An analysis of leadership selection in the Liberal party of Canada, 1919 to 1968.

Richard J. Simpson  
*University of Windsor*

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AN ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN
THE LIBERAL PARTY OF CANADA, 1919 TO 1968

by

Richard J. Simpson

A Thesis
Submitted to the Department of Political Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree
Master of Arts

at the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario

April, 1971
UMI Number: EC53108

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ABSTRACT

An attempt is made to evaluate leadership in the Liberal party of Canada in the context of a particular form of selection process. In particular, the relationship of pragmatic, "brokerage" leadership to the degree of conflict or consensus characteristic of the selection process is explored. Utilizing existing historical and quantitative research, the nature of leadership selection in the Liberal party can be seen as basically a consensual, rather than competitive (democratic), process. This characteristic is largely a result of the prevailing structure and ideology of the party, as well as of the leadership convention itself. It can be maintained, therefore, that the performance of party leaders within the political system may well be more related to the nature of party, than to a mere pragmatic response to certain societal conditions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The contributions of several individuals made the completion of this project a possibility. Professors Trevor Price and Lawrence Leduc, Jr. were sources of positive criticism, of fruitful suggestions, and of sincere encouragement. Too numerous to mention are those people who offered both stimulating ideas and provided the incentive to make use of them. In spite of the above benefits, the possibility of shortcomings in the work could not be entirely eliminated. For this aspect, the author takes the sole responsibility.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td></td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>I  INTRODUCTION: AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party and the Leadership Selection Process.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consensus and Conflict in Leadership Selection.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II THE NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTION AND LEADERSHIP SELECTION</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Structure of National Leadership Conventions</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delegates and Representation</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Role of the Party Leader</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Leadership Convention and Party Conflict.</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP CONVENTION AND PARTY COHESION</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Regulation of Internal Party Conflict.</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV THE LEADERSHIP CANDIDATES</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Candidate Behaviour: The Regional Representative and the Professional Politician</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Party Reformer</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER

V THE PARTY LEADERS. .......................... 109

The Non-Competitiveness of Party Leaders .... 120
Candidates and Leaders: The Rules of the Game
and Preselection .................................. 130

VI THE LIBERAL IDEOLOGY AND THE SELECTION OF
LEADERS. ........................................... 133

Ideology and Party Leadership .................. 147

VII CONCLUSIONS ................................. 155

Influences on the Nature of Leadership Selection 155
Leadership, Leadership Selection and Political
Party. ................................................. 171

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................... 173
**LIST OF TABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Convention Balloting Results, 1919 to 1968</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Percentages of Candidates with Provincial or Federal Party Experience</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Provincial, Parliamentary and Cabinet Careers of Leadership Candidates</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Candidates According to Length of Federal Political Careers Prior to Candidacy</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Provincial Party Experience</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Portfolios Occupied by Leadership Candidates</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF DIAGRAMS

DIAGRAM .......................................................... page

I  Political Party and the Leadership Selection Process. .................... 10
II Party Ideology and Leadership Selection........................................ 149
III Party Leadership and Party Ideology.......................................... 154
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Canadian party leaders\(^1\) have been the subject of a relatively extensive volume of scholarly research. The analysis, however, of leadership in Canadian parties has been largely confined within what may be termed the historical approach.\(^2\) This approach generally contains two basic deficiencies - an exaggerated emphasis on personality as opposed to ideological, institutional or social factors,\(^3\) and an inordinate or complete stress on the "output" aspect of party leaders at the expense of a consideration of

\(^{1}\)"Party leader" refers strictly to individuals who are recognized as the leader of the party in terms of both its electoral and Parliamentary activity.


"input" variables.4 The aim of this study is to redress partially this imbalance by analyzing leadership as a dependent rather than an independent variable in the political process. Therefore, by focusing on the selection of party leaders, analysis is directed at the ideological and institutional context, particularly the political party, in which leadership emerges. In this manner, party leaders are viewed as a response to influences fashioned by their institutional and ideological environment.

The selection of party leaders in the Liberal Party of Canada from 1919 to 1968 commends itself to a study of leadership in the above context. The characteristics of the party in this period which facilitate analysis derive from the relative stability of key variables involved in leadership selection - (1) the permanence of the national party convention as the mechanism of leadership selection,

4In other words, interest has been focused on the leader's capability of influencing the environment at the expense of attention to factors which have molded leadership and influenced its capabilities. An example of this approach resides in R. M. Dawson's evaluation of the leadership of Prime Minister Mackenzie King: "Political leadership, in short, must always meet two tests: the ability to gain and stay in power, and the ability to use power once it has been gained." Dawson, R. M. "Mackenzie King as leader", in Party Politics in Canada, 2nd edition, ed. H. G. Thorburn. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1967) p. 129.
(2) the relatively constant party situation, and (3) the continuity of leadership and leadership style in the party. The August 1919 convention which chose Mackenzie King was the archetype for selection of subsequent Liberal leaders. Unlike the Conservative party, which vacillated among convention, caucus and other procedures for leadership selection, the Liberal party remained faithful to the convention method. In 1948, Louis St. Laurent was selected from among three candidates to occupy the leadership. Both Mr. St. Laurent and L. B. Pearson, who won a virtual two-candidate race in August, 1958, were victorious on the first convention ballot. The selection of Pierre Elliott Trudeau in June of 1968 on the fourth ballot was the final occasion to date (April, 1971) at which the party convention was called upon to choose a party leader. Needless to say, the national party convention has been and remains the established mechanism for party leadership selection.

The period subsequent to 1919 is also significant for the Liberal party as it has maintained a relatively consolidated position in respect to the Canadian political and social systems. One can maintain that the collapse of the Unionist era ushered in a realignment of the Canadian party system, whose essential features have persisted from
1919 to the present. Thus, the party system has been
dominated by the existence of two grand omnibus parties -
Liberal and Conservative - whose ascendancy has been periodic­
ally qualified by third and fourth "splinter" parties.\textsuperscript{5} The
federal Liberal party has consequently maintained a generally
stable position in relation to other parties and to the
social foundations of the party system. This stable
position has included the virtual dominance of the Liberals
as a governing party. In only 11 of the 50 years from 1919
to 1968, has the Liberal party failed to form a government
at the federal level.\textsuperscript{6}

Over much of the period from 1919 to 1968, leader­
ship in the Liberal party has been notoriously stable and
generally restrained in style. Flamboyance and instability
of leadership, characteristic of the Canadian Conservative
party, has been notably absent in the Liberal case. Only
four leaders, as opposed to more than twice that number with
the Conservatives, have existed in the Liberal party since
1919. Moreover, there has occurred only infrequent

\textsuperscript{5}See J. R. Mallory, "The Structure of Canadian Politics"
in Thorburn, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 24-32.

challenges from followers to the continued tenure of Liberal leaders. Mackenzie King himself functioned as party leader for almost 30 years. Indeed, the dominance of Mr. King since 1919 has been viewed as the paragon of Canadian political leadership, according to the "brokerage" conception of the country's party and social systems. This passive form of leadership style has been most succinctly expressed by J. W. Pickersgill's observation:

He was acutely conscious that political progress was possible only if public support was forthcoming, and he believed that nothing was so likely to set back a good cause as premature action. 8

The low-key leadership perfected by King after 1919 differed from the more principled or doctrinaire form characteristic of other leadership styles. 9

7F. H. Underhill was a prime exponent of the virtues of "brokerage" leadership - the conciliation of many diverse demands: "The essential task of Canadian statesmanship is to discover the terms on which as many as possible of the significant interest groups can be induced to work together in a common policy...Mr. King's life has been devoted to the restoration of a working national harmony of the two national communities (French and English) through a revived Liberal party". F. H. Underhill, In Search of Canadian Liberalism. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 127-129.


9Former Liberal leader, Alexander Mackenzie, illustrated this form of leadership style, emphasizing principle rather than a more opportunistic approach: "My notion of the public
In the same manner, the leadership style of both Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. Pearson has been seen as relatively restrained and uncontroversial. Rather than as an innovator, Mr. St. Laurent was viewed as "an executor or liquidator to usher out the Mackenzie King era, not to usher in a new St. Laurent era."\(^\text{10}\) As one observer described Mr. Pearson's approach to leadership:

Reacting magnificently was always more important than anticipating or reaching out for problems...light on both feet, ready to move in any direction...he saw power in Canadian society dispersed among competing institutions that always managed to balance each other, producing "the national interest" by osmosis.\(^\text{11}\)

As a rule, leadership in the Liberal party has been relatively passive rather than dynamic in character.\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{9}\)man is that he should maintain sound principles, advocate them honestly, and trust to such principles working out a right solution. The Conservatives have had a lease of power, but they have had it by means no honest man can justify." A. Mackenzie, quoted in W. Buckingham and G. W. Ross, *The Honourable Alexander Mackenzie: His Life and Times.* (Toronto: Ross, 1892) p. 425. Significantly, Mackenzie's form of leadership coincided with a more doctrinal form of party. See S. P. Regenstreif, "The Liberal Party: A Political Analysis". (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1963) p.466. \(^{10}\)Eggleston, Wilfred, "Appointing a Liquidator, *Saturday Night,* August 14, 1948, p.4.


\(^{12}\)Admittedly, however, Prime Minister Trudeau appears to be an exception to this pattern.
Political Party And The Leadership Selection Process

The selection of leaders in the Liberal party can be assumed to occur within two systems of behaviour\textsuperscript{13} - the leadership selection process and the political party. Although other systems may have a marginal impact, these two are the most immediately related to the selection of party leaders.

The leadership selection process refers to behaviour which relates directly to the emergence of party leadership. The variables involved in the leadership selection process of the party can be grouped for purposes of analysis into three concepts - (1) the formal and informal structure of the mechanism of selection (2) the rules of the game applicable to participant behaviour and (3) the character of "preselection" operating in the party. The mechanism of selection refers to the institution, in the case of the Canadian Liberals - the national party convention, immediately responsible for the choice of leader. The patterns of behaviour characteristic of elites and non-elites operating within the leadership selection process as a whole constitute the prevailing rules of the game. Both the mechanism of

\textsuperscript{13}The concept of "system of behaviour" is derived from David Easton, \textit{A Framework for Political Analysis}. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965) pp. 23-34.
selection and rules of the game are primarily descriptive concepts whose delineation in large measure indicates the nature of the party selection process.

The character of preselection in the party is indicated by those aspects descriptive of the leadership selection process, but which do not stem from candidate behaviour or from the structure of the mechanism of selection. For example, the number and characteristics of candidates has profound influences on the form of leadership selection, but is distinct from either candidate behaviour or the convention structure. Thus, preselection is indicative of a more subtle, prior process in the leadership selection process, which substantially determines its manifest character. Although less visible than the actual act of selection, leadership also emerges in the context of the wider performance of the institution as a whole, which serves to project certain types of elites as potential leaders.

Leaders are always, covertly or overtly, "preselected" by their supporters according to the situational needs of the group. Leadership is a nexus of need fulfillments that binds situational demands and group membership. 14

In effect, the concept of preselection allows analysis to evaluate both the appearance and non-appearance of certain forms of behaviour in the manifest choice of leader.15

The second system of behaviour relevant to the selection of leaders can be considered to coincide with the political party itself. Although other systems of behaviour, (the political and social), may influence leadership selection, the political party is assumed to be the system most immediately linked with the selection process. Since its functions and objectives extend beyond that of providing leadership for itself or for other systems,16 the political party must, however, be considered a more inclusive system of behaviour than the leadership selection process.

The nature of the leadership selection process in the Liberal party constitutes the dependent variable upon which

15 The analysis now considers problematic the fact that leadership candidates reveal an inordinate bias toward certain characteristics. Whereas, if behaviour and structure alone were considered problematical, these characteristics would be given. The argument is similar to that made against the study of power exclusively using public issues as data. The essential question is who or what sets the agenda prior to the manifestation of a contest. See P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power" in Political Power, Community and Democracy, ed. E. Keynes and D. M. Ricci (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1970) p. 195.

16 For a catalogue of other suggested functions of parties, see John Meisel, "Recent Changes in Canadian Parties" in Thorburn, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
this analysis focuses. However, political party provides the immediate environment in which the selection process occurs. As such, it is the main independent variable which affects the nature of leadership selection. The influences of party derive from its two most basic features - party structure and party ideology. The ideology and structure of a political party provide the value and institutional environment within which the leadership selection process operates.

Diagram 1
Political Party And The Leadership Selection Process

[Diagram showing the relationship between political party structure, ideology, leadership selection process, preselection, rules of the game, and selection mechanism.]
Consensus and Conflict in Leadership Selection

In analyzing the nature of leadership selection, the most central problem revolves around the manner in which conflict arising over the pursuit of the office of leader is reconciled with the consensus required for further collective action.

In a theoretical sense, the question of the relationship of consensus to conflict with respect to the selection of leaders by the Canadian Liberals is most interesting. The Parliamentary nature of the Canadian governmental structure puts a priority on party consensus permitting unified, collective action; but the complexity of Canadian political cleavages and omnibus nature of the major parties makes the achievement of this consensus a delicate task. Nonetheless, the performance of the Liberal party since 1919 has clearly resolved this problem in favour of consensus and, consequently, of party success. In the light of this overall capability it is significant to explore the resolution of the problem in the context of one aspect of party activity—leadership selection.

As well as preventing internal schisms, the party has managed to attract political factions, such as the Progressives, into the party. See W. L. Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950).
Two forms of conflict between political actors may potentially arise in the process of leadership selection by the party conventions. The first involves the attempt by non-elites to control directly the leadership of the political party; the second features conflict between members of the elite over the occupancy of the office. To the extent that the latter process involves appeals for support to non-elites, both forms of conflict allow non-elites a measure of influence in the determination of party leadership. In this sense, both processes may be considered "democratic".

For a party to continue to function effectively, however, both forms of democratic conflict must be

---

18 The first constitutes a demand for equality. Several theorists have considered such demands for equality of control to be utopian. The only practical substitute is therefore competition between elites for non-elite support, or "polyarchy". Despite "the drive away from equality of control in modern society...the democratic goal is still roughly and crudely approximated in the sense that non-leaders exercise a relatively high degree of control over leaders. The constellation of social processes that make this possible we call polyarchy." R.A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare. (New York: Harper, 1953) p. 275. For purposes of this paper, elites will be considered to consist of occupants of party or political office at the federal or provincial, rather than constituency level - for example, federal and provincial Parliamentary parties and Cabinets and national officers of extra-Parliamentary organizations.

reconciled with the existence of an overriding consensus based on the acceptance of wider objectives. With respect to the selection of leaders by the Liberal party, it is therefore valuable to explore the degree to which conflict of a democratic sort has existed, the extent to which conflict has been limited by the presence of a party consensus, and the nature of this consensus. Moreover, it is consequently of great importance to evaluate those instruments - the mechanism of selection and the structure and ideology of the party - which have regulated the amount of consensus and conflict appearing in the leadership selection process. The resolution of conflict and the establishment of consensus constitute the primary focus for the analysis of the leadership selection process in the Canadian Liberal party.

20 The confinement of causes of the degree of consensus or conflict in leadership selection to the nature of the Liberal Party and the structure of the leadership convention obviously discounts the role of other influences. Due to the historical nature of the study, for instance, the influence of secular cultural trends should not be ignored. However, to the degree such wider influences are significant, it is assumed they will be reflected in changes in the variables considered. For example, if a trend toward a more democratic political culture has existed in Canada from 1919 to 1968, there seems reason to assume it will be reflected in the party itself or in the structure of the convention. Indeed, there is evidence that such changes have occurred in the latter institutions, accounting perhaps for a cultural trend.
CHAPTER II

THE NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTION AND LEADERSHIP SELECTION

The selection of party leaders by national convention is not characteristic of many political systems. In the United States, however, this procedure has been utilized for the selection of presidential nominees since the mid-nineteenth century.¹ As presidential candidates these nominees approached the status of leaders within the party, although theoretically their leadership was not equivalent to that exercised in the British form of governmental and party system. In this type of political system, prevailing in the United Kingdom and the Dominions, the appointment of party leaders remained under the control of parliamentary figures operating within the legislative caucus.

The first exception to the caucus control of leadership in British Cabinet-Parliamentary systems was the 1893 convention of the Canadian Liberal Party. Although conventions

of Canadian parties occurred prior to 1893, the 1893 gathering was the first convention to be widely representative and to concern itself, albeit briefly, with the question of party leadership. Compared to the American conventions of the period and later Canadian conventions, however, the leadership question was only a minor consideration in 1893. Certainly there was no idea of deposing the reigning leader, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and, in the conduct of the convention, priority was given to policy and organizational affairs. Indeed, the only official act of the convention in regards to leadership was to present at the last session a "resolution of confidence" in Laurier, which was hastily carried in the early hours of the morning.


4 Indeed, the convention was so representative that delegate credentials were often unchecked. See J. W. Lederle, "The Liberal Convention of 1893" Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XVI, (February, 1950), 46.

5 The resolution stated: "That this convention desires to express its entire confidence in the leadership of the Honourable Wilfrid Laurier and its admiration of his brilliant
In view of the characteristics of the 1893 convention, the 1919 convention of the Liberal Party can be considered the original prototype of national leadership conventions in Canada. Due to the death of Laurier and the unstable nature of the party system following the Unionist period, the convention of 1919 featured a serious struggle over the succession to Laurier's leadership of the party. Although the questions of party organization and program as well as leadership were the official purposes of the convention, the latter issue was, in reality, paramount. In this sense the 1919 convention patterned the succeeding conventions of 1948, 1958 and 1968. Similar to 1919, the later conventions all featured leadership contests between two or more candidates, which were decided by a majority ballot of delegates.

Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of


the history of contests, in contrast to their United States counterparts, is their irregular occurrence. Only four leadership conventions have been held this century. Between these gatherings the minimum interval was a decade; but the period between the King and St. Laurent conventions was almost 29 years.

The party's relationship to government has been assumed to affect the conduct of national conventions. In the United States, whether a party is "in" or "out" of power at the federal level has been considered a significant influence on convention behaviour. In the Canadian Liberal Party only one leadership convention - 1948 - has been conducted in a period when the party actually possessed a clear majority in the lower House. In 1968, the government of Mr. Pearson held only a plurality of the Commons' seats. Both in 1919 and 1958, the party constituted the Official Opposition at the federal level, although Liberal governments were present in the provinces.

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7See David, et. al., op. cit., pp. 82-125.


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The mere fact of being a Government or Opposition Party has not been clearly related to the varying patterns of competition in leadership contests. The highest degrees of competition, measured by the number of candidates and ballots, have occurred in 1919 and 1968, while the lowest degrees were present in 1948 and 1958.9

In the Liberal Party, more clearly related to the degree of leadership competition in convention were the prevailing party outlooks on each occasion. In this respect a distinction can be made between the Opposition periods of 1919 and 1958. In the former case the party was considered truly distant from the immediate possibility of forming a federal government. As well as having remained in Opposition since 1911 and having suffered the defection of the Liberal-Unionists,10 a realistic awareness of the party's position was prevalent within the party, as the

---

9 See Table 1

10 Although possessing some 62 Quebec seats after the 1917 election, "Laurier" Liberals retained only 8 seats in Ontario and a mere 2 in the four western provinces. None-the-less, the party received more than a third of the votes cast in Ontario and Alberta and never less than 20% in the other provinces. See H. G. Thorburn, ed., Party Politics in Canada, 2nd edition, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1967) pp. 218-224.
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<td></td>
<td>P. Martin</td>
<td>11.7 (277)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P. E. Trudeau</td>
<td>31.8 (752)</td>
<td>40.8 (964)</td>
<td>44.6 (1051)</td>
<td>51.2 (1203)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J. Turner</td>
<td>11.7 (277)</td>
<td>14.8 (347)</td>
<td>11.8 (279)</td>
<td>8.2 (195)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R. Winters</td>
<td>12.4 (293)</td>
<td>20.0 (473)</td>
<td>26.4 (621)</td>
<td>40.6 (954)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 (2366)</td>
<td>100 (2364)</td>
<td>100 (2357)</td>
<td>100 (2352)</td>
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* Spoiled ballots not included
prospective leader, Mr. King, observed:

There seems to be a call to me at this time, the need for leadership. It was never greater. The party's fortunes are at a low ebb, the lowest for many years. 11

In retrospect, the Prime Minister confirmed and elaborated upon this view:

...a party which had been out of office for eight years; a party which had become sharply divided at a time of war; a party which had lost the great chieftain...; a party which was in the minority in both houses of Parliament. In its ranks, there were still enmities and divisions. A third political party...was a rival of the Liberal Party for power. 12

The 1958 situation was substantially different.

