but that this activity had slowed down by the time we held the interviews. Several participants described having experienced less police harassment or violence after the uprising; for example a younger Ferguson resident said: “They be dirty… but they don’t be on all that no more. I ain’t deal with no police ever since Michael Brown died honestly, I never deal with them never….Yea. I never even got talked to by one.”, and another resident said: “I’ll just say police are more… aggressive on the streets before it happened; but after it happened they kinda laid back.”

However they also described several caveats or qualifiers to this perception. First, some participants like the worker quoted below saw the lower levels of police harassment as temporary:

“…I know it gonna change back the way it was. It really don’t mean nothing. I ain’t temporarily raising no kids… I ain’t temporarily trying to live life… That ain’t temporarily type-of shit… Putting a smile on your face, that’s going to fix something… that’s temporarily. But I ain’t smiling. And ain’t nobody else they trying to fix this shit for smiling. So that’s smiling in my face.”

Another interesting aspect of the descriptions of less harassment were the attributions some participants made for the decrease in harassment. This resident attributes a decrease in harassment to the actions of community members:
“so they had to stop coming through -- they had to stop doing that after the Mike Brown thing because citizens had cameras. And if [they] film the cops sitting up in Canfield they gonna be questioning about ‘hey what you guys were sitting up in here for?’ So they only came up in Canfield when there was a actual call.”

This young resident attributes less police harassment to police fear of community members

“ever since… Mike had died, shit, they don’t even be over here for real at nighttime. I promise, I’d barely see some polices over here at nighttime... But as far as nighttime, police act like they be scared now… They just act like they be scared or something… Yea, cause at first… I wouldn’t walk to the store. Now the police don’t… at first I wouldn’t walk to the store cause I know I’m fonna get pulled over… Gonna have go through all of that… Just walking? Yea… but now… shit its like they don’t even wanna come through this neighbourhood…”

There may be other Ferguson community members who would not agree with the assessment that there is less police harassment and violence. However, the data found in Method One regarding the specter of DOJ oversight and the slowdown of the Ferguson revenue generation machine seems to validate the overall assessment of ‘less police harassment.’

Perceptions of less police excess also have to be looked at relative to the prior excesses described in Method One. Because there was an extremely high level of harassment before the uprising, ‘less’ police harassment may still mean ‘a lot’ viewed relative to other localities.
Empowerment. The passages directly above suggest that in addition to federal oversight, community empowerment may be playing a role in the possible temporary decrease in police harassment. Those passages also show that many community members were in some ways empowered by the uprising, particularly in terms of their relationship with the police. One male resident described how this change occurred during the uprising:

“and right then, that was when the fear of the police, you could see that the fear that in them—people, cause people had been afraid of the police for so long, so long. And I could tell that these folks—cause I was out here—like, cause when the cops used to do crap that they did, I used to buck a these cops and niggas used to be like ‘you crazy, you don’t talk to police like that.’ I was like ‘shit, I’m a free American, I ain’t do nothing’… And they talking about ‘man… da da da’ and they’d, you know, be real quiet about this like crap that they do to people here. So that was a breaking point for them. That’s why that will forever be ground zero, right there in Canfield. Because that was the day them folks was like, we ain’t afraid no more… I literally seen the fear in the police eyes, when they seen these people. I mean folks was throwing water bottles at they cars, beating on they cars, they couldn’t get out they car! They was scared.”

Community unity. In the participants’ descriptions, community unity was related to personal and community empowerment, perhaps having a bi-directional relationship with them. In the following passage, the connection to between community unity and empowerment is evident; a young male activist said:
“this part of time… last year, we effectively made a change. And that was in a change in people’s hearts and the way people thought, the way people think and the way people operate… We gave them some type of hope. Some type of strength, you now, some type of strength, some type of power… The fact that we can stand up like we did. Unity. You know? The fact that this was one of the most, one of the highest murder rates… in you know what I’m saying, in the United States or whatever. To be like they united, all together… You wouldn’t believe it.”

Several participants suggested that perhaps more community unity was beginning to occur before the uprising. It is likely that social and collective identity factors contributed to setting the groundwork for this unity that came to full fruition in the uprising.

There is a pattern of potentiality, emergence, and maintenance within the participants’ descriptions of community unity. These descriptions show a potential for unity before the uprising, e.g. a young female activist said: “we are a community that we all stand together”; an achievement of increased unity during the uprising, e.g., a young male activist said:

“And that’s how it was, you was seeing all these different people… had actually rallied for the same reasons. You know for most of us that was out here, you know sometimes it just like its, I’mma say real—it’s like it’s unreal. That it happened.”;

and the maintenance of the increase in unity after the uprising, e.g., a young male resident said: “I feel like they doing their thing… everybody standing together, you know?”
Everybody ain’t used to stand together… it was every man for they-self. Ever since that day [August 9th]…”

Table 16 shows participant descriptions of general community unity, unity during the uprising and unity after the uprising.

Table 16

Community Unity

General Sense of Unity:
1. “We do what we do for our children, and for the better equality of our race. It’s not about a personal thing, this is about us as a whole.”—male activist

2. “See this is what this about: this is about us. All of us. Us -- it’s a bunch of us. Its not about me, him, her, it’s about us… Justice. Freedom. Pride. Respect. That’s what we uphold. I don’t uphold it by myself. I got help in this; we uphold that.”—same participant

Unity During the Uprising:
1. “for them to stand up, to wanna fight, to wanna be able to—to wanna damn near die for this… for real. People, when I had my life—people had they lives in my hand, like, and I had my life in they hand, and they had they lives in my hand, cause I was following them, they was following me. Whatever I knew, they knew. Whatever I… didn’t know, they knew, and whatever they didn’t know, I knew. So it was like vice-versa. And we was fighting, we was fighting the war fight, and it was strong.”—young male activist

Unity After the Uprising:
1. “we’ve done -- fundraisers -- of out of our own. People came to give us stuff, we turned around and gave it to the community for the kids because -- we don’t give a fuck about us. We keep telling people: it’s not about [an organization] no more, it’s about these children. It’s about the justice that we have to get.”—female activist

2. “Everybody got to looking out for each other… ever since the rioting and stuff started happening… and all of that. Everybody started looking out for each other, it ain’t every man for they-self no more… Hey you ain’t got no tissue, hold up let me go get you some tissue, cuz.” [participant demonstrates this new conscientiousness by offering a stranger some tissue at the restaurant the interview was being held in]—young resident
3. “Motherfuckers be on it, I know you seen it at Wal-Mart... Motherfuckers, you know what I’m saying, helping people out the store. ‘Aw, well that’s too heavy for you, where your car at?’ When the last time you ever seen people be nice, you know? Motherfuckers ain’t nice…”—same participant

Improvements in interpersonal relationships. It is likely that the increased unity described in the previous section contributed to the improvement in interpersonal relationships in the community. Interview participants spoke consistently about developing new relationships with other community members or groups of community members they did not know before the uprising, being kinder to strangers, being willing to settle interpersonal disputes in healthier ways and describing how community members with formerly bad relationships (such as rival gangs) were able to develop more positive relationships. One resident spoke about how this began in the uprising:

“Since the memorial came, it was like people was reminded… we had Crips and Bloods come down here to the memorial… And I remember one night it was like three o’clock in the morning, cause people would come out here at all hours of the night, we used to stay out here… And uhm, these guys was out there talking… and, come to find out like, these two guys, one of them was Crip, one of them was Blood, they wind up being family members. But they remembered each other by a beef while somebody from the opposite side had killed one of they boys. But they was like, you know that shit is some bullshit, and they was like, they’ll squash they little rivalry, little thing, and they stood out there, you know, united at that memorial… and showed each other love… And I thought that was a big deal.”

There were formations of new relationships, for example when describing the formation of a protest group a participant said that before the uprising: “Well, I’mma be
honest, we never even met each other”. These types of interpersonal relationship
improvements were attributed to the uprising and specifically to increased community
unity, for example one resident and activist said:

“these young guys… they stopped like… doing the banging [gangbanging] thing
for real, like they wasn’t going out there on that stuff for real. They was like, you
know, this thing is bigger than this… And they recognized that then, and nobody
had to tell them. They just—they could see, the enemy.”

Similar to the potential-actual-maintenance progression in the Community Unity
theme above, first, a potential for better relationships is described: “some of the people on
the other side of the street, I didn’t meet them until, you know, after the Mike Brown
situation”, then an actualization of improved relationships during the uprising: “The
people congregating—nobody was fighting… people was really recognizing what was
going on”, and finally maintenance of the improvements after the uprising: “people don’t
fight. People don’t have no problems no more.”

