1-1-1969

Foreign policy of the East African states.

Aderemi M. Olutola

University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd

Recommended Citation
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/6579

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters' theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email (scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000 ext. 3208.
FOREIGN POLICY
OF THE
EAST AFRICAN STATES

Submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Windsor in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

BY
ADEREMI M. OLUTOLA, B.A.

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
1969
INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
ABSTRACT

This thesis has attempted an analysis of the foreign policy of the East African states - Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Probably moreso than in the case of older established states, their foreign policy is an extension of domestic policies to the international scene. National survival, preservation of independence and the achievement of better living standards for the generally poor population are the important factors that influence the decision-makers in their choice of foreign policy orientations.

After Chapter one which constitutes a general background to this study, Chapter two is designed to provide factual knowledge that could enable the reader to develop a degree of insight into the tasks facing emerging states striding towards political modernization and rapid socio-economic development. In Chapter three, we are exposed to the dilemmas of ideology and the ambiguities inherent in the concept of Pan-Africanism. The initial attempts of the leaders to federate East Africa were founded on the appeals of Pan-Africanism, a common heritage and certain geopolitical factors but events soon proved to them that not even this complex of factors would necessarily lead to political integration.

iii
The Pan-Africanist theme also extended to Chapter four where specific inter-governmental problems have been considered. In their border disputes and territorial claims, Kenya and Tanzania readily invoked the O.A.U. articles to push their cases against Somalia and Malawi respectively. On the other hand, Tanzania refused to be guided by the O.A.U. resolution in her recognition of a secessionist state in Nigeria. Nevertheless all the East African states honoured the O.A.U. resolutions on the Congo and the Arab-Israeli conflicts.

Chapter five has probed into the theory and practice of nonalignment in East Africa. Within the framework of global politics, nonalignment can be deprived as noncommitment in the Cold War conflict system. But in East Africa, nonalignment may be deprived not only in terms of non-participation in the Cold War but also in regards to the pursuit of narrower national interests. Because of the need for accelerated economic development the East African states have chosen to draw advantages from both East and West without getting involved in the Cold War conflicts. This chapter also considered the similarities and differences between declaratory policies, attitudinal orientation and operative policies of these states in the pursuit of nonalignment. Lastly, a brief study has been made into the policies toward the United Nations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is not very easy to write a thesis on a field where little pertinent study has been made before. My task in assembling data for this study has involved me in direct contact with the Governments of East Africa. I would like to acknowledge my foremost appreciation to Dr. E.D. Briggs, my supervisor, who directed the research and also helped in tapping useful sources of materials.

My debts of gratitude also go to Mr. Bruce Burton and Mr. P.R. Burrell for their careful reading and invaluable suggestions. Despite the limitations of materials, the conscientiousness of my supervisor and the guiding suggestions of my readers, I hold no pretentions to the infallibility of my approach. Errors of fact and sins of misinterpretations remain, unhappy, to be entirely my own responsibility.

Lastly, I would like to thank the staff of Inter-Library Loans for making available their facilities for collecting information on the United Nations. Special thanks also to Dr. R.H. Wagenberg and Mr. L. Brown-John for their hints on data-gathering and to Mrs. Devine for typing the scripts.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>THE EAST AFRICAN STATES</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Land and People</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Resources</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stability, Ideology &amp; Political Institutions</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION &amp; PAN-AFRICANISM</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pan-Africanism and the O.A.U.</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The East African Federation</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>ATTITUDES TO OTHER AFRICAN STATES</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Border Problems, Territorial Disputes and Neighbourliness</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three Crises - Congo, Nigeria, Arab-Israeli</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>EAST AFRICA AND THE WORLD</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theory of Nonalignment</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relations with East &amp; West (including the Commonwealth)</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policies to the United Nations</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VITA AUCTORIS</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER I

THE EAST AFRICAN STATES

If South Africa has been a strategic enticement and a glitter of the earth; and West Africa has been malaria - Dr. Azikiwe, Governor-General of Nigeria wanted to erect a statue to the mosquito-humidity and disappointing company reports; then East Africa has been a pleasant climate.

The area that is generally referred to as East Africa is composed of three principal states - Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Their evolution towards self-government was slower than in the case of their counterparts in West Africa because of many reasons. In Kenya, good climate had attracted a large population of European settlers. Most of the settlers belonged to an economically dominant class and cherished their social ties with the prosperous and conservative forces in Europe. Administratively, the Africans were restricted to local government and were kept out of central, political affairs. This fostered tribalism and led to a divisive policy of provincialism. In Uganda, shallow nationalism and the "particular bolstering of the position of the Kabaka and the traditionalists in Buganda encouraged their intransigence, and this inevitably led to the delaying of independence."¹ Tanzania was

a little more fortunate. For almost throughout the territory, no single tribal unit possessed the size, wealth and education to dominate the others. While these factors provide an opportunity for the rapid growth of an organized and united demand for self-government...the backwardness of the country meant that most officials of the Party (TANU) were necessarily people with little or no formal education who did not always see the long-term implications of their attitudes, or of official Party policy. 2

However, progress towards independence became accelerated after 1960. Tanganyika opened the way by securing its independence in December, 1961. This was followed by Uganda in October 1962, despite her intertribal friction. Kenya's independence was granted on December 11, 1963 in response to the melodramatic attempt of the East African territories to federate.

THE LAND AND PEOPLE

Kenya was a former British colony that was leased from Zanzibar in 1887. It is bounded on the South by Tanzania, on the West by Uganda, on the North-West by the Sudan, on the North by Ethiopia, on the North-East by the Somali Republic and on the East Coast by the Indian Ocean. It has a total area of 224,960 square miles and had about 8.5 million people in 1962. Of this population, 8 million were Africans. The non-African population of 270,321 included

176,613 Asians, 55,759 Europeans and 34,048 Arabs. However, the predominant African population is far from being homogeneous. There are fourteen distinct ethnic groups, with the Kikuyus representing almost twenty per cent, followed by the Luo and the Luhya, each with about thirteen percent. Swahili, a Bantu language with a heavy Arabic admixture and English are the official languages.

Tanzania was the name chosen on April 26, 1964, when the former British-administered League of Nations trust territory of Tanganyika joined in union with the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba to become a United Republic. Tanganyika, now referred to as mainland Tanzania, is located between Lakes Victoria, Nyasa, Tanganyika and the Indian Ocean. It has a total area of 362,688 square miles and is bordered on the North by Kenya and Uganda, on the West by Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo and on the South by Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. The area was originally administered by the German East Africa Company before it was passed to Great Britain under a League of Nations mandate. After 1946, the territory became a United Nations trust under British supervision and on December 9, 1961, Tanganyika became an independent state under Prime Minister Julius Nyerere.

"Tanganyika is a geographical expression rather than a nation, with 120 different tribes. Most of these are self-contained, isolated from their neighbors by language
and other barriers." 3 Of the approximately 9.5 million pop-
pulation estimated in 1962, 99 per cent were Africans.
Others included the Indians, the Arabs and a European po-
pulation of about 20,000. The indigenous African popula-
tion comprised of the Chagga, the Somalis, the Kikuyus and
the Masais.

Zanzibar and Pemba comprised a sultanate under British
administration before their independence on December 10,
1963. With an area of 640 square miles, Zanzibar is the
largest island on the east coast of Africa. By 1958 census
figures, Zanzibar's 165,253 population was comprised of
about 75.8 per cent Africans, 16.9 per cent Arab, 5.7 per
cent Indians and 0.1 per cent Europeans. The African group
include the mainland Africans and the Shirazi who claim to
be indigenous and to have part-Persian ancestry.

For nearly two centuries after the discovery of the
Cape of Good Hope by Vasco da Gama, the Portuguese had been
very interested in Zanzibar because of its strategic posi-
tion on the route to the riches of the Far East.

At the end of the seventeenth century, the inhabit-
ants of Zanzibar drove out the Portuguese with the assis-
tance of the Arabs of Oman, and an Arab governor was sub-
sequently sent to govern. 4

---

3 John Gunther, Inside Africa, New York, Harper and Bro-
thers, 1953, First Ed. p. 405.

4 Helen Kitchen, A Handbook of African Affairs, New York,
Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1964, p. 180.
For a long time the governmental structure and cultural ties were based on the Arab pattern. But in 1886 Britain and Germany signed an agreement specifying their respective spheres of influence within Zanzibar without reference to the ruling Sultan. In 1890, the territory was formally proclaimed a British Protectorate under the terms of the Anglo-German Heligoland Treaty. After independence in 1963 Zanzibar was governed by a coalition of the Arab-led Zanzibar People's Party and a conservative Shirazi movement. On January 12, 1964 the Afro-Shirazi Party, led by Abeid Karume planned the coup d'etat that made him the Chief of State.

Pemba is an adjacent island that lies twenty-five miles to the northeast of Zanzibar. It has an area of 380 square miles. It is inhabited by a motley population of 133,858 people. Together making up the United Republic of Tanzania, Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Pemba have a combined population estimated at 10.3 million in 1964.

The third distinct East African state is Uganda. It lies astride the Equator and is bounded on the east by Kenya, on the south by Tanzania and Rwanda, on the west by Congo Kinshasa and on the north by the Sudan. It has an area of about 91,000 square miles and a population of about 7.5 million. Anthropologists have classified the African population there into the Bantu, the Nilotic, the Nilotic-Hamitic and the Sudanic groups. Of all the groups, the
Bantus are the most numerous. They include the Baganda tribe which constitutes the largest ethnic group in Uganda with nearly 2 million people. The Iteso is considered as the second largest tribe followed by the Ankole, the Bunyoro and the Basoga each having more than half a million people. Other minority groups include the Asians who number about 88,000 and are mainly of Indian extraction. They are primarily skilled workers and small businessmen. The 9,000 Europeans in the country are primarily British.

While English is the official language, Luganda is also spoken by a good proportion of the African population.

The early explorers discovered Uganda in the middle of the nineteenth century. "In 1875 the journalist-explorer, Stanley, arrived in Buganda from the East Coast and dispatched his famous letter to the Daily Telegraph, calling for Christian missionaries to go out and work in the country."

5 Buganda was the most powerful of all the ancient Uganda Kingdoms. It even lent its name in a way to the whole territory. Translators who were with the first British explorers to reach the protectorate could not sort out the changing prefixes in the language.

Buganda is the name of the Kingdom.
Luganda is the language.
Kiganda is an adjective pertaining to anything that has to do with Buganda.
Muganda is the name for a native of Buganda.
Baganda is the plural of Muganda.
Kabaka is the name for the King.
See John Gunther, op. cit., p. 425.

6 A.J. Hughes, East Africa, p. 147.
The missionaries began to arrive in large numbers after 1877. In the few years that followed, religious wars broke out between the Christian groups, the Muslims and the natives. Meantime Captain (later Lord) Lugard was exploring the country further for the Imperial British East African Company. In 1893, the British government succeeded in colonizing Buganda and in 1900 the Union Jack was hoisted over the rest of Uganda by the terms of a treaty called the Uganda Agreement. Since then Uganda has been under the British hegemony until she achieved her independence on October 9, 1962 under a coalition government headed by Prime Minister Milton Obote.

Thus, with a total area of 683,020 square miles, East Africa is about a fifth of the size of the United States. Kenya is about the size of England and Uganda is a little smaller than Great Britain. The total estimate of the population of the East African states is 26.5 million. Of this estimate, Africans comprised about 97.5 per cent before the Asian exodus from Kenya after 1968.7

At the time of independence, non-Africans were given the option to apply for full Kenyan citizenship or maintain their British passports. But following the Kenyan goals of economic reconstruction and the accompanying need for local participation, government legislation was more favourable to bona fide Kenyans. This Africanization policy affected the Asians with British passports and they were compelled to leave the country. Over 3,000 moved to Britain and many other countries. The term "Indians" include the Hindus, Pakistanis and Goans who had been living in Kenya since British rule.
ECONOMIC RESOURCES

With the possible exception of Kenya where moderate commercial activities have offset complete reliance on agriculture, East African States are generally poor. A general reason for the economic disability is the low level of industrialization, lack of capital and difficulties in the way of the improvement of native cultivation. Poverty, which is a common denominator in the study of East African economies, is further compounded by specific factors in each country.

In Kenya, the one dominant factor that has persisted from the time of colonization to the present, is the problem of land distribution. The land problem has constituted an extremely abstruse and controversial subject in the Kenyan politics. The Africans have constantly accused the European population of greediness; that they came to Africa to grab the best land thereby leaving the native citizens with barren tracts for cultivation.

In sixteen months (1903-4) 220,000 Highland acres were transferred to 342 individual Europeans, and moreover huge tracts - blocks of 300,000 acres or more - went to European syndicates...Of the 68,700 square miles of Kenyan arable land in 1911, 7,000 of the 42,000 European settlers held 16,000 square miles or 24 per cent of this; five and a half million Africans had to get along as best they could on the rest. 8

However, in defense of their acquisition rights, the Europeans maintain that their area of settlement was hitherto

---
sparsely populated by peoples with a wide variety of cultures, among whom the predominant folk were the Masai who ranged with their herds over a large section of the southern and western highlands. Since independence, pressure of population and government intensive efforts to improve native cultivation have encouraged land redistribution. At a news conference in Nairobi on August 12, 1964, Jomo Kenyatta said that:

The British Government has today agreed to provide the Kenya Government with 1.5 million pounds partly by loan and partly by gift, to enable European farms in the Kalou salient, and in the Dundori-Bahati areas, to be purchased and Africans to be settled on the land...The acreage of land in question is around two million acres which will accommodate 200,000 families, or about a million people. 9

Notwithstanding the land disputes, Kenya is regarded as the richest country in East Africa. Good climate and commercial agriculture have encouraged industrialization. Cash crops like coffee, sisal, tea and tobacco are grown on the fertile areas, but stock-rearing is still based on traditional customs. In the big cities, especially around Nairobi, commercial activities have flourished very well in recent years.

Tanzania, the largest state in area and population, is the most politically stable but also the poorest. In fact, its poverty is legendary. Apart from the Northwestern Highlands, "the greater part of the interior of

---

Tanzania represents a vast undulating plateau, averaging 2,000-4,000 feet from sea-level, whose surface is broken by residual hills and ridges left by the lowering of the plateau through denudation.\(^\text{10}\)

The land configuration, low precipitation and the native system of shifting cultivation have inhibited mechanized agriculture. The traditional peasant agricultural system, primarily concerned with the production of subsistence crops, is still regarded as a resource to be exploited rather than a liability to be dispensed with. Productivity is painfully low and industrialization is small.

In a memorandum to TANU's National Executive in June 1966, Nyerere argued that,

a poor country like Tanzania where there is in any case little attraction for capital investment, development depends primarily on the efforts and hard work of our own people, and on their enthusiasm and belief that they and their country will benefit from whatever they do.\(^\text{11}\)

Six months later, on February 5, 1967, the much-publicized Arusha Declaration was formulated on the principle that the self-reliance of the peasant population be matched by self-sacrifice and socialist commitment of the leadership. Under this strategy, the state took over the key industries,


banks, the export-import houses, and some of the major foreign manufacturing enterprises. A system of compensation was simultaneously organized under the Danish firm of auditors H. C. Steen Hansen. While the result of the nationalization policy may be difficult to assess as yet, Nyerere is convinced that the precarious plight of the Tanzanian economy warranted such bold and ambitious planning. Meanwhile the peasant farmers are encouraged to double their yield on subsistence crops along with their few cash crops of coffee, sisal and seed beans.

In Uganda, the situation of the economy is not much better. The over-all problem, which is affected by a multitude of factors, is low productivity. Like Tanzania and Kenya, the economy is agrarian, involving the growing of subsistence crops, communal help in building and an almost self-sufficient kind of living. The other side of the economy is relatively recent. This is the market economy that subjects economic life to national and international trade. It involves growing coffee for the market and buying transistor radios and manufactured goods in return. But unlike Tanzania, Uganda is pursuing an open-door economic policy for investments. This is intended to accelerate industrialization since lack of capital has hindered industrial development.

However, in the commercial life of Uganda the Indian population—about 77,400 (1961)—is of critical importance, and it is believed that they control 90 per cent of the total trade.
of the country.

During colonial rule, the Indians and the European communities in Uganda established a friendly relationship that could not be found in any other part of East Africa. This gave the Indians a good opportunity to maintain commercial contacts with India and many industrial countries. They also controlled the export crops of cotton and coffee. For cotton, they found a ready market in the textile industry of the Bombay Presidency and coffee was sent to the European countries. It is interesting to note that the reaction of the nationalists was initially indifferent to the Indian monopoly. But after independence, Prime Minister Obote encouraged native participation in commercial life along with foreign investment.

Thus, it can be safely assumed that the East African states have many things in common: the most striking being poverty and general lack of industrial development. Statistics sometimes fail to convey the social background of an economy but they provide a basis for a comparison of local conditions with the rest of the world. The following two tables provide an insight into the standard of living and level of industrialization in East Africa in relation to some selected African countries.

12 Walter Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 246.
TABLE I

Gross National Product of Some African Countries 1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population (Million)</th>
<th>G.N.P. (in U.S. $ per capita)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## TABLE II

Industrial Origin Of The G.N.P. Of Some African Countries

In %, 1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Forests, Fish</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Manufac-</th>
<th>Trade &amp; Transport</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I shows the Gross National Product per capita of some selected African countries. A salient feature of the table is the marked poverty of the East African States as indicated by the low G.N.P.

