Bureaucratic-military relations during the military governments of Ghana and Nigeria.

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BUREAUCRATIC-MILITARY RELATIONS
DURING THE MILITARY GOVERNMENTS
OF GHANA AND NIGERIA

Submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Windsor in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

by

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University of Windsor
1970
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This paper is an attempt to assess the patterns of bureaucratic-military relationships which developed during the period of military government in Ghana and Nigeria following the coup d'etat of 1966. It was found that the patterns differed between the two countries. In Ghana, the bureaucracy and the military worked closely together during the entire period of military government. In Nigeria, the military and the bureaucracy worked closely during the first period of military rule, but the bureaucracy was replaced in governing positions by political figures in the military government that took over after the second coup.

It is suggested that the difference in patterns of military-bureaucratic relations was due primarily to the attitudes held by the military toward politics and politicians. It is further suggested that the difference in attitudes was due to three factors:

1) patterns of alienation of the military and the bureaucracy which developed during the pre-coup period;
2) the events of the immediate post-coup period;
3) the type of problems facing the military governments.
Of these, it appears that the latter was the most important factor in the determination of the differing attitudes of the military toward politics and politicians.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation to Mr. W.C. Soderlund without whose guidance and criticism this paper would not have been possible. I would also like to express my thanks to Mr. C.L. Brown-John and Dr. Z.M. Fallenbuchl for their criticisms. The major thanks, however, must be extended to my wife, Elizabeth, for her constant help in both typing and editing this paper, and for the moral support which meant so much in the completion of the paper.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Ghana and Nigeria experienced *coup d'etat* in 1966 which resulted in military governments replacing civilian governments in both countries. Although in each case the obvious effect of the *coup* was to remove the civilian politicians from power, it is less clear what changes took place in the relationships between the remaining leadership groups. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the relationships which existed in both Ghana and Nigeria between the military, political and bureaucratic leadership groups prior to the *coup*, and attempt to assess the impact that the changes in regime brought about by the *coup* had on the relationships between the key elite groups during the period of military government.

This examination will be carried out chronologically. First, the paper will examine the patterns of interaction between the political and bureaucratic leadership and between the political and military leadership prior to the *coup* in Ghana and Nigeria. The purpose is to point out influences or patterns of
action which might contribute to the establishment of a close co-operation between the military and the bureaucracy. Second, the paper will focus on the patterns of interaction between the military and the bureaucracy which occurred after the removal of the political leadership by the coups in an attempt to determine the similarities and differences between these patterns of bureaucratic-military interaction in Ghana and Nigeria. In this context, the paper will examine the relationships in two time periods: (1) during the first six months after the coup; and (2) in the more formal period of military government which followed this initial six month period. Here the discussion will trace the development of relationships in these countries as conditions stabilized, and will attempt to point out how both the events of the initial period and the subsequent problems faced by the military governments contributed to the development of the relationships.

While there have been numerous studies focusing on the role of the military or the bureaucracy in political development, the importance of the relationships between the groups, and the determinants of these relationships, has not generally been stressed. Ghana and Nigeria present two instances where the development of bureaucratic-military relations in
post-coup military governments may be studied. In each country, a definite pattern of bureaucratic-military relations developed. Since the patterns were quite different, it will be the purpose of this paper to explain how these differences occurred.

In general, the major reasons given for the close co-operation between the military and the bureaucracy have emphasized the common background and attitudes of the two groups. Some of these specific binding ties mentioned have been: 1) that the military and the bureaucracy represent the most westernized and professional groups in the society; 2) that in ex-British colonies, both groups were British-trained and thus influenced by common professional socialization patterns; and 3) that both groups have similar attitudes towards politics and politicians.¹ The first two propositions appear to be supported by the

¹ Among numerous authors reflecting these viewpoints are:
S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) Ch. 4
A. Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army" Comparative Politics 1(3, 1969) p. 384
E. Feit, "Military Coups in Ghana and Nigeria" World Politics XX(1, 1967) passim.
close working relationship which developed in both Ghana and Nigeria during the immediate post-coup period, but fail to account for the subsequent differences in patterns of relations which developed. The third proposition, that of common attitudes toward politics and politicians is likewise important, but it is important in the fact that different attitudes existed especially on the part of the military in the two countries.

Attitudes toward politics and politicians on the part of Ghanaian and Nigerian military officers differed in two crucial respects: 1) in the level and uniformity of alienation felt toward the political structures; and 2) in the degree to which political and bureaucratic groups were to be permitted to participate in the military government. These crucial attitudinal differences were not solely the product of pre-coup relationships between the three groups, but were also affected by the events of the actual removal of the civilian regimes and the subsequent initial periods of military government, and perhaps more importantly, by the nature of the political problems which faced the military once they had assumed power.

The different types of military-bureaucratic relationships which developed in Ghana and Nigeria
following the coups are clearly the result of a number of causal factors. In an attempt to explain the differences in these relationships, this paper will focus on three major areas: 1) the development of attitudes on the part of the military and the bureaucracy toward the political sphere during the pre-coup period; 2) the way in which the actual events of the coups and the immediate post-coup period effected the availability of various groups to participate in the military governments; and 3) the manner in which the differing political problems confronting the military governments of Ghana and Nigeria were reflected in the pattern of relationships which developed.
CHAPTER II

PRE-COUP INFLUENCES ON
BUREAUCRATIC-MILITARY RELATIONS

In Ghana and Nigeria, the civilian bureaucracy and the military reflect both the influences of colonial background and the experiences of these institutions during the period of national independence. This chapter will examine some of the effects of these influences in the pre-co up period on the military and the bureaucracy as institutions and on the relationships between the two groups.

Prior to Ghana's independence, the structure of colonial government ensured the close co-operation between the civil service and the security forces of the colony. Within the colonial structure, both the colonial bureaucracy and the security forces, as the only organized structures, were implicitly charged

Throughout this paper, the terms security forces and military will be used interchangeably to mean both the military per se and the police as a para-military unit. For the rationale of including the police in the military, see J.M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order (London: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1969) pp28-31, 65-70.
with the maintenance of colonial security, both internally and externally. Both carried out the role of policy-application agencies, implementing the directives of the colonial hierarchy. In addition, they acted together to maintain internal security, with the civil service fulfilling the intelligence gathering role, and the security services the investigative and control functions. Thus within the prime role of system maintenance, the two services were forced to work closely together.

The same basic pattern was reflected in Nigeria, but one special problem arose which mitigated the chances of the same close relationship developing. Prior to 1951, the colonial civil service in Nigeria had been a unified service, fulfilling the same security maintenance role as had the civil service in Ghana. As a unified service, there was a fluidity of the movement of personnel between regions, which permitted the possibility of ethnic clashes. This was due both to the prevalence of southerners in the civil service, a result of the merit system of recruiting, and to the stated policy of not allowing civil servants native to one region to work in their

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home region. With the formation of the federal system in 1951, the well-developed educational system around Onitsha led to an increase in the number of Easterners entering the civil service of the central government, as well as the western and northern civil services.

The process of decolonization had major effects on both the roles and structures of the bureaucracy and the military in Ghana and Nigeria. In Ghana, the process resulted in altering the functions and goals of both these structures, and in the necessity of Africanizing the two groups. In Nigeria, the process also led to changes in goals and functions, as well as Africanization, with the additional problem that the federal nature of Nigeria required the repatriation of posts to citizens native to the region (termed northernization, westernization, easternization or regionalization).

In both the military and the civil service in Ghana, the movement toward independence meant an increase in the demands by Africans for major roles within the institutions of the country. To satisfy these demands, and to enable the country to control

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its own civil service and military, the process of Africanization was expanded. The Ghanaian goal was complete repatriation of the positions concerned by 1957. This process had begun in 1946 with the abolition of the favoured racial basis in the civil service, and was extended in 1949 by the cessation of expatriate recruiting for the administrative services. In the military, the process of Africanization of officer positions started during the Second World War, with some Ghanaians being granted temporary commissions. However, the first permanent, or Queen's, commissions were not granted until 1947, while a regular officer's school was not formed until the Teshie school was formed in 1953. By 1957, 12.8% of the officer corps was Ghanaian, while complete Africanization was finally attained in 1963. The Africanization process in the civil service progressed from 13.8% of the senior service African in 1949 to 38.2% in 1954, with almost complete Africanization by 1960.

5 A.L. Adu, Civil Services, p.131
6 Lee, African Armies p.41
7 ibid. p.44

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In Nigeria, the process of Africanization dates from the 1952 appointment of a Nigerianization Commission, and their recommendations in 1953. By 1957, a Nigerianization Officer had been appointed to accelerate the recruiting and training of Nigerians for the public services. In 1959, however, a committee of the House of Representatives adversely reported on the work of this officer because, among other reasons, only 10 of 73 superscale posts were Nigerianized. By 1961, however, the rate of Nigerianization in the federal service had increased greatly, with 64% of the senior posts being filled by Nigerians in 1962. Because of this increase, Nigerianization ceased to be regarded by the public service commission as a problem of major concern to the legislators. In Nigeria, the removal of expatriates was slower than in Ghana, due to a policy which created new posts for these expatriate advisors, mostly in tech-

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10 Cole, "Bureaucracy in Transition" p. 105
Superscale posts include those of Permanent Secretary, Deputy Permanent Secretary and Senior Assistant Secretary, the top three levels of the Civil Service.