Positive roles/self expressions for community members. According to the
participants, the uprising opened up a variety of opportunities for community members to
take on new positive roles in the community as well as to express positive character traits.
Earlier in the introductory passage to Meta-Narrative Three, a participant spoke about
how when you have a good community but there is no way for them to express positivity,
they act out of frustration and misguidance. The uprising seems to have given many
community members a chance to express their potential to engage in positive roles. For
example a participant said that many community members: “be dedicated to everything
they do… It’s just that we always, we put our dedication into the negative. When you put
the same dedication into the positive… motherfuckers will be surprised what you come up with”.

Of course, there were already many Ferguson community members with positive roles in the community, including workers, parents, students and church members. However, younger Ferguson community members are disproportionately unemployed and pushed to the margins of community and social life, and sometimes into the criminal justice system. The rebellion seems to have given many of them a productive and positive role in their community and in the larger society as well as a sense of purpose that they had not experienced before. One participant said about the police “they ain’t no heroes no more”. All of the participants expressed that the hero’s of the uprising were the youth who before were the object of police repression. This provides more grounds to interpreting the rebellion through the zone of proximal development theory: positive things didn’t necessarily come out of the uprising per se, but were already there waiting for expression or affordance.

Participants described a variety of examples of these new positive roles and positive character traits. A female participant described how a group of activists had become mentors: “like we’re protesters, activists… we became mentors. We [created a space for children], to try to give back to the community. To try to uh, do something positive out of something that happened bad”. And added later that “this is our vision, this is our passion, this is what we gonna do”.

Several participants who are Ferguson residents described how a community group is working together to monitor the activities of the police; one young resident said “I used to be a part of [a community self-defense group that monitors police], I used to be
a part of that, you know what I’m saying. But I just went to school… I’m in school now”.

Another resident said:

“And it’s been good so… [a group has] just been holding, uh, classes just to give enough information. If they wanna actually get involved with it [they] got a ‘know your rights’ class [they] give them… and then so if they serious about it then [they] gonna get them a camera. [They] gonna put a camera in they hand. [They] gonna… show them… make sure they know how to properly use this camera”.

A resident described that community members were looking for such a group to be a part of: “and it ain’t so much that they like really wanted to get involved with [a community self-defense group that monitors police]. They wanted to be a part of something that was real, that was in the movement, and that was doing something”.

A participant described how community members worked together to maintain the Michael Brown memorial: “people started putting this stuff in there -- that’s how the Mike Brown memorial got—came into existence right in the middle of street. And the people did that”; “They helped clean the memorial up. The mom was out in… one snowstorm, and she asked for help to shovel the snow from where the memorial was; cause we doing that”.

The interview participants also described the development of leadership roles; one male worker said: “them little dudes that was out here doing what they did, for him [Mike Brown] was 18… 17… that brought the attention to everybody else older, to come out there”. An activist described the process of learning how to be an effective protest group:
“Okay, we had a little—little flaws, where, you know how little mishaps happen. We ain’t perfect. There’s no—I’m—give me a book on how you protest, cause there’s no book on protesting. There’s no book on protesting. We learned how to do this by doing it everyday. Living out there on them streets”.

*Personal improvement, pride and integrity.* In addition to a sense of empowerment, community unity, and improved interpersonal relationships, participants spoke about a variety of positive personal transformations they underwent during the uprising, or positive character traits that they were able to express as a result of the uprising. As can be seen in the following passages about personal improvement, these transformations were tied into group processes, and are especially related to improvements in interpersonal relationships and community unity.

One young male resident said: “its shaped me like… I’m still a better person; it made me a better person… In a more social way. In a more, let’s come together, not fight… Yea. You help me I’ll help you.” Another young man said:

“I was just another probably street, hood, thug, whatever you wanna call it. In the streets looking for trouble; trying to make a way out of my society that I live in, trying to make it out. Trying to do something. Not trying to die fast. Not trying to die young but I’m still living fast... So, I took a lot from that, you know, from Ferguson. It showed me that I have power. You know me just me being a human being, and having a voice, and have an opinion. I have power. You know?”

The same participant also said:
“My father always told me I was like light years ahead of people. I never really understood until I came out to Ferguson. And I seen what type of power I have… over people. Not in a bad way but in a good way. A influence.”

The personal improvements endorsed above were related to community unity, better interpersonal relationships, and the ability to take on positive roles. As a result of these developments, participants reported that a sense of pride in themselves and in other community members was built or reinforced during the uprising; this pride is evident in the passages in Table 17 below.

Table 17

Pride and Accomplishment

Pride in Other Community Members:

1. “yea, I’m proud as a fuck about them. Proud as fuck about it. Cause they stood up for what they was on… They did that on they own. And they stood up for it, and they made a real big statement. So yea, I’m proud of them… So they did what they had to do to get some attention brought to this shit. So yes, I am very proud of them for it… Matter of fact, so I complimented them little dudes on that. They didn’t ask nobody for no help... They went down there and got down on their own situation.”—male worker

2. “I mean, everybody stood up… They stood up for what, you know… shit, I’m proud of the city for standing up for what they believe in… But yea, hell yea, I was proud of them.”—male resident

Pride in Self:

1. “I impact the whole world with the organization. Doing what I was doing. Telling the people like naw… we can’t just fold, we have to go hard, we have to keep going… Man… and that’s what I did, and I stood on that and that was my that was my word man… To not give in to this—not give into them.”—young male activist

2. “So, I was thinking I need like 15 to 20 people just to do that when I have a voice myself. I have a voice and a opinion that people will listen to, and people will undertake. And they would actually like, they would, actually take whatever I said into
consideration. Cause they know I’m genuinely meaning it from the heart. I speak with passion. I speak with truth. I speak with knowledge, facts.”—same

3. “I came out there with no structure, with no plan and with no— with no nothing. Just to go out there and protest. You know, then became a activist leader, you know… it was amazing. I became a civil rights leader. You know, and it was like man I couldn’t believe I did it.”—male activist

It was difficult and perhaps artificial to parse the ‘pride’ sub-theme from the integrity and dedication sub-themes. As can be seen in this passage from a young man, pride is evident along with integrity and dedication:

“I understood, that’s why like, I don’t want no pay-off. I don’t want no money, I don’t want— basically if you get paid, that means you gonna stop protesting. Everybody that got paid… basically stopped protesting. I mean when they did protest, they made a big ordeal about it, like… ‘I got locked up,’ and you know, put it all on the internet and all this, man… It’s crazy man, it’s breathtaking to see it unfold like this, I came out here with a genuine attitude to stand up even if it cost me my life.”

Participants often described their own integrity in juxtaposition to those who they feel ‘sold-out’ or were not dedicated to the movement solely for altruistic purposes. This is a sub-theme in itself and will be returned to below in the negative outcomes section (see Divisions Between Protesters).

The potential-actual-maintenance pattern can be found again in the participants descriptions. First, a potential for the positive characteristics of integrity and dedication before the uprising, e.g., a young man said:

“Motherfuckers, they be dedicated to everything they do… Its just that we always, we put our dedication into the negative, when you put the same dedication in to
the positive… motherfuckers will be surprised what you come up with. Cause that was all our dedication into the… into the positive… That was all our dedication into the positive, now we… now everybody see that man…”

Then an emergence and solidification of the characteristics during the uprising, e.g.,

“You gotta make a stand for something. If you can’t stand by—if you can’t stand with a group, stand alone -- stand up for something for what you believe in. {Damn right.}

That’s my thing, and it brought us out.” Then finally a continued maintenance of integrity and dedication after the uprising, e.g. a male activist said: “When all the cameras was gone and all that, we was still here.” Table 18 shows more participant descriptions of integrity and dedication.

