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A More United United Kingdom:

The Impact of Post-1999 Devolution on National Identity and Feelings Towards Independence in Scotland

By

Geoffrey Alchin

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies through the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis and that no part of this thesis has been published or submitted for publication.

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ABSTRACT

Scottish nationalism has always been part of the political debate in the United Kingdom since the birth of the Union in 1707. In the 1880s, inspired by Irish Home Rule, Scottish nationalists began to demand greater autonomy from London. To appease the nationalists, London began devolving small amounts of power to Scotland. However, this small amount of devolution was not enough for the Scots. In 1967, the Labour Government of Harold Wilson responded to the growth of Scottish nationalism by proposing more devolution. It would not be until 1999 under the Tony Blair Labour Government that Scotland would experience its greatest form of devolution with the creation of the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood. The purpose of this thesis is to determine if post-1999 devolution has impacted Scottish national identity. In particular, it explores whether or not devolution has led to an increase in the number of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity. The rise in the number of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity is important because these individuals are less likely to support independence compared to those that identify solely as Scottish. To examine the impact of devolution on national identity, Scottish Social Attitude Surveys from ScotCen Social Research were used. This thesis also compared its results with findings from previous research on Scottish national identity in the pre-1999 devolution period, as well as with how individuals voted in the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. Finally, it predicts the outcome of a potential second referendum on Scottish independence.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the people of Scotland.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I would also like acknowledge my family. I would specifically like to thank my mom and dad for their continued support throughout this process. I would also like to thank my sister, Amanda, for her many pep talks that motivated me throughout my thesis.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Since the Act of Union in 1707, there has been a growth in Scottish nationalism.\(^1\) This nationalism has led to questions of whether or not Scotland should remain part of the United Kingdom. To address nationalistic tendencies in Scotland, the Labour Government passed the Scotland Act of 1978 to further devolve power to Scotland in the hopes of quelling nationalism.\(^2\) Two decades later, Tony Blair and his Labour Government would enact the Scotland Act of 1998, allowing for the most significant period of devolution from Westminster to Scotland. This Act led to the creation of the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood.\(^3\) The aim of this thesis is to determine if Blair’s devolution has impacted national identity and support for Scottish independence. To answer this question, this thesis will examine the impact of devolution and the creation of the Scottish Parliament on national identity in Scotland between 1999 and 2013 or what this thesis calls the post-devolution period. If the British government wishes to keep the Union together, devolution may be the tool required to achieve that aim.

To further examine how devolution is impacting national identity, a breakdown of seven key demographic categories are assessed. These variables include age, gender,

education, location, employment status, religion, and political party preference. In addition to studying national identity, this thesis examines feelings towards independence in the post-devolution period. Essentially, this thesis argues that devolution will decrease support for Scottish independence by causing an increase in the number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity. It has been found that individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity are less likely to support independence.4 If the results of this thesis are in line with the hypothesis, then it will validate the Labour Party’s theory that devolution can keep the Union together.

To conduct this research, ScotCen Social Research, which is an independent research organization that is located in Edinburgh, Scotland, was used. It is part of NatCen Social Research, which is the largest research organization in Britain.5 To determine trends in national identity from ScotCen Social Research, surveys called the Scottish Social Attitude Surveys are used. The survey data was provided by What Scotland Thinks, which is run by ScotCen Social Research. The surveys are conducted through one-on-one interviews.6 These surveys use the Moreno question for the purposes of determining state and regional forms of self-identification.7 For Scotland, researchers ask respondents to choose from five separate identities: “Are you Scottish, not British; more Scottish than British; equally Scottish and British; more British than Scottish; or

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British, not Scottish.” For the purposes of this thesis, “more Scottish than British,” “equally Scottish and British,” and “more British than Scottish,” were combined into one category called “dual national identity.” The category of “Scottish, not British” was renamed to “just Scottish identity.”

Respondents were also asked about their feelings towards Scottish independence. They were asked if they feel Scotland should be “independent, separate from the United Kingdom and the European Union; independent, separate from the United Kingdom but in the European Union; part of the United Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has some taxation powers; part of the United Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has no taxation powers; or part of the United Kingdom without its own elected Parliament.”

For this thesis, individuals that selected “independent, separate from the United Kingdom and the European Union” and “independent, separate from the United Kingdom but in the

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European Union” were combined into one category called “independence from the United Kingdom.” This thesis also placed individuals that selected “part of the United Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has some taxation powers” and “part of the United Kingdom with an elected Parliament that has no taxation powers” into one category called “devolution.” The category of “part of the United Kingdom without its own elected Parliament” was renamed to “no devolution.” Similar to national identity, data from the Scottish Social Attitude Surveys was used.

In addition, this thesis will also show that the theoretical approach of new institutionalism helps explain this trend. This thesis will also help fill three gaps in the literature. Firstly, the research in this thesis will expand the knowledge by examining up to the year 2013. Most of the literature that evaluates the impact of devolution on nationalism in Scotland tends to stop at 2006. Secondly, this thesis will examine how devolution is impacting nationalism by examining the national identity of individuals in seven key demographic categories. Most research neglects the evaluation of national identity of individuals in different demographic categories. And thirdly, this thesis will use new institutionalism to help explain the link between the devolved Scottish Parliament and national identity. Most research that studies devolution and national identity tends to overlook this theory.

This thesis will also compare national identity in the pre- and post-1999 devolution periods. To determine if a trend in national identity existed prior to the 1999 devolution, a comparison was completed using previous research and the results from this thesis. It is important to note that it appears that 1992 was the first year where the Moreno
question was employed in a survey.\textsuperscript{10} A comparison between the results of this thesis and voting patterns in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum were also conducted. More specifically, this thesis will determine if its results match how individuals actually voted in the referendum. A breakdown of voting within some demographic groups is also provided. In order to do this, data from various polling and news agencies, such as Lord Ashcroft, Scottish Referendum Study, the \textit{Daily Record}, the \textit{Daily Mail}, \textit{Graphic News}, \textit{The Telegraph}, and \textit{The Guardian} will be used. Finally, this thesis will also predict how Brexit will affect the outcome of a potential second referendum on Scottish independence. To make this prediction, various data from scholars such as John Curtice and Charles Pattie and Ron Johnson was used. The next section of this chapter will discuss the history that led up to the formation of Scotland.

\textit{The History of Scotland}

From the first Christian century until the fifth century, Britain was a province of the Roman Empire. However, the Roman Empire did not have full control of the entire island. Roman power only sometimes extended into what is known today as Scotland. For the most part, Scotland had very few interactions with the Roman Empire because the Romans had very little interest in that part of the island. However, between the years 71 and 74, the Romans began to focus more attention on Scotland.\textsuperscript{11} Julius Agricola, the

\begin{footnotesize}

\end{footnotesize}
Roman Governor in Britain, decided to send soldiers into Scotland.\textsuperscript{12} To do this, Agricola utilized two routes. The first route was through the east and the second route was through the west. After securing the east and the west of Scotland, Agricola set his sights on Perth in the year 83.\textsuperscript{13} To ensure victory, Agricola ordered the construction of Inchtuthil, a fortified camp at the entrance of Strathmore. This camp would become the base of operations for farther advancement into Scotland.\textsuperscript{14}

In the year 84, a move by Agricola brought his soldiers face to face with a large native force. This native force was composed of several Caledonian tribes that lived in the Scottish Highlands. Led by chieftain Calgacus, who was the first native of Scotland, the Caledonian tribes would be no match for the Romans. This victory allowed Agricola to assume control of most of Scotland. Agricola and his successors would continue to hold this territory for about thirty-two years.\textsuperscript{15}

By the year 115, the Roman Empire started to quickly lose Scottish territory to northern tribes. In fact, the northern tribes were so successful in liberating areas from the Romans that by the year 122, Emperor Hadrian himself would go to Britain in order to help restore Roman control. Although he was successful in regaining control, Hadrian decided that Scotland was not worth the trouble to maintain.\textsuperscript{16} Hadrian relinquished control of Scotland and declared that the northern boundary of Britain would be the line of stone forts between Tyne and the Solway. Later, the Romans decided to build a large

\textsuperscript{12} Gordon Menzies, \textit{Who are the Scots?} (London, United Kingdom: The British Broadcasting Corporation, 1971), 35.
\textsuperscript{13} Mackie, \textit{A Short History of Scotland}, ed. Gordon Donaldson, 1.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 2; Graham Ritchie and Anna Ritchie, \textit{Scotland: Archaeology and early history} (London, United Kingdom: Thames and Hudson Limited, 1981), 121-125.
\textsuperscript{15} Mackie, \textit{A Short History of Scotland}, ed. Gordon Donaldson, 2.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
stone wall at this location. They claimed that the wall would separate the peaceful south from the unconquered north. This wall is called Hadrian’s Wall.\textsuperscript{17} This boundary between the south and the north would not remain static.

During the reign of Emperor Antoninus Pius in the year 140, the Governor of the Province of Britain, Lollius Urbicus, ordered Roman soldiers to re-enter Scotland.\textsuperscript{18} Once in Scotland, the soldiers were instructed to create a rampart at the Forth and Clyde, pushing the boundary of Britain further north. Once the rampart was complete, soldiers then constructed forts to further ensure that the south was protected from the north. Although the wall was built, it did not guarantee protection from the tribes on the other side.\textsuperscript{19}

In the year 154, northern tribes were successful in forcing the Romans to abandon their defensive line at the Forth and Clyde. Although the Romans were able to push back, in the year 185, the northern tribes were successful again in forcing the Romans to abandon their defensive line at the Forth and Clyde. As the last Roman solider disappeared over the slopes of the Cheviots, the northern tribes believed that they had finally liberated their land from the Romans.\textsuperscript{20} However, this liberation would be short-lived.

Roman soldiers would re-enter Scotland in the year 208. Under the Emperor Septimius Severus, Roman soldiers sailed into the Forth and docked at a deserted harbour

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 2-3.
\textsuperscript{18} Ritchie and Ritchie, \textit{Scotland: Archaeology and early history}, 126.
\textsuperscript{19} Mackie, \textit{A Short History of Scotland}, ed. Gordon Donaldson, 3.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
Once in Scotland, Severus ordered his soldiers into the Fifa and north-eastern Scotland. Although Severus was successful in retaking sections of Scotland, his plan to retake the north was abandoned after his death in the year 211. From this point, the boundary for the Roman Province of Britain would revert back to Hadrian’s Wall and fighting between the Romans and the northern tribes halted. In fact, many of the inhabitants of Scotland engaged in trading goods with the Roman Province. This relationship resulted in a peaceful phase for both the Province of Britain and Scotland.

However, this peaceful phase would come to an end around the year 368. Rome itself was under attack, so many of the soldiers that were in the Province of Britain and Scotland were called back to Rome. This allowed various tribes to claim parts of Scotland as their own. Britons began to settle in south-western Scotland. Sea-rovers, who were from the north of Ireland, began to settle in Kintyre and the shores of Argyll. In the year 501, a Scot from Ireland named Fergus brought his soldiers to Scotland and claimed Dalriada as his own. The Angles settled on the east coast and created the Anglian Kingdom of Northumbria. Thus, due to the departure of Roman soldiers, numerous kings ruled Scotland, leaving it divided.

Scotland would not be united until about the late seventh century. There were two additional groups in Scotland, the Picts and the Scots. Both of these groups regarded each other as alien. The Picts and the Scots were not only a different race, but

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21 Ibid., 3-4.
22 Ibid., 4-5.
23 Ibid., 4.
24 Ibid., 7.
25 Ibid., 9.
26 Ibid., 15.
27 Ibid.
they also had a different language and customs. In addition, the Picts themselves were not unified. There were two Pict kings. One Pict king ruled over Moray in the north while the other ruled over Fortriu in the south. Due to their differences, the Picts and the Scots rarely interacted with each other. As a result, the groups became suspicious of each other. After an intense battle between the Picts and the kings of Dalriada, in which the Picts won, the Scots started to move closer to the Picts. This caused the Picts to adopt the language of the Scots, which was Gaelic. The Picts and Scots communities would eventually become united under a Pictish king.

At the end of the eighth century, a new group of individuals arrived on the shores, threatening to disrupt the new unity of Scotland. The Norsemen, who were from the west and south-west of Norway, made their way through the Scottish mainland. The Picts attempted to push back the invaders, but an internal rebellion by the Scots, who were led by Alpin, a descendant of the old King of Dalriada, inhibited their efforts. This rebellion proved beneficial to the Scots because, with the help of the Norsemen, Alpin’s son Kenneth would become King of the Scots and Picts in a newly created kingdom called Alba. However, by the year 872, turmoil in Norway created problems for Kenneth and his new kingdom.

Harald Harfagr made himself ruler of Norway. As a result, territory in Scotland would become home to both chieftains who opposed the rule of Harfagr and chieftains that were sent by Harfagr to maintain the Norsemen’s hold on Scottish territory. While

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28 Ibid., 16.
30 Mackie, A Short History of Scotland, ed. Gordon Donaldson, 17...
31 Ibid., 18; Menzies, Who are the Scots?, 103.
Harfagr had many chieftains in Orkney and Shetland, he sent the grandson of one of his chieftains to the mainland. While on the mainland, the Norsemen assumed control of Caithness, Sutherland, Ross, and Moray. Kenneth would see some relief from Harfagr’s advances when the Norsemen started to focus their attention on England.33

The Norsemen, however, would soon learn that they could not defeat the English. Alfred of England was able to liberate northern England from the control of the Norsemen in the first half of the tenth century. With this, Alfred decided to further advance the English line towards Scotland, which created uneasiness for Constantine II, who became the new King of Alba in the year 900. This advancement pushed the Norsemen back.34 Constantine II’s kingdom was now neighbouring both the English and the Norsemen. To ensure peace for his kingdom, Constantine II extended his friendship to Edward of England. After the death of Danish Earl of Northumbria, the new King of England, Athelstan, assumed control of Northumbria. As a result, Earl’s two sons fled and Constantine II befriended them. This angered Athelstan, who then carried out an attack on Alba. This attacked pushed individuals from Alba, who were now predominately Scots, into territory held by the Norsemen. In the year 937, the Norsemen, along with the Scots, advanced towards the northern border of England. However, the English were able to defeat the Norsemen and the Scots, resulting in Constantine II promising absolute loyalty to Athelstan. A year or two later, Constantine II would step down, giving the crown to his kinsman, Malcolm.35

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
After coming to the conclusion that he could not hold Northumbria as long as the Norsemen were in Ireland, Edmund of England gave King Malcolm Northumbria in exchange for Malcolm’s help in defending the English. During this period of time, a series of disputes over who should become the next King of Alba plagued the kingdom. After numerous kings were killed, in the year 1005, Malcolm II would become the new king.

During his reign, Malcolm II attempted to push the boundaries of his kingdom into England, but he was ultimately driven back by Utrecht, who was the son of Earl of Northumbria. As a reward for his success, King Ethelred of England awarded Utrecht with the earldom of the king’s father. Soon after, the Danish invaded England and the Danish King, Cnut, ordered the murder of Utrecht. After the death of Utrecht, the throne of the earldom was open to Utrecht’s brother, Eadulf Cudel. Fearing a potential attack from Malcolm II, Cudel gave him Lothian as a peace offering. However, Cnut opposed this trade. In the year 1018, Cnut ordered his soldiers to go to battle against Malcolm II’s men. The battle between the two armies was intense, but Malcolm II ended up on top. This win ensured that Malcolm II would remain in control of Lothian. Following the death of Malcolm II, his grandson, Duncan, became the King of Alba. However, Duncan’s reign would be short-lived. In the year 1040, Macbeth, King of Moray, killed Duncan, taking control of his kingdom, which was now all of Scotland. Both of

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 21.
38 Ibid., 22.
39 Ibid.
Duncan’s sons fled after their father’s death.40 Duncan’s eldest son, Malcolm Canmore, would return from England to Scotland to retake his father’s kingdom.

In the year 1057, Malcolm Canmore killed Macbeth in a fight for the Scottish Crown near Lumphanan in Aberdeenshire. This victory allowed Canmore to control Scotland, which was poorer, more divided, and more isolated than its neighbour England.41 During this time, most people in Scotland lived in small settlements called clachans or farmtouns. The buildings were mostly composed of turf, stone, skin, or brushwood, a stark difference to their English neighbours. Despite the poor living conditions, Canmore was able to organize trade within Scotland and with outside countries. Organized trade did not exist in Scotland prior to his rule.42 After Canmore’s rule and until the end of the thirteenth century, Scotland was ruled by a succession of kings, keeping the country united.43

Most kings that ruled Scotland after Canmore held European values. This was because most of the kings were Normans. Normans were inheritors of Roman and European tradition. This resulted in Scotland adopting four essential elements that made it more European. These four elements were the implementation of feudalism, the creation of burghs, introducing effective personal control over the machinery of government, and reforming the church.44 The adoption of these elements resulted in Scotland becoming a more united country.45 Although Scotland was progressing towards

40 Ibid., 24.
42 Ibid., 20.
44 Ibid.
becoming a unified country, that progress was halted when the English re-entered Scotland.  

