An analytical model of the political decision making process in communist East Europe.

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AN ANALYTICAL MODEL
OF THE POLITICAL DECISION MAKING PROCESS
IN COMMUNIST EAST EUROPE

Submitted to the department of Political Science of the University of Windsor in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

In essence, I have attempted a two-fold objective in this paper: the first, to contribute something concrete toward the establishment of a more exact and meaningful "science" of politics, and in the second instance, to provide a clearer understanding of the actual decision making process in contemporary communist East European society.

With regard to the former goal, I have devised a "model" which I feel integrates in a fruitful and novel way innovative aspects of social sciences which are relevant to the phenomena studied. The model adopts as its theoretical unit of study the national "system" level of decision making and is thus based upon the premises and logics of "structural-functional" analysis. In addition, the model employs the decision making unit or "variable" as the focus of empirical investigation, substantiated by the decision theory of the "economic rationale". The former is intended to describe and explain the "what", the "how" and the "when" of certain political decision behaviour in communist East Europe, while the latter is particularly useful in deriving the "why".

In conjunction with these elements of theoretical analysis, I have proposed, as the most realistic and productive source of raw data, socio-political empirical
behaviour. The systemized assimilation, organization and interpretation of such behaviour, together with its explanation in terms of the theoretical units of analysis, best summarizes that general social science approach which currently travels under the name of "behaviouralism". It is my hope and expectation that this particular integration of theory and fact will lead to a political "science" which is not only useful in observation, description and explanation of adverse social phenomena, but also in their prediction, prevention and control.

With respect to my second objective, i.e. the clear understanding of the communist decision making process at the national level, I feel that the model not only contributes to one's idea of what is actually "going on" in communist societies, but more fundamentally, the "how" and the "why" of a great deal of their behaviour. Of particular significance is the emphasis on the interdisciplinary relationships between significant "variables" of political behaviour which form part of the political structure "per se" and those variables which inhabit the environment within which the political structure must function. Although time and space prevented a special treatment of the more specifically sociological factors, this inter-relationship remains a theme throughout.

Therefore the model will focus more precisely on the political aspects of decision making while at the same
time attempt to discover the interactions between the political and non-political features which account for the differences between the polarities of the "orthodox" and "liberal" communist orientations, between the "true People's Republic" and the "reactionary state", and between the stable and "safe" socialist society and a dangerous form of "crisis-provoking" communism.
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And a very special thanks is owing, in quite an unusual way, to Shelley.

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INTRODUCTION

During the night of August 20 - 21, 1968, Soviet military forces, together with units of other Warsaw Pact allies, invaded Czechoslovakia. Such an event broke nearly ten years of relative calm in socialist East Europe in a fashion which raised many questions concerning modern, industrialized, post-war communism.

On the superficial level, one may ask "What was the 'real' purpose of the invasion?" "What precisely did the Soviet Union (nominally the Warsaw Pact Alliance) expect or even hope to gain by such an uncivilized act?" "What exactly was Czechoslovakia's 'crime' which warranted such an imposition by military force?" Quite clearly, these questions barely scratch the surface of the more basic and substantive matters which must be investigated to render any answers to them truly meaningful.

One must further examine the underlying socio-economic and political features which have given rise to such a crisis. What are the environmental factors and relationships which characterize a "stable" and "peaceful" communism in today's industrial world? What are the socio-political bases for the current "orthodox" communist practices on the one hand, and the distinct "liberal" orientation on the other? What are the structural relationships between the political and the non-political aspects of East European communism?
which account for one nation's being "in tune" and "harmonizing" with the "socialist realities" and receiving the rewards therefrom, while another nation is simultaneously labelled as "reactionary", "revisionist", infested with "enemies of the people", and subjected to the penalties of non-conformity?

Satisfactory answers to these more fundamental questions are hard to come by. The analytical equipment of the contemporary social scientist is barely sufficiently sophisticated to precisely pinpoint the problems and give some general direction for their solution, let alone provide for a set of "pat" answers which are at once realistic and workable. If this were the case, social phenomena would be adequately predictable and effectively controllable such that serious conflicts could be avoided in the first instance.

While such a "science" is the more ultimate goal of many social and political theorists, I must state at the outset that my efforts here have not been directed toward such an ambitious objective. Although I do claim that there are some predictive and control merits to the theoretical construct which I present, my main purpose has been analytical and explanatory in nature. I believe that the "model" which I have created portrays quite accurately the political decision making process in the communist societies in question, both in its national and
international applications. Such a theory also throws considerable light upon the more fundamental interactions and relationships between political and social factors which have remained in the shadows for some time.

It is also my intention that the model presented will provide the reader with a theoretical and structural framework by which he can more easily and accurately locate, observe, describe and explain the more fundamental questions having roots in the political and social environment of contemporary communist societies. In effect, I hope that this theory, and those which may grow out of it, will prepare much of the theoretical and methodological groundwork prerequisite to a more complete and ideal science of politics, characterized not only by the capacities of description, explanation and measurement of adverse social phenomena, but also of their prediction, prevention and control.
THE THEORY OF COMPARATIVE FUNCTIONALISM

A. THE BACKGROUND OF THE COMPARATIVE MODEL

The synthesis of comparative politics and model theory is a relatively new innovation in political science. Comparative government, as an approach to understanding different types of political decision making, has existed since the time of the Greek city state, especially with the simplistic tri-partite Aristotelian classification of political systems. The comparative effort in politics however, has since experienced considerable academic "ebb and flow" over the centuries and even the "high water marks" have been substantially lacking in both content and form to adequately explain the political phenomena for which they were devised.

Since World War II however, with the complexities of political life evolving therefrom, comparative politics has once again risen to the challenge. Perhaps the most significant post-war development in this regard has been the emersion of the new "third world" states in world politics. Of paramount importance have been, firstly, the artificial political divisions in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia; secondly, the many pre-war colonial territories gaining independence; and thirdly the "liberation" of several areas, notably China, and the remoulding of others in a communist form, such as the communist regimes of Eastern Europe.
A second post-war phenomenon acting as a catalyst in
the resurgence of comparative politics has been the trend
towards a much larger governmental participation in the
affairs of most societies, thus in a sense producing at
least a qualitatively new type of politics not unaccompanied
by its own peculiar problems and phenomena.

The third post-war development signalling the new
comparative movement has been the re-establishment of
"internationalism", especially by the major beneficiaries
of the war, the United States and the U.S.S.R. For political
scientists this has produced whole new areas of study such
as "bloc politics", international alignments and realign­
ments, new forms of diplomacy, and a host of others.
Needless to say, these political developments were accompanied
by and intermingled with the parallel integrational trends
in other disciplines, especially the physical and military
sciences, communications and economics.

The overall result has been a truly earth shaking
"web" of developments, both within and between states,
which has caused staggering new formations and reformations
of political orders. The existing post-war "science" of
political life became increasingly inadequate both as a
description and explanation of the new political forms
and activity, and especially as a methodology for encountering
and treating the new political phenomena. Consequently, the
political scientists responded generously with new theories,
new descriptions, new approaches, and new methodologies as arms to analytically explain and control the "new politics". The political scientists' post-war arsenal (which is still accumulating) is best characterized by the new reinforcements with which he has allied himself -- the sociologist, the psychologist, and the economist being of special importance. With them they brought theories, constructs, definitions, verbiage and methodologies, both new and old, giving the new political science a distinctively eclectic and multi-variate trend which shows no sign of fatigue.

Although my main task here is to establish the theoretical basis and rationale for the model which I have adopted, it will be useful to briefly scan the major implications of the analytical and procedural equipment which has been at the disposal of the post-war political scientist. Although this survey is not meant to be by any means exhaustive, I feel it is broad enough to blanket the field generally and perhaps provide some contextual meaning to the approach which I have chosen and help the reader to more clearly identify the model relative to the alternative choices which were available to me.

James C. Charlesworth, in the introduction to his recent anthology provides what is perhaps the most

extensive nominal list of the "schools" of thought, both historical and contemporary. In addition, he categorizes their approaches as either a "methodology" or as an "objective", the significance of which I will examine shortly. All in all, Charlesworth runs the whole gamut of orientations, briefly listing no fewer than thirty-six schools (or "sub"-schools) of thought, from the allegorical, case method, and authoritative revelational approaches of Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas (respectively), to the misodemic, normativist and universalist orientations of the more contemporary analysts.

What is particularly important to note here however, is that at least sixteen of the twenty-six "methodologies" most frequently inhabit the domain of the "behavioural approach" in one form or another (e.g. the approaches of decision-making, the mathematical and metrical, the empirical, the structural-functional, the systems, the eclectic, the interdisciplinary, the residence-of-power, etc., etc.,).

Consequently, the redundance and overlapping of approaches and schools in Charlesworth's listing fails to provide one with a meaningful systematization by which one can pin-point his own approach without running in circles. In my mind, in describing any "methodology" or "approach", I feel it is best to distinguish between the unit (or units) of analysis which comprise(s) the theoretical substance of the approach on one hand, and the actual treatment of raw material (data, norms, or whatever) on
the other. Quite clearly, both are "sine-qua-nons" of the epistemological base of a complete approach, and are in fact more rewarding than Charlesworth's categorization. A very enlightening classification based upon this premise is provided by Don Martindale. Although Martindale is primarily concerned with "functionalism", he develops it in a rigorous, contextual setting, relating it to the other major contemporary schools of thought.

With regard to the unit(s) of analysis of an approach, Martindale distinguishes between those that are "holistic" (i.e. concerned with the totality of the environment within which the phenomenon occurs, such as "system") and those that are "elementary" (i.e. concerned with the smallest possible basic element of the phenomenon, such as the "individual"). Quite clearly, there may be a plurality of units of analysis as I will demonstrate later. In fact one of Heinz Eulau's most enlightening contributions has been the finding that there must necessarily be at least two units of analysis: a theoretical unit (such as a "group", a "nation", or a "system") which provides the scope and focal point of the enquiry and which comprises the conceptual scheme or "model", and an "empirical" unit of analysis (such as the individual man) which provides the focal point of observation and raw material gathering. In carrying

3. Heinz Eulau, in Charlesworth, op. cit., p. 36.
this analysis one step further, it is quite clear to see that the former represents what is termed "macro-theory" and the latter, "micro-theory".

Martindale's framework also distinguishes between a "positivist" treatment of data (following the methods of the natural and physical sciences) and an "anti-positivistic" systematization. The most significant forms of "anti-positivistic" data treatment have been the "normativist", the "formalist", the "existentialist" and the "sociological" orientations.

Martindale ultimately arrives at a categorical framework which comprises a systematic combination of these concepts. The "positivistic elementarism" would be best represented by the "behaviourists" (not to be confused with "behaviouralist"), a school of thought conceived by psychologist J. B. Watson and carried on presently by such notables as B. M. MacIver, F. S. Chapin, and Irving Goffman. The combination of a "positivistic" treatment of data and a "holistic" theory analysis however, is representative of such approaches as Marxism (as perpetuated by Ralph Dahrendorf) and "Positive Organicism" (G. B. Vold). "Anti-positivistic holism", indicating a concern for a non-rigorous and sociological explanation of larger wholes, is presently dominated by the "sociological functionalists" such as Talcott Parsons, Robert K. Merton, and the work of C. Wright Mills. It is this group which is most often considered to
be the leaders of the "behavioural" trend (defined below). The fourth combination, that of "anti-positivistic elementarism", is currently represented by such schools as the "Neo-Kantian Formalists" (Werner Stark), the "Phenomenological Sociologists" (G. Gorvitch) and the "Existential Sociologists" (Karl Jaspers). Needless to say, one could also further subdivide these schools by introducing the terms "micro" and "macro", e.g. Parsons and Merton could be considered as "macro-functionalists", and Kurt Lewin and the Gestaltist group as "micro-functionalists".

