The Italian question and British foreign policy, 1860–1861 as understood by the "Dublin Review".

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Submit to the Department of History of Assumption University of Windsor in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

by

Donald Clifton Walker, B.A.

Faculty of Graduate Studies

1958
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ABSTRACT

The period succeeding the Restorations of 1815 in Italy and extending to the final unification of the several sovereign Italian states in 1870, was characterized by a revolutionary movement toward constitutional government, national unity, and independence, which has been termed the risorgimento. Its supporters marked their first real success in February 1861, when they formed the first Parliament representing all Italy, except Rome and Venetia, and conferred the title King of Italy on Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia.

The British Foreign Minister, Lord John Russell, attributed the upset conditions in the peninsula to misrule by authoritarian governments, aided and abetted by oppressive foreign influence. Under his leadership, Great Britain performed a singular service for the Revolution in 1860, the focal point of our problem, by approving the conduct of the King of Sardinia and by lending her moral support to this struggle in the name of liberty and independence. The contributors to the Dublin Review believed that there was a case for the Italian governments; and that Italy's worst enemies were those who preached the inexorable march of progress, the moral authority of majorities, and the omnipotence of the state. They found the policy of Lord John Russell to be inconsistent and allied.
with the principles and powers which threatened to destroy the basis of all society and government.

This paper is a summary interpretation of the Liberal position as represented by Lord John Russell and of the Ultramontane position as represented by the Dublin Review. Back to back, they portray the black and the white sides of an otherwise complex question.

That a significant number of responsible British Catholic observers as revealed by the Review, found reason to condemn the contemporary liberal version of the Italian Question and British Foreign Policy in 1860-1861, is not surprising. Yet, it is challenging to British historians who, with few exceptions, have shown little or no respect for the position represented by the Review; and who have preserved to this day a somewhat nineteenth century liberal answer to the Italian Question of 1860.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Here I should like to express my appreciation for the assistance received from the Librarians and their assistants of both the Assumption University of Windsor Library and the Detroit Public Library. My thanks are also due to the Assistant Librarian of this University, Mr. William F. Dollar, M.A., A.M.L.S., who has been generous in his official capacity and whose skill as a typist is manifest here; and to the Instructor in Geography, Mr. Paul E. Vandall, B.A., who has aided me in constructing the maps.

I am deeply grateful to the Associate Professor of English, Dr. Mary J. Manley, Ph.D., who knows Italy well, and who has consented to act as reader and critic of this paper; to the Assistant Professor of History, Dr. C. M. J. F. Swan, Ph.D., my director and the one who first aroused my interest in this topic; to the Professor of History, the Reverend D. J. Mulvihill, C.S.B., Ph.D., who has widened and deepened my acquaintance with the viewpoint of those who are in communion with Rome by clarifying certain of their theological principles and practices; and who has, in this manner, assisted my further appreciation of the conservative side of a struggle which was essentially politico-religious in character. Both Dr. Swan and Fr. Mulvihill have pointed this discourse toward order and meaning by their discerning queries and comments. I am also indebted
to my wife, a patient sounding-board and proof reader.

Errors or omissions, in text or in style, are entirely my own.
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MAPS

ITALY: 1815.

PIEDMONT: April 1859; August 1859.

KINGDOM OF ITALY: April 1860; November 1860.
PAPAL STATES
1 Romagna
2 Marches
3 Umbria
4 Patrimony of St. Peter
I

A LIBERAL VIEW

OF THE ITALIAN QUESTION AND THE ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY

OF LORD JOHN RUSSELL, 1860-1861

The Congress of Vienna led to a restoration of Italy which differed very little from the status quo prevailing in the peninsula before the Napoleonic wars; and for the next generation Austria was the real mistress of Italy. She ruled Lombardy-Venetia directly; her princes governed in Parma, Modena, Tuscany; she felt secure in her power to elect a non-liberal Pope, sympathetic to the Austrian government; and not only had her troops re-instated the king of Naples, but she had also obtained a signed agreement from Ferdinand not to introduce any form of government incompatible with her own.

For a time the new régime was peaceful, but the influence of the progressive ideas implanted during the Napoleonic era had made considerable impression on the enlightened nobility and the upper middle class, impressions which were translated into action as the evils of French government faded and the oppressive methods of the restored governments became increasingly irksome. In the Papal States the unique system of theocracy maintained by the Papacy was the weakest government in the peninsula. Its ruler was frequently inept, blind, or ignoble; its law was based on antique statutes; its ecclesi-
astical administration was corrupt and inefficient; and in the states
over which it ruled anarchy and brigandage were prevalent -- often
requiring the assistance of the great powers of Europe to restore
order. The States as a whole were economically backward as little
or nothing was done to promote such effects as railways, banks, or
agricultural improvements. In Naples conditions were worse. Some
of the laws, institutions, and officials of the Murat régime were
retained but an odious police system, censorship, and the reaction­
ary policies emanating from Vienna, the real seat of authority in
Naples, became the basis of government and social life. Despite
severe laws of punishment the Italians honeycombed the peninsula
with secret societies, notably the Carbonari and Mazzini's Young
Italy. Their object of annihilating despotism and replacing it with
constitutional governments sound expression in a series of sporadic
insurrections all of which were ruthlessly suppressed.¹

¹This very brief summary interpretation of the restoration
and reaction in Italy during the years 1815-1846 has been drawn prin­
cipally from the following English language sources: (Monographs),
Sir J. A. R. Marriott, The Makers of Modern Italy, Napoleon—Musso­
lini (London: Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 37-68; J. S. Schapire,
Modern and Contemporary European History, 1815-1945, ed. James T. Shot­
well, new ed. (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1946), pp. 89-97;
G. M. Trevelyan, Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic 1848-1849
(London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1937), pp. 59-76; A. J. Whyte, The
(Composite Works), John Morris Roberts, "Italy, the French Revolution
Period", Enc. Brit., XII (1957), pp. 777-782; H. W. V. Temperley,
"Great Britain (1815-32)", Cambridge Modern History, X (1907), pp.
595-98; Luigi Villari, "Italy -- The Risorgimento 1815-1870", Ency.
Brit., XV (1911), 11th ed., pp. 48-61. For a full and impartial
study of this period cf. G. F. H. Berkeley, Italy in the Making 1815–
Descriptions by British historians of Italian events in 1848 reveal continued misgovernment at Rome and Naples. The election of Pius IX in 1846 had filled the hearts of Italians with hope. He was known to have liberal sympathies and he was the first Pope to be elected without Austrian influence since the establishment of Austrian-Hapsburg hegemony in the peninsula. His immediate granting of amnesty to more than a thousand political prisoners and hundreds of exiles and his subsequent embarkation on the path to reform of his government was greeted with immense enthusiasm. But both the period of his popularity and the era of his reforms were short lived. Demonstrations of applause for fresh concessions granted were accompanied by demands for still greater reform, till at length it became clear the people would be satisfied with nothing less than a complete change from the Papal theocratic principle of government and its forms of administration.²

In the fall of 1848, the liberal prime minister of the Pope, Pellegrino Rossi, was assassinated, the government overthrown and the Pope forced to flee to Gaeta. In February 1849, the temporal power of the Pope was declared abolished and the Mazzinians, who had gained control of the movement, proclaimed the establishment of a pure democracy to be called the Republic of Rome. Similar events were taking place throughout the peninsula. The king of the Two Sicilies and the autocratic rulers of Parma and Modena had been put to flight by

their subjects. However, the revolutionists still lacked the unity and power to prevent the great powers' decision to re-instate the legitimate governments. French troops, for example, restored the temporal power in July 1849, despite an heroic resistance led by Garibaldi.

On the Pope's return in April 1850, it soon became evident that little hope could be placed in a reformed or reforming Papacy. The Pope refused, absolutely, to admit constitutional limitations on his power; his secretary of state, Cardinal Antonelli, was commissioned to suppress with all possible vigour the political agitation which still persisted. The old ecclesiastical absolutism had been re-established: Pio Nono had become the chief opponent of nationalism and democracy. 3

In Naples, where the corrupt and inefficient government of the king was restored by the sovereign's own troops, suppression was particularly severe. The ferocious treatment of "political" prisoners as well as the general character of the administration prompted Lord Gladstone to brand the institution as "the negation of God

3"He[ the Pope] promised, indeed, a consultative council of state, and granted an amnesty from which no less than 25,000 persons were excluded; but on his return to Rome (April 12, 1850), after he was quite sure that France had given up all idea of imposing constitutional limitations on him, he re-established his government on the old lines of priestly absolutism, and, devoting himself to religious practices, left political affairs mostly to the astute [Cardinal] Antonelli, who repressed with great severity the political agitation which still continued." Ibid., p. 55. Schapiro believes this change of heart by Pius IX caused the movement toward unification to become tinged with anti-clericalism. Schapiro, Modern and Contemporary European History, p. 202.
erected into a system of government".  

With the half-hearted support of the Pope, the Duke of Tuscany, and the King of the Two Sicilies, Charles Albert of Sardinia led an unsuccessful attempt to push the Austrians out of the peninsula in July 1848. When his second attempt met with a similar fate in 1849, Charles Albert abdicated in disgust and his son, Victor Emmanuel II ascended the throne. The new King of Sardinia refused the generous terms of peace offered by Austria in exchange for his revocation of the constitution granted previously by his father at Turin. "If you wish a war to death, so be it . . . If I must fall, it will be without shame; my House knows the road to exile, but not to dishonor." Thus Victor Emmanuel turned a defeat into a moral victory.

Both ideas of a Federation under the Presidency of the Pope, and a Republic, one and undivided, had been discredited by events

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4 These words of Lord Gladstone were quoted by many of the authorities mentioned (see above, p. 2, n. 1). Marriott quotes at length all three reasons given by Gladstone for his condemnation of the Neapolitan Government, and concludes: "It is impossible to follow in detail the minute evidence upon which the English statesman based this appalling but not exaggerated indictment." Marriott, Makers of Modern Italy, p. 124. In his note 2, on page 122, Marriott further points out that "The full text of these Letters together with Mr. Gladstone's Examination of the Official Reply of the Neapolitan Government (1852) may (and should) be read in full in Gleanings of Past Years, vol. iv (John Murray, 1879)."

5 In his famous Allocution of April 29, 1848, the Pope declared his refusal to sanction an aggressive war against Austria. "From that day onwards he had forfeited the sympathy of all good Italians, and was compelled to rely more than ever on the support of the clericals and San-Fedists." Trevelyon, Defence of the Roman Republic, p. 75. See also: John Morris Roberts, "Italy, the French Revolution Period, 1796-1849", Ency. Brit., XII (1957), p. 781.

in 1848: henceforth, hopes of driving Austria out of the peninsula and of securing liberty and independence under reformed governments were centred in the Constitutional Monarchy of Sardinia.7

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1856 the Italian Question was placed squarely on the European political state. After the Conference, Cavour explained to Lord Clarendon his own views of the difficulties in Italy as well as their European prospects:

'That which has passed in the Congress proves two things: first, that Austria is decided to persist in her system of oppression and violence towards Italy; secondly, that the forces of diplomacy are impotent to modify that system. See the consequences for Piedmont. With the irritation on our side and the arrogance of Austria on the other, there are but two alternatives to take: reconcile ourselves to Austria and the Pope, or prepare to declare war at the Court of Vienna in a future not far distant. If the first part is preferable I must on my return to Turin advise my king to call to power the friends of Austria and the Pope. If the second hypothesis is best, my friends and I will not shrink from preparing for a terrible war — a war to the death.'8


8Marriott, Makers of Modern Italy, p. 101.
Few British historians have disputed Cavour's analysis or found reason to condemn him for persuading his sovereign to act on the second hypothesis.9

Following the Conference, Cavour pressed England for armed assistance against Austria. But the Queen and her ministers declined to promise anything more than England's moral support. In search of a more tangible aid, Cavour then turned to Napoleon III who had expressed a desire to do something for Italy.10 There followed a secret meeting of the Count and the Emperor at Plombiers in 1858 where the two agreed that Austria be expelled from the peninsula; North and South Italy were to be united under the House of Savoy, while Nice and Savoy were to be annexed to France and Victor Emmanuel's daughter was to be married to Napoleon's cousin.11

Despite the hostile attitude of Europe toward the prospects of another war and its utmost diplomatic efforts to prevent it, Sardinia and France took to the field against Austria in April of 1859. This war of Italian Independence began with a series of Allied successes but was abruptly ended by Napoleon who, on the eve of complete victory, decided to end the hostilities. Without consulting

9Ibid., pp. 103-139.

