1-1-1969

Canadian-American interplay in Asia 1945--1968.

William M. Scarfia

University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd

Recommended Citation

https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/6587

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters' theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email (scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000 ext. 3208.
CANADIAN-AMERICAN INTERPLAY IN ASIA 1945-1968

Submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Windsor, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

by

William M. Scarfia B.A.

Faculty of Graduate Studies
1969
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
ABSTRACT

Although a study of Canadian-American interplay in Asia from 1945-1967 reveals marked similarities in the attitudes of both countries, it also uncovers some interesting differences. In view of the power disparity between Canada and the United States, one may be tempted to attribute the similarities solely to American predominance. A closer study of Canadian reactions to American policy, however, reveals that it is due as much to the Canadian perception of events in Asia as to United States predominance. This discussion of Canadian-American interplay in Asia will show that, in the final analysis, these singularly Canadian perceptions dictated her policies, and that Canada was not prepared to follow blindly the ramifications of United States policy. The American influence on Canadian policy, although undeniably present, was not always the overriding Canadian concern.

Canadian-American interplay during the Korean War and in Vietnam has shown that the extent to which Canada was prepared to go in following the American lead was determined more by her concept of national interest than by securing a sympathetic outlook from Washington. Canadian action on the question of Communist Chinese recognition can also be seen as an attempt to further these interests, but in this instance deferring to American views in the interest of maintaining Canadian-American
rapport was thought to be in Canada's best interest.

In all three areas of study, reasonable justification for Canadian positions can be found in terms other than a simple deference to Washington per se. Although the line between deference and self-interest may at times become blurred, at no time did Canada forego what she believed to be a pursuit of singularly Canadian interests in favor of those of the United States.
AC Knowledgements

I am indebted to the members of my thesis committee whose efforts have aided me in the completion of this work. Dr. Ronald H. Wagenberg, my thesis director has given me the benefit of his knowledge in Political Science and Canadian-American relations by his careful consideration of my efforts and his valuable suggestions. To Mr. Bruce Burton, M.Soc.Sc., Department of Political Science I wish to express my gratitude for his excellent advice on matters of Asian policies after World War II. Dr. A. Lall provided me with counsel on the subtitles of this paper and, aided me with suggestions on style and form, without which this effort could not have assumed its present form.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Mrs. Frances Devine who tirelessly typed the preliminary and final drafts of this paper, and the Detroit Edison Company for their very generous grant to pursue research in the field of Canadian-American relations.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I  INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II BACKGROUND: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES AFTER WORLD WAR II</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Positions of United States and Canada After World War II</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Broad Policy Interests of United States and Canada After World War II</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Asian Policy Interests of United States and Canada</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Importance of Asia After World War II</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE KOREAN CRISIS 1945-1951</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Origins of the Korean Dilemma</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How Canada and the United States Viewed the United Nations</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Outbreak of the Korean War and Canadian reactions</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM 1954-1969</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Early Canadian Attitudes Regarding the ICSC and Vietnam</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The United States and Vietnam</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Implications of ICSC Role for Canada</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calm in Vietnam</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Canadian Activity and Vietnam 1954-1962</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Canadian Action and Vietnam 1962-1965</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Vietnam 1965 to 1967 and the Canadian Reaction</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND COMMUNIST CHINESE DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-The Problem</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Origins of United States-China Policy and Main American Interests</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Early Canadian-Far Eastern Relations</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-United States China Policy 1945-1949</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Canada, Korea and Communist Chinese Recognition</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Canada and Recognition, 1950 to Middle Fifties</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-United States and Taiwan</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Canada and Recognition in the Middle Fifties</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Communist Chinese Admission to the UN</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Trade and Canadian Recognition</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI CONCLUSION</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA AUCTORIS</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I
INTRODUCTION

Any aspect of Canadian-American relations is conditioned by the fact that the United States is a super-power and Canada is not. This is always at the heart of their mutual involvement anywhere, but it is seen especially in Asia. Inherent volatility and the People's Republic of China combine to make Asia an extremely difficult area with which to deal. Moreover, Canada has neither the power nor the capacity to pursue as wide a range of global endeavor as does the United States. Because the latter is committed in Asia presently in Vietnam, previously in Korea and Kuomintang China, and before World War II in trade and the "Open Door" policy, Canadian involvement must defer to an American presence which has been evident since the late eighteenth century. There is, in ad-

1

For our purposes, the term "Asia" will mean the Southern, South Eastern and Eastern portions of the continent, comprising Indochina, China, India and Korea, but excluding Soviet Asia, the Middle East and, unless otherwise referred to, fringe portions such as Indonesia, Malaysia etc. Japan, admittedly, is a special case, as are the Philippines, and unless otherwise stated, will not fall under the term "Asia" in this discussion.

2

dition, another aspect of American involvement which poses difficulties for the Canadian position in Asia - the American notion of a messianic mission to deliver the world generally and Asia specifically from Communism.

Before dealing with the more complex reasons for American involvement, it will be useful to define the concept of interplay as it pertains here. Interplay will mean a mutual involvement in Asia on the part of Canada and the United States. This does not mean, however, an involvement by one simply because the other has chosen to formulate or implement policy vis-a-vis a specific Asian area. That is, a prior amenability, other than the warrants of normal diplomatic activity, is not suggested. Interplay does suggest, however, that in areas where both have chosen to become involved there is influence on one or the other corresponding to their individual power positions, and how one country


It is also important to note here that the American conception of Asia, before World War II included mainly China, the Philippines and Japan. It was with China and the Philippines, however, that American tutelage was especially in evidence. See H. R. Isaacs. Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of India and China. (New York: 1962) (Capricorn Edition).

Canada, however, looked at Asia very much in terms of the British Asian Empire, later Commonwealth, of India, Ceylon and later Pakistan, since these were her main contacts with that continent.

The significance of these two dissimilar views of Asia become important, especially in light of developments in China since 1949.
perceives the relevance of that particular position in the context of the then existing situation. While for Canada, American support will normally be sought in any dealings, in certain situations Canada will also defer to American policy in favor of continuing Canadian-American rapport. Conversely, while the Canadian position generally is not as important to the United States, there will be times when Canada's support is valuable to American policy. In these situations American policy will, in turn, either defer to or encourage the Canadian position.

Simply, interplay will be an examination of fields of activity where Canada and the United States have seen fit to formulate a policy which elicits some action by the other. From this it may be determined what is the extent of influence either on Canada or the United States. Similarly, the extent to which Canada will conform to United States policy will also become apparent and, when she does not, how far she will diverge and why. Interplay, then, with special reference to Canada, will be a study of questions that are of significant import to warrant defined policy, and the degree to which that policy is or is not pursued when the United States is involved. With this in mind we can now deal with some of

4 There are influences on Canada other than that of the United States. The attitudes of Great Britain and India have, on occasion, been among the determinants of Canadian policy. However, it will not be within the scope of this paper to deal with all of them, but only those which in some way have an effect on Canadian-American mutual involvement.
the reasons for American involvement in Asia.

The United States has had somewhat of an emotional identification with Asia. It was the United States, among others, which tried to educate and civilize parts of Asia with missionary and medical teams since the second half of the nineteenth century. Similarly, it was the United States which tried to save Chiang Kai-shek's regime from 1941-1949. She did so obviously not only out of self-interest, but out of a conviction that if Asia (i.e. China) could not take care of herself then America would try to do it for her. This attitude was a form of spiritual "Manifest Destiny" to lead Asia from the "wilderness". There grew, then, a special kinship with parts of Asia that has, in varying degrees, pervaded American dealings with her. This mission, however,


8 See Tyler Dennett, Americans in East Asia, (New York:
has been plagued by a general lack of success in Asian involvement since World War II. Indeed, Kuomintang China fell, SEATO was less than effective, Korea is still divided, and Vietnam is, in 1969, a blight on American policy. It was paradoxical, moreover, that all this was thrust upon the acknowledged most powerful nation in the world. Thus, because of the enormous American capabilities, anything less than complete success in Asian dealings brought disillusion. All these factors complicate Canada's pursuit of her Asian policies.

Canada, by virtue of common European heritage and similar cultures, finds herself in the difficult position of at once supporting United States grand goals in Asia, while necessarily hesitating at some of the means to effect them. While it was, and very much still is, in Canada's interest to support America's world posture, if not her tactics, she must also do it in a way that would not classify her as a satellite of the United States. Canada, therefore, has had to walk the narrow line between possible subordinance and pursuit of self-interest in order to realize the goals that are set by her concept of the "middle power". Thus, hers was the difficult task of fulfilling the American desire for support, while avoiding the stigma of appearing merely a

"rubber-stamp" for American policy. This pursuit as it pertained to Asia was a particularly difficult one to realize.

Because Canada was not deeply involved in Asia until after 1945, her activity there had been determined by larger global circumstances. Professor Spencer suggests that not until Chiang's fall could Canada be said to have a peculiarly Asiatic policy, that is, a policy in which Canadian-Asian circumstances were at the root instead of Canadian-global ones. Her policies there were facilitated by the fact that she was neither mean nor offensive and had herself once been a colony. The fact is that, outside of India, Canada has had no special ties with Asia. Indeed, she has by any standard been pragmatic in her Asian dealings, and her policies there have been dictated more by logic than by messianism. This fact is at once the reason why she has the potential to pursue an independent approach to Asia, and why she must at times accord deference to American pretensions in the area.

However, if logic dictates that a Canadian presence in Asia can be helpful to world peace and, in turn, Canadian interests, then it also dictates that the United States can be a more useful friend than enemy. Her Asian involvement, therefore, must be conditioned to a great degree by anticipated American reactions. The point at which Canada presumably foregoes her own interpretation of Asian circumstances for those of the United States, is necessarily the point at which
American influence is acknowledged. Conversely, where Canada either lessens her commitment to American policy, or takes a position where she is less likely to become as deeply involved as the United States, then Canada takes a more independent approach to her foreign policy.

The fact is, that while Canada rarely initiates sweeping policy, she does react to great power endeavors. The degree of reaction to United States policies, then, is often the measure of Canada's independence in foreign policy. It will be the purpose of this paper to show that Canadian policies in Asia are largely reactions to American policies there, not unilateral Canadian decisions. Towards Korea, Vietnam and the question of Communist Chinese recognition, Canadian policies have been largely influenced by American positions and policies. In these areas Canada has shown a forebearance to American policies even when an independent role would have been useful in the form of greater world security. It will also be seen that Canadian influence has been effective only in areas where it served as a modifier of American policy, and only then when it was accompanied by similar American predispositions. In such instances as these, Canada's reaction was dictated more by self-interest and concern for world peace than by United States influence. Basically, because Canada was not prepared to pursue at length all the ramifications of American policies, she tried to tone them down. To that extent at least, Canada's desire for continued ease in Canadian-American relations was superceded by her concern for world security.
II
BACKGROUND: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
AFTER WORLD WAR II

In discussing Canadian-American interplay in Asia since World War II it will be necessary to examine briefly the wide range of goals and policies pursued by both countries since 1945. The extent and effectiveness of mutual involvement in Asia can only be determined within the context of the general foreign policy orientations of Canada and the United States. It will be seen that the positions of both countries after the war had much to do with their respective reactions to developments in Asia in succeeding years.

The close of World War II brought with it more than an end to hostilities; it brought, for all intents and purposes, a re-shuffling of the international state system. Although the war had been won, the victory proved a costly one for the Allies. While Germany had been defeated and Japan crippled, Great Britain and France had found it difficult to adjust in the post-war years, and this was generally true of most of Europe. Indeed, there were few countries to come out of that conflict relatively unscathed; two of these were Canada and the United States. They were to form their post-war policy goals, therefore, in the context of a much stronger position vis-à-vis most of the West.

8
Canada, unlike Britain and most of the other allies, "had not been bled white economically in the effort to achieve victory" in World War II. Unlike the other nations of Europe "her territory had not been a battlefield, nor had her people been subjugated by the occupation." She was, moreover, in the throes of an economic expansion which was "capable even of assisting the ruined great powers of the pre-war world." Indeed, given immunity from invasion, Canada's development as a power in post-war politics was inevitable. As the post-war years progressed, however, Canada soon found her immediate power position to be tenuous. While she was not small enough to be ignored, neither was she large enough to be feared, and Canada saw herself precariously in the middle of the Cold War. She was, therefore, "faced with the problem of finding for herself a place in international councils appropriate to her position as something less than a major and more than a minor power." In this pursuit,

1 R. Reford, Canada and Three Crises, (Lindsay, Ontario: 1968) p.2. See also R. Spencer, Canada in World Affairs 1946-1949, (Toronto:1959) Chapter I.

2 Ibid, p.2.


5 Holmes, op.cit. As will be seen in Chapter III this place was the United Nations.
moreover, she could not afford to neglect the one country which would be most involved with any international role, the United States.

While this search was first accentuated in the early post-war years, it has become one of the aims of present day Canadian policies. How she has resolved it will go a long way in explaining the general tone of Canadian-American interplay and will be dealt with more fully later. Suffice it to say now that her role evolved to one of nominal independence and pragmatic forebearance, largely unforeseen in 1945.

For the United States, it was not as necessary to find a role then, as to accept the one thrust upon her. At the close of World War II she inherited the consequences of a basic change in the global power structure. This change was a shift in the center of gravity in the Western world from the capitals of Western Europe to Washington. The end result of a change which had been going on imperceptibly for the first half of the twentieth century, this shift was greatly accelerated by the impact of two world wars. More than a difference of emphasis, however, this shift created a power vacuum "in those parts of the world which had formerly been

---

6 See Conclusion.

owned, controlled or dominated by Western Europe." This process had left the United States with more comprehensive obligations and less opportunity for "masterful inactivity." Indeed, by 1948 it became apparent that "masterful inactivity" was not going to forestall Communist expansion, nor could it formulate policy to meet this expansion.

Basically, the Soviet challenge "compelled the American people (as well as the American government) to accept the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended it to bear." While entanglement in World War I did not succeed in awakening the United States to a clear comprehension that responsibilities and national power were one, perhaps involvement in World War II could. Thus, after 1945, the United States was aware of at least two factors. One was that "responsibility concomitant with influence could not be avoided with impunity." The other was that the use of "American capabilities to influence

11 R.S. Synder and E.S. Furness, American Foreign Policy, (New York: 1954), p.571.
the international environment was a necessity and a responsi-

bility." Awareness of responsibility, however, and effect-
ing it proved to be two different things for American foreign 
policy at that time. The overwhelming national power possess-
ed by the United States after 1945 offered her one great po-
tential advantage, the initiative. "That the United States 
has not taken the initiative more often speaks to the pro-

blem of purpose rather than capacity." The problem of 
purpose, moreover, is evident in one word, containment.

It must be remembered at this point that, because Amer-
ican capabilities and power were more stable than those of 
Canada, she could conceiveably outline definite foreign pol-
icy goals. Whatever else they may have been accused of being, 
these goals were at least concise and with a purpose, to halt 
the Communist threat.

Canada, however, could not be as sure-footed in her post-
war relations. Her greater power position after the war was 
more inflated than that of the United States, more easily 
subject to change, and thus more tenuous. However, precisely 
because she was not as powerful as the United States, her 
policies could be more aspirational and thus more flexible.

Canada, it will be seen, evolved to a position, for example

---

12 Ibid, p.571. Soviet activity in Eastern Europe had at 
least proved that.

13 Wilcox, op. cit., p.20.
in Korea, where she could bend on issues when the United States could not. Since American policies had outlined definite aims, subsequent positions would necessarily be judged in that context. Thus, when she had crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and approached the Yalu, it became difficult to turn back from what was ostensibly a desire to unify Korea by force. Because she had outlined a definite policy of containment by that time, the United States was similarly hard put to deviate suddenly and accept a theory of limited war. Canada, however, did not find herself in such a position where she would have to disavow her own hard and fast policy.

This difference in policy criteria is important in Canadian-American relations, since it explains at once why the United States is in a position to lose face while Canada is not. So too, it enables Canada to adjust her policy so as not to incur needless hostility from Washington. For this reason, then, Canadian obduracy on questions not involving world security will come more slowly and be reconciled more easily than will Washington's. This same Canadian obstinacy, however, will also tend to make Washington less indulgent when Ottawa's policy does not coincide with that of the United States. Because Canada can be more flexible on so many issues, any deviation from the American "lead" will make Washington look upon her less favorably. Because the United States has so much at stake in the form of prestige on virtually every question of international import, much more so
than Canada, Canadian policy is thus expected to conform to and complement that policy. This American expectation and the way in which Canada perceives it is an important factor in Canadian-American relations and will be seen in the Communist Chinese recognition question.

The policy of containment was first formulated by George Kennan in his 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." This concept was, and is now, the rationale for American foreign policy. In effect, containment was an answer to the "innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism...which had become imbedded in the foundations of Soviet power." Since Russia was the most powerful Socialist state at the time, Moscow and Socialism (i.e. Communism) were thought to be synonymous. Thus, the antagonism of Socialism and Capitalism was felt to be one between Russia and the United States. This antagonism, in turn, manifests itself in Moscow's expansive tendencies. American foreign policy, it was felt, had to contain this expansion.