11 Cole, "Bureaucracy in Transition" p. 105
nical fields and in the northern region, where the political leaders preferred expatriates to southern Nigerians.

Table I

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<td>1961</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>13 of 13</td>
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Although the above table includes only the permanent secretary level, it is apparent that the rate of progress was substantial in the eastern and western regional services. At lower levels (superscale and scale A salary grades), over half of the 558 posts in the eastern regional service had been held by expatriates in 1952. By 1961, only 92 expatriates remained. In the north, the pace of progress was slower because of the demands for Northernization rather than Nigerianization. At the superscale level, of 100 posts, only 38 were held by Nigerians in 1963, while 33 were held by expatriates, and the remaining 29 posts were vacant. At the federal level, the pace of Nigerianization was fairly slow until 1960. At that time, only 32% of the superscale posts were held
by Nigerians. By 1963, however, Nigerians held 77% of these posts, with the rest held by expatriates.

Within the Nigerian military, the first Queen's Commissions were granted to Nigerians in 1947, and by 1960, 15.1% of the officer corps had been Nigerianized. This slow rate was the result of demands by the federal structure for the maintenance of an ethnic balance in the officer corps. These demands meant that suitable candidates could only be admitted within their regional quota. With the low number of northern Nigerians applying, this meant a slow rate of growth of the Nigerian officer corps. By January, 1961, three months after independence, there were only eighty-one Nigerian officers, an increase of twenty-four, but still a small number compared to the more than eight hundred expatriate officers. The formation of officers schools in the north helped to redress the balance, and increase the number of officers in the military. By 1965, the majority of the officer corps

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was Nigerian, with expatriates still serving in staff and training positions on a contract basis.

The changes in role and function of the civil service and the military also affected the future relations between the two groups. In both Ghana and Nigeria, the approach of independence meant the imposition of a political superstructure on the existing institutions. This resulted in a change in the character of the roles of the institutions from one of a static, systems-maintenance nature to one of a dynamic, supportative nature. This change resulted in an alteration of priorities.

Under the colonial system, the primary function of these institutions was one of service of the colonial office, and was primarily one of rule application. During the shift to an independent state (occurring in Ghana between 1951 and 1957, and in Nigeria between 1954 and 1960), the priorities changed to the


service of the government, and by extension, of the people, becoming more multi-functional with the addition of new departments, and changes to the scope of old departments. This alteration required the inclusion of highly-educated young men in the two institutions, bringing with them different conceptions of the role of the public services in the two countries.

The effects of Africanization and changes in role and functions of the military and the bureaucracy are easily shown. The rapid pace of Africanization compounded by changes in the structures and functions of the governments of these states prior to independence required an immediate injection of new, educated young men into the upper levels of both public services. These men, entering the public service, either military or civil, came into contact with senior ranks who had been trained and socialized in the patterns of the British model. Further, the pre-independence maintenance of British standards meant, for the military, further training at military schools in England, and conformance to the standards of these schools. For the bureaucrat, entry into an expatriate-dominated bureaucracy meant compliance with the standards of the expatriate.

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17 R.L. Harris, "Effects of Political Change on the Role Set of Senior Bureaucrats in Ghana and Nigeria," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 13(3, 1968) pp386-404

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In both cases, the results were that observance of high standards of professional conduct were required of these future elite members, and were adopted by these members as their own standards. The common standards of professionalism acted as the basis for future relations between elite groups.

Following independence both the bureaucratic and the military elites in Ghana and Nigeria were forced into patterns of action which did not conform to the standards adopted during the pre-independence period. In Ghana, this was mainly the result of political structure, while in Nigeria, it may be traced to problems of regionalism and ethnicity.

In Ghana, the Congress People's Party, (C.P.P.) led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, gained the position of government party during the colonial period, and, when elected Prime Minister, Nkrumah led Ghana to independence. The basic British structures were maintained, but during the entire period of Nkrumah's rule, the base of political and social activity was located within the C.P.P.. As Bretton noted, this political machine built by Nkrumah "hollowed out the existing structure (of state institutions) then proceeded to crush the remaining shell". This was done by altering the

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political structure, uniting the positions of head of state and head of government in the office of president by proclaiming a republican constitution in 1960. By this constitution, all structures of government were subordinated to the president. To complete this move, the creation of a single-party state in January 1964 vested all powers in the life chairman of the C.P.P., who also happened to be president.

These constitutional changes and amendments had two basic effects on the civil service. By the constitution of 1960, "the appointment, promotion, dismissal and disciplinary control of members of the public service is vested in the president." This article had the effect of opening the service as a source of patronage, with the Civil Service Commission stripped of all influence. In addition, the merit basis of the service was removed, allowing for political appointment and promotion within the civil service. This allowed the meshing of the C.P.P. and the civil service at all levels. The bureaucracy became an extension of the president's office, reduced to "mere administrative mentalities" of the presidency. The informal structure

19 Article 51, Section 2 of the Republican Constitution. For the full text, see Apter, Ghana in Transition Appendix A.

20 Bretton, Rise and Fall, p. 107.
of the C.P.P. within the civil service became the means for enforcing the president's wishes upon all levels of the service, and also became the upward channel of communication to the president's office.

The bureaucrats were removed entirely from the formulation of policy. Policies were made on the basis of highly personalized, ad hoc decisions by the president's office, with the bureaucrats reduced to the role of programming and executing the policies handed to them. If it was possible for bureaucrats to be purely administrative, then the role performed by Ghana's senior bureaucrat; under Nkrumah's regime came close to being so. For bureaucrats trained and educated in the British tradition, and who would have accepted British standards, this could only have resulted in the bureaucrats becoming opposed to the C.P.P.. Because of this opposition, many trained administrators chose to leave Ghana, preferring to work for international organizations rather than the C.P.P..

However, most bureaucrats chose to remain in Ghana, working within the restricted role allowed them by the political machine. Nkrumah allowed the profess-

21 Harris, "Effects of Political Change" p. 393.

22 Bretton, Rise and Fall Chapter VI and Harris, "Effects of Political Change" pp. 392-393.
ional civil servants in the upper levels of the bureaucracy to disregard the Party, and perform these limited functions, for it was in this way that he hoped to isolate the powerful members of a group he distrusted. 23

Until 1960, the military had been fairly free of political interference. From 1960 until the coup, however, the security services were continually alienated by Nkrumah. In July, 1960, the power to make all military appointments was granted to the president by the new constitution. Closely following this event came the involvement of Ghana in the Congo Crisis. These have been generally accepted as the starting points for the deterioration of relations between the president and the army. Relations between the police and the president generally seem to have deteriorated from August, 1962, until the coup in February 1966. Nkrumah, who was convinced

23 Bretton, Rise and Fall. pp.115-117

24 Within the context of this paper, the term alienation is used to refer to the process by which persons or groups become disaffected. That is, the process by which a neutral or active support group or person is changed into a group or person in conflict with the source of discord. In this case, it means the process by which the military and the bureaucracy were disaffected by the political regime. In this paper, alienation, disaffection and estrangement will be used interchangeably to refer to this process.

25 Gutteridge, Military in African Politics, p.100

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that the security branch was no longer reliable after an attempt on his life in August, decided to form a national security service responsible to the president only. This move humiliated the police, and a second attempted assassination by a police constable led Nkrumah to purge the top ranks of the police.

The army was faced with a similar situation. The formation of a Bureau of Military Intelligence in 1961 under the command of a diplomat, transferred to the military with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, aroused considerable resentment in the army. The appointment of this former diplomat, a fellow tribesman and friend of the president, meant that informants linked to the presidential security system were being introduced. Additionally, the formation of the President's Own Guard Regiment(s) (P.O.G.R.), an elite force composed of volunteer Ghanaians under the direct control of the president extended the army's resentment, especially since the P.O.G.R. were advised by east Europeans, in contrast to the British orientation of the rest of the army. As well, these regiments were given the best equipment and uniforms while the regular army was poorly

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26 Lee, African Armies p. 65.

clothed and supplied.

The formation of this independent parallel system thus alienated the existing security forces, by posing a threat to the traditions of the services involved. These traditions were further threatened by the continuing politicizing moves by the president who required all officers to be members of the C.P.P., and all officers to attend the party ideological institute at Winneba.

In Ghana, both the military and the civilian bureaucracy were alienated by the political superstructure. The bureaucracy was supplanted by the party apparatus, while the military position was reduced by the imposition of parallel structures, both actual and embryonic. In each case, the role which the institution was expected to play was less than the role which the members of the respective elites considered proper. Thus two alienated groups existed, the regular military and the civil service. These groups could co-operate on the basis of this alienation, and on the common standards of the groups.

In Nigeria, the basic situation differed greatly

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29 Gutteridge, *Military in African Politics,* p. 105. The 'embryonic groups' refers to the Worker's Brigade and the Young Pioneers, who could be used by the C.P.P. as enforcers.
from that of Ghana. There existed no one dominant party in the Federation. This made it improbable that the institutions of the bureaucracy and the military would be politicized by the actions of a single person or group. There could be no creation of parallel structures to extend personal influence into the lower levels of these institutions.

In Nigeria, the government of each region was in the hands of a dominant, tribally-based political party. The central government, however, was controlled by a coalition of the Northern Peoples Congress (N.P.C.) and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.).

