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Canada, Latin America and the Organization of American States.

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CANADA, LATIN AMERICA
AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

Submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Windsor in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

by

Jack Orval Kiervin

Faculty of Graduate Studies
1969
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to collate the arguments both for and against increased Canadian involvement in Latin America with special reference to the question of Canadian participation in the Organization of American States.

In addition to presenting the historic arguments, an attempt is made to anticipate Canadian foreign policy in the near future with a view to fitting Latin America into the projection of Ottawa's external relations. Two case studies are discussed (Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Dominican crisis of 1965) to illustrate the probable effects of Canadian membership in the Organization of American States.

The first chapter deals with the structure and function of the Organization in an attempt to clarify the degree of success it has attained. Throughout the thesis the dominant United States presence in Latin America is given every consideration.

In discussing Canadian involvement in Latin America every effort is made to consider objectively all the arguments. Unfortunately, the scope of the topic prohibits detailed scrutiny in all areas and to some degree objectivity has perhaps been sacrificed in the author's selection of topics.
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Special thanks is due to the Hon. Paul Martin and Mr. L. Brown John for their valuable assistance in securing unpublished sources of information. I should like to thank Mrs. Anne Mates whose interpretation of my writing and attention to detail were nothing short of heroic. Finally, I am deeply grateful for the encouragement and understanding I received from my wife, Shirley.
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INTRODUCTION

Canada has undertaken a valuable and effective role in international affairs especially since 1945. As a middle power of considerable stature she has participated in several regional and universal organizations to her own benefit and that of her allies and friends. Canada is a member of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) and the United Nations (U.N.), as well as a participant in numerous trade and aid agencies including the Geneva Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (G.A.T.T.) and the Colombo Plan. Since 1956, the role of peace-keeping has become a vital aspect of Canadian foreign policy and negotiated peace settlement the goal of her international involvement. Canada's own domestic interests, in turn, have been geared to the prospects of the increasing wealth, population and interdependence in the world. Economically, Canadians look to their neighbours for capital investment and export markets. Since her own survival depends on trade, 1 Canada naturally is concerned with

1 J.L. Skeggs, External Trade Division, Dominion Bureau of Statistics (Ottawa, 1968) notes that twenty percent of Canada's Gross National Product is directly dependent on foreign trade - the highest in the world.
increasing the stability, cooperation and viability of the world around her. Despite her already intensive involvement in many areas of the world, Canada remains separated from one of the oldest existing international association of nations. First conceived in the latter part of the 19th century,\(^2\) the inter-American system did not assume its present form until after World War II under the Rio Treaty and the Pact of Bogota. Canada is the single major Western Hemispheric nation that remains outside the Organization despite one hundred years of economic interaction with Latin America.

Based on statements by successive Government Ministers, it appears somewhat unlikely Canada will join in the near future regardless of her changing position in the world of nations. To illustrate, on March 30, 1939 Prime Minister Mackenzie King told the House of Commons that "public opinion in favour of the Pan American Union had not yet become sufficiently informed or sufficiently widespread and matured to warrant immediate steps to join."\(^3\) Twenty-two years later, in 1961, Howard Green, Secretary of State for External Affairs, stated that Canada was still waiting for an indicator from the majority of Canadians that such a step should be taken. Again, in 1968 Canada's Prime Minister is


still waiting for this onslaught of public opinion to guide her entry into the Organization of American States (O.A.S.).

In addition, there is evidence to support the view that Canadian leaders are unsure of the political consequences at home. Howard Green, Sidney Smith, John Diefenbaker, Lester Pearson, Paul Martin, Mitchell Sharp and Pierre Trudeau have all stated at one time or another that they favour joining the O.A.S. However, all have been strangely quiet on this point after they attain a position in the Government. It seems that membership in the Government delineates membership in the O.A.S. to a considerable degree. Whatever the reasons, the fact is evident that neither the government nor the people are anxious to commit the country to a greater role in Latin America if membership in the O.A.S. is a prerequisite.

This paper will discuss the relationship between Canada and Latin America with attention to the hegemony of the United States in the area and an analysis of the O.A.S. The paper explores the conditions for Canadian membership in the O.A.S., with reference to the structure, functions and accomplishments of the Organization. Two case studies on

### Notes


the Dominican Republic (1965) and Cuba (1962) will be analyzed to demonstrate the responsibilities and restrictions of membership in the O.A.S.
CHAPTER I

THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

The present Organization of American States came into being formally in 1951 with the ratification of the Pact of Bogota signed in 1948. This Act gave formal validity to the Rio Treaty of 1947 incorporating it into the official Charter of the O.A.S. The original idea of a hemispheric system is attributed to Simon Bolivar. Bolivar's dream of a cohesive union or "confederation" of Latin American Provinces received its impetus on December 7, 1824 when the dictator of Peru and titular head of Great Columbia sent the following message of invitation to the former Spanish colonies. 6

The day our plenipotentiaries make the exchanges of their powers will stamp in the diplomatic history of the world an immortal epoch. When, after a hundred centuries, posterity shall search for the origin of our public law, and shall remember the compacts that solidified its destiny, they will finger with respect the protocols of the Isthmus. In them they will find the plan of our first alliances that shall sketch the mark of our relations with the universe. 7

6 The ex-colonies were Mexico, Central America, Great Colombia (Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela) Chile, Peru, United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, Bolivia and Paraguay. Invitations were also sent to the United States of America, Great Britain and Brazil.


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The Congress which met at Panama June 23, 1826, did not reflect Bolivar's grandiose scheme of alliance. Of the eleven invited, only four attended\(^8\) and, as was to be the case for decades after, resolutions were signed, alliances postulated, agreements formulated, but nothing was ratified. The international scene was too uncertain and the precedents of newly gained independence too few to warrant anything beyond pledges of mutual coexistence and interdependence against colonialism. The domination of Spain's Holy Alliance, defeated in 1824, were soon replaced by fears of United States Manifest Destiny in the latter years of the nineteenth century.

Several states made efforts to further hispanic solidarity, notably at Lima in 1847 and 1864 and at Santiago in 1856, but the results were not immediately fruitful. What did emerge however was the basis for an international organization that emenated almost one hundred years later. These first conferences dealt principally with two issues - arbitration and the collection of public debts by governments. Lima settled the question of arbitration making mediation a point of international law as it applied to the Latin American Countries. At Santiago the Drago Doctrine prohibiting the collection of public debts by foreign governments, was promulgated. Both principles were later accepted by the U.S.A. at

\(^8\) The four Countries present were Mexico, Central America, Colombia and Peru.
the 1933 Montevideo Conference.

In summary of the period 1826-1889 it can be said that the four major conferences served the necessary function of continuing the "Liberator's" vision of a united association of American Nations. These early conferences were doomed to failure for two reasons: United States - Latin American conflict of goals, and secondly, Hispanic conflicts of interest.

"Not only did profound cultural differences exist between the U.S.A. and its Latin American neighbours which tended to obstruct the inter-American Movements, but the policies of the U.S.A. were such as to preclude Hemispheric cooperation." 9

American goals of isolationism from Europe and Manifest Destiny at home were, of course, anathema to the republics to the south. The United States was indifferent at this time to the area, and Bolivar's successors were too ambitious and too fearful of losing their independence. In fact, as Alvarez points out below, there was a multiplicity of factors which defied cooperation.

How, indeed, were these states to overcome the enormous distances which separated them, the absolute lack of intercommunication, the highly developed spirit of national independence, the bad blood engendered by the boundary disputes, the conflicts over the navigation of rivers, the baneful influences of civil wars due to the personal ambitions of revolutionary leaders, the lack of preparation of the people for political life and the want of common traditions. 10

9 A. Alvarez, _op.cit._, p.288.
The model was struck and through all this the vision persisted but the essential common dominator, the U.S.A. was missing.

The years between the Second Congress at Lima (1864) and the Washington Conference of October 2, 1889 saw the wane of Pan-Americanism, but forces were emerging in both the United States and Latin America which revived the concept of a regional association of states to handle problems such as arbitration, intervention and mutual defense. James G. Blaine, U.S. Secretary of State, presided over this first gathering of American nations in Washington, and it was largely his efforts which led to the creation of the Union of American Republics and the Commercial Bureau of American Republics (which became the Pan-American Union in 1910). It was possible to bring the states together at this time because conditions in both areas of the hemisphere had stabilized. To be sure, many differences still existed, (notably the 1879 War of the Pacific involving Peru, Chile, and Bolivia), but in general the climate toward Washington had changed favourably. This new atmosphere of co-operation was the aftermath of the cessation of southward expansion, the abolition of slavery and the U.S. protests against the French invasion of Mexico, the Spanish occupation of Santo-Domingo, and the intervention of Madrid in Peru. From Washington's point of view, stability and peace in Latin America meant increased markets and the exclusion of Europe from the Americas.
Successive conferences firmly established the hegemony of the United States of America in Latin America specifically the Caribbean. The Southern Republics divided amongst themselves were unable to form a counter-bloc to the power of the United States. Thus it was that Washington was able to suppress the formal discussion of political questions until 1933 at the Montevideo Conference. In the meantime, three additional meetings at Mexico City in 1901-2, at Rio de Janeiro in 1906 and at Buenos Aires in 1910 had produced significant results. The Commerical Bureau was given additional power to discuss cultural as well as commercial matters, several institutions were created including the International Commission of Jurists and the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, the first steps toward formal treaty alliance were initiated, and despite U.S. intervention in the Caribbean and Central American regions under the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the Pan-American Union was created. Although there were no regular conferences held between 1910 and 1923, numerous specialized conferences were convened, primarily in response to the crisis problems arising from World War I.

The resumption of conferences in Santiago, 1923 and Havana, 1928, reflected the growing independence of the Latin American Nations. Membership in the League of Nations and the defeat of the Central Powers drew the area closer to European affairs than ever before. This independence was reflected in the conferences which failed to support a U.S.
bid to take constructive steps towards regional, political unity. It was, in effect, a warning to Washington that the policy question of intervention, so long considered a prerogative of the United States in Latin America, must be tempered.

How would one speak of inter-American solidarity, Pan-Americanism or good neighbourliness, when the stumbling block in the path of good relations was nothing less than the most powerful republic of the hemisphere?\footnote{L. Quintanilla, A Latin American Speaks, 1943 in Humphrey, \textit{op.cit.}, p.156.}

The Good Neighbour policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt enunciated in 1933 had to be demonstrated by deeds. In 1928, the U.S. had signed two agreements in Washington, The General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation and the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration. These agreements compelling the signatories to arbitrate their disputes were deficient in themselves in that they stipulated that both belligerents in any single conflict must agree on the arbitrator. In addition, the United States Senate attached a further reservation that required mutual agreement on the definition of the problem before arbitration began (\textit{le complis}). The result was that both agreements were still subordinate to the Monroe Doctrine, and intervention was the order of the day.