Basically, the United States would meet the Russian expansion wherever it occurred and "build situations of strength to meet the Communist challenge." Such was the rationale.

\[\text{J. Burnham, Containment or Liberation, (New York: 1952) p. 15-21.}\]

\[\text{Ibid, p. 21. By the time containment was formulated, what came to be known as the Cold War had set in. Russian activity in Eastern Europe and the Middle East seemed to cement geographical divisions into ideological ones as well. It was actions such as these which conditioned the Cold War, and it was against this background that containment was formulated.}\]
for enormous aid to Europe through the Marshall Plan, Point Four and the Truman Doctrine. In essence, containment was going to make the world safe for democracy and, hopefully, win friends in the process. The policy was not totally an ideological one, however.

Due to the Communist challenge, "Americans began to realize that the security of Western Europe (and ultimately) of the United States was threatened." Thus,

Fearing that Moscow might take over so much of the world as to make Soviet victory inevitable... (the United States) decided that they would have to mount some sort of counteraction. They neither wanted total war nor felt ready to fight one. (American policy) therefore had to improvise ways short of all-out fighting to halt the Soviet avalanche. 17

Under the influence of Acheson, and later Dulles, containment in one form or another, was to be the mainspring of American foreign policy in the years after World War II. While it was designed primarily for application in Europe, it was later used in Asia as well. The fact that it was not as successful in Asia served to complicate Canadian-American relations generally, in addition to Canadian-American interplay in Korea and Vietnam.

Canada had quite a different set of broad policy interests after World War II. While not as far-reaching or pre-

else as those of the United States, Canada's interests after the war also conditioned her foreign policy in later years.

As the post-war years progressed and as Russian attitudes grew increasingly obdurate, Canada had to resolve two dichotomous tasks: the concern with national identity or independence in foreign policy and "the sober recognition of the necessity for partnership with the United States." Because a total peace had never really been achieved in the post-war years, Canada became fearful that an "ally of one war might become an enemy in the next." For Canada, one of the most distressing results of the Cold War was the unenviable position of being sandwiched geographically between the two great antagonists, the United States and the USSR. Thus, Canada's main policy concern would be the search for security, globally in the United Nations and regionally in NATO. Inherent in this search was a desire not to see the two emerging superpowers engaged in all-out war. Thus, in the United Nations she would do all she could to relieve the tension of the Cold War, but, failing this, she felt she would be secure in the NATO alliance.

Sprung from these conditions after World War II was


a two-fold awareness on the part of Canadian policy-makers: "a frank recognition that practically everything in international politics was of interest to Canada, and a willingness to accept responsibility." Because Canada became increasingly aware of the growing East-West rift, and because she had to alleviate its tension in hopes of preserving her own security, she became "inextricably involved in the full current of international affairs." Canada, therefore, would have to become positively involved in or engulfed by this current. In her efforts she realized the value of the United Nations as an effective instrument for political involvement and NATO as an effective instrument for military security.

It is significant to note that, initially, these Canadian interests were primarily attuned to events in Europe. Historically and culturally this was natural. However, as Western Europe slowly recovered, and was therefore less susceptible to the Communist threat, Canada found that the main danger to world peace lay in Asia. Thus, after 1950, when the Korean Crisis broke out, Canada's pursuit of early post-war interests were focused more and more upon Asia.

Importantly, however, Canadian relations with Asia had never been as profound as they had been with Europe, and their


growth had been gradual. Indeed, owing to the economic depression, expansion of the Canadian diplomatic service was prevented, and this delayed an exchange of representatives with China until 1942.  

To that time, and after, "fellow members in the Commonwealth afforded Canada their most intimate connection with Asia." India was especially useful in this regard, and Pearson himself had said that India was the wedge through which Canada gained its foothold in Asia.

Outside of India, however, Canadian-Asian relations had been slight. Indeed, by 1952 total trade even with India had

---


23 Pearson, op. cit., p.38.


While Indo-Canadian relations have, on the whole, been good, there were points of friction. One such difficulty, perhaps the most important one, was the discriminatory Canadian immigration policy which prevented many non-Europeans from entering Canada. This policy was an expression of the apprehension that many Canadians shared of indiscriminately lowering the barriers to oriental and non-white immigration.

Ostensibly the reason for this apprehension was the fear of cheap labor which would be produced with the influx of non-European immigrants. In reality, however, the policy expressed a desire to retain the racial balance in Canada, which in turn meant preserving the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon and French strains. Thus, by 1921, there was a wide gulf between the immigration policy in principle as formulated by Great Britain and public sentiment in Canada toward Chinese, Japanese, or "more embarrassingly British Indians." See P.R. Clyde, op.cit., p.474-475. Also Glazebrook, op.cit., p.24-27, esp. p.25.
amounted to only 283 million dollars (Can.). In 1966, however, Canadian-Japanese trade alone amounted to over 330 million dollars (Can.) and by 1969 it is expected to reach almost a billion dollars (Can.). The figures in Appendices I and Ia, when contrasted with this estimate, go far in explaining Canada's turn to the East since 1945.

While there were purely political reasons for Canada's Asian involvement from 1945, the Canadian commercial interest played a large part. Because World War II brought the realization that Canada was a Pacific as well as an Atlantic power, she became concerned about the development and restoration of trans-Pacific trade which would, according to Pearson, greatly stimulate the development of Western Canada.

It must be remembered, however, that in the period under consideration, 1945-1968, Canadian immigration policies and restrictions, although not in accord with the general multi-racial aspect of the Commonwealth, were of little relative importance. Even the Canadian, and American, maltreatment of orientals during World War II did not affect in any significant way policies to be discussed in this paper. The Canadian efforts to find a place for an independent India in the Commonwealth were thus much more beneficial to Indo-Canadian relations in general than immigration and discriminatory policies were harmful.


26 Canada was a member of the Far Eastern Commission, which was responsible for overseeing the terms of the Japanese surrender. See Angus, op.cit., p.56-57.

Since her trade with Japan and other Asian countries, although never great, had drastically curtailed during the war, Canada was interested in utilizing once more Japan's primary product need, and in finding a market for her own finished goods in areas like Ceylon, Pakistan and India. China, too, offered great potential, and Canada's huge grain sales to that country since 1961 have had political significance as well as economic benefits.

It was obvious, however, that trade could not be consummated without peace and generally stable political conditions in Asia. Thus, Canada was acutely interested in staying off the extension of the Cold War to Asia. However, with the results of the Chinese Civil War, Canada recognized that she would have to develop a genuine political interest in Asia, as well as an economic one. The fall of Chiang, who had been underwritten to a great degree by the United States, meant a de facto extension of the Cold War to Asia. Thus, it was in Canadian interests to pursue an avoidance of a hot war in Asia which might involve the United States, in addition to promoting a peaceful political atmosphere in which to conduct trade.

A peaceful political atmosphere, however, was not enough in itself to encourage trade with the underdeveloped countries

---


29 See Appendix II.
of Asia. A program of aid and technical assistance was also necessary. Thus, Canada embarked upon the Colombo Plan in an attempt to better the economic viability, particularly of the Asian Commonwealth nations. The Colombo Plan would provide an opportunity "to co-operate in working toward better economic conditions through a program of capital development and technical assistance." The plan was not entirely technical, however, in that it would ultimately help to "establish a good and sound society that would have the moral vigor and confidence to resist the Communist appeal." Significantly, Canadian membership in the plan was free of the taint of great power association and, as such, served as a remedial experiment in East-West relations. Because Canada was historically unsoiled by imperialism, and, by virtue of her association in the Colombo Plan, was a Western country which appeared to show genuine concern for the Asian plight, her actions in Korea were much less suspect as those of the United States. In that regard at least, the Colombo Plan had been of political as well as economic importance.

Canada's goal of a stable atmosphere has been made difficult by the American presence in Asia. While the United

---

30 Pearson, op.cit., p.38. See Appendix III for Canadian contributions to the Colombo Plan.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
States also had interests in Asia, these interests would not always coincide with Canadian aspirations. As a result there was a possibility that Canadian-American relations in general could deteriorate due to the rather divergent views of Asia taken by the two countries. Such a possibility was inherent in the question of Communist Chinese recognition, which for the United States, became an important question of prestige, while for Canada, it was one of the barriers to increased independence in foreign policy.

The fall of Nationalist China came as a rude awakening to the American people but not the American government. 32 Because the idea of monolithic communism was prevalent at that time, Mao's victory was viewed as another Communist and thus Soviet expansion. The fact that the deposed leader, Chiang, had been supported largely by the United States, made his collapse even more shocking. More than that, however, the Nationalists' defeat pointed up a great power vacuum as far as the American government was concerned. This is not to deny that the state of China was still powerful in Asia; but simply that it was now a Communist power instead of one friendly to the United States. Previously, American policy had been predicated on the basis of a friendly, pro-West, China. Now Chiang was gone, and China's new leader, Mao, proved extremely hostile to the United States. This fact coupled with

32 See below Chapter 4.
the already crumbling colonial system and the Korean War forced the United States into more active Asian involvement.

The United States has had a long history of Asian involvement in the Philippines, in extensive missionary activity and in substantial assistance programs. Theodore Roosevelt had predicted as much in 1901 when he said:

We stand supreme in a continent, in a hemisphere. East and West we look across two great oceans toward the larger world life in which...we must take an ever-increasing share. 33

Concern for the Russo-Japanese War, the "Gentleman's Agreement" and the war in the Pacific, all before 1945, seem to bear out Roosevelt's feelings. After 1945 the 16 billion dollars netted out in assistance to Asian countries show a continuing interest in that continent. 34 Significantly, however, America's Asian involvement during these years tried to divorce itself from appearing to perpetuate the colonial system. Chiang's imminent collapse, however, made this pretended aloofness impossible, and the United States became more active in that civil war from 1946 to 1949. It was not until 1950 that the United States containment policy


34 See Appendix IV. These figures indicate that while American private investment in Asia was not significant until 1960, the record of official government loans and assistance was. Thus it appears that the American government, if not the private investor, had a growing interest in Asia after 1937 and especially since 1958. See also China White Paper, op. cit. p. 1006-1053, esp. pp. 1043-1044.
per se became committed to Asia, occasioned by the outbreak of the Korean War.

It would be in light of the above, then, that Canadian-American relations in Asia were to be conducted. Importantly, even in the early stages of involvement, the United States had always had a great deal more at stake in Asia, since she was a world power more by right and less by transient circumstance than Canada. The latter, while her interests were not minimal did not, and still does not, have as much at stake. The Korean War served as the first test of Canadian-American mutual involvement in Asia, signalling a Canadian response to American initiatives that would be typical of her future Asian involvements. This was basically Canada's refusal to be committed entirely to American policy, and in that measure sacrifice what she considered indispensable policy objectives.

While the question of Communist Chinese recognition was chronologically first, its effect on Canadian-American interplay must be seen over a longer period of time, and will be dealt with in Chapter 5.
"Korea has been an ill-fated peninsula." Its checkered history has known domination by the Tartars, Mongols, Japanese and Manchus periodically until the seventeenth century. In the twentieth century it has been the pawn of Japan, the Soviet Union and, more recently, the United States. Lying in the heart of the Far East, the peninsula has been called the dagger pointed at the heart of Japan, and for this reason became a part of the developing Japanese Empire, later to be known as the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Korea's plight, never an enviable one, was worsened at the close of World War II.

The post-war problems of Korea, like so many of the other nations of Asia, were the result of Japan's unconditional surrender and the confused end of World War II. Trapped between the great Asian powers of China, Japan and Russia, the peninsula had obvious strategic importance in Asia specifically.

1 Wilcox, op.cit., p.44.


3 Wilcox, op.cit., p.44.
fically, but also to the world. Thus, the Cairo Declaration of 1943, signed by the Great Powers in anticipation of Japan's fall and mindful of Korea's long domination, agreed that "in due course (she) shall become free and independent." Consequently, Stalin and Roosevelt considered that the country could appropriately be administered by a multi-powered trusteeship in preparation for a future of full independence.

"The terms of the trusteeship or even the immediate future of Korea occupied the statesmen but little", thus the formula for independence was not worked out at this time. With the Japanese surrender in 1945, Korea once again became prominent.

It should be remembered here that the Korean question did not warrant as much concern from the great powers as did the larger question of Japan's defeat. Moreover, the United States, and Canada, had both felt that the European theater of war was more important than the Pacific, and to that extent were immediately concerned with the German front. Only when the war in Europe was close to an end did the United States make a full turn to the East.

Canada, to the extent that she participated in the Pacific Theater, was mainly concerned with a resumption of

4 McCune, op.cit., p.76.

Japanese trade. Thus, at the close of the war she was more interested in an equitable Japanese Peace Treaty to further that end, than in the Korean issue to which she was not even a party. From the beginning, then, it was apparent that Korea would theoretically occupy a more important place in American policy than in Canadian. This fact runs through the entire Korean issue, and it is well to note it now, for at no time was Canada proportionately as involved, committed, or interested in the Korean War per se than was the United States.

Logically, the end of World War II should have been the occasion for implementing the Cairo Declaration. The acceptance of Japan's surrender, however, took priority. It was at this point that the division of Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel was effected by Soviet and American troops, apparently for convenience and efficiency. At this time the Korean people were "assured that the purpose of the occupation was to enforce the instrument of surrender and to protect them in their personal and religious rights." The question of independence, however, was further clouded by the occupation forces until December, 1945 when the matter

---

6 See above Chapter II and Appendix Ib. See also Lower op.cit., Chapter 5, and Angus op.cit., Chapter 4, 6 and 7.

7 Thorpe, op.cit., p.78.

8 Gordenker, op.cit., p.4.
was taken up at a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow. It was here that the two occupying powers attempted to work out not only a solution to Korean independence, but to the resultant unification problem as well. Towards this end, the United States and the U.S.S.R. set up a Joint Commission for Korean settlement. Russian stubbornness, however, and an American reluctance to make use of her superior military power combined to bring the matter before the United Nations. According to American Ambassador Lovett, the United States "did not want to have the inability of two powers to reach agreement delay any further the urgent and rightful claims of the Korean people to independence." 9

The United Nations struck hopeful aspirations from both the United States and Canada. It is useful here to see how both countries viewed the then still-"infant" body for a better understanding of events that follow.

There were few countries that had more reason than Canada to appreciate the "inseparable connection between international organizations and (her) national interest." 10 Her difficult geographical position has already been mentioned, and this, along with her aversion to war, was instrumental in

---


directing her to the United Nations. St. Laurent himself, in 1947, had said that "the best hope for mankind lies in the establishment of a world organization for the maintenance of peace,"¹¹ and it was this pursuit which was to dictate policy there. She looked to the United Nations as an instrument through which nations could cooperate to remove dangers of war and establish an orderly and peaceful community.¹² Indeed, the early post-war years seemed to necessitate such cooperation since there was a greater need, through diplomacy, to reach a "modus vivendi with the Communists."¹³ Aside from this there were other reasons why Canada sought an effective world forum.

By 1948, Canada "was forced to realize that only occasionally could her voice be influential in detailing matters of grand policy."¹⁴ This was made even more evident when she considered the effect of living next to the most powerful nation in the world. Thus, for Canada to attempt an independent approach to foreign policy, it was necessary to mitigate somewhat the overpowering influence of the United

¹¹ Ibid, p.98.

¹² Ibid, p.212.


¹⁴ Spencer, op.cit., p.9.
States. In the United Nations, theoretically if not functionally, Canada had an equal voice in world affairs. Similarly, this voice would, to some degree, establish that Canada pursued her own foreign policy, rather than simply mimicking United States policy. Moreover, she knew she could not go it alone in any world crisis. The bald fact was, that for Canada, no major action was possible "if it did not have the support of those who held the major share of the world's military and economic power."\textsuperscript{15} There was a need for international cooperation with the nations that mattered - the superpowers. There was little point in Canada taking unlimited action if those who had to carry the major portion of that action were not in sympathy. She felt, moreover, that security lay in a firm structure of international organization.

In addition to the above, Canada accepted as a matter of course that war-time growth in power and stature (real or assumed) "required participation in the new international order which was being constructed with the United Nations as a pivot."\textsuperscript{17} During the war Canada was content to be accepted as a major participant, "without being required to under-

\textsuperscript{15} Statements and Speeches, No.47/2, January 13, 1947, p.8. Hereafter referred to as S/S.

\textsuperscript{16} Spencer, \textit{op.cit.}, p.7.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid}, p.2.
take in the responsibility of sharing in the determination of grand policy."

Now all that had changed, and Canada, from pride, concern, and interest, felt she should at least be a current in the stream of global affairs. For these reasons, then, Canada both sought and valued United Nations membership.

Although there was no basic Canadian-American divergence on United Nations' usefulness, the United States seemed to view that body differently. Collective security, while in principle extremely important for United States policy, was not the only advantage of the United Nations. A more hopeful consequence of membership would be the lightening of the burden of American responsibility in global affairs. In concert with other nations, American action in the United Nations would lend a moral justification to United States policy. The fact that submergence in an aggregate of nations would remove, to a certain degree, the opportunity for unilateral American action that was needed in the post-war years largely did not matter. Indeed, the idea that initiative itself was necessary was not then prominent.

These were the main Canadian and American concepts of the United Nations as formulated in 1945 and immediately after. The decision to bring the Korean deadlock before that body brought many of those concepts into play.

