Contributions of German philosophers to Thomism since the Encyclinal Aeterni Patris in 1879

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CONTRIBUTIONS
OF
GERMAN PHILOSOPHERS
TO
THOMISM
SINCE THE
ENCYCLICAL AETERNI PATRIS
IN 1879.
*
AN M. A. THESIS
SUBMITTED TO
ASSUMPTION COLLEGE
AFFILIATED WITH
THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO
BY
JOHN SONBERG
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The philosophy of the 19th century is characterized by a breakdown of Nagel's philosophy and a general rejection of idealistic speculation and by the growth of separate sciences not merely of mathematics and physics and chemistry but of biology, history, psychology and sociology. Since scientific research was concerned equally with nature and with human life and was striving to explore the reality of all that exists, philosophy met with a serious crisis. A fundamental issue arose, must philosophy be merged into science or has it a task of its own, justifying its independent existence, and if it should have such a task, of what significance, then, is the autonomous state of science and the reality investigated by the sciences. This relation between philosophy and science may be compared to the relation between philosophy and theology in the Middle Ages.

We notice in the sciences of political history, economics, law and politics, mythology and comparative religion as well as in the study of art, poetry, music, literature, man's aspiration to form a philosophy independent of all divine truths of revelation. We see men like Grimm tracing the development of the German spirit in language, law, religion, Savignay investigating law and its history on the basis of historical and social facts alone.
Perhaps Max Weber, the great economist and sociologist, expresses and characterizes the spirit of the scientific research best in these words: "A disenchantment of the world is taking place." A desire was felt to see all reality, past and present clearly and without illusions; the close relationship of man to animal, the organized struggle for power in society and political state and even in spiritual life. This was an age of doubt, an age of examining everything thoroughly and accepting only what was proved to be undeniable. The real contiguity between the world and human life, the manifold dependencies of man on internal and external causes in nature, society and history were set forth as dispassionately and precisely as possible.

We may obtain a grasp of the situation now existing due to the denial and ignoring of the true relations that should obtain between science and philosophy and observe the tremendous influence for wrong conceptions of life consequent to such beliefs. We have mentioned that the rise of different sciences gave rise to different theories, theories posited on the ground that each science was autonomous and independent, free to say anything with finality concerning their field. In biology we have Darwin dogmatically asserting evolution, which Haekel popularized and which such famous scientists as the embryologist Weismann...
and the botanist Julius Sachs furthered. We are quite aware what a change must have come about with the promulga-
tion of this theory from the one previous to it. In economics we have Marx's theory of materialism and the materialistic interpretation of history. In psychology we have the change of psychology of the conscious to the psychology of the unconscious. We note a new type of research, a research that is entirely dependent on investigations of historical and social facts, an attempt to interpret both spiritual and material in the same light. We have completely changed our method as compared with that of the Greek who did not deal so much with the concrete as with the essential and the universal.

In answer to the question with what philosophy should concern itself, Wundt said, "The construction of a logical consistent world-view which shall bring all special knowledge into one general system of thought." Another group answered this by saying that we should inquire into the principles, presuppositions and methods which are not investigated by the sciences themselves. They took upon themselves the task of answering how knowledge is possible and in so doing they assumed a scientific attitude. As a result we have various attempts to explain the essence of scientific knowledge in positivism, pragmatism, and fictionism and other intellectualist theories of knowledge.
In the midst of this confusion and bewilderment came the encyclical Aeterni Patris. It contained a wise counsel for it pointed out the way that should be followed if one were to avoid the pitfalls of the prevailing schools of philosophy. The distinguishing characteristic which differentiates the Catholic philosophy from all other philosophies is that the former is not the result of reason pure and simple. It is the result of reason aided and abetted by the teaching of the church, Christ's representative upon earth, the custodian of all truth. As a result of the encyclical Catholic philosophy has taken on especially since 1879 an aspect of unity unparalleled in any other branch of philosophy.

Thomism gains ground day by day. It is doing away with ontologism, traditionalism, historicism and exaggerated spiritualism of Descartes and the materialism of Marx. It is free from the weakness of pragmatism and voluntarism. It has the character of permanence as truth itself.

Thru the self-sacrificing labors of Catholic historians of philosophy such as Hertling, Baemker, Baumgartner, Grabmann much light has been upon a true presentation of medieval systems and periods. The "Contributions to the History of Philosophy of the
Middle Ages" gave much insight into the vigorous life of medieval philosophy, which has so long been consid-
ered simply as a handmaid of theology. Among the contrib-
utors were Hertling, Bäumker, Kettler, Stökl aided the
movement by his book written in 1864-66 "History of the
Philosophy of the Middle Ages" as also Ehrle and Demfe
who in 1855 founded the Archives for Literature of the
Middle Ages. Gutberlet, Commer, Wilmann, Kaufman,
Glossner, Schneid, Geyser are some of the more out-
standing men in this work. It was Baumgartner, Grab-
mann and Geyser who undertook the work of systematic
construction, attacked the problems which had been
under discussion since the days of Decantes and Kant
and framed the solution upon the solid basis of Schol-
astic Tradition.

This work merely presents the development of
Thomism since the encyclople Aeterni Patris and some
subsequent writers who enjoy more prominence than others.
It is not exhaustive. It's purpose is to present some
measure of information concerning the movement and some
of its exponents.

Bernard Bolzano

Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) was a son of a
merchant. He was not of a particularly robust nature.
In his school work he did not accomplish wonders. In
1796 after studying for 3 years at the university he
took up theology and for 2 years more mathematics and philosophy. In 1805, he obtained the chair in philosophy at the University of Prague and in that same year was ordained a priest but was suspended in 1820. It was he who was one of the foremost of stirring Scholasticism to new consciousness. It is he who really stands behind Brenntano as the latter behind Husserl and above them all Aristotle. Brennto had never knowingly abandoned Aristotle and his theory of "intentions". And too Max Scheler with the insight of genius sected these relations and the result was a fresh impulse to the Catholic movement. He looked at Leibniz as his great teacher. In many cases he is an opponent of subjectivism, although he constantly deals with an objectivity other than that of the external world. He recovers and carries farther the medieval teaching of "truths in themselves". (Such truths are to be differentiated from the act of judgment and constitute an objective content of the judgment. In other words, they constitute the meaning or proposition and are independent of the act of thinking them. Thus they form judgments in themselves. We are obliged to make a distinction between what is and what is not. Something
either is or is not. And it makes a fundamental difference which of the two it is. If "the judgment in itself" is we are obliged to ascribe to it some form of existence, whether it is expressed in words by anyone or not at any particular moment, or whether it is thought or not at any particular moment. Of course, it is impossible to ascribe a physical existence to the "judgment in itself", but it has an ideal being or existence. This later has deep influence on Brentano, Meinong and Husserl in their presentation of phenomenology. Bolzano further develops certain aspects of aesthetics and metaphysics, based, in some measure, on the teaching of Leibniz. He was of the opinion that the bestful was the result of the excitation of man's knowledge. With regard to the moral law, he viewed it as a power whose main end is the furtherance of the weal and morality of its members. But closest of all to Leibniz's idea is Bolzano's conception of the place of metaphysics in life. Things arise from monads, whilst dominant monads bring forth souls. Creation is thus spiritual and timeless and the world is infinite. Between the monads reciprocal relations arise. His testament written two years before his death indicates that he never intenally adopted ideas at variance with those of the church but rather that he erred in
good faith and was willing to give way in his position to the authority above him. In the sacraments he repeats a profession of faith. At his death he was fortified with the sacraments after expressing the desire to remain a faithful Catholic. Among his works are Athanasia or the Grounds for the Immortality of the Soul, Objective Foundations for the Teaching of the three Dimensions of Space and Science of Religion.

Denifle, Heinrich Seuse


Denifle's chief claim to recognition lies in paleographical and historical lines. He did much to focus attention upon the Middle Ages, founded the Archive for Literature with the aid of Father Ehrle, S. J. in 1885, and collected material for a critical edition of the works of St. Thomas, upon the request of Pope Leo XIII. In addition to this he threw much light upon the origin of universities and did much in the way of overcoming Luther's influence. This he did by the publication of Luther and Lutherism. He divided the book into three parts. The first part is a critique of Luther's treatise on monastic vows. It examined his views of chastity in detail and convicts him
of ignorance, mendaciousness, etc. The second part which is entitled "A contribution to the history of exegesis, literature and dogmatic theology in the Middle Ages", refutes Luther's assertion that his doctrine of justification by faith, i.e., his interpretation of Rom.1.17, was the traditional one, by giving the relevant passages from no fewer than 66 commentators. The third part shows that the year 1515 was the turning point in Luther's career, and that his own account of his early life is utterly untrustworthy, that his immorality was the real source of his doctrine, etc. Up till now there was no such analysis of Luther's theology and exegesis. We can well picture the effect of such a work on not only the German admirers of Luther but also upon others other than German. This, it might be said, was the first indication that there was more to be said for the Middle Ages than what had hitherto been said about them.

He devoted much attention to the relation existing between scholastic theology and medieval mysticism. It was comparatively unknown, and had in fact been grossly misrepresented by some flippant writers according to whom the German mystics were the precursors of the German Reformers. Denifle's researches put the matter in its true light. He discovered in various libraries
of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland copious materials in the 14th century manuscripts, and a selection of 2500 texts were given to the public in his book. He also proved and demonstrated that Catholic mysticism rests on scientific theology. In 1880 Denifle was made socius of assistant to the general of his order and summoned to Rome where Leo XIII commanded that a critical edition of the works of St. Thomas should be begun and Denifle was commissioned to search for the best manuscripts. He visited the libraries in Italy, Astria, Germany, Bavaria, Holland, England, France, Spain, and Portugal.

He also wrote The Universities of the Middle Ages up till 1400. He pointed out that the universities as a rule, did not owe their origin to the cathedral schools and that in the majority of them at first theology was not taught, The University of Paris formed an exception. He also with the collaboration of Emile Chatelain, the Sorbonne librarian, at the request of the Conseil General des Facultes de Paris wrote the "Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis." This work contains invaluable information regarding its inner life, organization, famous professors, and students, relations with popes and kings, controversies, etc. during the period when this university
was the chief centre of theological learning.

The Archive for Literature was founded in order to publish valuable texts which he had deciphered and the results of his studies on various subjects, together with Father Ehrle, S. J. the sub-librarian of the Vatican, he founded it in 1885.

Denifle was beloved by Leo XIII and Pius X, was a consultor of the cardinalitial Commission of Studies, a member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences (Vienna) and of those of Paris, Prague, Berlin, and Cobbingen, an honorary doctor of the Universities of Münster and Innsbruck, member of the Legion of Honour, of the Order of the Iron Crown, etc. He was on his way to Cambridge, where he and his friend Father Ehrle were to be made Honorary Doctors of that University when he was struck down by the hand of death.

Joseph Kleutgen

Joseph Kleutgen S. J. 1811-1883. Born in Dortmund, taught in Freiburg (Switz) Breg and at the Gregorian University of Rome. He was the author of Theology of Antiquity and the Philosophy of Antiquity. The latter was a supplement to the former. By the Philosophy of Antiquity is understood the entire philosophy of the Fathers and the scholastics until the present. It was Kleutgen who pointed out the difference between the latter philosophy and the modern; "They do not recognize the authority of the church and consequently no obligation to accept anything as revealed teach-
ing save what they themselves have found thru their own reflection in the depository of Revelation. This principle of independent inquiry has received its greatest impetus since Descartes in the field of Philosophy. In so doing they have discarded the basis of philosophic truth." Kleutgen and his school were directly opposed to Kant and his priority teaching. They maintained that the act of knowing proceeds from the thing and is not the result of the mere creative function of the intellect. Moreover they denied that ideas merely ordered the appearances of things, in certain relation and maintain that the idea presents the things. Kleutgen accepted the Thomistic theory and worked upon the principle "nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sense." Kleutgen maintained three principles were to be followed in intellection. (1) In the knower an image of the known is produced. (2) The known is in the perceiver according to the mode of knowing. (3) The intellect is so much more perfect in so far as the knowing principle is separated from matter. Man knows through means of the sensible and thus attains to knowledge. He does not know in God there is no distinction between potency and act. The idea shows us the genus of the thing and not the particular qualities it possesses, hence the
real object of the intellect is the universal and not the particular. Thus he points out by saying that no single thing of itself possesses a universal characteristic but that it is only and solely possessed by a thinking being. He affirmed that the soul was immortal and that it was a substance and that the body and soul had a reciprocal effect upon the other. He maintained that science does not alone set forth the truth of things and that the truth not necessarily depend alone upon it. He denied an intellectual insight of God was possible.