At the Montivideo Conference in 1933, this multinationalization of the 1823 doctrine remained the major
obstacle to formal union. Since the Havana Conference, at which Washington reserved to herself the right to interpret the Monroe Doctrine and notwithstanding Roosevelt's timely announcement of the Good Neighbour Policy, the Latin American Nations had remained suspicious of the United States's intentions. Their fears were not justified. When the Convention on Rights and Duties came to a vote the U.S. concurred, including the provision on non-intervention. Three years later, at the Buenos Aires Conference for the Maintenance of Peace the following Additional Protocol to Non-Intervention was also signed by all parties:

The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties. The violation of the provinces of this article shall give rise to mutual consultation, with the object of exchanging views and seeking methods of peaceful adjustment. 12

This treaty can be regarded as being the turning point of the Inter-American system toward a true security organization. In repudiating the right to intervene, the Monroe Doctrine became the hemispheric guarantee of defensive alliance. Although it was still basically a weak agreement, the principle of continentalization, the impetus to the Rio Treaty of 1947, had been established. In 1938, the Congress of Lima created the Meeting of American Ministers for Foreign Affairs thus endowing the principles of

12 This provision was later adopted as Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States.
arbitration and non-intervention with a concrete vehicle for enactment. Events moved rapidly in the next several years. World War II and the creation of the United Nations became the stepping stones to the creation of the Organization of American States.

In February of 1945, the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace met at Mexico City to discuss continental security and membership in the proposed United Nations. Firstly, the Act of Chapultepec extended the non-intervention Doctrine and collective security proposals to include all states. This was an extension of the Havana resolution which had been directed at non-American states. Political, economic and military sanctions were authorized as legitimate weapons against any aggressor. Secondly, a reorganization of the Inter-American System was undertaken not only to strengthen it but also to prepare for the San Francisco Conference in April.

The resulting inter-American stand at San Francisco was based on a clear conception by the American republics of what their regional system was, and a determination to preserve it. The United Nations urged each state to deal primarily with its regional system before taking problems to the U.N. Secondly, each regional organization was given the right to defend itself in case of war. These provisions appear in the U.N. Charter as Articles 51 and 52.
Article 51:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the U.N. . . . .

Article 52:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security . . . .

Having reorganized the structure of their system and caused the provision, embodied above, to be included in the United Nations Charter, the head of the United States delegation proclaimed that it was the intention of the U.S.A. "to negotiate in the near future a treaty with its American neighbours which will put the Act of Chapultepec on a permanent basis in harmony with the World Charter." 13

Two years later, nineteen of twenty-one American Republics (excluding Ecuador and Nicaragua) met at Quitandinha, Brazil and two years later, the parties signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance at Rio de Janeiro. By this agreement the signatories reiterated their desire to continue their existence as a regional organ under the auspices of the United Nations, reaffirmed their commitment to the principles set forth in the Act of Chapultepec, and imposed obligations on themselves to refrain from intervention, submit to arbitration and most significant, to come to their mutual aid against any aggressor. In addition, the Organ of

Consultation was given the power to rule on the action to be undertaken in the event of aggression against a member state other than armed attack and to decide by a two-thirds majority the appropriate counteraction. Because of the time involved in convening a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of Foreign Ministers however, the "Council of the Organization" was empowered to act in its stead - a provision that has had very significant consequences as will be seen below.

(It is noted here that the Rio Treaty by virtue of Articles 3 and 6 commits the American "States" to supporting Canada in the event of intervention that threatens her territorial integrity or the "peace of America". Thus, Canada is protected from all forms of economic, political and military aggression, although she has no reciprocal obligations).

From March 30 to May 2, 1948, the Ninth International Conference of American States met at Bogota to implement the reorganization resolution passed at Mexico City in 1945. The American republics attempted to give the O.A.S. an organic core based on fundamental principles negotiated after one hundred and twenty-two years of interaction and conflict. The Organization includes three documents dealing with the following: defense and intervention (Rio Treaty), arbitration and pacific settlement (Pact of Bogota) and structure and function (Charter). The legal foundation for the Organization is a multilateral agreement to which all states are bound according to the
provisions of international law. Ratification by two-thirds of the states (Article 108) was completed in December 13, 1951 with the deposit of the necessary instruments by Columbia. By 1956 all the states had completed the process. Since 1948 Trinidad and Tobago, a Commonwealth member, has been added (1967) and Cuba suspended but the Organization falls short of Bolivar's ideal in that the largest American state, Canada, is a glaring omission. In order to present a valid argument either for or against Canadian membership, it is necessary to devote some attention to the structure and functions of the O.A.S. and its agencies.

Part two of the O.A.S. Charter established six functional subordinate agencies to carry out the principles and purposes established in Articles 1-4. They are the following:

1. The Inter-American Conference, supreme organ of the Organization which meets every five years to decide general action and policy.

2. The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; which meets on request to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest, and which serves as the Organ of Consultation to deal with threats to the peace and security of the Continent.

3. The Council, which is composed of one representative from each state. It may act provisionally as Organ of Consultation. The Council has three organs: the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the Inter-American Council of Jurists, and the Inter-American Cultural Council.

4. The Pan American Union, which is the central and permanent organ and General Secretariat of the O.A.S., with headquarters in Washington, D.C.

5. The Inter-American Specialized Conferences, which deal with special technical matters and develop specific aspects of inter-American cooperation.
6. The Inter-American Specialized Organizations, which have specific functions with respect to technical matters of common interest to the American States. There are six such agencies: Inter-American Children's Institute, the I-A. Commission of Women, the I-A. Indian Institute, I-A. Institute of Agricultural Sciences, the Pan American Health Organization and Pan American Institute of Geography and History.

The supreme organ, the Inter-American Conference is the oldest having been formed in 1889, and meets according to Charter every five years, but sometimes special conferences are held.\textsuperscript{14} It is the parent organ being directly involved in the overall administration of the system but has surrendered much of its influence to the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, and so has become more of a coordinating body. The I-A. conference for example, has the theoretical power to mediate conflicts and decide peace-keeping policy, but in reality, the organ is too large, too unwieldy and too impractical given the time element in any crisis. In addition, the Rio Treaty specifically authorizes the Organ of Consultation of Foreign Ministers (or in its stead the Provisional Organ) to consider questions involving sanctions where the peace and security of the Continent is endangered. Finally, the decisions of the Inter-American Conference are subject to ratification by the national government adhering to its ruling and this consumes valuable time also. No legislation is binding in the Conference although the arguments are still divided over treaties and resolutions and the difference between legal and moral obligations. Under present

\textsuperscript{14} An example of a special conference was the Caracas Conference in 1954.
interpretation however, only treaties are binding\textsuperscript{15} and the Inter-American Conference is restricted to a recommending role.

The Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, mentioned above, also functions as the Organ of Consultation. By Charter, this body meets only "to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States....\textsuperscript{16} This organ is the modern successor of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers created at Lima (1936), and provides machinery for the implementation of cooperative consultation and action. The Meeting convenes at the request of one member with the agreement of the others and is able to consider any and all questions. The Inter-American Conference, in dealing with broad policy direction, complements the Meeting which initiates specific policy for ad hoc situations. Like the Inter-American Conference only recommendations to members are possible, but the moral obligation in this body is stronger. Functioning as the Organ of Consultation is the most critical power delegated by the Charter because this body is charged with the preservation of peace and security\textsuperscript{17}

In view of the aforementioned inability of the Organ of Consultation to convene quickly, Article 12 of the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance authorizes the Governing Board of the

\textsuperscript{15} See A.J. Thomas and A.V. Thomas, for a thorough discussion of this problem. \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 67-73.

\textsuperscript{16} Article 39 of the Charter.

\textsuperscript{17} Articles 3 and 6 of the Rio Treaty, Articles 25 and 43 of the Charter.
Pan American Union to act in its place as the Provisional Organ of Consultation. In its function as the Organ of Consultation, decisions arrived at by two-thirds of the Council's members are binding.\(^{18}\) The scope of restrictions available to the Organ of Consultation are outlined in Article 8 of the Rio Treaty and need not be listed here. In a majority of situations the Council, under Article 6, has called for a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers to consider the conflict but has set no date for this meeting. In the interim, the Council has taken action itself, acting as the Provisional Organ of Consultation. The Council, having taken the necessary steps to handle the problem, then cancels the proposed meeting of foreign ministers.

The Council of the Organization exercises administrative and supervisory control over the operations of the Pan-American Union at Washington, in addition to its function as Provisional Organ of Consultation. Each state is represented by an ambassador (usually the state's Washington representative). Article 51 of the Charter charges the Council with implementation of all O.A.S. resolutions and directives. Article 53 requires the Council to co-ordinate the activities of the Organization regarding all subordinate bodies, the specialized agencies, the Inter-American Council, as well as relations between all agencies and departments of the Organization. The three organs of the Council, listed

\(^{18}\) Article 20 of the Rio Treaty does not demand that a nation be required to use armed force except by its own consent.
above, exist to promote the internal welfare and modernization of the various member states in each Council's particular technical sphere, and to coordinate their work with other international organizations such as those established by the United Nations. In addition, specialized conferences are held from time to time (three hundred to date) to bring experts together for discussion of internal problems common to all the countries in South America.

The Pan American Union's duties are outlined in Articles 82, 83 and 84 of the Charter and consist principally of directing the activities of the three Councils. Additional subordinate agencies nominally under P.A.U. direction include the Inter-American Peace Committee (1940), Inter-American Defence Board (1942), the Ad Hoc Committee of Special Representatives of Presidents of the American States (1956), the Informal Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (1959), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1959), Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (1957) and the Special Consultative Committee on Security (1962). Added to these organs are numerous bodies of a semi-official nature such as the Inter-American Radio Office and the Inter-American Postal Union.

The institutional functions of the O.A.S. and its agencies have been presented as outlined in the Charter and the Rio Treaty. A further discussion of the Organization in the several areas of defence, economics, social welfare,
adherence to the spirit of the Charter, and respect for the principles of non-intervention and arbitration follows below in an attempt to decide if the O.A.S. has been successful. Upon the conclusions drawn here depends, to a significant extent, the prospects for Canadian membership and the recommendations for change in the O.A.S. Article 4 of the Charter lists the purposes of the Organization. To what extent purposes accord with practice is the subject of this third section.

Article 4 reads as follows:

The Organization of American States...proclaims the following essential purposes:

a. To strengthen the peace and security of the continent.

b. To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member States.

c. To provide for common action on the part of those states in the event of aggression.

d. To seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems that may arise among them; and

e. To promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social and cultural development.

I intend to discuss the areas embodied in this statement of purposes under the heads "Political" and "Socio-economic" objectives. This first category concerns the prevention of conflict, mutual cooperation for defense, and the maintenance of peace and security in the Americas.
Socio-economic goals pertain to the future internal viability of the members and require long term solutions unlike political problems which usually necessitate an ad hoc reaction to specific problems.

**Political Goals:**

According to the Charter of the O.A.S., the Organization is committed to the general goal of preventing conflicts of both an intramural and extra continental nature, (Articles 4, 24, 25), and in the event of aggression, commitment to the collective defence of the victim. Aggression, by Charter, includes economic, political and cultural intervention as well as military. It is a further obligation of member states to minimize conditions of potential conflict (Article 4b), to promote peace (4a), and to ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes (4c). Upon the degree that the Organization has succeeded in accomplishing these purposes, will the success or failure of the alliance be judged.

The adoption of treaties and resolutions does not, of course, eliminate the importance given to internal economic and political factors within a nation as the prime movers of that state's actions. Nor does the creation of international institutions ensure the implementation of principles and purposes. The O.A.S., like its counterparts, all over the globe, can only promote, resolve, encourage and if necessary, threaten. Enforcement prospects are governed by the dynamics of inter-state relations and
national interest.