---

18 Ibid, p.2.
At this point it may be well to remember that just as the Korean issue itself meant more to the United States than it did to Canada, the basic concept of the United Nations meant much more to Canada than to the United States. The United States post-war position was fairly well grounded upon economic and military realities and was, therefore, much less dependent upon outside circumstances than that of Canada. All this had the effect of continually placing Canada in a position where she would have to prove herself in the world community. Thus, with the emergence of a re-vitalized Europe, Canada found herself in a more tenuous power position. Moreover, because of the heightened volatility of the world situation due to Russia's, and much later China's, acquisition of nuclear weapons, Canada found herself drawn closer to the United Nations, and in utilizing that forum to encourage peace. The United States, it would seem, became increasingly disenchanted with the United Nations as she rose to the status of super-power. The situation would evolve, then, to a greater desire on Canada's part to uphold United Nations principles, while simultaneously trying to make American policy conform to world peace in general. In a word, the long time Canadian opportunity to influence the United States was now accompanied by a greater sense of responsibility for doing so. This responsibility was especially evident in the Korean situation.

Because of the American and Soviet deadlock, the thirty-eighth parallel evolved "from a line of military occupation to
an artificial barrier to political and economic unity."\(^{19}\)

It was the task of the United Nations to try to ameliorate this division and "in due course" ensure the independence of Korea. In the General Assembly, the United States introduced a resolution to establish a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTOOK) designed to "facilitate and expedite a program for the attainment of national independence (for) Korea and (the) withdrawal of occupation forces."\(^{20}\) The vehicle for this program was to be universal elections in Korea (observed by UNTOOK) which would unify the country and arrange for troop withdrawal. The United States also took the liberty of naming the members to the Commission, of which Canada was one.\(^{21}\) This was done, moreover, without prior consultation with many of the proposed members and Leon Gordenker suggests that "at least two delegations were taken by surprise when (the American delegate) read his list."\(^{22}\) Canada was one, but Gordenker adds that she did not reject the invitation out of hand apparently to save the United States

\(^{19}\) *Ibid*, p.89.


\(^{21}\) The others were Australia, China, France, El Salvador, India, The Philippines, Syria and the Ukrainian SSR.

\(^{22}\) Gordenker, *op.cit.*, p.31.
This American action is rather significant in Canadian-American relations. It suggests that the United States was firmly convinced that, besides being sympathetic on the Korean issue, Canada could be relied upon to take a view close to that of the United States in the matter. Indeed, the whole commission was set up so that "a majority of its members could be expected to favor or at least not sharply oppose United States policy." The United States had, to a great degree, taken Canada for granted in naming her to the commission.

This action was not wholly based on unwarranted assumptions, however. A combined war effort, similar cultural and historical heritages, and close policy outlooks regarding the Communist threat were all prevalent. Their broad policies were also similar regarding the need for security and peace in volatile areas. The only difference was that the United States overestimated the extent to which it could go regarding Canadian action. The notion that because ultimate policy aims were similar, agreement on tactics would necessarily follow proved to be false. The Canadian feeling that the United Nations was too important a body to be made into a super-power ploy was underestimated. Because of this mistaken

\[23\] \textit{Ibid.}, p.31.

\[24\] \textit{Ibid.}, p.31.
assumption an understanding of future Canadian positions would be difficult.

What was also apparent in the choice of Canada was the lack of diplomatic skill on the part of the United States. What may have been condoned in the backrooms of Yalta and Potsdam could not be considered useful when dealing in an open world forum like the United Nations. What may have been expedient in dealings with South American "puppet" regimes, conceivably would not be correct when dealing with a country which at that time fancied herself as a prominent power. This stroke, understandable as it was in view of the limited American diplomatic activity, was obviously an extension of intracontinental diplomacy onto an international level. While this nomination had a certain grounding in logic, similar American moves in the future would not prove as expedient. This time, however, Canada was not averse to membership on UNTOOK.

Canada, although diplomatically snubbed, looked upon UNTOOK membership both as an opportunity to try to influence the course of the United Nations and to mitigate tension in a potential trouble spot. She would also be taking an active part in the United Nations and to that extent be furthering her goal of implementing a successful international organization. Another element in her decision was the fact that Canada, being ultimately dependent upon the United States, did in fact want to please her. In reality, membership on
the commission was not such a bitter pill to swallow, and it could be valuable. In a word, it was just as easy as not to accept UNTCOK membership. That is what Canada did although she, like most other countries, was ignorant as to how far the situation would go.

The idea of a temporary commission to study and advise on the possibility of elections in Korea was accepted by most of the United Nations membership with the exception of Russia and the Soviet bloc countries. The very existence of a commission suggests that the United Nations had "developed a special political instrument for use in troubled areas where solutions are elusive but where the danger of spreading conflict is never distant." Pearson himself had said that the "expression of the Korean people for unity, on which (the General Assembly) agrees, does not seem to be necessary."  

The root of the problem, however, proved to be the difficulty of the commission's access to North Korea. American military officials were more in sympathy with UNTCOK's work, obviously because it was American sponsored. The Soviets, however, had advocated complete military withdrawal prior to any elections and thus would not support the commission's aims. Indeed, even the Ukrainian SSR had refused to serve

25 Ibid, p.VII.
26 Spencer, op.cit., p.90.
on UNTOK. Moreover, formulas for "democratic" elections were ostensibly different in the American and Russian views. Russian uncooperativeness was, in the final analysis, the main reason why the United States sponsored a second resolution calling for supervision of elections in Korea in such areas as were accessible to it. It was this second resolution which brought Canadian action. 27

The second resolution, though reasonable from the American point of view, was not endorsed initially by Canada. Her reasons, put forth by St. Laurent, were substantial and were based on legal as well as political grounds.

By virtue of the second resolution, the Temporary Commission had been authorized to supervise elections in the whole of Korea but "was not authorized to act in the South alone." The Interim Committee's decision to "implement the program in such areas as are accessible to it," would, 28

27 The American decision calling for the second resolution was also conditioned by other factors. One was the war-weary attitude of the American people. Cries of "bring the boys home" were prevalent during much of the Commission's work. Also, the fact that support of troops in South Korea, as well as of the government itself, proved to be such an expensive proposition that it tended to convince the American government that it was in their best interests to facilitate a quick settlement of the Korean question.


29 Ibid, p.1075-1076. The Interim Committee was a body set up to do the work of the General Assembly since the latter was too unwieldy for continuous consultation. As will be seen, the Committee itself proved to be a point of friction for the Canadian Delegation.
according to St. Laurent, be overstepping the bounds of the commission's authority. Its action could not, therefore, "be brought within the terms of reference...as laid down by the General Assembly." Thus, said St. Laurent, UNTCOK was not empowered to act in the South alone. Nor could the Interim Committee itself change the terms of reference. Indeed, such a change could only be effected by the General Assembly. In this vein, election supervision in the South was illegal. The question involved more than legalities, however, in that there were also political considerations.

While the constitutional repercussions of the second resolution were significant, the Canadian delegation also "appreciated the fact that Korea was a danger spot and that to hold elections in the South alone would amount, in fact, to a partition. Such an election would, moreover, institutionalize the decision in Korea to such an extent that ultimate unification would prove impossible. The division would also create de facto a government under the wardship of the United Nations. Such a situation would, it was felt, "involve the organization in police or administrative commitments which the United Nations could not fulfill in the absence of military force" -- a military force which Canada at that

31 Spencer, op.cit., p.105-111.
32 Ibid, p.111.
time did not believe advantageous.

For Canada, the implications of the second resolution were great. They would, in effect, remove the responsibility of the United States occupation and place it in the hands of the United Nations. More than any other power which was willing to deal with Korea through the United Nations, the United States had direct involvement there — basically the United States program was to shake off those ties. If this was in fact the United States' intention it would seem to bear out Canadian fears about the United Nations becoming a tool of the superpowers. While Canada's attitude would at least silence Russian allegations that UNT COK was in the service of the United States, attitude alone would not alleviate the situation.

The Korean issue in the United Nations boiled down to a question of the Interim Committee's reaction to the United States second resolution. If, as Pearson suggested, it should be taken as advice, then it would be just a matter of time before the matter could conceivably be worked out in the

---

33 Gordenker, op.cit., p.84.

34 Ibid, p.73. For St. Laurent's and Pearson's views see Harrison, op.cit., Chapters 7 and 8.

35 See Denis Stairs, "Confronting Uncle Sam: Cuba and Korea", in Clarkson, op.cit., p.57-68.
General Assembly. However, if the Committee accepted the second resolution without question there would be, in St. Laurent's words, "a new and serious situation created which would have to be taken into consideration by the governments who are members of the Commission, and who feel that the advice from this Committee is unwise and unconstitutional." Denis Stairs suggests that if "this was a threat that Canada would withdraw from UNTOK if the Americans had their way, then in terms of the usual Canadian subservience it was a bold stroke indeed." However, the threat, if it was one, proved to be unheeded.

The Canadian insistence in maintaining the formal machinery of a duly constituted United Nations organ was the overt expression of her high aspirations for the organization itself. Basically what she saw in Korea was a potentially dangerous situation which could only be exacerbated by the implementation of the second resolution. Her insistence on the formal machinery, then, was a public attempt to influence American policy in the United Nations. As will be seen, this attempt was largely unsuccessful but that failure did serve to reinforce her faith in quiet diplomacy.

On the Korean issue in the United Nations and later when


37 Stairs, op.cit., p.65.
hostilities broke out, it was apparent that open diplomacy, on a question about which the United States was truculent, was largely useless. This lesson seems to have been learned in view of Canadian action concerning Vietnam and on the Chinese recognition question. Hereafter only when there was imminent world danger would Canada voice her critical concern about United States policy. As will be seen, vociferous Canadian reaction to United States policy would serve only to embarrass Canada. Outspoken concern would be expressed, therefore, only on issues that were immediate and potentially dangerous, while quiet diplomacy would be used mainly on issues that were of relatively minor importance, or in cases where a loss of face far outweighed positive benefits. This is not to say that quiet diplomacy would never be used on major issues, but that when it was, it was usually accompanied by a major Canadian policy statement for public consumption, which served to lend gravity to Canada's position.

When the Interim Committee met, Patterson, the Canadian representative, had already been advised by his government "not to accept the advice given in the Second Resolution or associate himself with the election....in South Korea alone." However, Patterson was not present at the meeting when the decision was taken to implement the Second Resolution. That decision touched-off an already sensitive Canadian government.

Debates 1948, p.1075-1076.
"If the commission were to proceed in this matter", said St. Laurent, "its impartiality and authority as a properly constituted commission would be undermined." The overtones of the decision to implement the resolution indeed seemed lugubrious. The reasoning for such a decision was anything but constitutional, especially since it had come so soon after receiving word from the Interim Committee. In the words of the Secretary to UNTCK,

The two main reasons for making the announcement as soon as possible were firstly that it was desirable to avoid delay concerning a final date for the election, and secondly that a public announcement of some sort (was) expected in connection with the celebration of the Korean independence day on the first of March. It was hoped that the public announcement from the commission might have a quieting effect on threatening riots. 40

When informed of this, Patterson "regretted that the temporary commission had made a number of public statements to the effect that it had made up its mind (concerning the elections). Indeed, General Hodge, Military commander of the occupation in the South, had said that the elections had been cleared with the proper authorities. However, in Patterson's view, the commission's vote was not legal and Hodge's statements were "either misleading or based on a misunderstanding."

40 Gordenker, op.cit., p.76.
41 Ibid, p.77. See also Stairs, op.cit., p.64-68.
When the commission could not clarify the statements made by Hodge, Patterson temporarily walked out. When a formal vote was taken upon his return, an official statement, issued by the commission, declared that they were still considering action on implementing the second resolution. By this action it would seem that temporarily at least Canada had won, and that her cry of "foul" was heard in Washington. This exchange between an obviously American dominated commission and the Canadian Delegation was significant because it pointed up the degree to which Canada was able to influence the United States. The results can be misleading, however.

The Korean affair in the United Nations suggests the modifying influence of Canada upon the United States. Unable to ostensibly alter grand American policy, Canada chose to influence it in a legal manner. While the change would admittedly be minor, it did serve to illustrate Canadian stubbornness. Canada obviously did feel that larger issues were at stake, but only on this point could she get her way. Quiet diplomacy here was not enough and, to emphasize what she felt were significant implications for future United Nations policy, she came out publicly and criticized the commission's proposed actions.

The United States reaction was also significant. Canada did have a point and it was a valid one. In this sense it

\[42\]

Gordenker, op.cit., p.77.
is not too much to placate a friend over something that really was never in very much doubt. Basically, there was no point in alienating Canada over an issue which would ultimately go your own way. While a compliance to Canadian demands would not affect the whole scope of Korean activity in the United Nations, it did seem to be a point on which Canada was adamant. American stubbornness, moreover, might look as though the United States was trying to run roughshod over a United Nations commission. In this light one could easily concede Canada the battle knowing one would win the war. It was, however, another instance of American brashness and lack of tact, although it did point up the Canadian response to an American policy which she felt unwise. In the end, however, Canada's "victory" was short-lived and the "unconstitutional" decision was legally formalized. The American government was firm on the important issue of having elections, if not on the less important formula for effecting them.

Since formal procedures were followed on UNTOCK, Canada had made headway. Ultimately, however, she had not been able to influence American policy in the United Nations. It was doubtful that anyone at this time could have prevented the United States from extricating itself from Korea. The occupation itself had proved troublesome from the beginning, difficult to supply and strategically questionable."43 There

43 Loc. cit., p.87.
was also the possibility that there might be skirmishes with the Russians; a possibility that was pregnant with dangerous overtones. In a word, the United States was determined to get out of Korea. With Canada's consent or without it, this is what she did. Canada's action had the tangible result of adding legality to that predetermination.

Although she had been snubbed, Canada was not about to bite off her nose to spite her face. Her interests and position in the United Nations conceivably took precedence over diplomatic setbacks, and to that extent Canada took part in the commission's activity. It was obvious that even though UNTOOK had practically abandoned the aim of unification before or through a national election, Canada had not lost all hope. She would, by continuing to serve on it make the best of an admittedly bad situation. Her initial fears however were justified. Doubtless the thirty-eighth parallel had been institutionalized. With the outbreak of the Korean War, this political border became a military one as well.

The foregoing discussion of Canadian-American activity in the United Nations has shown how far Canada would go once

44

The difficulty on the commission, however, seems to have made Canada somewhat hesitant about robust service. Thus, when the Ukrainian SSR chose to step down from UNTOOK because of the decision to go ahead with elections in the South, Canada took this opportunity to do the same, saying that she did not want to offset the commission's balance. See Gordenker, ibid, p.70-138, also Stairs, op.cit., p.65-68 and Harrison, op.cit., p.111.
she knew the trend of American policy. The fact that she ran
directly counter to that policy proved she would go to some
lengths in situations that were of potential but not immedi­
ate danger. In the end she followed American policy, even
though she had been overruled by American domestic consider­
atations, notably a Presidential election. Canadian action
during the Korean War, however, was taken not for fear of po­
tential danger but immediate danger -- in that situation
Canada was considerably more vehement.

The Korean War for the United States served as the first
test of a European orientated containment policy, as well as
America's introduction to the limited war. From the develop­
ment of the Atomic bomb, until Korea, "American foreign po­
licity was based on the assumption that any war would be a to­

tal war waged largely with nuclear weapons." However, the
dismissal of one of America's greatest war heroes in MacArthur
and the overwhelming defeat of the Democrats in 1952 suggest
that the United States was unprepared for Korea and the lim­
ited war.

For Canada, too, Korea was significant. She had, for the
first time committed her forces to the United Nations in what
would prove to be peacekeeping operations. These operations,
moreover, were to serve a double purpose: alleviation of hos­
tilities and upholding the authority of the United Nations.

---

45 A. Gutteman, Korea and the Theory of Limited War,
With this in mind we must view Canada's action in an American dominated Korean War as a gauge of how much support she would give United States policy in a conflict that drew many countries close to the brink of World War III.

In an important speech before the National Press Club then Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined the Far Eastern defense perimeter of the United States. Missing from that perimeter were Korea and the island of Taiwan. "So far as the military security of these areas are concerned," said Acheson,

it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must (also) be clear that no guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.

"Should such an attack occur," he went on,

the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations (to resist it).

While Acheson's remarks were also concerned with the Chinese civil war, his statement did give the impression that the defense of South Korea would be up to the South Koreans themselves. Failing this, the responsibility would then be assumed by the United Nations.

Because the United Nations had chartered South Korea, it was reasonable to assume that it should come to Korea's de-

---

46 See below Chapter 5.

47 Guttman, op.cit., p.111-118.
fense, if it became necessary. This rationale was, in effect the same shared by Canada, which, for the reasons cited above, had been fearful of just such a situation. What proved to be Canadian providence was borne out when, in June 1950, North Korea attacked and overwhelmed a lightly manned South Korean army. Acheson's statement, provident or not, was similarly borne out by subsequent United Nations action.

The United States, by 1950, had taken measures to drastically reduce the American military establishment in Korea, in addition to the rest of the area generally. Indeed "Japan was garrisoned by a skeleton force of four divisions and these...were reduced to 70% of strength by defense economies." Korea itself, moreover, in a measure to assure that "(they) might not be tempted to embarrass Washington by a march northwards, were given little in the way of military aid." Small wonder then, with obvious military inferiority and what seemed a tacit refusal of American support, South Korea was attacked. The American government, however, in spite of previous pronouncements, chose to defend the South Korean government.

48 See above p. 38-41.


50 Ibid, p.81.
The United Nations Security Council, at the behest of the United States, issued a June 25 resolution calling "upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and withdraw back to the thirty-eighth parallel." Two days later, the Council issued another resolution recommending that the members of the United Nations "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack." With these two resolutions the Korean War became, in addition to a United States problem, one for the United Nations. The significance of this action cannot be overestimated.