In metaphysical respects Kleutgen is a Theist. He rejected the rationalism which refused to recognize the validity of revelation and also the possibility of proving religious belief upon rational grounds.

Kettler
(1811-1877)

Wilhelm Emmanuel Kettler bishop of Mains. He had intended to enter bureaucracy when in 1837 a persecution conducted against Archbishop Droste-Visching of Cologne moved him to the quick and led him to resign. In 1841 he studied Theology at Munich University and in 1843 completed his preparations for the priesthood at the Seminary of Munster. In 1850 he became the bishop of Mainz.
Kettler was a brave courageous fearless champion of the Catholic Church, whose power and freedom from estate control he labored to build up. He excelled in the sphere of sociology. Though he lived before the time of the Aeterni Patris he did much in the way of propagating and popularizing Thomastic doctrine. He distinguished himself by his broad and discerning intelligence of social movements of his time. He gave several sermons on the Catholic theory of property developing the sociology of St. Thomas and demonstrated the manner in which it answered every social need of the times. He opposed the political powers of Mainz which had for 25 years tyrannized the churches in all the small states of the ecclesiastical province of the Upper Rhine. It was he who led a procession for the first time since the reformation on Corpus Christi. He opened his own seminary and thus freed his clergy from the influence of the state faculty. He also founded several orders. He did much to forward the unity in the church, its cohesion by suggesting that conferences of the bishops should be held. He urged the foundings of Christian charity organizations of productive co-operative associations destined to restore social justice on a more equal scale. His reform consisted of increase of wages, shorter hours of labor, prohibition of child-labor in factories, pro-
hibition of women's and young girls labor. These claims he thought should be presented to the public authorities. He taught that the intervention of the church in the name of faith, morals and charity was necessary for the removal of economic evils. He also made clear the right of working men to legal protection and urged that in every diocese some priest should be selected to make a study of economical questions. This brought the church of Germany into closer relations with the new social activity, on the other hand his pamphlet on "Catholics in the German Empire" long served the German Centre as a basis for their social claims. In his Liberty Authority, and Church he took a stand on the question of Liberalism and set forth the Christian attitude towards the various meanings of the word liberty. The theological "school" which Kettler established in his seminary at Mainz, and whose chief representatives were Mofang and Heinrich was noted for its adherence to Scholastic theology and its hostility to anti-Roman tendencies of "Germanism" and "German Science" represented by Dollinger and the Munich School. In his book "The Labor Question and Christianity" he pointed out the futility of the Liberals to value the economic problems and advocated labor associations and accepted the idea of co-operation
of unions to be established not as Lassalle wished, by state subvention, but by generous aid from Christian capitalist. His complete works have been compiled by Johannes Mumbauer in 3 volumes. Religious Ecclesiastical, church-political writings, Social political and national writings and Social and personal.

Ceslaus Maria Schneider

Ceslaus Maria Schneider, a pastor, born in 1840, is chiefly noted for the work in making the teaching of Thomas popular by editing the St. Thom-asblatter. He deals with the original state of man's free will. He tries to carry out the design of Leo XIII in the Aeterni Patris, namely to restore to its ancient dignity the wisdom of St. Thomas to the honor and safeguard of the Catholic faith, for the benefit of human society, for the enriching and perfecting of all sciences. The periodical appears every 2 weeks. He founded it in 1888. He wrote, Nature, Reason, God. The Knowledge of God acc. to the teaching of St. Thomas. Principles of St. Thomas and Modern Socialism.

Albert Stöckl
(1823-95)

Professor in Eichstall

Insisted upon the church's right to decide whether a thing was in accord with revelation.
He said that science must of necessity be subservient to authority of the church. And if it were not so then it would be not in the service of Christ but in the service of the anti-Christ. And this latter would be a worse master than the former. He opposed the spirit which held for an "independent science". Science should he says, progress in union with the teachings of Christ and the church striving above all to promote spiritual welfare and then material welfare. He considered reason pure and simple and revelation as two sources of knowledge. A distinction was drawn between philosophy and theology. The former though it dealt with revelations was not to be considered as dealing with it from the revealed point of view but from the rational, sensible, point of view. Theology deals with revelation as it is from point of faith. He considered theology as primarily positive and secondarily speculative. In regard to the theory of knowledge he kept close to the principles laid down by St. Thomas. He maintained the intellect had to be active and not purely passive insisted on the presence of images and species. He opposed empiricism, celealism, innate ideas, mysticism, ontologism and traditionalism. He opposed the materialists' doctrine of the origin of the world and maintained that the earth had to be created since it had not within itself the principle
of its own being and hence had to have a beginning. The hylomorphic theory was accepted and dynamism and materialism rejected. He defines philosophy as a science of first principles, of the highest and final principles of being in so far as they can be proved and known by the intellect. He posits im-
pirical psychology as an intro duction to and as fundamental to philosophy. He divides philosophy into logic and epistemology, metaphysics and ethics and moral philosophy. Logic and epeistemology deal with ens ideals and ensures a true relationship be-
tween ens reale and ens ideale. Metaphysics deals with ens reale, with being objective, with its es-

tential terminations, relations, causes and laws, both in universals and particulars. Ethics and Philosophy of right have to deal with ens morale, with the principles, laws and being of morals and right. Philosophy of Art, religion and pedagogy he considers as intergrating philosophy. Some of his writings are: Textbook of Philosophy, Text-


Joseph Schwertchlager

Joseph Schwertchlager deals with philoso-

phy of nature and classes it as a branch of Meta-

physics dealing with the principles of being. It
considers nature in so far as it organizes sensible impressions and interprets them in the light of the highest principles. The purpose is to arrive at the uniform, scientific satisfactory causality and to attain an ethical outlook in life. He attempted to answer in his philosophy of nature objections of the non-Catholics through St. Thomas's teachings, objections—Biometaphysic, Psychometaphysic, Religionmetaphysic. As Pesh had renewed the hylomorphic theory so too did he. He maintained that all bodies in the world undergo a substantial change. Matter and form to him were not separate in things but different aspects of an analysis made by the mind. He further maintained that every occurrence in nature was directed to some uniform end. We do not know whether the world will again return to nothingness whence it sprang. Life is an immanent activity governed by laws. Schwartschlager discorded (the vitality theory) vitalism. And in opposition to Driesch he maintained there was an entelechy, or soul or something whatever one may call the principle of life which supports beings in its organic material, or mechanical activities, and this entelechy or soul is not merely a factor of nature like other factors in nature. Whenever a new life arises there too arises a new organic soul. Schwartschlager accepted the evolution theory since evid-
ences were present for a transition from animal to man. However, he maintained that the human soul comes directly from God. He wrote The Philosophy of nature in 1921, a work of two volumes.

Cathrein Vist, S. J. (1945 Professor in Valkenburg)

Cathrein had given a very clear presentation of St. Thomas, specially in the field of ethics. In moral philosophy he assumes the theistic point of view in opposition to all the ethics divorced from religion. His first principles are borrowed from Aristotle. "Moral philosophy develops its principles from natural reason and attempts to define scientifically man's duties and rights". However the Christian has need of revelation to really acquire the fullness of the teaching of Moral philosophy. This is not opposed to the dignity of science for he points out that if science were left to itself it would go astray. He characterized the history of modern philosophy as a chain, an untenable system which after a few years disappears leaving scarcely a trace behind it. He asserts that the last and final end of all things is the glorification of God for he created the world, having himself as its final end. The sensible things honor God each according to its own capacity. The reasonable things honor God
by their Love, veneration and obedience. He considers man as the high priest of all created things. There is a purpose in everything which impels it to seek its own good. Man is destined for happiness. But complete happiness is only to be found in God. Man's task on earth is to conduct himself in keeping with good morals, to serve God, to thereby prepare himself for eternity. It is most essential however to free oneself from earthly things and a most potent means is the thought of death. An action is moral if it proceeds from the will and conforms to the dictates of conscience. It is validity and value is derived from the consideration whether it is in conformity with man's final end and in conformity with all creation. All others, moral principles even Kant's autonomous Ethics are inadequate. The moral law according to Cathrein consists in this that we observe in all our actions the dictates of our conscience which has been given us by the Creator. Justice Cathrein says consists in giving to every man what is his due and not merely what men prescribe in laws. The former is more to nature. In his Unity of Ethical Views, an immense work exigency of life the fundamental ethical views of different people and different times. He believed that
Monatheism could be proved. Among his other works are: The Catholic World View (1909), Moral Philosophy (1911), Faith and Science (1911).

Franz Walter

Franz Walter distinctive contribution lies in his historical study of the earlier socialists views on property and less employment of the principles of St. Thomas to the then prevalent socialism. He traces the movement that ushered in a pagan theory of property and shows how the Reformation on Humanism revived the principles of the Stoa and the Epicure, re-established individualism, which passed from Philosophy to economical theory and then into economics and practical life. He asserts that the right to property in enduring goods is founded not only on physical and intellectual needs of man, but deeper still a more ultimately in the moral order, on the ethical and religious constitution and tendencies of human nature. Dr. Walter was opposed to the radical separation of economics from ethics, the external and internal, the material and spiritual, the temporal and eternal. Private Property according to the teaching of St. Thomas and Socialism (1895), Social Politics and Morals (1899).
Franz Schaub

Franz Schaub was a priest in the diocese of Speier. Like Walter deals with Socialism and opposes it by Thomistic principles. He differs from the latter in so far as he treats of socialism from its present existence and not like Walter from the historical development of property theories and earlier forms of socialism. Schaub treats of the nature and origin of property, on the necessity of private property (from which he concludes the impossibility of socialism), of wealth and property, on acquisition of property, its possession and use, of the relations of civil society and the State to property from the Thomistic relations of civil society and the viewpoint and by these he shows socialism and shows how much more conducive to a Weltschauung is Thomism than socialism. He says that the deepest problem of economics is one first of theology, and then of ethics and then of psydido. Private Property according to St. Thomas and the Modern Socialism (1898).

Otto Willmann (1839-1920)
Prof. in Prag.

Otto Willmann did much in the field of philosophical Pedagogy. In his History of Idealism he accepts Thomism as the true idealism and applies this
as a standard to all the modern philosophies. He opposed bitterly the teachings of Kant, and considered him the real autonomist. These attacks of Willmann against Kant led an exposition of the relation between St. Thomas to the minds of philosophers who otherwise might have remained ignorant of his teachings. Among his books are Logic, Empirical Psychology, Historical Introduction in Metaphysics, Aristotles as Pedagogue, History of Idealism. He is chiefly like Joseph Donat, Lehmen, Joseph Credt OSB., S Reinstadler, concerned with juxtaposing Scholasticism and modern systems rather than developing Scholastic philosophy from within.