Between January 1965 and the coup in January 1966, the central government was controlled by a national coalition embracing all four major parties. The regional power base of each party provided the opportunity for each party to maintain control by the purchase power of public funds, jobs, contracts, licenses, etc. The bureaucracy was limited to programme formulation and management, and the role of policy advisor. However, this latter role was circumscribed by the political dominance of the party in the region. Additionally,

30 The other major parties included: the Nigerian National Democratic Party (N.N.D.P.), west and mid-west regions; The Action Group (A.G.) western region; the Northern Elements Progressive Union (N.E.P.U.) an N.C.N.C. ally in the north.
the rate of political interference in programme management was fairly high, since the prime aim of the programmes became a source of patronage. This had been the situation since before independence, and had become so blatant that commissions of investigation were initiated. 31

In the regions, the boundaries of bureaucratic responsibility were highly circumscribed by the unwillingness of political entities to surrender the opportunity for political and personal gain.

In the central government, the respective compositions of the political and bureaucratic elites led to the same circumscription of responsibilities. Where northerners dominated the political structure, and easteners dominated the bureaucratic structure there appeared to be a formality of communication between the minister and the higher civil servants. While the political decisions would be supported, there appeared to exist on the part of the ministers a tendency to work around rather than through the senior bureaucrats, thus reducing the role of the bureaucrat. 33

31 Cole, "Bureaucracy in Transition" passim.


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In both the central and regional governments, it has been suggested that the bureaucracy was alienated by the tendency on the part of the political elite to by-pass the bureaucrat. This suggestion rests on the assumption of inter-tribal competition or distrust. Thus in the central government, the positions of the northern politician and the eastern bureaucrat would lead to this situation. In the west and midwest and eastern states, the competition would be lessened due to the tribal matching of politician and bureaucrat.

In Nigeria, military alienation was not as manifest as it had been in Ghana; however, the regional basis of parties implied a competition for the support of the military. Tensions within the army existed between northern and southern officers as early as 1961. This demonstrated the intrusions of political-ethnic considerations into the army, which would tend to alienate those trained or educated in the British pattern and who had accepted British standards. The primary ethnic ties of the members of the military elite allowed the extension of political competition

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34 Olorunsola, "Patterns" pp. 64-66.
35 Lee, African Armies; p. 77.
into the military. Identification would therefore be not with the federal government, but with regional parties. It appears that this problem may have been magnified by the quota system of recruitment which may have encouraged close regional ties.

While not as overt as the Ghanaian situation, the Nigerian situation before the coup still led to a partial alienation of both the bureaucracy and the military. The regional identification, corruption and political stagnation of the independence period would have alienated these groups which were trained to expect high standards. As in Ghana, the bureaucracy filled a reduced role, one in which an administrator would feel handicapped. The use of the military to solve internal political problems in the mid-west would only have led to a lack of confidence in the politicians. Finally, the police had been exhausted and confused in their attempt to control the break-down in the west.

To generalize, by the end of 1965, the military and the civil bureaucracy in both Ghana and Nigeria had been alienated by the holders of political power.


38 It is noticeable, however, that the police were considered a truly national force in 1968 and 1969 at the peace talks between the Federal Military Government and the secessionist eastern region, as noted in *Africa Report* for 1968-1969.
in their respective countries. In both countries, these alienated groups could co-operate on the basis of their alienation and on the basis of their British standards. Additionally, the common structural features of the two institutions meant the small elites of these two groups were easily identifiable, and the implications of high positions in these structures would instil confidence in the abilities of the holders of these positions.

The stage was therefore set for the coups. The military, disaffected by the imposition of political norms on its basically non-political standards, with a self-image as the protector of the state, could move to correct this disaffection. The bureaucracy, on the other hand, circumscribed and partially politicized, could only retreat into routine, waiting to take its proper role in the administration of the state.
In addition to the varied patterns of alienation which had developed in Ghana and Nigeria, both the act of deposing the civilian regimes and the problems encountered by the military governments in the period immediately following the coups likewise contributed to the development of different patterns of bureaucratic-military relationships. The events of the coups influenced the ability of various leadership groups to participate in the subsequent military government. Possibly more important, however, to the differences in patterns of relationships were the events of the immediate post-coup period.

In the coup of February 24, 1966, the Ghanaian military acted as a unified group to topple the Nkrumah regime. Planned and executed by the security forces, the take-over of power was accomplished with a minimal loss of life, and minimal disruption of
routine. The credit for the planning of the coup was claimed by many groups and individuals, but it now appears clear that the coup was the work of four men: Colonel E.K. Kotoka of the Army and Commissioner J.W.K. Harley of the Police, assisted by Major A.A.Afrifa and Colonel A.Ocran, commander of the Accra Garrison. The date chosen was after President Nkrumah's departure for a trip to Hanoi and Peking, because it was assumed that his absence would minimize the bloodshed.

The mechanics of the coup were fairly direct. In order to mislead the informers of the Security Branch, an exercise was planned for February 23rd on the pretext of practising for the invasion of Rodesia. The battalion at Tamale moved to join the brigade at Kumasi. On the evening of February 23, the brigade moved to Accra and, in the early hours of the morning of the 24th, attacked and captured the radio station and other key points in Accra. There was little resistance except from the P.O.G.R. at Flagstaff House (Nkrumah's residence) and this was quickly put down.

Only seven of the attacking force were killed, as was General C.N. Barwah, the General Officer Commanding

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Ghanaian Forces, who had refused to support the leaders of the coup. By 6:00 A.M., Colonel Kotoka announced over the radio that “the myth surrounding Nkrumah has been broken.” Headquarters were established at the police station, and an effective government with General A. Ankrah at its head established.

In the Nigerian case, the original assumption of power by the military on January 15-16, 1966 can scarcely be called a coup d’etat. In form, it appeared more a mutiny of some officers in Kaduna, Ibadan and Lagos. The timing of the move was such that these ‘plotters’ in Kaduna were able to kill Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the northern Premier, S.A. Akintola, the western Premier, and Brigadier Ademulegun, one of the more senior Nigerian officers, and were able to arrest the northern regional Governor. In Lagos, seven people, including the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and five senior officers were killed. The government was ordered dissolved, all gatherings were prohibited and the Constitution sus-


43 Ibid. p. 35

pended by Major C. Nzeogwu, the prime architect of the mutiny. However, these orders were ignored by the Government in Lagos, and the Cabinet met on the evening of the 15th. At this meeting, it was agreed that the government would be handed over to the senior member of the military, General A. Ironsi, the next day. On the 17th, Major Nzeogwu, in Kaduna, surrendered his dubious position, and declared loyalty to the Federal Military Government. Thus the group which attempted the coup had been unsuccessful because of the "intervention of the bulk of the Nigerian Army". However, the army still appeared as the most unified group capable of carrying on the Nigerian State, so it was to the upper levels of this group that power was given.

In each case, the events of the coup reflect the pattern of alienation to which the military had been subjected. In Ghana, the security forces, with the exception of those units directly under the president's control, had suffered misuse and abuse, both actual, and in the light of the plans for Rhodesia, potential. Coupled with economic stagnation and the deterioration of the political superstructure, this produced a unified force which was able to act in

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45 Government Statement p. 3
concert to remove the president and the party, and assume the reins of government. In Nigeria, on the other hand, only certain parts of the military had been alienated. The dominance of family and regional ties on the individual officer can be seen to have resulted in a close correlation between the degree of alienation of the individual officer and his ethnic or regional status. This correlation may be lessened by other influences such as service in colonial forces, age, or professionalism. In General Ironsi's case, influences such as these may have reduced his support for the officers engaged in the original disturbances. Thus the officers from the eastern region, or of eastern tribal background, would be alienated by the attitudes of northerners towards eastern people living in the north, and by attitudes of northern leaders toward the eastern region. Under these conditions, highly alienated eastern officers would be the first to take action. The identification of fourteen of the leaders of the January 15th mutiny as "members of a certain ethnic group", identifiably Ibo, bears out this suggestion. The actions of this group against mainly northern, or northern-supported,

46 Government Statement p.3.

47 Gutteridge, Military in African Politics, p.75
leaders reflects the direction of this alienation. Officers of other ethnic or regional backgrounds, who would not have been as alienated, supported their leaders, choosing to remain within the bounds of military discipline.

The results of the coup differed only slightly in the two countries. In Ghana, the immediate aim of the coup had been the elimination of Nkrumah and the C.P.P. Thus the police and the special branch of the Criminal Investigation Division rounded up all those who had been connected with political leadership. These included all members of the legislature, all senior Flagstaff House officials, and all C.P.P. branch officials. This effectively removed all politicians from consideration as members of the military government.

In Nigeria, although Parliament was suspended, few politicians were arrested, although some were put into protective custody, and then released within a few days. It may have been regarded as unnecessary to arrest the politicians, since except for Dr. Michael Okpara, Premier of the eastern region, all well-known or highly influential politicians had been killed in the coup.

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48 Africa Confidential #5&6, March 4 and March 18, 1966.

49 Also excepted were Chief O. Awolowo, Chief A. Enharo and other prominent A.G. leaders in prison.
In the Nigerian case, neither the events of the coup nor the patterns of alienation led to the elimination of the ability of politicians to participate in government. However, the leaders of the Ironsi government did not accept politicians into the government, ordering all politicians to their homes pending the investigation of charges of corruption.

