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Blumer's symbolic interactionism: Methodological implications.

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- BLUMER'S SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM:
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
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ANTHROPOLOGY IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
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ABSTRACT

Symbolic Interactionists maintain that a process of definition is inherent in all human interaction. This process is assumed, by Herbert Blumer and others, to be an indeterminate process. Some symbolic interactionists have argued that, because of this indeterminism, a different methodology from that used in the natural sciences is required for the analysis of human actions: others have suggested that symbolic interactionism cannot be a science.

This analysis has the following objectives:

1. The delineation of the major elements of Blumer's symbolic interactionism.

2. The analysis of the relationship between language, objects and distinctions.

3. The delineation of the major characteristics of covering-law explanations and the compatibility of these characteristics with the major elements of symbolic interactionism.

It will be shown, in the first chapter, that Blumer emphasizes the process of self-indication and that he does not differentiate between language and objects. It will also be shown that two presuppositions pervade Blumer's

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approach: 1) that man is capable of originative mental synthesis; and 2) that human social life is characterized by a subjective factor.

Blumer argues that, even when a 'situation' has a prescribed 'meaning', the process of self-indication enables an actor to reject, accept, or modify the prescribed 'meaning'. As a result of his emphasis upon the process of self-indication, Blumer gives little attention to the symbolic-nonsymbolic dichotomy, and none to the language-object dichotomy. To him, both language and objects are human constructs, as are moral principles. Blumer denies that symbolic interactionism cannot be a science and proposes two 'modes of inquiry': Exploration and Inspection. However, he asserts that complete descriptions may eliminate the need for theoretical schemes, and it is therefore suggested that he is ambivalent concerning the utility of theoretical explanations. It is also argued that he is equally ambivalent concerning the 'objectivity' of historical knowledge.

The second chapter explicates the process of making a distinction and analyzes its relationship to language and objects. Two usages of the term 'distinction' are delineated. Blumer, it is shown, argues that the actor

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can make private distinctions and, since Wittgenstein has argued against this, an attempt is made to evaluate Wittgenstein's argument. The analysis indicates that the process of making a distinction is a form of rule-following behavior.

The nature of language is examined in order to explicate the characteristics of rule-following actions and to ascertain the utility of the symbolic-nonsymbolic dichotomy. It is argued that logical principles are not derived from language, but are apriori. From this it is inferred that animals may use, or appear to use, some logical principles; and it is argued that animals do make distinctions. This, it is suggested, means that the symbolic-nonsymbolic dichotomy is of little significance in the study of human social behavior: everything is symbolic. The apriori nature of logical principles also indicates that the same logical principles can be observed in all societies.

The relationship between the Emic-Etic concepts and the two types of distinctions is briefly examined and a number of similarities are suggested.

The relationship between language and objects is examined and Blumer's non-differentiation of these two concepts is shown to be congruent with the analyses of Quine

and Wegner: words and objects are severally meaningless and only become significant when related to the total knowledge of the group. Quine's analysis shows that there is a 'systematic indeterminacy' concerning the empirical referents of all statements and it is argued that this places severe restrictions upon all ethnographic studies; the statements in any language are open to more than one interpretation.

The process of making a distinction is seen to involve the attachment of value to a distinction and it is argued that Blumer's assertion that moral principles are human constructs is congruent with the 'non-cognitive' meta-ethical approach to ethics. This approach is seen to present serious limitations upon the objectivity of historical knowledge.

The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the conscious-unconscious aspects of rule-following behavior. It is suggested that it is not essential that the actual decisions of the actor be conscious, providing that the actor has the ability to easily become aware of them.

The third chapter discusses the major characteristics of covering-law explanations and the compatibility of the major elements of symbolic interactionism to these

characteristics. It is acknowledged that there is a
continuing controversy among philosophers of science
as to the nature of scientific explanation. Hempel's
covering-law model is assumed, for the purpose of this
thesis, to be the most respected current theory of
scientific explanations. It is noted that Hempel was
striving to create a nonpragmatic model of scientific
explanation as had been developed in mathematics. Brief
reference is made to Popper's important distinction between
laws and trends, and to Ayer's distinction between 'gen-
eralizations of fact' and 'generalizations of law'.

Watanabe's Ugly Duckling Theorem is presented and it
is argued that his proof of the nonlogical nature of clas-
sification severely limits Hempel's model. It is also
argued that Watanabe's theorem precludes the development
of covering-law explanations which involve Emic descriptions.

It is suggested that this conclusion is congruent with
Peter Winch's assertion that a nomothetic science of human
behavior is impossible. Winch's arguments have received
many criticisms and some of these are examined in order to
ascertain the validity of his assertion. The criticisms
examined did not refute Winch's assertion insofar as it
concerned rule-governed behavior.

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The game of chess is used to illustrate some of the problems of developing covering-law explanations for rule-following behavior. Some of the problems of validation are also delineated. The extent to which social behavior is rule-governed is illustrated with an excerpt from M. Tumin.

The fourth chapter discusses briefly the various approaches that social scientists can use to analyze rule-governed behavior: covering-law models having been excluded. It is suggested that the primary task of social scientists is the delineation of behavior which is characterized as rule-following from that which is not. It is also suggested that the analysis of rule-governed behavior requires the use and knowledge of the various types of logic: symbolic, deontic and modal logic.

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PREFACE

Basic Orientation

The study of social phenomena has been approached in various ways(1N)[*]. Symbolic Interactionism refers to the approach that emphasizes that social behavior is built out of the joint actions of the actors(2N). Interactionism, a term covering a number of separate ways of studying social phenomena, has been sub-divided into nine schools: one of which is termed the Blumer school(3). This school focuses upon the more subjective aspects of social behavior and bases its approach upon the philosophical analyses of George Herbert Mead. It asserts that the appropriate methodology is the 'direct study' of social actions, e.g. participant observation(4). It maintains that a process of definition is inherent in all human interaction, and this process is seen as an indeterminate process in which the 'meaning' of an 'event' is not to be considered as intrinsic to the 'event', but is attached to the 'event' by the actor or actors(5N).

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[*] All reference numbers that have an N appended indicate that there is an elaboration at the end of the chapter. If there is no N, the number refers only to a citation.

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Statement of the Problem

The emphasis that Blumer places upon the indeterminacy of the process of definition has led to the charge that symbolic interactionism cannot be a science. Blumer has denied this charge, but his attitude toward theoretical explanations is ambivalent: he suggests that complete descriptions of a state of affairs may obviate the need for analytical explanations. His ambivalence may be a result of the argument, proposed by other scholars, that a nomothetic science of social behavior is impossible(6N).

The problem to be analyzed is whether the nature of symbolic interactionism, as delineated by Blumer, precludes theoretical explanations of a nomothetical form, thereby limiting the utility of nomothetic methodologies.

Objectives

1. The delineation of the major elements of Blumer's symbolic interactionism.

2. The analysis of the relationship between language, objects and distinctions.

3. The delineation of the major characteristics of covering-law explanations and the compatibility of these characteristics with the major elements of symbolic interactionism.

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NOTES: PREFACE

1. Alan Dawe suggests that all sociological research
   can be divided into two approaches: the Social
   System perspective and the Social Action perspec-
   tive. (Dawe, 1970:207-218).

2. Warshay, 1971:29.

3. Warshay, 1971:29. See also chapter I of this thesis.

4. Warshay, 1971:29.

5. Not all interactionists share this belief in the
   indeterminacy of the process of definition. See
   Manford H. Kuhn, 1970:49-59).

6. While the issue concerning determinism and free will
   cannot be discussed in this thesis, Ernest Nagel
   has suggested that determinism is desirable for
   scientific inquiry:
   > ...determinism can be regarded as a
   > fruitful maxim or regulative principle
   > for inquiry... if it is abandoned, then
   > inquiry in certain directions is, at
   > least temporarily, brought to a halt.
   > (Nagel, 1968:199).

CHAPTER I

BLUMER: SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

The term symbolic interactionism was introduced by
Herbert Blumer in 1937(1), and refers to a particular
approach to the study of human life(2). The principles
underlying this approach have been traced to G. Simmel
and M. Weber in Germany(3), and to George Herbert Nead,
John Dewey, W.I. Thomas, William James, Charles Norton
Cooley, Florian Znaniecki, Robert E. Park, James Mark
Baldwin, Robert Redfield and Louis Wirth in America(4N).
It has also been related to the writings of John Locke,
David Hume and G. Tarde(5). To the extent that symbolic
interactionism analyzes the nature of man and society,
its origins can be traced back to the earliest philoso-
phers(6N). The analyses of the philosophers were often
more speculative than empirical(7N).

There appears to be some disagreement among socio-
logists concerning the nature and scope of symbolic inter-
actionism, Swanson, in the International Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences, states that it "...refers to the
process by which individuals relate to their own minds or
the minds of others."(8). However, Blumer broadens its

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scope to include man's interaction with all 'objects', concrete or abstract, human or animal, animate or inanimate(9). Arnold Rose suggests that there are two kinds of environments: social and physical(10). Rose also delineates two strains of symbolic interaction theory: one is concerned with the study of the socialization of the child, the other studies social processes and social organizations(11N).

I have chosen to present Blumer's variation of symbolic interactionism because: 1) he coined the term; 2) he is considered one of the foremost exponents of this approach(12N); and 3) he is highly respected within sociology(13N). There are other contemporary sociologists who have proposed similar schemes and some of these will be referred to in this paper(14N).

Symbolic interactionism has been described as more of an orientation than a systematic theory(15). As an orientation it manifests several ambiguities(16N). This presentation of the principles of symbolic interaction will include some of Blumer's criticisms of other sociological approaches to the study of man and society. His criticisms, seen as definitions by negation, will allow a clearer delineation of his approach(17N).

This presentation of Blumer's approach will attempt to show the pervasive influence of two presuppositions. These are: 1) that man is capable of "originative mental synthesis"(18N) and 2) that human social life is uniquely characterized by a subjective factor(19N).

Blumer bases his theory on Mead's analysis of human group life(20N), and in Blumer's opinion, the "key feature in Mead's analysis is that the human being has a self"(21). He observes that there is nothing esoteric about the self (22N), and states that Mead postulated the "self" in order to allow the actor to be "the object of his own actions" (23). The ability to act towards himself is the "central mechanism" with which the actor deals with the world(24). It allows the actor to make indications to himself of the things in his surroundings(25). This process of indicating to himself is the equivalent of consciousness(26), and this ability emerges, along with the mind and the world of "objects", from human group life(27). Anything which the actor is conscious of is something which he is indicating to himself. If he is not indicating it to himself, he is not conscious of it(28). This emphasis upon consciousness leaves Blumer open to the criticism that he ignores the "unconscious" part of the self(29N). Blumer does admit

that there are rare cases in which there is no self-
indication, such as "the mood of melancholy, the craving
of a drug addict for narcotics, a burning rage and fright
in a panic". However, he claims that these states are
not characteristic of social interaction:

> (These) instances are not the pro-
> totype of human social interaction...
> (because) they stand in opposition to
> group life. If everyone expressed
> freely his felt tendencies and at-
> titudes, social life would become a
> state of anarchy(30N).

Blumer states that the self is not the same as the
ego. The ego would only be a self if it was reflexive.
Neither can the self be considered as some kind of organ-
ization of attitudes: "The reflexive process... alone can
yield and constitute a self"(31N). The possession of a
reflexive self allows the actor to interpret and organize
the world:

> ...he acts toward his world, in-
> terpreting what confronts him and
> organizing his actions on the basis
> of the interpretation(32).

The process of interpretation is also a process of
definition(33N), and this dual process involves attaching
meaning to something: that is, making it into an object
(34, see also 40N).

> ...objects are human constructs and
> not self-existing entities with in-
> trinsic natures(35N).

Blumer emphasizes that anything can be an "object", including ghosts, abstract moral principles, a mother, a priest, students, etc.(36N).

Blumer's use of the terms 'meaning' and 'object' is such that it is not possible to use one without implying the other; they seem to be synonyms:

> ...the environment consists <u>only</u> of
> the objects that the given human
> beings recognize and know. The
> nature of this environment is set
> by the meaning that the objects
> composing it have for those human
> beings(37).

The meanings are formed both by the process of social interaction(38) and by the individual actor(39), and because the actor may redefine the 'object' or situation, there is an inherent uncertainly concerning the 'meanings' or situations(40N). This indeterminacy can be seen to be the result of the "reflexive" property of the self; the "originative mental synthesis" of the actor.

The term "meaning" can also have an expressive sense, in addition to its referential sense. It would appear that when Blumer states that the actor "attaches meaning", he is referring to both the expressive and referential aspects of'meaning'. If this is the case, the criticism that

Mead (and thereby Blumer) ignored the role of affective
elements in social interaction is unwarranted(41). The
actor can, and apparently must, evaluate (appraise, judge,
assess) the 'object' each time he indicates it to himself
(42N). This process of evaluation would seem to determine
both the significance and the sentiments that are "attached"
to the 'object'(43N). He does state that attitudes, as
expressed in action, are a consequence of the process of
definition, in which he perceives:

> The vital dependency of the at-
> titude on the nature of the on-
> going interaction ...(44N).

Blumer's emphasis upon the primacy of the process of
self-interaction(45N) makes him very critical of theories
that use structural or cultural factors, such as values,
norms, roles, status demands, rules, reference group af-
filiation, institutional pressures or social system re-
quirements, as determinants of social action(46). These
factors may act as 'limits'(47) or frameworks within which
social action takes place(48) but even stable and repeti-
tive forms of social action do not occur automatically;
the processes of self indication and social interaction
are always present:

> What takes place in these two pro-
> cesses largely determines the sta-
> tus and fate of norms or rules;...
> (49N).

While he acknowledges that there are cases of "highly ritualistic" behavior, he suggests that these are not the prototype of human group life(50), except possibly in isolated primitive or peasant communities (51). It must be noted that the process of self-indication is itself a form of rule following, and that Blumer is therefore arguing against the determinate nature of rules that are external to the self.

Blumer does, however, refer to the 'historical dimensions' of social actions, but his statements conflict. In one case he asserts that it is invalid to isolate any form of social action from its 'historical linkage'(52), while in another he observes that ways of human living are "...seemingly products of historical experience"(53: my emphasis). It appears that he wants to show some historical continuity between social actions but is inhibited by his prior commitment to the primacy of the process of self-indication:

> It is highly important to recognize
> that the established patterns of
> group life just do not carry on by
> themselves but are dependent for
> their continuity on recurrent af-
> firmative definition(54).

> ...The career of joing actions also
> must be seen as open to many possi-
> bilities of uncertainty... one,

> joint actions have to be initiated -
> and they may not be. Two, once
> started, a joint action may be in-
> terrupted, abandoned, or trans-
> formed. Three...(55N).

Blumer acknowledges that the 'domain' of social science is the study of joint actions but insists that these joint actions must be seen as "an interlinkage of the separate acts of the participants"(56). Social action is the primary subject matter and society "must necessarily be seen in terms of the acting units that form it", rather than in terms of units, such as social classes that do not act(57N). And, for Blumer, one of the more important 'actions' is the process of self-indication(58N). He suggests, as has been noted, that the actions of the actor _may_ be limited by societal organizations, roles and historical linkages; but the degree of limitation is unclear(59N).

He does not distinguish the action of speaking from other types of action because both are symbolic, i.e. objects are as much human constructs as words(60N). Blumer discusses the distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic interaction in only three paragraphs(61), and he provides two examples of non-symbolic interaction: reflex responses, excluding a boxer who identifies ("reflectively") a forthcoming blow as a feint(62); and "unwitting" responses to

the tone of another's voice(63N). These two examples
suggest that the distinguishing characteristic of non-
symbolic interaction is that it is unconscious, and this
seems congruent with his stress upon consciousness. Very
few references to language occur in his writings(64N),
and I will attempt, in the following chapters, to show
that this is a consequence of his emphasis upon the pro-
cess of self-indication.