In his History of Idealism he traces the sources of Greek idealism, discusses the religious traditions as the starting point of ancient phil, particularly the teachings of the mysteries, doctrines of the Egyptian, Chaldeans, Magi and Hebrews. He asserts that theology is the foundation of phil. in general and of idealism in particular. He believes Plato was acquainted with the old testament and to have derived from it amongst other ideas, his conception of the several periods in the history more. The period of Kronos, which is the first period and reappears as the last corresponds, as he supposes, to Paradise and the kingdom of the Messiah while
the present Platonic age corresponds to the period of the Law, and he quotes with approval St. Augustines statement that in the bible and Plato we have thro some conception of creation. Willmann holds the disputed view that the dialogues teach the doctrine of the personality of the creator, and that, God is identical with the idea of the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) or the One (ὁ ὁμοιότατον). The function of the ideas is to serve as a connecting link between God and the finite world; the mediate between Him and the finite world as laws, types, norms, and forces. The ideas give to things their existence and to notions their validity, thru participation in them things are real and notions true; and in this way the content of being and thought coincide.

Willmann considers Spinoza's doctrine as a "cross to religion" Hegel he considers as a representative of the force of the political restoration, Kant and Rousseau of the force of revolution.

Franz Sawicki

Franz Sawicki is important in so far as he dealt with the philosophy of history from the Thomistic point of view. Contrary to the accepted form of limiting the philosophy of history to method of theory of knowledge, he placed emphasis on the contents of
the philosophy or the metaphysics of history. The philosophy of history of the world not only encompasses this present world but also the next. There the people will be organized on moral principle and not on national. Sawicks maintains that God's repeated intervention is present in the history of Christianity and in other histories and in attested events of a supernatural character whether they are externally miracles or internally works of grace. In the strict sense of the word historical laws are not possible since the freedom of man must be reckoned with. The conception of history lies in the realization of a plenitude of culture, a task which is impossible of fulfillment because of death (St. Augustine, City of God). Culture does not progress uniformly and steadily in all branches of knowledge. There are certain subjects such as religions and moral which achieve their highest point very early in the study of them and beyond which high point further progress is impossible, as in religion and morals. In relation to the theory of knowledge Sawicki holds for the possibility of knowing reality and denies the Kantian interpretation of history as a pure subjective ideal structure. Swicki maintains that the ultimate ground is not evidence simply as such but rather a combination
of insight a belief—evidence derived from our natural confidence in reason. "Philosophy of History," "The Ideal of Personality" are two of his works.

T. Pesch
(1836-1899 Prof. in Valkenburg)

The most outstanding man in philosophy of Nature is Tilmann Pesch S. J. He gave the first all embracing and intellectual understanding of the science of nature and its chief teaching the natural emperistic mon- estic philosophy. Among his works are: "Institutions philosophiae naturalis" in 1880, "Die Weltphanomen" (World Phenomena) in 1881, "Die grossen Weltratsel" (The Great World Problem). "Institutiones logicae secundum principia St. ThomasAquinas", (1888-90), "Souls and Body in Man", (1892), "Institutiones psychologicae", "Christian Ethik." (1896-7)

Pesch stands inopposition to the philosophical mechanistic atomism and dynamism. In preference to these two he returned to Aristotelian hylomorphism. Mechanism to Pesch was merely a subordinated means to special ends. Pesch interpreted the organic world in light of Aristotelian vitalism. He maintains that wherever in nature a new life is originated there originates in that new individual a substantial new "something" which brought this new organism into being. "Each newly originated living being is
also a new substance." This process he calls "eduction." Such a "principle of life" does not originate gradually but is formed in a single moment. Just as God is the first cause of all being so too is He the first cause of all becoming. The operation of natural things therefore, is not impossible but only the more dependent on him. Pesch makes an exception in regards to man. The soul in its operation and being is independent of nature and is more directly created by God than is the animal soul, which animal soul is designated as material in contrast to the spiritual soul of man.

Pesch rejects the narrow anthropomorphic theory and maintains that God and not man is the center of all creation. The position of man lies in this, that he is immeasurably higher than all the created world. The world too, enjoys a certain distinction in so far as it is the only place where man can live. He bases this upon the findings of astronomers, for they maintain this is absolutely no other habitable place to be found among the planets, and he concludes that all nature is created to serve man. The development of the universe has had a successful culmination in producing the earth as a temporary abode for organic life. Morals are an outflowing of the re-
lationalship existing between God and man. The soul of man is immortal. The existence and eternity of another world can be founded on scientific basis. Christianity he asserts is of a supernatural origin. By supernatural he understnads a work of God transc-e nding all powers of nature and which gives to the creature something excelling all claims and necessities of nature.

Engelbert Lorenz Fischer

Engelbert Lorenz Fischer in 1845 was a pastor in Wurzburg. Engelbert Lorenz Fischer has the reputation of being a sharp critic and independent thinker basing much of his learning on Aristotles. In his "Higher Philosophy" Fischer wishes to substitute for the decadent philosophy an ascending philsophy and considers philsophy's highest purpose the true happiness of man. Truth consists in the agreement between the judgment and the thing judged. This is only possible if thought and thing originated from the same principle, a principle that has real being namely God. Between God and the world there is no identity which would warrant pantheism nor an absolute difference which would warrant theism. All things are created by God as substance but have within them the principles of development. Fischer maintains there was no special creation of organisms but that matter was originally so endowed that the physical and chemical
relations were so arranged that the molecules of living cells sprung up in different parts of the world. The development of the organic world is interpreted from a mechanical teleological point of view. All organisms contain an immaterial spiritual factor which manifests the principle of organization. The creation of man did not necessarily require a new and separate creation but it did require due to the difference between man and beast a different natural law, a specifically human organic law, which was to be sure existing in the world but was realized only a bit later. Among Fischer's writing are: "Concerning the Principle of Organization and the Vegetative Soul," "Principles of the Theory of Knowledge," "Basic Problem of Metaphysic," "Triumph of the Christian Philosophy against the Anti-Christian World," "Outlook at the End of the 19th Century," "The Modern Substitution for Revealed Christianity," "Harmony as the Basis of Being and Life," "Views and Foundations of a Critical Realism."

Ludwig Baur
(Prof. in Tubingen)

Ludwig Baur considers metaphysics as the study of being which lies beyond experience. It is too for this reason metapsychic. He defines metaphysic as the science of being according to its essence and
highest principles. Its method consists in a union of induction and deduction. It is to proceed from the empirical to the principles of being then to God. The understanding of particulars is achieved thru universals. Ontology or general metaphysics deals with being with its transcendental properties and categories. Special metaphysics on the other hand deals with the spiritual manifested in sensible things that we with the spiritual element in nature and the soul of man and deals with the eternal and spiritual that is God. This latter he calls natural philosophy, metaphysical psychology, natural theology. He subjects philosophy to the teaching of the church. If philosophy is in contradiction with the latter it must begin "its investigations anew." The church, he maintains cannot err as regards its revealed truth. Science, he further asserts must come to the same conclusion since truth is not contradictory. And if science disagrees it is simply because it draws its conclusions from false premises and principles. Ontology concerns itself chiefly with being and substance. The idea of substance originates from the consciousness of the self and its environments. Space, time, and matter are considered as real. Bauer denied the mechanical atomism and dynamism and ac-
cepted instead the hylomorphic theory of the aristotelians scholastics. Inorganic and organic things are sharply differentiated. The organic things are not pure machines. The living principle is a real agent capable of operation. One can class this principle as a living entelechy or soul but in so doing he must remember that the word soul is used in an analogous way. The vegetative soul, if one so wishes to call it, consists of vegetative matter and does not rise to the sentient level. The animal soul can only exist in the animal and forms a harmony, a union with the animal body. Only the soul of a man is a self-subsistent, independent, immaterial substance as contrasted to the body. As regards evolution Bauer considers it a problem yet unsolved. He makes a concession in the case of man that his body may have descended from an ape but that his soul was not since it is an immaterial spiritual substance transcending all matter. To the ego belong the vegetative, sensitive and intellectual faculties. A pre-existence of the soul is denied. The soul is created at the moment of generation. It is immortal and indestructible. Were this not so then all morality would be absurd. The soul and body share the same
relationship that matter and form share. He proves the existence of God by the cosmological and physicoaleological arguments. God is a mystery and we can grasp him only analogously. He has written Metaphysics in 1922, Demands and Expansion of Religion in 1912.

Franz Brentano

Franz Brentano was born in 1838. He was ordained a priest but later left the church. At Würzburg and later in Vienna he was professor of philosophy. It is he who is responsible for the modern development of logic. In strong opposition to Kant and all those clinging to his philosophy he maintained that all sources of knowledge arises from experience. He adhered to Leibnitz and he was one of the few who did at that time. Above all he opposed Kants phenomenalism and his presentation of "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" especially when their existence has not been proven. The postulates of Kants teaching he viewed as the first step to the mystical degeneration of speculative philosophy. He may be designated as a psychologist. The more empirical side of his teaching is based upon Aristotle, whilst Scholasticism constituted the source of much of his material with regard to the important
place of psychology in logic. He laid great stress upon psychology as a basis of human and social science.

Psychology, in the first place, must be of a descriptive character. It is the science of psychical appearances and of inner perception. Inner observation is mediated by means of memory. The psychical part of man's nature has immediate and absolute reality. Psychology was termed as the teaching of mental phenomena, in contrast to the philosophy of nature which was the science of physical phenomena. The categorical characteristics of the psychological phenomena corresponds to the scholastic intentional being. The sensations are designated by Brentano as physical, but the act of sensing is psychical in so far as it contains the content of the object but the act of sensing is psychical in so far as it contains the content of the object. This "containing" of the content intends (or means) the object. Thus we find him agreeing with the Scholastics that the Intention means the non-existence of the physical object at the moment the content itself works. References certainly have to be made to external objects, but the act and the meaning have as their object the creation of objects in themselves. Many are such psychical phenomena in number and kind as, for
instance, presentations, judgments, dispositions such as interest, love, hate etc.

The judgment presupposes presentation and perception, but is fundamentally different from these. It is, in fact, a particular and even a unique act of consciousness. The judgment, further, is either an acceptation or rejection. The acceptation constitutes a truth; the rejection (based on sufficient grounds) constitutes a falsity. Many judgments have references to propositions of existence, and thus it is not essential to consider these as originating from subject and predicate. But there are also impersonal judgments which do not deal with existence, but with acceptation or rejection. These latter are objects which have no counterpart in the physical world; their really is found in consciousness alone.

Brentano shows that existence is irrelevant within the domain of judgment. When we state that "A is" we mean that A is known and recognized as true; affirmation and negation are the forms of the judgment.

In ethics Brentano defended the absolute point of view against the relative one. Just as in the field of judgments there is a true and false so too there is an analogical difference between love and hate, both are likewise right and false. The right
love and hate, just as the evident judgments are evident in themselves, are characterized as right. He may be termed as an intuitionist. There is, he states evidence of the "Good". An inner orientation of right stamps the nature of every moral act of Will.