Table 2 gives a helpful data in assessing the low level of industrialization and the dependence of East African countries on agriculture. Even the few industries available are geared towards the processing of agricultural and primary production for exports. Production figures and other measures that would be desirable for closer comparison are not available, but it is quite clear that Kenya has the largest industrial development. It has a number of food industries and a considerable number of textiles and shoe factories. Uganda has some food and cotton industries while Tanzania produces some limited forest industries, building materials including cement and traditional food products.

In general, the preceding analysis has been intended to give a background information to the East African countries. Incidentally, the survey has gone some way towards demonstrating the capabilities of the respective countries. Geographically, the two great rift zones, the Kilimanjaro and Kenya mountains may have provided barriers of immense proportions for mechanized agriculture yet the landform disadvantage should not be exaggerated. For example,

Uganda has the greatest hydroelectric potential, however, with a developable capacity of at least 2 million
kilowatts on the Nile alone... The Owen Falls plant can be expanded, while another very favorable site occurs only 4.5 miles downstream. 13

Similarly, the topography and climate of Kenya has made the country a centre of tourist attraction in East Africa. Demographically, the population of East Africa is seizable but it is unevenly distributed on the land area. Poor health, high illiteracy rate, incidence of tradition and tribal conflicts have inhibited efficiency and lowered manpower quality in the territories. Economically the East African countries belong to the class of "under-developed states", where, because of scarce capital, industrialization is scanty, productivity is low and the economy is primarily agrarian. Rate of growth of both Gross National Product and industrial output may continue to be disappointing owing to the poor natural resources and the outmoded system of cultivation. But dismal as this picture of the East African economies may appear, the intangible side of the countries' capabilities is not so unattractive. The extent to which leadership, political institutions and ideology have influenced political stability of the East African states will be examined in the succeeding chapter.

CHAPTER II

DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

For a new state, foreign policy is domestic policy pursued by other means; it is domestic policy carried beyond the boundaries of the state.1 -R.C. Good, Neutralism and Nonalignment, p. 12.

Professor Hermann has charged that students of international affairs have "displayed considerable reluctance to delve into the domestic factors that distinguish one nation's policies from another's. On the other hand, scholars of comparative politics, with their knowledge of political institutions and processes, have rarely considered the effect of various political arrangements on foreign policy."2 If a research worker can underplay the influence of domestic factors in the study of the foreign policy of developed countries, such action would be even more undesirable for a successful appraisal of the foreign policy of the East African states.

For European countries with an international life going back over many centuries...not only is the subject matter abundant for the research-worker, but there is also a historical perspective which furnishes a more integrated

---


view of the flux of events, enabling us to determine the causes of the phenomena observed with more certainty and precision. Black Africa possesses neither this long practice in international life, which allows of broad historical perspectives, nor state structures that have stood the test of time and use, nor a philosophy of political power enabling the personal idiosyncrasies of leaders to be disregarded, in theory at least.

But, in spite of this, the contents of politics have always been the struggle for power whether in the developed or the developing countries, locally or on the international level. In most cases, decisions affecting both domestic and foreign policies are determined by the same appropriate body. In the new states, for example, formal independence has been achieved, the legal myths of sovereignty have been donned and national elites are put in position to make policies based on national interest.

The policies are usually intended to consolidate the fruits and ideals of independence, to provide better standards of living, protect the people against external aggression and promote national identity.

Nowadays the distinction between home and foreign policy is largely a matter of practical convenience; they are two scales in the same balance, two aspects of the indivisible reality.


Often times, internal factors project into the international scene while, correspondingly, external relations may have serious effects on domestic policy. In this chapter, attempts will be made to correlate the role of political institutions, quality of leadership, ideology and the psychological influence of governmental stability within the framework of national policy.

LEADERSHIP

"One of the great questions of history is whether situations make leaders or whether it is the completely accidental appearance of a certain man that makes history go one way or another." Would there have been a Tanzania without Julius Nyerere? Would Uganda have remained a unified nation without Milton Obote? Would there have been peace in multi-racial Kenya without Kenyatta? It is difficult to provide any satisfactory answers to these questions. This is because most African countries depend for leadership on a handful of men. In many of the countries it is hard to see beyond a single figure. This apparent inability to provide alternative, efficient leadership reflects the youthfulness of the African states and the under-

5

developed condition of their state machines. But this youth contrasts with the age of the societies which the states enclose. Unlike the traditional societies where state machineries were simple and the position of the leader secularized, the implications of democracy and modern state management involve enlightenment, tolerance, compromise and shrewd understanding of the complex factors in international relations. Today, mere nationalist impulses are not sufficient pre-requisites for effective leadership. Education, charisma and ability to unite national elites, control over political processes, insight, perception of dangers and ability to avoid disasters go along with leadership.

In Kenya, President Jomo Kenyatta is regarded as the embodiment of nationhood. Since independence, he has been acclaimed as the most important single symbol of national identification and described as

the indispensable keystone holding together the disparate segments of the governing Kenya African National Union, and as the one authoritative voice capable of reassuring the country's remaining 55,000 European settlers that independence would not usher in another Congo. 6

As an unimpeachable freedom fighter, jailed and persecuted in the process of decolonization, he has endeared himself to the people with a charisma that is indispensable in the new state building. Similarly, as a member of the dominant

Kikuyu tribe and a paternal figure in an age-group conscious society, Kenyatta commands the allegiance of the majority of the Kenya people. Above all, in contemporary African politics where provincialism and local interests have resulted in the overthrow of various civilian governments, he has chosen to be pragmatic rather than ideological, moderate rather than radical. These character traits have helped tremendously in accommodating the ambitious elite group and in projecting national goals above partisan interests. Abroad, Kenyatta's popularity and prestige continue to increase in spite of his seldom travelling beyond the country's borders.

Tanzania is led by an extraordinarily popular and able leader, President Julius Nyerere. With a Masters degree in history and economics, Nyerere is usually regarded as one of the intellectual leaders in Africa. A "militant nationalist", as he often regards himself, he is essentially ideological, radical but humanitarian. Some observers feel that Nyerere's personality and temperament reflect the kind of leadership needed for political development in a backward economy with a dearth of technical and entrepreneurial personnel and an excessive dependence on subsistence agriculture. His eloquence and organizational ability have borne an indelible imprint on the Tanganyika African National Union. In a country with high illiteracy and lack of forceful elite groups, he inherits the dominant position in policy formulation. Despite the fact that
he comes from the Zanaki, which constitutes one of the smallest tribes in Tanganyika, his qualification, as the most enlightened man allow him to enjoy a reign of office that cannot be successfully challenged by other members of his party.

In contrast to Tanzania, leadership in Uganda is more complicated and unstable. Until recently, it was difficult to locate the effective leader of the country. This confusion was caused by the cleavage between the traditionalist Buganda's Kabaka and the more modern Prime Minister Milton Obote. This implies that for some time nobody really maintained a monopoly of power. The existence of a small but well-educated African elite (Makerere University College was established in 1921) made competition for leadership more pronounced. However,

it is generally agreed that the progress which Uganda made toward nationhood between 1961 and 1964 was due largely to the tactical skill of Prime Minister Obote and the tacit cooperation of younger Baganda politicians whose ideological sympathies lie with Mr. Obote's party even if they dare not risk an open break with the Buganda establishment. 7

In attempting to reconcile modern politics with tribal traditions, Obote has quietly and methodically cut his way through hardships involving the use of diplomacy and ruthlessness. As a member of Langi, one of the smallest tribes from northern Uganda, Obote lacks the overwhelming prestige

of Kenya's veteran nationalist, Jomo Kenyatta. Neither does he possess the personal magnetism of his other East African neighbour, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. But in spite of these drawbacks, Obote is one of the shrewdest African diplomats. In his initial attempts to unite the country and improve his political base, he married his Baganda secretary in November 1963. At the time of independence, he headed a coalition government that would have united the north with Buganda. But following the persistent outbreak of unrest and the competitive claim of the Kabaka to leadership in 1966, Obote swiftly out-maneuvered his rival, drove him to exile, put five of his leading ministers into detention, suspended the constitution and established the foundation for eventual dictatorship. Thus, Obote proved that deference and overwhelming allegiance to leadership may not be automatic in many states but personal initiative may create the atmosphere necessary for political tranquility. Meanwhile Obote is maintaining an uneasy peace as the dissidence of the traditionalist Baganda seems controlled.

STABILITY, IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

"Political stability is a condition in which there is continuity of government, and in which some reliable prediction is possible regarding the broad course of policy."

---

Theoretically there are two forms of stable government; one is an entrenched dictatorship which guarantees the continuity of both government and policy for a considerable length of time. The other form of stable government allows for changes in both policy and leadership of the nation through constitutional and orderly processes. However, both forms of government operate on ideology and the use of institutions.

Ideology is a response to reality. It maintains solidarity and identity and promotes its own durability. Ideology not only rationalizes, explaining the reasons for the present situation; it also points the way to the future goal. 9

Although the East African leaders may not have provided ideologies that apply to countries beyond their frontiers, catch phrases and principles such as "African Socialism", "One-Party State" and "African Personality" have been constantly used to dramatize state goals and policies.

In Kenya, African socialism means a social, democratic kind of welfare state that reflects government development planning which gives no hindrance to entrepreneurial capitalism. In the words of Jomo Kenyatta,

we shall continue to play our part, in accelerating capital accumulation. And we are determined to accelerate economic growth within the context of African Socialism, meaning that both the Government and private enterprise

---

will have a contribution to make. 10

In fact, in the attempt to give credence to his version of African Socialism, Jomo Kenyatta issued his Sessional Paper Ten, which provided safeguards for private property and inducements for foreign investments. Investment allowances and special taxation privileges were likewise granted entrepreneurs along with the provisions of the Foreign Investments Protection Bill which allow free movements of capital within and outside the country. A pledge against fears of nationalization was made in view of the fact that, "nationalization will not serve to advance the cause of African Socialism". Simultaneously, the government pledged a policy of tariff protection to pioneer and infant industries so that they could compete favourably with foreign investments. To ease the domestic ills of unemployment, however, the government pleaded with the private entrepreneurs to expand training of skilled personnel to include African secondary school leavers. It is contended that increased personnel training would encourage rapid Africanization of managerial life both in the public sector and in the business corporation.

In Tanzania, the political philosophy of African Socialism is widely different from that of Kenya. In an

---


11 Ibid, p. 79.
attempt to provide a theoretical base for the government planning of the economy, Julius Nyerere put forward the idea of 'Ujamaa' in 1962. 'Ujamaa' supposedly dramatizes the socio-economic behaviour of Africans in the traditional society.

'Ujamaa', then, or 'familyhood' describes our socialism. It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man. In this notion, Nyerere tried to emphasize the communal nature of the African society, where "nobody starved, whether of food or human dignity, because he lacked personal wealth; he could depend on the wealth possessed by the community of which he was a member. That was socialism. That is socialism."14

Therefore, Nyerere exhorted his people to go back to the traditional African custom of landholding whereby land belonged to the community and the individual's "right to land was simply the right to use it". He further urged that the capitalist attitude of mind which colonialism brought to Africa, with its emphasis on individualism, must be reject-

12 Ujamaa is one of those Swahili words which cannot be satisfactorily translated into English. For present purposes, 'familyhood', 'brotherhood', or 'friendship' could be substituted.


ed altogether. Whether or not this tenacious clinging to traditional values is conducive to modern economic development is debatable. Nkrumah was probably correct when he asserted that

Today the phrase 'African socialism' seems to espouse the view that the traditional African society was a classless society imbued with the spirit of humanism and to express a nostalgia for that spirit. Such a conception of socialism makes a fetish of the communal African society. Colonialism deserves to be blamed for many evils in Africa, but surely it was not preceded by an African Golden Age or paradise. A return to pre-colonial African society is evidently not worthy of the ingenuity and efforts of our people. 15

Here, it is interesting to note that Nkrumah and Nyerere who often shared similar views and deep sentiments on many aspects of African politics seem to be distinctly opposed on the interpretation of African Socialism.

However, in his attempt to be practical and increase the credibility of African socialism in relation to the Tanzanian economy, President Nyerere instituted the self-reliance, socialist blueprint of the Arusha Declaration in


16 Also note the contradiction in the operational definition of African Socialism between Kenyatta and Nyerere. The concept of socialism is elusive in the African context. It is hard to get consensus on what socialism means especially when one compares the definition of left-wing African nationalists with that of the moderates. But, with varying shades of distinction and emphasis, theorists on African socialism usually invoke African traditional life both as the basis of the concept as well as the major factor which distinguishes it from the European socialism. See Kenneth Grundy, "The Class Struggle in Africa: An Examination of Conflicting Theories", Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 2, No. 3, November 1964, p. 379.
1967. The rationale for the inward-looking policy was simple. Tanzania as a poor country would have to raise itself by its bootstraps and the operation would have to be based largely on agricultural production. Certain parts of the money economy had been infiltrated by local, eminent politicians who have used their offices to profit from foreign investment and capitalism. In accordance with the self-help philosophy, "mercenary politicians" would have to be denied active participation in the government. TANU officials could not own or participate in business enterprises; in other words, leaders could not receive more than one salary. Finally, self-reliance would replace expectation of and dependence on foreign aid. As expected, the Tanzanian elites were cool towards this socialist and almost ascetic doctrine. It would seem as if President Nyerere was the sole protagonist of the Declaration although the doctrine has now received the official stamp of the government and the TANU. It could be assumed that Nyerere has succeeded in convincing his people that the nature of Tanzania's economic ailment warranted such drastic surgery.

On his own, President Milton Obote of Uganda has been too pre-occupied with establishing a firm domestic political base and prestige to give any philosophical depth to the socio-economic relations of the Uganda people. Therefore, it is hard to give any fair appraisal of what he would call African socialism. All that can be said is that with a liberal attitude to foreign investments and the capitalist
attitudes of the elites, Milton Obote would probably favour an African socialism as defined by Jomo Kenyatta. For example, in October 1967, the Ugandan Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Kalema, said that, "the government would continue to allow private investors to operate alongside government-owned organizations because we believe that in Uganda, there is room for both private and public investment".

Another basic value that pervades the political machinery of the East African countries is the "single party system". At independence, the same pattern of British parliamentary democracy could be observed in all the countries. But some years after, leaders began to put forth their ideas and assessments of the two-party system. The general attitude of the leaders could be summed up in Julius Nyerere's remarks that:

Our own parties had a very different origin. They were not formed to challenge any ruling group of our own people; they were formed to challenge the foreigners who ruled over us. They were not, therefore, political "parties" - i.e. factions - but nationalist movements. 18

Here, it is necessary to remark that although the stabilizing and most commonly the unifying role of the party is indisputable in East Africa, yet the structure and ideology of the parties are largely influenced by the leaders'


colonial experiences and their evaluation of domestic needs. In some instances the single-party system is an outgrowth and continuation of the mobilization of people and groups that developed in the pre-independence period. In many cases, the single-party strategy is used by leaders to consolidate their powers, the moreso since there is an obvious interrelationship between the dominance of a single person and the discipline, control and structure of party organization. So long as strong personal leadership continues, mass loyalty would remain structured towards the single figure rather than the party organization.

Kenya manifests rather peculiar characteristics of a one party state. In the early years of independence, Jomo Kenyatta feared that the popular pressures that were mustered against the colonial regime could be directed at him by members of the opposition. This is not difficult to illustrate from events that followed the first election to the Federal Assembly in February, 1961. KANU won nineteen seats to KADU’s eleven. KANU refused to form a government as a protest to facilitate the release of Jomo Kenyatta who had been in detention since the Mau Mau uprising. The colonial administration refused to be influenced. Instead it called on the KADU to form a minority government with

---
19 KADU is an abbreviation for Kenya African Democratic Union which became the official opposition party after the 1963 general elections.
the support of some appointed European and Asian administrators. However, in the 1963 elections, KANU won a greater majority and Jomo Kenyatta was released to become the Prime Minister. Thus, at the time of independence in December 1963, there were two parties in Kenya.

Consequently, Jomo Kenyatta was conscious of the Opposition and the European forces in Kenyan politics. He would do nothing to aggravate race relations nor make speeches that could inflame violence from the tribally-based KADU opposition. Instead he appealed to the Opposition to realize that we have a country to build....that we cannot develop by throwing mud in one another's faces....whether people are KANU or KADU, and no matter to what tribe they belong, the Government knows only citizens. 20

But systematically and firmly, Kenyatta continued to consolidate influence and expanded his political base. On August 13, 1964 he announced that Kenya would henceforth work towards a one-party State. He explained that,

we reject a blueprint of the Western model of a two-party system of Government, because we do not subscribe to the notion of the Government and the governed being in opposition to one another, one clamouring for duties and the other crying for rights. 21

In the same speech, Jomo Kenyatta argued that KADU was not formed on a majority-rule concept but that the leaders of the party were conceited, and unreliable politicians. At this stage Kenyatta guaranteed that a one-party state would


not usher in tyranny nor the deprivation of human rights. KANU, the government party, would ensure freedom of speech, of association and assembly. KANU felt that Kenya could not afford opposition just for the sake of opposition.

On November 10, 1964, Ronald Ngala, leader of the KADU opposition party announced that all members of his parliamentary group would henceforth work with the Government and that KADU has been dissolved. He concluded by paying glowing tributes to Kenyatta and expressed hopes that his action would accelerate detribalization and national unity. Thus, from November 1964 to June 1966 Kenya was a de facto and a de jure one-party state. However, in July 1966, Vice President Oginga Odinga broke off from the KANU to form the Kenya People's Union (KPU). This was a culmination of an intra-party feud involving Tom Mboya over a contest for leadership. Even then and after, Odinga's party did not offset the predominance of the KANU party in Kenya's politics.