10"'Que peut on faire pour l'Italie?' was Napoleon's sincere but somewhat indiscreet question to Cavour in 1855." Ibid., p. 102.

11For some interesting observations as well as a part of the conversations between the Emperor and the Count at this famous meeting see Hales, Pio Nono, pp. 189-191.
the wishes of his ally Victor Emmanuel, he met Francis Joseph at
Villafranca on July 11, and thence the two emperors arranged between
themselves the preliminaries of peace.

At this critical moment in Italian affairs our real interest
in Britain's Italian Foreign Policy begins. In the week following
the Austrian defeat at Solferino in 1859, Lord John Russell had
accepted the seals of the Foreign Office and from the moment he as­
sumed this responsibility, he committed himself and the official
policy of his country to one of 'Italy for the Italians.' Throughout
the two years which followed Sardinia's bitter disappointment
at Villafranca in July, 1859, Great Britain, under the leadership
of Lord John, performed a singular service for the Patriots of Italy
by lending moral support to the risorgimento and by approving the
conduct of the King of Sardinia. For this reason, it has been said
that modern Italy owes more to the moral support of England than to
the material support of Napoleon III.  

12 The Right Honourable Lord John Russell, first Earl Rus­
sell, P. C., K. C., G. C. M. G. Educated in Westminster and Edin­
burgh Universities, he was the third son of the sixth Duke of Bed­
ford. He entered Parliamentary service in 1813 and sat in the Com­
mons for a total of forty-seven years. During this time his name
was prominently connected with most political events of his country.
He served variously as: Secretary of State for the Home, Foreign and
Colonial Departments; Lord President of the Council; Commander to the
Congress of Vienna; and was First Lord of the Treasury (Premier) from
1846-1852. He was afterwards appointed Foreign Secretary (18 June
1859) and he held that office till he again became First Lord of the
Treasury in 1865. He was raised to the peerage as Earl Russell and
Viscount Amberley 30 July 1861. Born in 1792, he died in 1878,
twelve years after his retirement from public office in 1866.
Burke's Genealogical and Heraldic History of the Peerage, Baronet-
This was not the first important manifestation of British interest in the Italian Question; there had been a number of instances when Britain and her statesmen showed their sympathy toward the cause of the Italian patriots. Lord John himself sympathized with their apparent misfortunes from the time he first visited the peninsula as little more than a boy. It is not surprising then to find him, as prime minister in 1847, sending a special mission under the guidance of Lord Minto to encourage the Pope to take the path of progress when the Pontiff was hesitating between his desire to initiate liberal methods of government and the pressure of the reactionary policies being advocated by Metternich.

Again, it was due to British insistence that the Sardinian minister, Cavour, was admitted on equal terms with the other delegates to the Paris Peace Conference in 1856. Here, it was hoped, the Sardinian minister would find the opportunity to present before the assembled plenipotentiaries of Europe, Sardinia's and England's

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*Sir Spencer Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, II (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), 2d ed., p. 309. As Walpole is still considered the authority on the Italian Foreign Policy of Lord John Russell, we have relied principally on his work which we have cited here. Supplementary studies touching on this same subject will be found listed in the Bibliography.

*In 1847, Lord Minto visited the Italian Courts to try to induce the recalcitrant despot to mend their ways, so as to avoid revolutionary war, the latter being England's especial anxiety; this mission, although not destined to produce much effect, aroused extravagant hopes among the liberals." Walpole, op. cit., p. 38.
opinion of the pitiable conditions of Italy, especially in the Neapolitan and Roman States, and to expose Austrian responsibility for an intolerable condition of affairs. Cavour was still waiting for a propitious moment in which to make his speech, when at the point of adjournment the British minister, Lord Clarendon, delivered an indictment of the Roman Government as powerful and as accurate as could have been made by the most ardent Italian patriot.

On July 13, 1859, Lord John received in a communication from the British Minister at Turin the conditions of peace proposed at Villafranca. Venetia and the Quadrilateral were to be retained by Austria while Lombardy was to be ceded by Austria. The rulers of Tuscany and Modena, who had been deposed by their subjects, were to be restored to their thrones; the Bourbon principality of Parma was to be at Napoleon's disposal; and Italy's princes were to be united in a confederation under the presidency of the Pope.

King Victor Emmanuel signed the armistice which followed Villafranca with the reservation that he meant no agreement with

15 Marriott, Makers of Modern Italy, pp. 100-101. With regard to the pitiable conditions of Italy, see Villari, op. cit., p. 55.

16 The settled terms at Villafranca were: "Italy was to be free not to the Adriatic but only to Mincio; Austria was to retain Venetia and the Quadrilateral; Lombardy up to the Mincio was to be handed over to Napoleon, who would, of course, transfer it to Piedmont. Leopold of Tuscany and Francis of Modena were to be restored to the thrones from which they had been driven by their respective subjects, 'but without the use of force'; Parma and Piacenza -- being Bourbon not Hapsburg principalities -- were annexed to Piedmont; Italy
regard to central Italy and he complained somewhat bitterly of Napoleon's hasty truce and of having been deserted by his prime minister at the moment of greatest difficulty. At Milan and Venice Italians were placing their last hope in the support of England -- Napoleon was regarded as "il gran traditore".\textsuperscript{17}

Austria wanted the terms of the armistice embodied in a treaty and she joined France in thinking a European Congress should be convoked in order to settle the remaining Italian questions under the terms of a European treaty.

It appeared to Lord John that a peace which left Italy divided and dominated by Austria and France was quite out of harmony with many of the views expressed by both France and Britain at the Paris Peace Conference in 1856. He declared, therefore, that before he could consider the newly proposed Conference he would have to know whether the freeing of Italy from the presence of foreign troops would be denied by continued French and Austrian occupation of Rome and the Romagna; whether the people of Tuscany would be allowed to convolve an assembly "in order that the wishes of the people in favour of the autonomy of that country may be regularly and freely expressed"\textsuperscript{18} or whether the Dukes would be restored to

\textsuperscript{17} Walpole, \textit{Life of Lord John Russell}, II, p. 310.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 311.
their thrones by force; whether Victor Emmanuel and the Bourbon, Francis II, King of the Two Sicilies, would be given free choice of entering the proposed confederation; and whether Austria, as owner of Venetia, would be a member of the Confederation, which fact, he believed, would convert the Italian Confederation into an Austrian Confederation. Lord John thereupon informed both Paris and Vienna he believed "that every people had a right to choose their own Government, and that 'the restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena by foreign forces would be to return to that system of foreign interference which for upwards of forty years has been the misfortune of Italy and the danger of Europe.'"19 Such were Lord John's views on the peace.

Quite understandably his policy of "Italy for the Italians" was regarded "with extreme irritation" at Vienna, but the anger of Austria, in itself, was not sufficient to overcome her prudence; she adopted a policy of delay hoping that events might offer an opportunity for interference. For his part Napoleon III could not afford to have England replace France in the affections of the Italians. Moreover, in order to win England to accept the idea of a congress, Napoleon was ready to concede much.20

Meanwhile events in Italy directly favoured Lord John's policy. Representative assemblies meeting in Tuscany, Modena, and

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19 Ibid., p. 312.
20 Ibid., p. 313.
Parma arrived at a unanimous decision in favour of annexation to Piedmont. When Victor Emmanuel applied to Lord John for counsel as to whether or not he should recognize and accept their decision, Lord John advised him unofficially that he might say to Europe: "'the creation of a large kingdom in the north of Italy was a matter so much affecting the balance of power that he could not undertake the decision of such a question without European consent; but in the meantime he would be prepared to defend Tuscany against the danger of internal disorder.'" Thus encouraged, Central Italy moved quickly. On the first of October it was announced that the government of Tuscany would be conducted in Victor Emmanuel's name; and on the ninth of the following month Victor Emmanuel's cousin, Prince Carignan, was appointed Regent of the Duchy. These rapid developments were too much for Napoleon who immediately vetoed the appointment of the Prince. Victor Emmanuel again applied to Lord John but failed to obtain assurance of England's support against Austria. Thus he was forced to accede to the demands of Napoleon; a Piedmontese statesman, Signor Bucompagni, was named in the place of Prince Carignan.

On the tenth of November 1859, the peace negotiations at Zurich were completed and the invitations for the Congress were

21Ibid., p. 314.

22The terms of settlement at the peace were, for all practical purposes, identical with those agreed upon at Villafranca (see above, p. 10, n. 16).
issued. But the Congress, set for January, was destined never to meet. Late in December, there appeared from the pen of "La Gueronnière" the famous pamphlet "Le Pape et le Congrès". This pamphlet from Paris proclaimed Napoleon's acceptance of the fait accompli of the revolt of the Romagna. Henceforth, a Federation of Italy would only be discussed on the basis of the separation of the Romagna from the Papal State. Austria and the Pope, who had readily agreed to the idea of a Congress, refused to join a conference on this newly proposed basis of discussion. Definite settlement seemed more remote than ever.

These events neither checked nor disturbed Lord John's plan of an "Italy for the Italians". Should the possibility of a Congress be altogether ended he was prepared to concert with France and Sardinia in order to prevent Austrian intervention. But some division in the English court caused him to modify his proposals and in January 1860 he suggested that:

1. France and Austria should agree not to interfere for the future by force in the internal affairs of Italy unless called upon to do so by the unanimous consent of the five great powers of Europe.

2. The Emperor of the French should concert with his Holiness the Pope as to the evacuation of Rome by the troops of France.

3. The internal government of Venetia not to be in any way matter of negotiation between the European powers.

23 "La Gueronnière" was a pseudonym for writers of Napoleon III's pamphlets. "It was part of Napoleon's technique to throw out pamphlets of this kind to test public reactions." Hales, Pio Nono, p. 192.
4. Great Britain and France to invite the King of Sardinia to agree not to send troops into Central Italy until its several States and provinces shall, by a new vote of their Assemblies after a new election, have solemnly declared their wishes as to their future destiny. Should that decision be in favour of annexation to Sardinia, Great Britain and France will no longer require that Sardinian troops should not enter those States and provinces.24

France accepted the proposals and though Austria was much against such a policy she admitted she had no intention of interfering in Italy. The end was coming near.

In January Cavour returned to office and Lord John, who was indirectly responsible for his re-appointment, was delighted to see Italian affairs once more under the control of his firm hands.25 On the eleventh of March, 1860, in a plebiscite held at the suggestion of Lord John, the people of Central Italy once again declared almost unanimously for union with North Italy. On the twenty-fifth of March elections were held in Tuscany, Modena, Parma, and the Romagna; on the second of April representatives from these States met at Turin in the first Italian Parliament.

Meanwhile, quiet arrangements had been completed between Napoleon and Cavour regarding France's annexation of Nice and Savoy. Lord John had been opposed to this sacrifice by Victor Emmanuel from the moment he had heard the first rumours of the policy. But, in his

25 Ibid., p. 316.
protest, Lord John stood alone. Cavour was pleased to have Napoleon a party to an agreement by which Sardinia was raised to the status of an Italian power; Austria could see no distinction between French annexation of Savoy and Piedmontese annexation of Tuscany; Russia could see no disruption in the balance of power resulting from the international transaction; and as the people of Nice and Savoy had voted in favour of annexation, Lord John’s hands were tied. Nevertheless, he was determined Nice and Savoy should be the end of French encroachments. In the House of Commons he publicly, though unofficially, denounced the French Government’s aggressive policies and called on Europe for an end to these flagrant abuses of the rights and limits of other states. As intended, the speech produced a great stir, particularly in the French court. While not solely responsible for checking the ambitions of Napoleon, it considerably retarded the readiness of the Emperor to attempt further annexations.  