It is in the protection of the sovereignty and independence of states that the Organization has achieved its greatest success and won its major plaudits.19

Since 1948, the O.A.S. (backed by the military predominance of the U.S.A.) has succeeded in the sphere of continental defense. Since 1948, the only major threat, Cuba, has been isolated through the cooperation of the Member states under the Rio Treaty in legitimizing Kennedy's embargo.

The Inter-American Defence Board, Juanta Internacional Defensa (JID) created at the Third Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1942 is the theoretical vehicle for implementing O.A.S. military policy. Since 1948, the prime importance of the J.I.D. has been, in fact, as a cementing agent that produces a degree of mutual cooperation, solidarity and standardization of procedure. Under the leadership of the United States of America, the Organization of American States has implemented the spirit of the 1954 Caracas Resolution to the extent that the possibility of a successful armed attack on the continent is negligible. Thus, the major function of O.A.S. security procedures today, is directed toward the elimination of inter-American conflict.

Subversive activities sponsored by one government against a member state are usually reactions to inherited

19 Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes, November 18, 1949. (Ottawa, 1949).
long-standing nationalist or territorial disputes; whereas, coups are, in the main, old fashioned power struggles. The former are the responsibility of the Council and its organs, while the latter are supposedly outside the realm of O.A.S. jurisdiction.

Historically, the O.A.S. has been extremely successful in the amelioration of differences between members. Despite the fragmentation and disunity of the American states, the Organization has successfully mediated several crisis situations. In some instances (e.g., Panama invasion of 1959) the O.A.S. has endeavored to establish its presence in the country by means of an investigating committee of neutral members which has the political backing of two-thirds of the member-states and the military support of the U.S.A. Faced with such supervision, the conflicting parties are loathe to continue aggressive measures. In most cases a return to the status quo ante-bellum is successfully concluded.

The goal of the Organization in the area of peace-keeping is primarily the restoration of peace and only

20 John C. Drèir, in The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis, (New York, 1962) lists seven crisis that the Organization has been successful in negotiating. 1949-50, Dominican Republic v Haiti; 1954, Guatemala Communist coup; 1955, Costa Rica v Nicaragua, invasion; 1957, Honduras v Nicaragua, boundary dispute; 1959, Panama v Cuba, guerilla invasion; Nicaragua v Costa Rica, guerilla action; 1960, Dominican Republic v Venezuela, terrorist activity; 1962, Cuban Missile Crisis.
secondly, the solving of the problems leading to the conflict. In ideological clashes (eg. Costa Rican-Nicaraguan conflict of 1955) the O.A.S. record is less impressive. Jerome Slater argues from an historical basis in fact that the effectiveness of the O.A.S. in these cases depends on the compatibility of U.S. objectives and Latin American ideology. Thus dictatorships were preferable to leftist governments (eg. Dominican Republic and Brazil) for many years, and even today, rank higher in Washington's value system than the governments of countries like Cuba. Countries like Mexico and Argentina have become alienated because of this Washington-imposed ideological soul in the collective security system. There is some agitation amongst Canadians regarding U.S. domination of the O.A.S. The 1954 Caracas Resolution is an excellent example of United States manipulation of the Organization to reflect its own ideological views. This problem, however serious, has not over-ridden the effectiveness of the Organization and it is possible to state that the O.A.S. has been successful in the promotion and maintenance of peace.

As noted earlier, intra-state power struggles are outside O.A.S. jurisdiction. In reality however, U.S. leadership has made the O.A.S. a vehicle for the maintenance of preferential regimes. In Guatemala, Cuba and the Dominican Republic, the Organization has intervened under

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the guise of the Caracas Resolution. Only the Guatemalan case is discussed here to illustrate the illegality of O.A.S. action; Cuba and the Dominican Republic will be considered in depth in Chapter four. The situation in Guatemala in 1954 deserves special mention here because it illustrates an important concept that potential member states would be wise to clarify before committing themselves.

The vagueness and ambiguity of the Caracas Resolution in dealing with the concept of "aggression" enabled the U.S. to 'legally' oppose the government of an independent Guatemala and cause it to be overthrown. The presence of numerous known communists in the Arbenz government and the threat of a takeover they represented prompted Washington to use the nationalization of the United Fruit Company as an excuse for U.S. intervention and support of the guerilla army under Castillo Armas. Using the anti-communist resolution, the U.S. contended that acceptance of U.S.S.R. arms by the Arbenz government was a threat to the peace and security of the continent. Under the Rio Treaty, the United States was able to sponsor an investigation by the Inter-American Peace Committee thus excluding U.N. action in the area. The Arbenz government fell! The interpretation of the concept of "aggression" as outlined in the Rio Treaty and the Charter, is therefore; the object of subjective interpretation. It is not difficult to visualize the conflict in Ottawa had Canada been a member of the O.A.S.
Support of an Organization that is dominated by one nation's value system reduces the possibilities of compromise and total cooperation.

The greatest danger to the O.A.S. at this time is that the United States in attempting to preserve its hegemony in Latin America will ignore its special responsibilities in the areas of peace-keeping and collective security. The regular application of treaties and the standardization of a clear and concise basis for O.A.S. action should be the immediate goals of the member states. As long as Washington insists on endowing the Organization with an ideological soul, the right of self defence as outlined in the Rio Treaty is impractical, if not fanciful.

In conclusion, the O.A.S. has served as a regional background to U.S. power in diminishing the threat to the Western hemisphere. In supporting the principles of collective security, the U.S. has been able to cloak its unilateral actions in the respectability of the Organization of American States thus avoid political questioning at home, confrontation in the United Nations and criticism in Latin America. In the realm of peace-keeping, inconsistencies regarding interpretation and policy have developed to the point of an open split between the U.S. and several other member states, such as Mexico. To some extent, the basic differences existing between the U.S. and Latin America and among the Latin American governments themselves,
have prevented further consolidation of interests and goals. However in the sphere of international relations, the O.A.S. has been more potent and effective than in the areas of social and economic development.

The pursuit of hemispheric stability has resulted in important internal developments for the Latin American countries. The success of the O.A.S. in preventing open conflict has enabled the other members to stabilize the amount of money and resources usually devoted to defence, to minimize the appeal of radical factions within the states and, most important, permitted more attention to be devoted to the solution of domestic ills of a social and economic nature. It is to a consideration of these problems that the remainder of this chapter is devoted.

It is of course, difficult to differentiate between the economic and the social spheres of life. The O.A.S. Charter combines the two areas under one heading, Specialized Agencies (Article 63). The Inter American-Economic and Social Council, established as a permanent organ in 1948, was the result of over sixty years of hispanic pressure on the United States to aid in these areas as well as defence. Since the days of Bolivar, the Latin American countries have recognized common social and economic retardation as the core of their domestic stagnation and external frailty.

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Since 1914, when the Commercial Bureau of American Republics, the first concrete step toward Pan-Americanism was created, concern has revolved around economic progress as much as security. In 1939, when financial instability and World War II necessitated additional cooperation, the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee was created. The establishment of the Inter-American Development Commission (1940) and the publishing of the Economic Charter of America became reflections of the growing awareness in Latin America of the immediate need for cooperation and joint development in the areas of trade, tariffs, taxes, price ceilings, resources, foreign exchange, inflation, devaluation, industrialization, agrarian reform and a host of other spheres. Thus, in 1945 the republics established the IA-ECOSOC to investigate and recommend joint measures to tackle the economic and social problems of the member states.

The role of the U.S.A. in the developmental process is of primary importance to the successful reorganization and reform of the Latin American domestic structure. Political instability, military prominence and the internal policies of the United States have been such that Washington did not heed Latin American pleas for economic and social reform until recently. The United States refused to accept the responsibilities its wealth and hegemony within the inter-American system placed in its hands. Small numbers of technicians and limited credit have trickled from Washington
since 1942 through the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and the Truman Four Point Plan, but U.S. business capital was loathe to penetrate too deeply into many of the unpredictable areas of Central and South America. The threat of nationalization and/or expropriation, high tariff walls, small markets, political instability, discriminatory taxes, government regulations, and the presence of more favourable markets elsewhere, all combined to restrict profound U.S. involvement.23

At the Fourth Extraordinary meeting of the IA-ECOSOC in Rio de Janeiro, November 22, 1954, the United States made its last stand in opposition to a vast regional economic system. In August of 1956 Operation Pan America was put forth by Brazil as a possible agent to deal with problems of trade, development, industrialization, technological advancement and related contingencies on a collective basis. In September, 1958, the United States reversed its traditional opposition to a regional financial institution and the Committee of Twenty-one was created to blueprint the necessary steps.24 This Act of Bogota, as it was formally ratified, contained four chapters that related to the conditions prevalent in all Latin American states to varying degrees. The headings were "Measures for Social Improvement",


"Social Development", "Economic Development", and "Multilateral Cooperation". The success of the Organization of American States in dealing with these problem areas will be discussed below separately.

In December of 1959, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) was inaugurated with a budget of one billion dollars (U.S. contribution five hundred million) for the purpose of making credit readily available to the Latin American countries. Eighty-five percent of the bank's resources were allotted for commercial loans and fifteen percent for "soft" loans to finance operations of a non-self-liquidating nature. Encouraged by the support given to the IADB, the U.S. called for a special cabinet level economic conference in Uruguay. By the Act of Punta del Este, Washington committed twenty billion dollars to the Alliance for Progress.

The Alliance for Progress was formulated at a White House meeting between President Kennedy and the Latin American Ambassadors in March 13, 1961. The aura of unity and optimism stimulated rapid adoption of the plan by the nineteen Latin American republics (excluding Cuba), and the program was inaugurated on August 17, 1961. The basic documents underlying the Alliance are the "Declaration to the

25 Thomas, op.cit., p.388.
27 7.7 billion dollars up to 1967.
Peoples of America" and the "Charter of Punta del Este Establishing an Alliance for Progress Within the Framework of Operation Pan America". The close partnership between the United States and Latin America born of World War II, was recreated by the Alliance in which aid and reform became multi-national, cooperative goals.

The Alliance has not been a dynamic success - this fact cannot be disputed - but neither has it been the outright failure predicted by so many sceptics. The Alliance has produced positive innovations in the social structure which are unmeasureable at this time or are not part of an analysis of a country's gross national product. In both the economic and social realm, positive gains are being made. The major successes of the program are outlined here as indicators of progress, however minor.28

General:

Domestic revenues rose 42 percent from 1961 to 1966 in seventeen countries. Tax collections increased 5.6 percent per annum. Central government capital outlay rose 32 percent, with significant increases in education (48.6 percent) and agriculture (32.5 percent from 1963 to 1966). Defense expenditures were stable at $1.8 billion annual average for the last four years, or less than 2 percent of total gross national product. Of this, 10 percent or less is for new equipment.

Industrialization:

Eight countries, with 87 percent of the total GNP and 82 percent of the population of the developing Alliance countries, showed manufacturing up 42 percent from 1960 to 1966. Mining rose 22 percent.

Agricultural Productivity:

Nineteen countries averaged a 3 percent increase in net agricultural production since 1960, but food production rose 27 percent for the period 1961-67. Major increases reflect newly cultivated lands, mostly medium and small farms. New agricultural on-farm credit now reaches about 8 million people, or 6 percent of the rural population, who had no available credit before. Since 1963 Latin American central government expenditures on agriculture increased 38.5 percent. But production is barely keeping pace with population growth.