English control of Scotland would lead to the War of Independence. During the first phase of the war, following the death of Alexander III, Scottish nobles and religious officials appointed Guardians to rule Scotland in the name of Alexander III’s daughter, who would become Queen. Meanwhile, King Edward I of England carefully watched the events in Scotland, waiting for his opportunity to make himself the only ruler of Scotland. He found it absurd that the island of Britain was divided. He wanted to unite the entire island under his rule. He decided to achieve this goal through nonviolent means. He secured the marriage of his son, Edward II, with the young Queen. However, the young Queen would perish in 1290, putting a halt on Edward I’s plan. Though it appeared that Edward I’s goal of merging the two kingdoms was failing, his fortunes would soon change.

Infighting among Scots provided another opportunity for Edward I to achieve his goal. The old Lord of Annandale, Robert de Brus, travelled to Perth with a loyal army. Despite opposition from the Guardians, de Brus believed that he should be crowned King of Scotland. Civil war appeared to be inevitable until Edward I offered his services as an arbiter. As an arbiter, Edward I announced that he would not consider any candidate that did not acknowledge him as their overlord and would not commit to do homage for him in Scotland. Out of the thirteen possible candidates, Edward I would choose John De

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47 Ibid., 55-56.
Balliol as the new King of Scotland.\textsuperscript{48} In 1295, Balliol would enter into an alliance with King Philip of France, infuriating Edward I.\textsuperscript{49}

In the spring of 1296, Edward I crossed the Tweed at Coldstream, appearing outside of Berwick. The townspeople were stunned and within a few minutes, Edward I and his soldiers controlled the town. As Edward I stayed behind in Berwick, his lieutenant, the Earl de Warenne, pushed forward to surround the castle of Dunbar. After a quick battle with Balliol’s soldiers at the castle, de Warenne and his men took control of the castle. The news of the attacks at Berwick and Dunbar stuck fear among Scottish nobles and peoples. A series of attacks by the English led Balliol to plead with Edward I for peace. Two weeks later, Balliol surrendered his kingdom to Edward I. Edward I left Scotland in the autumn of 1296, content that he was now in full control of Scotland. However, little did he know that his campaign of 1296 was far from finished.\textsuperscript{50}

When Edward I left, the Scots started to develop tactical skills from English officers and garrisons. Wanting to use these newly developed skills against their occupier, the Scots knew that they first must find a strong leader.\textsuperscript{51} They found that leader in William Wallace. Wallace was not a noble or royalty. He was what the Scots called a country gentleman. Wallace and a large group of Scottish men moved further into the north of Scotland, capturing castles held by the English. While at the castle of Dundee, Wallace received word that de Warenne was heading for his location.\textsuperscript{52} Against all odds, Wallace and his men were able to defeat the English. This victory made Wallace

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 56-57.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 58-59.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 59.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 60.
the ruler of Scotland. Wallace used this victory and his new title to invade northern England. Later that year, Wallace would be given the title of Guardian of Scotland. However, many nobles and knights in Scotland refused to follow Wallace into battle. With his army of mostly countrymen, Wallace marched into Falkirk.\textsuperscript{53} Wallace’s soldiers were no match for Edward I’s, who quickly defeated the Scots.\textsuperscript{54} Although Edward I defeated the Scots and claimed control of Scotland, Scots still opposed English rule.

This opposition to English rule would lead to the second phase of the War of Independence. During this phase, Robert de Brus, Earl of Carrwick and an English archbishop, was awarded the Scottish Crown. He won the support of the Scottish Clergy, who felt that having an English archbishop was important in showing support to the English Crown. However, de Brus could not get the support of the powerful Lord of Badenoch, John Comyn. The refusal enraged de Brus, who then killed Comyn.\textsuperscript{55} After hearing of this, Edward I ordered his lieutenant, Aymer de Valence, to capture de Brus and his remaining army. De Brus was able to escape Edward I’s grasp. He left Scotland in the autumn of 1306.\textsuperscript{56} Nevertheless, this was not the end of de Brus.

In the spring of 1306, de Brus returned to Scotland. De Brus knew that his small and under-equipped army would not be able to partake in any battle against the English.\textsuperscript{57} As de Brus and his soldiers moved through Scotland, they accumulated more men. By the early summer of 1307, de Brus defeated de Valence at Loudon Hill. After hearing of this news, the now very sick Edward I and his soldiers marched towards the north in order to...

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 62.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 63; Gordon Menzies, \textit{The Scottish Nation} (London, United Kingdom: The British Broadcasting Corporation, 1972), 24.
\textsuperscript{56} Mackie, \textit{A Short History of Scotland}, ed. Gordon Donaldson, 64.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 65.
defeat de Brus. During this march, Edward I died. Shortly before his death, he ordered his successor, Edward II, to continue the march north. Edward II would ignore this request. By 1308, de Brus was capturing castle after castle from the English. In retaliation, the English descended on Scottish positions. De Brus and his soldiers would be able to defeat the English, capturing all English strongholds in the south of Scotland. These victories would not be enough for de Brus.

De Brus wanted Edward II to recognize him as the lawful King of Scotland and for the English government to recognize Scotland as an independent country. When Edward II refused, de Brus marched into northern England. In 1318, de Brus captured Berwick, along with Yorkshire and Mitton. Even with these advancements, the English government showed no signs of heeding to the demands of de Brus. By 1322, Edward II attempted another invasion of Scotland, but when he and his soldiers noticed that there were no people within ten miles of Edinburgh, they quickly withdrew. As they retreated, de Brus followed them. De Brus and his soldiers would successfully defeat the English, leading to a truce between Scotland and England in 1323. Nevertheless, this truce was short lived.

In 1327, King Edward III renewed the war. After numerous battles, negotiations on how to end the war started between representatives of Edward III and de Brus. By the spring of 1328, the two crowns reached an agreement called the Treaty of Northampton. Not only did this agreement put an end to the war, but it also recognized the

58 Ibid., 66-67.
59 Ibid., 68-70.
60 Ibid., 71.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 72.
independence of Scotland and the right for de Brus to be King of the independent country. The process of the formation of a nation, as was just described here for Scotland, can create conditions that led to the development of nationalism and national identity. The next section of this chapter will discuss the concept of nationalism and national identity.

Nationalism

Anthony D. Smith defines a nation as a human community that is located in a supposed homeland, has a distinctive culture, shares common myths and history, and has common customs and laws for all its members. He then defines nationalism as an ideological movement that attempts to attain and maintain autonomy, unity, and identity for a population where some of its members believe that they constitute an actual or potential nation. Feelings of nationalism can arise within a nation when its citizens idealize the state, have a feeling of national superiority, have an uncritical acceptance of the nation-state and its political institutions, suppress ambivalent feelings towards the nation-state, overemphasis national association in the self-concept of individuals in the nation-state, and use derogating comparisons with individuals that are not considered to be part of the nation-state. There are two types of nationalism. The first type of nationalism is called civic nationalism. This type of nationalism involves bringing

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63 Ibid., 72.
64 Anthony Smith, Nationalism (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press, 2010), 5.
65 Ibid., 13.
66 Ibid., 9.
together and integrating distinct ethnic populations to create a new ‘territorial nation.’

Scottish nationalism is an example of civic nationalism because one does not need to be born in Scotland to be considered Scottish. The second type of nationalism is ethnic nationalism. In a post-independent sense, ethnic nations are comprised of ‘kinsmen.’ In other words, individuals in countries with ethnic nationalism share the same “blood and soil.”

In addition to these two types of nationalisms, some European states have experienced a surge in regional nationalism. Regional nationalism, or regionalism, has many different meanings. Individuals in a region of a state can exhibit regionalism when they feel threatened by the nation-state, feel excluded from the rest of the population, or disagree with how the state controls their territory. In other cases, regionalism occurs when individuals aspire to restore past ethnic and cultural identities and autonomies.

Michael Keating states that “regionalisms of developed western societies represent attempts to come to terms with the changing constellation of power and to reconstitute politics on a territorial basis which is legitimized historically but which can be used to confront contemporary political and economic realities.” There are two types of regionalism. The first is called institutional regionalism. Institutional regionalism began in the 1960s in many European states. In these states, the government would adopt a

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70 Smith, Nationalism, 15.
71 Ibid., 82.
72 Ibid., 44.
74 Ibid., 448.
75 Ibid.
regional development policy that would facilitate development in peripheral regions to stimulate economic development for the entire state. However, these policies did not produce the desired outcome.\textsuperscript{76}

Over time, these development policies became politicized and conflict would arise between the central government and the regional government. In some states, these development policies created powerful regional governments that became more assertive and increased their demands for financial support from the central government. In addition, some regional governments increased calls for more territorial autonomy from the central government. This led to the emergence of regionalism within some territories.\textsuperscript{77} The second type of regionalism, which is the most common, is called autonomist regionalism. Autonomist regionalism deals with ethnicity, culture, and identity. Specifically, autonomist regionalism is applied to “state-less nations” where separatist or secessionist movements are occurring.\textsuperscript{78} Although the two types of regionalism have different definitions, both arise because of similar factors. Firstly, regionalism arises because of the lack of support for the centralist model of government in some regions. Secondly, regionalism arises when individuals within these regions see their territory as distinctively different from the rest of the nation-state. And thirdly, regionalism arises because many individuals in these regions see themselves as having a different national identity than the rest of the individuals in the nation-state.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 449.  
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 450.  
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 451.
National identity is a more general concept that is related to nationalism and regionalism.\textsuperscript{80} It tends to explain the emotional bond individuals have with their nation-state.\textsuperscript{81} In particular, national identity arises when individuals form a positive bond with their nation-state.\textsuperscript{82} There are six concepts related to national identity. They include an understanding of which nation-state an individual belongs or potentially wants to belong to, a positive feeling towards the nation-state an individual belongs to, the eagerness to incorporate the state’s culture, forming illusory beliefs about the aims and problems of the state, forming illusory beliefs about the current opportunities and constraints of individuals in the state, and elevating the significance of national affiliation in one’s identity.\textsuperscript{83} National identity can also exist in regions of a nation-state.

In stateless nations, individuals can possess a national identity that reflects their loyalty to the region.\textsuperscript{84} For example, although Scotland is part of the United Kingdom, some individuals in Scotland see themselves as being just Scottish. However, some in Scotland see themselves as being both Scottish and British because dual national identities can arise in regions within nation-states.\textsuperscript{85} According to some scholars, some forms of Scottish identity have existed since the Roman times. This, along with its

\textsuperscript{80} Blank and Schmidt, “National Identity in a united Germany: Nationalism or Patriotism? An Empirical Test with Representative Data,” 291.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 290.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 291.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 290-291.
\textsuperscript{85} Curtice, “A Stronger or Weaker Union? Public Reactions to Asymmetric Devolution in the United Kingdom,” 99-100.
historical relationship with England, has led to the development of Scottish nationalism,\textsuperscript{86} which has increased over the years.

\textit{Scottish Nationalism and Devolution}

The growth of nationalism in Scotland after the \textit{Act of Union} in 1707 can be divided into three phases. The first phase stretched from 1707 to the 1740s. This phase was characterized by discontent among the Scottish population.\textsuperscript{87} The formation of the Union between Scotland and England led to hardships in many industrial sectors in Scotland.\textsuperscript{88} For example, the English government increased the salt tax in Scotland, which had negative repercussions for the herring industry. The woollen industry also suffered because of increased competition from England.\textsuperscript{89} Another issue that caused discontent in Scotland was the extension of the English system for the collection of customs and excise into Scottish territory.\textsuperscript{90}

The second phase stretched from 1750 to 1850. During this phase, expression of discontent towards the Union reached low levels. Scotland was witnessing the revival of Scottish literature, and many individuals in Scotland started to take an interest in English culture and history. People also witnessed a resurgence in the economy with the Scottish

\begin{footnotes}
\item[88] Ibid.
\item[90] Donaldson et al., \textit{Government and Nationalism in Scotland}, ed. James N. Wolfe, 5.
\end{footnotes}
economy expanding in all sectors. This century of harmony, however, ended with the renewal of criticism by individuals in Scotland towards the Union.

In the third phase, many started to take an interest in how Scotland was run. The Manager of Scotland disappeared, which created concerns that Westminster was gaining more control over Scottish issues. By 1853, the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights was formed. Resolutions within this association asked for the appointment of a Secretary of State for Scotland and increased Scottish representation at Westminster. Although the resolutions were not taken seriously by the British Government and the association was dissolved in 1856, the association’s proposal for a separate administration in Scotland was kept alive. In 1881, demands for a Scottish Secretary became more prominent. Administrative change would soon come to Scotland.

Devolution in the United Kingdom is the transfer of power from the central government in London to regional governments in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Devolution has been the greatest constitutional change in the United Kingdom since the Great Reform Act of 1832. Prior to devolution, Scotland was often referred to as North Britain and under the control of the British Home Secretary. In the 1880s, Irish Home Rule created a desire within Scotland for greater independence from Westminster. Lord Rosebery advocated on behalf of Scotland. He argued for the creation of a separate minister for Scotland. In 1885, as a result of his efforts, the central government in London

91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 6.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., 7.
96 Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, 1.
97 Ibid., 11.
began devolving power to Scotland.\textsuperscript{98} This devolution resulted in the creation of the Scottish Office.\textsuperscript{99} In a conversation between Lord Salisbury and the Duke of Richmond and Gordon, Lord Salisbury stated that the purpose of this newly created office was to address the concerns of the Scottish people that Scotland did not have enough control over its own territory.\textsuperscript{100} At its inception, the Scottish Office had very few functional responsibilities.

In 1954, the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs, the Balfour Commission, established two criteria to assess the effectiveness of the Scottish Office in regards to Scottish affairs. The first criterion stated that the government in Scotland needed to be designed in such a way that it promoted Scottish businesses in Scotland. The second criterion stated that Scottish needs and points of view must be taken into consideration when formulating policy for Scotland.\textsuperscript{101} By the 1960s, the Scottish Office started to gain more power. In the 1960s, the Secretary of State was responsible for bringing all issues relating to Scotland before Cabinet. The Secretary of State was also responsible for the administration of six departments within the Scottish Office. Those departments included the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Environment and Fisheries, the Department of Development, the Department of Education and Industry, the Department of Health, and the Home Department.\textsuperscript{102} The Scottish Office also witnessed an increase in its ministerial team throughout the twentieth century. In 1979, a new Under-Secretary of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{98 Ibid., 111.}
\footnote{99 Ibid.}
\footnote{100 Ibid.}
\footnote{101 Ibid., 112.}
\footnote{102 Ibid., 111.}
\end{footnotes}
State joined the Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{103} By 1998, the Scottish Office possessed a Secretary of State, five Under-Secretaries of State, and a Minister of State.\textsuperscript{104}

Although it appeared that the Secretary of State and the Scottish Office were given more autonomy, that autonomy was limited.\textsuperscript{105} The effectiveness of the Secretary of State was constrained by the conflict between their role as Scotland’s Minister and the convention of collective Cabinet responsibility.\textsuperscript{106} This convention made it difficult for the Secretary of State to create new policies that may be embraced in Scotland, but not favoured in England. English ministers had the ability to strike down policies initiated by the Secretary of State. As a result, the Secretary of State’s autonomy was limited to matters in Scotland that English ministers did not care about.\textsuperscript{107}

Another issue with the Secretary of State was that it was an appointed position. Instead of the citizens of Scotland choosing their representative at Westminster, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom decided who would be tasked with looking after Scottish affairs. This meant that the Secretary of State often came from a political party that had not won in Scotland. Also, this position was also seen as a junior post within Cabinet. However, even with its limitations and faults, the Secretary of State was viewed by many in Scotland as a key political figure. Willie Ross, Secretary of State in 1964 to 1970 and 1974 to 1976, referred to the public’s expectations of the position as

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item \textsuperscript{103} Lynch, \textit{Scottish Government and Politics: An Introduction}, 131.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Bogdanor, \textit{Devolution in the United Kingdom}, 112.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 113.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
“approaching the archangelic in Scotland.”108 These issues would remain until the election of Tony Blair and the “New” Labour government.109

After the death of popular Labour Party leader John Smith in 1994, four Labour Members of Parliament sought the leadership of the Labour Party. Those individuals were Gordon Brown, Tony Blair, John Prescott, and Margaret Beckett.110 As the leadership race progressed, The Scotsman, a Scottish news agency, published a survey showing that Brown was the most popular candidate in the leadership race in Scotland, followed by Blair.111 Despite his popularity, Brown withdrew his name from contention and decided to back Blair for the leadership.112 This move somehow proved beneficial to the Labour Party during the European elections a few days later. In Scotland, the Labour Party achieved forty-three percent of the vote, defeating both the Conservative Party and the Scottish National Party. This was the Labour Party’s best ever performance in a European election.113

On July 21st, 1994, Blair defeated both Prescott and Beckett to become the leader of the Labour Party. In October of 1994, Blair unveiled the party’s bold new election strategy, called “New Labour, New Britain.”114 This was considered to be the Labour Party’s most radical electoral strategy.115 Part of this plan was the proposal for further

111 Ibid., 68.
112 Ibid., 69.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
devolution to Scotland, which became part of the Labour Party’s 1997 manifesto.\textsuperscript{116} Addressing the issue of devolution guided the Labour Party to one of their best electoral performances in Scotland. During the 1997 general election, the Labour Party achieved about forty-five percent of the vote, making them the best performing party in Scotland.\textsuperscript{117}

It is important to note that Blair and “New Labour” cannot solely be credited with the reinvigoration of the devolution debate. In 1993, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats created the Scottish Constitutional Commission.\textsuperscript{118} In this commission, the parties negotiated issues regarding a new Scottish Parliament, including the future electoral system and gender balance. Debating intensified between the two parties over the format of the future parliament. The Labour Party argued for a parliament with 112 members while the Liberal Democrats wanted a parliament with 145 members. A compromise of 129 members was reached.\textsuperscript{119} On November 30\textsuperscript{th}, 1995, the Commission released a document with a set of proposals for a new Scottish Parliament. These proposals included a proportional representation electoral system, economic powers, tax-raising powers, and competence over large parts of public life in Scotland.\textsuperscript{120} Thus, although the conception of a Scottish Parliament was a combination of the efforts of both the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats, it was Blair and the Labour Party that benefited from this proposal, allowing them to defeat the Conservative Party and Scottish National Party in Scotland.

