How man knows

Andrew Joseph McLean

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HOW MAN KNOWS

--by--

Andrew Joseph McLean

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PREFACE

Man is the most striking proof of the wisdom, the power, and the goodness of the most High. He is the masterpiece of the Divine Artist, and is stamped with the most perfect likeness of His perfections; for was not he made in God's image? God is the sovereign, intelligent Being. God the Father knows Himself. He contemplates Himself, and by this infinite knowledge the Word is brought forth - equal to the Father, of Whom He is the perfect mirror, and reproducing His infinite splendor without shadow or spot.

And man brings forth his word also. When he makes an act of intelligence, he represents to himself, in a true conception, the object of his knowledge; he incarnates his idea in a word, verbum, which he pronounces interiorly, even when he remains silent before his fellows. This production of the human word is doubtless a coarse and imperfect imitation of the Divine filiation; it has its results not in a person like to and equal with the thinker (as is the case with the Blessed Trinity), but in a pure accident, a mere mood of the intellect. Human thought, therefore, bears but a faint resemblance to the Divine word, but there is nothing nevertheless, in the material world which approaches so closely to this generation of the Word - nothing in all nature so beautiful as a single act of the intelligence. (1)

The Abbe Saudreau has well said "in all nature," for there is a superior life for man - the life of grace, the slightest degree of which is "superior to the natural good of the entire universe" of matter and spirit as St. Thomas remarks. (2)

Human souls and angels are by nature made to the image of God and resemble Him by analogy in so far as He is intelligent; but no created or creatable nature can resemble God exactly in so far as He is God. Grace alone can make us participate really and formally in the Deity, in the intimate life of Him whose children we are by grace. The Deity, which

(2) Sum. Theol., Ia, IIae, 113, 9, ad 2.
remains inaccessible to all natural created knowledge, is superior to all the Divine perfections naturally knowable, superior to being, to life, to wisdom, to love. All these Divine attributes, diverse as they appear to be, are one and the same thing in God and with God. They are in the Deity formally and eminently as so many notes of a superior harmony, the simplicity of which is beyond our comprehension. (1)

This thesis considers principally how man knows natural things, but it must not be thought that man can have no knowledge of God apart from Divine Revelation. Every effect has its proper cause, and through the effects we can arrive at a knowledge of the cause of the effects. Since all things that are have been created by God, we can know God, though imperfectly, as First Cause through His effects. This is knowledge that we can have by the natural power of reason alone. We can know by natural reason not what God is, but that He is. What we cannot know about God by natural reason has been supplied by a Divine Revelation, revealing to man something of the intimate life of God — those necessary truths whereby the insatiable capacity of our intellect for truth and the insatiable desire of our will for good, can be eternally satisfied only by repose in the Divinity Who is Truth and Goodness itself. Only then, in the possession of the vision of God as He is in Himself, will the answer to the age-old question of Pilate, "What is truth?" be revealed.

FOREWORD

Many, in studying St. Thomas, have been carried away by the loftiness of his intellectual genius. They have failed to see, beyond the natural perfection, the supernatural principles which directed his whole effort. Hence many regard him as a Christian Aristotle, using the dialectic of Aristotle for the defense of truths of faith, much the same as Malebranche is looked upon as the Christian Plato. To adopt this view is to miss the whole significance of the writings of Saint Thomas. Saint Thomas always subordinated the philosophical elements to the science of God. So it was that he called his great work the Summa Theologica.

Perhaps it is possible to isolate sections of the Summa Theologica and form a purely rational synthesis, but this is to rob it of all its vitality. It is true that we can consider man's knowledge of natural things apart from a consideration of God, but it can not be complete without a consideration of the source of that power by which we know at all.

Hence the purpose of this thesis is not specifically to interpret nor to criticize; it is not to add anything novel to his doctrine. This has been done by those qualified for the task. But the purpose is to set down, as accurately as one so remotely from the mind of Saint Thomas can, the doctrine as he himself conceived it in some peda-
gogical order which, as far as I am aware, is original, and to subordinate the whole as he did, to the science of God.

Otherwise the Summa Theologica and all the writings of Saint Thomas would be incomprehensible, as would the Angelic Doctor himself who considered his great work as a thing of straw in comparison to what he beheld. How much more incomprehensible would be the work of one who failed to enter into the spirit of him who was the inspiration.
INTRODUCTORY:

Knowledge differs from opinion, supposition, belief. Knowledge is a stable, irrefragable, unchangeable, immutable thing. Quod scitur certitudinaliter cognoscitur. We can never know an error (1). This is the first characteristic of knowledge. Knowing is a result of thinking, but since what is known must have these qualities, what can we know?

The popular idea arising from this is that nothing can be known, nothing can be true - everything is delightful, charming, but nothing is true; such is the tone of modern philosophies, for example, Pragmatism.

Knowledge is something other than opinion, for knowledge is stable. The object of knowledge is unchangeable; it is to be found within the changing, mutable things, and is achieved by a process of abstraction.

The ontology of knowing, or the theory of knowledge, is more than an introduction to metaphysics; it is a part of it. The answer to our question - What is knowledge? - belongs definitely to the science of philosophy.

This problem has always engaged the energies of philosophers. Plato considered this problem and offered as his solution the well-known allegory of the cave, the theory that all things in this world are only shadows of true ideas

(1) See Chesterton, G.K. Tremendous Trifles, p. 72.
which exist apart in another world, the world of ideas (1).

Aristotle saw that the stable object of knowledge is to be found in the flux of things. The mind must penetrate this flux and perceive the stable element. He says, "look into the things and see them (the stable elements of knowledge) there," in other words, abstract -- seeing in the thing what is there. It is a process that goes always downwards -- an insight, a penetration into the thing to see the stable reality.

Descartes, sitting at his fireplace, dwelt on this problem, and considered that he could not even be sure that he was sitting in his chair before the hearth for he had often dreamed this very thing with minute details. He thought he actually was there only to wake up in bed and find that he had been dreaming. He resolved it to this that the only thing that he was sure of was that he was doubting; if he was doubting he must be thinking, and his conclusion was the famous "cogito, ergo sum." (2)

The Platonic solution of things really existing in an ideal world apart from our own is not satisfactory because it fails to solve the most elementary facts of every day experience, for example, stubbing one's toe. The theory of flux, too, must go. If there is no stability of truth I am constantly changing; then I am gone.

(1) Plato, Republic. Bk. vii.
Now comes Descartes' answer. Man, he says, finds himself in thought. When he had found himself, he found God, and through Him the external world. He doubted the existence of the external world because of a fear that some malicious spirit was mocking him in presenting it to him when it did not really exist. Then he conceived in his mind the idea of a God -- an infinitely wise, good and true God, a being than whom a more perfect one cannot be. He gives it existence, and thus secures for himself the certitude of the existence of the real world. For he reasons that God presents to him this external world, and since He is unable to deceive, that world of reality outside of himself must exist. (1)

Malebranche formulated, thereupon, a system of occasionalism. God, he said, takes occasion to present an external thing to us at the same moment that He gives us knowledge of the thing directly in our mind.

Leibnitz promptly discarded this theory for one of a pre-established harmony in things. God, as it were, wound two clocks - the world of thought and the world of external reality, and these run together in perfect harmony. Each time we see something in the external world the knowledge of that thing flashes through this pre-arranged harmony in our minds.

(1) Descartes and Leibnitz endeavoured to give to the ontological argument of St. Anselm the logical exactness which it lacked. The only thing that Leibnitz, like Descartes, can demonstrate is, that we cannot perceive the impossibility of the existence of God.

Berkley saw no need of the external world at all. All that was needed was idea.

A logical culmination of all this was the scepticism of David Hume. He said: "...I have my idea and you, yours. They are both unlike. There is no possibility, then, of knowing certainly who is right." The obvious conclusion for him was complete scepticism with regard to all possibility of knowledge.

Kant heralds another system. At first he accepted the dogmatic method of the ancient philosophers. He then began an investigation of the possibilities under which a man can know things. He saw Newton, a man of science, accumulating facts about scientific reality in the realm of the physical. He wished to adapt this to the philosophic level. What gave rise to the law of gravity he saw well - Newton putting facts within the framework of a law. Kant did this also. He said: "I can know nothing except what is presented to my senses limited by time and space. That only gives sensorial impressions. What those things are I cannot know. But now, what condition must I impose on reality in order that things may be known? His answer was that when he took material presented to him by sensorial impressions and subsumed it under forms, he had interpreted it, and, therefore, knew it. Knowledge, for Kant, consisted in informing uninformed matter - efficiency, productivity.

Next he began to consider the case of absolute knowledge. What, for example, is cause? His answer? Cause
was only another form which we impose on things - a priori forms or ideas. Absolute knowledge consists in shaping these a priori ideas of things. And again he concludes that we know only what we make. (1)

Concerning the thing itself, and not what has been constructed, Kant says that we can know absolutely nothing - it is unknown and unknowable. He is confronted now with three a priori antinomies - himself, God, and the world. These, he continues, are absolutely untouchable by a priori knowledge. Although we may never know them, they constantly incite us onwards. Hence, to make contact with any of these we must do it with something other than knowledge, viz., extra cognitional contact.

The first act of the mind, therefore, is judgment and not comprehension - synthetic or a priori judgments, or that type in which a certain group of data are arrived at by experience, and in that arrival an a priori form (of possibility, necessity, or causality) has been imposed on it. And so again, to know is to fabricate.

(1) "...connaître c'est fabriquer, nous ne connaissons que ce que nous faisons. Voilà l'axiome secret qui domine toute la philosophie spéculative de Kant. Et si connaître c'est fabriquer, les choses elles-mêmes ne sont pas connaissables, puisque nous ne les faisons pas, le seul objet de notre connaissance, c'est l'objet que nous faisons grâce à nos formes a priori, - un monde de phénomènes dont la loi, l'unité, la structure constitutive et la régulation viennent toutes de notre esprit." Maritain, J., Réflexions sur l'intelligence. pp. 34, 35.

We must notice that this axiom dominates the speculative philosophy of Kant. In his system he has transferred the proper activity of the practical intellect to the speculative intellect.
Descartes leaves us merely passive; Kant makes us all activity. (1) There are two kinds of activity, transitive where the result is achieved outside the agent, and immanent, an activity whose beginning and terminus is in the subject acting. Something is produced in the agent, as, when I see I do nothing to the book that I see. Kant saw all activity as transient - even the knowing process. Art, indeed, is concerned with transient activity, but knowledge and ethics are concerned with immanent activity. (2)

(1) "Descartes et Kant se sont trompés de même, parce qu'ils ont conçu la connaissance, et en particulier la connaissance intellectuelle, qui est ce qu'il y a de plus élevé dans la nature, secundum modum infimam creaturarum, quae sunt corpora, parce qu'ils ont confondu les choses du connaître avec les choses de l'action transitive. Connaître, pour l'un, c'est recevoir une empreinte, pour l'autre, c'est fabriquer un objet." Maritain, J., Ibid., p. 49.

(2) "Le caractère le plus foncé du connaître, c'est qu'il est une activité, et une activité immanente, je veux dire qui ne consiste pas à agir sur autre chose ou à produire un terme, mais à parfaire le sujet lui-même. L'activité "transitive" ou extérieure, celle de la matière inerte, celle des non-vivants, - qui sont comme un pur lieu de passage pour les énergies du monde, - est si pauvre de soi qu'elle ne s'exerce dans l'agent qu'à condition de s'épuiser aussitôt et dans la mesure même où elle s'épuise en un autre. Propre aux vivants, l'activité immanente se consomme dans l'agent, lequel - sous la motion toujours présente de la Cause première, - s'éleve et s'achève lui-même en perfection, et n'agit au dehors que par surabondance." Maritain, J., Ibid., p. 50.

The principal texts in St. Thomas which distinguish between transitive and immanent activity are as follows: Sent., I.D.40.q.1,a.1,ad 2; II,D.12,a.4; de Ver., q.3,a.1,ad 14; q.8,a.6; q.14,a.3; de Pot., q.2,a.2; q.3,a.15; q.5,a.5; ibid., ad 14; C.G., I,53; II, 1; II, 22; II, 23; I,q.14,a.5; q.54,a.1,ad 3; ibid., a.2; q.85,a.2; q.87,a.3.

See Also p. 51: "C'est (knowledge) une action qui n'est pas de soi une production, et qui ne va qu'à parfaire intrinsèquement la faculté, c'est pourquoi les
The Subject of Knowledge

There are things which have knowledge and things which have not. Some say that no things have knowledge; others say that all things have knowledge. This latter theory is called Hylozoism - life within matter. Later developments

Thomistes ne la classent pas dans le prédicament 'action', mais dans le prédicament 'qualité'. (cf. Jean de Saint Thomas, curs. Phil., Phil. Nat., III: P., q.XI, a.1.) Comporte-t-elle (ce qui à lieu de fait) réception d'une qualité informante et production d'un terme intérieur, ce n'est pas là ce qui la constitue formellement et essentiellement. Connaître, pris dans sa raison formelle, n'est pas faire, mais être ou devenir d'une certaine manière, en un achevement intérieur où s'épanche la spontanéité vitale du sujet, et par lequel celui-ci se parfait lui-même en lui-même.

Simon, Yves. L'ontologie du Connaître; p. 97, note: Aucun texte d'Aristote ni de s. Thomas, à notre connaissance, ne tranche expressément la question de savoir si l'action immanente appartient à la catégorie de l'action ou à la catégorie de la qualité. (Le texte cité par Jean de s. Thomas, Op. 48, summa totius logicae Aristotelis, C.7, est inauthentique.) Cela n'a d'ailleurs aucune importance, car s. Thomas ne cesse d'affirmer que l'action immanente est dépourvue des caractères que toute l'école aristotélicienne tient pour propriétés essentielles de la catégorie de l'action: esse cum motu, infere passionem, esse perfectio patentiis; il faut être aveugle pour supposer que l'on puisse rien conserver de la théorie thomiste de la connaissance si l'on admet que l'action immanente appartient à la catégorie de l'action - aussi bien les grands thomistes sont-ils unanimes à affirmer que l'action immanente est une qualité. Les petits thomistes et les parathomistes tiennent généralement pour la thèse opposée: il y a là un signe qui ne manque pas d'intérêt.

in this theory have made it a conscious life, called panpsychism. (1)

Why do materialists claim that nothing has knowledge? It is because they have too much confidence in natural or physical science. We can argue ad hominem against the materialist. I can say to him, "I think that I am endowed with knowledge. If I do not know that, any type of discussion is ridiculous and impossible. The theory of the materialist is contrary to our everyday experience and, no matter what you call it there is something in me peculiar and different from everything else, and I call it knowledge."

Why should the panpsychists say that all things have conscious life? These men start from the fact that there is finality and purpose in the universe. For example, hydrogen and oxygen tend to unite to make water; plants either turn towards or away from the light to sustain life. We see finality in all things, but how can all beings pursue an end unless they know it; it must be conscious to them for nothing which is not conscious can influence that which is. What is not, cannot act; whatever acts, is, and if the future is not in some way present in the act it could not

(1) Appelons hylozoisme, malgré l'imperfection de ce vocabule, toute doctrine qui étend le pouvoir de connaître au dela de ce que la pensée commune et la science nomment le règne animal. Dans l'histoire de la pensée, la théorie hylozoiste tantôt s'étend à toutes choses et mérite alors le nom de panpsychisme, tantôt se restreint au monde de la vie. Simon, Yves. Ibid. p. 2.
but sought. This future is found in knowledge; it is cognitively present; for no purpose can act as an attractive force unless it is present, and therefore it must be known.

But the question is, - is the knowledge in the thing, or is the purpose determined by someone who directs the thing and knows the purpose? Is it in the agent, or in the agent who directs? Here is where we differ from the hylozoists and panpsychists. The future can exist in the mind of a knower who can be either God or man.

If, however, all activity is psychic we meet a contradiction in terms. But if we distinguish two kinds of activity - psychic and natural - we arrive at a kind of solution; the first is based on knowledge and flows from the possession of knowledge; but surely we do find natural activities in life that are not based on knowledge, and further these are basic.

What was the tendency, therefore, that determined my direction to the knowledge of that thing? If we say that it was a tendency to know, then that tendency to know is based on a previous tendency to know. Hence we may have a regression that is unlimited. Therefore we must go back to a purely physical tendency. The mind we may say, then, has the same tendency to things to be known as a thing dropped has a tendency to the centre of gravity. Unless there are physical tendencies of physical tendencies there cannot be any physical tendencies at all.
What is the nature of the difference between things that have knowledge and things that have not? St. Thomas says,

"...intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (de Anima, iii) that the soul is in a sense all things. Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in de Anima ii. that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and unmixed...." (1)

All this amounts strangely to the fact that one thing is itself and that alone; and the other thing is itself and other things. Knowledge is a mode or manner of being; thus to know is to be in a certain manner. (2) (A)

In "Pensees" of Pascal, we read that man is a mean between two extremes - spirits and brutes. Our dignity consists in thought, which is knowledge. Thus we are bigger than the world by knowledge. (3)

By our principle of being in a manner all things we

(1) St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, Ia, q.14, 1.
(2) See Simon, Y., Ibid., pp. 11, 12.
challenge the principle of contradiction. Bergson refused
to do this. How then do we do so? Bergson destroyed the
ordinary conception of things in order to explain his theory
of knowledge. In reply to Bergson, Yves Simon says that not
by thinking can he be even six miles long, that he will
never reach the stars, and that that is evident or nothing
is. Man, by taking thought, cannot add to his stature one
cubit.

I am myself and something else as well. 1. Being physi-
cally - being oneself, as everything which is has its form,
and has that physical being. 2. Comparison shows that a
thing can exist in more than one way, for example, a book
is blue, is heavy. These are different modes of existence.
A thing can be itself and other things in different modes.

Cajetan, commenting on this question in St. Thomas,
solves it for us after a lengthy analysis. He says, 1. to
be * to be identical, and then it is false, that is, a thing
is not born or apt to be an ox, a stone; 2. to be is the ac-
ceptation of form in information. That "information," he
says, must be either intentional (information in a mode of
tendency) or physical. (1) In the first case the difference
is a false difference because that which does not know is
informed intentionally by color, and, therefore it should
know. In the second case a physical information would be
the most false of all because a stone is not in the mind

(1) Simon, Y. Ibid., pp. 13, 14.
when we know it. We may sum this up by saying, if I possess the forms of other things it is either by identity, and that is absurd, or by communicating in the same form, and this information is either intentional or physical. If it were the former the media of knowing things would have knowledge and they do not; if it were physical, the thing would come in as a physical addenda or something that would change my nature. Therefore, Cajetan concludes that for the time to be has no meaning. He then proceeds to his second point.

Now, he says, does "alia" equal all things or some things? He answers that whether it is all or some, it must be either by identity or by information. He goes on to say that God is all things by identity and is nothing by information. He has nothing; He is everything. On the next level, the angels, he says, have certain knowledge of some things by identity and of some things by information. Then in the human soul all knowledge is by information and nothing by identity. The sensitive soul is a cognitonal power by information only. (1) Now in what manner is this knowledge obtained? St. Thomas says that all knowledge begins with sense knowledge. (2) Intellectual knowledge is

(1) Cajetan, in I, 14, 1: "Aliquod enim cognoscens est, quod est omnia per identitatem, ut Deus. Aliquod, quod est aliqua per identitatem, et aliqua per informationem: ut Angeli. Aliquod quod est omnia per informationem ut anima nostra. Aliquod, quod est aliqua per informationem, ut anima pure sensitiva."

(2) Sum. Theol., Ia, 78, 4, ad. 4.
derived from sense knowledge. (1) The intellect, by its immaterial energy, separates or puts aside all the material conditions of the sense image, leaving the immutable, universal element which represents itself to the mind as an immaterial idea or concept. The process is one of abstraction or separation. If, then, sense knowledge is a source of truth, intellectual knowledge is also a source of truth, for the mind adds nothing to the sense image; it merely brings to light the intellectual element therein contained. (2).

Knowledge is a vital process in which the subject is rendered like the object by a process of information: "Omnis cognitio fit per assimilationem cognoscentis et cogniti." (3) St. Thomas likens it to the process by which the seal impresses its form on the wax, the tabula rasa. (4) The object is what it is by reason of the form, whether it

(1) Sum. Theol., Ia; 84, 6.

(2) Sum. Theol., Ia, 76, 2, ad. 4. Also, note the principle: Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu.

Again: Deficiente aliquo sensu, deficit scientia eorum quae apprehenduntur secundum illum sensum; sicut caecus natus nullam potest habere notitiam de coloribus. - Sum. Theol., Ia, 84, 3.

(3) Sum. Con. Gen., I, 65. Also: Cognitio contingit secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente. - Sum. Theol., Ia, 12, a.4. Also: Omnis cognitio est per speciem aliquam, per euius informationem fit assimilatio cognoscentis ad red cognitam. - I Sent., 3, 1. 1. ob.3.

(4) Vide, Aristotle, de Anima, L. iii, 14; Sum. Theol., Ia, 79, a.2; Sum. Theol., Ia, 84, 3; Cf., Cont. Sent., II, c. 77.
is composed of matter and form or pure form. When the object becomes known it impresses its form on the mind, causing the mind not to be the object actually, but to know the object, and to become the object in a certain way, intentionally. (1) Moreover in the act of knowledge subject and object become one in the ideal order, that is, the object becomes known by us and we become knowing the object. (2)

Our results can be briefly summarized by repeating that the soul is in a way all existing things. (3)

We have seen that for two things to be the same by identity is impossible. In fact, it is a metaphysical paradox that for two things to be the same they must be different. (B) For if two things are the same and not identical, they must be different. Therefore two things are the same when they possess some things which are alike and some things which are different. So, likeness or similarity is

(1) Maritain, J., The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 138:
It is necessary to admit a form of existence other than the esse naturale, according to which the known will be in the knower, and the knower will be the known: an entirely tendential and immaterial existence, whose office is not to posit a thing apart from nothingness in itself and as subject, but on the contrary, for another thing and in relation; which does not seal up a thing in its natural limits but disengages it from them; by which the thing exists in the soul by another existence than its own, and the soul is or becomes the thing according to another existence than its own - intentional being, which is, according to Cajetan, there to remedy that imperfection essential to every created knowing subject of the possession of a limited nature and the lack by being itself of all the rest.

(2) Sum. Theol., Ia, 55, 1, ad.2.

(3) Cf. de Veritate, II, 2a, Resp.- "...the perfection proper to one thing is found in the nature of another, and so one thing can possess all things in himself."
   - Also, Cajetan, in sum. Theol., I, 55, 3.
some sharing in the same form. Therefore this sameness must be by information. This means a participation in the same form which makes them the same in some points.

How, then, does the same form exist in two different things? First, by physical information, as for example, the color yellow is physically in a wall and in the leaves. Second, by way of transition, that is, being carried through a thing as a tendency, as color is in the wall but also in the ether waves as a medium between me and the wall, but the medium is not colored as the wall is colored. This is intentional existence, a tendency towards.

Cajetan says that the solution to this problem, which he calls the root of metaphysics and Natural Theology, is based on an analogy, and he adds that analogies are essential to metaphysics. (1)

(1) We must eliminate the common notion of analogy. It does not mean a comparison, metaphor, or anything like that. It means, ultimately, a proportion that exists between things. In metaphysics all meanings are analogous, for example, the word 'good'. This is applied to scores of different things. Good is applied to steak in one proportion; it is applied to a 'game' in another. It means simply that this steak which we are calling good in proportion to what a steak is, is good. Likewise, in so far as a football game is what a football game should be, it is a good game. Thus goodness has a different mode of existence in everything in which it exists. That is the analogy.