Agrarian Reform:

Fifteen countries have enacted agrarian reform laws and created administrative institutions to carry them out. Seven hundred thousand families were newly settled and 450,000 of them received land titles. Total land distributed is above 82 million acres, or 6.3 percent of the arable land of Latin America. Fifty to sixty percent of this was "new land" (public domain); 30-40 percent was expropriated or purchased; 10 percent was the result of private colonization efforts. Nearly 4 million people have benefited. But the number of landless families is increasing.
Adult Illiteracy:

Available statistics show a general decrease in the number of adult illiterates, with two out of three Latin Americans now being able to read and write. Since the beginning of the Alliance, central government outlay for education has increased nearly 62 percent. Sixteen countries increased their education expenditures during 1967; 13 diverted more than 15 percent of their expenditures to education.

Fifty-six percent of primary school age children are in school compared with 49 percent in 1961, while population increased about 3 percent annually. Following are specific areas of school growth:

Primary: Graduates increased 86 percent, teachers 61 percent, and classrooms 51 percent.

Secondary: Enrollment and graduates doubled. Teachers almost doubled.

University: Enrollment growth rate averaged 9.5 percent annually during the Alliance years. This is higher than growth rate in U.S. universities during the same period. There are approximately 1 million students enrolled in Latin American universities, double those enrolled prior to the Alliance.

Vocational: Graduates in 14 countries more than doubled, with 235,000 in 1967 against 106,000 in 1960.

Agricultural (secondary): Enrollment increased
2.5 times; enrollment tripled in higher agricultural education.

Life Expectancy:

Infant mortality went down 12 percent through 1964 while child mortality dropped 20 percent. Latin American population, meanwhile, is growing faster than any other world region and influences every aspect of Latin American development.

Malaria has been stopped in 10 countries, affecting 11.5 million people.

Potable water is available to 70 percent of the urban population of thirteen countries. Six countries report providing potable water to 50 percent of the rural population.

Twenty-three new medical schools opened. Physicians increased 26 percent and nurses 60 percent. However, 13,800 more doctors per year are needed for the next five years, and too many are being drained off to developed countries.

Health centers and posts showed a 30-40 percent increase from 1960 to 1965.

Construction of Low-Cost Housing:

The best indicators here are in the growth of housing co-ops and savings and loan associations. Co-ops numbered about 2,000 with 360,000 members in 1967, compared with 400 co-ops and 65,000 members in 1960.

Savings and loan associations increased from 23 in four countries to 175 in 12 countries. Depositors rose
from 50,000 to over 750,000, with deposits of over $300 million and loans of $433 million to 82,000 borrowers.

Under the AID housing guaranty program nearly 12,000 units were completed from 1964 to 1967.

Price Levels:

Inflation has been reduced in those countries where it was a serious threat. The rate in Chile went down from 39 percent in 1964 to 22 percent in 1967. Brazil cut inflation from 140 percent in 1964 to 25 percent in 1967, and Argentina was down from a 1966 peak of 32.3 percent to an estimated 10 percent in 1968.

Foreign Exchange:

The average annual increase in earnings from exports was 6.4 percent from 1961 to 1966. Following a world trade slowdown, earnings in 1967 failed to register any increase. The United States is working with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to develop guidelines for temporary preferences by developed countries for all developing countries.

An Inter-American Export Promotion Center was created in January 1968 to stimulate the sale of Latin American manufactured products. The United States pledged $500,000 to this program. Also, the International Coffee Agreement was strengthened by creation of a Coffee Diversification Fund.
Private Sector Participation in the Alliance:

The private sector in the home hemisphere and elsewhere is being increasingly encouraged to invest in economic development of Alliance countries. The U.S.-created Inter-American Investment Development Center in one short year of activity has promoted twenty-four possible projects, with an estimated investment potential of $25 million.

Economic Integration:

Since 1961 the five Central American countries - Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica - increased intrazonal trade 600 percent (from a very low initial base, admittedly) through their common market. The eleven South American countries of the Latin American Free Trade Association increased intraregional imports 135 percent and made 10,000 tariff and nontariff concessions.

Principal trade integration developments in the last two years follow:

- Panama has been invited to join the Central American Common Market on a progressive basis.

- A joint Latin American Free Trade Association Central American Common Market coordinating committee was established.

- LAFTA foreign ministers have met on the process of conversion into a common market.

- Meetings of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council have been held on the effects of Common Market integration.
- six countries (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) have organized in a subregional Andean Development Corporation.

- Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay have agreed to cooperate in the development of the 1,235,000 square mile River Plate Basin with a population of 50 million.

- Further steps were taken to establish an inter-American communications network by 1973 at the recent meeting in Rio de Janeiro of the Inter-American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL).

Multinational infrastructure programs received added support through new pledges of $1.2 billion to the Inter-American Development Bank's Fund for Special Operations (FSO). The United States will contribute $900 million over the next three years to this increase, in addition to $2 million from the U.S.-financed Social Progress Trust Fund to the IDB's Pre-Investment Fund for Latin American Integration.

The O.A.S. Special Development Assistance Fund provides technical assistance and training in support of multilateral efforts.

Infrastructure works are already supporting integration. Electric power production is up from 38 billion kilowatts to 100 billion kilowatts. Total road mileage increased by 16 percent, and paved road mileage by 58 percent.

In addition, the preparation of sound development programs, the compilation and analysis of basic factual information, hitherto notoriously sketchy, the setting of
national priorities geared to economic and social development and the dissemination of large quantities of United States technical aid were the immediate results of the Alliance for Progress. The critical disappointment of the Alliance has been the lack of integration and positive direction it has fostered. Faith in the Alliance is reserved to the few in any Latin American country. To most the Alliance means simply greater U.S. aid available and more severe competition for that aid. Thus, multinational development programs in the fields of telecommunications, irrigation, and hydroelectric power are subordinated to national projects which may or may not have equal urgency. In any event, the fight for the U.S. dollar often encourages the formation of grandiose schemes while widening the gulf between the nations. Furthermore, the Alliance despite claims by Latin American leaders, is not a Latin American project. Washington's allotment of 1.1 billion dollars per annum is distributed by projects on which the decisions are made in Washington. The goals of "self-help" and "reform" remain worthwhile concepts but their specific meanings must be written and implemented by the people of each nation. If the growth of the Central and South American nations depends on private investment, as presumed in the Charter of Punta del Este, the Latin American nations must assume responsibility for creating the necessary political and ideological climate, and for establishing specific priorities in the sphere of social reform.
New attention has been given to the problems of integration and responsibility especially during the conferences at Buenos Aires (March, 1966), at Washington (June, 1966) and at the meeting of the Presidents of the American Nations (April, 1967). A Latin American Common Market excluding the United States of America would of necessity foster integration and interdependence. But even at this embryonic stage, as embodied in the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), the lack of diversification and specialization, the recent birth of most home industries, the disparity in national wealth, the dependence on the United States market and countless other factors geared to parochialism and the need to export many of the same products has resulted in the refusal to make concessions and the creation and maintenance of high tariff walls by the members. The United States, in spite of its financial aid, has come under increasingly severe criticism from many quarters both at home and abroad. Export preferences, A.I.D. liberalization, Export-Import Bank loans, and an increase in the quantity of aid to that approaching the post-World War II Marshall Plan to Europe, have been the primary suggestions to overcome the stagnation within the area of economic development under the Alliance for progress.  

The political goals of the Alliance for Progress as outlined in the Charter of Punta del Este have largely been ignored. A cursory scanning of the purposes of the Alliance drive home the point that the economic and social development of the Latin American states must be viewed as the alternative to armed rebellion and that development must be geared to the preservation of democracy.

The elites in Latin American countries lack ideological direction, concentrate on the immediate benefits of the U.S. dollar, ignore the advice of and refuse to permit the participation of student groups, peasant cooperatives, trade unions, and in general impose reform from above rather than responding to the masses. The Alliance thus assumes the posture of an independent organization run by the few and dictated to the many. Based on successes to date, the accounting in the fiscal area is still in the red. For example, the 2.5 percent G.N.P. growth envisioned by the Alliance in 1961, has not been reached. To a significant extent this failure to achieve even this modest growth rate is primarily the result of two factors; the 3 percent growth rate in Latin America, and the large percentage of Latin American budgets geared to defence expenditures. The 1.6 percent average growth rate in G.N.P. cannot keep pace with the rise in population and government expenditures of 1.5 billion on defence, use up the great bulk of American aid.
In order to coordinate and re-direct the movements of the Alliance, the Committee of Experts, and the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress (C.I.A.P.) must both be assigned a greater degree of technical and political responsibility in order to achieve cohesive political developments that will inspire a commitment to the Alliance. Senator J.K. Javits presents a persuasive case for L.A.F.T.A. if the Alliance can become relevant to the people. The longer the people wait, the greater are their hopes and frustrations and in the not-too-distant future the more violent their revolution.

Without discussing all the reasons, the Alliance has achieved its greatest success in converting the image of Latin America from an area of constant instability, to one of relatively stability with infrequent interruptions. Foreign investors in the United States and Canada are viewing this area with a more favourable attitude. In the political sphere of long term direction however, the Alliance has failed to provide coordinated leadership and cohesive integration, and the United States has chosen to ignore the Alliance's commitment to regionalism, and populism. Perhaps a common market, though not a realistic

solution at present, will become the sole alternative.\textsuperscript{31}

The Alliance, like the Organization of American States has only been partially successful in fulfilling the duties assigned to it under its original Charter. Canadian participation within the Alliance as a donor nation could contribute little financial aid to augment its present contributions in the form of "soft loans" and outright grants. Indeed, Ottawa would do well to urge for a restructuring of the Alliance along the lines suggested above, before committing herself to supporting it. The structure and functions of the O.A.S. and the present direction and uses of the huge financial resources committed to the Alliance for Progress suggest, as I have shown, that a restructuring and a new dedication to original purposes and goals is vitally necessary, and should be a prerequisite for Canadian membership.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

The Canadian attitude toward Latin America has traditionally been one of indifference and ignorance. Shielded by the United States, separated by vast geographical distances, an absence of historical connections, and with the exception of the Caribbean countries, possessing different, sometimes antagonistic, political systems, Canadians found little to warrant profound investigation of the area's inhabitants. Historically, culturally, politically, geographically, Europe was closer to Canada and the fact that Canada was land-linked to South America through the United States, was not sufficient to justify more than passing reference in Canadian newspapers to Pan Americanism, gunboat diplomacy or revolutionary coups.

In addition, the early years of the Canadian nation were ones of domestic preoccupation. Until the Balfour Declaration of 1926, the United States was suspicious of the British Dominion.

If colonies, possessions or dominions, whose foreign relations are controlled by European States, were represented in these conferences, the influences and policies of European Powers would be injected into the discussion and disposition of questions affecting the political
entities of this hemisphere. Whatever value such conferences would have, it would not be that attaching to a conference distinctly American. Canadians were aware of U.S. hegemony in the area, and for many, Pan Americanism was a cloak for U.S. "Manifest Destiny" and expansion. In these early years, close allegiance to the Crown was the safeguard against this implicit danger of U.S. imperialism being directed north into Canada. This mutual distrust of motives continued to hamper close U.S.-Canadian relations to varying degrees until 1939, when Mackenzie King announced publicly that Canadian membership in the Pan American Union was "a possibility which should be given consideration in the future". Although the disclosure of official government interest in joining the Union was the first indication of serious Canadian interest, the war intervened and Canada, an active belligerent, was unable to follow through with concrete action.