Robert Brown, although not as systematically or in nearly the same depth, distinguishes between seven "theoretical devices" (combining both holistic and elementary units of analysis) in juxtaposition with varying forms of data treatment.4 This type of division with regard to approaches of study of political phenomena seems to be the most widely recognized as well as the most comparatively relevant.

I would now like to narrow down the generalizations concerning different orientations to political study by focusing more directly upon the approach labelled as "behaviouralism", which encompasses the model which I have employed in this paper. Following the framework above,

the "behavioural" approach can be subdivided into theory (units of analysis) and data treatment. What is most unique among the behaviouralists is their common commitment to a "scientific" treatment of data regardless of the theoretical conceptual scheme employed. With regard to the latter however, there are as many "behaviouralisms" as there are different combinations of theoretical units of analysis. This necessarily gives rise to perpetual subdivisions within the behavioural school corresponding to the holistic-elementarist, positivistic - anti-positivistic, and macro-micro classifications described above.

The theory of "behaviouralism" is rooted in the prospects of finding a science of general social behaviour which would be modeled after the methodological (data treatment) assumptions of the natural sciences. However, apart from their common dedication to scientific treatment, behaviouralists have split on the search for the requisite, universal, "fundamental units" or common variables of theoretical analysis relating to human behaviour which would allow them to make adequate generalizations or "laws" regarding social activity. It is in the latter respect that behaviouralists have appeared disunited and confusing to the critical observer. "Behaviouralism" can thus be restated at this point as the scientific method (of data treatment) combined with a shift in emphasis to the substantive, qualitative aspects of theory construction (i.e. units of analysis). It is clear that the more specific, methodological, and scientific aspects of the current behaviouralist movement
began in the 1920's; however, the uniquely "behavioural" qualities of the movement, the theoretical aspects, did not begin to catch up to the quantitative methodology until the mid-1950's, thus accounting for the currently erroneous preoccupation of some viewers with the rigorous "behaviouristic" and quantitative aspects of behaviouralism.

Until the 1940's, Harold Lasswell carried the burden of integrating behavioural theory with scientific empirical research. Now the theoretical applications are many and varied. David Easton is no doubt the leader of macro-analysis in the behavioural field, specializing in the society-wide integrative "system" as the theoretical unit of analysis. David Apter is most well known for his "structural" orientation of behaviouralism. Karl W. Deutsch has focused upon communication relationships as the theoretical glue of political behaviour, while Harry Eckstein has adopted "authority patterns" as the key conceptual framework. D. B. Truman's excellent treatment of the "group" as the prime theoretical unit of analysis

5. Easton's work in this field is covered by too many publications to note here; the bibliography lists what are perhaps the most representative of the selection.

6. see D. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, (Chicago, 1965), especially p. 16 ff., although I do not agree completely with his distinction between the "structural approach" and "behavioural approach".


8. The best and most concise treatment of this concept is given in Eckstein's Division and Cohesion in Democracy, especially chapters I, II, X and XII.
has been particularly influential on sociological interpretations. Max Weber and Talcott Parsons have conducted profound behavioural studies employing the concept of "action" as the theoretical cement of the epistemology of political behaviour. No less ambitious have been the multi-focal unit attempts of Gabriel A. Almond, Sydney Verba, Lucian Pye, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and James S. Coleman to weave together the theoretical constructs of "system", "culture", "function", "structure", and "action" into a conceptual scheme for comparative analysis and development research. Perhaps the most widely used and accredited theoretical and empirical unit of analysis today however is that of the decision making structure. This behavioural focal point is particularly prevalent in community studies (James Coleman), international relations and game theories (Morton Kaplan), and voting behaviour (Paul Lazarsfeld).

Anthony Downs presents a decision making theory of analysis which I feel is particularly applicable to the East European communist environment and hence have employed


10. For the most concise and clear account of Parsons' "action theory", see Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1966), especially pp. 5 - 9 and pp. 28 - 35.

11. There are several good works by these theorists concerning the multi-unit approach; the more pertinent ones are listed in the bibliography.

it as the theoretical rationale for the model presented in this paper. It is a comprehensive, socio-psychological theory which focuses upon the concept of the "economic rationality" of political actors, but yet is sufficiently flexible to allow for its own integration with the structural aspects of society as presented by the functional model. In section "C" I will present the reasoning background for this choice. In the intervening section, I will proceed to clarify and concretize the prerequisite concepts of "behaviouralism", "functionalism" and "model" as I will be employing them in this paper.

B. THE FORM OF THE MODEL

Due to the abundance of constructs and theories available the scientist has acquired the additional problem of choice. A wrong choice of "tools" may not only result in the lack of any positive contribution to the science of politics but may even result in the "loss of ground" by adding new problems, or at least confusion, to the area. Conversely, a proper choice, one which is both quantitatively and qualitatively consistent with the particular dilemma which the scientist is to encounter, can be just as rewarding as the improper choice is penalizing.

The subject of study in this text is the communist governments of East Europe. The comparative approach has been chosen for several reasons. Quantitatively, the
plurality of the Eastern European governments alone justifies some need for comparison. Although there is sufficient political commonness between them to speak of all of them generally as having certain attributes, tendencies, and so forth, they are in another respect like fingerprints; although superficially the same at a glance, there are many significant differences which can be detected and put into focus only by the comparative microscope. Qualitatively the difference between the political processes of these governments can best be perceived horizontally, comparing basically similar "layers" of political activity existent within each country's political process. A "vertical" comparison alone, compartmentalized country by country, inevitably fails to be sufficiently analytically significant, considering the intricacies of the modern phenomena.

My aim will be to show in the clearest possible terms, the contemporary "de facto" workings of the overall political systems of the communist East European communities. Our starting point will be with the "theory of the general model", indicative and explanatory of the basic system similarities between these countries. To a certain degree, it is intended to explain not only the basics of the systems of government in communist East Europe, but of any contemporary communist regime. As will be outlined in the discussion of the "general model", there will also be some predictive value of the theory, in addition to the descriptive and explanatory benefits. This will perhaps be of considerable
merit as a basis of determining actual political decisions to be taken by these countries in the future. More will be said on this point in the concluding chapters. The selection of the horizontal-comparative approach however, only gives one some direction, some general alignment between the starting point and the target. There are many possible roads by which one may venture in that direction and more importantly perhaps, there are several types of "vehicles" by which one may travel. Thus there are equally crucial procedural choices available and decisions to be made, all of which will have a direct effect upon the validity and usefullness of the analysis to be rendered and conclusions to be drawn. In other words, our investigation will necessarily be circumscribed by the choice of the new (and old) techniques, theories, approaches, and methodologies applied.

The general approach being comparative, the particular "path" or precise methodology will be decidedly "behavioural". In addition, the "vehicle" chosen will be that of the "functional model". Altogether therefore, I will present the analytical content in the form of the"general systems theory" with a "behavioural" treatment of evidence.

As I have indicated in the previous section, the behavioural movement is gaining unprecedented currency in every social science field. Due to the exemplary post-war developments mentioned earlier, the activity of politics
around the world has undergone phenomenal change while the academic equipment of the political scientists has remained relatively static. Consequently, the post-war years have witnessed some widening of the gap between the rapidly changing dynamics of political behaviour on every continent and the sluggish response of the orthodox political means to accommodate it.

The conventional political science has consisted essentially of the following characteristics:

1) a legalistic orientation; a study of formal, legal structures, offices, and institutions;
2) a stress upon what "ought to be" rather than what "is";
3) a normative approach, professing primarily (moral) value judgements;
4) a pre-occupation with "offices" and "authorities"; generally, a "compartimentalized" approach;
5) a stress upon "group" activity, eg. cabinet, legislature, etc., rather than individual activity.

The post-war development in political science, culminating in the contemporary approach, contrasts the pre-war "science" with the following corresponding ideas:

1) an emphasis upon informal political structures (such as pressure groups, religious associations, etc.) in addition to the formal political structure;
2) a "de facto" orientation; what "is" the actual political activity and how does the activity manifest itself with relation to how it institutionally "should";
3) it attempts to be dispassionate, non-normative; no idealistic solutions;
4) it tends to become more multi-dimensional, adding to the political dimension such disciplines as economics, sociology, psychology, and anthropology;
5) it focuses upon individual activity (eg. of leaders), as well as groups, whether formal or informal.

In addition to these basic orientations, David Easton most cogently provides the contemporary scientist with the more concrete assumptions and objectives of the behavioural movement. "Behaviouralism" assumes that political behaviour provides the empirical scientist with regularities sufficiently generalizeable to have meaningful explanatory and predictive results. Therefore verification of hypotheses by relevant human behaviour is a requisite goal. Data techniques, regardless of specific choice, must be structured congruently with the problem, and not simply a haphazard treatment of raw data. Consequently, quantification has no value "per se", but only where it is instrumental as an aid to understanding and prediction. Ethical evaluations and moral judgements should be clearly separated from

academic and empirical value considerations. Understanding and explanations of the political phenomena considered must precede all applications of theory toward solutions to "de facto" social problems. Theory and scientific research must be systematically combined, and not randomly jumbled, to be behaviourally relevant. Finally, there must be no "a priori" restrictions or impediments to interdisciplinary integration; social science, whether political or other, deals with the whole human situation and cannot ignore the relevant findings of other disciplines.

The above syndrome of tendencies, assumptions and objectives best summarizes the concept of "behaviouralism" which I intend to employ. The basic idea is that behaviouralism, both as a philosophic movement and a practical methodology, is more than just what many of its critics pretend, viz. a polite name to disguise the act of reintroducing the blatant rigors of the quantitative, mathematical scientism through the back door. Although its form employs the scientific method (with the limitations mentioned above) the approach derives the essence of its "behaviouralness" from the theoretical search for stable units for understanding human behaviour, e.g. in its political aspects.

This then raises the question of the limitations of behaviouralism. There is such a vast amount of literature concerning the "pros" and "cons" of this approach that there
is neither adequate time nor real purpose to enter into this terrain here, which is quite another thesis. I shall therefore leave the detailed battle to such apologists as Arnold Brecht, Harold Lasswell and Heinz Eulau (for the affirmative) and Dwight Waldo and Leo Strauss (for the negative).

I do feel compelled however, in order to substantiate the model I have chosen, to provide a limited defence as well as make clear to the reader certain important caveats of behaviouralism. As I have previously demonstrated, there are necessarily two levels of analysis with which the behavioural scientist must contend: the theoretical, conceptual unit or scheme (e.g. the "system"), and the empirical unit, the source of raw data. The key to success for this approach is to master the need to link behaviourally relevant (political) theory with the theoretically relevant behavioural data. Where complex phenomena are involved, complete success is hard to come by. Quite clearly, ultimate success in this regard is a function of the progressive development of scientific techniques and the increasing skills of the behavioural investigators.

Due to initial failures, polemicists have further accused behaviouralists of being intellectually stubborn for their failure to revert to the traditional, historical, legal and normative approaches. It is true that the more conventional orientations seem to be here to stay, but it
is my belief that the evidence suggests that one should not remain solely with the analysis of the past, especially since these older concepts are becoming increasingly outdated by reality. If today's social "science" is ever to catch up with the complexities of modern phenomena, the only way in my mind is through fresh, realistic experimentation. While it is admitted that there is still substantial value in a limited application of conventional methods, such value will only decrease if the traditional approaches insist on remaining isolated from the necessary integration with the knowledge of other disciplines and the fruits of the experimentation in a changed society.