Consider this relation in being and essence. When there is a proportion between the existence exercised by a thing in the physical world and the form it exercises, and between that same form and the existence in the mind, we have objectivity: e.g., Intellectum: Forma

Esse Intentionale: Esse Naturale

What, then, is in this that makes it possible that the form can exist in two different things. Matter limits the acceptance of form: for example, my humanity differs from yours because the form is received in matter. Every angel is a form, and if humanity existed apart from matter, it,
When St. Thomas says that the "knowing subject is apt to be other things by knowledge," he does not mean by identity or information. It abstracts from any mode of being. The phrase "other things" abstracts from all or some. It makes no difference whether we use one or the other of these terms. First, he does not mean being in any way, since these mean particular modes. Second, we do not say whether some or all or any has anything to do with it. Third, "cognoscens" means any knowing thing whatsoever.

There is one knower who is all things by identity - God. There is another sort of being which is some things by identity and some by information - the angels. There is another sort of being which is nothing by identity and all things by information - the human intellect. There is yet another which is nothing by identity and some things by information - the senses. (G)

Either God knows all things by identity, or He knows nothing: the nature of God is identical with His own knowledge. (1) Therefore God is God and all other things. To know perfectly is to be perfectly. To know all perfectly is to be all perfectly. God is a tree, but the tree is not God. God is man or tree eminently, that is, the perfection of God includes the perfection of all things. (2)

too; would be angelic. In order to be common to many, form must be separated from matter. Hence, the use of abstraction finds place.

(1) Sum. Theol., Ia, 14, aa. 2, 3, 4.

(2) Maritain, J., The Degrees of Knowledge, p.17. - "...the names and concepts which properly belong to God keep
Angels are separate forms, and they are some things by identity and some by information. Thus the angel knows itself because it is itself; it has immediate grasp or view of its own essence. (1) Their knowledge is supplemented by God-given information.

Our difficulty is how the thing known and the knowing subject are one. (2) Cajetan points out (i) the way in which the knower and the knowing subject are united; (ii) all their intelligible value and significance in being applied to Him; what they signify is completely in God, with all that it constitutes for our intelligence (formally is the phrase of the philosophers); in saying that God is good we intrinsically qualify the divine nature, and we know that it contains all that goodness necessarily implies. But in that perfection in pure act - which is God Himself - there is infinitely more than our concept or our name can conceive. It is in a mode which infinitely overflows our manner of conceiving that it exists in God (eminently is the philosophical phrase.) In knowing that God is good we yet remain ignorant of the divine Goodness, for it is good as nothing else is good, true as nothing else is true; He is like nothing that we can know. "Thus' says St. Thomas, 'the word wise when it is applied to a man, describes and encloses in some manner the thing signified; but not when it is applied to God; then the signifying word remains uninclusive and uncircumscribing, and he exceeds the significance of the name.' - Sum. Theol., Ia, 13, 5.

Also, see Cajetan, in Sum. Theol., I, 55, 3.

(1) Sum. Theol., Ia, 87, 1: "...immaterial substances are intelligible by their own essence, according as each one is actual by its own essence. Therefore it is that the essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence God knows Himself by His own essence, and all other things also. The angelic essence belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible things as act, but not as a pure act, nor as a complete act, and hence the angel's act of intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although an angel understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot understand all other things by his own essence; for he knows things other than himself by their likenesses."

(2) Simon, Yves, L'Ontologie du Connaitre, p.14 et seq.
the way in which matter and form are one. He says that the main difference between these two is that the knowing subject in the act of knowledge is the very object known itself, or in other words, the knowing subject is either in act or in potency the known object itself, whereas matter is never the form itself.

Cajetan further shows that the knower and the thing known are more one than matter and form. (1) He agrees with Averroes who said that from the thing understood and the understanding thing no third thing results, whereas from the union of matter and form a third thing does result. (2) Thus if the form of animal unites to the matter of animal a third thing results, namely, a dog or a substance. But from the union of knowledge the knowing subject has become the thing known. Hence the greater unity of this is that the third thing is excluded, and one becomes the other, while in the other case (matter and form) the third thing is included and one does not become the other. The former unity can be seen in the fact that the conclusions men draw about known things concur, for example, I have you in mind. We might say

(1) Cajetan, in I, 14, 1: Cognoscens et cognitum sunt magis unum quam materia et forma, ut egregie dixit averroes in 3. de Anima, Comm. 5; in I, 55, 3: Quanto vis cognoscitiva est altior, tanto magis unite se habet ad cognoscibilia.

(2) Averroes, in de An.,III, com.5.- Dicam igitur quod manifestum est quod homo non est intelligens actu nisi propter continuationem intellecti cum eo in actu; et est etiam manifestum quod materia et forma copulantur ad invicem ita quod congratum ex eis fit unicum; et maxime intellectus materialis: et intentio intellect in actu. Quod enim componitur ex eis non est aliquod tertium aliquid ab eis: sicut est de aliis compositis ex materia et forma.
that things are assimilated in knowledge somewhat as we assimilate food.

Again, this unity can be seen from the fact that the known thing has intentional being in the knowing subject, that is, the object as it exists in me does not exist there in the same manner as it does in itself, but in some way as to draw the intellect to that thing. In other words, the mind is brought to the thing by intentional existence. That thing is only in my mind in the form of a tendency. (1)

Therefore, known things have in my mind an intentional existence, and, further there is no created mind which has such perfection that it can be raised to the situation where the knower and the known are identical. (E)

What has gone before is necessary for two reasons: (i) because everything operates according as it is in act; (ii) because the known is the specifying principle of knowledge. The first of these statements has two meanings, and these are complementary: if we place the emphasis on the verb "is" in our first statement, we mean simply that nothing acts if it does not exist - Unum quodque operatur secundum quod est in actu. If, however, we emphasize the word "quod" in that same sentence we only add the further meaning that every-

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(1) Maritain, J., The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 139 ... "The esse intentionale, even when not concerned with the world of knowledge, is already for forms a means of escape from the slavery of matter; the scholastics frequently call esse spiritualis this existence not for itself, this tendenz-existence by which forms which are not their own supervene in things."
thing acts according to what it is, that is, according to its essence, for example, a fountain pen cannot act like a revolver.

The second of the above statements means that the nature of a thing specifies the operation of knowing. Now a certain operation we perform is knowing, and the specifying principle of that operation is the thing known. (1) But knowing is a generic activity, that is, it is specified, - I cannot just know in general; I must know something. The bark of a dog, for example, is not specified; any kind of a bark will do. It belongs to its nature to bark, and any operation of this kind satisfies that faculty which it has, namely, to bark. But man's faculty to know does not operate so easily or simply; he must have something to know. Otherwise it is obvious that he will get nowhere in the process of knowledge. Hence, only the object presented to me gives me the specific character of my knowing; thus, for example, we have actual, or practical, sciences and speculative sciences. Therefore we conclude that the thing which I know specifies the action or operation of knowledge.

From these last two principles mentioned, it follows that the knowing subject must be the sufficient principle of its operation. (2) The knowing subject, therefore, must

(1) Maritain, J., Reflexions sur l'intelligence, pp.52,53.

(2) Sufficient principle is merely the possession of that which is the specific character of the action of a thing.
be equipped for the act of knowing by its nature. If the object is the specific principle, the knowing subject must be the object. This may be a bit more clearly expressed - the subject knowing must be the sufficient principle of its own operation. The specifying principle of knowledge is the object known. Therefore the subject knowing must be the object known.

From this it follows that everything exists for its own proper operation.

The thing understood is the intellect in act - Intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu. (1) In other words, knowing things have the forms of other things. It is in this way that the likeness of the thing known is the form of the intelligence, just as the likeness of the thing sensed is the form of a sense. We mean that the act of knowing "happens" to the intellect, or is an accident of it. Thus it seems that the thing known is in the intellect. This fact that the intellect knows forms is held in almost all systems of philosophy, only the manner of it is explained differently; for example, idealism holds that we know forms of things, but it adds that these forms are the only real existence, the things we see only being shadows of the real forms which exist in the mind.

It follows, then, that the same thing is in the world of reality as it is, and also in the mind of the knower. We

must make a distinction, then, between objects and things. (1)

(1) An object is here understood as the formal object. By thing is to be understood that which may apply to any or all reality, spiritual or corporal, actually or possibly existing independently of the mind.

Maritain, J., The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 113: "In Thomist language, the thing is the 'material object' of the senses and the intellect, while what I have here called the object (i.e. on one hand, coloring, sonority, cold, heat, etc., and on the other, the intelligible quid) is its 'formal object': both the material and formal object being attained at once and indivisibly by the same perception."
CHAPTER THREE

The Object of Knowledge: Object and Thing.

The thing has existence in two ways, being itself, and existence being known. The latter phrase means that, in some way, it is the object of our knowing, or that it is cast at us, thrown at us. Thus in some way we suffer passion, we are impinged upon. The phrases, it strikes me, it impresses me, suggest this. (1)

Being a thing, the first type of existence which we said a thing had, means exercising the existence which a physical reality has. When we speak of being as an object of knowledge, we are setting up a relation between that thing and the knowing subject, and within that we consider two things: 1. the content of the thing "thrown at us," that is, its yellowness, hardness; 2. the peculiar formality, or relation that is called being an object, for example, the sound of a voice, the color of the blackboard, strikes us: hence, these are objects. But the sound of a voice and the color of the blackboard are both different in themselves, yet they are the same as objects. What makes them both objects we call the formality of objectivity, or the character of being an object.

(1) Maritain, J., The Degrees of Knowledge, p.110.- "...we see that the same thing can be found at one and the same time in the world of nature, where it exists, and, when it is known, in the world of the soul or of thought; and it is necessary for us to distinguish the thing as thing existing or able to exist by itself, and the thing as object, set before the faculty of knowledge and made present to it. The objects as such of our intelligence are abstracted from actual existence and only hold in themselves a possible existence; on the contrary, the objects as such of our senses denote an existence in act and grasped ut exercita, held in the present if it is a question of the objects of external sense, without the determinations of time (or in uncertain time) for those of the imagination, belonging to the past in the case of the objects of memory."
To attempt elucidation the foregoing can be summarized. A thing has, I. Esse naturale - that is, the physical existence of a thing, or existence in its own right; II. Relative existence - that is, existence not only in its own right but in relation to a knower as well. But we distinguished two things in this: the content which characterizes the physical quality of the things in themselves as they are manifested to us, and the character of being an object. Hence the content character is not common, but the object is common, that is, each are different in themselves but to me they are both the same as objects.

The content character gives the clue to their physical existence (by sensations and reasons.) Therefore we say that a thing is black, hard, non-resonant - it reveals the nature. The object character ought to reveal to me the nature of the relation which is an objective relation. By analysing what it means to be an object, we discover what sort of a relation is set up between subject and object. This will also set up the basis for what knowledge is, for knowledge is a relation.

To be an object may have various senses. But to define knowledge we must describe this object character or relation between things which are objects and the knowing subject; similarly we cannot describe desire without telling something about a relation to an object. This relation in knowing is purely tendential, the act of relation in knowing. The relation of object to subject knowing is the pure principle of the qualitative determining of the subject. When we flash
color on a screen, the manner of the being of that screen has received a qualitative change or determination. But, a pure qualitative determining is not a "blue" qualitative determining; it is a determining which is solely the determination of a qualitative character. It is what they all have in common, but none realize in particular.

In knowing we find that the object character does nothing but determine qualitatively my mind. (D) It is nothing more than a means, (l) or it is a pure qualitative determination. Then we say that an object is a definite qualitative determination of a thing. Objects are found in production, desire, and knowledge, but they have a different existence in each act, (l) when we desire, the object of knowledge is not presented to us except in so far as it is good, hence

(1) What is a means? It is something that is in between. If we drop an article, first on a chair, and then on the floor, the chair was the means by which we dropped the article on the floor. "Means" are not only means or medium, but something else also, as in the example a chair is a means but it is a chair also. If we could posit something that is pure "carrying through" (without carrying anything through) we have pure means. Hence, no thing can be pure means. A concept mediates between an object and the mind: it is a pure means to carry my mind to the object. It is an act or the exercise of the existence of something else. But this act is purely tendential, a means of reaching something else; and this sort of thing can only exist inmaterial things. Hence knowledge must depend on immateriality. Therefore the thing known to us will have to exist in an immaterial existence.

Maritain, J., Les degrés du savoir, annexe, a propos du concept, p. 781. "Le concept n'est pas pur moyen à titre de principe ou germe fécondant comme la forme préservative reçue (species impressa), il est pur moyen à titre de terme ou fruit (species expressa, forme préservative proférée). Mais ce terme produit, terme quod quant à l'intellection comme productrice, étant pur moyen quant à l'intellection comme intellection, n'arrête pas à lui l'intellection elle-même qui s'achève en lui. Par là même qu'elle s'achève en lui comme en un quo faisant connaitre, elle s'achève en l'objet comme au quod connu. De là l'expression in quo, qui

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it is not purely object, but objective goodness; (ii) when we have an object in production it is not a purely object relation, but it is connected with the relation of cause and effect; so now, it is an object effect, an object involved in efficiency; (iii) in knowledge the object is purely object - its purpose is to make the thing present to the mind. The relation which defines the object of knowledge is the relation of the form which makes this or that to be this or that with that which is this or that. The mind, knowing, possesses the thing which it understands, e.g. a book.

The relation of object is that which exists between the form of the act and the form of the existence of the book. A thing is only an object of my knowledge when the form which makes it to be what it is, is identical with the form which makes my act of knowledge to be what it is.

In knowledge the object is simply rendered present; hence, we say 'representation'. Therefore, we become, in a manner of existence, the thing known. Does this statement violate the principle of identity? The answer is found in the different modes of being.

Being is not a concept, only an act. It must be specified in order to exist. If it is not specified by anything it is being itself and God. If it is not specified it is infinite, for specification means limitation. Specification of the act of existence is given it by some form (e.g. some form

ne détruit ou ne diminue en rien, mais précise seulement le vocabable quo appliqué au concept, et signifie que l'acte d'intellection enveloppe à la fois et du même coup, indivisible-ment, le concept signifiant et l'objet signifié."

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of exercise). Thus, form gives the limitation. The book that we know has a specific existence, but it may have hundreds of specifiers. I also have physical existence, but I know existence as well. Hence the act of existence of the book is specified by the forms of the book, green, heavy, hard, etc. But there is a different existence of forms in the thing and in the mind - the greenness is in the book physically, but in my mind intentionally. Hence is explained the phrase of St. Thomas: "I am myself and I become other things."

The object of desire and knowledge is different in each case. The object of desire is not so much an object as a good. When we desire something we pass outside of ourselves as it were, or move toward the thing which we see as a good. When we produce something, however, something passes out of us into the object; hence, we can see something of the artist in his work. In knowledge we assimilate; movement is inwards toward ourselves, i.e. we do not give, but take. Therefore, in this case, the way in which a thing is an object is different. Thus, in desire, the thing is what matters, for we attach ourselves to it; in production, what goes out of us fixes itself on something that we make; and in knowledge, the form of that thing whereby we become orientated to that thing so that it can live within our minds - that life is knowledge. The form exists in us, therefore, in a way proper for the mind, in the way in which the mind exists - for, whatever is received in a receiver is received in a manner in which that receiver receives; "cognitum est
in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis." (1)

From this we see that the cognitum has existence in
two ways, viz. cognitum est and modum, and each is different.
In itself it exists as it is; in the mind it exists to bring
me in contact with its existence. Its existence is such
that a relation may be made between my mind and the thing,
 i.e. intentional being. (2)

The way essence is related to existence is one thing.

(1) It is on this basis that St. Thomas refutes Plato's
theory of knowledge. Cf. Sum. Theol., Ia, 84, i: "The in-
tellect, according to its own mode, receives under condi-
tions of immateriality and immobility, the species of mater-
ial and mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver
according to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude,
therefore, that through the intellect the soul knows bodies
by a knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and neces-
sary."
Also see Cajetan, in P. I, q. 85, a. 1, ad. 4: "Quidquid
recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis."

(2) There are other instances of intentional being.
For example, in writing with chalk, the thought which the
chalk is putting on the blackboard exists intentionally in
the chalk; again, in painting, the form, in a way, e xists
in the brush. See Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 138, 139.
Also, Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 124, 125: "Intention-
ality is not only that property of my consciousness of
being transparent in a given direction, of seeing objects
in its own depth, it is above all that property of thought,
the privilege of its immaterial nature, by which being in
itself and outside the mind, i.e. entirely independent of
its action, becomes existent in it, posited and integrated
by thought for thought's own action, and by which hencefor-
ward both exist in it in one and the same supra-subjective
existence.

If we do not go as far as this, if we refuse to the
mind the power, which is only real if being itself is real,
of 'surmounting' and interiorizing being in itself, the
pure transparence of intentionality is inevitably turned
material, being regarded as a 'constituent' of the object
through its 'structural laws', by the asking of it to con-
stitute the other and confer on it its own proper meaning
'starting' from my being as myself (whereas on the contrary
it brings the other to me 'starting from its otherness,
and makes me be the other).
See also Rabeau, Gaston, Species, Verbum, p. 16 et seq.
The way essence is related to existence in my mind is another. We can express this relation briefly as follows:

\[
\text{forma intellecta} : : \text{forma naturalis} \quad \text{intelligi} \quad \text{esse naturale}
\]

"The thing is in the intellect by its likeness," is offered as the solution. (1) Hence, we are qualified by what we know. The object gives us a qualitative determination. The object is to the subject as the male and female parts of a generation. Hence, we speak of a 'concept' from which comes forth the prolix. The "cognitum" actuates the mind and the mind brings forth

(1) St. Thomas says with regard to the presence of the thing in the soul by a likeness, that - "It must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands: which is proved thus. There is a twofold action, one which remains in the agent; for instance, to see and to understand; and another which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something external is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is the likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that like is known by like. For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to Aristotle (De An. III, 8), who says that the stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the stone; it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species." (Sum. Theol., Ia, 85, ii.)
We will digress for a moment to consider what knowledge is not. For Descartes knowledge is what is presented to the mind. Thought is presented to the mind, and the mind is simply passive to it. Knowledge is merely a passive reception of those things which are presented to the mind. This is not enough, for there are other types of passivity, (1) such as light upon the wall, but the wall does not have knowledge of that light. Hence seeing is not merely a physical power which we attribute to the eye, but it is a faculty of my soul, for I see not my eye.

Is knowledge, then, to make? For Kant knowledge con-

(1) Cf. De Artic. Fidei, Ch. II.

(2) Gilson, E., The Philosophy of St. Thomas, pp. 233-235: "Taken in its lowliest aspect, the human intellect appears as a passive power. The verb 'pati' can be taken in three different senses. In the first sense, which is moreover its proper signification, it means that a thing is deprived of something which it ought to have according to its essence or which is the object of its natural inclination; for instance, if water loses its cold temperature as it is heated by fire, or if a man falls ill or becomes sad. In the second sense, less rigorously literal, it means that a being is deprived of something, whether this something ought or ought not to be possessed by it. From this point of view the recovery of health no less than the loss of it is a 'passion' (i.e. something suffered or undergone); so it is to rejoice as well as to be sad. Lastly, in the third sense, the most general of all, the verb means that a being no longer loses or is deprived of one quality or receives another, but simply that something, being in potency, receives that in respect of which it is in potency. From this point of view, everything passing from potency to act can be considered as 'passive,' even though such passivity should be a source of enrichment rather than a cause of impoverishment. Our intellect is passive in this last sense, and the reason of this passivity can be deduced directly from the relatively inferior position of man in the hierarchy of being."
sists in fabricating. The mind for him is an active receptacle imposing on things all the categories peculiar to himself, e.g. when one says, "I know," one means that "I have imposed on something." According to his teaching we can perceive nothing that lacks time or space categories, because in that manner we are made. These, time and space, depend on me, hence they are necessary for the object on account of me. How can one say that a concept exists? What is the basis for existential judgments? We certainly do not know these things by thinking about them. For example, from the concept of man as a biped we cannot conclude that man exists. The same error is met in the ontological argument of John Scotus Erigena attempting to prove the existence of God. He has the concept of being, all good, merciful, just, powerful, etc. If this being exists, one may justly conclude that that is what he must be like, but he cannot from his concept conclude that this being does exist. Hence we cannot proceed from the statement of the nature of a thing to its existence, i.e. if we start with a concept of what a man is, we cannot proceed to the fact that man is.

Descartes' explanation is that knowledge of existence is contained within the clarity or distinctness of the idea I possess (ultimately this comes from angelic knowledge for this is how they know). In the concept of an angel is the infused actual knowledge. Angels are subsistent forms, and like other spiritual beings we must speak of them in abstract terms although they are concrete realities. An angel is naturally intelligible and knowable. Hence, presented to
itself (intelligence (1)) it is immediately known. We know by abstraction from the visible thing, and the mind cannot help knowing what is presented to it as knowable. The angel grasps the thing in act from God as, so to speak, it directs itself earthward. We must conclude that knowledge is not a mere passive acceptance, nor is it simply being active; but to know is to possess. Descartes was right in that we are pushed, or shocked to the presence of the thing; he was wrong in stopping there. Kant was wrong in thinking that knowledge was producing and not becoming; that knowledge is transient and not immanent.

(1) Vide Gilson, E., The Philosophy of St. Thomas, p.233. The whole virtue of the angel is concentrated in his intellectual power and in his will springing from it and so is a pure intellect, and hence the name "intelligence" has been given to the angel. Man is not called an intelligence because he has, besides his intellectual soul, a vegetative and sensitive soul, although not as separated entities but distinct.
The Problem: Some Preliminary Notes

Thus far we have established the possibility of the human reason to obtain knowledge from things by abstraction, how this knowledge exists in the mind as intentional being, and suggested the first step toward the solution of the mystery of knowledge - the sensible and the intelligible species, the means of the union of the thing known and the knower. Maritain substitutes for the word species presentative or objectifying form. (1)

Maritain says, "It is absolutely necessary that some determination should supervene in the knower, thanks to which what is not its should be in it secundum esse intentionale and not like an accident in a substance, and which will be able to exist with the same active super-existence as that of the knower become the known. The species is nothing other than this internal determination." (2) The intellect is specified by the species impressa, a presentative form abstracted from the sensible and received by means of it. Briefly the problem is as follows.

The phrase, immutatio spiritualis, is used by St. Thomas to indicate the change produced in the organs of sense perception as opposed to immutatio naturalis, or wholly material

(1) Maritain, J., The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 139, 140.
(2) Maritain, J., The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 140.
Cf. S.C.G., ii, 93.
change. (1) This immutatio spiritualis is the species sensibilis, which is consequently nothing but a passio, or affectio, of the peripheral sense-organs, a mode of motion, and by no means a substantial entity. According to the metaphysical principle well known to St. Thomas as an Aristotelian formula, actio and passio are merely two aspects of the same reality, like the concave and the convex of the same curve. (2) The action of the object and the modification produced by it in the sense are one and the same phenomenon, and the species sensibilis may therefore be defined as the physical determinant of sensation, inasmuch as it is received in the animated organism. The species sensibilis is not a miniature object; neither is it something which we first perceive in sensation, and by means of which we are led to perceive the object. It is merely the vital phase

(1) See Sum. Theol., la, 78, a.3: Est duplex immutatio: una naturalis, et alla spiritualis. Naturalis quidem secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutatio secundum esse naturale sicut calor in calefacto; spiritualis autem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutatio secundum esse spirituale, ut forma coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem autem sensus requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formae sensibilis fiat in organo sensus; alioquin si sola immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad sentiendum, omnia corpora naturalia sentirent, dum alterantur.