Because the United Nations had assisted in the creation of the new republic, and had kept its commission in Korea at the request of Syngman Rhee, this act of North Korean aggression could be construed as a challenge to the organization itself. The North Korean attack had turned the United Nations from an exponent of collective security to an actor in collective security. United States interests there were also in jeopardy as were those of Canada. The latter obviously did not want to see a war in Asia, but she did not want to see the work and the ideals of the United Nations compromised either. Accordingly, Canada found herself committed both in principle and, later militarily, to war-like action in Korea, under the auspices of the United Nations.


At this point Canada was in agreement with both the action of the United Nations and initial American policy. Truman, on June 25, had sent the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Formosa Strait to prevent a possible extension of the hostilities to that island. He was certain, moreover, that if South Korea were allowed to fall, communist leaders would then be emboldened to override nations closer to the United States, and quite possibly draw the world into another war. This was done prior to the first Security Council Resolution. However, acting on the justification of the second resolution, Truman authorized General MacArthur, "to send to Korea combat units drawn from the American army of occupation in Japan." With that action the United States unilaterally entered the war before the United Nations could muster the wherewithal to implement the second Security Council Resolution. Canada was in agreement with these policies since, said Pearson, they "represented collective action through the United Nations for peace." At this stage Canada felt American and United Nations policy complementary, and did not object to the United States' move: indeed, Pearson defended it.


55 Documents, 1951, p.9.
At this point it must be remembered that Canada looked at the Korean War on June 17, 1950 purely in terms of defense action. Even though there were hostilities there was no fear that the war would be expanded. Agreement with United States policy was entirely justifiable, in terms of reference of the war. This attitude changed, as we shall see later upon China's entrance, but it is well to note that the situation in late June of 1950 in no way resembled the situation when China entered the war.

"An act of aggression," said Pearson, "will be met by the dispatch of forces put at the disposal of the Security Council by member governments as the result of prior agreements." However, he continued,

because agreement (on the forces to be put at the disposal of the Council) had proved technically impossible, the responsibility for checking aggression had to be shouldered by individual members of the Council acting within the terms of the Charter but on their own initiative.

Significantly, Canadian approval had been given in terms of United Nations action, and not as an endorsement of American policy per se. This aspect would come into play later during MacArthur's push to the Yalu when, again with reference to the United Nations, Canada grew wary of American military leadership.

Canada's official reaction to the Korean hostilities


has been expressed by Lester Pearson. Although she could not be expected to play as important a role as the United States, yet Canada's job was

to play a part, a part determined by herself but worked out in consultation with (her) friends in the collective efforts of the free countries to prevent aggression if possible by showing that it cannot succeed, or to prevent it if it does. 58

Pearson's statement had a twofold effect. He was re-emphasizing the limited objectives of the war, and stressing the need for consultation among United Nations participants. Such consultation was to prove necessary for, in less than two months, the first half of the General Assembly resolution had been accomplished; the invader had been repulsed. The question now was whether to cross the thirty-eighth parallel and, if so, the extent to which the aggressor should be pursued.

The Canadian attitude, upon completion of the first half of the General Assembly Resolution, indicated an agreement with United Nations proposals to push across the thirty-eighth parallel. Speaking in the United Nations, Pearson expressed the hope that North Korea would lay down their arms, thus curtailing any more open conflict. If they did not do this, however, the United Nations should leave its forces free to do whatever is practicable to make certain that the communist ag-

58
Harrison, op.cit., p.282.
gressors of North Korea are not permitted to establish some new base in the peninsula from which they could sally forth again upon a peaceful people. 59

In this respect the Canadian attitude was similar to that of MacArthur, who felt that a foray into North Korea was a *sine qua non* for complete victory. Canada did have reservations about the crossing, however.

"Nothing should be done", said Pearson in the establishment of a unified free Korea which carries any menace to Korea's neighbors." 60

Nothing must be done (he added) which holds the least suggestion that any member of the United Nations has any purpose in Korea other than to establish that country under the full sovereignty of its own people. 61

It was obvious that the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel had political as well as military significance for Canada even at this early stage. Indeed, Canada had even "proposed sending a mission which would have been the last appeal to the North Koreans (to surrender) before the line (was) crossed." Similarly, endorsement of the United Nations authori-


60 *Ibid*, p.3.

61 *Ibid*, p.3.

zation to cross the parallel was given only after Canada was convinced such a move "might not result in a rush for the Manchurian or Russian border." To further lessen the tension conducive to a Chinese entrance, the Canadian government had even proposed a defensive line across the narrow waist of North Korea to serve as a "kind of unoccupied frontier area." In a word, the Canadian government, though in basic agreement with the first crossing, "felt that very great care should be taken to avoid offering any unnecessary provocation to the Chinese government at Peking."

The single most important unknown factor in the first crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel was the attitude of Peking. The enigma was solved when Communist China crossed the Yalu. By their action, it was obvious that the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel and the steady advancement of United Nations forces to the Chinese border was considered by Mao to be a threat to China's security.

It is important to note, however, that during the United Nations decision to cross the thirty-eighth parallel, the Chinese government had made their views known. Chou En-lai had said, on September 30, 1950, that the "Chinese people....

64 Ibid, 1951, p.55.
will not supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists." Moreover, on October 2, he had formally notified the Indian Ambassador, K.M. Panikkar that, "American intrusion into North Korea would encounter Chinese resistance." This attitude must have been in Pearson's mind as he warned against provoking the Chinese. The Ottawa-New Delhi link was apparently utilized on this occasion even though Canada ultimately acquiesced to United States policy. The American government, however, did not take Panikkar seriously.

Truman, writing of the incident in his "Memoirs" felt that

Mr. Panikkar had in the past played the game of the Chinese Communists (so) regularly....that his warning could not be taken as that of an observer. 68

The United States was also convinced that the Chinese warning was merely a ploy to prevent the United Nations authorization to cross the parallel, possibly hoping to blackmail it by threatening intervention. There was, moreover, continuing domestic pressure to extend the war and accept nothing

66 A.S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, (Santa Monica: 1960) p.93.


68 Truman, op.cit., p.362.

less than total victory. The popularity of General Mac-
Arthur was evident in this, in addition to a revitalized
Republican Party which was continually criticizing the lim-
ited war.

It is apparent in Canadian activity, at this time that
although there was a danger of Chinese entrance, it was not
considered so imminent that Canada should disavow either the
United Nations resolution or the American government's desire
to cross the thirty-eighth parallel. It was likely that she
was also thinking about the original United Nations desire
to see a free and independent Korea, once again unified. As
long as this objective was compatible with United Nation and
American desires, it was a proper course for Canada to follow
also, even though New Delhi had cautioned against it. Basic-
ally, there was a justification in endorsing American and
United Nations policy, even if that policy did offer a pos-
sibility for Chinese entrance. When Chinese entrance was
forthcoming, however, Korea became "an entirely new war" and
Canada's attitude changed considerably.

The invasion by Chinese troops said Pearson, had pushed
Korea to the mouth of a rumbling volcano. What had origi-
nally been latent fears, were now of foremost concern for
Canada. The risk of a major war "transcended immeasureably

---

70 Documents, 1952, p.60.
all other questions," and Canada's desire now was for a cessation of hostilities. It was also apparent that the unification of Korea was not, at this time, as important. Speaking in the Commons, Pearson felt that it was not the obligation of the United Nations to unify Korea by force but to "do everything (they could) to bring about that unity." "At the moment," he maintained, "the focus of our hopes and fears is...to find a solution to the grave and menacing problem that has arisen in Korea." That problem was to "do everything within the power of statesmanship to prevent the Korean War from becoming a war with China." In this vein, Canada pressed for negotiations.

"We should try to begin negotiations with the Chinese Communists", asserted Pearson, "if and when the military situation is stabilized." In his view, "nothing should be left undone which might conceivably result in an honorable and peaceful settlement in Korea." Thus, when there appeared to be a

72 Debates, 1951, p.1442-1444.
74 Ibid, p.15.
75 Ibid, p.16.
76 Ibid, p.16-17.
military stalemate at the thirty-eighth parallel, Canada pressed to take advantage of a "kind of cease-fire" and open negotiations. It was clear that with the Chinese entrance Canada became deeply concerned about the possibility of World War III. This concern was heightened by Truman's apparently casual reference to the use of atomic weapons.

When asked about the possible use of the atomic bomb, President Truman replied that "there (had) always been active consideration of nuclear weapons." Pearson, in a nationwide broadcast, warned that "the fate of the whole world would be jeopardized by such weapons." The atomic bomb, moreover, was not just another weapon, but one which was capable of destroying all life on earth. He urged that any decision pertaining to its use be taken in concert with allies and not as a unilateral act. "The atomic bomb is universally regarded as the ultimate weapon" concluded Pearson. "It should be treated as such."

Whether it was Truman's reference to the ultimate weapon, or a combination of a number of other factors, Korea ceased

77 Debates, 1951, p.1442-1444.
78 Truman, op.cit., p.395.
79 Documents, 1952, p.17.
80 Ibid, p.17.
81 The death of Stalin, a new American administration (which also alluded to use of the bomb) all were factors.
to be a hot war shortly after January 1952. Canada's action during the hostilities was significant.

Canada had accepted, in many respects, the main lines of United States policy. It is important, however, that she did so usually with a knowledge that such policy was in agreement with United Nations activity. She could, almost throughout the crisis, find a justification for her action in terms other than American goals. Thus, to the extent that American policy was compatible with her own goals she would for the sake of friendship, as well as interests, go along with these aims and subsequent means to attain them. However, it was one thing to consent to grand policy, but quite another to risk a major war. Thus when the possibility of war with China or the use of nuclear weapons seemed imminent Canada could not accede to American policy. The fact that the United States was not prepared to go to war with China, while significant, does not alter the fact that Canada came out strongly opposed to an extension of hostilities beyond Korea. Basically, through her action in the Korean hostilities Canada proved that when the situation demanded it she could express an opinion of her own regardless of American policy. This was also the case in the United Nations before hostilities broke out, when Canada had refused to allow the United States to make unilateral policy for the entire organization. The extent to which Canada was successful was not so much a measure of American influence, or lack of it, but rather of Canadian
determination not to see World War III. It was also this
determination which prompted her action during the Korean
hostilities, and it will be seen again, though somewhat dif­
ferently, in the Vietnam situation.
Canadian-American interplay in Vietnam has been conditioned by four main factors since the Geneva Accords of 1954. These are Canada's difficult role on the ICSC, her desire for a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia, direct American military involvement in Vietnam and the latter's attitude toward containment of Communism. It is around these four areas that our discussion of Canadian-American interplay will revolve, since they are the main points of friction and/or cooperation between Canada and the United States in Vietnam. From this discussion it will be seen that, similar to the Korean War, Canadian policy has been compatible and, at times, complimentary to American policy, but only insofar as her own sense of self-interest and security were not visibly threatened.

Canada's role on the ICSC was a direct result of the Geneva Conference of 1954 on Korea and Indochina. Basically, the ICSC was a three-member commission comprised of India, Poland and Canada, its main purpose being to supervise both the implementation of the cease-fire in Indochina, and the possibility of elections in Vietnam. Importantly, the commission was given the responsibility for such supervision,
but no direct power with which to effect it. It was the role of the ICSC to oversee and advise, but nothing more. The combatting parties, France and the Viet-minh, were largely on their honor to implement the decisions of the Geneva Conventions, most of which pertained to the cessation of hostilities. The main purpose of the Accords, it should be remembered, were military in scope and initially dealt little with political adjustments. At the time, the Accords offered France an easy way out of an embarrassing war, and for that reason were notoriously short-sighted. Thus, Canada's initial position on the ICSC offered her little hope of realizing the expectations of the Geneva Conference, as well as her own, and a great possibility for less than substantial participation. Moreover, she did not at first even expect to be a part of the conference on Indochina.

It was as a participant in the Korean discussions that Canada found herself at Geneva, since she had been involved in the Korean hostilities. Because she had had no direct involvement in Indochina at the time, Canada was not particularly interested in the Indochina settlement. Her interest came more by way of a general "desire to prevent the resumption of hostilities in the region,"¹ than anything else. Her

reaction to Indochina was basically the same as her earlier reaction to Korea in that since 1945 Canada "moved to a frank recognition that instability anywhere menaced her own interests." This is not to say that Canada's interest in Indochina was haphazard, but only that it was not as great as other parties, France, the Viet-minh, the United States, who had more at stake in the Indochina settlement. Pearson's policy in 1954 was "to avoid....involvement in any specific commitments for which the (Canadian) delegation did not have a mandate." Thus, it was felt that the Canadian role should be less than active, but more than disengaged. Indeed, she took pains to "avoid any appearance or attitude of indifference to developments, the consequence of which (should) they deteriorate into conflict, would certainly concern and (maybe) involve Canada."

Canada's role evolved, therefore, as "an unobtrusive oil-can" in the proceedings, owing in large part to the esteem in which the Canadian delegation was held. Pearson, it seems, "was highly respected and on good terms with Bedell

---

2 Ibid, p.178.

3 L.B. Pearson, S/5 54/30.


5 Ibid, p.461.
Smith, Bidault and even Molotov," and "Chester Ronning was able to speak (fluently) with Chou En-lai." Thus, the rapport which Canada enjoyed with a wide variety of parties did as much to ensure Canada's position on the commission as did the fact that she was a member of the Western Bloc. The other two members were non-aligned and pro-communist. There was, thus, a need for a Western voice on the ICSC. Canada's position was, therefore, a logical one, both for herself and the United States, even if it had come in a roundabout way.

The work of the commission, insofar as concerned the prevention of hostilities, was successful. However, the "troika principle - behind the composition of the commission indicated that Canada was there to protect the interests of the West, or to be more specific, of the United States." Canada's place on the ICSC, therefore, offered her at once a potentially useful role in Southeast Asia, but, at the same time, another area in which her involvement could easily conflict with United States aspirations. Membership on the commission, thus, gave Canada her first direct interest in Indochina.

6 The American, French and Russian delegates respectively. Ibid, p.461.
7 Ibid, p.461.
8 J.P. Singh, op.cit., p.125-127.
Canadian membership ensured "not neutrality but a judicial approach--a willingness to look at the situation and if necessary, agree with decisions which might be contrary to the wishes of the South Vietnamese, the French or the Americans." Because the Poles, "whose ideology did not permit impartiality, supported the other side 100 per cent, Canada was appointed to make sure the (Western) side of the case got a fair hearing." Her role, therefore, was to be one of judicial overseer although, after 1963, Canada did actively pursue her own interests there outside the realm of commission work. As will be seen, it became increasingly difficult for Canada to maintain complete objectivity in what she considered a threat to world security. Just as in Korea, when the latent possibility of world war was present though not imminent, in Vietnam Canada took what must be considered a pro-American leaning on the commission after 1963. This view, however, was combined with a stronger extra-commission approach that was more of an independent than pro-American leaning.

Canada's reaction to events in Vietnam would be compatible with her general approach to world security. Indeed, even if Canada had no direct commitment, it was conceivable that she still would have shown concern for developments

9 Holmes, op.cit., p.471.
10 Ibid, p.471.
there. "We know from experience," said Pearson, "that just as local conflicts can become general war, so conditions of security and stability in any part of the world, would serve the cause of peace everywhere." While her role on the commission did offer her a chance to serve herself as well, it is conceivable that she would have found a way to promote peace in the area had she not been a member. This would be an expression of her general post-war goal of eliminating hostility, especially that to which the United States was a party. This elimination was sought not only because Canada might become involved, but also to permit conditions for economic relations with an area hitherto untapped.

This attitude was a part of the rationale for the Colombo Plan, which included Canada. Generally, Canada's prosperity "depended traditionally on a complex interchange of goods all around the world." Canada, therefore, had a vested interest in the re-establishment of normal trading relations in the greatest possible volume. Thus, Canada was interested in facilitating conditions of "political and economic security in the Far East," as a pre-condition to ex-

11 Pacificus, op.cit., p.270.

12 Spencer, op.cit., p.189.


14 Ibid, p.52.
pansion of her own trade. These were some of the Canadian attitudes which must be considered in the context of the Vietnamese situation from 1954 onward.

A full picture of Canadian-American mutual involvement in Vietnam cannot be complete without a review of American involvement there since approximately 1950. While Canada was in a position to look at Geneva in 1954 with an air of relative dispassion, the United States could not—especially in light of events since the fall of Kuomintang China in 1950.

The period of hostilities in Vietnam from 1946 to 1950 was looked upon by the United States mainly as an indigenous struggle between the French and the guerillas in Northern Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh. This conflict was viewed largely as a colonial one in which the United States did not want to become militarily committed. Such direct commitment, it was felt, would cast the United States in the role of an advocate of imperialism, thus partially forestalling the evolution of the underdeveloped world. Moreover, the United States did not want to become involved in the relations "between a mother-country and a colony." At this time, the United States felt nothing of the moral, military, or political commitment which permeated American involvement from 1963 to 1967. The turning point in the earlier attitude came after Mao's control of China. This event once changed the American appraisal of

the Indochinese conflict from one of an indigenous struggle into the light of another communist confrontation. At this point the United States interest in French activity was also reappraised.

The forces of the French Union, according to United States policy, were engaged against the forces of communist aggression in Indochina (as) an integral part of the worldwide resistance by the free nations to communist attempts at conquests and subversion (even though) France has the major role there.  