Inevitably there arises the normativist concern for the "value limitation" of the behavioural method. And it is a viable argument in the sense that the behavioural persuasion does not and cannot deal, scientifically or otherwise, with ultimate, moral, primary value considerations. The distinction, quite clearly, rests between moral judgements on the one hand, and academic or cognitive ones on the other. Moral considerations such as "should variable 'x' have greater power over the political system?", or "why is democracy better than dictatorship?", or "should man be able to control political phenomena?" all have no place in behavioural science; these matters are for philosophers, not scientists. Behaviouralism, because it does employ the scientific methodology, can only concern itself with the secondary, "if...then" judgements. If the behaviouralist
can control the "if" situation (i.e. create the circumstances necessary to make the "if" come true), then he can scientifically predict the resulting "then". The fact that the benefits of behavioural science do not include moral and ethical judgements does not in my mind depreciate the value of the approach, but rather only proves that behaviouralists are neither divine philosophers nor social magicians.

A more serious limitation of behaviouralism rests with the need for the integration of both "micro" and "macro" levels of analysis. As noted earlier, behavioural scientists tend to specialize in one or the other. Certainly the behavioural methodology would be seriously suspect if the micro-theories of Paul Lazarsfeld (decision-making and voting studies), D. B. Truman ("group" analysis) and Morton Kaplan (decision-making and game theory) conflicted with or at least could not be reconciled with the macro-behavioural products of David Easton, Gabriel Almond and Harry Eckstein (general systems theory). Obviously, for all political phenomena to be favourably susceptible to the behavioural approach, there must be reasonable and satisfactory relationships linking "micro" and "macro" analysis. The behavioural scientist must be able to establish a coherent bridging network between the individual, the group, the nation and the system.

Quite clearly, this problem has not yet been solved;
there has not yet been enough sophisticated research within any one of these theoretical-unit fields, let alone between them all. However, advances are clearly being made as more innovative hypotheses and integrations are tested, and the trend indicates that, notwithstanding a high casualty rate, the century will witness the uncontested superiority of the behavioural methods of social investigation.

Yet I am convinced that this is the best methodology currently available for the purposes of my study here, namely, to explain as simply and realistically as possible the "de facto" political decision making activity with regard to the East European communist governments. Considering the political phenomena to be studied here, the approach to any treatment of them as they exist in a communist state must almost of necessity be behavioural. A non-behavioural (e.g. institutional) study of communist society would obviously lead the investigator astray — analysing power institutions where no power exists, passing out liberties to individuals and groups which do not in fact have them, and occupying himself with legal frameworks which are but facades, masking the realities of power. There is too large a gap between the "legalities" and the "actualities" in the communist state to employ any method but a behavioural one. The non-behavioural methods would at least in part maintain the legal facade.
What is required for a "de facto" study of the communist political processes is, quite clearly, a "de facto" methodology, and the behavioural approach is the best weapon of attack in the arsenal of the contemporary political scientist.

It should be noted however, that the behavioural approach, as I perceive it to be and also as I employ it here, is not, nor should not be exclusive of the conventional tools and methods of analysing political science but rather inclusive of them, selecting the best aspects from each, either singly or in combination, as the analysis warrants. The acceptance of the behavioural methodology does not imply an outright rejection of conventional methods, but rather only that the more orthodox procedures are inadequate in themselves and require supplementation by a more realistically productive technology of analysis.

Yet the "behavioural methodology" is just what it says--a methodology -- a means of treating data. As noted previously, this alone cannot satisfy the purpose since this would only produce a rather awkward accumulation of information. The data say nothing by themselves and there is certainly no magic in the method of their collection. The factual information must be accounted for meaningfully by some theoretical construct, otherwise there is no
particular significance attached to the data, they just "hang in the air". There can be no inductive generalization made, no explanation given, nor any logical deductive reasoning promulgated by the data, until they have been given substantial weight and analytical value by some theoretical construct. But once the theoretical element is added, such possibilities will then exist and the validity and usefulness of the theoretical structure will be determined on its merits by further testing, correcting and predicting.

Of the many theoretical approaches available to the contemporary political scientist, the one which I have chosen to accomplish the above tasks in marriage with the behavioural approach is that of "functionalism". "Functionalism" (alias "structural functional analysis", "systems analysis", "general systems theory") has its origins primarily in sociology and anthropology, being associated with such names as Emile Durkheim, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw Malinowski. It has more recently been adopted by other social sciences, most notably psychology and political science.

Of the many "functionalists" practicing within the political domain, Don Martindale provides what is perhaps the most concise yet coherent work on the theory of "functionalism".14 Technically, he distinguishes between

three types of functionalism in the social sciences. Of least significance is "eclectic" functionalism which finds in the term simply another and equally relevant dimension to add to all of the others (power, authority, etc.), the addition of which brings the science a little closer to reality; the nature of "function" in this regard is understood to mean simply "purpose" or "objective". Secondly, there exists an "empirical functionalism" which, although still regarding function as "purpose", considers this dimension to be substantially more important than, and central to, all other units of analysis. Thirdly, there is the prevailing concept of "structural functionalism" which is the sense in which I employ it here. "Structural functionalism" places emphasis on the whole system as the theoretical unit of analysis and thus becomes equated with "general systems theory". It is holistic in scope and organicist and non-positivistic in its application based upon the premise of establishing a whole new scientific theory of politics. Although I do not claim this magnitude of success with its application in this paper, I believe that such an achievement is well within the realm of probability in future decades.

The best definition of (structural) functionalism (or systems theory) is that provided by Morton Kaplan

"...the study of a set of interrelated variables, as distinguished from the environment of the set, and of the ways in which the set is maintained under the impact of environmental disturbances..."
emphasizing ...the articulation of the system of its components and the behaviours by means of which it maintains itself over time." 15

This concept of functionalism clearly demonstrates the application of specific environmental and multi-disciplinary integration together with certain emphasis on sociological theory.

Since the subject of my own theoretical analysis here will be the scope of the national political system within each of the countries of communist East Europe (and among all of them generally), the notion of "system" as given by this definitional treatment is essential. The inclusion of the idea of interdependence between variables is also requisite to the analysis since I feel that the behavioural data supports this concept. Yet I wish to make it clear at the outset that although I intend to substantiate certain basic linkage between variables in the system through their behavioural interdependence, this does not mean that every variable within the system must necessarily exist in a cause - and - effect relationship with every other variable. I see no reason why this claim is especially pertinent to the analysis or even should be made.

As a form of general behavioural theory, (structural) functionalism encounters much of the same critical difficulty

discussed above. The major problems with its application rest with the functionalist's apparent failure to specify and elaborate the precise nature of the interdependence of particular variables as well as being unable to adequately relate data on the empirical level to their corresponding referents on the theoretical or "system" level. Quite clearly, as before, these difficulties will only disappear in proportion to the advancement of behavioural technology and skills.

More seriously perhaps is the shortcoming that is difficult to determine precisely when a system is being satisfactorily (or unsatisfactorily) maintained. What are the objective, empirical criteria? Needless to say, the first part of this problem smacks of moral considerations and therefore is excluded from the behaviouralist scope. Once this normative difficulty is solved however, the empirical criteria must be found, otherwise the usefulness of the theory and the control over the system will be lost. I can only say that if such indicators are not obvious (and I think they are in the model which I present), then further behavioural experimentation will be necessary, perhaps employing theoretical units other than "system".

In contrast to these limitations which I feel are in no event insuperable, the rewards of the functional approach are substantially more apparent. In studying the phenomena of such a complex contemporary society, the systems
approach sensitizes our analysis to the relevant and intricate interrelationships and dynamics of modern social behaviour. It draws attention to the whole social system as a setting for political phenomena and thereby forces consideration of the products and techniques of other disciplines, in addition to the new theoretical dimensions of "function", "activity", and "purposes" (whether of the "latent" or "manifest" variety as theorized by R. K. Merton).  

More significantly still, the structural functional construct together with the behavioural methodology, has provided modern theorists with a fresh and infinitely flexible framework for political analysis which could conceivably account for and systematize every problematically important political behaviour from that of the smallest variable to that of the entire system. At the moment however, it is empirically impossible to test most of the phenomena by such a holistic and non-positivistic approach. This is the type of difficulty that both Parsons and Almond have encountered; they have attempted, by adopting an over-ambitious set of conceptual units, to theorize about too many phenomena at too many different levels of analysis simultaneously, without having an equally sophisticated reservoir of techniques and skills at their disposal with which to treat and meaningfully integrate all of the data to verify their hypotheses. Nevertheless, the progressive

16. see Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, (Rev. edit.), (Glencoe, 1977), especially pp. 60 - 82.
trend with regard to the development of the requisite "tools" indicates that even more complete and testable analyses are imminent.

Having now established the basis for the application of both "behaviouralism" and "functionalism", something must be said of the concept of "model".

The synthesis which I have created by the integration of "behaviouralism" and "functionalism" is what may be termed the "behavioural systems model". The term "model" is in essence a "theory" or an "hypothesis". But it is not just a theory; it is a theoretical construct -- an aggregation formulation, and integration of a set of ideas in such a manner that together, in that particular pattern or construct, they best explain what is intended to be investigated. Therefore it is not simply a collection of ideas; a model derives its "modelness" from the pattern or purposeful integration and interrelationship of those ideas.

The more explicit purpose for the behavioural model is best stated by Aviery Leiserson:17

"For the normative theorist, it is essential to establish satisfactory purposive grounds on which sufficient unity exists for the system to be worth maintaining; for the empirical theorist, it is necessary to explicate a working model of political mechanics or dynamics, whereby conflicting factual...

requirements of constitutional belief and social structure are reconciled in a logically adequate explanation of how... the political system... survives as an effective political enterprise."

Thus the "model" is essentially an explanatory device which entails a patterning of variables and their more or less logical relationships. Also implied are certain rules of interaction which, when the variables are assigned given values (either quantitative or qualitative), the phenomenon under consideration would logically result. The theoretical model is therefore the springboard to "scientization" and the resulting predictive rewards. The validity and usefulness of the "model" for purposes of understanding and control of political behaviour will necessarily be a function of how accurately the model variables correspond to the political realities; the better the structural-functional "fit", the more precise and innovative the predictive results will be.

The model may well take a diagramatic form (as it will here) in addition to the abstract-verbal form. In the diagramatic model, each variable or element in the visual conceptualization will have a clearly discernible referent on the empirical level, thus interlocking the research with the theory and providing a basis for behavioural verification, step by step. The comparative relationships which will be under inquiry can best be
illustrated by a series of graphic models which represent a microcosm of the workings of the political decision making process in communist East Europe.

The model, both verbally and diagramatically, can also be termed "interactive" (rather than "static") since it is based upon the notion of functional interdependence which carries with it the idea that the action of one variable leads to the reaction or response by another. It is this notion of "dynamic response" a "sine qua non" of the model, which I intend to show is indicative of the actual process of political decision making in the countries concerned.

Furthermore, I intend to show that the decision making process under investigation is of a circular nature, and that the process is continuous in the form of successive "rounds" of decision making activity, each "round" consisting of identifiable action and reaction within the environment to political decisions being made in response to pressure and alternatives both within and without the political structure. Yet each "round" is itself a response to the previous round, and the variables fluctuate accordingly. Hence in addition to the basic model outlining the "usual" pattern of activity in each round of decision making, there will be model variations explaining the transition of the decision making process occasioned by the
fluctuation of variables in successive rounds. In effect, the presentation will not be of the "static" two dimensional type, but rather of the "dynamic" three dimensional variety. Obviously, for explanatory purposes, the latter is much more complete in form, and, I hope, in substance as well. It should be remembered that this form of "dynamism" is inherent in the concept of "functionalism" which I have employed. As Kaplan has illustrated (supra), functionalism of the structural variety entails the maintenance of the system variables "over a period of time". As such, the functional model, by its very nature, is especially adaptive to and fruitful for comparative, dynamic analysis.