See also, Sum. Theol., la, 84, a.1; Sum. Theol., la, 84, a.2; Comm. de Anima, II, lect. 11.

See T. Fontaine, De la sensation et de la pensee; p. 63 et seq.

(2) In IIIum de An., lect. 2. - "Sicut dictum est in tertio physicorum quod actio et passio sunt unus actus, subjecto, sed differunt, ratione prout actio signatur ut ab agente, passio autem ut in patiente."
of the stimulative action of the external object, - a medium of communication between object and subject, but not a medium in the order of knowledge; for in normal conditions it does not rise into direct consciousness at all, the first thing perceived being the object itself. It is called a species because by means of it, in the sense explained above, the object is perceived.

In the active phase of the process of sensation the species is first impressed on the sense (species impressa); then consciousness responds, and by the actus consequens impressionem writes out, as it were, a representation of the object, called the species expressa. Sensation in the passive phase is not knowledge; for there is no knowledge without consciousness: it is only in the active phase that sensation becomes knowledge properly so called. (1)

But how do we rise from sense knowledge to intellectual knowledge? How do we derive from the world of material things the universal and the immaterial, which is the object of pure thought? In answering this question St. Thomas refers again to the Aristotelian distinction between active and passive intellect. (2)

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(1) In Tum Sent., dist. XL, I, 1, ad lumen.

(2) Sum. Theol., la, 79, 7: - "Now the intellect regards its object under the common ratio of being; since the passive intellect is that in which all are in potentiality, wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect; because as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power which is moved by the object existing.
The object as it presents itself to the senses is indeed contingent and singular; but, hidden beneath the surface qualities of matter, which give to the object its individuality and contingency, is the unalterable essence, or nature, which is universal and necessary. The active intellect by virtue of its illuminative power, separates what is particular and contingent from what is necessary and universal in the object, in this way causing the universal and necessary element in the object to stand forth in the clear light of its own intelligibility, and rendering actually intelligible what was only potentially intelligible before. The actually intelligible element acts upon the passive, or receptive, intellect in the same manner as color acts upon the eye, producing the species intelligibilis impressa; on being received into intellectual consciousness, this impression becomes the intellectual expression of the object in the mind, the mental image of the object, the species intelligibilis expressa, verbum mentis. (1) The idea which results from this abstractive process has a two-fold aspect; 1. entitatively considered, it is an acci-

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in act. Thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is compared to its object as a being in potentiality is to a being in act. Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect but that of passive and active."

Cf. also, *In Illum Sent.*, dist. XVII, q.II, a.1.
As regards the difference between active and passive power, see St. Thomas, *Qq. disp. de Veritate*, q.16, a.1, ad.13.

(1) *Sum. Theol.*, 1a, 85, 1; *Cf. C. G.*, II, 73; *de Ver.*, IV, 2; *Radeau, Gaston*, *Verbum. Species*, p. 62 et seq.
dent or quality of the mind in which it is; 2. representa-
tively considered, it is an image, or representation, of
the object, functioning, not as a medium in which we see
the object, - for that would be to open the door to subjec-
tivism, - but as a medium by which the object acts on our
consciousness. The analogy between the function of the
species intelligibilis and that of the species sensibilis
is perfect. (1)

(1) Sum. Theol., Ia, 85, 2.
The Function of the Species Sensibilis

The great doctors of the Middle Ages believed in the immediate perception of bodies by the external senses as a primary fact clearly attested to by the consciousness of every man. I touch this book; it resists beneath my fingers. I look at these objects. I see or I hear the beings which surround me. It seems evident to me that these are not merely ideas that I perceive as in a dream or memory, but that I am truly in direct communication with exterior realities. (1) Such a conclusion Descartes would not admit, but he even went further to deny that these ideas resulting from such perception had any more than a practical or pragmatic value. (2) In fact, in all these perceptions, and especially

(1) T. Fontaine, De la sensation et de la pensée, pp. 59, 60: "La perception sensible ne nous fait pas connaître les choses dans leur matérialité; une pareille connaissance serait impossible. D'une part, comme il y a dans les objets quelque chose qui se retrouve en tous, puisque tous ont des propriétés identiques, nous devrions en nous le fond qu'ils possèdent tous également. En second lieu, comme les choses sont multipliées et se distinguent, non par le substratum de leurs propriétés, mais par les manières d'être spéciales à chacune, nous devrions avoir en nous, non seulement ce qui se trouve dans toutes les chose en général, mais encore ce qui est propre à chacune en particulier. Ainsi nous serions tout ce que nous connaissons.

"Cependant les sens ne créent pas la sensation; ce ne sont pas eux qui se donnent les manières d'être dans lesquelles consistent leur opérations; car si la faculté sensitive était la raison de son acte, si elle avait dans son être ce qui est nécessaire pour qu'elle fût faculté sentante, non seulement elle devrait toujours sentir, mais encore sentir simultanément tout ce dont il lui est possible d'avoir une sensation; supposition incontestablement contradictoire, puisque nos perceptions sont successives. La faculté persistante est donc subordonnée, dans l'exercice de son activité, à l'influence de choses autres qu'elle-même."

(2) Réflexions sur l'intelligence, p. 31: "D'une part Descartes, tenant de certains scholastiques de son temps, infidèles sur ce point à saint Thomas, que le sens n'atteint
in those of contact and resistance, we have consciousness at once of the ego and the non-ego by an indivisible act of knowledge which involves both of them, while distinguishing them as different and mutually exclusive. This is the most elementary psychological observation.

Instead of denying the insurmountable evidence of this fact and of treating it disdainfully as illusory and impossible - the too convenient response of our ignorance of the mysterious problems of nature, - these great philosophers, following in the footsteps of Aristotle, have tried to explain it by a simple theory, which does not merit the profound neglect to which it has been condemned by the Cartesian revolution.

It has nothing artificial or forced about it; indeed far from having been invented by the ancients expressly for the purpose of extricating themselves from a difficult position, it spontaneously flows from the general theory - equally forgotten by the moderns - of the mover and the moved, of action and passion, or, if it is preferred, of the communication of substances, of which it is the most important application. (1)

(1) This assimilation of the two theories is an incontestable fact: i. Aristotle and St. Thomas constantly compare them: "Sensus autem comparatur ad sensibile sicut patiens et agens." - de Veritate, q.26, a.3.
External sense perception supposes the presence of three essential conditions: a subject capable of perceiving, a material object capable of being perceived, and finally a certain presence of the object in the subject. (1)

The subject is not the soul only, nor the organ only, but the animated organ, "virtus corporea," as St. Thomas repeats, or, we can also say, the nervous tissue of the sensible organs in so far as it is substantially informed by the soul.

Sensible objects are not all material objects, but only those which have sufficient attraction and power to move our senses.

How will this union with the subject come about? It is clear that neither the soul nor some power of the soul emanates from ourselves, as the rays of a lantern, in order to go forth and to communicate with the exterior world. That

"Ut probat Philosophus, de Anima, II, c.5, sentire accidit in ipso moveri a sensibilibus exterioribus, unde non potest homo sentiri absque sensibili exteriori, sicut non alicui potest moveri absque movente."; Contra Gentes, II, c. 57.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, III, c.5.

ii. They apply to the sensible and to the sense all the principles of the agent and of the patient, among others the following principle which dominates and sums up the whole theory: "Sensus in actu est sensibile in actu quia ex utroque fit unum sicut ex actu et potentia."; Sum. Theol., Ia, 55, 1, ad 2.


(1) Ad visionem tam sensibilem quam intellectualem duo requiritur: scilicet virtus visiva et unio rei visae cum visu. (That union is not a simple juxtaposition, but the union of the agent with the patient which it informs with its action.) Non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res visa est in vidente quodam modo (id est per actionem suam sibi similem)."; Sum. Theol., Ia, 12, 2.

Nam omnis forma est principium agendi simile sibi. Unde
strange fiction of Empedocles, reproduced in the Timaeus, has found no echo.

It is not, moreover, the exterior bodies which enter into us by their substance, nor by material emanations of their substance. It is not this stone that penetrates my eye in order to be seen, nor even a particle of that stone as minute as one could imagine. The material effluvia of Empedocles, the corpuscular images of Democritus, which they believed to float in the air and to penetrate the pores of our organs have quite rightly fallen into neglect. (1)

color causat sui similitudem in medio: St. Thomas, de An., III, 14.

(1) Simon, Yves, Introduction à l'ontologie du connaître, pp. 20-22, note. - "De an., III, 8, 431b, 29; Thid., I, 2, 404b, 10. Après avoir exposé les théories qui voient surtout dans l'âme le principal moteur de l'animal, Aristote commence à exposer celles qui s'attachent de préférence au fait de la connaissance. "Mais tous ceux qui ont porté leur attention sur le fait que l'âme connait les choses et les sent, ceux-là disent que l'âme est (constituée par) les principes...C'est ainsi qu'Empédocle (dit que l'âme est formée) de tous les éléments et que chacun d'eux est âme; il s'exprime ainsi:

C'est par la terre que nous voyons la terre; (c'est) par l'eau (que nous voyons l'eau),
par l'éther, le divin éther, par le feu, le feu destructeur; par l'amour, l'amour, et la haine par la triste haine (trad. Rodier).

Le commentaire de s. Thomas sur ce passage (I, lec. 4, p.43) présente un hommage bien significatif aux errements des premiers philosophes: ils ne se sont pas trompés tout à fait; ils ont bien compris que pour connaître l'autre, il faut que l'âme soit l'autre; ils ne se sont trompés que sur la manière dont elle l'est. "Ad ponendum autem animam esse ex principiis constitutam movebantur, quia ipsi antiqui philosophi, quasi ab ipsa veritate coacit, somniabant quodammodo veritatem. Veritas autem est, quod cognition fit per similitudinem rei cognitae in cognoscente: oportet enim quod res cognita alique modo sit in cognoscente. Antiqui vero philosophi arbitrati sunt, quod oportet similitudinem rei cognitae esse in cognoscente secundum esse naturale, hoc est secundum idem esse quod habet in seipsa: dicebant enim quod oportebat simile simili cognosci; unde si anima
Aristotle, anticipating the most modern science, has energetically combated the hypothesis of emission and has preferred instead, what we call to-day, the theory of unducognoscat omnia, oportet, quod habeat similitudinem omnium in se secundum esse naturale, sicut ipsi ponébat. Nescierunt enim distinguere illum modum, quod res est in intellectu, seu in oculo, vel imaginatione, et quo res est in seipsa. Ibid., II, lec.12, p.577. Cognitio autem omnis fit per hoc, quod cognitum est aliquo modo in cognoscente, scilicet secundum similitudinem. Ibid., III, lec.13.

Rien n'atteste mieux que la grossièreté même de la théorie d'Empédocle la force avec laquelle ce philosophe, comme Parménide l'avait fait, perçoit l'exigence d'une identité entre le connaissant et le connu. (La pensée, écrit Parménide, et ce dont il y a pensée, c'est tout un. Diels, VIII, 34). Avec Démocrite et Épicure l'explication de la connaissance par la présence physique du connu au connaissant s'efforce de devenir moins choquante: dans le tableau de W. James (Le Pragmatisme, tr. franc. Paris, 1911, p.29) Démocrite figurerait au titre des délicats, Empédocle au titre des barbares; les ἐκ νόμος de Démocrite sont du physique affiné, j'allais dire civilisé; mais toujours du physique, et il est clair que le raffinement n'y fait rien: J. Maritain, Réflexions sur l'intelligence et sur sa vie propre, Ier. éd., p.61; Degrés du savoir, p.223. "...il faut, écrit Hamelin (Essai sur les éléments principaux de la représentation, Ier. éd., p.359-40), réalistequement parlant, que ces soient les choses qui, à leur manière, entrent dans l'âme et dans la conscience. Mais comment serait-ce les choses même qui entraient dans l'âme, c'est à dire d'abord dans le corps et dans le cerveau? Assurément un encrrier n'y trouverait pas place; de petites images, à la bonne heure. Ainsi nul moyen d'échapper à l'absurdité épicienne sans renoncer au réalisme consiste dans une juste notion des conséquences qu'entraîne, concernant la nature de l'idée, sa fonction existentielle primordiale; quand on a compris la différence et la relation des deux existences, on a renoncé, pour expliquer la présence de la chose à l'intérieur de l'âme, à résoudre la chose en des choses plus petites, opérant incognito, mais incapables d'opérer autre chose qu'une union de chose à chose dont résulte une troisième chose, non un acte de connaissance. Entre la pierre et ἐκ νόμος qu'elle émet dans le système de Démocrite, il n'y a qu'une différence de subtilité qui n'intéresse que l'imagination; entre la pierre et ἐκ τοις qui la représente dans le système aristotelicien, il y a une radicale diversité ontologique, passage d'un ordre à l'autre.

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lation. But if foreign bodies do not penetrate us by their substance, they at least impress us and penetrate us by their action, since, according to Thomist and Aristotelian theory, the action of the agent is in the patient.

The action of the object, as extensive, as endowed with shape and form, as luminous, as sonorous, etc. will be in the objective element which will impress the corporal subject and will manifest to it something of the object, because action, properly speaking, is the very expression and the resemblance, at least partial, of the agent; omne agens agit simile sibi, as common experience has proven of the imprint of the seal on the wax, of the photograph, or of the echo. (1)

(1) It is convenient to recall here that we are speaking only of sense perception. In this respect we should consider the value for us of such perception as well as its place in the hierarchy of knowledge. M. Maritain has very well done this in "Rêflexions sur l'intelligence," p.31, note. He says: "La perception des sens ne pénètre pas jusqu'à l'essence, elle n'atteint les choses que dans leur extériorité matérielle, en tant qu'elles agissent au dehors hic et nunc par certaines de leurs qualités; à ce titre, tout en ayant une valeur objective absolue, tout en atteignant le réel extramental lui-même, elle reste immensément inférieure à la perception intellectuelle, et elle implique au regard de cette dernière une inévitable relativité due à la matérialité qu'elle comporte, je veux dire que l'objet propre du sens étant la qualité sensible prise non pas dans son essence, mais dans son action hic et nunc, telle qu'elle est par conséquent quand elle agit sur l'organe (par le moyen du milieu comme instrument), l'intuition du sens, sans manquer pour cela son objet formel, variera suivant la multitude des conditions matérielles dont dépend cette action (et pourra ainsi donner lieu à toutes sortes d'erreurs d'appréciation, qu'il appartient à l'intelligence de corriger). Mais par contre l'intuition du sens atteint les choses en tant qu'elles sont en acte d'existence ( Cf. Jean de s. Thomas, Curs. Phil., Phil. Nat. III. P.q.6, a.1 et 4, t.III, pp. 330 et 351), et à ce titre elle donne plus que la perception de l'intelligence à elle seule."
In order to develop these ideas and to clarify them, let us attempt an analysis of a tactile sensation. Let us suppose that a point or an embossament makes an impression on our hand. The action of this body informs the organ by the sense of touch, and produces in it a passion, that is to say, an impression similar to the embossament, as the action of the seal on the wax produces its imprint. That is the comparison used by Aristotle and St. Thomas; moreover, it is a fundamental principle of their metaphysic that the passion is always similar to the action; (1) we can even affirm that action and passion are only one and the same act which the one gives and the other receives.

The first effect of contact with the object on the subject will be, then, to reproduce in it its imprint as endowed with shape and form, and to be assimilated to it, not indeed substantially, but from the point of view of form: sensus accipit formam (objecti) sine materia. (2) Patitur

(1) Agens enim agenda assimilat sibi patientis. - St. Thomas, de Anima, II, 10. Whenever I use throughout this thesis the terms 'action' and 'passion', I only mean to indicate by it the 'one acting' (agens agenda) and the 'one receiving' (patient) agent and patient. I do not wish to confuse my use of action and passion with certain French philosophers who claim that an object is all action and not acting. The agent is the cause; the action is the effect. See above p. 34.


Maritain, J., Réflexions sur l'intelligence, p. 56: "Comment donc est-elle (the thing) présente dans le sens ou dans l'intellect? Sous son existence propre de chose, et

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dissimile facta vero passione simile est. (1) But it is clear that the impression of which we speak must take place at once in the body and in the soul, or better, in the animated organism. Every action penetrates at once the matter and the form of the patient, since they form but one and the same substance; but if this form were not living and sensible, the sensation could not take place, otherwise the members of a dead body and even all inanimate bodies would feel when one touched them. In order that the purely material impression become sensible, the action of the object must have a certain degree of intensity, and the subject must be normally disposed to receive it. It is then only that the scholastics give to this impression the name of

telle qu'elle existe au dehors? Évidemment non. Il faut que ce soit par un signe ou une similitude d'elle-même, par un vice-object, qui est encore elle-même mais détachée de son mode propre d'exister, et devenue principe intrinsèque de l'acte de connaître: species impressa, disaient les scolastiques, - image imprimée, germe du connaître.

L'objet du sens, la chose matérielle en train d'agir par ses qualités (en dépendance des agents cosmiques supérieurs) se trouvant de sol, telle qu'elle existe au dehors, proportionnée au sens, faculté organique, bref étant de sol apte à être sentie ("sensible en acte"), il suffit, pour que se produise, suivant le mode décrit ci-dessus, l'acte immanent de sensation, qu'elle soit rendue présente au dedans du sens par sa species impressa, (par sa forme détachée de sa propre existence de chose et reçue dans la faculté) grâce à l'action (transitive) de c'objet sur l'organe: le sens ainsi fécondé devient vitalement la chose, en un acte qui ayant la species impressa pour principe, a pour terme immatériellement vécu, pour terme contemplé la chose même, et qui la tient ainsi sans avoir besoin d'en produire une image dans laquelle il l'atteigne - en un acte qui débouche immatériellement sur la chose prise en tant même qu'elle existe au dehors et qu'elle agit sur l'organe: terminatur ad res prout extra sunt. [Cf. Jean de S. Thomas, Curs. Phil. Nat., III; P., q. 6.]

(1) see Aristotle, de Anima, II, c.5, §3 and 7; cf. St. Thomas, ibid.
species impressa. (1)

Such is the first phase of the tactile sensation which we study: it is purely passive; it is the information of the patient by the action of the agent and their assimilation in a common act.

The second phase is that of the activity and of the reaction of the sentient subject. Having been determined by the action of the object, I feel, that is, my sensitive faculty responds to the action of the object, reagendo, and in this reaction the passive power of sensibility is totally acting. (2) This second process is called the species ex-

(1) The species impressa in this sense is corporal, just as is the sentient subject. "Oportet igitur quod sensus corporaliter et materialiter recipiat similitudinem rei quae sentitur; intellectus autem recipiat similitudinem ejus quod intelligitur incorporaliter et immaterialiter.": de Anima, II, 12. Cf. de Veritate, II, 6, ad 1 and 2. - "Materialiter quamvis absque materia."

T. Fontaine, De la sensation et de la pensée, p. 73: - "L'impression organique, principe de détermination de la faculté sensitive, était appelée par les scholastiques species sensibilis impressa. Species (specis, voir, regarder), parce que, grâce à elle, l'objet est perçu par les sens; sensibilis, pour la distinguer de l'espèce intelligible qui est, à l'intelligence, ce que l'espèce sensible est aux sens; impressa est synonyme de passif; ce mot représente l'état du sujet sentant en tant qu'il subit l'influence de l'objet, non entant que la puissance sensitive déploie son activité propre."

(2) Sum. Theol., Ia, q.76, a.3.

T. Fontaine, De la sensation et de la pensée, pp. 71, 72: "Entre l'impression organique et l'acte du principe sensitif, il y a donc une relation de causalité; toutefois, cette relation ne consiste pas en ce que cette impression agit sur le principe sensitif comme un être qui en serait totalement distinct. Réciproquement, la réaction ne peut se faire comme si l'impression demeurait hors de la faculté sensitive. Et en effet, si celle-ci ne s'y unissait pas, elle devrait avoir en elle un substitut de cette impression, au même titre qu'il nous faut en nous, pour sentir,
pressa. (1)

Under this provocation, the subject cannot remain passive, since it is essentially living and active; besides in order to know it must act. Sensible activity, then, passes from potency to act; and this act is called by the scholastics "attendere," or it is an intuition of the action as extended and as endowed with shape and form of which it has

un substitut de l'objet extérieur. Le même problème se posèrait pour ce second intermédiaire, et ainsi de suite, de sorte que, à moins de rendre la connaissance impossible, on doit admettre que le substitut de l'objet se joint intiment à la faculté et forme, par son union intrinsèque avec elle, cet état qui détermine l'acte de sensation.

Ces arguments reçoivent une nouvelle lumière de la considération de la différence qui sépare les facultés cognitive des appétitives. La volonté tient son objet de l'intelligence, mais l'acte d'appétition précède la possession de l'objet. L'acte d'intelligence, au contraire, est la prise de possession de l'objet; s'il en était autrement, on connaîtrait avant de connaître. C'est parce que l'intelligence ne peut poser son acte que lorsque l'objet est en elle, et que cette possession est l'acte même d'intellection, c'est, disons-nous, parce que telle est la cause formelle de l'acte intellectuel, que l'idée est toujours et nécessairement vraie. Pour des raisons semblables la sensation l'est aussi toujours. Ainsi, quand on dit que les facultés sont mues par l'objet, on n'affirme pas cette proposition d'une manière identique de l'intelligence et de la volonté.

L'acte intellectuel, il est vrai, est un mouvement, mais c'est un mouvement continuellement renouvelé dans la possession de l'objet, tandis que l'acte appétitif est une tendance ou mouvement vers lui. Il en est de même pour les facultés inférieures. Si l'acte de la faculté sensitive était une tendance vers l'impression considérée comme distincte et séparée de la faculté, il se confondrait avec une acte d'appétition. Ou, celui-ci présume la connaissance."

(1) T. Fontaine, De la sensation et de la pensee, p.73-74. "Lorsque a lieu la réaction, se produit la spécies expressa, terme par lequel on désigne le résultat du développement spontané de la puissance sensitive dans l'état où est placée la faculté par la détermination qui lui permet de percevoir."
received the imprint. The subject perceives this form, while imprinting it (species expressa) and reproducing it within itself, in the imagination. In this way external perception occupies the middle place between two effects: the species impressa, which is the effect of the object on the sense, and the species expressa, which is the effect of the sense determined by the object.

It is quite natural that in reacting the sense is conformed to the object sensed in the measure in which the object first has conformed to it. Moreover it is a fact of experience: every perception is ultimately an experience of the representative order.

The species impressa ordinarily promptly disappears - there are some exceptions when the nervous system has been very powerfully excited; - but the species expressa, on the contrary, is preserved in the imagination in an habitual state, and can revive it either spontaneously, or by a voluntary effort of the memory, and even by a mechanical excitation of the afferent nerves.

