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Canada and Japan: The postwar trends in military relations with the U.S.

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CANADA AND JAPAN: THE POSTWAR TRENDS IN MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

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ABSTRACT

Canada and Japan contrast significantly in many respects. Geographically, Canada occupies the northern part of North America--vast in land area and rich in natural resources. Japan, on the other hand, forms a small chain of islands off the Asian continent. Its resources are found in a large population and a rapidly growing industrial strength substantiated by its high GNP.

Socio-culturally, Canada's heritage is mainly a mixture of French and English. Presently, it is greatly influenced by the American culture. Japan contrasts with a culture all its own, which has so far withstood attacks of Americanization.

Important differences can also be found in the foreign and defence policy-making processes of the two countries. The comparative study of the functions of their decision-makers shows great contrast in the senior officialdom, the Prime Ministership, the Cabinet, as well as the opposition of both countries, in spite of the fact they share a similar Parliamentary system.

Although there are these differences, Canada and Japan share in military relations with the U.S.--Canada in NATO and NORAD, and Japan in the Security Treaty. Careful comparative examination, however, reveals some striking differences. Most significant is the divergence in the development of their military dependence on the U.S. in the postwar period. Canada's defence has become greatly integrated with the U.S., whereas Japan has shown a tendency towards gradual reduction of its dependence.

To a certain extent, this divergence in their military dependence can be related to their differences in the policy-making process. This divergence can be related more to the differences existing in geographical

and socio-cultural aspects of the two countries. In Canada's case, heavier military dependence on the U.S. is explained by its convergence with the U.S. in geography, society and culture. Japan's divergence with the U.S. in these respects accounts for its trend to lesser dependence.

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INTRODUCTION

Japan and Canada are two middle powers across the Pacific Ocean from each other, differing entirely in geography, language, culture and history. Canada, before Confederation in 1867, was a British colony. Even today Canada still retains a close relationship with Britain. The French occupied Canada before it became a British colony. As a result, French Canadians comprise one-third of the present total population. Canada, thus, possesses a unique mixture of mainly British and French cultures.

Canadian cultural characteristics are not only British and French, but also American. Neighbouring on the U.S., Canada is, to a large extent, influenced by the Americans socio-culturally, economically and politically as well. In the postwar period, in particular, the influence of the U.S. on Canada has become so great that some Canadians today have difficulty in differentiating themselves from Americans in terms of political, economic, cultural and military aspects.

Historically, Canada has never enjoyed a fully independent identity. "Rather," writes Roger Swanson, "it invoked the counterweight technique of balancing external influences so that it could develop as an autonomous nation."[1] When Great Britain proposed an imperial defence federation in the 1870's, Canada invoked the United States to balance Great Britain. In the postwar period, this technique of balancing external influences has been used to create a counterweight to U.S. military, economic, cultural and political pressures.

In this respect, Canada presents a great contrast to Japan. Japan is an Asian country, unique in that it is considered too Westernized to be entirely Asian, and too Asian to be considered Western. Bounded on

all sides by the sea, Japan had seldom experienced a threat to its territorial integrity until the Second World War. Its geographical isolation contributed to its cultural and political isolation until the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Unlike Canada, Japan does not have the difficulty of differentiating itself from other countries in socio-cultural aspects.

Though Canada and Japan contrast in many respects, they also share some similarities. Not only are both allies of the Western power bloc led by the U.S. and classified as middle powers, but they also both share in military co-operation with the U.S. Among the bilateral military agreements of the U.S., the North American Air Defence (NORAD) system between the U.S. and Canada, and the Security Treaty system between the U.S. and Japan are most important in U.S. defence policy. As partners in such important bilateral military alliances with the U.S., Canada and Japan have kept, throughout the postwar period, a relatively close relationship with the U.S., economically, politically, as well as militarily.

Taking this into consideration, it is noteworthy to compare how Canada and Japan--two very different countries in many respects--have developed their military relations with the U.S. in this period. Comparative analysis of the development of their military relations with the U.S. will draw attention to some important bases from which Canada and Japan may possibly promote their co-operation in the future.

This paper attempts to analyze comparatively, in three parts, the postwar development in the military relations of Canada and Japan with the U.S. The purpose of taking this approach of comparative

analysis is to help account for the similarities and differences between the two countries in their defence policies.

Part I makes a comparative study of geographical, economic and socio-cultural factors in the relations of Canada and Japan with the U.S. Comparison of their respective public attitudes towards the U.S., on the basis of the public opinion poll results, will reveal a divergence and convergence existing in their relations with the U.S. Salient international environments of the postwar period and national interests and policy objectives of the two countries are also dealt with and compared in this part.

Part II analyzes, comparatively, the policy-making processes of Canada and Japan, with emphasis on foreign and defence policies. First, structural and functional differences between the Department of External Affairs in relation to the Department of National Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in relation to the National Defence Agency are examined. Next, the differences in background characteristics of senior officials in both the Department of External Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are pointed out. In the following sections, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and the people and opposition parties are comparatively dealt with.

Part III examines how the governments, the oppositions and the people of these two countries have reacted to the development in their military relations with the U.S., during the postwar period. This part divides the postwar period into three, focusing attention on the conclusion and renewal of NATO, NORAD and the Security Treaty. The courses of action taken by the government and the reaction to them of the opposition and the people in both countries are compared in each period.

The conclusion attempts to relate this divergence and convergence between Canada and Japan, in terms of geography, economy, society, culture and the policy-making process, to the postwar development of their military relations with the U.S. In doing so, the conclusion aims at discovering what is the most important factor determining the similarities or differences in the military relations of Canada and Japan with the U.S.

PART ONE

I. Strategic Location

II. Economic Relations with the U.S. After World War II

III. Socio-Cultural Aspects

IV. Attitude of the Public Towards the U.S.

V. Salient International Environments

VI. National Interests and Policy Objectives

Strategic Location

Geographical location and size have been among the most important factors shaping the defence policy of a country, and they continue to be of great importance in the Canadian case.

The land area of Canada extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific, covering the northern part of the North American continent. Canada's total area of four million square miles is the largest in the Western Hemisphere and second only to the Soviet Union, in the world. Bordered only by the U.S. to the south and north-west, Canada was remote from possible enemies of conventional war. Since the ICBM era, which began in the late Fifties, Canada's geographical advantages--vastness and remoteness--have become greatly reduced. Situated between the superpowers, Canada is now a possible area for a nuclear battlefield.

National security may include not only considerations of territorial integrity, but also of survival of national identity.[2] In considering "survival of national identity," which is widely discussed in Canada today, it may be viewed that the U.S. constitutes a threat to Canada. However, with reference to "territorial integrity," since the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union has been considered by military planners to be Canada's only possible enemy, and the direction of its threat has been over the North Pole.

Located on the other side of the Pacific, Japan is only one twenty-eighth the size of Canada, which means it is approximately one quarter the size of Quebec or the same size as Newfoundland.[3] Although Japan is an island country surrounded by the Pacific Ocean to the east and the Sea of Japan to the west, the archipelago of 3,513 islands is

more vulnerable to military attack--from the continent and from submarines. Especially since its two currently possible enemies, the Soviet Union and Communist China, are located directly across the Sea of Japan, its location is inevitably disadvantageous compared to Canada's location.

This divergence between Canada and Japan is even greater, when the population of the two countries is taken into consideration. Japan's population is five times as large as that of Canada. Of the 100 million Japanese, more than one-third are crowded into the narrow belt along the Pacific coast, from Tokyo in the north to Kita-Kyushu in the south. The population density of Japan is 130 times larger than that of Canada.[4]

The size, the length of coast line,[5] and the small population make Canada difficult and costly to defend. But Japan, whose huge population is crowded into such a small area, appears unavoidably open to possibility of total destruction through nuclear attack.

Economic Relations with the U.S. after World War II

Canada is not only great in land area, but also in abundance of natural resources. The mineral production of Canada, which accounted for $500 million in 1945, has rapidly increased to $1 billion in 1950 and $4 billion in 1966.[6] Bountiful natural resources from coal and petroleum to nickel and uranium lie under the relatively virgin land of Canada, only part of which has yet been exploited.

Japan, contrary to the Canadian situation, is rather limited in natural resources, particularly in mineral resources, which are vital to defence production. Iron ore, crude petroleum and nickel ore, which are important not only for military purposes, but also for modern industry, as a whole, are desperately in need.

Abundant in natural resources, the Canadian economy is much less agriculture-based than that of Japan. In Canada, approximately 90 per cent of the labour force is engaged in secondary and tertiary industries, while in 1967, 7.6 per cent was engaged in agriculture and 3.0 per cent in other primary industries. In Japan, over 20 per cent of the total labour force is still engaged in agriculture and approximately 25 per cent in primary industries.

The differences in economy between Canada and Japan, however, are not only found in economic structure, but also in per capita income. Although Japan's GNP in 1968 was more than twice that of Canada, per capita income of Japan in the same year was less than half ($1,110) of the Canadian counterpart ($2,300). The rate of increase in Japan's per capita income, like that of its GNP, has been much faster than that of Canada, but it will still take Japan a while to bring its standard of

TABLE 1.

Production of Mineral Resources in Canada and Japan
(1960-1968)

in thousands of metric tons

Year	Iron Ore			Copper		
	World	Canada	Japan	World	Canada	Japan
1960	256,600	11,140	1,774	4,270	395.5	89.2
1961	246,100	10,528	1,594	4,430	398.3	96.4
1962	252,300	14,148	1,442	4,630	414.9	103.6
1963	266,700	16,150	1,363	4,650	410.6	107.2
1964	301,100	20,766	1,432	4,840	441.7	106.2
1965	326,400	21,822	1,427	5,050	460.9	107.1
1966	339,900	22,474	1,370	5,270	459.1	111.7
1967	337,800	23,433	1,274	5,020	556.4	117.8
1968	368,100	27,349	1,249	5,390	562.4	119.9

Year	Nickel Ore			Zinc		
	World	Canada	Japan	World	Canada	Japan
1960	337,000	194,597	--	3,380	390.1	156.7
1961	374,000	211,366	--	3,500	402.0	168.3
1962	367,000	210,686	--	3,640	455.4	192.5
1963	358,000	196,886	--	3,680	451.0	198.0
1964	395,000	207,288	--	4,070	662.2	216.5
1965	458,000	235,126	--	4,360	826.4	221.0
1966	438,000	202,856	--	4,520	949.8	253.6
1967	513,000	225,569	--	4,900	1,133.1	262.7
1968	570,000	239,359	--	5,070	1,155.1	264.3

Year	Crude Petroleum			Lead Ore		
	World	Canada	Japan	World	Canada	Japan
1960	1,053,600	25,630	526	2,430	192.5	39.5
1961	1,122,200	29,863	657	2,420	165.6	46.3
1962	1,217,200	33,020	760	2,540	191.7	53.5
1963	1,305,800	34,845	785	2,540	180.5	52.7
1964	1,409,700	37,147	657	2,570	187.2	54.1
1965	1,510,700	39,457	671	2,750	274.8	54.9
1966	1,641,600	43,248	782	2,860	283.2	63.1
1967	1,760,100	47,394	788	2,900	308.2	63.5
1968	1,923,800	51,197	782	3,000	327.6	62.9

Source: U.N. Statistical Yearbook 1969, Statistical Office, Department of Economics and Social Affairs, the United Nations, New York (1970).

living up to the Canadian one.

Economic divergence between the two countries is also found in their postwar economic relations with the U.S. Throughout the postwar period to the present, Canada has relied on the U.S. for approximately 60 per cent of its exports and 70 per cent of its imports.

Before Japan's independence in 1951, its trade with the U.S. was very unbalanced; 66 per cent of its imports and only 18 per cent of its exports (the average of the four-year period 1947-1950) were with the U.S. After the Occupation ended, the American share in Japan's exports showed a drastic increase--14 per cent in 1951 and 32 per cent in 1968. At the same time, Japan has gradually decreased the proportion of its imports from the U.S. from 29 per cent in 1951 to 23 per cent in 1968.[7]

Canadian trade with the U.S., as a rule, has been to the advantage of the U.S., imports exceeding exports by about 10 per cent. In 1968, however, Canada's exports to the U.S. for the first time exceeded its imports from that country. Moreover, since 1961, Canada's world exports have exceeded its world imports.

In contrast to Canada's case, Japan, with exception of a few years, has always imported more than it exported in total foreign trade. But, as far as its trade with the U.S. is concerned, exports since 1965 have exceeded imports.

Furthermore, while Canada leaves little more than one-third of its foreign trade for the rest of the world, Japan divides the remaining 66 per cent of its foreign trade between the Asian market and the rest of the world. One of Canada's "mother countries," Great Britain, has remained its second largest trading partner, but its share has been

TABLE 2.

Foreign Trade of Canada and Japan with the World and the U.S.

in millions of U.S. dollars

	Canada				Japan			
	World		U.S.		World		U.S.	
Year	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import
1950	2,900	2,882	1,900	1,950	820	974	185	415
1951	3,750	3,802	2,220	2,520	1,350	2,044	190	595
1952	4,430	4,004	2,410	2,710	1,270	2,028	235	620
1953	4,220	4,317	2,510	2,940	1,270	2,410	235	670
1954	4,030	4,075	2,430	2,700	1,630	2,399	285	670
1955	4,390	4,628	2,640	3,140	2,010	2,471	455	647
1956	4,920	5,638	2,920	3,950	2,500	3,230	550	900
1957	5,110	5,710	3,060	3,840	2,860	4,284	605	1,230
1958	5,050	5,205	3,000	3,460	2,880	3,033	690	980
1959	5,360	5,746	3,330	3,740	3,460	3,600	1,050	1,070
1960	5,550	5,655	3,140	3,740	4,050	4,491	1,110	1,440
1961	5,820	5,705	3,180	3,750	4,240	5,810	1,070	1,830
1962	5,930	5,880	3,510	3,970	4,920	5,637	1,410	1,570
1963	6,470	6,085	3,650	4,180	5,450	6,736	1,520	1,840
1964	7,680	6,926	4,120	4,830	6,670	7,938	1,870	2,000
1965	8,110	7,986	4,670	5,530	8,450	8,170	2,510	2,070
1966	9,550	9,317	5,790	6,530	9,980	9,524	3,010	2,350
1967	10,560	10,057	6,800	7,070	10,440	11,664	3,050	2,670
1968	12,560	11,431	8,530	7,950	12,970	12,987	4,130	2,930

Source: U.N. Statistical Yearbook 1969, Statistical Office, Department of Economics and Social Assairs, the United Nations, New York (1970).

reduced. France is far below Britain on the list of Canada's leading trading partners.[8] Canada's trade with European countries, including the Soviet Union (2 per cent), occupied less than 20 per cent of the total in 1966 (24 per cent in exports and 15 per cent in imports), when the American share was 65 per cent. The remaining 15 per cent was shared by various countries in the world.[9]

Compared with the U.S. making up most of Canada's market, in 1967, all Asian countries, including those in the Middle East and in the Communist bloc, shared over one-third of the Japanese foreign trade; 34 per cent in exports and 31 per cent in imports. The rest of the world occupied another one-third; 15 per cent with Europe, 7 per cent with Africa, 6 per cent with Oceania, and 4 per cent with the others.

In the period 1950-1968, Japan's expansion in trade was much greater than that of Canada, although Canada's total foreign trade exceeded that of Japan until as recently as 1964. However, dependence on foreign trade is heavier in Canada's case than in Japan's. This can be derived from viewing total foreign trade as a percentage of GNP figures. (Table 3) In 1968, for example, Canada's foreign trade amounted to almost forty per cent of GNP, while the equivalent amount for Japan was 20 per cent of the GNP. This indicates that the American market is vital for Canada, while it is much less so for Japan.

Foreign investment by the U.S. is another important factor in the economic relations of Canada and Japan. According to the Watkins report of 1968 on foreign investment, the Americans control 46 per cent of manufacturing, 62 per cent of the petroleum and natural gas industry, and 52 per cent of mining and smelting in Canada.[10] Foreigners, mainly

Americans, control 97 per cent of Canada's automobile industry, 97 per cent of the rubber, 78 per cent of the chemical and 77 per cent of the electric apparatus.[11]

TABLE 3.

Comparison of GNP and Foreign Trade, 1950-1968

in millions of U.S. dollars

	CANADA			JAPAN		
Year	GNP (A)	Foreign Trade (B)	B/A	GNP (A)	Foreign Trade (B)	B/A
1950	16,500	5,800	35%	11,100	1,800	16%
1952	22,400	8,400	38	16,900	3,300	20
1954	23,100	8,100	35	20,700	4,000	19
1956	28,400	10,600	37	25,800	5,700	22
1958	30,700	10,300	33	34,900	5,900	17
1960	33,700	11,200	33	49,300	8,500	17
1962	37,700	11,800	31	62,400	10,600	17
1964	44,100	14,600	33	77,200	14,600	19
1966	53,700	18,900	35	97,600	19,300	20
1968	62,500	24,000	38	142,000	26,000	18

Note: Figures are calculated on a U.S. dollar base equivalent to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360, regardless of fluctuation.
Source: Canada Year Book, Nihon Tokei Nenkan and The Military Balance, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

The total foreign long-term capital invested in Canada increased from Can. $8,661 million in 1950 to Can. $32,012 million in 1966, of which the U.S. share rose from Can. $6,548 million in 1950 to Can. $25,644 million in 1966. Throughout this period, the U.S. has been Canada's biggest investor, holding an annual average of 77 per cent of total investments.

Compared with Canada, the capital inflow of Japan has at least two very significant characteristics: one is the small scale of foreign investments, which totalled $848 million in 1967; the other is the very limited participation in management by foreigners.[12] The small scale of

investment and management participation strictly limits the possibility of foreign intervention in Japanese industries.

In 1967, the foreign direct investments were $30 million, a figure undeniably smaller than the $1,925 million in Canada. Although more than 70 per cent of the foreign investments in Japan have been from the U.S., Japan has successfully maintained its independence from American control over the economy.

Because of the dominance of the U.S. in its economic relations, it is not difficult to understand why Canada, compared with Japan, must rely much more on the U.S. for its military production. In view of the differences in geographical and socio-cultural as well as economic aspects, Canada's heavy economic dependence on the U.S. is likely to continue, while Japan will probably further reduce its reliance upon the U.S., expanding its market in Asia.

Socio-Cultural Aspects

In Japan's case, geographical and demographic factors not only give rise to certain weaknesses, but also, when fused with socio-cultural factors, to certain strengths: the asset of a high degree of national unity. The insular, homogeneous population of Japan has preserved its own culture through its history. Rooted in this culture, the Japanese people are far more tightly unified than Canadians. The extent of national unification may bear considerable relation to the defence and foreign policies in Japan's postwar period.

In Canada there is a great variety of ethnic groups and religions, while in Japan, there are hardly any.[13] The Canadian people are divided mainly into two ethnic groups--those of British origin (44%) and those of French origin (30%). The rest are Germans (5.8%), Ukrainians (2.6%), Italians (2.5%), Dutch (2.4%) and more than thirty other small groups.[14]

Because of pressure from the second largest group, the Canadian Government has attempted to promote biculturalism and bilingualism.[15] However, because of its French-Canadian heritage, the province of Quebec is often alienated from the rest of the provinces where there is an English-speaking majority. While the economic interests of the poor maritime provinces are often in conflict with those of the rich provinces, the western provinces are geographically isolated from the eastern provinces.

This lack of national unification in Canada may also be related to the convergence which exists in culture, language and perhaps ideology between the U.S. and Canada. The pulls exerted by the great industrial power of the U.S. have worked in favour of a north-south mentality in

Canada, rather than an east-west one. Canadians seem to have made little effort to preserve their separate national identity, acquiescing in the maintenance of a cultural, economic and military "togetherness" with the U.S. In this respect, Canada has been drawn towards continentalism rather than towards Canadian nationalism.