Brentano's teaching has been the means of turning the attention of men, thinkers towards other ways of conceiving the nature, modes, and functions of mind than these of Kant and his followers. We find Brentano's standpoint exerting a great influence on Meinong, Husserl, Heidegger, and many others, who are laboring to present phenomenology as a mental discipline which will produce radical changes in our mode of attacking the way of knowledge in the world without and the world within. A great deal of such teaching is contrary to the fundamental principles of Kant and his followers, especially in the domain of Psychology and the theory of knowledge of the relation of subject and object. Among his writings are: Psychology from the Empirical Point of View (1874), Origin of Moral Consciousness (1889), Concerning the Future of Philosophy (1893), Investigation for a Classification of Psychological Phenomena (1911), Concerning Time and Space (1920).
Joseph Geyser

Joseph Geyser is a very important exponent of Thomism. He was born in 1869. In 1911 he was professor at Münster and in 1917 in Freiburg. His activity ranged chiefly around logic, epistemology, psychology. He is definitely opposed to Kant's critique and his teaching concerning the impossibility of knowing being. In place of Kant he accepted the teaching of Aristotle and the Scholastics, however, not in their totality. He was also greatly influenced by Husserl. In Husserl he rejected his Platonism, his doctrine of self and conscience and denial of reality. Like Husserl he rejected psychologism. He does not sharply differentiate between logic and epistemology. Logic is not merely rules and method but a fundamentally theoretical teaching as regards truth and the forms of thought. Epistemology answers the question whether and how the apprehension of being is possible. A judgment is true in so far as it corresponds to reality. Universality of ideas consists in this that they may be posited of several things. Its' importance lies in the fact that in some indefinite way it permits singular things to be grasped. From this is not to be inferred the impossibility of thinking upon individual things, but it is to be understood that thru universals a know-
ledge of the laws of being in things is obtained. Ideas which arise from sight he calls "visible ideas" all others he calls transcendental or invisible. By universal validity he means that which is characteristic of ideas that can be applied to many things. In contrast to Kant Geyser maintained that the logical form are derived from being. He affirmed that being equalled its object and not merely being. Every act of the intellect postulates a thing thought about. All thinking is of a noetic-noematic nature. (Noesis is the intentional psychical act. Noemis is the objectively logical content of the psychical act). Logic and epistemology deal with both aspects. The noetics are "acts of self", acts of the "I" and can therefore, only exist in dependence on the "I". Analogies may be also formed from the universals. The best and chief criterion of truth is immediate comprehension and not merely feeling. He says it is rather a psychical fact that we experience a certain judgment, in a sense, an insight into the content of the thing. Like Meinong Geyser distinguished between existence and essence. Each thing has a particular being in so far as its essence is differentiated from all other beings. It was existing before the intellect. Each and every being is char-
acterized by two moments: (1) the moment of perception, (2) the content peculiar to each thing. Existence which is not brought about by the "ego" is called real. Existence of the essence which is felt, thought, wished for, is called the existence of the conscience. All things have a cause, contingency is possible. An object is that upon which we can direct our thinking. What is grasped from it he terms as its contents. The uncaused cause has aserty. All things are transitory and changeable. Things follow certain set laws. Natural science strives to comprehend reality but will never do so completely because we cannot grasp the transcendental. Wherever there is change there is time. Nature can be comprehended only by means of the senses. He is in accord with the Hrestatelian Vitalism. There is a unity of matter and form. God is the course of life. The soul and body are a substance. Just as the form of a statue penetrates the entire matter so does the soul penetrate the body. He rejected Ostwald-Stumpf theory of physical energy being transformed into psychical. The soul was created by God. Parents are not able to create it and since they can not create they can not destroy it. God will not for He would not give man a desire for eternal life and then bring

George Hertling (1843–1919)

In the field of social ethics and politics George Hertling has done some very outstanding work. Born in 1843–1919, Professor of philosophy at Munich, later Ministerial president of Bavaria and Chancellor towards the end of the war. Hertling worked to found a philosophy of right, state, society developed from the theistic-teleological standpoint. According to this philosophy there is an absolutely necessary moral law which requires man to realize the plan of God. He must develop his nature in keeping with the divine plan having reason as his guide in his activities. From this arise all our duties concerning ourselves, likewise the ends which bind us with others in families, in transactions and in States and from this arise our duties as regards others. Good according to Hertling is the achievement of the end for which a thing was destined; evil what does
not achieve the end for which it was destined. Justice is to be conceived of in this way and in this way only. All attempts to dethrone Justice from the moral order and to make it subjective are erroneous. In consequence even the state must observe this moral law. However, the state is not the highest manifestation of the moral idea. The conscience must be taken in regard and if there is a conflict between the two the conscience has precedence. From these principles Hertling began to apply solutions to the current problems of his day and above all opposed the principles of the material mechanistic view of life. In regard to individual problems such as divorce he depended definitely upon the dogma of the church. He regarded punishment as retributive punishment, a completion of the divine justice inflicted upon the world.

In addition to his excellent work in the field of ethics Hertling made some valuable contribution to metaphysics. He considered Philosophy as the aid and preamble of the theology whose most important office was to establish to proof for the existence of God, an existence which could only be proven "a posteriori" and to establish a proof adequate to meet all objections. Instead of the material-mechanistic outlook on life, he said a teleological outlook must of necessity follows from a
consideration of the universe. Hertling carefully gathered proofs for this contention. In answer to the question whether God could create a better world he said that there was no proof for such a contention and furthermore that God was under no obligation to do so. Hertling further insisted that philosophy accept the condition as necessary, that it subject itself to divine revelation.

In 1891 Hertling and Baumber began the publication of their Contributions to the History of Philosophy of the Middle Ages. Among his writings are: Concerning the Limits of a Mechanical Explanation of Nature (1875), Essays and Speeches concerning Socialism (1884), Natural Right and Social Politics (1893), Essays on Contemporary History and Politics (1897), Principles of Catholicism and Science (1899), Right, State and Society, Lectures Concerning Metaphysics (1906).

Alb. Maria Weiss

Scores in socialism and liberalism, He considers liberalism in religion wrong since it is found on superficial knowledge and assumes to dogmatize against whatever having the merit of age, is opposed to its modern notions. He presents the church, constructed by supernatural hands and resting on eternal wisdom as the true guide in Ethics and rejects the
modern doctrinaires and fallacies. He wrote The Social Question and Social Order in 1892.

Carl Braig

Carl Braig, Professor in University of Freiburg. Considers Logic the anatomy of thought, "the biology of thinking" since it deals with the description, dissection, reconstruction of the organism of our ideas. Has written on Logic, noetics, ontology, natural philosophy, psychology, aesthetics, theology from the scholastic point of view. In 1897 he wrote The Fundamentals of Philosophy.

Huberto Grunder

He deals with the objectivity of sensuous phenomena. He defends and illustrates with copious references and data of physics and physiology that properties exist fundamentally in bodies and formally in the act of sensation. Fundamentally sound is a molecular energy of a vibrating body transmitted by aerial waves to the sense of hearing. Formally it is the perceptive state of this sense-akin to the apprehensional state, the verbum mentis of the intellect. He maintains that this theory is not idealistic, does not deny the real objectivity of the phenomena it has solid positive grounds, harmonizes best with a sound theory of knowledge and certain facts est-
ablished by physical science. "De Qualitatibus Sensibilibus" (1911).

Joseph Gredt O.S.B.

Gredt follows through out his works the thought of Thomas and Aristotle. He opposed the Neoscholastics who favored the Kantian interpretation of the world and insisted upon direct perception of being thru the senses. He also says God's existence can be proved from the argument of man's desire for happiness. This he places under the 4th argument of St. Thomas ex gradibus perfectionum. In 1899 he wrote Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelis Thomisticae to follow De Cognitione Sensuum Externorum (1913).

Clemens Baumker

Clemens Baumker was born in 1853. He is a theological professor at Munich. He has described with remarkable knowledge and fineness of style the enormous importance of taking up at once its chief problems and testing their solution in the light of contemporary metaphysical conclusions. In a brilliant way he traces how the various streams flowed together and give us even to-day valid interpretations of the universe and life and form a solid foundation of intellectual truth which justifies the further construction of religious experience upon it.
The philosophy of the Middle Ages, by uniting knowledge and faith and also theology and philosophy constructed views of the universe and life which possess the seed of further development. Here are to be found says Blumker transcendental truths which seem to issue from the very nature of the ceaseless development of thought, here are values of the individual and social life shown as realities which have brought into existence and have conserved all that is true and good for man; here is the present life of ours in its natural state viewed as a torso, and a life capable of endless development wholly within the world of spirit. The theology of "revelation" in the older sense sheds, as it were, its leaves more and more, and new buds of a philosophical and metaphysical character take their place. Metaphysics and the theory of knowledge come to the foreground psychology and ethics pass from their elementary stage and put on a metaphysical character. He maintains that the native a priori forms of the mind are shown to be actual "essences" which belong to man as a birthright. These forks work upon the material that is present and transform it from its "mere existence" so that it becomes a real, conscious, and active
portions of the mental and spiritual nature of man.

Alongside of all this he says emphasis was laid by the Middle Ages on the necessity for the development of all the branches of the various sciences and on the need of showing the importance of cultivation the practical and technical aspects of life. As Baumker shows, this fact is confirmed by the works of such men as Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, and many others. The movement intiated by these men shows that men saw that a comprehensive view of the world and of life was absolutely necessary in order to cultivate the various embryonic kinds of experience found in human nature. Thomas himself had so many naive and practical characteristics in his life, and these characteristics existed in peace alongside the wonderful metaphysical and religious conclusions and speculations which were his. Among his works are: View of Life and Thought (1913), Philosophy in Self-presentation.

Eric Przywara

Eric Przywara is a professor of theology in the Catholic theological faculty of the University of Munich. The scope of his knowledge of the history of the philosophical sciences of the past and the present is remarkable. He is equally at home in the whole
history not only of Catholicism but also of Protestantism. He has already, though comparatively young, done much to show the significance of the teaching of the Fathers from Augustine onwards with regard to their contributions respecting the creation of a philosophy of religion in general and of the Christian religion in particular. In his volumes on God and on Religious Philosophy of Catholic Theology he proceeds as follows. The problem of a philosophy of religion is a twofold one. In the first place it deals with the religious element which is found in philosophy, and in the second place with the philosophical elements which have to be incorporated in the Cultus, morality and dogmas of the Church. The former task can be accomplished only by taking into consideration the whole domain of philosophy; whilst the second task has, as its subject-matter the discussion and interpretation of what is to be found in the particular theology of the Church. He wished to show what is common in the two domains. In other words, the problem is directed towards a "metaphysical something" found in subject and object and in their correlation. It is in this manner that the two domains unite, and thus include the union of philosophy and theology as one organism as, he stated, has been the
case in the Catholic conception throughout the ages.

The problem of religion has a twofold aspect. One is the aspect of the being of religion; the other is the existence of religion. The first aspect — the being — means the presence of a truth in itself apart from its reference to anything existing outside ourselves. The second aspect means the presence of a truth in the mind, which has been brought into it by means of one or more of the senses from some object which exists in the external world. Both sides have to be taken constantly into account. The being problem means the relation of man to God by means of the various contents of man's nature; the existence problem means the relation of man to God by means of man's realization of the actual though partial meaning of the universe.

The being problem has as its starting-point the consideration of consciousness. This consideration happens concerning the fact of the strain (Spannung) of consciousness in two ways. On the one side the strain keeps the consciousness within its own enclosure, but the opposite strain draws the consciousness away from its immanence and directs it towards an actuality or being independent of the enclosed individual consciousness itself. On the level of the
theory of knowledge it may be stated that, in the first place this consciousness of the self in the double sense of an inner personal presence within himself and of the independent existence of an ideal or real object. In the second place, consciousness is a consciousness of a concrete self, i.e. it is not a consciousness of a "self in itself" in the sense of a transcendental self of its own alone. This would mean a soliptic philosophy but not an immediate "givenness". Consciousness means an awareness of an individual human self that experiences itself in the double tension or strain of body-mind and individual-society. Viewing the matter in this way, we obtain a double consideration of the problem of religion, i.e. religion from the consideration of the consciousness of the self and from the consideration of the concrete itself. This idea is worked out by Przywara in great detail in the light of the most important conclusions of Greek, Mediaeval and modern philosophical thinkers. His whole attempt is to base the eternal reality and necessity of religion upon what is being "given" from the side of the universe and from the side of the inner unfolding of meanings and values within man's own inner life. There are, on account of the tension, constant
reciprocal efforts in the life of man between being
and existence between the inward and the outward.