\textsuperscript{118} Hassan and Shaw, \textit{The Strange Death of Labour Scotland}, 71-72.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 72-73.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 72.
While the Labour Party benefited electorally from their policy on devolution, the Conservative Party’s policy on this issue may have led to their downfall in the 1997 general election, particularly in Scotland. John Major and the Conservative Party were firmly opposed to a Scottish Parliament, believing that it would lead to the break up of the United Kingdom. Many believed that the 1997 Conservative Party manifesto also echoed anti-devolution sentiments. Although the Conservative Party voiced their opposition, Blair and the “New” Labour Party kept their commitment to further devolve power to Scotland after the 1997 general election.

To confirm the popularity of further devolving power to Scotland, the newly elected Blair and the Labour Party held a devolution referendum in Scotland five months after forming government. Individuals were asked two questions: should there be a Scottish Parliament and should that Parliament have tax-varying powers. The majority of individuals who participated in the referendum voted yes to both questions with a voter turnout of about sixty percent. With these results, Blair knew that he would have to move forward with further devolving power to Scotland.

Devolution and the creation of the Scottish Parliament came in the form of the *Scotland Bill* that was introduced by the Blair government in 1997. Following its passage in 1998, the *Scotland Bill* became the *Scotland Act* of 1998. The *Act* provided for the establishment of the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood and the ability of that

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123 Bogdanor, *Devolution in the United Kingdom*, 199.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., 201.
Parliament to create laws within its own areas of competence. The Act also transferred some constituency responsibilities from Members of Parliament representing Scottish constituencies to Members of the Scottish Parliament. The Act also created a constitutional court, called the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, with the power to only rule on Scottish legislation. The Scotland Act of 1998 also provided powers to the Scottish Parliament itself. The Scottish Parliament would be tasked with policies over agriculture, fisheries, economic development, education, environment, local government, health, social work, civil law, criminal justice, tourism, and arts. The Act, however, preserved Westminster’s supremacy. It allows the central government to legislate on matters that have been devolved to Scotland. This is because the Act does not intend to affect the unity of the United Kingdom. All in all, although the Act devolved power to the new Scottish Parliament, Westminster still has power over Scotland.

127 Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, 202.
129 Lynch, Scottish Government and Politics, 16.
130 Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, 202.
Regional nationalism in many European states has been on the rise. Regional nationalism can exist in regions of nation-states. Within these regions, individuals can develop a national identity that is different than that of the rest of the individuals in the nation-state. In these regions, individuals can acquire either a dual national identity or an exclusive national identity. Some have suggested that devolution and dual national identity are correlated. The theory of new institutionalism may help explain this trend. New institutionalism studies how political institutions affect society. Both the Conservative Party and Labour Party of the United Kingdom indirectly use this theory to make the argument that devolved institutions affect Scottish society. Some of these nation-states where both dual and exclusive national identity exist include Catalonia in Spain, Flanders in Belgium, and Scotland in the United Kingdom. The implementation of devolution is important because individuals who attribute themselves with a dual national identity are less likely to support independence than are their exclusive national identity counterparts. This chapter reviews the literature that explores seven key subjects. Those subjects include nationalism in Europe, the relationship between devolution and dual national identity, the theory of institutionalism and new institutionalism, dual national identity in Spain and Belgium, dual national identity in

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131 Giordano, “Italian regionalism or ‘Padanian’ nationalism- The political project of the Lega Nord in Italian politics,” 451.
133 Bond and Rosie, “National Identities and Attitudes to Constitutional Change in Post-Devolution UK: A Four Territories Comparison,” 84-85.
134 Ibid., 91.
pre-devolved Scotland, the relationship between national identity and calls for the independence, and the relationship between national identity and support for the Scottish National Party.

**Nationalism in Europe**

Brigid Laffan states that nationalism is a product of the French Revolution and popular sovereignty and that throughout history, nationalism was required for a state to be considered legitimate. Laffan claims that during the 1960s, many Western European countries started to experience an increase in regional national identity within the nation-state. This increase led to the creation of regional nationalist movements, which forced many central governments to reconstruct the balance between the central government and regional bodies.

Like Laffan, Anthony Smith also studied regional national identity in Western Europe. He found that it has been on the rise since 1945. He states that there are three factors that can explain this increase. First, nation-states have become more powerful. This power translates into an increased ability to interfere in every sphere of social life. This increased interference led to resentment among some minority groups within the state. Second, globalization and technology resulted in the spread of literacy to remote areas within Western European states. This increased the level of consciousness and

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136 Ibid., 88-90.
137 Ibid.
expectations among minority groups. And third, many Western European states implemented education policies that promote a single civic culture. This created divisions along pre-existing ethnic lines within the state. These three factors tended to revitalize the memories of these minority cultures, which has led to an increase in regional national identity.\(^{139}\)

Similar to the above two scholars, Michael Keating also studied regional national identity in Europe, finding that it has been on the rise.\(^{140}\) Keating provides an economic explanation for this increase. The economic demands of regions are changing. Before, regional governments were able to press the central government for resources in the form of transfers or diverted public or private investment. This, along with tariff protection, created a disincentive for independence. Now, the capacity of the central government to provide these resources has been reduced by the negotiations of policies such as free trade agreements. Regional governments now put more emphasize on learning how to influence aspects of the international market, thereby relying less heavily on the central government.\(^{141}\)

In addition, Benedict Anderson also studied regional national identity. Similar to the above studies, he also found that in many European countries, regional national identity was on the rise.\(^{142}\) In Western Europe, regional nationalist movements exist

\(^{139}\) Ibid.


\(^{141}\) Ibid., 48-55.

because of deep historical memories and traditional communities.\textsuperscript{143} Anderson also claims that political oppression against minority groups in Western Europe is another reason for the increase in regional national identity.\textsuperscript{144} In addition, Anderson states that the rise of mass communication is associated with the rise of regional national identity in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{145}

Mass communication began in the nineteenth century with the introduction of mass-oriented newspapers. These newspapers were not only read by the middle class, but by the growing working class, thus increasing literacy among all classes. Acknowledging the importance of literacy, governments started to implement modern school systems, with standardized textbooks, standardized curricula, and standardized examinations. This new school system promoted the dominant political vernacular, which led in an increase in regional nationalism within regions in nation-states.\textsuperscript{146}

The common theme among most of the literature is that regional national identity is on the rise in Europe. Laffan claimed that this rise in regional national identity in Western Europe forced many central governments to reconfigure their governing styles. Smith stated that the rise in regional national identity was caused by the marginalization of minority groups by central governments and the spread of literacy. Keating stated that the rise in regional identity in Europe was related to economic demands. Anderson claimed that the rise in regional national identity in Europe was the result of increased literacy and mass communication, which was similar to the explanation that Smith provided. All in all, the literature above indicates that regional national identity in Europe

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
is on the rise and that there are numerous reasons for their increase. To respond to this increase, some central governments have implemented devolution.  

**Devolution and Dual National Identity**

In this section, literature that evaluated the correlation between devolution and dual national identity will be examined. According to a study conducted by Frank Bechhofer and David McCrone, in both Scotland and Wales, over half of individuals studied attributed their dual national identity with the fact that both countries have devolved regional governments. Unfortunately, no further explanation is given for this increase in dual national identity. The story is much different in England. After the announcement of devolution to both Scotland and Wales in 1997, the number of individuals in England who claimed to be exclusively English rose and the number of individuals claiming to be British and English or exclusively British dropped. The reason for this increase in exclusive national identity in England was largely due to the fact that the English were witnessing the creation of devolved governments in both Scotland and Wales but saw no devolved institutions heading their way. Another indication that devolution in the United Kingdom is leading to an increase in exclusive identity in England is the fact that numerous English national political parties that focus solely on English issues have formed in the post-devolution period. Some of these parties include

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the English Independence Party, the England First Party, and the English Democrat
Party. These three parties seek to create an English parliament that would promote
English issues. Unlike the England First Party and the English Democrat Party, the
English Independence Party does not seek to breakup the United Kingdom. However,
they would not be opposed to the breakup if it was to occur. It should be noted,
however, that some scholars argue that Englishness and Britishness are intertwined,
making the distinction between these two identities difficult. The next section will
discuss the theory that may explain why devolution influences national identity.

**Institutionalism**

The origins of the institutional approach can be traced back to the beginning of
political science. The institutional approach can be seen in the historical works of
various political philosophers. For example, Plato’s famous work, *Republic*, was a
comparison between different forms of government. However, the institutional
approach was largely insignificant until the rise of political science as an academic
discipline in the nineteenth century. Scholars of political science were increasingly

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151 Ibid., 372.
154 Ibid., 3.
156 Ibid., 152.
employing the institutional approach in their research.\textsuperscript{157} The importance of the institutional approach during this time was illustrated through the creation of the Weimer Republic in Germany.\textsuperscript{158} The institutional approach is also known as old institutionalism. Old institutionalism is a holistic approach that is concerned with three elements.\textsuperscript{159} These elements include the practical function of an institution, legally binding formal rules, and the comparison between governmental systems.\textsuperscript{160} Old institutionalism started to decrease in significance, however, around the 1950s, when other scholars from different theoretical traditions started to challenge this approach.\textsuperscript{161}

In 1984, two political scientists, James March and Johan Olsen, argued that political institutions were too important to ignore because they have such a large influence on everyday life.\textsuperscript{162} They argued that because of their importance, political institutions must return to the forefront of political science research.\textsuperscript{163} To address this, they devised a new institutional approach to study political institutions, which they called new institutionalism.\textsuperscript{164} New institutionalism looks at how political institutions affect the behaviour of individual actors and society as a whole.\textsuperscript{165} It also looks at how individuals can affect political institutions.\textsuperscript{166} These two institutional approaches differ in four ways.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{157} Peters, \textit{Institutional Theory in Political Science}, 4-5.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Porta and Keating, \textit{Approaches to Social Sciences}, 152.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Peters, \textit{Institutional Theory in Political Science}, 3.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 12.
\item \textsuperscript{162} Ibid., 19.
\item \textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Vivien Lowndes, \textit{The Institutional Approach}, ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 71.
\end{itemize}
Firstly, both institutional approaches define and study institutions differently. Old institutionalists define political institutions as static.\textsuperscript{167} This means that when studying institutions, old institutionalists look at whole systems of government because they believe that political institutions never change.\textsuperscript{168} New institutionalists, however, define political institutions as dynamic.\textsuperscript{169} Due to the dynamic nature of political institutions, new institutionalists study different aspects that may affect institutions, such as cabinet decision-making, inter-governmental relationships, the electoral system, and tax and benefit systems.\textsuperscript{170}

Secondly, while old institutionalists are interested in formal rules, new institutionalists are interested in informal rules.\textsuperscript{171} Formal rules are rules that are clear, enforceable, and specified.\textsuperscript{172} Informal rules are rules that are unwritten and unenforceable, but are important to the function of a governmental system.\textsuperscript{173} An example comes from the United Kingdom. After an election, it is the unwritten responsibility of the monarch to appoint a Prime Minister that they feel has the support of the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{174} Therefore, although both institutional approaches study institutions, their approach to that study is different.

Thirdly, old institutionalism and new institutionalism use different scientific approaches to conducting research. Old institutionalists use an inductive approach when

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., 68.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 69.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 68.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 69.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 67.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
performing research.\textsuperscript{175} This means that they first collect data, and then use that data to arrive at a theory.\textsuperscript{176} New institutionalist, however, use a deductive approach when conducting research.\textsuperscript{177} This means that they chose a theory and then test that theory using evidence they collected.\textsuperscript{178}

And lastly, unlike old institutionalism, new institutionalism can be used by numerous disciplines, creating different sub-categories. According to Vivien Lowndes, some of those sub-categories include international institutionalism, normative institutionalism, empirical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and feminist institutionalism.\textsuperscript{179} In sum, unlike old institutionalism, which is a holistic approach,\textsuperscript{180} new institutionalism can be utilized by a variety of disciplines.

As was mentioned previously, the theory of new institutionalism claims that institutions can affect society. Political parties in the United Kingdom have indirectly used this theory to make the argument that devolved institutions can affect Scottish society. Both the Conservative Party and Labour Party have opposing views towards the effects of devolved institutions on Scottish society. The Conservative Party has been historically opposed to a Scottish Parliament. They believe that it would lead to the break up of the United Kingdom because the growth of the Scottish Government may increase

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., 64. \\
\textsuperscript{177} Lowndes, \textit{The Institutional Approach}, 64. \\
\textsuperscript{178} Hedican, “Epistemological implications of anthropological field work, with notes from northern Ontario,” 217. \\
\textsuperscript{179} Lowndes, \textit{The Institutional Approach}, 65. \\
\textsuperscript{180} Peters, \textit{Institutional Theory in Political Science}, 31.
the desire for independence.\textsuperscript{181} This sentiment did not change under Margaret Thatcher or John Major. Both of these individuals were confirmed unionists, so during their leadership, any proposals related to devolution were quickly quashed.\textsuperscript{182} Individuals associated with the Conservative Party in Scotland also displayed anti-devolution sentiment. Some of those individuals included Brian Montieth, leader of the “Think Twice” campaign, and Donald Findlay, leader of the “No-No” campaign.\textsuperscript{183} Unlike the Conservatives, the Labour Party was in favour of devolution to Scotland.

The Scottish National Party experienced its first parliamentary breakthrough with Winifred Ewing’s Hamilton by-election victory in 1967. To respond to what was viewed as a growing nationalist movement in Scotland, the Labour Government of Harold Wilson created the Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1969. The commission’s report, which was not released until October of 1973, supported further devolution to Scotland. In 1978, the Labour Government would pass the \textit{Scotland Act} of 1978. As with any act, this Act had a number of amendments. One of the amendments to the Act, called the Cunningham Amendment, stated that “if less than 40 percent of those entitled to vote were to vote yes, then orders for the repeal of the legislation would have to be laid before parliament.” When it came time to vote on the proposals laid out by the \textit{Scotland Act}, 33 percent of people in Scotland voted yes, while 31 percent voted no. However, 36 percent of registered voters did not vote, so the condition set by the Cunningham Amendment was not met. As a result, the Scottish National Party withdrew their support for the


\textsuperscript{183} Seawright, \textit{An Important Matter of Principle: The Decline of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party}, 123.
Labour Government, causing a vote of confidence. The Labour Government would lose that vote, causing a change in government.\textsuperscript{184}

Throughout the 1980s, while in opposition, the Labour Party continued to develop policies on devolution. During this period, John Smith, a Scottish Member of Parliament who would become leader of the Labour Party, described the creation of a new Scottish Parliament as “unfinished business.” He committed the party firmly to devolution.\textsuperscript{185} In 1993, along with the Liberal-Democrats, the Labour Party created the Scottish Constitutional Commission.\textsuperscript{186} Aside from discussing how a new Scottish Parliament would function, the commission also discussed Scotland’s position in the Union.\textsuperscript{187} Following the death of Smith in 1994, Tony Blair became the new leader of the Labour Party. Blair adopted all Labour Party policies related to devolution from his predecessors.\textsuperscript{188} Therefore, to respond to the growing nationalist movement, the Labour Party proposed and has been in favour of devolving power to Scotland. This followed a pattern that was evident in other European countries, particularly Spain and Belgium.

\textit{Dual National Identity in Spain and Belgium}

Some countries in Europe have experienced a rise in dual national identity. One of these countries is the Kingdom of Spain. Individuals in the regional community of Catalonia experience self-identification, which can lead to them associating themselves

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{184} Munro, “Scottish Devolution: Accommodating a restless nation,” 110-111.
\item \textsuperscript{185} Tomaney, “End of the Empire State? New Labour and Devolution in the United Kingdom,” 682.
\item \textsuperscript{186} Hassan and Shaw, The Strange Death of Labour Scotland, 71-72.
\item \textsuperscript{188} Tomaney, “End of the Empire State? New Labour and Devolution in the United Kingdom,” 682.
\end{itemize}
with either a regional national identity or a dual national identity. After the death of Francisco Franco in 1975, which also ended the forty years of dictatorship, the Spanish government began to devolve power to regional communities. This was an attempt to curtail growing nationalist movements, particularly in Catalonia. The policy of devolution became official after the introduction of the new Spanish Constitution in 1978. To determine if devolution resulted in a decrease in regional nationalism and an increase in dual nationalism, Luis Moreno and Ana Arriba looked at nationalism in Catalonia.