Although in Opposition after the 1957 general election, the Liberals were only some 7 seats short of the government's total of 112 and had outpolled the Conservatives in terms of popular votes - 41 percent to 39 percent.13 As a result, the

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13Statistics found in the appendix to Thorburn, op. cit., p. 225.
atmosphere of the convention proceedings differed consider-
ably from 1919. According to one observer of the gathering

...a casual bystander could be forgiven if he
concluded that he was attending the convention
of a party which had recently won, not lost,
a general election. 14

In his closing address as leader, Mr. Pearson accurately
portrayed the party optimism and its causes:

With the right policies and the right
organization we will soon be returned to
office again...Our task is to bring
confidence and stability out of the pre-
sent confusion and uncertainty; to bring
back steadiness and faith where there is
now nervousness and fear...The Conservative
government is talking now of what they are
pleased to call a "pause" in our national
development...How long is it to be before
we get back on the Liberal road of full
employment and a rising standard of living,
the road this country has travelled ever
since the war? 15

Similarly, the party's situation at the "government"
conventions of 1948 and 1968 can be distinguished. As well
as possessing a vast majority of Parliamentary representation
and popular votes,16 the Liberal Party in 1948 remained under

14N. Ward, "The Liberals in Convention", in Thorburn,
_op. cit., p. 225.

of the National Liberal Convention. (Ottawa: National Liberal
Federation, 1948) pp. 251-253. Henceforth to be referred to as

16See Thorburn, _op. cit._, p. 225.
the guidance of a leader who had occupied the post of Prime Minister, uninterrupted, for 13 years. The more partisan challenge of the left-wing C.C.F. party had been replaced in significance by the threat of international communism. Except for the protest of C. G. Power, a former Minister, there seemed little evidence of dissatisfaction with the prevailing status of the party.

In 1968, however, the Party formed only a slim minority government, whose position was rendered even more tenuous by the government defeat of February 19, 1968. Electorally, the Party was challenged by the popularity of the new Conservative leader, as interpreted by the public opinion polls. Moreover, among the established figures in the party, no individual seemed adequate to bolster the party's prospects. Although Mr. Trudeau's attraction as a candidate was his expected electoral appeal, he did not represent an outstanding party figure as was Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. Pearson on prior occasions. As a result, in the 1968 situation of the Liberal Party, the "serene consensus", as

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17 This was measured both in terms of the public's view of Stanfield as a leadership choice - 61% felt it was a "good" choice - and the increased popularity of the Progressive Conservatives as compared to the Liberals - 43 to 34% in October of 1967. See The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Public Opinion News Service, (Toronto, October 25 and 28, 1967).
one writer has termed it, "that had so smoothly bestowed the
Liberal leadership on Lester Pearson (and on Louis St. Laurent
before him) was conspicuously absent." \(^{18}\)

The Structure of National Leadership Conventions

The leadership conventions of the Liberal party have
possessed a great similarity of structure, despite their
infrequent occurrence. Although leadership succession has,
in reality, constituted the focus of the national conventions
from 1919 to 1968 (except 1966), only at the 1968 convention
did it represent the sole official purpose for the event.
The former three conventions were called upon to entertain
organizational and platform considerations of the party, in
addition to deciding the contest for leadership. \(^{19}\) Therefore,
the necessity of leadership selection incidentally provided
the opportunity for a gathering of party membership to
discuss other party issues. \(^{20}\) However, the selection of a
party leader has constituted the real basis for the appearance

\(^{18}\) P. C. Newman, The Distemper of Our Times. (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1969), p. 436. As shall be noted below,
this previous "consensus" was primarily fostered by the
Cabinet elite or past leader.

\(^{19}\) See Report of the Proceedings of the National Liberal
Convention. (Ottawa: N.L.F. 1958) p. 1.8; Report of the
Proceedings of the National Liberal Convention (1948). op. cit.,

\(^{20}\) The long-time political organizer of the Liberal Party,
Senator "Chubby" Power, has asserted this advantage of party
conventions: "The greatest aid to part organization that comes

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of the national party convention. The absence of any additional national party conventions prior to 1960 illustrates this point and also the relatively low priority given to "grass roots" determination of party organization and platform once the question of leadership selection has been settled.

The role of the national party convention in the determination of party policy has been an indirect, minor one. Although the leadership conventions from 1919 to 1958 simultaneously created a party platform, its lack of influence on party policy has been defined by Mr. King's statement at the 1919 gathering:

I consider the platform as a chart to guide me and with the advice of the best minds in the Liberal Party as a compass, will seek to steer the right course. 21

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20 From conventions arises from the opportunities for personal contacts. The meeting of a large number of persons actively engaged in the same kind of work, the acquaintances formed, and, above all, the exchange of information and experience, are of great value." Power, C. G., A Party Politician: The Memoirs of Chubby Power, ed. Norman Ward. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966) p. 372. This opinion seems to be concurred in by at least one analysis of the Canadian party system: "This binding together of party activists, even at such rare intervals, in the performance of a crucial function adds significantly to party cohesion and facilitates the task of party leadership." F. C. Engelmann and M. A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 192.

The same philosophy was echoed by Mr. Pearson at the 1958 convention:

Our task is to bring confidence and stability out of the present confusion and uncertainty; ...The chart to guide us in this task has been established by the resolution you have adopted. 22

In the 1960's, the frequency of conventions reviewing party policies increased considerably. Nonetheless, despite desires among some activists that the party become "a vehicle for democracy" the prerogatives of the parliamentary party remained, according to Prime Minister Pearson, essentially the same. In speaking of the "freedom" present at the 1966 biennial policy conference, he announced

You have employed this freedom with a boldness and a sense of responsibility that has renewed the strength and vigour of our party. Your resolutions will be significant and important guides for government (Translation)...The resolutions that have been adopted will be our guide in the days ahead. 23

Despite party assertions that the attitudes of the present leader are somewhat different from his predecessors, 24

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24 According to recent claims, the Liberal party is increasingly committed to becoming "an effective participatory vehicle" in which "improved participatory techniques...to make more effective the role of the individual in all forms of political organization" are to be implemented. See Liberal Party of Canada. Study Group on Participation, The Politics of Participation: A Progress Report. (Ottawa: National Liberal Federation, 1970), pp. 2, 3 and 12.

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the relationship between party convention and ultimate party policy, has remained consistent with the "cadre" nature of the Liberal Party. At the party policy convention of 1970, the "responsibility" of the party elite as government took precedence over the implementation of members' resolutions on policy issues.

Similar to the historic pattern of elite control of policy determination in the party, the relationship of leadership to conventions has also reflected the influence of the Parliamentary party. Since 1893, the structure and occurrence of the leadership convention has not been determined independent of the power of the parliamentary elite of the party or of the perquisites of the party leader. J. W. Lederle

25In other words, policy has remained a prerogative of the elected party elites. According to Maurice Duverger, the essence of the "cadre" party is its structure which resembles "the grouping of notabilities for the preparation of elections, conducting campaigns and maintaining contacts with the candidates." Historically, the Liberal Party has resembled this form of party structure. See M. Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen, 1954) p. 64.

26The present leader considered some resolutions at the 1970 policy convention "for study" and for future implementation, while the government "should consider ways and means to study the balance of...resolutions." Letter from Prime Minister Trudeau to Miss Denise Howe, made public by the National Liberal Federation, p.3.
has pointed out the rigorous framework imposed by the parliamentary hierarchy on the conduct of the 1893 convention. 

Although the later conventions were more "open" - in terms of increased representation and the presence of candidates - than the 1893 archetype, at no time was the rule of parliamentary elites abrogated. Thus, the preparations for a second party convention were initiated by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1918. 

In 1919, following Laurier's death, the parliamentary Liberal caucus appointed a "committee of management" under the stewardship of James A. Robb, a former Cabinet Minister, to conduct the affairs of the party, including the provision of a national leadership convention. Some 14 Liberal M.P.'s, including the House Leader, D. D. Mackenzie, constituted this committee. 

The actual establishment of the convention was under the supervision of a National Liberal Convention Committee of 23 members. The committee was completely formed from Parliamentary elites - 15 of which were federal M.P.'s or Senators appointed by the House Leader and the remainder representatives of the

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27 According to J. W. Lederle, "...in organizing the body for business and subsequently in the discussing of policy resolutions, the fine hand of the party leader and his cohorts was omnipresent." Lederle, "The Liberal Convention of 1893", op. cit., p. 50.


Parliamentary elite in 8 of the 9 provinces.

As the extra-parliamentary structure of the party grew in significance, - witnessed by the creation of the National Liberal Federation in 1932 - its participation in the procedure leading to the leadership convention was recognized. Thus, a share in the responsibility for the organization of the 1948, (and subsequent conventions), rested with the National Liberal Federation and its officers. However, the essential control of the convention remained within the Parliamentary party. For instance, the decision to call a leadership convention was synonomous with Mr. King's decision to retire, which was expressed to a dinner of the National Executive Committee on January 20, 1948. Moreover, the consultations of Prime Minister King were basically confined to the elite of his Cabinet - St. Laurent, Martin and Pearson - rather than extended to include the party president, J. Gordon Fogo, or other extra-parliamentary figures.

The leader's initiative in prompting the calling of a leadership convention remained characteristic of Mr. St.

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Laurent's departure as leader in 1958. The desire of the former Prime Minister was communicated to the National Liberal Federation's President in September of 1957:

...I have come to the conclusion that I no longer have the vigour and energy to lead the party through a general election campaign...Accordingly may I request you take the necessary steps to organize a national convention of our party at an appropriate place and time. 32

As in 1948, final arrangements were the responsibility of a joint committee of 10 - 5 representatives each from the parliamentary caucus and the Federation. 33 The actual organization of the convention was further delegated to a National Convention Committee and Convention Organization Committee. The latter committee's 38 members were composed of some 18 Parliamentary figures, although the committee was chaired by the Federation president, Duncan K. MacTavish. In the former committee (45 members) were included 8 members of provincial legislatures and 4 occupants of federal Parliamentary seats. A further subdivision into subcommittees concluded the basic structures preparing the way for the leadership convention. 34

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Despite the extensive machinery established prior to the 1919, 1948 and 1958 conventions, the initiation of this machinery remained the constitutional prerogative of the Parliamentary leader. The existence of this prerogative was especially significant, given the possible status of the party leader as head of government, and therefore as an agent responsible to the populace at large rather than to the party. In the traditional view of this situation expressed by Duverger:

...democracy requires that parliamentary representatives should take precedence over party leaders (extra parliamentary) and the members of the electorate over the members of the party. 35

The recognition of this principle - to some extent - is testified to by Prime Minister King's comments on his calling of the 1948 leadership convention:

I said nothing of the position of Prime Minister I had the best of reason for this. The office of Prime Minister is not one in the gift of a political party. It is the highest office in the gift of the Crown...A Prime Minister is not responsible to a party organization or to a political party; he is responsible to Parliament and through Parliament to the people of the country as a whole. 36

35 Duverger, op. cit., p. 182.
36 King, op. cit., p. 7.
In this respect, the position of Mr. St. Laurent in 1958 was quite different. Due to the 1957 electoral defeat of the Liberals, the leader did not possess the constitutional or political prerogatives of the office of Prime Minister. This was perhaps one reason for the appearance of pressures urging Mr. St. Laurent's retirement.37

The context of Prime Minister Pearson's retirement from the party leadership also differed, in a constitutional sense, from that of his predecessors. The principle of party gatherings at regular intervals for purposes of reviewing party policy had been extended to the question of leadership by a resolution carried at the 1966 policy conference and adopted in the party constitution:

A resolution calling for a Leadership Convention shall be placed automatically on the Agenda of the Biennial Convention next following a Federal General Election. If such resolution is adopted by secret ballot the Executive Committee shall call a Leadership Convention to take place within one year. 38

37 The day prior to the leader's retirement the conference of Ontario Young Liberals called for a federal leadership convention. See G. Hamilton, "Young Liberals to Press for Convention" The Globe and Mail (Toronto) September 6, 1957, Expectations of Mr. St. Laurent's withdrawal had apparently been present for some time. See The Globe and Mail (Toronto) September 4, 1957. The private pressures are described by Thomson, op. cit., p. 524.

Apparently, if the resolution was to be rigidly enforced as part of the party constitution, the leader’s prerogatives on the question of leadership succession would be substantially reduced.

Events prior to Mr. Pearson’s retirement in 1968 allowed no application of the provisions of the 1966 resolution. In practice, the withdrawal of Prime Minister Pearson and his personal control of the initiation of a leadership convention did not markedly differ from those of his predecessors. The ultimate decision, or authority, in his retirement was the leader’s own. Prior to the day in which his impending resignation was proffered to the public, Mr. Pearson’s intentions were unknown to the Cabinet, National Liberal Federation officials, and key political advisors.39 Certainly, political factors were no doubt involved in the Prime Minister’s decision, including the appointment of a new Conservative leader; but there was a complete absence of the overt political pressure applied in the case of the other party,40 or in the resignation of Mr. St. Laurent in 1958.

40See Martin Sullivan, Mandate ’68. (Toronto: Doubleday, 1968) pp. 91-92, 121-130. For a biased, but more complete view of the attacks on Mr. Diefenbaker’s leadership, see Robert C. Coates, The Night of the Knives. (Fredericton: Brunswick, 1968)
The actual record of the national leadership convention in the Liberal Party seems to differ in this respect from conceptions of the process as an instrument of intraparty democracy. If democracy indicates control by non-elites or even accountability of leader to non-elites at specific designated intervals, the Liberal leadership selection process has not functioned democratically. In a sense, however, the party convention has maintained an aura of democratic legitimacy around the leadership of the party. Apparently, Mackenzie King was prone to remind his Cabinet colleagues of the wider nature of his party leadership constituency. Thus, the very fact that non-elites participated in the selection of party leader, regardless of elite control of the time and extent of this control, served to democratize, (and hence in some respects to legitimize), the party leadership process.

Delegates and Representation

The essential instrument for the delegate's participation in the selection process is the leadership ballot.

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Paradoxically, the form of balloting - secret, individual voting - utilized in Liberal Conventions, unlike the United States' example, has encouraged a great degree of individual free choice. The individual delegate seemingly performed as a free agent, since he was bound by no primary elections and, indeed, by no overt political "pressure" of any sort due to the secret nature of the ballot. If this had indeed been practically as well as theoretically the case, the relatively high degree of stability in the leadership voting - 2 of 4 contests decided on the first ballot - is quite exceptional.

The characteristics of delegates to Liberal leadership conventions are significant in view of this exceptional stability. The composition of delegates to Liberal leadership conventions from 1919 to 1958 was such that Parliamentary elites continually retained a substantial degree of participation in the conduct of leadership selection. The actual formulas providing for representation at leadership conventions have thus been quite similar, being arranged:

Following the plans adopted in the prior National Conventions...and having regard to subsequent developments. 42

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Except for the inclusion of ten rather than nine provinces and for the addition of the executive committee of the Canadian University Liberal Federation, the formulas for 1958 and 1948 were identical:

1. All the Liberal members of the Privy Council, of the Senate and of the House of Commons, and where any constituency is not now represented in Parliament by an adherent of the Liberal Party, the Liberal candidate defeated in the last general election, or if a new Liberal candidate has been nominated...such new candidate.

2. The leaders of the Liberal Party in the ten provinces of Canada.

3. All members of the Executive Committees of of the National Liberal Federation of Canada, the National Federation of Liberal Women of Canada, and the Canadian University Liberal Federation.

4. The presidents and two other officers of each of the ten Provincial Liberal associations; the Provincial organizations of Liberal Women, the Provincial organizations of Young Liberals; and the president and two other officers of each of the university Liberal clubs in Canada.

5. Three delegates from each federal electoral district...In the case of Constituencies having two Parliamentary representatives six delegates will be selected.

6. The Liberal members of each provincial assembly and the defeated Liberal candidates at the last provincial assembly election in each province or new candidates nominated, acting jointly, shall have the right to select from among themselves a number of delegates equal to one-fourth of the total membership of each provincial assembly. 43

The formulas consequently allowed Parliamentary elites to maintain a high degree of participation in the leadership conventions of 1948 and 1958. In the former, 307 of 1,302 delegates and, in the latter, 351 of 1,534 delegates were present members of, former members of, or candidates for, the federal Parliament. Another 140 in 1948 and 144 in 1958 were members of the Parliamentary elites of provincial parties. Thus, in each of the leadership conventions of 1948 and 1958, fully one-third of the delegate representation was attached to the Parliamentary level of party activity as either members or candidates.

The significance of the representational formula resides in the preponderance of Parliamentary over non-Parliamentary elites - officers of affiliated associations above the constituency level. The latter category constituted less than 10 percent of the total representation at both the 1948 and 1958 conventions. In 1919 this characteristic of delegate representation was reinforced by confining the participation of extra-Parliamentary heads of affiliated associations to those of the nine provincial organizations.

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45See The National Liberal Convention, op. cit., p. 6.
Furthermore, the numbers of federal Parliamentary elites qualified to attend the 1919 convention were extended to include all those members "who desire to cooperate with the Liberal Party", as well as Liberal members and defeated candidates per se. 46

The significance of the legislative party at the three earlier conventions clearly placed a high priority on the goodwill of Parliamentary members for the achievement of success by a leadership candidate. In reality, the successful leadership candidates have received a preponderant amount of support from federal Parliamentary members. However, the significance of the Parliamentary elite in leadership selection extended beyond that of its numbers alone. In particular, the behaviour of constituency delegates, who have formed the majority of votes at each convention since 1919, is not necessarily determined independent of Parliamentary figures. As Senator Power relates of the process of selecting constituency delegates:

The weakness in this is that very often the constituency delegates are the choice of the federal member of Parliament and reflect his views and vote as he directs. 47

46 The National Liberal Convention, op. cit., p. 6.
47 Power, op. cit., p. 371.
The influence of the Parliamentary party over constituency delegates derived from at least two factors - the method of choosing constituency delegates and the relative lack of information concerning leadership accruing to the non-Parliamentary delegate.

The accreditation of constituency delegates depended upon their election at a local party convention.

In each federal electoral district a meeting shall be called... for the election by a majority of the votes of those present at the meeting, of the number of delegates to which the constituency is entitled. 48

However, the responsibility for the organization of the convention resided mainly with the respective federal M.P. or defeated candidate. Although the action of the defeated candidate or member of Parliament was undertaken in conjunction with the local constituency and provincial associations, the latter's influence was clearly less direct. The situation offered the opportunity of affecting the quality of delegates much more to the federal Parliamentary members or defeated candidates, than to other elite groups, such as the extra-Parliamentary party or provincial organizations.

The impact of the legislative member on the views of

constituency delegates was enhanced by his frequent monopoly on political information. In conventions prior to 1968, the extent of candidate campaigns and the importance of the mass media were much less pronounced than in contemporary politics of leadership. Furthermore, the knowledge of leadership candidates and issues, as well as party affairs in general, were often obscured in favour of emphasis on electoral prospects and party unity. In the convention of 1948 one constituency delegate lamented:

We are here to prepare a platform...We don't need pep talks. We want adequate time in which to discuss what is going into that platform. 49

Party gatherings offered little opportunity for constituency delegates to ascertain even the basic dynamics of the party. According to Senator Power:

...the delegates usually return home with little or no idea of the issues to be put before the people of the country. 50

In view of this situation and of the nature of the constituency party, which has tended to feature relatively little independent presentation of information or discussion of issues, the status of the legislator became particularly significant. The member

50 Power, op. cit., p. 370.
of the Parliamentary party thus became a central focus for
the dissemination of information and opinion within the
constituency. The actual extent to which the member has
functioned as an "opinion leader" among his respective
constituency delegates in the first three leadership
conventions is of course presently indeterminable. However it
is not unreasonable to maintain that his potential influence on
delegate behaviour greatly exceeded that possessed by other
elites.

A change in representation at the 1968 leadership
convention favoured an increase in the number of constituency
delegates.