Social order is the result of "...the fitting to-
gether of acts to form joint actions"(65). This may oc-
cur for many reasons, including "sheer necessity". It
is not a case of the internalization of norms but of taking
the roles of others. "Social control becomes fundamentally
and necessarily a matter of self-control"(66N). The social
order, for Blumer, is characterized by continual change;
and this flux is a direct result of the actor's ability to
'reaffirm' a current 'definition of the situation'):

> Social change becomes a continuous
> indigenous process in human group
> life instead of an episodic result
> of extraneous facts playing on es-
> tablished structure(67N).

It is perhaps this aspect of symbolic interactionism
that has led some critics to state that it cannot be a
science. Blumer observes that this is an "astounding
charge"(68), and suggests that these critics have a

"profound misunderstanding of both scientific inquiry and symbolic interactionism"(69). He outlines two modes of inquiry: "exploration" and "inspection". The major requirement of both of these methods is "a return to the empirical social world"(70). Exploratory research would give an accurate description of some area of social life and this, Blumer states, may be enough to answer theoretical questions, or to eliminate the need for a theory:

> ...the fuller descriptive account it (exploration) yields will frequently give an adequate explanation of what was problematic <u>with-out the need of invoking any theory or proposing any analytical scheme</u>(71N: my brackets and emphasis).

Blumer's minimization of the value of analytical schemes, illustrated in this quotation, will be shown in a subsequent chapter, to be a result of his emphasis upon the "process of self-indication".

The "inspection"mode of inquiry involves analysis to discover "generic relationships" and "discriminating analytical elements" (i.e. concepts)(72). This mode of inquiry, "inspection", is proposed in one of his more recent publications. In earlier essays he has asserted that no generic relationships have been discovered yet by sociologists ("Sociological Analysis and the 'Variable'"), and that there

are no concepts with fixed denotations in sociology"(What is wrong with Social Theory)." In the latter essay, he suggested that "definite concepts" were not suited to the study of social phenomena(73N).

As was noted, Blumer distinguishes between symbolic interactionism and other theoretical approaches which also acknowledges that human life is characterized by a sub-jective factor. The major difference is that symbolic interactionism attributes the source of "meaning" to <u>both</u> the process of social interaction and the process of self-indication:

> The meaning of a thing for a person
> grows out of the ways in which other
> persons act towards the person with
> regard to the thing...(74)

To this extent symbolic interactionism is congruent with other approaches, such as that of Max Weber. However, Blumer also observes:

> ...it is a mistake to think that
> the use of meaning by a person is
> but an application of the meaning
> so derived. This mistake seriously
> mars the work of many scholars who
> otherwise follow the symbolic in-
> teractionist approach... the use of
> meanings by the actor occurs through
> <u>a process of interpretation</u>........
> The actor selects, checks, suspends,
> regroups and transforms the mean-
> ings... Accordingly, interpretation
> should not be regarded as a mere
> automatic application of established
> meanings, but as a formative pro-
> cess...(75).

Blumer's approach can be compared with the following statement by Robert A. Stebbins in an article entitled "Studying the Definition of the Situation: Theory and Field Research Strategies":

> ...For classes of actors within
> an identity, what <u>predispositions</u>
> are activated by <u>elements</u> in the
> ongoing setting that lead to the
> selection of one of these defini-
> tions instead of another?(76: my
> emphasis).

Stebbins appears to be using a stimulus-response approach: and implicitly denies that there is any "formative process" by the actor. This is not symbolic interactionism as defined by Blumer. Blumer explicitly denies that the self is a collection of 'predispositions' or attitudes (see note 31), and insists that there are no fixed 'elements' in the social world that 'activate' that self in any determinate manner:

> The process of self-indication
> by means of which human action
> is formed cannot be accounted
> for by factors which precede
> the act(77).

This presentation of Blumer's approach has, at times, ignored some of his statements that appeared to conflict with the main trend of his argument. For example, he asserts, at one point, that it is important that the researcher discover how the actors see their "key objects":

> The depiction of key objects that
> emerge from such accounts should
> ...be subject to...critical dis-
> cussion by a group of well-in-
> formed participants in the given
> world. This latter procedure is
> a genuine "must" to guard against
> the admitted deficiencies of in-
> dividual accounts(78).

The use of the word "key" in the above statement implies that there are such 'things' as "key objects", and suggests that if the researcher manages to 'depict' them he will have noted something 'solid', 'real' or 'permanent' about that group. In itself the statement is innocuous, but in conjunction with Blumer's emphasis upon the process of self-indication it is incongruous. For instance, he has stated:

> ...to presume that a knowledge of an
> attitude toward an object in one sit-
> uation foretells action toward that
> object in a different kind of situat-
> ion is to seriously misunderstand and
> misrepresent the nature of human act-
> ions(79).

In other words, key objects are only key objects relative to particular situations. Elsewhere he asserts:

> Objects have no fixed status except
> as their meaning is sustained...
> nothing is more apparent than that
> objects in all categories can under-
> go change in their meaning...human
> group life is a process in which ob-
> jects are being created, affirmed,
> transformed, and cast aside(80: my
> emphasis).

The major problem, then, is not the <u>description</u> of the "key objects" of a group at any one time, although this does present difficulties, but the theoretical status of these "key objects": objects which can be "cast aside" at any time, and which <u>will be</u> "cast aside" at·some time. The problem is to develop a theoretical scheme which will explain which "key objects" will be cast aside, when this will occur, the order in which it will occur, and which other objects will become "key objects". The answer to this problem hinges upon the relationship between objects and the process of self-indication.

The process of self-indication is a process in which the actor indicates something to himself, and all humans have this ability to make indications to themselves. The major point of his argument is that the actors cannot <u>not</u> indicate to themselves: there is a "meaningless infinity of the world process" and the act of 'perceiving' one 'thing' in this "infinity" is an act of self-indication. As long as we speak of an actor 'acting', rather than of chaotic or purposeless movements, we must acknowledge that the process of self-indication is continuously operating, and that the actions can only be classed as 'actions' when there is some order or value perceived in them.

The ability to indicate to oneself can also be described as the ability to make distinctions: to indicate something to oneself is to distinguish one 'thing' from the 'infinity' of things. It must, however, be recognized that there are no 'things' 'out there'. For example, there are no 'things' like 'trees' 'out-there': the actor creates the 'tree' and creates the 'edges' or 'boundaries' of the 'tree' which separate the 'tree' from the "meaningless infinity of the world process". It is because that 'tree' is a creation of the actor that it has 'meaning': the actor chose to create 'it' rather than something else, or nothing, and by his action he has affirmed that 'it' has significance. The action of indicating must involve the exclusion of the majority of the 'meaningless infinity of the world process'. To make a distinction is to distinguish something and it is a logical contradiction to assert that what is distinguished is of the same order of significance as that from which it is distinguished. "Man exists in action", Blumer affirms, and an action is not purposeless, it is an expression of the assessment of the situation made by the process of self-indication: actions are the result of the process of self-indication, and are therefore expressions of an evaluation.

Blumer, in differentiating his approach from other approaches that also emphasize the existence of a subjective factor in social behavior, denies that language determines the way in which actors see objects. He argues forcibly that the 'meaning' that is attached to any object or situation is not determined by any pre-existing factors: and such factors would include language. It is generally believed that there is some kind of determinate, or fixed, relationship between an object and a word: this is a relationship·that is clearly indicated in most discussions of "ostensive definitions". Blumer's argument obviously modifies this relationship, and the following chapter will attempt to further explicate the process of self-indication, and to corroborate Blumer's argument concerning the relationship between language and objects, by presenting some congruent arguments of other scholars.

NOTES: Chapter I

1.   Blumer, 1969b:1N.

2.   Blumer, 1969b:1.

3.   Rose, 1962:3.

4.   Blumer: 1969b:1.   Don Martindale adds Ernst Cassirer,
     Jean Piaget, Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills to the list
     of contributors. (Martindale: The Nature and Types of
     Sociological Theory, pp 339-375).

5.   Manis and Meltzer, 1970:V, 46.

6.   Cooley, one of the major proponents of this approach
     titled one of his books: Human Nature and the Social
     Order.

7.   Mead's writings have been characterized this way.   See
     Manis and Meltzer, 1970:5,6,22, and Blumer:61.

8.   Swanson: (I.E.S.S.) 441, Vol.5.

9.   Blumer, 1969b:10.

10. Rose, 1962:5.

11. Rose, 1962:8.   Leon H. Warshay distinguishes 9 varieties
     of "interactionism", the first being "the Blumer school".
     (Warshay:1971:29).

12. Manis and Meltzer, 1971:vi.   Devereux has suggested that
     in analyzing a theory the substance of the theory is
     more relevant than its origins:
               For it seems to me that when one is
               discussing a scientific theory, it
               is its substance rather than its or-
               igins that ought to be the main fo-
               cus of attention.   (Devereux Jr.,
               1964:4).

13. In 1939 he was invited by the Social Science Research
     Council to write the first of a series of works en-
     titled "Critiques of Research in the Social Sciences".
     He was editor of "The American Journal of Sociology"

from 1941-1952. He was president of the "Society for the Study of Social Problems" in 1954. In 1955 he was president of the American Sociological Association, and from 1962-1966 he was vice-president of the International Sociological Association.

14. Sociologists such as McIver, Bolton, Becker and Kuhn. Manford H. Kuhn states that the last twenty-five years has seen the development of numerous sub-theories "going by a variety of names other than symbolic interactionism". He mentions the following sub-theories: role theory, reference group theory, social perception theories, self theory, dramatergical theories, interpersonal theory of H.S. Sullivan, and the Language and culture orientation of Sapir-Whorf-Cassirer. (Manfred H. Kuhn:1970:48-59) Kuhn classifies some of these sub-theories as 'determinate', and Blumer may be referring to these when he observed that it is a mistake to assume that "... the use of meaning by a person is but an application of the meaning so derived (from social interaction). This mistake seriously mars the work of many scholars who otherwise follow the symbolic interactionist approach". (Blumer,1969b:5, my emphasis).

15. Manis and Meltzer, 1970:1, Manfred H. Kuhn, 1970:51.

16. Manfred H. Kuhn, 1970:48-52. He notes that the confusion can be summed up as a contradiction between determinacy and indeterminacy "in Mead's overall point of view"(48).

17. Many of Blumer's essays include some statements concerning methodology. These are frequently found in conjunction with criticisms of other "conventional" methods.

18. This term appears in Cooley's "The Roots of Social Knowledge": 80. Blumer refers to a "creative process". (Blumer, 1969b:135).

19. Blumer, 1969b:118,119,125. He notes that the term 'subjective' can be used in at least two ways. One, the legitimate use, in his opinion, which acknowledges that social action has 'meaning' for the participants; and the "worst kind of subjectivism"

in which the observer uses his own concepts and
categories in describing the behavior of the
actors (p 86,74,51)

A number of other sociologists have also stres-
sed that human behavior can only be understood when
we have knowledge of what the participants consider
to be significant. Max Weber states:

> ...knowledge of <u>cultural</u> events is
> inconceivable except on the basis
> of the significance which the con-
> crete constellations of reality
> have for us in certain individual
> situations.........................
> "Culture" is a finite segment of
> the meaningless infinity of the
> world process, a segment on which
> human <u>beings</u> confer meaning and
> significance. (Weber,1949:80-81).

Blumer acknowledges that others have emphasized the
subjective aspect of human behavior, (p 79), but he
claims that symbolic interactionism sees 'meaning'
as having a different source (Blumer, 1969b:3).

This view can easily lead to extreme positions. For
example, Cooley has stated that: "the imaginations
people have of one another are the solid facts of so-
ciety" (quoted by Martindale: 347): and Ernst Cassirer
observed: "Man does not live in a world of hard facts
... He lives rather in the midst of imaginary emo-
tions, in hopes and fears... in his fantasies and
dreams" (Cassirer, 1944:25). Blumer is aware that
this appears to be solipsistic and argues that it is
not so because the "empirical world can't talk back' to
our picture of it..." (Blumer, 1969b:22).

20. Blumer, 1969b:1,8,78,79,82. Although he makes many
references to Mead, I do not wish to imply that all
Mead's ideas have been adopted by Blumer. Blumer
recently published a book (1969) entitled <u>Symbolic</u>
<u>Interactionism</u>: <u>Perspective</u> <u>and</u> <u>Method</u>. Since this
is his most recent work, other than an article on
Fashion, I have based most of my analysis on it.

21. Blumer, 1969b:79.

22. Blumer, 1969b:12. He speaks of the 'self' mainly in terms of its function. In only one sentence does he refer to the composition of the 'self' in terms of the "I" and "Me" of Mead (p 111). There is an extensive body of philosophical literature concerning the nature of mind, minds, self and consciousness. A brief over-view is presented by Joseph Hospers in An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, 2nd edition, 1953,1957. A lucid discussion concerning 'minds' is presented by John Wisdom, 1949; Other Minds.

23. Blumer, 1969b:12,62,79.

24. Blumer, 1969b:80.

25. Blumer, 1969b:80; see also: 5,13,14,15,49,62,63,81,82, 83,85,96,97,111.

26. Blumer, 1969b:13.

27. Blumer, 1969b:61.

28. Blumer, 1969b:80; see also: 13.

29. Meltzer thus criticizes Mead's analysis. Manis and Meltzer, 1970:22.

30. Blumer, 1969b:97. Blumer states that the participants involved in social interaction have to "... arrest, reorganize or adjust their own intentions, wishes, feelings and attitudes" (66: my emphasis, see also: 82, 83,96,111,113). If all wishes and attitudes have to be 'adjusted' their origin would seem to be irrelevant for Blumer's theory. It seems that the 'unconscious' only becomes significant in social interaction if the actor is unable to 'adjust' his attitudes. Such a state would be seen as pathological.

31. Blumer, 1969b:63. He devotes one essay to an attack on the belief that attitudes determine action: 90-100. See also: 63,83,112,113,81,65.

32. Blumer, 1969b:63.

33. Blumer, 1969b: 132, see also: 10,12,13,17,53,55,56,
    66,67,79. Blumer also uses the term "interpret" to
    refer to the process whereby the actors involved in
    interaction: "...build up their respective lines of
    conduct by constant interpretation of each other's
    ongoing lines of action". (p 66)

34. Blumer, 1969b:80, see also: 49,134.

35. Blumer, 1969b:68, see also: 134. This definition
    would seem to imply that attitudes, wishes and sen-
    timents are also 'objects': "An object... is...
    anything that an individual indicates to himself"
    (80). The individual does indicate his attitudes
    to himself when he modifies them (see note 30).

36. Blumer, 1969b:10. This would seem to imply that
    moral principles, being 'objects' and hence 'human
    constructs' are not derived from any source other
    than the self.

37. Blumer, 1969b:11, also: 69.

38. Blumer, 1969b:59, also: 11,12,17,19,67,69,71,132
    and note 19.

39. Blumer, 1969b:5, also: 71,86,110,111,132.

40. Blumer, 1969b:135, also: 72,110,111,164-165. The
    structure of my sentence in the text is awkward be-
    cause it is not legitimate to refer to the 'meaning
    of objects', since 'meaning' and 'object' are both
    human constructs and are, it seems, synonymous (p
    11). It is not always clear whether Blumer always
    uses the term 'object' as he defined it, or whether
    he sometimes uses it in the standard way; referring
    to things 'out-there'. See also quotation in text
    re 'recurrent affirmation' (note 54).

41. Manis and Meltzer, 1970:22.

42. Blumer, 1969b:110. The following references do not
    specify that the actor 'must' evaluate. The state-
    ments usually just say that he does: 5,13,16,18,49,
    53,55,62,63,80,64,69,81,85,86,95,96,97,98,111,114,
    115. See note 30 concerning the actor's evaluation
    and control of attitudes.

43. Perhaps only the relative degree of sentiment is at-
tached. Blumer does not state that the actor can
'create' sentiments such as love and hate. He does
say that such sentiments can be rejected (p 81).