Przywara, specially in his volume on God, points
out the impossibility of man ever being able to
fathom the nature of God. There are limitations pecu-
liar to our nature which prevent us from exhausting
the deepest meaning of the universe. But we are cer-
tain that Something was, is, and will be --Something
in us and beyond us. And here the author call in the
aid of an analogia entis in connection with our con-
viction of this real, eternal Something--God. He
Shows what has already come to light within the con-
sciousness of a good, noble and able man. Such a man
has received all from the universe. There must be
present in the universe all that here on earth, and
infinitely more than is here. The eternal reality is
not alien to us; something of Him is in us; He is
near to us and yet infinitely far from us. What we
possess, though at the best only in a small degree,
compels us to conclude in the way of an analogia to
a Reality that has brought the universe into being.
And in the universe there are grades of reality from
matter to spirit.

Przywara sho's how christianity manifests to us
the being of God under the form of a divine personality.
He passes beyond the intellectual level to the level of what is termed faith. Faith with him is not a leap in the dark; it is no something towards the presence of which knowledge has made no contribution. Knowledge, on its higher, transcendental levels, has made its contributions towards the birth of faith. Faith is the setting in activity of this contribution of knowledge and aspiration and directing it towards goals which seem to have no terminus. Faith starts as a belief in our own best qualities, always remembering that these are not our own—that they have been given us by the Reality of the universe. It is not we who create the Reality of the universe, but it is the Reality of the universe, or God that has created us; and all our own creation of our personality is made up of potentialities which have been given to us.

The person of Christ, with its inexhaustible fullness of life, is a tangible proof to us of God. Who can plumb the depths of His life? As a Logos of God He has revealed the cosmic nature of Reality.

Mink Von Casper S.J.

Mink's chief reason to importance lies in the fact that he deals with the theory of knowledge. In carrying out this program he comes to the conclusion that many of the new solutions that are discussed
widely to-day are, after all, very old solutions. He finds that, though the Schoolmen of old did not give the problem of the theory of knowledge that prominence which it has to-day, still they discussed very thoroughly all the building stones of which the foundation of all knowledge that is made up.

He insists that universal doubt cannot be the initium philosophandi, no matter whether this doubt is real or only methodical. He maintains that the neglect of the all-important distinction between intellectual and sensory cognition is at the root of many unsatisfactory solutions of this problem. It is because of this neglect that the fundamental character of the supreme laws of all being and thinking cannot be understood and the absolute dominion which these laws exercise over us cannot be accounted for.

Here is the root of the philosophical attitude known as Psychologism. If there is no difference between intellect and sense, if all cognition is reducible to sensations as its constitutive elements the manner in which we arrive at these principles must be a riddle and the principles themselves can at best only be empirical rules. Their necessity can only be that which arises from purely sensory association. But such is far from being the case. It
is the objective and absolute necessity of the relations affirmed in the transcendental principles which governs all our thinking. We are absolutely powerless against this necessity. Even God Almighty cannot change the truths expressed by the transcendental principles; hence it is very wrong to make the empirical laws of psychology the starting point of all philosophizing. Logic with its eternal and unchangeable laws and their inexorable metaphysical necessity is the first science to be mastered by a philosopher, if he wants to avoid the dangers which beset his arduous path. He placed much importance on the part that the intellectus agens played in the acquiring universal ideas, disagreeing with Father Palmieri who says that an hypothesis cannot possibly be part of the foundation of all knowledge. And the intellectus agens is after all, a matter of hypothesis. Father Mink maintains that the first idea must be a universal one. He stood for the eternity, necessity and unchangeableness of all essences and for a moderate realism. He maintains that Hegel postulates the identity of being and nothing. And since this is a denial of the principle of contradiction he concludes that none of Hegels propositions are acceptable. The intellect Mink asserts, understands the
individual not as an object giving rise to sensory impressions but as the concrete realization of an abstract universal idea. While senses supply the matter upon which the intellect operates, the intellect is not completely instructed by them, for over and above that which can be known by the senses we also know those things which are absolutely necessary to a thing that is what it is and the relations that are implied in it. Only in so far, therefore, does mental cognition have its rise in the senses as they supply the intellect with that by which it is led into further knowledge. We call this further knowledge the essence of the object. Such abstractions are the fundamental ideas at the basis of all science; among some Minkists; being, essence, unity, plurality, differentiation, possibility, change, etc. Among his works are: Intellect and Understanding, Commentary to Kants Critic of Pure Reason, Principles of the Theory of Knowledge, and Being its Value and End.

Michael Wittmann

Wittmann is concerned with the Ethics of St. Thomas. He deals with the philosophical not theological concepts of the ethics of St. Thomas in their historical development he shows that Thomas is no revamped Aristotle. He points out that we
give too much credit to Aristotle, and not enough to Thomas and indicates the wealth of service that went into the making of Thomas the independent teacher he was. He studies the characteristics, nature, origin development of the thought of St. Thomas.

He analyses under four broad headings, Happiness, Will and Freedom, Virtue and Law, the thought developments within the writings of Thomas himself, then in relation to Aristotle and Post-Aristotelians, Plato, Augustine, the New-platonists, Boethius, Patristic literature in general, and earlier Scholastics. Preponderant influences on Thomas are, of course, Aristotle and Augustine. But Thomas is not merely an amalgam of the two. On one topic Aristotle may be the chief inspiration, on another Augustine; then again the language of the one is retained, but made to dress the ideology of the other, etc. Wittmann says apparent discrepancies or contradictions in the thought of Thomas can be led back to this fact, or must be explained by the passion for eclectic synthesis of all previous views, which was so strong a characteristic of the Scholastic mind of his time.

In regard to the concept and theory of happiness, Wittmann concludes that Thomas' view is not an even-up synthesis of Aristotle and Augustine; the
latter is by far the preponderant influence. In regard to the voluntarism, on the other hand, Thomas is under the inspiration of Aristotle, yet always with a caution. For Aristotle free choice presupposes reason but belongs to the will; for Thomas the seat and organ of free choice is reason. The Thomistic synthesis includes the doctrine of liberum arbitrium as handed down traditionally in Christian thought, while Aristotle's view became known only in the thirteenth century. The latter Thomas uses exclusively in his ethical treaties while the former is employed in his treaties on grace and creation.

The development of the doctrine of freedom in post-Aristotelian thought, he says, is a progressive one towards intellectualism. Augustine, drawing only from Christian sources, is entirely voluntaristic. Boethius followed the intellectualistic trend. Both currents are found side by side in the Middle Ages, and sometimes in combined form. Albert the Great tried to pursue such a middle way, going beyond will and intellect for the liberum arbitrium; Thomas is in this respect a voluntarist, basing it in will, but not without it due reference to intellect.

There is really a double theory of freedom running through the works of Thomas: the traditional
Christian, and the Aristotelian. Wittmann says, "Thomas wishes to join Aristotle completely and at the same time, remain true to tradition; his acceptance of Aristotle in this instance does not really lead to a break with tradition, least of all with Augustine. On the contrary, Augustine and Aristotle both agree germinally, so that Thomas is here is a position altogether different from that referring the theory of knowledge." "As in the doctrine of happiness the intellectualism of Thomas seems to increase with time, so his voluntarism in the doctrine of freedom. Whereas Thomas bases freedom in reason altogether and without restriction in an earlier work, this view is considerably modified in his theological Summa."

He shows that Socrates was intellectualistic in his notion of virtue. Plato and Aristotle base virtue in the whole personality, knowledge being a prerequisite. They stress the notion of habit in this connection. The mediaeval thinkers knew nothing of this and based virtue in a moral disposition, whence they too arrived at virtue as a habit. Virtuous actions must also be subjectively good and performed joyously. "It belongs to the essence of virtue, says Thomas, that man perform the good in the right way, i.e. willingly and gladly, with joy and determin-
ation. Thomas followed Aristotle in accepting a natural inclination in man towards good, an original tendency of will prior to all knowledge.

The Thomistic treatment of is intellectualistic throughout, yet less dependent on Aristotle than on the Stoics and Neoplatonists. But here too "theory lags behind reality; the formulas of ancient intellectualism are retained although they are no longer the adequate expression of current views.... Here, too, there is a touch of voluntarism noticeable." Thomas' views are entirely under the influence of post-Aristotelian thought. "The acceptance of Aristotle did not in this instance change the traditional views in any way." The teachings on Free will in St. Thomas, the Ethics of St. Thomas (1933) are among his works.

Michael Schmaus

Mischael Schmaus is noted for the excellent work he has done in the field of Medieval thought. He deals with the 13th and early 14th century scholasticism. He gives us in Liber Propugnatoruis the teaching of St. Thomas of Aquinas and Don Scotus on the Trinity.

He shows the differences and the agreement in the teaching of these two renowned Doctors of the
Scholastic period. The related elements in the two doctrines are many. He also shows the influence of the past on these two thinkers and their influence on the ages succeeding them. The splendid historical basis of this work is due to the fact that it brings forth a complete bibliography of published and unpublished literature of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. He also presents much literature on the subject from the twelfth century and uses the extensive material collected up to the present time.

With this comprehensive literature, Schmaus is able to give a vital treatment to the origin and development of the doctrine of the Trinity in the thirteenth century; the speculative contributions of Aquinas and Scotus built upon the common, traditional Scholasticism are shown. The scope of both leading opinions on the doctrine of the Trinity in the Middle Ages, the Augustinian-Anselmian and the Neoplatonic-Aristotelian-Richardian is brought out in a well developed way. He indicates the differences concerning the processions in the Trinity, the vital acts of God, the constitution of the divine persons and in showing these differences, Schmaus who shows how there is a willful breaking down of school lines,
and how the teachings of one school influences the teaching of the other.

He shows that on closer study, the teachings of St. Thomas, appears as systematic Augustinian teaching. He describes Duns Scotus as a faithful follower of traditional teachings, yet adding to that teaching by his own deep, independent thinking. He stands in the intellectual world of Henry of Ghent, turning away from the Franciscan tradition and inclining to the Augustinian opinion of St. Thomas.

He mentions for the first time the special Trinitarian doctrines of Thomas Sutton, Richard Fishacre, Nicolus Trivet, John of Naples, Peter John Olive, William of Ware, John Reading. Everywhere throughout this work is shown the rich deposit of medieval thought on the Trinity and the deep and independent thought of medieval theologians. In Nicolai Trivet,"Quaestiones de causalitate scientiae Dei et concursu divino,"Schmaus for the first time publishes Nicolaus Trivet's treatment on the causality of God's knowledge and divine concursus. He shows that Trivet a Thomist of the 14th century maintains that divine knowledge is the cause sine qua non of the being of things but not their efficient cause unless accompanied by the action of God's
will. He denies that God gives any new attribute to beings in action beyond those naturally in the created being; that the form of the being is alone sufficient for its action. But he does admit that God concurs with creatures in their action by conserving the form of the being, which is the principle of activity. He edited De Beata Vita Aureli Augustine, Augustine and the Trinitarian Teaching of William of Ware, The Psychological Trinity Doctrine of St. Augustine (1927).

Siegfried Behn

Siegfried Behn deals with metaphysics and attempts to clear up misunderstandings and uncertainties regarding the science of metaphysics. He maintains that it is ridiculous to say that a mechanistic and only a mechanistic interpretation of all things is possible. The visible cannot explain the visible, and behind every phenomena, there lies a reality which the intellect alone can reach. There can be no science in terms of sense data, no matter how carefully observed, classified and described; behind the phenomena the mind seeks the noumenon, behind the effect the cause and at the beginning of all order intelligence. Mechanism has given no explanation to the all too evident teleology and constancy in nature. The disrepute in which metaphysics lives is due to
some extent to the dialecticians of former ages who offered verbal solutions for want to a deeper insight. All experience embodies the eternal realities of metaphysics just as the orderliness of it reflects an ultimate intelligence. If there can be no reality without metaphysical implications, no science without principles and necessary connections, there can neither be any metaphysical understanding without an accurate knowledge of the facts of science—Behn maintains that although there be no vital process which does not involve excitation and reaction, a mere description of life initio cannot substitute for an explanation a fine. Life is an uninterrupted process of realization of an aim. The astoundingly cleverly organized living body is organized and operates for a purpose.