The model I have derived is the outcome of finding a balance between two most important values in this type of research, namely, simplicity and sophistication. Needless to say, a simple model is more easily communicable than a complex one; it also makes the behavioural task of selecting and applying empirical evidence much less difficult. Yet it has the insurmountable drawback that it can rarely tell us significant, new information of more complex political phenomena. On the other hand, a much more sophisticated model which has a much greater potential for profound innovations can rarely be practical or manageable for verifying its conclusions. Consequently as in most things political, a compromise must be struck between the two extremes. For the purpose of the comparative investigation at hand, I believe that the model which is presented represents
such a balance. It is sufficiently simple to prevent the anarchic confusion of the most comprehensive variety of system, while simultaneously containing adequate sophistication to first of all explain more clearly and in a more meaningful context, what we already know of the communist systems of East Europe, and secondly, give some new insights into the workings of their decision making mechanisms. In addition, I feel that every important variable and definitional treatment is behaviourally verifiable, and assumptions are minimized to those which the discipline rarely challenges. It is sincerely hoped that the model is sufficiently "air tight" to withstand the ever changing winds of political phenomena.

As is evident to the reader by now, the model, by virtue of the explanatory purposes for which it was derived, will adopt a "macro-functional" scope, covering each East European communist community at the national system level. The usual criticism of this scope is that it is too large and unwieldy, necessitating a research effort and verification scheme which is impossible with the present impreciseness of the tools of the discipline. Yet the model, for all its scope, has surprisingly few variables. This is not as inconsistent a development as at first may appear. Although the society-wide scope is the same, the model is limited to portraying only the variables necessary for the treatment of the national political decision making process; it is not a model explanatory of every phenomenon.
of East European political life, although it is expected that some light may be shed upon these others as well.

In other words, the model focuses upon only one major phenomenon -- the decision making element at the national level -- and those attached phenomena directly related to the process. As will be shown however, the verbal explanations will of necessity go into more detail, touching periodically upon other phenomena (eg. the sociological and psychological rammifications in East European politics) which are less relevant to our specific analysis.

C. THE RATIONALE FOR THE MODEL

Although the theoretical unit of study and "scope" of the model is the political decision making system at the national level, the empirical (or "micro") unit of analysis will be a form of decision making itself. It is not rare that in political models such as this that "decision making" is both part of the methodology and the explanatory objective at the same time. Quite clearly, as stated by Paul Driesing,18

"All decisions...occur within a decision structure of some sort, but political decisions in addition have the preservation and improvement of decision structures as their special subject matter."

This concept coincides with David Easton's "politics" as "authoritative allocation of values" (by decision making), however Easton does not distinguish between either public and private allocations or public and private values. Anthony Downs, in his decision making analysis of political phenomena also equates public and private decision making, as does Alfred Kuhn and Francis M. Bator. The significance of this union of public and private decision making is that it enlarges the arena of political activity while at the same time increasing the amount of observable "political" (decisional) behaviour.

Another reason for the employment of this empirical unit of analysis is that the model most satisfactorily accommodates the decision making rationale which serves as a basic for the verbal explanation of the decision making phenomena studied. A preview of this line of reasoning is warranted here before the introduction of the model itself.

The behavioural approach, as valuable as it is for our purposes of investigation, is primarily a means of accounting for descriptions and explanations of the "what", the "how" and the "when" of political activity in the most realistic terms; it is sometimes deficient however, in the analysis of the "why". Therefore the specific theoretical rationale which I have added to the basic behavioural system framework to assist in such explanations is that of the "economic rationale", 

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The basic hypothesis of the economic rationale is that just as corporations know their goals (e.g. profit) and employ the most "reasonable" (efficient) means of achieving them, so do political actors, i.e. there are specific, conscious goals of individuals while in their roles as political actors and we can explain and to some extent predict their political activity to achieve them.

The individual political actor, whether citizen or ruler, necessarily entertains a hierarchy of preferences, desires, and objectives, in the rank order of their importance to him. Due to inherent selfish motivations innate in every human actor, he will act politically by selecting the political alternative which best satisfies his utility stream or hierarchy of preferences. Indeed, for those political actors which to a significant degree control the political activity of a state (e.g. chief executives, party leaders, etc.), the selfish desire to possess and perpetuate this power is an economic incentive of its own. This is especially true in states where political power is concentrated in the hands of the very few.


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There are several important assumptions about this hypothesis which should be realized at the outset. First of all, the hypothesis assumes a consistent, intelligible relationship between "goals" and "means". Secondly, there is an assumption of rationality itself on the behalf of the political actor; (does he always attempt to choose the alternative which will maximize his return per unit of cost?) Thirdly, there is the assumption that all rational decision makers, individuals in every political capacity, exhibit the same qualities.

These assumptions certainly present theoretical problems to be solved (such as the obvious irrationality of some political activity). There is also the investigator's empirical problem of determining whether a decision taken by a political actor is "rational" or not. The actor is supposedly rational because he makes political decisions according to "benefit" and "utility" streams represented by the ordered alternative decisions open to him. All human political actors, because of the fact that they are human, are basically "selfish" and consequently will consistently order their priority of choices such that they will make the decision most beneficial for their own purposes, regardless of the utility or disutility involved for the society as a whole.

Downs does not satisfactorily eliminate the theoretical problems inherent in his model and must subsequently
recognize its limitations. However, Downs' theory was applied to the Western democratic society. There is ample reason to suggest that the problems he encountered were primarily the by-products of the democratic process and not the theory. In other words, I find that the employment of the "economic rationale" is more justified and more easily verifiable when applied to the model of the communist decision making process. The latter application does not confront the investigator with such difficulties as Downs encountered, and correspondingly the rationale becomes much more valuable as an explanatory and predictive device.

The evidence in support of this employment is overwhelming. The economic rationale assumes a high correlation between goals and means. This is a much less imperfect assumption in a communist regime since the number of political actors is tremendously reduced (in the name of "democratic centralism"). For this same reason, the problem of irrationality (or "rational error") is minimized; there are only a handful of individuals making truly significant "rational" decisions at the national level. Furthermore, the relatively fewer decision makers in communist society are limited to policy decisions which coincide (or can be "interpreted" to coincide) with the much less flexible ideology to which the society is committed. Thus their scope of rational choice in decision making is automatically less than their
democratic counterparts since the areas of utility streams are usually much more narrowly circumscribed by both ideological commitments and long term "plans". Resultingly, the economic rationale has a higher probability of greater explanatory and predictive strength in its communist application than when applied to Western democracy.

It should be asserted quite clearly however, that in any event this is not a serious limitation since decision making theory makes no claim or demand for "rationality". The assumption of rationality of a decision making person or structure is an impossible one. The most that can be said is that leaders and decision makers have some priority of values (whether rational or not, or even conscious or not) and they make judgements in the light of their own reasoning of the circumstances and alternatives. "Game theory" must assume rational actors but "decision theory" does not. The latter is empirical theory only and prohibits the notion of value judgement which is inherent in the premise of rationality.

This, in effect, is precisely why "decision theory" fits so well into the structural-functional model. To theorize about decisions and actions which structural variables may make rests not on the internal rationality of the decision making unit, but rather on the external examination and understanding of the environmental and social stimuli (i.e. the other variables in the system.
and environment) which cause such decisions and actions
to be taken. Quite clearly, as James Rosenau summarizes,20

"Processes located in the environment
toward which officials direct their
decisions are no less relevant than
those which occur in their minds and
interactions".

The "selfish interest" theme of the economic rationale
is also streamlined in its application. Since there are
drastically fewer political decision makers of any signif­
icance in the communist state, the impact of "selfish
interests" upon political decision making is concentrated
in a small minority. In effect, the behavioural ability
to trace, explain and predict is tremendously increased
since the investigator may legitimately concentrate upon
the handful of decision makers rather than attempt the
insurmountable task of achieving the same level of accuracy
in a pluralistic system where authority for significant
decision making is structured in a much more amorphous
arrangement of "power pockets" which are for the most
part qualitatively distinct from one another.

In the communist state, on the other hand, all significant
decision making is effectively politically controlled and
centralized in the very highest organs of the authoritative
structure. In addition, despite the nominal plurality of
decision making organs in the communist society, the behavioural

investigator need still only concern himself with applying the "rationale" to a handful of individuals since invariably there is a high degree of cross-membership in these organizations and subsequent interlocking of positions. Thus there are both quantative and qualitative advantages to applying the "economic rationale" to the communist system, especially for the behavioural investigator, since the phenomena involved in the decision making process can be covered with adequate scope and depth without creating unmanageable technical difficulties in assimilating and applying the necessary empirical data.

One may well posit however, that if, according to the "rationale", the political actor pursues his own selfish interests at the expense of society, this "rationale" cannot be applied to the communist state where, according to ideology, one pursues the interest of society at the expense of himself! But is this really true in the communist state? Certainly the communist political actors entertain at least a superficially different "selfishness" (since they cannot personally possess untold amounts of money, goods or other bourgeois accoutrements!) but they are still human beings, and still "social animals", and therefore still "selfish". The communist ideology is one which denies not the existence of selfishness, but rather the "free play" of this selfishness as manifested by a free, or Western democratic polity. The communist citizen is not free to be selfish, or at least not free to follow up any selfish
inclinations. The communist citizen, in effect, has nothing to be truly and politically selfish about; he has surrendered this privilege to the handful of real decision makers who make these decisions for him in order that the members of the proletariat do not "destroy" themselves by pursuing their selfish interests in a bourgeois fashion. Therefore the rationale is still applicable here.

I feel that this is sufficient evidence to warrant the assertion that the "economic rationale" is considerably more useful as an explanatory basis of political decision making in the communist society than in Western democracy. The precise weight of this analytical advantage can only be appreciated after a critical survey of the results obtainable from the application of the comparative model which now follows.
PART II
THE MODEL

A. THE COMPONENTS OF THE GENERAL MODEL

Any comparative approach in political analysis should commence at a point of basic ground common to all of the countries under consideration, such as the basic similarities between them with regard to the particular phenomena studied. This allows the subsequent investigation with regard to differences to proceed from as unbiased a point of departure as is possible, thus illuminating much more clearly the dissimilarities and variations in the political activity subject to analysis. The "general model" is constructed to present such a common point of departure, outlining the basic similarities generally inherent in the decision making process of the communist societies of Eastern Europe.

As pointed out in PART I, the "model" is based upon the theory of functionalism, with the scope of the "general system". Dynamic in form and comparative in purpose, it employs the rationale of the "economic theory" and the methodology of behaviouralism in the treatment of data and analysis.

Since the functional model is essentially an explanatory device, it is imperative that the mechanics of the model maintain the three necessary properties for any
functional explanation to be meaningful. These properties are:

1) a specific political phenomenon, or event;
2) a delineation of the "system" within which the event takes place (i.e. the boundaries);
3) and the resulting effects upon the variables within the system after the event has occurred.

With these properties in mind I will now begin to set up the model. At this point I will also become more eclectic in approach, borrowing variables and ideas from some of the leading names in this line of political research, especially David Easton, Gabriel A. Almond, and Sidney Verba. Much of the terminology which has been used by the model builders will be restated in terms and applications which are felt to be more realistically applicable to the model here. In any case, although much of the material has been used in models before, the specific form of the integration of these materials and the explanatory devices accompanying them are born of entirely original concepts. This has had to be the case, since to my knowledge, there has been no functional-behavioural model devised to date which has had to cope specifically with the phenomena concerned in the political decision making process in the communist societies.

The "boundaries" of the system of political decision making in the model will necessarily be, at the outset,
the national society, since the analysis will be society-wide and generalizable over the whole political system. (Later in this section, the boundary will be enlarged to include the necessary international variables). Within the societal boundary there will be some form of political decision making process. This "process" in its simplest form will be termed the "input-output" concept as represented in Diagram 1.

The societal boundaries in the diagram are self-evident. The political system within those boundaries represents the mechanics involved in the operations of the political decision making process within the framework of the total environment. The political decision making structure is that organizational unit within the political system which has ultimate responsibility for decisions. This structure need not, as the empirical evidence will show, be the formal government machinery, nor need it be even more than one person, i.e. a dictator.