In terms of Japan's defence policy, a strong sense of nationalism has been an undeniable supporter of the desire for increased independence from the U.S. Contrary to Japan, Canada does not yet seem instilled with the kind of strong nationalism which would make it refuse foreign control of its military operation, although Canadian attitudes clearly have changed in the last year or so.

In earlier history, Canada regarded the U.S. as an enemy.[16] One of the reasons for Confederation in 1867 was Canada's fear of being a victim of conquest by the U.S. Because of the military threat from the south and Great Britain's attempts to centralize its imperial defence with the strategic withdrawal of colonial garrisons,[17] Canadians, as a whole, became firmly unified and gradually, after Confederation, Canada expanded its borders from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Internally, however, the French Canadians developed a "state-of-siege mentality," after having been continuously dominated by the English. Mason Wade believes that the French Canadians are reminded, even today, that "they are a conquered people" and that "the 'English," whether English-Canadian or American, are heriditary enemies who still seek to anglicize and Protestantize."[18]

In spite of the existence of the French-Canadian antagonism to Americans, Canada, as a whole, began to move out of the British orbit

into the American one by the end of the First World War. This was accompanied by a great increase in American investment in Canada, compared to British investment which remained stable.[19] Friendlier relations between the U.S. and Canada were also effected, when Canada co-operated with the U.S. in the Second World War, after they created a Permanent Joint Board on Defence in 1940 through the Ogdensburg Agreement.

Joint efforts with the U.S. and Britain in the war economy brought about a spectacular development of Canadian industry and agriculture. After the War, however, Canadians came to realize the danger of excessive dependence on the U.S. militarily, economically and politically. To counterbalance U.S. influence, Canada quickly launched a determined effort to develop multiplicity of relationships through the United Nations, the North Atlantic community and the Commonwealth organization.

Unlike Canada, Japan had experienced a long period of isolation from the outside world for about 300 years until 1854. After opening its doors to the West, Japan commenced modernization, stimulated by modern Western technology. At the same time, Japan had unequal treaties with the strong Western countries forced upon it. The modernization or westernization period which took place after the Meiji Restoration shows some similarities with the early postwar period of Japan: acceptance of unequal treaties; heavy dependence on Western countries (the U.S. in particular); blind admiration of the western (American) culture; and concentration on establishing a strong economic power.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Japanese people had gradually become separated from the "powerful" Western countries and

had developed a high level of industrialization. It might have been that the Japanese were consciously trying to overcome a sense of inferiority that had been instilled in them by the phrase "replica of the West."[20] They went on to assume an aggressive spirit with strong overtones of militant nationalism, and what they had built up in the fifty years following the Restoration, collapsed at the end of World War II.

In the early postwar period, in contrast with Canada, Japan was obliged to rely completely on the U.S. It had to, in order to regain its economic power. As if "war made the U.S. and Japan friends," the U.S. took over the position that China held when Japan borrowed from it political and cultural ideas in the early period of its history. Accompanying this process of borrowing, the Japanese people seem to have felt, during the Occupation (1945-1951), some barrier which they had to surmount. Although the Americans embarked on the Occupation with much "flexibility" and broad "tolerance," they came with little knowledge of Japan's culture, history and tradition, but with great ambitions to enact another "New Deal" in Japan.[21] This socio-cultural barrier between the Japanese and Americans may be compared to what separates the French Canadians from "les anglais"--a sense of inferiority and a feeling of alienation in culture, history and language.

The divergence in socio-cultural relationships with the U.S. indicates the difference in what constitutes an acceptable degree of military dependence in the long term. Canadians have much more in common with Americans in culture and language than have the Japanese people. This factor seems to permit a higher Canadian tolerance level of U.S. military dominance, than the tolerance level of Japan. Although Canada earlier

on experienced the U.S. threat and had to devote itself to escaping from U.S. control when it became unacceptable, it appears easier for Canada to depend on the U.S. for its defence than for Japan.

Attitude of the Public towards the U.S.

In spite of the fact that a large proportion of the Canadian population is of French origin, integration with American culture seems to be greater in Canada than in any other part of the world. Except those who are solely French-speaking, Canadians are greatly influenced through the media of American television, radio, newspapers and magazines. Most Canadians, living within 100 to 150 miles of the U.S. border, are easily within reach of the American mass media.

Canadian integration into American culture, thus, derives not only from Canada's cultural and linguistical similarity with the U.S., but also from its geographical proximity. In all these respects, Japan is much less likely to be integrated with the American culture.

Japan is an island country located at the other side of the Pacific Ocean, and the Japanese people are entirely different from the Americans ethnically, culturally and linguistically. Although great developments in the mass media and in transportation have made it inevitable that Japan participate in cultural exchange with the rest of the world, the distinctive identity of the Japanese culture is still well-preserved. It provides a good contrast with the Canadian culture, which is confronted with the danger of losing its identity.

The great divergence in cultural ties with the U.S. between Canada and Japan makes their attitude towards the U.S. very different from each other, both in terms of general relations and military co-operation. The differences, as seen in various public opinion poll results, seem to bear very close relation to the differences in defence policies taken by Canada and Japan in the postwar period to the present.

Prior to the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a large number of Canadians (42%) were already aware of being more dependent on the U.S. than ever before.[22] A few years later, a majority of Canadians (60%) thought Canada should continue to encourage U.S. investment to help develop natural resources, not fearing that their way of life might be dangerously influenced by the U.S.[23]

Before Japan became independent in 1951, the majority of Japanese hoped that Japan would be pro-American rather than pro-Soviet or neutralist.[24] For the Japanese, being pro-American did not mean, however, that they approved the presence of U.S. bases in their country from the very beginning of Japanese-American military co-operation.[25]

In the mid and late Fifties, the differences in attitude towards the U.S. between Canada and Japan became increasingly distinguishable. Canadian opinion of economic relations with the U.S. in 1956 showed that the public felt development which was financed by U.S. money was beneficial for Canada.[26] More Canadians in 1956 (63%) than in 1951 (48%) believed that their way of life was not being overly influenced by the U.S., although at the end of the decade, the majority (50%) knew Canada had become more dependent on the U.S. for air defence.[27]

In Japan, in this period from the mid to late Fifties, an increasing number of Japanese opposed the presence of American bases in Japan, mainly because it was offensive to national pride.[28] The Japanese, however, seem to have been in a dilemma, at that time, wondering what they should do about their own defence. They opposed the American bases in Japan, on the one hand, and, on the other, they hesitated to rearm themselves, although they realized the necessity of military forces.[29]

When the majority of the Japanese agreed that the best way to protect Japan's security was either by their own forces or collective security (which required Japan to have its own forces),[30] they were undecided over the meaning of "own forces."

In the early Sixties, Canadians felt the danger of a threat from the Soviet Union, believing that the Russian claims for peace were merely propaganda and that the Soviet Union was really further advanced militarily than the U.S.[31] Although more Canadians regarded China as the greatest threat to world peace, the majority, in 1962, favoured an increase in Western military strength in order to counteract the power of the Soviet Union.[32] This indicated that Canadian military forces in Europe, at least, should not be reduced.

Moreover, during this period, a great majority of Canadians agreed that Canada was becoming more and more dependent on the U.S. for their air defence, and that their defence in general had become more integrated with that of the U.S.[33] In spite of this, the possibility of complete dependence on the U.S. for Canada's defence was strongly rejected.[34]

The Sixties were, for the Japanese, the beginning of the so-called "new era" of Japanese-American relations, following the stormy period of 1958-1960. Just before the renewal of the bilateral Security Treaty with the U.S. in 1960, a majority of Japanese favoured general co-operation with the U.S. in the future, while a large number of them worried that the Treaty would increase the possibility of Japanese involvement in war.[35]

In spite of the unprecedented prosperity in Japan, the majority of Japanese were uneasy about their future and the possibility of war.[36]

Strongly opposing to join the Communist bloc,[37] they sought to eliminate war.[38] Although they were uneasy, more than 80 per cent of the people favoured having Self-Defence Forces in the mid Sixties.[39]

In 1967, when Canada's foreign policy under the Pearson Government emphasized the peacekeeping role, the majority of the people supported the government's policy and considered it satisfactory.[40] While they wished Canada to pursue a more independent role,[41] in 1967, a great majority in Canada favoured continuation of membership in both military alliances--NATO and NORAD.[42]

By 1970, a majority of Canadians, particularly in Ontario, expressed the opinion that Canada is more dependent on the U.S. than in previous years.[43] However, they are satisfied with being Canadians, and they believe that Canada is the country which will have the most to offer ordinary people for their happiness.[44]

In the late Sixties, most Japanese feared being threatened by China because of its continual nuclear bomb testings.[45] In spite of this threat (or perhaps because of the threat) almost 70 per cent of the majority favoured friendlier relations or normalization of diplomatic relations with Communist China.[46]

Although the majority of Japanese agreed that Japan's economic prosperity had depended on American protection for its security,[47] they considered the U.S. troops no longer necessary for Japan's security.[48] This tendency seems to be closely related to their doubt of American sincerity to protect Japan in case of emergency,[49] and to the growing feeling of need for self-defence.[50]

Thus, as the results of public opinion polls show, Canadians, in

general, are much more favourable to Americans than are the Japanese. In military relations, while Canadians prefer "co-operation" with the U.S. to complete dependence on them, the Japanese people refuse even "co-operation," if it means allowing the Americans to retain their bases in Japan.

The favourable attitude of Canadians towards Americans seems to bear very close relation to Canada's similarity with the U.S. in geographical and socio-cultural aspects. In turn, the Japanese people take a much less favourable attitude towards the U.S., particularly with regard to its military alliance with the U.S., largely owing to its socio-cultural divergence with that country. These differences in general attitude towards the U.S. between Canada and Japan appear to be closely related to the trends of their military co-operation with the U.S. in the postwar period to the present.

Salient International Environments

The foreign and defence policies of a country are, needless to say, closely related to international environments. That Canada could play such a respected role as a mediator in the Suez crisis of 1956 was not only because of the diplomatic skill of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, and Canada's advantage of British and French heritage, but also because international environments were in favour of Canada at the time. Japan, too, was economically, to a large extent, saved by special procurements in the Korean War. Without the Korean War, Japan might never have been able to enjoy the gigantic economic power it basks in today.

No sooner was the United Nations, the successor to the League of Nations, established in 1945, than the Cold War between the Communist powers and the Western powers was in progress. Because of the ideological antagonism in the Cold War, the United Nations was divided by the rivalry between the two blocs: the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union and the Western bloc led by the U.S.

The tension between the two power blocs reached its peak in the late Forties with the Berlin blockade (1949), and the proclamation of the Communist Chinese Government (1949). At the time of the Berlin blockade, Canada swiftly moved toward the formation of the North Atlantic community. Owing to the ineffective role of the U.N. in the Cold War disputes and to an unacceptable degree of American control over Canada's political independence, Canadian political leaders seized the opportunity to bring North America into the North Atlantic alliance with the western
51
European countries.

The Korean War (1950-53) gave two different kinds of opportunity to Canada and Japan: for Canada—a political one— to provide foundations for Canada's reputation for objectivity and independence,[52] and for Japan— to give the Japanese economy a decisive injection of prosperity.[53]

After the Korean War, Canada became deeply involved politically in Asian affairs in Indo-China, Kashmir, Palestine and Lebanon. Its reputation as an impartial mediator was at a premium in the Suez crisis of 1960.

While Canada was busy establishing a reputation for independent diplomacy, Japan was concentrating entirely on economic growth in almost the same manner as half a century before.[54] Japan, at the time of the Korean War— the climax of the Cold War, and just when it became relieved of the long period of American control, hardly found it possible to envisage independence without alignment with the U.S.

The Fifties was an era of alliance for Japan in contrast to Canada's relatively independent diplomacy. At San Francisco in 1951, Japan concluded the Peace Treaty and the bilateral Security Treaty with the U.S., and in 1952, other bilateral Peace Treaties with Taiwan and India. In 1956, when Canada was one of the most significant participants in the U.N., Japan was just beginning its membership in the international organization. In spite of its restored relations with many parts of the world, Japan played a passive role in international activities throughout the Fifties.

For Canada, the Sixties proved much less favourable than the Fifties for playing a significant role on the international scene. The possession of advanced nuclear weapons by both superpowers and other

great powers, the rise in international politics of de Gaulle as leader of an independent foreign policy, the formation of regionalism among Afro-Asian states, and the preoccupation with biculturalism and bilingualism at home--all these changes decreased the role Canada could play. As a result, the loud voice from the French Canadians drew more attention from Canadians in the mid Sixties than the government's effort to integrate U.N. peacekeeping forces into the overall structure of its own defence policies.[55] Canada, thus, came to focus its attention on domestic affairs, rather than external ones, leaving its defence under the supervision of the U.S.

On the other hand, for Japan, the Sixties was a time of prosperity, when it slowly rose to its feet and started to play a more positive role, at least in Asia. The estrangement between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets developed from the difference of opinion over whether world war could be banished while capitalism still exists.[56] When the Vietnam War was rapidly escalated after the accession of the Johnson Administration, China simultaneously showed its nuclear capability by conducting a series of continuous nuclear testings.

Japan's uneasiness in this kind of Asian environment was further aggravated by its heavy dependence on the American military protection, which allowed the U.S. virtually a free hand militarily on Japanese soil. In this respect, international environments clearly had some effect on Japan's defence policy which has gradually moved from U.S. control to a form of rather independent self-defence.

National Interests and Policy Objectives

Since the time of Confederation in 1867, the social and economic bases of Canadian national interests have, of course, undergone change but have never been completely transformed. Even after Canada's active participation in the Second World War, the components of Canadian national interest have changed little, although rather different policies have been adopted.

In contrast to this strong element of continuity in Canada's social and economic bases, Japanese traditional life underwent a profound transformation. After the end of the War and during the Occupation, Japan endeavoured to obliterate the past period of nationalistic militarism from its memory. As a result, the social and economic foundations were revamped in the postwar period of Japan.

Although there were great differences in the immediate constituents of national interests, both Canada and Japan after World War II have been strongly concerned with promoting economic relations with as many countries as possible in the world. If it is agreed that a nation's policy should be aimed at promoting its prosperity and security, to maintain good relations with the U.S. has been one of most desired ends shared by Canada and Japan.

A nation's policies are, however, conditioned by external and internal environments. Immediately after World War II, multiplicity of relationships became an important objective in Canada's foreign policy—to secure its independence from the unacceptable degree of control by the U.S. While political independence was one of the most prominent national interests of Canada, Japan's national policy concentrated on

economic recovery. With little responsibility in and negligible influence on world affairs, Japan's realistic policy of economic development and prosperity has met with spectacular success.

Canada, on the one hand, intended to preserve national security by means of expanding its relationships through the U.N., NATO and the Commonwealth without reducing economic ties with the U.S. On the other hand, Japan attempted to regain its economic prosperity, almost entirely depending on the U.S. for its economic and military co-operation.

In the Sixties, Canada's prosperity and security became more interrelated with that of the U.S. Canadian national policy became more based upon the interdependence than the independence of nations. Economically and militarily dependent on the U.S., to a large extent, the Canadian leaders in the late Sixties came to conclude that:

> For Canadians to offer ill-informed criticism of United States foreign policy, without recognizing the enormous responsibilities which go with American power, and without recognizing the degree to which our (Canadian) interests coincide with those of the United States, would be a sign of immaturity and could have unfortunate consequences.[57]

In order to survive as an independent nation, however, Canada has undertaken a policy of multiplicity of relationships which prevents a further erosion of Canadian autonomy. Based on a middlepowermanship and a bicultural heritage, it seems to be this direction towards which Canada has begun moving within its national capability.[58]

The first step in Japan's national policy, after rapidly recovering economically, was to settle basic territorial disputes. In the Sixties, it became a main aim of Japanese independent foreign policy to have former territories returned from both superpowers--the Okinawa Islands and the Ogasawara Islands from the U.S., and the

Habomai and Shikotan Islands of the Kuriles from the Soviet Union.

In its attempt to establish national prestige, Japan has gradually become aware of the danger of being too dependent on the U.S. militarily and economically. Unlike Canada's tendency towards interdependence with the U.S., Japan appears to have already begun, in the late Sixties, seeking to protect its economic prosperity and security more independently.

PART TWO

I. Structures of the Department of External Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

II. Senior Officials in the Department and Ministry

III. The Prime Minister

IV. The Cabinet

V. The People and Opposition Parties

Structures of the Department of External Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Both Canada and Japan follow the parliamentary system, which is very similar to that of Britain. Although Canada operates under federalism and Japan under a unitary system, the political institutions of the two countries have rather similar functions.

In both countries, foreign and defence policy-making is effected through the co-operation of the Prime Minister, other Ministers whose departments are most related to foreign and defence policy issues, and senior officials in these departments. Of these departments, the Department of External Affairs (or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is, without a doubt, most involved with foreign policy-making.

To understand their functions, it is necessary to examine their structures and certain characteristics of senior officials in the Department, and the whole foreign policy-making process. In this examination, differences may be found not only in the departmental structure and senior officials, but also in the Prime Ministership, other Ministers and the opposition parties of the two countries.

Canada's Department of External Affairs, in the early Fifties, was small in terms of number of employees and expenditures. But, after gradual expansion in the late Fifties and early Sixties, the Department of today has approximately 3,200 employees and receives more than 2 per cent of the total budget of the Government. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was, in the early Fifties, of notable size; its expenditures accounted for more than one per cent of the government's total budget. However, unlike the Canadian Department, the Ministry has not expanded in

proportion to other ministries. Today, the Ministry is much smaller than the Canadian Department in terms of total expenditures, number of employees and the percentage of departmental expenditures in the government's total budget. (Table 4)

An examination of the Canadian Department shows that there were altogether ten divisions in 1946, based on geography and subjects. Among them were three political divisions. The first dealt with "questions of international organizations and general matters affecting the peace settlement"; the second looked after political affairs in Europe and the Commonwealth; the third dealt with the political aspect of American continents and the Far East. The other divisions were the Legal, Treaty, Diplomatic, Economic, Information, and Administrative Divisions.[1]

The first political division became the United Nations Division, and the second and the third political divisions were divided into three geographical divisions: the European, the Commonwealth, and the American and Far Eastern Divisions. Moreover, the Diplomatic Division was divided into the Protocol and the Consular Divisions. A new Personnel and a new Defence Liaison Division were added. These changes all occurred in 1949. At the end of the 1940's, the Department was headed by an Under-Secretary with a Deputy Secretary and three Assistant Under-Secretaries who supervised altogether twelve divisions in the Department.[2]

In the 1950's, the Department grew from 259 officers to 402, but the total number of employees did not increase proportionately.[3] Its budget grew from $9,100,000 in 1950, to $40,900,000 in 1955 and to $70,600,000 in 1959. During these years, eight more divisions were added to the Department, bringing the total number of divisions to

twenty. Both the Defence Liaison and the Economic Divisions came to constitute two independent divisions; the American and Far Eastern Division became two different divisions; and the Finance, Historical, Personnel, Supplies and Properties, and Middle Eastern Divisions were newly added. Moreover, the Inspection Service, Political Co-ordination Section and Press Office were appended as "other units."

By 1968, the Department further expanded its personnel and organization. The number of foreign officers and the total number of employees increased from 414 to 815 (1960-68), and from 1,998 to 3,192 (1960-68) respectively. A gradual move in the direction of specialization had taken place in its organization. The departmental organization had become more and more complex with each succeeding year. Included amongst the changes was the establishment of a separate division for U.S. affairs.

In 1969, the staff of the Department was headed by an Under-Secretary with a Deputy Under-Secretary and four Assistant Under-Secretaries. The work of the Department in Ottawa was carried on through 18 divisions, 3 offices, 3 branches and 4 other special offices.[4] However, the principle of organization by geography and subject remained intact.