Moreno and Arriba examined nationalism in Catalonia in 1986, 1991, and 1994. They found that in all of the three years studied, there were more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity than there were individuals that attributed themselves with an exclusive Catalan identity. Two years later, Moreno and Arriba, along with Araceli Serrano, wanted to determine if dual national identity in Catalonia was still higher than exclusive Catalan identity. Using data from 1990 to 1995, the researchers found that there were more individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity than there were individuals attributing themselves as being exclusively Catalan. Thus, Moreno, Arriba, and Serrano showed that dual national identity in Catalonia was higher than exclusive Catalan identity in the post-devolution period. Other

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192 Ibid., 82-83.
studies also concluded that dual national identity in Catalonia was higher than exclusive Catalan identity in the post-devolution period. However, unlike the previous literature discussed, Montserrat Guibernau makes it clear that devolution is the reason for the higher percentage of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity in Catalonia.

Ivan Serrano and Montserrat Guibernau also reviewed nationalism in Catalonia following the creation of the 1978 Spanish Constitution. Serrano and Guibernau found that during the post-devolution period, the percentage of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity was higher than those attributing themselves with exclusive Catalan identity. However, Serrano found that since 1979, the percentage of both individuals attributing themselves with exclusive Catalan identity and individuals that attribute themselves with being “[m]ore Catalan than Spanish” had been increasing. Serrano states that devolution may be playing a role in this increase. The Kingdom of Belgium is another European state that gains the attention of researchers studying dual national identity.

198 Ibid., 525, 527.
In Belgium, the central government introduced devolution in 1970 in an attempt to hold the multinational state together.\textsuperscript{199} After obtaining independence from the Southern Netherlands in 1830, the political elites in Belgium ruled the newly formed country as a francophone nation.\textsuperscript{200} This created animosity towards the elites by the two other language groups present in the country.\textsuperscript{201} Although the German population was not pleased, the Dutch speakers, or the Flemish, were particularly hostile towards the francophone rulers. This led to many individuals in Flanders attributing themselves with being exclusively Flemish. These same individuals were also calling for an independent Flanders.\textsuperscript{202} To determine if devolution had an impact on Flemish nationalism, Jaak Billiet, Bart Maddens, and André-Paul Frognier evaluated national identity in Flanders in the post-devolution period.

They found that in 2003, the percentage of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity was higher than the percentage of individuals attributing themselves with exclusive Flemish identity.\textsuperscript{203} In fact, many individuals in Flanders did not consider Flemish and Belgian national identities as conflicting, but rather, many saw them as complementary. This may be why the percentage of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity has been increasing since 1986.\textsuperscript{204} Thus, Billiet


\textsuperscript{201} Swenden and Jans, “‘Will it Stay or Will it go?’ Federalism and the Sustainability of Belgium,” 879.


\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 916-917.
et al. found that more individuals in Flanders claimed to have a dual national identity than claimed to be just Flemish. The reviewed literature shows that dual national identity in Catalonia and Flanders is higher than exclusive national identity in their respective post-devolution periods. However, there is a limited amount of literature on national identity in these regions in their pre-devolution periods, particularly about Flanders. The next section will review literature focusing on dual national identity in Scotland.

_Dual National Identity in Scotland During the Pre-1999 Devolution Period_

Numerous scholars have examined dual national identity in Scotland prior to devolution in 1999. In fact, some literature goes as far back as the 1980s. In 1986, it was found that more individuals in Scotland claimed to have a dual national identity than claimed an exclusive Scottish identity. In 1992, it was also found that dual national identity in Scotland was higher than exclusive Scottish identity.

This trend of higher dual national identity compared to exclusive Scottish identity continued into 1994. In 1997, Anthony Heath and James Kellas found, using British and Scottish Election Survey data, that dual national identity was much higher than exclusive Scottish identity. When comparing the first three years discussed, one could conclude that dual national identity in Scotland increased at the expense of exclusive

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205 Moreno, “Scotland, Catalonia, Europeanization and the ‘Moreno Question,’” 8.
Scottish identity. When adding the fourth year discussed to the comparison, dual national identity was still higher than exclusive Scottish identity, but exclusive Scottish identity increased.\textsuperscript{209}

Some of the literature looks at national identity in Scotland over a period of time. Using data from the Scottish Election Study, the British and Scottish Election Studies, and British and Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys, John Curtice discovered that dual national identity in Scotland was higher than exclusive Scottish from 1992 to the year of devolution.\textsuperscript{210} During that same period, Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson, Lindsey Jarvis, and Catherine Bromley also found, using data from British and Scottish Election Surveys, that dual national identity was higher than exclusive Scottish identity. However, over that period of time, dual national identity was declining and exclusive Scottish identity was increasing. This was mostly at the expense of individuals attributing themselves with being more Scottish than British and equally Scottish and British.\textsuperscript{211} Park et al. were not the only scholars to discover this trend. From 1992 to 1997, Ross Bond and Michael Rosie also found, using survey data from Systems Three Scotland and ICM Research Limited, that although dual national identity remained higher than exclusive Scottish identity, it was on the decline while exclusive Scottish identity was on the rise. This increase in exclusive Scottish identity was at the expense of individuals


\textsuperscript{210} Curtice, “A Stronger or Weaker Union? Public Reactions to Asymmetric Devolution in the United Kingdom,” 100.

\textsuperscript{211} Park et al., Is devolution strengthening or weakening the UK?, 10.
attributing themselves with being more Scottish than British and equally Scottish and British, which was consistent with Park’s et al. study.²¹²

Unlike Park et al. and Bond and Rosie, David McCrone does not find a consistent pattern of increase and decrease between dual national identity and exclusive Scottish identity. Using data from The Scotsman, Scottish Election Surveys, the Scottish Referendum Study, and Scottish Parliamentary Election Studies, McCrone found that, in 1986, there were more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity as opposed to an exclusive Scottish identity. In 1991, although the number of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity was higher than those attributing themselves with an exclusive Scottish identity, the number of those with an exclusive Scottish identity increased at the expense of individuals claiming to be “More Scottish than British” and “More British than Scottish.” It is important to note that the overall number of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity was no different in 1991 than in 1986. In 1992, the number of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity rose at the expense of exclusive Scottish identity. In particular, the number of individuals attributing themselves with the identity of being “More Scottish than British” and “Equally Scottish and British” rose.²¹³

In 1997, although the number of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity was higher than exclusive Scottish identity, their numbers dropped because of the fall in the number of people attributing themselves with being more Scottish than British and equally Scottish and British. Exclusive Scottish identity rose

during that same year. The last year that was under review, 1999, witnessed a similar loss in the number of people attributing themselves with being more Scottish than British and equally Scottish and British. However, dual national identity in Scotland was still higher than exclusive Scottish identity.\textsuperscript{214} Although John Curtice reached a similar conclusion about national identity in Scotland in 1997 and 1999, he found that the number of individuals that attributed themselves with being exclusively Scottish remained the same. The only changes that he noted was that the number of individuals attributing themselves with being more Scottish than British increased while the number of individuals that attributed themselves with being “Equally Scottish and British” decreased.\textsuperscript{215}

Similar to McCrone, Ailsa Henderson, using British Election Survey data, also does not find a consistent pattern of increase and decrease between dual national identity and exclusive Scottish identity. From 1986 to 1991, there were more individuals that attributed themselves with being exclusively Scottish than there were individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity. From 1991 to 1992, the number of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity increased at the expense of exclusive Scottish identity. Specifically, the number of individuals attributing themselves with being more Scottish than British increased. It stayed that way until 1998, when the number of individuals attributing themselves with being exclusively Scottish increased and the number of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity decreased. In particular, exclusively Scottish identity increased at the expense of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{215} Curtice, “Is Devolution Succouring Nationalism?” 82.
\end{footnotesize}
more Scottish than British and equally Scottish and British identity.\textsuperscript{216} The above literature shows that, in the pre-devolution period, dual national identity in Scotland was higher than exclusively Scottish identity even though some scholars have found that dual national identity was decreasing and exclusively Scottish identity was increasing.

\textit{Dual National Identity and Calls for Independence}

As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the Conservative Party of the United Kingdom believed that devolution to Scotland would result in increased calls for independence and thus, lead to the breakup of the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{217} However, as was also mentioned previously, devolution to Scotland has led to an increase in individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity. This is important because numerous studies have indicated that individuals with exclusive Scottish identity are more likely to support Scottish independence than are individuals who attribute themselves with a dual national identity. Some of this literature focused on the pre-devolution period in Scotland. In 1997, individuals in Scotland with exclusive Scottish identity were more likely to support Scottish independence than were their dual national identity counterparts.\textsuperscript{218} Another study that reviewed the relationship between national identity in Scotland and the desire for independence during that same year came to a different conclusion. David McCrone found that in 1997, the difference in preference for independence between individuals with exclusive Scottish identity and individuals with dual national identity


\textsuperscript{218} Heath and Kellas, “Nationalism and Constitutional Questions,” 116; Ibid., 118.
was so minor that one could not conclude that individuals with exclusive Scottish identity were more likely to support independence than were their dual national identity counterparts.\textsuperscript{219} This, however, did not prevent others from studying this correlation.

Accordingly, in the post-1999 devolution period, some scholars have reviewed the relationship between national identity in Scotland and calls for independence. From 1999 to 2001 and 2005, individuals that claimed to be exclusively Scottish were more likely to support Scottish independence compared to their dual national identity counterparts.\textsuperscript{220} Like most academic fields, other scholars have disputed the link between national identity and calls for independence in the post-devolution period. In 2003 and 2005, some literature claimed that the correlation between national identity and calls for independence in Scotland was not strong enough to conclude that national identity and support for independence were related.\textsuperscript{221}

However, other literature disputes this claim. In 2003, Ross Bond and Michael Rosie found that there was strong enough statistical significance to conclude that individuals that attributed themselves with an exclusively Scottish identity were more likely than individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity to support the independence of Scotland from the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{222} Therefore, most of the above literature demonstrates that one could conclude that an individual’s national identity does determine their opinion on the separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, which is

\textsuperscript{219} McCrone, \textit{Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Nation}, 164.
\textsuperscript{222} Bond and Rosie, “National Identities and Attitudes to Constitutional Change in Post-Devolution UK: A Four Territories Comparison,” 96.
important for this thesis. However, there are some studies that find that the statistical data is not strong enough to claim that a correlation exists between national identity and desire for independence. The next section will evaluate literature that establishes a correlation between an individual’s national identity and whether or not they support the Scottish National Party.

**National Identity and the Scottish National Party**

The Scottish National Party was created through a merger between the National Party of Scotland and the Scottish Party in 1934. The political goal of the Scottish Party, despite its name, was to strengthen the British Empire. The Scottish National Party remained largely irreverent until they won a by-election in Motherwell and Wishaw in 1945. The Scottish National Party’s next electoral breakthrough came in 1967, when the party won another parliamentary seat in the Hamilton by-election. In 1974, the party won eleven seats in the House of Commons. After devolution, the Scottish National Party did not immediately gain power in the newly devolved Scottish Parliament at Holyrood. From 1999 to 2007, the Labour-led coalition with the Liberal Democrats dominated politics in Scotland. It was not until 2007 that the Scottish National Party formed government in Scotland. Although it was only a minority government, it was

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225 Ibid., 90.
226 Ibid., 91.
227 Ibid., 92.
the Scottish National Party’s first major victory. They secured forty-seven out of a potential one hundred and twenty nine seats at Holyrood. In 2011, the Scottish National Party won sixty-nine seats in the Scottish Parliament, forming a majority government. The victory of the Scottish National Party had less to do with independence and more to do with the fact that many saw them as a party that was both more competent than both the other parties and willing to stand up for Scotland when it came to disputes with the central government in London. Although independence was an indirect reason for the success of the Scottish National Party, many scholars have evaluated the link between national identity and an individual’s likelihood that they will support the Scottish National Party. Mainly, some believe that individuals who are exclusively Scottish are more likely to vote for the Scottish National Party than are those who attribute themselves with a dual national identity.

Most scholars look at this correlation after 1999. According to the studies by Frank Bechhofer and David McCrone and Michael Rosie and Ross Bond, individuals who attribute themselves with being exclusively Scottish were more likely than their dual national identity counterparts to vote for the Scottish National Party. Ross Bond and Michael Rosie confirmed this. From 1999 to 2001, support for the Scottish National Party was higher among exclusively Scottish individuals than dual national identity

232 Park, et al., “Is devolution strengthening or weakening the UK?” 15.
individuals. However, Bond and Rosie only compared exclusive Scottish identity individuals with individuals that attribute themselves with being more Scottish than British. This neglects the opinions of individuals that attribute themselves with being equally Scottish and British and more British than Scottish. Therefore, although their study is informative, it lacks a full comparison between exclusive Scottish individuals and dual national identity individuals and their support for the Scottish National Party. Frank Bechhofer and David McCrone addressed this issue. In their study, they compared exclusively Scottish individuals with all forms of dual national identity in Scotland. They found that individuals that attribute themselves with exclusive Scottish identity were more likely to support the Scottish National Party compared to individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity. Although there is not much research on this subject, the literature above demonstrates that there is a correlation between national identity and support for the Scottish National Party in Scotland. Using the literature in the previous section and this section, it could be concluded that exclusively Scottish individuals are more likely to support independence and the Scottish National Party than are dual national identity individuals.

Conclusion

In conclusion, a common theme in the literature is that regional national identity is on the rise in Europe. This rise, caused by numerous factors, has resulted in many nation-states rebalancing power between the central government and the regions. Some

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234 Bond and Rosie, “National Identities in Post-Devolution Scotland,” 43-44.
scholars believe that the process of devolution will lead to individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity within these regions. The theory of institutionalism, particularly new institutionalism, can help explain how devolved institutions are influencing national identity within regions. In countries such as Spain and Belgium, devolution may be contributing to an increase in dual national identity. Catalonia in Spain and Flanders in Belgium both have witnessed an increase in the number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity after devolution. In the United Kingdom, particularly in Scotland, some individuals attribute themselves with a dual national identity in the pre-1999 devolution period. It is important to note that, as was mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, prior to the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, the central government was devolving small amounts of power to Scotland. \(^{236}\) Also, the literature established a connection between national identity and the feelings towards an independent Scotland. Individuals who attribute themselves with a dual national identity were less likely to support the independence of Scotland than were their exclusively Scottish counterparts. It was also established that exclusively Scottish individuals were more likely to support the Scottish National Party than were dual national identity individuals. All in all, the rise of regional national identity in Europe has resulted in some central governments implementing devolution, which has led to an increase in individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity, thereby reducing the desire for independence.

Furthermore, this thesis will also help fill three gaps in the literature. Firstly, the research in this thesis will expand the knowledge by examining up to the year 2013. Secondly, this thesis will examine how devolution is impacting nationalism by examining

\(^{236}\) Bogdanor, *Devolution in the United Kingdom*, 111.
the national identity of individuals in seven key demographic categories. And thirdly, this thesis will use new institutionalism to help explain the link between the devolved Scottish Parliament and national identity.
CHAPTER 3

METHODS

Data Collection

Cumulative measures of national identity, particularly in Scotland, have had little consistency prior to the introduction of the Moreno question in 1986.\textsuperscript{237} Developed for his PhD thesis, Luis Moreno created the Moreno question for the purposes of determining state and regional forms of self-identification.\textsuperscript{238} Prior to this, some scholars used votes for the Scottish National Party as proxies for increasing Scottish identity at the expense of British identity. With the introduction of the Moreno question, scholars can now determine an individual’s true national identity.\textsuperscript{239} This means proxies like political party affiliation are no longer required to determine national identity trends. To determine an individual’s national identity using the Moreno question, researchers ask respondents to choose from five separate identities. For example, in regards to Scottish identity, individuals can be asked the following: “Are you Scottish, not British; more Scottish than British; equally Scottish and British; more British than Scottish; or British, not Scottish?”\textsuperscript{240} Many organizations use the Moreno question to determine national identity within nation-states or regions. One of those organizations is ScotCen Social Research.

\textsuperscript{237} Henderson, “Identity measurement in Scotland and Quebec: The Meaning and Salience of Identity Markers,” 270.
\textsuperscript{238} See Moreno, “Decentralisation in Britain and Spain: The Cases of Scotland and Catalonia;” Moreno, “Scotland, Catalonia, Europeanization and the ‘Moreno Question,’” 11.
\textsuperscript{239} Henderson, “Identity measurement in Scotland and Quebec: The Meaning and Salience of Identity Markers,” 270.
\textsuperscript{240} “Moreno National Identity.”
ScotCen Social Research is an independent research organization that is located in Edinburgh, Scotland. It is part of NatCen Social Research, which is the largest research organization in Britain. ScotCen Social Research is a non-profit organization and a registered educational charity that is independent of government departments and political parties. For over a decade, ScotCen Social Research has been commissioned by the British and Scottish governments and various charities to determine the views of Scottish people.  