Table 18

*Integrity and Dedication*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integrity During the Uprising:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. “we came out here for the fight. They came out here—a lot of people came out here seeing… ‘oh, all we gotta do is start a group y’all, our name is this, and we can raise our own money’”—male activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. “They used our name and got some money but they wanted us to use—they wanted to use us, to kinda rock with them while they do it, but we was against it. We like no, we don’t want that shit at all, that’s not what we doing.”—same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. “that could have been just any other dude, you know what I’m saying, if the police would have killed him, we could have, you know what I’m saying, we could have—we did what we did, everybody was gonna sit there and watch it till the body left. Motherfucker could have went in the house and went to sleep, like nothing happened… We could have, you know? We could have went in and went to sleep like nothing happened. Like shit, he dead now… That’s what we could have did. But, you know what I’m saying, naw, fuck naw, cause that wasn’t right...”—young resident</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Integrity After the Uprising:*
1. “it wasn’t about money to us and it’s still not. I’mma tell you right now, we still volunteer free work. Right now. From August the 9th up until right now. We don’t have no type of paper, we don’t get no type of salary, we don’t get no stipends or nothing; we still here doing this work for free. Volunteer, cause it’s for our seeds [children].”—male activist

2. “We don’t do it for the glorification, we do it from the heart. See, when your heart is in it… then you don’t have to worry about the big money. See, the whole idea—I wanna know why the movement look like it done died because a lot of people done sold them—done sold their souls.”—older activist

Dedication:

1. “we have kept this shit going! We refuse to let this shit go. When people was down there, we was out there marching in thunderstorms, and hurricanes, and goddammit when it started to get cold—tornados, still sleeping out in them tents.”—same

*Personal significance of uprising.* The interview participants expressed that the uprising was a watershed moment in their lives, and likely for many other members of the Ferguson and North County community. Participants reported positive feelings associated with being a part of a historical event; for example, a young man said:

“This our little piece of history in St. Louis. As far as I’m concerned this the first piece of history since I’ve been alive. This the first thing that I can straight see—that’s gonna be in social studies book… Mike gonna be in the social studies book, Canfield gonna be there. You know what I’m saying? That’s the first history—piece of history, you know what I’m saying, since I ever been born. So that is something I’m gonna remember… all my life, I’m always gonna remember that”.

Some participants spoke with fondness about their memories of the uprising, for example a resident said: “Yea, it was a wild time. I remember. I was in it. I was in it”. Another young man described the uprising as if he were part of something special event in American history: “I promise, I ain’t never seen that. Never seen that. That’s why I
said, that’s something I’mma always remember man, that’s something I never seen a day in my life. Like, if you ever seen the Freedom Riders movies and stuff…”; and he also said that: “My kids gonna learn about that one day. ‘Daddy did you know anything about Mike Brown’. Aw, yea man, yea I done smoked a couple—you know what I’m saying. I done did my thing with him before man.”

As the participants expressed, community unity, the improvement in relationships, and dedication to the cause all contributed to making the uprising so special for community members. The significance of the Ferguson uprising in the lives of many community members is magnified by looking at it through the lens of youth who were formerly marginalized and in some cases, literally trapped within a small geographic area owing to a veritable occupation by the police, and the failure of the public education system. For example, one young man said: “the Ferguson story, what happened in Ferguson… it was something that was supposed to happen. Put it like that. It was something that was gonna change peoples lives for the rest of they lives. I know it did me.”

*Micah Brown Jr. legacy.* A few of the interview participants knew Mike Brown before his death, but most of them did not. The participants described Michael Brown’s death as a tragedy, however they also talked about Michael Brown in the status of a martyr. Participants related how while his death was a tragedy and loss, in other ways Michael Brown left a positive legacy through the fight for justice which emerged from his death. Table 19 below shows some of these views.

Table 19
Michael Brown Jr. Legacy

1. “It’s always been like that. It was just the fact that Mike Brown shed light on the, on uh, the system. You know when his death actually shed light on the system on how they treat people and how they act and... how they carry out they duties.”—male activist

2. “that’s like a example of how a young Black men get treated that... a lot of people don’t see... that situation could have been a eye opener for people who don’t know that stuff, you know, like the other side of it, you know what I mean. Like I said, like all of us, I know everybody right here been in the situations like that but luckily we walked out... alive {Mmm-hmm... We done been in a couple together} Right... So luckily we can live to talk about it and he lost his life over it, but... some people will never know that side, so... That would be my opinion... like open somebody else’s eyes. Just tell them to look at that type of situation as, you know what I mean, some of the stuff we gotta deal with.”—young worker

3. “the fact that since Mike Brown died... in the inhumane way that he did, sparked a lot—lots of people. I know it did me.”—activist

4. “That’s why I’m saying Ferguson was only the tip of the iceberg, but it started a fire—it started a fire that should burn forever. And the people that really want the change, people that really want to see something different, they wanna see this world turned upside down -- cause that’s the only way its gonna happen is turn upside down. Everybody that’s in... a position of power should be in a position of poverty.”—activist

5. “So yea, but that one, set the mark right there, like—if people probably wouldn’t have acted like how they acted in Baltimore had it been for the shit that happened with Mike Brown...”—young worker

Wisdom. The participants related that they generated a lot of wisdom during the uprising that can be used going forward in the struggle for justice. It is not always clear whether or not they already had this wisdom, or just consolidated the wisdom they already had. For example this activist came away with insights into how to politically organize in the future:

“And if you don’t have a strong enough plan... to keep your—keep our people strengthened and keep them solid and keep them loyal... then they shall fall up
under the hands of the government system. And they still be puppets and pawns among everybody else.”

This young man gained a new respect for the members of his own community: “But you know what I’m saying… they gave me a change of mind, you know. Everybody can be equal for real—for real. I ain’t never believe that, you know.” This resident said he was inspired to seek out new information:

“so… you know, tell people man, we gotta start asking questions, and we gotta stop like, stop waiting on somebody else to give us information cause it’s not gonna come. You not gonna get information until you go look for it. You gotta investigate. Just like the stuff we talking about now. If people don’t investigate, what people been covering… then you won’t know. Still.”

Table 20 below shows that the participants came away from the uprising with what they considered to be profound truths and observations.

Table 20

\textit{Wisdom}

1. “But I understand something. I understand that the government will never cease to, you know have equal rights amongst everybody, because that was—that was not how the system was put in place.”—\textit{young activist}

2. “You know, but I just understand now that… just with a little money, little fame you can change the course of people’s thought processes. The way they thinking, the way they acting, the way they… operate as humans.”—\textit{same}

3. “Because… when people hurt other people… we should still get together. Don’t turn nothing down, cause… how it happened.”—\textit{young worker}

4. “A system can only operate when, when the people are uneducated. Once the people are educated to what the system is about, then they lose they power. How else can 3
percent of the world control, you know what I’m saying, 97 percent?”—resident and activist

5. “a change shall come, but the change shall only come if the people force it”—young activist

**Negative outcomes of uprising.** Speaking broadly, while the ‘positive outcomes’ themes primarily concerned developments that organically grew out of the community’s struggle against state sponsored violence and oppression, conversely, the ‘negative outcomes’ themes, for the most part, concerned anti-social developments that were done to the community (or to the participants themselves), that were attributed by participants, in one way or another, to power-elites and law enforcement.

**Nothing changed.** There was a feeling among many, if not all of the participants that although some things have changed in Ferguson, they are only temporary or appearance level changes. According to most participants, and as Method One showed, despite the fact that there may have been some temporary respite from the types of excesses which were committed by law enforcement before the uprising and some cosmetic changes involving community policing, not much has changed from before; for example this worker said:

“All they doing is putting a band-aid over what just happened… all they doing is putting a band-aid on a bad situation… But when that band-aid get old, they gonna rip it off and it gonna be back to where it was”.

Another worker said:

“like I said I really don’t feel like it changed shit… I don’t, you know what I mean, cause like he said it’s been a bunch of incidents after that that happened in New York, Baltimore, and you know all these other cities. You know the same
shit still going on. And it’s still gonna keep happening. That’s how I feel. Like it gonna keep going on.”

The tension between change and non-change is discussed further below (see Tension Between Positive and Negative Outcomes of the Uprising). Table 21 shows participants’ thoughts about how things have not changed concerning the relationship of the police and the government to the community.

Table 21
Nothing Changed

1. “I still feel like the police, they still got the upper-hand cause they got they badge and they still gonna get away with the shit they gonna get away with, you know what I mean. So… the short answer is no, ain’t nothing really changed.”—young worker

2. “Ain’t nothing come out of it except for another dead brother.”—male resident

3. “its too many eyes on the situation now… You here asking us questions now. Its too much shit going on in the situation now. The moment that shit stop, shit gonna go right back to doing what it was doing.”—same

4. “I feel like they just, they just back to business as usual.”—male activist

5: “So you asked do I believe anything changing? No. They gonna get smarter and we gonna get smarter too… Ain’t that a bitch?”—male worker

Table 21 above showed the perception among participants that conditions in Ferguson have not changed. Participants also gave specific examples of how things have not changed relating either to personal experiences or knowledge of other facts. This participant gave personal testimony as to how things did not change:

“I got paperwork now in my back pocket. Look what I went to jail for. [a non-criminal traffic offense] What date was that? What date was that man?... You tell
me what date that was man…Ain’t that after Mike Brown? Has the shit changed?”.