Dr. P. Benedict Linder

Dr. Linder deals with a period of philosophy little known. He shows that Thomas of Strasburg, one of the most influential thinkers of early fourteenth century, was an ardent supporter of moderate realism against the then reigning Averroism and nominalism. He was born at the close of the thirteenth century in Hagenu, in Alsace. He joined the Augustinian Order there at an early age, and was sent to
Strasburg, in 1306 to commence the study of philosophy and theology. He studied there and in Padua in 1305 he was sent to Paris where he received, two years later the degree of doctor. Linder shows that Thomas wrote many works, many of which are lost to-day. His important philosophical work, the Commentary on the Sentences has come down to us intact, and was printed as late as 1490. Linder shows that Thomas of Strasburg was a very close follower of Thomas Aquinas in his epistemology, although he differs radically from him on the question of grace and free will, wherein he follows Augustine very closely. He holds for the primacy of the will over the intellect, but discards the ontological argument. Linder points out that Thomas of Strasburg followed a method that became very well known to succeeding generations of philosophers. He first advances the proposition which he intends to hold. Then he states the argument against their proposition and the development arising there from. Thirdly, he proves his own position with every precise argument, and fourthly, he replies to the objection against the proposition. He reduces philosophy to a simple examination of a few problems such as the scientific character of theology, the relation of the soul to its faculties, the principle of individ-
uation, etc. Linder points out that Thomas of Stras-
burg was devoted to realism and opposed to nominalis-
and conceptualism. Theory of Knowledge of Thomas of 
Strasburg.

Fr. Pelster Franciscus

Fr. Pelster Franciscus is a historian dealing 
with the Middle Ages. He and Grabmann have collor-
ated in several works. In 1921 he and Grabmann edited 
Opuscula et Textus. Among some of his works are: 
Thomae de Sutton O.P., Questiones de Reali Distinct-
ione inter Essentiam et Esse. In this field he with 
Dr. Koch are the outstanding specialists. "The Origin 
of Richard of Mediavilla O.F.M." In this work he dis-
cusses whether Richard of Midleton was an Englishman 
and answers in the affirmative. Life and Writings of 
the Oxford Dommican Teacher Richard Fishacre(1248). 
It is a sketch of his life with a critical analysis 
of his writings in which Pelster showed that he was 
deeply influenced by the Augustimari tradition. Thomas 
of Sutton O.P. as author of two writings concerning 
the Unity of Knowledge. In this Pelster proves that 
Thomas of Sutton is the author of the treatises contra 
pluralitatem formorum, and De productione forma sub-
stantialis formerly ascribed to Thomas Aquinas. In 
the oldest Sentence Commentary of the Oxford-Franciscan
School. Pelster argues that Richardus Rufus Cornubienses was the first Franciscan who commented on the Sentences of Peter Lombard at Oxford in 1250. Roger Marston O.F.M. (1303) an English representative of Augustine. Marston has already been introduced by Ehrle (Cardinal) "He is a theologian." His writings throw light on the conflict between Augustenianism and Aristotelianism about the year 1250, in Chronological Order of the St. Alberts the Greats Treatment of Aristotles Paraphrase. He tries to throw light on the chronological order of certain work of Albert the Great and in particular to fix dates of the paraphrase of Aristotle. In the compendium de negatis naturali. Pelster shows that judging from the external criticism of the codices and manuscripts that the work is that of Albert the Great and not of Albert of Orlamunde.

Gallus M. Manser

Gallus M. Manser (1866) is a very learned scholar whose field encompasses theology, psychology, ethics, history and especially metaphysics. His viewpoint is unswervingly that of the Aristotelian metaphysician. He is the chief exponent of the Freiburg school which school numbers J. Credt, M. de Munnynch, M. Benz, G. Jud, M. Thiel, E. Spierr, B. Kalin, J. Kraus, M. Morard, J. Fehr,
C. Zamara. Freiburg-Thomism differs from the accepted Scholasticism in this that importance is placed upon the principles of Aquinas. These principles are not interpreted as being restrictions, as hampering or sterilizing but rather as luminous guideposts. This defense of his principles, "Principles Angeli Doctoris" Mauser allucidates in his Essence of St. Thomas. He defends the validity and reality of the principle of causality. He considers the five ways of demonstrating the existence of God as five ways of showing forth the act of creation as the immediate act of an omnipotent and infinite God. He describes the nature of creation to show that God is and can be the sole immediately efficient cause of the world. He accepts the view that there is a real distinction in creatures as regards essence and existence but only a logical one as regards God's. He points out that Suarez misinterpreted the teaching of St. Thomas with the result that a vast number of commentators become heirs to the mistake of Suarez. Suarez interprets Thomas as saying that essence and existence being really distinct becomes thus two things "ita ut sint duas res". Manser shows that according to the correct understanding of St. Thomas the essence of a thing is the quod est, its existence is the quo est or the act of the essence. It is nothing
more than a further application of his (St. Thomas) basic principle of potency and act. Those who contend that there is no distinction must assert that in the finite being essentia and esse or the same really and yet the being is an ens ab alio. This Münser assents is certainly a logic alien to that of the great Master. In his study of the scientific value of the analogical knowledge of God he makes as prerequisites for analogy the real multiplicity of things or their unity in transcendental being. The existence of a real multiplicity of things is an undeniable fact. The multiplicity, ever becoming and changing, is a mixture of potency and act. It is likewise evident that every true analogy proposes a plurality of things, because by analogy we predicate of several things the same thought content under the same name, not in an absolutely identical, nor in an absolutely different sense, but according to an identity of relationship. Transcendental being includes all the transcendentals in their union with being. He says that a metaphysical analogy requires that the middle term with which the members of the analogy agree be found in these members formally and with an interior necessity. Transcendental being alone can thus be found in all members of an analogy. This being likewise fulfils
the second condition of the true analogy. It cannot be predicated univocally of things, otherwise there would be no plurality of things, but monism. Only potential being makes the plurality of the actually existing things of the world possible. Manser says that the doctrine of act and potency is in fact the ultimate metaphysical foundation of true analogy and the true analogical knowledge of God. Manser maintains that the ground of individuation in spiritual things is their simplicity; for material things, their matter. Thru it alone are we able to distinguish between metaphysical analogy, the only scientific analogy, and the various other analogies. Only by means of the doctrine of potency and act studied in relation to the absolute act can we explain proportionality, the existence of God, and existence in itself as well as attain a measure of knowledge though imperfect, of the divine nature.

Martin Grabmann

Martin Grabmann 1875, 1898 ordained, 1906 Professor of dogma of christian philosophy and pedagogy in Vienna, 1918 Professor of dogma at Munich.

Grabmann is perhaps the greatest living authority in his field. He has done more than any other scholar to unearth the sources of Scholastic philo-
osophy and theology. His painstaking research, tire-
less investigation, self-sacrificing labors, were
instrumental in vanquishing historicism, and in shed-
ing much light on the vigorous life of the mediaeval
philosophy which had long been considered as simply
a hand maid to theology. And like Hertling, Baum-
garten, Baumker he roused much interest in non-
Catholic groups thus leading to a careful discussion
of the mediaeval periods. He is above all, promin-ent in the history of the origins of Thomism. He is
familiar with the entire range of the writings of
the Angelic Doctor. In treating with the Summa Theo-
logica he shows the different developments of the
theological summa up to the time of St. Thomas, and
then successively with the origin of the Thomistic
Summa, the chronology of the different parts, the
relation of the Summa to the other philosophical and
theological writings of Aquinas and the history of
the commentaries. He moreover analyzes the steps
by which St. Thomas accomplished his purpose of writ-
ing for beginners a theological manual that would
avoid superfluous questions and articles, would eschew
intricacy and confusion in the arrangement of sub-
ject matter and would avoid useless repetitions.
Grabmann has also done some very fine work
historical as regards Albert the Great. He shows that Albert was the first to introduce the immense material of Aristotelian and Jewish-Araluan philosophy and the natural sciences to scholastic thought. He was the creator of Aristotelian scholasticism which Thomas developed and perfected. Grabmann shows that the influence of Albert upon his own time and the succeeding centuries is not that of a mere compiler. He gave evident proof of his initiative as the creator of Christian Aristatianism; as founder of the Neaplatonism of the German Dominican scholasticism in his acute and independent system of ethics elaborated in his De Bono sine de Virtutibus which, Grabmann maintains was written twenty years before the Secunda of Thomas and before the Nichomachean Ethics became known in the Latin translation of Robert Grosseteste. Further his original researches and observations in the field of natural sciences, in zoology, botany, geography, meteorology and cosmology give evidences of an initiative which has merited the acknowledgment of the scientific world. Grabmann also shows the influence of Albert upon German scholasticism and mysticism down to the fifteenth century. He adduces a long line of philosophers and theologians who drew their thoughts and often their very words
from the works of Albert. Among the foremost disciples, apart from St. Thomas, were Ulrich of Strassburg, Nicholas of Strassburg, Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, Dionsuis Ryckel the Carthusian, etc.

In treating of St. Augustine Grabmann shows that he was a pioneer in the science of experimental and metaphysical psychology. And that this influence was paramount in the pre-Thomistic Scholastics. And that Don Scotus and St. Thomas never underestimated Augustine as a psychologist even when breaking with Platonic traditions and embracing Aristotelianism. St. Thomas particularly in his Summa Contra Gentiles, far from attempting to supplant Augustine by Aristotle, makes a synthesis of these two great thinkers, round whom the whole philosophical thought of the Middle Ages turns. He points out in contrast to St. Augustine's constant object and yearning for God the worlds search for God rather than the acknowledgment of Him. The knowledge of God is the essential condition of all investigation, in no matter what field. Grabmann also tosses the influence of the Augustimori fourtis Dei on the Scholastics and mystics all the way from the Prologium of Anselm, of Canterbury, thru the sentences of Peter Lombard, the Intmarium Mentis in Deum if St. Bornaventiera thru the writings of Albertus Magnus.
St. Thomas Aquinas, Meister Eckhart, Tauler, Seuse, etc. down to the Theotimus of St. Francis de Sales.

He has innumerable other short works other than those he edited among which is one dealing with Bernard of Auvergne who lived during the fifty years after the death of St. Thomas and shows he was among the first to sense the true meaning, profoundity and breadth of St. Thomas and defends him. Principles of St. Augustine concerning the Soul and God, Introduction to the Theological Summa of St. Thomas, The Works of St. Thomas Aquinas, Manuscripts Examinations and Notes on the Writings of Wihelm of Conches on Schience, Influence of Albert the Great and the Middle Ages' Spiritual Life, History of the Scholastic Method.

Fr. Der Groot J.V.

Fr. Der Groot a Domainsan Follows St. Thomas. He obtains these principles up to date. He mentions that the Catholic Theologics are often at fault because they fight with arms that are out of date. They forget that history, archeology and experimental science have introduced new aspects to old questions and are constantly causing fresh doubts in the minds of men who enter upon the scene of inquiry without the preparation grace of supernatural faith. He states the requirements for a thoroughly scientific work on apologetics as, establish-
ment of definite authorities for facts stated in connection with the doctrines of the Catholic Faith. The authorities are the Sacred Scriptures, not as inspired works, writings, but as historical documents. The early eccelesiastical writers to be cited as concordant witness of uninterrupted tradition. The definitions of the councils have a similar value. They establish the actual belief of Christians at different periods of the history of revealed religion and secure a kind of accuracy which we could hardly look for in the ordinary writings of individual teachers of the Christian faith. The science of apology differs from works of Christian Apology in thus that it points out the methods of defense, and not simply the weapons. It is different from theology since human reason is the principle not faith. It is different from philosophy since it assumes that somethings namely existence of God, spirituality of the soul, these latter philosophy would have to prove. Summa Apologetica-1890.