Let us return to the very important act of intuition in order to grasp the essential distinction between external perception and internal perception. (a) We distinguish them, first, in time. The sentient subject perceives in the first place the form, or if it is preferred, the action of the exterior object as extended and as endowed with shape and form of which it receives the imprint before perceiving this impression itself. It is still observation which demonstrates it to us. When I touch an embossment with my finger, it is
the embossment itself which I perceive in the first place, and not the impression of my finger, which is on the embossment. When I carefully touch the point of a needle in order to know its form, it is the point that I perceive before the impression of pain which it has caused me. (b) In the second place we distinguish them by the contrast of their objects. The internal impression is ordinarily the image of the object turned about or reversed. That is true of touch also. If I touch a small ball with my finger, the impression made by my finger is concave, and yet I perceive a convex ball; a pointed object impresses on my organ a re-entrant angle, and I perceive the form of a salient angle. All our sensations are passive states, and yet there are some active states which I think I perceive in the forces which strike me and impress me. To such a degree it is true that exterior perception does not consist in grasping the modifications of the Ego, but rather in grasping the actions considered as luminous, extended, or as endowed with shape and form which have modified the Ego.

I distinguish quite clearly the action of the object from the passion which it causes me, and that is why it is not my painful impression that I attribute to the object, by a kind of fantastic hallucinatory projection which would make me cloth the exterior world with my own subjective impressions; it is no more my impression in the cavity which I attribute to the point of the needle, nor my impression on the embossment that I attribute to the concave object.
In a word, I never attribute to the object the subjective passion which it has caused me, but only the action by which it has impressed me. I restore to it what belongs to it so that I may know its proper action: here, in the example we have selected, it is an action considered as extended and as endowed with shape and form which is impressed on my sensible organ. I restore to it, then, its own form, without imposing mine upon it; I only ascribe to it what it has impressed on my senses. Whereas, in modern theories, we must begin by projecting our sensible impressions, and then correct them by a ratiocination, which has never happened, and which, moreover, would be manifestly impossible.

(c) We distinguish them again by the contrast of their intensity. Internal perception and external perception are accompanied or are always followed in inverse ratio: one always gains in intensity and distinctness what the other loses. The more active the organic impression is, the more obscure and enfeebled the external perception is. Too brilliant a light prevents us from seeing it; a too powerful blow on the hand prevents us from grasping clearly the nature of the object which has struck us.

(d) Consciousness not only distinguishes the external and internal perceptions by their chronological succession and by their contrasts, but it also separates them. Watch a blind man on the streets exploring the terrain with a simple cane: someone has picturesquely said that he had an eye at the end of his cane; it would be more exact to say that he almost has a hand. In fact all sensations of fullness, of
emptiness, and of relief, he feels with the end of his cane, while the sensations of pressure and of muscular strain remain localised in the hand. Why this difference and this separation? Because the sensation of strain of the fingers has an affective and interior character, while resistance and relief assume a representative and exterior character.

The first object is perceived as personal, the second as extraneous; it is then quite natural that he should project the latter only outside himself and that he should attribute it to the exterior agents which produce it, at the exact distance of his cane already measured by exploratory touch. Thanks to a habit which is easy to form, it associates the image of that distance to the object perceived.

It is for the same reason that in writing I feel the resistance of the paper beneath my pen and the muscular movement in my fingers as something quite distinct.

Let us study somewhat more closely the direct perception of a relief by touching it, and let us show that that operation demands on our part neither ratiocination nor induction - of which, moreover, animals would be incapable - and that it is necessarily an immediate perception.

In order to immediately grasp the object acting as endowed with shape and form, the subject as patient does not need to go outside itself, because the action of the agent is in the patient. (1) In fact, at the exact moment of the

(1) Sicut enim actio et passio est in paciente et non in agente ut in principio a quo, ita tam actus sensibilis quam actus sensitivi est in sensitivo ut in subjecto. - St. Thomas, de Anima, III, c.2.
action and of the passion, the action of the agent informs the patient, in such a way that the agent and the patient, though substantially distinct, are accidentally united into one common act. (1) It is the same act which one gives and the other receives; the giving and the receiving, the action and the passion, are only two different points of view of the same act, as the road from Athens to Thebes and the one from Thebes to Athens - that is the example of St. Thomas and Aristotle - are the same road in two different senses. (2)

If the same act is common to the one which gives and the one which receives it, to the agent and to the patient, the latter does not need to go outside itself in order to grasp it. It grasps it, then, within itself directly, (3) by an immanent operation; but it grasps it such as it is, that is to say, as an act which it receives without producing it, as an extraneous act coming from without, from the non-Ego into the Ego; and that is why we have an invincible tendency to project it to the exterior in the direction from whence it came, and to restore it, as it were, to the agent whence it emanates.

This is quite a natural tendency, after all, and eminently reasonable, since it consists in assigning again each

(1) "Operatio rei sensibilis una quidem et eadem est; at eorum ratio non eadem.": Aristotle, de An., III, 2, 4.

(2) See above, p. 34.

(3) The extraneous action which has moved the organ, St. Thomas tells us, is directly perceived by the senses: "Exterius ergo immutativum est quod per se a sensu percipitur.": Sum. Theol., Ia, q.78, a.3.
thing to its proper place; whereas those who would clothe
the exterior world with our own affections, as modern phil-
osophers have done, would be an unreasonable and unintelli-
gible tendency, a veritable misconception, which no one
has the right to ascribe to nature.

Another misconception, no less strange, consists in
interpreting the Aristotelian formula: a common act in the
agent and in the patient - by the latter: a twofold act
resulting from two distinct acts: Aristotle, St. Thomas, and
even Descartes distinctly say that the action and the pas-
sion are but one and the same act, that it is the act of the
agent which informs the potency of the patient: *ex utroque
fit unum sicut ex actu et potentia*. (1) Besides, it would
be unintelligible that two acts should only make a single
act; and if, supposing an impossibility, the operation of
the object and that of the subject were reduced to the con-
dition of producing only one single operation, we would no
longer distinguish in this confusion what belongs to the
object from what belongs to the subject, and we would fatally
turn into scepticism or agnosticism.

The enormity of this misconception, accepted currently
by so many, shows how far the sense of the ancient formula
has been forgotten in our day, and reveals in its proper
light the conceits of the moderns against an old theory of
which they know so little.

(1) Sum. Theol., Ia, q.55, a.1, ad 2.
Also, De anima, II, 53.
External perception well merits, then, the name that is given to it, since it immediately grasps something of the exterior object, namely, its action, an action considered as endowed with shape and form, as resistant, as extended, as luminous, etc. The passion of the subject, the species impressa, is by no means here the thing perceived (objectum quod); it is not even a photograph or an intermediate image (objectum in quo), as it is sometimes falsely supposed; it is only a means (id quo), the necessary means to unite immediately in a single act the agent and the patient, the material object and the sentient subject, and thus to make possible the immediate perception which results from it. (1)

(1) "Species (impressa) non est illud quod sentimus, sed magis id quo sensus sentit...Quidam posuerunt quod sensus non sentit nisi passionem sui organi..., sed haec opinio manifeste apparat falsa. Species secundaria est id quod intelligitur, sed quod intelligitur primo est res.": Sum. Theol., Ia, 85, a.2.

T. Fontaine, De la sensation et de la pensee, p. 109, 110.- "L'acte de la Faculté sensitive n'a donc pas pour objet le corps, mais la chose même par son substitut dans l'organisme. Le corps est un lieu de réception où les choses, devenues sensibles et rendues perceptibles par les organes, sont présentées à l'âme; mais elles ne sont pas dans l'organisme avec leur réalité objective; voilà pourquoi ce n'est pas là que l'âme les connaît; la formalité qui s'y accomplit n'est pour elle qu'un moyen (id quo) de saisir les objets à l'extérieur où ils se trouvent réellement; "oculus per speciem lapidis quam habet in se, cognoscit lap-idem secundum esse quod habet extra oculum.": Sum. Theol., Ia, 18, 3.

L'ébranlement nerveux n'est donc pas objet de notre connaissance; il ne peut pas l'être, car l'acte de connaissance n'est possible que par l'intervention de cet ébranlement comme co-principe de la sensation. Il est clair dès lors, qu'il n'en est pas non plus une condition, car la condition n'a aucune influence sur l'effet à la réalisation duquel son concours est nécessaire. L'impression organique ou, pour parler scolastiquement, la species impressa, est un moyen (id quo, non id in quo), ce par quoi, non en quoi nous percevons les objets extérieurs; ce n'est pas une representa-
That is why, if God, by a miracle - St. Thomas makes this supposition - would directly produce in us the species impressa, in place of producing it by the material action of bodies, external perception would become impossible. If it is no longer the action of the fire which heats my hand, but the action of God, I will feel indeed the heat of my hand, but I will no longer feel that of the fire. (1) The species impressa is not, then, an image nor an intermediate idea.

On the contrary, the imagination, the memory contain the intermediate images, mirrors (objectum in quo) between the subject and the object. They merely show us the object when absent in the image which has been preserved in it. Their manner of action, which is that of internal perception, is, then, essentially different from external perception.

In the knowledge which pure spirits have of bodies, the species impressae are still intermediate ideas. The knowledge of bodies which the angels have, St. Thomas tells us, is independent of material objects; non habent cognitio-

(1) "Si sensatio calor is in organo (e.g. manus) ab alio agente fieret (sc. a Deo), factus, etsi sentiret ignem esse calidum.": St. Thomas, Qq. disp. de Potentia, III, 7, c.
nem a rebus acceptam. (1) Thus their innate or infused species are by nature completely spiritual, whereas, for man, his knowledge is essentially dependent on material objects: accipit scientiam a rebus; it is impossible for him to have other species than those which he receives from bodies, and which are corporal. (2) The angels, then, know bodies without perception properly so called, whereas man can only know them and represent them to himself after having perceived them.

Sense perception includes two phases: (a) the object acts on the sense as a mover on the movable or the agent on the patient, while communicating its act to it - that is the passive phase; (b) then this act is immediately perceived by the sense which receives it - this is the active phase, the final result of which is a representation of the object which remains in the imagination and is recalled by the memory.

Such is, in its simplicity, the foundation of the Aristotelian theory, which is sometimes called the theory of assimilation.

This assimilation produced by the agent in the patient, as by the seal on the wax, is incontestable when it is a question of touch and of extension with shape and form.

(1) St. Thomas, de Veritate, III, II, c.-In God, knowledge is still more independent of created objects; it is, on the contrary, the objects which depend on the ideas of God, "qua sunt factivae rerum."
Also see St. Thomas, de Veritate, II, 5, ad 16.

(2) Recipientur in eis materialiter.- St. Thomas, de Ver., II, 5, ad 11.
qualities which it reveals to us. Must we, then, extend our conclusions to the other senses, which seem to act remotely and to other sensible objects?

Aristotle and St. Thomas never hesitate on this point. Many modern philosophers, on the contrary, even among the neo-scholastics, impelled by certain scientific scruples, have thought that it was necessary to make, on this point, certain concessions to modern theories. They think that after having safeguarded the objective reality of extension perceived by touch, they can discard the objectivity of color, of sound, of smell, and of all the other objects proper to the other senses.

We hold to the general thought which dominates and sums up the whole theory: we are in immediate communication with the exterior agents of nature which impress us and inform us by their actions. Sometimes these agents which impress us are the bodies themselves, as in touch (1), sometimes it is through the interposed medium (air or ether), to which bodies have communicated their vibrations either luminous or sonorous, by which these objects are brought into contact with the retina or the acoustic nerve; (2) but in each case there is not, between the sense and the exterior agent,

(1) "Hoc autem universaliter accipere de omni sensu op- ortet...Simili modo patitur et uniuscujusque sensus ab eo quod habet calorem aut saporem, aut somnum.": Aristotle, de An., II, 12, 1.

(2) We should note that this is in harmony with the scientific theories of sound and light as well as with reason.
another intermediary than the action itself of that agent passively received by the sense. The union between the subject and the object would no longer be an intimate one and the perception which results from it no longer immediate; it is the union of the agent with the patient, of the mover with the moved, to which it communicates its act and its resemblance: ex utroque fit unum sicut ex actu et potentia.

Since action is the expression and the resemblance of the agent, similitudo, species, as St. Thomas repeats so frequently, some authors believe that they have discovered in it an intermediate image between the subject and the object. But this is an error - action being something of the agent (est entis). If such were the case the two would be separated rather than united. This interpretation, far too superficial, would be a travesty of the theory of St. Thomas and the great scholastic doctors.

Our soul, in truth, has doors and windows open upon the exterior world, which, as Leibnitz says of it: it has consciousness, first of its own body, with which it forms only one substantial whole; and then it becomes conscious of all the extraneous actions with which that body is itself penetrated in its incessant dealings with exterior bodies. Their actions, luminous, sonorous, extended, resistant, endowed with shape and form, etc. constantly move our sensible organs, and the latter, in receiving these actions, perceive them immediately. The world is, then, no longer for us the unknown cause of our sensations, since these are indeed the
operations of exterior bodies which we grasp and not only our own psychic operations as is supposed in all other systems.

Hence we can ascend from the nature of these operations to the nature of the material agents which produce them, for the action of a power is the expression and the resemblance, at least partial and inadequate, of that power; omne agens agit simile sibi - an axiom verified over and over again by the well known results of common or scientific experience;(1) thus each action of a body of whatever kind produces in us a corresponding sensation.

The sensation, or the impression of the object on the the animated organism, far from being an impassable barrier between the subject and the object, becomes, on the contrary, their bond of union. Just as by the passion the action of the agent informs the patient, so also the agent and the patient are reunited in a common act which one gives and the other receives. Thus, St. Thomas and Aristotle tell us, it is through the sensible impression, or the species impressa that the subject and the object are united in a common act, and it is this act which is the immediate term of our perception and of our consciousness.

This intimate union of the subject and of the object is, indeed, what reveals to me the testimony of my consciousness. Indeed, when I touch these keys which resist the pressure of my fingers, when I grasp this pen - (and all the

(1) See Adler, What Man has made of Man,- p.12; note 5, pp. 129-31; note 6; pp. 131-32.
other senses sense equally through a certain contact (1), - what insuperable abyss can I imagine between it and myself? Are we not, on the contrary, closely united to each other? The insurmountable abyss between the subject and the object is a gratuitous invention of philosophers, and the hopeless efforts that they have essayed to fill up this abyss which they have at the same time been pleased to deepen with their own hands, and to suspend a bridge between the two worlds of the subjective and the objective, are not only powerless efforts, but perfectly useless as well. Since the subject and the object, as the agent and the patient, at the very moment of the passion are united and blended into a common act, that act of extraneous origin enters necessarily into consciousness. (2)

The Cartesians stop us here, asking us to observe that if they separate the two worlds too much, we, by a contrary excess, commit regrettable confusions, to the point of attributing to exterior objects modifications which belong only to the sentient subject. Is it the fire that is hot and ice cold? Is sugar sweet and vinegar sour? The landscape gay or barren....?

This old objection, formulated so often in the tone of a friendly irony, has never appeared very formidable nor very serious.

(1) "Omnes sensus quodam perfici tectu.": St. Thomas, de Anima, II, 20.
Also, "Corpora enim non se immutant, nisi se tangent.": Ibid., 15.

(2) Cf. T. Fontaine, P. 114, 115.
Far from causing us to attribute to exterior objects our states of consciousness, our emotions or subjective impressions, agreeable or disagreeable, the Thomist theory preserves us, on the contrary, from such a gross confusion in establishing the distinction, at once theoretical and experimental, between the external and the internal senses, between perception of our sensible emotions and perception of exterior action which has occasioned them. The first has an interior and affective character; the second, an exterior and representative character.

Thus, when, with my fingers, I feel the image of a medal, I perceive interiorly a slight movement of the tactile organ, but at the same time I perceive exteriorly an embossed form. Now these two perceptions, by their different characters preserve me from all confusion: I do not attribute to the medal the cutaneous movement, nor to my tactile organ the form of the medal.

I not only distinguish them, but an attentive observation makes me aware that when these two perceptions are succeeded or accompanied, it is always in inverse ratio; one always loses in intensity what the other gains. The stronger and more material an impression is, from the point of view of provoking subjective reactions of the organ, the more will the exterior perception be dull and feeble. (1) A too brilliant light dazzles and fatigues; one sees nothing

(1) See Aristotle, de An., II, 12; III, 4 and 13; II, 11; III, 2; and the commentary of St. Thomas.
distinctly. When it is moderated the disagreeable sensation disappears, and the view becomes distinct. A violent blow can occasion an impression so painful that we can hardly discern it, and it may even be impossible for us to determine whether it is a dull or sharp, a square or pointed instrument that has struck us. This is an observation that we have already made, and to which we will again return since it permits us to establish a kind of hierarchy among the external senses.

The milder the organic impression demanded for their normal function is, and, as it were, immaterial, (1) as in vision, the clearer and more powerful will the exterior perception be. That is why the sense of sight, being nearly

(1) St. Thomas uses here the word "spiritual," immutatio spiritualis, which he attributes not only to the sense, but even to the medium: to air, to water, to circumambient bodies. To understand the meaning of that expression it must be related to the physical theories of his time. When I, for example, cause a ray of red light to act upon a white screen, that coloration of the screen is not material, since the screen remains white. If, on the contrary, I paint it with red ink, the screen becomes materially red. The first change is called spiritual in opposition to the second which is called material change. Thus the air, water, the organs of sense which receive sounds and colors do not become on that account colors and sounds: their change is called spiritual or intentional. But all our senses are not spiritual in the same degree: the eye is more so: visus est spiritualior - forma coloris recipitur in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata...., recipitur secundum esse spirituale. On the contrary, the hand in receiving heat really becomes hot; it is the most material sense: Forma recipitur secundum esse naturale, sicut calor in carafacto. The first change is required only for the perception of the external senses; when the second occurs, it only agitates the external perception by the addition of its subjective elements.

Cf. St. Thomas, de An., II, 14, 20, and 21; Sum. Theol., Ia, 78, a.3; Sum. Theol., Ia, 84, a.1 and 2; Comm. de An., II, 11.
exempt, in a normal state, from organic reactions, makes us perceive especially the luminous action of exterior objects: it is the most objective. On the other hand, the sensation of heat or of cold is, perhaps, the one which shows us most clearly the successive states of our organs: it is the most subjective sense. Finally, between these two extremes are ranged all the other senses, in which the two kinds of perception, internal and external, affective and representative, appear simultaneously in varying proportions. First, there is touch, which is, with sight, the representative sense par excellence; then hearing; finally, smell and taste, where we not only perceive, as some have maintained, the sensation sweet or sour, agreeable or disagreeable of the organ, but also the perfume of the rose, which belongs to this flower.

When, sometimes, we attribute to exterior objects our subjective impressions themselves, in saying for example, that vinegar is sour, that a sound is musical or flat, etc. we merely attribute these qualities to them in a metaphorical manner, causality, as an effect is imputable to its cause; and, in this, we are in conformity with a perfectly legitimate and well-founded usage. But we attribute to them really and objectively all the qualities manifested by external perception with an evident character of exteriority, for example, extension, shape-form, movement, even color and sound.

It is quite true that our external perceptions depend, in a certain measure, on natural aptitude, as well as on the
accidental disposition of the senses; and again the theory of actio and passio will assist us to understand it; this it is which, after having shown us the functioning of the senses, will explain, first, their fundamental objectivity and then, their partial relativity.

The patient, in fact, can only receive the action of the agent in the measure of its capacity and of its actual dispositions: Receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis. In order that the action of the object be received in the sentient subject the latter must be capable of receiving it. (1)

A certain proportion and harmony is necessary, consequently, between the power that acts and the one that is acted upon. It is necessary, moreover, that no accidental obstacle intervene to disturb this communication. If there is an obstacle the action will not be received at all or it will be distorted. If there is a disproportion between the action of the agent and the capacity of the patient, the impression will be either too feeble, and the perception will not take place, or too strong, and then it will provoke abnormal reactions in the organ, internal sensations which will confuse the external perceptions. Thus, when the light is too feeble, I see nothing; when it is too bright, my eye is dazzled, hurt - I can no longer see the type on the pages before me.

(1) This is one of the arguments by which we have shown that the subject of the sensation must be corporal in order to receive the corporal actions of bodies; a spiritual subject would be incapable of it. Cf. St. Thomas, de Ver., II, 5, ad 1 and 2.
But if the action of the agent is proportioned to the capacity of the sense, if it encounters no obstacle, and finally if the sense is properly disposed and attentive, in other words, if the sensation is effected under normal conditions, the objectivity of the perception is revealed with the clarity of a necessary consequence, for the action of the agent does not change its nature because it is received in the patient. The patient, that is to say, the animated organism, "virtus corporea," receives, then, the action of the object such as it is, and becomes conscious of it: sensus apprehendit rem ut est.

Thus we clearly distinguish what belongs to the subject and what to the object in such a complex operation. The subject produces the perception, consciousness, the imaginary representation, the emotions of pleasure or of pain, the sensible reactions of the organ; but it does not produce the object, and does not distort its action, at least in normal conditions. If the subject always and necessarily distorted the action of the object as some have claimed, it would render it unknowable, and our pretended power of knowing would be no more than a radical impotency.

The objective and exterior element is, thus, perfectly grasped and distinguished from the subjective elements, such as pleasure and pain, reactions and organic disorders, personal effort, attention, and so forth, and the instrument which makes this distinction between what is mine and what is foreign to me, between the Ego and the non-Ego, is none other than consciousness, the testimony of which is always
trustworthy when one consults it in a normal state.

Perhaps it is now more clearly seen how important it was, so as not to make this separation of the subjective and objective elements impossible, to carefully distinguish in the complex phenomenon of external perception, the purely passive phase from the active phase where the twofold reaction of the subject which perceives the object takes place, and which then reproduces it (species expressa) in the imagination. If the first phase were not purely passive, if the subject mingled something of its activity with it, the action received from the object would greatly risk being distorted and confused by such active co-operation of the subject.

This is, moreover, the express teaching of St. Thomas. (1)

Internal sensation is essentially subjective, since it is a reaction or affective emotion of the sentient subject and the reaction belongs to the nature of the one which reacts. On the other hand, external perception is essentially objective, since it results from a passion impressed in the sentient subject by the exterior agent, and the nature of the passion, received under normal conditions is to resemble the

(1) "Sensus exteriore susceptiunt tantum (speciem) a rebus per modum patiendi, sive hoc quod aliquid cooperentur ad sui formationem (the purely passive phase); - quamvis jam formati habeant propriam operationem, quae est judicium de propriis objectis (the first reaction in the active phase). - Actio rei sensibilis non sistit in sensu, sed ulteriorius pertingit usque ad phantasiam, sive imaginationem; tamen imaginatio est patiens quod cooperatur agenti: ipsa enim imaginatio format sibi aliarum rerum similitudines (the second reaction in the active phase).": St. Thomas, Quodlib., VII, 3.
action which produced it. It is true, however, that the
passion is not always the complete and adequate expression
of the action, the action not being always integrally rec-
eived in the patient: this belongs to the very imperfection
of its powers. But it is only an accidental relativity, or
rather an imperfection which makes our external sense per-
ception incomplete, without altering, in any way, its fun-
damental objectivity.
An a priori criticism relating to the conditions of knowledge has made it necessary to posit a form which is organic without being material. This doctrine, that we cannot think without images, is the most widely known of Thomist teachings. If thought is made difficult or impossible it is because the images are incoherent and confused (1) and so presents to him who would think no occasion of thought. Beside the proper object of our intellect is the nature of bodies, and the nature of bodies is real and knowable only in physical bodies. Absolutely nothing is susceptible of being understood by us outside of physical realities, in a state of separated being. We can, indeed, see one physical object separated from another, but we could never know the nature of that object separated from it. Intelligibles are, by their esse, in sensible forms, mathematical intelligibles as well as the dispositions and transformations of physical things. Also it is impossible to acquire knowledge without the use of the senses or to revive an acquired knowledge without recourse to the phantasm. When I contemplate I must evoke an image. (2)

The knowledge of purely spiritual things, of God and

(1) Sum. Theol., Ia, 84, a.7.
See also above, p.64 and following.
Cf. Adler, M., What Man has made of Man: Notes, 18, 19, pp. 162-164.