In Tanganyika, the one-party system was a result of Nyerere's careful planning. He had earlier propounded that young nations which "emerge as a result of a nationalist movement should first be governed by a nationalist government rather than a party government". Nyerere's contention was that the unity achieved during the struggles against colonialism was fragile and not strong enough to

---

withstand the stresses of nation building. This unity should be consolidated. The desire to institutionalize unity consequently found expression in the one-party system. Two-party politics was considered dangerous especially in a multi-tribal society like Tanganyika. But Nyerere was careful to distinguish the Tanganyikan single party prescription from other forms such as those that operate in the Communist countries. He thought that if membership were open to all and the single party were democratic, minority opinion could be heard without intimidation.

At the time of independence, TANU was already a mass movement and the de facto single party in Tanganyika. It was hierarchically organized and led by a charismatic leader. It faced no organized interest groups and the position of the leaders was secure. But after Nyerere and other top echelons of the Party had been absorbed into the Government in 1961, TANU organization became weakened. Nyerere had to step down as Prime Minister in order to revitalize and reorganize it. In this process TANU membership was extended to everybody, African, non-African, civil Servants or bureaucrats living in Tanganyika who could afford to pay the two-shilling entrance fee. Grassroot party organizations were strengthened and by the time Julius Nyerere returned to the government in 1962, he was in full control of both government and party administration. However, it was not until 1964 that formal steps were taken for the establishment of a Constitution to make Tanganyika
a de jure One-Party state. On January 28, 1964, a Presidential Commission was appointed under the chairmanship of Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa to consider what changes were necessary in the constitution of Tanganyika and the Constitution of TANU, as well as in the practices of government, in order to bring into effect a democratic one-party state. 23

The Commission invited public comment on a large number of party, government, leadership and administrative issues and came out with its Report in March 1965. Besides constituting the basis for the Interim Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of July 1965, the Report accepted that the One-Party State would be a reflection of political reality in Tanzania and that its formalization would be designed to perpetuate that reality into the future, and with it the political stability that was regarded as its product. 24

The Interim Constitution that was passed by Act 43 of 1965 further elevated the Party as the "institutionalized organ of the State subject to the same controls and scrutiny of the Cabinet, Parliament or the Civil Service". No doubt the organizational inheritance of the pre-independence period, lack of organized opposition, the ingenuity of


Nyerere and the social environment in Tanganyika had contributed immensely to the predominance of the TANU party in present-day Tanzania.

But of the three East African countries, none has found it more difficult to attain the one-party status than Uganda. The competitive leadership, the Bugandan parochialism, the complicated federal structure and the position of the traditionalist Kabaka Yekka (KY) party made the road to the one-party system very long and arduous. Milton Obote therefore chose to be pragmatic rather than overtly ideological. But in spite of the caution, the single-party state offered an attraction. The attraction was reinforced by the obstructionist politics of the KY party, the separatist policy of the Kabaka and predominance of the Baganda that arose from the constitutional status guaranteed to Buganda during the pre-independence negotiation. This privileged "legal position of Buganda in the Uganda Constitution (1962) represented the solid achievement of Buganda's negotiating strength, and, until the events of November 1964 after the referendum on the lost counties, it suggested that the Kabaka's Government could effectively insulate Buganda and preserve its constitutional rights by litigation." 26

In the April 1962 general elections Milton Obote's Uganda Peoples Party won thirty-seven of the ninety-one

seats in Parliament. The other seats were won by the Kabaka Yekka Party with twenty-one and the Democratic Party with twenty-four. A coalition government between the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) and the KY was formed under Prime Minister Obote. Some years after the coalition government was formed, there grew evidences of its imminent collapse. By December 1963, forty-eight of the ninety-one deputies in parliament were committed to the UPC. Further defections from both KY and the DP greatly strengthened the position of the UPC at the expense of the Buganda-based KY Party.

While this means that the UPC could now technically govern without Kabaka Yekka's support, Mr. Obote apparently feels that it is safer politically to keep the creaky alliance functioning and avoid a premature polarization between the progressives and neotraditionalists in Buganda.

Meanwhile, Obote permitted constitutional debates on whether Uganda should adopt a unitary or a strong central government in place of the existing loose federation. By the time the coalition government broke down in December 1964, Mr. Obote had already made a statement which outlined the future of Uganda in terms of a single-party system. In a major policy address to a local meeting of the UPC in Lango (Northern Uganda) in 1964, he assailed

the factional and tribal groupings which inevitably divide our endeavour to build national consciousness and embark on the Socialist construction of our society...I am firmly convinced that a one-party state does not ine-

vitably and necessarily remove the opportunity of giving voice to the expression of individual opinion and the giving of constructive criticism...Socialist principles must guide, inform and govern the basis, form and content of all institutions of our society. 28

By then, the UPC had in fact secured control of all elected assemblies in federal states and districts outside Buganda, some by electoral victories, others by defections from the DP.

However, Buganda did not leave Obote's growing powers unchallenged. Early in 1966, violent disruptions broke out in Kampala. Obote took stiff action, created emergency powers, muzzled the opposition, deposed the Kabaka and assumed full control of the government activities. In September 1967, Uganda was proclaimed a Republic and the third Constitution after independence was imposed. Under it, Obote became the President of a unitary state and the long aspiration to build a strong, unified, republican state became almost a reality. In this turn of events, the UPC became the dominant party in the state.

From the foregoing discussion on factors affecting domestic policy in East Africa, one can identify freedom, unity and economic survival as the major and all-pervading themes that concern the leaders. As Jomo Kenyatta once put it

28

their striving, under the law, have the right to be free.29 Because of their colonial experience, the three leaders (Obote, Kenyatta and Nyerere) believe that freedom and unity are necessary conditions for the attainment of other goals. They think that, "a house divided against itself would not stand". They fear communal violence. They want to preserve peace, order and good government. Jomo Kenyatta still remembers the intrigues that surrounded the Mau Mau uprisings of the 1950's. As the central figure, jailed rightly or wrongly for having masterminded the eruption, he is apprehensive of public reactions to bad policies. Similarly, the mutiny of the two battalions of the Tangan­nyikan Army against their British officers in January 1964, and the outbreak of riots and tribal hostilities at Kampala in 1964 and 1966 are vivid illustrations of how easily public order could break down. Therefore, all the leaders are concerned about ways and means to improve communications, suppress tribal sentiments and cement national unity. This is one reason why all the leaders (with varying intensity and methods) prefer a single-party system. This is why the two-party system is rejected and rationalized as a luxury. Opposition parties have also been denounced as saboteurs while the position of the ruling parties has been enhanced.

Economically, the three East African governments have

---

been promoting programmes of development specially attuned to their interpretation of African socialism. Consequently, Socialism has become the *a priori* solution to economic ills. But the extent to which economic factors actually influence both domestic and foreign policies cannot easily be explained as some Marxists or other economic determinists may postulate. In some cases, economic considerations seem to be as important as the freedom and unity theme. In other cases economic factors seem to have played a subordinate role as it appears to be in Tanzania's refusal of aid from West Germany and the rejection of the £21m. loan from Britain over the Rhodesian issue. However, in both Uganda and Kenya where economic structure depends on foreign interests, the governments have tried to establish a "countervailing power" in order to ensure a more equitable distribution of national wealth. Both governments have adopted a creeping Africanization policy with a view to creating more job and business opportunities for the native Africans. For example, in April 1965, the Kenyan Minister for Commerce and Industry urged non-African businessmen to identify themselves with African aspirations by inviting Africans to buy shares in their enterprises. Minister Kiano said "while we do not discriminate against non-Africans in Kenya, the spirit of give and take should pre-

---

30 Circumstances surrounding Tanzania's action will be explained later in the thesis.
Currently, both the Ugandan and the Kenyan governments are selective in their issuing of business permits to their Asians with British passports. It would appear that both governments are not only advocating the operation of African Socialism as such but the Africanization of capitalism as well. According to Jomo Kenyatta:

The purpose of our Africanization programme is simple: to maintain an efficient and effective machine of Government by and for Kenya's people....We need at many levels not only talent and loyalty, but also experience. This is why training schemes have been instituted, and must be continued, to equip our people for posts of high responsibility, and give them opportunity to gain the maturity that comes from experience. 32

Finally, it should be remembered that in East Africa, independence was the result of successful nationalist revolutions. The colonial administration was accused of economic exploitation and blamed for the slow rate of social transformation of the Africans. Conscious of their tasks to eradicate diseases, poor nutrition and illiteracy, the three governments have embarked upon various projects intended to expedite modernization. But modernization cannot be defined in exclusively Western values. For image and cultural reasons, the East African governments are selective about the import of modernization "appearances" which seem to conflict with their criteria of ethics and tradi-


32 Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee! p. 3.
tional values. As evidenced in the new slogans of "African personality", contemporary East African nationalism seeks to display the social and cultural uniqueness of the people to the rest of the world. Mini-skirts are banned in Uganda and frowned at in Kenya. Tanzania has recently published her "cultural revolution" policy. It rejects not only radical Western dressing but outlaws the primitive culture of the Masais. Similarly, Nyerere defies capitalism because of its emphasis on materialism and its distortion of the egalitarian principles of African Society. Conversely, Jomo Kenyatta and Milton Obote have embraced capitalism with qualifications. For them, there is nothing inherently bad in it under governmental control and supervision. Kenyatta believes that mutual social responsibility conceives of the state as a means by which self-interest is harmonized with the general welfare. But generally, all the leaders believe that Africaness should not be sacrificed for political modernization or economic development. For them, modernization should blend, not destroy African identity, traditional values and culture.

33 In a recent debate on cultural nationalism Senator Kabaso said in the Kenya Parliament that "Our ministers are the worst offenders. They are the policymakers who preach African socialism, yet their women have hair that looks like sisal." Another Kenya politician, G. Kariuki (KANU) declared that wearing of a miniskirt was "just like a woman advertising herself, and this is very unfair and we cannot tolerate this in our African socialism." See Ali A. Mazrui, "Miniskirts and Political Puritanism", Africa Report, Vol. 13, No.7, Oct. 1968, p. 12.
Considering these attempts of leaders to integrate political modernization with tradition, one can see the inter-relationship between domestic and foreign policies. For the decision-makers both foreign and domestic policies should enhance the ideals and fruits of independence. Unity, political stability, economic developments and security are the basics of domestic policy. Foreign policy is a logical extension and tool for achieving the ends.
CHAPTER THREE

EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION AND PAN-AFRICANISM

From Tangier or Cairo in the North to Capetown in the South, from Cape Guardafui in the East to Cape Verde Islands in the West, Africa is one and indivisible.
- Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, p. 127.

PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE O.A.U.

The concept of pan-Africanism is almost universally accepted among African leaders, but its potential lies more in the ideal it expresses than in its practicability. As an ideal, it is capable of bringing together many leaders who embrace conflicting views on almost every issue facing Africa. Pan-Africanism has many aspects and interpretations. The most consistent theme that runs through the literature on the subject seems to be the general concern among African leaders that some form of co-operation is necessary to insure the economic development, decolonization and political stability of African states.

In the early 1960's, it was rare for most African leaders to make a speech of any importance without touching upon the theme of African unity. Pan-Africanism became romanticized. It sought to glorify the African mystique of unity and brotherhood. Some leaders propounded theories about the necessity of unity. Even with the rapid achievement of independence among African States in 1960, the struggle for unification was intensified; yet there was
no consensus on the ideal pan-Africanism. For some leaders pan-Africanism meant a total political unity of all independent African states; for others it was a desire for functional cooperation on such matters as economic development and communication. For example, the All-African People's Conference which met in Accra, Ghana in 1958 under Tom Mboya of Kenya resolved that:

Pan-Africanism calls for the amalgamation of independent African states into regional federations or groupings on the basis of geographical contiguity, economic interdependence, and linguistic and cultural affinity, with the caveat, however, that the establishment of such regional federations should not be prejudicial to the ultimate objective of a Pan-African Commonwealth. 1

For President Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika pan-Africanism meant a political federation of all African states. In 1963, he contended that Africa unity was necessary prerequisite for survival. He went on:

For the sake of all African states, large or small, African Unity must come and it must be real unity. Our goal must be a United States of Africa. Only this can really give Africa the future her people deserve after centuries of economic uncertainty and social oppression. This goal must be achieved and it does not matter whether this is done by one step or by many, or through economic, political or social development. 2

However, in May, 1963 leaders of twenty-eight African countries met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to find a more coherent definition of pan-Africanism. In a long debate about whether or not African countries should adopt a monolithic,

2 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 189.
political amalgamation, Prime Minister Obote of Uganda spoke in favour of Ghana's proposal for a "strong executive, central government with effective powers". Kenya, still a British colony, was represented by Oginga Odinga, who was also a representative for the twenty-one nationalist parties in dependent states of Africa. He also favoured a political unity of African states.

On May 25, the twenty-eight leaders signed the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. The Charter represented, "a compromise between radically differing views of African unity, between those who thought of African unity as a symbolic and tactical aspect of a revolutionary movement and those who thought of it as an alliance between sovereign states to protect their newly acquired status in the world community." Among other things, the Charter recognized the territorial integrity of each independent, sovereign, member state, condemned outside interference in the internal affairs of states and emphasized the need for greater understanding and cooperation among the members. The Charter also expressed the desire for rapid decolonization in Africa and condemned racial discrimination in South Africa.


During the Summit meeting, Oginga Odinga, the Vice-President of the Kenya African National Union, read a memorandum urging that an African Liberation Bureau be set up in the capital of an independent African country for the purpose of coordinating the liberation struggles of the dependent states in Africa. He also recommended that the Conference issue "an ultimatum to all colonial and racist powers in Africa to start immediately, the transference of power to the African peoples in the dependent territories, or else face the consequences". This theme was echoed by President Nyerere. As the last head of state to address the Conference, he summarized his feelings on pan-Africanism and the need for rapid decolonization in Africa.

In order then to complete this picture of unanimity, let me add Tanganyika's voice....At present, not because of any greater dedication to the cause of freedom in Africa, but because of that proximity to non-independent Africa, we are already making a humble contribution to the liberation of Southern Africa, but we are prepared to do more....I want to assure our gallant brother from Algeria, Prime Minister Ben Bella, that we in Tanganyika are prepared to die a little for the final removal of the humiliation of colonialism from the face of Africa.  

Thus, by the end of the Summit Conference at Addis Ababa in 1963, pan-Africanism assumed two more distinct forms. First, as a means of preserving the newly won independence, the Charter ensures respect for sovereignty and territorial

---


integrity of member-states. Second, as a means to combat colonialism and imperialism, the Summit called for rapid transference of powers to the dependent territories. It also pledged specific sums of money and military equipment, to nationalist movements through the Liberation Coordinating Committee. It is significant to note that the East African leaders who formerly favoured African unity in terms of political amalgamation also came out strongly in favour of rapid decolonization. Milton Obote even tried to demonstrate his support for liberation forces by offering his country as a base for nationalist movements against South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia. He said that, "if the latter country (Southern Rhodesia) should succeed in obtaining independence with a white minority government all independent African States should break off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom and her fellow-travellers." Consequently, from the activities of the East

However, it is interesting to note that when, on November 11, 1965, Ian Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia independence, only Tanzania of the three East African States honoured her pledge to sever diplomatic relations with Britain. The extra-ordinary OAU meeting of December 3, 1965 had adopted a strong resolution in favour of this action if Britain failed to crush the Smith Government by December 15. Other countries which severed relations, with Britain were: Guinea, Ghana, UAR, Mali, Mauritania, Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan, Algeria and Somalia. Uganda, which was the first country to recommend severing of diplomatic relations with Britain as a measure of protest against the minority government in Rhodesia, clearly failed to honour her pledge.
African States at the first O.A.U. Conference at Addis Ababa, it would appear that there was a shift in emphasis from outright political unity of independent African states to total emancipation of the dependent territories.

THE EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION

On June 5, 1963, Prime Ministers Kenyatta and Obote and President Nyerere jointly declared their intention to establish a federation by the end of the year. In their communiqué at Nairobi, they declared that:

Our meeting is motivated by the spirit of Pan-Africanism and not by mere selfish Regional interests... We believe that the East African Federation can be a practical step towards the goal of Pan-African Unity.8

Simultaneously, a timetable was established and a Working Party was set up to draft a Federal Constitution. On July 31, 1963, Jomo Kenyatta expressed the need for federation when he said that:

This matter of the Federation is particularly important to us here in East Africa. We do not want to be separated from our brethren by artificial frontiers, created at the time of Colonialism... We want to move towards that unity of the East African people in good order and with our administrative machinery geared to the great task ahead.9

However, it is questionable whether there was a genuine political commitment on the parts of Kenyatta and Obote

---

8 See the complete text of the Communique in Appendix 1.
9 Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee, p. 28.
towards an East African Federation. In fact, a case can be made that appeals to Pan-Africanism and the Declaration to federate were being used to procure Kenya's independence. Kenya was a British colony at the time the Nairobi Declaration was signed. An appeal was dispatched to Britain that:

We must declare most strongly our opposition to any attempt to delay the country's achievement of Independence any longer ... We must regard it as an unfriendly act if Britain uses the pretext of some minority interest or other to prevent Kenya joining the free nations at the earliest possible moment. We are closely involved in this matter now since a hold-up in Kenya's advance to Independence will hinder the achievement of Federation to which we are committed.10

Soon after the first meeting of the Working Party, Mr. Tom Mboya headed a delegation to press the Kenyan demands in London. The delegation met with Mr. Duncan Sandys, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies. As a result of the meeting, Kenya's independence was set for December 12, 1963. In Mr. Sandys' report to the

British House of Commons, he said that the decision of the East African States to federate was, "an important new development...which has to be taken into account in the timing of Kenya's independence." He went on that the East African Governments had affirmed their intention to establish a federation before the end of the year and had already "made substantial progress in working out the constitution". He concluded that it was "in the light of these considerations" that such an early date had been set for Kenya's independence.