Al. Schmid

Al. Schmid Professor at the University of Munchen. He makes special note of Noetics, the science of knowledge itself. He makes a strong defense for the principle of doubt, not as a
principle of science, but as a standpoint to be taken by the radically searching mind. Noetics must scrutinize the objective reality of the contents of human consciousness. He insists that one must place himself in a critical attitude toward all its elements. He must (methodi causa) begin with nothing. Next from nothing nothing follows; from uncertainty certainty can never spring. Science must ultimately rest on affirmation not on negation. The radical affirmation must be tested and proved not directly but indirectly, by the contradiction evidently seen in its negation. Schmid applies the comment of St. Thomas in Aristotle's Metaphysics Dicit (philosophies) quod illi, qui volunt inquirere veritatem non considerando prius dubitationem, assimilantem illis, qui nescunt quo vadant. Et hoc ides quia terminis viae est illud quod intenditur ab ambulante, ita exclusio dubitationes est finis, qui intenditur ab inquirente veritatem. Manifestum est autem, quod ille, qui nescit, quo vadat non patest directe ire nisi forte a casu. Ergo nec aliquis potest directe inquirere veritatem, nisi prius dubitationem videat. He agrees with Kleutgen, is opposed to the Cartesian method and considers the senses as sources of knowledge. He maintains that epistemology is as the justification of supersensible
knowledge and apologetics of supernatural, epistemo-
logy the speculative basis of phil. and apologetics the speculative basis of theology. Apologetics must show the connection between theology and natural or rational sciences, show that theology has a right to supreme and regal claim among sciences, and that Catholic theology is not grounded in sentimental emotion but in faith. Theory of Knowledge (1890), Apologetics (1900).

Paell Wilhelm

Paell Wilhelm attempts to overcome the limitations of Huxter's phenomenology in the intellectual perception of "essences". To reach the essence of a thing, Paell says it is not enough to determine phenomenologically the notes or attributes of a thing in their totality; there must be found a principle which will account for the fact that a certain group of attributes is constant in a thing, and which makes it possible forthat thing to be. This then, is the essence. It is the principle of the being, but also of the essence. How is it perceived? The first step is to determine the generic essence of a thing by way of comparative-inductive abstraction. After this we must find the precise unity of attributes which will adequately account not only for the being, but
also for the oneness of these attributes in the thing. In a special intuitive act of the mind the logical meaning of this unity of attributes and consequently the essence is perceived. This intuition is not the cognition; it only makes possible to perceive the meaning, truth and certitude of judgment. When we speak of essences we speak of ultimates and that means of metaphysical realities. And the way to them is obstructed by the materiality of things. Plato’s contemplation of the eternal essences was but an aspiration of a poetic, soul, and Aristotle, who held that only the individual is real, had to open another way for an immaterial intellect to reach the ideal content beyond the physical realities revealsent to sense. He thought he found it in his theory of intellectus agens — a metaphysical theory. Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur. St. Thomas explains that to every passive potentiality there corresponds in nature an active power; otherwise a passive potentiality there would be useless, since it cannot be activated. This intellectus agens illuminat phantasma and activates the intellectus possibilis. Poell maintains that if we understand the metaphor illuminat we also understand the activity of the intellectus agens, and we will also understand the possibility of interaction
between mind and matter. Of mind we have no knowledge quis in hac vita omnina non intelligit seipsum per seipsum. Quid sit, we know only by the quality of its actions. Not by any act of intuition, but thru discursive thought do we build up the "quiddity" of a thing, and we are never sure that we have exhausted the essential knowability of anything. ie. We could see the essence of a thing we could know it attributes a priori and deductively. Man's environment is a whole universe and his destiny transcends all limitations of matter. Teleological adaptation would require that he have much greater plasticity in his reactions to environment than the simple animal armed with sense and instinct. And this he has due to his intelligence. He can operate with the principle of causality and thus step from one reality to another, from the seen to the unseen, from the physical to the metaphysical. He traces relationships between absolutes, he can establish the existence of God, the world, and the soul and determine exactly his relationship to all. This, he says is sufficient for all purposes of life, including his final destiny. To penetrate the very core of the world, and the reality in any single instance lies beyond his powers. Only when he is no longer composite in his cognition will he realize the dream of
Plato and meet the essence face to face.

Peter Wust
(1884)

Peter Wust's chief contribution lies in metaphysical spheres. His aim was to bring the human back to his true position, to liberate him from his sev-erance from his "ontological roots and his transcendent objects" described by Moritain in his St. Thomas.

Among his writings are: The Ressurection of Metaphysics(1920), Return from Exile, Naivitat and Putat, The Dialectic of the Soul.

The characteristic note sounded by Wust is the loss of simplicity, humility and the duification of reason above due measure. We may best sum his outlook in the words of Adler, "Reason is merely an inquiry function but does not lead to certainty. For the latter Religion is necessary."

Joseph Mausbach

Joseph Mausbach was born in 1861. He is a professor of theology in the Catholic Faculty of the University of Munster. He is well versed in the biological, pyschological, and metaphysical literature of the Past and Present. His works are very numerous and deal with ontological problems in the light of the above-mentioned description. In "The Existence and Nature of God he deals with the whole question from
purely scientific and philosophical points of view. He shows a very wide and exact acquaintance with some of the most important conclusions of science and philosophy. Mausbach wishes to indicate what consequences flow from the biological and philosophical sciences with regard to the question of the meaning of the cosmos. He starts by tracing the conception of End in antiquity and in the Middle Ages. Next he comes down to Kant's explanation of the teleological proof of God. This is followed by a minute examination of the concepts of order, aim and law. Accepting the conclusions of some eminent natural scientists he shows how lower ends serve the production of higher ends in nature itself. His main purpose is the conclusion that there is a planner behind the plan. He makes an examination of the origin and nature, and teleology of organic life. Here Mausbach, in the main, accepts the conclusions of the neovitalists. In all living organisms there is a factor present which cannot be reduced to mechanical and chemical elements. He views the various processes of life and their ascent right up to man as marks of a principle working in all things and that has its roots in spirit. In other words, creative wisdom is the cause of life. He lays great emphasis upon the presence of teleology in organic life. This, he tells us, is in accord with some of the best experimental work in physics, biology, and psychology.
He passes on to show the ascent of life from the level of the vegetative in the plant to the level of the spirit of man. And he arrives at the conclusion that the creative cause of life can only lie in a thinking and willing spirit. He urges that the younger generation of thinkers would more intimately keep in touch with present day thinking and would combine a knowledge of present day science with philosophy and that theologies would too study science and philosophy since their appeal will have to be made to a generation well versed in them. In comparing St. Thomas and St. Augustine Mausbach says that Augustine influence has been greater for the reason that the scope of his activities was larger. "Essence and Gradation of Organic Life according to St. Augustine" in which he shows how Augustine applies his knowledge of animal and plant life to the illustration and treatment of philosophical and theological doctrine. In this field Mausbach observes that Augustine belongs neither to antiquity nor to the Middle Ages. Among his works are: Catholic Morals and Their Opponents (1901), Christian Catholic Ethics (1906), Ethics of St. Augustine (1909), Principles and Development of Character according to St. Thomas of Aquinas (1920), Earth and Man's End (1921), Essence and Existence (1929).

Fr. Victor Frins S.O.

He is well acquainted with scholastic thought.
He holds for the existence of a natural law of morality. The objective goodness or evil of human acts is in their formal relationship to divine law, and also in their bearing on man's ultimate end. He deals with the influence of ends or final motives on human conduct, the determining and disturbing elements in the voluntary character of that conduct and the nature of acts which are commanded and elicited by the will from the Thomistic viewpoint. He refers to older theologians on ontology and psychology and presents them in modernized form. He wrote "De Actibus Humanis," in three volumes 1897, 1904, 1911.

Others who have dealt with St. Thomas from the psychological point of view are: Julius Beszmer S.J. "Disturbances in the Life of the Soul," "Fundamental Disturbances of the Soul." John Ude's "Introduction to Psychology".

Joseph Frobes S.J.
(Prof. of Philosophy at Valkenburg)

In his Manual of Experimental Psychology he encompasses the whole field and deals with current discoveries and advances. Also to be mentioned in this Fr. John Lindworsky, Experimental Psychology, The Will and its appearance, Contrale accroding to the Findings of Experimental Psychology.

F.W. Foerster

F.W. Foerster, 1869 professor at Zurich, Wein,
Munchen was converted but left. Another man who was closely associated with ethical aspect of Thomistic teaching was F.W. Foerster. His contribution lay chiefly in the field of pedagogy. We may best obtain an idea of his thought from the titles of the books. Technique of Ethics, Instruction of Youth, Christianity and Class Struggle, School of Character, Method of Living, Ethics of Sex and Pedagogy of Ethics, Authority and Liberty of Guilt and Sin. Foerster is also to be associated with the history of culture and literature.

J. Feldmann, O. Grundler, Karl Adam

J. Feldmann, O. Grundler and Karl Adam are to be classed under philosophy of religion. Grundler in his "Elements of a Religious Philosophy on Phenominal Principles" gives Husserl's Scheler's and other phenomenologists' teaching of religion, and thru analysis completes their teaching by a metaphysics based on God. God, he says, since he created from a boundless love and destined man for perfect happiness had to of necessity create a being who could misuse his freedom.

Karl Adam born in 1876 professor at Tubingern deals with catholicism from the point of view of faith, revelation and duty. He has given a magnificent defense of catholicism in his book called the Essence of Catholicity. G. Wunderle defines religion as the recognition of the dependency on God and our resignation to Him. A duty auto-
matically follows which consists in complete resignation
upon God's will which in turn is manifested by holiness
and this is the greatest thing in life. The essence of
virtue is a living dependence upon God. In all our ac-
tions are shown and we should be mindful of God and His
precepts.

In the field of aesthetics Gerhard Geetmann S.J.
and John Sorensen S.J. have done much to elaborate theor-
ies of aesthetics from the standpoint of Thomistic Ethics
and Aesthetics. Albert Voge in his "Pessimism and Tragedy
in Art" and Joseph Jangmanns S.J. in "Beauty and the Fine
Art" have made worthwhile contributions to Aesthetics from
the Thomistic teachings. J. Jungmann holds that beauty
is the proper and formal object of the appetitive faculty,
that is to say beauty does not belong to the category of
truth but rather to that of goodness from which it differs
only in the aptitude to produce enjoyment. Kleutgen too
held this view. He also wrote "Aesthetics and Beauty and
the Beautiful Art".

Gietmann holds the scholastic view in regard to
beauty that as truth is the formal object of the cog-
native faculty, so beauty, which is the splendour of
truth, participates in the quality of the former and
belongs to it. He favors Christian idealism, as leading
to those conceptions of beauty which the aesthetic phil-
osopher must regard as the basis and highest aim of the
true artist. He also wrote "Universal Aesthetics".

Paul Wilpert

Paul Wilpert historian deals with the works of St. Thomas from a historical, critical and systematic point of view. He deals with the concept of truth, truth as a essential attribute of cognition, on the concept of truth in Pre-Thomistic Philosophy, an antological truth, on the judgment as the bearer of logical truth and on judgment, and criteriology. In his study on the criteriology he points out that the Schoolmen took for granted what we try to establish critically, eg. that we can know the objective world and a good many things regarding it. He shows that they have offered very minute observations on the experimental side and some very ingenious theories which to this day have not been superseded. He shows that De Ferrara's opinion that truth is inconclusive, 'imperfect', in simple apprehension or in the concept finds no support in the philosophy of St. Thomas.