Encouraged by Lord John’s stand, Count Reichberg authorized Count Apponyi to assure Lord John confidentially that:

26 Though speaking unofficially Lord John was whole-heartedly supported by the Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston. “Lord Palmerston soon made it plain that, if the Foreign Secretary had spoken without authority, the Prime Minister shared his opinions. General Flahault, as he was about to start for Paris, asked [him] whether he had any message for the Emperor Napoleon. Lord Palmerston answered, ‘Repeat to your Emperor Lord John Russell’s speech, and tell him it expresses my own opinions.’ ‘Mais c’est la guerre!’ said the peace-loving General. Lord Palmerston shrugged his shoulders and replied, ‘En bien! si c’est la guerre, c’est la guerre. Que voulez-vous? Nous sommes préparés, et nous l’attendons de pied ferme.’” Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, II, p. 321.
Though Austria could not support the proposals of England respecting Savoy, she considered the safety of Europe to depend on the faithful observance of treaties; and that she was ready to enter into an arrangement with Great Britain to resist all further encroachments.\textsuperscript{27}

The proposal only served to reveal the profound difference of opinion existing between the Count and Lord John. They might agree on the necessity of defending a nation such as Belgium or Germany but as Lord John said:

"In Italy the question of territorial circumspection is mixed up with questions of internal government, . . . and neither the government, nor the Parliament, nor the people of Great Britain would ever sanction a war to support the authority of the King of the Two Sicilies against the just discontent of his subjects."\textsuperscript{28}

This declaration, made in April, could hardly have been more timely. Insurrection had again broken out in Sicily and on the sixth of May, General Garibaldi had sailed from Genoa to aid the insurgents. By the end of July he was master of the whole island.

Neither Garibaldi's venture nor its success surprised Lord John. Almost from the moment he assumed office he had warned the Neapolitan Government of the consequence of its misrule. If the King insisted upon a despotic police system and refused to admit liberal methods of internal government he could expect the overthrow of his dynasty and its replacement by a less oppressive and corrupt form of administration, whether Royal or Republican.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., pp. 321-322.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 322.
But if Lord John was not surprised by these events in Sicily he was concerned. The new kingdom, he believed, must not be allowed to grow too quickly; furthermore, he feared additional annexations by Sardinia would provide excuse for fresh aggrandizement by France. He urged Cavour, therefore, to be patient, not to entertain designs on Sicily nor to sanction aggression on Naples by Austria. The rapidity of events outdated Lord John's advice. By the beginning of July the Sicilians were declaring their desire for annexation to Piedmont and Garibaldi was preparing to cross the Straits of Messina. The difficulties of harmonizing his policy of non-intervention, with his desire to see the revolution confined to the Peninsula, were increasing. He was anxious lest Naples should follow the path of Sicily. He had no desire to see the union of Piedmont with the Two Sicilies, at least not for the moment; the realization of the dream of a United Italy pointed too readily to a possible attack on Venetia and a subsequent war with Austria. However, when France suggested England join her in stopping Garibaldi's passage to the mainland, the British Government, acting on the advice of Lord John, declined to accept this policy and allowed the general to cross the Straits.

The revolution was permitted to run its course.29 By the seventh of September the "liberator" was at Naples declaring his in-

29 Lord John believed Garibaldi lacked the force to take Naples alone; and should the Neapolitans join him in revolution against their King, it would remain a matter to be settled by the Neapolitan Government. In neither case would the British Government interfere in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
tention of marching on Rome. Fortunately, for the cause of the patriots, a surprisingly stiffened resistance by the Neapolitan troops held the impulsive Garibaldi back and a clash with French troops stationed at Rome was averted. Meanwhile, Cavour, excusing his actions as a necessary expedient to maintain order among the excitable population, invaded the Papal States on the eleventh of September. The greatly outnumbered Papal forces under the Pope's General Lamoricière were caught unawares, and on the twenty-eighth of September the brief campaign was ended at Ancona. Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi entered Naples together on the seventh of November. Meanwhile, Cavour had requested the Turin Parliament to authorize the annexation of Central and Southern Italy. In February, 1861, the first Parliament representing all Italy, except Rome and Venetia, met at Turin and conferred the title King of Italy on Victor Emmanuel II. Though Great Britain was the sole great power in Europe to applaud the event, these were great moments in the history of the risorgimento. To those who favoured the Revolution in 1859-1860, the Sardinian victory over King Francis of Naples and the Italian unity now symbolised by the constitutional crown of Sardinia meant the first real success among many attempts and failures of the Italian people to win their liberty from Italian despots, to rise to the status of a nation, and to secure their freedom from threat of the return of the Austrian Regime in the peninsula. Though Venice remained outside the new kingdom until 1866 and Rome was not acquired until 1870, the first great step in the making of
modern Italy had been successfully completed. During the course of these dramatic events Lord John had adhered to his policy of non-intervention and had done his utmost to confine the revolution to Italy. His fear of an attack by Sardinia on Venetia, and of subsequent fresh annexations by France which were being so persistently rumoured, led him to announce to Piedmont on the thirty-first of August that "an attack on Venice would be an infraction of the Treaty of Zurich, which the King of Sardinia had no excuse for violating". Fresh cessions of Italian territory could not be countenanced by England -- Italy was for the Italians. This counsel of moderation was delivered on August 31st, ten days after Garibaldi had landed at Calabria. But in October, when the war was at its height, and authoritarian Europe was hastening to register its disapproval, Lord John joined Sardinia in her hour of difficulty. At a time when France, Russia, and Spain had severed diplomatic relations with Sardinia, and Prussia had expressed her indignation and disapproval, Lord John issued a despatch in which he declared England's whole-hearted support of the revolution and approval of the conduct of the King of Sardinia. This famous despatch dated October 27, 1860, appeared in Italy in November and it is sufficiently important for our purposes to warrant quoting it at length. In it Lord John said:

'There appear to have been two motives which have induced the people of the Roman and Neapolitan

30 Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, II, p. 325.
States to have joined willingly in the subversion of their Governments. The first of these was that the Governments of the Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies provided so ill for the administration of justice, the protection of personal liberty, and the general welfare of the people, that their subjects looked forward to the overthrow of their rulers as a necessary preliminary to all improvement in their condition.

The second motive was that a conviction had spread, since the year 1848, that the only manner in which the Italians could secure their independence of foreign control was by forming one strong Government for the whole of Italy.

Looking at the question in this view, her Majesty's Government must admit that the Italians themselves are the best judges of their own interests.

That eminent jurist Vattel, when discussing the lawfulness of the assistance given by the United Provinces to the Prince of Orange when he invaded England and overturned the throne of James II., says, 'The authority of the Prince of Orange had doubtless an influence on the deliberations of the States General, but it did not lead them to the commission of an act of injustice; for, when a people from good reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties.'

Therefore, according to Vattel, the question resolves itself into this: Did the people of Naples and of the Roman States take up arms against their Government for good reasons?

Upon this grave matter her Majesty's Government hold that the people in question are themselves the best judges of their own affairs. Her Majesty's Government do not feel justified in declaring that the people of Southern Italy had not good reasons for throwing off their allegiance to their former Governments. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, cannot pretend to blame the King of Sardinia for assisting them.

It must be admitted, undoubtedly, that the severance of the ties which bind together a sovereign and his subjects is in itself a misfortune. Notions of allegiance become confused; the succession of the throne is disputed; adverse
parties threaten the peace of society; rights and pretensions are opposed to each other, and mar the harmony of the State. Yet it must be acknowledged, on the other hand, that the Italian revolution has been conducted with singular temper and forbearance.

'Such having been the causes and concomitant circumstances of the revolution of Italy, her Majesty's Government can see no sufficient grounds for the severe censure with which Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia have visited the acts of the King of Sardinia.

'Her Majesty's Government will turn their eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edifice of their liberties, and consolidating the work of their independence, amid the sympathies and good wishes of Europe. — I am, &c.,

J. Russell.'

In Italy the despatch was received with delight. Cavour immediately acknowledged the immense service Lord John had performed for the Italian people. Villamarina's first exclamation was that it was "'worth more than 100,000 men'". From Rome, Lord John received a private letter from his nephew, Mr. Odo Russell, saying:

'. . . thousands of people copied it from each other to carry it to their homes and weep over it for joy and gratitude in the bosom of their families, away from brutal mercenaries and greasy priests.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

every day convinces me more and more that I am living in the midst of a great and real national movement, which will at last be crowned with perfect success, notwithstanding the legion of enemies Italy still counts in Europe. . . .'"

31 Ibid., pp. 325-327.
32 Marriott, Makers of Modern Italy, p. 135.
Lord John's biographer, Sir Spencer Walpole, believes that there is scarcely any document which Lord John ever wrote "that bears on its face more distinctly the impress of his style or the colour of his opinions. Probably no other statesman but Lord John would have rested the defence of General Garibaldi and Count Cavour on the Revolution of 1688." 34

Apart from these two points the despatch has other and still wider points of significance. In it Lord John was expressing to Europe, not only his own view of the risorgimento, but in a general way he was expressing the opinions of a great many Englishmen as well as being in close agreement with Italian patriots and statesmen. With Lord John's despatch of October 1860 our interest in his foreign policy ends. But, we may note in concluding this chapter that the interpretation of the Italian Question by the majority of British historians bears a remarkable resemblance to the understanding of Lord John; especially in regard to the character of the Roman and Neapolitan governments and the nature of Austrian influence in Italy. Thus, in our summary of the Italian Question as in our sketch of Lord John's policy we have been discussing, in a general way, a sympathetic viewpoint of an Italian struggle in the name of Liberty and Independence. Again, as we have said, this same view was shared by many other parties politically significant in mid-nineteenth century British society. But, by the same token,

34 Ibid., p. 327.
there were also parties, not without influence, who challenged this interpretation of the Italian Question and of the foreign policy of their government. It is to one such dissenting group that we now turn.
AN ULTRAMONTANE VIEW

OF THE ITALIAN QUESTION AND THE PAPAL POSITION, 1846-1859

AS RECORDED IN THE DUBLIN REVIEW

The Dublin Review believed that future historians would be hard pressed to unravel the meaning of the foreign affairs of England in 1860-1861. The men at the head of the government, all of whom were either aristocrats, or closely allied to the most illustrious families in the nation, had supported the most revolutionary party in Europe. Historians would not find it a simple task to explain why the gentlemen of the English Cabinet had thus aided in their foreign policy men who had "trampled under foot all constituted authorities, all law, all order, all treaties, all principles of justice and of property".¹ Let us first examine the Review's refutation of the "two motives" laid down by Lord John Russell in stating the cause of the revolutionary party, and second, the opinions of the Review on the principles of this policy, by beginning

¹Sir W. H. Barron, "Our Foreign Policy in 1860-61," Dublin Review (orig. ser.), XLIX (Feb. 1861), 417. Note: With the exception of n. 21 in Chapter III, references to the Dublin Review in this and the succeeding chapter pertain to its "original series" only. Further indication of the series will therefore be omitted while the nomenclature of the Review will be abbreviated thus: DR. Details pertaining to the arrangement of articles in the Review will be found in the Bibliography on p. 69.
with a brief description of the significant events in the years 1846-1859.