Six delegates from each federal electoral
district at least one of whom shall be a
Liberal woman and one a Young Liberal,
and alternates, who shall be elected at a
local meeting, to be called for that purpose.51

The relative decline of representation of Parliamentary elites
and the realignment of constituency boundaries in 1966 -
reducing the influence of Parliamentary members on constituency
members - has been seen as contributory to the more competitive
leadership contest in 1968. However, the freedom of the
individual delegate is not necessarily proved by increased
competition, since the latter could equally well result

51Constitution, op. cit., Clause 9, Section D,8.
from increased conflict between elites. The significant feature of delegate representation at the 1968 convention, as with its predecessors, was the commitment—through prolonged party membership and occupancy of party offices—of a great majority of delegates to the existing party framework.

The Role of the Party Leader

Although the power of non-elites in the leadership selection process has been limited by the nature of delegate representation to party conventions and by the lack of leadership accountability at designated periods, a further qualification was enforced by the nature of the elites contesting for the possession of the party leadership. Consequently, the effectiveness of non-elites in the conduct of the political system is not necessarily measured by their actual participation in elite roles but by the degree to which their activity influences the award of elite roles to different sets of competitive elites. In the latter situation, the existence of a clearly defined elite group or

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52One survey of the 1968 convention reports over 50 percent of delegates were party members for at least 10 years. See C. R. Santos, "Some Collective Characteristics of Delegates to the 1968 Liberal Party Leadership Convention", Canadian Journal of Political Science, III, (June, 1970), 301.
a "counter elite" is a prerequisite of this influence.

In the leadership selection process of the Liberal Party the success of a clearly defined "counter-elite" has been infrequent. As a result, there has not appeared a serious discontinuity in leadership succession in the party. This continuity in party leadership is evidenced by the positive relationships established between past and present leaders. Moreover, the characteristics of leadership candidates at conventions indicate a relative similarity of elites - and therefore the absence of alternative or dissimilar elites - in terms of their backgrounds in political institutions. Both these characteristics have coincided with the absence of facilities, (the form of balloting excluded), conducive to competition among alternative elites for the support of non-elites, such as the frequent use of pre-convention campaigns and of campaign organizations or the presentation of issues to the non-elites through the promulgation of alternative platforms or philosophies.

The dominant contribution to the impotence of "counter-elites" in the leadership selection process of the Liberal Party has been the strong influence of the past leader.

53See Tables 2 to 4
One source of this influence has been the tendency of the Liberal Party to venerate its great leaders - Laurier in 1919, King and Laurier in 1948, and in 1958 St. Laurent as well. As a symbol of the party and its success the party chief was regarded with deference by many party members. In the case of Mackenzie King, even the most dispassionate participant in the 1948 convention was not unaware of this phenomenon:

We Liberals spoke of Mackenzie King with a mixture of wonder and uneasiness, but sparingly. He was less a person, more a presence. To the Liberal Party he had become a familiar mystery - like Communion wine - to be seen, partaken of, believed in, never fully understood; King conjured visions of mystical powers, eternal triumph, and an omnipotence beyond the ken of ordinary men...one could end a conversation by beginning to talk about him. 54

It is thus not unlikely that the considerable material resources and political skills of the party leader were enhanced by this prestige.

The significance of the former leader in the selection of his successor was based on material as well as symbolic considerations. In remarking on Mr. King's influence at the

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1948 leadership convention, a western journalist stressed the considerable impact of the Prime Minister's control of elements of party patronage, including the occupation of Senatorial posts.

These hopeful candidates for 13 vacancies in the Upper Chamber point up an overlooked fact...The cardinal factor is that the Right Honourable William Lyon Mackenzie King is still the Prime Minister...Anyone who leaves Mr. King out of his calculations has omitted the principal factor of prophetic wisdom. 55

Although publicly uncommitted to any candidate, there seems little reason to doubt the many reports that Prime Minister King privately exerted his influence in favour of Mr. St. Laurent's candidacy. The most obvious example was King's encouragement of Cabinet Ministers to enter initially the nominations for the leadership and then to withdraw in favour of St. Laurent. 56 The fact that his tenure of the Prime Minister's office was not concluded immediately after the choice of his successor, (similar to Prime


Minister Pearson), afforded Mr. King significant political resources to exercise this type of influence.

The influence of the past leader in relation to the choice of his successor was not confined to the 1948 situation, but was also present in the selection of the remaining leaders. In 1919, Mr. King utilized the veneration accorded to the late leader, Wilfrid Laurier, by intimating that his candidacy represented Laurier's personal preference. King's speech at the convention extolling the virtues of the late leader and his support of Laurier's position during the conscription crisis stressed Mr. King's favourable relationship with the past chieftain. 57

In the selection of Mr. Trudeau and Mr. Pearson, the same overt emphasis on relationships with the past leader was less evident. However, in both of these cases, the new leader, as a candidate, did not attempt to criticize or to eschew identification with the former leader.

The converse of the above relationship consisted of the role of the past leader in promoting the fortunes of a

particular leadership candidate. Certainly in 1958 and 1968, evidence of the control which Mr. King was reported to have exercised in Cabinet prior to the 1948 convention was lacking. However, there appeared evidence in both examples of successful candidates being particularly favoured by the activities of the past leader. In 1958, Mr. Pearson was not only politically associated with Prime Minister St. Laurent; but had been encouraged in his political ambitions by Mr. King himself before 1948. Similar to the procedure in 1948, when King consulted Ministers Howe and St. Laurent prior to his decision to retire, the final decision of former Prime Minister St. Laurent to withdraw was occasioned by a discussion with past Cabinet colleagues, including Pearson and Lionel Chevrier. In both instances, the meetings reportedly considered the successor to the present leader. To Mr. St. Laurent, the assurance of Mr. Pearson's


60 See Thomson, op. cit., p. 524.
decision to run in the leadership convention was apparently a vital causal factor in his resignation. The clear association of Mr. St. Laurent and the leadership candidate was further evidenced by his request that Pearson draft the statement announcing the leader's resignation. 61

The relationship of Prime Minister Pearson to the candidacy of Mr. Trudeau suggests a further source of the influence of the party leader in the leadership selection process. Thus, by emphasizing certain facets of the party ideology, (the French-English Canadian partnership and the principle of leadership alternation), Mr. Pearson tended to favour a particular leadership candidate. In announcing the advent of a leadership convention and his retirement, the Prime Minister pleaded the case of a bilingual governmental and party leader:

...it is one of my secret hopes for Prime Ministers of the future...I want them to be given the privilege of exposure to the two great mother languages of the western world from cradle to grave. It will make life a lot easier...for future Prime Ministers. 62

The statement was a significant one in view of the fact that the majority of established candidates - Sharp, Hellyer, and

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62 Quoted in Peacock, op. cit., p. 121.
Winters - were less than fluently bilingual. Although External Affairs Minister Martin was bilingual, he was not privy to the meeting of Mr. Pearson with possible French-Canadian, bilingual leaders including Ministers Marchand and Trudeau. It was at this time that the leader encouraged the candidacy of a representative of French Canada.  

The degree to which this indirect promotion of Mr. Trudeau's candidacy was, in fact, a willful action of the Prime Minister is, of course, problematical. However, in a negative sense, the Prime Minister apparently had reason to prefer the Justice Minister. A former Liberal Cabinet member has substantiated this view:

No one of us doubted, however, that he would do everything he legitimately could to stop Paul Martin, that he did not want to see Hellyer succeed, and that he wasn't as enthusiastic about Mitchell Sharp's candidacy as he had once been. I think he himself would like to have supported Trudeau, but felt that the young man was too much the non-conformist ever to make it.  

To some observers, the emphasis of Mr. Pearson on a French-Canadian candidate derived in some measure from his preference.

63 See Sullivan, op. cit., p. 274 and Peacock, op. cit., p. 222 for an account of these meetings, which included both Trudeau and Marchand.

for Mr. Trudeau. Reportedly, this was the attitude of the Prime Minister in respect to his discussions with prominent French-Canadian Liberals.

I was most anxious, like everyone else, that Marchand should not feel that he was being replaced by Trudeau as the French-speaking candidate. 65

The actual delineation of the party leader's influence in regard to his successor is a difficult one. However, some pattern has emerged from 1919 to 1968. This pattern has reflected a high degree of coincidence between the reported or suspected preference of the party leader and his successor selected by the party convention. Moreover, successors have hastened to associate themselves with the preceding leadership and policies. The presence of this pattern suggests that the party leaders have possessed some capability of performing a significant role in the determination of the subsequent party leader. More significantly, the continuity witnessed between party leader and successor indicates that successful intervention of counter-elites attacking the prevailing leadership has been infrequent.

The Leadership Campaign and Organization

In addition to the contribution of the past leader in the minimization of inter-elite competition, analysis of the leadership contests themselves indicates further the relative absence of conflict. An observation of Liberal conventions reveals that conflict has been infrequent, not only in a superficial sense due to the first ballot selections of 1948 and 1958, but also due to the relative absence of institutions or processes conducive to elite competition for non-elite support.

Indicative of the low priority with which competition between leadership candidates was regarded were the regulations concerning speeches by candidates to convention delegates. In 1919, leadership candidates were not allowed to present public arguments in favour of their candidacies to the assembly. Instead, the only public presentations of candidates concerned their roles in introducing platform resolutions of various convention committees. In 1948 and 1958, the limitation on speeches was abandoned in favour of permission

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for limited addresses by candidates to the entire body of delegates.

A final procedure for the presentation of candidates to the convention delegates was evolved in 1968. As well as general speeches by candidates, a series of "workshops" established on the basis of general policy areas - "Our Economy - Our World", "Our Life", and "Our Country" - were available for delegate-candidate discussions. Despite the relative informality of these latter occasions, they did not provide a forum for intensive candidate debate. The more controversial exchanges involved the conflict between divergent views of constitutional problems possessed by Ministers Trudeau and Turner.67 A relative lack of attention was focused on other areas.68

The development of the above procedures indicates at least a tendency toward the increasing establishment of formal structures conducive to greater contact between candidates and delegates. The existence of this trend illustrates perhaps that the formal institutions were becoming

68See Wearing, op. cit., p. 16.
more hospitable to inter-elite competition. At the same time, it indicates, however, that competition of this sort has not been an inherent assumption behind the historical practice of the leadership selection process. Previously, formal convention structures had coincided with attitudes deprecating the institution as a forum for extensive elite conflict.

In addition to little evidence of convention institutions facilitating candidate competition, non-competitive patterns of activity have existed outside of the formal framework of the convention itself. In viewing the pre-convention campaigns of candidates for the leadership as one of these patterns of activity, the lack of elite competition is quite apparent. The activity and attitudes of successful leadership candidates has been emblematic of the historical insignificance of campaign organization in the selection of the party leadership. The archetype of the ostensible lack of interest in personal campaigning was Mackenzie King's performance in 1919. Generally considered exemplary of King's position in this matter was his visit to the United Kingdom during the months prior to the leadership convention. The future Prime Minister recorded at the time that his actions were a conscious policy on his part:
I had no organization of any kind and did not seek the support of a single man. When spoken to, I told my friends it was a matter for them to consider and so as they might think best. I literally abstained in every direction from exerting any influence whatever. The trip to England was evidence of my desire not to intrigue, and my attitude since my return was not less visibly so. 69

The reluctance to intercede on one's own behalf in the form of a personal leadership campaign remained characteristic of King's successor. Despite the contrary efforts of his chief opponent, Mr. St. Laurent refused to participate in leadership campaigning or policy debate prior to the convention. To the External Affairs minister, a serious candidacy did not require artificial stimulants of support.

I am not seeking the leadership...But I believe that any member of the party whom the convention selects would feel it an honourable duty to accept. I am doing nothing at all to influence the choice of the party. 70

Officially, St. Laurent considered himself a candidate, since he would accept the leadership, but he was not a "running" candidate similar to Mr. Gardiner.

Similar to his predecessor, Mr. Pearson's preparations for the leadership convention were not characterized by

69 Quoted in Dawson, op. cit., p. 298.
extensive personal campaigning. Apparently, at lower levels of the party, a struggle between sympathizers of Pearson, Walter Harris, and Paul Martin had been present for some months prior to the resignation of the party leader.\textsuperscript{71} Significantly, however, the elite of the party did not encourage this conflict. The minimal level of personal campaigning conducted by Mr. Martin, mainly consisting of telephone calls and handshakes with arriving delegates, was considered exceptional in terms of his opponent's strategy.\textsuperscript{72}

The successful leadership candidate has also tended to possess a limited campaign organization within the convention itself. As the archetype "machine politicians", the unsuccessful candidacies of Gardiner, Graham, Fielding, and Martin were more representative than the leaders themselves. In 1968, despite a general growth in attention to campaign organization, it was Mr. Hellyer's, rather than Mr. Trudeau's activities which represented the most professional convention "machine".\textsuperscript{73}

Candidates' use of the leadership campaign and organization did increase significantly in 1968.

\textsuperscript{71}\textit{The Globe and Mail}, September 4, 1957.
\textsuperscript{72}The response of the Pearson camp to Martin's activity was W. Gordon's encouragement of Keith Davey to "talk it up" with party supporters of Pearson. See Beale, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 140-142.
\textsuperscript{73}See LeMarsh, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 331.
As one candidate lamented:

In business, when you want a man for an important job you turn to the man you want not the job seekers...I can't recall other leadership conventions in which the candidates have been called upon to debate public issues during the course of the campaign. 74

Country-wide campaigns contacting delegates and various promotion techniques were undertaken by the major candidates. The vast expenses incurred illustrate the attempt to mobilize party membership in support of particular candidacies.75

Whether the increase in candidate competition witnessed in 1968 can be considered permanent is subject to further investigation. However, even accepting this trend as irreversible, the development of these structures directed competition toward personal rather than policy or ideological differences among candidates.76 In this respect, the 1968 contest resembled all previous leadership selections. Only unsuccessful "pariah" candidates, such as J. G. Gardiner, emphasized ideological divisions in leadership campaigns in previous conventions. Despite contemporary issues of considerable import, the 1968 Liberal candidates also did not engage

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74Winters, Robert, quoted in Saywell, op. cit., p. 298.
75Some candidates were estimated to have spent in excess of 400,000 dollars. See K. Z. Paltiel, Political Party Financing in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 1970) pp. 39-40.
76Professor Smiley observes that this is more functional in terms of retaining party unity and leadership recognizes it as such. See Smiley, op. cit., pp. 396-397.
in extensive preconvention policy debate. The early attempts by candidates, not including Mr. Trudeau, to debate the Medicare question were discontinued in response to the demands of the party leader.  

The Leadership Convention and Party Conflict

The formal structure of the national leadership convention did allow for a competitive leadership selection process in the Liberal party. Provisions were made for competition between elites and for non-elite participation by voting. Despite the formal competitive framework, however, characteristics of the convention over much of its history did tend to reduce conflict and encourage party consensus over leadership - the substantial influence and representation of Parliamentary elites; the absence of accountability procedures or of rules stipulating the frequency of leadership conventions; and the choice of a successor. However, the most significant restraint on the appearance of intraparty conflict consisted of the behaviour of the political actors themselves. There was relatively little disposition among either elites or non-elites to utilize the

77See Wearing, op. cit., p. 15.
convention as a forum for conflict over the party leadership. As a result, informal practices conducive to elite competition, such as leadership campaigns or policy debates between candidates, did not appear with great frequency. In the final analysis, the formal competitive framework established by the national party convention did not constitute a sufficient condition for the appearance of a democratic leadership selection process.
CHAPTER III

THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP CONVENTION AND PARTY COHESION

Despite the establishment of the national party convention as the mechanism for leadership selection in the Liberal Party, the structure has not created a high degree of competition among elites for the support of non-elites. In this respect, the party leadership convention has not functioned primarily as an instrument for accountability or control of leaders by the general party membership. In this context it becomes necessary to explore the actual function of the convention within the Liberal Party and with regard to party leadership. If the terminology of R. K. Merton can be utilized, a "latent" function of the Party leadership convention may be contrasted to its "manifest" function of instituting non-elite control over party elites.¹

¹The treatment here of the leadership convention does not represent an application of Merton's paradigm for sociological analysis. However it is useful to utilize his distinction between "latent" and "manifest" "functions". In regard to the leadership convention therefore a basic analytic difference can be maintained between "consequences" of the institution "which are intended and recognized by the participants in the system" and "those which are neither intended nor recognized." See R. K. Merton, On Theoretical Sociology: Five Essays Old and New. (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 47.

The selection of leadership is "manifest" in respect to the convention: its role in the promotion of party unity primarily "latent".
It is useful to consider the extent to which any mechanisms for the selection of party leaders actually function as institutionalized control of elites by non-elites. The mechanisms for the selection of party leaders in many democratic systems are thus much less liable to be judged prematurely as instruments for non-elite influence over elites. For instance, in the United Kingdom and other British-type Parliamentary systems, excepting Canada, leadership selection has been the sole prerogative of the Parliamentary caucus and, in some cases, has often been restricted to an even smaller legislative group. Such a procedure remains operative in the British Labour Party despite the prevailing democratic ethos characteristic of this mass party.\(^2\)

A traditional argument presented to explain absence in certain democratic systems of leadership selection by party conventions relies on evidence of dissimilar political cultures and governmental types. Thus, the selection of the

party leader by legislative caucus is seemingly consistent, in the British case, with a form of government in which executive leadership traditionally depends on legislative approval rather than on a direct relationship with the populace and with a political culture emphasizing deference to political elites rather than their control by non-elites.\(^3\) Correspondingly, the convention method is more suitable to the "division of powers" concept of government in which the political executive is more directly linked to the populace than the legislature and accords with political attitudes emphasizing non-elite participation in the conduct of political affairs.\(^4\)

Neither political culture nor governmental structure account fully for the applicability of the convention method to Canada. In addition to the disagreement on the extent to which

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which Canadian political culture approaches the populistic, American form, the suspicion of a basic incompatibility of responsible government in the Cabinet system with the selection of leaders by party convention exists. Nonetheless, the national party convention has continued to provide the political system with stable forms of leadership conducive to maintenance of the political system. Moreover, its function as a stable mechanism for Liberal leadership selection has coincided with a high degree of both party success and party solidarity. Clearly, then, the utility of the party convention as a selection mechanism in the Canadian party situation is not present solely for reasons of either political culture or of governmental structure.

A more acceptable explanation for the suitability of the national party convention derives from the nature of the social and political environment to which a party system must adapt. Studying the party convention's role in the United States political system, a distinguished American scholar has offered the observation:


The national convention represents the solution by American parties of the problem of uniting scattered points of political leadership in support of candidates for the Presidency and Vice Presidency. Thus it is the basic element of the national party apparatus...In a fairly real sense, the national convention is the national party. When means develop for uniting people in support of a nominee, the essence of party comes into being...The national convention thus is at the heart of the national party system. 7

Professor Key's analysis of the national convention recognizes the decentralized, "constituent" nature of American parties due to their performance as aggregators, within a federal political system, of multitudinous demands emanating from a diversified social structure.

In many respects the American party and societal situation parallels the position of the Liberal Party in Canada. Thus, the existence of the national party convention as the mechanism of leadership selection in the Liberal Party can be viewed as consistent with a particular party response to Canadian political and social conditions.

Studies have indicated that the development of political parties and of their internal characteristics has often coincided with changing characteristics of the social

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structure or of other areas in the political system. The introduction of mass suffrage has thus generally influenced the increasing bureaucratization and internal democratization of political parties. For reasons of relative social homogeneity or due to the party's approach to electoral success, the parliamentary caucus remained, despite mass suffrage, the characteristic European form of leadership selection. However, in the North American situation, national political parties faced the further prospect of reconciling a large degree of regional, ethnic and class diversity in order to achieve governmental power. Of particular significance to the parties' efforts was the influence of regionalism, which

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10In many European parties, explicit identification with certain social groupings or with particular ideologies is more vital than the pursuit of governmental power through pragmatic electoral means. A modern example is the Italian Christian Democrats. For the affect of this characteristic on its leadership recruitment patterns, see Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism" in Political Parties and Political Development, ed. J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 143-144.
was reinforced by the operation of a federal system\textsuperscript{11} and by electoral systems which exaggerated regional representation in legislatures.\textsuperscript{12}

The influence of these conditions of social diversity became particularly acute to the Liberal Party in the period between 1887 - the selection of Sir Wilfrid Laurier by the party caucus to succeed Edward Blake - and 1919, when the first selection of a national leader was accomplished by party convention. The Canadian situation was endemically more complex than the American, due to the existence of the province of Quebec, which overlapped ethnic loyalties with the regional identifications already encouraged by the federal

\textsuperscript{11}Certainly the existence of a federal political system facilitates the mobilization of regional demands and their presentation to the central authority. Moreover, it has been argued that the federal nature of a system may encourage the persistence of opposition to the centralization of the political system after the initial social or political reasons for opposition have declined. See T. J. Lowi, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 253-254.