Although the events of the coups differed, the subsequent military governments were very similar. In each case, the constitution of the country was suspended, and all power was assumed by the military. The military excluded all politicians from government, handed control of all levels of administration to the civil servants, and delegated to senior bureaucrats the responsibility of purging the ranks of the civil service, and of maintaining standards of competence within government. The relations between the military and the bureaucracy in the two countries were virtually identical. In Nigeria, this pattern contributed to the downfall of the Ironsi regime, while in Ghana, the same pattern contributed to the success of the military government.

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In Ghana, the military and the bureaucracy worked closely together to rebuild confidence in the state. Following the coup, and the removal of parallel structures of the C.P.P., the leading bureaucrats were given ministerial powers by the National Liberation Council (N.L.C.). With the expressed aim of eliminating inefficiency and corruption, the N.L.C. and the bureaucratic ministers initiated a reorganization of the structures of government. Under this reorganization, the number of ministries was reduced from 32 to 18, and the number of administrative districts from 168 to 47. Civil servants were appointed to regional and district administrative committees to replace politicians, and city and local councils were replaced by management committees composed of civil servants. Additionally, the Civil Service Commission was reconstituted to ensure job security and equitable treatment of civil servants, and to protect them from the vagaries of any future leadership.

Following the change in regimes in Ghana, the


54 Markovitz, "Ghana Without Nkrumah" p.13
scope of the civil servants' duties was greatly expanded. From purely administrative roles, senior bureaucrats were brought into the inner circle of policy-making, not only as advisors, but as final policy-makers. Although this would not appear to be the case if only the structure of the military government was assessed, the nature of the military leadership, and the nature of the concepts of government held by the military, set the psychological boundaries of the bureaucratic role. The original N.L.C. acted as a collegial head of government in Ghana. By this structure, the N.L.C. as a whole was responsible for the government. The Cabinet Secretariat set up was along the lines of a staff planning body that included expert advisors from the ministries. Thus the military recognized the bureaucrats as invaluable sources of advice and assistance. Since the military view of leadership was limited, they were more willing than their political predecessors had been to delegate responsibility. Bureaucrats, as experts in their fields, were delegated complete responsibility for their decisions. Within the broad scope of efficiency and rationality laid down by the N.L.C., and in

55 Africa Confidential #6 March 18,1966

fulfillment of the primary goals of economic recovery and moderate socio-economic reform, the bureaucrats both formulated and executed policy.

In the field of primary concern, economic re-growth, the Economic Council, led by Mr. N. Omaboe, the Government Statistician whose repeated warnings of impending economic disaster had been ignored by the previous regime, acted as a composite economic policy-maker for Ghana. This can be seen in the statements of March 1966, and in the subsequent budgets of the N.L.C., in which the guidelines outlined for the reconstruction of the economy stressed elimination of those items which Mr. Omaboe had been most critical during the Nkrumah regime: over-expenditure, prestige projects, the development plan and the state enterprises.

As noted, these quasi-ministers were given complete internal control of their own departments, a broadened scope which included both programme formulation and planning, as well as a co-ordinated implementation. In the re-organization of the ministries and the allocation of priorities, the civil service directed its own affairs. As previously noted, the Cabinet

57 The other members of the Council included Mr. A. Adamokoh, Governor of the Bank of Ghana, and Mr. R. S. Amagashie, Mr. Omaboe's deputy.

58 *Africa Report* (July 1966) p.36

59 *Africa Report* (November, 1966) p.18

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Secretariat was re-organized to consist of senior bureaucrats chosen for their professional ability. In the ministry of Foreign Affairs, the reduction of embassies from 60 to 13, and the removal of the politically oriented civil servants was carried out completely by the senior members of the ministry. Foreign relations, the prime responsibility of General Ankrah as head of the N.L.C., were developed and maintained entirely by a committee composed of four prominent civil servants. The scope of this ministry was considerably widened by the return of African Relations to the Ministry.

With the removal of political organizations, the bureaucracy was also given the role of maintaining contact between the people and the government. As mentioned, local and municipal councils were reconstituted to consist of civil servants. The replacement of politicians by these civil servants at all levels meant that the only line of communications or feedback from the people to the military existed in the civil service. This line was supplemented by the increasing criticism of the newspapers and the intelligentsia, whose members

60 West Africa Annual 1967 p.85
61 These had been handled during the Nkrumah regime by a special office in Flagstaff House. Since this was the prime concern of the Ministry, only European and international organizations had been left to the Ministry.
had returned to Ghana following the coup to assist in the work of reconstruction. This voice was mainly negative, however, and the civil service tended to be the voice of support for the military.

In Ghana, the bureaucracy and the military worked closely together. Possibly unconsciously, the N.L.C. acted to relieve the alienation felt by the bureaucracy during the previous regime. By broadening the scope of responsibility, the N.L.C. removed the prime reason for this alienation. Further, by its dependence on civil servants during this early period, the military government was able to utilize the expertise of this group for the satisfaction of the prime problems of the regime. These actions by the military predisposed the bureaucracy to aid in the maintenance of military rule.

In Nigeria, as in Ghana, the formation of the military government in January, 1966 resulted in the close co-operation of the military leadership and the bureaucracy. Following the removal of the politicians from government, bureaucrats were given the same powers given their Ghanaian counterparts. As in Ghana, the Supreme Military Council acted as a collegial head of

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government, and at the federal level, the senior bureaucrats were given the task of cleaning out political appointees within a reduced structure in order to put an end to "waste and extravagance in public expenditure." Public corporations in Nigeria were similar to those in Ghana since they were a source of political patronage to the parties. Furthermore, they were both expensive, and for the most part, inefficient. Within two weeks of the coup, these public corporations were reconstructed to remove political appointees, who were replaced by civil servants.

On February 1, 1966, Mr. F.C. Nwokedi, formerly Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, was appointed Commissioner on Special Duties "to study and report to the Supreme Military Council on the establishment of an administrative machinery for a United Nigeria, and on the unification of the public services and judicial services of the Federation." The appointment of a civil servant to investigate such an area of prime concern to the government shows the amount of trust and co-operation expected of the bureaucrats.

In the regions, a similar pattern of action
took place. In the western region, the executive council consisted of the Governor, the senior military commander, the police commissioner and six permanent secretaries from the regional public service, although other permanent secretaries could be co-opted. A number of committees and boards were purged of political appointees and restaffed with primarily senior civil servants, although some academics were included on specialized boards. In the mid-west, the executive council consisted of two military, one police and five senior civil servants. The number of boards and commissions was reduced from seven to five, and the number of ministries from twenty to eleven. Civil servants, by decree, were given full powers of control over the positions - boards or ministries - to which they were assigned. In eastern Nigeria, the changes were equally sweeping. The number of ministries was reduced from fifteen to twelve, the appointment of all board chairmen and members was revoked, and these were replaced by senior employees of these boards. In northern Nigeria, the pattern differed slightly, but it was noticeable that almost all of the appointed civil

servants were northerners, while many 'clean' politicians were also brought into government in a consultative capacity.

One noticeable difference between the treatment of civil servants in Ghana and Nigeria was the reliance of the Ghanaian leaders on the civil service as a whole. In Ghana, the civil service was given carte blanche to rationalize its own structure and maintain the professional standards expected of it. In Nigeria, on the other hand, this reliance was not as evident. In both the east and mid-west states, the military governors publicly denounced the lack of discipline in the public service. In the mid-west the governor went even further, locking the doors of all public offices at starting time, and arresting all those late for work. This type of treatment was reflected in the criticism received by the civil service in the press, which became so critical that General Ironsi was forced to call on the press to stop the attacks.

In Ghana, the pattern of co-operation between the military and the bureaucracy laid the groundwork for

71 News from Nigeria, June 1, 1966.
the alliance of these two groups and the solution of Ghana's problems. In Nigeria, however, this same pattern contributed to the downfall of the Ironsi regime, on July 29th, 1966. This can be attributed to two basic differences between Ghana and Nigeria: 1) the nature of support for the military government, and 2) the nature of the problems facing the military government.

In Ghana, the people were fairly unified in their support of the military government. Further, the people of Ghana were, for the most part, highly integrated. The bureaucracy would have been representative of the nature of the people, reflecting their unity. In Nigeria, on the other hand, support for the military government was of a less unified nature. Despite the one-Nigeria ethic of the military leaders, the identification of leadership was tribal rather than national, and the quality of support varied within regions. Because of the predominance of easterners in the top levels of the bureaucracy, this structure would magnify, rather than minimize the split in support along ethnic lines.

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73 See Africa Report and Africa Confidential during the period January 1966 to July 1966 regarding variation in support.
In Ghana, the nature of the bureaucratic-military alliance matched the nature of the problems and the methods of solving the problems facing the N.L.C. during this period. The problems, as previously noted, were primarily economic, requiring direct government action which, because of the goals involved, could be carried out on an administrative basis. Because there were no manifestations of opposition, the military would regard this alliance as successful.