If the Nairobi Declaration were assessed from the point of view of Kenyan decolonization, then, it could be assumed that pan-Africanist ideals had been used to advantage. That the Declaration to federate was a strategy primarily intended to procure Kenya's independence could also be inferred from Prime Minister Obote's speech to the backbenchers' conference in May 1964. Explaining the unwillingness of Uganda to enter into a political federation with other East African States, he said, "the idea of Federation had been put forward as an argument to speed Kenya's independence....the first objective of the Nairobi meeting was to achieve Kenya's independence....regardless of..."

---

Also see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Britain, July 2, 1963, Vol. 680, Col. 201 or Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee! p. 28.
of what people today are alleging." Jomo Kenyatta seemed to support this view in his speech at Kisumu Nyansa on August 2, 1964 when he said that the Declaration of East African Federation was intended to lure the British Government to decolonize Kenya. However, President Nyerere, apparently unimpressed with the interpretations of Prime Ministers Obote and Kenyatta, said in Dar-es-Salaam in August 1964, that he had signed the Nairobi Declaration, "in all honesty, believing that federation was genuinely wanted." But assuming that Prime Ministers Kenyatta and Obote were right, could the "diplomacy of independence" be the only motivation for proposals of the East African Federation? In the Nairobi Declaration, for example, it was mentioned that, "an important factor in view of our determination to achieve Federation is the existence of a shared currency, a leading aspect of economic working together is the functioning of the E.A. Common Market".

The Common Market Organization itself was an economic institution that was established by the colonial powers in 1948. It was intended to be a first step towards political integration. It operated under a permanent executive au-

12 Uganda Argus, Kampala, June 27, 1964.


authority called the East Africa High Commission. The High Commission was composed of the Governors of the three East African territories. A Secretariat consisting of the Administrator, Legal and Financial Secretaries, the Postmaster General and the Commissioner for Transport was established in Nairobi. The immediate goal of the Common Market Organization was the promotion of a high degree of economic integration i.e. the elimination of duplication in administration and of competition in such matters as railway, postal services, the facilitation of labour mobility and the adoption of a common currency and a common market.

After some years, the Organization became the subject of frequent criticisms. Its critics contended that the Organization was specially created to benefit the Kenya Europeans. So vigorous and disturbing were the criticisms that Sir Jeremy Raisman was appointed to head a Commission to investigate the complaints in 1960. In its report, the Commission recommended the "creation of a common pool of income to compensate Uganda and Tanganyika for the revenues and employment benefits these two territories customarily lose through the tendency of new industry to locate near existing industry - i.e. in Kenya." The 1961 recommendations of the Raisman Commission led to the establishment

---

of the Distributable Pool Fund to serve two purposes; "one was that of providing an independent source of revenue for the common services; the other was to provide a fiscal redistribution between the territories."

When Tanganyika became independent on December 9, 1961, there was need for a revitalization of the Common Market Organization. The executive authority of the East African Common Services Organization (EASCO as it was then called) passed to the Chief Ministers of the territories. Four ministerial committees were established in charge of Communications, Finance, Commercial and Industrial Coordination, Social and Research Services. Like the former Common Market Organization the EASCO was not entirely satisfactory and instead of its projected unifying role it served as a medium of dissension. Soon after its formation, disputes arose over equity - distribution of funds and allocation of faculties among the three colleges comprising the University of East Africa. In February 1963, Uganda decided to withdraw from the East African Tourist Travel Association because of alleged disparities. Efforts to achieve free movement of capital and labour for the realization of full benefits from the customs union were already being hampered by technical difficulties.

Similarly, there has been reluctance to accept the principle that capital generated in one country should be

---

A Ugandan who announced his intention to invest in Kenya early this year ran into severe difficulties with his own government.\footnote{Op.cit., p. 6.}

Stresses within the common market became more serious as industries and commercial activity congregated increasingly around Nairobi thereby making Uganda and Tanganyika equalizing factors seemed to illustrate an imminent collapse of the E.A.S.C.O. and although the Organization itself may have been advantageous to the region as a whole Tanzania and Uganda were getting disenchanted. Perhaps an abandonment of the E.A.S.C.O. would have been more logical than its continuation but the leaders, particularly President Nyerere probably thought that a political union and a better organized, central economic planning would redress the imbalance in the Organization. Therefore, the Nairobi Declaration was timely, for the idea of East African Federation could be used to de-emphasize regional disparities and marshal greater co-operation.

Now, why did the East African leaders fail to agree despite the fact that after the first meeting of the Working Party for Federal Constitution, the Kenyan Minister of Justice, Tom Mboya told reporters that "agreements had been reached on every issue".\footnote{Tanganyika Standard, (Dar-es-Salaam), June 11, 1963.} Four broad reasons can be given. Firstly, the leaders of the three states appear to have had various degrees of commitment to the federation
idea. Prime Ministers Obote and Kenyatta seem to have put their priorities on Kenyan independence and, therefore, regarded the Nairobi Declaration as a form of diplomacy to achieve this goal. President Nyerere seems to have upheld a different idea. For him the creation of the East African Federation was the most essential purpose of the Nairobi Declaration.

Secondly, constitutional problems began to arise in Kampala on June 29, 1963. The Ugandan representative in the Working Party, Mr. Nekyon, who was also the Minister of Information in his government, gave a formidable list of matters, "on which agreement had still to be reached - the Civil Service, the selection of a federal capital, the number of chambers in the federal legislature and the powers they should have, citizenship, the division of powers between the federal and state governments with respect to foreign affairs, minerals and agriculture and whether residual powers should belong to the federal government or the states".19

On citizenship, for example, Uganda proposed that the East African citizenship be conferred on all citizens of the three territories should not become the citizen of another; in other words,

East African citizenship was to be merely an expression of a loose federation. Kenya and Tanganyika maintained that citizenship should be an all-pervading, common denominator that would guarantee equal status to every subject irrespective of residence. Citizenship and foreign affairs were held to be so essential to federation that Minister Kambona of Tanganyika said, "without these powers, there can be no question of a genuine political association". Uganda denied this and charged others with being too presumptuous in assuming that "there is a standard model which must be followed in all cases". Uganda's determination to retain power over external relations was also argued with reference to the already established membership of the international community and the OAU. Since these Organizations recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, Uganda argued that "East Africa's strongest weapon in international affairs is its three separate votes and voices in the United Nations." Kenya and Tanganyika rejected these arguments on the ground that federation would be meaningless without federal control over citizenship and foreign affairs.


Thirdly, domestic pressures and personality conflicts aroused distrust among the leaders. In Uganda, the traditionalist Buganda and the Kabaka wanted to keep their privileged status and did not want to be assimilated into any other federal structure besides Uganda's. In fact, a resolution had been passed as far back as January 26, 1963 in the Lukiko, (regional legislature) opposing any other political union.

Five days after the Nairobi Declaration, a closed session of the Lukiko was presented by the Kabaka's Cabinet with a statement of policy which viewed East African Federation with favour on condition that Buganda be one of its constituent units. This was said to be necessary to guarantee the future not only of its monarchy and other traditional institutions but also of its very identity. 23

As the Ugandan Federal Government was most unwilling to accept the Kabaka's terms, Obote felt compelled to be cautious on negotiations about the East African Federation. Similarly, in Kenya, the Kikuyu and the Luo predominant, ethnic groups wanted to enter into the federation as separate, constituent units. They were being supported by the KADU opposition party. On June 17, 1964, Jomo Kenyatta told the House of Representatives that, "if it was not for a KADU nuisance, we would have federated a long time ago.... If it was not for the introduction of majimbo* by KADU,


* Majimbo is a Swahili word for provincialism or regionalism or tribalism.
the Federation would have been much easier". But, apart from tribal feelings, there were indications of acrimony and silent distrust among the various leaders over the race for top posts in the proposed federation. Even some of the junior leaders were reported to be apprehensive of their chances and status if the federation should materialize. However, the accusation of personal aggrandizement should be directed to the three heads of Government who were more disposed to contest for the highest posts in the federation. According to J.H. Proctor,

Neither Dr. Nyerere nor Mr. Kenyatta was invulnerable to such accusations, for the former was an ardent federalist and the latter was certain to be offered the top position in the Federal Government. The reluctance of Dr. Obote was said by some to be due to his awareness that he would be doomed to a distinctly secondary position at the federal level since the other two Heads of Government so clearly surpassed him in stature.

When for example, Mr. A. Nekyon expressed the opinion in September 1963 that federation would be "practically impossible" before the end of the year the Financial Times correspondent in Nairobi wrote that:

Mr. Nekyon's statement appears to be a bargaining counter rather than a serious threat. But it has brought to light the rivalries and fears that plague Uganda's relationship with Kenya both nationally and personally. Now that more of the implications of federation are known, there is a real fear in Uganda of domination by Kenya. 26

---


Fourthly, the time factor may have become one of the greatest obstacles to federation. As President Nyerere prophesied shortly before the Nairobi Declaration, "time may well not be on the side of federation".

The fact is that there is the right moment for everything, and the right moment for unity is certainly not after the achievement of separate sovereign independence. If separate independence is inevitable we should certainly not give up trying, but it is going to be much harder task to unite our countries.27

Nyerere was under no illusion of how difficult negotiations could be except before all the three countries achieved independence. Both Uganda and Tanganyika were sovereign states when the Nairobi Declaration was made in 1963. As a historian, Nyerere had learnt that federations designed from previously independent and sovereign units had never really been easy, except those built under an extremely powerful force. It could hardly be anticipated that force would ever be used to impose federation in East Africa. The structure of power, the ostensible pacifist policies of the three leaders, the diversities in population and poor logistics inevitably make negotiation as opposed to confrontation the only vehicle for integration.

Nyerere's prophesy was right after all. When Mr. A. Nekyon was giving the report of the Working Party to the Uganda National Assembly in July 1963, he said:

We are negotiating now as independent states and when we sit at the conference table we talk as if we are talking at Geneva on disarmament. We

27 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 98.
are not talking on friendly terms as relations or as clans, but we are speaking as different states discussing their own future... We appreciate we are brothers but we will do everything in our power to see that Uganda gets her due share irrespective of our relations.28

In addition to the above reasons for the failure of the leaders to federate East Africa, one other factor deserves to be mentioned, though it is difficult to assess its actual significance. There were alleged to be external forces opposed to federation. The allegations have not been adequately substantiated but on June 23, 1964, The Nationalist paper (Nairobi) accused the United States and Britain of sabotage in the materialization of the East African federation. The paper contended that an East African federation would hasten the liquidation of white rule in Rhodesia and Mozambique against Western interest. Similarly, Mr. J.S. Gichuru, the Kenyan Minister of Finance said that, "it was these outside influences which got in our way. If we had been left alone, I am quite sure we would have done much more up to this moment".29 However, it is difficult to admit the above allegations of external subversion since Britain earlier granted Kenyan independence as a mark of support for the proposed federation.

While there has been lack of evidence to support the alleged Anglo-American subversion, there is evidence of continental disapproval especially from Ghana. Nkrumah’s

lofty ideas of pan-Africanism did not admit of regional integration as proposed by the East African leaders. In his book on Africa Must Unite, he wrote in particular reference to the federation that:

In order to improve effectively and quickly the serious damage done to Africa as a result of imperialism and colonialism, the emergent African States need strong, unitary states capable of exercising a central authority for the mobilization of the regional effort and the co-ordination of reconstruction and progress. For this reason, I consider that even the idea of regional federations in Africa is fraught with many dangers. There is the danger of the development of regional loyalties fighting against each other. In effect, regional federations are a form of balkanization on a grand scale.30

Nkrumah's disapproval of the East African federation was also expressed with charges of a neo-colonialist plot intending to perpetuate Western hegemony in Africa. Consequently, efforts to federate in East Africa were bitterly attacked by the Government-controlled newspapers in Accra while the "Ghanaian officials in East Africa engaged in an unrestrained public diplomatic offensive as well as clandestine lobbying against the project".31

Now it seems that economic and social forces are not automatically leading to political unification but leaders have not given up all hopes. In the words of President

---


Kenyatta:

It is true we made a declaration that we were going to federate at the end of 1963, but it was impossible to do so at that time. We as a Government have laid down our plans, but we cannot do all things we have promised overnight. Even angels could not do this. It is impossible for me to give you the date when Federation will be.32

However, if this remark is not entirely a gloomy appraisal

32 Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!, p. 32.
of past efforts to federate, it is a reflection of the intractable problems that had beset the paths of unity. Laying the foundation stone of the East African Common Services Organization regional headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam on July 15, 1965, President Nyerere noted:

The failure of East Africa to federate is a great shame. So, I repeat, we prefer federation. But if our neighbours prefer a looser form of cooperation in the form of the Common Market and the Common Services, I pledge Tanzania's full cooperation in maintaining them. 33

By 1966 there grew the impression that the best that could be expected of the former grandiose attempt to federate was greater economic cooperation among the states. Therefore, on June 6, 1967, Kenyatta, Obote and Nyerere signed a treaty of economic cooperation in Kampala which became operative on December 1, 1967. The treaty established a Community between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda for the purpose of bringing balanced development to the three countries. The treaty should be seen essentially as a corrective measure that is designed to remove the imbalance and inequity which constituted the weaknesses of the EASCO. It allows the use of a transfer tax as an instrument for controlling industrial development. Under the transfer tax system, a member state whose total trade in manufactured goods is in deficit


34 See Appendix II.
with the other states can impose tariffs on imports from any of the states. The treaty also allows decentralization or services and operations so that partner states could benefit from staff and organization managements.

By far the most important parts of the Treaty are those establishing the common market, a method of countering some of the existing economic imbalances between the partner states, and the supra-national institutions that are to administer the market, for between them they create a completely new framework for the continuation of economic cooperation between the three East African countries and have the potential of limiting each country's freedom to pursue its economic policies to a much greater extent than has hitherto been the case. 35

The two important supra-national institutions consist of the Common Market Council and the Common Market Tribunal. The Council is charged with keeping the operation of the Treaty under constant review and making sure that member states keep to their pledge. Questions concerning the observance and interpretation of the treaty may be taken to a judicial body, the Common Market Tribunal. It also investigates irregularities of partner states and acts as advisory body to the Council. It may be, therefore, that the immediate importance of the treaty rests mainly on its demonstration of the desire for continued and extended cooperation.

From the inception of the Common Market, Ethiopia, Zambia and neighbouring Somalia have been expressing their

desire to be full members. While Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are still discovering what the Community really means to their economies and political policies, they may hesitate to complicate issues by admitting new members. However, it is almost certain that because of the fragile political situations in East Africa, the only thing that can be expected of the original attempt to federate is this by-product of economic association, at least for sometime to come.
ATTITUDES TO OTHER AFRICAN STATES

We have to accept Africa as it is, and not imagine that we have any more right to interfere with the internal affairs of others than they have to interfere in ours....But we must be ready to co-operate with all African states in African affairs, regardless of our opinion of their internal - or even external policies.

-Julius K. Nyerere, Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs, p. 15.

East African relations with other African states are difficult to evaluate in precise terms. Although, official continental policies are couched in brotherhood solidarity phrases, inter-governmental relations are hampered by poor communications. For economic reasons, few Embassies are established in other African countries. Official state visits are made to few "friendly" states. In fact, before the inauguration of the "Good Neighbor" Conference of 1966, the East African states had very little contact with other African countries. The OAU forum at Addis Ababa was the only link enabling the East African leaders to be in touch with fellow African politicians. Close to home, goodwill was degenerating as a result of border problems and/or territorial disputes between Kenya and Somalia Republic, Uganda and her neighbours. This chapter will attempt to show the East African responses to border problems and the extent to which OAU resolutions have affected foreign policy and attitudes of the East African states to three African crises.
One of the most interesting and paradoxical phases of pan-Africanism is probably the outcome of the O.A.U. summit meeting of May 1963 which gave some impetus to nationalist feelings and irredentism in respect to the colonial-drawn African boundaries. The peaceful tone of the summit meeting was interrupted when President Osman of Somalia rose to attack the host Emperor Selassie for refusing to grant a plebiscite to the Somali people on the Ethiopian borders.

Asserting his belief that the problem of Africa's mis-drawn boundaries was a proper subject for debate at the Conference, he said there could be no unity as long as these problems remained. For a moment the fate of the Conference hung in the balance as the Emperor arose, indignant over this slur.  

President Houphouet-Boigny, the chairman of that particular session of the conference quickly intervened by sharply criticizing the Somali action. "Modibo Keita of Mali expressed the opinion of many delegations in asking that the conference should not be spoiled by this incident and urging that the present frontiers in Africa be maintained".  