While the organizational principle of Canada's Department of External Affairs remained unchanged after World War II, the Japanese Ministry was totally reorganized in principle, in the Occupation period. In 1948, the Ministry consisted of a Secretariat, five Bureaus (General Affairs, Treaties, Research and Documentation, Control and Civil Property), two Divisions (Public Relations and Special Records) and a Foreign Service

Training Institute. The Ministry, at this time, was organized, unlike Canada's Department of External Affairs, solely on the basis of subjects.[5]

In 1951, when Japan became independent with the conclusion of the Peace Treaty at San Francisco, the Ministry was reorganized, this time, on the basis of geography and subjects, similar to the present Canadian Department of External Affairs. However, even in the Sixties, the Ministry was one of the smallest among the twelve ministries of the Japanese Government both in terms of employees and expenditures.

In 1968, there were nine bureaus in the Ministry, divided on the basis of regions and subjects.[6] Four of these bureaus were political-geographical ones: the Asian Affairs, American Affairs, European Affairs, and Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureaus. Within each bureau, the designated area of its work was further subdivided into two to four sections according to smaller regions. In addition to the political-geographical bureaus, there were five bureaus which dealt with specific subjects of foreign policy. They were the United Nations, Treaties, Economic Co-operation, Economic Affairs, and Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureaus.

While the Canadian Department of External Affairs places more emphasis on divisions related to international organizations, Japan's Foreign Ministry, under the direction of the Deputy Under-Secretary, appears to lay more stress upon the Economic Affairs Bureau and the Minister's Secretariat.

The staff of the Ministry is headed by a Minister with a Parliamentary Vice-Minister and a Permanent Vice-Minister. As his advisors, moreover, approximately 15 counsellors are listed at the top

level, most of whom are ex-ambassadors. The work of the Ministry is carried on under the direction of these top officers, through altogether 9 bureaus, 3 branches, and one Minister's Secretariat.

TABLE 4.

Comparison of Department of External Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Employees and Expenditures

Expenditures = in thousands of U.S. dollars

	Department of External Affairs			Ministry of Foreign Affairs		
Year	Employees	Expenditures	A	Employees	Expenditures	B
1955	1,610	43,800	1.0%	1,763	35,900	1.3%
1956	1,701	44,900	1.0	1,796	18,700	0.7
1957	1,795	60,200	1.2	1,837	22,700	0.7
1958	1,831	60,200	1.2	1,941	25,900	0.7
1959	1,859	75,500	1.4	2,059	29,900	0.7
1960	1,998	97,200	1.7	2,185	34,900	0.7
1961	2,095	103,000	1.7	2,401	41,600	0.7
1962	2,084	95,600	1.5	2,451	50,100	0.7
1963	2,159	85,200	1.3	2,517	53,100	0.6
1964	2,298	97,000	1.4	2,546	58,600	0.6
1965	2,644	131,200	1.8	2,611	64,600	0.6
1966	2,817	152,500	2.0	2,697	85,300	0.7
1967	3,069	230,500	2.6	2,749	88,800	0.6
1968	3,192	215,700	2.2	2,746	98,300	0.6

Note: A = Percentages of expenditures of the Department in the total governmental expenditures.
B = Percentages of expenditures of the Ministry in the total governmental expenditures.
Expenditure figures are calculated on a U.S. dollar base equivalent to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360, regardless of fluctuation.

Source: Canada, Department of External Affairs, Annual Report, 1955 - 1968, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, and Department of Finance, Budget Speech, 1955 - 1968, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa.
Japan, Prime Minister's Office, Nihon Tokei Nenkan, 1962 - 1968.

As previously mentioned, the Canadian Department of External Affairs has been expanding much faster than the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Japan, in terms of employees and expenditures. Moreover, the Canadian Department has three divisions dealing with political-military affairs: the North American Defence and NATO Division, the Peacekeeping and Military Assistance Division, and the Defence Liaison (2) Division. In the Japanese Ministry, there is only one section on military affairs, which is found in the American Bureau. This Bureau also deals with political affairs of the American continents.

In contrast to this small section devoted to military affairs, the Ministry has two large bureaus: Economic Affairs and Economic Co-operation. One is divided into 10 sections on the basis of regions, and the other into 6 sections on the basis of subjects. In Canada, the Office of Economic Affairs, which is further divided into three divisions, comes under the direction of the same Assistant Under-Secretary as the one responsible for Latin American and U.S.A. Affairs.

In the Department of External Affairs, there is a separate division for handling relations with the U.S., as well as the North American Defence and NATO Division, and in nearly all the other Divisions, the work of the officer is influenced by an awareness of Canada's "special" relationship with the U.S. However, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has only the North American Section, which deals with both U.S. and Canadian affairs, under the direction of the Chief of the American Affairs Bureau. In structure, at least, the U.S. is much less importantly ranked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs than in the Department of External Affairs.

Although both the Department of External Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are organized on the basis of regions and subjects, their differences indicate that the Canadian Department has somewhat of a political and military character, whereas the Japanese Ministry has the characteristics of a cultural and economic organization. These functional characteristics may further be related to the possibility that the Canadian Department of External Affairs has more influence over defence policy-making, than has the Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry.

The National Defence Agency of Japan is not classified, at least legally, as highly as the Department of National Defence in Canada. The National Defence Agency does not enjoy full authority as a Ministry, although the Director General of the Agency is a Cabinet member. Unlike Japan's case, the Canadian Department of National Defence not only has full ministerial status, but also is one of the largest Departments in the government.

Practically speaking, however, the National Defence Agency is not necessarily less influential in defence policy-making than the Department of National Defence. Because of the emphasis on cultural and economic affairs within Japan's Foreign Affairs Ministry, defence policy-making appears to be the work of the Defence Agency. In Canada, on the other hand, defence policy-making is not always a prerogative of the Department of National Defence, because the Department of External Affairs is much more concerned with national defence policy.

Senior Officials in the Department and the Ministry

In addition to the roles the Department and the Ministry play, the characteristics of senior officers in foreign affairs are also important. In both Canada and Japan, the bureaucracy is one of the most significant factors in the foreign policy-making process. Senior officials are those who are experts in the field, and therefore, are very important as well as influential in policy-making. Their influence on policy-making becomes much greater when the Minister and the Prime Minister at the very top level lack special knowledge of their field. Furthermore, when these officials are strictly career men, their view may be very profound but, at the same time, narrow and inflexible.

Lester Pearson, as Under-Secretary for External Affairs, explained in January, 1947 how the top posts of the Canadian Department should be filled:

> In the U.S. diplomatic service the very top posts have rarely, if ever, been held by career men. That I think is not good for the morale of the Foreign Service. On the other hand, the British diplomatic service is sometimes criticized as too much of a closed corporation of officials recruited from a limited class of persons. I think the Canadian service has given evidence that it will avoid these extremes . . . . .[7]

Among the top 64 officers of the Department,[8] 27 started their careers in the Department. Ten worked for other Federal Government Departments or Agencies before joining the Department. The rest came from various fields of society. There were news reporters and journal

editors(6), lawyers(6), university teaching staff(6), high school teachers(2), insurance company workers(2), a poet, among others. However, once they joined the Department, a very limited number of them (4 our of 64)[9] have been transferred to another Department or have voluntarily worked outside the Department.

The variety of previous experience among the Canadian officers is one of the most significant differences compared with the Japanese counterparts. Another significant difference is in education. While a Bachelor's degree from Tokyo University is an established avenue to higher positions in the foreign service in Japan, it appears that Canada's foreign service officers are required to have at least two degrees.

Among the 63 top officers,[10] 61 have at least one university degree; 59 from Canadian universities and two from a British university. Forty-four of the 61 have more than one degree.[11] The remaining two of the 63 have devoted themselves to international studies abroad. This offers no comparison with the Japanese case in which there are only seven out of 57 higher foreign service officers who have a Master's degree.

Another distinctive difference between Canadian and Japanese higher officers in this field is the presence of an academic clique. Unlike Japan, where more than 80 per cent of these officers are graduates of Tokyo University, there is hardly any indication of an academic clique amongst Canadian officers. There are 16 University of Toronto graduates, but this is only about one-quarter of those with degrees. The remaining 45 are from the University of British Columbia(6), the University of Manitoba(5), Dalhousie and Queens University(4 each), the University of Alberta and Bishops University(3 each), and fifteen other universities

and colleges.

By region, 24 of the 61 obtained their first degree in Ontario; 13 in Quebec; 6 in British Columbia; 5 each in Manitoba and Nova Scotia; and 2 in Britain. This corresponds roughly with birthplace except for those foreign-born.[12] This regional distribution changes slightly in higher education beyond a Bachelor's degree. Half of the eleven Bachelor of Law degrees were obtained in Ontario, while more than half of the ten Doctor of Law degrees were given in Quebec. At the Master's degree level, eleven degrees were obtained from universities in the U.S.(6), Britain(4), and France(1).

As for the Japanese senior officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,[13] fifty-eight top officials (excluding the Minister and Parliamentary Vice-Minister, both of whom are political appointees from members of the Diet) are examined in this paper. In 1968, forty-seven of them in the Ministry had passed the Foreign Service Examination, a year prior to or in the same year as graduation from the university (this examination is one kind of higher Civil Service Examination). Access to higher positions in the Ministry is very much restricted to those who have passed the Examination.

Among those who have passed the Foreign Service Examination, an important advantage in the Ministry is graduation from Tokyo University. Eighty-three per cent of these top fifty-eight officers are graduates of that University, and more than 60 per cent of them have degrees in law.

Compared with the Canadian top civil servants in External Affairs, the incidence of education beyond a first degree is significantly

lower in Japanese civil servants. Only seven out of the fifty-eight have a Master's degree, and none has a Doctor's degree. Moreover, only two have studied abroad--both at Cambridge University, one obtaining a degree there.

TABLE 5.

Average Ages for Selected Senior Officials in the Department of External Affairs by Positions (1968)

Whole Department	51.0
Ottawa	47.2
Abroad	55.3
Upon Joining Department	29.7
First Secretary	32.5
Counsellor	40.2
Minister	43.5
Consul (or Consul General)	43.8
Assistant Under-Secretary	44.0
Deputy Under-Secretary	46.4
High Commissioner	46.5
Head of Division	46.7
Permanent Representative to International Organization	47.1
Mission Head	47.3
Ambassador	47.9
Under-Secretary	49.0
Ambassador to International Organization	54.2

From the above table, it appears that the importance of position and promotion in the Department of External Affairs depends upon seniority, to a large extent. This table also shows that Canada sends older and more experienced officers to foreign nations and to international organizations. But senior officers at home are rather young, except for the highest position, the Under-Secretary.

As far as promotion is concerned, the figures show that it takes some time to become a Counsellor after having been promoted to

First Secretary. However, once one has become a Counsellor, the way to the ambassadorial level appears rather clear. Those who were recruited to the Department at the age of forty or older, most often go abroad as an advisor or an ambassador. At home, almost all of the higher positions are filled by career men, and it appears that there is a close relationship between higher positions and longer careers in the Department. Thus, the recruitment in the Department of External Affairs appears rather closed, at least as far as the top posts at Ottawa are concerned.

Unlike Canadian officers, the higher civil servants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have hardly ever experienced working for other Ministries or outside the government before they started serving the Ministry. Even after their service started in the Ministry, fifteen out of 57 (data for one of these 58 is not available) have been transferred to other agencies or Ministries of the national government for a limited time.[14] Because of this career stability in the Ministry, it may be assumed that important positions are ranked in terms of seniority. If this is so, taking an example of the average ages of those who held high posts within the Ministry and of selected ambassadors as 53.5 and 57.0 (in 1968) respectively, the latter appear higher in classification than the former (except for the Vice-Minister and the Foreign Affairs Councillors). Furthermore, the average age of those appointed to a position as an ordinary ambassador is 50.7, but for more important ambassadors (U.K., U.S.S.R., U.S.A., France, Korea, Germany, India, Australia and International Organizations), it is 56.2. These figures seem to indicate a possible classification for positions from Head of a

Section to Vice-Minister.

TABLE 6.

Average Ages for Selected Senior Officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Positions (1968)

Upon Joining Ministry	24.1
Section Head	37.9
First Secretary	39.1
Counsel	40.2
Counsellor (Abroad)	44.4
Counsel General	46.8
Vice-Chief of Bureau	47.6
Minister	48.2
Chief of Protocol	49.3
Chief of Minister's Secretariat	49.3
Chief of Bureau	49.4
Ambassador (General)	50.7
Head of Department	51.8
Head of Institute	54.0
Foreign Affairs Councillors	56.0
Ambassador (Selected)	56.2
Vice-Minister	58.0

Examination of the above information reveals some important differences between the Canadian senior officers and those of Japan. First of all, in spite of the fact that the top posts of Canada's External Affairs Department are rather closed to outsiders, the background experience of senior officials in Canada shows much more variety than that of Japanese officials prior to joining the Department.

Secondly, there is no established educational institution required of a senior official in Canada, whereas in Japan there is a strong tendency for graduates of Tokyo University to have the advantage. Compared with the Canadian case in which those with higher degrees than a Bachelor's can go into this field, in Japan, those who have most

opportunity to be highly promoted are those who get into the Ministry as soon as they obtain their Bachelor's degree.

Thirdly, in contrast to the younger age at which men join the Ministry in Japan, the average ages for higher posts are much higher among Japanese officials than Canadian ones. This indicates that, in Japan, higher posts require longer careers in the Ministry, since very few have been recruited from or to other Ministries.

These differences become very important in the consideration of the scope of foreign policy. Judging only from the background characteristics of senior officials, Canadian officials appear to have much more variety and a broader experience for foreign policy-making than do the Japanese. As senior officials are often very influential over decision-making, their broader ideas and information may help create a more flexible diplomacy, instead of one effected by narrow, inflexible ideas, typical of Japanese senior officials.

The Prime Minister

From the time the Borden Government brought the Department legally and practically within the Prime Minister's authority in 1912[15] until 1947, it was the Prime Minister of Canada who held the portfolio of Secretary of State for External Affairs. Even after that date, Louis St. Laurent, the first Secretary of State who was not a Prime Minister, was, to a large extent, under the control of the Prime Minister.[16]

"The Prime Minister," writes James Eayrs, "bears inevitably a unique responsibility for his country's external policy even if by taste and temperament he has little interest in it; and circumstances make it likely that he will have too much interest rather than too little."[17] Because the Prime Minister is the leader of the cabinet and foreign policy is his prerogative, it is difficult for him to avoid direct involvement in international relations.

In the postwar period the ties between the Prime Minister and foreign affairs have been special and close, with the exception of the Diefenbaker Cabinet. Until Pierre Trudeau replaced Lester Pearson as Prime Minister, this was so. Prime Minister Diefenbaker, who held the portfolio of Secretary of State for External Affairs himself for two periods of twelve weeks, felt that most of the officials in the Department were "partisan in the direction of the Liberal Party,"[18] because they had been appointed by that party.[19] Pierre Trudeau had neither the associations nor the experience with the leadership of the Department that his Liberal predecessors had.

In addition to the fact that special ties between the Prime Minister and foreign affairs have existed, the powers of the Canadian

Prime Minister are great. R. MacGregor Dawson explains the great powers of the Prime Minister as follows:

> They spring from his position of primacy in the Government reinforced by his leadership of the majority party, which usually owes its majority, indeed, to his leadership during the last election. The Prime Minister as such may possess virtually no legal authority; but operating through the Governor General, the Privy Council, a minister, or sometimes as a minister in his own right, his powers are very great indeed.[20]

Not only the cabinet ministers who are appointed by the Prime Minister, but also most of his Party's members are dependent on him for leadership. They recognize his pre-eminent position and accept his leadership, because "their political survival in the cabinet and in the House of Commons depends on him."[21]

In Japan, some Prime Ministers have held the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the postwar period. The first Prime Minister under the new Constitution of 1946, Yoshida Shigeru, held that portfolio for three years out of his more than seven-year term as Prime Minister. The others are Ashida Hitoshi (7 months), Kishi Nobusuke (5 months), and Sato Eisaku (1 month).[22]

However, the fact that some Japanese Prime Ministers have held the portfolio of the Minister of Foreign Affairs does not necessarily mean that they were experts in foreign affairs. Except for Yoshida and Ashida, the rest had experience related neither to this field in general, nor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[23]

Constitutionally, the Prime Minister of Japan has great power; he appoints all ministers and can dismiss any of them at will; he supervises his government and is responsible to the Diet for reporting external and internal affairs. His power extends to the control of police power in

emergency situations and to the ultimate decision to order the military force to be sent out. His authority is superior to the Chairman of the National Defence Council.[24]

In practice, the power of the Prime Minister of Japan is drastically weakened by the presence of a unique form of factionalism which creates intraparty factional struggles. The Prime Minister's efforts, therefore, are spent on keeping his position safe, and he devotes himself more to factions for support, than to influencing other parts of the policy-making process in the direction he desires. All Prime Ministers, particularly after the merger of the Liberal and the Democratic Parties into the Liberal Democratic Party in 1955, have lacked control over the Party, as a whole.[25]

This lack of leadership of Japan's Prime Minister may also be explained by the fact that since 1947, eight Prime Ministers have presided over eighteen Cabinets.[26] Almost every year in the 23-year period, the Prime Minister of Japan has dissolved and formed a Cabinet. Furthermore, the average term of a Prime Minister from 1947 through to the end of 1969 is only 33 months, although some Prime Ministers such as Yoshida, Ikeda and Sato have been in power longer. It is only half the average term of the Canadian Prime Ministers in the same period (1946-1968). The longer average term seems to indicate a much stronger hold on leadership.

Thus, there is a considerable difference between Prime Ministers of Japan and Canada in terms of their control over the Party. The Canadian Prime Minister possesses virtually no legal authority, but in practice his power is so enormous; on the other hand, the Prime Minister of Japan has considerable legal power, but in practice it is decidedly

weakened by Japan's unique factionalism.

There have been six Prime Ministers in Canada since the end of the War. Only one, Lester Pearson, was an ex-bureaucrat. Among the eight postwar Prime Ministers in Japan, only two (Tetsu Katayama and Tanzan Ishibashi), were non-bureaucrats and neither of them held their Prime Ministership for more than eight months.

In spite of their characteristic of bureaucratic background, the Japanese Prime Ministers generally lack leadership and experience in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This, intermingled with their short-lived term and their lack of leadership in the Cabinet, allows more power to senior officials of the Foreign Ministry in the foreign policy-making process. The Canadian Prime Minister, on the other hand, has better control over senior officials in the Department of External Affairs, mainly owing to his strong leadership in the Cabinet and the long-established fact that foreign policy is his prerogative.

The Cabinet

The Cabinet is the ultimate decision-making body both in internal and external policies. Under the leadership of the Prime Minister, most of foreign and defence policies are made among the Prime Minister and other Cabinet members whose departments are directly involved in phases of international relations. Besides the Foreign Minister (or the Secretary of State for External Affairs), the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Trade and Industry and the Minister of National Defence (or Director General of the National Defence Agency) are often directly involved in foreign and defence policy decision-making.

This section attempts to make a comparison of the Ministers of these two countries in terms of longevity, education and effectiveness of appointment to their portfolios. If a Minister is too short-lived, he may not be able to exploit his own skill and knowledge in order to form a dominant policy. If he is appointed to the portfolio in disregard of his special background, he may not be able to co-operate with his Departmental officials and, as a result, may cause the people to be dissatisfied with the government policy itself.

In the period 1946-1968, five Prime Ministers of Canada made altogether 153 Ministerial appointments. The number of Japanese Ministers, 521, appointed by eight Prime Ministers in the same period is more than three times as many as the Canadian appointments. There were about 20 to 24 members in each Canadian Cabinet in the 23-year period.