In Nigeria, the initial problems of waste and corruption were successfully attacked by the military-bureaucratic alliance. However, in attacking the main problem, the nature of the Nigerian state, this alliance failed. The measure of success in this area can only be assessed on the basis of the amount of opposition to the policies resulting from the alliance. By its very nature, the military-bureaucratic alliance worked on the basis of consultation among members leading to the policy decision, with the expectation of automatic support from those affected by the policy. Decree 34 (1966) of May 24, 1966 established a unitary state as a transition to a new constitution. An executive decree formed by the consultation of the professional public servants, this administrative instrument, and the nature of the decision-makers, did not match the political nature of the problem. The close relations of eastern military
and eastern bureaucrats meant that this decree appeared to other Nigerians as the extension of the rumoured Ibo domination. This resulted in attitudes of fear and resentment in the minds of the other Nigerians, and led to the riots of May and June, 1966. In addition, the failure of the military government to revoke the decree in the face of this opposition reflects the nature of the alliance between the military and the civil servants. In effect, the nature of the alliance did not allow for the conciliation of the demands for change. In this situation, there would appear no alternative to the non-easterners except mutiny and counter-coup. Thus the nature of the alliance, the support for the Ironsi government, and the problems faced by the Ironsi government were contributory factors to the northern-led counter-coup and the changes in the pattern of relationships which subsequently developed.

74 While it is recognized that the Supreme Council of the Federal Military Government was formed on a cross-tribal base, this rests on the assumption that it would be assumed by northerners that General Ironsi would be more affected by the eastern officers. This would be identified with the rumoured Ibo domination.

75 Government Statement p.3. also Daily Times (Lagos)
June 2, 1966
CHAPTER IV

BUREAUCRATIC-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING
THE PERIOD OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

To this point, I have suggested the common patterns in Ghana and Nigeria which set the stage for the close working relationship between the bureaucrat and military officer. This chapter will discuss the differences in the patterns of relationship which followed the initial period of military rule, and will assess the qualitative differences between the Ghanaian and Nigerian experience.

In Ghana, following the initial period of experimentation and dislocation, the military and the bureaucracy worked closely together to solve the underlying problems of the country. Fortunately, these problems had been relatively few. The primary problems were those of an economic nature, and posed the greatest challenge to the N.L.C.. At the time of the coup, the economic problems consisted of inflation, unemployment, over-expenditure and mismanagement in the public sector, and were of such magnitude that the Ghanaian economy was on the verge of bankruptcy in the international economic system. These problems were all closely inter-related, and policy aimed at the solution to each part of the over-all problem of economics had to be co-ordinated.
One of the major problems, having both internal and external consequences, was inflation, which had been a problem in Ghana since 1960. The cost of living in Accra, for example, had risen from an index of 100 in 1960 to 136 in 1963, 153 in 1964, 196 in 1965 and 205 in January 1966. During the same period, the inflationary pressures in the economy had reduced the purchasing power of the cedi (₵) so that local produce sold in Accra had almost doubled in price between 1964 and 1966 (119 - 226). Compounding this, wages had stayed constant in the public sector, with the last pay raise in that sector occurring in 1960.

The second aspect of the economic difficulties facing the N.L.C. was unemployment and underemployment. Although unemployment figures for Ghana are highly questionable prior to 1966, the N.L.C. estimated that at the time of the coup, 12% of the labour force was unemployed. This situation would intensify if not solved fairly rapidly. The rate of movement from rural to urban centres was fairly high, and the numbers entering the work force from school were greater than the increase in jobs in the stagnant economy. This created a social problem, and a potential political problem, since it was

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76 This section abstracted from the Quarterly Review of Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Liberia (Economist Intelligence Service) 1967 - 1968 and Africa Report vol. 8, 1966.
the unemployed and poorly educated from which Mkrumah had drawn the bulk of the C.P.P. support.  

A supplementary problem was that of under-employment, uneconomical employment, or disguised unemployment. The number included under this heading varies, but did include most employees of state enterprises, the members of the worker's brigade, and those for whom positions had been made in the public service.

The third and fourth aspects of the economic problems facing the N.L.C. are closely connected. At the time of the coup, Ghana's national debt had reached 860.1 million cedis. Of this 395.3 million £ or £ 280 million, was in external debt. The long-term debt amounted to £ 125 million, while the medium-term debt amounted to £ 155 million, the bulk of which was due by 1971. The cause of this debt had been massive deficits in the budgets of the last five years. With the numerous prestige projects, and the high import rate, this external debt had risen from 38.4 million £ in 1963. In the same period, as can be seen in the table below, the high levels of deficits in the budgets, added still more to the problem.

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77 Bretton, Rise and Fall, pp. 43, 44.
78 Ghana Today vol. 11 #4 April 19, 1967, p. 5.

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The N.L.C. was also confronted by the fact that choices of policy instruments to combat the economic problems were severely restricted. To reduce the deficit would require either raising revenues, or lowering expenditures, or a mixture of the two. Increasing revenues would necessitate either higher taxes or higher revenues from the foreign sector. However, in 1965 Ghana enjoyed the highest tax rate in West Africa, so that raising taxes was effectively removed as a policy weapon. Higher revenues, on the other hand, were dependent on factors outside the control of the N.L.C.. Ghana, an agricultural exporter, was a price taker, unable to set its own price for exports. Thus the revenues from this export market were uncertain. There was a third option, however. This was the external financing of the debt, but this also was, at the time of the coup...
barred from the policy arsenal. The size of the external debt left by Nkrumah, and the depressed state of the economy, had resulted in an international lack of confidence in Ghana's ability to pay its debts. However, since this last measure was the only one both certain and acceptable, the primary concern of the N.L.C. became the rebuilding of international confidence through the efficient management of the domestic economy.

The second general problem faced by the N.L.C. was that of political reconstruction and purification. The coup had been aimed at the corrupt personal party machine of Nkrumah, the C.P.P. Thus the second aim of the military government was to restructure the political environment of Ghana to preclude the possibility of such a machine once again taking control of the country. To accomplish this, the N.L.C. viewed the major goals as the construction of a constitution which would balance the powers of the three sectors of government, and the removal from the political arena of the influence of the C.P.P. Therefore, the aims were the moderate economic reform, and the building of the infrastructure of a democracy which had been lost.

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The prospect of the attainment of these aims meant the return to civilian rule. The N.L.C. had committed itself to this return both at the time of the coup, and at various times during the period of consolidation of rule. In effect, the N.L.C. had three goals: rehabilitation of the economy; purification of the political system; and, return of power to civilian hands. To assess the bureaucratic-military relations in Ghana, it is necessary to investigate not only the degree of success of the N.L.C. in meeting their goals, but more importantly, how and why the N.L.C. was able to maintain the alliance with the bureaucracy.

The solution to the first set of problems, the economic, was undertaken under the direction of the Economic Committee of the N.L.C. As outlined by General Ankrah, the reconstruction of Ghana's economy would take place in three steps:

1) 'emergency' action to avoid international bankruptcy and re-establish Ghana's credit;
2) 'consolidation' to rid the economy of its internal problems; and
3) 'preparation for development', laying the firm groundwork for expansion and growth.

The emergency period would cover the period between the

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82 Speech on Ghana Radio, March 15, 1966, as reported in Daily Times (Lagos) March 17, 1966.
COUD and the introduction of the N.I.C.'s first budget (July 1, 1966). During this period, the economic committee and the N.I.C. were to take measures to drastically reduce imports and other drains on foreign reserves. The consolidation period was to include the first full year of military rule. In fact, this period lasted until August 1967, and was to include a reorganization of the public sector to place this sector on a firm basis. The private sector was to be induced to expand and diversify, laying a ground work for the lessening of Ghana's dependence on one crop. The third period had no time limit, and included the organization and coordination of all economic enterprises. The successful initiation of this step was to be the determinant of the return to civilian rule.

Both internal and international measures had to be taken in order to re-establish international confidence in the Ghanaian economy. The primary step required was the drastic reduction and eventual elimination of the deficit in the budget. The N.I.C., because of the economic conditions previously noted, had no choice but to restrict government expenditures to the minimum.

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84 *Supra*, p. 42.
possible. This policy was initiated during the "emergency" period, and continued throughout the rule of the N.L.C.

As shown in Table III, the expenditures in 1966 were sharply reduced from the 1965 level (Table II), and the rate of increase of expenditures was also reduced.

TABLE III
REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES IN MILLIONS OF CEDIS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>230.9</td>
<td>241.5</td>
<td>340.4</td>
<td>375.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures</td>
<td>268.4</td>
<td>301.1</td>
<td>303.8</td>
<td>302.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>-37.5</td>
<td>-59.6</td>
<td>+36.8</td>
<td>+73.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The measures taken to achieve this reduction included the re-organization of the government. As noted in the previous chapter, the number of ministries was reduced from 32 to 18, and the size of these remaining ministries reduced. As shown in Table IV, every area of government was affected in both current and Capital expenditures.

Unfortunately, these figures may be somewhat misleading on the reduction in the rate of increase due to devaluation of the cedi and the introduction of the New Cedi.

TABLE IV

EXPENDITURE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 1965-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cur- Cap-</td>
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<td>rent ital</td>
<td>rent ital</td>
<td>rent ital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration, Justice and Police</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Social Services</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and non-mineral resources</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel and Power</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and Construction</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, Storage and Communications</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>263.7</td>
<td>170.2</td>
<td>203.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These reductions in expenditure resulted from the closing down of state enterprises of a non-viable nature, the slowing down of other projects, and the re-organization of inefficient state enterprises.

In order to reduce the drain on the reserves of foreign currency, import licences were restricted to only those having clear need, such as manufacturers needing raw materials or enterprises needing new equipment. Furthermore, tight controls were placed on domestic credit in an attempt to reduce purchases of im-

87 Statistics abstracted from Quarterly Review, 1966-68

88 These latter projects included the harbour at Tema, the Volta River Power Project and a number of roads.
ported non-essentials. These measures resulted in a significant reduction in the deficit of trade in 1966 and 1967, and a surplus on the export-import balance in 1968. It should be noted that these measures were combined with changes in both type and value of the currency, with the cedi ($\text{\textdollar}$) being replaced by the New Cedi (NC) in February, 1967. In July, 1967, the New Cedi was devalued in an attempt to encourage exports and reduce imports.