(2) Comm. de Anima, III, lect.13; Cf. Rousselot, P., S.J.
The Intellectualism of St. Thomas, pp. 86, 87.
of the angels, also requires an image, but this is not the materialization of the object since we can know God only through His effects when we apply the processes of negation, causality, or of excellence to Him: we must humble ourselves in the presence of this truth that we can know God only by means of a phantasm of a divine effect. (1)

To think God is not precisely to think the effects of God, and consequently the notion that I have of God has such an image more for an occasion than for a support. This is what St. Thomas means when he constantly reminds us of the need we have of concrete examples: when we try to understand we form images by way of examples. (2)

But the example is not an image which contains the concept and engenders it. It seems, then, according to St. Thomas, that the necessity of thinking by images is not at all the necessity of thinking an image which contains the notion as one thing contains another. The phantasm is not essentially the sensible impression in which the intellect has only to read the intelligible; it is not necessarily cause or container; it can be only a support. (3)

(1) "In usu cognoscendi quamdui in hac vita sumus, semper est nobis phantasma necessarium, quant umcumque sit spiritualis cognitio; quia etiam Deus cognoscitur a nobis per phantasma sui effectus in quantum cognoscimus Deum per negationem, vel per causaliter, vel per excellentiam." St. Thomas, de Malo, q.16, a.8, ad 3.

(2) "Format sibi aliquia phantasmata per modum explorum, in quibus quasi inspiciat quod intelligere studet." Sum. Theol., Ia, 84, a.7.

(3) "The potential intellect understands immaterial things, but views them in some material medium; as is shown by the fact that in teaching universal truths particular examples are alleged, in which what is said may be seen."
Nothing corporeal has the power of acting on the mind, or, says St. Thomas, of making its imprint there. (1) A body "never acts beyond its species." The act of thinking receives its determination, its species, from a universal and immaterial object, and consequently it surpasses infinitely the form and the species of any acting body whatsoever.

The role of the phantasm is not one of a corporal quality which would alter the soul: only one other function remains possible, that of a form which is seen. We know that the intellect is spiritual, but we also know that it is empty of forms - a tabula rasa: by itself it knows nothing, but it is capable of knowing everything. Images, on the contrary, are resemblances of corporeal forms, and of determined forms, the intelligible latent in them capable of being freed. (2) They contain the intelligible; they do

(note that this is a fact of consciousness) Therefore the need which the potential intellect has of the phantasm before receiving the intellectual impression is different from that which it has after the impression has been received. Before reception it needs the phantasm to gather from it the intellectual impression...But after receiving the impression, of which the phantasm is the vehicle, it needs the phantasm as an instrument or basis of the impression received. (If we understand this last expression we understand St. Thomas' teaching regarding the necessity of a conversio ad phantasmata.) And in this phantasm the intellectual impression shines forth as an exemplar in the thing exemplified, or as in an image." Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. 2, c. 73.

(1) Sum. Theol., Ia, 84, a. 6.

(2) "Animæ intellectiva est quidem actu immaterialis, sed est in potentia ad determinatas species rerum. Phantasmata autem e converso sunt quidem actu similitudines specierum quarundam, sed sunt potentia immaterialia." Sum. Theol., Ia, 79, a. 4, ad 4.
not impose it.

While the phantasm as such is unintelligible in act, it is nevertheless present to thought: a motionless presence it is true since it does not impress or move the possible intellect in any way except through the intellectus agent which accomplishes the abstraction from material conditions and causes the intelligible form to spring up. In order that the image may enter the intellect, the condition sine qua non is not that it be received by the intellect as image (since the image as such is material,) but that it be made capable of being received through a new 'similitude' by abstraction. (1)

Hence, in vain, would we immerse the phantasm in a spiritual light; it would remain what it is. It could only receive that light according to its nature, that is to say, sensibly and materially: it will remain individual, limited, and consequently it could not penetrate the intellect. But

(1) "Secundus modus est ut illae species non sint accep-tae a phantasmatibus, sed sint irradiantes super phantasmata nostra; puta si species aliquae essent in oculo irradiantes super colores qui sunt in pariete...Si autem ponatur,... quod species intelligibiles illustrent phantasmata et secun-dum hoc intelligatur...sequitur...quod talis irradiatio phantasmatum non poterit facere quod phantasmata sint intel-ligibilia actu. Non enim fiunt phantasmata intelligibilia actu nisi per abstractionem: haec autem erit magis receptio quam abstractio. Et iterum cum omnis receptio sit secundum naturam recepti, irradiatio specierum intelligibilium, quae sunt in intellectu possibili, non erit in phantasmatis quae sunt in nobis, intelligibiliter, sed sensibiliter et materialiter; et sic non poterimus intelligere universale per hujusmodi irradiationem." St. Thomas, de Unitate intellectus, Maria ed., p.483.

does not what I think lie latent in the image, and then is it not the object of thought, the form of the intellect? Of course this is a materialist error. This is the hypothesis of Averroes that there is but one possible intellect for all men, engendering diverse concepts according to the diverse images of various men. Suppose that the image of a stone becomes the form of the intellect. The image of this stone such as it strikes my eye, is particular to me; it differs from that which you can have at the same moment under precisely the same circumstances. It is quite evident that the image of a stone in me and in you is not the same and could not be the same unless viewed under identical circumstances, from the same perspective and with the same clearness which is impossible. (1) Since the image is material it exists with all its individuating circumstances, and so mine is particular to me and yours to you. Hence, if the phantasm is the form of the intellect, this form will be different for each man and so in this case it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action from yours by the distinction of the phantasms. (2)

(1) See Sum. Theol., Ia, 84, a.6; Sum. Theol., Ia, 85, a.2.

(2) "Aliud est phantasma lapidis in me, et aliud in te.. In uno autem intellectu a phantasmatibus diversis ejusdem speciei non abstrahitur nisi una species intelligibilis; sicut in uno homine apparet, in quo possunt esse diversa phantasmatum lapidis, et tamen ab omnibus eos abstrahitur una species intelligibilis lapidis, per quam intellectus unius hominis operatione una intelligit naturam lapidis, non obstante diversitate phantasmatum." Sum. Theol., Ia, 76, a.2.
The image is indispensable for thought. It is more than a condition. St. Thomas has written that the phantasms received from exterior things are, for thought, "quasi agentia instrumentalia." (1)

The image does not move the intellect as the agent which is accomplishing its proper activity, but as the object which provokes an agent to accomplish its activity in it. The intellectus agens, a great deal more than the imagination, is capable of reaching the quiddity of the thing which is not included in sense: it alone being spiritual accomplishes the spiritual work of thought. If images are called, in relation to this activity of the intellectus agens, agentia instrumentalia, it is precisely in this that they provoke the begetting of thought.

There is, then, no idea without a corresponding phantasm, but more than this the corresponding phantasm must always accompany the idea in consciousness. We cannot be conscious of an idea unless there is present also a sensible

(1) "Phantasmata...movent intellectum possibilem, non autem ad hoc quod ex seipsis sufficient, cum sint in potentia intelligibilia; intellectus autem non movetur nisi ab intelligibilii in actu: unde oportet quod superveniat actio intellectus agentis, cujus illustratione phantasmata fiunt intelligibilia in actu, sicut illustratione lucis corporalis fiunt colores visibles actu. Et sic patet quod intellectus agens est principale agens, quod agit rerum similitudines in intellectu possibili. Phantasmata autem qua a rebus exterioribus accipientur, sunt quasi agentia instrumentalia: intellectus enim posseibilis comparatur ad res quarum notitiam recipit, sicut patiens quod cooperatur agenti: multo enim magis potest intellectus formare quidditatem rei quae non cecidit sub sensu, quam imaginatio." Quodlib., 8, a.3.
representation of that idea in consciousness. As we have already seen, the action of an object in the external world impresses itself upon a subject with which it comes into contact or with which it is brought into contact by means of the surrounding medium. A motion is set up in this medium between the object and the sense organ. The medium conveys the motion to the sense organ. By the combined action of the motion and the sense organ, sensation results. When the object is removed a sense representation of the sensation remains in the imagination. (1) As such it is not intelligible but the phantasm is made intelligible by the intellectus agens which abstracts from the phantasm that by which it understands. (2)

(1) "...An animal through the sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually affected by them, but it must also retain and preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist things are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct from the power which preserves them....Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the proper sense and the common sense are appointed....But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the phantasy or imagination is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses." Sum. Theol., Ia, 78, a.4.

(2) "Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as the power of sight: and therefore they can impress their own image on the eye. But phantasm, since they are images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the same mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an impression on the passive intellect. This is done by the power of the active intellect which by turning towards the phantasms produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which represents, as to its specific conditions only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is
St. Thomas shows from experience that the intellect cannot think without at the same time turning to the phantasms of the thing thought, although that by which we think is the likeness of the object thought, which is in the intellect. (1)

According to St. Thomas the intellect is capable of bringing the phantasm into contact with itself. The intellect then, both makes the phantasm capable of being understood, and at the same time understands it and knows it. The active intellect renders the phantasm capable of being understood; the possible intellect understands. (2)

That which is abstracted from the phantasm by the intellectus agens is called the species intelligibilis, and it is not the thing understood, nor the thing known, but thus that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm; not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is subsequently in the passive intellect, as a body transferred from one place to another. Sum. Theol., Ia, 85, a.1, ad 3.

(1) "...the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to the phantasms, as experience shows." Sum. Theol., Ia, 89, 1.

Again, St. Thomas writes: "In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything actually except by turning to the phantasms." Sum. Theol., Ia, q.84, a.7.

(2) "Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, inasmuch as it considers the nature of things in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the phantasms, since it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms." Sum. Theol., 85, a.1, ad 5.
that by which the thing is known. (1) The species intelligibilis is an intellectual likeness or representation of the thing understood. It is universal; it is equally representative of the universal form wherever it is found in the external world. The species intelligibilis is the likeness in the intellect of the object outside by which we know the object outside. But we must remember that the image is not transferred into the intellect, as a body leaves one place in order to occupy another. There is no form which, numerically the same, could exist first in the image and could then be transported into the intellect, no more than there is any form which, numerically the same, could exist in a

(1) See Sum. Theol., Ia, 85, a.2: "It must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands; which is proved thus. There is a twofold action, one which remains in the agent, for instance, to see and to understand, and another which passes into an external object, for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something external is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is the likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that like is known by like. For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to Aristotle (de Anima, iii), who says that a stone is not in the soul but only the likeness of the stone; it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species." Sum. Theol., Ia, 85, a.2.
material body and then could pass into the image. The image, St. Thomas says and repeats, is not the material body, but its resemblance; the intellectual form (species intelligibilis) is not the image, but its resemblance. (1)

The intellect directly knows universals. Aristotle says that the intellect grasps only the universal. (2) Only by a series of universals, combined in such a way as to limit an object to a particular position in space and time, can we grasp the particular. We do not know the particular, however, but rather each universal which limits the partic-

(1) See Sum. Theol., Ia, 85, a.1, ad 3.- Also Rabeau, Gaston, Species. Verbum, p.55: "Tout est la différence entre la couleur qui agit sur l'œil et l'image qui est en présence de l'intellect: la couleur est de même nature sur le mur et sur la rétine, la lumière agit sur l'organe, mais les images ressemblances des individus, et existant dans des organes corporels, n'ont point le même genre d'existence que l'intellect, elles sont hors d'état d'agir sur lui. Ce sera donc une action de l'intellect, une "conversion" sur les images, qui opéra une nouvelle "similitude" de la chose dont déjà l'image était une ressemblance, et c'est cette action qu'on désigne, quand on dit que l'espèce intelligible est abstraite des images."

(2) "Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter, whereas our intellect understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted from individual matter is the universal. Hence the intellect knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as it were by a kind of reflexion, it can know the singular, because, even after abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect in order to understand, needs to turn to the phantasms in which it understands the species, as is said in de Anima iii. Therefore it understands the universal directly through the intelligible species, and indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition, Socrates is a man." Sum. Theol., Ia, 86, a.1.
ular extended object. This series of universals, in order to indicate the particular, must be such that it could never be predicated of more than one extended object at the same time. (1)

The intellect directly knows only universals; the sense knows only particulars. (2) This is so simply because there is no active intellect in irrational animals by which individual characters can be separated in the phantasm from its universal character, and no possible intellect to receive the separated species. Hence the phantasm alone is present in the sensible organ, - (the known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower) - without being able to be universalized.

The intellect knows universals by means of the species intelligibles which it possesses. Hence we must note (a) that these species intelligibles are likenesses in the intellect of the objects outside the soul which are known by them, and (b) that these species are in the intellect quite apart from the phantasm and are preserved in the intellect even after the soul is separated from the body, and consequently that these species are quite apart from the phantasms since they are in the imagination which is sensible, and so, perish with the body.

(1) We must note that this is the only case where we get the particular.

(2) See de Veritate, q.II, a.5. N.B. (The whole article should be read.)
In support of (a) we quote some texts from St. Thomas.

"Sed quia intelligere est actio in ipso intelligente manens...sequitur quod intelligere sit secundum modum intelligentis, id est secundum exigentiam speciei qua intellectus intelligit. Haec (species) autem cum sit abstracta a principiis individuantibus, non repreæsentat rem secundum conditiones individuales, sed secundum naturam universalem tantum. Nihil enim prohibet, si aliqua duo conjunguntur in re, quin unum eorum repreæsentari possit etiam in sensu sine altero.
(De unitate intellectus, p.487, Maria ed.)

Undoubtedly the species in this passage represents the concrete external object.

"Sicut in principio actionis intellectus et species non sunt dico, sed unum est ipse intellectus et species illustrata, its unum in fine relinquitur, similitudo, scilicet perfecta, genita et expressa ab intellectu, et hoc totum expressum est verbum...."

"Ad ipsum enim in quo quidditas rei recipitur, imo quia ipsemæt est quidditatis similitudo, terminatur intelligere."

"Non enim generatur verbum ipsum per actum intellectus, nec ejus similitudo, nec etiam similitudo illius speciei, quia intellectus informatur quasi verbum esset ejus expressivum, sed similitudo rei."
(Opusculum de natura verbi intellectus)

Again,
From this we can gather two things concerning the mental word, namely, that the word is always something proceeding from the intellect and existing in the intellect and that the word is the nature and likeness of the thing understood...the concept which anyone has of a stone is only the likeness of a stone but when the intellect understands itself, then such a mental word is the nature and the likeness of the intellect.
(De differentia verbi divini et humani)

The concept is not the species; but if the concept is the likeness only of the thing, then the species too is the likeness of the thing.

In the "De ente et essentia," c.4., St. Thomas writes:

"And although this nature understood has a universal side when compared with things which are outside the mind because there is one likeness of all, nevertheless
according as it has existence in this intellect or that, it is a definite particular species understood."

In the Summa Theologica, Ia, q.85, he writes:

"The thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually understood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act."

In the De potentiiis animae:

"Therefore the substance of a thing is that which the intellect understands, but the likeness of that thing which is in the soul, is that by which the intellect formally understands the thing outside."

So the understanding takes place through the possible intellect as receiving the likeness of the phantasm, through the operation of the active intellect abstracting the immaterial species from the phantasm and through the phantasm itself impressing its likeness on the possible intellect.

So also, Sum. Theol., Ia, q.87, a.1:

"As the sense in act is the sensible in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the thing understood in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood which is the form of the intellect in act."

Again in the Summa Theologica, Ia, q.87, a.2:

"Material things outside the soul are known by their likeness being present in the soul and are said, therefore, to be known by their likenesses."

In the Sum. Theol., Ia, q.78, a.2, he says:

"Knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the knower, as a kind of form thereof."

We must now consider our second point that these likenesses exist whole and entire apart from the phantasms. St. Thomas proves that ideas are stored in the intellectual memory quite apart from the sense memory. These ideas are
preserved in the intellect when not present in consciousness. (1) The separated soul is deprived of its sensible organs through which phantasms are received and in which they are preserved, as the imagination and the sense memory. Hence the separated soul cannot turn to the phantasm. But the separated soul retains the species intelligibiles of all the thoughts it had in this life. Any new knowledge that the separated soul may possess does not come through the phantasms (because for this sensible organs are required,) but by the direct infusion of species intelligibiles.

There are innumerable texts to show that the species are preserved in the intellect both of the composite and in the separated soul. We shall mention but a few of these. In the De unitate intellectus, p. 487, Maria ed., St. Thomas writes:

"It is evident that the species are preserved in the intellect; for it is as the philosopher has said above, the place of species, and, again, knowledge is a permanent habit."

Again, Contra Gentiles, Bk.2, c.73:

"Nor can those impressions formally received into the potential intellect have ceased to be, because the potential intellect not only receives but keeps what it receives."

Ibidem:

"He (Avicenna) says that the intellectual impressions do not remain in the potential intellect except just so long as they are being actually understood. And this he endeavors to prove from the fact that forms are actually apprehended so long as they remain in the

(1) See Sum. Theol., Ia, 79, a.6 and 7.
faculty that apprehends them...but the faculties which preserve forms, while not actually apprehended, he says, are not the faculties that apprehend those forms but storehouses attached to the said apprehensive faculties...hence (because it has no bodily organ) Avicenna concludes that it is impossible for intellectual impressions to be preserved in the potential intellect, except so long as it is actually understanding...So it seems (according to Avicenna) that the preservation of intellectual impressions does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul, but, on careful consideration, this theory will be found ultimately to differ little or nothing from the theory of Plato...Intellectual knowledge is more perfect than sensory. If, therefore, in sensory knowledge there is some power preserving apprehension, much more will this be the case in intellectual knowledge. This opinion (of Avicenna) is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who says that the potential intellect is the place of ideas: which is tantamount to saying, it is a storehouse of intellectual impressions, to use Avicenna's own phrase...The potential intellect when it is not considering them (intellectual impressions) is not perfectly actuated by them but it is in a condition intermediate between potentiality and actuality."

Concerning the preservation of the species in separated souls we quote De anima, a,15:

"Separated souls will also have definite knowledge of those things which they knew before, the intelligible species of which are preserved in them."

Ibidem:

"We must say that separated souls will also be able to understand through the species previously acquired while in the body but nevertheless not through them alone but also through infused species."

Also, De natura verbi intellectus:

"For that which is understood can be in the intellect and remain in the intellect without being actually understood." (1)

We now come to an important question which at first glance seems to be a contradiction. The soul, as we have

(1) For a thorough treatment of this subject see De anima, 15, and objections.
already considered, retains in the intellect the intellectual impressions by which it knows things. St. Thomas teaches at the same time that separated souls can think and understand without turning to any phantasm. Why is it necessary then, that the intellect turn to phantasms every time that it thinks?

St. Thomas has anticipated this question and answers it for us. (1) "Can the intellect actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed without turning to the phantasms?" He answers in the negative: "The Philosopher says (de Anima, 3) that the soul understands nothing without a phantasm." (2)

Therefore, St. Thomas maintains, to be conscious of any thought we must at the same time turn to the phantasm in our imagination, and that this is so is a fact of ordinary experience.

Why does he insist that the soul must turn to phantasms?

For an angel, he says, it is proper to understand without phantasms directly through intelligible species, because it is an intelligible substance itself and without any body. It is natural for man as united with the body to learn of individual objects through individual phantasms rendered intelligible by the intellectus agens. But we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. Therefore, he concludes, for the intellect to understand, it must

(1) *Sum. Theol.*, Ia, 84, a.7.
(2) supra (1)
of necessity turn to the phantasms.

If we said that it is natural for the soul to understand without turning to phantasms we would be Platonists, and hold that the union of body and soul does not benefit the soul but the body. The union of body and soul is natural, and therefore good for the soul.

But now another question arises: in what way is it done and how is it good for the soul? St. Thomas says: "But here again a difficulty arises. For since nature is always ordered to what is best (and it is better to understand by turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to phantasms) it might seem that God would so order the soul's nature as to make the nobler way of understanding natural to it, and not to level it down for that purpose to the body." (1)

He continues that the nobler way would not be suitable to the inferior nature of man. Nature comprises a minutely graded series of beings from lowest to highest and the nobler is not suited to the less noble.

The intellect puts the intelligible forms in act "ut similitudines determinatarum rerum ex cognitione phantasmatum." (2) The role of the phantasm is to orientate thought in a determined direction.

(1) Sum. Theol., Ia, 89, a.1.
(2) Quaest. disp. de Ver., q.10, a.6, ad 7.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE FUNCTION of the INTELLECTUS AGENS

Plato is the first, to our knowledge, who was concerned with the origin of intellectual ideas. His solution was quite simple. He thought that the types of things existed somewhere where our soul sees them, or has seen them, and has remembered them.

Aristotle, who was more of a realist, could not be satisfied with such an hypothesis. He held that the types exist only in the objects where they are realized. In order to contemplate them apart, Aristotelianism posits a special power in the soul giving to the types intelligible existence, as light gives existence to colors.

The scholastics have developed this thought, and among them St. Thomas. The notion of the object known passes, they say, through a series of successive purifications. First, the object strikes the senses and impresses a similitude there. This similitude (species sensibilis) is already detached from matter where it was realized; it remains nevertheless subject to the conditions of time and place. (1) It then passes to the imagination which is less material than the external sense. The sensible image still exists materially in the perceptive organ, in the imagination; it is purely intentional. (2) Nevertheless it remains indivi-

(1) "Sensus... accipit formam rei cognitae, sine materia quidem, sed cum materialibus conditionibus." Sum. Theol., Ia, q.84, a.2.

(2) "Phantasmata sunt similitudines sensibilium, sed in hoc differunt ab eis quia sunt praeter materiam, nam sensus est susceptivus specierum sine materia, ut supra dictum est, phantasia autem est motus factus a sensu secundum actum." Comm. de Anima, III, 13.
A final purification is then necessary. The faculty which accomplishes this is called the intellectus agens. (1)

Aristotle compared this faculty to light. The scholastics also call it light. St. Thomas clearly indicates that the word and idea are borrowed from physical experience. (2) Physical light has a twofold function: it makes us capable of seeing and it illumines the objects about us. Intelligible light will have also two analogous functions: ipse vigor intellectus ad intelligendum, vel id quo aliquid fit nobis notum. Experience teaches us that these two functions are independent of one another. We should note that the object known, in so far as such, possesses in itself intellectual light in a state of participation, and it is in virtue of this light that it is capable of invigorating the intellect. (3)

Since the intellectual light exercises an activity in view of a determined act, there must be in itself a determined structure, and therefore it is a form. St. Thomas says that the human intellect possesses a certain form, that is to say the intelligible light, which of itself is capable of knowing certain intelligibles which we can reach through sensible things. (4) Intelligible light par excellence is

(1) See De anima, q.1, a.4; Sum. Theol., Ia, q.79, a.3.
(2) De Ver., q.9, a.1.
(3) De Ver., q.9, a.1, ad 2.
(4) Sum. Theol., IaIIae, 109, a.1.
what St. Thomas calls the intellectus agens. (1) The property which the intellectus agens has of making a thing intelligible in act is called lumen. (2)

It is truly light; it realizes the idea of light more completely than the light of the sun. The light of the sun only makes us aware of the phenomenal world; intellectual light manifests to us the highest truths.