The reader will recall the charge of Lord John Russell that the people of the Roman and Neapolitan States had joined willingly in the subversion of their governments as the first step necessary toward the attainment of a proper administration of justice, the securing of personal liberty, and the maintenance of the general welfare of their states. In the estimation of the Review, the charge was too sweeping and not unlike those levelled by "all demagogues in all countries under the sun, and frequently charged against British rule in Ireland, in Canada, in India." It did not admit the facts of the case. How would Lord John explain, for example,

2See above, p. 21. Lord John's despatch on 27 October 1860. Limited space prevents a detailed description of the opinions of the Review on the condition of affairs in the Neapolitan States: we will confine our remarks, therefore, to our interest in the reaction of the Review to the "Roman Question". It is worth noting that in their defence of Rome's Civil Government as in their support of the Pope in his struggle against the progressive liberalism of the day, the contributors to the Dublin Review adopted a position which differed from that advocated by the leading English Liberal Catholics. Cardinal Wiseman, Dr. Purcell, and others considered it their task to refute both the liberal philosophy and the solutions suggested by those English Catholics who opposed the contemporary Papal policies. They disagreed with the policy of Lord Acton (editor of the Catholic periodical, the Rambler -- The Home and Foreign Review after 1862) which, in their opinion, added weight to the popular Liberal dictum (later condemned by Pius IX in his Syllabus of Errors, 1864) that "the Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile and harmonize himself with progress, with liberalism, and with modern civilization." The policy of Lord Acton and those who supported him aggravated a condition the Reviewers sought to remedy. This difference in spirit between the Ultramontane and the Liberal Catholics is mentioned by Mr. Hales in his consideration of the Lyons Letters. See Appendix, pp. 67-68.

3Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", DR, XLIX (Feb. 1861), 419.
that only a small number of the upper classes had joined the revolution, or that the elections, by which the great masses of the people were supposed to have expressed their desires, were nothing but a farce. Every conceivable kind of political chicanery had been employed by the minority revolutionary party to engineer results favourable to their ends. Moreover, they had been openly adopted and supported by the foreign army in possession of the country, which was itself "commanded by the man to be chosen". Yet, exclaims the Review, of this and a great deal more Britain approves.

It was the purpose of the Review to show "that from the moment when Pius IX was elected Pope [in 1846], he proceeded in the course of civil reforms in a manner which ought to [have satisfied] the most ardent English reformer", and that had circumstances but allowed, he would have accomplished his aim. Within the first two years of his reign the Pope had granted a free constitution founded on the British model, appointed Count Rossi, the most distinguished lay statesman in Italy, as his Prime Minister, and proposed reforms in every department of internal civil government. Pius IX originated the idea of a commercial union and a federal treaty between the various states of Italy, an idea which was ac-

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4 Ibid., p. 419.
5 R. J. Gainsford, "The Roman State", BR, LII (April 1863), 505.
6 Ibid., p. 506.
claimed by his own people and approved by every statesman of the liberal party. That he failed to carry his good intentions into effect was no fault of his own.

From a comparison of the civil government of the Pope in 1848 with the civil government of Great Britain immediately prior to 1832, the Review concludes that the only real difference between the two governments was the power of the latter to control the threat of revolutionary elements and to complete a gradual programme of reform. But Rome was a weak state, "that on principle never kept a larger army than was sufficient for the preservation of order under ordinary circumstances"; it was unable to withstand the highly organized and skillfully executed work of those insurgents whose primary object was not reform but overthrow of the government. Reform was made impossible by the clameur and violence ensuing from the activities of the Mazzinians against the Pope who "feared that his reforms, if quietly accomplished, would spoil their trade". Count Rossi, the Prime Minister of the Pope, was assassinated in the midst of attempting the very thing peace-

7 Ibid., p. 506.
9 Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", DR, XLIX (Feb. 1861), 418.
10 Gainsford, "The Roman State", DR, LII (April 1863), 507.
fully accomplished by the reformers in Great Britain after 1832. For a short period, attempts to bring the civil government into line with the changing needs of the times had to be abandoned.

The confusion aroused by the temporary victory of the Mazzinians in 1848-1849 resulted in the idea of confederation being pushed into the background where the subsequent ambitions of one Italian state (Sardinia), anxious only for its own aggrandizement, further obscured the notion and finally discredited it altogether. The revolutionists had proclaimed their aim to have been good government; but their actions refuted their words. It was the opinion of the Review that had they genuinely desired reform, they would have behaved reasonably towards the Pope’s attempt to concede to their demands. Instead, they had wickedly and wantonly destroyed their opportunity.

Reform in Southern Italy was similarly treated and ultimately destroyed by insurrection. Barron describes the manner in which the Neapolitans treated their newly won constitution in 1848 as follows:

They obstructed every measure by the most violent harangues and by endless divisions, to such an extent that all business was brought to a standstill, whilst an insurrection was going on in Sicily. The parliament was prorogued, and the constitution was virtually destroyed by the men loudest in demanding free institutions, but who proved themselves totally unqualified for the blessings of liberty. This disgusting use made of their newly acquired privileges deterred the governments of Italy from following up.

\[11\] Ibid., p. 506.
reforms and granting further liberties to their people. It must be allowed that this decision was natural, and the reasons stated in Lord John Russell's despatch, as justifying the revolution, fall to the ground. If these complaints had any solid foundation, the people had the power of reform in their own hands, which they abandoned, by choosing as their representatives, men totally unfitted for such a responsible position.\(^\text{12}\)

It was believed by some contemporary critics, among them Farini, and, as we have observed, has since been upheld by other historians, that the tide of popularity so favourable to the Pope in the first two years of his reign received its first real check on the appearance of his Allocution of April 29, 1848.\(^\text{13}\) The Review went to considerable length to refute the subtle implication that the Pope was guilty of oscillating between the liberal and the reactionary camp. To sanction only a defensive war and not an offensive one, seemed to the Review to be quite consistent not only with everything said and done previously by the Pope, but also to be in harmony with the special character of his Sovereignty. It was moreover a mark of political sagacity. Had the King of Sardinia adopted a similar policy in the summer of 1849, he might have avoided the humiliating defeat of Novara and his own abdication.\(^\text{14}\)

Again, when Pio Nono returned to Rome in 1850 under the protection of French arms, it was asserted that he neglected to

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\(^{12}\) Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", \textit{BR.} XLIX (Feb. 1861), 420.

\(^{13}\) Cf. above, p. 5, n. 5.

\(^{14}\) Gainsford, "The Roman State", \textit{BR.} LII (April 1883), 565.
continue to give full effect to his scheme of civil reform.\textsuperscript{15} The Review countered that in view of previous circumstances the Pope was entirely justified in proceeding with the utmost caution. In addition to internal pressures he faced the peculiar difficulties of being the centre of intrigues emanating from European nations. An impossible state of affairs, the Review carefully points out, as even Lord John once allowed.\textsuperscript{16} He had on his return done much, and continued in his desire to do more; but if the dictates of circumstances and common sense were to be his guides, further extensive reform would have to wait until more favourable times. Meanwhile, if the power of the Pope was to equal his will, he would have to have the genuine sympathy and encouragement of Europe. Before we pause to deal with the intelligence provided by the Review on this last point, let us first examine briefly the Review's understanding of the form and operation of the Papal Government during the years 1850-1859.

It seems the First Lord of the Treasury, Lord Palmerston, once remarked in parliament that Rome never possessed as good a government as under the Roman Republic. According to the Review this notion was generally accepted as true by the majority of Eng-

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. above, pp. 4-5.

\textsuperscript{16} Finlayson, "The Massacre of Perugia", \textit{DR}, XLVII (Sept. 1859), 177. See also: Finlayson, "The Government of the Papal States", \textit{DR}, XLVI (June 1859), 297. There seems to have been an error in dating the former article: the above date (Sept. 1859) appears at the head of the article in vol. XLVII; but the published list of articles of the Review bears the date November 1859.
lishmen as was the accompanying belief that the Papal States were not only stationary but retrograde; that every concession made by Pius IX at the beginning of his reign had been rescinded so that the Papal States had slipped back into the old system of ecclesiastical rule.17 This, remarks the Review, was simply not the case. Following events in 1848, a form of government analogous to that established by Napoleon III in France was instituted by Pius IX at Rome, and his Decree of December 31, 1852, presented "pretty nearly the model of the 'Roman Council of State'".18 The same form of control was extended throughout the provincial and municipal administration so as to preserve the highest possible degree of municipal self-government; nor was the system dominated by ecclesiastics.19 Ranke is quoted in support of their view that "while the Italian cities early enjoyed municipal privileges, they had never had, and did not appear to be fitted for, what we call political institutions."20 The Review contended that much of the misunderstanding in regard to the nature of liberty in the Papal States lay in the failure to distinguish between municipal and political independence.21

17Cardinal Wiseman, "Italy and the Papal States", DR, XLI (Sept. 1856), 207. Cf. above, pp. 4-5.

18 Ibid., p. 207.

19 Ibid., p. 208.

20 Finlayson, "Massacre of Perugia", DR, XLVII (Nov. 1859), 171.

21 Ibid., p. 171.
The Review was much concerned with the repeated charge that the Pope's government was dominated and principally operated by ecclesiastics to the exclusion of the laity. One writer, in his attempt to display the proportion of clergy and laity as well as the amount of salaries paid these two classes in the Pope's administration, summarized an official set of tables drawn up by the Roman government in 1856 and presented his table to his readers in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINISTRY</th>
<th>NUMBERS EMPLOYED</th>
<th>AMOUNT OF SALARIES, DOLLARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>Laymen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>3,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, &amp;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>6,836</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our author then points out that "of the 289 clerical employees here set down, 179 were chaplains to prisons, or otherwise employed in purely ecclesiastical functions." We conclude, therefore, that there were in actual fact 110 clergy holding offices of State as compared to 6,836 laymen, and that a great deal more of the public money was paid to the laymen than to the clergy.

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22 Wiseman, "Italy and the Papal States", DR, XLI (Sept. 1856), 209.

23 Ibid., p. 209.

In vindicating the importance of the positions held by ecclesiastics in the Pope's government, Finlayson quoted the following excerpt from an article which appeared in the French journal Univers:
In a speech made by Lord John Russell in the Parliamentary Session of March 1859 -- a speech quoted at great length by the Review -- the Minister, in his description of Roman events before and after 1848, stated his belief that:

'Before the French Revolution there were municipal institutions. The people very much governed themselves. The French destroyed all these municipal institutions, but they put in their place a good administration of justice, and what is called an enlightened despotism. Since 1852 they have neither municipal institutions nor an enlightened despotism. They have every kind of corruption and oppression. If persons are required to pay allegiance they should receive protection from the Government, and in what respect is protection more required than in the administration of justice?'**

'The ecclesiastical element must dominate, and in fact does dominate, at Rome. The Pontifical States form the patrimony of the Church. The cardinals, principal advisers to the Pope, naturally take part in the government. They constitute the political family of the sovereign, and possess rights claimed elsewhere by princes of the blood. Amongst them exists the man they will one day raise to the sovereignty. And it is suggested that these Princes of the Church should be systematically removed from public affairs! The idea is iniquitous and insane. In this case, secularization would be more complete in the Papal States than anywhere else. The English, warm partisans of Roman secularization, have a Bishops' Bench in the House of Lords, whilst the constitution of 1832 gives a seat in the Senate to our Cardinals. The first rank, even in political order, cannot be withdrawn from the members of the Sacred College at Rome, and they will continue to have ecclesiastics for assistants since they will be succeeded by ecclesiastics. Nevertheless, laymen in the Papal States are not pariahs; they have their entry to the Council of Ministers; they are governors or prefects; they figure in the first rank of the various public offices, and take a great share in public instruction. This, in addition to election functions and the military career, is sufficient to occupy the activity and satisfy the legitimate ambition of those who seek to serve their country. To require more would be to prepare the way for the revolution.' "The Government of the Papal States", BR, XLVI (June 1859), 312. See also below, p. 41.