This speech was warmly applauded by delegates to the conference and Somalia seemed to have lost all African support for her boundary agitation. In 1964 the Somali Government made another claim that

---


"all Somali peoples living outside the nation-state have a right to self-determination, and thus the right to become part of Somalia if they so wish." This appeal was being directed to the Somalis inhabiting the Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.) of Kenya. The area is about 102,000 square miles and includes the dominantly Somali-inhabited land of Mandera Wajio and Garissa with the mainly Galla districts of Marsabit, Isiolo and Moyale. Since 1960 when Somalia became independent, the N.F.D. has become the centre of controversy between Kenya and Somalia. The Somalis think that the division of their land and people has been the fault of colonial powers which created arbitrary boundaries that defied ethnographic logic. On their part, the Kenyans feel that the border problem directly affects national interests that "even to recognize that boundaries are negotiable would itself constitute a threat to the country's integrity".

However, the Somalis who constitute the bulk of the population have been deeply resentful of the Kenyan claims. They have demanded secession from Kenya and unity with Somalia. Their feeling of alienation and resentment towards Kenya is accentuated by the steady social and economic developments.

---

5 The total population of the N.F.D. was estimated in 1962 to be 388,000 out of which about 240,000 were considered to be Somalis, Ibid, p. 36.
in Somalia relative to N.F.D. and accompanied by constant doses of virulent propaganda from Radio Mogadishu. They also claim that the Kenyan Government has neglected them for a long time. For example, Ahmed Farah, the Somali Legislative Council representative is quoted as saying in the 1960 London Constitutional Conference that:

Sometimes the people of the N.F.D. think of the rest of Kenya as quite a foreign country. They have little in common with the rest of Kenya....I had better say what will happen if the administration of the Northern Province is not changed. I foresee that the Somali and Boran and the Galla and the Turkans....will break away in different directions.

When Kenya became independent in 1963, the Somalis in the N.F.D. began to organize armed, insurgent movements called shifta with the support of the Somali Government. In his parliamentary speech on February 26, 1964, Jomo Kenyatta reported that,

Early in January, gang attacks stopped in the border area, but several gangs penetrated deep into the North Eastern Region, where they made well organized and concerted attacks on patrols and camps. The whole pattern changed as civilians in the Region were attacked, presumably to instill fear into the local population, to promote a policy of non-cooperation with the Kenya Government and Security forces....There is no doubt at all that the Somalia Government's policy of territorial expansion has led to the killing of peaceful Kenya citizens, straining our relations with that Government.

---


Mindful of this country's obligations in the maintenance of peace and security, and in accordance with their own declaration, the Kenya Government raised the matter in an emergency Council of Ministers meeting of O.A.U. held in Dar-es-Salaam two weeks ago. The Council decided to include the matter on the Agenda of its meeting now under way in Lagos.

Until 1967 when a change in the Somali Government was effected and Mohamed Egal became Prime Minister, O.A.U. initiative at mediation was unsuccessful. Somalia wanted the O.A.U. to conduct a referendum on self-determination of the Somalis in N.F.D. Kenya insisted that she would not allow any part of her territory to be dismembered and would defend her "territorial integrity by every means". In 1966 Dr. Mungai, then Minister of Defense, said that, "our contention is borne out by the resolutions of both O.A.U. and the Conference of the nonaligned nations held in Cairo in 1965. Both Conferences agreed that the territorial integrity of the present African states must be maintained". Thus, the border dispute between Kenya and Somalia arose from conflicts in the application of Somalia's conception of self-determination and Kenya's desire to retain the colonial status quo in boundary arrangements. When the O.A.U. intervened again in October 1967, a Working Committee was established under President Kaunda of Zambia charged with periodic review of the Somali-Kenyan relationship for the

---

8 Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!, pp. 39-41.
purpose of promoting understanding between the two disputing countries. Since then relations between the two countries have improved considerably.

In Tanzania, the dispute with Malawi is territorial. It arose on September 11, 1968 when Dr. Hastings Banda was addressing a rally at Chitopwa, Malawi. Pointing to a part of the Tanzanian territory, he said, "That is my land over there and these people - Tukuyu, Njombe and Songea - are my subjects. All of them must be given back; the British had no business to give away the land to someone else". A week later, during the opening session of the annual convention of the malawi Congress Party, Dr. Banda reiterated his claim also to the whole of neighbouring Zambia's Eastern Province. In Tanzania, the Government dismissed Dr. Banda's claim as "insane, absurd and highly provocative". The condemnation went on:

When Tanzania repudiates Dr. Banda's claims, she cannot ignore his words on the grounds that they have been uttered by an insane person, because the powers behind the so-called Ngwazi (Lion) are not insane. In the world today, there are many countries which are either under the direct control of the imperialists or have their leadership manipulated by foreign remote control.

While it is difficult to explain objectively why Dr. Banda chose this time to make his claim on sections of Zambia and Tanzania territories, Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda of

11 Ibid., p. 2.
Zambia alleged that Dr. Banda has been egged on by forces of the Lisbon-Pretoria-Salisbury axis. In fact, Tanzania thinks that the appointment of a high ranking Military Attache by South Africa to "a tiny country like Malawi is proof that Malawi is a strategic spying post for South Africa and Rhodesia". Consequently, Dr. Banda is regarded as a saboteur of African efforts to liberate dependent territories in South Africa.

Of the three East African states, however, Uganda has the most unusual form of border problems. Because of her landlocked geographical position, she shares common borders with many neighbours -Rwanda, Congo, Kenya and Tanzania. While these countries have not formally laid claims to any part of the Ugandan territory, the backlash of their domestic problems have usually affected Uganda. In a speech in Entebbe on August 3, 1968, Foreign Minister Odaka remarked:

A pattern has arisen whereby whenever there are disturbances in one of the neighbouring countries, refugees pour into Uganda. Some of these refugees attempt to carry out subversive activities against their countries of origin and sometimes Uganda villages and border posts are attacked by legal and illegal forces from neighbouring countries. Uganda for instance witnessed this pattern of events on the Rwanda, Congo and Sudan borders and the only time there is relative calm on any of our borders is when there is peace and stability in the country that shares that border.  

---

12 Ibid., p. 2.

Thus, as a matter of necessity and in response to the refugee problems, Uganda has been trying to develop and strengthen relations with the neighbouring countries since the Second Congo eruptions of 1964. Kenya and Tanzania have joined in on the assumption that,

If Tanzania works in harmony with Kenya and with Zambia, then Kenya and Zambia are linked together. If Kenya then co-operates with Ethiopia, then Tanzania and Zambia are both linked to Ethiopia - and so on throughout our continent.... When these exist, then all-African meetings can facilitate and speed developments. If these do not exist, then the all-Africa meetings have to devote their time to patching and mending the torn fabric of cooperation, instead of helping the move forward.14

In an attempt to formalize this setting of special relationship, the first "Good Neighbor" meeting of the East and Central African heads of states15 was held in Nairobi on March 31 to April 2, 1966. It operated without an agenda and a "spokesman emphasized that no attempt was made to form a regional grouping or to usurp the functions of the O.A.U.".16 In his evaluation, President Nyerere claimed that:

Indeed the Tanzania delegation was unanimously of the opinion that we had never attended a more useful and constructive political gathering. Of course, that meeting did not solve all the problems of this part of Africa; some of them are too deep-seated and too complicated to be susceptible to such treatment. But the meeting did create an

atmosphere in which problems could be tackled; it did contribute greatly to our common progress. 17

After the meeting, Obote invited President Mobutu of Congo-Leopoldville to visit Uganda for a one-day discussion on refugee problems. Both leaders agreed that they would allow greater freedom of movements for nationals on either side of their borders.

The third of the "Good Neighbor" Summit meetings of the East and Central African heads of states was held in Kampala on December 15-16, 1967 after the second meeting which was held in Congo-Kinshasa late in 1966. In his opening address Obote appealed to his fellow heads of states for greater co-operation. He concluded by saying that "as good neighbours we aim at removing obstacles that tend to separate us from each other. We strive to develop resources that are of mutual benefit to us all. We unite to face challenges that threaten our sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is in this that I see the emergence of a strong, viable and meaningful co-operation". 18 However, from the reports of the last meeting held in Dar-es-Salaam from May 13-15, 1968, it would seem that the deliberations of the "Good Neighbor" summit meetings are gradually extending to continental problems. The communique of the Dar-es-Salaam meeting, for example, "welcomed current efforts to find a peaceful

17 J.K. Nyerere, Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs, p. 18.
solution to the Nigerian conflict; noted with concern the
deteriorating situation in Rhodesia and agreed on making
representations to states aiding Rhodesia, South Africa
and Portugal, called for the expulsion of South Africa from
the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development; and reaf­
affirmed their support for the liberation movements in South­
ern Africa". No doubt, reports of the success of the East
and Central African "Good Neighbor" meetings have improved
intra-state communications now extending to other members
of the O.A.U. family.

THREE CRISES - CONGO, NIGERIA, ARAB-ISRAELI

While most African countries are in the initial stage
of political development, one of the pre-occupations of the
O.A.U. is to regulate the involvement of outside powers in
the African continent. The Congo crisis and the Nigerian
civil war are cases that illustrate this phenomenon.

At the first outbreak of the Congo crisis in 1960, no
East African state was independent, the O.A.U. had not been
formed and independent African states operated in splinter
groups. When the crisis opened up again in 1964, Kenya was
one of the newly independent African countries. The lead­
ing members of the ruling KANU party expressed strong nation­
alist feelings against outside intervention in African af-

19 "Good Neighbor" Summit, Africa Report, Vol. 13, No. 7,
October 1968, p. 25.
fairs. Joseph Murumbi the Minister for External Affairs, launched a bitter attack on western policy:

We consider that the recent military intervention mounted by the United States and Belgium with the collaboration of the United Kingdom, constitutes unwarranted influence in African affairs, a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, a threat to the peace and security of the African continent and a calculated attempt to undermine African unity. 20

In September 1964, an Ad hoc Conciliation Commission was appointed by the O.A.U. in Addis Ababa with the mandate to finding "ways and means to effect national reconciliation within the Congo and the normalization of relations between Congo-Leopoldville and its neighbors". Jomo Kenyatta was named as head for the Commission. On September 18, 1964, the meeting of the ad hoc Commission was held in Nairobi and an appeal was made for cessation of hostilities in the Congo. Later the Commission decided that, "all white mercenaries and foreign troops should be withdrawn forthwith from the Congo and that all foreign interventions should cease immediately". The Commission also dispatched an unsuccessful mission to ask President Johnson to end U.S. military intervention in the Congo. But whether or not the O.A.U. mediation and initiative were effective is not the focus of the Congo crisis, nor of this analysis; what is

22 Ibid, pp. 8-10.
significant is the unanimous African resentment towards outside intervention. The following speeches of the other two East African states to the U.N. General Assembly of December 1964 would illustrate this.

1. My country (Tanzania) was shocked and horrified that at the very time that the O.A.U. was seeking an African solution, at the very time that the ad hoc Commission was establishing its competence, certain non-African Powers thought it fit to frustrate the efforts of the O.A.U. by unwarranted military intervention. This military intervention...is a clear affront to the O.A.U. and shamefully detracts from the U.N. efforts in the Congo during the past four years. My country, therefore, earnestly requests those foreign Powers intervening with their troops, arms and mercenaries to withdraw all these unwanted instruments of neocolonialism and allow the Congolese people, and only the Congolese people, and their African brothers to settle the problems facing them in an African manner, by themselves. 23

2. The Uganda delegation appeals to all outside Powers involved in the Congo situation to use their influence to end the fighting which has resulted in the unnecessary loss of so many lives. It is also vital that the white mercenaries should be withdrawn, in order to give the Reconciliation Commission a chance to tackle the problem. 24

The Nigerian civil war is another classic example of how African states deplore outside intervention in continental matters. When the war started in 1964, Nigeria identified the pattern of the crisis with that of the Congo, Ojukwu with Tshombe and the secessionist Biafra with Katanga. At the O.A.U. summit in Congo-Kinshasa in September 1967, a

23 Kambona-Tanzania, Plenary Meeting of the U.N. General Assembly, 19th Session (English) December 10, 1964, A/PV.1293, p. 77.

Consultative Committee of six Heads of States was appointed under Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia to help Nigeria bring an end to the conflict. In setting up the Committee, the O.A.U. affirmed its support for the territorial integrity of Nigeria and admitted the internal character of the conflict. In addition, most African states blamed external interests for the causes of the civil war. In Uganda, Foreign Minister S. N. Odaka said that:

The tragedies that have befallen Nigeria have come because international involvement has highlighted differences and exaggerated not only the differences of tribe and religion existing in that country but gone out of their way to illuminate the already enlarged identification tags.... Some enthusiastic men have even attempted to equate the plight of Ibos as similar in every respect to that of the Jews. We have been told that they are a persecuted tribe and race.

However, not all African states would interpret the Nigerian civil war in the same perspective as Uganda. President Nyerere has vigorously protested that external factors were responsible for the Congo crisis whereas, in Nigeria, secession was roused by internal forces. Therefore, "Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere have both been concerned that a bloody

25 The Ibos constitute the predominant ethnic group in the secessionist province. By the 1964 Nigerian census figures, the Ibos numbered 8.2 million of the 13 million people in the region.


27 Four countries have recognized the secessionist Nigerian state-Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon and Ivory Coast.
civil war undermines the claims that they are pressing on the front line in Southern Africa....Their argument goes, accept the division of Nigeria and concentrate on the more important task in hand in Southern Africa". In fact, in recognizing the secessionist state, President Nyerere explained that:

For 10 months we have accepted the Nigerian Government's legal right to our support in a "police action to defend the integrity of the State". On that basis, we have watched a civil war result in the death of about 100,000 people, and the employment of mercenaries by both sides. We watched the federal government reject the advice of Africa to talk instead of demanding surrender before talks could begin. Everything combined gradually to force us to the conclusion that Nigerian unity did not exist.

In spite of whatever compassion and the good intentions that Nyerere must have had towards Biafra his recognition of secession is regarded by most African states as an open violation of the O.A.U. resolution which recognized the Nigerian civil war as a domestic problem. Most Africans believe that the balkanization of Africa would invite chaos, therefore, territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs of member states have remained sacrosanct in the O.A.U. Charter.

At the O.A.U. Summit in Algiers in September 1968, the four countries which recognized Biafra found themselves in


a difficult situation. Strong denunciations were made of the "imperialist attempt to divide Nigeria by leaders of impeccable African record like President Keita" and President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria. Of the four countries which recognized Biafra, only President Kaunda of Zambia attended the Conference as head of his country's delegation; others were represented on the ministerial level. Even President Kaunda had to leave early and protested "at being lumped with the imperialists". At the end of the summit, a resolution was passed which "appeals to the secessionist leaders to cooperate with the Federal authorities in order to restore peace and unity in Nigeria". In asserting Kenya's support for the resolution, Arwings-Kodhek, Minister of State in the Office of the Kenyan President said in the U.N. General Assembly on October 15, 1968 that:

I should now like to make reference to a special African problem, which for more than a year has been the focal point while external arms and ammunition have been clashing. I refer, of course, to Nigeria. It is barely three weeks since we came to some understanding on this African problem at the O.A.U. Summit in Algiers. It is lamentable that outsiders are still active in that African country. However, the unequivocal support given to Nigeria by Kenya, Uganda and many African states may not necessarily be construed as a reflection of deep allegiance to the O.A.U.


resolution. For example, these countries did not break diplomatic relations with Britain in accordance with the O.A.U. resolution on Rhodesia. The fact on Nigeria is that most African countries, particularly Uganda and Kenya, are apprehensive of laying a precedence for possible secessionist tendencies in other parts of Africa. This has been the trump card of Nigerian diplomacy.

Although the East African states were not unanimous in their support of the O.A.U. interpretation of the Nigerian civil war, on the Arab-Israeli conflict, they fully endorsed O.A.U. resolutions. Before the 1967 war, Israel had established considerable influence in sub-Saharan Africa. In an attempt to offset the geo-political Arab advantage in Africa, Israel maintained embassies in every country except Somalia and Mauritania. Israeli experts were helping to train the Ugandan pilots, youth-mobilizing and agrarian centred movements along Israeli model were established in Tanzania, joint stock companies were formed in Kenya. In effect, Israeli influence was increasing as many African leaders were getting ambivalent of Arab position in Africa. This phenomenon still affected the attitudes of Uganda in 1968 as could be illustrated from the speech of Foreign Minister, S.N. Odaka, in Entebbe.

In the north, we find countries which belong to two different worlds. It has been authoritatively stated and is a well-known fact that such countries as Egypt and for that matter Sudan at our border, are both African and therefore members of the O.A.U. and members of the Arab League and simultaneously involved in the Middle East politics and conflicts, including the Arab Israeli conflict. To make matters worse, unlike Uganda, these countries in their foreign policies place major emphasis on religious
considerations since they are part of the Islamic world. Immediately after the Arab-Israeli June war of 1967, African attitudes began to change from former ambivalence or pro-Israel to outright sympathy for the Arab underdog. The belief that the first shot was probably fired by Israel and the apparent Israeli unwillingness to surrender occupied areas strongly reinforced African suspicion of Israeli imperialism. In the O.A.U. Summit at Kinshasa on September 23, 1967, the Middle East situation was discussed and a resolution was passed expressing "sympathy for the U.A.R.", but the O.A.U. agreed only to work through the United Nations to help the U.A.R. to recover its occupied territories.

In Tanzania, President Nyerere said that:

The establishment of the State of Israel was an act of aggression against the Arab People. It was connived at by the international community because of the history of persecution against the Jews. We recognize Israel and wish to be friendly with her as well as with the Arab nations. But we cannot condone aggression on any pretext, nor accept victory in war as a justification for the exploitation of other lands, or government over other peoples. Julius Nyerere even sent a cable to President Nasser offering aid "in defense of your rights against imperialism".