\textsuperscript{12}A concise argument of this hypothesis in reference to the Canadian political system is found in A. C. Cairns, "The Electoral and Party Systems in Canada, 1929 - 1965". \textit{Canadian Journal of Political Science}, I (March, 1968) \textit{passim}. See also Duverger, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 216-228.
and electoral structures of the country. However, political and social developments, particularly the expansion of immigration, economic growth, and the addition of new provinces, had exacerbated the social diversity upon which the Canadian political system was based in 1919.

The most significant of these elements of diversity in terms of their effect on political movements was the development of prairie agriculture and the expansion of industry. The expansion of these interests and their mobilization due to the conditions of the World War I era increased substantially the complexity of the Canadian political system of 1919 in comparison to the nineteenth century.

13 The relationship of Quebec to the regional ethnic and religious cleavages of the Canadian political system is a significant one. Its creation of an "overlapping" pattern of cleavages has considerable effect on the nature of the Canadian party system. See R. R. Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1963) p. 260.

14 Two simultaneous movements dominated the Canadian economic system in the early years of the twentieth century prior to the 1920's. The first witnessed the expansion of the western wheat economy which brought the prairie provinces into the mainstream of Canadian political and economic activity. The birth of the "new industrialism" and the growth of Canadian manufacturing to an output equivalent to agriculture constituted the second of these trends. See W. T. Easterbrook and H. G. J. Aitken, Canadian Economic History (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 476-488; 515-522. The emergence of labour and agriculture as significant political interests was the result of these economic forces. See W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), pp. 3-95, and Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), pp. 58-61.
century. This was reflected in the election data of the period. Although Parliamentary seats increased by just 20 to 235, the electorate expanded fourfold between the elections of 1887 and 1921 from less than a million to more than three million voters. The problems thus posed to the two major parties at the national level were illustrated in the 1921 election results. While the category "Other" received a mere 1.6 percent of the vote in 1887, almost 6 percent of the 1921 electorate were recorded under this category. Moreover, this statistic does not include the 9.0 percent of 1921 voters who registered some disapproval of the prevailing party system by voting for the Progressives.\textsuperscript{15}

The growth of socio-economic diversity complicated the task of building a viable "national" party. If this task is construed as a process of distributing party output among the claims or demands emanating from these interests, processes such as the choice of party leader must appear to take cognizance of these demands. Leadership selection in the Liberal party since 1919 has been conducted in the context of an overriding concern with building a national party from the

prevailing diversity of social groups. The utility of the mechanism of selection can therefore be measured by its ability to contribute to the reconciliation of the demands of these interests - in effect, to socialize potential inner-party conflict over leadership.

A precondition of socialization of potential conflict is participation.\textsuperscript{16} Allowance of a sufficient degree of participation through representation of demands is thus a vital measure of the utility of a given selection mechanism. In the position of the Liberal party after World War I, due to the proliferation of political and societal cleavages and the nuances of the electoral system, the legislative caucus did not appear to provide adequately for this representation. The provision of an institution more representative than the Parliamentary party\textsuperscript{17} of these social interests was therefore a necessity. Although there seems little evidence of a direct causal link between this situation and the provision of a national leadership


\textsuperscript{17}Of the total of 83 seats held by the Liberals only 20 were outside of Quebec. Moreover a mere two seats represented the Liberal Party west of Ontario. This lack of representation occurred despite the fact the Liberals never gained less than 20% of the total popular vote and only less than 25% in one province, Manitoba. See H. G. Thorburn, ed., \textit{Party Politics in Canada}, 2nd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 214-225.
convention in 1919, the convention appears to have been considered the most efficacious arrangement possible under the circumstances. R. M. Dawson does remark that:

... the convention would determine in large measure how permanent was to be the disruption of the Liberals, to what degree the party could forget the animosities of the conscription election and reach out and meet some of the more recent movements which were breaking down traditional loyalties and threatening the stability of the old federal parties.

The convention alone seemed to provide adequate representation to those forces - including, Liberal members of Parliament who supported Laurier's struggle against conscription, independent Liberal members such as Fielding who supported the Unionist cause but who after the war wished to return to the Liberal fold, Liberals involved in provincial politics who nonetheless had harboured Unionist sympathies nationally, various extra-Parliamentary "Laurier" Liberals, and all those federal M.P.'s who "desire to cooperate with the Liberal Party" - necessary to the regrouping of a national party.

The 1919 situation of the Liberal Party is of course


19 For a complete account of the alignment of political forces at the 1919 convention, see Dawson, op. cit., pp.
merely an exceptional example of the unique contribution of the convention to the support of a stable selection process. However, in all its applications, the representational formulas of Liberal leadership conventions were sufficient to create a greater degree of participation than could the Parliamentary caucus. In an explicit form, the 1919 example illustrates that the essence of the national party convention's role consisted in its ability to permit the overt participation in the leadership selection process of a wide spectrum of party activists, whose exclusion would have been detrimental to party ambitions.20

Although a precondition, mere participation is certainly not a sufficient cause of the resolution of conflict within an institution. First of all, conflict must be confined within reasonable boundaries by some form of preliminary consensus, at least in order to legitimize the means rather than the ends of the activity involved. Moreover, within these boundaries, an institution, through its structure and by the behaviour of its participants, must be conducive to the maintenance of this preliminary consensus.

20 The chief of these would in this case be electoral success and party unity.
In the case of the Canadian Liberal Party, a factor contributing to the discouragement of convention conflict and therefore encouraging a stable leadership selection process has been the relatively high incidence at convention periods of party electoral success and of optimistic outlooks toward party victory. By encouraging the exhibition of a high degree of internal party consensus, this has facilitated the acceptance of the successful leadership candidate by its participants. Significantly, at a low ebb of party fortunes (1919), the new leader's succession was greeted with the most scepticism, due in particular to the question of his acceptability to western voters. In contrast, during periods of actual electoral success (1948, 1968) or of expectant victory (1958) the party leader's efficacy as a vote-getter was relatively unimpugned.

The prevalence of electoral success or of optimistic outlooks toward it at convention periods and, therefore, the existence of inducements to party consensus relate directly to the control over the occurrence of leadership conventions vested in the person of the party leader. Certainly such an hypothesis cannot be applied in 1919, when the death of the

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past leader was involved. However, in other situations, the occurrence of a leadership convention was governed by the discretion of the party leader instead of by specific constitutional directives relating to leadership succession. This was at least conducive to a greater control of the electoral situation of the party at the time of the convention. In contrast to formal rules regarding convention occurrence, such as in the United States, which do not allow this control, the flexibility of the Liberal situation has allowed elites the opportunity to choose occasions conducive to an untroubled transfer of leadership. Although the exact extent to which this consideration has entered into the calculations of leaders cannot be ascertained, it is reasonable to expect that leaders were not unaware of the degree and nature of party consensus at the time of their decisions.

A high incidence of electoral success and the control over the initiation of the leadership convention possessed by the party leader has encouraged the probability of consensus within the institution. In the final analysis, however, consensus within the national Liberal convention was a function of a more central political process. This process was based on the congruence of the interests of the
party elite and non-elite.\textsuperscript{22}

For the leadership convention to remain a contribution to a stable selection process and to party unity, the capability of reconciling the interests of party elites with the bulk of non-elite participants was essential. In practice, the leadership convention of the Liberal party has exhibited this capability, since the desire of occupants of various elite roles to control the selection of leader has been consistent with the expectations of party non-elites. The basis for this reconciliation has ultimately rested in the acceptance by non-elites, except for isolated, insignificant instances,\textsuperscript{23} of the necessity of selecting party leaders from

\begin{quote}

\textsuperscript{23}Mr. L. Henderson is the sole exception. However, his vote totals in 1958 and 1968 (1 and 0) testify to his practical and analytical insignificance.
\end{quote}
the party elite. The individual delegates who constituted
the convention non-elite were basically concerned with the
utilization of the ballot to choose between elites rather
than demanding non-elite control of the party leadership.
In effect, the former activity represented the maximum degree
of participation expected by occupants of non-elite roles.
Due to the structure and practice of the convention, however,
this degree of participation could be afforded non-elites
without necessarily reducing the potential influence of party
elites.

The basis for the lack of true control in the leader­
ship convention possessed by non-elites has derived from the
factors elaborated earlier diminishing the significance of
the leadership ballot - the decreased influence of the
independent delegate due to lack of information and to the
effectiveness of Parliamentary elites as sources of information
and opinion; and the discouraging of viable alternative elites
by the avoidance of policy debates and information campaigns
by convention candidates. As a result, control was largely
the prerogative of elite roles - the former leader, the
Cabinet and Parliamentary membership. In this manner, elites
within the party were generally allowed to possess influence
in relation to leadership selection commensurate with their party status.  

The Regulation of Internal Party Conflict

The above analysis has suggested that a function of the party leadership convention has been the promotion of party unity and the furtherance of the party's attempt to encompass a wide diversity of social interests. As a corollary, it has also maintained that the leadership convention did not exist merely to provide for a democratic choice of leaders within the traditional competitive model of leadership selection.

In contrasting these functions of the institution, the relationship of the leadership convention to internal party conflict is revealed. The party convention, despite providing ostensibly for competition among leadership candidates, has also controlled rather than encouraged party conflict. Only in respect to the performance of the former

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24 Explicit examples of informal practices of leadership selection recognizing the inequality of individuals' influence occurred frequently. The informal meetings alluded to earlier were somewhat exemplary in this respect. In 1948, Mr. King's consultation with C. D. Howe over the admissibility of Mr. St. Laurent as party leader amounted to a virtual veto possessed informally by a powerful party figure. See D. C. Thomson, *Louis St. Laurent: Canadian* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967), p. 211.
service has the leadership convention invariably been utilized, since in reality elite competition has been minimized. The leadership convention in the Liberal Party has thus resembled a "functional mechanism" as described by the sociologist, Karl Mannheim. In this respect the convention is usefully regarded as an institution, possessing a formula - in this case the balloting of delegates - which legitimates collective decisions in the absence of complete agreement. According to this conception, the essence of the leadership convention has consisted in its ability to regulate conflict over leadership in the interests of party consensus.

CHAPTER IV

THE LEADERSHIP CANDIDATES

Despite provision for conflict, the formal and informal structure of the leadership convention has not been extensively utilized as a forum for conflict between party elites or as an instrument of non-elite control of the party leadership. This feature of the leadership convention was encouraged by the existence of rules of the game and by a process of preselection which discouraged the appearance of competitive candidates and behaviour. The characteristics and behaviour of leadership candidates indicate this form of preselection and rules of the game prevailing in the selection of Liberal leaders.

The Leadership Candidates: Characteristics

A significant feature of Liberal leadership candidates has been their association with careers at the federal level of government. Of the 17 major candidates for the party leadership from 1919 to 1968,\(^1\) only Mr. Kierans lacked

\(^1\)All candidates were considered serious or major with the exception of L. Henderson in 1958 and 1968. Only candidates who actually were nominated at the convention and remained until the casting of the first ballot with one exception - Mitchell Sharp.
experience in federal politics. The emphasis on careers at the federal level of government was also evident in the degree of initiation of future candidates directly into politics at the federal level. A mere four candidates, in addition to Mr. Kierans, had held provincial political office prior to their introduction into federal politics. Two of these candidates - J. G. Gardiner and W. S. Fielding - were leaders of provincial governments. In all of these cases, however, with the one exception of Mr. Kierans, the federal careers of these individuals were quite extensive prior to their attempt to gain the leadership.

The characteristics of candidates indicate the importance of possessing some experience in government positions at this level, not only in terms of House of Commons membership, but with respect to Cabinet posts as well. With the duly noted exception, all leadership candidates previously possessed Parliamentary and Cabinet membership at Ottawa. Moreover, in 1919, Mr. King's temporary lack of a Commons seat was the only case of a candidate's failure to occupy a legislative position at the time of the selection of a party leader.  

2The Minister of Finance, Walter E. Harris, was considered a prime contender for the party leadership - The Globe and Mail (Toronto) September 4, 1957 - until his defeat in the general election of 1957.
TABLE 2: PERCENTAGES OF CANDIDATES WITH PROVINCIAL OR FEDERAL PARTY EXPERIENCE

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<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Office Holders</td>
<td>29.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Office Holders</td>
<td>94.1</td>
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</table>

N = 17

The general characteristics of leadership candidates in the Liberal party differ in some degree from those of their counterparts in other Canadian parties. In this respect, the propensity toward federal party careers of limited duration was a particularly distinctive trait of Liberal candidates. Leaders and candidates of the Conservative and New Democratic parties have been to a much greater extent products of extensive provincial party service and of prolonged careers as professional politicians.\(^3\)

The characteristics differentiating Liberal leadership candidates from those in other Canadian parties are

even more pronounced in the case of the party leaders. Successful candidates for the leadership exhibited political backgrounds distinguishing them, not only from the leaders of other parties, but also from unsuccessful candidates within the Liberal party. Thus, successful and unsuccessful Liberal candidates differed considerably in relation to their background in provincial or federal politics, the length of political and Parliamentary service, and the quality and extent of executive experience.4

TABLE 3: PROVINCIAL, PARLIAMENTARY AND CABINET CAREERS OF LEADERSHIP CANDIDATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Leaders, N=4</th>
<th>Non-Leaders, N=13</th>
<th>All Candidates, N=17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Years in Elected Provincial Office</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Years in Federal Parliament</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Years in Federal Cabinet</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The resolution of the process of leadership selection in the Liberal party has been favourable to candidates who not only identified with the federal political level, but also those

4See Tables 2 to 5.
who possessed a limited tenure of Parliamentary and Cabinet positions prior to their pursuit of the party leadership. The longest Parliamentary and Cabinet apprenticeship of a Liberal leader was Mr. Pearson's, of 10 and 9 years respectively. The legislative experience of both Mr. Trudeau and Mr. King extended less than 5 years, of which both spent a considerable portion as Cabinet ministers. Moreover, infrequently did any eventual leader function as a private M.P.. Of the four Liberal leaders, only Mr. Trudeau - from 1965 to 1967 - served as a government back-bencher. All the remaining leaders were co-opted directly into Cabinet positions.  

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5This co-option was characteristic of Cabinet membership as a whole. A study of Cabinets from 1940 to 1960 has shown 40% of ministers were appointed during their first political (Parliamentary) term. See J. Porter, The Vertical Mosaic. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 400.
TABLE 4: CANDIDATES ACCORDING TO LENGTH OF FEDERAL POLITICAL CAREERS PRIOR TO CANDIDACY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1-10</th>
<th>10-20</th>
<th>20+</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaders:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>King</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Laurent</td>
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<td>Pearson</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trudeau</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Leaders</td>
<td>Greene</td>
<td>Fielding</td>
<td>Martin</td>
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<td>Sharp</td>
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<td>Graham</td>
<td>Power</td>
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<td>Turner</td>
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<td>Mackenzie</td>
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<td>Gardiner</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Winters</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hellyer</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>MacEachen</td>
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Candidate Behaviour: The Regional Representative and the Professional Politician

The predominance of federal careers and the limited experience in formal political offices among eventual party leaders was indicative of a sharp contrast between victorious leaders and defeated leadership candidates in the Liberal party. The failure of particular types of leadership candidacies further exemplified the correspondence of degree of success with certain candidate characteristics. Thus, the regional representative, who had gathered political experience at the provincial level or who had developed a regional constituency as a federal politician, and the professional,
long-time politician, who had extensive political experience as a legislative and Cabinet member prior to his leadership candidacy, consistently failed to gain the leadership of the Liberal party. Three of these candidates - Fielding, D. D. Mackenzie, and Allan MacEachen - represented the Maritimes; the final regional candidate in this category, J. G. Gardiner, was a westerner. Of these candidates, the political background of Mr. Gardiner in particular and his approach to the question of party leadership clearly illustrated both the regional nature of his candidacy and the difficulties of this form of candidacy in respect to the selection of Liberal leaders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fielding</td>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>Cabinet Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graham</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>Cabinet Minister &amp; Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mackenzie</td>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>Member of Legislative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardiner</td>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>Premier &amp; Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kierans</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>Cabinet Minister</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 In Porter's terminology, the professional politician represents "a professionalizing of political roles where the individual devotes his life to politics and in the process develops a 'love' for political institutions." See Porter, op. cit., pp. 405-406.
There can be little doubt of the explicit identification of Gardiner's political career with the interests of the western prairie provinces and in particular with western agriculture. His position as Premier of Saskatchewan from 1926 to 1929 and his occupancy of the Agriculture portfolio in the Liberal Cabinets of the King and St. Laurent governments were consistent with a close relationship to these groups.

The character of Mr. Gardiner as a regional representative was apparently contributory to his difficulties as a leadership candidate. The basis of this difficulty rested with his excessive attachment to a particular faction of the Liberal party and to a particular group in the Canadian social system. An accurate appraisal of the image which resulted from this form of political behaviour has been offered by a biographer:

the common currency of contemporary comment has been that he is too much a politician and too much the Westerner...Gardiner seems to have been regarded by the rest of Canadians, and in particular by those policy-molding parliamentary figures, as exclusively and dominantly the champion and favorite native son of the Prairie provinces. 7

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In Parliament and Cabinet, the Minister's extreme concern with the promotion of western interests thus often placed him in opposition to contrary demands by other political figures and political groups. 8

As well as adhering to his representative function within the context of Cabinet and Parliamentary activity, Mr. Gardiner approached the contest for the party leadership with a similar explicit identification to this particular segment of the Liberal party. Prior to the 1948 convention, the Minister of Agriculture was involved in a wide variety of controversial issues relating to western interests. In March and April of 1948, Cabinet controversy over railway freight rates and the nature of new wheat marketing legislation resulted in Gardiner's association with the demands of western farm interests. 9 In contrast, his opponent was concerned with issues relating to external affairs, which were

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8 The Minister was often said to have "taken care of" the producers, while others were disadvantaged. See The Mackenzie King Record, op. cit., p. 332. In addition the Minister refused to cooperate with the legislative committee, chaired by Paul Martin, which was investigating excessive prices. See The Globe and Mail (Toronto), May 11, 1948.

9 Ibid., March 31, 1948; March 20, 1948; and May 8, 1948.
much less likely to provoke internal party conflict.\textsuperscript{10} The great difference in the issues confronted by the two leadership candidates was exemplified in policy speeches given by both on May 8, 1948. Unlike Mr. St. Laurent's speech which basically concerned the government's policy against Communism, Mr. Gardiner emphasized his stand in support of the unpopular ban on Margarine.\textsuperscript{11}

The Agriculture Minister's campaign for the leadership culminated in his promulgation of a ten point platform. The platform was really an embodiment of western demands on the federal government and on the central, industrial regions. The familiar requests for the expansion of immigration, export and transportation policies was coupled with the call for the decentralization of industry and the development of western resources.\textsuperscript{12} As well as representing an unprecedented action by a candidate for the Liberal leadership, the content of the program once again clearly indicated Mr. Gardiner's character as a regional representative.

\textsuperscript{10}The external affairs policy of the St. Laurent era was based on a premise of a hostility to international communism. As a result, there was little basis for partisan debate.

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{The Globe and Mail} (Toronto), May 9, 1948.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{The Globe and Mail} (Toronto), July 23, 1948.
The regional basis of Gardiner's candidacy was reflected in what support he did achieve. The regional criteria upon which his candidacy was evaluated was illustrated by the leader of the Saskatchewan Liberals, Walter Tucker, one of the few prominent public supporters of Gardiner. As his reason for voting he declared:

Agriculture is going to be faced with difficulties in the future comparable to those of the 30's. A man who has worked for Agriculture and who has worked to get markets for the farmer all his life is going to be more helpful as leader of the government in the times that may come. I am not voting against anyone. I have the greatest admiration for Mr. St. Laurent and his ability as a statesman. I am voting for Mr. Gardiner. 13

Similarly, the Alberta leader, J. J. Bowlen, indicated his belief in the legitimacy of a regional candidate.