On the other hand, five hundred and twenty-one Japanese Ministers were appointed to approximately seventeen posts in each Cabinet in the same period. This means that the average term of Ministers in Japan is

only 9 months, while that of Canadians is 3 years and 5 months.

In the period 1946-1968, there were seven Secretaries of State for External Affairs, eight Ministers of Finance, seven Ministers of Trade and Commerce and seven Ministers of National Defence in Canada.[27] In Japan, in the same period, the number of these Ministers is sometimes double and triple: fourteen Foreign Ministers, fourteen Ministers of Finance and twenty-three Ministers of International Trade and Industry. Even the National Defence Agency, which was established as late as 1952, has been presided over by twenty-two Directors General, who also held the title of Minister of State.[28]

The average terms of not only Cabinet Ministers in general, but also those Ministers most related to foreign and defence policies, differ greatly between Canada and Japan. The average terms for Foreign Minister, Minister of Finance, Trade and Commerce Minister and Minister of National Defence (or Director General of the Defence Agency) are 39 months, 34 months, 39 months and 39 months repectively in Canada, compared with 19 months, 19 months, 12 months and 9 months respectively in Japan.

In addition to the longevity of Canadian Ministers, they had a higher level of education. In particular, among the seven Secretaries of State for External Affairs, six had more than one university degree. Three were university professors, and the other four were: lecturer at a university, lawyers (2), and financier. Although the level of education is lower among other Ministers, seven out of twenty-seven Ministers in the other three Departments had experience in university teaching. Five others practised law. Those lacking any university degree comprised a a fairly small minority.

TABLE 7.

The Number of Ministers in Postwar Cabinets of Canada and Japan

Canada

Prime Minister	Period	Number of Ministers
W.L. Mackenzie King	Oct. 1935 - Nov. 1948	25 (since 1946)
Louis S. St. Laurent	Nov. 1948 - June 1957	32
John G. Diefenbaker	June 1957 - April 1963	34
Lester B. Pearson	April 1963 - April 1968	34
Pierre E. Trudeau	April 1968	24 (up to end of 1968)
	Total	153

Japan

Prime Minister	Period	Number of Ministers
Shigeru Yoshida, 1st.	May 1946 - May 1947	24
Tetsu Katayama	May 1947 - March 1948	21
Hitoshi Ashida	March 1948 - Oct. 1948	17
Shigeru Yoshida, 2nd.	Oct. 1948 - Feb. 1949	16
" 3rd.	Feb. 1949 - Oct. 1952	39
" 4th.	Oct. 1952 - May 1953	21
" 5th.	May 1953 - Dec. 1954	25
		101
Ichiro Hotoyama, 1st.	Dec. 1954 - March 1955	18
" 2nd.	March 1955 - Nov. 1955	19
" 3rd.	Nov. 1955 - Dec. 1956	18
		55
Tanzan Ishibashi	Dec. 1956 - Feb. 1957	18
Nobusuke Kishi, 1st.	Feb. 1957 - June 1958	35
" 2nd.	June 1958 - July 1960	35
		70
Hayato Ikeda, 1st.	July 1960 - Dec. 1960	20
" 2nd.	Dec. 1960 - Dec. 1963	49
" 3rd.	Dec. 1963 - Nov. 1964	36
		105
Eisaku Sato, 1st.	Nov. 1964 - Feb. 1967	62
" 2nd.	Feb. 1967 - Nov. 1968	48
" 3rd.	Nov. 1968 -	-
		110 (up to Nov. 1968)
	Total	521

Source: Canada Year Book, 1945 - 1968; Mainichi Nenkan, 1966 and 1969.

Compared with Canadian Ministers, Japanese Ministers have a lower level of education. Although among altogether 71 Ministers, there was only one lacking a university degree, those with more than one degree are very few. Among these 71 Ministers, there were two second Bachelor's degrees, two Master's degrees and two Doctor's degrees.

As far as appointment of Ministers is concerned, it seems to be much more efficient in Canada than in Japan. Japanese Ministers have often been appointed without consideration to their experience or knowledge in a particular field, and furthermore, higher appointments are given to those most often elected to the Diet and those loyal in supporting factional leaders.[29] In the past ten years, a long career as Diet man (at least five terms) has been the most important criterion of a Minister.

Canadian Ministers, on the other hand, have been comparatively more appropriately appointed and consideration seems to be given to their previous experience or study. As for their appointment, the Canadian Prime Minister is required to take religious and regional representation into consideration, as well,--a point with which the Japanese Prime Minister does not have to be concerned. However, the qualification of special skill, experience and education is still one of the most important criteria of a Canadian Minister.

Comparing these Ministers of Canada and Japan in these terms, it is evident that Canadian Ministers have much longer terms in office, higher education and more appropriate appointment than the Japanese counterparts. This means that Canadian Ministers are far better able to participate in the policy-making process, whereas in Japan, the senior officials are more influential in the process. Since Japanese

senior officials are career men who often have narrow views biased towards their specialities, national policies made under these conditions ultimately lack flexibility and breadth.

The People and Opposition Parties

Both in Canada and Japan a foreign policy is a Cabinet decision, however different the influence of senior officials may be in the foreign policy-making process between the two. The Cabinet must explain foreign policies to the House and to the people to secure support for them. It must represent public opinion in external and internal policies as much as possible.

However, it is not uncommon for a gap to exist between government policy and public opinion. The political representation of Canada and Japan may be roughly divided into three parts: the distribution of seats by parties in the House; the support of parties by the people (shown in election results and various popularity polls); and public opinion on foreign policy issues.[30]

The gap between the government and the people very often reflects a difference between the first and the third parts. Nevertheless, it is important to know what this difference is. To know the difference is to be aware when the people feel that their present comfortable life is endangered—this is the time when a political crisis takes place.

One of the means to determine the difference is the public opinion poll. In Canada, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion takes public opinion polls in virtually every field. Canada's Government and Department of External Affairs, however, have neither the proper channels of communication with the public nor the facilities for the systematic study of public opinion on foreign policy. "In the past," says R. Barry Farrell, "the attitude within the Government concerning Canadian public opinion seemed to be associated with the assumption that there were wide areas of foreign policy for

which the Canadian public appeared to allow the Government to do whatever it wished within very broad limits."[31]

Today, the information about public demand on foreign and defence policies comes not only from the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, but also from such sources as newspapers, academic groups, and other private organizations. For example, the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, the most important committee for members of the House of Commons in international relations, had many witnesses, the majority of them coming from outside the government.[32] The Department of External Affairs and the government as a whole, are now trying to ameliorate the accusation formerly voiced of their aloof attitude to the people.

In Japan, one example of crisis caused by too great a difference between the government policy and the public demand occurred when the Kishi Cabinet was forced to resign, after passing the renewal of the Security Treaty with the U.S. in 1960. This incident resulted in the establishment of an independent Public Information Unit in the Prime Minister's Office in July, 1960. The Unit has put more stress, among other things, on public opinion of special issues that the government is about to make or has made a decision on.[33]

In addition, Japanese nation-wide newspapers also take public opinion polls on general as well as special issues. Unlike Canadian newspapers, at least three newspapers in Japan--Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, and Yomiuri Shimbun--are quite capable of analyzing the public opinion shown in their own opinion poll results.

However, as far as the communication between the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and the people is concerned, Japan critically lacks meaningful channels of communication. Departmental or governmental publications on foreign and defence policies available to the people are very limited in terms of quality as well as quantity. Although there are an increasing number of publications about party policies on special issues, information published by the Japanese Government or Ministry is hardly known to the people, unless it comes via newspapers or other mass media.

Even in the communication system between the government and the people, the people are, in general, often indifferent to foreign and defence policies. Particularly in Canada, where there is less national unification, the people often react neither positively nor negatively to foreign policy issues, unless the government disregards public opinion too flagrantly.[34]

Both in Canada and Japan, there are opposition parties, representing a large part of the people, in Parliament. The concerns and needs of a political system today have grown too fast, too complex, and too specialized for the popularly elected representatives to provide effective control over every foreign and defence policy issue.[35] Nevertheless, opposition parties are, without a doubt, bodies with the most power to prevent domination by the government. One means to achieve this is to gain more seats in the House.

The two major parties in Canada, the Progressive Conservative and Liberal Parties, are "alternating in and out of power in part as the mood of the country,"[36] sharing a relatively equal balance of power. An important aspect of Canada's political parties, according to J.R. Mallory,

is that "at any given time only one party is in tune with a national mood—and that party is likely to stay in power until the mood changes and leaves it politically high and dry."[37]

The New Democratic Party (formerly, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation), which is a "mass" party compared with "cadre" parties of the Liberals and the Conservatives,[38] has never been the "one party in tune with a national mood." As a result, Canada's official opposition has been formed either by the Liberal or the Conservative Party. Both Parties, as far as foreign and defence policies are concerned, support basically the same principles.

In Japan there were, until 1955, numerous conservative parties of varying names. In the fall of 1955, the conservative parties (at that time there were two, the Liberal and the Democratic Parties) merged into a new party—the Liberal Democratic Party. At the same time, the Socialist parties, the Right-wing, the Left-wing, and the Labour Farmer Party formed the Japan Socialist Party. In 1960, the Democratic Socialist Party split off from the Socialist Party, and, in 1964, the religious group, the Sokagakkai, established its own party called the Fair Play Party. Although these changes have occurred in the Japanese political parties, the opposition has been, since 1949, the collective group of progressive parties. Before the 1955 merger, there were some conservative parties other than the majority party, but they could hardly be called "the opposition."

One of the significant differences between the Canadian and Japanese oppositions is that, in Canada, the opposition and the government stand on basically the same principles of foreign and defence policies, whereas the Japanese opposition and the government differ

fundamentally in ideology.

Secondly, perhaps largely owing to this ideological divergence, the Japanese Socialist opposition has only once been in power, and then, only in a coalition.

More contrast between the two countries can be seen in the number of seats the respective oppositions occupy. In the past eight general elections in Canada, the Liberals have held an average of 49 per cent of the seats in the House of Commons in comparison with 38 per cent for the Conservatives. Contrasted with this, the conservatives in Japan, in the period 1947-1955, have averaged sixty-seven per cent of the total number of seats in the five House of Representatives elections. The progressive parties altogether in the same period held only 28 per cent. Since the mergers of the LDP and JSP in 1955 up to the recent election in 1969, the average percentages of the Liberal Democrats and Socialists have been 60 and 29 respectively. Because of their slight chance of winning power in the Diet and their ideological gap, the opposition in Japan appears to have less effect in preventing the government's domination than the Canadian opposition.

Moreover, there always exists a gap between the percentages of the seats in the House and of popular vote in elections. The Canadian Conservative Party has won an average of 36 per cent of the popular vote in the past eight general elections compared to 38 per cent of the seats, while, at the same time, the Liberal Party has won an average of 42 per cent of the popular vote compared to 49 per cent of the seats.

Among the Japanese parties, too, almost the same gap exists. In the five elections prior to the 1955 merger, the conservatives won

63 per cent of the popular vote and 67 per cent of the seats, compared with the progressives (excepting Independents) who won 28 per cent of the popular vote and 28 per cent of the seats. In the remaining five elections (1958-1969), the Liberal Democrats, in contrast to winning 60 per cent of the seats, have won only 53 per cent of the popular vote, while, in the same period, the Socialists have won 27 per cent compared to 29 per cent of the seats.

Another important factor is that Canadian opposition party members often become members of important committees on international relations. For example, the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, in May 1967, elected a Conservative member for its vice-chairman and had many other opposition party members among the twenty-four total.[40] This Committee used to have little to do with the actual formation of policy, but since the fall of 1968, under its new name, the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence began to display a "remarkable demonstration of activity."[41]

Unlike Canada's case, the role of the Japanese opposition party members is very restricted in committees which place emphasis on foreign and defence policies. As a consequence, the government party, the Liberal Democratic Party, dominates proceedings whenever it is willing to pay the price of doing so.

Moreover, opposition members in general, have a difficult time obtaining detailed information on foreign relations, compared to the government party members. The establishment of the Parliamentary Research Centre in Ottawa in late 1968 was, in this respect, a great advantage for Canadian opposition members. The Research Centre is designed to provide

non-partisan information and research to any member of Parliament.

Compared with this, Japanese opposition members, in spite of their other disadvantages, have, for a long time, had a non-partisan research section in the National Diet Library. This research section--the Research and Legislation Reference Bureau--was designed with a purpose similar to that of the new Canadian Parliamentary Research Centre in Ottawa.

Taking all these aspects into perspective, the Japanese opposition parties are still less influential over the government than those in Canada in the formation of foreign and defence policies. This lack of influence by the opposition may be related to the rather narrow and relatively inflexible foreign policy of Japan. Conversely, the strong influence of the Canadian opposition tends to make Canada's foreign policy more flexible and much broader.

TABLE 8

Results of General Elections: Canada (1949-68)

	1949			1953			1957			1958		
	Seats	A	B	Seats	A	B	Seats	A	B	Seats	A	B
Progressive Conservatives	41	29.7	15.6	51	31.0	19.2	112	38.9	42.3	208	53.6	78.5
Liberal	193	49.5	73.7	171	48.8	64.5	105	40.9	39.6	49	33.6	18.5
New Democratic (or CCF)	13	13.4	5.0	23	11.3	8.7	25	10.7	9.4	8	9.5	3.0
Social Credit	10	2.3	3.8	15	5.4	5.7	19	6.6	7.2	0	2.6	0.0
Others	5	5.1	1.9	5	3.5	1.9	4	2.9	1.5	0	0.7	0.0
Total .	262	100.0	100.0	265	100.0	100.0	265	100.0	100.0	265	100.0	100.0

	1962			1963			1965			1968		
	Seats	A	B	Seats	A	B	Seats	A	B	Seats	A	B
Progressive Conservatives	116	37.3	43.8	95	32.8	35.8	97	32.4	36.6	72	31.4	27.3
Liberal	100	37.2	37.7	129	41.7	48.7	131	40.2	49.4	155	45.5	58.7
New Democratic (or CCF)	19	13.5	7.2	17	13.6	6.4	21	17.9	7.9	22	17.0	8.3
Social Credit	30	11.7	11.3	24	11.9	9.1	5	3.7	1.9	0	0.8	0.0
Ralliement de Creditistes	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	4.6	3.4	14	4.4	5.3
Others	0	0.3	0.0	-	-	-	2	1.2	0.8	1	0.9	0.4
Total	265	100.0	100.0	265	100.0	100.0	265	100.0	100.0	264	100.0	100.0

Note: A = Percentages of popular vote; B = Percentages of seats
Source: J. Murry Beck, Pendulum of Power, Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., Scarborough, Ontario (1968).

Results of General Elections: Japan (1947-1969)

	1947			1949			1952			1953			1955		
	Seats	A	B	Seats	A	B	Seats	A	B	Seats	A	B	Seats	A	B
Liberal	131	26.9	28.1	-	-	-	240	47.9	51.4	-	-	-	112	26.6	24.0
Democratic	121	25.0	26.0	69	15.7	14.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	185	36.6	39.6
People's Conservative	29	7.0	6.2	14	3.4	3.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Democratic Liberal	-	-	-	264	43.9	56.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Progressive	-	-	-	-	-	-	85	18.2	18.2	76	17.9	16.3	-	-	-
Hatoyama Liberal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	8.8	7.5	-	-	-
Yoshida Liberal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	199	39.0	42.7	-	-	-
Socialist	143	26.2	30.7	48	13.5	10.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Left-wing Socialist	-	-	-	-	-	-	54	9.6	11.6	72	13.1	15.4	89	15.3	19.1
Right-wing Socialist	-	-	-	-	-	-	57	11.6	12.2	66	13.5	14.2	67	13.9	14.3
Labour Farmer	-	-	-	7	2.0	1.5	4	0.7	0.9	5	1.0	1.1	4	1.0	0.9
Communist	4	3.7	0.8	35	9.9	7.5	0	2.6	0.0	1	1.9	0.2	2	2.0	0.4
Others	25	5.4	5.4	17	5.2	3.6	7	2.6	1.0	1	0.4	0.2	2	1.3	0.4
Independents	13	5.8	2.8	12	6.6	2.6	19	6.8	4.1	11	4.4	2.4	6	3.3	1.3
Total	466	100.0	100.0	466	100.0	100.0	466	100.0	100.0	466	100.0	100.0	467	100.0	100.0

	1958			1960			1963			1967			1969		
	Seats	A	B	Seats	A	B	Seats	A	B	Seats	A	B	Seats	A	B
Liberal Democratic	287	57.8	61.5	296	57.5	63.3	283	54.7	60.6	277	48.8	57.0	288	47.7	59.2
Socialist	166	32.9	35.5	145	27.5	31.0	144	29.0	30.8	140	27.9	28.8	90	21.4	18.5
Democratic Socialist	-	-	-	17	8.7	3.6	23	7.4	4.9	30	7.4	6.2	31	7.7	6.4
Communist	1	2.6	0.6	3	2.9	0.6	5	4.0	1.0	5	4.8	1.0	14	6.8	2.9
Fair Play	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	5.4	5.1	47	10.9	9.7
Others	1	0.7	0.2	1	0.3	0.2	0	0.2	0.0	0	0.2	0.0	0	0.2	0.0
Independents	12	6.0	2.6	5	2.8	1.0	12	4.8	2.5	9	5.5	1.9	16	5.3	3.3
Total	467	100.0	100.0	467	100.0	100.0	467	100.0	100.0	486	100.0	100.0	486	100.0	100.0

Note: A = Percentages of popular vote; B = Percentages of seats.
Source: Robert Ward, Japan's Political System, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1967), and Asahi Shimbun, December 28, 1969.

PART THREE

I. The First Period (1947-1953)
   a. The Conclusion of NATO
   b. The First Security Treaty between Japan and the U.S.

II. The Second Period (1957-1963)
   a. The Conclusion of NORAD
   b. The Renewal of the Security Treaty

III. The Third Period (1966-1969)
   a. The Renewal of NORAD and NATO
   b. The Automatic Extension of the Security Treaty

Japan and Canada provide a good contrast with each other in many respects--geography, population, history, and political culture. However, in the postwar period, both countries share close relations with the U.S., particularly in terms of military co-operation.

In the late Forties and early Fifties, Canada was one of the strongest nations in the West, whereas Japan's dream of establishing "a Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" collapsed, and the country fell under the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Under these circumstances, the conditions of joining in the military alliance with the U.S. were entirely different. By fostering the idea of NATO, a multilateral alliance, the Canadian political leaders sought to bring North America into an alliance with western Europe, in particular with Britain and France.

On the other hand, while Japan had undergone complete reconstruction by way of Westernization (or democratization in another sense), it had no choice but to join a bilateral military alliance with the U.S. Japan's alliance with the U.S. was hastened into being and strengthened by Mao's announcement that he would form the Peking Government and by the outbreak of the Korean War.

Throughout the Fifties, the revival of western Europe was rapid, and, at the end of the decade, Canada was no longer a big power. Concomitant with its reduced importance in NATO, this vast and rich land was threatened by possible Soviet air attack over the North Pole. The increasing antagonism between the U.S. and the Soviet Union sparked the beginning of the North America Air Defence Command agreement between the U.S. and Canada. Thus, Canada reverted to heavy dependence on the U.S.,

from which it previously had been most anxious to escape.

As for Japan's alliance with the U.S., external and internal conditions were quite different from Canada's. Instability in the Far Eastern and Southeast Asian regions continued in the Fifties, at the time Japan was making a comeback as an economically powerful country. The more Japan's economy grew stable and expanded, the more it became necessary for the U.S. to pay attention to Japan. Consequently, the unequal military alliance between the two changed to one of mutual cooperation in security and economy. In contrast with Canada, Japanese political leaders were still reluctant to assume increasing responsibility for peace and prosperity in East Asia.