In the U.N. General Assembly, Kenya decried the effects of the closure of the Suez Canal on her economy. On the political aspect of the war, Arwings-Kodhek said,

---

33 S. Odaka, Speech on Geography As a Determinant of Uganda's Foreign Policy, Entebbe, 1968, p.3.


35 J. K. Nyerere, Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs, pp.6-7.
The Government of Kenya proceeds from the belief that all states have a right to exist. We do not share the philosophy of permanent belligerency now maintained against Israel by some of her neighbors. On the other hand, the Government of Kenya cannot support the further occupation by Israel of Arab territory it brought under its control during the six-day war. The language of the United Nations Charter is clear and unequivocal on the question of territorial aggrandisement; as we have already reminded the Assembly, it urges its signatories to refrain from the acquisition of foreign territory through conquest. 36

When the Middle East conflict came up again at the O.A.U. Summit in Algiers in September 1968, the three East African states unanimously voted along with other thirty-three states to adopt a resolution which "reaffirms support for the U.A.R., calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967 in accordance with the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 and appeals to all members to apply this resolution strictly". However, the resolution did not condemn or mention Israel by name, neither had the diplomatic relations between the East African states and Israel changed too dramatically. In fact, Israel has not broken diplomatic relations with any African state in protest against the O.A.U. resolution.

Finally, two conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis of the East African reactions to African problems. Firstly, that border disputes can best be solved through


improved communications with neighbouring states. This was demonstrated by the success of President Obote in discussing refugee problems with President Mobutu of Congo-Leopoldville after the first meeting of the "Good Neighbor" Meeting in 1966. Secondly, that O.A.U. resolutions have, to varying degrees, affected the general attitudes of the East African states in respect to outside interventions and continental policies. This is evident from the violent condemnation of outside intervention in the case of the Congo and the unanimous support for the U.A.R. after the O.A.U. resolution on the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the Nigerian crisis, opinions of the East African leaders differ but Kenya and Uganda have subscribed to the O.A.U. idea that secession should be discouraged in any independent African country.
The African has, as you know, a pride and determination that his new status will have its own African character. He will not imitate the East any more than he will the West. While he may draw from other societies, the end-product will have a distinct African character.¹

- G. Mennen Williams, Documents on Modern Africa, p. 142.

One of the most important results of the epochal decolonization in East Africa has been the responsibility imposed on the leaders for the formulation of policies that relate to their external affairs. For these leaders, foreign policy is the continuation of the task of state-building. The conduct of external relations is a test of political maturity and an expression of the nation's independence within the international community. Membership to the United Nations and participation in the deliberations of its various bodies, exchange of protocol and diplomatic recognition from foreign governments, attendance at other international gatherings and opportunity for the free expression of views on international issues are regarded as legitimate symbols of state sovereignty and prestige.

In this chapter, attempts shall be made to analyze the

foreign policy of the East African states in respect to non-alignment, general attitudes to the East and West including the Commonwealth, and the policy towards the United Nations as a world organization. Continental policies of unity and good neighbourliness have been examined in the preceding chapters, however, I shall feel free to elaborate the extent to which commitments to decolonization have affected relations with the West.

THEORY OF NONALIGNMENT

Insofar as foreign policy helps to provide a medium of asserting national identity, for the new states, nonalignment presents an attractive policy for maximizing advantages and yet maintaining independent status from the former colonial power. In East Africa, nonalignment is the logical acceptance of the traditional doctrine of sovereignty and of attempts to apply it to contemporary international affairs.

But non-alignment has often suffered from lack of precise definition. Some people speak of "non-commitment" others of "positive neutralism" and still others speak of "dynamic neutrality". To label the non-alignment policy of the East African states as neutrality would be very misleading. This is because neutrality does not clearly describe the policies of smaller countries in relation to a power-rivalry especially in time of peace. It may, however, refer to the policies of such a country as Switzerland which has consistently followed its neutrality in war and in peace.
times. In East Africa, non-alignment is not neutrality as such; neither is it really non-commitment. Nonalignment is a sort of insurance policy, guaranteeing an uninhibited voice on international issues and allowing the countries to stress their claim to uniqueness. For example, the policy of the Kenya African National Union states that:

Nonalignment is not based on Kenya's desire to be left alone, but on a desire to be taken notice of. Our policy is one of nonalignment, not noncommitment. We fully commit ourselves to support what is right and just in international affairs. 2

Oginga Odinga, leader of the Kenya People's Union, provides another definition that draws on the realities of the power blocs and the role of nonalignment policy. "Nonalignment, let us remember, means that we shall tie ourselves to no power bloc; and that while we shall not necessarily opt for neutrality on every issue, ours will be the freedom to decide". 3 Thus the terms "non-commitment" or "neutrality" must be qualified when used to substitute for nonalignment.

President Nyerere intended to bring out the implications of nonalignment when he said that, "we care very much about the future of humanity; but we do not believe that the present divisions of the world are between the good and the bad...We believe that the propaganda which is directed at making humanity believe this proposition is a most hid-


An interpretation of this strong sense of morality and idealism is that Tanzania reserves the right to judge international issues on their own merits and that the country is as committed to objective action for universal peace as the Great Powers.

But in spite of these goals and interpretations it is still difficult to know the true intentions of these nonaligned states. It is probably true that motivation of economic development, anticolonialism and psychological reactions against former European political control and exploitation have induced the East African leaders to choose nonalignment in the conduct of their relations with both East and West. Clearly, this policy does not imply indifference or non-commitment on contemporary international issues beside the Cold War, but encompasses the strategy being used to manipulate both East and West to obtain modernization priorities without necessarily losing sovereignty and political independence to any of the blocs.

When President John Kennedy was a Senator, he admitted that:

The desire to be independent and free carries with it the desire not to become engaged as a satellite of the Soviet Union or too closely allied to the United States. We have to live with that, and if neutrality is the result of a concentration on internal problems, raising the standard of living of the people and so on, particularly in the underdeveloped countries, I would accept that. It's part of our own history for over a hundred years.

---

This seems to be a fair portrayal of the attitudes of the East African leaders. Faced with the desperate struggle to build a nation from very slender resources, nonalignment is not only an attractive policy, but discretion in taking and shifting friends is regarded as a worthy strategy. When on October 19, 1965, the Central Executive Committee of the Uganda People's Congress meeting in Kampala approved resolutions reaffirming the party's adherence to a foreign policy of nonalignment and instructed members to "refrain from using abusive language against any country with which Uganda has diplomatic relations,"6 the leaders were trying to consolidate their strategy for attracting foreign aid from the East and the West. Similarly, Jomo Kenyatta's speech that, "the foundation of Kenya's foreign policy is the principle of nonalignment",7 is no less an invitation to foreign powers, irrespective of ideology, to help Kenya. This may appear to be an oversimplification of the intents and purposes of nonalignment policy. But considering the needs of the East African states and in view of their general economic deprivations, nonalignment seems to have been a diplomatic weapon for achieving benefits to meet domestic problems.


7 Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!, p. 57.
But in spite of the narrow national interests which nonalignment seems to be satisfying, the East African states have stuck to the criteria of the Belgrade Conference of 1961 which recommended that a non-aligned state:

1. should follow an independent policy based on non-alignment (1) and peaceful co-existence;
2. should support liberation movements;
3. should not be a member of a multilateral military pact in the context of the East-West struggle;
4. should not be a member of a bilateral military pact with a Big Power in the East-West struggle;
5. should not have granted military bases to foreign powers.8

Because of nationalism, claims of uniqueness and need for rapid economic development, East African countries are likely to remain non-aligned for a long time, although, some will be more nonaligned than others. The extent to which nonalignment has been put into practice by each state shall be examined in the next section.

RELATIONS WITH EAST AND WEST (including the Commonwealth)

Whatever people may think about the possibility of detente between East and West, recent international politics have been largely influenced by ideological orientations which have divided the world into camps. The emerging countries have found themselves at the crossroad of this harsh expressed reluctance to be conscripted into either of the two main ideological camps. According to President Nyerere:

Before independence we had no direct contact with Eastern Bloc countries. After independence, we began to establish such contacts and we shall continue to strengthen them. It should be clear that we shall not allow anyone - whether they be from East or West, or from places not linked to these Blocks - to try and use our friendship for their own purposes. 9

But, have the East African countries practised the nonalignment policy which they espoused? Have the East and West been given equal treatment in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda?

Kenya's foreign policy is, no doubt, characterized by a nonalignment orientation in favour of the West. While Jomo Kenyatta and the KANU Party have continued to make right noises about the righteousness of a nonaligned policy and the desirability for a just international community of nations, Kenya's sympathy has usually been disposed towards the Western bloc. The domestic political system, demands for foreign aid and the capitalist structure of the economy have bolstered the pro-Western attitude since independence. Conversely, there is a trend to distinctly hostile attitudes towards the Communist states, especially to China, after Oginga Odinga left the KANU government party in 1966 to form the socialist Opposition KADU party. Before the split, Jomo Kenyatta addressed the KANU members that:

What we want is Kenya Nationalism which helped us to win the struggle against imperialism. We do not want somebody else's nationalism. It is a sad mistake to think that you can get more food, more hospitals or schools by crying "Communism". 10

9  Julius K. Nyerere, Tanzania on Foreign Affairs, p. 4.

In 1965 Njoroge Mungai, Minister of Internal Security and Defense declared Wang Te Ming, Nairobi correspondent of the Communist Chinese Hsinhua News Agency, a prohibited immigrant and declared that Kenyans would no longer be allowed to receive military training in Communist China. In February 1966, the government announced that it had canceled the agreement with the Soviet Union to construct the Kano irrigation project and postponed all other projects that were to be financed by Soviet loans.

Kenya, which rejects aid from most Communist states has rejected all forms of Chinese aid, including China's offer of a $30 million loan and grant in 1964. On the other hand, Tanzania has become a primary recipient of Chinese foreign aid and of assistance from all other foreign sources. 11

Ostensibly, Kenya's pro-Western nonalignment policy is a result of economic pressures. Jomo Kenyatta does not intend to alienate the Western aid-giving countries. Nor, for that matter, does he like to create an atmosphere that is unfavorable to prospective entrepreneurs; so Kenya pursues a policy that radically undermines Communist influence. Here, it would seem that practice conflicts with theory. Jomo Kenyatta had earlier propounded that "the aim of my Government which starts today is not to be pro-Left or pro-Right," that a nonalignment policy would enable Kenya to secure


12 Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee! p. 18.
assistance from the two blocs and that:

When we choose some techniques from the East, it is not because we approve the conduct of their domestic or foreign policies; nor should we be accused of being pro-West if we adopt or perpetuate some Western ideas. We are determined to develop Kenya as a democratic African Socialist country. 13

In reality, Kenya has restricted communications with the Communist countries, rejected their aid and shifted more and more to the West. For example, "at independence there were just 20 American businesses in the country. Then prospects turned rosier - and today there are 73 United States firms established in Kenya". A U.S. Embassy survey reported in International Commerce (Washington, D.C.) on October 2, 1967 noted that "Kenya's political stability and expanding economy are attracting the growing interest of U.S. exporters and investors". The report also noted that U.S. exports to Kenya rose from $13.5 million in 1963 to $31.6 million in 1966 while U.S. imports from Kenya increased from $7.3 million in 1965 to $14.8 million in 1966. In 1964, about 84 percent of total Kenyan trade were with the West and only 2 percent with the Communist bloc. In 1966, Oginga Odinga protested that:

I cannot tolerate an African regime dominated by either West or the East. If nonalignment is used to justify relations with one of these worlds alone, it is not nonalignment. Kenya is still, today, largely part of the Western sphere of interest and investment. To reach the nonaligned position

13 Ibid, p. 78.
we must break the predominantly Western influence and develop relations with the East. 16

Regardless of domestic opposition pressures for improved relations with the East, the Kenya Government is showing greater concern for the outward forms of nonalignment policy and less to its substance. Formal diplomatic relations and some commercial activities exist between Kenya and the Communist countries but they are not strong enough to withstand stresses. On February 14, 1968, a government statement announced the deportation of two Russians of the Novosti Press Agency and Sovex portfilm. Vice President Daniel arap Moi said that the offices of both Soviet Agencies would be closed and warned that "methods used by hostile intelligence services to subvert and undermine governments and to carry their ideological battles into countries which have repeatedly expressed their intention of remaining nonaligned" 17 would not be tolerated. However, it is noteworthy that, "China has increased its trade with Kenya notwithstanding a steady deterioration in political relations. In 1966 direct exports from China to Kenya reached $5.4 million, as compared to $23,000 in 1961; during the same years direct imports from Kenya came to $2.6 million and $150,000 respectively". 18

---

On the other hand, Kenya's support for the Commonwealth has probably encouraged close relationship with Britain. Apart from the economic and military assistance from Britain, Jomo Kenyatta sees in the Commonwealth, a philosophy of racial harmony that could be applied to the Kenyan multi-racial society. In his report of the 1964 Commonwealth meeting to the National Assembly, he remarked:

As regards the call for interracial harmony in the world, there was a definite commitment for each Commonwealth country to build a society providing for equal opportunities and non-discrimination for all its people. In this respect, I did not hesitate to quote the example of Kenya. 19

In terms of aid and trade Kenya relies on the Commonwealth countries especially Britain. Until independence Britain normally provided nearly all the assistance but since 1963, Western countries outside the Commonwealth, have extended aid to Kenya. In 1964, Britain spent 15 million pounds in aid to Kenya.

Some long-term funds for industry, mining and housing as well as agriculture have been supplied by the Commonwealth Development Corporation. ...The total of the Corporation's other investments rose from 7.1 million pounds at the end of 1958 to over 8.25 million pounds at the end of 1965. 20

The advantages and benefits accruing from membership to the Commonwealth have been reflected in Kenya's attitude for the survival of the Association. "This became particularly

19 Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!, p. 52.

clear at the London Commonwealth Conference of July 1966, when the Kenyan delegation was instrumental in creating a measure of agreement between Britain and the ad hoc African caucus on Rhodesia, which at one stage appeared unlikely.21 Since the civil war in Nigeria, the coup d'etat in Ghana, the instability in Uganda and the temporary, Tanzanian withdrawal of diplomatic relations with Britain over Rhodesia, Kenya has assumed a mediating role on certain matters between African members and the rest of the Commonwealth. Correspondingly, Kenya's stock and prestige have increased in British Government circles. And because Kenya has not backed out on sensitive African problems such as decolonization, she also enjoys the confidence and respect of fellow African members of the Association.

However, it would be misleading to give the impression that Kenya is complacent about her relations with Britain and the West. Kenyatta had been disenchanted with the Western acquiescence in the apartheid policy of South Africa. In a speech in June 1964, he expressed shock over the continuation and improvement of Western trade and investments in South Africa. "By refusing to participate in workable sanctions against South Africa, the countries of the West are creating a situation in which violence becomes the only

answer". Jomo Kenyatta also regards the lack of Western support for the nationalist cause in Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola primarily as a Western intention to compromise Africans' rights to self-determination.

On Vietnam, Kenya has been dismayed over the U.S. involvement in an "unjust" war. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in October 1968, Arwings-Kodhek, Kenyan Minister of state in the Office of the President said that:

The policy of the Government of Kenya is clear on the issue of Vietnam. We condemn unreservedly the arrogance of a Big Power that sees fit to tread on the toes of a small nation without provocation. We feel, moreover, that this is a futile war in which the mighty obviously cannot hope to win...We believe that peace can come to that unfortunate land any time the United States wishes.23

Clearly, Kenya's stand is consistent with her frequent reassertion of the need for world peace and a just international community of nations. Therefore, condemnation of U.S. on Vietnam is not necessarily an anti-Western policy. The Fact that U.S. attitude towards Kenya has not changed since then is a reinforcement of this argument.

Tanzania's practice of nonalignment shows how difficult it is for a small African country to actively seek the application in Southern Africa of the principle of the rights of peoples everywhere to self-determination and at the same time to remain on friendly terms with Western countries.

22 Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!, p. 49.
Like most countries emerging from colonial status, Tanzania was heavily dependent upon the western world at the time of independence. Over 80 percent of her total trade was with the sterling area while most of the top posts in the Civil Service were held by personnel from the West. But in 1964 the situation changed dramatically. The change was brought about by a rapid succession of events - "the revolution in neighbouring Zanzibar, the mutinies of the three East African armies which necessitated an appeal to British troops, the union of Tanganyika with Zanzibar under the name of Tanzania, the Chinese offer of military advisers and a loan, the rebellion in the neighbouring Congo which caused refugees to pour over the borders, and the declaration of war on Portugal by Mozambique freedom fighters based in Tanganyika". This list of events and Tanzania's reactions urged a re-evaluation of the country's foreign policy.

To begin with, the union with Zanzibar gave rise to certain diplomatic problems. Zanzibar had been maintaining diplomatic relations with East Germany before union. This was a violation of the Hallstein doctrine on which West Germany broke relations with Zanzibar. On the other hand, Tanganyika recognized West Germany before union, an action

---

that conformed with the spirit of the Hallstein doctrine. In an attempt to tackle the problem squarely, accommodate each other and compromise the foreign threats to unification, Tanganyika and Zanzibar decided to extend diplomatic relations to both East and West Germany. This was unacceptable to West Germany and the latter stopped military aid to Tanzania. President Nyerere reacted by rejecting development aid from Bonn as well.