44. Blumer, 1969b:113, also: 81,94-97. Whenever the actor
is engaged in social interaction, there is also oc-
curring a process of self-interaction (p 111). He dis-
cusses the dependency of attitudes only in relation to
the subsequent actions of the actor. He does not ex-
plicitly refer to the 'existence' of attitudes; that
is, to their ontological status. To do so would in-
volve him in the problem of how we know the content of
'other minds' when there are no physical clues (see
note 22). He has frequently noted that concepts such
as 'attitude' and 'sentiment' have no clear empirical
reference. See pages 91,92,130,145, and the foot-note
on p 45 for statements concerning the empirical re-
ferents of attitudes. See pages 33,45,129,143,146,
173 for his statements about concepts and empirical
referents.

45. "Social scientists and psychologists are invited, in-
deed beseeched, to observe their own social action
and see if this is not true". (Blumer, 1969b:55, my
emphasis).

46. Blumer, 1969b:14,15,16,18,19,30,53,57,59,65,66,73,74,
75,76,83,87,106,107,114,115,116,127-139.

47. Blumer, 1969b:58.

48. Blumer, 1969b:87.

49. Blumer, 1969b:59, also: 17,18,67,71,75,86,106,110,
115,134. He does state that 'structure', i.e. roles,
norms, values, etc., are important, but: "...only as
they enter into the process of interpretation and de-
finition..." (p 75). He does not explain this state-
ment except to note that there are ritualistic rela-
tions. He does assert that organizations supply
"fixed sets of symbols"(p 88).
See also subsequent quotation re 'recurrent affirma-
tion' (footnote 54).

50. Blumer, 1969b:115, also: 75.

51. Blumer, 1969b:88.

52. Blumer, 1969b:20.

53. Blumer, 1969b:106. Additional references to 'history;
    are made on pp 47,60,71,77,193.

54. Blumer, 1969b:67, also: 18.

55. Blumer, 1969b:71. There is also the problem of deter-
    mining 'which history' he is referring to, i.e. the use
    of 'the'history of a social movement (p 47), or 'its'
    history (p 20) would seem to assume that there are
    historical 'facts' or 'events'. which have the same
    'meaning' (or significance) to all people. Yet this
    appears to conflict with the basic postulate that
    'objects' are created by individuals: "An object may
    have a different meaning for different individuals"
    (p 11); (or groups, p 69)

56. Blumer, 1969b:17, see also: 8,12,13,15,16,18,20,49,50,
    54,56,57,59,64-68,70-77,86,87,90-.00.

57. Blumer, 1969b:85. He states that Mead saw the social
    act as the fundamental unit of society (p 70, also p
    8). He also states:
    > A cardinal principle of symbolic
    > interactionism is that any empirical-
    > ly oriented scheme of human society,
    > however derived, must respect the
    > fact that in the first and last
    > instances human society consists of
    > people engaging in action (p7).
    Blumer does not, however, provide criteria to distinguish
    one 'act' from another 'act', or 'act' from 'acts'.

58. Blumer, 1969b:13. He also states: "Fundamentally, action
    on the part of a human being consists of taking account
    of various things he notes..." (p 15, see also p 83).

59. Blumer uses the term 'action' to refer to both overt
    physical actions, which would include speech, and co-
    vert actions, such as 'self-indications'. This is per-
    haps why there are no clearly defined limitations in
    his presentation. The process of 'self-indication'
    would seem to have no limitations, except logical ones,
    such as round-squares, etc. I may, for example, define
    myself as Napoleon Bonaparte, although if I also present

this definition to the world the consequences may be other than I expected.

Overt physical actions appear to be more restricted; I am, for example, unable to levitate, unable to travel from Canada to Australia in less than a certain period of time, and unable to live on air. In this sense we can say that there are cultural universals; e.g. all humans eat, no human levitates. We could also perhaps specify the necessary chemical composition of the stuff that all humans must ingest. However, we could not say that all humans evaluate the edibility of their environment by the same criteria; there are variations from culture to culture. We, for example, do not eat rats. Blumer refers to this cultural variations when he states that while 'attitudes' and 'feelings' are "...presumably present and in operation in all human societies" there are many societies in which some particular form of expression of an 'attitude' is absent (he is referring to the phenomena of "Fashion': Blumer:"Fashion,"285). Furthermore, as Steward has observed, behavior which is universal must have a different explanation than behavior which varies from culture to culture. (Steward, 1970:8f).

60. Blumer's view differs sharply from the common view that "actions speak louder than words". R.M. Hare expressed this view in "The Language of Morals":

> If we were to ask a person 'What are his moral principles?' The way in which we would be most sure of a true answer would be by studying what he <u>did</u>. (Hare; 1952:1).

Blumer might, however, point out that this is merely the way one group evaluates the relative significance of action versus speech (see note 55).

61. Blumer, 1969b: 8-9, 66-67.

62. Blumer, 1969b:8.

63. Blumer, 1969b:66. Non-symbolic interaction appears to involve a logical contradiction.

64. "The word, then, is a symbol of a given process of conception. By reason of its verbal or symbolic character, ..." (Blumer, 1969b:159). This would seem to indicate that Blumer equates 'verbal' with 'symbolic'.

65. Blumer, 1969b:76.

66. Blumer, 1969b:77. This suggests that the most basic reason is fear: fear that one might not survive if one ignores the wishes of others. The concepts in the following quotation do not emphasize any form of altruism:

> The participants may fit their acts
> to one another in orderly joint
> actions on the basis of compromise,
> out of _duress_, because they may _use_
> _one_ _another_ in achieving their
> respective ends, because it is the
> sensible thing to do, or out of
> sheer necessity. (Blumer, 1969b:
> 76, my emphasis) Cf quotation
> (footnote 30) on page 4 of this
> thesis.

67. Blumer, 1969b:77. The concept 'action' connotes movement and change: "...human groups or society _exists_ _in_ action" (Blumer, 1969b:6).

68. Blumer, 1969b: 48.

69. Blumer, 1969b: 49.

70. Blumer, 1969b: 34. The phrase is repeated twice on this page. Similar proposals appear on pages: 21,23,27,33, 35,37,38,47,49,55,60.

71. Blumer, 1969b: 42. It is not clear how distinctions can reduce the need for explanations, e.g. a description can answer the question "What's going on here?" but only if it is an elliptical explanation - an "explanation-sketch". If there is a valid difference between descriptions and explanations, and Hempel assumes that there is, as will be discussed in Chapter III, then no description can eliminate the need for explanations.

72. Blumer, 1969b:.43. Cf. "Concepts, which in the last analysis are our analytical elements", p 45.

73. Both of these essays are reprinted in his latest book: _Symbolic_ _Interactionism:_ _Perspective_ _and_ _Method_. "Sociological Analysis and the 'Variable'", pp 127-139.

73. For his statement about <u>generic</u> see p 129. "What is Wrong with Social Theory?", pp 140-152. For his statement concerning fixed denotation see p 147.

74. Blumer, 1969b:4.

75. Blumer, 1969b:5.

76. Stebbins, 1969:208.

77. Blumer, 1969b:82.

78. Blumer, 1969b:52.

79. Blumer, 1969b:96.

80. Blumer, 1969b:12.

CHAPTER II

DISTINCTIONS, LANGUAGE AND OBJECTS

In the preceding chapter, it was observed that the 'meanings' that are attached to objects or situations have two sources: 1) the process of social interaction (see footnote 38, chapter I) and 2) the process of self-indication of the individual actor (see footnote 39, chapter I). However, Blumer emphasizes that the primary source of 'meaning' is the individual: social actions are joint actions built out of the interlinkage of the separate acts of the participants (see footnote 56, chapter I). The emphasis is, therefore, upon the private 'meanings' that the individual attaches to objects and it is these private 'meanings' that may become joint 'meanings' if others reaffirm them. Of course, if there exists a group of people, rather than an aggregate, there will be shared 'meanings' as shared 'meanings' are often one of the defining characteristics of groups. This is not to deny that children learn the 'meanings' of sounds from adults: sounds that have shared 'meanings'. But, as Humpty Dumpty suggested to Alice: 'words' can mean whatever one wants them to mean.

It was also observed that Blumer denies that 'meanings' are determined by pre-existing factors; and it was suggested

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that the relationship between the 'status' of objects
and the process of self-indication is a crucial factor
that must be considered in all explanations of social be-
havior.

Blumer's position can be contrasted with the fol-
lowing assertion of Winch, a scholar who also sees that
social behavior is characterized by a subjective factor:

> Our idea of what belongs to the
> realm of reality is given for us
> in the language that we use. The
> concepts that we have <u>settle</u> for
> us the form of the experience we
> have of the world. (1, my emphasis)

Winch's statement ignores the existence of the pro-
cess of self-indication and implies that once the researcher
has learnt the 'language' of a group he will also know how
that group perceives 'reality'. While it appears, at first
sight, that a knowledge of the group's "concepts" will show
the researcher how that group views 'reality', or at least
will show the limits within which their view of 'reality'
can be perceived, it is not clear how the introduction of the
'process of self-indication' modifies this relationship be-
tween language and objects.

This chapter will attempt to delineate more precisely
the concept 'process of self-indication', examine its re-
lationship to language, and delineate the ways in which it
modifies the language-object relationship.

It will be argued that the ability used to make self-indications is the same as that used to make discriminations, and the same as that used to make distinctions; and that these actions are all forms of rule-following behavior. Two uses of the term 'distinction' will be delineated and these will be shown to be similar to the usage of the terms Emic and Etic.

The relationship between logical rules and language will be discussed, and it will be argued that some logical rules are apriori; and that consequently all actions will be perceived as employing the same logic. This renders the symbolic-nonsymbolic dichotomy void for the study of social behavior. It will be shown that no unique relationship can be ascertained to exist between 'words' and 'objects' and that, although it is necessary to learn the language of the group, it is impossible to eliminate some indeterminacy of 'meaning' of any statement within the language: the mapping of their 'cognitive structure' must be equally indeterminate.

Blumer's assertion that moral principles are human constructs will be shown to be congruent with the anti-naturalistic 'noncognitive' meta-ethical theories of ethics.

However, before proceeding with the analysis as outlined, it is necessary to note that Wittgenstein has argued against the possibility of a private language and against

the idea of private objects:

> Always get rid of the idea of the
> private object in this way: assume
> that it constantly changes, but
> that you do not notice the change
> because your memory constantly de-
> ceives you. (2N)

Wittgenstein's discussion of the concept 'private language' involves an analysis of what it means to follow a rule. Language is considered to be a form of rule-governed behavior; language game(3). The possibility of a private language is dependent upon the possibility of private rules.

Wittgenstein's argument against the idea of a private language can perhaps be circumvented by differentiating between 'use' and 'mention'. That is, the difference between an actor's 'use' of a private language and our 'mention' (talk) of the actor's use(4N).

Wittgenstein's argument is directed against a particular kind of private language: a language that is not only not understood by anyone else, but that <u>cannot</u> be understood by anyone other than the speaker (5). This restriction seems unusual as it would at first sight appear that we could arrive at some understanding of the actor's private language by just observing the situations of his utterances (6N). Wittgenstein attempts to refute

this suggestion by presenting an analysis of the concept
'rule'. His analysis rests upon the intersubjective prin-
ciple of verification. To talk meaningfully of rules, it
is necessary that it should be possible (in principle) to
verify our statements:

> The proof that I am following
> a rule must appeal to some-
> thing independent of my im-
> pression that I am (7)

Wittgenstein illustrates the necessity of this con-
dition by stating that the concept 'rule' is logically re-
lated to the concept 'mistake': a rule is something that
can be followed correctly or incorrectly, and if there is
no way of proving whether someone is following a rule cor-
rectly or not, it is meaningless to talk of 'rules'(8).
He also argues that it is not possible to use one memory
to verify another. He gives as an example the act of re-
collecting the departure time of a train, and asks whether
the recollection can be checked by recalling a memory of a
page of the time table:

> ...this process has got to pro-
> duce a memory which is actually
> correct. If the mental image of
> the time table could not be
> tested for correctness, how
> could it confirm the correct-
> ness of the first memory? (9)

Wittgenstein differentiates between 'thinking' that
one is following a rule, and 'obeying' a rule:

> And to _think_ one is obeying a
> rule is not to obey a rule.
> Hence it is not possible to
> obey a rule 'privately'; other-
> wise thinking one was obeying a
> rule would be the same thing as
> obeying it. (10)

Wittgenstein's argument can now be seen to rest upon the concept of 'proof': a proof is only a proof if it is intersubjectively verifiable (11). If we now stipulate, as he does, that a private language is only a private language if it is _not intersubjective_, the private language is not open to this type of proof (see footnote 11N).

It should be noticed that in the last quotation, Wittgenstein does not argue against the possibility that an actor may _think_ that he is following a rule, nor that the actor may _believe_ that he is correctly following a private rule; but only that neither we nor he can verify it (intersubjectively).

Wittgenstein's argument relies heavily upon the belief that memories can be false, and this is obviously often the case. However, it must also be acknowledged that an individual's memory is not entirely capricious; if it were, there would be no principle of intersubjectivity. This principle itself rests upon the belief that memory is reliable most of the time for most people.

Wittgenstein's argument, therefore, does not elimi-
nate the possibility that an actor can redefine a situation
or create a private object. It does show that, over a
period of time, an actor may recall that definition 'false-
ly', i.e. in a way that we, as observers (with a perfect
memory?), but not the actor, see as inconsistent with his
original definition.

Blumer asserts that the actor, by means of the pro-
cess of self-indication, attaches 'meaning' to objects:

> The nature of an object - of any
> and every object - consists of
> the meaning that it has for the
> person for whom it is an object.
> (12)

And, since objects have no intrinsic 'meanings', if
the actor ceases to attach significance to 'it', then 'it'
ceases to be an object: it becomes indistinguishable from
the "meaningless infinity of the world process". The pro-
cess of creating an object, or of attaching 'meaning', is
therefore a process which involves 'selecting' some aspect
of the 'meaningless infinity' and, at the same time, at-
taching some 'meaning' to 'it'. The actor distinguishes
that which is itself undistinguished. If we ignore the
apparent solipsism it will be as equally valid to assert
that the actor makes a distinction as it is to assert that
he indicates something to himself. It is because the term

'something' occurs in English after the verb 'indicate' that there is a tendency to assume that some 'thing' is just waiting 'out-there' to be indicated. The advantage of using the phrase 'make a distinction' is that it does not make such a forceful ontological commitment. In ordinary usage the term 'distinction' refers to discriminations that people make; and it is often acknowledged that the distinctions that one person makes may not be shared by another.

It will be assumed in this thesis that the process of making a distinction is the same as the process of self-indication: that both are a result of an inherent capacity (13N).

The concept 'distinction' can be used in at least two different ways: ways that correspond to the two different sources of 'meanings' that Blumer delineates. It can be used to refer to those aspects of the 'meaningless infinity' ... that a group has distinguished and for which it has coined names, e.g. if a group distinguishes between what we call 'cats' and 'dogs', they will, in all probability, have distinct 'words' to name these 'objects'. It is this usage that Winch speaks of in the quotation on page 28: these shared 'meanings' of a group. The Ethnosemanticists refer to these distinctions as Emic distinctions:

>Emic statements refer to logico-
>empirical systems whose phenomenal
>distinctions or 'things' are built
>up out of contrasts and discrimi-
>nations significant, meaningful,
>real, accurate, or in some other
>fashion, regarded as appropriate
>by the actors themselves. (14)

The second usage of the term 'distinction' refers to the individual's act of making a distinction: a distinction that need not have previously been made by other members of the group. This act, however, has two aspects: a _cognitive_ aspect and an _emotive_ aspect. The former aspect is apparent in the action of making 'stipulative definitions': the introduction of new terms, say in science, which replace long descriptive statements (15N). The second aspect of 'making a distinction' refers to the action of attaching significance (emotive) to some 'thing'. One way of understanding this usage of the term 'distinction' is to note that, according to some philosophers, no value or moral prescription can be inferred from any factual description (16N). Therefore, when an actor makes a distinction, he is saying (to himself at least) that something is noteworthy; he is carrying out a process of grading (17N). Blumer emphasizes that the actor _must_ appraise every situation in order to be able to act, or to continue acting (18N). In a similar vein, Rescher argues that in order for an actor to plan his future actions he, the

actor, <u>must</u> evaluate alternatives which are mutually ex-
clusive (19).