In the Sixties, the U.S. domination in NATO and NORAD continued, while, at the same time, Canada's strategic role in both alliances was gradually reduced. Although Canada became less influential over European affairs and gradually decreased in military strength, expenditures on modern expensive weapons did not decrease proportionally. Nonetheless, at the end of the Sixties, it has decided to remain in the U.S dominated alliances.

Japan has been expanding in military strength rather significantly, but its tremendous economic growth is incomparable. At the end of this decade, Japan's GNP ranked third in the world. Its military strength is one of the largest in the East Asian region, including Communist China. Economically, Japan is a giant among nations.

The military alliance between the U.S. and Japan does not take the one-man command system under the direction of the U.S., as found in NATO and NORAD. The U.S. supervisional service in the Japanese armed

forces has been greatly reduced, whereas Canada's forces have become almost integrated as a small part of the U.S. military forces.

These trends in Canada-U.S. and Japan-U.S. military relations can be examined in three periods: (1) 1947-1953, (2) 1957-1963, (3) 1966-1969. The first period centers on the conclusion of NATO and the first Security Treaty. The second period deals with the exchange of the NORAD agreement and the conclusion of the second Security Treaty. The last period focuses on the renewal and automatic extension of NORAD and NATO, and the automatic extension of the Security Treaty.

THE FIRST PERIOD (1947-1953)

The Conclusion of NATO

(1) The Government Policy

One year after the end of the Second World War, the western Allied powers in Europe drastically reduced their forces. While the Soviet armed forces remained virtually unchanged at more than four million men, the U.S., Britain and Canada, the three strongest Allied powers, reduced their total number of men under arms from five million to less than one million. The western Allies, thus, were outnumbered by the Soviet Union four to one in 1946. It took the West more than one year and a great effort on the part of the British Prime Minister[1] to react to the Communist threat in the region.

In March 1947, the American President finally asked Congress for four hundred million dollars to assist Greece and Turkey against the threat of Communism.[2] At this time, the U.S. was not considering involvement in the political affairs in Europe, but rather economic aid. The economic aid motive was further heightened by the establishment of a European Recovery Programme (the Marshall Plan).

Unfortunately, the implementation of the Plan played a contributing part to splitting Europe into east and west. The Plan, which also offered aid to the countries of eastern Europe, was refused by the Soviet Union. At this time, Canada began its "crusade" for a North Atlantic Treaty.[3]

In early 1948, at the National Liberal Federation, Prime Minister Mackenzie King supported the British view that it was an urgent necessity

to rally the forces of Western civilization to stem further encroachment of the Soviet tide in Europe. "Force has not in itself," said the Prime Minister, "the power to create better conditions. But a measure of security is the first essential."[4]

The great step taken by Mackenzie King towards collective defence, however, came only after persuasion from senior officers in the Department of External Affairs.[5] After heavy involvement in the War, the Prime Minister was deeply pessimistic and began to retreat to his pre-war isolationism.

Only a month after the Prime Minister's speech, the Soviet Union supported the Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia. Not only did this incident hasten the conclusion of the Brussels Treaty between Britain, France and the Benelux countries,[6] it also convinced the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, to organize a collective defence force in which Canada and the U.S. would participate. On the topic of allying western Europe with North America, Louis St. Laurent spoke in the House of Commons on April 29, 1948, as follows:

> One thing we must constantly keep in mind as we approach this fateful decision is that the western European democracies are not beggars asking for our charity. They are allies whose assistance we need in order to be able to defend ourselves successfully and our beliefs. Canada and the United States need the assistance of the western European democracies just as they need ours.[7]

To seek a regional defence within the framework of the North Atlantic community became a firm governmental policy.

After the Vandenberg Resolution was passed by the U.S. Congress[8] in June 1948, negotiations between the Brussels Treaty powers, the U.S. and Canada began in Washington. The negotiations at the ministerial

level took a full eight months before arriving at the final draft of the treaty.

During lengthy negotiations, the scope of alliance came into question. While the U.S. and the European countries were primarily interested in economic aid, Canada urged that the North Atlantic Treaty cover the widest possible ground.[9] Lester Pearson, External Affairs Minister, expressed his ideas on the alliance in the House of Commons:

> In the past, alliances and leagues have been formed to meet emergencies and have been dissolved as the emergencies vanished. It must not be so this time. An Atlantic union must have a deeper meaning and deeper roots. It must create conditions for a kind of co-operation which goes beyond the immediate emergency.[10]

With this in mind, Canada fought for the incorporation of Article 2, which dealt with political institutions and economic co-operation, into the Treaty.[11]

The North Atlantic Treaty was finally concluded by thirteen North American and western European countries in Washington on April 4, 1949, and ratified in Parliament on April 29, 1949.

(2) The Opposition and the Public

On March 28, 1949 the draft of the North Atlantic Treaty was first brought before the Parliament of Canada. In spite of the Liberal Government's late submission to the House, George Drew, Leader of the Opposition, expressed the Conservative Party's view that they approved the draft wholeheartedly.[12] Traditionally in favour of Britain and less in favour of the U.S., the Conservative Party accepted the Liberal Government's policy. Since Britain had diminished in power relative

to the U.S. in the postwar period, Canada, threatened by U.S. control, desperately needed a counterweight to it.[13] Under these circumstances, the government's call to bring the U.S. into the alliance with Europe, in particular, with Britain and France, was "wholeheartedly" accepted by the opposition.

The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation also supported the government's policy. The National President and Leader of the Party, M.J. Coldwell, went as far as saying he would resign if the Party did not support the Treaty, even though CCF provincial organizations in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and British Columbia opposed it.[14]

In the ten months between July, 1948 and April, 1949, not much was known by the Canadian public about what had been going on behind the scenes. However, the political leaders predicted that "the public would be much more ready to support a treaty with a constructive aim than a mere military alliance."[15] This prediction won great support from the Canadian voters in the June 1949 election, increasing the Liberal seats from 125 in 1945 to 193 and its popular vote from 40.9 per cent in 1945 to 49.5 per cent.

(3) Military Co-operation with the U.S.

It was not considered that the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty would increase Canadian defence expenditures, but rather reduce them, since the Treaty would result in a "pooling of the defence forces of the allies which would be more efficient than unco-ordinated defence forces."[16] Contrary to expectation, the defence expenditures increased

from $385 million in 1949 to $1,882.5 million in 1952.

The main factor for the increase of the budgetary expenditures of defence was not membership in NATO, but rather involvement in the Korean War.[17] However, Canada's rearmament, required by the conclusion of the Treaty, accounted for a large part of the expenditures.

In addition to this, Canada's military co-operation with the U.S. was revived in October, 1949, when the Permanent Joint Board on Defence decided to initiate a new programme for reciprocal military procurement. One year later, having been stimulated by the outbreak of the Korean War in May, 1950, the two governments affirmed the decision to develop co-operation in production of military essentials.[18]

The imbalance of this co-operation was revealed in the early 1950's. The American purchases in Canada amounted to $100 million in 1951, which was five times more than Canada originally anticipated. It reached as much as $300 million in the succeeding fiscal year. However, Canada spent $850 million on defence purchases in the U.S. in less than two years (April 1, 1951 to December 31, 1952).[19]

Furthermore, the drastic increase in defence purchases led the Canadian Government to establish a new Department of Defence Production. The imbalance of Canadian purchases from the U.S. showed that the military co-operation might increase Canada's heavy economic dependence on the U.S.

Canada's circumstances in the period between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Korean War provide a sharp contrast with those of Japan. Canada was not only on the victors' side, but also was the third strongest power among the western Allies at the end

of the War when Japan suffered total destruction and control by SCAP.

Canada had been, in history and in culture, closely related to the U.S., Britain and France. Through these relations, it strove in its own interests to bring these countries into the alliance with North America. Japan, on the other hand, had no choice but to accede to the alliance with the U.S. In this period, international as well as domestic situations differed greatly between Japan and Canada.

The First Security Treaty between Japan and the U.S.

(1) The Government Policy

The proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan provided the groundwork for the erection of an "Asian bastion" against Russian Communism. The U.S., though it had almost complete control over Japan's occupation, strongly supported the establishment of Japan's own armed forces.[20] Formation of self-defence forces was a far cry from the SCAP policy of democratization and demilitarization.

While Canada had a chance to ease its heavy dependence on the U.S. by exploiting the threat of Communism in Europe, the tense atmosphere of the Cold War meant, for Japan, only tightening of U.S.-Japan relations. First of all, Japan, unlike Canada, was not an independent and strong nation at the time. Secondly, the international situation, particularly the establishment of the Peking Government in October 1949, stimulated a closer alliance with the U.S. Thirdly, although Japan's economy had been rapidly recovering, instability was still rife on the political and

social scene.[21] And finally, the Korean War, which began before Japan's independence, without a doubt became a main factor forcing it to stay militarily allied with the U.S.

When the U.S. was heavily drawn into the Korean War, the economic aid to Japan became an oppressive burden.[22] The American intention to ease this burden coincided with the evident anticipation of the Japanese leaders and of the anxious public to regain their independence from the six-year long occupation.

Three years prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the conservative government of Japan had already decided to have the U.S. reinforce Japan's defence, rather than relying upon the United Nations.[23] But there were no further developments in this direction until January, 1951, when U.S. Secretary of State, John Dulles, came to Japan. The U.S. representative and the Japanese Government reached an immediate understanding that "there could be no peace treaty and independence unless Japan's security was guaranteed."[24]

Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, the Security Treaty was not a treaty of mutual security. Through this Treaty, Japan, unable to afford rearming itself politically and economically, was to depend on the U.S. to maintain "certain of its armed forces in and about Japan." The armed forces stationed in Japan were to be used to counteract not only outside aggression, but also any large-scale disturbances within Japan. However, throughout the closed negotiations, Japan devoted itself to improving "close relations and friendship," rather than pressing the U.S. for an automatic provision similar to the one in the North Atlantic Treaty.[25]

Moreover, Article 3 of the Treaty left the disposition of "the

U.S. troops in and about Japan" to be discussed in administrative agreements between the two countries.[26] There were two main reasons for the postponement. One was that the matter concerned was "mainly of a purely technical nature," and "a considerable amount of time would be lost" in reviewing them with the Americans--time which Japan could ill afford, because it might "let slip the opportunity presented to Japan to conclude an early peace treaty."[27] The other reason was that

> the same sort of talks were then in progress between the United States and the nations of western Europe for the stationing of United States forces in those countries in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty signed in April 1949, and it seemed to us (Japanese) an advantage for both parties if the terms eventually to be agreed upon between the United States and the countries of western Europe were available for reference, and such a procedure was likely to prove advantageous to (Japan).[28]

Following the example of NATO, Japan replaced, jointly with the U.S., the Administrative Agreement in 1953, which had originally given the U.S. extra-territorial rights, with one similar to "the Agreement between the Partners of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces."[29]

(2) The Opposition and the Public

The greatest difference in the process of defence alliance of Canada and of Japan was the degree of support the opposition parties gave to the government. While in Canada the government's policy towards multilateral military alliance was unanimously upheld by the opposition parties, the opposition in Japan stood entirely opposed to the government. The government's policy on security did not ease the uncertainty

of the public who felt U.S. troops in Japan might hinder the course of its independence, or lead to another war.[30]

On July 8, 1950, immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War, the government announced to the public the establishment of a Police Reserve of 75,000 men, without informing the Diet. The opposition had no chance to decide or even discuss what the Police Reserve would do.[31] This faux pas by the conservative government provoked the opposition to strongly oppose the government. In the eyes of the opposition, the establishment of the Police Reserve was not only unconstitutional, but also completely against the Potsdam Declaration which called for Japan's complete demilitarization.[32]

In addition to this, the Liberal Government made another blunder which aggravated the opposition's antagonism toward the conservatives. This was committed by ratifying the Security Treaty together with the Peace Treaty. The opposition found most provocative the preamble, which included the phrase: "Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defence against direct and indirect aggression." The phrase clearly indicated the possibility that Japan, which had already established the Police Reserve, would rush into rearmament. Both opposition parties and a large number of the Japanese people attacked the government, through the mass media and street demonstrations, in an attempt to eliminate the phrase from the Treaty.

Disregarding the dissatisfaction of the opposition, the government passed the Security Treaty 289 to 71 in the House of Representatives and 147 to 76 in the House of Councellors.

Of more significance than the difference of opinion on military

alliance was the uproar on the matter of the Administrative Agreement. Contrary to its promise to follow the example of NATO, which required member nations to obtain a simple majority support in Parliament, the Japanese Government ratified the Administrative Agreement without following the proper procedure of having a simple majority in the Diet, rationalizing that it was not considered a treaty.[33]

In a public opinion poll taken by Mainichi Shimbun on September 13-14, 1951, results showed that the government's policy was in great favour.[34] This did not mean that the public supported its policy "wholeheartedly," as Canadian Conservatives did. It seems they did so with the feeling of inevitability. It may be reasonably postulated that signs of their anxiety over the government policy towards bilateral military alliance were revealed in the two election results of 1952 and 1953; the Socialist Parties (Left- and Right-wing) increased their seats in the lower house from 48 in 1949 to 111 in 1952 and to 138 in 1953, and the percentages of popular votes from 13.5 in 1949 to 21.2 in 1952 and to 26.6 in 1953.

(3) Military Co-operation with the U.S.

Consideration of the possibility of establishing Japan's own armed forces started as early as in 1947. Foreign Minister Ashida daringly added the clause: "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph . . ." to the beginning of the second paragraph of Article 9 of the new Japanese Constitution. By this, he meant that Japan should be able to maintain the right of self-defence.[35]

However, it was not until the New Year of 1950 that General MacArthur, SCAP, proclaimed that the new Constitution would not deter Japan from establishing its own self-defence forces. Japan was ordered to immediately form a Police Reserve of 75,000 and a Marine Security of 8,000 men.

Since most of the former Japanese military officers were purged by SCAP after the War, the entire management of the Police Reserve during the first half-year came under the direction of the U.S. commander.[36] From the beginning, close military co-operation with the U.S. was inevitable. In spite of the nation's anti-war sentiment, Japanese youth were attracted by the relatively high wages and the name "Police Reserve."[37]

In the deteriorating situation of the Korean War, the new Police Reserve "naturally" co-operated with the U.S. troops on Japanese soil. Not until April, 1952, was the 8,000 strong Maritime Guard formed. It, too, came under the American command, borrowing all equipment from the U.S.[38] Moreover, in August, 1952, a Security Agency was appended to the Prime Minister's Office. At the same time, the Police Reserve increased to 110,000. Both the Police Reserve and the Maritime Guard were completely modernized, and their budgetary expenditures were increased from $86.1 million to $164.3 million.

Further steps to rearm Japan were taken in 1953, when the Korean armistice came into effect. The end of the War resulted in a decrease in special war procurements from the U.S. to Japan ($809 million in 1953; $596 million in 1954).[39] The Japanese economy once again became very unsteady. It was at this time that the U.S. announced its plan to include Japan in the Mutual Security Assistance programme (MSA).

After lengthy and heated negotiations, the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (MDA) between Japan and the U.S. was signed on March 8, 1954.

Through this Agreement, "special procurements" stayed at the 500 million-dollar level throughout the rest of the 1950's. In addition to the procurements, military aid (in the form of gifts) and economic aid (mainly in loan form), which had been cut out in 1953, gradually increased. Most of the new equipment for the National Security Force (this had developed from the Police Reserve in 1952, with the addition of a Maritime Security of 6,000 men) was provided by the U.S.

Only three months after the conclusion of MDA, the Security Agency further evolved into the National Defence Agency. The Security Force (army) and the Maritime Guard became the Ground Self-Defence Force and the Maritime Self-Defence Force. Moreover, a new Air Self-Defence Force was added, which was filled by officers who had been trained in the U.S. Air Force.[40]

While Canada exploited the multilateral alliance in order to ease the encroaching control of the U.S., Japan was drawn increasingly into closer relations with the latter. It almost appeared as if the Pacific War had never existed.

TABLE 10.

Total Budgetary Expenditures and Military Expenditures
(1951 - 1957)
in millions of U.S. dollars

	Canada			Japan		
Year	Total(A)	Military(B)	B/A	Total(A)	Military(B)	B/A
1951	2,711	731	27%	2,083	352	17%
1952	3,489	1,352	39	2,428	507	21
1953	4,054	1,842	45	2,825	348	12
1954	4,066	1,733	43	2,891	375	13
1955	3,996	1,778	40	2,828	378	13
1956	4,143	1,652	40	2,970	397	13
1957	4,532	1,667	37	3,299	425	13

Note: B includes expenses of National Defence, Defence Production (or Defence Establishment) and Industry. All figures are calculated on the base of the U.S. dollar which is equivalent to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360 regardless of fluctuation.

Source: Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Speech, 1952-58, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa; Japan, Prime Minister's Office, Nihon Tokei Nen'kan, 1962 and 1963, Tokyo.

TABLE 11.

Military Strength, 1951 - 1957

	Canada				Japan			
Year	Total	CRN	CRA	CRAF	Total	MSDF	GSDF	ASDF
1951	68,427	11,082	34,986	22,359	75,000	-	75,000	-
1952	95,394	13,508	49,278	32,611	116,038	6,038	110,000	-
1953	104,427	15,546	48,458	40,423	117,000	7,000	110,000	-
1954	112,529	16,955	49,978	45,596	144,738	8,000	130,000	6,738
1955	117,005	18,806	49,447	48,750	166,000	8,500	150,000	7,500
1956	117,172	19,000	47,632	50,540	179,000	10,500	160,000	8,500
1957	119,414	19,815	47,938	51,661	184,500	15,000	160,000	9,500

Source: Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1952-58, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa; Japan, Asahi Shimbun Sha, Jieitai, Tokyo (1969).

THE SECOND PERIOD (1957-1963)

The Conclusion of NORAD

(1) The Government Policy

The diplomacy of the Liberal Government of Canada based on multiplicity of relationship reached its heyday in the middle of the 1950's. Canada expanded its prestige as a peace-keeping mediator not only between the great powers, but also between the West and the East, through the arena of the United Nations. As a member of both NATO and the U.N., it seemed Canada could provide a good channel of communication between the U.S. and Britain and France, the two strongest powers in western Europe.[41]

However, this heyday was short-lived. International circumstances in the late 1950's gradually became less favourable to Canada than they had been in the 1940's and early 1950's. European countries steadily regained their power; newly-born states in the Afro-Asian region were inclined to consider Canada as a "bourgeois" western power; Japan had risen from ashes to revive in the Pacific; China expanded its sphere of political influence throughout the world.

After a hegemony of more than two decades, the Liberal Government was replaced by the Progressive Conservative Party. Unlike the Democratic Liberals' succession to the Liberal Government in the early 1950's in Japan, the changeover in Canada was less easily accepted by the bureaucracy. In Japan, no matter which conservative party came to power, it had little trouble co-operating with the bureaucracy. Unlike Japan's case, the Conservative Government under John Diefenbaker found it

difficult to see eye to eye with the Liberal oriented higher officials of the Department of External Affairs.

Subsequently, Canada's contribution to NATO became less military and more political and economic.[42] As far as the North American continent was concerned, however, increasingly sophisticated military equipment posed a greater threat from the Soviet Union via the North Pole.

The joint air defence commands between the U.S. and Canada had been established in 1954.[43] The integration of the military co-operation with the U.S. was continued by the Conservative Government under John Diefenbaker. With a firm understanding of the operational control of the continental air defence, Prime Minister Diefenbaker accepted that "the Liberal Government had, before the general election of June 10, 1957, all but formally given its approval to the NORAD agreement."[44]

The Diefenbaker Government had no choice but to agree to the establishment of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) on September 12, 1957. However, detailed agreements for NORAD were postponed until after the twenty-fourth election of 1958.