The year 1940 saw a reawakening of Canadian attention to Latin America. Unable to obtain the necessary loans needed for the Canadian war effort because of the U.S. declaration of neutrality, Ottawa looked south of the U.S. for a hard currency market. Markets in Latin America were readily accessible because the German occupation of Europe


had eliminated Latin American markets on that continent.

These diplomatic exchanges were carried out between Ottawa and Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, and preferential trade agreements were signed between Ottawa and Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Argentina. However, even with the increase in trade with Latin America, approximately 29.4 percent, Canada still sold only 2.25 percent of her total exports to this area. More important, however, was the fact that initial contacts had been made and had proved fruitful as well as harmonious.

"In the post World War Two years, Canadian preoccupation with the United Nations obscured any appeal the P.A.U. might have had for Canada." For example, in April of 1947, United States Senator Vandenburg issued an invitation to Canada to join the Union, but events were such that Ottawa and the Canadian people were already afraid of regional organizations undermining the New World Organization. Even after collectivism was recognized in Canada as being a necessary evil, Prime Minister St. Laurent declared in 1949, that the nation's destiny lay with a North Atlantic Union and, he continued,

it has not appeared to us that there would be any decided advantages in formal membership in the Pan American Union. If there were any advantages we would join.35

34 Commercial Intelligence Journal, Canadian Trade with Latin America, May 17, 1941. pp.595-600.

35 Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes, November 18, 1949. p.20.
John Holmes believes that the U.S. invitation was issued at this time because of the growing Soviet threat and the strategic significance of Canada.\(^{36}\) The offer was abandoned, however, presumably because of the Canadian sponsorship of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which effectively tied Ottawa to the anti-communist league of nations as well as the Rio Treaty would have done.

The decade following the Bogota Conference which founded the Organization of American States as the successor to the P.A.U., witnessed an atmosphere of polite detachment existent between Ottawa and Washington regarding membership in the Organization of American States. The election of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1957 coincided with a revival of Canadian interest in Latin America. Developments in Cuba in 1959 and the Dominican Republic in 1961, served to keep the question of Canadian involvement before the government for some time, but the new administration's interest waned. After 1960, attention in Ottawa was geared to the U.S. policy regarding Cuba and a fear of the effect Canada's decision to retain its representative in Havana and to continue trade with Castro would have on Canadian-American relations.\(^{37}\)

\(^{36}\) Holmes, John W., Canada and Pan America, luncheon address delivered to the American Historical Association in Toronto, December, 1967.

In May, 1961, the question of Canadian membership rose again. President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the Canadian Parliament, invited Canada to take her "rightful place" in the Organization of American States. The government declined the offer, ostensibly because of the lack of a popular directive, but most likely because Mr. Diefenbaker viewed acceptance of Washington's invitation as bowing to U.S. pressure. It is important to note here that most of the Canadian newspapers and journals supported Mr. Diefenbaker's stand. The Cuban missile crisis further strengthened the contention of many to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. The Cuban crisis brought home two profound facts to Canadians; firstly, the Canadian people realized how vulnerable their security was when the two super-powers decided to test each other, and secondly; the manner in which Washington bypassed the O.A.S. in imposing the blockade on Cuba, demonstrated that the Canadian position was more favourable outside the Organization. The year 1965, brought the Dominican crisis in April and the open intervention of U.S. troops in Santo Domingo was condemned in editorials across Canada. In 1967, the acceptance of Trinidad and Tobago, Commonwealth members, stimulated new speculation that Canada would now join, but the movement was weak and shortlived. In October 1968, the question of Canadian membership was one of the main political reasons for the

38 The Globe and Mail, Vancouver Sun, and the Financial Post were the leaders in opposing the invitation from Washington.
Cabinet trip to Latin America. However, it appears that the Latin American countries saw little benefit in Canadian participation in the O.A.S. As an aide to Mr. Jean Luc Pepin put it: "By and large membership seems not to matter that much in most (Latin American) capitals". By March of 1969, the interest generated by the Cabinet trip had disappeared. Even Howard Green, Minister of External Affairs in the Diefenbaker administration, and Paul Martin, former External Affairs Minister who have supported Canadian membership in the O.A.S. for over twenty-five years, have been quoted as having changed their positions, unless the O.A.S. is reformed.

In short, Canadians are becoming more aware of the O.A.S. and of Latin America in general, but are reluctant to do more than observe. Contacts between Canada and Latin America have been intermittent and geared to the crisis situations rather than to the total area as an object of cultivation or interest. The Canadian Institute of International Relations publishes the International Journal which serves as a conveyer of those ideas which are considered by the Institute as being of interest to its readers, many of whom are academics and specialists and therefore, possible opinion moulders. The table below reflects the amount of


40 Paul Martin's comment in an interview with the author at Windsor, Ontario, March 7, 1969.
interest in Latin America as gauged by the C.I.I.A. between 1957-67.

United States of America 10
United Nations 5
Great Britain 6
Commonwealth 8
- Africa 19
- Asia 17
- West Indies 2
- Antipodes 5
Europe 54
Africa 14
Asia 18
Latin America 3

The sample above, may be indicative that Canadians at various levels of society are still relatively unaware of their hemispheric neighbours. Not only is familiarity with the region lacking, but the quantity of the material published by Canadian specialists seems to indicate that even as a field of academic study, Latin America is of minor significance.

Arguments in Favour of Canadian Membership in the Organization of American States:

Most arguments favouring Canadian involvement in the O.A.S. advocate full membership commensurate with Canadian strength and developmental progress within the Western Hemisphere. As a member of the O.A.S., Ottawa would be in a position to mediate, negotiate and stabilize relations among the republics or between them and Washington. Committed to the processes of quiet diplomacy, possessing a reputation as a successful intermediary, reflecting a history of progressive evolution, stability and anti-colonialism,
and harbouring no imperialistic ambitions or heritage, Canada would be acceptable to the vast majority of American states. Furthermore, Canada would be welcome as an added North American influence to de-emphasize the cultural, economic and power rift between the U.S.A. and the Latin American republics. Arthur Irwin agrees that Canadian entry into the O.A.S. as the link between North and South America would serve a useful purpose internationally. With the shift in power emphasis from Europe to Russia and the United States, the inclusion of Canada in the O.A.S. would present a solid, unified bloc to the U.S.S.R. and would complete the Canadian adjustment process in accepting the relatively new order of the world focus. It is the duty of Canada, Irwin believes, to accept her hemispheric responsibilities in securing the North American "power centre" by completing the hemispheric defence alliance. Canada, through commitment to the Rio Treaty and the Charter of the Organization of American States would, it is argued, increase her own prestige and influence in Latin America and the world. At the United Nations, Canada would receive the support of twenty-four additional votes in the General Assembly; in the Council of N.A.T.O.; it would be consulted regarding Latin American affairs and within the O.A.S., it would represent the unaligned, the objective, the rational point of view. Canadian-American relations would in all

probability, be enhanced as the U.S.A. saw Ottawa accepting her hemispheric responsibilities. Canada and the U.S.A. would not, as D.E. Smith suggests "cross horns to their mutual disaffection". Rather, counters Professor Irwin, the diversity of interests among the Latin American states would prevent such occasions arising. Certainly, crisis such as the Cuban situation, could be temporarily disunifying but the O.A.S. would survive and gain, in effect, a greater degree of realism, vitality, and objectivity as a result of the cleavage.

A recent argument favouring Canadian membership is concerned with the possibility of the hemispheric nations forming a regional political alliance. The possibilities of Canada becoming 'lost' between two organizations such as the O.A.S. and the Western European Union is disconcerting. By joining the Organization beforehand, however, Canada will have an influence on the formation, direction, and extent of the regional bloc. Or, she would become the most qualified candidate for the leadership of a Caribbean group including Guyana, Trinidad, Tobago, Honduras, Jamaica. In any event, the Commonwealth ties with the West Indies bind Canada morally, and historically to protect and aid these former colonies - a function it could perform more effectively if it had a vote and a voice in the councils of the Organization of American States.

Possibly the strongest inducement to Canadian membership is that its presence in the Organization as a full member guarantees that the Canadian viewpoint will be given and will be heard. Had Canada been a member when the decision to suspend Cuba was taken, her particular stand would have been presented directly. As Canada's relations with the other hemispheric nations become closer, Ottawa will be forced to take the necessary action to safeguard these ties. The inter-American system is the most obvious instrument to guarantee that the Canadian opinion will be considered. Though John Holmes does not favour membership in the O.A.S., he does admit the practicality of the argument that "Canada must be present if she expects her voice to be heard." 43

There are important economic reasons why Canada should join the inter-American system. The 1969 fact-finding tour is expected to produce trade agreements with the countries of Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. At present, Canadian trade with Latin America is nine hundred million dollars per annum, 44 about 3.5 percent of total Canadian world trade. With the population of Latin America expanding at the fastest pace in the world (approximately 3 percent), the combined population should reach three hundred million

43 John Holmes, in an interview with the author at Windsor, Ontario, November 25, 1968.

by 1975 providing an extensive market for potential Canadian exports. S.J. Randall, President of General Steel Wares Ltd., echoed the views of many Canadian businessmen in an article in Monetary Times. He said "the economic need for joining the O.A.S." is such that Canada must act rapidly "before it is too late and the republics merge into trading blocs."\footnote{S.J. Randall, editorial in Saturday Night, LXXVI. (August 5, 1961).}

There is a strong cultural argument for increased Canadian involvement as has been reflected in the French language newspapers especially Cite Libre and Le Droit. This appeal to the French-Canadians formerly centered around membership in the O.A.S. as a counter weight to involvement in N.A.T.O. There is a tie, however nebulous, between the French language and the romance Latin tongue of the hispanic nations, although only one Latin American nation, Haiti, is French speaking. The argument today, however, has less impact because of Ottawa's increased attention to Francophonic Africa and Quebec's international forays into Gabon, Niger and Paris. Canada, at present, has no official cultural exchange program with Latin America despite the rich tradition of French, Spanish and Portuguese culture and the heritage of the Inca, Aztec, Maya and Toltec civilizations existent in Latin America; and notwithstanding the fact that thirty percent of Canada is of Latin origin (French mainly). Closer ties with the area, it is believed, could be most easily achieved through O.A.S. contacts.
By joining the Organization, Ottawa would automatically increase its role in all spheres; cultural, economic and political. The moral obligation Canada has, to assist the poorer nations of the world, should be met here in Latin America in her own hemisphere. The Latin American peoples are linked to Canadians and have been neglected too long. The dominant member of the O.A.S. has urged Canadian membership, the body has unanimously endorsed the invitation, and the benefits, it is argued, are obvious and far outweigh the costs of such a move. Writing in 1942, John Humphrey believed he had gauged the attitude of the Canadian people accurately when he wrote:

> Canadians are much surer of themselves than they were twenty years ago, and they look to the future....They feel, moreover, that because of their particular relationship to two Great Old World cultures, they have a role to play in the hemisphere which fully justifies their continued national independence. Membership in the Pan American Organization will make that role easier to play.\(^6\)

Twenty-five years later, Arthur Irwin again interpreted the Canadian mentality regarding Latin America. He said;

> ...more than forty years of observation of public affairs in this country impels me to the conviction that if lead were given... the Canadian people would respond positively as they have responded to similar challenges in the past.\(^7\)


\(^7\) Arthur W. Irvin, *op.cit.*, p.303.
As noted in the introduction, many Canadian statesmen believe Canada has a role to play within the O.A.S. and in Latin America. Prime Minister Trudeau agreed with those who support membership; he said,

As soon as we learn our role, which I hope will be soon, we must get into the O.A.S. to exercise that role. 48

Canada is in Latin America at present, in the persons of missionaries, educators, doctors, social workers, technocrats and C.U.S.O. volunteers. It remains for Ottawa to give concrete expression to the potential and present Canadian-Latin American harmony through membership in the Organization of American States.