The major problem in the foreign sector, however, was the outstanding debt. As noted in Table II above, the total external debt had reached $378.4$ million Cedi, or £280 million. Of prime concern was the medium term debt, amounting to £155 million, which was due within five years. Because of the measures outlined above, and the assistance of the International Monetary Fund, the N.L.C. was able to cover most current and arrears payments on short term debt. This helped re-establish international confidence in Ghana, enabling the N.L.C. and the countries to whom the medium term debt was owed to arrange an agreement satisfactory to both parties. Under this agreement, a two-year moratorium was granted, allowing the N.L.C. to use the funds which otherwise

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Export-Import balance: in million $\text{\textdollar}$ or NC,

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>-13.3</td>
<td>-93.2</td>
<td>-59.2</td>
<td>-19.9</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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uld have been used for debt payment in the rebuilding of the economy and the clearance of outstanding short-term debts. Also, the medium-term debts were rescheduled, extending the time required to repay the debts.

The reduction in government expenditures, while primarily aimed at reducing the budgetary deficit, had both beneficial and detrimental side-effects. The second facet of the economic problem facing the N.L.C. had been massive inflation. The dominant causes of this inflation had been the method of financing the budgetary deficit and the expenditures on prestige projects. As is noted in Table II, the internal debt had risen faster than the external debt. With the decline in international confidence, the Nkrumah government had been forced to finance this deficit internally. Loanable funds had been scarce, and the independant businessman who was able to borrow was forced to raise prices in order to cover the cost of the borrowing. In addition to this reason, the direction of government expenditures contributed to the inflationary spiral. As is apparent in Table IV, capital expenditures were high. These capital expenditures had been for non-economic prestige projects, such as Job 400 (the O.A.U. Council Hall in Accra), the Ghanaian airline, and the shipline. These expenditures poured money into the Ghanaian economy
forcing prices higher. As these expenditures were reduced, the pressure on prices was reduced, and the price level started to fall. By 1967, this price level had fallen to 190 from 205 in 1966.

These reductions had detrimental effects. The other facet of the economic problem had been the high unemployment rate. In 1966, the N.L.C. estimated that there were over 100,000 seeking employment. These figures did not include those in the Worker's Brigade, or those underemployed in state enterprises. As the prestige projects were stopped or completed, the workers on the projects were added to the ranks of the unemployed. As operating costs were reduced on other enterprises, more people who had received their jobs as patronage, and who were surplus or redundant, were also fired, adding still further to the problem.

A second detrimental effect of austerity was the loss of business confidence. As import licences were restricted, a number of firms closed down because of the shortage on imported goods. Further, other businesses closed down because of the lack of either patronage or legitimate government contracts. These

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90 Ghana Today April 19, 1967 p.5.

91 As noted in West Africa and the Economist during this period.
business closings meant a reduction in work opportunity, further adding to the unemployment problem. Neither the effects nor the problem were attacked directly, but it was hoped that the general improvement of the economy would solve them. By 1968, the reopening of many state enterprises as co-operative government-private enterprise firms absorbed some of the unemployed, and induced other private firms to open or expand.

In the solution of the second set of problems, the political, the N.L.C. originally set its goals as the elimination of the C.P.P. and the return to civilian rule by 1968. The first policy was to bar the office holders of the C.P.P. from holding power in any subsequent civilian government in Ghana; the second aimed at ensuring that the people of Ghana could not be subjected to the control of a single party again. To attain these goals, the N.L.C. used the organization of government to direct the political future of Ghana.

The collapse of the personal party machinery of the C.P.P. did not mean the removal of the C.P.P. from Ghana. Since C.P.P. membership had been fairly widespread, a purge of all members of the proscribed party would have been neither moral nor equitable, since some people, in order to gain promotion or a position, or to operate a business profitably, had been forced to

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92 Radio Ghana Broadcast by General Ankrah March 3, 1966

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become members of the party. Investigations were held to verify the individual members' political purity, but the main drive was against those who had held an office in the party.

Those members of the C.P.P. who had engaged in corrupt practices were regarded in two categories. The first, those who had received gifts from the President or some other highly placed official, were ordered to return the gifts to the state. These included such things as automobiles, houses and land. The second category included the gift givers. These were, if still in Ghana, arrested and tried for corruption. As well, all those who had held a seat in the National Assembly as a C.P.P. member or had supported the C.P.P. in the Assembly were barred from holding political office in Ghana for a period of ten years dating from the return to civilian rule. These included even those C.P.P. politicians who had disagreed with Nkrumah and left Ghana before 1966, such as K.A. Gbedemah. By this ban, the N.L.C. ensured that there would be no resurgence of the C.P.P. in Ghana.

93 See Bretton, *The Rise and Fall* notably those chapters on the C.P.P.

94 These included all members of parliament, party district leaders, region leaders, or members of the C.P.P. governing bodies, also teachers at the ideological institute.
Although the original commitment to return to civilian rule had been taken by many to be the standard speech of military rulers, the transfer to civilian rule on September 1, 1969 meant the fulfillment of the commitment made by General Kotoka the day of the coup. The return to civilian rule followed a period of revitalization of politics in Ghana.

With the end of the emergency period of economic stabilization, the formation of a constitutional commission, headed by Chief Justice Akofo-Addo, was announced on September 1, 1966, and held its first meeting on November 4, 1966. While this may have appeared as if it were only to placate critics, the commission held public hearings throughout Ghana, and worked closely with the political committee of the N.L.C. After fifteen months of work, the commission submitted a draft constitution to the N.L.C. on January 26, 1968, which was published January 29, 1968. At the same time the constitution was published, a 140 man constitutional assembly was authorized. Its purpose was to study the draft, and to submit a final draft for electoral approval.

95 Such as in D. Austin, "Saviour with a Sword"
New Society March 10, 1966 p. 22

96 The political committee consisted of former members of opposition parties, chaired by Dr. K.A. Busia. This committee was appointed July 1, 1966 to assist the N.L.C. on political matters. However, it was powerless.
Since this assembly was to be elected, an electoral commissioner was appointed. Following the appointment, a firm schedule for return to civilian rule was announced over Radio Ghana May 22, 1968. By this schedule, the electoral commissioner was to conduct the registration of voters beginning September 1, 1968; elections to the constituent assembly on a non-partisan basis were to be held in May, 1969, the ban on politics lifted in June, 1969 and the new constitution to be completed by August 1, 1969, with elections for the civilian government to be completed no later than September 30, 1969. The elections were held August 29, 1969, and the military stepped down on September 1, 1969.

While these events were taking place, other hints of the strength of the commitment to return to civil rule were evident. On June 30, 1967, the structure of the N.L.C. was changed to include a national executive council (N.E.C.) and a national advisory council (N.A.C.). The N.E.C. consisted of the top three men in the N.L.C. and thirteen civilian (bureaucrats) commissioners with ministerial responsibility, charged with the direction and control of government, a field previously held by the N.L.C. alone. The N.A.C. consisted of this group plus fifteen appointees chosen to represent the various groups in the society, including chiefs and women.
On October 23, 1967, following a series of strikes, General Afrifa stated over Radio Ghana that the N.L.C. would continue to rule only if it received a mandate at the polls. During July, August and September, a public opinion poll, said to be the first held in a country under military rule, was conducted by an independent polling agency. Its findings were published on December 2, 1967, expressing the general opinion that the N.L.C. should return power to civilians by 1970. On December 9, Generals Ankrah and Afrifa publicly supported this opinion, and restated the commitment of the N.L.C.

The N.L.C. was able to meet its goals and commitments. The return to civilian rule meant that the N.L.C. considered that the political structure envisioned in the new constitution was viable, and the economy was well on its way to steady growth.

The final area to be investigated is the reasons why the N.L.C. was able to meet their commitments. As noted by Feit, Gutteridge and others, the military in

98 Africa Report March 1968 p. 33
99 Africa Report March 1968 p. 33
100 E. Feit, "Military Coups in Ghana and Nigeria"
Ghana was able to gain the support of groups such as the bureaucracy, the middle class and the intelligentsia, groups which had been excluded from positions of power in the Nkrumah regime. Furthermore, the N.L.C. was able to retain this support by acting in co-operation with these groups, especially the bureaucracy. Second, the N.L.C. took over a citizenry which had been highly politicized, and which was highly unified, exhibiting few divisive characteristics such as inter-tribal conflict or regional identification. Third, there were few requirements for actions of a highly political nature, that is, that required compromise. The primary problems which the N.L.C. had to face had been economic; this meant that economic or administrative methods could be used to solve the problems, and political side-effects could be ignored. The second problem, the C.P.P., was also handled on an administrative basis, with the judiciary being the means of ensuring support for the actions taken. All other matters were handled on an administrative basis, with the priorities of the goals being the determinant of the methods. Finally, the N.L.C. was able to utilize the common distrust of pol-

100(cont.)

101
Austin, "Saviour with a Sword" p.22
iticians to maintain its rule until such time as the mechanism for the return to civilian rule had been developed. In Ghana, the bureaucratic-military alliance was maintained by the two way support of the military utilizing the expertise of the bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy proving its worthiness to the military by the successful handling of the problems facing the government.