Thus "if Indochina fell," wrote Eisenhower, "not only Thailand but Burma and Malaya would be threatened, with added risks for East Pakistan, South Asia and (other parts) of Indochina as well." Still, the United States did not want to shift the war from French shoulders to theirs and it was hoped that the United States would not have to send ground troops there. Even by that time, however, there were events fomenting in Indochina, and elsewhere, to make American direct involvement there a fact.


19 This was the opinion of then Vice-President Nixon. New York Times, April 18, 1954.
By January 1950 Ho Chi Minh and Peking exchanged representatives, and Moscow, shortly thereafter, followed suit. Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of the Viet-minh troops, also had said in 1953 that, instead of harassing guerilla activities pursued until then, "he was preparing an offensive attack for the conquest of Indochina in its entirety." The fall of Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Agreements themselves, coupled with these events, rounded out the conditions for direct United States commitment.

The fall of Dien Bien Phu was a humiliating defeat for the French. While she was still militarily stronger than the guerillas, Dien Bien Phu had a tremendous psychological effect on the French people as well as the French army. The already war-weary public grew even more so after 15,000 of their best forces were annihilated by the Viet-minh. "There is no question of the extent and nature of the French fighting this war," said Bedell Smith, "they have been at it now for almost eight years." After Dien Bien Phu, the French obviously decided eight years had been long enough.

The French defeat had also come on the eve of the Geneva Conference, and had the effect of generally softening their position regarding an Indochina settlement. Not only were

---

20 Bator, op.cit., p.10-11.

they eager for a negotiated settlement, but they desired to rid themselves of a war they knew they could not win. It was largely this desire that fostered the final agreements, over eighty per-cent of which were devoted to military withdrawal. Because France wanted to get out of Vietnam quickly, the result was a rather abortive conference which left the cause of the Indochinese war untouched, i.e. political settlement of Northern and Southern Vietnam. These developments set the atmosphere for the Geneva Conference, and made it increasingly difficult for a genuinely stable solution. Moreover, when an agreement was drawn-up, the United States would not sign.

American domestic opinion in 1954 remained virulently anti-communist, especially anti-Chinese communist. The United States still had not recognized Mao's regime, and Dulles was, therefore, reluctant to affix his signature to a document which bore Chou En-lai's also. Moreover, the United States, as Canada, was there only as an interested party, and did not feel ready at this time to commit itself de jure to Indochina. The United States would, however, respect the accords, and "view with grave concern" the action of anyone who violated them. They had even included this in the appendage to the accords—an appendage which was partly responsible for American involvement later.

By "Viewing with grave concern" any violation of the agreements, the United States had become de facto the only party committed to seeing them work. They had, in fact, underwritten the agreements to the point that additional commitments, if necessary, would be forthcoming. This attitude, however, was couched in global terms as a determination to preserve international security. Bedell Smith put the American case succinctly when he quoted the main provision of the addendum. Here it was affirmed that the United States would refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the agreements, but...would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the...agreements as seriously threatening international peace and security. 23

This commitment was reinforced in 1955 by Eisenhower’s controversial letter to Diem, new President of South Vietnam. In it Eisenhower put forth the prospect of "American aid given directly (to Vietnam) to assist in (her) present hour of trial." By giving aid directly to South Vietnam, the United States had become the main provider for the infant republic, and was to that extent committed to make it work. Since 1949, the United States had been giving military and economic assistance to South Vietnam, but had always done so through France. With this letter, overt ties to France were removed and the


24 Ibid, p.100.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
United States was alone responsible for South Vietnam and the Diem regime.

It is interesting to note that contained in both documents the express reasons for aid were resistance to aggression. This, Eisenhower and Smith had both stated. Such references point up the fear of communist subversion in Vietnam shared by policy-makers in the United States. Whether guerilla activity at that time could be construed as such was a technical point and not considered. However, what was important was that, rightly or wrongly, communist subversion was thought to be possible in Indochina, and that the United States had to act to try to contain it. By these references the United States had placed the Indochinese question in the context of the Cold War struggle. It, therefore, was to be the justification for their presence in South Vietnam. Moreover, such a rationale would not make American presence there imperialistic. This justification was to make a reversal of American policy more difficult in later years, as was the massive aid program to the Diem regime of the late fifties.

The huge assistance program carried on by the United States to Vietnam reinforced her verbal commitment, even though it did nothing to solve the intricate social and political problems which were at the root of the trouble. For these

---

It was estimated that fully 65 percent of the Vietnamese economy was supported directly by the United States in the period from 1954-1955 to approximately 1957. See W. Henderson, "South Vietnam Finds Itself", Foreign Affairs 1957, Vol.35, No.2, p.271-283, p.280.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
particular problems, it was felt that Diem himself could consolidate diverse elements in Vietnam, and many held him up as a sort of saviour to that country. This aid and the hope in Diem, combined with the Manila Pact, or SEATO, in 1954, to complete the conditions for an increased American commitment.

The Manila Pact was designed, "to the extent that it (was) practicable, throw a mantle of protection over Laos, Cambodia and the free territory of Vietnam." Such a mantle, said Dulles,

(would), in fact, make a substantial contribution to preserve free governments in Southeast Asia and prevent communism from rushing into the Pacific area where it would threaten the defense of the United States. SEATO went into effect late in 1954 and was, no doubt, part of the reasoning behind United States aid. Thus, by 1955, the United States had undertaken the moral and political commitments which would inextricably involve her in the Vietnam crisis culminating in the sixties.

Behind these commitments lay one theme, containment. However, by associating Vietnam with containment in general, the United States was trying to solve essentially political

26 Eisenhower and Cardinal Spellman among them.


problems by military and economic means. Indeed, even mas-
sive aid did not alleviate the root cause of the dilemma.
What that aid did in fact was to make the Diem regime and
Vietnam, more dependent on American tutelage than ever be-
fore. In effect, the United States had built a castle on sand.
By 1960 the castle was falling.

American activity in Vietnam in the early fifties was
largely not an issue per se in Canadian-American relations.
Such American involvement, however, was to play a large part
in these relations later in the decade. It is significant,
though, that precisely during the years of increasing Ameri-
can involvement, 1950 to 1955, Canada was careful to remain
somewhat aloof, prior of course to her ICSC appointment. In-
deed, before Geneva, Pearson felt that because "the problem
of Indochina had never been submitted to the United Nations,
Canada had never been as directly concerned with Indochina." 29
Moreover, it was logical that, after having been involved in
Korea, Canada wanted little to do with another theater of war.
This unequal emphasis is significant because while the ICSC
was her first close association with the area, the United
States had been concerned to the point of giving aid for at
least five years. Thus, at the time of Canada's election to
the ICSC, the United States felt it had vital interests in
Vietnam and, because of the troika principle, Canada would

29
D.C. Masters, Canadian World Affairs, 1953 to 1955,
(Toronto:1959) p.81.
be the one to look after them. Moreover, in 1954 Canada did not share any of the neurotic factors of aversion to communism that permeated American policy in the Far East. All these factors were to make Canada's position on the ICSC more difficult to pursue, and a possible source of friction in Canadian-American relations.

Because Canada accepted a position on the ICSC she was "in a sense committed to trying to make the Geneva settlement effective." Yet it was an agreement to which the United States had not given their unconditional support. Indeed even the government of South Vietnam had refused to sign the accords. Moreover, Canada was "taking on an important duty in a part of the world with which she had no direct acquaintance." Now, however, "there was no United Nations direction of policy or responsibility" as there had been in Korea. There was, also, none of the international justification that came with the United Nations. On the contrary, from the beginning it was tacitly assumed by all concerned that Canada was there for one purpose, to look after United States in-

30 Holmes, op.cit., p.458.
31 Ibid., p.461.
32 Ibid., p.471.
33 Ibid., p.471.
terests. Although Canada would like to believe she is there because of her reputation for fairness, impartiality and objectivity, (she was put there) because she is a close ally of the United States and a...member of the NATO alliance. 34

Thus, the expectation of satellitism was apparent even in 1954.

Under any conditions, a completely impartial Canadian judgement on the commission would have proven difficult, but it became even more difficult in light of the intense American build-up after 1963. In this regard membership on the commission proved less than helpful to Canadian prestige and interests, since any stand supporting American policy could make Canada appear as a "lackey of the imperialists" or a "Western Poland." Similarly, staunch refusal to condone or offer a rationale for American policy could have led to a deterioration of Canadian-American relations at a time, the middle and late fifties, when there was much anti-American sentiment anyway. Assumption of a place on the commission, therefore, offered Canada little but a chance to moderate American policy, somewhat along the lines of the Korean Crisis. When the Indochinese war flared up again in the early sixties, her role on the commission was not conducive to such

34 Singh, op.cit., p.129.

35 There was never really a complete halt to the Indochinese War, even from 1954 to 1958. Events in North and South Vietnam were smoldering such that there was always some hostility, most of which was subversive in nature, though not always supported from the North.
influence, and it was at that time that Canada expressed her views in other ways.

It is important to note that the period 1954 to 1958 was one of relative calm in Vietnam. This was, no doubt due in large measure to the fact that Ho Chi Minh felt confident that, should elections take place, he would win them. This view was generally shared by all, even Eisenhower. When, in 1956, it became evident to Ho that elections were not going to take place, it was only then that the conflict was re-initiated, on a gradually ascending level. The point is, however, that it would be unfair to suggest that Canadian activity on the commission, or the commission itself, fostered the conditions that led to the intense hostilities of the sixties. Indeed, there were few at this time who foresaw this. Moreover, the commission had succeeded in overseeing a cessation of hostilities between the French and the guerrillas, and in troop withdrawal; the main provisions of the 1954 accords. There were, thus, no loud calls for negotiation that permeated the period 1963 to 1967, and thus no real reason for Canada to try to initiate them.

While there were general problems in accomplishing the ultimate objective of peace in the area, Canada acknowledged them. Indeed, the ICSC had issued reports which pointed to that fact. "The degree of cooperation," said the 1957 report,

given by the two parties is not the same. While
the commission has experienced difficulties in the North of Vietnam, the major part of its difficulty has arisen in the South." 36

This memorandum, with Canada in agreement, is indicative of the responsible position she took during this period. It was this type of posture that enabled Paul Martin to say that

Despite the temptation to live up to the conference's expectations, Canada decided from the beginning to avoid the role of rigid advocate for the West and instead tried to promote an objective and balanced approach by the commission. 37

This Canadian response to developments in Vietnam during that period were very much similar to her response to the Korean question earlier in the decade. Canada, in the late forties, took a judicious approach to UNTOOK, and one that she felt was necessary. On the ICSC there was more at stake than being a voice for the United States, for it became apparent that Canada's prestige was on the line as well. A responsible approach to ICSC work conceivably would garner more diplomatic credits in Asian eyes than being a mimic for the United States. This reasoning could not have been absent from Canadian thinking.

Canada's attitude of reserved agreement regarding crossing the thirty-eighth parallel for the first time in 1950, can be likened to her at least tacit support of increased

36 ICSC Report to the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Convention, 1957.

37 Singh, op.cit., p.129.
American involvement in Vietnam. At no time did Canada roundly come out and express misgivings about American policy in the earlier stages of commitment. Importantly, when there was apprehension, as in the 1957 report, this was given mainly in the context of the ICSC itself, that is, in terms other than a bi-lateral exchange between the United States and Canada. Moreover, there was no need for intense concern in the early stages of the Vietnamese conflict, since there was no real imminent danger of widespread war. At that time there was, thus, no justification for indiscriminantly "ruffling the eagles feathers." It was not until the early sixties, when the position of the Diem regime had deteriorated such that stepped-up American military commitment was necessary, that the situation grew more dangerous. At this time, increased guerilla activity in the South of Vietnam was evident, and it is not unreasonable to assume that it was sponsored by the North. In these circumstances Canada reacted differently, and, still in agreement with the goals of American policy, took an overt stand supporting them.

In the ICSC minority report of June 1962 Canada disavowed any condemnation of increased American military activity in Vietnam - activity which was construed by India and Poland as being a clear violation of the Geneva Agreements which prohibited "the introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops.....
military personnel...arms and munitions." Canada's minority report offered what amounted to a rationale of American policy in Vietnam.

The majority report, in essence, stated that military action had been taken against installations in the North of Vietnam by the South, and indicated the seriousness of the situation. Canada, while agreeing that "the situation continued to be unstable," believed that the cause "must be seen in context," lest one run the risk of giving the members of the Geneva Conference a distorted picture of the problem in Vietnam and its underlying causes.

What followed was a carefully worded justification for the attacks on the North by the South. Such raids, said the minority report,

(were) a dramatic manifestation of a continuing instability which has (been)...the deliberate and persistent pursuit of aggressive but largely covert policies by North Vietnam directed against South Vietnam.

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
The North, moreover, (has) allowed their zone to be used for inciting, encouraging, and supporting hostile activities in the zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the South. 43

The report further stated that, because of increased arms and support for anti-Saigon guerillas,

the government of South Vietnam has been obliged to request increased foreign aid for self-defense. 44

By placing the onus of guilt on the North, Canada was sanctioning Southern retaliation. Moreover, according to the minority report, the events which had transpired were "the direct result of the aggressive policy of the government of North Vietnam" and that such activity "constituted the root cause of general instability in Vietnam." 45 Thus, not only had Canada laid the blame at Hanoi's feet, but later stated that it would be up to her to cease such action "as a prerequisite of the restoration of peace in Vietnam." 46 The report, by implication, also held out the United States as somewhat of a saviour of South Vietnam.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.
Canada's action in view of these hostilities pointed up her increasing concern over Vietnam. However, it is well to remember that even then there was no imminent danger of widespread war. Canada, therefore could reasonably go along with the policy of the United States somewhat in deference to the latter's deepening commitments. There was, moreover, good reason to believe that the Canadian position was an accurate statement of what she felt was really happening in Vietnam. The action of India and Poland can be construed as interpreting the violation in the letter of the agreements rather than in the spirit. In the case of Poland their position is understandable. However, Indian action could also be interpreted as an expression of her reluctance to sanction American activity in Vietnam; activity which India may have construed as American suppression of an indigenous national movement. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret the Indian and Polish majority report in light of other developments. While much the same can be said for Canada, there is less reason to assume a strict subservient role with respect to the United States, especially when the Diefenbaker government was still in power. It would seem folly indeed to jeopardize a hitherto judicious role on the commission, for what was then thought to be simple retaliation, and which no one

47

It is also well to remember that the 1962 report appeared prior to the Sino-Indian border clash.
felt would escalate as quickly as it did. Similar to the Korean Crisis, therefore, Canada was taking a pro-American stance not only because she believed it justifiable but because there was really no point in doing otherwise.

However, with the air raids on the North by American bombers in 1965, Canada's concern became intense, and her reaction to American policy from that time to 1967 was one of attempted modification.

The period from 1964 to 1967 was marked by a period of intense escalation on the part of both North and South Vietnam and the United States. The air raids on the North, moreover, made for an extremely dangerous situation and one that Canada sought to retard. This period was also marked by many attempts by Canada to bring the parties to the Vietnam conflict to the negotiating table.

The American rationale for increased activity in Vietnam was that "a gradual commitment, with gradual punishment would (at some point) discourage the communists."

If we had gone slam bang right at the first (in 1963 he added) we might have won or started World War III. 50


49 J.R. Dickenson, "How will History Remember LBJ?", National Observer, January 20, 1969, by an aide of then President Johnson.

50 Ibid.
Thus, the idea of gradual escalation would serve to inform the North of the tenacity of American purpose, yet do it in such a manner so as not to alarm her powerful neighbor, Communist China. Conceivably, Canada could be counted upon to go this far also, so long as there was no danger of World War III.

With the escalation, however, Canada felt that "the situation (was) more serious than it had been for some time." So serious in fact that it could (have led) to a great crisis.

We are all deeply concerned with the implications for world peace (said Paul Martin). Increased military activity contains the seeds...of an open conflict of stark and terrifying proportions...(and) only if all concerned are prepared to exercise restraint....

can the next step toward peaceful settlement be taken. 53

In this period the mission of Chester Ronning in 1966 is also significant in that it pointed up the Canadian desire to reach a negotiated settlement. By that time the bombings had been in effect for over a year and the threat to world security had been increasing proportionately. His efforts were accompanied by other Canadian initiatives led by Lester Pearson.


It is significant to note that in this period there was an almost world-wide consensus to do something to facilitate a cessation of hostilities. Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, the Belgian Prime Minister, and many others were all calling for negotiations. While there were critics of American policy in the United States and in Canada as well, all seemed to agree on the need for negotiation. The NDP Party, even though they did not approve of American policy, agreed with Paul Martin in "calling for a cease-fire and negotiations." Diefenbaker, now leader of the Opposition, also felt the same way, and in the United States, Senators Morse and Fulbright were constant critics of the war. In essence, while Canada's reaction to the infiltration was not worth an open break with the United States, their reaction to the bombings were of a different nature. While there was no pressure to act in the earlier stages, Canada now deemed it necessary to try to do something. Pearson's speech in Philadelphia in 1965 was indicative of that pressure.

"The progressive application of military sanction," said Pearson, "can encourage stubborn resistance rather than a willingness to negotiate". "Continued intensification of hos-

tilities", he added, "could lead to uncontrollable escalation."