I am not one of those who puts the West up against the East, but this party must recognize the needs of both West and East. The voice of the West is not being heard in Ottawa. 14

Along with the backing from these western leaders, the Gardiner campaign was reinforced by elements of the Ontario Liberals,

13Quoted in "Highlights at Liberal Convention Preview", in The Globe and Mail (Toronto), August 5, 1948.
14Ibid., p.5.
who represented the rural wing of the Ontario party.\textsuperscript{15}

Despite the support he obtained from his own constituency, Mr. Gardiner's status as a regional candidate clearly diminished his prospects of attaining the party leadership. The feuds prompted in the Liberal Cabinet by the championing of causes unacceptable to his colleagues resulted quite early in a "beat Gardiner" alliance among prominent Liberals at the federal level.\textsuperscript{16} Such a situation was anticipated by the Liberal leader himself in assessing the overall strength of Gardiner's candidacy:

I imagine Gardiner has these two provinces (Saskatchewan and Alberta) in hand. The fact that the West is strongly Gardiner will operate against him in the other provinces.\textsuperscript{17}

In addition, the promulgation of Gardiner's platform offered an opportunity for wider opposition to crystallize. Thus, a prominent Quebec newspaper attacked Gardiner's platform as a

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\textsuperscript{15}This faction was lead by Colin Campbell. Gardiner and the rural wing of the Ontario party had been associated with the forces of the Liberal premier of the province, Mitchell Hepburn - an intense rival of Prime Minister King. See The Mackenzie King Record.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., pp. 352-353; The Globe and Mail (Toronto), May 11, 1948. One reported statement from a member of the Manitoba delegation maintained: "Garson will get pretty close to unanimous support from the Manitoba delegation. We're frankly cut to beat Gardiner." The Winnipeg Free Press, July 5, 1948.

\textsuperscript{17}The Mackenzie King Record, op. cit., p. 358.
clear appeal to western economic sentiment, which was incompatible with the unifying function leadership should perform.

Ce programme attente en effet à l'unité nationale, à la souveraineté canadienne et à l'influence française. 18

By reinforcing his image as a regional candidate, the presentation of the platform, rather than mobilizing support, actually facilitated the emergence of further opposition. The emergence of this opposition contributed to Mr. Gardiner's rather severe defeat at the leadership convention of 1948.

The inability of Mr. Gardiner to present a serious threat to the ascendancy of Mr. St. Laurent corresponded to the general failure of the regional candidate as a leadership aspirant in the Liberal party. Two sources of this general failure can be considered - the effect of differing delegate strengths among regions and the prevalence of certain rules of the game diminishing the legitimacy of parochial appeals within the Liberal party. On the first issue, the disadvantages accruing to Mr. Gardiner from the inferiority of his western and agricultural constituency in terms of convention votes are quite evident. Certainly a vast

majority of delegates came from French Canada, industrial areas, or the coastal provinces, whose interests were opposed or only marginally sympathetic to western or farmer demands.

There is little evidence nonetheless that the respective delegate strengths of regions at conventions constitutes a sufficient condition for the bias against regional representatives as leadership candidates. On this note, it is important to recognize that distortions in delegate representation due to great electoral success in particular regions have not been a primary factor in Canadian conventions, as has been the case in the United States. Since constituency delegates remained constant regardless of the success of the party in the constituency and since both defeated and victorious federal candidates were automatically delegates, there was no regional distortion in this respect. Admittedly, a region constituting a substantial proportion of the Parliamentary party, such as has been the case of the Quebec Liberals, would possess a greater degree of influence than a region represented by

defeated candidates. However, in practice, this has been partially countered by the provisions for representation of provincial Parliamentary elites. In the Liberal conventions from 1948 to 1968, for instance, the provincial Liberal parties in both Quebec and Ontario were in minority positions in the provincial legislatures - reducing the representation of these regions. The fact therefore, that the formulas for delegate representation did not reinforce regions, such as Quebec, which possessed a larger share of the federal Parliamentary party and that regional representation in the federal legislative party did not often coincide with the party's control of the provincial legislature, diminished any tendency toward a numerical preponderance of delegates from a single region.

As no inordinate bias is forced on delegate representation as a result of electoral success, it is difficult to justify the difference in significance of regional candidates between the Liberal and the Conservative parties on the basis of distortions of regional delegate strength. Despite the lack of distortion, it is true that the central provinces of

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20There is however strength to the argument that the western provinces, especially Alberta and British Columbia which have been dominated by third party regimes, have been thereby disadvantaged in terms of delegate strength.
Ontario and Quebec, if united, retained a virtual veto over potential coalitions based on the peripheral regions. However, there has been no indication that such monolithic unity has been characteristic of the delegates from central Canada. In varying degrees, significant divisions of opinion on the choice of leader were present in the Ontario Liberal party at all conventions and, to a lesser extent, in the Quebec party.\(^\text{21}\) Certainly at no time was there virtual unanimity among delegates from central Canada as a whole.

The argument that a bias has existed against regional candidates independent of the delegate strength apportioned to regions is also reflected in the avoidance by the successful candidates themselves, whose background and support was based in central Canada, of explicit appeals to or identification with this region. In fact, Liberal leaders received a large amount of support of necessity from the central provinces, especially Quebec. However, the leaders did not overtly cultivate the interests represented by these areas, despite the decisive number of delegates involved. An attempt was made to appeal to all regions, at least in the form of a call for national unity. The interest of the major 1968 candidates,

\(^{21}\)The Gardiner-St. Laurent split in the Ontario party in 1948 is a fine example of such a difference of opinion in the Ontario Liberals.
including Trudeau, Sharp and Martin, to cultivate intensively at great expense delegates outside of the central provinces exemplified this concern for all regions of the country.\textsuperscript{22} Although surreptitiously the successful leadership candidates perhaps continued to be representatives of central Canadian interests, the important fact remains that ostensibly they adhered to a non-regional orientation. Thus, these candidates overtly appealed to unity instead of to diversity and thereby avoided the stigma of illegitimacy seemingly characteristic of the more obvious regional candidate.

The conduct and result of Mr. Gardiner's campaign for the party leadership and the low frequency of candidates either with significant careers in other than federal politics or directly co-opted from provincial office, does not result directly from differences in delegate representation. Rather, their lack of success illustrates the existence of rules of the game governing leadership selection in the Liberal party which discount the legitimacy of explicit appeals to regional loyalty and to party diversity. The illegitimacy accorded to

\textsuperscript{22}See P. C. Newman, The Distemper of Our Times. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), pp. 439, 451-456. This situation is not readily attributable to a greater division in the central provinces, since Mr. Trudeau, like previous leaders, also had an equally strong foundation of Quebec support and significant Ontario backing.
appeals to party diversity by the rules of the game complemented a party ideology valuing solidarity and consensus, but was inconsistent with the applicability of conflict between elites as a primary criterion of leadership selection. The failure of the regional representative as a leadership candidate was thus demonstrative of the priority of consensus over conflict in respect to leadership selection in the Liberal party.

Similar to the regional candidate, the professional politician's difficulties can be viewed as stemming from the identification with particular interests which a prolonged political career encouraged. An identification with any particular social interest, regional or otherwise, promoted the image of a leadership candidate as a representative of a parochial group rather than as a symbol of unity. Thus, in 1919, Mr. Fielding was associated with the industrial interests of central Canada, whose concerns centered around the maintenance of a high protective tariff. In the view of his western opponents, Fielding represented a class and economic philosophy in complete contradiction to their own interests.\footnote{The Globe (Toronto), July 26, 1919.} The former Finance Minister had always favoured a conservative
position on the tariff, maintaining its high level to prevent "interference of a serious character with the business of the country". 24 According to the low-tariff Liberals, Fielding's candidacy represented the attempt by the power of big industry to control the leadership of the Liberal party.

The candidacy of the long time politician, being often associated with a special interest, encouraged conflict and polarization rather than consensus. Referring to the candidacy of Fielding, which was already bitterly opposed on ethnic as well as economic grounds, and his relationship to the tariff-conscious Canadian Association of Manufacturers, Le Devoir predicted a probable alliance against the former Unionist:

"la situation se résume à une tentative d'union entre l'Ouest, prétendu uni et compact, et le Québec, aussi reconnu tel, pour purger le parti de la direction suspecte qui voulaient lui imposer des influences extérieuses."

As with regional interests, a candidate's affiliation with a particular economic group constituted an invitation for irreconciliable opposition to arise. Thus, the strong identification of Fielding with the high tariff, industrial


interests served as a polarizing agent - similar to his sympathies for the Unionist program - creating a situation where a substantial segment of the party was placed in unavoidable opposition to his candidacy.

The candidacy of Mr. Martin presents a further, perhaps more exemplary, case of the inability of professional politicians to succeed in gaining the leadership of the Liberal party. In this case, the former Minister of Health and Welfare had for some time been the prime exponent of Liberal social welfare policies during the years prior to his candidacy in 1958. Despite the wide constituency to which these policies were directed, Martin was obliged nonetheless to engage in a great degree of internal party conflict to guarantee their success.

Martin had to fight every step of the way facing disagreement and doubt from Cabinet colleagues...In Cabinet the chief stumbling block was the inevitable fear of costs, the reluctance to enter upon new spending programs. Louis St. Laurent was hesitant, C. D. Howe unsympathetic. 26

The propensity to involvement in conflict of this variety appeared to be the main risk incurred by long-time politicians,

such as Paul Martin, who aspired for the party leadership.

Similar to Fielding, the candidacy of Mr. Martin invoked a polarization of party opinion, rather than a consensus. A prolonged Cabinet career and involvement in domestic issues had resulted in the appearance of party elites, such as Walter Harris and C. D. Howe, who for personal or ideological reasons severely opposed the Martin candidacy. The polarization provoked by Mr. Martin's candidacy contrasted with that of his opponent, Mr. Pearson, whose previous political background was unconnected to partisan controversy of this sort.

The essence of the difficulties faced by the candidacies of long-time politicians, such as Fielding and Martin, rested in the tendency to create a polarization of party opinion in respect to their candidacy. The exact nature of the elements constituting this polarization varied, but it consistently involved the creation of substantial portions of the party whose primary interest in relation to the candidacy was negative. In the case of Mr. Fielding the Quebec and low tariff Liberals were in unalterable opposition; the conservative segments of the party had long been alienated.

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by the rigour of Mr. Martin in the pursuit of increasing social welfare policies; and Mr. Gardiner's paternal relationship to agriculture was resented by the more sophisticated eastern politicians in the Liberal party. In all of these instances, of course, the candidate reaped some support from the core of his constituency within the party. However, the success of this candidacy remained inconsistent with the nature of the party's leadership selection process.

The leadership candidacy of the professional politician was usually considered to be a contradiction of the expected approach to the selection of the party leader. It was such an expectation which prompted Prime Minister King to distinguish the qualities of an individual such as Mr. St. Laurent with those of politicians such as Gardiner and Martin:

I confess much of my thoughts through the day were of the action of some of the men of our party in whom I have been greatly disappointed. Chief of all was Gardiner for entering the race the way he did; trying to knife St. Laurent, putting out little praises of himself, etc. His sole emphasis on machine politics. No statesmanlike outlook... Next I think was Martin. 28

The party leadership and its determination was thus considered a question of statesmanship - of conciliation and compromise - rather than a contribution to political conflict.

28 Mackenzie King Record, op. cit., p. 365.
The rejection of the professional politician on the basis of incompatibility with the form of leadership prescribed by the prevailing rules of the game paralleled the failure of the political machine as a campaign weapon. The rigorous application of campaign organization did not necessarily correspond to a high degree of success in the leadership contest. The most talented exponents of the "machine" - Gardiner, Hellyer, Martin - did not seem to gather great benefits from its use. In fact, like the professional politician himself, the utilization of the political machine was inconsistent with the apparently accepted form of leadership selection in the Liberal party. In contrast to successful candidates, who expressed the idea that the position of party leader would seek its occupant, the machine politics of the professional served to indicate an undesirable eagerness to seize the leadership. The political machine itself thus seemed to reject the assumption that certain qualifications rather than mere political opportunism should determine the party leadership. As a consequence, the exertion of machine politics in leadership contests was liable to mobilize opposition, rather than support, for the candidacy of its most vigorous proponent.

The bias contrary to the emergence of internal conflict, which has characterized the rules of the game applying to
leadership selection in the Liberal party, was also revealed by the association of candidates' success with certain Cabinet portfolios.  

**TABLE 6: PORTFOLIOS OCCUPIED BY LEADERSHIP CANDIDATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Portfolio</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
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<tr>
<td>External Affairs</td>
<td>Mackenzie&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; St. Laurent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Pearson Sharp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture &amp; Welfare</td>
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</table>

- a. Solicitor General
- b. Trade & Commerce
- c. Consumer & Corporate Affairs

Portfolios are distributed according to the highest - in terms of last - occupied prior to leadership convention. Candidates appear twice if they have been candidates at two separate conventions (Martin) or if portfolios occupied at separate times were considered relatively equal in status (St. Laurent, MacEachen). Three candidates have been listed under a portfolio which they did not occupy since the effect on candidate's association with internal conflict was approximately equal. Two candidates are not listed who nonetheless received Cabinet office (Hellyer - Defence; Graham - Railways and Canals).

Thus, the main channel used in the Cabinet careers of Liberal leaders were the portfolios of Justice and External Affairs.

These were occupied by Mr. Trudeau and by Mr. Pearson respectively.

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<sup>29</sup>All information from Johnson, *op. cit.*
through-out their careers as ministers, while Mr. St. Laurent possessed both of these posts prior to his selection as leader. It is interesting to note the singular lack of success of leadership candidates who devoted much of their Cabinet careers to the portfolios of Agriculture, Health and Welfare, and Finance. Despite the political and technical expertise these positions demand, they have not appeared to constitute strong foundations for the pursuit of the party leadership. Especially notable in this respect is Finance, which although held by some of the more illustrious figures in Liberal party history - Fielding, Harris, and Sharp - has never been occupied by an eventual party leader.

The poor leadership success of former Ministers of departments such as Finance and Agriculture corresponds to the bias in the leadership selection process of the Liberal party contrary to candidates identified with particular social interests. The portfolios of Finance, Agriculture and to some extent Health and Welfare have tended to develop a constituency with respect to both the department and its minister. The development of this clientele relationship was accompanied by the association of the minister with the interests of his constituency. The images of candidates such as Gardiner, Fielding and Sharp were prime examples of this process.
The tendency toward association with parochial interests incumbent upon the Ministers of Finance and Agriculture contrasted with the portfolios of Justice and External Affairs in which such an outcome was improbable. Due to the probability of conflict with other party elements, the occupying of the former portfolios did not constitute a favourable basis upon which to pursue the party leadership. All Cabinet Ministers were concerned with the determination of government policy and therefore liable to involvement in internal conflict with other Cabinet members and party elites. However, the portfolios of Finance, Health and Welfare and Agriculture not only favoured the association of the minister with a particular interest, but encouraged his engagement in Cabinet conflict over the content of government policy. These ministries were extremely vulnerable since they were all vitally concerned with the disposition of scarce federal revenues for the pursuit of programs favourable to one or another social group. The conflict concerning Medicare from 1966 to 1968;\textsuperscript{30} the struggle between welfare and development policies in the 1950's; and the battle over consumer

\textsuperscript{30}As Minister of Finance, Sharp was in forefront of opposition to Medicare from 1966 to 1968. See J. LaMarsh, Memoirs of a Bird in a Gilded Cage (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1969), pp. 338-344.
and producer interests prior to the 1948 convention, represented conflicts occurring within the Liberal Cabinet between these ministers.

A propensity to participation in internal party conflict, deriving from association with certain social groups, has accounted for the association of certain ministerial positions with lack of success in the selection of Liberal leaders. Only Mackenzie King of the Liberal leaders selected in this century possessed a portfolio other than that of External Affairs or Justice, which could be considered associated with a specific constituency. However, even this one exception, due to the peculiar nature of the Liberal party's philosophy and historical position toward labour, \(^{31}\) was not strictly comparable to those of Agriculture and Finance. In general, occupants of ministerial positions conducive to the necessity of engagement in internal party conflict were notably unsuccessful as leadership candidates.

The Party Reformer

The failures of the professional politician and of the regional candidate were indicative of prevailing rules of

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\(^{31}\) The King philosophy of labour relations stipulated government's impartial, objective role, identifying itself with neither labour nor industry. See Dawson, op. cit., pp. 246-249 and also Chapter VI in this work.
the game diminishing the legitimacy of internal party conflict as a determining criterion of party leadership. Another form of candidacy illustrating the low salience of conflict in leadership selection consisted of the unsuccessful attempts to encourage a division between elite and rank-and-file within the party. Although genuine campaigns for party democratization by leadership candidates have been a rarity, some use has been made by candidates of strategies designed to mobilize non-elites behind their candidacies as a challenge to the prevailing elite of the party.

The candidacy of C. G. Power in 1948 represented the most serious attempt to appeal to the rank-and-file rather than to the party elite. Although the leadership chances of the former Cabinet Minister were at no time extensive, Mr. Power's candidacy represented a protest against the "bureaucratization" of the Liberal party and a plea for a more democratic party framework.

I never had anything like a glimmer of hope that I would be successful; but I was coming more and more to the conclusion that since I had in the past three or four years, in the House of Commons, in speeches, and in magazine articles, protested against the government's method of procedure and continued wartime controls, I could not at this time
whitewash the past and give a blank cheque for the future. This was the time, when Liberals of all shades and degrees were assembled, to set forth my views, and if anyone wanted to vote for them and for what I considered to be the true precepts of Liberalism, then I would give him an opportunity. 32

Nonetheless, the vote total accredited to Mr. Power was minimal. The strength of the "protest" candidate and the opportunity to register displeasure with the Parliamentary elite of the party33 did not appear as a significant concern of the bulk of convention delegates in 1948.

The Power candidacy clearly constituted, due to his long concern over the issue and since the probability of his attaining the leadership was always minimal, the only true "protest" against the prevailing structure of the party in the four Liberal leadership conventions. In later situations, candidates such as Paul Martin and John Turner attempted to precipitate a cleavage between elite and non-elite membership of the party. However, the motive in these cases was to further the leadership prospects of the candidate, rather than an exceptional concern for party reform.


33Power had resigned from the Liberal Cabinet in 1944 and had not returned, which to a degree validated his appearance in opposition to the party elite.
The campaign of Mr. Martin in 1958 represented the most overt attempt to mobilize delegate support on the basis of an ostensible democratization of the party. A statement issued by the Martin campaign organization declared:

I know and so does every delegate, that the time has come when the people and not the brass must be heard if the Liberal party is going to come back to power...It is evident that the Liberal party is now beginning to speak from the bottom up instead of the top down. 34

Predictably, the call for "democratization" was not accompanied by precise proposals for organizational reform of the party structure. According to the Martin campaign, an increase in the power of non-elites would be accomplished by supporting the candidate who differed with the current arrogance of the party establishment:

If the brass in the Liberal party feel that this party can survive only by their dictates as a closed corporation, telling delegates how they should think, then the time has come for new leadership with an ear to the ground and an eye to the future...If Mr. Martin is elected leader he will fight for these (Liberal) principles. He will also have the support of the delegates who are gathered here to see that Liberal policies are once more dictated by and for the people. 35

35Ibid.
This technique complimented Mr. Martin's position in the leadership contest. The overwhelming support for Mr. Pearson by the party elite had placed the former Health and Welfare Minister in a position where the mobilization of non-elites was a necessity. Using the preponderance of support for Mr. Pearson's candidacy and the fact that the party had recently suffered a setback at the polls, Mr. Martin hoped to emphasize a conflict of interest between the party as a whole and its prevailing elite and to present his candidacy as the champion of the party rank-and-file. In fact, the strategy was adopted in all probability to compensate for an already established situation - Mr. Martin's lack of support among prominent party figures. Certainly Mr. Martin himself, as a long-time Cabinet Minister, did not represent a plebian political cause and, ironically, he was identified as much or more with the party electoral difficulties in 1957 as was his opponent. Nonetheless, the Martin candidacy did represent an attempt to mobilize non-elites and utilize their support in challenging the established party elites.

\[36\text{See Whealen, op. cit., p. 64, who admits that this was a probable image of Martin in 1958.}\]
The attempt to associate front-running candidates, who had already gathered superior support from the elite of the party, with a party "establishment" and to further other candidacies by identifying them with opposition to such an elite group continued, although less explicitly, in 1968. Although a minor candidate, John Turner's approach to the leadership race stressed his unwillingness to "make deals" with the party "power brokers" as had the more successful candidates.\(^{37}\) Reportedly, the grouping of the Winters and Hellyer forces prior to the final convention ballot was accompanied by an expressed desire to stop the party "establishment".\(^{38}\) As in 1958, the attacks were directed against the victorious candidate, who apparently possessed the majority of Cabinet and Parliamentary support.