We have already mentioned the Review's objection to the supposed lack of municipal institutions in the Papal States. The Minister's ideas on Roman justice were refuted in this particular instance by citing Farini, in whose work Finlayson claims, "there is no fact stated whence it can be inferred that there is not an impartial administration of justice, and that the persons and property of citizens are not protected."25

The authors of the Review considered the following quotation and summary testimony of Barron to be a fitting description of their views on the Roman Government's administration:

'There is no branch of the administration', says Sir Henry Barron, 'which the Pope has not reformed or improved.' And what of the general results? 'There is no people in Europe so lightly taxed, where education is so carefully attended to, where the poor are so kindly and paternally provided for.' He has reduced the duties on foreign comforts, commenced three railroads, and completed one of them; established public bakeries, model lodging houses, and electric telegraphs; lighted Rome with gas (granting a charter for that purpose to an English company), constructed new bridges, viaducts, and roads. He has increased the customs receipts during the last few years; he has increased the number of laymen in the government; he has added to the public schools in Rome. Imports and exports increase, depositors...

25 Ibid., p. 244. It was a favourite trick of the Reviewers to bring the testimony of an adverse witness against the testimony of another of the same kind -- as in the case above. Again, an author adverse to the Papal position might find his own words (in proper context) used most effectively in contradiction of his own thesis. Thus we find the liberal historian Farini is often quoted in refutation of Farini'. Cf. Finlayson, ibid., p. 210.

For a description by the Review of the contributions made by Farini, Balbo, and Gioberti to the attacks on the Papal Government, see Finlayson, ibid., p. 205.
in the savings' bank increase. The income exceeds the expenditure; and the national debt is so small, that four years' income would pay it off. 26

We have presented here but an outline of the Review's understanding of Pius IX's government in the years 1850-1859. There is scarcely an argument or speck of evidence which was not used by the authors of the Review in the several means they adopted to meet what they believed to be vague and unfair charges of: corruption, inefficiency, failure to administer justice, the inability to protect personal liberty, or the uncertain capacity of the government to ensure the general welfare of the people.

Such conditions were frequently compared with the actual workings of the British Government's "own much lauded system"; 27 while the considered lack of statistical data, either "conveniently forgotten or dishonestly suppressed" 28 by detractors of the Pope's government, was answered with a mountain of facts and figures drawn from official documents. 29 Still further, they attempted to prove by citing historical authorities such as Ranke, that the rise of

26 Finlayson, "The Government of the Papal States", DR, XLVI (June 1859), 405.

27 A host of the administrative institutions of both these governments is compared in great detail by Finlayson in his articles on "The Government of the Papal States", DR, XLVI (March 1859), 187-251, and (June 1859), 283-409.

28 S. S. Purcell, "Papal Allocutions and Revolutionary Principles", DR, LI (Feb. 1862), 203.

29 Cf. ibid.; and Wiseman, "Italy and the Papal States", DR, XLI (Sept. 1856), 207-226.
Italy was not the fall of the Pope, nor the rise of the Pope the fall of Italy; and generally that not only did the government of the Pope compare favourably with other governments, but the charges against the government of the Pope were not "true at all". Therefore, rather than being one of the worst of governments "it was probably one of the best".

We will not pause to question the validity of the evidence which forms the basis of the Review's cogent arguments, such is beyond the scope of this paper; we shall have to be content with this very brief summary of their evidence and their conclusions. We turn now to consider the nature of the relations between Rome and Europe through 1846-1859 in an effort to describe the Review's understanding of the support the Pope received from European and Italian States. We have mentioned previously the Review's considered need of the Pope for the sympathetic ear of Europe and of Italy. But it appears the ruler of the States of the Church was


32 Next to the Papal Allocutions and Encyclical Letters composed by Pius IX and his predecessors, the writers in the Review acknowledged their greatest indebtedness to the patient and painstaking German Catholic historians of the day. Again, prominent Catholic laymen such as Reyneval and Maguire who were writing in defence of the Papal position in the 1850's, and the Protestant historians Ranke and Roscoe, were frequently cited as authorities in support of their arguments. Cf. Appendix, pp. 67-68.
quite far removed from the genuine assistance of either of these elements.

England not only abandoned Pius IX but she also became his enemy by abetting the insurgents and encouraging the ambitions of an Italian State. C. S. Purcell wrote:

In the revolutionary wars which desolated Spain and made Portugal nothing better than a vineyard for England, Great Britain, by her counsels and her arms preached the 'sacred right of insurrection'. . . . And to-day . . . 'the purest of Italian patriots look upon her as the surest and most solid support of their work'. In the press, in parliament, by the presence of her fleets, giving encouragement to the chiefs of anarchy where the sanguinary struggle rages most, her moral influence is always on the side of the revolution. But still worse, material assistance is thrown into the scale. In the battle on the Volturno, British seamen, on leave of absence from the fleet in the Bay of Naples, worked Sardinian guns against the King of the Two Sicilies. And again, to further the work of the revolution, the British embassies in the various states of Italy have for years been engaged in an active revolutionary propagandism.33

The reader will recall it was in 1847 that the Government of Great Britain sent Lord Minto to Italy for the purpose of encouraging and aiding the Pope in his programme of reform. But, says the Review, the minister was in reality a kind of roving commissioner who patronized the lowest mob leaders such as Ciceruacchio, and whose real purpose was to "instigate and encourage insurrection in Italy".

33 Purcell, "Bonapartism", DR, XLIX (Nov. 1860), 118-119. According to the Review it would seem that this was the theme of English foreign policy throughout the period 1848-1861.
particularly at Rome. 34

In his analysis of the significance of Roman events in 1848, Finlayson quotes Montalembert as having said, that not for having denied liberty or pardon was the Pope persecuted, but because he refused to sanction war on Austria and thereby preserved his sovereign neutrality -- a principle peculiar to the special character of his sovereignty and his purpose on earth as Vicar of Christ. 35 "The Protestantism of England renders it a moral necessity to revile the Papal Government, for if the Pope be antichrist how else can his rule be otherwise than accursed?" To the Protestant mind it is essential, concludes Finlayson, that the "Papal Government be the weakest and worst in Europe" and to doubt the validity of this charge repeatedly dinned into British ears by the Times, Exeter Hall, Lord Shaftesbury and Sardinia, was "to display the spirit of a sceptic". It would appear Finlayson believed a jealousy of the Pope's spiritual power, coupled with a desire to curb his political influence so as to cripple his spiritual supremacy, marked the real basis of Anglo-Roman relations. 36 Nor did the Review consider such objects as these to be historically unique. As early as 1683, they say, the principles of a politico-religious No Popery domestic and foreign policy developed under Charles II. "This

34 Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", BR, XLIX (Feb. 1859), 418. Cf. Trevelyan, Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic 1848-9, p. 73.
35 Cf. above, p. 5, n. 5. See also p. 30, and below, pp. 50-51.
double policy", wrote Russell (? McCabe), "may be described in two words: the foreign policy has been 'Anti-Papal', the domestic, 'Anti-Social.'" This same object, implicit in the English aid to Anti-Catholic rebels in the Netherlands, Scotland, and France during the Elizabethan Reign, bore a marked resemblance in form and character to that which appeared in the encouragement to the rebels in Spain, Portugal, and Italy during the long reign of Lord Palmerston.\footnote{37}

Instead of supporting the Pope in his attempts to reform his government, Gainsford maintained that

The policy of England seems to have been so to use its influence as to deprive the Pope of the power of doing anything, and then -- to tell him to do everything. What the Pope wants is -- not the will, but the power. They who really wish him to effect certain measures of reform, should by every means in their power strengthen his position, discourage the agitators against him, and tell them plainly that civil reforms cannot be prudently or properly conceded to pressure either internal or external, but must be granted freely . . . Let the Pope only be treated as fairly as the Sultan, and then we have no doubt of the result. We have backed up the Turk against internal insurrection: we have spent our blood and treasure to protect the Turk from external attack. How, under similar circumstances, have we treated the Pope? Not a man has turned traitor to the Pope with either sword, pen, or tongue, that has not been encouraged by England to do so, and probably would not have done so but for that encouragement.\footnote{38}

Thus explains the Review, England did everything in her power to paralyze the efforts of a genuine reformer and all because he hap-

\footnote{37} Dr. C. Russell (? McCabe), "Recent Writers on the Temporal Sovereignty of the Pope", \textit{DR.}, XLII (Dec. 1866), 381.

\footnote{38} Gainsford, "The Roman State", \textit{DR.}, LII (April 1863), 566.
If the Pope suffered from the interference of England, the Review felt the Papal position was undermined to an even greater extent by the combined efforts and disinterested desires of still other great powers who wished to strengthen (?) his temporal dominion. The real object of Protestant Prussia and schismatic Russia, for example, was to subvert the temporal dominion in order to destroy the spiritual supremacy; while Gallican France, "all but schismatic", and Josephist Austria, "still labouring under the old anti-papal regime", sought the subversion of the Pope's domain in order that his supremacy might "be exercised in subserviency to their will". These secret aims were believed to be particularly evident in the celebrated Memorandum addressed to the Pope by these five great powers in 1831. The adoption of the recommendations suggested in the Memorandum would have eventually resulted in the complete loss of the Pope's domain.

For what but that could be the result of these measures, "That the laity should be generally


40 In 1831, an insurrection in the Papal States which was put down with the aid of Austria and France ended in a conference of Ambassadors at Rome for the purpose of discussing reform in the Papal States. Though the Memorandum containing the suggestions of the Ambassadors was opposed by the Pope and by Metternich, and only partially implemented, it provided a rallying cry for the revolutionists and reformers. Moreover, the nature of the Austrian and French interference (with Britain in the background) meant that the States of the Pope would henceforth be the centre of the European struggle between these two champions of legitimacy and of liberalism.
admitted to administrative and judicial functions? Generally, that is, in the superior offices; for, as Farini himself informs us, they already were in the inferior. And with lay ministers of state around him what would become of the Papal Government? especially as, combined with this demand for lay administration was another of these disinterested counsels, viz., that there should be what is called 'constitutional government', i.e., a general system of representative institutions, not only municipal councils elected by the people, but provincial councils, 'to assist' the governors of the provinces, and 'with suitable powers', 'to be consulted on the most important affairs.'

In addition to continually reminding their readers of the vague nature of the complaints against the Roman government, the Review also emphasizes the deep and vivid sense of foreign intervention apparently felt by these same people who were overly critical of the Pope's administration. These interventions, it is explained, were occasioned by upset conditions which resulted from the corrupting influence of French revolutionary principles and the oppressive nature of Austrian interference: that is to say, the powers who came to put down disorders were themselves greatly responsible for those disorders. Rome's reliance on Austria, which had come about through the disturbances of the French revolution and Napoleonic Wars, had led to the association of the Roman Government with the despotism of Austria. But, Finlayson tells us, in March 1854, at the very time this unhappy association was being formed in the minds of Italians, the Pope himself was suffering,

41 Finlayson, "The Government of the Papal States", DR, XLVI (March 1859), 286.
as few had suffered before him, under the heel of Austrian despotism; and that no other thing "was so mischievous to Papal Authority" as this aggressive intermingling of Austria in the Papal States. In support of his view of Austrian ambition, Finlayson quotes the following "curious" passage from one of Farini's works:

'It cannot be doubted that Austria had from a remote date desired to extend her sway to the four Pontifical Legations, that she had studied the means of acquiring them in 1815, and still cherished the hope of doing so. Accordingly her official servants murmured against clerical government, and drew comparisons to its extreme disadvantage with the government of Lombardy.' (p. 87). 'Austria wished Europe to understand that the government of the Pope was feeble and in its dotage, and that her troops were indispensable to keep in order the unruly inhabitants of the Legations.' (p. 63).