The Conservative Party, contrary to the results of the final poll taken by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion,[45] widely increased its seats in the House of Commons from 112 in 1957 to 208, leaving only 49 seats for the Liberals. The 208 majority was unprecedented in Canada.

Within two months after the greatest victory ever of the Conservatives, steps were quickly taken towards reaching agreement on NORAD. On May 12, 1958, the Canadian Ambassador to Washington, N.A. Robertson, presented the U.S. Government with the proposal of the eleven principles on NORAD. According to the proposal, the two countries were to agree

on the "necessity for integration of operational control of Canadian and United States air defences." The system was to provide for "authoritative control of all air defence weapons which must be employed against an attacker." The purpose of the agreement was "to counter the threat and to achieve maximum effectiveness of the air defence system."[46] NORAD would not hinder the existence of the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group of arrangements for the air defence of North America. The Commander-in-Chief NORAD and his Deputy Commander would not be from the same country.

This proposal was accepted on the same day by the U.S. Government. To fulfil the purpose of the agreement, Prime Minister Diefenbaker was obligated to announce, within four months, a large expenditure for the modernization of Canada's NORAD equipment.[47] Moreover, the government had to take steps to face the nuclear age, which had been rapidly advanced by the Soviet Union and the U.S. Manned aircraft became notably less effective and the U.S. wanted the Canadian component of NORAD to be nuclear-armed, just as the American one was.[48]

The Prime Minister hinted at the eventual necessity for nuclear warheads as early as September 1958.[49] However, the mysterious and indecisive Diefenbaker policy on defence and foreign affairs continued even through the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962--the culmination of nuclear anxiety between the U.S. and the Soviet Union--until the Conservative Government was replaced by the Liberals in April, 1963.[50]

The following brief statements of Diefenbaker reveal his indecisive attitude towards nuclear weapons:

> . . . by the 1960's manned aircraft . . . will be less effective . . . It has therefore been decided to introduce the Bomarc guided missile (which) can be used with either a conventional high explo-

sive warhead or a nuclear warhead.

(September 23, 1959)

Eventually Canadian forces may require certain nuclear weapons if Canadian forces are to be kept effective . . . . the necessary weapons can be made available for Canadian defence units if and when they are required.

(House of Commons, Canada
January 18, 1960)

If and when the Canadian government should decide to equip its forces with nuclear weapons those weapons would be under Canadian control and would be used in Canada only as the result of a decision by the Canadian government.

(House of Commons, Canada
July 4, 1960)

We have made it perfectly clear that when and if nuclear weapons are required, we shall not accept them unless we have joint control.

(House of Commons, Canada
November 30, 1960)

We take the stand . . . (that) the nuclear family should not be increased so long as there is any possibility of disarmament among the nations of the world.

(House of Commons, Canada
February 26, 1962)

(2) The Opposition and the Public

With confimation that the Soviet Union now possessed the means of striking western Europe and North America, the opposition confronted the Diefenbaker Government, urging it to strengthen the military alliance with the European countries and the U.S. The important question was whether to possess nuclear weapons.

As early as 1955 the NATO Council decided that the defence of western Europe must be conducted with nuclear warheads.[51] However, the question of nuclear weapons did not become a serious issue for Canadians

until the Soviet Union announced that they had successfully fired an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) on August 26, 1957, and that they had sent Sputnik I into orbit on October 4 of the same year.

The superiority of the Soviet Union in offensive missiles gave Premier Nikita Khrushchev confidence to deliver ultimata on Berlin in late 1958 and mid-1961, to walk out from the U.N. Assembly and Disarmament Council in Geneva, and finally, to place missiles in Cuba in 1962.[52]

At the beginning of the nuclear armament race, the Liberal opposition, by and large, agreed with the Conservative Government. The Leader of the Opposition said in the House of Commons, on February 20, 1959:

> I . . . agree with the Prime Minister that anything that can be done to limit the extension of the manufacture of (nuclear) weapons should be done. I welcome his statement these nuclear weapons are not to be manufactured in Canada. Nevertheless, with regard to the nuclear warheads of Bomarc missiles and defensive weapons of that kind, it seems to me that it would be quite insupportable . . . to have Canadian air squadrons without them and United States squadrons with them.[53]

Two years later, the opposition, with its own electoral ends in mind, changed its attitude towards nuclear weapons. The Leader of the Opposition, supporting the ban-the-bomb movement in Canada, said at the opening of the National Liberal Party Conference in Ottawa in January, 1961:

> . . . (We) should not acquire or use nuclear weapons under any kind of national or joint control. The extended possession of nuclear weapons by individual nations . . . will greatly increase the difficulty of abolishing all nuclear weapons, and will also greatly increase the danger of nuclear war.[54]

The government gradually moved in the direction of disarmament. On the other hand, the opposition further reversed its policy on nuclear weapons. Paul Hellyer, senior member of the Party and later

Minister of National Defence in the Pearson Government, said in December, 1962:

> In order to resolve this dilemma (expensive but ineffective Canadian forces) I have come to the conclusion that . . . Canada should sign a bilateral agreement with the United States which will permit the supply of atomic weapons to Canadian forces . . . .[55]

Annoyed by the government's indecision on possession of nuclear weapons, the Opposition Leader, supporting the speech of Paul Hellyer, criticized the government policy. In the House of Commons, on January 25, 1963, he made the following statement:

> . . . (B)oth in NATO and in continental defence (NORAD), the Canadian Government has made certain defence pledges and has accepted certain defence commitments on behalf of Canada which can only be carried out by Canadian forces if nuclear warheads are used. . . . (I)t is humiliating and dishonourable for Canada to discharge them or put our men in a position to discharge them if they were called to do so in an emergency . . . . (W)e must be prepared to do the job in that sector until we agree to do something else . . . .[56]

The trend of Canada's foreign and defence policies is clearly illustrated in this example. It is a fact that both government and opposition in Canada are, particularly since the King era, "cadre" parties.[57] The bulk of the Japanese opposition parties was greatly restricted by the ideology of pure Marxism, and had little flexibility in their policies. But the Canadian opposition has frequently changed its policy, based on "a justification of the democratic political process as such, without any attempt to evaluate the quality of decisions resulting from this process in the light of a formulation of the public interest,"[58] but with orientation primarily towards electoral victory.

There was obvious indecision on the issue of nuclear weapons in the defence policy on the part of the Conservative Government and the

Liberal Party.[59] According to the Gallup Poll, however, the Conservatives gradually came into disfavour with the public. Unlike Japan, the Canadian public had the advantage of the right to choose between two very similar parties.

(3) Military Co-operation with the U.S.

The military integration embodied in the NORAD agreement of 1958 extended to defence production. When the plans for the Canadian Ground Environment system (CAGE) and the CF-105 Arrow were cancelled,[60] it became imperative that the Canadian defence industry gain access to the U.S. defence market. This idea was welcomed by the U.S., and quickly worked on. By September 1958, John Diefenbaker was ready to announce that the U.S. Government was now "prepared to work out production sharing agreements" with Canada.

Having established a bilateral committee on the matter in October, 1958, both governments reached agreement in mid-1959 that "the production sharing programme would cover a wide range of United States defence programmes in which Canadian industry could establish its ability to compete with American industry on the basis of technical competence, delivery and price."[61] Canada had become involved with the U.S. in defence production long before, but now it reached the point of being protected and being taught the technology of defence by the Americans. Although Canada was increasingly successful in developing its defence industry in the 1957-62 period,[62] Canada's deep involvement in the military co-operation with the U.S. seems to have put Canada in a more

difficult position to become independent of U.S. defence policy.

Moreover, in the field of military strategy, the U.S., in the period 1958-63, became very dominant in the operational control of NORAD, as it had been in NATO. First of all, the NORAD headquarters were located at Colorado Springs, Colorado. The post of Commander-in-Chief (CINCNORAD) was filled by an American general who owed his first responsibility to the U.S. President.

Secondly, CINCNORAD and the majority of officers assigned there were American. This U.S.-dominated system had the authority to control all forces, including Canadian forces, assigned to the NORAD defence system. This authority, with an American CINCNORAD at the top, had included the power of "transfer of forces from one area to another and the crossing of the U.S.-Canada boundary."[63]

Thirdly, since Canada was no longer devoted to developing a major weapons system in the military strategy of North American defence, it was largely dependent upon the newly developed weapons of the U.S.

Canada, like Japan in the 1950's, was integrated industrially and strategically into the military co-operation with the U.S. Although the Canadian and Japanese cases were rather different, both countries accepted the integration for mainly economic reasons. For Canada, it was to prevent increase of its heavy economic dependence on the U.S., by balancing its defence purchases in the U.S. with those of the U.S. in Canada; and, for Japan, it was to maintain Japan's favourable economic relations with the U.S. in general. Both entered into military co-operation under U.S. dominance, diligently attempted to alter it, but reverted to the former position of being dominated by the U.S.

The Renewal of the Security Treaty

(1) The Government Policy

The feeling of helplessness the Japanese people had towards the Security Treaty of 1950 gradually changed to an antagonism to the presence of the U.S. bases in Japan by the end of the Fifties.[64] This change of attitude helped the progressives (Socialists, Communists and other minor opposition parties) increase their popular vote as well as the seats they held in the Diet.

To confront this gradual and steady increase of the power of the opposition, a complicated struggle for hegemony among the conservatives followed, which resulted in their unification within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) under Ichiro Hatoyama. But, contrary to the conservatives' expectation, the general election of 1958 indicated a decrease for them of 5.4 per cent in popular votes and 10 seats.

In external affairs, the Hatoyama Government began to normalize Japan's relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had refused to sign the Peace Treaty at San Francisco, and constantly vetoed Japan's entrance into the U.N. After the death of Stalin and the termination of the Korean hostilities, signs of "a less unfriendly Russian attitude" appeared.[65]

It was at this time that the Hatoyama Government reverted to a less pro-American or more neutral policy. By December, 1956, the Soviet Union finally allowed Japan's admission to the world organization. However, the normalization policy of Hatoyama cost him his Prime Ministership. Hatoyama was replaced by Tanzan Ishibashi a few days after Japan's admission to the U.N. His position as Prime Minister

lasted only two months, because of ill health. In late February, 1957, Nobusuke Kishi, who had been famous for his pro-American sentiment, succeeded Ishibashi.

Since the conclusion of the first Security Treaty, Japan's economy rapidly increased in terms of GNP: $16,900 million in 1952, $22,900 million in 1955, and $28,900 million in 1957. Japan's economic revival on the international scene and unsatisfactory state of military domination by the U.S. created a confused feeling among the Japanese majority. It made them wonder whether Japan would ever be able to recover its economic power without U.S. military protection, or whether Japan could continue its economic relations with the U.S. without the U.S. military bases in Japan.[66]

Under these domestic and foreign circumstances, the Kishi Government proceeded with the revision of the first Security Treaty between Japan and the U.S. In Washington in June, 1957, Prime Minister Kisni expressed his government's desire to strengthen its defence forces in order to fight Communism. To carry through this intention, Kishi felt the 1952 Security Treaty should be revised to coincide with the "new era" of Japan-U.S. relationships.[67] Although the U.S. negotiators in Washington did not agree with the revision of the Treaty at that time, the American attitude rapidly grew more flexible in the next year.

The Kishi Government's policy on a new Security Treaty stood on four principles.[68] The first was to continue its military alliance with the U.S., but to put an end to U.S. intervention in Japan's domestic affairs, allowed by Article I of the Security Treaty of 1952.

The second principle was to include a date when a new Treaty

should be terminated, with or without a notice of denunciation by either of the partners. The old Treaty was to be terminated only when the U.S. and Japanese Governments agreed that an alternative security arrangement had been found.

Thirdly, Japan desired clarification as to whether the U.S. would commit itself to defend Japan, and that it would consult with Japan beforehand, regarding the use of Japanese bases for military operations outside Japan or before introducing nuclear weapons into Japan. This principle was an attempt to justify Japan's co-operation with the U.S., even when Japan was not under attack, though it was unconstitutional. However, the right of self-defence was not against the Constitution.

The last principle was to promote, through a new Treaty, economic co-operation between the two countries. This was a completely new principle in the Japanese-U.S. alliance, but one most stressed during the negotiations. The Prime Minister put much emphasis on the new economic aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The government seemed to have learned the importance of the economic aspect, especially from Canada's experience.[69] Canada, as mentioned earlier, negotiated industriously to have incorporated into the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 2, which dealt with the economic co-operation between the Treaty partners. Furthermore, Canada's devotion to the economic and political aspects of an alliance made Canada the most prestigious mediator in the West, if not in the world.

On January 6, 1960 the final draft of a new Treaty was completed, and, on the nineteenth of the same month, the Prime Minister flew to Washington to sign the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security between

Japan and the U.S. Abiding by the Charter of the U.N., the four principles on which the Kishi Government had based the revision of the first Treaty, were largely accepted by the U.S.[70]

(2) The Opposition and the Public

Japanese opposition to the military alliance with the U.S. had very different sources than those of Canada. While Canada's opposition was mainly because Canadians felt that the defence system was ineffective and very expensive, the Japanese opposition had its sources in the cultural and ideological differences between the U.S. and Japan.[71] Three most significant factors in the Japanese opposition to the military alliance with the U.S. seem to have been: (1) the presence of foreign bases in Japan, (2) the difference of race and culture--a factor antagonistic to the Japanese nationalistic feeling, (3) the strong opposition of the U.S. to Communist ideology--an ideology on which the Japanese opposition bases its principles.

The anti-U.S. feeling in Japan brought about an unexpected upheaval in the opposition, stimulated by the crimes of American servicemen against Japanese civilians.[72] However, when the time to decide to revise or abolish Japan's military alliance with the U.S. arrived, the Japanese people became more and more uncertain.[73] It is very difficult to determine what made the people more confused about this special issue, but too great a difference between the policies of the government and the opposition could account for one reason. While in Canada the Conservative Government and the Liberal opposition shared basically the same

policy, there was, in Japan, a radical difference between the Liberal Democratic Government and the opposition parties headed by the Socialist Party. This great difference of opinion might have frightened an "unspecified majority" into thinking that there could be complete chaos if the opposition parties were supported.

When the Joint Statement to revise the first Treaty was announced by the Japanese and American Governments in September, 1958, the opposition parties had already gone beyond the point of compromise, taking the stand of "absolute opposition."[74] The policy of "absolute opposition" focused on four points: the withdrawal of all U.S. bases; neutrality; establishment of relations with Communist China; and a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.

However, it was not until late March, 1959 that all opposition parties were united with the purpose of preventing the revision of the Security Treaty. Because of ideological differences between the Socialists and Communists, it was difficult to establish the "People's Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty."[75] Even after its establishment on March 28, 1959, the differences in view among ideologically organized parties and groups often resulted in clashes and splits.[76]

In the 1958 general election, the newly-formed Socialist Party gained 1.2 per cent more seats in the House of Representatives. However, the total strength of the opposition parties was only 168 seats (or 36.3 per cent) against the 287 seats (or 61.5 per cent) the conservatives held. Having no chance to defeat the government's policy because of their small numbers, both the Socialists and the Communists depended on public support outside the Diet to demonstrate their dissatis-

faction with the government.

The Socialists sought an organized support from Sohyo (the General Council of Japanese Labour Unions), which had about 3.7 million members. The Communists, too, relied on the Zengakuren (the All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Government Association), which had already split into "mainstream" and "anti-mainstream" groups in 1958.

In addition to the fact that it had a slim chance to defeat the government's policy in the Diet, the Socialist opposition was much too preoccupied with the definition of the words in the new Treaty,[77] although it had already been signed in January, 1960. In February, 1960 a special committee on the new Security Treaty was organized in the House of Representatives; it debated a total of 150 hours on the new Treaty. However, the opposition, particularly the Socialists, hoping to filibuster until the Diet session ended, spent most of the time demanding a definition of "the Far East" and "previous consultation" used in Article 4.[78]

The dispute between the Liberal Democratic Government and the opposition reached a climax on May 19-20, 1960. When the Liberal Democrats, with the exception of some anti-Kishi factions, tried to pass a 50-day extension of the session, the Diet became a violent battlefield of Socialists, Communists, Liberal Democrats and the Diet police. After a lengthy period of fighting, the conservative proposal to extend the session was passed, and, immediately after that, the new Treaty was approved without forewarning and debate and in the absence of opposition parties (including some anti-Kishi factions of the LDP).[79]

The complete lack of democracy and peace in the Diet during the

"May 19 Incident" caused quite a controversy. Almost all the leading newspapers, magazines, and millions of Japanese people violently attacked the government, but not necessarily the revision of the Security Treaty.[80] However, the majority of the Japanese mass media again refocused its attack, this time on the opposition. This reached a crisis in the political unrest which occurred between June 10 and 19. The first incident in the continuous violence occurred when Press Secretary Hagerty and Ambassador MacArthur arrived at Tokyo International Airport on June 10. Thousands of anti-American demonstrators, associated with the anti-Kishi forces, surrounded their car so that both of them had to be taken to Tokyo by military helicopter.

The second was the eruption of violence in the vicinity of the Diet on June 15. Thousands of demonstrators demanded the immediate dissolution of the Diet and the abolition of the Treaty.[81] Demonstrators clashed with the police, causing the first death of a demonstrator and an attack by police on some newsmen and university professors.

The third was the government's cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit. The Kishi Government was intending to welcome the President who was coming to celebrate the centennial of Japanese-American friendship, after the ratification of the new Treaty.

These violent activities made the Japanese mass media and public criticize the anti-government movement. The violent demonstrations, largely supported by the opposition parties, turned the public's sentiment against them and in favour of the status quo of the conservative government.

In July, 1960, Kishi was replaced by the low-postured Prime

Minister Ikeda. Prime Minister Ikeda stressed economic prosperity rather than the establishment of a strong military power allied with the U.S. In November, 1960 the twenty-ninth general election was held. The LDP increased its seats to 296, a gain of 9. The JSP decreased in popular vote by 5.4 per cent and suffered a loss of 21 seats. The reason for this decrease was mainly because of the formation of the DSP, which broke away from the JSP early in 1960.

The opposition in Japan, thus, was in an entirely different situation from the Canadian opposition in this period. This was probably because there was too great an ideological gap between the Japanese conservatives and the progressives. It may also have been because party politics were not deeply rooted in Japan. It seems that the people voted for the LDP on the basis of the personality of the candidates, rather than of party policies.

(3) Military Co-operation with the U.S.

It was no accident that the U.S. and Japanese Governments agreed to incorporate economic co-operation into the new Treaty. In order to build up armed forces in Japan, the U.S. military aid (gifts) had increased gradually and in 1959 reached $147 million. Special war procurements, even after the Korean truce, remained at the 500 million-dollar level. The Japanese defence industries increased in productivity from $208 million in 1955 to $322 million in 1960. (Table 12)

The Canadian Government reduced its military obligation to equip itself with modern weapons, and developed, instead, the Defence Production

Sharing Programme with the U.S. By producing and exporting military equipment, Canada attempted to meet its military obligation in the alliance and, at the same time, to offset the economic demand at home. In other words, it exploited the military alliance in terms of defence production.

However, compared with the Canadian example, Japan's economic exploitation of the military alliance with the U.S. did not rely so much upon defence production. (Table 12) Rather, Japan took advantage of the mutual co-operation of general trade with the U.S. The average three and a half per cent of Japan's share in the total of U.S. imports in the 1950's rose to an 8.8 per cent average in the early half of the 1960's.[82] From Japan's point of view, it meant that while it reduced its import dependence on the U.S. from 37.8 per cent in 1957 to 30.8 per cent in 1963, it increased its exports to the U.S. from 20.9 per cent to 27.6 per cent in the same period.[83]

As far as defence production was concerned, in the period down to the conclusion of the new Treaty, U.S. integration with Japan did not yet occur. In June, 1957 the first Defence Supplies and Equipment Programme,[84] which was to be completed by 1960, was introduced by the Defence Council. It was, however, intended only to fill the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japan[85] and to lay the foundations for the growth of a military-industrial complex tightly bound to the American defence industry.