The input variable represents the combination of "demands" and "supports". "Demands" represent pressure upon the decision making structure to promulgate certain ideas as "outputs". Demands are thus those "wants" which exert enough pressure upon the system to force the decision making structure to consider them as potential outputs. The "wants" with which the model is concerned here are those interests, desires, etc., which occur in the environment
and which require some form of political action to give them the status of "demands". A "want" which cannot be or is not "politicized" (transformed into a "demand") remains simply a "frustrated want".

"Supports" represent the aggregate of actions, feelings, beliefs, and attitudes within the environment which pre-dispose the environment to think, act, and feel beneficially towards the political decision making system, i.e. in ways which tend to preserve and promote the system as it exists. In a sense, the sum total of supports represents the degree of "legitimacy" given to the system.

The "output" variable is simply the combination of both authoritative and associative decisions promulgated by the decision making structure. Outputs of the "authoritative" variety are "direct action" statements, requiring and enforcing the need and obligation for some positive action (or non-action) on behalf of some or all members of the society. The failure to comply with the obligations imposed by authoritative outputs results in the imposition of penalties in the form of legal sanctions. Outputs of the "associative" variety on the other hand rarely have such characteristics. They usually take the form of general policy pronouncements which are designed to influence the "atmosphere" of the environment (e.g. to make the environment more receptive to the authoritative outputs.

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and to generate a certain degree of support for the programs put forth). The most conspicuous type of associative output is that of the nature of "propaganda".

The distinction between authoritative and associative outputs is extremely important analytically. In a Western democratic polity, the associative decisions and pronouncements must of necessity precede the authoritative outputs -- the society must be generally amenable to the rationale behind the authoritative output before they accept it as legitimate. If the decision making structure of the Western democratic state attempts to promulgate and enforce authoritative outputs (which legally bind the members of society) without receiving either the overt or covert consent of the environment, various elements within the environment will react with hostility such that the existence of the entire decision making process may be threatened.

In a communist state, although generally authoritative outputs are preceded and supported by associative statements, there are many significant occasions when the associative output, if it comes at all, is promulgated long after the more arbitrary authoritative output is given. This is particularly evident in those communist states where there is a strong "Stalinist" orientation toward decision making. In fact, there is substantial behavioural evidence to support the contention that in many cases there is no
associative output given at any time to justify or win environmental support for the authoritative decision taken.

In those communist states which are more "progressive" (Roumania), "independent" (Yugoslavia), or "liberal" (Czechoslovakia, January - August, 1968), the reverse trend is often the case, where nearly every authoritative decision is preceded by or at least made to co-incide with, the associative output created to generate popular support within the environment.

In addition to enabling the investigator to classify outputs, the relationship between these two types of output is particularly crucial when investigating political activity with regard to "legitimacy" (especially whether the resulting "supports" of the input variable are "legitimate" or "forced"), the feedback (and its resulting environmental effects upon the system), and identifying sources of the outputs themselves (e.g. whether they are occasioned by inputs from the environment, "withinputs" of the decision making structure, or "international inputs"). More will be said of these new factors as the model building progresses.

At the moment, the explanation of Diagram 1 will be complete with a brief discussion of the "feedback". The "feedback" variable represents the environmental response
to the outputs of the decision making structure. If the outputs are "effective", i.e. if they satisfy the most pressing wants and demands, or at least make the environment perceive them to be satisfied (by successful associative outputs), then the proportion of supports to demands (in the input factor) will be relatively high, resulting in a high degree of legitimacy accorded to the system which in turn tends to preserve and give stability to the political decision making process. On the other hand, if outputs are not effective or at least not perceived to be, then the "feedback", or total environmental response, will produce a redistribution of the "demand" and "support" elements of the input variable resulting in an appropriate reduction in the level of supports and a simultaneous and proportionate increase in the level of wants and demands.

This overall process will be discussed at length and in more detail in the more sophisticated forms of the model which follow. The point I wish to make here however, is that the role of the "feedback" in the model is a crucial one. It is the "feedback" which gives the decision making process the characteristic circularity which was discussed in the previous section. In the model drawn however, the feedback arrow is simply a diagramatic device to portray this circularity. In reality, the outputs permeate some elements of the environment immediately upon their release from the decision making structure, in which case the
feedback response begins immediately. Other elements in the environment may not be affected by the outputs until much later (or even not at all) and thus not generate a feedback response affecting the input variable until a much later date (or not at all). Thus, analytically, there is no co-ordinated, homogeneous feedback response as the arrow may suggest. Behavioural evidence in all of the East European countries indicates that such response is inevitably diversified in time, origin, content, and strength. Thus the feedback mechanism operates as a type of clearing house, weighing, sifting, and counter-balancing these diversified responses to outputs in the environment, and presents a "net" demand - support combination which becomes the new input variable. There may be considerable dissatisfaction with some authoritative outputs, however this may be counterbalanced or erased by a proportionate increase in supports due to the success of some associative outputs promulgated at the same time. The "net" effect in the environment will then be practically nil.

Before proceeding further to the more advanced model, a more detailed discussion of the decision making structure is warranted. Diagram 2. presents a close-up of the typical political decision making structure in the communist states of Eastern Europe. This structure has been previously defined as "that organizational unit within the system which has ultimate responsibility for outputs". The
behavioural evidence put forth in the following chapters will significantly substantiate the contention that this "structure" is almost invariably synonymous with the politburo of the communist party, or at least the core group of the most influential members in it. What is important to realize is that it is not the "structure" or the "politburo" itself which is important, but rather the influential members which comprise it. Perhaps the most striking differences between the communist political system and that of the Western democracy is that in the former, decision making power is invested (at least "de facto") in men, not offices. Consequently, for the purpose of the model, political power follows the man, not the structure, no matter how formal or legal the latter may be. Therefore, although diagramatic convenience requires something which resembles an official structure, it must be realized that analytically this is not necessarily the case. Again, as behavioural evidence in the following chapters will indicate, the organizational unit represented by the "decision making structure" often is in fact a small, informal group of men, usually dominated by one among them. The point is that the decision making power is derived from the personalities involved, not the organizational characteristics of the structure.

It is not my intention to give evidence on behalf of this hypothesis here but rather to point out two important
features of the decision making structure in the model, as applied to the East European communist state. The first feature is the possible treatment of the "demands" of the input variable which are considered by the decision making structure as potential outputs. As "demand one" (D1) indicates, a demand may be readily transformed into an output without significant modification. As an alternative, a number of demands may be grouped together (D2, 3, 4,) and with some alteration eventually become an output factor. As D5, 6, 7, 8, indicates however, a grouping of demands may take place in the form of a potential output and be pushed part way through the conversion process only to be killed before actually becoming an output. "D9" represents the situation where a demand may be seriously considered however must be "split" for some reason or another, resulting in the formation of several potential outputs deriving from one demand. As in the previous case however, any number of these split demands may be "killed" before becoming an output. The previous discussion concerning "authoritative" outputs gives more theoretical credence to this type of activity, since different aspects of demand may be required to serve both authoritative and associative purposes. Finally, D10, D11, and D12 are indicative of the situation where a number of single demands may be entertained for a period of time before being dropped (D10), may be killed after some initial consideration (D11), or simply ignored from the outset (D12).
The transformation of demands into outputs is self-explanatory with regard to demonstrating the circularity of which I spoke earlier. However, the "killing" of demands within the decision making structure seemingly contradicts the principle of the circular process and requires further discussion. If a demand (or demand "group") is terminated at this point, there may be no further concern with it by the decision making structure, which probably feels that a "non-output" of this nature would not have serious effects upon the environment. In this case the circularity for that particular input has ended and the "linkage" process has stopped. If the decision making structure is that which appears in the "Stalinist" type of state, then this structure may be more inclined to this type of response to demands (i.e. a "non-output response"), relying upon force to handle any serious environmental reaction to the "non-outputs". On the other hand, the more "liberal" type of regime which relies more heavily upon legitimate environmental support and avoids the use of force wherever possible, will tend to ignore only demands of minor consequence. In addition, the "liberal" decision making body will be more inclined to replace the ignored demand with one of its own, by creating an "associative" (propaganda) output to relieve the potential adverse environmental response to the "non-(authoritative) output". Thus if a demand is killed within a decision making structure, this need not represent a "non-influence" upon this group.
In fact there is sufficient behavioural evidence in most all of Eastern European communist communities to support the hypothesis that if a sufficiently important demand from the environment is not to become an output (e.g. the demand for increased production and distribution of consumer goods), this "killed" potential output (authoritative) will be replaced by an associative output designed to compensate the environment for the non-satisfaction of its demand. This brings me to the second important element to be discussed with regard to the decision making structure, the "withinput" factor ("W").

Since no decision making structure in any form of government, be it communist, democratic, or otherwise, can satisfy all of the demands upon it, there will always be some form of "demand killing" such as the one described above. However, what is truly distinctive and unique to the totalitarian state is the tremendous significance of the "withinput" factor associated with "demand killing". A "withinput" is of essentially the same character as the "input", however it has its origins somewhere within the decision making structure itself. The "support" element however, can usually be taken for granted, since it can be assumed that the existing regime gives utmost support to itself and its system of decision making. Frequent purges within and without the decision making structure have the purpose of guaranteeing a satisfactory degree
of homogeniety in this regard. Of more crucial analytical value is the demand aspect of the withinput.

As noted earlier, many an authoritative output will be paralleled by an associative output to assist in its implementation. Most of the important authoritative outputs will necessarily be derived from withinputs (e.g. the long term "plans", "co-operatives", foreign policies, etc.), with relatively little regard given to the desires or influences of the environment. This, of course, is practically a definition of the totalitarian system of government and one of its basic features. Yet on the other hand, even the most totalitarian of states must give some recognition, albeit infrequent, imperfect, and indirect, to the environment, since this is in the best interests of the decision making group, namely to maintain and promote its own power. Consequently, "withinputs" will also result in associative outputs designed to assist in the proper administration of authoritative outputs (whether originating from inputs or withinputs), or to placate those dissatisfied elements of the environment which are subject to "non-outputs" as discussed above.

It should also be noted that the "withinput" demand is more often successful than the "input" demand in becoming an output, since it is originated by the decision making structure itself. It undoubtedly occurs however,
that one or more members of the decision making group will have his own demands "killed" during this process. The withinputs represented in Diagram 3 do not reflect this since for the purposes of the model at this stage, a perfectly homogeneous decision making group is assumed. 21

In summary then, by far the most important type of "demand" in the communist system is that of the "withinput" variety. It has a much better chance of being promulgated as an output, which is a notable feature of "democratic centralism" in the communist decision making process. In addition, it may well be a response to a "killed" demand from the environment, as well as being born solely within the decision making structure itself.

At this point, we are now ready to proceed with the more complex model.

B. THE DYNAMICS OF THE GENERAL MODEL - EQUILIBRIUM STATE

Diagram 3 represents the model approximating the "equilibrium" position. Although it may seem that the model is totally different than that of Diagram 1, the basic input - output principle is the same. Diagram 1, 21. Beginning with the non-equilibrium stage (Diagram 4(b)), this assumption is no longer valid and demands arising from the withinput variable are in fact "killed".

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in all of its simplicity, served the function of explaining the basic, circuitous principle involved in the decision making process. Diagram 3 is a sophistication of that process which is intended to portray the more subtle characteristics of a particular type of decision making, that found in communist East Europe.

The societal boundary lines have been removed to avoid confusion; the reader must still assume that this model is of a national, society-wide decision making process. The decision making structure is identical to that just discussed (Diagram 2). The output factor however, takes on a new dimension here, becoming the "output area". This has been necessary in order to indicate variations in communist party initiative and control over the implementation of outputs. The larger the output area, the more extensive the party control, both quantitatively and qualitatively; the smaller the area, the more lax are the party controls at every level of the environment to be affected by the outputs concerned.