Earlier Paul Martin had also expressed concern that the war "could go well beyond the borders of (Vietnam) itself" and that the United States "should avoid the consequences of escalation." Thus, to alleviate this danger, the Canadian government felt that a suspension of the bombings, at the right time,

might provide (Hanoi) with an opportunity if they wish... to inject flexibility into their policy without appearing to do so as the direct result of military pressure. 59

Pearson thereupon suggested that

"a measured pause... might facilitate the development of diplomatic resources which cannot be easily applied to the problem under existing circumstances." 60

With statements as these Canada foresook passive agreement with American policy in favor of open diplomatic manoeuvres to influence it, although she still clung to the basic tenet that communist influence in Southeast Asia was not desirable.

Canada's reactions to the Vietnam War pointed up her desire to modify American policy when she felt that policy was

60 Ibid, p.35-36.
on a collision course with immediate threats to world security. Just as in Korea, Canada attempted to forestall the imminent danger of world war. The only difference in the United States reaction, however, was that unlike Korea, the threat to world peace did not seem to loom as large, and therefore Canada's influence and initiatives were not as effective as they might otherwise have been.

Thus, analogous to the Korean situation, change of American policy would have to come from within, Canada's contributions not withstanding. This is the typical American reaction when the United States becomes deeply committed to anything, Vietnam included. This is not to say that the Canadian peace-feelers were negligible. Indeed, Ronning's mission in 1966 made clear Hanoi's refusal to negotiate unless there was "an unconditional and permanent end to the bombing." The point is that Canadian initiatives, unless they are in concert with American predispositions, will not be very effective. While Canadian reactions can be predicted on the basis of the direct ratio between hostilities and world security, American policies cannot. Throughout the Vietnam crisis, however, Canada's response combined self-interest and judiciousness with a desire not to unduly aggravate Canadian-American relations. This main theme and similar reactions will be seen again in the question of Communist Chinese diplomatic recognition.

61 See Raskin and Fall, op.cit., p.470.
The question of recognizing the Communist Regime in Peking has been an important one in Canadian-American relations since the 1949 fall of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government. While there have been occasions when Canadian policy in this matter has been criticized from within, the principal effect of non-recognition in Canada has been the ever-present symbol of deference to American policy. Here, as in perhaps no other Canadian policy consideration, the overbearing influence of the United States has been one, if not the only, factor which has retarded Canadian action.

The initiative which in 1969 the Trudeau government has taken on the question of recognition was indeed a bold step when seen in light of developments since 1949. This action is neither illogical or spiteful, but, rather, it is in keeping with the basic Canadian reaction to American policy. That reaction entails a deference to Washington policy until such policy proves to be a possible danger to world security, as in Korea and Vietnam, or until Canadian interests are noticeably furthered by divergence from American views.

---

1 See Debates, on this question from October 1949 to June of 1950, especially the NDP party's reaction.
On the question of Chinese recognition, Canada, under both the Liberals and Conservatives, felt that neither of these two conditions were so prominent as to precipitate an open break with Washington. On the contrary, during this time Canada has shown a great deal of forebearance to the American cause. Whether this attitude was out of understanding, fear, national interest, or a combination of these, it was a wise course to take in that the "China question" proved to be a highly controversial and embarrassing one for the United States.

The origins of the United States-China policy go back to the eighteenth century. "The American concern about the 'Open Door' in 1899 was the latest expression of a long-continued interest (in China) which had been manifested in commercial, missionary and diplomatic channels." While it is not within the scope of this paper to give an historical account of United States activity there, it is worthwhile to note a few of the overriding American policy interests with respect to China. As will be seen, these attitudes were not shared by Canada, thus making her look at the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek in a very different light than did the United States.

Basically, there were, and still are, two interconnected foundations for American concern about China, and the Far East

---

2 Fairbank, op.cit., p.251.
generally. One was the desire for "an amenable China receptive to American officials, missionaries, students and businessman." Below the superficial, yet by no means insignificant, desire for trade with the Orient lay the spirit of Manifest Destiny in United States-China relations. This spirit was exhibited not only in the intense missionary work of the time, but also in the emotional attachment for the Chinese as a people, which was shared by many who had first hand contact with them. The other concern, more recent, has been a search for a "balance of power capable of guaranteeing American security in the Pacific." These two objectives were complementary in that a compliant China in the fields of trade and commercial enterprise, would be one in the field of diplomacy as well. All this would, it was believed, lead to the optimal American objective in the Far East—"an independent China, strong enough to preserve its security, but one prevented from gaining control over its major neighbors." This goal, however, grew more illusory with the Chinese Civil War which was being pursued intermittently from 1927 to 1949.


In the early stages of that conflict the American fear was not so much of Chiang's collapse, as it was of the collapse of a China integral to United States Far Eastern policy. In the middle forties, when the defeat of Japan was imminent, China seemed the only logical country to fill the power vacuum thus created. In the eyes of American policy-makers it was reasonable to contend, therefore, that China's capabilities, although not at the moment obviously effective, were latently enormous. China, thus, should be groomed to inherit the Asian leadership which would be rendered vacant by Japan's demise. This was the rationale for the American sponsored drive which ultimately sought great power status for China. Thus, when China assumed her seat on the Security Council of the UN as one of the Big Five in 1945, she did so less by her own merit than by United States influence.

China's status under Chiang, however, was shaky to say the least. Like the Saigon regime, it too collapsed, and with it American hopes for an amenable China and one conducive to United States policy. The shock in which the American people greeted that collapse was significant and will be dealt with later. Suffice it to say now, however, that prior to the massive American aid to Chiang and his regime, the United States had evolved to policy based more on self-interest.

---

Canada, as mentioned above, shared little of the kind of
interest in China that the United States had. Although there
had been great potential in Sino-Canadian trade, such poten-
tial was never, until recently, realized. The fact is that
while the United States was making a half-turn to the East
from 1898 to 1945, Canada was consolidating her position with­
in the Empire and, later, the Commonwealth. After World War
II her main concern had been in finding a place for herself
in a restructured international state system. Thus, "Canada
had been neither personally nor emotionally engaged in the
(American) post-war effort to bolster the Kuomintang, and
there was none of the feeling of having 'lost China' which
deeply affected American thinking." When Chiang was subsequ­
tenly driven from the mainland in 1949, some felt that Cana-
dian recognition would come as a matter of course. However,

One exception of course was the work of Norman Bethune,
Canadian doctor and surgeon who worked in China during the
Civil War. Mao Tse-Tung called him "a great internationalist",
and one from whom "all (can) learn the spirit of absolute un­
selfishness." See Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-
Tung,(Peking:1952) Vol. II.

Even with Bethune's example, however, missionary zeal in
Canada held none of the popular appeal it had in the United
States. Missionary activity in general, then, was not fraught
with as many political overtones and therefore not as signifi­
cant in Canada as the United States.

J. Holmes, "Canada and China: The Dilemmas of a Middle


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
recognition did not come then, largely because of the out-
break of the Korean War soon after, and has not come at this 
writing, mainly due to the truculent attitude of the United 
States. An examination of relations between the United Stat-
eses and the Nationalist Government from 1945 to the Korean War 
offers some insight into the American aversion to the Peking 
Regime. In view of the Canadian desire not to indiscriminate-
ly run counter to American policy, this examination also part-
ly explains Canada's reasons for non-recognition at that time.

Former Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hillsman, speak-
ing in 1964 of Chiang's collapse said that the American reac-
tion was "anger and disbelief, a sense of betrayal." The 
McCarthy era was an indication of how deep and widespread that 
feeling was. Indeed, at first glance it would seem well found-
ed in that in the period 1937 to 1949, the United States had 
poured over two billion dollars worth of aid, military and 
economic, into the shaky Nationalist Regime.

Such aid was necessary, in Truman's words, for the deve-
lopment of "a strong and progressive China making a full con-
tribution to the strength of the family of nations." The

10 Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1954, p.11-17, p.16.

11 See The China White Paper, August 1949, p.1042-1046, 
esp. p.1043-1044.

China that Truman had in mind, however, long since had proved inept, as the long internal struggle had seriously weakened the Nationalist Government, not only militarily and economically, but also politically and in morale. The same government that had received massive injections of United States help had, through graft and nepotism, "lost the crusading spirit that won the people's loyalty during the early stages of the war." As a result, they had sunk into corruption and a scramble for place and power...into a reliance upon the United States to win the war for them and ...preserve their own domestic supremacy. 15

Chiang's ineptness apparently had been suspected by Truman as early as 1946 when, in a letter to Chiang, he felt that the United States could not "be expected to continue in its generous attitude toward (him) unless (there were proof) that genuine progress was being made" toward a peaceful settlement of China's internal problems. To this end, Truman sent General George Marshall to China for the purpose of a negotiated settlement of the Civil War.

It would seem, then, that Truman was, at this time, more

13 Ibid, p.VIII.
14 Ibid, p.VIII; See also H.R. Isaacs, op.cit., Ch. 8-9.
15 White Paper, op.cit., p.VIII.
16 Ibid, p.652.
interested in a stable China than he was with a stable Nationalist Government. It was also obvious in Marshall's mission that the search for a peaceful China seemed to override concern for Chiang Kai-shek, at least in 1946. "It was imperative" said Marshall, "that efforts be made to bring (Mao) into the government and that the greatest care should be taken to avoid having military action disrupt the negotiations." 17 "The Communists", he added, "were too large a military and civil force to be ignored." 18

It is plausible to assume, then, that during the period 1945-1947 the official response to the Chinese civil war had none of the emotional fervor that was to dominate it in later years. The reaction then was more pragmatic and less tainted with fear of Communism. Indeed, Truman himself, in 1945, said that,

peace, unity, and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of (China's) government is broadened to include other political elements in the country. 19

Dean Acheson also, in 1948, seemed to be playing down the United States involvement.

The United States (he said) must not become directly involved in the Chinese Civil War

(or) assume responsibility for underwriting the Chinese government militarily and economically. 20

"Present developments," he went on to say,

make it unlikely that any amounts of United States military or economic aid would make the present Chinese government capable of re-establishing and then maintaining its control throughout all of China. 21

Thus, the American official attitude prior to the collapse of Chiang seemed to be evolving to one of resignation. Indeed, the publication of the Department of State "China White Paper", showing the corruptness of the Kuomintang and massive American aid, was an attempt to relieve the United States of responsibility for his debacle.

It was also apparent that, seeing the imminence of his fall, the United States had to look out for its own interests. Indeed, as Acheson had said, American policy "should preserve maximum freedom of action," in case of just such a contingency. It is logical to assume, therefore, that American policy-makers, if not the American people, were at least aware of Chiang's tenuous position and were preparing for his demise. It is also logical to assume that, in view of Mao's triumphs, the United States was gradually trying to remove the stigma of

21 Ibid, p.281.
22 Ibid, p.286.
supporting the Nationalists and quietly disengage themselves from Chinese internal politics. It was apparent that, in this period, the United States was, in some vague way, striving toward a *modus vivendi* with Mao and the Communist Regime. In light of this, the furore that surrounded the "loss" of China seemed unwarranted. While this is to a certain extent true, it does not take into account pertinent internal developments of American politics.

While Chiang's fall from power had been prepared for in the State Department, there was no such preparation for the general public. It was the latter that was dismayed at the so-called "loss" of China and men like Senators Knowland, McCarthy, Bridges and Jenner parlayed this loss into political fortune. Thus, charges that the State Department had been infested by Communists, although groundless, were nevertheless exploited by politicians in 1949 and 1950.

Whether or not these charges, and the resultant public opinion stemming from them, would have prevented the United States from ultimately recognizing the new regime is largely speculative, but it is conceivable that they would not. Indeed, even the New York Times in January of 1950 had said that "recognition was inevitable" and "just a matter of time". A Gallup poll as late as June 1950 indicated that fully 60

\[23\]

M.A. Guhin, *op.cit.*, p.47.
percent of the public had no opinion or were in favor in re-
24 cognition. The whole upshot of the situation in the mid-
24 dle of 1950, then, was a gradual evolution of United States
24 policy towards recognition. Even Acheson, writing in 1950,
24 seemed to be preparing the nation for it.

It is abundantly clear (he said) that we must
25 face the situation as it exists in fact. We
25 will not help the Chinese or ourselves by bas-
25 ing our policy on wishful thinking. 25

Indeed, the great moralist, John Foster Dulles, in a rare mo-
26 ment of candor, had written in 1949 that, if the Communist
government of China proves its ability to govern China with-
26 out serious domestic resistance then it (should not only be
26 recognized but also) admitted to the UN." Clearly then, as
26 late as June 7, 1950, the decision not to recognize the Peking
Regime would stem from quarters other than the United States
government. The actions of the Peking Regime itself at this
early stage proved to be the stumbling block.

It is significant to note that even during the early sta-
24 ges of the Nationalists fall, and after 1950, both the Cana-
dian and American delegations did not leave the mainland or

24 Ibid. p.47.

25 R. Blum, The United States and China in World Affairs,

26 Q. Wright, "Non-Recognition of China and International
Tensions", Current History, Vol.34, No.199,(March:1958) p.152-
157.
the capital of Nanking. This is indicative of the prevalent attitude among those observers then in China, as they too were apparently preparing for recognition. Indeed, American Ambassador Leighton Stewart had for a long time seen the handwriting on the wall forecasting the inevitable downfall of (the Nationalist) regime. 27

Thus, the official American source of information was obviously cognizant of Chiang's collapse, and was preparing to stay in the Chinese capital to try to accommodate Mao Tse-tung.

The assumption that the United States was, in late 1949, preparing for recognition is strengthened by the American decision to authorize Stewart to stay in Nanking when Chiang fled to Canton. 28 Indeed, Stewart had even rejected the Nationalist invitation to leave Nanking for the new nationalist capital.

The Canadian delegation also seemed to be preparing for recognition. Indeed, by 1950 there was no doubt (on the part of Canada's legation) that the criterion for recognition of the new government had been adequately met. 30

These criteria, as put forth by Lester Pearson, consisted of

27 Ronning, op.cit., p.42.

28 Ibid, p.442.

29 Ibid, p.442.

"independence of external control—, an ability to control the territory it claims," and that it be reasonably well-defined. "When these requirements are met," continued Pearson, "consideration should be given to the recognition of a government in China or in any other part of the world."

Chester Ronning, head of the Canadian Delegation in Nanking, thus "assumed that the embassies and legations in Nanking would be moved to (Peking)," and therefore that recognition would be shortly forthcoming.

If both the American and Canadian governments were preparing for recognition, however, the initial actions of the new regime at least retarded those developments. Because of the Chinese harassment of Mr. Stewart, his eventual arrest, and other belligerent acts against American personnel, immediate United States recognition was not forthcoming. This is not to say it was the only reason for non-recognition, but that this type of Chinese activity made the United States government increasingly less amenable to recognizing the new regime. So too, Mao himself did not seem to be entirely well-disposed to American support of Chiang. He had felt that such

31 Debates, 1949, p.1108.
32 Ibid, p.1108.
33 Ronning, op.cit., p.442.
support was an attempt to "reduce China virtually to a United States colony." Liu Shao-chi also said, in 1948, that it would be extremely harmful and erroneous to harbor illusions that American imperialism would in good faith help the Chinese people to achieve real independence, peace and democracy. 35

Canada, however, was not in the same position and their delegation did not suffer similar harassment. Thus, it was likely that while both Canada and the United States were preparing to accommodate the Peking Regime, the Canadian Government probably would have done so first. Indeed, Great Britain and India had already done so, and it would seem, owing to the memory of Bethune and the amiable relationship between Chou En-lai and Chester Ronning, that Mao would have been in favor of its acknowledgement. To this end, thus, Ronning and Chou were making arrangements for reciprocal recognition.

Reciprocity was extremely important in the Canadian view. Indeed, according to Ronning,

Ottawa wanted to avoid the embarrassment of extending unreciprocated recognition as that experienced by the United Kingdom. 37

Even though Canadian public opinion in 1950 was not thought to

34 R. Blum, op.cit., p.94.
36 Ronning, op.cit., p.444.
37 Ibid, p.444.
be fully in favor of recognition, it was felt, by Pearson and St. Laurent, that in due course recognition would be accorded. The whole situation was altered, however, by the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950.

For both Canada and the United States the Korean War signalled a re-appraisal of the recognition question. When Communist Chinese "volunteers" entered the war, recognition, it seemed, was shelved indefinitely. While Canada and the United States looked at the war differently, they both arrived at the same conclusion -- recognition of the Peking Regime could not come at that time.

In the view of American policy-makers, the invasion of South Korea was effected with at least the approval and quite possibly the aid of the Soviet Union. China, moreover, was probably not unaware of such aid and perhaps even encouraged it. When the thinly veiled "volunteers" entered the war this possibility became a reality. It was apparent at that time that the traditional American desire for a well-disposed China and one which could act as a favorable weight in the balance of power in the Far East was no longer possible. This, coupled with the hostile public reaction and the height of the McCarthy furore, made it impossible for the United States to

38 Paul Martin, address to University of Windsor, March 15, 1969.

39 Truman, op.cit., p.342 et. seq.
recognize the People's Republic of China. Truman's order to the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Formosa Straits, moreover, while originally intended to limit the war to the Korean peninsula, had the effect of protecting Chiang from a possible invasion from the mainland. From that point, then, tacit American support for the Formosa government was implied, and this was to become the symbol of American refusal to recognize the Mao Regime. Canada's refusal, although due in no small measure to American attitudes of 1950, ostensibly came as a result of her membership in the UN.