48 P.E. Trudeau, op.cit., p.1
Arguments on either side of the membership issue have remained relatively constant over the last six decades. Canadian attention to Latin America has been intermittent and restricted to the Caribbean; specifically the West Indies. An important qualification made by those who oppose Canadian participation in the Organization of American States, is that they do not oppose increased involvement on a bilateral basis with Latin American states. John Harbron, Ian MacDonald, Ian Lumsden, John Holmes and others opposing membership do so, primarily on the grounds that the benefits would be negligible in view of the restrictions and responsibilities incurred. Many Canadians agree that the country is uninformed regarding Latin America and that Canada "must have a policy of its own...and learn to exercise it"49 before joining the O.A.S.

The contention of those who oppose immediate involvement is that Canada has higher priorities at present and little reason to designate Latin America as an area of rapid economic and political cultivation.

The historic obstacles to involvement are still present to varying degrees. For example, Canada is heavily committed to numerous international organizations at present,
and the argument that Ottawa is incapable of assuming additional responsibilities now does have some validity even today. In addition, there is still a serious lack of trained experts in the area of Latin America, the cost of joining the O.A.S., estimated at over thirty-one million,\(^{50}\) is prohibitive and should be allotted to repressed, aid-receiving countries, and as Holmes says, Canada must be selective and "avoid...the attempt to do all things with the result that we may do nothing well, and the urge to be all things to all men.\(^{51}\)

The most familiar historical argument against membership is that Canada would find itself forced to take sides, thus risking alienation of either the Latin American countries as a whole, a particular faction of them (such as Mexico, Brazil and Chile which are the most progressive and often vote against Washington on serious questions regarding intervention) or Washington itself.\(^{52}\) It is argued that if Canada and the U.S.A. are to quarrel, the issue must be one of serious national interest.\(^{53}\) The prospect of Ottawa being forced to assume a position counter to United States interest

\(^{50}\) John Harbron, op.cit., p.27. Harbron estimates membership would cost Canada one million dollars initially, thirty million to fulfill its probably Inter-American Development Bank assessment, plus supporting costs and contributions to the Alliance for Progress.

over a border dispute between two South American republics is frightening, given the fact that a major Canadian foreign policy goal is the maintenance of a cooperative harmony with its greatest ally and neighbour. The Canadian-American relationship is both unique and profitable; if it is to be jeopardized the conflict must be of vital interest to both states.

The Commonwealth ties with the Caribbean countries could conceivably provide Ottawa with a ready-made bloc of which it would be the spokesman. This contention is used by supporters of Canadian membership as being a necessary step to increase Canadian prestige and influence around the world. Perhaps, they argue, Canada would become the counterweight to United States hegemony in the area, thus saving Ottawa the embarrassment of being placed between the Latin American and the U.S. interests. Unfortunately, experience has shown that the Latin American republics distrust blocs, believing they are divisive. Furthermore, it is doubtful that Canadian-Caribbean interests and priorities would coincide given their divergent degrees of development. In support of this counter view, John Holmes points out that experience in the United Nations has demonstrated that;

Canadians - a pragmatic and inarticulate people - are intolerant of the incurably rhetorical Latins: The more committees we sit in the less well we work together.

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52 Charles Lynch, Ottawa Citizen, August 9, 1966.
53 Holmes, op.cit., p.417.
The possible economic effects of Canadian membership in the Organization warrant consideration here. Canadian economic involvement in Latin America has been confined to the Caribbean principally and Brazil. Cooperation is based on personal business contacts and government trade commissions and while it is possible that membership in the O.A.S. would add new dimensions to Canadian commercialism in Latin America, it is doubtful that the Canadian businessman would appreciate the political subtleties included. John Harbron points out that a meeting of Canadian executives involved in Latin America, sponsored by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, was split on the question of O.A.S. membership. Those who opposed Canadian membership did so on the grounds that government trade commissions were objective and entirely adequate. Those who favoured the idea thought participation in the O.A.S., or any regional agency, would broaden contacts and increase liaison with all the Latin American countries. It is interesting to note that the more progressive Latin American countries, place a minimal value on the O.A.S. as a commercial or contact agency. Otto Lang, Acting Minister of Mines and Northern Resources, for example, has said that he was convinced the nations he visited in 1969 (Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Columbia) viewed the O.A.S. as an "artificial body devoted mainly to the discussion of common political and developmental problems".  


The argument that Canadian membership in the O.A.S. would guarantee that country inclusion in the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) is a weak one also. The United States, Latin America's greatest trading partner, has no intention of joining such an organization, so it is difficult to see how Canada would benefit by doing so.\(^{56}\) If LAFTA were to offer O.A.S. members preferential tariffs in a world market system, the appeal to Canadian investors would be greater, but here again, this is impossible in light of the dependence of most countries in Latin America on one-crop economies and the exclusion of Canada's greatest trading partner.

Additional economic obstacles to greater Canadian involvement in Latin America are of a similar difficulty to overcome. In May of 1967, prior to the Geneva Agreement on Trade and Tariffs meeting (Kennedy Round), Mitchell Sharp outlined the principles which would guide Canadian external economic policy. Foremost was the reciprocity arrangements which are essential to Canadian export growth. In Mr. Sharp's words, "there must be a reasonable balance between concessions obtained and those which we (Canada) grant."\(^ {57}\) It would be impossible for the Latin American countries to compete with the Commonwealth preferential trade agreements. In addition,

\(^{56}\) Smith, op.cit., p.107.

Mr. Sharp pointed out that Ottawa's main objective was to increase its "traditional exports of raw materials and food-stuffs." Latin America would purchase little in the realm of primary exports at this stage in its development when the emphasis is on industrialization and the maximization of efficiency through the importation of manufacturing equipment and technological advancements.

The question of Canadian public opinion regarding O.A.S. membership is another directive that will guide the Canadian Government's actions in Latin America. Paul Martin, former Minister of External Affairs, has been an outspoken and long-term advocate of O.A.S. membership for Canada. Indeed, if the question had been considered a major policy issue, Mr. Martin would have been compelled to resign his Cabinet position years ago. As it stands at present, however, public opinion has been incalculable. The government did urge the public to express itself in 1961, but the response was too poor to even be considered noteworthy. A report prepared by J.C.M. Ogelsby in 1967, points out that the majority of letters received in April of 1961, were opposed to membership. Mr. Martin believes that Canada has a duty to join the O.A.S. as a member of the Western Hemisphere but is reluctant to introduce such a motion to the Government until public opinion indicates support for

58 Sharp, op.cit. p.2.

such a move. It appears even to Mr. Martin that:

the general Canadian opinion, however, does not seem to support the view that we (Canada) should join the Organization of American States. 61

As noted earlier, successive Canadian governments have relied on public opinion to guide their perspective toward the Organization of American States. The role of the public in foreign affairs, while usually minimal in any country, has either become crucial in this sphere of Canadian-O.A.S. potential for some unknown reason, or is being used as a convenient excuse for indecision. Possibly, the question of O.A.S. membership has been of minor importance to the Canadian government over the years, and has necessitated the seeking of a crutch to answer the few who persist in raising the question?

A possible though partial explanation for the Canadian citizens' indifference is a recent awareness that they are not members of any so-called Western Hemisphere. As Holmes points out, the idea of a Western Hemisphere is a figment of the geographer's imagination. 62 Traditionally, Canadians have been intimately linked to the North Atlantic group of states. The idea that hemispheric unity demands formal Canadian adherence to an O.A.S. Charter, has been discarded by most Canadian academics as being unrealistic.

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and artificial.

To the extent that Canada should be involved in foreign relations...the problems must be viewed in their global context.63

Canadians have become universalist in their conception of foreign relations as demonstrated in Ottawa's relationship with Cuba, the Chinese Peoples' Republic, its position during the United Nation membership crisis of 1955, its commitment to the United Nations and its multinational and political trading outlook. To many Canadians, the Pan American system must appear more as a United States-Latin American historical evolution than a collective security organization to which Canada need belong.

It is axiomatic that the foreign policy of a country is an expression of what it conceives to be in its national interest.64

The question here is whether the Organization of American States would serve Canada's interests more efficiently than continued adherence to the present policy of bilateral contacts? Or, conversely, would the O.A.S. impair Canadian efforts to expand her role in Latin America?

Membership in the Organization would add little to the extension of Canadian interests in Latin America. Canadian officials in all spheres maintain contact with their


counterparts in the Latin nations through diplomatic missions, trade commissions, international organs; such as, United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America (UNECLA), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and Pan American institutions such as the Inter-American Statistical Institute (IASI), Inter-American Radio Office (IARO), Pan American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH). In addition, there is constant cooperation in the fields of labour, technology, education, social welfare, urban problems and so on. Canadians work as teachers, missionaries, social workers and CUSO volunteers in all the Latin American nations. In 1964, a new dimension, foreign aid, was added to the extent of $152.2 million through the Export Credits Insurance Act. (Section 21A).  

(Similarly, Canadian contacts on a bilateral basis have been very successful as demonstrated by the Cabinet trip headed by Mr. Sharp in October of 1968. The Canadian officials were especially successful in the negotiation of trade and cultural agreements between Canada and Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala.)


Although the question of O.A.S. membership was not included in Mr. Sharp's report to the House, he did say that the matter was "still in balance."

When the mission left for the Latin American tour on October 27, 1968, Mr. Sharp was quoted as saying;

the most important aspect of the mission concerns Canadian political relationships with Latin America including Canada's relationship with the O.A.S. 67

Mr. Sharp was openly disappointed by the lack of enthusiasm displayed by the Latin American governments regarding Canadian membership in the O.A.S. The Cabinet Mission's report could well be a significant directive to Ottawa to postpone the membership question for yet another four years.

In an interview with a Globe and Mail Reporter, Mexico's Director of Tourism, Agustine Salvat, commented on the Cabinet mission. He said;

I got no hint about Canada's political thinking towards Latin America. If this trip was in preparation for a membership bid, I bet few Latins got to know about it. 68

Despite the fact that Mr. Sharp had stated before leaving the "most important aspect" of the mission was to discuss political relationships, he is quoted in the same article after the trip as saying;

Canadian membership was not really important to Latin American countries anyway. They

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want closer relations but would not take offense if this was not done through the O.A.S.\textsuperscript{69}

Otto Lang, a member of the Canadian fact-finding mission, believes the majority of the Canadian Cabinet agrees with the Mexican External Affairs Minister, Antonio Carillo Flores,\textsuperscript{70} who said he could agree with and defend the argument that Canadians should develop their own relations with Latin America outside the O.A.S.\textsuperscript{71} Whatever the outcome of the foreign affairs review regarding Latin America, it is certain that the January Latin American excursion will be significant in that the trip eliminated the illusions of many Canadian statesmen who envisioned the republics as hosts anxious for the important guest to arrive.