The cognitive aspect of the second usage of the term
'distinçtion' is similar to the Ethnosemanticists' usage
of the term Etic:

> Etic statements depend upon pheno-
> menal distinctions judged approp-
> riate by the community of scientific
> observers. Etic statements cannot
> be falsified if they do not conform
> to the actor's notion of what is
> significant, real, meaningful, or
> appropriate. (20)

If we allow the other group, the 'community of scienti-
fic observers', to consist of only one person (a singleton
set), then Etic distinctions correspond to the distinctions
drawn by an individual actor; and, in effect, involve an
alternate 'redefinition' of the situation by an observer-
actor. It should be noted that in those cases where the
'redefinition' of the situation agrees with the definition
of the situation agrees with the definition of the situation
gigen by the group he is studying, the Emic-Etic dichotomy
fuses. For instance, if a scientific observer studies his
fellow scientific observers, and uses their conceptual
scheme in his analysis, there is no difference between Etic
and Emic (21N).

The two uses of the term 'distinction' delineated will be called 'distinction A' and 'distinction B'. The term 'distinction B' will be used, unless otherwise indicated, to refer to both the cognitive and emotive aspects of making a distinction. The rejection of an existing distinction will also be considered as a case of 'making a distinction'. Since there are no intrinsic distinctions, it would be inappropriate to say that an actor 'failed' to make a distinction (22N). The use of the term 'fail' would also not be congruent with Blumer's emphasis upon the process of self-indication. These uses of the term 'distinction' and the use of the terms Emic and Etic, imply that it is often possible to describe, or perceive, some 'state of affairs' in more than one way. For example, Edward Sapir observed that an anthropologist would misdescribe an 'event' if he was not aware of those aspects of it which were 'meaningful' to the natives:

> He will find interesting what the
> natives take for granted... and he
> will utterly fail to observe the
> crucial turning points in the
> course of the action that gives
> formal significance to the whole
> ... (23)

In more general terms some philosophers, such as Thomas Kuhn, state that any 'event' can be described in at least two ways (24).

If it is the case that an 'event' or an 'action' can be described in more than one way, it is possible that the 'logic' of the 'event' can also vary. It has been argued that the principles of logic arise, in some way, out of the rules of language, i.e. that linguistic rules entail logical principles (25), and since linguistic rules can vary, the logical rules might also vary. For example, Kenneth Burke suggests that our concept of negation is derived from language:

> ... dramatism is devoted to a stress
> upon the all-importance of the nega-
> tive as a specifically linguistic
> invention...(26, my emphasis)

The belief that language rules entail logical rules appears to commit us to the view that there could be a 'pre-logical' language (27N). This opinion was at one time proposed by Levi-Bruhl, and has recently been proposed by Paul Watzlawick. He differentiates two codes of communication: verbal and non-verbal, and describes non-verbal codes as analogic. He asserts that analogic codes are unable to express negatives and are therefore ambiguous. He illustrates this by observing that a clenched fist can indicate either anger or restraint, tears can be of sorrow or joy, and a smile may convey sympathy or contempt (28).

The view that logical principles are derived from our language rules has been called 'linguistic-conventionalism', and this position has been supported by P.F. Strawson (29). An alternative position, proposed by David Mitchell and others, is that logical principles are 'a priori': unlearnt and therefore unteachable (30). The difference between these two theories is considerable and neither has a clear superiority. However, Mitchell's is more congruent with the arguments of Blumer and Quine and is therefore presented here.

One way of expressing the difference between these two positions is to ask, is it _necessary_, or merely contingent, that a language have incompatible predicates? That is, _do_ _we_ decide whether or not there are to be boundaries limiting the applicability of predicate words, in addition to deciding where they are to be drawn. Mitchell's argument is that boundaries are necessary, although we decide where the boundary is to be:

> ... if a word were applicable to anything whatever, it would be useless for the purposes of description.
> ....
> ... boundaries for the application of words are and must be drawn somewhere. (31)

Mitchell observes that the linguistic-convention-alism theory require that negative propositions constitute a type of affirmative propositions, and he asserts that this argument is unacceptable (32).

Using Blumer's terminology we can ask, is it possible for an actor to indicate something to himself and yet in so doing not exclude what he indicates from the "meaningless infinity of the world process?" Mitchell states:

> Negation cannot be explained away:
> it is implicit in all determinate
> thought whatsoever. For there is
> no such thing as pure affirmative
> thought. To understand what it is
> for an affirmative proposition to
> be true is in part to understand
> that its negation is false. To
> see that 'p' is true is to see
> that 'not-not-p' is true. Affir-
> mation and negation are comple-
> mentory concepts neither of which
> is intelligible in isolation. The
> function of negation is to exclude
> and this function of exclusion, as
> Mr. Strawson himself has said, is
> implicit in all descriptive uses
> of language and, in fact, in all
> expression of thought whatsoever.
> (33N)

The position expressed in this quotation can be contrasted with the quotation (given earlier) from Kenneth Burke. In particular, Mitchell's assertion that affirmation and negation "are conplementary concepts neither of

which is intelligible in isolation", suggests that Burke's stress upon the "all-importance" of the negative is inappropriate. Mitchell's argument also conflicts with Watzlawick's argument. A code of communication, in order to be able to express affirmative propositions, must be able to express negative propositions: "To see that 'p' is true is to see that 'not-not-p' is true".

If logical principles are 'apriori' and not derived from language rules, language cannot be considered a necessary condition for the manifestation of logical behavior. Entities that do not manifest any language-using ability may have the ability to manifest rule-following behavior. Furthermore, if logical principles are 'apriori', we would be forced to interpret any other logic, if we assume that there could be such a variant logic, by means of our logical rules (34N).

Blumer implies that the process of self-indication is specifically human ability and suggests, in his discussion of symbolic and non-symbolic action, that animals exist in a non-symbolic 'world'. However, we do attribute to animals the ability to make discriminations: Lindesmith and Strauss assert that it has always been known that animals could discriminate: for example, between chairs and beds (35N). If, as has been argued here, the ability used

to make distinctions (36N) is the same as that used to make discriminations, then animals do not appear to differ from humans in this respect (37N).

However, if everything including 'objects' is symbolic, then defining a 'word' by pointing to some object, for example to define the word 'tree' by pointing to a 'physical tree' is to establish a relationship between two human constructs, two symbols; and this establishes a syntactical relationship (38N). That is, since both 'words' and 'objects' are human constructs, the establishment of a relationship between them is an assertion concerning the syntacticality of two symbols (human constructs).

While it is usually assumed that there is some definite relationship between language and 'reality', there is no consensus among philosophers concerning this relationship. There are various theories of meaning (39N), and although none are considered adequate, there appears to be some agreement that the most basic use of the term 'meaning' occurs in ostensive definitions:

> The notion lingers that to each
> statement, or each synthetic
> statement, there is associated
> a unique range of sensory
> events...(40)

Blumer, in asserting that both 'words' and 'objects' are human constructs, has eliminated the touchstone of

'reality' from ostensive definitions. Definitions are now
a process of correlating one human construct with another
human construct: the same process that occurs in syntactics.

A congruent analysis of the relationship between 'words'
and 'objects' has been developed by Willard Van Orman Quine,
and some congruent observations have also been made by
Peter Wegner. Both of these authors minimize the significance
of semantical relationships, thereby corroborating Blumer's
viewpoint.

Quine's analysis is subtle and complex and any brief
outline is bound to distort it. However, its importance(41N)
warrants an attempt and it may be possible to convey his
basic ideas by looking at two parts of his analysis: one,
his delineation of the usage of the term 'meaning', and two,
his analysis of what is involved in the process of making
ostensive definitions.

Quine observes that the term 'meaning' is normally
used in two ways:

> ...the having of meanings, which
> is significance, and the sameness
> of meaning, or synonomy... If we
> are allergic to meanings as such,
> we can speak directly of utterances
> as significant or insignificant,
> and as synonymous or heteronymous
> one with another. The problem of
> explaining these adjectives 'sig-
> nificant' and 'synonymous' with
> some degree of clarity and rigor -
> preferably, as I see it, in terms
> of behavior - is as difficult as
> it is important.(42)

It should be noted that my use of the term 'sig-
nificant' in this paper is not the same as Quine's use
of it in the above quotation. For Quine, 'significance'
is an all or nothing term, whereas for me, it is a question
of degree. Furthermore, I use the term 'significance' to
denote the emotive aspect of an expression, as well as its
'cognitive meaning' (43N).

'Significance', for Quine, is that aspect of language
which is studied by grammarians:"the grammarian wants to
know what forms are significant, or have meaning" (44).
His analysis shows that the grammarian must study phonemes,
and the criteria of what is to count as one phoneme or as
two slightly different phoemes depends upon the concept of
sameness of meaning, synonomy (45N). Quine discusses vaious
types of synonomy: cognitive synonomy: stimulus synonomy;
statement synonomy, as related to the verification theory
of meaning, and analytical synonomy.

His examination of stimulus synonomy involves the
analysis of the relationship between a 'word' and some
'sensory data' (i.e. ostensive definition). He examines
the methods a linguist would use to learn, in a radically
different language, the relationship between the appearance
of what seems to the linguist to be a rabbit and the noise
(utterance) of the natives who apparently see the rabbit.

He shows that it would not be possible for the linguist
to decide whether a particular utterance refers to rab-
bit,   rabbits, stages of rabbits, integral parts of rab-
bits, the rabbit fusion, or rabbithood (46). Quine con-
tinues by discussing the problems involved in translating
analytical sentences: sentences that are synonymous and
which are only indirectly related to experience (47). He
concludes that there is still a systematic indeterminacy as
to whether the translation is correct:

> We may alternately wonder at the
> inscrutability of the native
> mind and wonder at how very much
> like us the native is, where in
> one case we have merely muffed
> the best translation and in the
> other case we have done a more
> thorough job of reading our own
> provincial modes into the na-
> tive's speech. (48N)

Quine acknowledges that he studied the translation
of exotic languages because the factors involved would be
more visible. However, "the main lesson to be learned con-
cerns the empirical slack in our own beliefs" (49). In his
essay "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism", he concludes:

> My present suggestion is that it
> is nonsense, and the root of
> much nonsense, to speak of a
> linguistic component and a
> factual component in the truth
> of any individual statement.
> ....
> The idea of defining a symbol in
> use was, as remarked, an advance
> over the impossible term by term

> empiricism of Locke and Hume.
> The statement, rather than the
> term, came with Bentham to be
> recognized as a unit account-
> able to an empiricist critique.
> But what I am now urging is that
> even in taking the statement as
> a unit we have drawn our grid
> too finely. The unit of empirical
> signific nce is the whole of
> science.....................
> The totality of our so-called
> knowledge or beliefs... is a man-
> made fabric which impinges on ex-
> perience only along the edges.
> (50N)

It is important to note that this 'systematic in-determinacy' is also an intralinguistic phenomena. That is, since many statements in our language are only in-directly related to sensory data, these statements could 'mean' different things to different people, and we would not be able to decide which of these possible 'meanings' was correct:

> If we were perverse and ingenious
> we could... devise other analytical
> hypotheses that would attribute un-
> imagined views to our compatriot,
> while conforming to all his dis-
> positions to verbal response to all
> possible stimulations. (51N)

Quine acknowledges that if two theories are empirical-ly equivalent, then they may as well be considered one theory. However, his major point is that it is logically possible that, given two theories that agree empirically, there need be little or not agreement between, for instance, their conceptions of

rabbits, rabbit stages, etc., and in particular that there
is <u>no</u> <u>way</u> <u>of</u> <u>deciding</u> which of the possible interpretations
is the correct one. Quine comments:

> I am not sure that it even
> makes sense to ask. (52N)

Neither sentence nor terms can be considered to con-
vey meaning severally; the meaning is conveyed only when the
statement or term is considered in conjunction with the whole
body of knowledge of the group (culture). The usual dichotomy
between 'words' and 'things' is no longer significant: there
is no ascertainable correlation between the 'meaning' of <u>a</u>
'word' and any 'object'.

Quine's analysis is corroborated by Peter Wegner's
study of computer languages. In his discussion he observes
that expressions (of a specified computer language) are de-
fined in terms of the way they may be transformed into other
expressions (of that language). He acknowledges that this
seems 'circular' and that it would seem better to define the
'meaning' of the expressions by stating their correspondence
to a 'predefined class of objects'. However, he asserts that
it would be less useful:

> ... semantic definitions of languages
> in terms of the transformational pro-
> perties of expressions of the language
> are generally more useful than semantic
> definitions in terms of class of objects.
> (53)

Wegner's comments are essentially pragmatic, he does not explain why semantic definitions are less useful. However, Quine's analysis would appear to be as relevant to computer languages as it is to natural languages (54N).

The analysis of Quine (and Waisman, see footnote 54) suggests that ostensive definitions are of limited usefulness; even intralinguistically there remains the possibility of a 'systematic indeterminacy'. While this may pose no serious obstacles for the researcher who is merely recording the statements made by the natives in response to questions (55N), it does pose a serious problem for those who wish to 'get behind' the utterances of the natives: those who, like the ethnosemanticist, wish to map the 'cognitive systems' of the natives (56N). They will be unable, it seems, to determine whether the natives conceive of rabbits, or rabbit stages, or rabbithood, etc., and when they attempt to delineate some of the native's more intangible concepts, such as gods, spirits, love, etc., they will be "floating free of fact, and the best (they) can do is to ensure consistency". (Scheffler, see footnote 50N).

The foregoing discussion suggests that we can expect researchers to come up either with data that seem inconsistent (57N), or with analyses that perceive a universal logical structure (58N),

This chapter has dealt with aspects of human behavior which are considered to be 'rule-governed'. And, as Wittgenstein's remarks indicate, 'distinctions' are a type of rule-governed action. Rules, however, are neither true nor false; they may be <u>followed</u> correctly or incorrectly, but are justified only by their utility (59N). Moral principles are frequently conceived of as rules, but there is some philosophical controversy as to whether these rules can be derived from 'facts' (empirical statements). Blumer has asserted that moral principles are human constructs (footnote 36, chapter I), and in this respect his position appears similar to the views of some linguistic philosophers, in particular to the "noncognitive" approach of Charles L. Stevenson (60N).

Stevenson suggests that there can be two kinds of disagreement: a) in belief, and b) in attitudes. People may differ in their description of some 'event', (i.e. in belief), or they may agree 'in belief' but differ in their attitudes to the 'event'. Stevenson states that there can be no guarantee that agreement in belief will lead to agreement in attitude:

> In considering whether a man is
> courageous... the judgement is
> only partly established... even
> if we go on to describe - in
> factual terms, and again with
> empirical evidence - the exact
> ways... in which he makes his

> stand against danger. For
> there will still be a question
> as to whether these ways are
> <u>admirable</u> ways. (61)

This argument, however, leads to the conclusion that in the last resort moral principles are nonrational. As Bertrand Russell at one time observed: "... questions of ends are not amenable to rational argument" (62N).

The "noncognitive" argument can be contrasted with the following statement by Karl W. Deutsch in which he asserts that values depend upon knowledge, and therefore upon science:

> ... the knowledge of what ought
> to be cannot be divorced from
> the knowledge of what is... (63N)

Deutsch's argument obviously presupposes that there is no 'systematic indeterminacy', or 'open-texture' of language; "facts are facts!"

The "noncognitive" metatheory has grave implications for those who ask: "Why this rule... rather than some other rule?" W.H. Walsh argues that a "noncognitivist" must be committed to the view that no objective historical knowledge is possible; it is irreducibly subjective (64). Every historian has his own viewpoint, and "since points of view are, ultimately, not matters of argument... we cannot say that one is 'objectively' better than another..." (65).