The American integration of defence production began with the second Defence Supplies and Equipment Programme of the period 1962-66, which was planned to modernize weapons, including the missile system.[86] This

five-year programme of $3,611 million included the first Defence Production Plan. This plan called for the manufacturing of weapons at home. The main reason for the home-manufactured weapon plan was said to be to prevent inefficiencies such as late delivery and inferior quality of goods.[87]

During the first Production Plan of 1961-64, 43 per cent of the 1,480 million-dollar production was spent on Japanese defence industries.[88] In the second plan of the same type (1965-67), the percentage was expected to greatly increase. It seems that the real reason for the home-manufacture, in this instance, was the intention to reduce Japan's heavy dependence on the American defence industry. In fact, home-manufactured airplanes and warships were more expensive than those bought from the U.S., and the increase in cost of home manufacturing in the first plan was mainly owing to the practice of buying American licences, required in order to produce the same defence weapons in Japan.[89]

The more Japan's defence products were manufactured at home, the more independent the Self-Defence Forces became. However, the most important force, the Air Self-Defence Force, was, at least until the end of the second Defence Programme in 1966, under the command of the U.S., in spite of the existence of the Burns-Matsumae agreement,[90] which gave the ASDF its own command and authority in 1959.

Strategically, the Air Self-Defence Force worked and trained with the U.S. Air Force in the same office and under the same regulations. The only difference between the two Forces was that regulations were written in Japanese and operation control was often done in Japanese.[91] Economically, Japan gradually eased its dependence on the U.S. defence

industry, but the U.S. still dominated the command system of the Japanese forces.

TABLE 12.

Defence Production and its Percentages in GNP, 1954 - 1966

in millions of U.S. dollars

	Canada		Japan	
Year	Defence Production	DP/GNP	Defence Production	DP/GNP
1954	1,007	4.4%	217	1.0%
1955	652	2.6	208	0.9
1956	673	2.4	241	0.9
1957	516	1.7	302	1.0
1958	664	2.2	282	0.9
1959	508	1.6	278	0.7
1960	672	2.0	322	0.7
1961	470	1.3	287	0.5
1962	455	1.2	354	0.6
1963	436	1.1	354	0.5
1964	511	1.2	463	0.6
1965	666	1.4	371	0.4
1966	964	1.8	303	0.3

Note: All figures are calculated on the base of the U.S. dollar which is equivalent to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360 regardless of fluctuation.
Total amount of defence production for Canada is the net value of all contracts issued by the Department of Defence Production, and for Japan is the sum of domestic procurement by the National Defence Agency and special procurement by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Defence production usually includes aircraft, ships, tank-automotive, weapons, ammunition and explosives, electronics and communication equipment, fuels and lubricants, clothing and equipage, construction, and others.

Source: Canada, Department of Defence Production, Annual Report, 1954-67, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa; Asahi Shimbun Sha, Jieitai, Tokyo (1969); Mainichi Shimbun Sha, Mainichi Nen'kan, 1969, Tokyo.

TABLE 13.

Total Budgetary Expenditures and Military Expenditures (1958 - 1963)

in millions of U.S. dollars

	Canada			Japan		
Year	Total(A)	Military(B)	B/A	Total(A)	Military(B)	B/A
1958	4,754	1,568	33%	3,699	412	11%
1959	5,013	1,348	27	4,153	437	11
1960	5,330	1,432	27	4,842	444	9
1961	5,568	1,437	26	5,732	510	9
1962	6,094	1,532	25	7,102	569	8
1963	6,140	1,494	24	8,456	675	8

Note: B includes expenses of National Defence, Defence Production (or Defence Establishment) and Industry. All figures are calculated on the base of the U.S. dollar which is equivalent to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360 regardless of fluctuation.

Source: Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Speech, 1959-64, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa; Japan, Prime Minister's Office, Nihon Tokei Nen'kan, 1964 and 1968, Tokyo.

TABLE 14.

Military Strength, 1958 - 1963

	Canada				Japan			
Year	Total	CRN	CRA	CRAF	Total	MSDF	GSDF	ASDF
1958	120,848	20,252	48,682	51,914	203,000	18,000	170,000	15,000
1959	120,400	20,300	48,400	51,700	221,000	23,000	170,000	28,000
1960	120,000	20,500	48,000	51,500	232,000	30,000	170,000	32,000
1961	119,300	20,000	47,800	51,500	233,000	30,000	170,000	33,000
1962	122,500	20,000	50,000	52,500	235,000	24,500	171,500	39,000
1963	123,700	21,700	50,000	52,000	249,500	34,000	171,500	34,500

Source: Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1959; Asahi Shimbun Sha, Jieitai, Tokyo(1969); The Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, London.

THE THIRD PERIOD (1966-1969)

The Renewal of NORAD and NATO

(1) The Government Policy

Even in the period 1963-1968, when the Liberal Government was headed by Lester Pearson, Canada's position in the NATO and NORAD alliances became less important. Exercising influence through the alliance was hardly enough reason to remain both in NATO and NORAD.[92]

However, Canada's original intention of creating collective security under a common alliance framework was maintained in the alliances in which Canada had been involved. Faithfully adhering to its commitments to NATO and NORAD, Canada accepted the principle of "flexible response," which was introduced by the U.S.[93] It left ultimate control over deterrence of war to the U.S. and acquiesced to its increasing domination in the alliances.[94]

In spite of its reduced importance in the alliances and its acceptance of the "flexible response" principle, the Liberal Government added a new dimension to its foreign policy. This was a policy for the continuation of a multinational association, laying more stress on the U.N. than on regional alliance. Prime Minister Pearson, insisting that there had been no better possibility than collective security at the time of the birth of NATO, advocated that a number of middle powers like Canada should take the initiative to establish a genuine and powerful U.N. force.[95]

Canada's reasoning for remaining in NATO was further shaken when the French Government under General de Gaulle refused to accept

the principle of "flexible response." The French Government announced its complete withdrawal from the military role of NATO in March, 1966.[96] Since one of Canada's greatest advantages of being a member of NATO was "some assurance against eventuality of conflict" between its principal partners in Europe--Britain and France, it seems that the reason for remaining in NATO had lost its meaning for Canada.[97]

Nevertheless, the Pearson Government upheld its allegiance to the alliance as firmly as ever. In response to the French departure from NATO, Prime Minister Pearson expressed the following optimistic view:

> In my judgment . . . (France's) arguments . . . do not support the conclusion that unified command and planning arrangements are no longer necessary for the defence of Western Europe . . . . Providing NATO itself does not disintegrate . . . the immediate military consequences of the French action are thought to be manageable . . . .[98]

As far as Canada's bilateral relations with the U.S. through NORAD were concerned, the policy of the Pearson Government appeared to be confused. On the one hand, the Government supported the U.S. hard-line policy toward the Vietnam War and regarded its involvement there as "a necessary and justified attempt by the United States to prevent international Communist aggression and hence, to guard the security of the free world."[99] On the other, the same government denounced the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, rationalizing that it had an obligation to be objective by virtue of its membership in the International Control Commission.[100]

In addition to this contradiction, Canada supported, though indirectly, the U.S. military actions in Vietnam by way of providing munitions to the U.S. The fact that a large number of arms were

sold by Canada to the U.S. was admitted by the Prime Minister, but he, at the same time, refused to put an end to it, because where the Canadian arms were destined was beyond Canadian responsibility.[101]

Compared with Canada's situation, Japan was not a member of ICC. The Japanese Government, having supported the American position in the Vietnam War, had gained, by 1966, a total of $470 million from the War.[102] The increase of exports directly related to the War was not as successful as the war procurement during the Korean War, but the Vietnam War obviously helped to increase Japan's exports to third countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, of goods for manufacturing items which the U.S. bought for the War.[103]

Leaving a feeling of confusion among the opposition parties, the Canadian Government secretly extended the NORAD agreement for another five years on April 1, 1968. The secret process of renewing the agreement was in complete contradiction to the government's previous acceptance of requests by the opposition parties for a full debate on the issue.

When the new Liberal Leader, Pierre Trudeau, took over, it was expected that he would review Canada's foreign and defence policies. During the election campaign in May, 1968, Trudeau stated the necessity of re-examination of Canada's alliance. He said:

> They (NATO and NORAD) are an integral part of the delicate balance of power on which the peace of the world has rested during a long and difficult period. We shall take a hard look . . . at our military role in NATO and determine whether our military commitment is still appropriate to the present situation in Europe. We shall look at our role in NORAD in the light of the technological advances of modern weaponry and of our fundamental opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.[104]

The Trudeau Government differed from the previous Liberal

Governments in that neither Trudeau himself nor his Secretary of State for External Affairs had the associations or experience with the leadership of the Department of External Affairs. For the first time, the new Prime Minister ventured to make the statement that "the first priority for Canadians is not NATO."[105]

In 1969, NATO was about to celebrate its 20th anniversary. From that time on, any party in the Treaty could terminate membership one year after its notice of denunciation. Prime Minister Trudeau allowed a number of witnesses from the academic community to have the opportunity to explain their objections to the Pearson-Martin alliance policy.[106] Extensive hearings were held across Canada for eight weeks between January and March, 1969, by the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

The result did not change much, however. The Government reached the conclusion that Canada would continue membership in NATO and would co-operate closely with the U.S. within NORAD and in other ways.[107] But the Liberal Government under Pierre Trudeau had never submitted the renewal of the NORAD agreement to Parliament for approval. It inherited that equivocal role of peacekeeping as well as fulfilling its commitment to NATO and NORAD, although the number of the Canadian troops in Europe was to be reduced by half.

(2) The Opposition and the Public

When the North Atlantic alliance was first discussed in the late 1940's, the Liberal Government justified the need for the alliance in four points: first, the alliance would reduce Canada's dependence

(militarily and politically and economically) on the U.S.; secondly, Canada would increase its influence in international affairs through the alliance; thirdly, the instability of Europe might endanger North America with the threat of Communism; and finally, regional collective security was the best means to protect an unstable Europe (the U.N. Security Council was impotent because of the bitter division between its permanent members).

These reasons were widely accepted, and Canada's participation in the alliance became a reality. However, in the late 1960's, it was questionable whether these reasons for remaining in NATO were still valid. Although the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly are still as ineffective, Canada's role in NATO has now become much less effective, mainly owing to the recovery of Europe.

Since the North Atlantic Treaty allowed withdrawal within a year's notice of denunciation (after 1969), the question of whether to stay in the alliance became the main bone of contention for the opposition parties. While NATO was diminishing in importance for Canada, the U.S. was, too, growing less dependent on Canada for its North American defence.[108] This indicated that Canada could no longer expect to influence American foreign policy, since Canada hoped that its military contributions to NATO and NORAD would increase its political influence.

Not only the opposition parties, but also many Canadian people began to doubt if their country could really gain any advantage from its multi-million dollar commitments in NATO and NORAD.[109] The Conservative Party, however, failed to propose any specific alternative to the defence

and foreign policies of the Liberal Government. Nor did it advocate withdrawal from NORAD and NATO, promising only to review them in the 1968 election campaign.[110]

While the Conservative Party made no significant change in NATO and NORAD, many Canadians came to show an increased interest in the defence and foreign policies of their government in the 1960's, particularly after Pierre Trudeau attained Prime Ministership. This tendency of the people might have been, to some extent, influenced by the increasing danger of new missile interceptors, destroyers and nuclear-equipped missiles.

However, the public was more likely to be concerned, in their participation in foreign policy, about human morality, while the opposition parties were more concerned with the high expense of the Liberal Government's policy. Problems in Vietnam and Nigeria/Biafra, accordingly, gained higher priority for the Canadian people than the NATO and NORAD questions.[111] Lack of support from the public made the opposition in Ottawa less effective in terminating Canada's participation in NATO and NORAD.

One of today's most prominent experts in the field of foreign policy, however, takes a view opposed to increased public interest in Canada's defence and foreign problems. He believes that most Canadians should have no influence in Vietnam, the ABM system or any other foreign policy problems. International affairs, according to him, should be left to "the small group of highly educated and broadly experienced men," because those problems are "too difficult, too complex, and too technical for the average man."[112]

Although the Canadian public participate to an increasing extent in defence and foreign policy problems, it seems the view expressed by

this former senior official of the Department of External Affairs is still the dominant one in Ottawa. That Canada has unusually rich resources of information available for a country of its size cannot be disputed, but because more and more Canadian people are becoming interested in foreign affairs, it will not be long before the government will have to display a greater willingness to improve the channels between the government and the people.

(3) Military Co-operation with the U.S.

The following is part of Prime Minister Pearson's letter replying to 360 representatives of the University of Toronto's teaching staff in 1967.

> The U.S.-Canadian production-sharing arrangements enable the Canadian Government to acquire from the U.S.A. a great deal of the nation's essential defence equipment at the lowest possible cost, while at the same time permitting us to offset the resulting drain on the economy by reciprocal sales to the U.S.A. Under these agreements, by reason of longer production runs, Canadian industry is able to participate competitively in U.S. research, development, and production programmes, and is exempted from the "Buy American" Act for these purposes.[113]

This was also the Prime Minister's answer to many other critics who insisted that "weapons going to Vietnam are weapons for aggression and, unless we can have an assurance that our weapons are not going to Vietnam, we will not sell Americans any arms."

In the mid-1960's, the Canadian procurements in the U.S. increased from $130.1 million in 1965 to $332.6 million in 1966. (Table 15) How Canada spends its money in the U.S. can be derived from the following example.[114] Of the $332.6 Canada spent in 1966:

Aircraft and components	50%
Navigation and communication equipment	32
Components for ammunition	10
Ship components	2.6
Vehicles and components	2.4
Research and miscellaneous	3

Almost all these items were for component parts rather than complete weapons, which are assembled in Canadian factories. The U.S. buys arms assembled in Canada as well as purely made-in-Canada goods. Thus, from 1959 to the end of 1969, more than $2.9 billion were sold to the U.S. "from fill for land mines to jackets for bullets, from complex electronic gear to the Green Berets."[115] Moreover, the factories producing these goods provide about 100,000 jobs for Canadians.

It is virtually impossible, however, for Canada to produce anything as large and as complex as a jet interceptor at a competitive price.[116] The U.S. spent $317.1 million in 1966 on Canadian-made arms and other items. They were all items smaller than aircraft. This means that Canada, whenever it has to employ modern equipment required for NORAD, must buy it from the U.S., not being able to produce it at home with Canadian labour and brainpower. It seems, therefore, very unlikely that Canadian industry will be exempted from the "Buy American" Act in the near future.

Strategically, there has been a great development of the air defence system in the 1960's. First of all, in the Sixties, a new warning system against ICBM's called the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) was established in addition to the DEW Line and SAGE. BMEWS in the ICBM era did not require Canadian soil for fulfilling its purpose. Bases were established in: Thule, Greenland; Clear, Alaska; and Fylingdale Moor, England. Furthermore, all BMEWS radar at these

sites is operated by the non-Canadian command, although it is part of NORAD.[117]

Secondly, the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system was introduced by the Johnson Administration in September, 1967. Since then, the Canadian Government has refused to agree that the ABM system is at all relevant to NORAD. When the Nixon Administration decided to proceed with the installation of the ABM system, Prime Minister Trudeau insisted in March, 1969, that the ABM, as the Pearson Government had said, would not be a part of NORAD. It was purely an American defence system on which Canada should not demand any consultation. But he did not deny that Canada might participate in that system at will.[118]

Thirdly, there were two other changes proposed for NORAD, which were introduced by U.S. Defence Secretary McNamara in Congress in February, 1968, although they as yet remain undecided for Canada.[119] These changes are, unlike the ABM system, obviously included in NORAD, if decided. One of them is the introduction of the F-106 Delta Dart. Once this is accepted, the old Bomarcs and even the Voodoos in Canada might be replaced. The other is a new Air-borne Warning and Control System (AWACS). AWACS is likely to replace the DEW Line and even BMEWS. If they are deployed, it is estimated to cost Canada up to $14 billion.[120]

More important than the expense of modern weapons is the fact that the development of the defence system never ceases and continually increases in cost. It is very clear that Canada will never be able to deploy the new defence system at the same pace as the U.S. Therefore, the government may have to alter its traditional view that an increase in military commitments in the alliance is justifiable because it means an

increase in the sphere of political influence.

The Automatic Extension of the Security Treaty

(1) The Government Policy

Following the stormy period accompanying the revision of the first Security Treaty, Japan enjoyed enormous economic growth throughout the Sixties. Japan surpassed Britain in GNP by 1967, then France by 1968, and West Germany by 1969. With a GNP that is expected to reach $200 billion in 1970, Japan now ranks third in the world, behind the U.S. ($932 billion) and the Soviet Union ($600 billion).[121]

The enormous increase of Japan's economic power has created, in the minds of a majority of Japanese, pride in being Japanese. It has also caused a great number of Japanese to feel their country has a vital role to play in sharing more responsibility for world peace, in particular, peace in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific region.[122]

This change of attitude was well illustrated when Japan asserted its request for the return of the southern islands (the Ogasawara Islands and the Okinawa Islands) from the U.S. Soon after his assuming the post of Prime Minister in late 1964, Eisaku Sato insisted that, until Okinawa was returned to Japan, the "postwar period" would not be over for the Japanese.

In the House of Representatives, on December 5, 1967, the Prime Minister announced possible dates for their return, which were arrived at in his consultation with President Johnson.

> In my recent consultation with the President of the U.S., I have become certain that we will reach an agreement on the date of reversion (of Okinawa) which is to be within three years . . . .
>
> On the other hand, it was agreed that the Ogasawara Islands would be returned to Japan within one year . . . [123]

The reversion of Okinawa, however, has created very complex problems in relation to the Security Treaty, the escalated Vietnam War and nuclear weapons. The Japanese refused to accept Okinawa with U.S. nuclear bases and weapons.[124] The sensitivity of the Japanese people to nuclear weapons caused complications for the government, which planned to gain prestige by having Okinawa returned as soon as possible.[125]

On the other hand, Okinawa has been one of the most important U.S. military bases in the Far Eastern and Southeast Asian regions.[126] Geographically, it is situated right in the center of those regions: 900 miles from Tokyo; 750 miles from Seoul; 400 miles from Taipei; 900 miles from Manila; and 1,750 miles from Saigon.

Previously, the Prime Minister had flatly stated that any nuclear weapons on the Ogasawara Islands had to be removed before they were returned. He stood firmly on his famous "three basic principles on non-nuclear proliferation."[127] As a result, the Ogasawara Islands have been returned to Japan devoid of nuclear weapons.

Because of the importance of the bases there, Prime Minister Sato did not immediately clarify whether the conditions applied to the Ogasawara Islands would be applied to Okinawa, too, at the time of the reversion. In April, 1968, he refused to go into further discussion on the question of Okinawa, other than saying that the conditions concerning the U.S. bases in Okinawa were still in the stage of "blank paper."[128] According to him, Japan should first concentrate on having Okinawa and

its one million people returned to Japan, before demanding further conditions regarding the military bases there. The Prime Minister's purpose was to strengthen Japan's ties with the U.S., instead of arousing resentment and suspicion.[129] This was clearly expressed in the communique after he consulted with President Nixon in late November, 1969.

During the consultation, the Prime Minister was successful in having the U.S. agree to withdraw its nuclear weapons from the strategic island before its reversion to Japan in 1972. However, he consented to the U.S. deploying nuclear weapons on Okinawa "in an emergency after close consultation with the Japanese Government."[130] He also agreed on the expansion of Japanese defence forces in proportion to its national power.