During an interview I was witness to a situation which demonstrated non-change; the day previous to the interview a boy had been shot by the police in North St. Louis city, and the interview participant had just referenced the shooting a few minutes before when a call came through:

“we had just got a call saying that the young boy that had got shot in the face by the police, mother is trying to get into the hospital to get some information, get anything about her son and they not letting her.”

Another participant referenced the failure of the justice process regarding the death of Michael Brown: “It was injustice, you know what I mean? he [Officer Wilson] didn’t get charged with nothing, you know the final—when it came down to it… He got away with what he did so, it was injustice… The shit wasn’t right.” Another participant thought that the same personnel were still at the Ferguson Police Department:

“right now each and every last one of those racist-ass officers that was working for Ferguson, still in Ferguson right now. What’s gonna stop them from turning around and doing it again? Only way you fight that—dismantle them, send them elsewhere, or better yet, send their ass—just get rid of them period. Don’t even put them back—under a uniform, cause if you put them back in a uniform, guess what? They’re gonna turn around and do it again.”

*Increased vigilance and fear of law enforcement.* Despite the perception that law enforcement excesses had declined, the interview participants reported that they and other community members were much more sensitive and vigilant about such excesses after the
uprising both because they were terrorized by the shooting death of Michael Brown, e.g. this father said:

“it’s dangerous. …How would you feel if the police… shot somebody in your neighborhood?... how safe is that?.....Know what I’m saying? My kids be out there. How many times did he [Officer Wilson] fire?… Those bullets skip, those bullets don’t got no name- they skip, shoot… pass and go through stuff… That’s hella scary”

and also by the ultra-violent response of the authorities to the uprising, e.g. one worker said: “But after that… it was tense and you know, you really couldn’t trust, you know, you really couldn’t trust the police at all”

Increased fear and vigilance is a seeming contradiction to the feelings of fearlessness participants had when confronting the police during the uprising. My own interpretation of this is that everyday life is a long and uncertain process; the prospect of facing a potentially violent, racist police officer on one’s own is much more daunting than facing the law enforcement authorities united with ones comrades. Table 22 shows participants descriptions of increased fear among themselves and others in the community of law enforcement owing to their experience of the Michael Brown killing.

Table 22

Participant Descriptions of Increased Vigilance and Fear of Law Enforcement

1. “honestly… I’m less comfortable… if they can do it to him they can do it to anybody… That’s just one more person who you can’t really do nothing about… but they can do something to you… Now you gotta look at that.”—young male worker
2. “it affected me… just like it affected anybody else in Ferguson… it could have been anybody who they accused of stealing… anybody could have died that day though. You know? Anybody big and Black could have been right there.”—male student

3. “I could see how it you know, could affect somebody—I mean you know it made me look at this—I got young [children], I don’t want none of that shit happening to them”—young father

4. “right now we got police scared, citizens scared, the kids are scared. I want my [child] to know man, hold on man, I might be able to go ask me a officer for help cause this dude following me.”—another young father

5. “citizens are scared because they can’t call police… So when your neighbour become the person you call… what they think gonna happen out here?”—same

**Increased cynicism about institutions.** The interview participants had all most likely already developed a critical consciousness about the police before the Michael Brown shooting. This appeared as a theme in Meta-Narrative One. However in that case the theme referred to the development of cynicism before the Michael Brown killing. However, several layers of grievances developed after that time including the Brown killing, the suppression of the uprising, and the Grand Jury non-indictment. Even before the non-indictment, this young resident reported that he had no faith in the justice process:

“Well, for the longest time, we was discussing whether or not that was obviously he [Officer Wilson]… was not gonna be charged. Which we kinda knew… but when I heard the final jury it was just like… it’s just like now watch, look what’s fonna happen now… Its like they make an example out of a whole lot of things… he should have been made an example out of. They make a example out of one cop who kills an unarmed teen— an *unarmed* teen, you know what I’m saying? A
college kid, I mean he was a big fella but that’s—what is you stereotyping; I’m a big dude, you just gonna shoot me down?”

The participants expressed that after the uprising their cynicism had increased or even become a form of irreparable hopelessness; for example a student expressed: “I wouldn’t put nothing past these policemen. Nothing at all.” A male resident said: “It’s fucked. We might as well be Mexico.”

The cynicism and hopelessness about institutions found in the participants descriptions of life after the uprising may be quantitatively or even qualitatively different than those descriptions they gave of life before the uprising; for example a student expressed that: “Cause they [the police] ain’t no heroes no more. You know what I’m saying, they ain’t no hero’s, they doing dirt. You know what I’m saying, they act like they gang-banging or something, basically that’s what the polices be acting like”. The same participant said later that “they [the police] hypocrites… how you gonna sit here and tell somebody not to do something and you’re doing it. You saying ‘don’t catch bodies’ [don’t kill], but you catching bodies though.”

*Physical and Mental Harm.* Participants described many instances of being on the receiving end of violent attacks from the police during the uprising, particularly the first weeks of the uprising; one woman said: “we all been knocked out, tear-gassed, everything.” This is something that was reported in Method One. The violence went far beyond what most people watching the national news were exposed to; as a female activist said: “There’s so much you guys don’t know…” and “It’s so much shit that done happened down here that y’all don’t know about that we done encountered.” Several participants interpreted the deaths of Deandre Joshua and others as a form of retribution
from the police: “Two of Mike Brown’s witnesses dead… One got burnt up in the car, one of them got burnt up and threw in the River du Pere… We know the police did it.” It is unclear what type of future physical or mental health consequences these experiences could result in. Examples of physical harm suffered by community members are shown in Table 23.

Table 23

*People were Hurt or Killed.*

1. “The more we shut down stuff it seem like they just—the more we shuts down the more they just wanna retaliate by killing youth.”—*female activist*

2. “Back when they was doing that they shot tear-gas for a whole hour straight. They kept on loading up them things, and shooting them off ‘choo-choo.’ And all—people was all standing out there. So like I’m sure it’s a lot of people got health issues that they need to be checked out… even myself. I need to get checked out… for my… breathing all that crap, you know whatever the hell they had in the air.”—*male resident*

3. “When we start looking at footages of the tear gas, the rubber bullets getting shot, the little kids getting shot in they eyes and they legs {starts crying} and they backs. It’s kinda hard to like, look through Facebook and see some of the stuff that they did when we was down there.”—*female activist*

In addition to physical harm, the participants reported many instances of being exposed to racism or perceived racism. Participants were directly exposed to White supremacist racists:

“Prime example. Look where they had them police rallies, when we used to go downtown how racist they was on us. They had they little confederate flags—motherfucker we know y’all KKK! {We know y’all Klansman} We know y’all Klansmans. And they wives standing there… I said, you mean to tell me you gonna defend that shit you married to?”
and threatened by White supremacist racists:

“When they came down here, they think they was fonna walk, up West Florissant… the KKK, we knew when they was here. They think they was fonna come down on ground zero and walk up West Florissant… in they hoods; it would have been a war out of this motherfucking world… {This is what we told them: If y’all let the Klan come through here…} Were coming down there… {We gonna fuck them up. They won’t do it. Come on, come on. Shit we gonna do more than scare y’all motherfuckers! Come on, come on, we want you to come down. Bring your ass down here, I promise you, half of them won’t make it out this motherfucker right.}"

and through the media learned that Officer Wilson was receiving donations after the Michael Brown killing: “That part was just… devastating. Like why would they feel like that? Some people just was hating, just hatred, showing hatred. I don’t understand how people can donate money to help somebody… live after they killed somebody.”

Participants have also been exposed to ongoing harassment and punishment by authorities. Some instances of possible extrajudicial punishment were reported in Method One. Below are more instances that were described by participants. Despite the participants’ perceptions that the Ferguson police may have slowed down their excessive behaviour in the wake of the rebellion, some participants reported an ongoing pattern of special harassment and intimidation being waged against the residents of the Canfield Green Apartments, and particularly those who have been critical of the police. On its face, this pattern appears to be a form of extrajudicial revenge or punishment against community members by law enforcement agencies, perhaps in conjunction with the
owners of Canfield Green Apartments, the Lipton Group. Participants focused on three forms of what they considered to be revenge or punishment: 1) The desecration of the Michael Brown memorial at the site where he was killed (which, as described in Method One, was built shortly after Michael Brown’s body was removed from the shooting scene and was lovingly maintained by community members from that point on); 2) The harassment of citizens who have organized themselves to monitor the activities of the police; 3) The involuntary removal of residents from the Canfield Green apartment complex. Regarding the memorial and the monitoring of police activities a young male resident said:

“Man if y’all gonna tell the world something… let the world know how they be doing us… They play it all funky… [A group] put cameras up in Canfield to make sure we’ll know who take down the teddy bears [teddy bears formed the foundation of the Brown memorial]… motherfuckers take the cameras right back down. Like who the fuck could possibly take the cameras down?… Who else would take the cameras down?… y’all take the cameras down for what?… a couple days later the teddy bears come up missing; we can’t catch it on footage… Cause the cameras gone. That’s how they be doing us… They riding… to stop [an organization]. Huh? How that sound? This stuff that ain’t out, you heard me?”