It is not difficult to comprehend the lack of enthusiasm of the Latin nations toward Canadian membership. In spite of superficial appearances to the contrary, the Alliance is not a homogenous one. There are striking economic, political and ethnic differences between the Latin American countries themselves as well as the obvious discrepancies between them and the United States. For example, it is difficult, if not impossible, to discover the common denominator between the Creole-speaking Negroes that comprise ninety percent of Haiti and the Spanish of Costa Rica. The former has a one-crop economy based on coffee; the latter relies on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Interview with author, Winnipeg, January 1969.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Lee, \textit{op.cit.} p.7.
\end{itemize}
cacao, coffee and bananas. The political structures are antagonistic; the former an entrenched dictatorship; the latter a stable democracy.

Internally, few Canadians realize the persistent instability of the vast majority of the Latin American republics. All except Chile, Mexico and Uruguay have suffered at least one illegal change of government since 1948.\textsuperscript{72} Externally, the picture is again, one of instability and antagonism. Border clashes and ideological conflicts are traditions, guerilla warfare is prospering and the majority have suffered continual outside interference both from Washington and their neighbours. The historic result is that each nation is highly sensitive, possessing different ideas of what role the O.A.S. should play. For example, Mexico and the larger republics see the Organization as primarily a collective security arrangement, while the U.S.A. and the smaller nations, (dependent on Washington to a great extent) see the O.A.S. as the guarantor of democracy.\textsuperscript{73} If one adds to this list of inconsistencies the open split between the most progressive Latin republics and the United States, it becomes easier to understand the fears of many Canadian Members of Parliament who applauded Stanley Knowles when he said in the House that he hoped

\textsuperscript{72} Slater, \textit{op.cit.}, p.276.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Ibid.} p.271.
the Canadian government will continue to be sceptical about accepting the full implications of membership, (and) Parliament should have the opportunity to discuss (this) before we have been taken down the path to a situation that might involve us in defence, monetary and trade relations that would make us more a satellite than we are now of the main power in the Organization of American States.74

Having outlined the arguments for and against Canadian participation in the O.A.S., it would be appropriate here to discuss the possible effect of membership on the Canadian position in two crisis situations involving Cuba in 1962 and the Dominican Republic in 1965. In addition to discussing the relative positions taken by the O.A.S. and Canada on the two instances, an attempt is made to discern the probable effect of Canadian membership on Ottawa's eventual stand.

The Cuban Crisis:

The Canadian position vis-a-vis the Cuban crisis in 1962 differed from that of the O.A.S., not on basic principles but on tactics. Whereas both the O.A.S. and Canada took the position that Soviet short and middle range missiles in Cuba represented a serious offensive threat to the Western Hemisphere, Ottawa believed restraint and caution would be more effective in preventing an international confrontation. Had Canada been a member of the O.A.S. the pressure on the government to agree with the O.A.S. action

74 Debates, November 29, 1968.
in supporting the U.S. trade embargo and severing diplomatic ties with Havana would not have been much greater than was the pressure imposed by the Kennedy forces. However, the element of time was an important factor in the eventual Canadian position. Diefenbaker, though informed nineteen hours before John F. Kennedy's public announcement of the blockade at noon, Monday, October 22, did not announce support of the United States quarantine until Thursday, October 25. Had Canada been a participant in the Organization of American States' discussions begun at 8:00 a.m. Tuesday, October 23, it would have been placed in the unavoidable position of commitment or abstention. The motion endorsing Washington's action passed in the Organization of American States by a vote of nineteen to nothing.

Diefenbaker's fear of being viewed as the obedient follower of the United States was one of the major factors in his refusal to grant automatic public support to the Kennedy proposal,

One of the least effective ways of persuading Canada to adopt a policy is for the President of another country to...tell us what we should do. 75

Although enunciated in response to an offer by Kennedy to join the O.A.S., the sentiment has remained the same well into the nineteen sixties and was especially keen during the Cuban affair.

The eventual Canadian position regarding the missile crisis was definitely in sympathy with the O.A.S. membership, but did not go as far as confirmation of the United States embargo. The Canadian attitude toward trade restrictions on Cuba and diplomatic relations with the Castro regime had been formulated in October 1960, and has never changed even after the missile crisis (1962) and change of government (1963). Had Canada been in the O.A.S. during the missile crisis, its position today would have been outwardly the same as that of the United States. Even Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia, which opposed U.S. moves to isolate Cuba in 1960 and again in 1962, felt compelled to support Washington in October of 1962. The motion outlined below passed the O.A.S. Organization of Consultation Meeting the day after Kennedy's embargo announcement. In summary,

1. It found by "...in controvertible evidence..." that "...Cuba...has secretly endangered the peace of the continent by permitting the establishment of intermediate and middle range missiles on its territory by the Sino-Soviet powers...."

2. It called "...for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with offensive capability."

3. It recommended "...that the member states, in accordance with Article six and eight of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures...which they may deem necessary...to prevent the missiles in Cuba...from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the continent...."76

Canada would have been legally compelled to support the resolution. The proof of Soviet missile bases in Cuba was well documented, and as a signatory to the Rio Treaty, Ottawa's only alternative to supporting the motion would have been to abstain in which case it was bound under Article nineteen of the Rio Treaty, which becomes operative if two-thirds of the members support a resolution.

The divergence of views in Ottawa and Washington, was primarily the result of the difference in attitudes toward Latin America. Neither the missile threat nor the necessity of joining in the quarantine were considered in Ottawa as requiring Canadian involvement. To be sure, the threat was real to most Canadians, but they viewed the crisis solution as being in the hands of the "Great Powers". Thus the Canadian government withheld announcement of public support for the embargo; delayed the placing of Canadian NORAD forces on the alert and urged "free men everywhere" to remain calm and not to "panic". 77 While ascertaining its own official position on the crisis in private, one fact was made clear to the public; Canada did support the U.S.A. position regarding point two of the Punta del Este resolution which demanded the dismantling and withdrawal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. The question centred around how far Canada would support the follow-up quarantine of Cuba. The personal relationship between the President and the Prime Minister and the ever present

Canadian fear of satillitism, both profound influences on Diefenbaker, prevented immediate Canadian acceptance of the United States' position. Having been informed, not consulted, only hours before the announcement of the embargo, the Government resented United States expectations of immediate and full public support. Senator Charles Foulkes, former Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff during NORAD negotiations, elucidated the Canadian position with respect to hemispheric crisis, and Canadian-American cooperation to defend against them. He said,

Canada has to be consulted every time the U.S. contemplates using force anywhere in the world.\textsuperscript{78}

Since Canada was not, in Diefenbaker's opinion, consulted but informed, and then only hours before public announcement of United States action, Canada could not have been expected to regard the missile problem as a serious threat to itself but rather as a potential one, if U.S. counteraction failed. In any event, the Canadian reaction to Washington's unilateral declaration, though confused and delayed, was an independent one arrived at after profound and extensive discussion at all levels. Diefenbaker's position, right or wrong, was an independent position that would not have been open to a member of the Organization of American States.

The Dominican Crisis:

The Dominican crisis in 1965 presented another

\textsuperscript{78} Reford, \textit{op.cit.} p.209.
situation similar to the Cuban missile crisis in which the Canadian position differed from that of the United States and the Organization of American States.

The intervention of the U.S. in the Dominican Republic in April of 1965 was 'legitimized' by the O.A.S. on May 6 at the Tenth Reunion of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization. By a vote of fourteen to five, the U.S.A. succeeded in getting the minimum necessary support for the creation of the first O.A.S. military peacekeeping force known as the Fuerza Inter-Americana de la Paz (FIP.) The landing of thirty thousand marines to protect foreign nationals in Santo Domingo was also justified under the guise that there was a serious threat of a communist takeover of the reins of government. In support of this premise, the CIA produced a list of fifty-three suspected communist sympathizers, hardly sufficient justification for the breaking of the O.A.S. Charter, which prohibits intervention in the internal affairs of a member state.

The reaction of Canadian news media to the U.S. intervention centred on criticism of the unilateral nature of the action and most hoped that the O.A.S. would bring order out of chaos. In Parliament, Prime Minister Pearson and External Affairs Minister Paul Martin, expressed the same fears and hopes. While Mr. Martin "gratefully acknowledged"

the protection provided Canadian citizens by the United States marines, noted that the Canadian government disagreed with the unilateral aspect of Washington's intervention. The Canadian spokesmen were hesitant on the question of U.S. intervention for over a month after the April 24th revolution broke out. Aware of the seriousness of the situation in which Washington found herself, both in the O.A.S. and the U.N., Ottawa was reluctant to add its critical voice to the rest of the world. Until May 28, the government refused to answer directly, questions concerning the Dominican Republic, and then only after repeated insistence on the part of the Opposition.

Had Canada been a member of the O.A.S. her position would have clearly been a critical one. The United States resolution at the Foreign Ministers Conference required a two-thirds majority if Washington was to receive O.A.S. endorsement. The Canadian Foreign Minister would have held the decisive vote in a very clear cut situation. Would Canada have voted for her ally despite the obvious objections to U.S. action among the Canadian public and press? The choice for Canada would have been especially troublesome because an abstention on the vote would have had the effect of opposing the resolution. The vote fourteen-five-nothing, a bare two-thirds majority, would have become fourteen-five-one in which

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case the resolution would have failed.

It is possible to speculate that Canada would not have voted for the resolution. The Progressive Conservatives and the New Democrats, in addition to the press, declared the United States' action "illegal" and a violation of international law.81 In supporting Washington, the Canadian government would have been in opposition to what were then some of the most progressive republics in Latin America,82 and sanctioned the actions not only of the United States marines but also of the other nations that contributed troops to the F.I.D., that is, the dictatorships of Honduras, Nicaragua, and Brazil.

Despite the possible outcome, the fact remains that Canadian action would have been criticized in any event. In supporting the Americans, perhaps Ottawa would have received a number of diplomatic credits from Washington. Perhaps, as John Holmes believes;

Canadians did not like the way the United States handled the Dominican affair. The rest thanked God we did not have to make any decisions ourselves.83

Canadian policy makers would be wise to consider seriously the benefits of their country's present status vis-a-vis the O.A.S. and the United States. Free to follow her own

82 Mexico, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay.
83 John W. Holmes, Canada and Pan America, p.181.
independent foreign policy, unhampered by the necessity of assuming a rigid position, Ottawa can better negotiate the dips and swells of her relationship with Washington.

Both the Cuban and the Dominican Republic affairs demonstrate the possible restrictions membership in the O.A.S. could place on Canadian foreign policy. As a member of the Organization of American States, Ottawa's traditional loyalties to Washington and the Commonwealth would be compromised. Dedicated to the principles of sovereignty and the fostering of a stronger United Nations, Canadian membership in the Organization would prove incompatible because of United States domination and use of the O.A.S. to cloak its own unilateral actions. Jerome Slater, in a paper entitled, The Limits of Letigimization in International Organizations: The O.A.S. and the Dominican crisis, came to the following conclusion:

The Dominican experience is apparently viewed by the majority of O.A.S. states as more of a warning than a precedent, and it is probable that the role of the Organization in inter and intra state political conflict has entered a decline. The attitude of the Chileans, Mexicans and Uruguayans - we may have to live with U.S. domination of the hemisphere but we don't have to institutionalize and legitimate it by giving the O.A.S. political authority - may now be becoming the prevailing one.84

CHAPTER IV

ANTICIPATED CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The dominating question in Canadian-Latin American relations concerns membership in the Organization of American States. Indeed, many Canadians view political Latin America as synonymous with the Organization of American States, and increased involvement with the former means, to many, membership in the latter. As discussed above, proponents of membership see the O.A.S. as a hemispheric responsibility, a Canadian duty, a necessary contribution to the development of Latin America, and a counterweight to U.S. hegemony in the area. Opponents believe Canada is overburdened with international commitments to the United Nations, N.A.T.O., the Commonwealth and most recently to la Francophonie, and therefore, could not assume additional responsibilities at this time. They envision Canada as being caught in the middle of any United States-Latin American confrontation, as having too much to lose and too little to gain.