Despite its frequent appearance, the demand for party reform or democratization did not appear to constitute a particularly significant influence in the selection of leaders by the Liberal party. Neither the vote totals of the protest candidate, Mr. Power, nor of candidates such as Paul Martin, who used their proclaimed opposition to the


party elite as a campaign strategy, demonstrate extensive concern with the problems thus posed. The disappointing results of attempts to mobilize non-elites in opposition to party elites, combined with the fact that no candidate has achieved the leadership of the party by an appeal to the rank-and-file against the interests of the party elite, again indicates that leadership selection was not generally interpreted as an instrument of party control of elites.
CHAPTER V

THE PARTY LEADERS

The failures of certain candidates to achieve the leadership of the Liberal party have revealed only one side of the patterns of activity of candidates and only one aspect of the rules of the game characteristic of the process of party leadership selection. The success of the party leaders themselves also constitutes a valuable indication of the nature of leadership selection in the Liberal Party. Previous analysis has shown the extent to which party leaders differed from unsuccessful leadership candidates in terms of their political background prior to selection. Thus, leaders of the Liberal Party have exhibited political careers which were of relatively shorter duration, as measured by membership in Cabinet or Parliament, and which were based entirely at the federal level.¹ The political careers of unsuccessful candidates tended to be longer and more likely preceded by provincial party experience. Moreover, the careers of unsuccessful leadership candidates were conducive to their

¹See Tables 2 to 5 in Chapter IV.
association with internal party conflict and resulted in the usually vain attempt to introduce a competitive framework into the issue of leadership selection. In contrast to this feature and corresponding to their political background, the successful leadership candidates did not become identified with serious internal party conflict and illustrated a generally non-competitive approach to the selection of a party leader.

The lack of association with factional conflict characteristic of future party leaders derived from the nature of their careers as members of the party elite. The Cabinet career of the Liberal leader was typically not only extremely brief, but of such a character to place the minister above the vicissitudes of Cabinet conflict. In the cases of St. Laurent and Pearson, the occupancy of the External Affairs portfolio did not automatically engage them in overt conflict with Cabinet colleagues. The practise, during the later years of the King administration and in the St. Laurent governments, of the leader's and Cabinet's deferral of foreign policy to the special competence of the minister\(^2\) contributed to consensus rather than argument on

these issues. Similarly, the Cabinet careers of Trudeau and King were so extremely short as to make the opportunity for severe personal or political animosity to arise extremely improbable. Even given the brevity of Cabinet activity, there was nothing particularly controversial about their tenure. A colleague of Mr. Trudeau commented:

He did not seem to hold very informed views on anything. He was, however, always well prepared for discussions within his own portfolio and skillful in winning support to his ideas. Pierre Elliott Trudeau may have had some feeling he was destined to be Prime Minister... If so, he never displayed any such personal conviction, and behaved for the most part in a modest way. He wasn't active in Cabinet and wasn't often present...

Similar to the pattern of other party leaders, the Cabinet activity of Mr. Trudeau was devoted especially to the concerns of his portfolio rather than to a wide range of policy issues.

The type of portfolio possessed by the leader previous to his selection allowed him to disengage to a great degree from Cabinet conflict. Since the policies articulated were

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identified with no particular social group (Justice and External Affairs) or required no extensive conscription of government revenue (Labour under King), the portfolios occupied by the leaders were not antagonistic to the interests of colleagues. Rather than a liability, lack of partisanship and estrangement from domestic politics were evidently an advantage to a Liberal leadership candidate.\footnote{For experience of Liberal leaders, see Chapter IV, above.}

Although unlikely to lead to a polarization of the party elite, the issues subsumed under the jurisdiction of the leader did give his candidacy a substantial degree of public eminence. The particular Cabinet office or issue-area in which the successful candidate was involved was responsible for his attachment to an issue of national importance immediately prior to the occasion of the leadership convention. In 1948, for instance, the candidacy of Mr. St. Laurent was boosted by the suitability of his personal characteristics and career with the handling of the critical international situation of the period. As one delegate remarked:
I'm all for young fellows being given a chance to do things and to go places, mind you. But with this serious world situation, I think the new man should be someone with a good sound knowledge of foreign affairs. 6

This attitude and reasoning was not untypical of other elements in the party, including members of the Cabinet and the Young Liberals. 7

In much the same manner, the candidacy of Lester Pearson in 1958 was undoubtedly favoured by his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize a month prior to the leadership convention. The reported comment of a Cabinet colleague was perhaps not dissimilar from the responses of other delegates to the award:

When a man gets that kind of play outside the country, he's just too good to pass up at home. We've got to like Mike. 8

To a lesser extent, comparable benefits were produced by Mackenzie King's domination of the platform resolutions on

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7 Ibid., August 3-4, 1948.
8 Quoted in David MacDonald, "Who Will Lead the Liberals in the Campaigning to Come," The Globe Magazine, January 4, 1948.
Labour at the 1919 convention⁹ and by Mr. Trudeau's defence of Canadian federalism during the confrontation with Quebec premier Daniel Johnson at the 1968 constitutional conference. On the latter case, Judy LaMarsh has speculated:

As in his predecessor's case, so timing (over which he had no control) was responsible for the success of Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1968. For without a chance row at a televised Dominion-Provincial conference, January 1968, Pierre Elliott Trudeau would never have captivated the public with his style. ¹⁰

Certainly Mr. Trudeau's remarkable progress in popularity polls, which showed him rise from negligible recognition as a leadership prospect to the support of almost a third of the poll within the first three months of 1968¹¹ substantiates the hypothesis that his activities as Minister of Justice during

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⁹As a former Minister and Deputy Minister of Labour, King was chairman of the preconvention committee on labour resolutions and chairman of the convention Capital and Labour Committee. As such he introduced the policy resolution to the convention - especially significant due to the absence of provision for formal speeches by leadership candidates. See Liberal Party of Canada. The National Liberal Convention, (Ottawa, 1919), pp. 126-146.

¹⁰LaMarsh, op. cit., p. 324.

¹¹In December, 1967 Trudeau was one of several candidates who together received mention by less that 3% of the poll; in a poll published in April of 1968 he had 32% of preference - 18% more than the popularity of his closest opponent. See The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Public Opinion News Sheet: The Gallup Poll of Canada, Toronto, December 20, 1967 and April 3, 1968.
this period offered him ample opportunity to reach the public eye.

The significance of these variables can be considered to be greater than merely proving Machiavelli's dictum that "fortune is the ruler of half our actions, but that she allows the other half to be governed by us." The intervention of issues which aided the candidacies of Liberal leaders is instructive regarding the selection process due to the nature of the questions involved. In the cases of the last three Liberal leaders, the problems confronted in their pre-convention activity corresponded to responses to internal or external threats to the nature of the Canadian state. As a result, their candidacy and Cabinet career represented the larger interests of the Canadian whole rather than the demands of a parochial group. Thus, the candidacies of St. Laurent and Trudeau were linked with the recent battles against divisive social forces lead by Premiers Duplessis and Johnson respectively. In addition, St. Laurent and his successor were associated with the external role of the Canadian state.

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13Mr. St. Laurent had been active in the provincial election campaigns of both 1944 and 1948 against the Union Nationale under Duplessis.
Leadership, party and state were considered equally instrumental in the defeat of the external threat. Prior to the national convention of 1948, St. Laurent proclaimed that the "Liberal Party is still the only bulwark against socialism in Canada...." It was even necessary for Mr. Martin in 1958 to record his concern with the priority of Canada's external role by assuring his opponent the retention of the External Affairs portfolio under his leadership.

The ability of successful candidates to identify with prevailing conceptions of the Canadian state in relation to external and internal threats was reflected in the delegate support received at the leadership convention. In general, the party leaders were supported by elements of the federal party, who were more prone to support the present status of the federal system, and often opposed by provincial parties, who were more likely to be innovators in opposition to the federal status quo. The Gouin - Lapointe controversy over the Quebec delegation of 1919 constituted a struggle between provincial and federal Liberal forces. The conflict was resolved by the assertion of Lapointe's jurisdiction in

15See The Globe and Mail (Toronto), January 8, 1958.

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federal matters and by the alignment behind the King candidacy.

They (the Quebec delegation) met in caucus - and actually turned Gouin down cold. They told him that he could run his own Local Legislature, but that they would run themselves in Dominion matters. 16

The role of the federal party in contributing to King's selection was also evidenced by the extent of Mr. Fielding's alliance with the bulk of provincial Liberal leaders. 17

The leader's relationship to federal and provincial parties followed a similar pattern in subsequent conventions. In 1948, the King - St. Laurent axis included the overall support of the federal Ontario Liberals in opposition to the sympathies of the provincial party or "Hepburn gang" with Agriculture Minister Gardiner. 18 There appeared again a split in the Quebec Liberal delegation of 1968. The overwhelming majority of federal Liberals aligned behind the candidacy of Mr. Trudeau, but the provincial party was not entirely in

16 Sir Allen Aylesworth, quoted in Dawson, op. cit., p. 308.

17 Six of eight provincial premiers were reported to have supported Fielding. See F. A. McGregor, The Fall and Rise of Mackenzie King, 1911-1919, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1962), p. 338.

favour of the federal Justice Minister. 19 In this respect, the support given successful leadership candidates corresponded to a response to challenges by regional or parochial interests to influence or control the party leadership.

The nature of the candidacies of Liberal leaders allowed them to be conceived of as unifying symbols opposed to the forces of divisiveness and conflict with which the images of their opponents were identified. The support of the federal party rather than of provincial parties manifested a commitment to the Canadian whole rather than a particular region. Similarly, Liberal leaders were identified in opposition to any parochial appeal, including those to social class as well as to regions. Peter C. Newman's appraisal of Mr. Trudeau illustrates the non-class status of the Liberal leader:

Unhappy to classify him as a man of either the political right or the political left, most of Trudeau's listeners seemed happy to regard him simply as a man of the future. 20

The candidacy of Mr. Trudeau appeared above the partisan, ideological struggles engaged in by his challengers.

19 The legislative party of the Quebec Liberals and leader Jean Lesage were initially quite opposed. See Donald Peacock, Journey to Power. (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968), pp. 262-263.

There was no overt conservatism in the candidacy of the Liberal leader, despite his avoidance of involvement with particular groups or in polarizing issues. A dynamic element was suspected in all the Liberal leaders. The Trudeau candidacy, for instance, was considered to mean...

...that national politics was passing through one of its periodic upheavals when a non-partisan outsider moves in to reform and recharge the system. 21

However, the dynamism or reform projected by leaders was directed toward a reconciliation rather than toward a vested interest. In 1919, Mackenzie King retained the support of the progressive western Liberals, due to the fact he was "safe" on the tariff and liable to be less an outright enemy than his opponent. However, the King candidacy did not at all identify itself with the extreme demands of this faction against other elements in the party. 22 The innovation to which King, Trudeau and other leaders were linked did not tend


22 The reason for Mackenzie King's acceptability by the west derived from the revision of the party platform toward a more moderate tariff: "We would much rather trust the tariff to King than Mackenzie or Graham. The tariff is not as advanced as the farmer's platform, but it meets it more than half way." Quoted from The Lethbridge Herald in The Globe, August 9, 1919. Given its acceptance in the platform by the party, King could be considered as at least less liable to reject the moderate tariff idea than Fielding, who opposed the convention's decision on the tariff. See Dawson, op. cit., p. 305.
to alienate party factions, but attempted to submerge their differences. The successful Liberal leadership candidate was not unassociated with the promise of change; however he was unassociated with change conducive to his identification with party or social interests.

The Non-Competitiveness of Party Leaders

The association of successful leadership candidates through their political careers and other characteristics with issues and opinions of general rather than special interest corresponded to the role their candidacy played in leadership selection by the party. The candidacy of the eventual party leader represented a re-affirmation of unity rather than an appeal for conflict with other elites. As such, the ability of leaders to substitute consensual for competitive rules of the game has constituted the major variable in the inapplicability of competition between elites as a determinant of leadership selection in the Liberal party.

The scope of competition cannot be separated from the prevailing issues around which the competitive structure is constructed. Since the prevailing issue in the Liberal party has appeared to be the necessity of party unity, the focus of elite conflict has revolved around this concern. The successful candidates have been identified most thoroughly
with the cause of unity: the defeated candidates usually were linked to the forces of disunity and diversity. The candidacy of the party leader was able to associate itself most clearly with the party battle against the challenge of particular factions and of the internal conflict which they provoked.

To promote unity instead of diversity necessitated the articulation by the party leader of an essentially negative approach to the question of leadership selection. In other words, the support of the successful candidate was typically garnered from those elements of the party who had previously been alienated by alternative candidates rather than from the development of a positive program of his own. The archetypal example of this occurrence was Mr. King's exploitation of the antagonisms developed in the party against the Unionist cause.

What I would like to make clear is that it seems to me that there was never any strong sentiment in favour of King personally. He simply represented the protest against conscription and the protest of those who wished to avenge Laurier. 23

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Similarly, the support given to King by low-tariff Liberals was to be expected, given the protectionist views of Fielding and Graham.

The support devoted to the party leader reflected the unacceptability of opponents who were apparently aligned to party factions instead of to the Liberal party as a whole. To some degree, the overwhelming mandate for Mr. St. Laurent registered a rejection of the candidacy of Mr. Gardiner as much as an endorsement of the victorious leader. One delegate reportedly explained his advocacy of St. Laurent by maintaining that he would "vote for anyone who could defeat Jimmy Gardiner." In 1968, the success of the Trudeau organization's strategy in promoting their candidate as a second ballot choice rather than risking the alienation of delegates by pushing for a stronger first ballot total illustrated the disinclination of the party leaders to contribute to a polarization of opinion and the consequent ability to attract delegate support as the least undesirable of the remaining alternatives.

25 Newman, op. cit., p. 460. Analysis of voting behaviour of delegates has illustrated the strategy was largely successful. With the exception of Hellyer supporters, who supported Winters, Mr. Trudeau gathered a large proportion of votes previously cast for other candidates. See L. Leduc, "Ballot Behaviour in a National Convention", Paper presented to C.P.S.A. meeting, Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 2-4, 1970. pp. 19-20.
Linked to the successful candidates' ability to aggregate delegates opposed for various reasons to alternative candidates, was the professed reluctance of the future leader to capture the party leadership. In contrast to the ambitions of many unsuccessful candidates, the party leader appeared disinclined to seek the leadership for specific purposes. Mr. Pearson's attitude was not uncharacteristic:

When I look back in my career, the most amazing is that things just happened. Mr. Diefenbaker said he always had a goal and worked toward it. Nothing like that with me. I was always alert for any opportunities or responsibilities or interesting work, but if I didn't take it on, it didn't worry me. I'd do something else. I have never hewn to any particular line. It was only pressure, really, that got me into this. 26

The typical approach of the eventual leader to his candidacy seemed to be more of an applicant sought out to fill a certain position, rather than a politician who was ready to advance a political cause or interests by attaining the leadership of the party. Initially, Mr. Trudeau reported that he felt the notion of his candidacy to be a good "joke". The attitude of Mackenzie King to his own candidacy and to that of his successor in 1948 indicated that certain objective qualities

26Quoted in Beal, op. cit., p. 101.
of a candidate rather than sheer political ambition were considered the best measure of a potential leader.  

Successful leadership candidates have avoided the identification of their pursuit of the party leadership with political ambitions favourable to a certain regional or class grouping. Due to this characteristic, eventual party leaders have represented the pursuit of a party consensus rather than the exacerbation of internal party conflict. The position of Quebec relative to the selection of Liberal leaders has reinforced this consensual role of the successful candidate. All Liberal leaders since Laurier have been selected with the approval of the greater majority of the delegates from the province of Quebec. This hypothesis remained as true of the more competitive occasions as of those selections which were marked by relatively minor opposition to the dominant candidate. Despite this clear relationship of Quebec to the success of a leadership candidate, the party


leader remained symbolic of a party consensus rather than of a particular faction. This remained the case since the Liberal Party had tended to give a special status to the ethnic-cultural-regional demands of Quebec and since the direction of this privileged status was not primarily toward the capture of the leadership for a Quebec partisan.

In 1919, although receiving a preponderance of support from its delegation, Mackenzie King was sympathetic to, but hardly a virulent partisan of, Quebec. Despite being led by a future lieutenant of King, Ernest Lapointe, Quebec delegates were not particularly intense partisans of any specific candidate. Le Devoir expressed their mood as

le bloc Québécois manque de direction et se trouve dans un état d'esprit uncertain et qu'on peut appeler négatif. 30

Among some delegates, there was an acceptance of the fact that the Quebec delegation could exercise some influence over the selection of a leader, but could hardly control the leadership for itself.

We French-Canadians efface ourselves. We admit that the leader must be English Protestant, and therefore, the English Protestants should tell us whom they want. 31

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30 Quoted in Le Devoir, August 5, 1919.
Therefore, Mackenzie King's candidacy could not be considered controlled by a particular segment of the party. Indeed, King took great pains to dissociate himself from any such notion since the identification would have tended to alienate other elements within the Liberal Party.\footnote{32}

The Quebec Liberals were not primarily interested in the control of the party leadership, but did demand the possession of a veto on candidates who were absolutely unacceptable. The veto situation was characteristic of Mr. Fielding's unsuccessful candidacy in 1919. Due to his stand on wartime conscription, in which he deserted the Liberal party to vote as an independent sympathizer of the Unionists, the former Finance Minister had incurred the complete enmity of the federal wing of Quebec Liberals. Despite the lack of an overwhelming positive direction in favour of a certain candidate, the views of the delegation toward Fielding were clear:

...plus la plupart d'entre eux se sentent une irresistible repulsion à voter en faveur de M. Fielding. \footnote{33}

\footnote{32 See Dawson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 325.}
\footnote{33 Bilodeau, Ernest, "M. Fielding et le Bloc Québécois". \textit{Le Devoir}, August 5, 1919.}
The application of the "alternation" principle, by which French-Canadian Quebeckers have occupied the leadership of the party, has also not been emblematic of Quebec control of the leadership. The French-Canadian leader emphasized his attachment to the federal concept rather than to a parochial loyalty. The relationship of Mr. Trudeau to the support of the Quebec delegates in 1968 was only indirect, since he was apparently considered by more effective leaders of the Quebec Liberals, such as Jean Marchand, to be an acceptable candidate to both English as well as French Canadians. Personally, Trudeau was considered to have no independent, Quebec power base. Similarly, the previous French Canadian leader, Mr. St. Laurent, symbolized the partnership itself of French and English Canada rather than the interests of one particular member. Indeed, the most virulent attacks directed against the Minister of External Affairs came from the nationalist element in the province of Quebec. In a public address, a member of the Union Nationale party stressed that nationalists could not consider St. Laurent representative of Quebec:

34See LaMarsh, op. cit., p. 353.
Je me rejouirais le premier, si un Canadien français était appelé à devenir premier ministre du Canada... mais à condition que ce soit un véritable Canadien français et non un impérialiste qui n'a de français que le nom.\(^{35}\)

The tradition of "alternation" did not involve the alternation of control by regional or ethnic groups over the party leadership: it merely represented an affirmation of the unity upon which both the Canadian political system and the Liberal party were based.