To determine trends in national identity for ScotCen Social Research, researchers Susan Reid and Anna Marcinkiewicz survey about 1,200 to 1,500 people using random sampling. These surveys are called the Scottish Social Attitude Surveys. Using Post Office list of addresses, which are public, Reid and Marcinkiewicz send survey requests to each individual selected. The use of the Post Office list of addresses ensures that everyone in Scotland has an equal chance of being selected. This allows the researchers to provide a true representative picture of the Scottish population. It is important to note that addresses cannot be replaced by another address, which prevents bias in the results. If an individual agrees to partake in the survey, Reid and Marcinkiewicz send an interviewer to the individual’s residence for a one-on-one interview. Interviewers are employed and trained by ScotCen Social Research. They have also been checked by the Disclosure and Barring Service. All information collected by the interviewer is kept confidential under the Data Protection Act of 1998. This thesis utilizes the information collected from the Scottish Social Attitude Surveys from ScotCen Social Research to  

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241 “FAQs;” “About What Scotland Thinks.”
242 “FAQs;” “Scottish Social Attitudes.”
determine the extensiveness of dual national identity in Scotland in the post-devolution period.

To gather this information, What Scotland Thinks, which is run by ScotCen Social Research, was used. More specifically, Scottish Social Attitude Surveys data from ScotCen Social Research on What Scotland Thinks was used. These surveys, which were funded by a variety of charitable and government sources, were carried out from 1999 to 2001, 2003, 2005 to 2007, and 2009 to 2013. It is important to note that for this thesis, individuals who selected “more Scottish than British,” “equally Scottish and British,” and “more British than Scottish,” were grouped into a single category called “dual national identity.” This method was adopted from a study conducted by Anthony Heath and James Kellas. 243 Also, the group “Scottish, not “British,” was renamed to “Just Scottish Identity.” Individuals that selected “British, not Scottish;” “Other Description;” “None of these;” or “Refused” were removed from this study. In addition to answering the Moreno question, respondents were also asked to group themselves within eleven demographic groups. Respondents were allowed to place themselves in more than one group. Of these eleven categories, this thesis used seven in its research. These seven groups included “age group,” “sex,” “education,” “urban or rural,” “main economic activity,” “religion,” and “party political identification.”

For the purposes of this thesis, “age group” was changed to “age,” “sex” was changed to “gender,” “urban or rural” was changed to “location,” “main economic activity” was changed to “employment status,” and “party political identification,” was changed to “political party preference.”

Aside from being asked questions about national identity and demographics, respondents were also asked about their preference as to how Scotland should be governed. More specifically, respondents were asked about their feelings towards Scottish independence.

Respondents were asked if they feel Scotland should be “independent, separate from the United Kingdom and the European Union; independent, separate from the United Kingdom but in the European Union; part of the United Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has some taxation powers; part of the United Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has no taxation powers;” or “part of the United Kingdom without its own

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For simplicity, this thesis combines individuals that selected “independent, separate from the United Kingdom and the European Union” and “independent, separate from the United Kingdom but in the European Union” into one category called “independence from the United Kingdom.” This thesis also combines individuals that selected “part of the United Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has some taxation powers” and “part of the United Kingdom with an elected Parliament that has no taxation powers” into one category called “devolution.” The category of “part of the United Kingdom without its own elected Parliament” was renamed to “no devolution.” Individuals that selected “Don’t know” or “Refused” were removed from the study. A comparison between national identity and feelings towards independence was completed for each group under study. Similar to many studies, this thesis encountered some limitations.

**Limitations**

Firstly, the quality of the data that was collected could have been impacted due to the fact that it was collected using one-on-one interviews. The quality of the data that is...
received from one-on-one interviews often depends on the abilities of the interviewer.

There is a possibility that some interviewers from ScotCen Social Research have either low data gathering skills or have their own biases that could impact the respondent’s answers.\(^{246}\) Secondly, some data points were missing from the data provided by the Scottish Social Attitude Surveys. For each demographic group under study, the years 2002, 2004, and 2008 were unavailable. In addition, data from 1999 to 2001 was missing for “urban or rural.” These missing data points may have prevented this thesis from providing a full account of trends in national identity and feelings towards independence in the post-devolution period. And thirdly, for the demographic groups, the Scottish Social Attitude Surveys did not provide a year-to-year breakdown of national identity and feelings towards independence. Instead, all years after 1999 were combined, producing a single percentage. As a result of this, this thesis could not establish a trend of national identity and feelings towards independence from year-to-year in the post-devolution period. Although this thesis encountered limitations, it was still able to provide an accurate account of the effects of devolution on national identity and feelings towards Scottish independence in the post-devolution period.

In conclusion, prior to the introduction of the Moreno question, some scholars used votes for the Scottish National Party as proxies for increasing Scottish identity at the expense of British identity.\(^{247}\) The Moreno question has eliminated the need for researchers to use proxies for national identity. Instead, researchers can now ask respondents to choose from five separate identities. For example, in regards to Scottish


\(^{247}\) Henderson, “Identity measurement in Scotland and Quebec: The Meaning and Salience of Identity Markers,” 270.
identity, individuals can be asked if they are “Scottish, not British; more Scottish than
British; equally Scottish and British; more British than Scottish; or British, not
Scottish.”^248 Many organizations, such as ScotCen Social Research use the Moreno
question to determine the trends in national identity, as well as feelings towards
independence in Scotland. For this thesis, ScotCen Social Research data, which for
national identity and feelings towards independence comes in the form of Scottish Social
Attitude Surveys, was obtained using What Scotland Thinks. Individuals that attributed
themselves with being “more Scottish than British,” “equally Scottish and British,” and
“more British than Scottish,” were combined into a single group called “dual national
identity.” The group “Scottish, not British” was renamed to “Just Scottish Identity.” For
feelings towards independence, individuals that selected “independent, separate from the
United Kingdom and the European Union” and “independent, separate from the United
Kingdom but in the European Union” were combined into one category called
“independence from the United Kingdom.” Individuals that selected “part of the United
Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has some taxation powers” and “part of the
United Kingdom with an elected Parliament that has no taxation powers” were combined
into one category called “devolution.” The category of “part of the United Kingdom
without its own elected Parliament” was renamed to “no devolution.” This thesis, like
other studies, encountered some limitations. Those limitations included potential
problems with the quality of the data, missing data points, and the fact that Scottish
Social Attitude Surveys did not provide a year-to-year breakdown for national identity
and feelings towards independence for demographic groups. However, this thesis was
still able to provide an account of the effects of devolution on national identity and

^248 “Moreno National Identity.”
feelings towards Scottish independence in the post-devolution period. All in all, this thesis used data in the form of Scottish Social Attitude Surveys from ScotCen Social Research to determine the extensiveness of dual national identity and feelings towards independence in Scotland in the post-devolution period, and although it encountered some limitations, it was still able to provide that information.
The introduction of devolution sought to quell nationalist tensions and thereby, reduce calls for independence in Scotland.\footnote{Curtice, “Is Devolution Succouring Nationalism?” 80; Arthur Midwinter and Murray McVicar, “The Devolution Proposals for Scotland: An Assessment and Critique,” \textit{Public Money \& Management} 16, no. 4 (1996): 15, doi: 10.1080/09540969609387940.} In 1999, Blair’s government passed the \textit{Scotland Act}, allowing for the creation of the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood.\footnote{Bogdanor, \textit{Devolution in the United Kingdom}, 1.} In order to determine if Blair’s devolution had an impact on national identity and feelings towards independence, Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from ScotCen Social Research will be examined. More specifically, this thesis will examine if devolution has led to more individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity over a just Scottish identity and therefore, leading more individuals to reject independence. As was mentioned previously, individuals who attribute themselves with a dual national identity are less likely to support independence than individuals who attribute themselves with an exclusive identity. To further determine the impacts of devolution on national identity and feelings towards independence, demographic variables were also examined. Those variables included age, gender, education, location, employment status, religion, and political party preferences. The following section will examine the relationship between devolution, national identity, and feelings towards independence.
**National Identity and Independence**

To determine if there is a higher number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity during the post-devolution period in Scotland, which for the purposes of this thesis is from 1999 to 2013, Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from 1999 to 2001, 2003, 2005 to 2007, and 2009 to 2014 were evaluated.

The Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys show that there is no clear pattern of increase or decrease for either just Scottish identity or dual national identity (Refer to Figure 1 and Table 1). However, dual national identity has been consistently higher than just Scottish identity since the introduction of the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood in 1999 (Refer to Figure 1 and Table 1). One of the most noticeable increases in dual national identity and decrease in just Scottish identity occurred in 2012 (Refer to Figure 1 and Table 1). This was the same year that Alex Salmond, the former leader of the Scottish National Party, revealed his plans to hold an independence referendum in 2014.\(^{251}\) One year following this announcement, the percentage of individuals that attributed themselves with just Scottish identity rose from 23 percent to 25 percent at the expense of dual national identity, which decreased from 65 percent to 62 percent (Refer to Table 1). The lowest point for dual national identity in Scotland came one year after the creation of the Scottish Parliament. In 1999, the percentage of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity was 60 percent (Refer to Table 1). In 2000, this percentage dropped to 55 percent (Refer to Table 1). Just Scottish identity witnessed an increase from 32 percent in 1999 to 37 percent in 2000 (Refer to Table 1).

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Therefore, in the post-devolution period, there are more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity than individuals that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity.

Figure 1: Just Scottish Identity vs. Dual National Identity Post Devolution.

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As was mentioned in the literature review, some studies show a correlation between an individual’s national identity and their feelings towards Scottish independence. These studies show that individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity are less likely to support Scottish independence compared to those that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity. To confirm this, Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period were examined.

The Social Surveys show that individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity were less likely to support Scottish independence than were their just Scottish identity counterparts (Refer to Figure 2). When it came to devolution compared to no devolution, individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity are divided. However, slightly more dual national identity individuals supported devolution compared to no devolution (Refer to Figure 2). Therefore, in the post-devolution period, there are more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity and those individuals are less likely to favour Scottish independence. The next section of this chapter will discuss the relationship between an individual’s age and how they attribute themselves in terms of identity. This section will also discuss the relationship between an individual’s age and their feelings towards Scottish independence.

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Figure 2: How Scotland Should be Governed.


Age, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Independence

Many developed countries are experiencing a shift in the dynamics of their populations. Populations within these countries are becoming increasingly older.\(^{254}\) Since 2000, Europe has been experiencing what Wolfgang Lutz, Brian C. O’Neill, and Sergei Scherbov call a “negative momentum” in their population. This means that many European states are witnessing a decline in younger individuals and an increase in older ones.\(^{255}\) In 2012, many European states witnessed an increase of 15 to 22 percent in the


number of individuals who are sixty years of age or older. The United Kingdom is not an exception to this trend. In 2007, the United Kingdom had a population of approximately sixty-one million.\textsuperscript{256} Out of the sixty-one million, ten million of them were sixty-five years of age or older. This number is expected to rise to sixteen million by 2032.\textsuperscript{257} Like the rest of the United Kingdom, Scotland also has an aging population.\textsuperscript{258} In the post-devolution period in Scotland, there were more individuals that are over the age of sixty-five than any other age group.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.png}
\caption{Age Group Population of Scotland Post-Devolution.}
\end{figure}


The fact that Scotland has a high proportion of individuals who are aged sixty-five and over is important because these individuals are more likely to attribute


\textsuperscript{257} Ibid., 6.

themselves with a dual national identity than are their younger cohorts (Refer to Table 2). For example, 64 percent of individuals over the age of sixty-five attribute themselves with a dual national identity (Refer to Table 2). This is compared to the 54 percent of individuals who are between the ages of eighteen to twenty-four that attribute themselves with a dual national identity (Refer to Table 2). When looking at just Scottish identity, younger individuals are more likely to attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity than are their older cohorts (Refer to Table 2). This trend is not unique to Scotland. In Wallonia, an autonomous region in Belgium, younger individuals are more inclined to attribute themselves with a just Walloon identity than are their older cohorts. However, it should be stated that in the post-devolution period in Scotland, there was a higher percentage of individuals in all age groups that attributed themselves with a dual national identity compared to a just Scottish identity. With this in mind, based on the argument in this thesis, individuals aged sixty-five years of age or older should be the most likely to support devolution, whereas individuals aged eighteen to twenty-four should be the most likely to support Scottish independence. To determine if this is the case, Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period were examined.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group and National Identity</th>
<th>18-24</th>
<th>25-34</th>
<th>35-44</th>
<th>45-54</th>
<th>55-59</th>
<th>60-64</th>
<th>65+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Just Scottish Identity</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual National Identity</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During this period, individuals aged sixty-five years or older were the most likely to support devolution (Refer to Figure 4). Individuals aged eighteen to twenty-four were the most likely to support Scottish independence (Refer to Figure 4). It should be noted that in all age groups, there were more individuals who supported devolution compared to Scottish independence (Refer to Figure 4). All in all, in the post-devolution period, individuals in all age groups were more likely to attribute themselves with a dual national identity and more likely to support devolution. The following section of this chapter will evaluate the association between an individual’s gender and how they attribute themselves in terms of a national identity. This section will also discuss the correlation between one’s gender and their feelings towards Scottish independence.
Gender, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Scottish Independence

In North America and Europe, there is a gender imbalance. According to Peter Lloyd-Sherlock, in North American and European countries, there are more women than men. This is mainly due to the fact that men tend to have higher mortality rates, caused by violent activities or accidents in early life or through chronic diseases later in life.260 This gender imbalance is also seen in the United Kingdom. In the years following devolution, females outnumbered males by at least one million.261 Similar to the United Kingdom, this trend was also observed in Scotland. However, because Scotland has a

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much smaller population than the rest of the United Kingdom, the difference between males and females is about two hundred thousand.\textsuperscript{262} This gender imbalance in Scotland has continued into the post-devolution period (Refer to Figure 5).

The gender imbalance in Scotland is important because, in the post-devolution period, females were more likely than males to attribute themselves with a dual national identity (Refer to Table 3). However, an equal amount of females and males attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity (Refer to Table 3). This means that, according to the thesis, females should be more likely than males to support devolution in the post-

\textsuperscript{262} Ibid.
devolution period. Scottish Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period were examined to determine if this was the case.

An evaluation of these surveys found that during this period, females were more likely than males to support devolution (Refer to Table 4). Males were more likely to support Scottish independence (Refer to Table 4). According to Joane Nagel, males tend to be the more nationalistic gender, which could explain why males in Scotland are more likely to support Scottish independence. Therefore, females are more likely to attribute themselves with dual national identity and more likely to support devolution. The next section will discuss the correlation between one’s education and how they attribute themselves in terms of national identity. The relationship between an individual’s educational status and their feelings towards Scottish independence will also be examined.

---

### TABLE 4
National Identity and Feelings Towards Independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Devolution</th>
<th>No Devolution, But Remain Part of the United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Education, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Independence**

According to the United Kingdom’s Department of Education, there are five stages of education. These five stages are early years, primary, secondary, further education, and higher education. In Scotland, early years education is referred to as ante-pre-school education. This means that early years education typically starts with pre-school. Pre-school education can be provided by private and voluntary providers or local authority centres. At the end of five or six terms of pre-school, a child then can enter primary school. In primary school, students learn from a broad general education phase, called the Curriculum for Excellence (CfE). In secondary school, the curriculum is comprehensive and is offered for six years, with the compulsory age being 16 or S4. Following the end of this stage, students normally enter into a range of external examinations. From there, they either go into further education, higher education, or no education.

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265 Ibid., 2.  
266 Ibid.  
267 Ibid., 4.
Further education is used to cover non-advanced courses that are taken after compulsory education. This form of education ranges from basic skills training to higher vocational education. These courses are taught at further education colleges.\footnote{Ibid.} Higher education usually involves undergraduate or postgraduate courses that are taught at a recognized university.\footnote{Ibid., 6.} Compared to the rest of the United Kingdom, Scotland has a high proportion of students in higher education.\footnote{Lindsay Paterson, “Trends in Higher Education Participation in Scotland,” \textit{Higher Education Quarterly} 51, no. 1 (1997): 29, http://journals2.scholarsportal.info.ezproxy.uwindsor.ca/pdf/09515224/v51i0001/29__tihepis.xml; Ibid., 43.} Lindsay Paterson claims that this is because the Scottish education system is more socially open than any other education system in the United Kingdom.\footnote{Ibid., 30.}

The fact that Scotland has a high number of individuals enrolled in higher education is important because these individuals were the most likely to attribute themselves with a dual national identity (Refer to Table 5). Individuals with no qualifications were the most likely to attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity. However, it is important to note that in the post-devolution period, all categories have a higher number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity compared to those that attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity (Refer to Table 5). With all this in mind, according to the argument of this thesis, individuals enrolled in higher education would be the most likely to support devolution, while individuals with no qualifications would be the most likely to support independence. Nevertheless, all categories should have a higher number of individuals that support devolution because all categories possessed a higher number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual...
national identity. To determine if this is true, Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period were examined.