Walsh also notes that there is no such thing as "the"
evidence, "... historians have to decide what they are to
treat as evidence..." (66) and if historians should decide
something is not evidence, there is nothing anyone can do.
He also notes that comparisons between different versions
of the same set of events are impossible from this (non-
cognitive) point of view (67). It was noted in chapter I
that Blumer appeared ambivalent about history and histo-
rical continuity. If, as I claim, his position concerning
moral principles is congruent with that of the 'noncognitive'
theorists, then the historical aspect of social behavior
cannot be scientifically objective (i.e. intersubjectively
valid).

Blumer has been criticized for overemphasizing the
role of consciousness in human action, and the linguistic
philosophers have been criticized for overemphasizing the
rule-following aspect of language. Herbert Spiegelberg asks:

> Who, especially in speaking his
> mother tongue, is even impli-
> citly, let alone explicitly,
> aware of the rules of this
> language? (68)

Both of these criticisms suggest that many human acts
are nonconscious, or at least are ones of which the actor is
unaware. Spiegelberg takes the "whole emphasis on rules...
to be something of a myth" (69). While it does appear

ridiculous to suggest that the actor is aware of all the relevant linguistic rules each time he utters a statement, this does not refute the argument that language is rule-governed. Similarily, Blumer's argument that a 'process of self-indication' is involved in every action is not re-futed by showing that the actor is frequently unaware of the process. The question is whether he can become aware.

We have noted that everything for man is symbolic; and one of the possible results of 'symbolism' is a re-duction in the mental effort required for any actions. Whitehead discusses the importance of symbolism in math-ematics and observes that it frees the mind of unnecessary work and simplifies the procedures. He states that it is not desirable to think about what one is doing:

> It is a profoundly erroneous
> truism... that we should cul-
> tivate the habit of thinking
> of what we are doing. The
> Precise opposite is the case.
> Civilization advances by ex-
> tending the number of import-
> ant operations which we can
> perform without thinking
> about them. (70N)

The process by which actions become 'automatic' has been termed "cognitive step-down transformation" (71N). There are, it would seem, different degrees of trans-formation. The use of mathematical symbols 'automatically', for example, would appear to require a quite different

degree of transformation than that involved in habit of walking with a slouch. The modification of one type of 'automatic' action may be much more difficult than that of another. There may be some areas of life in which it is as necessary to learn how to modify actions 'automatically', as it is to learn how to perform actions 'automatically'. For instance, in mathematics, the use of symbols 'automatically' would seem to require also the ability to realize 'automatically' that the values of the symbols change from situation to situation, equation to equation. Social interaction would be another area in which an inability to modify actions would be maladroit. That we do not 'think' while performing some acts is no proof that we are unable to.

In this chapter we have explored the implications of Blumer's notion that human action is essentially a "process of self-indication" and have suggested that the existence of this process seriously modifies the relationship commonly assumed to exist between language and 'reality'. The process of self-indication has been shown to be a form of rule-following action, and, if it occurs in all human action as Blumer asserts, the study of social actions must employ concepts and methods that take into account the nature of rules. The following chapter will examine the question: "Why this rule... rather than some other rule?" and will argue that rules, by their very nature, are not subsumable under "covering law explanations".

NOTES: Chapter II

1. Winch, 1967:15.

2. Wittgenstein, 1953:207. (In Chappell, 1962:74-100) An
   explication of Wittgenstein's argument against the
   possibility of a private language is presented by
   Norman Malcolm, "Wittgenstein's Philosophical In-
   vestigations", in Chappell, 1962:74-100)

3. Wittgenstein, 1953:124.

4. Wittgenstein's argument is complex and my refutation
   may be erroneous. Norman Malcolm admits that at times
   he only dimly understands Wittgenstein. (p 89)

5. Wittgenstein, 1953: paragraph 243. This point is
   explicated by Norman Malcolm (in Chappell, 1962)

6. A similar observation was made by P.F. Strawson in his
   review of Philosophical Investigations. (P.F. Strawson,
   "Critical Notice: Philosophical Investigations", Mind,
   LXIII. 1954, pp 70-99). However, many of Wittgenstein's
   statements refer to a private language in relation to
   pain. This relationship ;will not be discussed here.
   Inasmuch as Wittgenstein himself refers to the many
   different types of 'descriptions', the exclusion of
   a particular subject area is congruent with his philo-
   sophical position. (Wittgenstein: paragraph 24).

7. Malcolm, 1962:76.

8. Wittgenstein, 1953:paragraph 258. Winch also explicates
   this point. Winch, 1964:32.

9. Wittgenstein, 1953:paragraph 265.

10. Wittgenstein, 1953:paragraph 202, see also paragraph 380.

11. A brief discussion of the principle of intersubjectivity
    can be found in Bochenski. He observes:
          According to the contemporary view
          one should as far as possible make
          use of such expressions as are re-
          latively easy for others to verify.
          When formulated in this way the
          rule holds good for all domains of

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11.   knowledge and should be rigidly
           applied. (Bochenski, 1968:57)
     However, it may not be appropriate for all types of
statements.   See Hospers, 1967:260-275.

12. Blumer, 1969b:11.

13. Quine, in discussing how a child learns to associate the
    sound "Mama" with the appearance of its mother, sug-
    gests that "we must credit the child with a sort of pre-
    linguistic quality space", because: "He must, so to
    speak,sense more resemblance between some stimulations
    than between others. Otherwise a dozen reinforcements
    of his response 'red' on occasions where red things
    were presented, would no more encourage the same response
    to a thirteenth red thing than to a blue one". Quine,
    1960:83).

14. Harris, 1968:106.

15. For a brief discussion of 'stipulative definitions'
    see Copi, 1968:97-98.

16. Bourke, 1970:144.   See also the subsequent discussion
    in this thesis of Stevenson's "noncognitive" metaethical
    theory of ethics. Alston briefly discusses the dis-
    tinction drawn between the 'cognitive' and 'emotive'
    meanings of statements. See Alston, 1964:74-75,102.

17. Urmson has presented an analysis of this process. See
    Urmson in Flew, 1965:381-409. Urmson discusses actions
    which are obviously acts of grading, e.g. grading apples;
    or which utilize the terms 'good', 'first class', 'bad',
    etc. He ignores the implicit grading process that oc-
    curs whenever an actor 'notes' something, and he there-
    fore asserts that a description is just a description,
    (p 394). In asserting this he is overlooking the dis-
    tinction between 'use' and 'mention;. The actor, in the
    act of describing something (and describing only some of
    the 'thing's' manifold characteristics. See chapter 3)
    indicates that what he is saying is relevant to the
    situation; that it is, at least, more 'important',
    'relevant', 'significant', than saying and doing nothing.

18. Blumer, 1969b:110. He explicates this with reference to
    the effects of hunger pains upon the subsequent actions
    of an actor. pp 95-96.

19. Rescher, 1964:8.

20. Harris, 1968:109.

21. This is a point Harris does not discuss. Alfred Schutz suggests that the use of the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' is unfortunate because "... the term 'objective meaning' is obviously a misnomer in that the so-called 'objective' interpretations are in turn relative to the particular attitudes of the interpreters and therefore, in a certain sense, 'subjective'". Schutz, in Hook, 1958:220)

22. Von Wright uses the word 'change' in this way: "It is convenient, however, to use the word 'change' so that it includes also non-changes..." (Von Wright, in Rescher, The Logic of Decision and Action: 121).

23. Quotation in Harris, 1968:105.

24. Thomas S. Kuhn, 1970:76.

25. Mitchell, 1970:156,139.

26. Burke, 1968:450.

27. Mitchell, 1970:152-153. "For the conventionalist claim is that we can get behind logic to that on which it rests". (p 152)

28. Watzlawick, 1967:65.

29. P.F. Strawson. Introduction to Logical Theory. London, 1952.

30. Mitchell, 1970:174.

31. Mitchell, 1970:151.

32. Mitchell, 1970:153-154.

33. Mitchell, 1970:155. However, there was a time when the idea of zero, a number expressing nothing, was inconceivable. It may happen that a language lacking negation will be conceivable in the future.

34. Quine, in discussing 'radical' translation, observes:
    Wanton translation can make
    natives sound as queer as
    one pleases. Better trans-
    lation imposes our logic
    upon them... (Quine, 1960:58, my emphasis)

35. Lindesmith and Strauss,1952:274. A.N. Whitehead ap-
    pears to be in agreement with this position when he
    suggests that a puppy-dog "would have acted immediately
    upon the hypothesis of a chair... It is not a mere
    tropism, or automatic turning towards, because both
    men and puppies often disregard chairs when they see
    them". (Whitehead, 1959:4)

36. There has recently been developed, by G. Spencer Brown,
    a 'calculus of indications', in which the idea of dis-
    tinction is taken as given:
    We take as given the idea of
    distinction and the idea of
    indication, and that we can-
    not make an indication with-
    out drawing a distinction. (Brown, 1969:1)

37. Whether the difference between animals and humans is
    qualitative is a controversial question. Leslie White
    discusses this question, presents the views of various
    scholars, and opts for a qualitative difference: "...
    animals cannot create or bestow new values". (pp 22-23)
    There are, however, problems in ascertaining when and
    if an animal has made an act of discrimination. It
    would seem that only if there is a repition can any
    given action be described as purposeful rather than
    random. It should be noted that use of the term
    'action' with reference to animals often implies
    ·purposiveness. (Hamlyn, 1962:60-73)
    The qualitative-quantitative dichotomy may be ir-
    relevant: any language-using entity would need a
    considerable minimum complexity, depending upon the
    definition of language applied. This minimum level
    might appear as a qualitative difference.

38. Bochenski presents a brief discussion of syntactical
    and semantical relationships. Syntactic relation-
    ships link words to one another, semantic relation-
    ships relate words to objects. See Bochenski, 1968:
    32-34.

39. Quine observes:
          Pending a satisfactory explana-
          tion of the notion of meaning,
          linguists in semantic fields
          are in the situation of not
          knowing what they are talking
          about. (Quine, 1963:47)
    William Alston presents a brief review of the major
    theories of meaning. (Alston, 1964)

40. Quine, 1963:40.

41. Quine's major work on this subject is Word and Object,
    published in 1960. This book, together with his many
    articles, have received much attention. In 1969, a
    number of essays concerning Quine's work were col-
    lected and published in book form, Words and Ob-
    jections: Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine., eds.
    D. Davidson and J. Hintikka. Synthese Library.
    Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co.

42. Quine, 1963:11-12.

43. These two aspects of 'meaning' are discussed by
    Alston, 1964:45-48.

44. Quine, 1963:49.

45. Quine, 1963:50,54. His analysis of 'significance'
    shows that there is no way of specifying the suf-
    ficient and necessary conditions of sentences that
    are 'significant'.
    Mortimer Taube notes that Quine's analysis makes a
    'transformational grammar', specifically Chomsky's,
    impossible. (Taube, 1961:57)

46. Quine, 1960:52.

47. Quine, 1960:64.

48. Quine, 1960:77. Some of the problems of translation
    were outlined by Malinowski in his article: "The
    Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages". He saw
    that no word for word translation was possible, but
    did not see that some of the problems of translation
    might be inherently insoluble. (Malinowski, 1923:
    296-236)

49. Quine, 1960:78; my emphasis.

50. Quine, 1963:42. Quine's argument is congruent in
    some respects with the Coherence theory of meaning:
    "Our beliefs float free of fact, and the best we can
    do is to ensure consistency among them". (p 93)
    Israel Scheffler, 1967: Science and Subjectivity.
    Scheffler's book delineates the controversy between
    Coherence theorists and Correspondence theorists.

51. Quine, 1960:78. 'Analytical hypotheses' are those
    that the linguist makes when he attempts to break up
    the native's utterances into short 'words', and which
    he then equates with English words or phrases. (Quine,
    1960:68,61-72)

52. Quine, 1960:77. The belief that it is useless to ask
    questions for which there are no criteria that can be
    used to evaluate answers is a characteristic of
    linguistic philosophy:
            But the only presupposition which
            we must make is that if we have no
            criteria for evaluating answers to
            certain questions, then we should
            stop asking those questions until
            we do. (Rorty, 1967:14,4)
    Quine's work can be seen as part of a wide-spread
    philosophical controversy concerning the methods and
    problems of evaluating the validity of theories.
    Thomas S. Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revo-
    lutions, discusses some of the problems involved in
    assessing the validity of 'paradigms'. There have
    been many other studies on this subject, including
    Scheffler's Science and Subjectivity. One of the
    more extreme views has been proposed by P.K. Feyerabend.
    He concludes that the problem of induction is insoluble.
    He also argues that well confirmed theories are not ne-
    cessarily desirable. (Feyerabend, 1968:12-39)

53. Wegner, 1970:29.

54. The possibility of translating a statement into terms
    of sense-data has also been discussed by Friedrich
    Waisman. He claims that it has not been achieved be-
    cause our empirical statements have an 'open texture';
    that is, the terms which occur in it are non-exhaustive
    and we cannot therefore "foresee completely all the
    possible circumstances in which the statement is true

54. or in which it is false" (p.127). He suggests that the application of logic is limited; that the "...class of premises is not 'closed' and that <u>therefore</u> the conclusion is lacking stringency". This, he observes, is the same as saying "that S is <u>not</u> a logical consequence of the premises as far as they are stated". He concludes:

> We may say that the known relations of logic can only hold between statements which belong to a homogeneous domain; or that the deductive nexus never extends beyond the limits of such a domain. (Waisman, 1965:134)

55. There would seem to be at least two ways of viewing the 'fact' of 'systematic indeterminacy':
    A.   "For if we have not been aware of the existence of a 'systematic indeterminacy' in our own use of language, there is little reason to suppose that any other group will have perceived it".
    B.   "Since we have always believed in the "precision" of our own language we may well have assumed that other languages are equally 'precise'".
    See Harris's comments on kinship terminology, footnote 57.

56. As described by Charles O. Frake in "The Ethnographic Study of Cognitive Systems". He states that it is important to determine the attributes that a group of natives use. His article appears in <u>Readings in Anthropology</u>, vol.2. Morton H. Fried ed., pp 82-95.

57. Marvin Harris discusses the inconsistencies that occur in Kinship terminology and argues that ambiguity may be a characteristic of kinship terms. (Harris, 1968:120)

58. Edmund Leach notes that Levi-Strauss "tends to imply ... that the whole structure of primitive throught is binary" (p 129). Leach observes that even though distinctions are of the either/or kind, humans can still "cut up the cake of experience in quite different ways". (Leach, 1970a:128)

59. Hospers, 1967:225. However, they are frequently spoken of as being 'true' or 'false', e.g. if someone asserts that it is wrong to steal, a common reply would be: "That's true". See Stevenson, 1967:216-218)

60. Stevenson argues that the 'noncognitive' (emotive) view is "a nonnormative meta-theory of norms, its business is not to make value judgments but only to survey and clarify them". (Stevenson, 1967:90)

61. Stevenson, 1967:222.

62. Russell, 1965:58. Russell defined three characteristics of reason: 1) It relies upon persuasion rather than force; 2) It seeks to persuade by means of arguments which the man who uses them believes to be completely valid; 3) In forming opinions, it uses observation and induction as much as possible and intuition as little as possible. (Ibid: 55-56)

63. Deutsch, 1966:148. Within limited contexts, Deutsch's argument may appear sound. For example, the decision to use pesticides must, it would seem, depend upon the severity of any known 'side-effects',it does not follow that its use would be acceptable: religious or ethical beliefs concerning the sanctity of life might rule out its use as 'inconceivable'.

64. Walsh, 1958:110.

65. Walsh, 1958:113.

66. Walsh, 1958:116. See footnote 55, chapter I for Blumer's very similar comments.

67. Walsh, 1958:115.

68. Spiegelberg, 1968:291.

69. Spiegelberg, 1968:292.

70. Whitehead, 1958:41-42. For a similar argument concerning the driving of cars and buses, see Lawrence LaFave, "The Concept of Involuntary Non-Conformity in Social Sciences". Symposia Studies Series of The National Institute of Social and Behavioral Sciences, 1968.