In sum, it appears that the N.L.C. was able to attain the goals it had set for itself because of the nature of the goals, and the means used to attain them. Each of the goals was basically operational, and in the Ghanaian context, non-controversial. The methods employed were basically administrative, and allowed the bureaucracy to be fully employed in all facets of problem-solving. It was not necessary for the N.L.C. either to use existing political groups or to establish new political groups to extend and maintain its regime, since the civil service was able to perform this function. Finally, it may be that the military rulers, since they were planning on a return to civilian rule, may have wished to keep the politicians who would take over free from the stigma caused by the unpopularity of the austerity moves, keeping them in the background.
In Nigeria, the patterns which were similar to
the Ghanaian experience during the first six months
of military rule did not lead to similar patterns of
relations in the maintenance of the military regime.
The assessment of the Nigerian situation can be accom­
plished by comparing Nigeria's basic problems, commit­
ments and support patterns to the Ghanaian experience.
In this way, the reasons for the changes in the patterns
of military government can be examined in the context
of the commitments made.

The basic Nigerian problem, unlike Ghana's,
stemmed from the basic structure of the state. This
structure had allowed little room for maneuvering at
the federal level due to the predominance of power in
the regions, and the disparities involved. This meant
that the northern region would be in a dominant posi­
tion in the federal government, being the largest re­
gion. Contributing to this dominance was the population
factor. The population of the northern region was
nearly equal, or more than, the population of the rest
of Nigeria. This meant that the dominant party in the

102
By maneuvering is meant the possibility of
shifting alliances between groups to gain control of the
government.

103
On regionalism, see O. Awolowo, Thoughts on the
pp. 23-26. Also A. Carol, "The Making of Nigeria's Political
north would be the dominant party in the Federation. The second contributor factor was the problem of ethnicity or tribalism. Because of this factor, the lack of maneuvering room received much more sinister overtones, with the northern dominance being regarded as a Hausa-Fulani dominance, and giving any move to reduce this dominance implications of an inter-tribal conflict. The third contributory factor was the lack of a national identity, which removed the framework within which these other problems could be worked out. This lack of national identity meant that anyone who attacked the state because of its shortcomings would be in turn attacked on the basis of his regional background, not his motives.

As can be seen, each of these problems was closely related to the others, and each was more complex in nature than Ghana's had been. This is not to say that Nigeria did not have any other problems. Like Ghana, corruption and the waste of funds for prestige


projects were also problems in Nigeria. Unlike Ghana, the overall economic situation was bright, although regional disparities did exist. These economic problems, however, were minor compared to the more basic problems of restructuring Nigeria on a more viable basis.

From the discussion of the complexities involved, the reasons for the failure of General Ironsi's Decree 34 (1966) can be appreciated. As previously mentioned, this decree unified the structure of Nigeria. This unitary concept had been central to the Ironsi regime's concept of Nigeria. However, the attempt to implement this by an executive instrument formulated in conference with senior bureaucrats and military leaders led to political unrest and threats of secession in the north and west. In effect, the attempt to build a new structure without first changing the political base of the country, and solving some of the above mentioned problems, allowed politicians in the north to play on the fears and tribal distrust of the people, leading to riots, massacres and the second coup.

The same problems existed for the Gowon govern-

106

ment, with the problems of regionalism, tribalism and
the lack of a national identity magnified by the events
of the Ironsi regime. However, these problems were
approached in quite a different fashion from that which
General Ironsi had favoured. To solve the overall pro-
blem of maintaining the viability of the Nigerian state,
the first problem to be approached was that of the
structure of the post-military government. To this end,
Chiefs Awolowo and Enaharo, and fifteen other prominent
political figures were released from detention on August
2, 1966 and August 4, 1966. Many of these were taken
into the government's advisory councils. On September
12, 1966, these political figures, and others from the
regions, joined in a conference on the country's future
constitution. The purpose of this conference, which met
in Lagos, was the fashioning of a political structure
for Nigeria which would take into account the factors
mentioned above, and could be of any form, except the
unitary. Also excluded were the options of continuing
the military government, and the complete break-up of
the country. In October, 1966, this conference pro-
duced an interim report which favoured a federal system,
but made no recommendations as to either the number of
states or the division of powers in the federation.

107
*New York Times* 13 September, 1966

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These were left to negotiation between the regions and the military government. While this conference was in session, however, relations between the central government and the government of eastern region had deteriorated. The governor of the region refused to allow the delegates from the region to return to Lagos after the recess ended in October. Because of this boycott, the conference was adjourned indefinitely on November 16, 1966.

On November 20, 1966, General Gowon stated that Nigeria would remain a federation of between eight and fourteen states. Relations between the east and the central government continued to deteriorate, with many statements that the central government was again trying to force a new form for Nigeria on the regions. The estrangement continued, culminating on May 30, 1967, with the secession of the eastern region. On the same day, General Gowon issued the twelve state decree, which may have been either causal or resultant of the secession. This is based on the supposition that there would have been consultation between Gowon and the regional governors on the content of the decree.

In form, the twelve state decree, like General

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108 On Record, "Nigeria: Tribalism against Unity". p. 75
Ironsi's Decree 34(1966), was an executive instrument. However, in content and method of formulation, these decrees varied greatly. The decision to create the twelve state system was made after public consultation with representatives of the four main regions of Nigeria. These representatives were mainly 'clean' politicians who were respected by the members of the region they represented. Furthermore, the system took into account the realities of the Nigerian political system, and attempted to correct the structural defects of the old constitution. By this decree, the minority tribes in the various regions were implicitly given their own states. In the eastern region, the minority tribes in the Calabar, Ogaja and Port Harcourt provinces were given their own states of Rivers and South-Eastern, removing the minor tribes from the domination of the Ibo, a move requested prior to 1958. The Yoruba in the north were given the West-Central state, while other minor tribes were given the Bene Plateau and Kano states. The moslem tribes were thus split among the North-Western, North-Central and North-Eastern states.


110 Cf. Awolowo, Thoughts 'Map' Nigeria: Proposed States.
With the break-up of the north and east, the problem of tribal domination of the Federation was reduced. The strength of the tribally-based parties rested on the control that they had over large areas of the Federation. With the reduction of the area of the states, this power base was reduced. It also resulted in the probability that the previous opposition parties such as the N.E.P.U. and the United Middle Belt Congress would control some of the new states in the north, and small parties in the east would control the new eastern states. With this structure, it appears that the problem of flexibility or maneuvering at the federal level was reduced. In addition, the problem of the lack of national identity may have been reduced as well. While identity had previously been regional because of the power of the regions, the new structure may lead to a centralization of power in the federal government, and a change in identity from regional to national.

The primary focus here, however, is the nature of the decision-maker and his advisors. As noted above, the 'clean' politicians played a large role in the formation of the new structure for Nigeria. The influence of Chief Awolowo is especially significant, if his proposals and the new structure's actual boundaries are considered.

111 C. Legum "New Hope for Nigeria" p.132

112 Awolowo, Thoughts as compared to Africa Report October, 1967, pp53-55.
It can be assumed that, in this case at least, the influence of the bureaucrat was less that that of the politician.

By the end of 1968, nine of the new state governments were functioning. This expansion created problems for the military government, since the expansion from old to new states necessitated the transfer of bureaucrats at a time when competent senior bureaucrats were in short supply. This shortage was due to the exodus of senior Ibo bureaucrats during the early months of 1967, with the majority of these senior bureaucrats returning to the eastern region. These bureaucrats' positions had not been filled, due to the policy of holding positions open for them. With this shortage, and the demand for civil servants, the drive against corruption had to be halted. The problem of inefficient state enterprises had been removed by General Ironsi's policy of replacing the commissioners with civil servants, as noted in Chapter two.

In Nigeria, the commitment was also made to return the country to civilian rule as soon as the problems had been solved. This commitment was made both by General Ironsi and General Gowon. The attaining of

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113 Murray, "Nigeria After Biafra" p.139.
success of this commitment depended upon both the success of the military government in attaining its goals, and the strength of the desire to return rule to the civilians. Both of these factors can be assessed on the basis of the military government's inclusion of civilians in the military government. As mentioned above, politicians were brought into the central government at an advisory level on the nature of the constitution. Since this was the basic problem concerning the military government, it can be assumed that this meant that the military planned for more major roles for the politicians. This is supported by the inclusion of civilians in the government at the policy level during the civil war. As well, the twelve state structure appeared to solve the basic problems of Nigeria, and the cessation of the civil war in January, 1970, completed the drive to maintain the integrity of Nigeria. It can be projected that once the problems of rehabilitating the war zone are solved, the oft stated commitment to return to civilian rule will be carried out.

In both Ghana and Nigeria, the initial pattern of bureaucratic-military relations was one of close co-

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For example, the War Cabinet of August 26, 1967 included four civilians: Awolowo, Enahoro, Elias and Arikpo. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* 1967 p. 21994a
eration between the bureaucracy and the military at all times during the initial period of consolidation. During the subsequent period, however, the patterns varied. In Ghana, the pattern remained one of close bureaucratic-military co-operation. The N.L.C. and the bureaucracy held dominant positions in the councils of government, including the economic and executive councils, those of primary concern. In Nigeria, on the other hand, the subsequent period showed few civil servants in prominent positions. In the Federal Executive Council, of the fifteen members, only three belonged to the security forces. The remainder of the Council was composed of two chiefs (both Action Group leaders), and ten other civilians. Of these ten, only one can tentatively be classed a bureaucrat, Dr. J.E. Adetoro, Commissioner for Health. Of the remainder, Dr. T.O. Elias had been Attorney-General for the Federation for many years, and was considered a clean politician. Dr. O. Arikpo was a well known figure in Nigeria. Of the

116 The political committee was disbanded on June 30, 1967 in favour of an independent body formed to educate the people in democracy.