Because Canada was committed to the still infant UN, she felt it essential to preserve the principle of collective security. Since it was becoming increasingly apparent that the failure of this principle would place the UN in a grave alongside the old League of Nations, Canada felt it imperative to uphold collective security. Moreover, because the UN had named China the aggressor in the Korean War, Canada felt it would be impossible to then recognize her. Thus, according to Lester Pearson,

Until the war ends and China abandons her attack against the United Nations in Korea, there can be no question of...recognition of that regime in Peking. There can be no question even of considering it while the Chinese defy the United Nations in Korea and fight against our (sic) forces there. 41

40 See above Chapter III.

41 Debates 1951, p.2750.
Previously, because of internal opposition and a general desire to proceed cautiously, Canada had withheld the formal act of recognition. Conceivably, she was also content with the progress of the Ronning-Chou negotiations. However, when the Korean War broke out, Pearson thought that Canada "did not feel justified in taking any action toward recognition until the circumstances surrounding aggression in Korea became clearer." Similarly, "when Peking joined in the aggression in Korea it was inconceivable that (Canada) would change (her) policies." The United States took a similar view of recognition, since the American public became "adamantly opposed to recognizing a government whose policies during the Korean War brought humiliation to their land and death to their young men." Thus, the outbreak of the Korean War served to justifiably postpone recognition for both Canada and the United States, at least until after the hostilities had ended.

By the time the Korean War was over, however, the United States looked at China and saw nothing but Communism. With

42 Ibid. 1950, p.555.
43 Ibid. 1950, p.555
45 Fairbank, op.cit., p.4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the Dulles and Eisenhower era, "new moral criteria became the deciding factors" to recognition, thus making it more difficult to accord. For Canada, that era also proved to be a tripwire for recognition, since it became apparent that "an ill-timed act of recognition by Canada might appear (to the United States) as a betrayal and a slap in the face."

In John Holmes' words,

the United States became so deeply committed against Peking that recognition by any of its allies was bound to appear more unfriendly than such a move had seemed when the British, Dutch and others had acted before June 1950.

Thus, the Canadian government acted accordingly and withheld recognition. This was done, however, not so much out of a fear of Washington reprisal, but rather in the hope of retaining the status of America's good friend and ally.

Indeed, prior to this time Pearson was quick to point out that recognition does not imply or signify moral approval, but it is simply acknowledgement of a state of affairs that exists.

Similarly, the Canadian government

---

46 Ronning, op.cit., p.442-443.
48 Holmes, op.cit., p.104.
49 Debates, 1949, p.1838.
rejected completely the Marxist-Leninist principles espoused by the Chinese Communists. 50

It is obvious, therefore, that during the Korean War, and until 1954, the Canadian government exhibited justifiable deference to American policy. From 1954 onward, however, Canadian action regarding recognition can be viewed as a "persistent yet frustrated attempt" 51 to recognize the Peking Regime. The United States, however, during these years found it increasingly difficult to recognize the Chinese Peoples Republic.

If the United States was anywhere near recognition in 1950, the Korean War quickly erased any possibility. From 1954, then, American policy became more adamantly opposed to Mao's Regime and at the same time more disposed to the Formosa Regime of Chiang Kai-shek. From withholding recognition on the moral grounds that Communism was evil, after 1954 the United States began withholding it on strategic considerations and holding it up as humanitarian alternatives to Communism. These attitudes also involved the United States more deeply in its commitment to Taiwan.

At the end of the Korean War the Nationalist Government acquired a special place in the American security policies of the Western Pacific. Dean Acheson had outlined the Pacific

51 Holmes, op.cit., p.104.
defense perimeter prior to the conflict, but had omitted Korea and Formosa. However with the presence of the American Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits during the Korean War, and later on with SEATO, Formosa had come under the mantle of American security. In 1954 the Seventh Fleet was still in the area although for reasons other than limiting the aggression to the Korean peninsula. Then, what seemed the overt protection of Formosa served a different purpose. This purpose evolved during the middle fifties as a "concrete and necessary symbol of the American determination to contain the Chinese Communists."

In addition to such containment American policy makers expressed the hope that the communists would encounter insurmountable obstacles in their attempt to consolidate control. This was possible it was felt in "light of the many decades of chaos in China as a whole." Thus, if the People's Republic proved incapable of successfully consolidating their hold on mainland China, the Nationalist Government, in exile on Formosa, would be offered as an alternative. By supporting the Nationalist Government, the United States hoped to undermine the faith in the Peking Regime. To further this

---

52 See above Chapter III.

53 Blum, op.cit., p.240.

54 Guhin, op.cit., p.54.

55 Ibid, p.54.
erosion, moreover, the United States withheld diplomatic recognition.

In the middle fifties, therefore, the Mao regime was spoken of as "a passing and not a perpetual phase." Indeed, by 1958, fully nine years after Mao had conquered the mainland, Dulles was still harping on the same theme. "While it is true," he said

(that) there is no reason to believe that the Chinese Communist regime is on the verge of collapse....there is equally no reason to accept its present rule in mainland China as permanent. 57

He went on to say that one day the regime will pass. "By withholding diplomatic recognition from Peiping, therefore, the United States sought to hasten that passing."

The island of Formosa was consequently held up as the only legitimate successor once that passing was effected. The successful preservation of Taiwan, therefore, as a rival and alternative to Peking became a basic element in American policy. It was for these reasons that the American commitment to Taiwan, as well as American aid to the island increased in the fifties. This aid and hope was underwritten by an assumption of the military defense of Taiwan which had been a result of the off-shore island crisis of 1954-1955. During

56 Graebner, op.cit., p.221.
57 Blum, op.cit., p.121.
58 Ibid, p.121.
that crisis, the United States and Chiang had agreed to the Mutual Defense Treaty which "assured the Chinese Nationalists that the United States stood squarely behind them as far as defense of Formosa was concerned." Thus, during this time the American government was moving farther and farther away from recognition because of increased military and strategic obligations. At the same time, however, Canada seemed to be preparing more than ever for the recognition that was close in 1950.

Understandably, American activity and UN commitments from the years 1949 to 1953 retarded the not always latent desire on Canada's part to recognize Communist China. During this time, however, she could offer a justification for non-recognition on grounds other than a deference to Washington. Indeed, it was quite plausible for Canada not to recognize a power which had been labelled an aggressor by an organization which was becoming more and more important to her foreign policy. Similarly, years of war-time cooperation with the United States and the necessity for the latter's partnership in NATO must have been uppermost in the minds of Canadian policymakers. After the Korean War was over, however, Canada took a different position on recognition and began to look at the situation more pragmatically.

Speaking in the Commons in 1954, Pearson stated that

---

Canada had to be "realistic" on the problems of recognition and "be prepared to deal with those who represent the nation over which they exercise authority." He was offering not only a different emphasis to the problem of recognition, but was preparing the nation for the realities of the Geneva Conference. Indeed, "the necessity of dealing with Red China at Geneva," said Pearson "is inescapable." He was also hopeful that perhaps the Chinese attitude itself would change, and make it easier for Canada to gain more leeway on the recognition question. This could only be done, however, if Peking made efforts to remove the stigma of aggressor with which the United Nations had labelled her.

"If China adopts a conciliatory attitude at the Geneva Conference," Pearson said, "Canada might take a new look at this problem." This hope for a more conciliatory posture on Peking's part would be for Canada at least the crack in the door which might signal formal recognition. Still, the United States attitude was weighty, since any decision of such import "required a careful balancing of national and international factors." Indeed, Pearson even quoted Dulles on

---

60 Debates 1954, p.2748.

61 Ibid., 1954, p.3545.


63 Ibid, p.3544.
the realities of the Chinese question who said that "diplomatic intercourse (is useful) between those who exercise de facto governmental authority."

Thus, the Canadian government during the middle fifties seemed to be coming much closer to the real issues that recognition implied. It is significant that Canada began increasingly to speak of the tangible advantages and disadvantages of the question than echo the moral criticisms of American policy makers. Canada was, in Pearson's words, "taking another look at the problem - a more realistic, less emotional look." Indeed, Canada had even divorced herself from the dangerous possibilities of conflict pregnant in the Offshore Island Crisis of 1954-1955. Speaking of that crisis Pearson commented that while Canada

\begin{quote}

could not stand aloof from a major war which threatened the very existence of the United States (she)....did not consider that crisis to be such a situation; or one requiring any Canadian intervention in support of the Chinese Nationalist regime. 66
\end{quote}

It was apparent that Canada, while she never forgot the close ties that bound her with the United States, was not about to become engaged in another war so soon after Korea. In this vein of self interest, any Canadian decision to recognize the

\begin{footnotes}

64 \textit{Ibid}, p.3544.


66 \textit{Ronning, op.cit.}, p.49.
\end{footnotes}
Mao Regime would be based on "the national and international advantage" for Canada.

It is significant to note that during this period, while Canada was taking important steps to make recognition of China a fact, there were two overriding concerns. One was the fact that by 1957, after Mao had withstood eight years of American non-recognition and the first offshore island crisis, a Canadian refusal to recognize Peking could easily be construed as undue deference to Washington. While this in itself was not advantageous, the fact that the United States might, by some stroke of fate, recognize Red China before Canada did was even less so. This is made even more significant since, during the middle fifties, internal criticism regarding heavy American investment was prevalent. Cries of Canada's being the ploy of American investors were extremely difficult to take and, moreover, such outbursts were usually given credence by the example of Canadian unwillingness to recognize Peking. Because United States intransigence on the recognition issue had acquired a symbolic significance, the issue in Canada had come, by 1957, to reflect the domination of Canadian external policy by American interests.

---

67 Debates 1953, p.2748.
68 Bayrs, op.cit., p.79. See also J. Holmes, op.cit., p.104-116. The influence of Diefenbaker was, in no small way, also responsible for this attitude.
nition, therefore, it would be useful for the Canadian government to take the initiative on the question "but fatal to be beaten by the Americans themselves." This element was another of the very real and pressing problems faced by Canada on the recognition question during the middle fifties. Another important concern facing Canada was the Chinese behavior itself.

The Korean Conflict, Chinese action in Tibet in 1951, and her expressed desire to consolidate her hold on Taiwan had always retarded Canadian recognition. It was events such as these which prompted Pearson to cautiously appraise the recognition question, yet always doing so in a manner to refrain from taking an unalterable position on the matter. When, therefore, prior to the first Offshore Island Crisis, the Peking Regime had proven reasonable in the Geneva negotiations, Pearson expressed the belief that recognition, then, was not out of the question. Indeed, after Geneva he had said that while Canada should not read too much into the improvement, "(she) would also be unwise to ignore it." In a sober look at Peking's hostility Pearson did not want to appear too much like his American opposite number, John Foster Dulles. According to Pearson, Canada should not get into the position where she would be "demanding positive proof of utter purity

69 Bayrs, op.cit., p.79. See also Holmes, op.cit.

70 Ibid, p.80.
from (the Peking) Regime," before consideration of formal diplomatic recognition. The first offshore island shelling, however, could not be overlooked and, because Canadian-American intrahemispheric relations from 1954 to 1957 had deteriorated so badly, recognition again was out of the question.

The whole upshot of the situation in the middle and late fifties was the result of Canadian ambivalence made more difficult by increased American rigidity. Even though Peking was more conciliatory in the years 1954 to 1957 Canada could not recognize Communist China as long as the American opposition was so intense. Indeed, Pearson, speaking in 1956 had put the Canadian case succinctly. Recognition, he said "was not worth having a first class row with the United States." 72

As non-recognition continued into the sixties other connected issues came to the fore; the admission of Red China into the UN and the question of Taiwan's status.

Because Chiang and his Nationalist Government continued to hold the Chinese seat at the UN, the issue of Taiwanese as opposed to Nationalist representation became clouded by the larger question of Communist Chinese admission. Strictly speaking the Taiwanese per se were not represented at the United Nations. For both Canada and the United States, the

71 Ibid, p.80.

72 Reford, op.cit., p.20.
political question of recognition and admission had to take into account the interests of the Taiwanese people.

For United States policy in the early and middle sixties, the question of Communist Chinese recognition and admission to the UN became more a matter of prestige than strategy. Indeed, speaking in 1964 Roger Hillsman had said that the United States "had no reason to believe that there is a present likelihood that the Communist Regime (would) be overthrown." This was merely the formal expression of what had been fact since the Korean War. United States non-recognition policy by the sixties was based on the fear of Communist subversion of her non-Communist neighbors. Where earlier, recognition had been withheld in an effort to weaken the regime itself, by 1960 there was really no basis for this hope. Since the danger in the sixties lay in subversion, the United States felt it still had to contain Red China as well as isolate her. Then, however, isolation would be strategic and defensive instead of an attempt to undermine her internal position. Moreover, such isolation would remove the threat of militancy espoused by the Chinese Communists.

The adherence to violence ran through most of Peking's policies in the late fifties and early sixties and was offered as one reason for not allowing her admission into the UN. Because this theme had been incorporated into the American rationale for non-recognition and admission since the

---

73 Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1964, p.11-17, p.13.
Korean War, there arose the fear that any variance in the American position would be construed as tacit agreement of Peking's policies, and therefore could not be tolerated. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, speaking in 1964, summarized the American case when he said such a conciliatory attitude "would be very unwise and (would) indicate to Peking that a policy of militancy is profitable and pays dividends." Thus, a favorable attitude to Red Chinese admission could not be considered, as the latter's espousal of violence would conflict with Article 37 of the UN Charter. Moreover, admission of Peking and recognition would, in effect, break the American commitments made not only to the people of Taiwan, but also to the other non-communist nations of Asia which had relied upon American support. A reversal, therefore, on the United States non-recognition policy would render her suspect in the eyes of many non-communist Asians. United States prestige, then, would inevitably be impaired from such a turnabout.

Prestige was also the issue in the UN itself since, by 1960, the United States had become the champion of those who were wary of Peking's admission. By 1960, however, and even as early as 1958, international conditions had so changed that the once assured American domination in the UN had become weaker.

Because of the influx of the many Afro-Asian nations in the late fifties, the once-sure voting block commanded by the United States lay open to erosion on certain issues. Since for many of these new states independence from the West was the keystone of their founding, they radically altered the global structure from one of bi-polarity to poly-centric. In effect, these nations had a mind of their own in foreign policy, with the result that the United States could no longer count on majority support that it once had in the UN. For the United States in these years the issue of prestige was indeed an important one.

Dulles, however, writing in 1949, had put the recognition question succinctly. "If the United Nations membership were made substantially universal," he wrote,

that might end a preponderant voting superiority of the United States and its friends which, while pleasant is somewhat fictitious....
....if we want to have a truly world organization then it should be representative of the world as it is....75

True as Dulles' words were, and are, the United States government still could not reconcile Chinese admission with support for the Taiwanese government, since control of Taiwan was, for Peking, a sine qua non for diplomacy with the West. A tolerable attitude toward admission, therefore, would turn over de facto the island of Taiwan to the Chinese Communists - the same island which had become the pillar of the American non-

75 Guhin, op.cit., p.44-48.
recognition policy.

Concern for Taiwan was also becoming apparent in Canada's view of recognition and admission. For Canada, the status of Taiwan had never been settled satisfactorily. While she was somewhat cool to the Nationalist regime itself, she showed concern for the people of Taiwan. Even though Canada was aware of the need to deal with Communist China, the answer to the recognition question did not lie in accommodating Peking's desire to control Taiwan. It was for this reason, then, that in 1961 Canada introduced the "Two-China" or "one-China", "one-Taiwan" policy.

The "Two-China" plan, as put forth by Senator Alfred Brooks of the Canadian UN delegation, held out the possibility that both China and Formosa could be admitted to the UN in a manner which would not leave the Taiwanese people at the mercy of Peking. The future of (Taiwan) said Brooks,

is the affair of the people of (Taiwan). Canadians would never understand or accept a solution by which (the UN) sanctioned the forcible extinction of the political identity of (Taiwan). 76

This formula, however, was not in the least acceptable to Peking.

Chou En-lai, as quoted by Pearson in the Commons, stated that the Chinese People's Republic would "not tolerate any

plot to carve up Chinese territory and create two Chinas."

The Canadian initiative, however, had lent a new twist to her admission policy. The concern now would be with the interests of the Taiwanese people as well as with world diplomacy.

This Canadian approach was substantially different in emphasis from that of the United States, which in that period, had been stressing the dangers of Communist subversion. With this action, under the Conservatives, Canada gradually would try to make recognition and admission possible under what she considered equitable conditions for all concerned. At the same time, the Canadian non-recognition policy would come under less criticism for an undue deference to United States policy.

Canada's action in 1961 reflected what was a pragmatic shift in her policy toward Red China. Speaking in the Commons in 1959, then External Affairs Minister Smith had said that Canada's course should be "one of prudence based on an appreciation of the realities of the situation." In that vein,

---

77 Debates 1960, p.738. Chou's statement apparently grew out of concern for the "two China" solution which had been spoken of in many quarters for some time. The Canadian statement of 1961, however, was received with so much publicity and excitement that previous references were relatively unimportant as far as this paper is concerned. See Lyon, op. cit., p.303-305.

78 Debates, 1959, p.1406.
he felt that Canada should take the initiative in limited fields, in fields of trade...." By her one-China, one-Taiwan policy, Canada, in effect, was divorcing the issue of Chiang's Taiwan government from that of the recognition of China. Thus, as trade with Peking increased in the sixties, Canada's one-China, one-Taiwan policy evolved not only as an equitable but also as an advantageous approach to the Chinese question. With this approach Canada, by 1969, had laid the groundwork for the initiatives of the Trudeau government.