The feedback line is again simply a diagramatic device to demonstrate the interaction and linkage between outputs and inputs. Analytically, the output area covers the entire environment. Similarly, the "stress area" represents the entire environmental response to the output combination at that particular "round" of decision making activity.
In effect, it represents the result of the feedback's "clearing house" operations discussed earlier. The "stress area" (or "environmental pressure area") reflects the correlation between "potential demands" and "supports"; the greater the level of "supports" compared to the level of "potential demands" (i.e. "wants"), the smaller the stress factor will be; conversely, the greater the level of potential demands as compared to the level of supports, the larger the "stress area" will be.

At this point, a new distinction must be made. Behavioural research necessitates a restatement of "demands" within the environment, which hitherto (Diagram 1) included all wants, desires, objectives, etc., upon the assumption that they all have significant influence upon the decision making structure. Empirically this is not the case. Most "wants", especially in the communist state, simply exhibit nothing which even approximates direct influence upon the decision making structure while in the form of individual wants or even groups of wants. This is because they fail to become "politicized", or considered as potential outputs by the decision making structure.

The model here of course is interested only in "demands" at the national level. It is certainly true that "wants" may become "politicized" and satisfied by decision makers on lower, more local levels, especially
when the "wants" are of comparatively little significance. This is the case, since on a much more minor scale there are "decision making structures" of a type at every level of society, especially in the form of communist party organizations which permeate and parallel each and every stratum of the environment. Yet even if such "wants" are politically chanelled upward at local levels, they may be rejected at any higher stage and fail to become "demands", which are defined as "politicized wants" which have a substantially direct influence upon the national decision making structure in so far as they are considered as nationally determined "potential outputs". Therefore, previous to becoming "demands" within the national context of the model, "wants" only have the status of "potential" demands; if and when they fail to become demands (or if the demands are killed in some decision making structure), they remain simply "frustrated" wants.

Two points must be clarified however. I mentioned above that "non-politicized wants" (potential demands) have no direct influence by themselves upon the decision making structure. Yet at the same time, the model contends that they are instrumental for the all-important "stress area". The paradox arises from the confusion between "direct" and "indirect" influence upon the decision making structure. Directly, "wants" can rarely influence the national decision making structure in a communist
state, since there is no mechanism provided for the mobilization and politicization of "wants", apart from the party hierarchy. (Indeed, it is within the very definition of "communist party" that it discourages such independent political activity.) However, indirectly this is not the case. As the following chapters will point out, I believe that there is ample behavioural evidence to confirm the hypothesis that due to the dissatisfaction resulting from this lack of political effectiveness of environmental wants, considerable "support" for the system is withdrawn, while simultaneously the quantity and strength of the "wants" increase, creating a larger "stress area" for the next round. This phenomenon assumes of course, that any substitute outputs, especially of the "associative" or "propaganda" nature, are ineffective. The dynamics of this process will be elaborated later.

The second point to be clarified is that which concerns the decision makers at the lower party levels within the environment. As already pointed out, the hierarchical arrangement of the communist party necessitates some decision making of a political nature at every level. Since some communist party organization exists as an "alter ego" of every significant environmental group, whether formal or informal, the party organization is the most significant "aggregator" of wants; it provides the mechanics for synthesizing and grouping of selected wants and
interests within the environment. Necessarily, in a totalitarian system, this same organization must provide for the controls over the "articulation" of these wants. For the purpose of the model here, interest or want "articulation" is defined as the conversion of a "want" into a "demand", or, in effect, politicizing a particular "aggregated want" which is believed by the lower level decision making structures to be of "potential output" significance.

Those party "representatives" or decision makers within the environment who decide which of the particular "wants" which are aggregated and filtered upward through the party hierarchy are to ultimately become "demands" upon the national decision making structure, are the "gatekeepers".

The "gates" are an extremely significant variable in the communist decision making process. As the diagram indicates, as the analysis suggests, and as the behavioural data verify, the "gates" present themselves as a barrier through which the environmental influences must get in order to be politically effective. The "gates" show that such influences from the environment do not automatically, or even with moderate difficulty, reach the decision making structure. Whereas there are institutional mechanisms, both formal and informal, guaranteed by the
Western democratic system to assist and protect the legitimate political expression of environmental "wants", the reverse is the case in the communist state. The "gates" have the prime function of preventing such influences from making their weight felt upon the ultimate political decision making body. The "gatekeepers", being trustworthy, dedicated personnel well versed in the requisites of communist decision making, man the "gates" which screen most all potential demands which reach that level, to determine what political weight is to be accorded them. With regard to the environment, these party functionaries largely monopolize the power of politicization. Any "want" from either the party or non-party environment which a "gatekeeper" articulates, becomes a "demand" directly upon the decision making structure. Exactly who these individuals are, what offices they occupy, and what authority they possess, are questions which I will leave for the following chapters, where a more behaviourally rigorous and comparative analysis is convenient.

The "gates" are plural, representative of the many areas of decision making at the national level for which "potential demands" must be screened. At any one time, certain gates among them may be "open" in which case non-party interest aggregators within the environment (e.g. church hierarchy, leaders of youth groups, etc.,) may have direct influence.
upon the decision making structure ("v", "w", "x", "y", "z"). In this case, these "aggregators" become their own "articulators" and are able to transform their "wants" into political demands (at the national level) without the difficulty of being screened by the party "gatekeepers". This type of activity is rare in most communist countries, however it is not infrequent in the more "liberal" regimes (e.g. Czechoslovakia, January - August, 1968). This latter example represented the situation where the decision making structure may authorize certain gates to be left open, and in effect, invite direct politicization of wants from and by the environment. Another type of direct articulation however, is that whereby an environmental factor (such as the church hierarchy in Poland) is able to either "force" its way through the gates (by arousing enough environmental support) or has enough influence on its own to somehow get by the gates, despite the gatekeepers' efforts to prevent such influence.

There is a definite relationship between the "stress area" and the "gates". In a Western democracy, wants are politicized much more directly, as pointed out above, since there is no substantial "gatekeeping" activity performed, and in so far as there are some barriers to more direct political influence, there are many legal and effective ways to circumvent them (e.g. mass demonstration, press publicity, etc.) Since wants can most always be
politicized in Western democracy, then for all intents and purposes they can be equated with "political demands". Since the "gates" of the communist system are set up to prevent this, there is a tremendous number of "non-politicized wants" within the communist environment. To the extent that the outputs of the decision making structure are ineffective in one "round" (i.e. do not satisfy the major wants and fail to appease the environment in any other way), the supports for the system will decrease while the non-politicized wants tend to become at least qualitatively stronger and eventually, quantitatively more abundant, resulting in a corresponding increase in environmental stress. If these activities prevail over successive "rounds" of the decision making process, the stress area will build up against the gates. Thus the pressure build-up in the environment, although initially an adverse response to ineffective outputs, is also the result of the function of the "gates" to shield the decision making structure from the environment and prevent any "seepage" of environmental pressure toward the decision making structure. In effect, although the "gates" are designed to protect the decision making structure from the societal stress, they can, under certain circumstances, produce the opposite result. This situation will be analysed later in considerable detail, with the operation of the model in the "third dimension".

Once the environmental wants are articulated by the
gatekeepers, they become politicized at the highest level, and, by definition, are considered as potential outputs by the decision making structure, after having been funelled through the "boundary threshold" to reach this small group of political actors. The "threshold" variable is the last element in the circular linkage of the decision making system and it is to a discussion of this element that I now turn.

The "boundary threshold" represents the distance between the decision making structure and the "gates" within the environment. This "distance" in the theoretical model is indicative of two necessarily related phenomena on the empirical level. First, it shows the "tightness" (more orthodox) or "slackness" (liberalness) of control which is exercised by the decision making structure over the party and non-party elements in the environment with regard to inputs. When more strict and centralized control is deemed necessary by the decision making structure, this "distance" is substantially shortened; the more "liberal" and decentralized the control, the threshold distance is lengthened. These changes occur over a period of many "rounds" of decision making activity however; therefore I will elaborate upon the threshold activity further with the presentation of the three dimensional model.

The second and interdependently related aspect of the
"threshold distance" is the corresponding gate activity. If the threshold distance is relatively great, indicating a more slack and decentralized control over the environmental inputs by a more liberal-oriented regime, this necessarily infers more open gates and more direct environmental influence upon the decision making structure. Conversely, in the case of a more orthodox, highly centralized "watch-dog" control over environmental inputs, which is indicative of the more "Stalinist" type of regime, the situation will be "up tight", with a very short threshold distance, and the gates will tend to be closed, tightly locking out environmental influence. These situations also bear a definite relationship with the size of the "output area", since the relative environmental control exercised by the decision making structure in response to the input variable must be consistent with the administrative control and enforcement of the outputs.

This is particularly significant when considering the time element associated with the decision making. The shorter the threshold distance and, correspondingly, the greater the degree of gate closure, the less time the decision making structure will have to make effective decisions to prevent a pressure area from building up. On the other hand, if the threshold distance is relatively great and the gates are "liberally" open, then the decision making structure will have more time with which to produce effective output combinations. This is the case.
since, for example, in the latter situation the environment
is exercising considerably more direct influence upon the
decision making structure, and in a sense, the open gates
allow pressure from the environment to dissipate. To this
extent, the openness of gates represents a "safety valve"
factor in the system, a means of partial control over the
environmental pressure area. Furthermore, many of the
environmental demands upon the decision making structure
will be contradictory or mutually exclusive. This allows
the decision making structure to legitimately stall
certain output combinations since the environment has not
generated homogeneous support for such demands. The
environment, in turn, will be hesitant to create an increase
in pressure since the source of the non-satisfied demands
(ambivalence) is within the environment itself, not the
decision making structure.

Such are the basic variables of the general "equil-
ibrium" model of decision making on the national scale in
communist East Europe. Now it is time to consider these
variables together in linkage motion, and add the third
dimension, the temporal element. The functional interactions
rarely produce a 1:1 relationship between the interdependent
variables concerned. Thus the state of "equilibrium" is
more mythical and theoretical than actual and empirical.
Consequently, the basic input - output mechanism is
rarely balanced and the actions and reactions of variables
are constantly in a state of flux. Thus only the "third
dimension", that of successive "rounds" of decision making activity over a period of time, can give a realistic interpretation of the dynamics of the model.

During this "analysis in motion" however, it should also be kept in mind that the decision making structure is the "lock" which holds all the links of the functional chain together in circular form. Especially in the totalitarian state, where the key to power is in the hands of a uniquely omnipotent decision making group, this analogy obtains special significance. By the very concept of totalitarian power, the decision making structure can to a certain degree make or break any link in the chain.

C. THE MODEL IN THE THIRD DIMENSION

Let us take as our starting point what I consider to be the "state of equilibrium" of the general model as represented in Diagram 3. In the state of equilibrium, the combination of authoritative and associative outputs is sufficiently effective to satisfy the environment such that the proportion of potential demands relative to supports does not change (i.e. the stress area remains stable). In addition, the gate activity remains similar to the previous round and the threshold distance is neither increased nor decreased substantially. Consequently, the equilibrium position presents a rather "static" round of decision making activity. There are very few changes since every
disbalancing tendency is equally offset by a counter-balancing action. For example, if certain demands from the environment are "killed" in the decision making structure, the potential effect upon the stress area of this "non-output" may be offset by a successful associative output which is substituted by the decision making structure; consequently, the decrease in system "supports" (in the environment), caused by the non-outputs frustration of wants, is restored by the associative output(s) designed to counterbalance the adverse effects. Since the stress area remains the same as in the previous round and assuming that the aims and attitudes of the decision making structure remain constant, there is no reason to change either the gate activity or the threshold distance. Such is the theoretical state of "equilibrium".