Also before 1964, Tanzania and other African states relied on gentle and discreet diplomacy to secure the transference of power from the colonial governments. By 1964 it became clear that diplomacy would be of no avail in liberating Southern Africa, Mozambique and Angola. Most African governments had to decide to what lengths they would go in opposing the policies of these Western countries which they regarded as impeding liberation. Tanzania adopted the most militant position of the three East African herself as the enemy of Britain, France, West Germany or the United States. But it does mean that her passionate concern for liberation brings her into frequent and inevitable conflict with these countries. Besides, the presence of the Mozambique liberation group FRELIMO in Tanzania has undoubtedly reinforced Tanzania's anti-Portuguese policies at the same time that it has raised the fear of Portuguese retaliatory bombing of Dar-es-Salaam if FRELIMO becomes too active in Mozambique. The exiles' presence has stimulated a heavy inflow of arms into Tanzania from the Eastern bloc and
probably necessitated the build-up of the Tanzanian army as a potential counter weight to the nationalist fighters in case things get out of hand. Thus, domestic considerations and Tanzania's commitment to continental African freedom meant closer ties should be maintained with the East in order to receive supplies of military hardware to aid nationalist forces.

But in his opening of the window to the East, Nyerere expressed the desire to steer clear of the East-West conflict. On his first state visit to the People's Republic of China in February 1965, he used an East African proverb to express Tanzania's policy that:

> When elephants fight, it is the grass which gets crushed...where there are hostile blocs facing each other on the world stage Tanzania will ignore the threats or blandishments from both sides and pursue her own interests. ..It is this belief which underlies our opposition to colonialism and neocolonialism. We wish to be friendly with all, and we will never allow our friends to choose our enemies for us.

However, events following the state visit to China have further vindicated Nyerere's lukewarm attitude to the West. Firstly, Nyerere saw in China, the image and prototype of Tanzania's economic structure and was highly impressed by the Chinese self-reliance policy which was yielding rapid economic development. It should be remembered that following:

ing the 1949 Communist Revolution in China, Western aid was withdrawn but Mao-Tse-tung organized the economy, regulated the living standards of the people and expanded agricultural production. The 1967 Tanzanian self-reliance Declaration at Arusha was probably a tribute to this model.

Secondly, Chinese extension of credits and loans to Tanzania had been generous. "By June 1968, China had offered the country a total of $36.3 million in loans. All aid has been allocated to development expenditures with projects ranging from a completely equipped textile mill, the development of a state farm, and assistance in the construction of a police academy to the offer to survey and construct the Tan-Zam railroad". The construction of the railroad would cost China over $300 million. This is the boldest single project yet to be undertaken by China in Africa. When the project was first proposed, Western finance was refused because organizations that studied its feasibility reported that costs would be greater than the economic advantage. Tanzania placed high value on the project and proposed to receive aid wherever possible.

The ready involvement of China in Tanzania's development considerably undermined Western influence as Tanzania's policy gradually became hardened against the West. In December 1965, Tanzania rejected a $21 million loan from

---

and broke off diplomatic relations with Britain over Rhodesia. But in announcing this action, Nyerere explained that:

I should perhaps, add that breaking diplomatic relations with the British Government does not at present mean that Tanzania will be leaving the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth is a multi-national organization, and although it is still true that Britain, for historical reasons, has a very special place in the Commonwealth, it is no longer the British Commonwealth - it is a Commonwealth of free nations. ....But loyalty to the Commonwealth, and support for its principles is impossible without loyalty to the Organization of African Unity. 27

Nyerere's current view about the Commonwealth is more moderate than what he expressed in the Royal Commonwealth Journal of December 1961, that if membership of the Commonwealth was not in the "best interests of Tanganyika's efforts to advance the unity and welfare of people in the continent, Tanganyika would give up her Commonwealth membership". 28

It should be remarked that Nyerere really threatened to leave the Commonwealth over South African membership in 1961. South Africa had to withdraw her membership from the Association over the allegation that her apartheid policy was making a mockery of the multi-racial character of the Commonwealth.

Another issue that seemed to have driven Tanzania away from the West is the Vietnam war. In his address to the


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TANU Conference on October 16, 1967, President Nyerere assailed U.S. presence in Vietnam and said that:

We are told that great principles are involved, and that the richest nation on earth is defending those principles against attack....But if this is a civil war, what are outside nations doing in that conflict?.... The U.S.A. must recover from the delirium of power, and return to the principles upon which her nation was founded. 29

Of course, strained relations with the U.S. were not entirely based on Tanzania's opposition to American involvement in Vietnam. The essential issue seemed to have developed from the alleged Western plot of November 1964 according to which Foreign Minister Kambona claimed that an American Congo-based conspiracy was planning to overthrow the Tanzanian Government. In a rally at Dar-es-Salaam on November 15, 1964, President Nyerere said:

We get this news. The U.S. Government is tired of seeing Dar-es-Salaam being used by the Chinese to the detriment of the Western countries and for the purpose of breaking the peace of Africa. And that their Government has decided to put an end to this....My brothers, we are not gods. We are human beings. We have been threatened too much in the past. What should we have done?....It was only the other day that Portugal threatened us; and then today we get the news....30

In concluding the speech, Nyerere declared that the American Ambassador had denied reports of the conspiracy but, notwithstanding, he would hand over the documents to the Ambassador for examination. After this incident, distrust and

29 Julius K. Nyerere, Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs, pp. 5-6.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
suspicions developed within the Government against America.

In 1965 another quarrel flared up in Dar-es-Salaam which culminated in the expulsion of two Senior American diplomats from Tanzania for subversive activities. The United States struck back by expelling one of the officials in the Tanzanian Embassy at Washington. Each country recalled its Ambassador for consultations but results did not show any appreciable diplomatic understanding between the two countries. Of recent, the U.S. announced the winding-up of its Peace Corps program in Tanzania. Tanzania was one of the first nations in the world picked by the U.S. for the Peace Corps program. From the former strength of over 400, the Peace Corps delegation is now eleven in Tanzania. The program is scheduled to be scrapped entirely by the end of 1969. A Peace Corps official said recently that, "In a sense, it's a marriage that has had a very rocky go of it. We know what their (Tanzania's) feelings are. And they know we'll leave quietly". Some of the past departures stemmed from charges of espionage activities against the Peace Corps workers.

No doubt, the foregoing discussion would leave one with the impression that Tanzania's nonalignment has not been favourable to the West, yet Nyerere has not deliberately pursued an anti-West policy. For example, in spite of the low-level diplomatic relations with Britain, U.S. and West

---

31 The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Thursday, February 27, 1969, p. 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Germany, Nyerere has encouraged the presence of Canadian teachers and C.U.S.O. volunteers. In 1967 Canada completed a supply of $15 million worth of military aid to Tanzania. The aid consisted of Caribous and the air-transport wing of the defense forces. Negotiations had also been concluded to increase the Canadian assistance for the building of a military academy in the northern town of Arusha. In recent years attempts have been made to develop close relations with Japan. At the completion of a visit to Tokyo in November 1967, Economic Development Minister Bomani signed a credit agreement worth of 967,000 pounds with the Export-Import Bank of Japan for the finance of a cashew nut processing plant at Mtwara in Southern Tanzania.

In September 1968, President Nyerere announced the restoration of diplomatic relations with Britain after a successful Canadian mediation. This is a significant development with quite uncertain implications. While Britain has not changed her stand on the use of force to bring down the Rhodesian Smith Government, Tanzania joined her Commonwealth colleagues in the January 1969 Conference in London. Reporters even claimed that Nyerere was surprisingly moderate on the Rhodesian issue and that he played considerable influence on the attitude of other African members to the

British Government. However, Nyerere gave an indication of flexibility when he said on October 16, 1967 that:

Most other African states took a different view of the O.A.U. Resolution than we did, and of those that acted with us, some have now reconsidered their position. In these circumstances it will be for the Tanzanian Government in the coming months to consider what action will best serve our continuing purposes.33

Lastly, Tanzania's international relations present some elements of curiosity. It would seem that her desire to stick to the principle of self-determination in Africa, her preference for friendship with the Great Powers and the rejection of reliability on any have, often times, led her into conflicts with the West. However, one wonders why the Soviet involvement has been so minimal as to be almost negligible. Surely the East Germans give some aid and technical assistance to Tanzania, especially Zanzibar. But there seems to be little doubt that China's considerable presence has reduced Soviet involvement. Indeed, President Nyerere should be trusted on his views that, "any real discussion of the nonalignment of Tanzania's foreign policy should therefore be based on an examination of what we do, more than on what is said publicly".34

If Kenya's "moderate" nonalignment is pro-West, and Tanzania is acclaimed as an African pacesetter for radical

33 J.K. Nyerere, Tanzania on Foreign Affairs, p. 12.
foreign policy, Uganda's relations with East and West are, perhaps, the best example of a truly nonaligned policy. In her relations with the Great Powers, Uganda has tried to maintain a scrupulous neutralism. Consequently, President Obote accepts financial and technical aid from Britain and the United States and military aid from the Soviet Union, China and Czechoslovakia.

To a large extent, aid is essentially a part of an individual country's relations with Uganda. While historic associations and the capitalist structure of the economy have brought Ugandan trade relations closer to the West, President Obote has deliberately tried to court Communist aid in order to offset any alleged alignment with the West. The encouragement of the East and West missions to the Ugandan borders and Obote's occasional visits to the Eastern countries demonstrate that the Ugandan Government views foreign aid in political terms. In his state visit to the People's Republic of China in 1965, President Obote negotiated an interest-free loan of $13.4 million from China and invited Chou en Lai to visit Uganda. In his attempt to negotiate and receive aid from East and West, Obote has emphasized his desire to remain on friendly terms with the two camps. In his opening address to the Council on World Tensions Conference held in May 1965 at Makerere, he explained:

Suppose we in Uganda wanted to experiment with growing swamp rice on the shores of one of our lakes. It might turn out that the best combination for the project would be American and some Chinese advisers. It is questionable whether we would be likely to get assistance for a project put together on this basis. If we could do so it might be of value not only to us but also to other nations concerned. Certainly a combined aid operation between U.S.A. and China seems remote at the moment but President Obote is ready to accept assistance from China, in the same spirit as aid is received from other foreign sources, without discrimination or prejudice. So far, aid from the Communist countries is not as extensive as that from the West. The Soviet Union has offered 5.5 million pounds in long-term credits to build a textile factory, a training centre specializing in mechanical agriculture, meat refrigerating installations and a dairy factory. Arrangements have also been concluded with the Soviet Union for the supply of bulldozers and tractors for road construction.

Obote's attitude to the Commonwealth has also allowed Uganda to receive technical and development aid from the Association. Since independence, Britain has remained the largest source of external financial assistance to the Ugandan Development Plan.

To maintain the momentum of development expenditure after the aid already agreed before independence was exhausted (which was by mid-1963), the U.K. Government made a grant to Uganda of 1.5 million pounds and a Commonwealth Assistance Loan of 2.4 million pounds. This brought the

---

total of British financial aid from July 1961 to 8.6 million pounds....There was further a grant of 50,000 pounds for improvements to the Uganda Rifles barracks at Jinja and the United Kingdom continued to meet part of the cost of military forces - up to 200,000 pounds - until 31st of March, 1963. 37

In recent times the Commonwealth Assistance loan has been used to finance Group Farming Scheme and a television station. The Group Farming Scheme was started in 1963 along with the introduction of mechanized agriculture for which the British loan was requested. Thus, British assistance has been of extreme importance to Uganda. In fact, without it, the Ugandan economy would collapse. On the other hand, U.S. financial aid has been operating on specific projects handled by the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development. In terms of outright grants and financial aid, American assistance has been small until recently. In the first three years of the Five-Year Plan, U.S. aid amounted to 2.2 million pounds in loans and grants but in 1966 the loan had gone up to 6 million pounds.

However, it is the military supply to Uganda that has generated some confusion. For some years after independence, Uganda relied on Israel for the training of the army, the air force and the supply of Fouga-Magister that could carry rockets. More recently, President Obote has turned to the Communist world for military air-support. In August 1968, Foreign Minister Odaka explained that:

37  Ibid, p. 49.
We have also, in the course of building up our army, purchased certain arms and ammunition from the Soviet Union and from Czechoslovakia. Again, I want to assure you that neither the arms nor the ammunition could be said to have, in themselves, any communistic inclinations. Nor can the arms we purchase from Belgium, Australia, Britain or from Israel, be labelled capitalistic. The fact that you buy these arms from such sources can easily make you unpopular in certain quarters. 38

Obote's use of this diverse arrangement of military supply and training is intended to bolster Uganda's nonalignment policy.

With Kenya showing renewed suspicion of all the Communist powers and Tanzania becoming increasingly hospitable to the Chinese, Uganda might seem to offer the Russians their best opportunity to extend their influence into East and Central Africa. But there is no panic among Western observers in Kampala. None doubts that President Obote is sincere in his nonalignment, and shrewd enough to handle all comers. 39

Thus, President Obote seems to have been more realistic and less partisan in his application of a nonaligned policy than his immediate neighbours in East Africa.

POLICIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The admissions of the East African states to the United Nations have roughly coincided with the phenomenal influx of new members to the Organization since 1960. Generally, but in differing ways, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have expressed faith and unflinching support for the ideals of the United Nations.


Nations. But Tanzania's support for the Organization is, probably, a result of Tanganyika's colonial association with the Trusteeship Council. In his maiden speech to the United Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1961, President Nyerere expressed the view that:

We feel a special gratitude and loyalty to the United Nations because we are conscious of the debt we owe to the Trusteeship Council and, of course, to this General Assembly.....Our pleasure at being accepted as a Member of the United Nations is a recognition that we have been given the right to join in the search for greater harmony between the peoples of the world. 40

By approving the termination of the trusteeship agreements in Tanganyika, the U.N. formally sanctioned national independence and the full participation of mainland Tanzania in the deliberations of the World Organization. Even with Kenya and Uganda, where the U.N. did not directly influence the liquidation of colonialism, it has performed a validating function. For the two countries, membership has endowed them with a degree of legitimacy and enhances their status as separate entities. Also, on account of their militancy against colonialism, the U.N. forum is commonly regarded as the appropriate place for the furtherance of pan-Africanist ideals of decolonization.

In Kenya, anticolonialist sentiments figure very prominently on the foreign policy. Often times, the Government has carried this passion to the U.N. Consequently, Kenya regards the U.N., "not so much as an Organization primarily

40 J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, pp. 144-145.
designed to ensure peace and security— as the big powers intended it to be — but as an organization which should be primarily concerned with human rights at large." In his speech to the General Assembly in 1964, Foreign Minister Murumbi said that:

There are still millions of our African brothers in South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, French Somaliland and the Spanish colonies who are living under the worst forms of human oppression. They are denied the right to self-determination; the regimes imposed upon them by brute force have stamped out their fundamental rights and freedoms, contrary to the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the various other international instruments intended to promote human rights throughout the world.42

Of course, all the African countries use the U.N. forum to condemn colonialism but Kenya certainly thinks that the Organization should also promote international morality especially that relates to the rights of the oppressed peoples and weak nations. In his own evaluation of the role of the United Nations in respect to the liquidation of colonialism, President Nyerere thinks that the Organization should assume more responsibility in this task. He said:

We do not see how it is possible for any single nation to be judge of its own cause, as some colonial powers decide to be judges of their own causes. We would therefore like to see the United Nations assume the responsibility of being judge.43

---


The above views of President Nyerere are not very specific on what the U.N. should do in respect of decolonization, but, one can assume that he wants more effective sanctions against countries impeding total liquidation of colonialism in Africa.

Closely related to the East African calls for decolonization and the persistent advocation for peace with justice all over the world is also the agitation for the admission of Communist China into the World Organization. In 1963, Uganda and Tanganyika voted with thirty-nine other members in a bid to seat the Chinese People's Republic in the General Assembly. In 1964, Kenya gained membership to the U.N. and voted in 1965 for another resolution urging the admission of China to the U.N. From the time of their membership to the Organization, all the East African states have consistently voted for the Admission of China to the U.N. In their speeches, the East Africans argue that the exclusion of the Chinese People's Republic is a miscarriage of justice by the international community of nations and that continued isolation of a nuclear power and the most populous state in the world is an unrealistic policy for an organization which regards itself as a repository of power in the preservation of world peace. The East African attitude can, perhaps, best be illustrated by the Ugandan Foreign Minister Odaka's speech to the General Assembly in 1964.