**TABLE 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Status and National Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree/Postgraduate Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higherers/A Levels or Equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Grades 1-3/GCSEs or Equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Grades 4-7/CSE or Equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Qualifications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Just Scottish Identity</th>
<th>14%</th>
<th>29%</th>
<th>29%</th>
<th>36%</th>
<th>37%</th>
<th>38%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dual National Identity</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The surveys showed that in the post-devolution period, individuals with a degree or postgraduate degree were the most likely to support devolution (Refer to Table 6). However, individuals with no qualifications were not the most likely to support independence (Refer to Table 6). Individuals with standard grades 4-7/CSE or Equivalent were the most likely to favour Scottish independence (Refer to Table 6). However, all categories possessed a higher number of individuals that supported devolution during the post-devolution period (Refer to Table 6). Thus, all categories have a higher number of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity and have a higher number of individuals that support devolution in the post-devolution period. The ensuing
section will examine the association between living in a rural or urban environment and one’s national identity. This section will discuss the relationship between where an individual’s lives and their feelings towards Scottish independence.

### TABLE 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Identity and Feelings Towards Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree/Postgrad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education Below Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highers/A Levels or Equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard grades 1-3/ GCSEs or Equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard grades 4-7/CSE or Equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Qualifications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Location, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Scottish Independence

The Scottish government divides Scotland up into six categories. The first category is Large Urban Areas, which contain population centres that have 125,000 people or more. The second category is Other Urban Areas, which contain population centres that have 10,000 to 124,999 people. The third category is Accessible Small Towns, which contain population centres that have 3,000 to 9,999 people and are within a
thirty-minute drive from a population centre that has ten thousand people or more. The fourth category is Remote Small Towns, which contain population centres that have 3,000 to 9,999 people and are within a drive of over thirty-minutes from population centres that have 10,000 people or more. The fifth category is Accessible Rural Areas, which contain a population of less than 3,000 people and are within a thirty-minute drive from a population centre that has 10,000 people or more. The final category is Remote Rural Areas, which contain a population of less than 3,000 people and are a drive that is over thirty-minutes from a population centre that has 10,000 people or more.\textsuperscript{272} In a report published by the Scottish government in 2014, approximately 35 percent of Scotland’s population are located in Large Urban Areas, 35 percent are located in Other Urban Areas, 9 percent are located Accessible Small Towns, 3 percent are located in Remote Small Towns, 11 percent are located in Accessible Rural Areas, and 6 percent are located in Remote Rural Areas.\textsuperscript{273} Although most people in Scotland live in Large Urban Areas or Other Urban Areas, Accessible Small Towns and Accessible Rural Areas are important in terms of dual national identity (Refer to Table 7 and 8).

According to Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 2003-2013, both Accessible Small Towns and Accessible Rural Areas have the highest number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity at 62 percent (Refer to Table 8). Remote Small Town and Remote Rural Area have the lowest number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity (Refer to Table 8). However, all areas in Scotland possessed a higher number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual


\textsuperscript{273} Ibid., 16.
national identity compared to those that attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity. With this information, although comparatively Accessible Small Towns and Accessible Rural Areas should possess the most individuals that support devolution, all areas should possess more individuals that support devolution over independence.

TABLE 7
The Approximate Percentage of the Population Living in Large Urban Areas, Other Urban Areas, Accessible Small Towns, Remote Small Towns, Accessible Rural Areas, and Remote Rural Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large Urban Areas</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Urban Areas</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessible Small Towns</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Small Towns</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessible Rural Areas</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Rural Areas</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 8
Location and National Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Large Urban Area</th>
<th>Other Urban Areas</th>
<th>Accessible Small Town</th>
<th>Remote Small Town</th>
<th>Accessible Rural Area</th>
<th>Remote Rural Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Just Scottish Identity</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual National Identity</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period showed that Remote Rural Areas had the highest number of individuals that support devolution (Refer to Table 9). It is important to note that comparatively, Remote Rural Areas had one of the lowest numbers of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity. Accessible Small Towns, which had one of the highest numbers of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity, had the lowest number of individuals that support devolution (Refer to Table 9). This is different to the findings in the four previous sections. However, individuals in all areas in Scotland were more likely to support devolution (Refer to Table 9). In sum, all areas possessed a high percentage of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity and a high percentage of individuals that support devolution. The following section of this chapter will review the relationship between individual’s employment status and how they attribute themselves in terms of national identity. This section will look at the relationship between an individual’s employment status and their feelings towards Scottish independence.
### Table 9

**Location and Feelings Towards Independence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Devolution</th>
<th>No Devolution, But Remain Part of the United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large Urban Area</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Urban Area</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessible Small Town</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Small Town</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessible Rural Area</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Rural Area</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

**Employment Status, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Independence**

In the United Kingdom, there are regional disparities when it comes to employment. When evaluating the employment rates between regions in the United Kingdom during the winter months of 1999 and 2000, Stephen Fothergill found that Scotland, along with Wales and Northern England, had the lowest employment rates.²⁷⁴ To increase the employment rate in these areas to match that of the south east of England,

1.5 million jobs would have to be added to the United Kingdom. However, during the post-devolution period, Scotland’s employment rate has been steadily increasing, with the exception of the years between 2008 and 2010 (Refer to Figure 6). The decline between 2008 to 2010 was related to the global recession, which impacted global financial sectors and negatively impacted global trade. When comparing all the countries in the United Kingdom during the post-devolution period, Scotland’s employment rate is the second highest (Refer to Figure 6). Employment rate is important when it comes to dual national identity.

![Figure 6: United Kingdom Employments Rates Post-Devolution.](http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Labour-Market/TrendData)

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275 Ibid., 246.
According to Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period, individuals who were employed were the second most likely to attribute themselves with a dual national identity at 60 percent (Refer to Table 10). Individuals who were once employed, but now are retired, were the most likely to attribute themselves with a dual national identity at 64 percent (Refer to Table 10). Individuals who were unemployed were the most likely to attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity at 38 percent (Refer to Table 10). However, during this period, all categories possessed a higher number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity compared to those that attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity (Refer to Table 10). According to this thesis, although retired individuals, followed by employed individuals, should be the most likely to support devolution, all categories should have a higher number of individuals that support devolution compared to those that support independence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Identity and Employment Status</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Retired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Just Scottish Identity</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual National Identity</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Retired individuals, followed by currently employed individuals, were more likely than unemployed individuals to support devolution at 30 percent and 28 percent respectively (Refer to Table 11). Nevertheless, in the post-devolution period, all categories possessed a higher number of individuals that supported devolution compared
to those that support Scottish independence (Refer to Table 11). Therefore, although retired and employed individuals were more likely than unemployed individuals to support devolution, all categories possessed a higher percentage of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity and a higher percentage of individuals that supported devolution. In the next section, the association between an individual’s religion and how one attributes themselves in terms of national identity was evaluated. The relationship between an individual’s religion and their feelings towards the independence of Scotland will also be discussed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Devolution</th>
<th>No Devolution, But Remain Part of the United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Religion, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Independence

According to the Scottish census of 2001, the Church of Scotland has the highest number of followers of any religion in Scotland. The census found that of Scotland’s five million residents, 42 percent of them claimed to be part of the Church of Scotland (Refer to Table 12). Roman Catholicism followed in a distant second, with only 16 percent of the Scottish population claiming to belong to the Roman Catholic Church (Refer to Table 12). In the 2011 census, it was found that the Church of Scotland experienced a decline in
its fellowship to 32 percent (Refer to Table 12). While the percentage of individuals for most religions increased from 2001 to 2011, the percentage of individuals that claimed to have no religious affiliation increased the most significantly. The number of individuals that claimed to have no religious affiliation surpassed those who claimed to be affiliated with the Church of Scotland (Refer to Table 12). This increase in the number of individuals that claimed to have no religious affiliation is not unique to Scotland. In England and Wales, individuals that claimed to be non-religious rose from 15 percent in 2001 to 25 percent in 2011. Although the number of individuals with no religious affiliation has increased significantly from 2001 to 2011, the Church of Scotland still has a high percentage of the Scottish population in their fellowship (Refer to Table 12).

---

### TABLE 12

**Religious Affiliation in Scotland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001 (Population= 5,062,000)</th>
<th></th>
<th>2011 (Population= 5,295,000)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Individuals</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number of Individuals</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of Scotland</td>
<td>2,146,000</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>1,718,000</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>804,000</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>841,000</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>347,000</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>291,000</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>77,000</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Religion</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>1,409,000</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>1,941,000</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The high number of individuals that follow the Church of Scotland is important because these individuals are the most likely to attribute themselves with a dual national identity at 66 percent (Refer to Table 13). Individuals that follow the Roman Catholic Church were the most likely to attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity at 34 percent (Refer to Table 13). However, all the categories possessed a higher number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity compared to those that
attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity. According to this thesis, individuals who follow the Church of Scotland should be the most likely to support devolution, whereas individuals who follow the Roman Catholic Church should be the most likely to support Scottish independence. Nevertheless, because all categories had a higher number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity, all categories should have a higher number of individuals that support devolution. Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period were examined to determine if this was the case.

**TABLE 13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Affiliation and National Identity</th>
<th>Church of Scotland</th>
<th>Roman Catholic</th>
<th>Other Christian</th>
<th>Non-Christian</th>
<th>No Religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Just Scottish Identity</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual National Identity</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The surveys showed that during this period, individuals who follow the Church of Scotland were one of the groups that were most likely to support devolution at 30 percent (Refer to Table 14). Individuals who followed the Roman Catholic Church were the most likely to support Scottish independence at 17 percent (Refer to Table 14). However, all categories had a higher number of individuals that supported devolution compared to those that support Scottish independence. In sum, all the categories possessed a higher number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity and a higher
number of individuals that support devolution. The following section will look at the correlation between an individual’s political party preference and their feelings towards Scottish independence.

### TABLE 14
*Religious Affiliation, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Independence*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Devolution</th>
<th>No Devolution, But Remain Part of the United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of Scotland</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Christian</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Political Party Preference, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Scottish Independence

In 1934, the Scottish Party and the National Party of Scotland merged to create the Scottish National Party. The party was formed on the basis of a Home Rule Policy for Scotland. Cunninghame Graham became the first Honorary President, while The Duke of Montrose became the first President and Sir Alexander MacEwen became the first Chairman. Most of the chief officers in the Scottish National Party were chosen from the
Scottish Party. Although the Scottish National Party was created through the merger between the Scottish Party and the National Party of Scotland, the Scottish National Party’s policies towards the United Kingdom reflected those of the Scottish Party.  

The Scottish Party policy never mentioned Scottish independence. Instead, it focused on Scotland’s contribution to the development of the United Kingdom and the fact that Scottish ideas needed to be incorporated into English law and life. This was in contrast to the National Party of Scotland’s policy towards the United Kingdom. The National Party of Scotland’s policy of 1928 emphasized an independent Scotland. The Scots Independent, a nationalistic Scottish newspaper, stated that the goal of the National Party of Scotland policy was to “restore to the ancient Scots Nation and the People their former Freedom to govern themselves.”

For the Scottish National Party, self-government for Scotland would come by enabling Scotland to become an equal partner in the United Kingdom, giving it the same status as England. To achieve this, the Scottish National Party proposed four objectives. The first objective was to create a Scottish Parliament that would have ultimate authority over all Scottish affairs, including taxation and finance. The second objective was for “Scotland to share with England the rights and responsibilities they as Mother Nations have jointly created and incurred within the British Empire.” The third objective was for Scotland and England to create dual mechanisms to deal with the responsibilities discussed above, as well as with matters relating to defence, foreign policy, and customs. And the last objective was for the Scottish National Party to be independent of all other

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279 Ibid.
political parties. In addition to their self-government policy, the Scottish National Party also created a new membership policy.

The Scottish National Party policy for membership stated that as long as an individual adheres to the self-government policy, they would be allowed to join the party. Also, the Scottish National Party stated that the party would be non-sectarian. With the new self-government and membership policies in place, the Scottish National Party believed that they would perform well in the 1935 general election. However, this would not be the case. In the urban heartland of Scotland, the Scottish National Party performed poorly. The Scots Independent claimed that this failure was mainly due to the merger between the Scottish Party and the National Party of Scotland. The Scottish nationalistic newspaper claimed that this merger weakened the enthusiasm of many nationalists in Scotland.

In light of their poor performance, John MacCormick, the Secretary for the Scottish National Party and advocate for Scottish Home Rule, was determined to unite all Home Rule elements in Scotland. To do this, MacCormick sought the approval of the party at a special convention in 1936 to start negotiations with the Liberals and the Labour Party to establish links between the Scottish National Party and these two parties. His request was granted and the Scottish National Party entered into negotiations with the two parties for the next three years. However, the potential results of these negotiations were never realized.

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281 Ibid., 163-164.  
282 Ibid., 164.  
283 Ibid., 165-167.  
284 Ibid., 166; Ibid., 155.
The Scottish National Party became preoccupied with the approaching war. Most conferences became about the rise of Nazism in Germany and how to react in the event that a war broke out. In 1937, the Scottish National Party passed a policy stating that they would not support Britain in the war, should one start. However, when the war did start, the majority of Scottish National Party members ignored that policy. As the war progressed, discontent within the Scottish National Party grew. Many of its members were upset by the fact that Scottish National Party leaders were not taking a stronger stance on industrial conscription. By the conference in 1942, dissidents within the party grew stronger and a battle ensued on how the party should move forward.\(^{285}\) After the resignation of MacCormick, dissidents within the party nominated Douglas Young to become the party’s Chairman, against MacCormick’s wishes.\(^{286}\) With this, the Scottish National Party was starting to look more like the National Party of Scotland.\(^{287}\)

Although the Scottish National Party’s policies started to mirror the National Party of Scotland’s, that changed after the election of Dr. Robert D. McIntyre as the party’s leader.\(^{288}\) To deal with the growing number of dissidents within the party, McIntyre tightened party discipline and suspended numerous members. Other members resigned because they did not like the direction McIntyre was taking the party. At the general conference in 1947, McIntyre focused on unity. This created greater cohesion at annual conferences. Since then, there have not been any successful attempts to divert the party from McIntyre’s vision.\(^{289}\)

\(^{285}\) Ibid., 167.
\(^{286}\) Ibid., 167-168.
\(^{287}\) Ibid., 169.
\(^{288}\) Ibid., 172.
\(^{289}\) Ibid., 176.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Scottish National Party adopted a campaign strategy that focused on municipal elections and contesting parliamentary elections in areas where the party was well-established. Although the Scottish National Party performed well in municipal elections, they only made minor advances in both United Kingdom and Scottish Parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{290} This changed in 2007. The Scottish National Party would form its first minority government in Scotland at Holyrood by securing forty-seven out of a potential 129 seats.\textsuperscript{291} In 2011, the Scottish National Party formed its first majority government by winning sixty-nine seats at Holyrood.\textsuperscript{292} This electoral success also benefited the Scottish National Party in terms of membership.

According to a House of Commons Library research briefing, out of the United Kingdom’s seven major political parties, the Scottish National Party ranks third overall in terms of membership size. The briefing stated that the Labour Party has the highest membership at 515,000, followed by the Conservative Party at 149,800 members and the Scottish National Party at 120,000 members. For the Scottish National Party, this represents 0.26 percent of the total British electorate.\textsuperscript{293} Therefore, based on membership, the Scottish National Party has grown to become one of the United Kingdom’s largest political parties.

The growth of the Scottish National Party may negatively impact the total number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity. According to

\textsuperscript{291} Ibid., 92; Scott and Wright, “Devolution, Social Democratic Vision and Policy Reality in Scotland,” 441.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid., 441.
Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period, the Scottish National Party had one of the lowest numbers of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity at 49 percent (Refer to Table 15). They also had the highest number of individuals that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity at 47 percent (Refer to Table 15). The second largest political party in the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party, had the highest number of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity at 69 percent (Refer to Table 15). However, all parties had a higher number of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity compared to those that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity (Refer to Table 15). With this in mind, the thesis statement suggests that individuals that affiliated themselves with the Scottish National Party will be the most likely to support Scottish Independence, whereas individuals that affiliated themselves with the Conservative Party will be the most likely to support devolution. Also, because all categories have more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity than with a just Scottish identity, they all should have a higher number of individuals that support devolution over those that support Scottish independence.
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Just Scottish Identity</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual National Identity</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period, individuals that affiliated themselves with the Scottish National Party were the most likely to support Scottish independence at 30 percent (Refer to Table 16). Unlike in most of the previous sections, the group that had the most individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity does not have the most individuals that supported devolution. The Liberal Democrats have the most individuals that support devolution at 36 percent (Refer to Table 16). Another difference between this section and most of the previous ones is that although all categories had more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity compared to a just Scottish identity, not all categories had more individuals that supported devolution compared to Scottish independence (Refer to Table 16). The Scottish National Party had more individuals that supported Scottish independence compared to those that supported devolution (Refer to
Table 16). Thus, although all categories had more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity, the Scottish National Party had more individuals that supported Scottish independence compared to those that supported devolution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Devolution</th>
<th>No Devolution, But Remain Part of the United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Labour Party</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish National Party</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Conservative Party</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Green Party</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Party</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Party</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Conclusion**

In conclusion, this research shows that in the surveyed population, as well as the demographic categories under study, devolution from 1999 to 2013 has resulted in a higher number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity compared to those that attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity. For example, no
matter one’s employment status, all individuals that were surveyed in this demographic category were more likely to attribute themselves with a dual national identity compared to a just Scottish identity. In addition, all categories that had a higher number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity were more likely to support devolution over independence, with the exception of the Scottish National Party. This means that a high percentage of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity is important for maintaining the unity of the United Kingdom. For example, individuals that supported the Labour Party were more likely to attribute themselves with a dual national identity and more likely to support devolution over independence. It is important to note that a comparison between the pre- and post-devolution periods was completed in the next section. To remain consistent, this thesis used data starting in 1992 to make the comparison between the two periods. The year 1992 was the first year that the Moreno question was utilized in a survey. All in all, this research has shown that devolution has increased the number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity and the number of individuals that support devolution over independence in the post-devolution period.