71. LaFave, see previous footnote. LaFave also discusses
    this concept in "Involuntary Non-Conformity as a
    Function of Habit Lag", in Perceptual and Motor Skills,
    1967, no. 24.   pp 227-234.
    This process of cognitive step-down transformation
    may be a cultural universal; that is, a universal
    characteristic of man. However, as Leach observes
    (footnote 58) "the cake of experience" can be cut up
    in different ways: actions which are 'automatic' in one
    society may not be in another.

CHAPTER III

DISTINCTIONS: DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION

Blumer's emphasis upon the 'process of self-indication' and his denial of any significant distinction between language and objects, was delineated in chapter I; some corroborating views of other scholars were presented in chapter II. The process of 'making a distinction' was seen to be a form of rule-following, and some of the characteristics of rule-governed behavior will be more clearly delineated in this chapter (1N). The question still remains: "Can Blumer's symbolic interactionism be a science?" Blumer, it was noted, answers in the affirmative but implies that "fuller" descriptions might obviate the need for analytical explanations. While Blumer appears ambivalent concerning the need for theoretical explanations, another sholar, Peter Winch, who also saw social behavior as a form of rule-governed behavior, has firmly asserted that nomothetic explanations of social behavior are impossible. Some of Winch's arguments, and criticisms thereof, will be considered in this chapter' for the light that they may throw upon the description and explanation of social behavior. Although it is conceptually useful to distinguish 'descriptions' from 'explanations', it should be kept in mind that whereas 'explanations' presuppose

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'descriptions', the reverse is not necessarily the case.

Whether symbolic interactionism can be a science will depend upon both the definition of the term 'science' that is used and the nature of the 'process of self-indication;. The term 'science' has no clear denotation; the distinction between 'scientific' and 'non-scientific' activities is by no means precise. Michael Scriven observes that science, as an activity "... is continuous with the pre-scientific activities directed to the same ends" (2). Clifford Geertz suggests that there are close links between science, magic and religion:

> Myth, and in a slightly different way, rite are systems that ... permit the construction of a 'science of the concrete' - the intellectual comprehension of the sensible world in terms of sensible phenomena - which is no less rational, no less logical, no more affect-driven than the abstract science of the modern world. (3)

There are also differences of opinion as to the aims of science. Purtill, in a recent article, suggests:

> The basic aim of science is to give an organized account of whatever knowledge we can obtain about the universe. (4N)

This statement is almost identical in content to Geertz's statement; voiding the science - non-science dichotomy.

Within more limited contexts, the term 'science' is often used indiscriminately to refer to basic research, applied research or technology. Thomas S. Kuhn observes that the term 'science' is usually reserved for those fields that do show progress, and that since progress is an obvious attribute of both science and technology, the profound differences between them are often ignored (5). Kuhn emphasizes the difference between basic and applied research by observing that a great deal of resistance to Darwin's concept of evolution was because his concept had no goal, in contrast to the many vague evolutionary schemes that were current at that time. Kuhn sees this non-goal orientation as an essential characteristic of basic research and suggests that if we substitute "evolution-from-what-we-know" for "evolution-toward-what-we-wish-to-know", a "number of vexing problems may vanish in the process" (6). One of Kuhn's more important points is that he denies the commonly assumed relationship between science and 'truth'. He states that the concept of truth is not relevant to scientific validity. The process of verification involves choosing between alternative solutions at a given time:

> Whether that choice is the best
> that could have been made if
> still other alternatives had
> been available, or if the data
> had been of another sort is
> not a question that can use-
> fully be asked. (7N)

There is, however, some controversy concerning the criteria that a 'scientific' explanation should fulfill. The argument that has commanded the most respect is the one put forward by Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim (8). This is termed the 'covering-law' model: a 'deductive-nomological' model (9N) Hempel's model involves nine propositions, according to Krimmerman (10), of which the fifth states that a scientific explanation, in order for it to be acceptable, must subsume the event to be explained under general laws. Hempel states:

> ... all scientific explanations
> and their everyday counterparts
> claim or presuppose at least im-
> plicitly the deductive or induc-
> tive subsumability of whatever
> is to be explained under general
> laws or theoretical principles.
> (11)

Hempel observes that in developing his model, he was attempting to construct a nonpragmatic model:

> ... the problem of constructing
> a nonpragmatic conception of
> sciencentific explanation - a
> conception that requires re-
> ference to puzzled individuals
> no more than does the concept
> of mathematical proof - is
> ... (12)

While there are many criticisms of the covering-law model, and many problems of the epistemology of laws (13N), Hempel suggests that many of his critics "miss their aim because they apply to nonpragmatic concepts of explanation certain standards that are proper only for a pragmatic construal" (14).

Hempel's model is valid if, and only if, the distinction between pragmatic and nonpragmatic is valid in relation to _scientific_ explanations (as distinct from a logistic system; an uninterpreted calculus). In other words, if all scientific explanations are irreducibly pragmatic the objections of his critics may be valid (15N). The discussion in chapter II concerning Quine's 'systematic indeterminacy', and the reference to Waisman's 'open-texture', suggests that scientific explanations may refer to individuals in some way (16N).

A scientific explanation does not 'explain' some 'thing' which is 'out-there' in all pristine purity and totality. It explains a description of a 'state of affairs' or an 'event', and descriptions refer only to a part of the 'event'. Morgenbesser states:

> Let us begin by emphasizing the
> trivial point that we never ex-
> plain an event as such, but only
> selected aspects of it. In
> other words, it is not the event
> itself that is explained but the
> event under a given description.
> (17)

The words used in a description, for example the word 'tree', are general words: they refer to a class of 'events', not to a particular 'event'. If, as seems likely, there are no two things exactly alike, then when we

use the word 'tree' in an observation-statement we have classified some 'thing' according to certain similarities that it is perceived as sharing with other 'things' (18N). If our explanation is to be nonpragmatic, then it is essential that our process of classification be nonpragmatic. The process of classifying requires a knowledge of the "bond by which members of a class are supposed to cohere together" (19)

Satosi Watanabe, in a recent essay on pattern recognition, observes that the relation of 'similarity' is the major factor used in classification. He then proves that there can be no logical basis for the idea of similarity (20N). From this he deduces the Ugly Duckling Theorem:

> Any pair of two objects are as
> similar to each other as are any
> other pair of two objects (21)

Watanabe's theorem would appear to severely limit the validity of Hempel's model (22N).

If classification is a logically arbitrary process, Watanabe's Ugly Duckling Theorem appears also to put a limit upon the development of covering-law explanations of phenomena which are Emically classified, i.e. the cognitive studies of the ethnosemanticists and of Levi-Strauss, particularly if we bear in mind Ayer's distinction between 'generalizations of fact' and 'generalizations of law' (23N).

The extent to which a classification scheme can be 'logically arbitrary' is well illustrated in the following taxonomy, reputed to be of ancient Chinese origin:

> ... animals are divided into: a) belonging to the Emperior, b) embalmed, c) tame, d) suckling pigs, e) mermaids, f) fabulous, g) dogs running free, h) included in the present classification, i) which behave like madmen, j) innumerable, k) drawn on camel-skin with a very fine brush, l) et cetera, m) which have just broken their leg, n) which from a distance look like flies. (24N)

Watanabe's Theorem, of course, corroborates indirectly Blumer's assertion that there may be different 'objects' for different people; different 'worlds' for different groups (25).

Peter Winch, in his book The Idea of a Social Science (26), also stressed the rule-following characteristics of social behavior. Winch presents a number of arguments, of which the following three will be discussed: 1) a nomothetic science of human behavior is impossible (27), 2) it is necessary to understand the 'mode of discourse' (the language) of the group being studied (28), 3) the method of philosophical analysis (conceptual analysis) is necessary in order to understand a mode of social life (29N).

There have been many criticisms of Winch's arguments, but one in particular seems to be more important than the

others: the criticism that Richard S. Rudner presents in
his "Philosophy of Social Sciences" (30N). Rudner focuses
upon the second and third arguments listed above. However,
his criticism occurs within a chapter concerning the ob-
jectivity of social science, in which he also discusses
Emergentism and delineates two uses of the term 'meaning-
ful'. He earlier presented, and affirmed, Hempel's covering-
law model of explanation. Rudner claims to refute Winch's
second argument by showing that it is a subtle form of the
'reproductive fallacy' (31) and he assumes that the third
argument also falls because it is dependent on the validity
of the second. Rudner does not explicitly discuss Winch's
first argument (above), but he does claim to refute the
argument for emergence: which is, of course, Winch's first
argument. Rudner's discussion is complex and it will be
easier, and porhaps clearer, if Winch's argument against
the possibility of a nomothetic social science is presented
first, and then compared with Rudner's refutation of Emer-
gentism.

Winch asserts that science studies uniformities and
that "... statements of uniformities presuppose judgments
of identity" (32). He observes that the criteria of uni-
formity (sameness) that the sociologist must use are those
that are specified by the group that he is studying, (i.e.

Emic criteria) (33). In other words, whereas the natural
scientist studies 'reality', the sociologist can only
study those aspects of 'reality' - that 'meaningless in-
finity of the world process' - that are selected by the
group he is studying. Winch continues by observing that
these rules (criteria) are based on a social context of
common activity (34), and asserts that voluntary behavior
i.e. social behavior, is "behavior to which there is an
alternative" (35N). He concludes that behavior has a
characteristic different from that of the movements of
matter:

> ... the central concepts which
> belong to our understanding of
> social life are incompatible
> with concepts central to the
> activity of scientific pre-
> diction. (36)

Winch's conclusion is also corroborated by Wata-
nabe's Ugly Duckling Theorem: if there is no logical basis
in 'similarity' there can be no 'generalization of law'
concerning what is to count as similar from one group to
the next, from one individual to another, or indeed, from
one point in time to the next.

Rudner first presents the 'hypothesis' of absolute
Emergentism (37N), and then claims to refute it by merely
asserting that no one has ever come close to proving it
(38N). Absolute Emergentism is, he states, the belief that:

> ... some events are, in prin-
> ciple, unpredictable (i.e.,
> there are events the predic-
> tion of which is logically
> impossible), since they are
> not connected with other
> events in any lawlike fashion.
> (39)

If we acknowledge that events are not 'events' i.e.
that we must select in our descriptions (Morgenbesser),
then Watanabe's proof appears to be a proof of absolute
emergence in 'similarity' (40N).

The central concept of Blumer, the 'process of
self-indication' is also, for the same reasons, an emer-
gent process; that is, the 'distinctions' that have been
encoded in a language are emergent because there is no
logical basis for the way in which 'similarities' have
been clustered and the distinctions (redefinitions) that
the actor makes are emergent for the same reasons (i.e.
'distinction A' and 'distinction B' of Chapter II).

The two other arguments of Winch (#2 and #3) can be
inferred from the conjunction of Quine's analysis of
language and Winch's earlier statement that "the con-
cepts we have settle for us the form of the experience
we have of the world " (41). Briefly, if the majority of
the 'words' of a language are not conditioned to stimuli,
and if the 'words' (concepts of a language determine the

way in which the 'natives' see the world, then it is essential to learn that language in order to attempt to describe their world view. (There are limitations and problems as Quine stresses). Winch's third argument follows because some form of 'conceptual analysis', i.e. knowledge of synonyms, is involved in learning any language. Winch did not assert, in argument 3, that philosophical analysis was sufficient as well necessary (42).

Rudner, however, did not interpret Winch's arguments (#2 and #3 above) in the same way that I have. He has some justification because Winch goes into a discussion of Weber's 'Verstehen' concept (43N), in which Winch asserts that statistical data alone are not sufficient to validate an 'interpretation' of a rule (44N). Winch argues that 'understanding' involves "grasping the <u>point</u> or <u>meaning</u> of what is being said or done" (45). Winch's argument is not particularly lucid as he does not indicate that there are two ways, at least, of looking at rule-following behavior: from the point of view of a logician or from the viewpoint of an ethnographer (or linguist). Winch uses the logician's approach, i.e. Wittgenstein's. The logician emphasizes that the use of a rule is an all or nothing affair; one either 'gets the point' or one doesn't, e.g. "Either I 'see' (or 'it strikes me') that the consequence follows or I fail to see it". (Mitchell, 1970:63), see also Foucault's remark concerning the Chinese taxonomy: footnote 24). This is the aspect of rule <u>learning</u> that Winch is stressing in his argument and for this aspect statistics are irrelevant. How-

ever, from the linguist's viewpoint, in order for him to know that he has described a rule that the majority of the 'natives' use, he must, of course, 'count heads'. That is, in general, and in particular, from Quine's discussion and from Blumer's 'redefinition of the situation' concept, any single actor may employ a rule that is not common to many, or any of the other 'natives': this does not reduce the rule's 'validity' for the actor, but does reduce its 'significance' for the linguist.

Rudner, not seeing that Winch is using the logician's approach, claims that Winch argues for the necessity of a 'direct experience' of the subject matter, and he therefore asserts that Winch is committing the "reproductive fallacy" (46N). (Winch does, of course, argue for a 'direct experience', but only in the sense of learning a language: a 'game').

Rudner's discussion of 'objectivity' is also obscure because he shifts from considering the possibility of scientific explanations (Hempel's covering-law explanations) to considering the possibility of validating observation-statements; that is, to answering the question:

> (is) "X is valued or judged to be important by Y)... logically impervious to validation through the scientific method? (47)

The obscurity occurs in his usage of 'the scientific method'. Whatever this may mean, it does not refer to Hempel's covering-law model because Hempel's theory does not discuss the validation of observation-statements. Neither does Rudner explain what this 'method' involves, except by indirect references to the principle of inter-subjectivity (48N).

Furthermore, Rudner fails to differentiate between 'use' and 'mention' in his discussion of the term 'meaningful'. He delineates two usages of this term: a <u>semantical</u> (<u>nonevaluational</u>) use or sense, and an 'evaluational' usage. The latter usage occurs when the speaker is referring to the "importance or value" that things have. Rudner then assumes that since we can differentiate two 'types' of 'meaningful' when we talk about the term (which of course is possible), we can therefore argue that an actor can use either 'sense' independently of the other. This is not the case, as was shown in chapter II. In Blumer's terms, the actor must choose each time he acts (which includes speaking) and this means that when the actor 'reaffirms' an existing distinction (definition) he is attaching 'importance' to the distinction. He could have rejected it, and it is likely that he had a number of possible 'definitions' to choose from.

Rudner acknowledges that the 'evaluational' usage is important in the argument that asserts that the "... valuational predicates that occur in social science theories or hypotheses are not definable by any set of observation predicates" (49). The reverse of this: that no valuational predicates can be derived from observation predicates, is the argument against naturalistic ethics: which is Blumer's "moral principles are human constructs" argument (50N).

The focus of this chapter has been the question "Why this rule?" (51N). It has been claimed here that there can be no theoretical covering-law explanations of rule-following behavior. It may be helpful at this point to examine the game of chess, as an example of rule-following behavior (52N), and delineate what a covering-law explanation of chess would require. There are, in our culture, "chess masters", but no "chess scientists!"

Perhaps the first thing to note about chess is that it is not legitimate to assume that the rules continue unchanged from game to game (53N). A survey of this campus would show that the rules often change, even within 'one game'. Michael Scriven attempted to delineate an example of essential unpredictability by constructing a 'guessing' game. His example was analyzed by Patrick Suppes, who showed that as long as the game is known probabilistic predictions can be made. However, Suppes asserts that the game must not be changed:

> ... it is important to emphasize
> that prior to the analysis of the
> predictability of C's moves, we
> must fix upon the game that C is
> playing... If, in fact, they
> are not playing this game but
> some other game, then what is to
> be said about predictability must
> be changes. (54)

The rules of chess are such that it is logically impossible to learn them all from the observation of one game (55N). A covering-law explanation would require that the rules of chess, since they 'cannot explain themselves' (Goldstein), be determined by some 'law', and such a 'law' would have to explain the variations that occur between Persian chess, Chinese chess, American chess; and of course, all the variations that can be observed on this campus, and elsewhere.