The relationship between leadership candidates and the Quebec wing of the party illustrates the intertwining of the requirement of party unity and the nature of the party ideology. To maintain the adherence of French Canadian elites to the Liberal party, it was necessary for the group to possess some form of effective influence on party output, including leadership. Although control of the leadership would be detrimental to the unity of the party, the Quebec Liberals could exert influence in the form of a virtual veto over unacceptable leaders and by the establishment in the practice and ideology of the party leadership of the principle of "alternation". In many respects, the virtual veto possessed by Quebec in Liberal leadership selection became a practical,

\(^{35}\)Paul Bouchard, quoted in Le Devoir, July 16, 1948.
and the principle of alternation an ideological, recognition of the requirements of party unity, and thereby electoral success.

This was illustrated no more cogently than in the rejection of Mr. Fielding in 1919. The candidacy was totally unacceptable to Quebec and those other Liberals loyal to the idea symbolized by Laurier, of the partnership of English and French Canadians:

...I should not wish to stand in the way of any of our friends who had been loyal to Sir Wilfrid in the last political contest. I would be quite unwilling, however, to stand aside for anyone who helped to divide the Liberal party at that time. 36

The real threat of Mr. Fielding's candidacy was not solely to the interests of a particular group - Quebec, but injurious to the welfare of the party as a whole by encouraging its dissolution.

I would think it not far wrong to say it was 'conscription' that defeated Fielding. For myself at any rate, the one thing that I was bound to do everything I could to accomplish, was to prevent any man who had deserted Laurier in 1917 becoming our leader in 1919 - because such a result I believed would have utterly disrupted and destroyed the party. I know that a great many who were at the Convention had exactly the same feeling - and I think it was a very powerful factor in electing King....37

36 King, quoted in Dawson, op. cit., p. 297.
It was therefore in the interests of the party as a whole to recognize the veto of the Quebec group against a particular candidate and to select a leader generally acceptable to both Quebec and the remaining sections of the federal party.

In conclusion, the success of Liberal party leaders as candidates has derived from their consensual character, rather than from the capture of a particular faction of the party. In the sense that they avoided any polarization of party opinion on the selection issue, the activity of Liberal leaders as candidates cannot be considered as primarily competitive in character. In conventions, such as 1968 and to a lesser extent in 1919, when several challengers for the leadership existed, the association of success with an essentially non-competitive, consensual candidate is more predictable as the latter could be considered a particularly advantageous candidate strategy. However, in 1948 and 1958, when opponents were few and their strength meagre, the leader's position in the center of the party still remained applicable.

Candidates and Leaders: The Rules of the Game and Preselection

A high degree of competition between elites for non-elite support has not generally been a dominant characteristic of leadership selection in the Liberal party. The most successful candidates - the party leaders - identified with
the interests of the party as a whole, rather than a particular faction, and tended to provoke consensus, rather than conflict. Only infrequently did candidacies appear which represented careers or interests emblematic of conflict within the party. Some candidates who were associated, through their political background, did attempt to introduce competition into the process of leadership selection. However, these candidacies were consistently unable to prevent the ascendancy of the leader who identified with party unity and consensus. Thus, the lack of success of the professional politician, regional representative and party reformer indicates that limitation of conflict in the selection of leaders was associated with rules of the game tending to discourage the appearance of internal party conflict, and hence, of elite competition. The result of these rules has been to accord a minimal degree of legitimacy to serious conflict between elites and thereby to discourage competition for non-elite support.

The nature of preselection as well as the rules of the game suggest the lack of legitimacy given to internal conflict as a determinant in the selection of Liberal leaders. The characteristics of candidates indicate that the process of preselection has operated with a bias contrary to candidates associated with party conflict. Candidates have not emerged
with great frequency from distinct, parochial interests to contest the leadership. With few exceptions, candidates have been recruited from the centre - the federal Parliamentary and Cabinet elite - rather than from the margins - provincial parties and governments or particular party factions - of Liberal party activity. As a whole, preselection has been centripetal rather than centrifugal in direction and significance.
CHAPTER VI

THE LIBERAL IDEOLOGY AND THE SELECTION OF LEADERS

The ideological element in party life refers to those collective values or beliefs which express the orientation of the political party to its social and political environment.\(^1\) To a great extent, party ideology serves to define the status of internal conflict or solidarity as values within the party and to stipulate the role of leadership in respect to these variables. Thus, the ideological character of a party constitutes a basic influence on the relative consensual or competitive nature of leadership selection.

The most prominent ideological trait of the Liberal Party in the twentieth century has been its conscious effort

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\(^1\) As an organization promoting group activity, the political party must exhibit an ideological framework, at least in order to justify its own existence. In most parties the ideological framework will also include a legitimation of the political regime and other social systems. See Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. Hans Gerth and C. W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 194. An ideology is neither synonymous with the belief-systems of individual members or to the actual situation of the party in relation to external reality. The political belief-system, which consists "of the set of beliefs according to which individuals navigate and orient themselves in the sea of politics" - Sartori, Giovanni, "Politics, Ideology and Belief Systems," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (June, 1969), 400 - relates to ideology only in respect to the correspondence.
to "unify" rather than "divide" the Canadian social system. In consequence of this and of the high importance accorded to leadership in achieving it, party definition of the leadership role has stressed its ability to personify this characteristic. Thus the leaders of the Liberal party have consistently stressed their identification with Liberal formulas of national unity - the recognition of the partnership of English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians, the conception of the Liberals as a non-class, "center" party, and finally the idea that the Liberal Party provided for the government of "all" of Canada rather than government in the interests of particular regions.

The leadership of the Liberal Party has perhaps been most exemplary in its representation of the unity between French and English Canadians. The words of a former leader, Mr. St. Laurent clearly express the pattern by which the Canadian state is viewed:

1of some beliefs with a justification for adherence to the collective activity of a group or institution. Ideology may not correspond to the actual character of reality. The fact that it represents to varying degrees a distortion of reality does not however detract from the function it nonetheless performs. For a discussion of ideology's role in socializing individuals' beliefs with collective activity and ideology's "false consciousness", see Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936) p. 21.
...our nation was planned as a political partnership of two great races; it was planned by men of vision, of tolerance, as a partnership in which both of the partners would retain their essential characteristics, their religion, their language, their culture. To realize that plan, to make it work, has always required and still requires a practical recognition in the government of the partnership of those two historic races. 2

The ideal of "partnership" has been carried into the practice of Liberal leadership by the principle of "alternation". The concept of "alternation" is more than a mere observation of the fact that English-Canadian and French-Canadian names have alternately occupied the position of party leader. Although the suitability of the principle was not necessarily favoured, a survey of the 1968 leadership convention revealed a vast majority of delegates recognized the existence of such a "Tradition" and indeed ballots for individual candidates were explained, (or rationalized) on this basis.3

The principle of alternation cannot be claimed to be an exclusive determinant of party leadership. However, it would seem at least a marginal consideration even at the level of convention balloting. Moreover, the belief in the


"partnership" idea imbedded in the Liberal party has had the effect of facilitating the recruitment of French-Canadian elites with leadership potential, as well as socializing party cadres to the acceptability of French-speaking Canadians as leaders. Both of these circumstances would be difficult, for instance, given the prominent ideology of the Conservative party. The search for what was felt to be the "necessary" Quebec candidate prior to the 1968 leadership convention, regardless of his leadership chances, illustrates

4Ernest Lapointe and Louis St. Laurent are two of the more prominent examples. The latest and most comprehensive recruitment included the trio of Marchand, Trudeau and Pelletier. See P. C. Newman, The Distemper of Our Times. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), pp. 370-372. In relation to the integration of French-Canadian elites, it may be useful to consider the function of the Liberal party in promoting or maintaining a stable democratic system by "consociational" means - "Democracies with subcultural cleavages and with tendencies toward immobilism and instability which are deliberately turned into more stable systems by the leaders of the major subcultures." See Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems", in Politics in Europe: Comparisons and Interpretations, A. Lijphart ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 63. For an application of this scheme to the Canadian political system, see S. J. R. Noel, "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation: Interpretations of Canadian Federalism", A paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, June 1970, pp. 21-34.

clearly the legitimate role which the Quebec membership perceived it possessed within the leadership race.\textsuperscript{6}

In addition to its influence on the alternation principle, the value of English and French Canadian partnership has been reflected in the character of the French-Canadian leaders of the party. Including Sir Wilfrid Laurier, each have personified the conception of the Canadian state as a partnership between the two major ethnic groups. As well as being fluently bilingual, the leaders' family and educational backgrounds epitomized the reconciliation of dualism with unity.\textsuperscript{7} By exposure to both sides of the

\textsuperscript{6}See Newman, The Distemper of Our Times, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 402-403 and Peacock, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 222. During consultations concerning the candidate to be representative of French Canada, Prime Minister Pearson was reported to have said: "This is a tradition of the Liberal Party - and he may or may not win. But he must be a good candidate and get a lot of votes, and we must show that although the Tories can't we can always come up with an alternative from Quebec." Quoted in P. Stevens and J. Saywell, "Parliament and Politics", in The Canadian Annual Review for 1968, ed. J. Saywell. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 17.

\textsuperscript{7}Both Trudeau and St. Laurent came from families of mixed ethnic background. These two leaders and Sir Wilfrid Laurier had early exposure to English language or culture due to family or educational experience. The former pair used English as a home language. See Thomson, \textit{op. cit.}, Douglas Stuebing, et. al., Trudeau: A Man for Tomorrow. (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1968), pp. 5-6 and Joseph Schull, Laurier: The First Canadien. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 19-24.
Canadian partnership, these leaders represented a biethnic as well as a bilingual fusion.

The fusion of the two ethnic identities into a single individual was directly related to the form of leadership characteristic of the Liberal Party. In explaining the inapplicability of the principle of "dual leadership" in the St. Laurent Cabinet of 1948, one historian has remarked:

The characteristics of the two groups were interwoven in the Prime Minister's own personality, and he was no more able to conceive of a cabinet composed of two teams representing two separate groups than he was of splitting his own personality. 8

Thus, in a very real sense, the political leadership of St. Laurent represented a transcendence of the dualism upon which the Canadian partnership was founded.

The fusion of the two ethnic groups, which these Liberal leaders exemplified, and the subsequent form of leadership in which it resulted, meant that the French-English partnership and the principle of alternation of leaders represented a unifying rather than a disintegrating

ideology. The Liberal leaders from French Canada interpreted their leadership and the nature of French-English partnership within a predominating belief in the supremacy of the partnership over either of its constituent parts. Demands for the illegitimate patronage of one "partner" - French Canada - were thus not consistent with the partnership ideal. In his approach to the issue, Prime Minister St. Laurent

...saw the relationship between French and English Canadians not as a group, but on an individual basis, as citizens of the same state, with equal rights...Concomitant with this principle of 'practical equality' was his insistence that French Canadians should demonstrate their competence to occupy positions of responsibility and not demand a percentage of them merely as a right. 9

The resistance to parochial challenges to the unity represented by the partnership idea was further pointed out by Mr. Trudeau's position on the nationalist propensities of French Canada.

...the nationalists...are politically reactionary because, in attaching such importance to the idea of nation, they are surely led to a definition of the common good as a function of an ethnic group, rather than of all the people, regardless of characteristics. 10

Thus, as the French-Canadian leader of the Liberal party represented the partnership as a whole rather than merely one

of its members, the ideology of French-English partnership accorded a special place to French Canada only in terms of the perceived coincidence of its interests with those of Canadian unity. In this manner, the partnership idea contributed to the party ideology's general emphasis on the value of political solidarity and unity.

A second quality of the Liberal Party is its non-class orientation, which some observers have claimed to be the definitive characteristic of the party relative to the Canadian party system. A former Cabinet Minister explained the party position in this manner:

11In terms of electoral support the non-class ethos of the Liberal party seems to be mirrored in reality. See R. R. Alford, *Party and Society*. (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1963), p. 253; also Alford, "The Social Basis of Political Cleavage in 1962", *Papers on the 1962 Election*, ed. John Meisel. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 209. On the other hand, the argument has been advanced that non-class ideologies may originate from a specific social class, such as the petite bourgeoisie. See R. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 99. Certainly the Liberals have been attacked as a "class" party by critics such as Stanley Knowles, *The New Party*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1961), pp. 2-5. However, whether or not in terms of policy output the party has been "non-class" is immaterial to the non-class nature of its ideology.

The Liberal view is that true political progress is marked by...the reconciliation of classes, and the promotion of the general interest above all particular interests. 13

This belief in the substitution of community interest for the interests of a particular group or class has also been reflected in the attitudes and characteristics of Liberal leaders. Thus, in many ways the contribution of Mackenzie King as an intellectual to the field of industrial relations mirrored the stance of the Liberal Party with respect to labour policy.

A solution to the problems of industry is not to be looked for in forms...A new spirit alone will suffice. This spirit must...breathe mutual confidence and constructive good-will. It must be founded on a belief in an underlying order which presupposes between individuals, not conflict, but community of interest in all that pertains to human well-being. 14

As a politician, Mr. King believed in the Liberal Party as the instrument of this reconciliation:

As the bulwark of freedom, Liberalism stands midway between those forces that seek the protection of special privilege or vested interests...and those forces that seek the control of the nation's in the interest of one or more classes or economic groups. 15

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15 King, W. L. M., "Address by the Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King on his Years of Leadership - and Reasons for Retirement as Party Leader". (Ottawa: National Liberal
Finally, the party ideology has tended to emphasize the Liberals' character as a truly "national", i.e. federal, party. In the prevailing party view, only a "national" party, such as the Liberal, is capable of coalescing the various parochial strains emanating from the diverse regions of Canada. Consequently the party

...must express only the highest common factors behind which majority support can be mobilized

...We occupy half a continent; there is enormous diversity of regional economic interest.

Government in this country can be carried on only by alliances, by forming coalitions of regional and other interests. 16

Thus, the Liberal party becomes the political vehicle transcending the diversity of the Canadian social structure.

In contrast to the party as a whole, represented by its membership, and to governmental institutions such as the Senate and Cabinet, in which a simple principle of representation can be applied, the party leader was obliged to stand alone as a symbol of the all-inclusive nature of the party.17 This fact itself was sufficient to influence the successful political leader to eschew identification


17M. Duverger speaks of "scientific democracy" in this context - proportional representation according to regional or other affiliation. See M. Duverger, Political Parties. (London: Methuen, 1954), p. 158. This has not been applicable given the historical definition of Prime Ministerial leaders. Only one individual has possessed both the formal and informal authority of the leader, despite prevalent myths concerning "dual leadership". See F. W. Gibson. "Conclusions". in Gibson on. cit. n. 155.
with particular regional interests. However, reinforcing this situation has been the tendency of parties governing over a long period of time at the federal level, to associate themselves with the "centralist" points of view expressed by the federal career bureaucracy. Certainly the Liberal Party, in terms of its policies and of its recruitment practices, has not been independent of these influences.

The consequence of such factors was to emphasize the "national" nature of a leader's role as a criterion for leadership selection. In fact, the leaders of the Liberal Party since Laurier have satisfied this criterion to the extent that both their careers and belief-systems have coincided with the party's definition of national rather than regional patterns. In contrast to leaders of the Conservative Party and unsuccessful Liberal candidates, such as J. G. Gardiner and Eric Kierans, the leaders of the Canadian Liberals in the 20th century have had no appreciable career in provincial politics.

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The predominance of career patterns at the federal level of government has paralleled the existence of belief-systems emphasizing a "federal" view of the Canadian state. In this view, the viability of the Canadian federal system, represented by the existence of a federal, "Canadian", national government, is to be protected against the centrifugal forces operating within the constituent regions. The most ardent defender of this outlook, in intellectual terms, is the present leader, Mr. Trudeau:

It is now becoming obvious that federalism has all along been a product of reason in politics. It was born of a decision by pragmatic politicians to face facts as they are, particularly the fact of the heterogeneity of the world's population. It is an attempt to find a rational compromise based on the will of the people. 20

As federal Minister of Justice during a period of constitutional "crisis", Mr. Trudeau's viewpoints on the issue of "Canadianism" were perhaps his most significant contribution to the political scene prior to the 1968 convention. Thus, in the government publication *Federalism for the Future* prepared under his supervision, the view was expressed that:

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A constitution is more than a legal document; it is an expression of how the people within a state may achieve their social, economic, and cultural aspirations...Canada's identity is its diversity and its unity; we lose ourselves if we lose our two linguistic communities, our diverse cultural heritages, or our several regional identities. We lose them all if we lose the Canada in which they have been able to exist and develop. 21

As a result of his long legal practice and tenure as Minister of Justice, the former leader, Mr. St. Laurent occupied a similar ideological position. As a counsel for the federal government, a member of the Rowell Sirois Commission, a president of the Canadian Bar Association and prominent figure in the preparation of the post-war "Green Book" proposals, Mr. St. Laurent's background was consistently associated with institutions or beliefs emphasizing "federal" rather than "regional" interests within the Canadian political system.

The association of Liberal leaders with federal careers and belief systems did not, of course, extend to a negation of the federal system itself by resorting to unitary government. The King-Lapointe defence of provincial autonomy in the

291920's and a similar stance by Mr. Trudeau at the 1966 National Liberal Conference, in contrast to the centralizing tendencies of the post-war party, are illustrative of this point. Rather it was the defence of federalism, and therefore of Canadian national unity, combined with the pragmatic adoption of certain interpretations of it, depending on the political situation, which constituted the essence of the Liberal ideology. Thus, in his approach to a particular problem of the constitutionality of federal policy Mackenzie King "had no explicit theory of the economic responsibilities of a federal government...For him it was a political problem". In the conduct of party affairs, as well as governmental policy, a similar approach was evident. The federal nature of the party necessitated a balance between the interests of presenting a unifying national party and the legitimate demands of provincial party autonomy.

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25 Thus, despite great divergence in philosophy, personality, and policy, federal and provincial parties coexist under identical labels. See N. McKenty, *Mitchell Hepburn*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968) and M. A. Ormsby, *T. Dufferin*
In intraparty as well as interparty politics a dominant ideological theme was the recognition of the role of the federal formula in preserving Canadian unity. The essential qualification of the successful leader was therefore an identification, as measured by explicit beliefs or by consonant career patterns, with this formula and with the corresponding conception of the party leader.

Ideology and Party Leadership

Party ideology provides an important theoretical link between the nature of party and the form of political leadership which it possesses. Research into the leadership of groups has asserted that leadership is conducted within a framework imposed by the group's conception of its collective purpose and of the normal procedures for achievement of this purpose. In some respects, therefore, leadership is selected and persists in response to its adherence to the

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collective values of the group or organization involved:
The dominant belief determines the legitimacy of a leader, in the sociological sense of the term "legitimate". 27

The significance of party ideology rests in its preeminent role as a determinant of political attitudes within the party. Although it represents a cognitive response to external conditions, ideology also vitally affects the internal activity of the political party. Depending on the nature of the party, ideological reaction to the environment will involve the articulation of goals which are directed to both external and internal needs. 28 Regardless of their internal or external basis, internal party processes will nonetheless be influenced by the character of these goals. The goals defined by the party ideology constitute the normative foundation upon which party

27Duverger, op. cit., p. 133.
28External goals or needs are defined in relation to the party's performance in the political system as a whole, e.g. the pursuit of electoral success. In contrast, goals and needs defined in terms of the party's membership can be considered "internal". An example of internal needs and goals are those deriving from the necessity of creating a "social movement". For a discussion of the dialectic between the latter internal goal and the external goal of electoral success in a Canadian party, see Walter D. Young, *The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-1961*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), passim.
activity is based. Consequently, the nature of the party ideology dictates the form of political subculture within which all internal party processes occur.

Diagram 2: Party Ideology And Leadership Selection

In this manner, party ideology is a vital factor shaping the context in which party leadership operates and in which it is selected. The interaction of leaders and of potential leaders or candidates is conducted within and, to

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29 As party has been considered a system of political behaviour, it is permissible to speak of a political culture, (or subculture, since the party is clearly operating within a wider political and cultural system), applicable to this activity. "Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the ...system". Pye, L. W., "Political Culture in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume XII, ed. D. L. Sills. (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 218.
some extent, resolved by the ideological character of the institution or group involved. The prevailing rules of candidate and elite behaviour thus reflect these ideological traits. Moreover, party ideology will substantially influence the form of preselection characteristic of the leadership selection process. Two manifestations of the influence of ideological considerations on the process of selecting leadership are thus apparent: the characteristics of individuals who through "preselection" are eliminated at various levels of the selection process, and the rules of the game which govern interaction among these elites and between elites and other members of the organization.