Aristotle seemed to make of this light, according to certain of his commentators (3), a distinct and quasi-divine being. Perhaps in his eyes it was an influence of the world soul entering into communion with the Master Artificer of the universe. The scholastics make of it a faculty of the soul, a faculty given nevertheless by the Supreme Being who created us to His image and likeness. (4)

(1) "In intellectu humano lumen quoddam est quasi qualitas vel forma permanens, scilicet lumen essentiale intellectus agentis." de Ver., q.12, a.1.

(2) de Ver., q.10, a.6, ad 1; De spirit. creat., a.10. "...the intellectual light which is in us, is nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types." Sum. Theol., 1a, 84, a.5.

cf. 1a, 105, a.3.

Some Thomists seem to consider in this intellectual light only its abstractive function and not its illuminating function which continues after the abstraction; cf. de Ver., q.10, a.6, already referred to.

(3) We do not mean to say scholastic commentators.

(4) "Virtus intellectualis creaturae lumen quoddam intelligibile dicitur, quasi a prima luce derivatum." Sum. Theol., 1a, 12, a.2.
God is the eternal and uncreated light. He illumines all things with a single act of His will. (1) The pure spirits are, to a lesser degree, light. They have in them the types of all created things. Man is far from that perfection. He has indeed received some light from intelligible being, but he possesses it only virtually and, as it were, in potency. He can see but he can see nothing of himself; he can know but he knows nothing intuitively. His intelligence is compared to a tabula rasa on which nothing is written. God has given him senses in order to store it.

But how can he make two faculties, so disparate, act in common? In order that he may have knowledge, the intelligence must be assimilated to the object, so that it becomes, in some manner, its resemblance. (2) Is it possible that the sense should act so intimately upon a very superior faculty, that the material resemblance which it possesses might inform the immaterial? Here we cannot take refuge in the unity of the subject. Often the determination which the intelligence needs does not exist, properly speaking, in the sensation. It is included materially in the object of the sense (3); it is not sensed.

(1) "As any human doctrine exteriorly proposed instructs us because of the intellectual light which we have received from God, it follows that God alone teaches us interiorly and as principal Cause." De Ver., q.11, a.1.

(2) "Virtus cognoscitiva habet cognoscere per similitudinem rei cognitae." Sum. Theol., Ia, 17, a.3.

(3) "Neceesse est quod intelligibilia intellectus nostri sint in speciebus sensibilibus secundum esse." de Anima, I, III, lec. 13.
Hence some intermediary is necessary to effect the transposition of the sensible datum to the intelligence, a function which is neither a sensation nor an intuition, but a vital, natural operation produced independently of our will and without our having direct consciousness of it, the whole efficiency of which is to counterdraw, as it were, on the form of the sensation the intelligible content and to impress it on the possible intellect.

The intellectus agens does not know; (1) it merely, from the point of view of knowledge, renders the intelligible, which is potentially contained in sensible reality, actually intelligible, (2) in communicating to it the intelligible being which belongs to it in itself. (3)

The faculty which receives the transformed datum is called the intellectus possibilis. These are two really distinct powers. (4) Both are light; both concur to manifest

(1) "Intelligentum agens non facit species intelligibilis actu ut ipse per eam intelligat." _Contra Gen._ 2, 76.

(2) "Actio ejus est facere phantasmata intelligibilia actu." _Ibid._

(3) "Tales autem facit eam qualis est ipse, nam omne agens agit simile sibi." _Ibid._

(4) It is not a common error, but an error nevertheless, to say that the intellectus agens and the intellectus possibilis are merely two aspects of the same power. So say the followers of St. Bonaventure. Rather we must say that they are two really distinct powers from which proceed two acts of the same intellectual soul. Hence they are really distinct powers, just as the faculties of sight and hearing are really distinct powers, and not only virtually distinct. St. Thomas says in the _Quaestio disputatione De Anima_, IV, ad 1, "...duae potentiae, quae sunt in una substantia animae radi- catae,...ad octavum dicendum, quod duorum intellectuum, scilicet possibilis et agentis, sunt duae actiones. Nam
the truth. The intellectus agens concurs in impressing the
types of the things on the intellectus possibilis; the lat-
ter concurs in affirming them. Are these two faculties

actus intellectus possibilis est recipere intelligibilia;
actio autem intellectus agentis est abstrahere intelligibili-
ia. Nec tamen sequitur quod sit duplex intelligere in
hominem: quia ad unum intelligere oportet quod utraque istar-
um actionum concurrat."

St. Thomas, I, 79, 7: "Diversificatur tamen potentia in-
tellectus agentis, et intellectus possibilis: quia respectu
eiudem objecti, aliud principium oportet esse potentiam
activam, quae facit objectum esse in actu; et aliud poten-
tiam passivam, quae movetur ab objecto in actu existente.
Et sic potentia activa comparatur ad suum objectum, ut ens
in actu ad ens in potentia: potentia autem passiva comparar-
tur ad suum objectum e converso, ut ens in potentia ad ens
in actu.

According to the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas the
intellectus agens and the intellectus possibilis are really
distinct. This distinction is further found in St. Thomas:
Ia, 79, 10; Ia, XIV, I, ad 1; Cont. Gent. lib II, cap. 78;
II Sent. dist. 17, q.11, a.1; III Sent. dist. 14, a.1;
quæst.uncula 2 ad 2; Compendio Theologiae, inter opuscula,
cap. 85, 87, 88.

Cajetan: In I, 79, 7: "Diversitas potentiarum aut est ex
diversitate formalis objecti; aut ex diverso genere attin-
gendi idem objectum formaliter. Sed intellectus diversitas
non potest esse primo modo; et secundo modo solum causatur
distinctio inter agentem et possibiln. (I)

Et dicendum quod, apud s. Thomam et veritatem, diversi-
tas intellectuum non sumitur ex prima radice, scilicet ex
diversitate objecti; sed ex secunda, scilicet diversitate
actus et potentiae. (IV) In (V) he further clarifies the
point by pointing out that the distinction is not based on
acting and suffering, ex agere et pati, but on the basic
distinction between act and potency.

John of St. Thomas: Phil. Nat. IV P. Q. X, Art. I:
(Utrum sit necesse ponir intellectum agentem distinctum a
possibili et quid sit.): Et aliqui auctores negant distin-
gui has duas potencias, sed esse eandem cum duplici vi seu
efficientia, quod probabile reputat P. Suarez libro 4 de
Anima cap. 8, n.15. OPPOSITUM TAMEN TENET D. THOMAS.

Otherwise there would not be "aliqua ratio communis,
sub qua conveniant illi duo actus et a qua specificetur
illa unica potentia habens illos. Ratio autem faciendi
species sine cognitione et ratio eliciendi cognitionem per
species non convenient in aliqua ratione communi constitu-
ente unam potentiam, sed sunt rationes ita distanties, quod
ex se sufficiunt fundare distinctas potencias, ut patet in
sensu cognoscendo et virtute emittente species ab objecto
seu faciente illas sine cognitione. (Note this is a real
really distinct, or a single faculty acting under two different conditions? The first opinion is that of St. Thomas; the second is maintained by St. Bonaventure. One thing is certain, and that is that the two modes of action are essentially different.

Another distinction must be made in the intellectus agens. The intellectus agens, with respect to the image, illumines it, disengaging the intelligible contained in it. (1)

Tilmann Pesch, S.J. has characterized this twofold effect of the intellectus agens very well:

Intellectus agens ex natura suae indolis sese phantasmati existente in phantasia humana intime adjungit, atque hac sul conjunctione cum eo in unum coalescens, illud quodammo elevat, simulque elevando tanquam instrumentum intime conjunctum ad operationem suam movet et diriget. (2)

distinction.) Non est autem anima nostra tantae eminenticis, ut virtus elius in unica ratione superiori et enimenti ori uniat illam duplicem virtutem faciendi species et intelligendi, neque in angelo datur talis perfectio, ut unica potentia sit factiva specierum et cognoscitiva.

Difficulties if this were not so: (1) quia eadem potentia sempam moveret et reduceret de potentia ad actum; esset enim potentia ad species et faceret illas. (2) quia alias ratio activi et passivi non esset sufficiens ratio distinguendi potentias, cum tamen sint rationes maxime diversae et primae differentiae entis. Primo enim dividitur penes actum et potentiam, et consequenter penes potentiam activam et passivam, quae fundantur in actu et potentia.

(1) "Phantasmata et illuminantur ab intellectu agente et iterum ab eis per virtutem intellectus agentia species intelligibles abstrahuntur." Sum. Theol., Ia, 85, a.1. Also, "Phantasmata virtute intellectus agentis redduntur habitia ut ex eis intentiones intelligibles abstrahuntur." Ibid.

(2) Psych., t.III, n.335.- It may be asked where the movement of the intellectus agens comes from, because it does not always act. Is it the object, either by itself or by the sensation, which sets it in motion? If by this is meant a communicated impulse, it is not necessary: the
All these distinctions of powers do not imply entities added one to the other, but only qualities which manifest the perfection of the same entity. There is only one existence properly speaking (1), that of the individual which in its being and by its being is sensible, intelligent, and so forth, although sensibility and intelligibility are essentially diverse properties.

Particular material circumstances, that is to say, the circumstances of time and place are excluded from the intelligence. Following the scholastic doctrine these data are absolutely repugnant to the nature of the intelligence. It is not, as St. Thomas explains, that the intellect cannot represent to itself a singular object. It represents to itself its own act and the existence of its subject, and these are singular things. But it is powerless to grasp directly a material object in such a determined place or moment. In order that it might represent to itself a position in place or time, it is necessary that it reproduce in itself

intellectus agens needs only the active power which was given to it by God. Under the creative influence, everywhere present, it is always ready to act, - comparatur ut actus respectu intelligibilium in quantum est quaedam virtus immaterialis activa: de Anima, III, 10. If by this is meant the determining circumstance, that circumstance is the image in the imagination. As soon as that image is presented, the intellectus agens comes into motion to abstract from it the intelligible content; then the intellectus possibilis, determined by this previous operation, becomes conformable to the object and perceives it.

(1) "Forma accidentalis in hoc a forma substantiali differt quod non dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale." Sum. Theol., Ia, q.76, a.4.
the analogues of that position. (1) This the sensation does because it has a material organ.

Some other things in sensible datum belong, on the contrary, perfectly to the intelligence. St. Thomas mentions mathematical relations, habits, and the passions. (2)

Many difficulties still present themselves, such as the question whether the active intellect is a power of the soul or a superior power, extrinsic to the essence of the soul and conferring upon it ab extra the faculty of knowing. This difficulty St. Thomas answers for us. (3) But such questions have only an historical or controversial value with which we are not concerned here.

(1) See above p. 77.

(2) "Tum illa quae dicuntur per abstractionem, scilicet mathematica, quam naturalia quae sunt habitus et passiones." de An., III, lec. 13.

Cf. Sum. Theol., 1a, 85, a.2.

(3) Sum. Theol., q.79, a.5, 4; Contra Gent., II, 76.
CHAPTER EIGHT

The FUNCTION of the INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES (1)

Let us recall briefly the elements which concur in a remote or proximate manner in the act of intellection. (2)

Our knowledge is the result of the action of the intellectus agens upon the sensible image which is drawn from concrete things. Their combined action produces what we call the species impressa intelligibilis whose role consists in informing the intellectus possibilis, to lead it to produce the very act of knowledge or intellection. (3) (F.-7)

Our faculty of knowing, finite and limited, is essentially passive. (4) Experience suffices to demonstrate

(1) Rabeau, G. Species. Verbum. p. 36: "Au moment où je pense, je suis ma pensée. Sans doute, je distingue ma pensée de mon corps, voire, avec moins de facilité, de mes sentiments. Mais en quoi mon intellect se distinguerait-il de son intellection au moment où il se connaît? Cependant, avant d'accomplir cette intellection, mon intellect ne connaissait pas telle chose ou peut-être même était en sommeil: c'est uniquement pour cette raison et de cette manière que l'intellect diffère de l'intelligible, parce qu'il est et quand il est en puissance. Mais aussi, quand il pense, c'est-à-dire quand il devient l'intelligible, il faut bien qu'il y ait en lui une cause qui le change, qui réalise cette unité. Cette cause, c'est la species intelligibilis."

(2) "In intellectu autem tria sunt, scilicet ipsa potentia intellectus, species rei intellectae, quae est forma ejus se habens ad ipsum intellectum sicut species coloris ad pupillum, et intelligere, quod est operatio intellectus." St. Thomas, de differentia verbi divini et humani.

It is well to keep these distinctions in mind when these terms are used.


(4) "Causaliter et in sua foecundatione est intelligere quoddam pati." John of St. Thomas, Curs. theol., t.IV, disp.15, a.7.

Also, "Est igitur intelligere nostrum pati causaliter, et hoc per s e." Cajetan, in I, 79, 2, n.XV.
this truth. Our mind is at first empty of knowledge, a "tabula rasa"; it is little by little and at the cost of ceaseless effort that we reach truth. Because this truth is extended to the infinite as being is, "verum et ens convers-tuntur," we never attain it in an exhaustive degree; in other words, our minds always remain in potency with reference to new truths.

We could argue a priori. Since the object of the intelligence has no limit: if the human intelligence does not depend on the object: if, on the contrary, it is the object which depends on the intelligence: if universal being, the object of knowledge, exists because I know it and in so far as I know it, we must admit that the human intelligence is the efficient and exemplary cause of all beings, that it attains the infinite, not in a successive manner, but simultaneously as God Himself does. This is evidently repugnant.

Our intelligence is essentially passive, since it depends on its object, and it is under its influence that it will pass from potency to act. Now the object, such as it is presented in nature, could not act on the intelligence, and this for two reasons, (a) because the corporeal cannot attain the spiritual, and (b) because every finite object is limited in its being and hence is powerless to communicate its activity to an extraneous faculty. We have recourse, then, to an intermediary immediately susceptible of represent-

The intelligence as determined by the object is passive with regard to it. - Sum. Theol., IaIIIae, 22. - not in intellect itself, but in the cause of intellect.
ting the object and of acting on the intelligence to make it pass from potency to act. This intermediary is the species impressa.

Knowledge is an operation of the metaphysical order by which the knowing subject, separated from all impediments and imperfections inherent in the subject, is united to the object known, in a manner so intimate, that far from composing with it a tertium quid it becomes the object known itself: Cognoscens fit ipsum cognitum. (1) This mysterious operation, this passage to second act, evidently supposes that the faculty is already in actu primo. (2) It is impos-

(1) Cf. Cajetan, in I, 14, 1: Cognoscens et cognitum sunt magis unum quam materia et forma, ut egregie dixit Averroes in Illum de Anima, comm. 5; also in I, 55, 3: Quanto vis cognoscitiva est altior tanto magis unita se habet ad cognoscibilia.

Cf. also Maritain, J., Réflexions sur l'intelligence, pp. 57, 58.

(2) Cf. Maritain, J., Reflexions, pp. 54, 55.

The thing known is in the knower:

actually considering
{species expressa - as understood in actu secundo.)
not actually considering but potentially considering it (species impressa - as understood in actu primo - not acting, but ready to act.)

...according to the mode of the knower:

a thing exists outside the knower.
{esse physicum, or esse} {esse intentionale, or}
{esse naturae, or esse spirituale, or}
{esse entitativum.} {esse viale.}

The impressed species of any object is of the same essence as the object known, only the mode of being is different; esse naturale, outside the mind; esse intentionale, in the mind.

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sible that it be so by itself, being essentially passive, in spite of the activity which it exhibits; nor does it come about by the immediate action of the object as has already been indicated. Lest we should fall back to the explanation of Malebranche, Descartes, Kant, or to that of the empiricists, we must admit in the object a purification which renders it apt to be united to the intelligence in the manner we have pointed out. The object thus purified and immaterialized is the species impressa.

Cognitum est in cognoscente secundum modum (immaterialitatis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognoscentis.</th>
<th>Knowers:</th>
<th>Object</th>
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<tr>
<td>I. Sense - (function of a corporeal organ - a material function</td>
<td>The sense is nothing by identity and some things by information.</td>
<td>The singular - in this particular matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Spiritual substance - (united to a material body but not depending intrinsically on it - the human soul</td>
<td>The human intellect is nothing by identity and all things by information.</td>
<td>Universal, immaterial essence of material things abstracted from matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Pure spirit - a composition of essence and existence - the angel</td>
<td>The angel is some things by identity and some by information.</td>
<td>Intuitively knows its own essence (The proper object of its intelligence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV God. Pure Act. No composition even of essence and existence</td>
<td>God is all things, by identity and nothing by information</td>
<td>Divine Essence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lower creature has only an analogical, not proper knowledge of that which is above him. Cf. Rousselot, P. S.J., The Intellectualism of St. Thomas, pp. 87-96.
What is the role of the species impressa in relation to the intelligence?

First, let us note the twofold character of the species impressa. On the one hand it is an immaterial entity, completely different in itself from corporal realities, but a physical entity nevertheless, which as such, does not exceed its proper evaluation; it is a modification of the faculty, an accident which is united to it to constitute a tertium quid, the faculty thus modified. On the other hand, because of its tendential character towards knowledge, it virtually keeps in itself its nature and privileges. (1)

"Il y a un être, un exister, - celui que ces mots évoquent immédiatement pour tout le monde, - qui consiste à être posé "hors du néant" ou hors de ses causes pour son propre compte, de par une actualité dont on jouit soi-même, soit qu'il s'agisse d'exister en autre chose comme les accidents. Ce n'est évidemment pas de cette façon que les choses existent dans l'âme pour donner lieu à la connaissance; car l'âme n'est pas un amalgame de tous les éléments du monde et de toutes les qualités qu'elle peut connaître.

"Alors il faut reconnaître un autre mode d'exister, inférieur, incomplet, incapable de donner consistance à une chose ou à une nature, mais capable par la même d'introduire

(1) "C'est ici qu'il convient d'amenuiser nos concepts, pour les rendre dignes de la subtilité de l'objet. Nous ne comprendrons rien à la connaissance si nous ne nous décidons à épurer exprès pour elle la notion même d'être ou d'existence." Réfl., p. 59.
dans les choses des anoblissements qui n'appartiennent pas à leur être propre, - un exister qui consiste non à être pour soi, mais purement et tendre à autre chose: appelons-le 'être de passage,' ou 'être de tendance.' Le mouvement nous offre déjà, dans l'ordre de l'action, des exemples de cet être de passage (esse viale). (1) Chaque fois qu'une cause instrumentale est mue par une cause supérieure ("agent principal") à produire un effet plus noble qu'elle-même, comme le pinceau ou l'archet à produire de la beauté, ou les ondu- lations du milieu à produire la couleur ou le son, l'analyse métaphysique nous force à admettre, qu'à ce moment et de par cette, motion quelque réalité supérieure, la vertu efficiente de l'agent principal de l'artiste maniant le pinceau ou l'archet, de la qualité active causant la vibration, passe dans l'instrument, et surélève son action; mais passe-t-elle aussi avec son être de chose? (2) Scrutez de toutes man- ières la cause instrumentale en train d'agir, vous n'y trouverez jamais, comme chose (purement et simplement existante et décelable,) la vertu efficiente de l'agent principal, vous n'y trouverez jamais, selon l'être de chose, que la cause instrumentale elle-même et son mouvement. C'est selon l'être de tendance que la causalité de l'artiste est dans le pinceau.

Disons donc en général qu'a côté de l'être de chose, par lequel une nature est posée hors du néant pour son propre

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(1) Esse viale is also called by the scholastics esse spirituiale and more generally esse intentionale. Cf. Refl., p. 61.

(2) Etre de chose is called by the scholastics esse naturae or more generally esse entitativum. Cf. Refl., p. 61.
compte, comme substance ou comme accident, il faut admettre un autre être, une autre existence, qui en tant même qu'existence est tendance, une existence tenue, impondérable, décontée spiritualisée, qui suffit pour que la chose qui existe sous cet état produise un certain effet mais non pas pour qu'elle soit plantée dans l'être à son propre compte, et qui demande, à cause de cela même, à s'accrocher à quelque autre chose existant pour soi, dans laquelle passera ou existera ce qui a cet être de tendance." (1)

Now, of the two unions required for knowledge, one entitative by which the subject is put into contact with the thing, and the other intentional (2) by which the one becomes

(1) Réfl., p. 60.

(2) We must distinguish the intentional reception of the species impressa from the act of knowledge itself. Cajetan has noted this distinction in a well-known text which has not always been exactly understood: "Ipsam (speciem intelligibilem) constituere in actu secundo, est ipsam non esse actum secundum, sed habere se ad actum secundum ut forma ad esse. Quemadmodum enim forma est principium essendi materiae, ita quod idem est esse materiae et formae diversimode,...ita species intelligibilis, si actu est in genere intelligibili est intelligendi principium ita quod intelligere et ut ipsius est." in I, XII, 2, n.XVI. To forget this logically leads to the confusion of the species impressa with the formal concept or the species expressa. If St. Thomas distinguishes the act of knowledge from the latter, the species impressa cannot be the term of knowledge. It becomes, in this case, principle of the act of knowledge. Now it cannot be the principle and the term at the same time. St. Thomas on this point is very clear: "Differt (conceptio intellectus) a specie intelligibili: nam species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu, consideratur ut principium actionis intellectus; cum omne agens agat secundum quod est actu: actu autem fit per aliquam formam quam oportet esse actionis principium. Differt autem ab actione intellectus: quia praedicta conceptio consideratur ut terminus actionis, et quasi quoddam per ipsam constituendum." De Pot., VIII, l. He says the same a little farther: "Neque Intellectum per se est similitudo rei intellectae, per quam informatur intellectus ad intelligendum.
the other, it is especially the second with which we are
here concerned, the first being only a preliminary condi-
tion to the act of knowledge itself. It is thanks to this
intentional union, wholly objective, wholly representative
and tendential - it is thanks to this special existence, -
and ordinary with regard to the mode, - of the faculty and
of the thing, by which one can become the other. Thus "la
composition primitive selon l'ordre entitatif - de l'espèce
impressive et de l'esprit - aboutit à la simplicité définitive
d'une identification (selon l'ordre intentionnel). Tout se
passe dans un complet désintéressement et du côté de l'in-
telligence qui n'apporte à cette union aucune inertie,

Intellectus enim non potest intelligere nisi secundum quod
fit in actu per hanc similitudinem, sicut nihil aliud potest
operari secundum quod est in potentia, sed secundum quod
fit actus per aliquam formam. Hae ergo similitudo se ha-
bet in intelligendo sicut intelligendi principium, ut calor
est principium caelefactionis, non sicut intelligendi termin-
us. Hoc ergo est primo et per se intellectum, quod intel-
lectus in se ipse conceptum de re intellectu...Hoc autem sic
ab intellectu conceptum dicitur verbum interius...