Another participant said: “they took everything… from the memorial, they kept taking the stuff.”

Regarding citizen monitoring of police activities a male activist said:

“even the [organization] that’s out watching the police, and they [the police] know who [they] are; they wanna do their form of intimidation… They came up
to [somebody’s] house a couple times, where they would just drive past the back… and Ferguson don’t got no need to go around [that] way, they do that crap and they’ll come past and they’ll wave… that’s intimidation… that’s low-key intimidation… they try to punk all the [members of an organization] that’s been doing this to try to get [them] not to watch the cops because they don’t want people to start doing that… Cause cops are the bad guys.”

Regarding the involuntary removal of residents from Canfield Green, participants described the ways that community members were removed. A small number of Canfield Green residents left voluntarily in the weeks after the Brown killing because they were scared of the police, or wanted to get away from the escalating situation: “some people move so they won’t have to feel this type of thing.”; “when the murder happened… a lot of people were afraid… So people started moving out…” However, according to participants, many more residents left Canfield Green because they were denied lease renewal or were evicted for minor infractions that were not enforced before the uprising. The vacancies were also noticed by the local media, and I witnessed the empty apartments myself. A male activist and resident said:

“everybody didn’t move out, so don’t think like all these empty units was empty because all these people were scared of the police -- no. That’s not what happened… a very few people left because of that, those people got out like, within the first, you know, couple weeks. But… right after that -- because they waited to see how many people was gonna leave -- … then they went on some big push to try to get all these residents up out of here. People that was late on they rent… they would send them… notices… And so the people that they couldn’t,
uh, get out far as rent, they got other people out because of ordinance violations or something like that… So a lot of people… they got evicted because of something… like if they had somebody that was staying in they apartment that wasn’t supposed to be there. And then they kicked somebody out. So uh, they had various reasons; maybe it was—the maintenance man come in here to inspect the units and see something wrong, they said ‘oh’… ‘you just destroyed something’… you getting evicted. So they found reasons to evict people."

_Divisions between protesters._ The negative or antisocial outcome that was perhaps discussed the most in the interviews was the manner in which uprising participants were divided or demobilized by outside interests with large amounts of cash, mass media access and organizational capacity. This theme stands in contrast to the interview participants’ descriptions of increased community unity and better interpersonal relationships. The interview participants, particularly the ones who were very dedicated activists, consistently talked about how large amounts of outside money, which they resisted taking, split the movement and weakened it, perhaps even killed it, e.g, “I wanna know why the movement look like it done died because a lot of people… done sold their souls.” The connection between the sources of this cash, the recipients, and the settling of grievances by powerful interests was reported in Method One. The effect of incentives on the motivation of protesters was also discussed in relation to ‘rational choice’ theory.

It is evident in the passages above that there was a general feeling of unity between community members united against those state agents seen as responsible for the death of Michael Brown, as well as the ongoing racism and police violence that his death
represented. According to participants, as the uprising went on, there was a detrimental impact on this unity, and it was perceived as coming from the negative influence of outside activists, non-profits and funding organizations, most of whom came from outside the community:

“And with them I seen that… the way the government system is set up I seen that they was paying people off… pay-cutting people—I mean like literally like paying people, seriously bro, you couldn’t—you’d have to see it to believe it—

**Like protesters?** Yea man, organizers man, people just came out there to fight, they got organizations now… I was like man, this is evil.”

The participants thought that money changed people motives for participating in the movement: “they’re not trying to support the community. They’re supporting their brand, their name.” This activist explained further:

“People seeing what we was doing, when you got some people that manipulated this movement. We seen some people that seen what we was doing and figure ‘ah this is something we can get money out of.’ People who already was into fundraising, all people that was into these non-profits… they seen what we was doing and they wanted to use us… ‘oh we gonna start falling in’ and they kinda went for it, went for the little sellout.”

In addition to the problems with money, participants saw many of the outside activist groups as falsely representing the community; this resident and activist explained that:

“they trying to push their… uh, message or what they’re trying to do. And they’re not really concerned about the community. And they come into our community
and tell us what we need… I was like, no, that’s not what we need… So because they think that they smart. But see when they run into brothers like me and they realizing like it ain’t a whole bunch of dummies that’s out here in the street.”

Some participants also saw that outside groups were causing splits within the uprising movement:

“And yea the people is trying to unify, but we getting… we getting hammered…; by these people and these people. You got folks that came out here… instead of supporting the whole group, they would try to give individuals money… to see what they gonna do… It’s like dropping something and see if they gonna fight for it.”

Some of the descriptions of the impact of extrinsic rewards for protesting are similar to descriptions of the ‘overjustification effect’ which was found in a meta-analysis of studies on extrinsic motivation by Deci, Koestner, & Ryan (1999). A young activist said he perceived that:

“the people that got paid off are no longer around. The people that didn’t get paid off, they still in the streets, still trying to find a way… Still trying to find some way… to uh, to make a difference and to make a change, to do something. And I’m one of the people that didn’t get paid off. So I’m still out here trying to find a way to make a difference… to make a change.”

The same participant expressed later that:

“And it didn’t make any sense to me. You know, like it really didn’t. I was like man, like seriously… I couldn’t man, like I said, it was like seeing is believing until I actually seen it. I couldn’t believe that people would stand strong like this
and I couldn’t believe that they would be… and I couldn’t believe that got divided like they did.”

From the information gathered in Method One it is clear that a great deal of the money and influence came from private foundations or non-profits with ‘liberal’ or ‘progressive’ platforms, particularly Teach for America, the Ford Foundation and the Open Societies Foundation. It is also clear that this is not the first time that such foundations have been involved with radical social movements, nor the first time that community members perceived this involvement in negative terms (Domhoff, 2005; Schecter, Ansara, & Kolodney, 1968).

A sub-theme that emerges related to the money issue is the split between those protesters who took money and those who didn’t. This cleavage is characterized as a difference between those whose motives were to get justice and those who were willing to ‘sell-out’ as can be seen in the following participant’s comment: “So peoples starting to realize that these groups… these uh, activist groups or whatever you want to call them; a lot of them come out here for their own political gain.” Worse yet, these paid activists were actually seen to be in collusion with the same state power that was oppressing community members, e.g., “So when you see these lieutenants, and these churches, and all them running around and trying to look good in the camera; they’re doing it because they conjoined with North County and Ferguson to look good” and “they dispatched them to diffuse the situation” and “they working for the enemy, so they’re not going to expose them. That’s how they getting they check, you know.”

This theme also parallels the discussion on ‘rational choice’ theory which speculated that some activists joined the movement for altruistic reasons (‘irrational’
reasons, according to ‘rational choice’) while others seem to have joined in the uprising after making a cost-benefit analysis of what they could gain from it.

Some participants blamed the return of the status quo in Ferguson on the influence of the funding and tactics from outside organizations; this young male activist said:

“like now… the way Ferguson is running… the way its operating. Like the people—like if this—if August 9th come around and people don’t stand up and people don’t really fight… then it’ll let them know that you know, we got them back in check. They got the people back in check, you know the people, you know we understand that the people… are, you know can get paid off, so anybody come up, just drop some money in they bucket… man you know, go about your business, you know.”

He continued later:

“That’s basically how it is, just business as usual man. So nobody is—nobody is doing nothing. Nobody’s trying to make a change. Nobody trying to uh… uh basically, nobody’s trying to go hard like they did. Cause I don’t know if they scared… I would say the money-wise. Cause since everybody got some money… and they act like its cool now. I’mma go get me a nice little car, a little apartment or something like that. And they just forget about what you came out here for, it wasn’t for no money the reason you came out here. The reason you came out here is to fight for your freedom.”

Emerging from all of these problems related to the influence of well-funded outside activist organizations comes a sense of disillusionment, disappointment or even
betrayal on the part of some participants from seeing the inconsistent behaviour of people who they thought were strictly in the movement to seek justice; this young activist said:

“Its crazy man… its breathtaking to see it unfold like this. It hurt me for the most part cause, I came out here with a genuine attitude to stand up even if it cost me my life. Then you looking back on it like you was gonna lose your life for people that was going to walk away when they got a pay-cut”

Later the same activist said:

“You know just because you ain’t got shackles on your feet that don’t means you ain’t free. You know what I’m saying. Like they don’t—sometimes they just psychologically like, brainwashing man, for them not to understand and see the dynamics of what the hell the system is doing to us.”