For purposes of analysis and demonstration of the third dimension however, I will introduce into this equilibrium position of the model a more realistic catalyst. After successive hypothetical "rounds" of equilibrium activity, let us suppose that the combination of outputs, both associative and authoritative, are generally ineffective or at least perceived to be so by the environment. In this first round of ineffective outputs (Diagram 4(a)), the environmental stress area will tend to expand slightly due to the initial adverse feedback response to such ineffectiveness. The balance of supports and potential demands is upset in the latter's favour. Since the
Diagram 4(a)
"stress area" is crucial here, it must be stated now that the behavioural evidence suggests that crisis proportions are not reached until after several successive rounds of output ineffectiveness, both quantitative and qualitative, followed by corresponding "de facto" changes in pressure area build-up. This is due to the built-in "structural lag" in the workings of this aspect of the decision making process. As pointed out earlier, there is no extensive network of facilities available in the communist environment which promotes and encourages the effective politicization of dissatisfaction, as there exists in Western democracy. On the contrary, the structure of the system is such that organized environmental influence is deliberately discouraged. The "alter ego" party organizations paralleling every significant group at every societal level, effectively prevent any form of organized pressure from occurring. Similarly, within the party, each level of party organization is surveying and criticizing the one below to prevent any such "reactionary" activity. Thus both horizontally and vertically, independent environmental pressure is systematically thwarted. Resultingly, it usually takes several "rounds" of ineffective decision making in the communist system before the pressure area is large enough and strong enough to overcome these structural barriers to the political expression of environmental dissatisfaction.

Therefore, although the pressure area may increase
slightly in the first round of ineffective outputs, there will be no other significant changes. If second and third rounds of decision making fail to satisfy the environment's major demands however, there will be severe digressions from the equilibrium state, characterized by the growing pressure area, closing of the gates, tightening of party control over the input variable (reducing the threshold distance), proportionate increase in the "withinput" factor over the "input" factor from the environment, and a more strict administration of outputs, i.e. a larger output area (Diagram 4(b)).

A careful analysis, step by step, is warranted here. Since third round outputs were again decidedly ineffective, the growing level of expressed dissatisfaction in the environment is catching up with the successive rounds of ineffectiveness, and is expressed by the significant growth in potential demands and proportionate shrinkage of supports. The reaction of the decision making structure to this adverse growth of environmental pressure must necessarily include a further closing of the gates to protect their own power position. At the same time, the boundary threshold will be drawn closer; party control over the society will have to be more strict to keep the environmental pressures from erupting.

Necessarily of course, if the previous direct environmental influence is curtailed by the closing
activity of the gates, there will be less significant input factor from the environment (only "x" and "z") and both the number and proportion of withinputs to inputs will increase. Another reason for this is the tendency of the decision making structure to increase outputs in hope of alleviating some of the environmental pressure. In addition, to give the outputs the best chance of reducing this pressure in the environment, the party bureaucracy and administrative organization will have to implement these outputs with decidedly more control to achieve more effectiveness. Thus the output area will also increase both quantitatively and qualitatively, to control more effectively the administration of those outputs so that maximum value can be obtained therefrom.

This enlarged output area however, is the beginning of round four. Let us again assume that the output combination is generally ineffective, in which case all of the adverse trends in round two and three are strengthened. Diagram 4(c) indicates the functional variations which have occurred due to further ineffective rounds of decision making (R4, R5, R6). The proportion of potential demands to supports is about as high as it can get. (There will always be some supports for the system, especially of the "old guard loyalty" variety). Thus the "stress area" reaches crisis proportions. The gates will be closed solidly and the threshold distance will be as short as possible. Consequently, party control over environmental
influences will be as tight and rigorous as can be. There will still be demands from the environment, but they will be as a result of the growing pressure area and will be cautiously filtered by the party and articulated only by the "gatekeepers". Behavioural evidence suggests that this situation is also characterized by a certain distrust in the party decision making structure. Consequently, some or all members of the decision making structure may even become the "gatekeepers" themselves.

The disbalancing "snowball" movement should now be apparent. One adverse reaction feeds another. The ineffective output combination assists the growth of the pressure area, which in turn promotes gate closing activity (just when they should be left open to relieve the pressure). This in turn justifies a further tightening of party controls (over inputs) which warrants a proportionate increment of withinputs resulting in an increase and stronger enforcement of outputs which are disadvantaged to begin with in a more hostile environment. Thus it can be readily seen that there seems to be lacking any inherent structural balancing mechanisms as there exist in the Western Democratic process.

The decision making structure at this point is in trouble. The job of the decision making structure is to make decisions, in effect, to govern. No government can exist for long, no matter how totalitarian, if it continues
to render ineffective decisions, decisions which do not solve problems but only feed them. The "stress feedback" snowballs and over a number of rounds the system approaches the structural explosion point.

Let us assume however, that the system does not explode, but rather that the decision making structure at round seven manages to come up with an output combination which begins to satisfy many of the environmental "wants" which have accumulated over the previous six rounds. This may have little immediate effect upon the stress area since the lagged dissatisfaction from rounds five and six may just be "catching up" at this point and making their weight felt. Also, if the period of prolonged dissatisfaction was considerably lengthy, the environment will not usually respond more favourably at the outset. After all, party controls and environmental suppression are still exercised within the environment to a large degree at this point. There may be therefore a certain element of environmental distrust toward the system, or at least a "wait-and-see" attitude.

Nevertheless, the time lag in the environmental response to satisfactory or effective outputs should be shorter than the lag in registering the adverse response. This seems to be true since there are specific structures and procedures built into the administrative machinery to promote and encourage the satisfaction of outputs within
the environment. As much as environmental dissatisfaction of and participation in decision making is discouraged by the system, acceptance of and satisfaction with the outputs, once they are promulgated, are strongly encouraged. Thus the "satisfaction lag" will in fact usually be considerably shorter than the "dissatisfaction lag".

Assuming that an effective output combination is forthcoming in round eight, some ameliorating tendencies may then begin to show, as demonstrated by Diagram 5(a). In this situation, the reverse influences are apparent. The effectiveness of the output combination will generate a favourable "feedback balance" in which the adverse proportion of potential demands to the level of supports will be reduced, thus diminishing the pressure area somewhat. At this point however, the pressure area, although no longer of crisis proportions, is still large. Consequently, there will be little change in the closed gates, and relatively strict party control over both the input and output areas will remain.

Although all outputs will emanate directly from withinputs at this stage, there will be fewer withinput demands which are actually promulgated. The output combination of round seven was relatively effective, therefore there will be less pressure upon the system to find output solutions which are satisfactory. Resultingly, more of the withinput demands will be "killed" by the
Diagram 5(a)
Diagram 5(b)
decision making structure itself during this round.

Successive rounds of effective output combinations will have a more significant effect upon these variables. Diagram 5(b) illustrates the situation at the end of round ten, or the fourth successive round of "generally effective" outputs. Here, the successive rounds of want satisfaction have caught up with and have overcome the previous rounds of dissatisfaction, causing a shift in the proportion of potential demands to the level of supports, but this time in favour of the latter. Consequently, the "stress area" is significantly reduced.

Behaviourally however, the decision making structure is much more reluctant to withdraw strict controls than the environment is to withdraw its dissatisfaction with previous outputs. To guarantee greater control over the system and reassure the decision making structure of a tranquil environment, only partial relaxation of control will usually be accorded at this round. Some gates may be reopened to allow some direct environmental influence and the boundary threshold may be extended somewhat. If distrust of the environment still prevails however, these concessions may be more of a "nominal" type than real. Similarly, the output area may be decreased somewhat, as the decision making structure feels that the situation warrants.
Diagram 5(c) carries this ameliorating trend to its obvious conclusion. Over a period of time, during which the output combinations remain at least satisfactory, the distrust of the environment by the decision making structure may wain, and the situation approaches that which may be termed "liberal". Successive rounds of effective output combinations have resulted in a most favourable proportion of potential demands and supports within the environment, heavily favouring the latter. The potential demand factor is not strong and the legitimacy accorded the entire system of government by the environment is generally high; therefore the "stress area" is near a minimum.

The decision making structure, in consideration of a most favourable environmental response to the processes of the system, and wishing to avoid any recurrence of build-up in the "stress area", will open as many gates as is feasible. It should be noted however, that this does not remove the party structures from the environment; they still exist as before, with the exception that their controlling activities are less severe. However, since there are more legitimate channels of direct influence open to the non-party environment, the proportion of inputs channeled by the party structure as compared to inputs from the non-party environment (which by-pass the gates and influence the decision making structure directly), is lessened to some degree. In effect then, as discussed earlier, this necessarily means a lengthened threshold
distance and a relaxation of party controls over both the party and non-party environment with regard to the input variable.

In turn then, there will be a much larger influx of demands from the environment, coming either directly through open gates or through the established party channels and gatekeepers. Consequently, the top-heavy proportion of withinputs to inputs is reduced and the environment becomes relatively more influential in the decision making process. Since the subsequent outputs are legitimately more of a product of the environment, the latter's favourable acceptance of the output combination will be more likely. This being the case, rigorous party controls over strict implementation and enforcement of the outputs are not necessary. Also, due to the high level of supports and legitimacy accorded the system, the quantity of outputs (exclusive of international outputs) may be decreased, especially those of the "associative" character. For these reasons, the "output area" will be substantially reduced as well.

D. SOME ANALYTICAL REFINEMENTS

Such are the dynamics of the model in the third dimension. There are some misconceptions however, which may arise from the diagramatic presentation, and so it is to these that I now turn for some discussion and
clarification.

The concept of "rounds", although clearly perceived in the diagramatic version of the model, is much less obvious on the empirical level. Decision making is a continuous procedure in any system; this is the prime function for which the system was set up. The diagramatic version may suggest that when a group of decisions have been made (i.e. an output combination), no other decisions are taken until that group completes the circular process. If this were in fact the case, there would be no difficulties of empirical identification. However, as the behavioural data will confirm, output combinations may intercede with others. For example, "output combination one" may be promulgated and only part way through the feedback process when "output combination two" is promulgated. A third output group may follow closely upon "combination two" and, due to its more limited scope, ease of implementation, etc., may actually supercede groups one and two and complete the process first. Thus, the "successive rounds" of which I discussed earlier are more likely to be imperfectly successive, with much overlapping and overtaking. Consequently, the rounds are "fuzzy" from an empirical standpoint, sometimes necessitating a distinction between "rounds" in theory and "rounds" in practice.

Yet this is not a serious drawback since we are concerned with the national scope of the decision making
process of communist East Europe. The decisions made on this level are usually very "large" (e.g. the adoption of a long term "plan") which provide the investigator with a relatively easy task of tracing and behaviourally verifying and accounting for the data which accrue.

Another variable warranting further discussion at this point is the "stress factor". As pointed out earlier, the "stress area" is not solely representative of the level of "potential demands", but rather the proportion of which results from the feedbacks "clearing house" operation. If this is the case, a problem seems to arise from the analysis of Diagram 5(a), (b) and (c). It is behaviourally apparent that there can be no limit to "wants" or "potential demands". Although output combinations may be generally effective, out of sheer optimism (or whatever reason) in the environment, potential demands may certainly increase, while the level of supports remains constant. If this is so, one may point out that:

1) the stress area is simply a function of potential demand (and not of a proportion between the potential demands and level of supports);
2) and therefore, increases in the "stress area" are unlimited since "wants" are limitless.

The above problem arises if one fails to take proper account of the distinction between "basic" wants and "non-basic" wants. It is this qualitative difference
which is most significant as a catalyst of the "stress area", not simply the quantity of wants put forth from the environment. Let me illustrate more clearly.