Chess, or at least the chess game approved by the International Chess authorities, has been extensively analyzed. There are reams of books. However, a change of even one rule relegates all previous analyses to the historians; they are no longer valid analyses. For example, there is a rumor among chess players that the 'pawn' may be allowed to move one square backwards, as well as forwards. The pawn is the lowest valued unit on the board, yet this modification would completely change the tactics and strategies of the chess game. All previous discussions of the value or importance of certain moves or positions would be invalid. New analyses might of course confirm some of the previous analyses, but until that time it would not be possible to answer the question "Is X a good position (move)?"

The game of chess would appear to be much less complex than the 'game' of life, or the 'game' of language, yet the number of possible moves in chess is so great that it is not feasible to programme a computer to evaluate all the possible moves in any one game. This being the case, Winch's statement that "the concepts we have settle for us the experience we have of the world" must be interpreted figuratively. Polanyi has drawn attention to the very large number of permutations that can be developed from the twenty-six letters of the alphabet (56). A similar operation is possible, to some degree, with concepts. For example, the 'wings' of a bird may be, in the imagination, attached to a horse, thereby creating a Pegasus figure. Similarly 'hard' and 'radiation' can be combined in 'hard radiation': a combination that the usual usage of the term 'hard' does not imply. There is, of course, an additional "creative" element, over and above permutation, which enables the actor to attach 'significance' to aspects of the 'world' which had not previously been significant.

There remains the problem of validating observation statements. Rudner asks whether the statement "X is valued or judged important by Y" can be validated by the scientific method. The term "validate" can, as has been discussed, refer to two different processes: the validation of a statement

that an individual Y values X, or the validation of the
statement that a group Y values X. In the first case,'
the veracity of the statement ultimately requires Y to
answer in the affirmative. That this is the case follows
from the 'fact' that X is a <u>description</u> of a 'state of af-
fairs, and as such the description has neither intrinsic
significance nor a one-to-one correspondence to any 'thing'.
The same description can 'refer' to more than one 'state of
affairs', and different descriptions can 'refer' to the same
'state of affairs' (57N). There may be times when observa-
tion of behavior alone will indicate whether Y values X, but
only if X is a common Emic description of a 'state of af-
fairs'. For example, if I make a silent resolution to stop
smoking cigarettes, the modification of my behavior will be
noticed by my friends and probably by an observer; but only
because the smoking/non-smoking distinction is significant
within this society. However, suppose that I make a silent
resolution always to hold a cup with my little finger held
straight. There may be societies where the position of
one's little finger when drinking from a cup is significant,
but the campus culture here is not one of them. In this
case, neither my friends nor the observer would detect
this behavior modification, because the 'state of affairs'
to which I attach significance is not significant to others.

Even when X appears to be a common 'state of affairs', observation alone, i.e. no communication, will probably attach significance to the wrong elements (see Sapir, footnote 35, chapter II). Even when the language is known, Quine's analysis indicates that there will remain some 'systematic indeterminacy': but the language of the 'natives' must be known in order to describe those aspects of a situation that they consider significant.

The validation of the statement concerning a group involves all the previous problems plus the problem of 'counting heads'. Should the population be large, sampling methods may have to be used.

There are two further aspects of the process of validation that warrant some discussion. The first concerns the validation of <u>our</u> evaluations (i.e. Etic evaluations) of the similarities, or differences, between the 'rules' of other groups. At least two anthropologists have written articles on this subject: Macbeath sees many differences between cultures, while Mead sees many similarities (58). The Ugly Duckling Theorem implies that there can be no 'validation': there is no logical basis in 'similarities'. The only criterion is the criterion of consensus. There can be no other (59N).

The second point about validation concerns the problem
of 'exceptions'. These may be of various types: a) there is
an individual member of a tribe who makes a new distinction,
e.g. "Two Crows" interchanges the Z and A of the alphabet
(60N); b) all cultures except one or two have both a high
degree of stratification and slavery (61N); c) the 'ideal'
culture prescribes polygamy but the 'actual' culture is
predominantly monogamous (62N). To the extent that these
'exceptions' concern rule-governed behavior, they cannot
be theoretical problems: rule-governed behavior not being
subsumable under covering-laws. Obviously there can be
exceptions, i.e. deviancy from prescribed laws, but this
is not the point. There may be problems in ascertaining
the extent of the 'exceptions', i.e. 'counting heads', but
this is a statistical problem, not a theoretical one (63N).

The preceding discussion has concerned only those
parts of social behavior that are rule-governed. Although
anthropologists have delinated behavioral 'traits' which
they say are cultural universals, there is some disagree-
ment as to the validity and explanatory power of this
dichotomy between cultural universals and cultural par-
ticulars' (64N). Melvin M. Tumin recently observed that
patterns of behavior cannot be explained by biological
instincts or psychological drives. The factors he

delineates all refer to values, or to synonyms of values:

> The patternings of motives,
> forms, and consequences - are
> the products of ideologies,
> values, interests, resources,
> world views, and philosophies,
> and they change continuously...
> (65N).

While the Ugly Duckling Theorem has been the main analytical tool of this chapter, the analysis could just as easily have been drawn from a study of Polanyi, Quine, Waisman, and Ayer, etc. The following quotation expresses, in different words, the central place that 'value' has in the study of human behavior:

> An order is an arrangement with
> respect to which it would matter
> if it were otherwise. And this
> holds for order in science, in
> art, in civil life, whereever in
> fact the concept applies... The
> question about order, then, is
> not why things should be dis-
> posed in a certain way, but why
> it should matter that they are
> disposed in this way. And that
> transforms the question into a
> question about value. (66N)

NOTES: Chapter III

1. This is not to deny that there are areas of social
    behavior which may not be rule-governed. See sub-
    sequent discussion.

2. Scriven, 1968:84.

3. Geertz, 1968,:404-405.

4. Purtill, 1970:306. Purtill claims that it is now
    generally agreed that the aim of science is to ex-
    plain, but he wonders if this is a description of
    what scientists do, or advice as to what they should
    do.

5. Kuhn, 1970:160-161.

6. Kuhn, 1970:171-172.

7. Kuhn, 1970:146,170 ff. He also notes: "Philosophers
    of science have repeatedly demonstrated that more
    than one theoretical construction can always be
    placed upon a given collection of data... it is not
    even very difficult to invent such alternatives (in
    early stages of a new science) p. 76. (See also
    note 54, chapter II)

8. Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim. "Studies in the
    Logic of Explanations", in Philosophy of Science,
    Vol.15, No.2, April, 1948. Reprinted in The Bobbs
    Merrill Reprint Series in Philosophy, Phil - 100.
    Hempel's most recent exposition in Aspects of Sci-
    entific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philo-
    sophy of Science. New York: The Free Press, 1965.

9. Hempel speaks of two models in some essays. These
    are the 'deductive-nomological' and the 'inductive
    probabilistic'. (See Krimmerman, 1969:137).
    Hempel considers the 'inductive probabilistic'
    model to be of less significance. This is, however,
    a controversial position and Hans Reichenbach has
    argued extensively that all knowledge is based on
    probability. (See Reichenback, 1961) The analysis
    in this thesis is based on Hempel's 'deductive-
    nomological' model, but it is acknowledged that a

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9. complete analysis would include the probabilistic
   model. This has not been attempted here because
   the probabilistic model is itself subject to
   controversy.

10. Krimmerman, 1969:43-45.

11. Hempel, 1965:425.

12. Hempel, in Krimmerman, 1969:135.

13. Krimmerman's volume, 750 pages, is only a small part
    of the writings concerning scientific explanations.
    A.J. Ayer distinguishes 'generalizations of fact'
    and 'generalizations of law', and discusses the
    criteria that might be used to distinguish them. He
    asserts that we do, in fact, distinguish them, but
    our criteria are unclear.
         Karl R. Popper differentiates 'laws' from
    'trends'. Universal laws do not assert existence
    whereas trends do assert existence (115). "Explained
    trends do exist, but their persistence depends upon
    the persistence of certain specific initial condi-
    tions." (p 128) A trend may change overnight. He
    claims that historicists assume that trends are un-
    conditional and states that the poverty of the
    historicists is a poverty of the imagination; they
    are unable to "imagine a change in the conditions
    of change". (Popper, 1957:130)

14. Hempel, in Krimmerman, 1969:136.

15. Stephens M. Dietz, in a recent article, discusses
    some of the pragmatic aspects of Hempel's model.
    He shows that Dray's notion of 'explaining how-pos-
    sibly' is a special sort of 'explanation-sketch' and
    confirms Hempel's thesis. Dietz erroneously assumes
    that Hempel claims to be describing what scientists
    actually do "... for he (Hempel) would not have given
    us any realistic account of what scientists usually
    do." (p 616) Compare this with Hempel's statement:
    "... we can also dismiss the complaint that the
    covering-law models do not, in general, accord with
    the manner in which working scientists actually
    formulate their explanations," (because the scientists
    direct their explanations to a particular audience)
    (Hempel in Krimmerman: 136) (Dietz, 1970:614-617)

16. Polanyi's concept of 'tacit' knowledge also relates scientific explanations to 'individuals'. (Polanyi, 1967)

17. Morgenbesser, 1968:121.

18. Hospers discusses the need for general words and notes that the 'act of classifying is the work of human beings. (Hospers, 1967:45.47) Copi states that classification schemes are hypotheses which group 'important' characteristics. His criteria of 'important' characteristics is: "involved in a greater number of causal laws..." (Copi, 1968: 409-410) Neither gives a proof that classification is nonlogical.

19. Watanabe, 1969:526.

20. Watanabe, 1969:526. He outlines his procedure in this essay but refers to his other essays for the proof.

21. Watanabe, 1969:526.

22. A scientific explanation must be about 'events' (i.e. descriptions of events) and must therefore be expressed in an interpreted calculus, and interpretation will be logically arbitrary according to Watanabe. See footnote 40.

23. See note 13, chapter III. Ayer gives the following as an example of a 'generalization of fact': "... All the Presidents of the Third French Republic are male". For 'generalization of law" he states: "the planets of our solar system move in elliptical orbits". (Ayer, 1970:39,48)

24. Caws, 1970:208. Caws excerpted this quotation from Michael Foucault's "Les Mots et les Choses". The quotation from Foucault continues: "In our astonishment at this taxonomy what strikes us... is... the stark impossibility of thinking that". Foucault apparently believes this taxonomy to be a figment of Borge's imagination.

25. Blumer, 1969b:11.

26. Published in 1958.

27. Winch, 1967:94.

28. Winch, 1967:110,15.

29. Winch, 1967:113. The analysis involves "the as-
    sertion of equivalence between two expressions".
    (Urmson, 1956:116) Urmson states that conceptual
    analysis involves the problems of synonomy, vague-
    ness, ambiguity, etc.

30. Rudner's book is inexpensive and is also one of a
    paperback series on philosophy: "Foundations of
    Philosophy Series".

31. Rudner, 1966:83.

32. Winch, 1967:83.

33. Winch, 1967:86-87.

34. Winch, 1967:84.

35. Winch, 1967:91. Compare with Toynbee's statements:
    > I therefore think that a formula
    > such as "challenge and response"
    > is a more realistic approach to
    > the study of human affairs. p 56.
    > ....
    > A single cause must have a single
    > uniform effect every time that this
    > cause comes into operation. But a
    > challenge may have at least two
    > responses, I will or I won't, and
    > it may have quite a number of
    > variations. (Toynbee, 1968:57)

36. Winch, 1967:94.

37. Rudner, 1966:71. He dismisses Relative Emergence
    (the belief that it is not technically possible to
    predict at this time) by noting that although it
    "is doubtless true, it does not imply that any
    social phenomena are closed to investigation by
    means of the scientific method." (p 71)

38. Michael Polanyi has always argued for the necessity
    of 'emergent theories' in the study of human affairs
    (and in biology). Although I have few references to
    his works, my interest in Emergence has been greatly
    stimulated by his writings. In particular by _Personal_
    Knowledge: _Towards_ _a_ _Post-Critical_ _Philosophy_.

39. Rudner, 1966:71.

40. This is not a restriction to the natural scientist.
    They agree to 'select' only certain aspects of
    'things' to study. (See Polanyi, 1964:13-17,163 ff,
    292-294)

41. Winch,1967:15.

42. Winch, 1967:118. Statistics "might form part of the
    argument" (re validity).

43. There have been many 'interpretations' of "Verstehen".
    A recent article by Warringer, while initially murky,
    does approach the delineation that I present here.
    (Warringer, 1969)

44. Winch, 1967:113. Inasmuch as Winch, in this para-
    graph, suggests that statistics are _somewhat_ rele-
    vant, he clouds the issue. Rudner takes Winch to
    be saying that they (statistics) are 'wholly ir-
    relevant", and for _learning_ a rule, they are ir-
    relevant, as is explained.

45. Winch, 1967:115. Italics in original.

46. Rudner, 1966,:82-83. The 'reproductive fallacy' in-
    volves the belief (fallacious) that science is sup-
    posed to 'reproduce' 'reality'. Rudner quotes
    Einstein: "... it is not the function of science
    'to _give_ the taste of the soup'", p 69. It should
    be noted that Winch explicitly rejects any 'inner-
    sense' type of Verstehen. (See p 119)

47. Rudner, 1966:79.

48. For example: "... to provide the empathizer with a
    reliable basis for accepting or rejecting his hypo-
    thesis about the phenomenon he is investigating. We
    must _have_ established independently that the empathy
    is ..." (Rudner, 1966:73, my emphasis)

49. Rudner, 1966:80.

50. A sociologist, Christopher G.A. Bryant, has recently responded to some of Winch's arguments (and, he claims, to some of the arguments of MacIntyre and Louch). His discussion is somewhat confused as he does not clearly distinguish between the criteria needed for scientific <u>explanations</u> and those needed for <u>validation</u> of observation-statements. He attempts, among other things, to classify social phenomena into categories, ordered as to their susceptibility to causal analysis (p 101). Of the three categories, the first category, the one most amenable to causal analysis, includes 'age-structure' as an example. He subsequently asserts: "Sociologists can identify these phenomena according to the characteristics they themselves attribute to them because they exist independently of any human conception of them". (p 103)

   I do not understand what Bryant means. It seems as if he is saying that there are babies, older babie , young children, older children, etc., in all societies; but this is not to state that all societies change their classification categories at the same chronological age, nor to state that the 'appropriate' behavior for any 'age-grade' is the same in all societies. (All babies, I admit, do apparently make sucking motions when very young!) Category 2 uses "class" and :language" as examples. Category 3 is for rule-following actions. He does not show clearly how the 'behavior' of categories 1 and 2 is not rule-following. He does assert: "Laws in natural science are supposed to be timeless and unchanging. Many 'laws' in social science are principles which explain what occurs, and they continue to work until they are reflected upon and if need be challenged... The principles are not challenged that often". (p 102) (Compare this to <u>The</u> <u>Poverty</u> <u>of</u> <u>Historicism</u>, footnote 13, this chapter). (Bryant, 1970:95-107)

51. R. Brown observes that it is obvious that social behavior is rule-conforming and asserts that the social scientist "... is impelled to ask 'Why this intention...? or 'Why this rule...?' and the chain of answers will soon enough depend on

51. referring to neither goals nor rules for its ex-
planatory power". (Brown, 1963:98)
    A similar observation was made by Goldstein
in his review of Winch's book. Goldstein states:
"... if I want to account for the existence of an
institution, or if I want to explain the existence
in this society of some particular rule, I cannot
appeal to the rule to explain itself ... To explain
the presence of institutions, I _must_ be able to
specify the conditions which give them rise ... it
is clear that if he (the sociologist) is not _per-
mitted_ to go beyond the given rules he cannot ex-
plain them. (p 333) (Winch, of course, is arguing
that the sociologist is not _able_ to go beyond the
rules). (Goldstein, 1960:332-333)

52. There can be more than one type of 'rule'; Von
Wright delineates three types. It may well be that
each type of rule requires, or is associated with, a
different type of rule-following behavior. (Von
Wright, 1963: ch.1)

53. A mistake that Ryle makes. He assumes constancy:
"After much research this spectator will have worked
out _all_ the rules of chess ... (Ryle, 1968:75, my
emphasis)

54. Suppes, 1969:286-287.

55. The game can end either in 'check-mate' or 'stale-
mate', but not both (ignoring the act of conceding).

56. Polanyi, 1964:78.

57. 'Morning Star', 'Evening Star' and 'Venus' are ex-
amples often used in philosophical literature.