This section outlines Canadian views on Latin America and attempts to fit increased involvement in Latin America into the overall spectrum of anticipated Canadian foreign policy. It is hoped that this discussion will provide additional insight into the arguments concerning

85 Ogelsby, op.cit. p.18.
membership.

Canada and Latin America - A Projection on Future Relations:

To what extent Canada should be involved in any particular area of the world is a question which must be answered in its global context. As the largest of the small powers, Canada's position and influence was much different in 1945 than it is today. Immediately after World War II, Canada was the fourth strongest power in the world militarily, the fifth largest exporter, one of the few countries untouched by the war, and the leader of the middle and small powers. Today, the world is much larger with twice the number of independent states; the Canadian export economy, though still strong, is now seventh in the world; the million men under arms in 1945 has been reduced to one-tenth of its former size, and the balance of power has become a "balance of terror" dominated by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. Europe has been revitalized and the third world has been born. As Prime Minister Trudeau has written, "realism in how we read the world barometer ... in how we see ourselves thriving in the climate it forecasts" must be the prime directive of Canadian foreign policy.

Professor B.E. Burton has succinctly outlined the basic determinants of Canadian external policy as being: the presence of the U.S.A., the bicultural nature of the country, the Canadian style of mediation, and the Canadian capability.

Little elaboration, if any, is needed concerning the limitations that its giant neighbour to the south places on Canada. For obvious reasons Ottawa is forced to consider her special relationship with the world's largest power as being of prime importance. In addition, the Canadian style of "quiet diplomacy" and peaceful negotiation has been so successful that it is doubtful that Messrs. Sharp and Trudeau desire to trade it in for a louder but perhaps less effective approach. As Mr. Burton points out:

Consensus building, mediating interpreting, keeping the talks going, and holding things together come naturally to the central political elites of a federal state characterized by a relatively small, bilingual, polycultural, polyethnic population sprawled over a vast extent of territory and over several regions. 88

To study the projected direction and scope of Canada's foreign policy in the near future the two most important variables are her biculturalism and her national capabilities. Is Canada in a position to contribute significantly to the positive development of the O.A.S.? Indeed, is it in her interests to do so at this time, given the historical and cultural priorities on her external aid, the goals of her foreign policy, and the domestic contingencies with which she must contend?

In the last fifteen years Canadian biculturalism has emerged, demanding recognition. Though it is impossible to fashion an external policy based on the total Canadian ethnic

mosaic, the two official cultures are now being reflected in Canadian policy directives. According to the 1961 census approximately 43.8 percent of Canadians are of British origin and 30.4 percent of French stock. Prime Minister Trudeau, and those who elected him in June of 1968, believe Canadian foreign policy must reflect the realities of the nation's new found "dual nationality". And so, the quiet revolution within the East Block in Ottawa has created a new "Relations among French-Speaking States Division", has placed a new emphasis on la Francophonie, has accelerated the Canadian aid program and has encouraged the Prime Minister to declare that Canada's major foreign policy goal is;

\begin{quote}
to ensure the political survival of Canada as a federal and bilingual sovereign state.... It means reflecting in our foreign relations the cultural diversity and bilingualism of Canada as faithfully as possible.\footnote{Trudeau, \textit{op.cit.}, p.6.}
\end{quote}

The selection of a dynamic foreign policy based on Prime Minister Trudeau's model, acceptable to both French and English Canadians, and contributive to the nation's political unity at home must, of course, involve a significant increase in attention and aid to French-speaking countries. In the last four to five years, Canadian officials in the Department of External Affairs have followed this popular directive in the political, economic and cultural spheres of foreign policy.

Francophone Africa has been the prime target for Canadian government investment in all three areas. In the
area of foreign aid, Canada has increased its total aid program from an average annual amount of three hundred thousand dollars to $22.1 million in 1969. These figures not only represent a huge percentage increase in terms of aid to Francophone Africa, but also take on an added significance when seen in comparison to the total aid allotted to Latin America over the last four years. Aid to the Latin American republics has averaged only $5.57 million per annum and has remained static for that period. This increase in aid to Africa is indicative of two facts; the capability of the country to support an enlarged aid program has risen and the orientation for this increase will be principally French-speaking Africa. Mr. Trudeau has confirmed this second fact. He has said, that "Canada must allot a "substantially increased share of our (Canada's) aid...to Francophone countries as an important investment both in improving bilateral relations and in contributing to national unity." Lack of cohesion at home is the most serious problem facing Canadians at present, and is likely to remain so in the immediate future. With this fact in mind, it is important that the Canadian government discern an international role for Canada which has a cementing influence at home. In the realm of foreign policy, Africa has been chosen as the principal field for Ottawa's cultivation. French-speaking Africa is the best proving ground for Canada's new bilingual, bicultural foreign


91 Trudeau, op.cit. p.6.
aid program. To achieve maximum impact, Canada is obliged to select relatively few areas of the globe for her particular attention. As Ian Macdonald writes:

We must avoid ... the attempt to do all things with the result that we may do nothing well.92

At the same time, Canada cannot abandon her commitments to the Commonwealth members; therefore, contemporary obligations will be continued at their present pace and the increase will be granted to the twenty nations of Francophone Africa.

While Latin America has also received additional funds for development through Canadian contributions, to the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the ties of history outside the Caribbean, are non-existent and the obligation less urgent, less compelling. John Holmes raises the pertinent question here:

Is there anything special about South America which makes an association with it more natural than with Japan or Europe, or Australia, or India?93

Ideally, all countries of the globe are legitimate objects of any state's attention, but for Ottawa, the "urge to be all things to all men"94 must, as mentioned, be suppressed by reality. Aid to French-speaking Africa has run four hundred percent higher than to Latin America in 1968-196995 and Canada

92 Macdonald, op.cit., p.4.
93 John W. Holmes, "Reflections on the Bohia Conference" p.415.
94 Macdonald, op.cit. p.4.
has made its choice, if dollars are any indicator of preference or direction.\footnote{Report of the Canadian Ministerial Mission to Latin America, October 27, 1968, Queen's Printer, (Ottawa: 1968), Canadian development assistance to Latin America is only three percent of her total world program of economic development. p.11.}

In addition to linguistic similarity, Africa offers Canada a place to establish her presence. Unlike the Western Hemisphere where United States hegemony is obvious and restricting, French-speaking Africa is free of United States domination. The competition is less avid and the opportunities are correspondingly much greater in the dark continent. It is difficult to visualize any substantial alteration in the new Canadian commitment to Africa, and it is impossible for Ottawa to concentrate on a third area of the globe at present or in the immediate future.

Canada's limited capabilities to exert influence in the Western Hemisphere are an axiom of her foreign policy. The American presence in South and Central America is such that Canada would be the "weak sister" in any regional organization such as the Organization of American States. For example, the Canadian foreign aid allotment to the entire world is only one-eighth of that contributed by Washington to Latin America alone. The Canadian financial allotment on a bilateral basis has remained stable at ten million dollars to the I.A.D.B. since 1964 and the projection is the same for 1970. As long as this token gesture is the total Canadian
contribution to Latin America (excluding the Caribbean),
the bulk of Latin America will continue to remain a secondary
bloc of nations in the realm of Canadian external policy.

In a second area for comparison of the Canadian
attitude toward Francophone Africa and Latin America, that
of cultural inter-action, the evidence is even more revealing.
The table below demonstrates the rapid awareness in Ottawa
of the benefits of pursuing a bilingual approach in the
realm of cultural interchange.

**CANADA - FRANCOPHONE AFRICA CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>Percent Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advisors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>9800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table portrays a program that is still in the embryonic
stage. However, the progress being made in terms of the
number of participants indicates a definite bid on the
Canadian government's part to extend the cultural exchange
program to every French-speaking African nation. By contrast,
Ottawa, which has had economic ties with Latin America for
one hundred years, and diplomatic representation for thirty-
five years, has not yet made the effort to establish an
official cultural exchange program with the republics of

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Central and South America.

In a third sphere, that of diplomacy and official exchange of missions, Francophone Africa has again been the major goal of Canadian expansion. In Latin America there has not been an addition to the fourteen resident Canadian missions, including those in the Caribbean, since 1963. Those missions already present in Latin America are, in addition, being maintained at minimal standards. By comparison, Canada has added five resident missions in French-speaking Africa in 1969 making a total of twelve established in twelve years. In this indicative area of official relations between governments, the trend again is toward a maintenance of present quotas in Latin America and the fostering of increased contacts with French-speaking Africa.

The fourth element of Canada's external relationships is economic. Canadian economic survival as the world's fifth largest trading nation depends on the continual securing of new markets for Canadian exports. In this all-important search, Latin America's projected population of four hundred million by 1972, should be very attractive to Canadian investors. It is interesting to note that Colombia has the oldest trading agreement with Canada; drawn up in 1866, the contract is still in effect. Despite the long-term commercial relationship between Canada and Latin America, and the fact that Canadian-Latin American trade has surpassed the one billion dollar level,

98 Mission to Latin America, op.cit., p.36.
Latin America is still heavily dependent on the United States's market and on concessions from the State Department in Washington. It is significant that in one hundred and two years of trading, no more than 5 percent of total Canadian exports have ever gone south of the U.S.

The future commercial development of Latin America, while it looks promising considering the creation of several regional trade organs such as the Central American Common Market (CACM), and the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) is also misleading. Canadian export markets are uncommonly political in contrast to the politically restricted markets of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., Japan, West Germany and so on. Because they trade in all areas of the world, including Cuba and the two Chinas, Canadians are more responsive to all potential markets. With this fact in mind, it seems quite evident that Canadian exporters are looking to Japan to absorb an ever increasing percentage of Canada's exports. The rapid growth of Japanese trade with Canada since 1955, prompted the Japanese Economic Planning Agency to predict that Canada will sell one billion dollars worth of goods annually to Japan by 1970, making Japan Canada's second largest trading partner.

There are other reasons for Canadian investors and exporters looking elsewhere than the republics of Latin America for market potential. For example, the prospect of a North Atlantic Free Trade Area is still viable as long as the

G.A.T.T. talks continue. Secondly, Canada is looking for a market that has reached a level of development that will guarantee the highest rate of importation. Japan with a rapidly expanding consumer base and a high level of consumption is readily available; Latin America is not.

It is evident that Latin America will not occupy a special place in the economic, cultural or political plans of the Canadian government. The factors discussed above are only a few of the basic tenets which indicate a cultural and political wooing of Francophone Africa and a commercial awakening to the immediate appeal of the Japanese market. It is a surity that Canadian-Latin American relations will continue to expand as a natural outgrowth of rising Canadian economic capability and Latin American internal development. However, there is no priority urging greater Canadian involve­ment in the Latin Republics. As John Holmes, former Under­secretary of State of External Affairs has pointed out:

Canada has nothing to gain from Latin America that is not available elsewhere.\footnote{John W. Holmes in an interview with the author, November 28, 1968 in Windsor.}
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Interviews

The following persons were kind enough to discuss aspects of the thesis with the author:

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Professor Ian Lumsden.

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