294 See Curtice, “A Stronger or Weaker Union? Public Reactions to Asymmetric Devolution in the United Kingdom,”; Park et al., “Is devolution strengthening or weakening the UK?”; Bond and Rosie, “National Identities in Post-Devolution Scotland.”
CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

National Identity and Feelings Towards Independence

Using Scottish Social Attitude Surveys from ScotCen Social Research, this thesis was able to show that dual national identity in Scotland has been consistently higher than just Scottish identity in the post-devolution period, which in this thesis is from 1999 to 2013. This is similar to what some scholars found in their research of national identity in the post-devolution period. For example, Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarine Thomson, Lindsey Jarvis, and Catherine Bromley found that from 1999 to 2000, the percentage of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity was higher than those that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity.\footnote{Park et al., “Is devolution strengthening or weakening the UK?” 10.} Ross Bond and Michael Rosie also found similar results in their study of national identity in the post-devolution period. From 1999 to 2001, the percentage of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity was higher than those that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity. In fact, during this period, the percentage of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity increased while the percentage of individuals that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity decreased.\footnote{Bond and Rosie, “National Identities in Post-Devolution Scotland,” 37.} John Curtice also studied national identity in Scotland, but just looked at the year 2003. He also found that there were more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity than those
that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity.\textsuperscript{297} To determine if this trend existed prior to the 1999 devolution, a comparison was completed using previous research and the results from this thesis.

According to Figure 7, dual national identity in Scotland has been consistently higher than just Scottish identity since 1992. It is important to note that after a review of the literature, it appears that 1992 was the first year where the Moreno question was employed in a survey.\textsuperscript{298} The fact that dual national identity was higher than just Scottish identity prior to the 1999 devolution may be because Westminster had been devolving small amounts of power to Scotland. An example of an early form of devolution was the creation of the Scottish Office.\textsuperscript{299} Starting in 1992, it is evident that just Scottish identity increases at the expense of dual national identity. This could be attributed to the fact that for most of the 1990s, Scotland was run by a Conservative Government. The Conservatives enacted policies that were opposed by most of the Scottish population. One of those policies was the poll tax, which was enacted in Scotland one year before it was enacted in England or Wales, causing frustration among the Scottish population.\textsuperscript{300} Another potential contributing factor to the increase in just Scottish identity was the referendum on Scottish independence that was held in 1997.\textsuperscript{301} In 1999, Scotland would

\textsuperscript{297} Curtice, “A Stronger or Weaker Union? Public Reactions to Asymmetric Devolution in the United Kingdom,” 100.
\textsuperscript{298} See Curtice, “A Stronger or Weaker Union? Public Reactions to Asymmetric Devolution in the United Kingdom,”; Park et al., “Is devolution strengthening or weakening the UK?”; Bond and Rosie, “National Identities in Post-Devolution Scotland.”
\textsuperscript{299} Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, 111.
\textsuperscript{300} McLean, New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls, ed. Anthony King, 151.
hold its first devolved parliamentary elections. This may have also contributed to the increase in just Scottish identity. In 2001, however, just Scottish identity started to decline while dual national identity started to increase (Refer to Figure 7). In addition, this thesis also showed that national identity and feelings towards independence were related.

Figure 7: Trends in National Identity in the Pre- and Post-Divolution Period.


This thesis found that individuals who attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity were more likely than their dual national identity counterparts to support Scottish independence. This means that a high percentage of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity in the post-devolution period is important for maintaining the unity of the United Kingdom. This trend, however, was also present in the pre-devolution period. Anthony Heath and James Kellas discovered in their 1998 study that individuals that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity were more likely than their dual national identity counterparts to support Scottish independence.\(^{303}\) The relationship between devolution, national identity, and feelings towards independence is not only present in Scotland.

In the autonomous region of Catalonia, it has been found that there is a relationship between national identity and feelings towards independence. After the merger between Catalonia and Spain, many Catalans felt repressed. Catalonia was absorbed by Spain when King Ferdinand II of Aragon married Queen Isabella I of Castile.\(^{304}\) In response to this perceived repression, Catalans used political means to make their voices heard in Spain.\(^{305}\) In 1941, two political parties, Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia and Catalonia’s Republican Left created the Assembly of Catalonia.\(^{306}\) The aim of this Assembly was to create momentum towards an independent Catalonia.\(^{307}\) After the death of Francisco Franco in 1975, Catalonia was successful in attaining a status of autonomy through the 1978 Constitution, as well as through the Statute of Autonomy for

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\(^{303}\) Heath and Kellas, “Nationalism and Constitutional Questions,” 118.


\(^{305}\) Guibernau, “Prospects for an Independent Catalonia,” 10.

\(^{306}\) Ibid., 11.

\(^{307}\) Ibid.
Catalonia of 1979. More specifically, Spain began to devolve power to Catalonia in 1978. The 1979 Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia was a product of the 1978 constitution. The Statute provides Catalonia with the right to its own governmental institutions, as well as allowing for the return of national symbols, such as the Catalan flag. The Statute also provided the framework for the relationship between Catalonia and Spain. The devolution of power to Catalonia in 1978, according to some, has fostered dual national identities.

According to Luis Moreno and Ana Arriba, who examined nationalism in Catalonia in 1986, 1991, and 1994, there were more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity than there were individuals that attributed themselves with a just Catalan identity. Also, similar to what was found in this thesis for Scotland, researchers that study Catalonia claim that identity and feelings towards independence are related. In studies conducted by Ivan Serrano and Jordi Argelaguet, they found that individuals that attributed themselves with a just Catalan identity were more likely to support the independence of Catalonia compared to their dual national identity counterparts in the post-devolution period. Therefore, according to studies, devolution in Catalonia has resulted in the fostering of dual national identities, and these

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308 Ibid., 13.
310 Ibid., 378, 382.
311 Ibid., 378.
313 Moreno and Arriba, “Dual National Identity in Autonomous Catalonia,” 82-83; Ibid., 83.
individuals are less likely to support independence from Spain. The next section of this chapter will discuss the background leading up to and the importance of the demographic findings of this thesis in regards to the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum.

How Individuals Voted in the Scottish Independence Referendum of 2014

For the first two terms of the devolved Scottish Parliament, a Labour and Liberal-Democrat party coalition made up the Scottish executive. This changed, however, in May of 2007. During the 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections, the Scottish National Party won the most seats, forming its first minority government in Scotland. In August of 2007, the Scottish National Party started a National Conversation on Scotland’s constitutional future. To respond to this, the British Government created the Commission on Scottish Devolution, also known as the Calman Commission, in April of 2008. The goal of this commission was to study different options for constitutional reform in the United Kingdom. The commission was not able to draw in all political parties. Only pro-union parties were involved. In June of 2009, the commission released its final report. The report recommended minor devolution to Scotland and an enhancement of tax-raising powers for the Scottish Government. By November of 2009, the Scottish Government released its White Paper, which discussed its own constitutional preferences for Scotland. Those preferences included maximum devolution and independence. By May of 2011, the Scottish National Party would reach a historic milestone in their party’s history.316

The result of the Scottish Parliamentary election of 2011 left the Scottish National Party with the majority of seats, forming its first majority government at Holyrood. With its majority government, the Scottish National Party was now in a position to implement its manifesto on Scottish independence. Although the British Government initially argued that, because of the Scotland Act of 1998, the Scottish Government had no legal power to hold a referendum on independence, they would eventually accept it, stating that the people of Scotland were entitled to this referendum. Disputes between the British and Scottish governments over the terms of the referendum were settled by the Edinburgh Agreement of 2012. Some of those terms included that only one question (yes or no to independence) be allowed, that the referendum be held before the end of 2014, that the conduct of the referendum should follow the principles in the Political Parties, Elections, and Referendums Act of 2000, that only individuals living in Scotland are eligible to vote, and that 16 and 17 year olds be allowed to vote if the Scottish Government so chooses. The terms were brought into effect by an Order under section 30 of the Scotland Act of 1998. This gave the Scottish Government power to hold the referendum.317

The referendum campaign began in late May 2014. During the campaign, there was the Yes campaign, which favoured leaving the United Kingdom, and the No campaign, which favoured remaining in the United Kingdom. At the start of the campaign, most opinion polls showed a substantial lead for the No campaign. This lead, however, changed over the course of the campaign. Nearing the end of the campaign, several polls were reporting that support for the Yes campaign was increasing, cutting

317 Ibid., 631-632.
into the No campaign’s lead. On September 18th 2014, Scots went to the polls to determine the future of their country. At the polls, individuals were asked to answer yes or not to the following question, “Should Scotland be an independent country.” Of the 4,283,938 eligible to vote, 3,623,344 casted a ballot. This means that voter turnout was 84.6 percent. This voter turnout was the highest in any election held in the United Kingdom since 1918. At the end of a very lengthy campaign, Scotland would vote no to independence. The ballots showed that the No Campaign received 55.3 percent of the vote, whereas the Yes campaign only received 44.7 percent of the vote. As previously stated, this thesis found that individuals who attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity were more likely to support independence compared to their dual national identity counterparts prior to the referendum. To determine if this remained the case when it came time to vote, polling data on national identity and voting was examined.

According to a study conducted by the Daily Record newspaper, individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity, except for those that said they were more Scottish than British, voted no to independence. When combining all dual national identities together, 69.5 percent voted no, while 30.5 percent voted yes. For individuals that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity, 88.6 percent voted yes, whereas

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11.4 percent voted no.\textsuperscript{323} These statistics show that the results found for national identity in this thesis were in line with how people actually voted in the referendum.

As was also shown in this thesis, when it came to age, all age groups had a higher percentage of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity compared to those that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity. However, the results showed that individuals aged 60-64 and 65 and older were the most likely to attribute themselves with a dual national identity. The data provided also showed that these individuals were less likely to support independence prior to the 2014 referendum. At the referendum, this still remained the case.\textsuperscript{324} For example, a poll conducted by Lord Ashcroft showed that 73 percent of individuals aged 65 years and older voted no to independence, compared to the 27 percent of them that voted yes.\textsuperscript{325} This finding is important because it shows that the data in this thesis was in line with how people voted in terms of age. To determine if the data in this thesis was conforming with how people actually voted in the referendum in terms of gender, various polling data was examined.

This thesis found that when comparing females to males, females were more likely than males to attribute themselves with a dual national identity. It is important to note, however, that between males, there were more that attributed themselves with a dual national identity. As a result, it was found that when comparing females to males,

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\textsuperscript{325}“Scottish Independence: Poll reveals who voted, how and why.”
\end{flushright}
females were less likely than males to support independence leading up to the 2014 referendum, although between males, there were more supporting devolution compared to independence. With this in mind, it should be expected, based on the findings of this thesis, that although both genders should have voted no in the referendum, there should be a higher percentage of females voting no compared to males. To determine if this was the case, a poll conducted by Lord Ashcroft was examined.

The poll found that more females voted no compared to males, although between males, there was a higher percentage of them that voted no compared to yes. According to the poll, 56 percent of females voted no, whereas 44 percent voted yes to independence. For males, 53 percent voted no, whereas 47 percent voted yes.\textsuperscript{326} This poll confirms what was expected based on the results of this thesis.

As was shown in the results, no matter your level of education, most individuals were more likely to attribute themselves with a dual national identity than with a just Scottish identity. However, individuals with a degree or postgraduate degree were the most likely to attribute themselves with a dual national identity and the least likely to attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity compared to the other categories under study. With this, the data also showed that individuals with a degree or postgraduate degree were the least likely to support independence leading up to the referendum. This proved to be the case on the day of voting. Studies conducted by the Scottish Referendum Study and by the \textit{Daily Record} newspaper found that most individuals with a degree or postgraduate degree voted no. More specifically, in the Scottish Referendum Study, 51.7 percent of individuals with a degree or postgraduate degree voted no, whereas 48.3

\textsuperscript{326} Ibid.
percent voted yes. The poll conducted by the Daily Mail newspaper found similar results, but a different distribution. They found that of these individuals, 52.9 percent voted no, whereas 47.1 percent voted yes.\footnote{Douglas Fraser, “Study examines referendum demographics,” The British Broadcasting Corporation, 18 September 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-glascow-west-34283948; Clegg, “Independence Referendum figures revealed: Majority of Scots born here voted YES while voters from elsewhere in UK said NO.”} A poll by Graphic News was also examined to determine if the data presented in this thesis was in line with how people voted in the referendum based on their location.

This thesis found that in every location, there were more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity compared to a just Scottish identity. It was also found that in every location, more individuals supported devolution over independence prior to the referendum. It would be assumed, then, that when it came to voting in the referendum, all locations should have voted no. As it turns out, this was not the case. For example, in the local authority of Dundee City, 99.5 percent of the residents are classified as living in a large urban area.\footnote{“Classifying Other Geographies,” The Scottish Government, http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2014/11/2763/5.} When it came time to vote, the Graphic News poll found that in Dundee City, the majority of residents voted yes. Glasgow City is another example of a local authority that has a high number of individuals classified as living in a large urban area. Most residents in Glasgow City voted yes as well. It is important to note that besides Dundee City, Glasgow City, North Lanarkshire, and West Dunbartonshire, the other 28 local authorities voted no in the referendum.\footnote{National Post Staff, “Scottish independence referendum results: A detailed breakdown of the vote,” The National Post, 19 September 2014, http://news.nationalpost.com/news/scottish-independence-referendum-results-a-detailed-breakdown-of-the-vote.} According to Steven Ayres, a statistical researcher for the House of Commons Library, there is a positive correlation between individuals who voted yes and those who claim out-of-work
benefits. The local authorities of Dundee City, Glasgow City, North Lanarkshire, and
West Dunbartonshire all have a high percentage of individuals claiming out-of-work
benefits.\textsuperscript{330} This explains why these authorities voted yes. Employment status results and
voting in the 2014 referendum was also examined.

The results in this thesis showed that unemployed individuals were the most
likely to attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity and the most likely to support
Scottish independence. Individuals who were retired were the most likely to attribute
themselves with a dual national identity and the mostly likely to support devolution over
independence. This proved to be the case on the day of the referendum. According to
studies conducted Lord Ashcroft and the \textit{Telegraph}, most individuals who were
unemployed at the time of the referendum voted yes.\textsuperscript{331} Individuals who were retired at
the time of the referendum voted no.\textsuperscript{332} Polling data was also used to determine if the
results of this thesis, in regards to religion, were in line with how people voted in the
referendum.

The results of this thesis showed all religious groups under study had a higher
percentage of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity
compared to a just Scottish identity. As a result, all religious groups had a higher

\textsuperscript{330}Steven Ayres, “How regional differences in Scotland impacted voting results in the independence
referendum,” \textit{The London School of Economics and Political Science}, 23 September 2014,
\textsuperscript{331}Szu Ping Chan, “Scottish referendum: young, poor and unemployed more likely to vote yes,” \textit{The
\textsuperscript{332}“The 2014 Scottish independence referendum: why was there a NO vote?” \textit{Open Learn}, 2 March 2015,
percentage of individuals that supported devolution compared to those that supported independence. From this data, it would be expected that on the day of the referendum, all religious groups should have voted no. A study conducted by the *Daily Record* newspaper found that the majority of individuals belonging to the Church of Scotland voted no. More specifically, 59.1 percent voted no, whereas 40.9 percent voted yes. However, the study found that not all religious groups voted no. For Roman Catholicism, 56 percent voted yes, whereas 44 percent voted no. The majority of Catholics in Scotland live in economically disadvantaged areas and as Ayres points out, there is a positive correlation between individuals voting yes and out-of-work claimants. This positive correlation explains why most Catholics voted yes.

Political party preferences and voting in the 2014 referendum was also examined. It was found that all political parties possessed a higher percentage of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity compared to a just Scottish identity. It is important to note, however, that the Scottish National Party had the most affiliated individuals that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity compared to the other political parties. The results also indicated that all political parties, except for the Scottish National Party, had more affiliated individuals that supported devolution compared to those that supported independence leading up to the 2014 referendum. As was mentioned in the results, dual national identity did not cause Scottish National party individuals to support devolution over independence. It would be assumed then that on the day of the

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333 Clegg, “Independence Referendum figures revealed: Majority of Scots born here voted YES while voters from elsewhere in UK said NO.”

referendum, all parties, except the Scottish National Party, would have a higher percentage of affiliated individuals voting no. When evaluating a study conducted by *The Guardian*, this turned out to be the case. The Labour Party, the Conservative Party, and the Liberal-Democrats all had a higher percentage of affiliated individuals that voted no, whereas the Scottish National Party had a high percentage of affiliated individuals that voted yes.\(^{335}\) Thus, although most individuals affiliated with political parties voted no, individuals affiliated with the Scottish National Party voted yes to independence, matching the findings provided in this thesis.