The ideology of the Liberal party was not merely a philosophical guide to action, but also to a great extent corresponded to the actual position of the party in the Canadian political system. In terms of electoral support, the Liberal party appealed to a broad range of class, regional and ethnic groups, as well as representing through its elite composition the co-operation of the two major

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30The emergence of candidates represents only the highest stage of the selection process at which "preselection" occurs. See Kenneth Prewitt, "From the Many are Chosen the Few", American Behavioural Scientist, XIII (November-December, 1969), 169-188.
ethnic identities. It is this electoral characteristic which was seen to account for the preeminent success of the Liberal party at the national level. As electoral success constituted the preeminent concern of the party, a natural consequence was adherence to an ideology which was perceived to express the formula for the achievement of this goal.

The primacy of electoral success also tended to promote the importance of this external goal at the expense of alternative, internal goals. Since the external goal of electoral success was predominant, the formulas corresponding to this objective constituted the major ideological framework within which party activity was conducted. Thus, the emphasis on consensus characteristic of Liberal ideology became the dominant feature of the political subculture which governed the internal processes of the party, including the selection of leader.

The form of preselection characteristic of Liberal leadership selection was consistent with the dominance of the party's consensual ideology. In the process of reduction or preselection in respect to the emergence of leadership candidates, consensual rather than competitive qualifications tended to prevail. Few candidates were associated, through previous political behaviour, with parochial groups or...
institutions which could form a basis for a competitive leadership struggle. Those candidates who were so disposed did not succeed in becoming party leaders. Thus, the characteristics of Liberal leaders reveals further the nature of preselection applicable to the party. The political background of the party leader tended to stress identification with the membership and ideology of the party, (and of the political system), as a whole. In general, preselection in respect to candidates and leaders in the Liberal party directed the process toward the center and consensus rather than to the periphery and conflict.

The influence of the party ideology was further reflected in the rules of the game describing the behaviour of candidates and elites within the selection process. The introduction of competition or conflict as significant rules for candidate behaviour was infrequent. Generally, the resolution of leadership selection was accomplished by the application of non-competitive or consensual rules of the game. Candidates, who failed to abide by these consensual rules were notably unsuccessful in their pursuit of the leadership. In contrast, the eventual party leaders were most successful as candidates by pursuing consensus instead of conflict. Consequently, success was equated with resemblance
to the highest common denominator - the party; failure often consisted in alignment with only a particular segment of the organization.

Leadership selection in the Liberal party was accomplished within the limits established by the character of preselection and of the prevailing rules of the game. The exact nature of the latter parameters corresponded to the dominant features of the party ideology. Thus, Liberal leaders have not been chosen independent of the influence - in this case, ideological - of the political party. However, this is not to deny, leaders when established, do not themselves profoundly shape the party ideology. In fact, the interaction of leadership and ideology is reciprocal, with the rules of candidate behaviour and preselection representing the intermediate stage of ideology's influence on the form of leadership.

The significance of this relationship in the Liberal party has consisted in its remarkable congruence over the period from 1919 to 1968. Related to this congruence of party ideology and leadership, is the long, unchallenged tenure of Liberal leaders during this period. However, it is
Diagram 3: Party Leadership And Party Ideology

also connected with the inordinately effective performance of the Liberal party in terms of its primary goal of electoral success. The tenure of leadership has been considered to be related to the degree of electoral success of the party. This relationship alone is unable to account for instability of leadership in some parties, even when electoral success is present - for example the Diefenbaker experience of the Conservative governments of the early 1960's.31 The experience of the Liberal party suggests that electoral success and security of leadership tenure are most complimentary when the party has both accepted the unqualified preeminence of the former goal, and possesses an elaborate ideology which promotes its dominant position.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding argument has investigated variables indicating the intensity and scope of conflict over the issue of leadership selection in the Liberal Party of Canada - the structure of the mechanism of selection, the character of preselection, and the nature of the rules of the game governing participant behaviour. The analysis has revealed that the leadership convention did not ultimately constitute a selection mechanism allowing the control of elites by non-elites or for the competition between elites for the support of non-elites. Moreover, the character of preselection and rules of the game tended to limit the appearance of strong competition between elites and to resolve existing conflict to the detriment of the most competitive candidates. As a rule then, Liberal leadership selection has not tended to conform to the democratic model, but resembled to a great degree a non-conflict or consensual process.

Influences on the Nature of Leadership Selection

The analysis of leadership selection in the Liberal party has sustained two propositions concerning the nature of
the selection process: (1) the lack of a rigorous competitive or democratic framework and (2) the predominance of consensual variables as the operating criteria of selection. To account for the prevalence of these characteristics, three factors can be mentioned - Liberal party ideology, the structural characteristics of the party and the structure and function of the mechanism of selection itself.

The structural characteristics of a political party provide the most immediate influence on the nature of its internal processes. The most significant structural characteristics of the Liberal party of Canada over the period 1919 to 1968 have been those deriving from its cadre nature and its close relationship to governmental power. In consequence of these characteristics of the party, the probability, (and suitability), of a leadership selection process which provided either for the control of elites by

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1 The structure of a cadre party resembles a "grouping of notabilities for the preparation of elections, conducting campaigns and maintaining contact with the candidates." See M. Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 64. For the Liberal party as a cadre party, see Engelmann, F. C. and Schwartz, M., Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 248.

2 According to the typology developed by Engelmann and Schwartz the Liberal party is a broad-based, success-oriented, cadre party which has possessed governmental power. op. cit., p. 248.
non-elites or for the extensive competition of elites for non-elite support was diminished.

The subservient role of non-elites in relation to the occupancy of the leadership position stems from the nature of party as an organized political group. According to the traditional theory of party oligarchy, as expounded by Robert Michels and others, the masses or non-elites are incapable of self-government. Consequently,

Organization implies the tendency to oligarchy. In every organization, whether it be a political party, a professional union, or any other association of the kind, the aristocratic tendency manifests itself very clearly. The mechanism of the organization while conferring a solidity of structure, induces serious changes in the organized mass, completely inverting the respective positions of leaders and led. As a result of organization every party or professional union becomes divided into a minority of directors and majority of directed.

In respect to the most pre-eminent party office - party leaders, non-elites cannot practically control the position through the direct assumption of its functions. Rather, the prerogative of control was applicable only in the sense that non-elites could threaten to replace existing leadership with

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4 Ibid., p. 38.
another elite or choose among elites competing for the position.

If elite competition is discouraged, non-elite influence is further reduced. According to his conception of party as oligarchy, Michels' believed that the circulation of elites in positions of authority was more assimilative than competitive in character. A contrary formulation has maintained that the occupancy of elite position reflects a "stratarchic" rather than oligarchic party structure. Thus, party possesses a more diverse elite group, which necessitates conflict and accommodation.

The oligarchic rather than stratarchic model has been more appropriate to the conduct of leadership selection in the Liberal party of Canada. Thus, the low significance of democratic or conflict criteria in the selecting of Liberal leaders derives from a party structure discouraging the development of independent centres or foundations of political power from which sets of counter-elites could be recruited. Of special significance was the lack of secondary associations reasonably detached from the control of the

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5Michels, op. cit., p. 378.
prevailing party elite. According to at least one study of the conditions of democratic systems, this constitutes a basic necessity for the institution of internal conflict.\textsuperscript{7}

Thus, the lack of viable independent secondary organizations, represented by the inferior status and influence possessed by both the federal extra-Parliamentary party and the provincial Liberal parties encouraged, along with the party discipline enforced by the Cabinet-Parliamentary system of government, the undemocratic nature of the party structure.

The development of the Liberal Party of Canada has featured the predominance of the Parliamentary party and leader at the expense of an independent extra-Parliamentary organization. In fact, the 1948 leadership convention was the first held in which any official party organization outside of the legislative party existed. Its inability to influence the direction of party output as a counterbalance to the Cabinet and party leader was witnessed by the latter's usually preeminent control over the nature of party policy.

As previously discussed, the resolutions of party conventions were not considered as binding directives of legislative

leadership. The creation of electoral programs was usually the prerogative of Parliamentary elites in which the intervention of the party organization was rare.\(^8\)

The ineffectiveness of extra-Parliamentary organization was evident in leadership selection as well as policy formation. Although the great majority of delegates to conventions were not holders or past holders of legislative office, the absence of a strong, centralized party organization made inevitable the identification of these delegates with elites in the legislative party and with the goals\(^9\) articulated by this elite. There was little opportunity therefore for an alternative group of elites or set of goals to compete with those prevailing under the existing leadership. This dominance of the Liberal legislative party was moreover, manifested in the prerogative of the party leader for much of this period in respect to the initiation or call of a national leadership convention. In addition, the preeminent role of the legislative party was reflected in the significant degree of

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\(^8\)For one excellent example of this procedure, see John Meisel, *The Canadian General Election of 1957*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 38.

\(^9\)In practical terms, the predominance of external goals of electoral success as stipulated by the party ideology. The fusion of legislative and bureaucratic parties meant the goals and ideology of the former remained fundamentally unchallenged.
delegate strength it maintained at each convention.

The lack of effective extra-Parliamentary challenges to the leadership of the Liberal party was especially vital in view of the unity and discipline required of legislative elites under a Cabinet form of government. Except for 1919, all leadership conventions of the Liberal party have been held during periods of Liberal government (1948, 1968) or at a time when prospects of future electoral success were regarded as high. The demands, which were often articulated by the party leader, for solidarity and discipline among Cabinet elites restricted the amount of open policy debate with which the Parliamentary elites could take issue. In 1948 and 1968 particularly, prolonged engagement in policy debate was not appreciated by the party leader and Prime Minister. Moreover, advocacy of policies which contradicted previous party, and therefore Cabinet, policy were somewhat incongruous since the critic himself had participated in and was responsible for these decisions. It was not incidental, therefore, that two of the three specific critics of past party policy and advocates of specific policy alternatives - C. G. Power and Eric Kierans - were outside the jurisdiction of Cabinet rules. Certainly, in the 1968 case, sanctions were threatened against those candidates who otherwise would
have felt obliged to pursue a more programmatic leadership campaign.

The costs of incurring sanctions imposed by the present or future party leader were highest with respect to those candidates who, due to their political background, would be most likely to challenge the party leadership. The potential candidates with the most political ambition, whose political career was extensive, would incur the heaviest penalties, in terms of status, by the loss of Cabinet position. The "political outsider", who had less attachment and need for the status incurring from political office, ironically did not possess the political ambition to compete for the party leadership. The restrictions of Cabinet government on competitiveness between elites was most effective, since it affected inordinately precisely those elites who otherwise would be most likely to challenge existing leadership.

Prolonged tenure as the government party also encouraged the inability of provincial parties to act as foundations for the emergence of counter elites in opposition to the existing party leadership or in competition with federal

10The effects on the status of elites of internal conflict over the leadership roles has been suggested as a prime variable in the emergence of two-party, democratic systems within organizations. See Lipset, et al., op. cit., pp. 239-247.
party elites. Certainly a comparison of elites vying for the leadership of the Canadian Liberal and Conservative parties represents a correlation between possession of federal executive power and the significance of leaders of provincial parties.\footnote{For the lack of provincial party elites among Liberal candidates in contrast to those of the Conservatives, see Chapter IV. Since 1919, the Liberal party has held federal office for all but 12 of 52 (to 1971) years.}

There is reason to maintain that long tenure in federal government by the Liberal party has had the effect, through party structure,\footnote{Of course, ideology is a major variable here too. "Federal" party ideology has not been unremoved from this monopoly of government and its effect on party structure.} of denigrating the role of provincial parties as major influences on federal leadership selection. Under the structure of success-seeking parties, the nexus of party structure is provided by the material and psychological benefits deriving from the extent of the party's capture of executive power. In a federal party system, the level of party most capable of providing these benefits will garner the more thorough attachment of party adherents and therefore constitute a stronger foundation upon which political
elites and leaders can function. The inordinate success of the federal Liberals has resulted in the ability to distribute a multitude of rewards to supporters and in the consequent preeminence of federal Parliamentary elites. In the actual selection of leaders, the relatively more favourable position of federal elites was reinforced by the election of delegates on the basis of federal constituency organizations. Since a great proportion of these delegates were actually holders of some form of constituency office and were elected by the local federal constituency party, it can be assumed that these delegates were those most likely to have received rewards from the federal party's position in the past and therefore most favourable to the leadership and goals represented by the federal Parliamentary elite.

Given this centralized structure, which is maintained by continued electoral success, provincial parties have not

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13The argument has been advanced that Canadian parties generally tend to be relatively more centralized than the federal party system of the United States, for example. See Corry, J. A. and Hodgetts, J. E., Democratic Government and Politics, 3rd edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), p. 251. Comparisons of the two major Canadian parties have concluded the Liberals to be more centralized than the Conservatives. See Neisel, John, "Recent Changes in Canadian Parties", in Party Politics in Canada, 2nd edition, ed. Thorburn, H. G., (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 45.
provided foundations upon which internal conflict over leadership selection could be based. The continuing tendency toward greater separation of federal and provincial parties, exemplified by the formation of a distinct, federal Quebec Liberal party in 1964, has no doubt, assuming continued electoral success, accelerated this tendency. In this respect, party structure provides not only a variable explaining the lack of conflict in the Liberal leadership selection process, but also can account for the great differences, especially in terms of the nature of candidates and leaders, between the selection of Liberal leaders and that characteristic of the Canadian Conservative and United States' parties.

The absence of secondary organization, such as an independent extra Parliamentary organization and provincial parties, relevant to federal leadership selection, and the character of Cabinet organization militating against the emergence of conflict within the Parliamentary elite resulted in a structural environment generally hostile to elite competition. The national party convention could not guarantee the viability of a competitive form of leadership selection, since the latter depended on the existence of competing sets of elites and of uncontrolled delegates desirous and capable of choosing between them. In the final
analysis, a merely formal competitive structure, such as the leadership convention, could not operate effectively in the absence of environmental conditions conducive to the necessary degree of internal party conflict.

The leadership convention's contribution to intra-party democracy was also limited of course by its own characteristics. Throughout most of its history representation of Parliamentary elites remained substantial. Furthermore, although the convention was established as the sole means of leadership selection, accountability, prior to 1966, was not either a constitutional or practical requirement of party leadership. The lack of accountability and the inapplicability of the party convention as a basis for internal party conflict was manifested in the power possessed by the party leader. First, it was the leader himself, who was always responsible for the call of a convention to choose a successor. Secondly, his pre-eminence as past leader and, in two of three cases, as Prime Minister offered him substantial political resources to intervene in and to influence the process of leadership selection.

Although the national convention did not function entirely effectively to promote competition for the party leadership, a second, latent function was performed by the
institution. The leadership convention served to provide an established method of arriving at a collective decision and thereby to legitimate the character of this decision. In this sense, consensus rather than conflict constituted the primary objective of the mechanism of selection. The widening of the selection mechanism, in terms of participation, from the legislative caucus to representative convention broadened party involvement in the selection of leaders; however, rather than encouraging conflict, this extension allowed the socialization of important party members with respect to the choice of party leader and thereby party activity as a whole. In the Liberal party of Canada, this latent function of the national party convention has apparently prevailed over the manifest function of providing for conflict in leadership selection and has represented a major variable accounting for the consensual nature of the party's selection process.

For at least two reasons, the latent function of the party convention cannot be considered a sufficient reason for the prevalence of consensus in the selection of leaders in the Liberal party. First, the extent of members' concurrence in the outcome of the functional mechanism depends to a substantial degree on some form of prior commitment to a more inclusive purpose. Thus, participants in leadership
selection were committed to the concerns and purposes of the party itself rather than merely to a particular result of the selection process. Secondly, only in terms of a pre-existing consensual variable can differences in leadership selection of parties, such as the Canadian Liberals and Conservatives, using similar mechanisms of selection, be explained.

The quality of the party ideology, containing not only a certain political philosophy but also expressing the party’s position and direction in relation to reality, has constituted the prior variable determining the consensual character of leadership selection in the Liberal party. The non-class economic ideology as well as the adherence to the ideas of French-English partnership and of the federal formula gave the Liberal party an ideological outlook deprecating the utility of conflict and asserting the value of political cooperation and consensus. The priority of consensus witnessed in the selection of Liberal leaders was influenced by the extent to which these attributes were accepted by participants as practical, as well as philosophical, guides to action.

The force, which allowed for the influence of these traits on the determination of leadership was the primacy accorded to the external goals of the party. The predominance of external rather than internal goals derives to some extent
from the very nature of a political party. As S. J. Eldersveld describes them, "parties are unique structurally because they are groups oriented to the achievement of special goals and functions under unique environmental conditions in the society."\(^{14}\) Moreover, the Canadian Liberal party has developed in the context of a cadre party's emphasis on the external goals of electoral success and occupation of governmental office. This development has tended to maintain a high emphasis on the operation of the party in the environment and to resist the entrance of concerns or goals based on the internal activity of party.\(^{15}\) The predominance of external goals expressed in the party ideology, constituted the linkage between a party ideology deprecating conflict and the consensual form of leadership selection characteristic of the party.

\(^{14}\) Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 2.

\(^{15}\) In essence this difference reduces to a situation where the internal dynamics of a party are regarded as either a means to a given end (electoral success in the Liberal party) or as to a great degree an end in itself. The desire to build a social movement at the expense of immediate electoral success characteristic of elements in the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation is a fine example of the latter. See Young, W. D., The Anatomy of a Party: The National C.C.F., 1932-1961. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 177-216.
The demands made by the political and social environment within which the party operated were such that an ideology predicated on consensus was most functional in terms of the accomplishment of the party goals. The form of Parliamentary government, in which the capture of executive power required a stable legislative majority, meant that unity was a much more immediate requirement of the Liberals, than of United States' or even of Canadian opposition parties. Moreover, unity and a consensual party ideology were conducive to electoral success, given the diverse nature of the Canadian electorate and society. Finally, the maintenance of the political system necessitated adherence to the federal formula at the expense of revisionist philosophies, and the integration of French-Canadian political elites.

The nature and pre-eminence of the external goals of the Liberal party were therefore the foundation for the consensual nature of leadership selection. As an internal and therefore secondary activity of the party, leadership selection reflected the predominant external goals of the party. In effect, the selection of a party leader was generally regarded as a means, although an essential one, to accomplish the wider goals of the party in the environment rather than an end in itself.
The primacy of external goals and the nature of the party ideology promoted consensual rather than competitive values in party activity as a whole. Internal processes of the party were thus conducted with the same eschewal of conflict and preservation of consensus as external activity. In the final analysis, the high emphasis on consensual variables in the selection of Liberal leaders derived substantially from the party's relation and response to its environment, as perceived by its members.\(^{16}\)

Leadership, Leadership Selection And Political Party

In general, leadership selection in the Liberal party has reflected the basic structure and the ideological foundation with which the external activity of the Liberal party was conducted. The process by which leadership emerged was therefore determined in the context of the party as a whole. In the Liberal party the environment was most favourable to a consensual, rather than a conflict, model of leadership selection.

A consensual form of leadership selection allowed

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\(^{16}\) Lipset's study of trade-union democracy refers to the "cult unity" enforced on many unions by the necessity of membership unity in the conduct of bargaining with industry. Similar to Liberal party ideology, this "cult" hinders the development of internal pluralism and conflict. See Lipset, \emph{et al.}, pp. 270-273.
that type of compromise, consensual leadership, which has prevailed in the Liberal party, to emerge. Both the long unchallenged tenure, as well as the selection, of Liberal leaders can be attributed to their performance or potential performance, as conceived by the party membership, of the goals and purposes of the Liberal party. Of course, the actual practice of party leadership was not unrelated to the maintenance of these goals. In fact, the adherence of Liberal leaders to the goals of electoral success and of the integration (recruitment) of French-Canadian political elites, after the necessity of conformity to party goals had declined, testifies to the reciprocal relationship, in secular terms, of leadership and party.

In the final analysis, the nature of party emerges as a prime determinant of leadership in the Canadian Liberal party. In this light the performance of political leadership in Canada must be seen as a partial consequence of the applicability of party activity and goals to the requirements of the political system as a whole. As a corollary, political party should be considered a significant determining variable in any complete explication of the meaning of political leadership.
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