Truth is of the judgment, and of the judgment only. Wilpert rejects the interpretation of Sentroul (Louvain) of adequatic which results in his definition of truth a Quatre termes, and according to which truth is the corresponding between logical and ontological truth. He says that Sentroul stresses unduly the adequation and rejects it on the predication of the Summa; esse rei, non veritas rei, causaveritatem intellectus. While the judgment is composed of subject and predicate and a copula, it is in the
copula that the judgment formally consists, for in the copula the reference takes place between subject and predicate. The reference is the cognoscere et dicere verum. Wilpert is deeply interested in establishing the true thought of Aquinas. Problems of the Certainty of Truth in St. Thomas Aquinas (1921).

Joseph Mueller

Joseph Mueller deals with Thomism from the psychological point of view. He maintains that the phemomena of memory can be satisfactorily explained only by the theory of unnoticed, but conscious ideas. In reproduction ideas are neither brought up from the depth of the unconscious nor actualized from mental "disposition" or "potencies" nor created anew from cerebral "traces". They are brought into the foreground of consciousness by association and are fixated by attention. Discrimination must be made between "unconscious" and "unnoticed" or unattended to. The idea never passes from the conscious to the unconscious. There is no absolute forgetfulness. The mind holds its entire past record only if we could turn the attention to it. Introspection shows that an important part of mind is made partly of "fringes"-elements which are unnoticed, but whose lack would make consciousness narrow and barren. When the mind is most active, its power of association is greatest, and consequently its content reaches a maximum of richness. It is a wrong tendency, he says, in psycho-
logy to narrow consciousness down to the clear point of attention. Unfixed memory reverberations are in the personality. Reproduction and recognition receive no adequate explanation from theories of memory as a function of organic matter. "Knowness" which appears in recognition is quite unexplicable in terms of ease acquired thru repetition. Recognition is a judgment and a reproduced idea must be present to mediate comparison. Though repetition may modify a sensation, the modification cannot be known, unless the unmodified form is reproducible.

Filthaut Von Ephram

Filthaut Von Ephram is noted for his historical work in the early formative years of Scholasticism in the first half of the thirteenth century. In his work Roland Von Cremona and the Beginning of Scholasticism in the Dominican Order he treats of the life of Roland, sorses, used by Roland, content of his Philosophy and theology. Roland was the first Dominican to hold the chair of theology in the University of Paris. He was born in the last quarter of the twelfth century and enjoyed the reputation of a great scholar in Bologna. Filthaut thinks he was either a miner cleric or a layman. As to whether he belongs to the liberal arts of the medical faculty Filthaut decides for the former. Rolands seems to have studied theology at St. James in Paris. One year after assuming his professorship at the Sorbonne(1229) he was transferred to Toulouse where able and courageous men
were needed against the Albigensians. From 1233 on his life seems to have been spent largely in the service of the Inquisition. He died probably in 1259. Filthaut remarks that Roland was an aggressive personality. He is one of the first to depart from the Augustinian tradition in favor of Aristotle. In fact, he surpasses all his predecessors and contemporaries by his wide knowledge and extensive use of the new Aristotle, a distinction which has been claimed until now for Alexander of Hales. Roland is the first to call the pseudo-Aristotelian Liber de causis by that name. While he did not recognize the true character of this work he was able to do so in other cases of books attributed to wrong authors.

Bernard Geyer

Bernard Geyer, a historian dealing with mediaeval texts on Abaelard. He has made an edition of the unedited dialectical glosses of Abaelard. This publication throws a new light on the philosophy of the early Middle Ages. Among the manuscripts is Glossulae magistri Petri Baelardi super Porphyrum. This particular work shows the combination of fine palaeographical science and profound acquaintance with the parallel literature for the manuscript, abounds with errors and the text had to be frequently amended by conjecture. He discusses the postion of Abaelard in the history of logic. The Questiones et Sermo Parisienses of Meister Echart edited by Geyer and Zellinger
is an excellent compilation of various philosophical questions and a sermon of the great German mystic, Meister Eckhart with a critical edition to these texts. In point of doctrine it illustrates a succinct comparison with earlier and later writers, especially in connection with the central doctrine of Eckhart which he seems to have borrowed from Scotus Erigena, namely, the superessentiality of the Divine Being, a doctrine which Erigena himself brought from the Pseudo Dionysius. He is a frequent contributor to philosophical publications.

Brosch Josef

Brosch Josef deals with philosophy from the historical point of view. On his work on Boethius he concludes that esse is to be understood as meaning essentia, and that Boethius was not the first pre-scholastic to make a distinction between essentia, and existence. He further shows that he did not identify essence and existence in God. Concept of Being in Boethius (1931).

Adolf Dyroff

Adolf Dyroff professor at Bonn, deals with philosophy from historical point of view and is responsible for much useful work in the field of mediaeval philosophical research. He maintains that St. Anselm did not intend to construct his famous argument a priori; but that the argument starts with the psychological fact of faith found in the soul by grace, and is conditioned...
by the Augustinian theory that all human truth is ultimately founded in, and, in so far, caused by God. Adolf puts this dialectic thought of Anselm as follows: he who does not believe will not experience and he who does not experience will not understand this truth.

Heinrich Flatten

Heinrich Flatten is a student of Adolf Dyroff who is responsible for much of the useful work in the field of mediaeval philosophical research. He like Dyroff deals with philosophy from the historical point. He has written a life on Condres in which he traces the Platonic influence on Conches, its sources and points out that William of Conches follows Aristotle in his logic. Also he deals with his scientific teachings, theory of knowledge, ontology, cosmology, anthropology and psychology, theology. As also the "materia primordialis" in the school of chartes is traced and thru Bermliard Silvester, etc. The Philosophy of William of Conches(1929).

S. Frank

S. Frank considers modern psychology as a natural science of external, observable conditions and regularity of psychic phenomena. Wishes to change the name psychology to metaphysic of soul or philosophical anthropoplogy. It does not touch upon the living, unitary inner world of man, the human personality or that which we spontaneously call soul—abstracting from all theories
regarding its nature. The opposition between idealism and realism, he considers, as one of rationalism and intuitivism. Being which is for richer than any idea, and overflows it, is given in life and becomes manifest in living cognition. In it we come face to face with the union of idea and reality of timeless essence and timeless becoming. Reality can be established only on the destruction of rationalism. The metaphysical problem can be solved only by analysis of being, as distinguished both from idea and cognition.

Rev. Fr. Bernhard Jansen

Fr. Jansen maintains that metaphysics alone is philosophy. Inductive philosophy so called is interesting and important for the progress of scientific thinking, but is not philosophy. It is speculative science. Empiricism that refuses to transcend experience remains enmeshed in the particular and relative and hence is not philosophy. Philosophic truth is independent of time and space, of schools and attitudes because it is the science of the permanent. Philosophy is not static. Being, real and objective, substance, cause, accedent, movement, interaction are a few realities forever acquired. He asserts that the modern scientific mind has turned from metaphysics to physics, from the permanent to the unstable from the necessary to the contingent,
science can say nothing authoritative regarding the existence of God, immortality. The principles of Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics are the only sound and sufficient basis for the construction of a philosophy of nature broad enough to comprehend the facts and data of nature as now known. The principle of sufficient reason in the final analysis depends on the principle of identity. It is a concept apart from the nature of a thing but may be predicated of all things. Approach to Metaphysics to-day and Yesterday.

Louentio Janssen


Kilbousky Raymondu

Kilbousky Raymondu, historian, edited works of Nicholas of Cusa and Meister Eckhart. In the latter he identifies the sources, quotes parallel passages in Eckhart's works and passages in other writers which show his influence.

Koch Joseph

Koch Joseph, historian working with Grabmann and Fr. Pelster S.J. in editing manuscripts. Durandi de s Porciano O.P., Quaestio de Natura Cognitiones Desputatio cum Anonymo Quodam.
Anton Koch

Anton Koch, Professor of theology at University of Tiibingen, and follows St. Thomas. He agrees with St. Thomas that sin is counteracted in its hereditary effects by the application of the sacramental system, which at the same time enforces a code of discipline that serves in partial atonement. Testbook of Moral Theology (1905).

A. Lehmen S.J.  
(1899)

A. Lehmen deals with logic, critics, general and special metaphysics from the Scholastic point of view. Handbook of Philosophy based on Aristotle and the Scholastics (1899).

John Lindworsky S.J.

John Lindworsky deals with psychology. Critizes the experimental psychology of his day as mostly a string of facts without laws or principles and contrasted with much of the older physics is loose and ununified. He attempts to arrange and coordinate this science in a systematic whole and thereby give it greater compactness and adapt it to new methods and progress. He studies the ultimates of the content and process of mental life, formulating central ideas and hypothesis and so presents a picture or panorama of the psychical phenomena as a whole.

J. Santeler

Jl Santeler asserts that the principle of causality
is explicable not on any subjective grounds but it can only be due to the fact that mankind has an insight into reality. A cause is an ontological necessity of the contingent. There are four causes. Insists on the necessity of the principle of nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu.

Julius Seiler

Julius Seiler, historian, and deals with Suarez and points out how he took the metaphysical approach to prove teleogy. Nature study by observation did not occupy the mind of Suarez. He observes for instance that the elements seek their locus naturalis, (a pre-Aristotelian finding), that a stone has an rumanent tendency downward. He believes that water using in a vacuum and the halting of ocean waves at the shore can be explained by a special external intelligence. Purpose of the Philosophy of F. Suarez. (1336).

J. Stufler S.J.

J. Stufler, Professor of Dogmatic Theology at Innsbruck University and Contributor to various philosophical periodicals along Thomistic lines. Holiness of God and Eternal Death, God the First Mover.

K. Krogh-Toming

K. Krogh-Toming a convert to Church deals with the vindication of the church and of the teaching of
the Schoolmen concerning grace. He defends the Schoolmen from the charge of injecting semi-Pelagianism, and attributing a heretical efficiency to human nature in the work of salvation. Intimately acquainted with the history of the reformation. De Gratia Christi, The Lost Schoolastic (1905).

J. Assenmacher

J. Assenmacher deals with the history of philosophy and pedagogy. Asserts that the principle of individuation is intimately connected with the all-absorbing problem of universals as well as with the fundamental concept of matter. He maintains that Scotus and Suarez held that single beings must be individual by their own entity. Both teach that every being of things both material and immaterial is their individuating principle. It differs from the Thomistic theory of matter is quantitate signata. He like Cuthberts considers the teaching of St. Thomas concerning the principle of individuation as incorrect.

O. Schilling

O. Schilling is best known for his many scholarly contributions to the fields of social ethics and political economy treating these in the light of the doctrine of St. Thomas.

A. Mitterer

A. Mitterer urges critical studies to be carried
on in the field of science and its role in philosophy. He considers three world-views as of particular interest to the Catholic philosopher and theologian: those of Sacred Scripture, of St. Thomas, and of our modern day. A comparison between the last two he entitles, "Thomas and Science". In this work he deals with the essential constitution of enorganic corporeal substances. Here two worlds, two distinct theories strive for supremacy, the physical hylemorphism of St. Thomas and the theory of modern science, which regards physical corporeal substance simply as an atomic energy-system of material particles. A critical comparison between the two Mitterer contends leads to the rejection of hylemorphism. He compares the different theories held in Thomas' day with ours. He points out that in Thomas' view of the angels playing an important part of the exclusion of man is no longer lued today. He maintains that without the cooperation of man many things would not be brought about. The World View of St. Thomas and of Modern Day. Man's Role and Nature's Role according to St. Thomas and the Moderns.
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