\(^{335}\)“Scottish Independence: Poll reveals who voted, how and why.”
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Nationalism is defined by Anthony D. Smith as an ideological movement that attempts to attain and maintain autonomy, unity, and identity for a population where some of its peoples believe they constitute a nation.\(^{336}\) Nationalism can arise when its citizens idealize the state, have a feeling of national superiority, have an uncritical acceptance of the nation-state and its political institutions, suppress ambivalent feelings towards the nation-state, overemphasis national association in the self-concept of individuals in the nation-state, and use derogating comparisons with individuals that are not considered to be part of the nation-state.\(^{337}\) There are two types of nationalism.\(^ {338}\) They are civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism involves bringing together distinct ethnic populations to create a territorial national. Scottish nationalism is an example of civic nationalism.\(^{339}\) Ethnic nationalism arises in nations that are comprised of ‘kinsmen.’\(^ {340}\) In addition to these two types of nationalism, many European states have been experiencing a surge in regional nationalism.\(^ {341}\)

This surge in regional nationalism, or regionalism, has been noted in studies by Brigid Laffan, Anthony Smith, Michael Keating, and Benedict Anderson.\(^ {342}\) Regionalism
can have many different meanings. Individuals can exhibit regionalism if they feel threatened by the nation-state, feel separated from the rest of the population, or disagree with how the state controls their territory. In other instances, regionalism can occur when individuals aim to re-establish historic identities and autonomies. Similar to general nationalism, there are two types of regionalism.

First is institutional regionalism. In many European states in the 1960s, the central government would create development policies to stimulate development within poorer regions. These policies ultimately created more powerful and assertive regional governments in some states, which then increased their calls for greater autonomy from the central government. This created a rise in regionalism. And the second is autonomist regionalism, which deals with ethnicity, culture, and identity. More specifically, autonomist regionalism is applied to “state-less nations” where separatist movements are occurring. Although there are two types of regionalism, they both occur for three reasons.

Firstly, regionalism can occur when there is a lack of support for the centralist model of government in some regions. Secondly, regionalism can occur when individuals in regions feel that their territory is different from the rest of the nation-state. And thirdly, regionalism can occur when individuals within a region see themselves as having a different national identity than the rest of the individuals in the nation-state. The concept of national identity is related to nationalism and regionalism. It occurs when

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343 Giordano, “Italian regionalism or ‘Padanian’ nationalism- The political project of the Lega Nord in Italian politics,” 448.
344 Ibid., 448-449.
345 Ibid., 450.
346 Ibid., 451.
individuals form a positive bond with their nation-state.\textsuperscript{347} National identity can also exist in regions of a nation-state, also called stateless nations.

In stateless nations, individuals can possess a national identity that reflects their loyalty to the region.\textsuperscript{348} For example, although Scotland is part of the United Kingdom, some individuals in Scotland see themselves as being just Scottish. However, some in Scotland see themselves as being both Scottish and British because dual national identities can arise in regions within nation-states.\textsuperscript{349} Dual national identities can also arise when the central government begins to devolve power to regional governments.\textsuperscript{350}

In the United Kingdom, devolution is the transfer of power from the central government in London to regional governments in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{351} Although Westminster has been slowly devolving power to Scotland, the most significant period of devolution occurred after 1999. Prior to this, with the help of the Liberal-Democrats in 1993, the Labour Party under Tony Blair proposed further devolving power to Scotland, which involved creating a Scottish Parliament.\textsuperscript{352} The plan for further devolution was part of the Labour Party’s new election strategy, called “New Labour, New Britain.”\textsuperscript{353} This then became part of the party’s manifesto in 1997.\textsuperscript{354} The

\textsuperscript{347} Blank and Schmidt, “National Identity in a united Germany: Nationalism or Patriotism? An Empirical Test with Representative Data,” 291.
\textsuperscript{348} Bond and Rosie, “National Identities and Attitudes to Constitutional Change in Post-Devolution UK: A Four Territories Comparison,” 84-85.
\textsuperscript{349} Curtice, “A Stronger or Weaker Union? Public Reactions to Asymmetric Devolution in the United Kingdom,” 99-100.
\textsuperscript{353} Hassan and Shaw, The Strange Death of Labour Scotland, 69.
introduction of the *Scotland Bill* in 1997 would pave the way for further devolution and the creation of the Scottish Parliament.\(^{355}\) The *Bill* would be passed in 1998 and the Scottish Parliament would be founded in 1999.\(^{356}\)

This thesis set out to determine if Blair’s devolution to Scotland has resulted in an increase in individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity in the post-devolution period. To further examine how devolution was impacting national identity, a breakdown of seven key demographic categories were assessed. These variables included age, gender, education, location, employment status, religion, and political party preference. This thesis also set out to determine if individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity are less likely to support Scottish independence. Again, to further evaluate this, a breakdown of the seven key demographic categories listed above were assessed. A comparison of national identity in the pre- and post-devolution periods was also conducted. However, due to data limitations, 1992 was the first year evaluated in the comparison. This research is important because as the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum showed, there are still individuals that wish to see Scotland become its own independent country. If the British government wishes to keep the Union together, devolution may be the tool required to achieve that aim.

To conduct this research, this thesis utilized Scottish Social Attitude Surveys from ScotCen Social Research. These surveys were provided by What Scotland Thinks. The surveys are conducted through one-on-one interviews. Using the Moreno Question, respondents were asked “Are you Scottish, not British; more Scottish than British;

\(^{355}\) Bogdanor, *Devolution in the United Kingdom*, 201.  
equally Scottish and British; more British than Scottish; or British, not Scottish.” As was previously stated, for the purposes of this thesis, “more Scottish than British; equally Scottish and British; and more British than Scottish,” were combined into one category called dual national identity. Respondents were also asked about their feelings towards independence.

Individuals were asked if they feel Scotland should be “independent, separate from the United Kingdom and the European Union; independent, separate from the United Kingdom but in the European Union; part of the United Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has some taxation powers; part of the United Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has no taxation powers; or part of the United Kingdom without its own elected Parliament.” For the purpose of this thesis, individuals that selected “independent, separate from the United Kingdom and the European Union” and “independent, separate from the United Kingdom but in the European Union” were combined into one category called “independence from the United Kingdom.” This thesis also combined individuals that selected “part of the United Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has some taxation powers” and “part of the United Kingdom with an elected Parliament that has no taxation powers” into one category called “devolution.” The category of “part of the United Kingdom without its own elected Parliament was renamed to “no devolution.”

357 “Moreno National Identity.”
358 “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Urban or rural area (six categories)' All years (2002- 2013);” “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Sex' All years (1999-2013);” “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Religion' All years (1999- 2013);” “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Party political identification' All years (1999- 2013);” “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Main economic activity ' All years (1999- 2013);” “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Education' All years (1999- 2013);” “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Age group' All years (1999- 2013).”
Using Scottish Social Attitude Surveys, this thesis was able to show that since 1999, or the post-devolution period, dual national identity in Scotland has been higher than just Scottish identity. When looking at the demographic categories of age, gender, education, location, employment status, religion, and political party preference, each category had a higher percentage of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity compared to those that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity. Scholars who study national identity in Catalonia have also found similar results. According to Luis Moreno and Ana Arriba, in the post-devolution period, there were more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity than there were individuals that attributed themselves with a just Catalan identity.\(^{359}\) The rise of dual national identity is important because these individuals are less likely to support independence compared to their exclusive identity counterparts.\(^{360}\)

In the case of Scotland, this thesis found that individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity were less likely to support independence compared to their just Scottish identity counterparts. The only case where most of the individuals attributed themselves with a dual national identity, but still supported independence, were individuals that affiliated themselves with the Scottish National Party. It is important to note that the results of this thesis, for the most part, lined up with how people actually voted in the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. This shows that because there is a higher percentage of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity and that these individuals are less likely to support independence, there is a greater chance of maintaining the unity of the United Kingdom. Also, the

\(^{359}\) Moreno and Arriba, “Dual National Identity in Autonomous Catalonia,” 82-83; Ibid., 83.

percentage of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity was also higher than the percentage of individuals that attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity prior to 1999. This may have been due to the fact that Westminster has been devolving small amounts of power to Scotland. An example of this was the creation of the Scottish Office.\textsuperscript{361}

The results of this thesis are significant because they showed that devolution can lead to a decrease in feelings towards independence by increasing the number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity. It is important to note that future research could take into account for gradual temporal changes in national identity and feelings towards independence in the pre- and post-devolution periods. However, due to data limitations, the first year in this comparison would have to be 1992. Knowing this, the British government can use further devolution to ensure the Union remains intact. The results of this thesis are also significant because they both validate that devolved political institutions are impacting national identity and confirm the Labour Party’s belief that devolution would lead to a decrease in Scottish nationalism.

As was mentioned previously, new institutionalism studies how political institutions can affect the behaviour of individual actors and society as a whole.\textsuperscript{362} It is apparent from the results in this thesis that the creation of political institutions, particularly the Scottish Parliament, impacted national identity in Scotland. More specifically, devolution in Scotland has led to more individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity and these individuals are less likely to support Scottish

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{361} Bogdanor, \textit{Devolution in the United Kingdom}, 111. \\
independence. As was mentioned above, this means that it is more likely that the United Kingdom will remain united. This is in accordance to the Labour Party’s view on the effects of devolution. Unlike the Conservative Party, which believes that devolution would lead to the breakup of the United Kingdom, the Labour Party viewed devolution as a way to keep the Union together. However, another threat to the Union has presented itself recently. That threat came in the form of Brexit.

In 1957, the European Economic Community, the precursor for the European Union, was founded after the signing of the Treaty of Rome by West Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy. The idea behind this community was that if these nations traded together, they would be less likely to go to war with one another. The United Kingdom would be late in joining this community. On its first attempt to join the European Economic Community in 1963, the United Kingdom was blocked by a veto from French President Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle feared that if the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community, English would replace French as the main language of the Community. In 1973, the United Kingdom was successful in joining the European Economic Community.363

Since joining the European Economic Community, the United Kingdom has increased its trade with European states, consequently benefiting its economy. In 1976, three years after joining the European Economic Community, British exports to European

Economic Community member states increased to approximately 29 percent.\textsuperscript{364} In 2013, with the enlargement of what is now the European Union, British exports to member states had reached approximately 52 percent.\textsuperscript{365} In 2014, however, British exports to the European Union dropped slightly to 48 percent.\textsuperscript{366}

The biggest benefactors in the United Kingdom in terms of trade with the European Union are small and medium sized companies. In 2012, these companies exported approximately 87 percent of their products into the European Union. This is a vast difference compared to these same companies’ exports to BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). In 2012, these companies exported approximately 13 percent of their products to BRIC countries.\textsuperscript{367} In addition, the United Kingdom also benefits from European Union membership through international free trade agreements. These free trade agreements eliminate tariff barriers between third party countries and all member states.\textsuperscript{368} In 2006, the European Union made up approximately 43 percent of all global trade.\textsuperscript{369} The service sector also benefits from membership in the European Union. In 2015, services exports from the United Kingdom to the European Union made up about 40 percent of all services exported by the United Kingdom. During this same


period, the United Kingdom posted a services trade surplus with the European Union. Without this, the United Kingdom’s current account deficit, with is the difference between what the country earns and what it invests and consumes, would be twice as large.\textsuperscript{370} Despite these economic benefits, the United Kingdom would hold a referendum on European Union membership on June 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2016.

Prior to announcing the referendum, then Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron entered into prolonged discussions with Brussels on Britain’s current membership conditions in the European Union.\textsuperscript{371} At these negotiations, Cameron made four key demands. The first demand was to allow the United Kingdom to opt out from the European Union’s founding desire to build an “ever closer union.” This would prevent the United Kingdom from being drawn into further political integration within the European Union. The second demand was that European Union migrants who wish to claim tax credits and child benefits must live and contribute to the United Kingdom for a minimum of four years. In addition to this, Cameron also wanted provisions that would prevent European Union migrant workers in the United Kingdom from sending child benefits or tax credits back to their home country. The third demand was to have the European Union recognize that the euro is not the only currency within the Eurozone and to ensure that countries outside the Eurozone are not disadvantaged. Cameron also added that he wanted safeguards put in place that would prevent the furthering of the financial union on non-Eurozone states and allow the United Kingdom to opt out of contributing to Eurozone bailouts. The last demand was to reduce excessive regulation and extending the


\textsuperscript{371} “A background guide to ‘Brexit’ from the European Union.”
single market. Although Cameron had to compromise on some of these demands, he was able to secure the European Union reform deal. After reaching the deal, Cameron kept his 2015 election promise and announced that the United Kingdom would hold a referendum on whether or not to leave the European Union.

The referendum was scheduled to be held on June 23rd, 2016. Following the announcement, many Members of Parliament and other prominent political officials started to back either the “remain” campaign or the “leave” campaign. The remain campaign, which was official called the Stronger In, was supported by politicians such as David Cameron, Leader of the Opposition and Leader of the Labour Party Jeremy Corbyn, the former Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer and First Secretary of State George Osborne, and former Prime Ministers Tony Blair and John Major.

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374 “A background guide to ‘Brexit’ from the European Union.”
The leave campaign, which was officially called Vote Leave, had the support of former London Mayor and current Conservative Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Boris Johnson, Labour Party member Kate Hoey, and former Leader of the UK Independence Party Nigel Farage. On June 23rd, 2016, the people of the United Kingdom would vote to leave the European Union.

However, not all parts of the United Kingdom wanted to leave the European Union. In Scotland, 61.9 percent voted to remain, while 37.9 percent voted to leave. Scotland had a lower voter turnout compared to Wales and England, who both voted to leave the European Union.

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Upset that Scotland voted to remain, but Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May still triggered Article 50 of the *Lisbon Treaty*, which gives any European Union member the right to leave unilaterally, Scotland’s First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, confirmed her intention of holding a second Scottish Independence Referendum.\(^{379}\)

At a press conference at Bute House, the official residence of the Scottish First Minister, Sturgeon stated that an independence referendum would be needed after the results of Brexit in order to ensure that the future of Scotland is decided by the Scottish people. This call for a new independence referendum sparked criticism from Theresa May, who stated that “Instead of playing politics with the future of our country, the Scottish government should focus on delivering good government and public services for the people of Scotland. Politics is not a game.” According to Section 30 of the *Scotland Act*, for a referendum to take place, the Scottish Parliament must get the approval of Westminster. Although May was upset by the referendum announcement, she did not rule out allowing one to take place. Some news outlets have stated that a referendum will likely take place after the United Kingdom has left the European Union.\(^{380}\) As these two

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political leaders clash over the referendum, some polls suggest that many Scots do not approve of a second independence referendum.

According to John Curtice, the Brexit vote did nothing to “shift the balance of opinion on Scotland’s constitutional status.” Curtice found that commitment to the European Union among Scots is relatively weak. He found that 56 percent of individuals that voted to remain want the European Union to have less power. Also, he also found that 74 percent of those that voted no in the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum who backed remain in the European Union would vote no again in a second referendum. The results of this thesis support Curtice’s statement that a second Scottish independence referendum would result in a no victory. Unlike Curtice however, this thesis will use the argument of national identity to make its case.

This thesis found that individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity, meaning that they associated themselves with being both Scottish and British, were the least likely to support Scottish independence. With this in mind, it means that even if a person feels slightly British, they will be less likely to support Scottish independence compared to just Scottish individuals. This proved to be the case in the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. Using data provided by Charles Pattie, a Professor at the University of Sheffield, and Ron Johnson, a Professor at the University of Bristol, this thesis would speculate that because Scots feel more British than European (52 percent of those surveyed claimed to be “more British than European,” whereas only

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30 percent claimed to be “more European than British”), they would rather remain part of the United Kingdom than the European Union and therefore, would vote to remain in a second Scottish independence referendum.

In addition, various polls and news agencies have reported that many Scots do not agree with Sturgeon on having another independence referendum. Although most polls found that the majority of Scots do not want a second referendum, the distributions vary. A poll conducted by YouGov found that 49 percent of Scots did not approve of a second independence referendum, whereas 37 percent did approved. A Kanter poll found that 46 percent of Scots did not want a second referendum, whereas 26 percent did. A BMG study found that 56 percent of Scots did not approve of a second referendum, whereas 44 percent did.

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384 Davey, “Poll: 49% of Scots don’t want a second Scottish independence referendum before Brexit.”

385 Završnik, “Scots don’t want another independence referendum: survey.”

386 McCann, “Over half of Scots do not back a second independence referendum before Brexit, poll reveals.”
To determine if the speculation made in this thesis is correct, a future survey would need to be conducted, using the Moreno question, to see if individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity are still less likely to support Scottish independence after the Brexit vote. All in all, because of that absence of data, a future survey that employs the Moreno question is needed to determine if the speculation made in this thesis is correct.

The impending second Scottish independence referendum shows that identity politics and Scotland’s place in the United Kingdom will, most likely, remain part of political debate in the future. The success of the Scottish National Party in the 2007, 2011, and 2016 Scottish elections, as well as the recent council elections, shows that Scots are still concerned about their identity and their place in the Union.387 However, as this thesis showed, if the British government continues to devolve power to Scotland, it is likely that dual national identity will increase, meaning that Scotland will remain part of the United Kingdom for many more years to come.

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