The cause of Italian Independence had interested Louis Napoleon at a very early age in his career. But in the light of the evidence of the Review the nature of his interest as Emperor of the French did little to enhance the real safety of Papal rule in Italy. The Emperor believed "the power of Austria must be broken -- in Italy he would find a pretext of war and a battlefield -- in Sardinia an obedient ally, and in the revolution a ready tool". The spirit of nationalism supplied him in his need for a war cry. The Emperor knew he would have to break with the Pope if he were to accomplish his aim of bringing glory to the

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42Ibid., pp. 205-206.
43Ibid., p. 228.
44Purcell, "Bonapartism", DR, XLIX (Nov. 1860), 124.
arms of France as well as that of fulfilling his own desire for territorial aggrandizement. 45

The French troops sent to restore the Papal Government in 1848 remained in Rome until 1870 where they prevented the free exercise of Papal authority; at the same time they acted as a chief instrument for the spread of French revolutionary principles among the Roman citizens. Yet, remarked the Review, while the French and English emissaries helped incite rebellion by their presence and propaganda, they condemned and undermined attempts by the Pope to suppress revolt. It would seem they considered such action unbecoming a Pontiff and examples of the aggressive nature of his Government. 46

In June 1859, there appeared the pamphlet of the French Emperor, "Napoleon III and Italy". Directed from Paris toward Vienna, it was a crude version of the secret Pact of Plombiers; and it contained, among other things, three "considerable difficulties" whose settlement the Emperor considered essential for the proper reform of the Papal Government:

1. To reconcile the regime of the Church with a legal, political, and regular regime in the Roman States.
2. To render the Pope independent of questions of nationality, of war, of armaments, of internal and external defence.
3. To constitute a native army, and to substi-

46 Finlayson, "The Massacre of Perugia", DR, XLVII (Sept. 1859), 174-175.
tute for our occupation the protection of an effi-
cacious and real Italian force.
'This is a threefold necessity, which, under
pain of certain and perhaps approaching disturbance,
must be satisfied, in the interest of Italy, of re-
ligion, and of all the Catholic States.'

The objects of these suggestions were observed by the Review to be
no different from those aimed at by the first Napoleon in 1791, by
the Great Powers in 1831, and by Napoleon III in 1848. Hence, de-
spite an accompanying suggestion of setting up a Confederation of
Italian States with the Pope as its Head, the same old questions
remained unanswered and the real object continued to be that of re-
lieving the Pope of his rule over the States of the Church.

It was the argument of the Review that as early as 1848
Sardinia conspired against the security and integrity of the Ital-
ian states. Her cabinet, parliament, press, and refugees, all con-
tributed to a policy which kept Italy in a constant turmoil through
the years 1848-1861. Even the French pamphlet "Napoleon III and
Italy" was compelled to admit that the policy of Piedmont was "an
couragement to revolutionary passions and embarrassment to con-
sciences and a real and grave danger not only to Piedmont but to
Italy and the whole of Europe".

In his article concerning the ecclesiastical affairs of the

47 Finlayson, "The Government of the Papal States", DR, XLVI
(June 1859), 303.
48 Ibid., p. 236.
49 Purcell, "Döllinger and the Temporal Power of the Popes", DR, L (May 1861), 220.
states of the House of Savoy and their relation to the Holy See, Bowyer attempts to prove false the assumptions that in the Sardinian states a Protestant reformation was going on and that the body of the nation, headed by its king and parliament, were engaged in a struggle for independence against the Holy See and against the clergy of the Catholic Church. Bowyer points out that these same notions were rooted in English public opinion and even supported by statesmen in both Houses of Parliament. According to his evidence the defeat of Sardinia at Novara in 1849 resulted in the revolutionary party's rise to power. Though peace brought the people, the nobility, and the clergy against this party, they succeeded in maintaining their position by virtue of their control of key government positions, of the press, and of their encouragement to the secret societies. Still they feared the power of the church and they therefore launched a campaign which shortly took on the aspects of an attack against the church and the Holy See. They realized, however, that direct attacks leading to a breach with the Holy See would be regarded unfavourably by the great body of the nation; therefore, they professed deference to Rome and a wish to do nothing violating the rights of the Church; they pretended to obtain their desires through negotiation and consent of the Pope. But, accused Bowyer, in their negotiations with Rome the Sardinian ministers "declared negotiations to be going on where none whatever were in fact being carried out: ambassadors were not instructed to proceed with business on which they publicly professed to have sent [them];
or [they were] instructed to proceed with business demands which they knew could not be complied with. All this, reports Bowyer, was for the purpose of bemusing the people and deluding Europe so as to give weight to the opinion that compromise with Rome was impossible, that the Holy See was deaf to argument, heedless of the demands of circumstance and the need sometimes to admit reasonable concessions. The severe treatment of those who opposed the schemes of the Sardinian ministers, a "severity which would have been called tyranny and cruelty in another less favourite state", was applauded in England and on the continent as proof of the energy of a "so-called constitutional government".

In this cursory description of events and conditions in the Roman States through the period 1846-1859 we have attempted to give some of the reactions of the Review to the "two motives" laid down by Lord John Russell in stating the cause of the revolutionary party. Finlayson sums up the argument as follows:

[To foreign aggression and intrigue] more than to any other cause, except the kindred causes of the French Revolution and Josephist despotism in Austria, are to be ascribed those intrigues in Italy and those discontents and disturbances which are,

50 Sir G. Bowyer, "Rome and Sardinia", DR, XXXIX (Sept. 1855), 164-199.

51 Wiseman, "Italy and the Papal States", DR, XLI (Sept. 1857), 180.

52 See above, Lord John's despatch of October 1860, pp. 20-21.
with such entire ignorance of history, attributed to Papal misgovernment. 53

It would seem then, according to the Review, that the real difficulty of the Papal Government lay not in its misgovernment but in its struggle against France on the one hand and Austria on the other as each vied with the other for dominance in the peninsula. Nor, as we have been asked to observe by the Review, was this the only difficulty facing the Pope because of external pressures. Sardinia used both France and Austria to advance her own desire to become a power; and always at the additional expense of the Papacy.

But we have only touched the heart of the problem of the Pope's temporal sovereignty -- a problem of the utmost importance from the viewpoint of the Dublin Review. For in addition to the various aspects of the attacks on the Pope's sovereignty that we have already mentioned, there remains to be considered still another approach taken by those who would have seen the Pope relieved of his embarrassment of temporal rule. The Review says:

... those enemies of the Papacy maintain that the independence of the Church, as typified by the sovereignty of the Pope, is incompatible with the independence of the Commonwealth, whatever be its form -- an Empire, a Kingdom, an Oligarchy, or a Republic; that no Nation can be great, no People happy, and no Ruler free, where the Church is not an instrument in the hands of the State -- a College rather than a Church -- and those who preside over its flocks, and serve at its altars appointed by, or under the direct control of the State.

According to them the claims of the Papacy are

'unfounded', and the exercise of its powers, at home and abroad, a downright mischief. The temporal sovereignty of the Pope rests, they say, on no solid basis; the spiritual supremacy of the Pope in all lands, outside the Papal States, is, they affirm, the cause of evils innumerable to those who govern, and those who are governed.  

This view, which was evidently shared by the governments of England, France, Prussia, Austria, and Sardinia, explains to the Review at least one of the reasons why these governments desired to treat the problem of temporal sovereignty as a purely political question. The writers in the Review objected to this on the ground that to distinguish sharply between the temporal power and the spiritual power so as to relegate the latter to matters of conscience alone was to pervert the very nature and purpose of the Church. As religion is concerned with every act of the individual, so it is interested in the affairs of nations and their governments. The Church insists upon the supremacy of God over man, of the soul over the body; the Pope could never admit to the subserviency of religion to human institutions, the supremacy of the world over the Church. Rather, he would forever strive to maintain temporal independence and to exert the greatest possible moral influence and


55 Finlayson, "The Government of the Papal States", DR, XLVI (March 1859), 284.

56 Russell (? McCabe), "Recent Writers on the Temporal Sovereignty of the Pope", DR, XLI (Dec. 1856), 346.
authority over civil and political interests. Hence, the practical importance of the temporal sovereignty which secured the complete autonomy of the Papacy and the exercise of spiritual supremacy; its overthrow would weaken the organization of the Church and cripple its power of resistance. Temporal sovereignty, therefore, could not be treated as a purely political question as it existed for the sake of the spiritual supremacy alone.

Thus, according to the Review, the peculiar character of the Papal sovereignty, the interdependence of the spiritual power and temporal power of the Pope, called for an independent Papal State. The Pope required complete temporal independence from the Princes of Europe and, by the same token, he also required complete civil freedom in his own state — he could not "be the subject of his own people".

Thus far we have presented three of the arguments of the Review in answer to the charge that ecclesiastical absolutism was being maintained by the Pope despite the reasonable demands of progress for a constitutional form of government. First, the Revolution in 1848 had revealed the absence of a class of men to whom po-

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57 It is important to note that the Review considered the temporal sovereignty to be in no way an essential part of the idea of the Pope's position as head of the Church. Russell, "Dr. Döllinger's Protestantism and the Papacy", DR, LII (April 1863), 472.

58 Purcell, "Sicily, the Italian Revolution and the Papacy", DR, LI (May 1862), 507.

litical power could be trusted as well as having proved Rome a weak state unable to withstand the work of insurrectionists and foreign intrigue; thus, a programme of gradual reform had been rendered impossible. Second, the far from disinterested pressure brought to bear on the Pope by France, Austria, and Sardinia (not to mention England) throughout the entire period 1846–1859, only served to illustrate the revelations of the Revolutionary era. Third, the peculiar character of the Papal State, the interdependence of the spiritual power and the temporal power called for the investiture of supreme political authority in the Pope. His government was necessarily a Theocracy.

In his article "The Italian Revolution — Its Cause and Character", Purcell directs the reader who would find the truly basic cause for the disturbances in the Peninsula to an examination of the mind and the character of the Italian people. In the north of Italy, where the bold and unscrupulous ambition of the professional class existed beside the "thinly disguised Voltarism" of the nobility and where both these were conjoined with the traditional monarchical sentiment of the people, there was sufficient strength and unity for the formation of a powerful state. But, in Central and South Italy, where ancient local traditions, "the necessity of Papal Sovereignty", the intense traditional pride of its several ancient cities and the topography of the land divided the peninsula into distinct regions, the argument in favour of small republics or municipalities far outweighed that in support of one vast government for
the entire peninsula. However, or so it seems, Italy in 1859 har­
boured the same spirit of rebellion against tradition and authority
as that which characterized France in 1793. And yet, Purcell ex­
plains:

The growth of the revolutionary principle and the
spread of the doctrines of Massini are not enough
in themselves to account for the change that is come
over the minds of men, and for the upheaving of those
passions which are now shaking Italian society to its
centre. Make what abatements we will from the record­
ed suffrage of the Italian people, strike off those
numerous votes that have been obtained by bribery and
intimidation, and make a still larger deduction on the
score of the miserable cowardice manifested in every
village and hamlet and borough of the revolted states
by the friends of faith and loyalty, and reduce yet
again that majority, swelled to its vast dimensions
by the falsification of the election returns and yet,
after all these necessary abatements and allowances,
we are bound in the interests of truth to confess
that large and active masses of the Italian popula­
tions, in spite of their ancient traditions, and of
their historical recollection, and in spite of their
wonted reverence for religion, have deliberately
chosen to cast in their lot with the excommunicated
king of Sardinia.

Nevertheless, we are told it was a vain hope to seek a
restoration of Italy to her former glory in the rise of a united
nation. "Patience and self-denial, civil courage and military valour,
habit of association, and reverence for monarchical authority are not
the most distinguishing qualities for political pre-eminence."  