The species impressa - intelligible or sensible - as its
name indicates, does not make of the object of which it is
the similitude a known object; through it we cannot say it
is "cognitum," "intellectum," "sensatum," but only "cognos-
cible," "sensible," "intelligible;" through it the faculty
becomes, in fact, capable - in actu primo proximo - of know-
ing the object. The verbum mentale or species expressa, on
the contrary, represents the object, no longer in so far as
knowable, but in so far as known. For St. Thomas we must
remember, there is no species expressa for the knowledge of
the external senses: "Non facit ipse sensus exterior sibi
aliquam formam sensibilem; hoc autem facit vis imaginativa,
cuius forma quodamodo simile est verbum intellectus."
Quodl., IX, 9, ad 2. These notions clearly distinguish them
from each other. Those who, simplifying in excess the no-
tion of knowledge, and reducing it to the simple intentional
information of the faculty by the intelligible species are
forced by that very fact to identify them.
aucune réserve, et du côté de l'espèce impressa qui survient à l'esprit en vue d'une existence impersonnelle. La compénétration est telle que nous sommes désormais en présence d'un seul entité. Que si l'on parle encore soit de l'esprit, soit de l'espèce intelligible, ou des qualités particulières à chacun de ces deux éléments, ce n'est plus comme s'il s'agissait de deux objets ou de deux parties d'objet; c'est simplement comme de deux objets discernables d'une même réalité." (1)

We are now on the threshold of the very birth of knowledge, since the species impressa must cause the faculty to pass from potency to first act.

"La genèse de la connaissance consistera évidemment dans la naissance de cet être original, nouveau, dégagé des entraves de la fonction de sujet, - qui caractérise la représentation. Or cette genèse est un fait de vie, une génération réalisée selon l'immanence. Elle est constituée par ceci que l'intellect possible sous l'influence de l'intellect agent, parvienne à cet être représentatif, cet être d'ordre idéal qu'il n'avait point encore. Au cours de cette genèse vitale, l'esprit se donne un être qu'il n'avait pas ou du moins il s'en donne l'exercice épanoui." (2)

It is through the medium of the species impressa that the intellectus agent makes the intellectus possibilis pass from simply physical or entitative existence to objective, ideal, or intentional existence. We must remember, however, that if the species possesses a truly objective value, that if it exists according to an ideal, representative mode, it always

(1) Garin, La théorie de l'idée. p.530 and following.

(2) Garin, Ibid., p. 536.
remains the principium quo (1), and it is also the connecting agent between the mind and the object. It is not, then, the term in which the mind reposes and which it contemplates;

(1) Sum. Theol. Ia, 85, 2.- "Quidam posuerunt quod vires cognoscitivae quae sunt in nobis, nihil cognoscunt nisi proprie passiones; puta quod sensus non sentit nisi passionem sui organi. Et secundum hoc intellectus nihil intelligit nisi suam passionem, scilicet speciem intelligibilem in se receptam; et secundum hoc species hujusmodi est ipsum quod intelligitur. Sed haec opinio manifeste apparat falsa ex duobus. Primo quidem, quia eadem sunt quae intelligimus, et de quibus sunt scientiae. Si igitur ea quae intelligimus esse solum species quae sunt in anima, sequeretur quod scientiae omnes non essent de rebus quae sunt extra animam, sed solum de speciebus intelligibilibus quae sunt in anima: sic secundum Platonicos omnes scientiae sunt de ideis, quas ponent esse intellectus in actu. Secundo, quia sequeretur error antiquorum dicentium, omne quod videtur esse verum; et sic quod contradictoriae essent simul verae. Si enim potentia non cognoscit nisi propria passionem, de ea solum judicat; sic autem videtur aliquid secundum quod potentia cognoscitiva afflictitur; semper ergo judicium potentiae cognoscitiva erit de eo quod judicat, scilicet de propria passione, secundum quod est, et ita omne judicium erit verum. Puta, si gustus non sentit nisi propriam passionem, cum aliquid habens sanum gustum, judicat mel esse dulce, vere judicabit. Et similiter, si ille qui habet gustum infectum, judicat mel esse amarum, vere judicabit. Uterque enim judicabit secundum quod gustus ejus afflictitur. Et sic sequitur quod omnis opinio aequaliter erit vera, et universaliter omnis acception." This is why St. Thomas continues, the species intelligibiles (ideas, representations) are not ipsum quod intelligitur, but id quo intelligitur, forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit. "Et idea dicendum est, quod species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum, ut quo intelligit intellectus."

Cf. Maritain, Reflexions, p. 33; Les degrés du Savoir, Annexes, p. 782: "Quo peut s'entendre en général, au sens de pur moyen (alors le concept est quo comme la species impressa), ou en particulier, au sens de moyen par quoi, comme à partir d'un principe, l'acte d'intellection se produit (alors le mot ne convient qu'à la species impressa, tandis que le concept est in quo, moyen en quoi, comme en un terme, l'acte d'intellection se consomme.)

Quo (pur moyen) (principe) (term) (in quo)

D'après le vocabulaire employé par saint Thomas dans un texte du de Veritate, p. 787, note 1., on pourrait appeler
this is the role of the species expressa. Apropos to this
John of St. Thomas says: "La seule représentation de l'objet
ne constitue pas avec l'esprit une tierce nature resultant,
faite de la représentation et de la faculté. En effet cette
tierce nature, de soi entité physique, une fois devenue représen-
tation pure, ne serait plus entité physique. Donc
l'espèce intelligible parfait la faculté uniquement dans
l'ordre représentatif, dans l'ordre de la connaissance: elle
entre avec cette faculté en union selon mode objectif et non
selon le mode physique. Toutefois, par un autre côté, sous
son aspect d'accident inhérent dans l'intellect, l'espèce
imprime l'actue selon l'ordre physique (entitativ). Mais
ceci reste accidentel par rapport à sa valeur essentielle
d'espèce intelligible: d'élément représentatif substitut de
l'objet. De plus les espèces intelligibles n'ont pas entre
elles d'opposition comme les entités physiques des réalités
contraires, comme le blanc et le noir ne s'opposent pas dans
la vision mais y coexistent. Partant la connaissance suppose
moins un changement physique qu'un changement objectif et
représentatif, supérieur aux conditions du changement phy-
sique." (1)

With respect to the role of the species in regard to

primum quo la species impressa (principe de l'acte de l'in-
tellection), et secundum quo le concept (terme de cet acte.)"

(1) John of St. Thomas, Theol., I,P., q.12, D.13.-
Translated by Lavaud, Introduction à la theologie de Saint
Thomas.
the object itself towards which it orientates and turns the mind we find the answer in John of St. Thomas. "Les espèces impresses sont requises de la part de l'objet à titre de représentation pour unir cet objet à la faculté selon l'être de connaissance et l'être immatériel. L'espèce intelligible ne détermine point la faculté de connaissance de n'importe quelle façon, mais selon l'ordre objectif, en l'actuant à la place de l'objet, en la déterminant suivant l'être représentatif de l'objet. Ainsi, nous ne le nions pas, les espèces impresses se considèrent sous l'aspect représentatif, elles se situent du côté de l'objet tenant sa place, lui permettent de déterminer et d'actuer la faculté par leur intermédiaire. Or, cette information n'est pas seulement détermination de la faculté: c'est une détermination de la faculté du côté de l'objet qui la spécifie." (1)

And in this way, for John of Saint Thomas, the object makes an impression on the mind directly, albeit through the intelligible species. It is not surprising, then, that it becomes the term really attained by thought. Besides John of St. Thomas will say that the species impressa is a germ, a seed of knowledge.

However, if the exercise of an efficient causality on the part of the species impressa itself precedes the act of knowledge, it does not constitute it; it is in virtue of the formal cause that the species impressa acts on the mind to

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(1) Ibid.
determine it, to cause it to acquire its normal existence, its objective, intentional existence.

The action of the species impressa is not only felt in the entitative order; it is exercised principally in the representative or intentional order. If it does so in an incomplete manner at first and, as it were, virtually, it is because the intelligence has not yet arrived at the total act of its representative being. But the intelligible species possesses already objective existence; it but awaits the opportune moment to transmit it, and it is made the vehicle of the intellectus agens in order to establish the intellectus possibilis in its perfect and definitive actuality.

We must not conclude, then, that the intelligence is a purely passive faculty, that it exercises no proper activity; it is "elle qui, de par sa force vitale, se fait passer de l'existence purement entitative, purement physique, à l'existence objective, idéale, représentative, supérieure et indépendante par rapport à la fonction de sujet limité. Elle se donne cette existence et elles s'y maintient d'elle-même, ce qui constitue la fin suprême de toute faculté de connaissance, le degré suprême de l'existence." (1)

The species expressa, the verbum mentale, the concept, the idea, are words which designate one and the same thing, and present different aspects under which it can be viewed.

(1) Garin, Ibid. p. 597.
Distinct from the intelligence, although enclosed in it; distinct from the species impressa, as the term of the operation is distinguished from its principle; distinct from the psychological realities which concur in the elaboration of all finite knowledge, the species expressa is presented to us under two well delineated aspects: on the one hand, it is the result of mental activity: on the other hand, it manifests to us exterior reality. Under the first aspect it is an emanation, a production inherent in the mind and yet distinct from it. Under the second aspect, it constitutes the form according to which our knowledge is cast with exactitude; it is also the proximate term to which our contemplation is directed.

Let us consider the existence of the mental word. According to John of St. Thomas, it is derived from a two-fold source: "Ce terme de la connaissance, placé à l'intérieur de la faculté de compréhension, est postulé pour deux motifs: soit eu égard à une nécessité se tenant du côté de l'objet, soit eu égard à une fécondité se tenant du côté de la faculté." (1)

First, the intelligence calls for the existence of a word, of a species expressa. Informed by the species impressa, it acts in its turn and necessarily produces an effect similar in every degree to the principle of its activity. This is the effect which we call the verbum mentale,

(1) Theol., I, P., q.27, D.12, a.6; See, St. Thomas, de natura verbi intellectus.
concept, idea, species expressa; the verbum terminates the very act of knowledge at a point where the act of knowledge is no longer conceivable without that interior procession which terminates it. There is present a true generation, of the intellectual order it is true, but in which is recognized, purified and ennobled, an operation analogous to the generation of the human body: the verbum is the fruit of the faculty in action, as the child is the fruit of the one who gives it life. Hence to know is added to the mind by way of growth, and that, in reality, to know is to surpass at the same time its proper worth. Since knowledge is a privileged mode of being, an objective absolute existence, stripped of all impediments and of the potentialities inherent in the subject considered as subject, its term cannot be constituted, at least immediately, by a material object, by a physical entity enclosed in its subject, incapable of universality, of extension and of the absolute. This term must be on a level with the thinking faculty and in intimate contact with it, since it is its fruit as well: hence we see the necessity for the species expressa.

This necessity can be considered also on the part of the object. John of St. Thomas says: "Le concept ou espèce exprimée en nous ou verbe est admis en vue de deux offices. D'abord pour que l'objet soit intelligible en acte second; pour qu'il soit saisi par l'esprit à titre de terme. L'objet n'est pas en lui-même assez intelligible et immatériel pour être atteint de façon à former en soi le terme de l'esprit."
Sans doute, par l'espèce imposée, l'objet est-il rendu intelligible, est-il uni à l'intelligence: c'est alors à titre de facteur d'intelligence, non pas à titre de terme visé. Or il faut que l'esprit atteigne l'objet en valeur de terme, de chose vue, donc il faut que l'esprit atteigne l'objet en un autre élément qu'en l'espèce imposée. En effet en celle-ci l'objet se trouve simplement sous forme de principe d'intelligence, sous forme de principe d'actualité de la faculté en vue de l'élaboration de la connaissance: ce n'est pas sous forme de terme vu. D'autre part l'objet ne peut être atteint en tant qu'il est en dehors de l'esprit et existant en soi. D'abord, en cet état, il se trouve la plupart du temps corporel et non encore spiritualisé, partant sans proportion à l'égard de la connaissance intellectuelle. Bien plus, même si l'objet est alors spirituel en son entité, il n'est pas en acte second de vivre par mode de terme et de servir de terme à la connaissance à titre de contenu compris."

"Ainsi faut-il, pour que cet objet devienne élément compris, que se constitue le concept ou espèce expresse, dans laquelle lui se trouve représenté à titre de terme connu, manifesté, exprimé en acte. De même fallait-il d'ailleurs qu'il soit représenté dans l'espèce imposée à titre d'intelligible en acte premier. Cette fonction (d'objet visé) le concept l'exerce en nous pour l'objet extérieur de façon à permettre à celui-ci de se trouver compris en acte à titre de terme. En cela, notre idée mérite précisément le nom d'espèce expresse et de concept. Notre
idée exerce d'ailleurs une autre fonction. Ce n'est plus seulement de rendre l'objet proportionné, spiritualisé selon l'être d'entité comprise par mode de terme: cette fois c'est la fonction consistant à manifester à "dire" la chose comprise et connue. A cause de cela appelle-t-on l'espèce expresse: verbe, parole, lumière (puisque toute entité manifestée est une lumière). Selon son office primordial, l'espèce expresse s'appelle verbe: elle est une manifestation. Mais à ce moment cette espèce s'exprime en vue de la compréhension et contemplation de l'objet en vue de rendre l'objet compris." (1)

(1) Theol., I,P., q.27, D.12, a.4. Intellectus in actu est intellectum (res intellecta) in actu - Cf. Sum. Theol., Is, 14, 2.

I. Stone - (in esse naturae; potentially intelligible) The intellect - (without the species of the stone; potentially understanding.)

II. Stone - (as it exists in the species impressa; not actually considered but actually intelligible.) The intellect - (possessing the species of the stone; not actually considering, but habitually understanding - in actu primo.)

III. Stone - (as it exists in the species expressa; actually understood.) The intellect - (possessing the species of the stone; actually understanding the stone - in actu secundo.)

Not identical but distinct in so far as potential.

The multiplicity of steps in the acquisition of knowledge are necessary because both the object and the intellect are potential. In the case of God, since He is Actus Purus there is no potency, and hence God's essence and His understanding are identical.

It is well to keep in mind the distinction between intelligere (intellection - in the active sense - actualizing the
For St. Thomas and his commentators "l'être de la pensée est un être spécial. Il diffère de l'être de la substance, existence directe d'un sujet en soi. L'être de la pensée est une existence s'exerçant au-dessus et au-delà de la fonction de sujet. Pour qu'un tel être atteigne cette substance, il faut qu'il fasse au moyen d'une forme exempte des ravalements du sujet fini, au moyen d'une forme apte à exercer immédiatement et directement l'être de terme comme terme. Ceci est d'autant plus nécessaire qu'en sa nature la connaissance est une existence non point seulement d'assimilation, mais de "percée" et de pénétration. Le besoin d'un terme de même ordre que l'esprit et que la pensée sert ainsi de base à la nécessité d'un verbe mental." (1)

To show the necessity of the species expressa we must study its nature more deeply. We shall do this by comparing the production of the verbum mentale with the contemplation of the object through the verbum itself. Is there in the production of the verbum and in the intellection or contemplation of the same word, two absolutely distinct operations or simply two aspects, two modalities of one and the same operation? And again, is there priority or union of nature; is there subordination?

It is certain that for St. Thomas and his principal commentators, to see and to express, to know and to say, to contemplate and to produce, are in se two modes of a different intellect), and intelligi (in the passive sense - actualizing the thing.)

(1) Garin, Ibid. p. 647.
nature. This difference, according to them, does not go as far as a complete opposition or a mutual and absolute repugnance, or as far as a real distinction. It denotes rather two different or distinguishable aspects of one and the same operation.

For them, in fact, to know is a supreme state, the fundamental disposition of a mind. It is before all else a manner of existence, a manner of being: per modum incrementi. What dynamism there is in knowledge must take the second place as fieri is ordained to esse. "La comprehension n'est pas nécessairement action," says John of St. Thomas: "elle est acte second, comme une qualité qui serait virtuellement action. Elle n'a plus l'imperfection de devenir, de la préparation sous la forme du changement: elle est une fin, un acte suprême, recherché pour soi et non pour un effet quelconque." (1)

Moreover: "le fait de comprendre par opposition à l'émission du verbe, consiste bien plus dans une définitive possession d'acte que dans une genèse." (2) Furthermore, it is the categorical affirmation of St. Thomas: "Intelligere solum dicit habitudinem intelligentis ad rem intellectam, ubi nulla ratio originis importatur." (3) This difference does not go as far as a real or absolute distinction. If "tout acte de connaissance en effet requiert la produc-

(1) Theol., I,P., q.27, D.12, a.15.
(2) John of St. Thomas, Ph., III, P., q.11, a.1.
(3) Quoted by John of St. Thomas; Ph. III, P., q.11, a.1.
tion d'un verbe mental, l'intelligence qui a déjà mis au monde ce verbe mental et qui contemple grâce à lui, n'a plus à le produire de nouveau, mais simplement à le maintenir."(1)
Thus intellection or contemplation supposes the production of the verbum and vice versa. How can we explain this mutual inclusion? We can explain it by the very nature of knowledge which is a vital superior state, the disposition of a living person which contains in itself the dynamic power to produce the species expressa. This stability, this static force of vital operation, this immanence and this autonomy in existence, by far surpasses the production which follows and which flows from it less as an exterior consequence than as a simple aspect which is both derived and interior. Thus the act of knowledge is before all else a state of immanent contemplation. This eminent and fruitful source of energy overflows itself, as it were; it becomes dynamic, productive; it begets the species expressa.

This presents a serious difficulty. How can the verbum mentale serve as the proximate term in the act of knowledge, in contemplation, and at the same time be an interior and annexed product of that same contemplation? Does this not seem to be a vicious circle? Let us first consider the difficulty from the point of view of priority of time. It is quite clear that from the point of view of duration the verbum is produced at the same time as contemplated, and that there is not a moment in which the verbum would be

(1) Garin, Ibid. p. 663.
produced before having been discovered as it were, nor a moment in which it would be perceived before having been produced.

But, if this is true, must we not at least admit a priority of nature in the logical order: the species expressa cannot be perceived before its production; it cannot be produced without having been perceived. This would be the case if the intelligence were obliged to beg the concrete determination which the verbum bears to it. But the mind gives itself this determination; for when it forms the species expressa the mind is, in a manner, mistress, and it already possesses the essential form. And if the verbum mentale is necessary, it is less as a cause than as a term. In a word "l'intelligence, plus foncière que la contemplation et la production du verbe, leur donne l'être à toutes deux à la fois." (1) Such is the conclusion of Thomism as is quite evident from this text of John of St. Thomas: "La première action de l'esprit est la formation du contenu de pensée par le moyen de l'espèce (impressa). Une fois ce résultat obtenu, dans le même instant l'esprit forme le verbe et se trouve en acte de le posséder et dans le même instant l'esprit comprend. Toutes ces opérations en effet ne sont pas des changements allant de la puissance à l'acte: l'intelligence est déjà en acte. C'est là le processus parfait: en cela point n'est besoin de lente progressivité." (2)

(1) Garin, Ibid. p. 682.
(2) Theol., Ia, 2a, p., q.5, D.2, A.2.
We should remember that oppositions which are met in the psychological order, in the real order would disappear as by magic when they are carried over into the ideal order. Under certain aspects the ideal mode is opposed to the real mode. But, in fact, the idea possesses its own reality, which is precisely to make the reality known. That is why Sylvester of Ferrara tells us, as quoted by Garin, "l'être idéal constitue l'être réel même de l'espèce intelligible, et que néanmoins cet être se distingue encore de l'entité purement physique de l'idée de ce qu'on appellerait déjà par ailleurs sa "réalité" physique." (1)

From this Thomist theory of the species intelligibiles manifest consequences flow for the very validity of human knowledge. All the efficacy of knowledge rests on this superior mode of existence which we have described, "mode caractéristique de la représentation, mode dégagé des privautés du sujet fini, soit du côté de la faculté, soit du côté de l'objet et des similitudes ou espèces qui le représentent, mode né pour porter à l'absolu l'intelligence et tout ce qui concourt à son acte ou l'accompagne, mode capable de dominer les barrières qui opposent entre eux les divers êtres." (2)

The unity and identity realized between the intelligence and the species expressa, thanks to the ideal existence of both, is not absolute nor especially exhaustive. We

(1) Garin, Ibid. p. 700.
(2) Garin, p. 715.
never understand our ideas thoroughly, either because of the weakness of our mind, or because of the imperfection of the intelligible species: "car en toute créature il y a de l'inertie à l'égard de l'existence substantielle." (1)

Since it is characteristic of the mind to have a term, to penetrate it and to contemplate it, indeed more, to be ideally and objectively identified with it, and consequently to be this term, we must understand that, for Thomism, the intelligence is absolutely capable of retaining its own being while becoming all other things: fieri quodammodo omnia. (2)

If the mind embraces the object in its fundamental reality, St. Thomas gives this reason for it: "Et praeterea, nulla actio cognitivae virtutis potest dici fluens vel dissiliens sicut sunt actus virtutum naturalium, qui procedunt ab agente in patient; quia cognitio non dicit effluxum a cognoscente in cognitum, sicut est in actionibus naturalibus, sed magis dicit existentiam cogniti in cognoscente." (3)

It is, then, absolutely conformable to the Thomist theory to judge of the fundamental value of knowledge less after the manner of efficient causality, which exteriorly or interiorly prepares it, than after the mode of final being which constitutes it.

(1) Garin, p. 696.

(2) Anima fit quodammodo omnia, said Aristotle, and St. Thomas was able to include in all things the Maker of them all. - See Sum. Theol., Ia, 14, 1.

(3) De Ver., q.2, a.5; De Ver., q.8, a.7.
In a word, "pour le Thomisme l'immanence de la connaissance, son intimité profonde et, en ce sens, son subjectivisme typique sont si intense qu'ils dépassent tout subjectivisme et aboutissent au pouvoir réel d'objectivité." (1)

This efficacy of our knowledge admits of some restrictions which the scholastics have very clearly noted. John of St. Thomas writes: "Autre chose est comprendre l'essence d'un objet, autre chose comprendre sous l'angle de l'essence. En effet l'intelligence ne comprend pas toujours l'essence d'une chose; elle ne pénètre pas toujours la chose en sa nature réelle. Par contre, elle la comprend toujours sous l'angle de l'essence; de par son mode d'opération, il lui est naturel de pénétrer l'intérieur de chaque entité, accident ou substance. Partant l'essence est dite par Aristote l'objet propre de l'intelligence. De même est-il affirmé par Saint Thomas, que comprendre c'est lire à l'intérieur. Ceci, ajouta-t-il, se manifeste à qui considère la différence de l'esprit et des sens. La connaissance sensible extérieures concerne les qualités sensibles extérieures. La connaissance intellectuelle pénètre jusqu'à l'essence de la chose, l'objet de l'intelligence restant "ce qu'est" une chose. Ainsi, quoique l'intelligence, en fait, ne pénètre pas chaque fois jusqu'à l'essence de l'objet, son mode de connaître toutefois ne tend pas moins de soi à l'essence." (2)

(1) Garin, p. 720.
(2) Ph.N., 3, P., q.10, a.4.
What we attain by the act of knowledge, in spite of these restrictions, is being itself. Franciscus de Sylvestris speaks categorically on this point: "L'acte de comprendre, n'a pas valeur de similitude représentative mais valeur d'atteinte efficace par rapport à l'objet... Le concept, à l'encoutre, est similitude de l'objet." (1)

John of St. Thomas says on the same point: "Essentiellement, l'opération de pensée n'est pas image, mais acte et tendance vers l'objet." (2)

It is through the mediation of the verbum, of the idea, that we attain reality: the species expressa acts here as liaison agent which bridges the gap between the knowing subject and the object known, not as on a screen on which the object would be outlined, but rather as something transparent through which one perceives the object.