He eventually showed his frustration:

“Whatever man, it’s like, man, we just all gave it up. We just gave all that up for nothing… And I stood strong for all them months man just to be—get back to square one. It didn’t make any sense.”

*Emotional Pain and Healing.* Participants described ongoing emotional pain in dealing with all of the negative consequences of the uprising discussed above; one woman said: “we seen the pain in the little kids faces, the grown men coming down there crying. Asking the questions why is this keep happening? Feeling, they feeling helpless like, they should have done something.” She stated later that: “it’s hard I mean, the closer we get to… the 9th [of August, the anniversary of Brown’s death and the beginning of the uprising], the harder it is for us…. the closer it gets, it brings back more memories and
more pain.” A male activist expressed that: “Sometimes I think about and I can’t do nothing but I cry now, I feel hurt, I feel pain, I feel like I can’t do anything.”

Several participants, both male and female, were moved to tears during the interviews when sharing stories about the descriptions of police violence towards them during the uprising. However, they also described healing and resilience in the face of all the negativity and pain; one female activist said: “right now, we’re trying to heal. We’re trying to heal, that’s all. We’re like a work in progress. Considering everything that we’ve been through, and endured since August 9th.” She continued:

“we were messed up down here, like, in all—I mean in all different aspects, we were fucked up down here… But… right now we’re trying to heal, and get back to being a community that can help and support each other.”
She eventually came to the conclusion that: “But uh, it’s gonna be okay. It’s gonna be okay. It’s gonna be alright. But uh, we gonna be okay. We doing alright right now. We trying to heal. So, that’s what’s going on, we trying to heal. I’m trying to heal.”

**Tension Between Positive and Negative Outcomes of the Uprising.**

There is a tension that emerges from the juxtaposition of positive/pro-social and negative/antisocial outcomes of the rebellion as described by the interview participants. This tension could be characterized as ‘things have changed’ vs. ‘things have not changed.’ The ‘less police harassment’ theme shows many examples of participants validating the ‘things have changed’ theme, but Table 21 shows a validation of the ‘things have not changed’ theme. Looking more closely at the ‘things have changed’ theme, it is limited to some very appearance-level or surface-level factors like community policing and the cessation of policing for revenue. A closer look at Table 21 shows that
the perception of ‘things have not changed’ speaks to a more essential level of non-change. It is best to make sense of this tension in light of what is known about the outcomes of the uprising from Method One as well as the participants’ own comments. From these perspectives the ‘have changed/have not changed’ dichotomy is not a contradiction of formal logic, but rather a dialectical tension between non-mutually exclusive opposites (change and non-change), where non-change is primary over change.

The Method One findings showed that the Ferguson Police Department, municipal court system and city government are under intense scrutiny, not only from the major media and outside activist groups but perhaps more importantly from the U.S. Department of Justice (as one participant said: “it’s too many eyes on the situation now”). There is, in addition to the words of the participants, empirical evidence to suggest that the racist Ferguson revenue generation machine described in the DOJ investigation has, if not halted, slowed down to a great extent. The best empirical evidence for this is that Ferguson is now in deep revenue trouble and in possible danger of bankruptcy (Deere, 2015). However, to my knowledge, there are no plans to compel Emerson Electric, or any of the other major businesses located Ferguson, to fill this gap. This may be a case of ‘the more things change, the more things stay the same’ -- another contradiction which may help to clarify the ‘change/non-change’ contradiction which emerged from the interview data.

The way that many of the participants, who undoubtedly represent many more voices from Ferguson and the broader North County and metro St. Louis community, have made meaning out of these contradictions is that the struggle for justice must continue; as one young man said:
“Y’all just gotta wait and see, you know what I’m saying? With that I can’t tell y’all too much detail about that, you know what I’m saying. It’ll fuck y’all up. Just wait on it. You know what I’m saying? I ain’t gonna lie to you, I ain’t gonna say—I’ma give you a hint though: we ain’t done. We ain’t done at all. Yea. Yea. No, it ain’t done.”

“We ain’t done”.

“when you have a bunch of individuals willing to stand up and fight regardless, of how many it is; damn them. Damn Ferguson, damn North County, damn any other state and other city that’s doing the same damn thing. They—every—all of them been exposed. Now that you’ve been exposed, clean up the dirt you done dropped! Cause if you don’t, we will. By any means necessary! If we have to walk, crawl, or come through a motor vehicle; we will come to your town, your city, your state, your country, wherever you stay at and expose everything that you do.”—resident/activist explains that his activist group has stood up to the authorities and will continue to do so

The interview participants described that there were many positive or pro-social aspects to the uprising. They also indicated that the uprising gave great hope to many North County community members that people were willing to stand up to injustice. However, it is also clear that participants did not feel that they had accomplished all of the goals they set out to achieve, which for many was to end racism and the institutions that perpetuate it “by any means necessary.” As can be seen from the findings of Method One and from some of the participants’ descriptions as well, powerful individuals and organizations decided behind closed doors how they were going to resolve the grievances that led to the rebellion. Some of these same organizations and individuals were directly
or indirectly responsible for those grievances in the first place. Both carrot and stick approaches were used against the rebels to prevent them from achieving their aims, or even having a seat at the table in the decision making process. Participants described unyielding violence committed against them by official state as well as extra-judicial forces, in addition to a form of psychological warfare used to thin or co-opt their ranks with what amounted to bribery from extremely powerful private interests. The DOJ forced the Ferguson Police Department to initiate ‘community policing’, but many participants felt the department should have been disbanded. Beyond Ferguson, Americans, and disproportionality Black Americans, continue to be killed by the police at a rate unparalleled in most of the world.

Despite all of the racism, the state-sponsored violence, the co-optation, the setbacks, the passage of time, the continued killing of youth in metro St. Louis by law enforcement, and the dark shadow cast by the increasing rate of homicides in Metro St. Louis, which already has one of the highest homicide rates in the world, most of the participants, including all those who consider themselves activists, stated that they were ready to continue fighting for justice against any odds; a female activist said:

“The fight still continues. Front-liners. Front-line. That’s what we need. If you gonna kill us on this front-line, you gonna kill all of us cause we not going nowhere. We all gonna die. We all gonna die together, locked up. And every time you push back, every time, uh, y’all tell us to get back, we fighting back. It’s just like that.”

She also added that:
“These generation of youngsters- they ain’t no joke, they’re fearless. They fight the police cause they know, once they get them, they get them in the alleyway, they gonna either get their ass killed or they gonna get beat up real bad. They coming out. And they—they’re doing what they need to do, so they can try to make change.”

The ability to heal and the power of resilience that some participants described may be one of the factors potentiating this ability to march on against seemingly insurmountable odds; for example a female activist said: “You can’t do nothing else but kill us now. You done done every damn thing else.” Perhaps this resilience is one of the factors behind many of the participants insistence that their fight against oppression in Ferguson, across the United States, and around the world is not over, as one young activist said:

“That’s why I’m saying Ferguson was only the tip of the iceberg, but it started a fire—it started a fire that should burn forever. And the people that really want the change, people that really want to see something different, they wanna see this world turned upside down- cause that’s the only way it’s gonna happen is turn it upside down. Everybody that’s in… a position of power should be in a position of poverty.”

Another resident also echoed the international aspect of the struggle: “What I want the world to know about Ferguson… one thing man, that Ferguson is everywhere.”

Another aspect of many of the participants’ insistence that the struggle is not over is to make the local authorities remember the Michael Brown killing, for example one woman said:
“we’re not gonna let them forget what they did to our child laying down there for four and a half hours. Just looking at him like he was a dog or an animal. Not covering him up, or anything. Uhm, we’re gonna make you remember what you did to him. You may wanna forget”

The date ‘August 9th’ has a particular resonance with the participants, e.g., “We gonna make y’all remember, what y’all done to Mike Brown. August 9th coming, we gonna make y’all remember. We ain’t never gonna forget this shit!” One young man stated that as long as this date is upcoming, which seems to be always, community members will continue to take to the streets:

“Don’t think this gonna be the last year cause it’s—motherfuckers gonna be back next year. August 9th. And then the year after that, motherfuckers gonna be on it… We gonna be on it. We’ll fuck around though. We still gonna go trick-or-treating through the stores if we want to; again. We just—cause that’s what we can do. Who the fuck gonna stop us? Cause ain’t nobody stop you from killing Mike… So who the fuck gonna stop us? If you can do what you wanna do, we can do what we wanna do then. How about that?”