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60 Purcell, "Bonapartism", DR, XLIX (Nov. 1860), 135.
61 Purcell, "The Italian Revolution -- Its Cause and Charac­
ter", DR, XLVIII (May 1860), 158-159.
62 Ibid., p. 160.
Divided by geography and hereditary feuds Italy had ever been a land of cities; she had never been a nation; neither her tradition nor the character of her people fitted her for the role. Yet, under the leadership of a few, endowed with faith, boldness, ambition and tireless energy, Italy cried out for liberation, not for love of liberty, said Purcell, but for the sake of a Utopia envisioned in a United Kingdom. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Italian expects his kingdom to have power and influence, he will not stir himself to accomplish it. This infirmity, Purcell believed, was the key to the mystery of the Italian position. In 1860 she welcomed the sword of Victor Emmanuel; before, she welcomed the sword of the French; and before that, the sword of the Archduke John of Austria with its promise to free Italy from the first Napoleon. We have not seen, Purcell concludes, the last of this habitual yielding of Italy to external pressure.

According to the Review, Papal administration and the special character of the Pope's Sovereignty should not have been held responsible for a part in the upset conditions of Italy through 1846-1859. "'If agitation be still kept up, the cause will be found in the character of the nation itself, and its ambitious views directed to unattainable objects.'"63

Here ends our summary of the Italian Question and the Papal position as understood by the Dublin Review. From this same view-

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63 Barron, "Our Foreign Policy in 1860-61", DR, XLIX (Feb. 1861), 421.
point, let us now glance briefly at the basis of Lord John's moral support of the Italian Revolutionary party in 1860–1861.
It seemed to the Review that some very important features of Lord John's Italian policy were completely inconsistent. While Her Majesty's government supported revolution in Italy with one hand, she was arming her other against the threat posed by the chief of revolution, Napoleon III, in France. Yet by its very nature, Purcell stated, revolution does not mean to be confined. If its success be permitted in Italy, "the triumph of Bonapartism will not be long delayed in Europe." Barron, who shared Purcell's thought, reminded his readers that Britain herself had not been without her share of hot-headed theorists, and this same country which had helped pull down the oldest sovereignty in Europe held no solid reason why she might not also be faced by a revolt against Queen and Country. He inquires further, "does not the dispatch of 27th October hold out every inducement" and lend the highest English authority to this very element in British society?

1Purcell, "Bonapartism", DR, XLIX (Nov. 1860), 144. Cf. Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", DR, XLIX (Feb. 1861), 428.
2Purcell, "Bonapartism", DR, XLIX (Nov. 1860), 143. Cf. Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", DR, XLIX (Feb. 1861), 432.
3Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", DR, XLIX (Feb. 1861), 432-433.
It will be remembered Lord John had declined to interfere
with Garibaldi's crossing the Straits of Messina and had approved
annexation of Tuscany by Sardinia because of his belief that, in
Italy, questions of territorial circumspection were mixed up with
questions of internal government. The Review objected. The an-
nexation of Nice and Savoy by France, which the Foreign Minister
had most emphatically denounced as a violation of the rights and
limits of other nations, was no different in principle from Sar-
dinian seizure of Tuscany or the Romagna. Both instances showed the
same stamp of foreign aggression. Moreover, Sardinia had no closer
relation to the Peninsular states than did France or the rest of
the European community. Sardinia, therefore, had no more right to
the Romagna than France had to the ancestral seat of the King of
Sardinia. We have already mentioned our authors' unwillingness
to attribute any value to the plebiscites which had apparently
shown Savoy and the country of Nice begging "to be annexed to im-
perial and despotic France". We will pursue this subject no fur-
ther.

The Review was quite in agreement with the several leading
states of Europe who had protested and denounced the King of Sar-

4 Cf. above, pp. 14-18.

5 Gainsford, "The Roman State", DR, LII (April 1862), 503-504.

6 Cf. above, pp. 26-27. See also Purcell, "Bonpartism", DR, XLIX (Nov. 1860), 131-133, 140; and "The Italian Revolution -- Its
Cause and Character", DR, XLVIII (May 1860), 154-155.
dinia's invasion of the Papal States without causus belli. His at-
tack on a neighbouring sovereign with whom he was at peace was a
complete violation of international law. His joining of the revolu-
tionary party gathered there from several nations to promote insur-
rection "'no longer allowed Europe to regard him as a stranger to
the movement which had upset the Peninsula'".

Victor Emmanuel had far surpassed the violation of law and
of order committed by William III. Moreover, Lord John's citation
of Vattel was inaccurate and not a valid corroboration of his stand.
"In the first place, Lord John adroitly evaded the question of 'good
reasons' stated by Vattel. Every man who enters into a rebellion
believes that he has 'good reasons.'" It was not Vattel's meaning
that the decision to take up arms should be left to the people.
Otherwise, the Canadian Rebellion, or the Irish Rebellion might have
been similarly defended and their leaders might have claimed the sup-
port of foreign powers on the same grounds. Barron applied this
argument used by Lord John in defence of the Italian insurrection
to the problems of British rule in India.

The People of Naples (Delhi?) have chosen a king
by universal suffrage. They vote the expulsion of

7Cf. above, p. 20.
8This is taken from the Russian Government's despatch to its
minister at Turin on September 28 (Oct. 10), 1860. This despatch,
as well as similar expressions by the Foreign Office of Paris and of
Austria, are quoted at length by Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", DR,
XLIX (Feb. 1861), 422-425.
9Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", DR, XLIX (Feb. 1861), 425.
Bourbons and Austrins (English?). Thus in the words of Lord John Russell, "Upon this grave matter, her majesty's government hold that the people in question (of Delhi) are themselves the best judges of their own affairs. Her majesty's government do not feel justified in declaring that the people of southern Italy (Delhi) had not good reasons for throwing off their former (British) government."

He believed this parallel to be perfect and inquired whether Britain was to hold "two separate sets of principles", this time, "one for India and another for Italy. If the argument is sound for Italy it is equally sound for India." But, our critic concludes, the principle is unsound in either case: it upsets the foundations of all governments and, if upheld, would lead to anarchy all over the world. Moreover, not one state in Europe agreed with Lord John's interpretation of Vattel nor did any one of them consider the opinions of Vattel as the law for their community of nations.

The same author further emphasizes the inconsistencies of Lord John's policy by comparing as follows two short extracts taken from the Minister's despatches dated 31 August and 27 October, 1860:

"For they (the English government) conceived that in substance that note (Count Cavour's Note) disavowed any intention of attacking the domains of the Emperor of Austria or the king of Naples'. But the king of Sardinia has attacked the domains of the king of Naples. Then it is quite clear that the 'substance' of the note has been violated. How will honest plain-spoken Englishmen, or future historians, reconcile this violation of a solemn pledge, by a king, given through his prime minister, with the no less solemn approval of Lord John Russell, given in these words, (dispatch. October 27,) --

\[10\] Ibid., p. 430.
'Her majesty's government cannot therefore blame the king of Sardinia for assisting them,' (the revolutionary party) by violating the territory of the king of Naples, at the head of his army.

The failure of Lord John to blame the King of Sardinia for breaking his pledged word and forfeiting his honour prompted Barron to conclude that this must be "a new principle in diplomacy". 11

As we might guess, the authors of the Review did not share Lord John's opinion that the Italian Revolution had been "conducted with singular temper and forbearance". Rather, in light of their remarks, the campaign conducted by Victor Emmanuel's general Cialdini was a particularly sanguinary affair and Garibaldi's adventure appears to have been no less blameworthy. 12 Though Cialdini's forces were three times those under the command of the Pope's general Lamoricière, he incited his troup to give no quarter to the Papal army and, it appears, he bombarded Ancona "for twelve hours, after all firing had ceased from the town, and at a time when he knew that conditions

11 Ibid., p. 431.

12 It seems that in addition to the property Victor Emmanuel himself had confiscated, the Sardinian Monarch had sanctioned acts of spoliation by Garibaldi. "By a decree of Garibaldi, the Dictator of Naples, the private property of the royal family, amounting to 25 millions of francs, in the Neapolitan funds, and comprising the dowry of the queen, the portions of the royal princesses, and the fortunes of the royal cadets, were summarily confiscated. A commission was appointed to distribute this money among the patriots who had suffered for their country." Purcell, "Bonpartism", DR, XLIX (Nov. 1860), n. 142. The fate of the Irish prisoners at Genoa prompted the Review to give "on official authority" a description of the prisoners' "cruel treatment" by the "model government" of Sardinia. See Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", DR, XLIX (Feb. 1861), 426-427.
of surrender were under discussion between the Sardinian admiral and the besieged. Further atrocities, we are told, were committed by the same force on its entry into Neapolitan territory.

Thus, Barron concludes, international law was set at naught; promises were broken; pledged honour was violated; and the principles of public and private property were treated with contumacy.¹³ All was done in the name of liberty and all received the unqualified approbation of Lord John Russell. But, Barron exclaims, the main object of Lord John was not to promote liberty. The policies of the British ministers, aided by the daily press¹⁴ and the insti-

¹³Ibid., p. 432.

¹⁴On innumerable occasions the contributors to the Review were most outspoken in their criticism of what they considered false reporting of the Italian Question by British daily newspapers, periodicals and learned journals. It had, for example, very little regard for the Times, and even the Catholic Rambler did not escape the biting criticisms of its writers. The Tablet seems to have been the one paper with a tenacity of principle sufficient to preserve it against "the delusive liberalism of the day". Purcell, "Döllinger and the Temporal Power of the Popes", DR, L (May 1861), 199. "No one", Wiseman said, "has ever found our daily press hard upon a protestant State, whatever be its violation of constitutions, or its religious persecutions." Wiseman, "Italy and the Papal States", DR, XL1 (Sept. 1856), 182. Gainsford remarked, "the correspondent of the Times writes that 'the Italian political atmosphere is filled with lies', and we fear that the correspondence from Italy, in the column of that and some other papers, savours strongly of the atmosphere whence it comes." Gainsford, "The Roman State", DR, LII (April 1863), 504. In one place the Review tells of instances of completely false reports which, though later proved as false, were never published as such in England; see Wiseman, "Italy and the Papal States", DR, XLI (Sept. 1856), 177. The Review itself was generally regarded all over the world as being notoriously partisan because of "its [admitted] attachment to the person of the Holy Father, its fidelity to every doctrine, usage, and feeling of the Roman Church". Ibid., p. 206.
gators of the anti-Catholic party in the United Kingdom, had won considerable sympathy for the cause of Italian patriots in the minds of a great many Englishmen. To approve the efforts and the success of Italian insurgents was to flatter the sentiments of a large portion of the British populace. The despatch of October 27, 1860, had sprung from the same ground and was part of the same policy which had dictated the Durham Letter in 1859; its message was quite in harmony with the Minister's habit of taking advantage of popular sentiments to court popularity.  

As we direct our attention toward the basic differences between the positions adopted by Lord John Russell and the Dublin Review it is no surprise to find their premises absolutely opposed. Lord John's chief interest in the Italian question sprang from his view of the causes and concomitant circumstances of the Revolution in 1860. His support of the insurgents and the King of Sardinia flowed naturally from his desire to see the Italian people rid of

15 A particularly good instance of the Review's opinions in regard to this point will be found in Russell (? McCabe), "Recent Writers on the Temporal Sovereignty of the Pope", DR, XLI (Dec. 1856), n., 349-351. Dr. Russell (? McCabe) describes the work of the Oxford Italian Professor, Aurelio Saffi, a member of the Roman Triumvirate in 1849, and whom Russell considers "a fitting professor of that 'national religion', which Anglicanism has been seeking to import into Italy".

16 Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", DR, XLIX (Feb. 1861), 430. The Durham Letter was written by Lord John Russell to the Bishop of Durham in 1859. In it the minister lent his voice to the cries against "Papal Aggression" which greeted the attempt of Pius IX to re-establish the Catholic Hierarchy of England on his return from exile at Gaeta in 1849.