58. Alexander Macbeath. The _Relationship of Primitive
Morality_ and Religion. London: Macmillan, 1949.
Margaret Mead. "Some Anthropological Considerations
Concerning Natural Law", in _Natural Law Forum_, vi,
1961, pp 51-64. These works are referred to by
Vernon J. Bourke. _History of Ethics_, Vol.2, Image
Books, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968,
1970, p 155.

59. In Stevenson's terms, a "disagreement in belief" cannot be resolved by reference to 'facts'.

60. Edward Sapir notes that any deviation from the norm can become the norm, and suggests that the ultimate criterion of "value interpretation" is "... nothing more than consensus of opinion" (p 572). He also discusses the problem of one informer denying what another has affirmed, and Sapir appears to opt for a statistical resolution: the majority rule. (Sapir, 1963:569-577)

61. A.J.F. Kobben discusses some of the problems of cross-cultural research. He does not present any theoretical solutions but notes that many anthropological terms are too monolithic: they cover a multitude of sins. (Kobben, 1967:3-34)

62. Hugo G. Nutini discusses this problem in an article concerning Levi-Strauss. He claims that descriptions of both the 'ideal' (Mechanical in Levi-Strauss' terminology) and the actual (statistical) should be constructed, but asserts that the statistical 'model' should be subordinated to the mechanical (p 95): "... mechanical models are always heuristically superior to statistical models..." (p 95). He, however, does not offer any explanation of why the mechanical model is superior, or in what way it explai s 'more' than the statistical model. (Nutini, 1970:70-107)

63. Herbert Dingle discusses the relationship between statistical knowledge and causal knowledge. His example concerns the number of unaddressed envelopes that are mailed each year in England: the proportion remains constant from year to year. He states:

> [the statistical information] is some-
> thing superposed on the causal and, so
> far as we can see, not dependent on it
> at all... we cannot even begin to ex-
> press one in terms of the other with-
> out destroying them... we have here
> two essentially different kinds of
> regularity, one applicable to single
> events and the other to collections
> of similar events... (and it is de-
> lusion to attempt to explain either
> in terms of the other). (Dingle,
> 1970:235-236)

64. Murdock finds cultural universals valuable, while
    Geertz argues that they are of no value. (G.P.
    Murdock, 1947: "The Common Denominator of Culture".
    (Clifford Geertz, 1965: "The Impact of the Concept
    of Culture on the Concept of Man".

65. Melvin M. Tumin, 1970:21. Tumin also asserts that
    power determines the tenacity and initiation of
    patterns of behavior.

66. Caws, 1968:106. Carl J. Friedrich, in the same
    volume asserts:
            Conflicts of principle are at the
            very essence of political order...
            There never has been any resolution
            of their contradictions, and there
            never will be any resolution in
            terms of any order of priority.
    (Friedrich, 1968:343). Kuntz, in the Introduction,
    states: "There emerges a concensus among authorities.
    No one of them considers the moral order derivative
    from the natural order... In a word, they all defend
    the autonomy and irreducibility of the moral order".
    (p.XXVIII).

CHAPTER IV

SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

The analyses presented in the previous chapters have shown that there can be no covering-law theories concerning rule-governed behavior (1). This does not mean that sociology requires only conceptual analysis, which was one of Winch's conclusions. Winch failed, as was shown, to distinguish between the logician's approach and the ethnographer's approach: the ethnographer must discover the extent of any rule. (Winch may, of course, have considered this to be other than 'analysis'). This is not to deny that conceptual analysis may be very useful, although Winch did fail to mention that the 'ordinary language' philosophers, e.g. the Oxford School, rarely agree upon the 'usage' of any term (2). Conceptual analysis can be very illuminating, e.g. Joseph Beatty's analysis of the concept "Forgiveness" (3). However, the validity of conceptual analyses cannot be verified by any experimental method: one 'sees' or one doesn't (4).

Rule-governed behavior, although not subsumable under covering-laws, may manifest the characteristics of 'trends'. And, as Karl Popper has emphasized, trends may change overnight (5). The most that we can do, it would seem, is to

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trace the forms that these various rules have taken through time: a methodology adopted by Eliade in his studies of religious phenomena (6). Blumer, and others (7), have stressed that social behavior is characterized by "continual flux": this "flux" brings into question the utility of re-plication studies and also those studies in which, for the purpose of 'completeness', a long time is spent in observa-tion. For example, Becker states that he and his colleagues spent more than three man-years studying an undergraduate college: "All these numbers serve simply to indicate that there is a sufficiency of date gathered over a substantial period of time" (8). Assuming 'trends' rather than 'laws', what amount is a 'sufficient' amount of data and what amount is a 'substantial' amount of time? Becker discusses this in relation to a number of studies including those of Tepoztlan by Redfield and Lewis. He implies that we can never expect two researchers to agree because either their subject will have changed in the course of time, or the researchers will approach their subject-matter with different points of view (9). The researcher, like the historian (Cf. Walsh), appears to be the final authority concerning the validity of his studies (excluding statistical problems).

It was noted in Chapter I that Blumer does not provide criteria for differentiating between 'an act', 'the act' and

'acts'. The difficulty of specifying the descriptive ele-
ments of an action has been seen as a serious problem by a
number of philosophers. Austin suggested that we have to:

> ... decide what is the correct
> name for "the" action that some-
> body did - and what, indeed, are
> the rules for the use of "the"
> action, "an" action... (10, my
> emphasis)

Austin observes that it is possible to describe what a
person did in many different ways, and that an action is
composed of more than just physical movements (11).

Philosophers interested in deontic logic have also
discussed the problem of describing actions and 'states of
affairs'. Rescher has delineated five aspects of action:

1. Agent (Who did it?)
2. Act-type (What did he do?)
3. Modality of Action (How did he do it?)
   a. Modality of manner (In what manner
      did he do it?)
   b. Modality of means (By what means
      did he do it?)
4. Setting of Action (In what context
   did he do it?)
   a. Temporal aspect (When did he do it?)
   b. Spatial aspect (Where did he do it?)
   c. Circumstantial aspect (Under what
      circumstances did he do it?)
5. Rationale of Action (Why did he do it?)
   a. Causality (What caused him to do it?)
   b. Finality (With what aim did he do it?)
   c. Intentionality (In what state of mind
      did he do it?) (12)

Rescher states in a footnote that the second "... is
the fundamental item in the specification of an action." (13),

and subsequently asserts that it may vary in degree of concreteness: "It can be a _fully_ _generic_ _act-type_, e.g. 'the opening of a window'... (or) a _specific_ _act-type_ ('the opening of this window')" (14).

Other philosophers, however, have delineated some problems concerning the specification of 'generic' states of affairs (15). While the study of the logic of actions is obviously very relevant for all research concerning rule-governed behavior, there exists the possibility that people are not entirely logical. Both Ackerman and Chisolm raise questions concerning the empirical utility of deontic logic and the logic of preference (16).

This thesis has acknowledged that there may be areas of social behavior which are not characterized by rule-following actions, and it is suggested that the delineation of these areas should be one of the primary tasks of sociologists: a task that Bryant has initiated (Cf. footnote 50, Chapter II).

There is, additionally, the need to delineate clearly the methods to which we relate our conceptual models to the observed behavior. For example, 'primary groups' occur, it would appear, in all cultures: but the behavior that is indicative of a primary group may vary from group to group. The concept 'primary group' therefore appears to function

as an Ideal Type, for which there is no exact observable instance. If this is the case, it is essential to delineate the methods and criteria that enable us to relate the observed structure to the Ideal pattern. Grenander, in his discussion of pattern recognition, lists seven requirements that an analysis should meet. He states:

> ... if we do not specify how the
> observables are related to the pure
> patterns we have left out one of
> the most crucial steps in the whole
> approach. (17)

Although Grenander's statement refers to pattern recognition by a computer, he asserts that his analysis is applicable to other areas, such as biology. It is also relevant to sociology. Our example, the concept 'primary group' has some specified characteristic behavior patterns as its empirical indicators. We, however, have to evaluate those patterns that are observed to determine their 'similarity' to our Ideal patterns. And this evaluation of 'similarity' has no logical basis. We can, of course, specify a different set of criteria, and there is no way of objectively deciding between the two sets of criteria.

The position of the natural sciences is no different, although it does appear that they are more 'objective' (18). The natural sciences do, of course, have 'laws' but there is still an inherent uncertainty because more than one theory

can be fitted to any collection of data (19) and, since
'evidence' within one theoretical approach is often con-
sidered 'epiphenomena' by an alternative approach, the
evaluation of rival theories is much more difficult that
it might appear (20). Kuhn asserts that natural science
may appear stable because most scientists spend most of
their life working within one 'paradigm', solving puzzles
set by that 'paradigm' (21).

Blumer's symbolic interactionism is indeed more of an
orientation than a theory; it cannot be subsumed under any
covering-laws. Rule following behavior, while not amenable
to covering-law explanations,can still be studied and des-
cribed, and these descriptions will be valid as long as
there are no changes in the rules. As Peters has suggested:

> Man in society is like a chess-
> player write large. (22)

However, Peters, in the same paragraph, also asserts
that prediction is possible: an observation that does not
appear congruent with a chess model of society.

Although there have been many comments made about
Winch's argument that a nomothetic science of social be-
havior is impossible, a similar assertion had been previously
made by Karl Popper. He stated that positive predictions in
sociology were not possible: (23)

> We cannot exclude the logical pos-
> sibility, say, of a bacterium or
> virus that spreads a wish for Nir-
> vana (p 157).......................
> ... the human factor is the ultimate
> and wayward element in social life
> and social institutions... for every
> attempt at controlling it completely
> must lead to tyranny; which means,
> to the omnipotence of the human
> factor - the whims of a few men, or
> even of one. (24)

Popper suggests that social theory, while it cannot predict, can analyze and explicate the logical consequences of adopting any principle or embarking on any course of action. He gives, as an example, the possible consequences of a large number of people manifesting the desire for mountains and solitude:

> ... if many people like the mountains,
> they cannot enjoy solitude... this kind
> of problem is at the very root of social
> theory. (25)

Edward A. Tiryakian has suggested that because sociology lacks a philosophical background, "... research projects accumulate, but are not cumulative" (26). The analyses presented in this thesis suggest that sociology, on the contrary, has a philosophical background, and that 'research projects may accumulate, but cannot be cumulative'.

However, there are also structural aspects of social behavior which may well be amenable to covering-law

explanations, although it must be borne in mind that Blumer explicitly denies the utility of structural explanations (see footnotes 45 and 46 in Chapter I).

In addition, some patterns of behavior are common to all societies. For example, the institutions of marriage and religion (27). These 'cultural universals' may also be amenable to covering-law explanations. Blumer, however, is not inclined to accept this (see footnote 73, Chapter I).

In conclusion, therefore, we see that, in its analytic aspects, Blumer's position is largely justified. Indeterminacy is built into any empirical analysis. Here we seem to be confronted with a fundamental dilemma of methodology: the indeterminacy of empirical knowledge versus the determinacy of logical thought. It is this dilemma that gives initial plausibility to Reichenbach's argument that knowledge is built on a probabilistic foundation.

NOTES: Chapter IV

1. Watanabe's theorem would seem relevant for other
   theoretical approaches to the study of human be-
   havior, e.g. structuralism. While this cannot be
   discussed in this paper, it should be observed that
   Watanabe's theorem is relevant to both 'theories'
   and descriptions. Nadel considers structuralism
   to be descriptive: "I consider structuralism to be
   no more than a descriptive method ... not a piece
   of explanation". (Nadel, 1957:151)

2. Mates, 1964:68. Mates wonders what the prospects
   for agreement would be when the sample size is en-
   larged.

3. Beatty, 1970:246-252. American Philosopical
   Quarterly 7, No.3, (July, 1970), pp 246-252.
   For an example of conceptual analysis by an
   anthropologist see: Hyman, 1966:42-45.

4. D.B. Fry states that experimental methods can
   neither confirm nor contradict knowledge that is
   obtained by introspection "... since an experi-
   mental method and an introspective method col-
   lect information about different sets of events".
   (Fry, 1955:147)

5. Barrington Moore observes that George Lundberg,
   "... confessed that he was at a loss for a good
   example of scientific generalization... the only
   one he could point to was a rather limited one about
   migration... His remark (led) me to doubt that the
   search for scientific laws should constitute the
   primary task of sociology". (Moore, 1963:93n)

6. Geertz, 1968:403. Geertz thus assesses Eliade's
   methodology. Geertz also notes that this is a
   kind of "cultural paleontology", and that "it has
   placed beyond the range of scientific analysis
   everything but the history and morphology of the
   ... forms...".
       Geertz claims that Eliade has uncovered
   "some highly suggestive clusterings". However,
   given that rule-governed behavior is not sub-
   sumable under a 'law', it is difficult to eva-
   luate the significance of any "suggestive clusterings".

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7. Boskoff asserts that McIver places social change at the core of his system. (Boskoff, 1969:125)

8. Becker, 1970:53.

9. Becker, 1970:19,40-43. Kobben also discusses this problem and gives some examples of ethnographic reports which have conflicting statements.

10. Austin, 1965:44.

11. D.W. Hamlyn discusses the differences between actions and physical movements. He traces the distinction back to Aristotle. (Hamlyn, 1962:60-73)

12. Rescher, N.D., 215-216.

13. Rescher, N.D.: 215n.

14. Rescher, N.D.: 216.

15. John Robinson discusses the distinction between states of affairs "conceived of generically and individually". (Robinson, N.D: 140)

16. Rescher, N.D.: 71,138.

17. Grenader, 1970:177.

18. Lawrence LaFave has discussed the way in which values enter into science. (LaFave, 1970)

19. Kuhn, 1970:76.

20. See Feyerabend's discussion of the difficulties involved in comparing theories. (Feyerabend, 1968:12-39).

21. Kuhn, 1970:24,36-38.

22. Peters, 1958:7.

23. Popper, 1957:158. Universal laws, for Popper, asserts the impossibility of something, not the existence of anything. (p 61)

24. Popper, 1957:157-158.

25. Popper, 1957:158. His examples of social pre-
    dictions are, of course, all negative: i.e.
    assert the impossibility of something: "You can-
    not introduce tariffs and at the same time reduce
    the cost of living". "You cannot introduce a
    political reform without causing some repercussions
    which are undesirable from the point of view of the
    ends aimed at". These examples express logical
    impossibilities, and can be rephrased into logical
    contradictions. For instance, the tariff example
    can be rephrased: If a country is importing a com-
    modity which sells for less than a comparable do-
    mestic commodity, any import restriction or tax
    on the imported commodity will remove a 'cheap'
    commodity from the market and thereby make pur-
    chasers pay more. In other words, if the technical
    terms in this social law are replaced by synonyms,
    the statement expresses a logical contradiction.
    It appears that the method of developing these
    'laws' is 'conceptual analysis'.

26. Tiryakian, 1962:4.

27. There are problems in defining these terms. For
    example, if religion is defined so as to include
    animism, the definition may be unacceptable to
    many theists. For a brief discussion of the
    criteria used to define religion, see John Hick
    Philosophy of Religion. New Jersey: Prentice-
    Hall Inc. There are similar problems with the
    universal definition of 'marriage'. See Wm. N.
    Stephens, The Family in Cross-cultural Perspec-
    tive. New York: Holt Rhinehart and Winston
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