Table 24 shows more participant comments about the ongoing nature of the struggle.

Table 24

*The Fight Continues*

1. “we still out here, we ain’t going nowhere. We ain’t going nowhere. It may kinda quiet down just a little bit. But its fonna kick back up. We ain’t going nowhere”—*female activist*

2. “We got to stay strong. Ain’t no, ain’t no—ain’t no going in our house, ain’t no more going to sleep, turning on the news, watching this again and again and again. Ain’t none
of that. The men, they didn’t want us in the forefront. Come on. The women done ran the movement for years. How you gonna tell us as a parent birthing a black child in this world we ain’t gonna get on the front-lines? Y’all got us fucked up. We gonna get on them front-lines, we gonna hold them front-lines. We gonna stay there, if we have to die, pass out, however, we gonna be down there, we have to do this. For our kids; we got a whole n’other generation of young kids. You gonna kill them too? You gonna keep—you just gonna say you gonna keep killing our kids and nothing gonna be done about it? You just gonna just kill our kids… and nothing’s gonna be done; you got us fucked up.”—same

3. “We gonna stomp these grounds until these people do something -- right. You don’t like what we do? Then straighten up your act.”—male resident and activist

4. “And I get it, I understand and that’s why I’m not stopping. I’m not gonna just bow down to my oppression. I’m gonna stand up. I’m gonna fight for that, even if it comes for my life.”—young male activist

Discussion

The investigation began with this prologue from a conversation during a participant interview: “These people don’t want nobody to tell this story. It’s bad enough it’s already out.” I have attempted to tell the Ferguson story from the perspective of residents who took part in the uprising as well as from secondary sources. The analysis and the story are incomplete. There is much more that could have been extracted from the interview data and many more contextual details that could have been filled in. Despite the incomplete and, owing to my own limitations as an interpreter, imperfect nature of the analysis of the participants’ narratives, I feel that I have done my best to represent their perspectives, and overall, to give a report which reflects the point of view of Ferguson residents who took part in the uprising. My hope is that the reader is brought to a closer understanding of the significance of a historical event, and the uniqueness of the people who made the event happen.
The following discussion is a reflection on the quality of the investigation, its major limitations, as well as a reflection on what I see as the four biggest takeaways from this investigation: a better understanding of collective action in general, and the positive impacts of collective action on the lives of oppressed and exploited people, the rejection of the ‘underclass’ ideology of ghetto cultural pathology, and a caution about the over-specification of racism in describing and challenging social problems.

**Quality of Report and Limitations**

The overall quality of this report is a measure of the balance between its strengths and weaknesses. Because the strengths of the study as well as justifications for the method and approach were more prevalent than self-criticism throughout most of the report, I will only briefly discuss the strengths of the report and then go into a slightly longer analysis of the weaknesses and self-criticisms.

**Quality of Report.** According to Mitchell (1983) and Polit and Beck (2004), the primary way to establish the quality and trustworthiness of a research study is through truth-value. There are several ways to measure this truth-value. The first is to do research in a real life setting. I take some pride in the fact that data collected for this study concerned a real life issue of great interest to the study participants, and that the data collection (including the archival work, because I learned what to look for from my experiences in Ferguson) was done in their neighborhoods, and the places where they live their lives. A study like this simply could not have been done without stepping into the community around West Florissant Avenue.

Another way to establish truth-value is through reflexivity (Hertz, 1996). The thoughts, motives, values and biases of the researcher should not be hidden. I attempted
to be as reflexive as possible, acknowledging rather than hiding my subjectivity and biases, and these became an integral factor in shaping the study. This factor is also analyzed below as a limitation. However as a critic of research that has hidden (or unknown) ideological, philosophical or political agendas, I felt the need to go above and beyond in showing my own subjectivity. I would argue that showing subjectivity actually increases objectivity as well as the likelihood of extracting universal truth from research.

Finally, truth-value is established through triangulation, or the use of multiple data sources (Thurmond, 2001). Data sources should be as all-sided as possible. I attempted to achieve triangulation by providing a thorough contextual backdrop to go along with the interview data. Furthermore, the interview data itself came from a variety of Ferguson residents, including activists, students and workers. That being said, there can never be enough sources of information.

There are also several other measures of trustworthiness (Creswell & Miller, 2000). Another way to assess trustworthiness is to look at the consistency of the data and to ask if the data would be the same if the study were replicated (Guba, 1981). The unique timing of the investigation, the design of interview questions and methods that allowed the participants to create their own narratives, and the idiosyncrasy added to the study by my own unique experiences related to the uprising means this data set is probably unique and could not be replicated.

A final aspect of trustworthiness is neutrality (Guba, 1981): are the data the result of the true feelings and thoughts of the participants and the true social conditions in the community or are the data the result of the biases of the researcher? As was discussed previously, the present investigation is not ‘neutral’; therefore, overall, reflexivity was
maximized in order to explicitly point out my bias and agenda. Bias was controlled in
several other ways: by designing interview questions that allowed the participants to
create their own narratives, by maximizing the use of the participants’ own words in the
report, through reflexivity, and through triangulation.

**Rigour.** First, as was mentioned previously, there was much more analysis that
could have been done with this interview data set. This is partly self-criticism, and partly
recognition that there was so much rich data from the interviews that it would have
required much more time, skill and effort to fully analyze it. There were many more sub-
themes that could have been parsed from the data. Some of the longer passages could
have had entire sections devoted to them. In addition, there were likely a variety of other
ways to organize the results. However, I feel that I roughly achieved what I set out to do
in the beginning of the investigation.

**The Interview Sample.** A fair criticism of the quality of the interview data could
be the lack of saturation (and the lack of a real saturation analysis). The interviews ended
due to logistical concerns and time constraints (specifically the fact that I had only
limited time to be in St. Louis), not theoretical saturation.

In my opinion, the biggest limitation of the interview sample was the low number
of female participants. Although there were only two female participants out of ten in this
study, this was enough to see discernable differences between the data gathered from
females, and the data gathered from males. The data would have likely been much richer
if there were more female participants. It is possible that women would have not only
been able to give a unique perspective solely from their unique experience as females,
but, extrapolating from the existing data, the content may have included more reflections
about personal feelings, interpersonal relationships, and the impacts of the uprising on children.

My own timeline to finish the report may have left some topics, themes or parts of the narratives lacking. Due to personal, logistical and financial concerns, I had a self-imposed time limit to complete the research. If these limitations did not exist it is possible that I could have recruited more participants, done more contextual work, and provided a richer analysis.

Post Hoc Results. It is possible that the way the participants described their experiences, especially in Meta-Narratives One and Two, was actually biased by their experiences in the uprising and by the DOJ report. For example, the way that they characterized their experiences with the police could have been based on a collective narrative that emerged after the release of the DOJ report. While this is possible, I think it is unlikely as the participants specific personal experiences, as distinct from the narrative they gave of their general personal experience, were so much like those of the complainants in the DOJ and Arch City Defenders investigations.

Idiosyncrasy. My own ideology, axiology and subjective experience could have been a liability. The participants could have been misrepresented in some way or not represented enough in another way. It is unclear at the time of the submission of this report whether or not the interview participants will accept or reject my interpretation of their stories. I have not received feedback from them yet on the matter. It is also up to the readers of this report to decide for themselves whether or not I have adequately interpreted the voices of the participants. This was the reasoning behind including so many direct quotes.
Non-Replicable. Looking through the lens of a positivist or quantitative research paradigm, a major limitation of this study is that it would probably be non-replicable. This is not because another researcher could not employ the same methodology. It is rather because the nature of my involvement with the subject matter was unique and most likely another researcher would have difficulty getting the same quality of participants. However, the factor that would be impossible to repeat is the timing of the study. Even my own initial research questions were changed by the timing. A year on from the Brown killing and the uprising, the Ferguson community was in a historical moment between two stages: the end of the uprising and the beginning of an uncertain future. The timing of this investigation adds to its value, but guarantees it can never be replicated.

Limitations of the Individual Unit of Analysis. Another limitation of this study was the unavoidable focus on social psychology theory and individual level of analysis which was I was compelled to use because this study was completed as part of a requirement for a master’s degree in social psychology. I recall throwing several fits early on in the literature review when I veered into group process theories and then had to drag myself back to the individual level of analysis. Although social psychological factors are very important in understanding human behavior, the idea that there are deterministic social psychological reasons for why people enact social behaviours is limiting. The social psychological process is of limited interest and value, at least on its own. Investigating the social psychology of uprising participants in the context of the sociology of group processes would have made this study much richer.