Evidently it is not as a physical entity that the species expressa plays this important role, but rather according to its ideal or representative value, according to its value as term. Hence it is clear in what way this second aspect dominates the first. Moreover it is this typic mode which assures the efficacy of the act of knowledge, the representative efficacy of the idea itself, since by this absolute mode, the species expressa, the verbum dominates in the differences of the ideal and the real. The verbum, in its quality as term, has all that is needed

(2) Ph., Log., 2.P., q.22, a.4.
to present the object to the mind; but having only this value as term, not possessing the totality of the modes of being, it cannot play the role of ultimate and fundamental term. Such a function belongs to real being, and to what is most real in being, namely, substance; not, it is true, the substance of such an object in concreto, but substance in general. We must not forget that the universal is the direct, formal, immediate object of our intellect.

Sylvester of Ferrara presents this doctrine as follows: "L'image sise dans l'esprit est l'essence même existant hors l'esprit. Elle est dite image de cette essence, tout en ayant un autre mode d'existence. L'essence de la pierre, prise dans l'intelligence, c'est l'essence de la pierre, prise dans la mode idéal d'existence. Par conséquent l'idée possède par nature capacité de représenter une essence extérieurs d'une manière distincte et spéciale, elle possède capacité à conduire l'esprit à la connaissance de cette essence extérieure." (1)

It suffices to say that our knowledge generally remains very imperfect, the human mind being the least noble of intelligences. It is one thing to know the essences of things, i.e. to know by abstraction; and it is another thing to know what constitutes them in reality.

The further question presents itself here: what becomes of these species after the act of knowledge or contemplation?

(1) 2.C.G. 98, n.XVII, I.
In the first place the species intelligibles are disentangled from the image through the action of the intellectus agents, sometimes with the assent, more or less explicit, of the will. The intelligible species would revert then into the subconscious after completion of the act of knowledge and would dwell there in a state of habitual dispositions, which explains, moreover, the existence of the intellectual memory over and above the sensible memory.
Appendix A
Point 1.

There is a rigorous correspondence between knowledge and immateriality. A being is knowledgeable in the measure of its immateriality. (Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, p. 135.)

Appendix B
Point 2.

Why is this so? Because to know is, by an apparent scandal for the principle of identity, to be in a certain way another thing than what one is; it is to become another thing than oneself, "fieri aliud a se," to be or become another in so far as it is another, "esse seu fieri aliud in quantum aliud." (cf. RefleXions sur l'intelligence, p. 53,) which presupposes, on the one hand, the emergence of the subject capable of knowledge from matter (which restrains or imprisons things in the exclusiveness of their own being;) and on the other, a form of union between the knower and the known transcending any material one; for when matter receives a form it is in order to constitute with it a third term, a tertium quid, which is informed matter. Thus a material being can become other, i.e. can change or modify itself, it cannot become the other. While the knower, while all the time keeping its own nature intact, becomes the known itself and is identified with it, the knower being thus incomparably more one with the known than the matter with form. (Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 135, 136.)
Appendix C.
Point 3.

To know is to the senses and the intellect, taken as such, as cognoscitive functions, as to exist is to the essence, to the quidditative function. It is a form of existence which defines knowledge. To know does not consist in doing something, nor in receiving something, but in a degree of existence greater than that of being removed from nothingness: it is an active, immaterial super-existence, by which a subject exists no longer only in an existence limited to what it is as a thing included in a certain kind, as a subject existing in itself, but with an unlimited existence in which it is or becomes so by its own rightful activity and that of others.

This is why in God, because He is infinite, existence and knowledge are purely and absolutely one and the same; between the esse divinum and the intelligere divinum there is not the slightest, even virtual, distinction; his existence is his very act of intellectation.

Having come to this point we can comprehend that the formula "to become the other in as much as other" most certainly defines knowledge, but as taken first of all in what characterizes human knowledge, which is primarily directed towards another. An angel knows itself before it knows things; God knows Himself, He is Himself the sole specific object worthy of His intelligence, and it is in His essence that He knows all things, things possible and things created. In order to give a definition of knowledge
capable of including the whole of this analogical span, it
would be necessary to say that to know is to or become a
thing - oneself or another - otherwise than by the existence
actuating a subject. An angel in knowing is itself and
other things otherwise than by its own existence as a limited
subject; God by His wisdom is Himself and things otherwise
than by the existence which actuates a subject. (Deg. of
Knowledge, p. 136.)

Appendix D.
Point 4.

The act of knowledge is not any of the actions which we
customarily observe about us, it does not come under either
the heading of 'action' - nor that of 'passion' - in Aris-
totle's table; taken purely in itself it does not consist
in the production of anything not even in the depth of the
knowing subject. To know is to advance oneself to an act of
existence of super-eminent perfection, which, in itself,
does not imply production.

In fact there is the production of the image in sensi-
tive knowledge, of a mental word or concept in intellectual
knowledge; but this interior production is not formally the
act of knowledge itself, it is at once a condition and a
means, and an expression of that act. (Cf. Reflexions sur
l'intelligence.)

This is why the ancients called the act of knowledge an
action properly immanent, and perfectly vital, which belongs
to the heading 'quality'. (Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge,
p. 137)
Appendix E.
Point 5.

Wherever it is a question of a knowing being other than God who is in Himself super-eminent over all things, we are constrained, if we wish to conceive of knowledge without absurdity, to introduce the notion of a kind of existence which is entirely particular, which the ancients called esse intentionale, intentional being, and which is opposed to the esse naturae, to the being which a thing possesses when it exists in its own nature. For indeed the scandals suffered by the principle of identity can only be apparent, and it is certain that if the characteristic of the knower is to be another thing than what it is, we must needs, to avoid absurdity, distinguish two ways of having existence, conceive of an esse which is not the rightful existence of a subject as such or of its accidents.

How is it that the knower is the known? It cannot be according to its natural being that it can be what it is not.

How is the known in the knower? It cannot be according to its natural being that a tree or a stone is in the mind.

It is therefore necessary to admit another form of existence, according to which the known will be in the knower, and the knower will be the known: an entirely tendential and immaterial existence, whose office is not to posit a thing apart from nothingness in itself and as subject, but on the contrary, for another thing and in relation; which does not seal up a thing in its natural limits but disengages it from them; by which the thing exists in the soul by another exis-
tence than its own, and the soul is or becomes the thing according to another existence than its own: intentional being, which is, according to Cajetan, there to remedy that imperfection essential to every created knowing subject of the possession of a limited nature and the lack by being itself of all the rest.

In another order than that of knowledge, in that of efficient activity is it not equally necessary to admit an intentional manner of existing - the way, for example, in which artistic talent passes into the hand and the brush of a painter? For the entire picture is the work of the brush, there is nothing in the picture not caused by the brush, and nevertheless its beauty and intelligible radiance, the spiritual values with which the picture is charged, surpass all the capabilities, in its connection with the material universe, of the causality proper to the brush itself; a causality higher than its own, and super-imposed upon its own, must then have passed into it. If you scrutinize everything 'entitative,' or existing secundum esse naturae in the brush, you will find no element of the painter's art, only the substance and the qualities of the brush and the movement to which it is directed by the hand; nevertheless the art has passed into it. Scrutinize everything entitative in the transmitting medium of the sensitive qualities, you will only find the properties and the wave and other movements that the physician recognizes, you will not bring the soul under the scalpel: its quality has nevertheless entered in, secundum esse intentionale, since the senses will per-
ceive it when the waves of the vibrations reach the organs. It is a dream of the materialist imagination to think, like Democritus, that it enters in entitatively, or because it is not so to deny, like modern scientists, that it can enter in at all. The esse intentionale, even when not concerned with the world of knowledge, is already for forms a means of escape from the slavery of matter; the scholastics frequently call esse spirituale this existence not for itself, this tendenz-existence by which forms which are not their own supervene in things. I hold that a great field of interests lies open for philosophers in the study of the part it plays even in the world of physics, which is doubtless the cause of that form of universal animation by which movement brings to bodies more than they are in themselves, and colors all nature with a semblance of life and feeling. However this may be, our concern here is with the part it plays in knowledge and the immaterial operations of the latter, the intentional presence of the object in the soul and the intentional transformation of the soul into the object, the one and the other functions of the immateriality (imperfect for the senses, absolute for the intelligence) of the cognitive faculties. (Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 137, 138, 139.)

Appendix F.
Points 6 and 7.

What is the means of union of the knower and the known?
The medium thanks to which the known is intentionally in
the knower, and by which the knower becomes intentionally the known? It is the whole world of intra-psychic immaterial forms which in the soul are like the deputies of the object and which the ancients called similitudes or species. This word, species, has no equivalent in modern language, and I have decided that the aptest rendering of it is the expression, presentative or objectifying form. No more than that of the esse intentionale, the notion of species is not for the philosopher an element of explication which is already known and fully elucidated by others. They are rather supports which result from the analysis of the data and of which it constrains the mind to recognize the reality - which certainly if the analysis has itself progressed correctly and under the constant pressure of intelligible necessities. It is absolutely necessary that some determination should supervene in the knower, thanks to which what is not its should be in it secundum esse intentionale and not like an accident in a substance, and which will be able to exist with the same active super-existence as that of the knower become the known. The species is nothing other than this internal determination.

In the case of sensitive knowledge, the external sense, itself is a state of vital tension, and which has only to 'open itself' to know (all is ready in advance for it, and in this it is comparable to an already acquired intellectual habitude,) receives the thing by its qualities acting on the organ, which so offers itself to be felt (we call it the sensible in act,) a species impressa, a presentative form
imprinted on it - let us call it a received presentative form - thanks to which it is specified as by a germ which has entered into its depth; and having so become intentionally the sensible in the initial or prime act (the sense and the sensible then make only one principle of operation), in the terminal or second act it becomes it, in its own immanent action, and then makes only one act with the felt - not without producing at the same time an image of the latter, a species expressa of the sensible order in the imagination and the memory.

The intelligence knows things in forming them in the fruit which it conceives in the bosom of its own immateriality. The Thomists, following Aristotle, recognize in it an active light (the agens or activating intellect) which, making use of sensible representations and disengaging the intelligibility which they contain in potentia (which is not possible without leaving on one side the individualizing notes enclosing the sensible as such), specifies the intelligence by means of a species impressa, of a presentative form abstracted from the sensible and received by means of it. This is, then, the prime or initial act of the intellect; it has become, as indeed a principle of action, intentionally the object, which in its species is hidden in its depth like a fecundating seed, a co-principle of knowledge (according as the intellect, the sufficing principle of its own proper action, is already itself.) And it is thus, actuated by this species impressa, and producing thus in it, like a living fruit, a mental word or concept, a species
expressa of an intelligible order, an elaborated presentative form, in which it brings the object to the sovereign degree of actuality and intelligible formation, that it becomes itself in ultimate act this object. If the distinction between the prime and second act re-appears again thus in the act of knowing, it is because this last, as I have already said, constitutes in itself alone a whole metaphysical order, where are re-united, transposed into the same line which is that of knowledge, at once the distinction of the essential form and the existence in the line of being and that of the operative form and the operation in the line of action. Is not knowledge at once existence and (immanent) action? The soul, by its faculties of knowledge, becomes first (intentionally) the object in the prime act, in order to become it as a result in the second, as nature exists before it acts.

7. In what is concerned with the species or presentative forms, it is necessary to distinguish carefully between two very different parts or functions. On the side of immaterial forms, these species are modifications of the soul, and by this right they determine the faculty in the same way as any other form determines any other subject, but these modifications of the proper nature of our soul, these entitative modifications are not pre-requisite to knowledge; they make no part of knowledge.

On the other hand presentative forms are, in so far as they are means to knowledge, purely and formally deputies of the object, simply its similitudes, i.e. in the soul they
are the object itself detached from its own existence and made present in an intentional and immaterial state; in this way they do not determine the faculty as a form determines matter or a subject, but in relation to the entirely immaterial and supra-subjective union by which the one becomes, first intentionally in the first act, then in the second act and by its vital operation, the other in itself. And this entirely immaterial information, in which the soul only receives or experiences in order to exercise its own vital activity, to bring itself in act into an existence not limited to itself, is what constitutes knowledge.

In thus making a resume of knowledge, it shows itself to us as an immanent and vital operation, which essentially consists not in making, but in being: in being or becoming a thing - itself or others - otherwise than by the existence actuating a subject; which implies a much higher union than that of the form and matter composing a conjunction or tertium quid, and which also presupposes that the object known is intentionally made present in the faculty thanks to a species, a presentative form; finally, that intellectual knowledge is accomplished thanks to a mental word or concept, a presentative form proffered from within itself by the intellect, and by which it intentionally becomes in the final act the thing taken as such or according to its intelligible determinations.
Appendix G.
The Concept.

Thomists distinguish between two forms of sign which are essentially different, what is called the instrumental sign and the formal sign. An instrumental sign is something which once known in itself makes another thing consecutively known: a trail of smoke rising to the sky, a portrait painted on canvas which we see in a gallery, are objects on which our knowledge rests for a moment and passes on from them to other objects which are known thanks to them, to the fire of which the smoke is the effect and the sign, to the sitter of whom the portrait is the image and the sign.

A formal sign is one whose whole essence is to signify. It is not an object which, having at first its full value as an object, or more precisely, something which before being itself known as an object by an act of reflection, is only known by the knowledge which is conveyed by its means to the mind of the object, in other words, which is known not in 'appearing' as an object, but by 'disappearing' as object, because its essence is to relate the mind to something other than itself. Everything which has been established up till now enables us to comprehend that the species impressa, or enlarged presentative forms which intervene in knowledge, are formal not instrumental signs. Remembrance or the presentative form held in the memory and which the memory uses hic et nunc is not what is known when we remember, it is the means by which we know; and what we know by this means is the past itself, the thing or event held in the substance of our past. The concept or mental word is not what is known
when our intellect is at work; it is the means by which intellection takes place; and what we know by this means is the nature or intelligible determination in itself of some actual or possibly existing thing. These (elaborated) presentative forms are the sole realities which correspond to the notion of formal signs, a notion 'cut to their measure,' according to the exigencies of an analysis which respects the rightful nature of knowledge, and belong only to it. All the other signs of which we have experience are instrumental ones. This is why, the moment one neglects or forgets the irreducible originality of the things of knowledge, presentative forms are so easily confounded with instrumental ones, just as the immanent activity of sensation and intellection is confused with the transitive activity proper to bodies, and at once knowledge perishes.

St. Thomas, refuting beforehand certain idealist positions, took great care to point out that the species or presentative forms are not the objects of our knowledge, but pure means thereto. They only become the object of knowledge reflectively, and thanks to the production of a new concept. If, he explains, our knowledge stops at them, in other words, if it is our own representations that we know, then, on the one hand, all sciences would be absorbed by one unique one, psychology; on the other hand, contradictions would be true, since a true judgment would be judgment in conformity with our representations: he who decided that 2 plus 2 equal 4, and he who decided that 2 plus 2 do not equal 4, would be equally right in each declaring according to their respective
representations. Thus presentative forms, concepts in particular, are pure means of knowing; the scholastics call them objectum quo, mental objects by which knowledge takes place. What is known thanks to these immaterial species, they called objectum quod, the object which is known.

I have distinguished two elements in the concept: an entititative function, by which it is a modification or accident of the soul, and an intentional function, by which it is the formal sign of a thing, in which the object is grasped by the mind. This object which is grasped by the mind in and by the concepts is the thing in itself, taken according to one or other of its determinations, and which, first by sensation and then by abstraction has been brought - though stripped of its proper existence - within the mind. It is in the depth of thought that the object is attained, in the heart of the intelligence that it is known (which is why the ancients often called it objectus conceptus,) it is the only thing in its own proper existence (possible or actual) which is extramental and metalogical. But what is capital is that while existing under two different conditions, in the concept in a state of universality and of abstraction which enables it to be manipulated, divided, compared by the mind and also enter into the connections of discourse - and in the thing in one of individuality and concretion, nevertheless the object and the thing are not two known terms, two quods, but one: it is one and the same quod, which exists for itself in the thing, and which is attained by the mind as object.
Let the thing, for example, be Peter. He exists outside the mind under certain conditions: he is not only man, but animal, substance, etc., philosopher or musician, ill or well. Let the object, for example, be Peter as the object of thought, man, which has in Peter and outside the mind a natural existence, and in the concept and in the mind an intentional existence (and which in the degree to which it is known or posited before the mind has only an ideal or rational existence.) It is essential to concept to be abstract and universal. It is essential to the extramental thing to be singular and concrete. The object, on the other hand, which in the thing exists with natural existence, is singular and concrete, as is proper to the thing, and which exists in the concept with intentional existence, which is abstract and universal, is indifferently one or the other. It is posited in the mind in a state of abstraction and universality, which comes to it from its existence in the concept, where it is attained by the mind, but this state is not essential to it, since in the judgment, in the declaration 'Peter is a man,' for example, I identify Peter and the object of thought, man.

As to the concept or mental word which I have in mind when I think 'man', it is held to be the sign of the thing, the similitude or deputy of the object, an inward end in which the object is intellectually perceived (terminus in quo.) But let us be on our guard against that materialization or spatialization which language always brings in its train if we are not careful. The object is by no means in
the concept as a material content in a material container; it is no material thing enclosed in another; it is an immaterial 'word', omitted by the mind in explaining the object; to contain, for it, is simply and purely to know. The object exists in the concept and is attained in the concept in the sense that in proffering the concept, in the fulfilment of this intellectual production, the immanent act of intellection attains by this and immediately the object, and attains it clad in the conditions of the concept; and this is only possible because the concept is only a sign, a deputy or similitude of the object by right of the formal sign, as was pointed out above.

What does this mean, if not that the notions of deputy or similitude or image must be purified here of all those features which would belong to things coming before the eyes of the mind, like a portrait before our bodily eyes? But then, if the concept is not a thing resembling the object, what remains of it? It remains being - as existent intentionally in the soul, and so carrying the object to the ultimate degree of spirituality, as making known what the thing or object is by right of the term known. The concept and the thing make two from the point of view of entity; but as formal sign and in the line no longer of being, but of knowledge, it must be said that it and the object do not make two. The fruit of intellection in act, its content, is the intelligible object itself, but this intelligible content, which as object is set before the mind, as concept is vitally proffered by the mind, and has
for its existence the act of intellection itself; as to its
intelligible constitution therefore the concept is identi-
cal with the object - indeed I do not say in as much as it
will be what is known, but exactly in as much as it is the
sign and inward end by which the intellect becomes, in ul-
timate act, what it knows. It has just been pointed out
that the formal sign is not something known at first which
consequently leads to the knowledge of another. Now it is
understood that it is something known in the very degree
to which it makes known and by the act of making known.
The immanent reason of the presentation of the object to
the intellect in act, the concept or mental word is steeped
in intellectuality in act; to be thought in act, to termin-
ate intellection in act, is its intrinsic denomination,
since it is in it that the object like the intellect,
achieves the ultimate act of intellectuality. But it is
not as object that it is thought and known, it is not as
signified end that it is intellectum in actu, grasped and
conpenetrated by intellection in act, it is as signifying
end.

Finally, the concept in its entititative function and as
modification of the subject and the concept in its inten-
tional function and as formal sign are not two distinct
things (just as intentionality is not precisely a thing-in-
itsel, but rather a mode). These are two formal aspects
of two formally distinct values of the same thing, the in-
tentional function only applying to knowledge, the entita-
tive function to the being of nature (on this occasion, the
soul itself.) As the divine essence has itself, in being intellectum in pure act, the value of both species impressa and species expressa for the intelligence of the blessed, as the substance of the angel is itself the species impressa for its intelligence, the entity of the concept is in itself for us the formal sign of the object. As thing or entity the concept is an accident, a quality of modification of the soul; but as arising in the soul as a fruit and expression of the intelligence already formed by the species impressa, already perfect, and under the action of this created participation in the intellectual power of God, of that centre of immateriality perpetually in act, the highest point of spiritual tension naturally present in us, what should be called the active intellect (intellectus agens), whence the intellect which knows derives all its formative energy, this quality, this modification of the soul which is the concept has (like all the objectifying forms) the privilege of transcending the function of entititative information exercised by it, and of being present in the faculty like a spirit. It is from the intelligence itself, from the intelligence in living act, that it holds this privilege, as though the intelligence gathered all its own spirituality into this one active point, there to bring it to a maximum. Thus the concept is in the intelligence not only entitatively or as a formative form, but also as a spiritual form not absorbed in the actuation of a subject in order to constitute with it a tertium quid, but on the contrary as actuating or rather terminating the intellect per modum intentionale and in the
line of knowledge, in the very degree to which it expresses and volatilizes the object.

On the other hand, this form which the intelligence, primarily put in act by the species impressa, engenders in itself through the discontinuous light of the active intellect, is truly, as I have said, the pure similitude or spiritual ignition of the object, or rather the object itself made mind, and intentionally present, not as object, but as sign: because its entire specification comes from the object, the intelligence which illumines and that which knows being for it equally indeterminate. Thus the concept (in its intentional function) and the object are indiscernible, save as the one makes known and the other is known, the one is a sign and the other the signified, and that the one exists only in the mind and the other in the mind and in the thing.

By this we comprehend that the intuition proper to the intellect lives (at the lowest stage) in abstract perception working by means of the concept, and that for things which fall in the first place within the grasp of our intelligence this perception may be absolutely infallible, giving us those first principles, known by themselves, which direct the whole development of apprehension. And yet, because our intelligence must so form its objects for and by itself, and in the degree to which it advances in knowledge, actively draw from the same received representative form (species impressa) those varied concepts which disconnect the aspects of one intelligible nucleus accord-
ing to the diverse directions of attention prevailing in the mind (for things are not only brought in the species impressa to intelligibility in act, they are also, in the heart of the intelligence, inventoried and debited in multifarious ways in order to be brought in the concept to the final degree of intellection in act) — it is equally comprehensible that the work of concepts may be complicated and tortuous, progressing from the indeterminate and generic to the determined, admits a large measure of artificial construction, causing us often to take wholly indirect views of things or 'confused, partial, derived or negative' ones, and in short, runs the risk of error in the degree to which it advances, and that not only in facts of judgment and reasoning, but also in the very facts of abstract perception. For when our intelligence is already occupied by these forms, the new concepts which it engenders, and whose formation does not depend only on the thing, but also on the already possessed objects by means of which the new object is set before the mind, may well be formed awry. Doubtless, when these are not pseudo concepts presenting to the mind a complex of contradictory elements (e.g. the greatest whole number or the most perfect world), they always present to the mind some aspect of the real — or some rational being founded on the real — but one which can be so arbitrarily reconstructed and cut about that the product is meagre, if not illusory. Thus we see certain concepts, made use of by science truly for long enough,
and which are certainly not absurd, vanish forever, leaving no trace: the ancient concepts of chemistry with its phlogistic, for example; we can find in the sociology which stems from Comte and in modern psychology concepts equally perishable. (Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 139-155.)
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