117 West Africa Annual 1968 and Africa Report 1967
remainder, two are definitely ex-politicians, while the other five are well-known figures, probably 'clean' ex-politicians from minority parties of other regions. Each of the commissioners was in full charge of the ministry or ministries to which they were appointed, with the permanent secretary of the ministry subject to the political commissioner.

In the regions, the same held true. Prior to July, 1968, the regional councils of government contained mainly politicians. In keeping with the pattern of the central government, these were mainly members of the minor or opposition parties responsible for the ministries. In addition, the political advisor of the governor of the region was the man who had been political governor of the region prior to the coup. The position of the politicians in the regional government was probably exemplified in the extreme in the western region, where the politicians were dominant. In this region, the decrees of the military governor had to be supported by the political commissioners, and Chief Awolowo, to be obeyed. Most of this influence was wielded by the Action Group leader in the region, Adegbenro, and his

118 A.A. Kano(N.E.P.U.) and J.S. Tarka(U.M.B.C.)

119 This assumption is based on the familiar way in which they are referred to in Nigerian sources, implying that they were well-known in the south.
deputies, Onabanjo and Ige. Other politicians in the government included the leader of the N.C.N.C. in the west and his deputy leader, and one independent. In the north, civilian commissioners consisted of both 'clean' politicians and the more reputable and liberal emirs and chiefs.

After the new state governments became functioning governments, it can only be assumed that the same situation would occur. With the expansion from three to eleven governments, the problems of setting up the new administrations virtually preclude civil servants from being used to politically control the new states. The civil servants would be faced with the problems of transferring power from the old governments and would be needed to direct the activities of their new departments. Since this would be an area of prime concern to the military rulers, it can be assumed that the demand would be for politicians to act as organizers of support rather than civil servants.

In summation, it appears that the pattern of military-bureaucratic relations in Nigeria did vary greatly

120
Africa Confidential May12, 1966

121
Not included are the old eastern regional government or the new east-central state government, since this state was, until Jan.13, 1970, the 'Biafran' stronghold.
from the Ghanaian pattern. The problems of Nigeria seem to have resulted in reputable politicians being brought into alliance with the military rulers for the purpose of solving the basically political problems of Nigeria. It appears, therefore, that in the development of this varied pattern of relationships in Nigeria, the problems which faced the military governments during the period following the coup of July, 1966, influenced the attitudes of the military, which led to the inclusion of the politicians in policy-making positions, and the relegating of bureaucrats to lesser roles.

**TABLE V**

Regional, Ethnic or Political Identification of Nigerians Noted in this Paper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akintola, S. A.</td>
<td>Premier</td>
<td>West N.N.D.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awolowo, O.</td>
<td>Leader A.G.</td>
<td>West A.G. Yoruba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balewa, Sir A. T.</td>
<td>Prime Minister, Federal</td>
<td>North N.P.C. H.F*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo, Sir A.</td>
<td>Premier</td>
<td>North N.P.C. H.F*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enharo, A.</td>
<td>Deputy Leader, A.G.</td>
<td>Mid-West A.G. Yoruba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gowon, General Y.</td>
<td>Head of Federal Military</td>
<td>North Middle Belt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government July, 1966-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ironsi, General A.</td>
<td>Head of Federal Military</td>
<td>East Ibo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government Jan, 1966-July, 1966</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* H.F. - Hausa-Fulani group.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Since Ghana and Nigeria have in common a similar experience with British colonialism, and the bureaucracy and the military in the two countries were subjected to similar standards of professionalism, it could be expected that the two countries would experience similar pattern of relationships in military governments. Nevertheless, after the civilian regimes were overthrown in the two countries in 1966, significantly different patterns of relationships among the political, bureaucratic and military leadership groups developed during the subsequent periods of military government. In each case, the coup resulted in the removal of civilian politicians from power, and the creation of an alliance between the military and the bureaucracy. In Ghana, this bureaucratic-military alliance was maintained during the entire period of military government. In Nigeria, on the other hand, this alliance contributed to the downfall of the Ironsi regime, and to the establishment of the subsequent alliance of the military and
political leadership groups.

The crucial difference between the military-bureaucratic patterns in the two countries appears to be based on the attitudes which the military held toward politicians. These attitudes seem to be the result of three dominant factors:

1) the pattern of alienation in the two countries;
2) the patterns of the actual coup d'état and the events of the immediate post-coup period;
3) the problems facing the military governments.

In Ghana, the patterns of relationships which resulted from the factors listed was one of close bureaucratic-military co-operation throughout the period of military rule. The pattern of alienation prior to the coup had been one in which the professional public servants had been similarly estranged by the political structure. The political structure was the C.P.P.; the direction of the coup meant the removal of the C.P.P., since there were no other political parties in Ghana at the time of the coup. The aims of the military government had been the rehabilitation of the economy and the restructuring of politics, with a view towards the return to civilian rule. That is, the military government may have viewed itself as only transitional, performing a necessary technical role to right previous imbalances. It would probably not have viewed politic-
ians as being suited to this short term role, allocating to them the more long term political educational role, preparatory to the politicians once more taking control. In addition, the country had already experienced the manner in which an independence party held on to the reins of government. The military may have been guarding against a similar occurrence after the turnover of power to the politicians. However, the bureaucracy were considered to have a proper role in the government, and were allotted a definite legitimate place, handling all governmental functions not performed by the N.L.C.

In the initial period of government, the bureaucracy played a highly successful role in the solution of the emergency problems facing the military government. Also, the bureaucrats were best suited to assist the N.L.C. in solving the long-term problems. The primary goals of the N.L.C. were to solve the economic problems previously described. The N.L.C. expected the bureaucracy, as specialists in the area of economics, to perform the duties of an advisory body. The nature of the economic problems meant that no politically explosive issues would have to be faced, and the politicians who returned to Ghana following the coup could be left in peripheral roles, leaving the dominant positions to the military and the bureaucracy.
In Nigeria, the interaction of these three factors resulted in a different pattern of bureaucratic-military relations. During the pre-coup period, alienation in Nigeria had been selective, and had varied in intensity within groups in the military and the bureaucracy. The military and bureaucratic members from the eastern region were the most alienated. Since the coup or mutiny resulted in eastern officers dominating the military government, and since the coup had been directed against the northern politicians who had dominated the federal government, politicians would not logically be assigned places in the military government. With the eastern dominated civil service, the bureaucrats were assigned full partnership in the governing of the country, a move attributable either to ethnicity or necessity. Furthermore, the Ironsi government had a conception of the problems facing Nigeria which did not include a role for the politician. As a highly alienated group, the eastern military leaders had a view that the problems of Nigeria could be solved by unifying the state, altering the structure to exclude the corrupt politician, and eliminating the source of the politicians' power, the regions. In the destruction of the politicians' power, the bureaucrats would appear to the military as those best suited to assist in the aim.
The Gowon government, on the other hand, was composed of those less alienated by the politicians, and who had a higher conception of the role of the politician in government. The second coup had an effect on the conception of the role of the bureaucrat. The failure of the Ironsi regime, evidenced by the unrest and riots of May and June, 1966, was detrimental to the image of the military government as that best able to solve Nigeria's problems. Since the bureaucrats were closely allied with the Ironsi regime, this would be regarded as a failure on the part of the bureaucracy as well. This failure would restrict the role which the military government would be willing to assign to the bureaucrats.

A further influence on the changes in roles assigned by the Gowon government can be linked to the new government's conception of the problems facing the country. By the failure of the unification decree, it was evident that a unified state was not the answer to Nigeria's problems. Because of the diversity of the country, it appeared evident that a federation was the only other answer. Further, the reaction to the unification decree had demonstrated the politically explosive nature of the problem. Since the bureaucracy had failed to perform the role assigned to it by the Ironsi regime,
by not advising the government of this political aspect, the Gowon government co-opted experts in the field of politics into its ranks. However, in order that the alienated groups would not have further cause for dissatisfaction, the 'clean' politicians were used rather than the previously powerful governmental leaders.

Although the nature of the problems facing the military governments appears the key factor to the explanation of the different attitudes, the other two factors were contributory. The patterns of alienation, the events of the actual coups and the events of the immediate post-coup period were instrumental in defining the boundaries from which the military could co-opt support. That is, because of these two factors, the military's choice of supporting groups was restricted, with the actual choice being determined by the problems facing the military, and the military's conception of those best suited to the solution of the problems at hand.

It therefore appears that the most important factor affecting the variation in patterns of relationships was the nature of the problems facing the military governments. In Ghana, the economic problems dominated, with the political problems being only a minor segment of the overall patterns. Therefore the military could maintain its alliance with the bureaucracy, and
relegate the politicians to minor roles until the process of returning to civilian rule had been initiated.

In Nigeria, on the other hand, the problems had been predominately political in nature. Because the bureaucrats could not fill roles which were both political and controversial, politicians were brought into the military government, with the bureaucrats in subsidiary, though necessary, positions.
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