Conclusions
Collective Action. A larger discussion should open up about the relationships between different theories and models of collective action and further the development of a three-dimensional model of collective action. The already existing three-dimensional model of collective action, the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA), lacks the scope to adequately describe the reasons for individual participation in the Ferguson uprising. SIMCA only covers identity, efficacy, and relative deprivation. However this research suggests that a three-dimensional social psychological model of collective action participation should include affect, expectations, suddenly imposed grievance, and cognitive reflection of the socio-political environment. In addition, as social psychological processes do not occur in a vacuum, an adequate three-dimensional model of individual collective action participation should include sociological group processes, as it is likely that such processes set the parameters and provide the affordances for individual decisions.

The original idea that I began the investigation with, i.e., that the uprising occurred because there was ‘something about the people in Ferguson,’ was inadequate. While there is likely some degree of truth to this, the uprising and community members’ participation in it was dependent upon a variety of factors; the Ferguson uprising was more like a perfect storm, or a an interaction between chance and necessity. It is likely that no collective action model, no matter how comprehensive, could predict the type of collective action participation that happened in Ferguson accurately.

Rejection of the ‘underclass’ theory. Moynihan (1965) and Wilson’s (2012) ‘ghetto underclass’ theory of the supposed cultural pathologies of the low-income urban Blacks, has been used as a rationale for neoliberal policy reforms from the dismantling of
public welfare, to the destruction of public housing, to mass incarceration (Marchevsky & Theoharis, 2000). This theory-turned-ideology has long stigmatized members of the urban Black population with the negative ascriptive status of ‘underclass’ (and a host of other related ascriptive categories like ‘crack-baby’, ‘welfare queen’, ‘super-predator’ etc.). Like race itself, ‘underclass’ is part of a “taxonomy of ascriptive difference, that is, an ideology that constructs populations as groups and sorts them into hierarchies of capacity, civic worth, and desert based on “natural” or essential characteristics attributed to them” (Reed, 2013). The imagery of wild underclass crowds burning and looting during the uprising were used to discredit and malign members of the Ferguson community, especially youth (MacDonald, 2014).

The descriptions given by the interview participants’ of pro-social behaviour and positive development amongst many individuals and groups of Ferguson residents who participated in the uprising, particularly young people, contrast with the underclass narrative which posits that such behaviour is impossible given the cultural backwardness of low-income Blacks.

It is reasonable to suspect that programming which seeks to modify the behaviour of low-income Black youth through the imposition of various middle-class norms of values could not come close to having the validity and efficacy of a collective action led by the youth themselves.

**Over-specification of Race**

As Adolph Reed has said: “antiracism is focused much more on taxonomy than politics. It emphasizes the name by which we should call some strains of inequality—whether they should be broadly recognized as evidence of ‘race’—over specifying the
mechanisms that produce them or even the steps that can be taken to combat them.”
(Reed, 2009) In other words, seeing Ferguson strictly as a ‘racial’ issue can actually act as shield to protect powerful interests whose interests are not challenged by platitudes about racial equity. The power-elite dominated Ferguson Commission prefaced its recommendations by saying: “We know that talking about race makes a lot of people uncomfortable. But make no mistake: this is about race” (Ferguson Commission, 2015, p. 8). Criticizing racism without talking about the capitalist political-economic system that produces inequalities and which depends on various forms of racism for its existence can turn ‘antiracism’ into a cover for nefarious activity.

The Ferguson story is about power: on the one hand the corrupting power of capitalist oligarchs and their managerial substratum (both White and Black); on the other, the power of ordinary people of all races led by the most oppressed members of American society (who are disproportionately Black) to fight back and to educate the masses. The insistence of the Ferguson rebels that the struggle must go on in Ferguson and around the world gives me hope that this power to fight back and to keep learning more will achieve the ultimate goal of the rebels, which is to dismantle and destroy the institutions which maintain racism and poverty through corruption and violence.

Positive Value of Collective Action. Notwithstanding what was just said previously about scholarly inquiry into collective action models, I’m going to break from tradition and not call explicitly for more research here. Academics and others with special skill sets should be working more with people and not on them. Researchers often call for more study because they are trying to generate further incentives for themselves. I have no plans for that. However I can say in all seriousness that many of things I needed to
know about fighting back against racism and capitalism, I learned from the people of Ferguson in the last year and half of collective political struggle. Therefore I have a very different final takeaway than most research. I’m not calling for more study, but for more action – or study in the context of action: praxis.

In my previous research, which involved engaging young adults on the issue of neighbourhood violence, I found that these young adults described the violence in their neighbourhoods as the culmination of a temporal sequence that started with poverty, a lack of public services, and an overall scarcity of resources. This deprivation led to interpersonal and small group disputes over money, contraband and territory. My conclusion was that possible future intervention strategies should involve creating youth and community led organizations that fight politically for economic, educational, and recreational opportunities. In other words, I felt the only reasonable intervention strategy to stop neighbourhood violence was to organize young people to fight back against the roots of the problems they were facing rather than to focus on the end results. I viewed these end result interventions like the ‘Cure Violence (Ceasefire)’ program, which recruits former gang members and ex-cons to attempt to settle violent situations that have already started (Hartnett, Bump, Dubois, Hollon, & Morris, 2008), as simply putting a band-aid over the wounds that were being created by neo-liberal social policies (not to mention that programs like this don’t work). My only evidence that the type of intervention I was thinking of could be effective in an American context was looking back to the Civil Rights movement and the impact of organized groups that fought against Southern Jim Crow segregation and Northern racial discrimination on working class youth and young adults.
In that context, the most important finding of this investigation was the way in which the Ferguson Uprising had, and has continued to have such a positive impact within and between community members, especially youth and young adults. As the results of this investigation suggest, in essence the uprising was about pursuing collective goals. This pursuit led to positive developments which included the fostering of community unity and new relationships, the creation of new positive roles for community members, the development of interpersonal skills to settle grievances, and the flourishing of positive character traits like dedication, integrity and pride. Of particular importance was the finding that so many of these positive characteristics and traits already existed in a zone of proximal development before the uprising, that these potentialities were actualized during the uprising, and that these positive attributes and traits were maintained by many community members after the uprising. Furthermore, unlike virtually all behavior modification programming that takes place in Black working class communities, the Ferguson uprising was initiated on the community’s own terms, was predicated on a strengths-based rather than a deficits-based approach, and the effects of the uprising spread far beyond small groups, reaching the whole community. As the interview participants related, the unfortunate outcome was that activists, intellectuals and politicians with various personal and group interests which diverged from those of the Ferguson rebels, found ways to take advantage of the uprising for their own purposes, and opened the floodgates for the power-elite to make Ferguson another case study of disaster capitalism (Franklin, 2015; Klein, 2007).

My conclusion on this matter is an affirmation of the ideas I developed in my previous study: that it is much more effectual, and even therapeutic, for communities and
community members to strike at the root of the problems they face through mass action like the Ferguson uprising, than for outside programmers to come in to a community and put band-aids on the problems caused by the capitalist political-economic system and its neoliberal social policies. Unlike programming that comes from non-profits or universities, the Ferguson Uprising was initiated by community members on their terms and they decided what the goals and tactics would be. The ability of Ferguson area community members to articulate goals and organize themselves into roles to accomplish the goals, even if they were not ultimately accomplished (through no fault of their own), is perhaps why the positive developments of the uprising have had such a lasting impact.

Since a great deal of Ferguson’s problems can be traced back to the ways in which municipal revenue is raised and expended, one idea, although modest, would be to engage youth and young adults in a reform struggle around this issue. Study groups could be formed to understand how the Hancock Amendment and Tax Increment Financing affect the amount of money that is collected from local businesses for the Ferguson–Florissant and surrounding school districts. An action plan could then be developed to carry out the necessary process stipulated by the Hancock Amendment to create a citizen referendum for the city of Ferguson to reform its municipal tax code so it can collect increased taxes from the businesses operating within its jurisdiction. If successful, this could also act to buttress the public school system in North County, and protect it from privatization and charter schools. Perhaps this could save valuable teaching jobs in the community while also working towards a public school system that prepares Ferguson and North County youth for higher opportunities in the St. Louis Metro area and beyond.

Better public education and more recreational opportunities would not only give the
youth of Ferguson an opportunity to actualize the positive traits this study has shown that they have had all along, but most importantly would raise their expectations of what their rights and entitlements are, whether these rights and entitlements are yet encoded in law or not.

"We declare our right on this earth...to be a human being, to be respected as a human being, to be given the rights of a human being in this society, on this earth, in this day, which we intend to bring into existence by any means necessary." –Malcolm X (X, 2015)
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