17 Cf. above, pp. 20-22.
misgovernment and of mischievous foreign influence in order that they might build up the edifice of their liberties, and consolidate their work of independence. In fine, the Italian Question for him was a political question; a question which involved political principles of the highest order and of the greatest importance to all Englishmen. Eight weeks before he wrote his despatch of 27 October, he had written to Lord Bloomfield at Berlin:

'I wish to put in a caveat against the indiscriminate use of the words 'revolution' and 'revolutionary'. A revolution may be the greatest of calamities; it may be the highest of blessings. In England the phrases 'the Revolution,' 'from the time of the Revolution,' 'the Government which has prevailed from the period of the Revolution,' are terms which are applied to the change from subserviency to France, and the arbitrary tyranny of our pensioned Stuarts to national independence and the rule of law and liberty, which began to prevail under William III. and the House of Hanover.

'In France the term 'Revolution' is generally applied to the democratic anarchy of the Jacobin convention.

'The servile parties on the Continent are apt to use the term indiscriminately, and the advocates of absolutism speak with as much abhorrence of a change from the worst despotism to the prevalence of the law of order, as of a change from a mild Government to democratic licence. Thus the change from government maintained by torture to a free and regular government is called a 'Revolution'; but such a change, by whatever name it may be called, is a blessing and not a calamity.'

The interest of the Review in the Italian Question was derived from its desire to help preserve the Temporal Sovereignty of the Pope. Its authors believed there was a case for the Roman

18 Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, II, 327.
Government at the time of the Revolution in 1860, and that not only was Lord John's policy inconsistent but it was allied with the powers and principles which threatened the true basis of all society and government. In their answers to the charge of Papal misrule, the authors of the Review were arguing not only for the right of the Holy See to possess territory and its ability to govern its States; but they were also claiming the right of the Church to exist as a corporate and independent body. However, in the final analysis, the Review believed that above all else the attack on Rome was an attempt to destroy the spiritual fortress which barred the path to a new way of life. The Pope's worst enemies were those who preached the inexorable march of progress, the moral authority of majorities, and the omnipotence of the state. Purcell wrote:

In the Italy of to-day, almost without disguise we come upon that trinity of evil which characterised the French revolution — pride, self-love, and disobedience — laid down as a rule of life.

Modern civilization preaches a new morality as well as a new gospel, in which injustice crowned with success is a virtue, and robbery on a grand scale, or in pursuit of an idea is reckoned a merit. In this new code of morals, to rectify a frontier or to create an empire 'a terrible war, a war to the death, a war to the knife', is accounted justifiable. In our age, says this new morality, if we much want a thing that is rightfully in another's possession, or if we fancy we could make a good use of it in our grand schemes of ambition, have we the power and audacity sufficient, we do well to seize it. 'In our age', says the most systematic apostle of the new gospel in his letters just given to the world,

\[19\text{cf. above, pp. 49-50.}\]
'I believe audacity is the best policy; it did
good to Napoleon.' Such a rule deserves such an
illustration. The minor virtues, such as truth-
fulness, fair dealing, frankness, modesty, and com-
mon honesty, and the sentiment of honour, are al-
together omitted from the code of this new civili-
sation. 'Could then,' says Pius IX. in a recent
allocation, 'the Sovereign Pontiff extend a friendly
hand to a civilization of this kind, could he sin-
cerely make a league and bond with it?' Let things
be called by their true names, and the Holy See
will appear always consistent with itself. In
reality it has been in all times the protector
and initiator of true civilization.

The writers in the Review desired to defend the government
of Rome and the principles of Rome from the viewpoint of Rome itself;
and, they were in accord with Papal political principles, though oc-
casionally in error with regard to the political manoeuvres conducted
by Pius IX and Cardinal Antonelli. Strict adherence to their re-
ligious convictions and the theological tenets of the Church lent
a singular consistency to their arguments and produced a remarkable
degree of agreement between their separate treatments of the various
problems raised by the Italian Question and Lord John's foreign policy.
Both in their condemnation of the conduct and of the aims of the ris-
orgimento, as well as in their refutation of the new philosophy of
progress, apparently embraced by Lord John, these critics spoke from
a Papal position and in some instances anticipated Papal pronounce-
ments.

20 Purcell, "Papal Allocutions and Revolutionary Principles",
MR, LI (Feb. 1862), 206-207.

21 All this was strikingly evidenced by the appearance of the
Syllabus of Errors in 1864. This famous politico-religious document
Our summary interpretation of the positions represented by Lord John Russell and the Dublin Review is nearly ended. The British Foreign Minister attributed the Italian Revolution in 1860 to misrule of the authoritarian governments of the Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies as well as to the corrupting and oppressive influence of France and Austria. The Review countered with a case for these Italian Governments, particularly the Papal government, contending that Italy's worst enemies were those who preached the new philosophy of progress, and that the policy of Lord John Russell was not only inconsistent but also allied with those principles and powers which threatened to destroy the basis of all society and government.

and the Encyclical Quanta Cura which accompanied it, "were profoundly upsetting to many within the Church and to others outside who were friendly disposed to her", but the authoritarian Review greeted both with very real satisfaction. See Hales, Pio Mon, p. 285. Cf. below, Article IX of the Syllabus, with the Review's position as given above, pp. 48-50.

IX

Errors concerning the Roman Pontiff's civil principedom.

LXXV. Children of the christian and catholic Church dispute with each other on the compatibility of the temporal rule with the spiritual.

LXXVI. The abrogation of that civil power, which the Apostolic See possesses, would conduce in the highest degree to the Church's liberty and felicity.

These documents are discussed fully by the Review which quotes them in their entirety, both in Latin and in translation. Cf. "The Encyclical and Syllabus", DR (new ser.), IV (April 1865), 441-529.
Back to back, these two positions portray the black and the white sides of a complex question. But which is the dark and which is the light? That the contributors to the Review were writing in the presence of something they considered a calamity and wrong is a fact; that they had a tendency to exaggerate the evils and the magnitude of passing events is therefore probable. Yet, the same may be said of the other side — especially the non-Catholic liberal side.

The question is unanswered; but the fact remains that the Dublin Review reveals the presence of a significant number of responsible British Catholic observers who found reason to condemn the contemporary liberal interpretation of the Italian Question and British Foreign Policy, 1860-1861. This is not surprising. Yet, it is challenging to British historians who, with few exceptions, have shown little or no respect for the position represented by the Review; and who have preserved to this day a nineteenth century liberal answer to the Italian Question of 1860.

We today who have met the children and the grandchildren of European Liberalism and the Revolution, who have seen Massini turn into Mussolini, Herder into Hitler, and the idealistic early socialists into the intransigent communists, are able from a new vantage ground to consider once more whether [the Dublin Review], or the optimistic believers in an infallible progress, like [Massini], will have, in the eyes of eternity, the better of the argument.  

22 Hales, Pio Nono, p. 331.
APPENDIX

CONSIDERATION OF THE LYONS LETTERS

BY E. E. Y. HALES

On July 9th, 1860 (two days after the Piedmontese ultimatum had been sent to Rome, and when interest in the 'Roman Question' was at its highest), Acton wrote to Simpson, his fellow editor of the Rambler: 'I send you notes, which may help for a Roman article for this week, on Lyons' papers. I got them and read them today. They are a running commentary on some of my articles, confirming, thank God, all I said. Monsell, Maguire, etc., are greatly disturbed by them. I think Lyons honest. Monsell doubts it . . . . '

The papers referred to by Acton were the despatches sent by Mr. (later Lord) Lyons from Rome to his superior, the British Minister at Florence (first Campbell Scarlett, then Lord Normanby), during the years 1853 to 1858 when Lyons was British Attaché at Rome. They can be read at the Record Office (F.O. 43, vols. 58, 59, 60, 63, 66, and 69), and they provide evidence of some value as to the character of life and institutions in the Papal States, evidence which, though often reflecting adversely upon the Roman administration, is very far from lending colour to the lurid picture of liberal tradition. The reason why they disturbed 'Monsell, Maguire, etc.', was that these men, with their ardent, Irish, Roman sympathies, looked for a warmer appreciation than they found in them of the qualities of life at Rome. Monsell and Maguire both had much to do with the translation and dissemination in England and Ireland of the report of the French Ambassador at Rome, Rayneval, on the same topic, and Rayneval was a good deal more enthusiastic about the Roman government than was Lyons.

Acton found the Lyons despatches congenial and convincing because they reflected his own viewpoint in which misgivings about the Roman government were blended with a profounder mistrust of the revolutionaries. Lyons had a warm admiration for Pio Nono and a respect for Antonelli, whom he found accessible, courteous, and reasonable. He clearly had grave doubts about the efficiency of the financial administration, but he believed that the charge of corruption was 'somewhat exaggerated' and he writes that 'far greater blame than is just is attributed to Cardinal Antonelli' (January 23rd, 1854). He implies, in several of his despatches, that secular-
isation is needed in the administration, but one is left wondering how far this attitude was forced upon him by the policy of Clarendon and Palmerston. Certainly, the villain of the piece, in Lyons' letters, is the pro-Minister of Finance, Galli, who was a layman, and who was relieved of his office in November, 1854, and replaced by an ecclesiastic, Mgr. Ferrari, apparently with beneficial results. After the Congress of Paris, in 1856, it became Lyons' duty, under instruction from Clarendon, to urge upon the Pope 'Reforms in the Papal State', and particularly secularisation; and he was obliged to put arguments in this sense to Antonelli. But it is quite evident (e.g. from his despatch of May 29th, 1856) that he found much substance in the views of Rayneval, and of Colloredo, the Austrian Ambassador, who considered it out of place to advise the Pope on his choice of ministers and who conceived that it was a matter of the first consequence to support the authority of the Papal government which had been prejudicially affected by the publicity given to the proceedings of the Congress -- and no doubt particularly, though they were too polite to say so, to Clarendon's unguarded outburst there.

Rayneval told Lyons that most of the political prisoners imprisoned as a result of the revolution had, in fact, been amnestied. He had also had a return made for him from which he had found that the total number of prisoners in the Papal State was smaller, proportionally, than in France. Lyons checked up on this and found, from the police reports (made at that time to the French Embassy on account of the occupation), that arrests for political offences in Rome were in fact very rare, that there were only about seven or eight arrests daily for all crimes, many being for prostitution.

The general implication of the Lyons' letters is that improvements could be made in the Roman administration if it would draw upon the wisdom of intelligent liberal laymen of the type of the Marchese Bevilacqua of Bologna, whereas Acton (who was in Rome in 1857) believed, and was one with both Veuillot and Montalembert in believing, that the heart of the opposition to the Papal government was a determination to exclude the Pope wholly from temporal power, and perhaps ultimately from spiritual power, and that concessions on his part were as futile as were Austrian concessions at Milan or at Venice. The revolutionaries, in the name of their new ideas, had decided upon 'No Pope' and upon 'No Austria' and they would make the government of either unworkable.

According to Mr. Hales, these letters have hitherto received little attention. E. E. Y. Hales, Pio Nono (Appendix: The Lyons Letters), p. 343.
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Complete sets of the Dublin Review are scarce; and an index is non-existent. The following pamphlet, its publishers' note, and the author's table may prove helpful to the interested reader.


Publishers' Note: (Taken directly from the pamphlet mentioned above)

The following complete list of contents gives the names of contributors wherever these have been ascertained. The names have been supplied for the earlier articles from the editorial memoranda of Father Matthew Russell, S.J., published in the Irish Monthly, vols. XXI and XXII, collated with the lists preserved in the Oscott Library. Fuller information concerning these researches by the late Bishop Casartelli will be found in the article by him included in the centenary number of April 1836.

Continuous numbering of the issues was not begun until the opening of the Fourth Series, at the beginning of 1892, when the first volume of the new series was numbered vol. CX and the new issue appeared as No. 220. The total was miscalculated, and it should have been No. 219. To avoid confusion, the former numbering has been left uncorrected in the present volume.

No records have been preserved which could assist in identifying the writers of most of the articles during the later years, before it became the practice for articles to be signed. The discrepancies in spelling and in the titles of writers have been retained as they appeared in the list prepared by Dr. Casartelli, or as they were given in the contents pages of subsequent volumes.
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