With the de facto recognition in a substantial increase in trade between China and Canada, Canadian non-recognition became less sensible. Similarly, with Canada's one-China, one-Taiwan policy, she could not be charged with neglecting the interests of Taiwan itself. Recognition as a course for Canada, therefore, became more logical. Continued non-recognition moreover, in the face of expanded trade, would appear more like a deference to Washington than ever before.

It is significant to note, however, that during the middle sixties, the Senate Foreign Relation Committee Hearings on China, led by US Senator J.W. Fullbright began to take a new look at the China problem. The atmosphere in the United States, while not altogether in favor of recognition was nonetheless becoming less strident in opposing it. This is not to say that Canadian trade was directly influenced by this

American attitude, but only that such attitudes made it less disadvantageous for Canada to seek new answers to the non-recognition question.

Basically, Canada's action in 1968-1969 reflected an attempt to recognize Red China which had been a latent desire since 1949. Indeed, she had succeeded, in the twenty years from 1949 in reaching a *modus vivendi* with the Peking government and, considering the American position in the same period, had been quite successful. There was indeed de facto diplomatic relations with Peking at Geneva and earlier in the Korean negotiations. What had happened under the 1968-1969 Trudeau government was in fact a realization that non-recognition as a policy for Canada had the effect of compromising Canadian prestige in foreign affairs. Her action in 1969, therefore, must be seen as an attempt not so much to thwart American policy as to advance the Canadian interest. In this respect the advantages of recognition outweighed the disadvantages of possible American reactions in Canadian-American relations. Similarly, if continued non-recognition at this stage had been pursued, it would have been valid to criticize Canada for unduly deferring to Washington. While non-recognition could have been justified in the earlier years because of Chinese intransigence and American over-sensitivity, those conditions no longer seemed to exist in the same degree that they had. It would appear, therefore, that there was a very real desire on Canada's part not to be beaten by the
Americans on the recognition question, and thus once again putting herself in the position of following the American lead.

To further her own prestige, therefore, Canada has taken a significant step toward recognizing the Peking regime. This step is made easier, moreover, by dint of the rather relaxed position the American government had in 1966 through 1968. Because it is not a crucial issue at the present time Canada can further what she considers her own goals of independence in foreign policy instead of adopting a reflexive position, waiting for Washington to act.

See Appendix II.
VI

CONCLUSION

While it is generally in the Canadian interest not to diametrically oppose United States policies, this discussion of Canadian-American interplay in Asia suggests that there will be times when this desire is superceded by the way in which Canada interprets the ramifications of those policies. In all of the areas under study, Canada has been in virtual agreement with most of the main lines of American policies. Significantly, however, this agreement has always been predicated on the conditions that United States policies would not endanger world peace or visibly impede Canada's pursuit of self-interest. When these conditions were either unattainable or in jeopardy, Canada questioned American tactics although she still agreed with the principles underlying those policies.

1

These remarks will be drawn from the preceding discussion of interplay in Asia, and are not necessarily intended to be universally applicable to Canadian and American policies. Indeed, different circumstances dictate different policy approaches, and what may have been true in Asian interplay may not be true in other areas. This analysis simply attempts to glean major Canadian reactions, and their justifications, to American policy in the Asian arena when circumstances demanded a choice between following or not following the American lead. However, a detailed study of Canadian-American policy in other areas might bear out many of the conclusions drawn here.
Canadian actions in Vietnam and Korea can be separated somewhat from her policies on the question of Communist Chinese recognition. In the first two instances, especially Korea, the dangers of world war were indeed present. In the last, it was not so much a direct threat to world security that was at stake as a furtherance of singularly Canadian interests. Throughout all three areas, however, Canada has shown that her similarity to American policy is based on her own perceptions as well as on deference to Washington.

It is significant to note that, in each of the areas under discussion, Canada sought to reconcile her position with that of Washington in the early stages of mutual involvement, even though she did not ultimately align with American policy. This can be seen not only in her constant attempts to modify the implications of that policy but also in her efforts to bring about negotiations. In the Korean Crisis, Canada was among the first to seek United Nations help in utilizing the *de facto* cease-fire along the thirty-eighth parallel for negotiation. In Vietnam, although the Canadian influence may not be known for some time, it is nonetheless probable that Chester Ronning's mission did in no mean way contribute to the Paris Peace Talks of 1968-1969. The Canadian accessibility to both belligerents, moreover, cannot be discounted.

Canadian attempts toward negotiation show her concern not

---

1 Raskin and Fall, *op.cit.*, p.470.
only for world peace but also for the future of the Canadian-American "partnership." Realizing that Canadian prosperity depends significantly on American prosperity and cooperation, she does not want to needlessly endanger the rapport within which relations are conducted. By choosing not to indiscriminately run counter to American policy, even though internal critics may advocate this, Canada offers what must be construed as genuine concern for that policy. It cannot be denied that the similar policies of Canada and the United States are conditioned in part by similar backgrounds and heritages. For Canada however, the success of Canadian-American relations also depends a great deal on her general agreement with American policy. Thus, while Canada did disavow certain aspects of American policy, this came only when such policy was thought to be on a collision course with world war. At that time, Canada subjugated the concern for Canadian-American rapport to the concern for Canadian security.

Importantly, this Canadian position has revealed the extent to which she has gone in sacrificing the marginal benefits which might have accrued from a more favorable stance vis-a-vis Washington. While such benefits are always a matter of degree, Canadian policies have indicated that she would not go to the brink of war to achieve them. Although she might have satisfied her internal critics by her pursuit of a more declaratory and sometimes anti-American foreign policy, the point is that Canadian interests and interpretations were
pursued, and that this meant a disavowal of certain American policies.

The method which Canada chose in this pursuit is also relevant. Canadian behaviour in the areas discussed exhibit a dependence on quiet diplomacy in most of the early stages of conflict. However, open diplomacy was used when Canadian positions became intractable. This utilization of open diplomacy in times of crisis served a two-fold purpose.

By publicly refusing to endorse all the implications of American policy, Canada placated adherents of an "independent" foreign policy. More importantly, however, Canada emphasized what appeared to be an open break with Washington. This signaled an end to the typical American attitude of taking Canada for granted.

In addition to the unique ease in Canadian-American relations since 1945, there has developed in Washington an attitude that on any given question, Canada would fully endorse United States policy. While this has been shown to be false, the attitude is significant for it is an example of the faith which Washington has in Ottawa decision-makers. Thus, when Canada does not completely conform to American policy there arises not so much criticism as dismay and shock.

The effect of Canadian disavowal lies more in the intangible need for psychological approval than it does in hard and fast

---

Canadian tactics and opinions on trade with Communist countries is an important exception.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
practical support. In a word, the question is asked, "If we cannot count on Canada, then who is left?"

Canadian prestige since 1945 has been garnered more by her diplomacy and inoffensiveness than by the exercise of her limited power. Her support, therefore, brings with it this aura of goodwill and acceptability. This is what is sought after by Washington rather than an overt display of force. The United States is rarely wanting in the resources to carry out a given policy, but lack of acceptability and justification among her allies may often times tone down the implications for such policy.

This is not to say that American policy in the areas discussed was ultimately determined by the Canadian reaction. Indeed, the domestic environment in the United States was often the crucial factor in American decisions. It must be remembered, however, that in the early stages of each area of study, Canadian endorsement, either overt or tacit, was present. While American policy would most probably have evolved in much the same manner without Canadian approval, it is not too much to suggest that Canadian backing gave the psychological sanction which at least gave impetus to that policy.

Since 1945, the reconciliation of Canadian independence with Canadian-American interdependence has been at the heart of interplay in Asia. For Canada, this reconciliation has always had a greater significance than for the United States,
since it was, in fact, a search for a modus vivendi between the national interest in its many forms and United States predominance. Ultimately, however, Canada relied upon her own interpretation of self-interest, American preponderance not withstanding.
APPENDIX I*

TRADE OF CANADA (EXCLUDING GOLD), BY CONTINENTS, 1938-42

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item And Continent</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMPORTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>119.3</td>
<td>114.0</td>
<td>161.2</td>
<td>219.4</td>
<td>161.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europe</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>424.8</td>
<td>496.9</td>
<td>744.2</td>
<td>1,004.5</td>
<td>1,304.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other North America</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS IMPORTS</td>
<td>677.5</td>
<td>751.1</td>
<td>1,082.0</td>
<td>1,448.8</td>
<td>1,644.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPORTS (DOMESTIC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>339.7</td>
<td>328.1</td>
<td>508.1</td>
<td>658.2</td>
<td>741.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europe</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>270.5</td>
<td>380.4</td>
<td>443.0</td>
<td>599.7</td>
<td>885.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other North America</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>202.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>110.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>125.4</td>
<td>254.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS, EXPORTS</td>
<td>837.6</td>
<td>924.9</td>
<td>1,179.0</td>
<td>1,621.0</td>
<td>2,363.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Canada Year Book 1967.

129

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
## Appendix I continued......

### Percentages of Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
## TRADE OF CANADA BY LEADING COUNTRIES, 1966, WITH COMPARABLE FIGURES FOR 1964 AND 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Item and Country</td>
<td>Domestic Exports</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>4,271,059</td>
<td>6,027,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1,199,779</td>
<td>1,22,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>330,234</td>
<td>393,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Republics</td>
<td>315,943</td>
<td>320,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>China, Communist Republic</td>
<td>136,263</td>
<td>184,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Belgium &amp; Luxembourg</td>
<td>100,535</td>
<td>117,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>145,812</td>
<td>117,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>62,236</td>
<td>114,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>64,042</td>
<td>117,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>67,582</td>
<td>107,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>79,433</td>
<td>84,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>64,075</td>
<td>75,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>69,166</td>
<td>74,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>60,930</td>
<td>61,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>65,151</td>
<td>62,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>33,714</td>
<td>41,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>26,889</td>
<td>39,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>62,653</td>
<td>37,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>21,235</td>
<td>36,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>29,922</td>
<td>36,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>10,749</td>
<td>36,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>28,942</td>
<td>33,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>28,502</td>
<td>31,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>20,031</td>
<td>25,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>21,252</td>
<td>25,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>17,791</td>
<td>23,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>22,985</td>
<td>21,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>15,406</td>
<td>19,560</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTALS, 30 LEADING COUNTRIES:**

| | 7,685,255 | 8,132,276 | 9,690,529 |

**GRAND TOTALS, DOMESTIC EXPORTS:**

| | 8,094,219 | 8,525,078 | 10,070,627 |

*Source: Canada Yearbook 1967.*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX Ib*

CANADIAN TRADE WITH CHINA AND JAPAN, 1870-1938

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>China Exports to</th>
<th>China Imports from</th>
<th>Japan Exports to</th>
<th>Japan Imports from</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>$36,782</td>
<td>$432,919</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>36,782</td>
<td>301,970</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>10,619</td>
<td>350,939</td>
<td>$26,891</td>
<td>$542,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>5,972</td>
<td>1,622,168</td>
<td>21,780</td>
<td>876,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>34,926</td>
<td>861,047</td>
<td>26,825</td>
<td>1,258,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>367,853</td>
<td>942,493</td>
<td>10,307</td>
<td>1,572,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>254,814</td>
<td>629,729</td>
<td>110,735</td>
<td>1,751,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>980,876</td>
<td>541,837</td>
<td>508,609</td>
<td>1,928,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,249,189</td>
<td>799,708</td>
<td>659,118</td>
<td>1,673,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>294,251</td>
<td>1,042,383</td>
<td>963,631</td>
<td>2,783,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>6,665,805</td>
<td>1,205,229</td>
<td>7,732,514</td>
<td>13,637,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>7,638,187</td>
<td>2,521,874</td>
<td>22,011,088</td>
<td>7,005,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>16,527,959</td>
<td>2,977,022</td>
<td>30,475,581</td>
<td>12,537,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>4,461,485</td>
<td>2,345,570</td>
<td>16,935,859</td>
<td>4,424,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>4,555,726</td>
<td>3,717,181</td>
<td>14,844,137</td>
<td>3,466,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>4,899,488</td>
<td>4,175,235</td>
<td>21,629,690</td>
<td>4,796,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>3,354,228</td>
<td>3,341,243</td>
<td>26,639,885</td>
<td>5,782,416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LARGEST SINGLE YEAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports to</th>
<th>Imports from</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>24,473,446</td>
<td>5,041,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td></td>
<td>42,099,968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SINO CANADIAN TRADE 1961-1966

(MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Canadian Exchange To China</th>
<th>% Of Canadian World Exchange</th>
<th>Communist Chinese Exports To Canada</th>
<th>Canadian Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>$123</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>$3</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>112</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### COMMUNIST CHINA'S GRAIN PURCHASES

(MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Grain Purchases</th>
<th>Wheat Imports From Canada</th>
<th>Chinese Purchases From Canada as of Canadian Total Wheat Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year Ending March 31</th>
<th>1951 to 1960</th>
<th>1961 to 1965</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>India</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>166,523.0</td>
<td>127,404.1</td>
<td>36,976.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>33,000.0</td>
<td>10,000.0</td>
<td>20,000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>199,523.0</td>
<td>137,404.1</td>
<td>56,976.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>114,802.7</td>
<td>70,355.2</td>
<td>11,999.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,000.0</td>
<td>12,000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>114,802.7</td>
<td>77,355.2</td>
<td>23,999.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ceylon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>21,945.0</td>
<td>9,701.7</td>
<td>3,494.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>1,976.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,921.2</td>
<td>9,701.7</td>
<td>4,494.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Malaysia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>2,442.9</td>
<td>8,976.9</td>
<td>2,000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,442.9</td>
<td>8,976.9</td>
<td>2,000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thailand</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>132.0</td>
<td>592.4</td>
<td>721.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>132.0</td>
<td>592.4</td>
<td>721.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Vietnam</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>753.4</td>
<td>1,810.5</td>
<td>1,250.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>753.4</td>
<td>1,810.5</td>
<td>1,250.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cambodia and Laos</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>398.2</td>
<td>732.9</td>
<td>299.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>398.2</td>
<td>732.9</td>
<td>299.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other South East Asian Countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>6,602.7</td>
<td>8,033.1</td>
<td>2,856.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,602.7</td>
<td>8,033.1</td>
<td>2,856.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unallocated Regional Reserve</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Allocations</strong></td>
<td>348,676.3</td>
<td>244,256.8</td>
<td>92,598.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX III Continued......

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16,786.7</td>
<td>132,915.7</td>
<td>4,919.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98,455.1</td>
<td>52,018.3</td>
<td>481,376.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,000.0</td>
<td>38,000.0</td>
<td>121,000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56,976.4</td>
<td>90,018.3</td>
<td>602,376.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,400.0</td>
<td>10,500.0</td>
<td>223,057.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,000.0</td>
<td>18,000.0</td>
<td>49,000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27,400.0</td>
<td>28,500.0</td>
<td>272,057.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,505.0</td>
<td>2,500.0</td>
<td>40,146.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,000.0</td>
<td>2,000.0</td>
<td>6,976.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,505.0</td>
<td>4,500.0</td>
<td>47,122.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,700.00</td>
<td>1,500.00</td>
<td>16,619.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,900.00</td>
<td>1,500.00</td>
<td>2,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,700.00</td>
<td>3,000.00</td>
<td>19,119.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>632.0</td>
<td>800.0</td>
<td>2,877.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>1,000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,132.0</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
<td>3,877.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,000.0</td>
<td>2,604.6</td>
<td>8,418.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,000.0</td>
<td>2,604.6</td>
<td>8,418.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>503.9</td>
<td>2,434.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>503.9</td>
<td>2,434.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,594.6</td>
<td>1,986.9</td>
<td>21,373.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>1,000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,094.6</td>
<td>2,488.9</td>
<td>22,373.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX IV*

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 1968


UNITED STATES ASSETS AND INVESTMENTS ABROAD

($MILLIONS US)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>12,275</td>
<td>16,818</td>
<td>31,539</td>
<td>43,323</td>
<td>67,964</td>
<td>99,117</td>
<td>106,174</td>
<td>111,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Asia)</td>
<td>2,291</td>
<td>3,112</td>
<td>3,569</td>
<td>3,891</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX IVb

MAJOR U.S. GOVERNMENT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

($MILLION US) 1945-1967

Far East (Total) 16,490

Far East Specific

Korea 4,320

China 2,188

Vietnam 3,229

APPENDIX IVc

DEVELOPMENT LOANS (US GOVERNMENT)

($MILLION US) 1958-1967

East Asia and Vietnam (Total) 585,366

East Asia and Vietnam Specific

China 154,397

Korea 291,189

Vietnam 37,316
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government Documents


Books


Reford, Robert W. Canada and Three Crises. Lindsay: John Deyell Ltd., 1968.


Articles


Whiting, A. "How We Almost Went to War with China", Look Magazine, April 29, 1969.
VITA AUCTORIS


Education:
1951-1959 Received elementary education at Sacred Heart Grammar School, at Rochester.
1963-1967 Registered as an undergraduate in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the University of Windsor 1963. Received Bachelor of Arts May 1967.

Other Activities:
1967-1968 Granted a graduate assistantship in the Department of Political Science, University of Windsor.
1968-1969 Granted a teaching assistantship in the Department of Political Science, University of Windsor.