In the submission of my delegation, the question of whether there is one China or two Chinas should not be permitted to cloud the issue. The People's Republic of China representing as it does the world's oldest and most populous country must be represented in this Organization. In considering the question of the admission of the People's Republic, we must not be prejudiced by ideological, economic or political considerations. We should be guided only by our determination to make this Organization truly universal and an effective instrument for the preservation of world peace. 45

In fact, the East African states and other militantly anti-apartheid countries in Africa would settle for the expulsion of South Africa from and the admission of China to the U.N. They think that racial discrimination and the attendant violation of human rights are the real potential threats to world peace. They sometimes go all their way to predict that a black and white racial confrontation in South Africa would result into a holocaust with implications affecting the whole world. In this setting of rationalization, it would appear that the East African states - and many O.A.U. members, for that matter - tend to put more emphasis on the demands "making human rights fundamental to peace rather than vice versa". 46

Quite apart from providing opportunities for the expression of important viewpoints affecting Africa and world peace, the U.N. has afforded the East African states econo-


mic and easy contact with other members of the international community. For example, after independence Uganda stated that, "it is very expensive both in manpower and finance to open and maintain an embassy and, therefore, as a developing country, Uganda is reluctantly forced to limit severely the number of missions she establishes". Similarly, when Tanganyika became independent, she announced an austerity allocation of embassies to only three countries and the greatest priority was given to the U.N. Mission. In the calculations and thinking of Nyerere and the Ugandan Government, New York is a highly useful ambassadorial listening post, undoubtedly, the best place in the world to pick up information on other governments. Perhaps they are right; a researcher once remarked that the United Nations:

provide voluminous documentation that covers virtually all international problems... This documentation is, of course, more important to some nations than it is to others. For smaller nations and nations not directly involved in some issues, the United Nations information sources may provide virtually all of the data on which national positions are based. 48

No less influential on the attitudes of the East African states to the World Organization are the U.N. technical and economic development assistance to Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Aids are channelled through specialized agencies like

---


the Food and Agriculture Organization, World Health Organization, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Economic Commission for Africa and supplemented by the Expanded Technical Assistance Program. Upon becoming independent, the East African countries found themselves without adequate staffs of qualified nationals and in need of substantial numbers of foreign personnel to keep the governmental and economic machine going. Assistance was also needed in the training of Africans for the eventual takeover of the administration. The U.N. Technical Assistance has been of immense help to these states in filling the gaps left by colonial administration and also in the provision of funds and material aids for development. Through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) a medium of dialogue and increased trade involvement with the outside world has been established.

No doubt, these material privileges have bolstered the support of the East African countries for the United Nations. Jomo Kenyatta acknowledged this when he said, on the United Nations' Day in October 1964 that, "beyond its great purpose in political philosophy and adjustment, we in Kenya appreciate very greatly the practical efforts and aid of the United Nations, through its specialized agencies in the field". Foreign Minister, Odaka puts it in another way when

he said that, "even without material or other benefits Uganda's faith in the United Nations is strong". Since economic development remains a strong force in East African politics and to the extent that these states make the fight for justice, international morality and the preservation of human rights the conditions for world peace, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda will continue to support the United Nations and its ideals.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Within the three preceding chapters, attempts have been made to analyse the foreign policies of the three East African states in relation to other African countries and the outside world. Of course, the consideration of a foreign policy is not exclusively confined to the examination of daily patterns of interaction between states. It encompasses a wide range of related factors such as the consideration of national interests and capabilities - tangible and intangible - which influence the decisions of the policy-makers.

In most countries, foreign policy is largely influenced by national interests and domestic policies. The fact that the East African States are generally poor, young on the international scene and still at the initial stage of economic development have increased domestic influence on their foreign policy formulations. In spite of their general lack of capital and natural resources, they want an accelerated socio-economic development. Consequently, the decision-makers, on the whole, choose to be pragmatic in their foreign policy orientations. They express the desire to receive aid from foreign powers if it would not involve a loss of independence. Also the demands for decolonization of the dependent African states and the desire not to participate in Cold War conflicts make Pan Africanism and nonalignment the focus of foreign
policy orientations of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

Pan-Africanism is very difficult to define but in particular reference to the East African foreign policies, it serves two outstanding purposes. Firstly, it serves as a driving force for the liquidation of colonialism in Africa. Decolonization is an objective to which all independent African states are committed, although with varying degrees of zeal. In East Africa, it is a logical extension of the belief in fundamental human rights and the right of small states to self-determination. Also on account of their geographical proximity to the dependent areas of Southern Africa, the East African states feel a special moral obligation to help fellow Africans whose rights to freedom have been violated. However, their ability to implement decolonization policy on their own is limited; therefore, they choose to work through the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations.

It would be misleading, notwithstanding, to give the impression that the three East African states uphold decolonization with the same degree of tenacity. They each declare in their foreign and domestic policies that their independence will not be complete until colonialism is completely eradicated on the African continent but the Rhodesian issue has proved the extent to which Kenya and Uganda would act in the pursuit of this policy. Despite the O.A.U. resolution of December 3, 1965 that member states should break off diplomatic relations with Britain.
if she failed to crush the Smith Government by December 15, only Tanzania honoured this pledge. The desire not to alienate the British Government which provides a substantial development assistance to Kenya and Uganda was probably responsible for their apparent inability to implement the O.A.U. resolution. If this interpretation is correct, Kenya and Uganda could be regarded as selfish and hypocritical in respect of their decolonization policy. On the other hand, Tanzania could be regarded as the only country that has consistently pursued her decolonization policy since independence. The 1963 decision of the O.A.U. to base the headquarters of the African Liberation Committee in Dar-es-Salaam was probably a tribute to the support and devotion which Tanganyika was giving to the cause of liberation.

Secondly, Pan-Africanism constitutes an ideological base for the foreign policy orientation of the East African states to other African countries. It is used to promote friendliness between states and to suppress hostilities around the borders. Put in another way, Pan-Africanism is a positive effort to achieve such identification between African states to facilitate brotherhood solidarity and functional co-operation. The principle that underlay the inauguration of the "Good Neighbor" Summit of 1966 at Nairobi is fundamental to this line of analysis.

Support for the O.A.U. is another significant foreign policy orientation of the East African states. Since its inception, the O.A.U. has been concerned with the limitation
of outside involvement in African affairs. By approving the O.A.U. Charter, Article III, Section 7, which recommends that member states should pursue "a policy of nonalignment with regard to all blocs", the East African states have identified with the O.A.U. attempts to immunize African states against Cold War conflicts. However, their choice of nonalignment in the conduct of their relations with outside world should be more appropriately explained in terms of national interests. It is difficult to conclude that Tanzania which ignored an O.A.U. resolution in her recognition of Biafra or Kenya and Uganda which failed to honour their pledge on the Rhodesian issue have adopted nonalignment, primarily as a demonstration of their loyalties to the O.A.U. Charter.

The East African leaders start from the assumption that contemporary global international affairs are dominated largely by the conflicts between the Communist and the Western powers, more particularly by the rivalries between the United States, the Soviet Union and China. In their foreign policy formulations they have expressed the unwillingness to participate in the conflicts that have no relevance to their domestic policies. Besides, having just emerged from the colonial status, they are deeply apprehensive of losing their sovereignties to foreign powers. Consequently, they choose to be friendly with all the major Powers and reject the possibility of an absolute reliance on any.
Their dedication to policies of rapid economic development also make them declare their willingness to receive aid from both East and West, without prejudice or discrimination. The findings in this research show, however, that Kenya looks to the West for patterns of government, ideological orientation and aid for development. Tanzania looks towards China for direction on economic developments based on self-reliance, and Uganda has consciously maintained her nonalignment by actively seeking aid from both East and West. Whether attitudinal behaviours have been favourable to the East or West or positively neutral, it seems that all the East African states have been getting economic benefits from the pursuit of their nonaligned policy.

Lastly, the brief analysis of the East African policies to the United Nations reveals that the three states share some confidence in and support for the Organization. However, there is a tendency on the parts of the states to assume that the United Nations is largely influenced by the Western bloc. They see the inability of the United Nations to enforce decolonization in South-West Africa and Rhodesia as a result of Western acquiescence to the policies of the regimes in Pretoria and Salisbury. They think that U.N. intervention in the Congo was influenced by the Western countries. Although they did not specifically condemn the U.N. action, they blamed the Western countries and supported the O.A.U. Conciliation Commission under Jomo Kenyatta in appealing to President Johnson to end U.S. military inter-
vention in the Congo.

The East African states also contend that the U.N. seems to reflect the old European system of international relations. Nyerere has even suggested that the Organization should be reconstituted so that it can effectively promote the dignity of man, justice and the well-being of all members. The two other East African leaders would probably agree to this proposition but it is hard to see whether there is any marked difference between the proposition and the present structure and operation of the U.N.

Similarly, on account of their stated policies on colonialism, and their faith in the rights of small states to self-determination, it would seem that the East African states, especially Tanzania, would reject any attempt to make the declared United Nations purpose of maintaining international peace and security the number one priority if it enables the Western countries to maintain a colonial status quo in Africa. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have been joining other Afro-Asian countries in demanding that Britain should use force in crushing the rebellion in Rhodesia. They have also made concerted efforts with other African states to end South African participation in various International Conferences because of her apartheid policy. They seem to have brought their own priorities to the United Nations and would like to interpret world politics in terms of these priorities. To the extent that policies are largely influenced by demands for total decolonization in Africa and the priorities of human rights, East African attitudes to the United Nations will remain ambiguous.
APPENDIX I

THE FEDERATION DECLARATION OF
5TH JUNE, 1963

The following statement was issued in Nairobi on Wednesday, June 5, 1963 by the President of the Republic of Tanganyika, Dr. Julius K. Nyerere; the Prime Minister of Uganda Dr. Milton A. Obote; and the Prime Minister of Kenya, Mr. Jomo Kenyatta:

We, the leaders of the people and Governments of East Africa assembled in Nairobi on June 5, 1963, pledge ourselves to the political Federation of East Africa.

Our meeting today is motivated by the spirit of Pan-Africanism and not by mere selfish Regional interests. We are nationalists and reject tribalism, racialism or inward looking policies. We believe that the day of decision has come and to all our people we say there is no more room for slogans and words. This is our day of action in the cause of the ideals that we believe in and unity and freedom for which we have suffered and sacrificed so much.

Within this spirit of Pan-Africanism and following the declaration of African unity at the recent Addis Ababa conference practical steps should be taken wherever possible
to accelerate the achievement of our common goal.

We believe that the East African Federation can be a practical step towards the goal of Pan-African unity. We hope that our action will help to accelerate the efforts already being made by our brothers throughout the Continent to achieve Pan-African unity.

We share a common past and are convinced of our common destinies. We have a common history, culture and customs which make our unity both logical and natural. Our futures are inevitably bound together by the identical aspirations and hopes of our peoples and the need for similar efforts in facing the tasks that lie ahead of each of our free nations.

In the past century the hand of Imperialism grasped the whole Continent and in this part of Africa our people found themselves included together in what the Colonialists styled "The British sphere of influence". Now that we are once again free or are on the point of regaining our freedom we believe the time has come to consolidate our unity and provide it with a constitutional basis.

For some years we have worked together in the PAFMECA where we have accepted common objectives and ideas and created the essential spirit of unity between ourselves
and among our people. We are happy that with KANU's victory in the Kenya elections we now have in the three East African countries Governments which are fully committed to genuine African nationalism and Pan-African unity.

For 40 years the Imperialists and local settler minorities tried to impose political federation upon us. Our people rightly resisted these attempts. Federation at that time would quickly have led to one thing - a vast White dominated dominion.

The East Africa High Commission and its successor the Common Services Organization have taught us the value of links in the economic field. Indeed it was the recognition of the value of these connections which led the two fully Independent members to agree to continue participation after they had achieved their freedom. In many practical ways we already are co-operating - in scientific research, in communications and in postal services. An important factor in view of our determination to achieve Federation is the existence of shared currency; a leading aspect of economic working together is the functioning of the E.A. Common Market.

Thus the value of working together has been adequately
demonstrated in the E.A.C.S.O. and in the Common Market but the scope for further joint action remains wide. Economic planning, maximum utilisation of manpower and our other resources, the establishment of a Central Bank and common defence programme and foreign and diplomatic representation are areas in which we need to work together. Such approach would provide greater co-ordination and savings in both scarce capital, facilities for training and manpower. What is more we would have a total population of some 25 million people – a formidable force and a vast market to influence economic development at home, attract greater investment and enhance our prestige and influence abroad.

The movement towards popular Government and Independence in our various countries of recent years has brought forward the issue of truly popular Governments in each country and removes fears of minority or settler domination under Federation.

We believe a political Federation of East Africa is desired by our peoples. There is throughout East Africa a great urge for unity and an appreciation of the significance of Federation.
We are aware that local and territorial factors have to be taken into account. We firmly believe that ways can be devised of overcoming any fears and of surmounting such difficulties. Special attention will be paid to the accommodation of relevant territorial interests in drawing up the constitution of the East African Federation. We believe, in fact, that some of these territorial problems can be solved in the context of such an East African Federation.

As already mentioned we have some basis for a joint endeavour in the political as well as in the economic spheres. The Common Services authority was conceived as a body for this purpose although up to now its functioning was greatly hampered partly by the sharing of Kenya representation on the Authority but largely by the lack of central political direction. The various Ministerial committees and the Central Legislative Assembly, especially since it became properly representative have demonstrated the need for such direction.

We are convinced that the time has now come to create such central political authority.

Having stated our aims we wish now to announce the
steps we are taking to achieve the implementation of these aims.

A Working Party is being established which will prepare a framework of a draft constitution for the Federation of East Africa. It will report back to a full Conference of East African Governments. In its work it will consult with the three Governments and with their consent may co-opt constitutional or other experts. The E.A.C.S.O. will be associated with these deliberations.

In the third week of August a full scale Conference will be convened to consider the proposals of the Working Party.

At this point we must express our happiness at the victory of KANU in the Kenya elections. While welcoming the results of the Kenya elections, we must declare most strongly our opposition to any attempt to delay the country's achievement of Independence any longer. The ruling party has a clear mandate for Independence and we must regard it as an unfriendly act if Britain uses the pretext of some minority interest or other to prevent Kenya joining the free nations at the earliest possible moment. We are closely involved in this matter now since a hold-
up in Kenya's advance to Independence will hinder the achievement of Federation to which we are committed. The three Governments, having agreed to the establishment of a Federation this year, expect the British Government to grant Kenya's Independence immediately.

Although Zanzibar is not represented at this conference we must make it clear that that country is invited to participate fully in our plans for Federation.

As soon as Zanzibar has held its elections next month its Government will be invited to take part in the functioning of the Working Party and of any other body which may be set up as a result of our plans to build a Federation.

We reiterate that our plans for the Federation of East Africa are the logical promotion of the spirit of Pan-African unity and wish to make it, therefore, clear that any of our other neighbours may in future join this Federation.
APPENDIX II

EAST AFRICA COMMON SERVICES

The general administration of services common to Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania by the East Africa High Commission in pre-independence days was taken over by the East Africa Common Services Organisation in 1962. Policy was controlled by the Premiers of the three states sitting as the East Africa Common Services Authority. There were five committees of three Ministers, one from each territory, to control the five groups of services: Communications (railways, harbours, posts and telecommunications, civil aviation and meteorology); Finance (income tax, customs and excise collection, and administration of the General Fund for the various services); Commercial and Industrial Co-ordination; Social and Research Sciences; Industrial Relations and Co-ordination of Labour. The Central Legislative Assembly, responsible for passing the legislation for the administration of the common services, consists of a Speaker, 15 Ministers (five from each state), 27 members (nine from each state and elected by their legislatures), and two official members (the Secretary-General and the Legal Secretary).

130
On 6 June 1967 in Kampala, President Kenyatta (Kenya), President Obote (Uganda) and President Nyerere (Tanzania) signed a 15-year treaty of economic co-operation which came into force on 1 December 1967. Under the treaty, there will be an East Africa Development Bank, inter-territorial tariffs on goods originating in one state and exported to another, replacement of the ministerial committees, decentralisation of E.A.C.S.O., and the organisation of an East Africa Economic Community of 25 million people.

The Development Bank will promote financial and technical assistance to industrial projects. Priority will be given to raising the industrial level of Uganda and Tanzania on a par with Kenya. Each state will contribute an initial £2 million each and it is hoped to raise £4 million overseas. The directors can call up a further £10 million over consecutive five-year periods. Tanzania and Uganda will each get 38-3/4 per cent of the Bank's total investment while Kenya will receive 22½ per cent.

A "transfer tax system" will allow a state that has a trading deficit with its partners to impose transfer taxes on goods originating in these countries, up to the
amount of the deficit, but only if similar goods are manufactured, or are expected to be, within three months in the tax-imposing country. The protected industry will also have a capacity to at least 15 per cent of domestic consumption or to a value of $100,000 whichever is the less. The tax will not exceed 50 per cent of the tariff on goods originating outside East Africa, nor can it be imposed for more than eight years. Its aim will be to favour Tanzania and allow her to compete freely with Kenya and Uganda with which she had trade deficits.

The ministerial committee system for E.A.C.S.O. will be replaced by a Minister for East Africa from each state, permanently based on E.A.C.S.O which will be moved from Nairobi to Arusha in northern Tanzania. The Development Bank and postal headquarters will be in Kampala; East African Railways and East African Airways in Nairobi; and the Harbour headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam.

The three Presidents will retain their authority as the controlling body of the East Africa Economic Community; a Common Market Council will handle the Community's day-to-day affairs; and a tribunal will be created as a judicial body. Provision will also be made for the association or
active participation by Zambia, Burundi, Ethiopia and other interested countries in the East Africa Common Market.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I BOOKS


II ARTICLES


Canadian Annual Report for the Department of External Affairs, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Cat. No. EL - 1967, Ottawa, 1968.


Odaka, S. N., Speech on Geography as a Determinant of Uganda's Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Division, 9/8/1968.


VITA AUOTORIS

FAMILY


EDUCATION


OTHER ACTIVITIES

Soccer, Table Tennis.

Secretary, Journalism Club, St. Peter's College, Akure and was Editor of the College Key Magazine 1959-1960.

Social Secretary, Ijero-Ekiti Recreation Club, 1962.

General Secretary, Orin Progressive Union 1963-5.

Entered Local Politics and became Chairman of the Planning Committee, Ido/Osi District Council, 1963-1964.