Let us hypothesize an equilibrium situation where total inputs of "100 units" are comprised of "50 units" of supports and "50 units" of potential demands. The 50 units of supports represents the "satisfactory" level of support resulting from previous output effectiveness. The 50 units of potential demand represent current interests, wants, etc., in the environment. Suppose that out of these 50 units of potential demand, there are 25 units of basic wants (enough food to live on, enough clothes, housing and protection) and 25 units of non-basic wants (electric toothbrushes, the latest fashions from Paris, etc.,) Now there are three possible situations.

First, if the decision making structure promulgates an output combination which satisfies only the 25 units of basic wants, then resulting supports for the system (at the "equilibrium stage") will remain approximately the same, since "major" or "basic" wants are satisfied. The "stress area" also remains primarily the same since the behavioural evidence will prove, as the theory of the "economic rationale" illustrates, that individuals will not increase pressure upon the system by either a change in their "potential demands" or their "supports", if their basic wants remain satisfied. Therefore the "frustration"
of non-basic wants does not create a crisis condition.

The second situation which may arise is that in which the output combination does not satisfy the 25 units of basic wants, but rather the 25 units of non-basic wants. In this case, supports for the system will decrease and the unsatisfied wants will become stronger, creating a substantial increase in the pressure area. Even though an equal quantity of the non-basic wants are satisfied (i.e. 25 wants), the frustrated "basic" wants will be reinforced, since an electric toothbrush has little utility if one has no food. It can readily be seen therefore, that as the economic rationale indicates, wants are ordered by the individual, and one will only be politically satisfied if the more important, more "basic" wants are fulfilled.

The third situation represents the case where the output combinations are able to satisfy both the basic and the non-basic wants. It is then probable that supports may become even higher than if just the basic wants are satisfied. (Supports, similar to "wants", are theoretically quantitatively unlimited). Due to optimism in the environment, it may also be said that this situation may create an even larger number of wants. This is undoubtedly true since it is obvious that many luxury wants can be added to the wants expressed in the previous rounds. Yet this will not significantly effect the
"stress area" if these wants are frustrated.

It should be clear therefore, that as long as basic wants are satisfied, the stress area will never reach crisis proportions. There is a possibility of "surplus supports" (in the event that non-basic wants are satisfied in addition to the basic wants), as well as a loss of "surplus supports" (if these non-basic or "surplus" wants are not satisfied). Yet the basic stability of the system derives from "basic" supports from the environment, and this "basic support" is a result of output satisfaction of "basic wants". "Surplus" wants and supports therefore only have a quantitative significance; the frustration of even thousands of surplus wants will not create a crisis situation, while the prolonged frustration of one truly basic want very well may!

In summary then, the "stress area" in the model is primarily a correlation between output satisfaction of basic wants and basic supports. There may be a quantitative increase in non-basic wants "ad infinitum", but as long as basic wants are satisfied, this will not create a significant increase in the pressure area unless at some point of time they become qualitatively significant (i.e. basic) in their own right.

It should also be noted that the quality of "basicness" of wants varies from one environment to another. In less
developed societies, basic wants are essentially "enough food", "adequate clothing", "protection", etc. In a more advanced society, these things may be taken for granted; basic wants will be of a higher nature (e.g. the automobile becomes a "necessity", as well as education, telephones, and health insurance).

A word should also be said of the relationship between the "stress area" and the economic rationale which was a subject of discussion earlier. As was pointed out in PART I, the individuals in the environment surrender their ability to give "free play" to their respective "utility streams" to the decision making structure. This does not however, deny the existence of interests or "utility streams" in individuals in the environment. What it does mean is that these utility streams rarely exercise direct influence upon the decision making structure; this is inherent in the definition of the totalitarian system. Yet the individuals, collectively, may influence such decision making indirectly by altering the "stress area" variable. Every individual will exert "wants" (but not necessarily demands) in their order of priority in their particular "utility stream". Obviously, as indicated by the "rationale" and behaviourally substantiated, the more basic wants will have priority over the less basic, since the more basic or more important wants will render greater utility. Therefore collectively, to the degree that basic want strength is generalized over the environment as a whole, the stress area will
increase, thus applying indirect pressure upon the decision making structure.

I believe this should eliminate the significant misunderstandings which may arise from the model itself. With these clarified, I will now present the final model.

E. THE INTERNATIONAL ELEMENT

It would not require a very exhaustive accumulation of behavioural evidence to demonstrate the significance of international influence upon the decision making structures of the East European communist societies. Since these political systems sprung from common origins during and after World War II, owing their birth to the same communist source and their "allegiance" to their original parent, the U.S.S.R., can be readily understood. Such "allegiance" need not necessarily be voluntary, as the events in Poland and Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 testify.

It is certainly true however, that the last two decades have brought many changes within what is generally understood to be the "socialist camp", perhaps the most significant being the evolutionary changes in communism, both ideologically and in practice, and its subsequent splitting into two major and several minor forms. Consequently, allegiance to and influence of the "camp" have also split, making the lines of international
socialist command and obedience somewhat hazy, irregular, and unstable. Yet even in the present, as was evidenced by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, international influence upon national decision making still exists, although the strength of such influence seems to vary from one country to another. Of the East European group, Yugoslavia has succeeded in perhaps being at least relatively independent, although more subtle Soviet influences are still exerted upon her. Albania has not become much more independent, but rather has switched her lines of allegiance from the Soviet Union to the People's Republic of China. Even Roumania, within certain limits, has managed to escape some of the undesirable international influence by virtue of her strong economic interests.

Yet by the very fact that they are "possessions" of the Soviet Union, derived from post-war political card dealings, and that they represent strategic areas of influence to the U.S.S.R., there remains a very significant international element in each of their internal decision making processes. The model in its final form as Diagram 6 illustrates, is identical to that of Diagram 3, but with the international variable added.

Although the international influence is also represented as basically an input-output principle, there are some significant changes in the entire model. Since the model is now concerned with an international environment as well
Diagam 6

The Complete Model - Equilibrium State
as a national one, there will necessarily be a "split feedback", registering both internal and external environmental responses to the output combination. The national "control" (via the output area) over the effectiveness of any East European state's output combination, will of course be substantially limited to the internal environment. No East European country can enforce its outputs upon the decision making structure of the international environment.

The decision making structure(s) of the international environment will generally consist of those of the socialist camp, and may be dominated by one among them (e.g. the U.S.S.R.) They are presented in the model collectively for diagramatic convenience; however, analytically, the international decision making structure may often be plural, since any one of the East European communist decision making structures may be subject to the influence of several others collectively.

The outputs of any East European communist state provide the material for inputs into the decision making structure(s) of the international environment (predominately of the nature of "supports"). There will be no "gatekeeping" activity however, and hence no boundary threshold concept, since "inputs" will be directly communicated and "politicized" between the national decision making structure (or more often the national environment) and the international decision making structure(s). However, there very well may
be a "pressure area" build-up on the input side of the international decision making structure, since the "camp leadership" (e.g. the Soviet Union) has as its goal, the maintenance of its own power and influence over the rest of the camp. Therefore the individual East European communist states may exert some pressure upon the "camp" decision making structure(s) (e.g. that they produce less heavy equipment for the "camp" and more consumer goods for their own people).

A brief analysis of the Czechoslovakian crisis of August, 1968 may be illustrative here. The Czechoslovakian decision making structure, between January and August 1968, promulgated output combinations which were very satisfactory to the internal environment, resulting in a very low national pressure area, relatively open "gates", a large threshold distance, and a less lopsided proportion of withinput to inputs. In effect, Czechoslovakia presented that syndrome of conditions which would indicate a "liberal" regime. However, these same output combinations during this period failed to generate similar tendencies in the international sphere. On the contrary, the international feedback created a buildup in the pressure area of the international system; the Czechoslovakian output combinations reflected a "de facto" loss of supports relative to demands, and hence a loss of political influence of the "camp" leadership over Czechoslovakia. Inevitably, the international decision making structure(s) (nominally the
"Warsaw Pact Alliance", but in fact the Soviet Union), countered with international outputs, especially of the associative variety, derived mainly from "withinputs" designed to relieve the "stress area". These internal outputs became direct inputs to the Czechoslovakian decision making structure. After successive rounds of ineffective international output combinations (and subsequent "stress build-up") the international output area expanded also. In addition, the international outputs became decidedly authoritative in character, resulting in the direct enforcement of these outputs by the international decision making structure(s) (i.e. invasion and military enforcement). The international decision making structure(s) subsequently followed up with output combinations which were predominantly "associative" in character, designed to legitimize the authoritative-military activity and reduce the stress area being built up by the adverse responses by both communist and non-communist states. Following the invasion, the decision making structure of Czechoslovakia was forced to reorient its national output combinations towards a more orthodox content. The "gates" in the Czechoslovakian decision making processes were to be closed for the most part, and the threshold distance shortened. Withinputs regained their lopsided advantage over inputs from the environment, and as could be predicted, the ensuing output combinations failed to satisfy the environment, resulting in a certain level of internal stress buildup.
This brief treatment of the Czechoslovakian crisis more factually and empirically demonstrates two points that should now be evident from this phase of the model. First, the mechanism of the international element clearly operates upon the same principles as that of the typical decision making system on the national level, with only the few variations discussed. Second, and even more significant, is the fact that no model of communism, especially of Eastern Europe, can possibly be considered complete without taking full account of the international variable; linkage between the decision making structure of the national state and that of the parallel structure(s) on the international scene is much too strong to be ignored.

With regard to the overall model, and within the scope of its original two-fold objective, it will succeed in great measure if it contributes even towards the intelligent awareness of the significance of the interrelationship between the political and the non-political aspects of society, between the behaviour of men in politics on the one hand and their more distinctly socio-economic and psychological activities on the other. Unfortunately, time and space have prevented me from engaging in the latter, especially the sociological element, in very great detail; but that is quite another thesis. Notwithstanding this omission, I believe that I have at least substantiated the case for the need for political scientists to account for and integrate these other social behaviours in order
to arrive at a more meaningful, contextual, science of politics.

By way of a concluding statement, and more specifically in a communist vein, I think the model presented clearly demonstrates that in addition to the more precise descriptive, explanatory, and predictive merits obtained, this type of analysis is capable of profoundly integrating the elements of modern communism with the intangible variables of social change. Communist societies have been established on the premise of achieving considerably different social cultural objectives than the polities which preceded them. In striving toward the realization of these goals they rely on a perpetuation of their political rule by rooting their power in a minority group of dedicated militants who in turn monopolize control over all means of coercion, communication and social organization. However, it is now clear that their propensity to reach their objectives, and even to survive, cannot be anchored on their widely touted organizational ability or Stalinist suppression of resistance. They can never succeed in ultimately escaping the cleavaging aspects inherent in human society or isolating themselves from the forces of social change. Long run viability, even in the communist society, will necessarily be a function of their capacity to obtain the popular acceptance of their legitimacy, their persuasion of goals which adequately satisfy the expectations of the masses, and their talent in remedying social conflict.
without jeopardizing the dominant role of the party.

As the East European situation testifies, the communist leaders and parties are finding it more and more difficult to sustain their authority in an increasingly hostile and intolerant social environment characterized by industrial development, increasing pressure for bureaucratic and professional pluralism, rising intellectual discontent, and cumulative popular demands for higher living standards. These countries cannot avoid the environmental complexities which accompany industrial modernity; and there is no social magic in the term "democratic centralism". The power which emanates from the barrel of a gun only provides for a transitory and inchoate control over society; if the modern communist nations are to survive this century, they will have to master the laws of socio-economic change or else bow to the crises which such a failing will precipitate. It is toward gaining a more realistic and yet sufficiently sophisticated body of knowledge of this too long abandoned and yet all-important perspective, that this paper is dedicated.
BOOKS


**ARTICLES**


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