The Sato Government dissolved the House of Representatives a month after the announcement of the communique. The Liberal Democratic Government returned with a decrease in the popular vote, but with more seats. In June, 1970 the Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan was, according to the previous announcement, automatically extended without any complications.

(2) The Opposition and the Public

Since 1964, the nuclear power of China has been slowly but steadily developing. On the Korean peninsula, the confrontation between North and South Korea at the 38th parallel has been intensified by the North Korean attempt to assassinate the President of South Korea in January, 1968. Immediately following that, the American Navy intelligence ship, the Pueblo, was captured by the North Korean guard on the

Sea of Japan. In Vietnam, the U.S. transferred its main B-52 base from Guam Island to Okinawa, in order to shorten the bombing run and to counteract a heavy attack by the National Liberation Front.

Under these circumstances, in the late 1960's a large number of the Japanese people feared possible involvement in war since Japan served as an offensive military base of the U.S. According to the opposition, the possibility of involvement in war was because of Sato's renewal of the Security Treaty with the U.S.[131] The opposition further denounced the government's failure to adhere to the "previous consultation" clause which was interpreted to require "consent" of the Japanese Government. When the U.S. nuclear submarines visited Japanese ports in 1968, the government took a very indecisive attitude towards them. The lack of firmness with the U.S. in the negotiations on the Okinawa reversion policy also made the opposition attack the government for Japan's possible involvement in war.

However, unlike 1960, the opposition parties proposed their own policies on the Security Treaty and the reversion of Okinawa. Although there were some minority opinions within the opposition parties, their policies towards these two main issues of the late Sixties can be classified as follows:[132]

I. The Security Treaty

The Japan Socialist Party:
Denunciation of the Treaty through diplomatic procedure; the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and bases; the gradual dissolution of Japan's Self-Defence Forces and reforming into a National Police; the establishment of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union and the restoration of relationships with China.

The Democratic Socialist Party:
Continuation of the Treaty, but with no U.S. troops in

Japan, except in an emergency; the retention of a minimum of Self-Defence Forces, upon public consensus; then, a real security dependent upon Japan's independent foreign policy.

The Fair Play Party:
Gradual annulment of the Treaty through refusing the increase of armed forces and U.S. bases, and adhering to stricter "previous consultation"; the establishment of a perfect neutral foreign policy; and the maintenance of Japan's National Guard reduced from the Self-Defence Forces.

The Japan Communist Party:
Emparte denunciation of the Treaty; the proclamation of Japan's neutral policy, which denies any foreign troops in Japan; immediate dissolution of the Self-Defence Forces; then, the conclusion of a real international peace treaty through which Japan would be protected from all external enemies.

II. The Question of Okinawa

The Japan Socialist Party:
Immediate complete reversion with no U.S. military bases and troops.

The Democratic Socialist Party:
Complete reversion without nuclear bases but with other bases, which are on similar conditions to those of the fatherland.

The Fair Play Party:
Immediate complete reversion and immediate withdrawal of the U.S. bases; some inevitable bases, if any, should be withdrawn in five years.

The Japan Communist Party:
Immediate complete reversion with no conditions; immediate complete withdrawal of the U.S. bases.

There were public polls on the Security Treaty, the Self-Defence Forces, and the question of Okinawa, taken by two nation-wide newspapers, Yomiuri Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun, between April and June, 1968. How much public opinion is represented by the government or the opposition parties is indicated in their results.

Yomiuri Shimbun (April 7 - 9, 1968)

1. Question: Japan has concluded the Security Treaty with the U.S. Do you think the Treaty is useful for Japan's security?

Answer:	
Very useful	12%
Somewhat useful	43
Useless	17
Can't say	10
Others	1
Don't know	16
No answer	1

2. Question: The year 1970 is the time when this Treaty is to be re-examined. At that time, which of the following do you think is the most desirable?

Answer:	
Solidification of the Treaty for a longer term	6.8%
Automatic extension	11.6
Revision to weaken it	36.1
Denunciation	10.8
Others	7.5
Don't know	25.2
No answer	2.0

3. Question: Do you think the U.S. military bases in Okinawa are useful for Japan's security?

Answer:	
Very useful	5%
Somewhat useful	24
Useless	45
Can't say	12
Others	1
Don't know and no answer	13

4. Question: When Okinawa is returned to Japan, do you think the U.S. nuclear bases should remain, or should they be taken away beforehand, or are they inevitable?

Answer:	
Should remain	3%
Should not remain	66
Inevitable	20
Can't say	4
Others	1
Don't know and no answer	6

5. Question: The Sato Government has a policy that Japan must neither produce nuclear weapons, nor possess them, nor acquire them from abroad. Do you approve or disapprove of this policy?

Answer:		
	Approve	78%
	Disapprove	8
	Can't say	7
	Others	1
	Don't know and no answer	1

Mainichi Shimbun (June 14 - 15, 1968)

1. Question: Do you think it is necessary for Japan to have the Self-Defence Forces?

Answer:		
	Necessary	82%
	Unnecessary	15
	Others	3

(for those who answered it was necessary)
Question: Why is it necessary?

Answer:		
	To use against aggressive enemies	17%
	For the maintenance of public peace	31
	For disaster relief	27
	Because most countries have their own armed forces	6
	Others	1

(for those who answered it was unnecessary)
Question: Why is it unnecessary?

Answer:		
	Unconstitutional	5%
	Useless for defence	2
	No danger of aggression	1
	Japan should automatically surrender	3
	Waste of taxes	4
	Others	0

2. Question: At present the total number of the Self-Defence Forces (Ground, Maritime and Air) is about 250,000. Do you think it should be increased or reduced?

Answer:		
	Increased	17%
	Left intact	62
	Reduced	8
	Abolished	8
	Others and no answer	5

In addition to this, Mainichi Shinbun took three polls in Okinawa on how the U.S. bases should be changed when the Okinawans come under Japanese rule. None of these polls were taken before the Sato-Nixon consultaion, in which the specific date of returning Okinawa to Japan was set. Nevertheless, the results of the polls show their uncertainty about the status of the U.S. bases, intermingled with their desire to become Japanese citizens.

Public Opinion Poll Results on Status of the U.S. Bases in Okinawa

	A	B	C
Same as Fatherland	11%	27%	21%
Complete Withdrawal	25	18	14
Free Use without Nuclear Weapons	24	43	26
Free Use with Nuclear Weapons	12	5	7
Others and No Answer	28	7	32

(Note: A=December 1-5, 1967; B=February 26-March 3, 1968; C=September 7-11, 1968)

According to these public opinion polls, the majority of the Japanese people preferred gradual weakening of its military alliance with the U.S., while, at the same time, approved the present Self-Defence Forces. Although a large number of the people were uncertain or were inconclusive about the Security Treaty in the year 1970, most of them approved of the non-nuclear policy of the Sato Government. Therefore, in view of public sentiment, it is understandable that the Government pursued a policy of automatic extension of the Security Treaty in June, 1970, after having set the specific date of the reversion of Okinawa without U.S. nuclear bases.

(3) Military Co-operation with the U.S.

While in Canada the defence industries buy components from the U.S. and are restricted from making anything as large as a jet plane, the Japanese defence industries produce most of their modern airplanes at home. By the second Defence Production Plan (1965-67) defence items, including F-104 J fighters, were to be manufactured at home. As a result, the Japanese industries succeeded in manufacturing 64 per cent of the thirty F-104 Js.[133]

The third Defence Supplies and Equipment Programme which was set up in November, 1966, with the $6,500 million estimated cost, included the Nike Hercules, the Hawk, light and heavy tanks, large- and middle-size helicopters, and others to be manufactured at home.[134] The total cost of home-manufactured defence products came to $1,388.9 million. Only 34.4 per cent of the estimated cost of $6,500 million in the Programme was to be spent on defence weapons, of which more than 60 per cent was to go to Japan's defence industries.[135]

Consequently, Japan's defence industries have been rapidly growing. However, as in the Canadian case, Japan's research on military development is negligible compared with that of the U.S. This means the "home-manufacturing" policy encourages closer link-ups between the military industrial complexes rather than reducing Japan's dependence on the U.S.

The closer link-ups between the two military-industrial complexes are, moreover, supported by governmental bilateral agreements, for example, the "Memorandum on Military Research and Development" in 1968 and "U.S.-Japan Aerospace Co-operation Agreement" in 1969.[136] The latter was said to pave "the way for American aerospace industry assistance in the

Seventies in the development of Japanese IGBM-type rockets" which could be armed with nuclear warheads rather than space research satellites.[137] In fact, most of the top Japanese defence contractors are closely tied to the top 100 American defence industries by licensing agreements and joint ventures.

In strategy, on the other hand, U.S.-Japan military co-operation has entered a new era. It is a known fact that since 1965 at least, Japan's Maritime and Air Self-Defence Forces have been conducting joint maneuvers with South Korean, Nationalist Chinese, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet forces.[138] Its joint maneuvers with the U.S. Navy (mainly the Seventh Fleet) began as early as 1959. The period of exercise has been extended from 5 days in 1959 to 11 days in 1968.[139]

Every year since 1962, the Ground Self-Defence Force has been sending its missile operators to the McGregor missile-test field in New Mexico.[140] In addition to this, GSDF sends 150 to 200 of its best soldiers to the U.S. to study the technology of new weapons.

In spite of this, the Self-Defence Forces of Japan have steadily become more independent from the U.S. in their system of command. It is not only because of the decrease in the number of U.S. troops in Japan, but also because the quantity as well as quality of the Forces have become close to par with those of the U.S. forces in Japan, after the completion of the third Defence Programme.

ASDF, the force most integrated with the U.S., no longer conducts Japanese-American joint exercises in as large a scale and as long a period as it had been doing.[141] Furthermore, the Matsumae-Burns Agreement, in which Japan and the U.S. held their own command separately, unlike NORAD and NATO, has lapsed. In fact, the U.S. bomber squadrons were removed from

Japan in June, 1966. Since then, Japan has been guarded only by ASDF, and a new Base Air Defence Ground Environment (BADGE) system installed in April, 1968.

Japanese military co-operation with the U.S. has indeed moved in the direction of depending less on the U.S. for command, while, at the same time, becoming increasingly characterized by economic interrelations. This is significantly different from the situation of Canada which has become gradually dependent on the U.S. both military operation and defence production.

TABLE 15.

Procurements Under Canada-U.S. Defence Sharing Programme
(1959 - 1967)
in millions of Canadian dollars

Year	Canadian Procurement in U.S.	U.S. Procurement in Canada
1959	45.3	96.3
1960	51.7	112.7
1961	37.7	142.6
1962	127.4	254.3
1963	152.0	142.0
1964	173.3	166.8
1965	130.1	259.5
1966	332.6	317.1
1967	293.8	307.7

Source: Canada, Department of Defence Production, Annual Report, 1960-68, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa.

TABLE 16.

Total Budgetary Expenditures and Military Expenditures
(1964 - 1968)
in millions of U.S. dollars

	Canada			Japan		
Year	Total(A)	Military(B)	B/A	Total(A)	Military(B)	B/A
1964	6,422	1,610	25%	9,197	764	8%
1965	6,695	1,482	22	10,347	954	9
1966	7,178	1,492	21	11,831	946	8
1967	8,168	1,588	19	14,454	1,058	7
1968	9,179	1,641	18	16,163	1,172	8

Note: B includes expenses of National Defence, Defence Production (or Defence Establishment) and Industry. All figures are calculated on the base of the U.S. dollar which is equivalent to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360 regardless of fluctuation.

Source: Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Speech, 1965-69, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa; Japan, Prime Minister's Office, Nihon Tokei Nenkan, 1969, Tokyo.

TABLE 17.

Military Strength, 1964 - 1968

	Canada				Japan			
Year	Total	CRN	CRA	CRAF	Total	MSDF	GSDF	ASDF
1964	120,000	20,700	49,000	50,600	244,000	35,000	171,500	39,000
1965	120,000	20,700	49,000	50,600	246,000	35,000	172,000	39,000
1966	107,000	18,000	44,000	45,000	246,000	35,000	171,500	39,500
1967	103,000	17,000	42,000	44,000	246,000	35,000	171,500	39,500
1968	101,600	16,600	41,500	43,500	250,000	36,000	174,000	40,000

Source: The Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 1964-69.

CONCLUSION

Since the end of World War II, both Canada and Japan have maintained a close military co-operation with the U.S. In the first stage, as examined in the previous chapter, the two countries were situated in completely different international environments. Canada in the late Forties and in the early Fifties was the strongest nation among middle powers. Abundant in natural resources and land area, it had an industrial capacity ranked as one of the highest in the world after the collapse of the economies of the west European countries following the War.

In spite of this, its strong economic power did not effect military independence from the U.S. This contrasts with the Japanese trend towards reducing military dependence on the U.S., after the re-establishment of its economic power in the early Sixties. By that time, antagonism between the U.S. and the Soviet Union had escalated the development of offensive weapons.

In the ICBM era--the late Fifties and early Sixties--Canada's geographical remoteness from enemies of conventional war became much less important for Canada's security. The problems of continental defence were characterized by a completely new and unprecedented urgency. Up to the time of the Cuban crisis, the military integration between Canada and the U.S. had been taking place rapidly.

In the Fifties, when Canada was busy in international affairs, it was also occupied with establishing a continental defence system with the U.S. Japan had just become independent at the beginning of the decade and was seeking admission to the United Nations. Almost completely protected by the U.S., Japan was militarily a small power with one-fifth

to one quarter of Canada's military expenditures throughout the Fifties. In spite of Japan's proximity to the eastern border of the Soviet Union, Japan's small economic and military power hardly provided the Soviet Union sufficient provocation for attack.

Canada has been gradually losing its strategic significance in continental defence. In the mid Sixties, with the development and construction of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), Canada's role vis-à-vis the U.S. declined in importance. Since then, Canada's contributions to continental defence have grown even less important than the contributions it made to NATO and NORAD in the Fifties and in the early Sixties.

In contrast to Canada's diminishing strategic significance, Japan, in the Sixties, was gradually moving away from dependence on the U.S.--economically, politically, and militarily. While Japan's "perpetual" conservative governments have maintained a pro-American policy, Japanese military power has been rapidly re-established with the accompanying diminution of dependence on the U.S.

Politically, the U.S. needs a Japan sufficiently strong to defend itself because it serves as a "bastion" of American democracy in Asia and also to deter potential enemies on the west and the north. Contrary to this, Canada is no longer essential to the U.S. in the ICBM era, unless the U.S. decides that it must meet the threat of missile attack by means of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system installed on Canadian soil.[1]

Throughout the postwar period, Canada's military co-operation with the U.S. has been very close. In particular, since the exchange of

the NORAD agreements in 1958, Canada has become integrated for military purposes with the U.S. to a degree higher than ever before. At present, Canada's military power compared with that of the U.S. is so small that it may not be significant to the U.S. for continental defence.

While the Trudeau Government has decided to reduce Canada's military contributions to NATO and promises to take a hard look at the alliance of NORAD with an eye to decreasing its commitments, the Sato Government anticipates an increase in Japan's military forces in proportion to its economic power. In light of this, Canada and Japan have reached turning points in their military relations with the U.S. As shown in the gradual decrease of its military expenditures in percentage of total expenditures, Canada's military contributions both to NORAD and NATO might be further reduced. Japan, on the other hand, will continue to increase its military expenditures in proportion to its rise of GNP, but whether this means it will expand its military responsibilities over the Southeast Asian and the western Pacific regions remains unclarified.

These trends in military relations with the U.S. between Canada and Japan can be related to geographical, socio-cultural and economic divergences. Moreover, the trends may also be related to some characteristics of the Canadian and Japanese political systems.

Geographical factors of the two countries have influenced the postwar trends of military relations with the U.S. to a high degree. Because of its geographical location, Canada has become more closely related in strategy to the U.S. than to any other NATO member under the Canada-U.S. Regional Group of arrangements for air defence of North

America. As partner to such a giant military power, Canada has hardly any chance to influence the U.S. armed forces in its collective security with the U.S.

In the late Fifties and in the early Sixties, Canada's close co-operation with the U.S., based on geographical location, became more apparent. Since the Russian introduction of the Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in 1957, there has been a growing arms race between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The increasing threat of the Soviet Union over the North Pole by the ICBM strengthened Canada's military co-operation with the U.S.

In addition to the DEW Line along the coast of the Arctic Ocean, there are the Mid-Canada Line across Canada at the 50th parallel, the Pine Tree Line on the U.S.-Canadian border, and the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system--all are designed to defend North America against the Soviet long-range bombers and missile attack over the North Pole. Canada is geographically situated first in the line of Soviet attack. Yet as Soviet missile technology improves, the warning time these systems provide the U.S. declines.

In the mid and late Sixties, despite the fact that all-out nuclear war has become less likely, Canada's geographical location has been largely responsible for continuing close relations with the U.S. By cutting down on personnel expenses, the Canadian Government could afford to modernize the NORAD equipment.[2] However, Canada's military establishment has lost the strategic significance it once possessed. Owing to geographical location, the remaining significance of Canada to the U.S. is that it provides an early warning system and that it allows the Americans free

access to Canada in time of emergency. Even this significance may become greatly reduced, once the recently launched spy satellite, which makes it possible for the U.S. Air Force to observe long-range missile launching sites in China and the Soviet Union, comes into operation.[3]

As for Japan, in the late Forties and early Fifties, it was only a part of the "Asian bastion" against Soviet Communism, which had already encroached on the Asian continent. When the Chinese Communists established the Peking Government in October, 1949, the military protective front of "American democracy" was fortified along the crescent-shaped line of Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines.

In the Korean War, the Peking Government explicitly expressed its opposition to the U.S. and its allies. The fortification of the U.S. military front in Asia, including Japan, was further strengthened.

In the late Fifties and early Sixties, however, Japan's geographical remoteness from North America created a doubt among some Japanese about whether the U.S. would seriously come to protect their country. Japan's rapidly growing economic power gradually drew attention from the Peking and Moscow Governments. With two potential enemies only across the Sea of Japan, the Japanese political leaders busily devoted themselves to acquiring a military power, at least capable of self-defence.

Ever since China's first nuclear bomb testing in 1964, nuclear bomb experiments have been occurring every year there. Faced with the possibility of the Chinese Communists producing a long-range ballistic missile system, the Japanese budgetary expenditures on armed forces suddenly doubled in 1965 the rate of increase of the previous year.[4]

To oppose a long-range ballistic missile attack, Japan built the Base Air Defence Ground Environment (BADGE) system in 1968. In the case of bomber attack, Japan may now be able to defend itself for a limited length of time. In this field, the Self-Defence Forces operate almost completely independently from the U.S. command. Examination of this trend of Japan's military relations with the U.S. also shows that geographical factors have been, to a considerable degree, responsible for the resulting independent operation of Japan's armed forces.

Socio-cultural factors may also explain differences in the postwar trends of military co-operation with the U.S. between Canada and Japan. In Canada's case, the U.S. has always posed a potential threat to Canada. When Canada eagerly fostered the idea of establishing a North Atlantic community, which brought the U.S. into the west European sphere, its main motive was to ease its heavy dependence on the U.S. and to create "a more healthy balance" within the community. Canada sought to escape from a renewed threat of an unacceptable degree of control by the U.S., immediately after the War. This seems to be one of the reasons which caused the External Affairs Minister at that time, Lester Pearson, to say:

> An Atlantic union must have a deeper meaning and deeper roots. It must create conditions for a kind of co-operation which goes beyond the immediate emergency.[5]

The French Canadians have developed a "state-of-siege mentality" for a long period of their history. They have continuously felt domination either by the English-speaking Canadians or Americans. Since the postwar period the English-speaking Canadians, too, have developed a feeling that they are being threatened from the south. The fact that,

presently, both French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians share a similar sentiment may serve to encourage reduction of Canada's heavy dependence on the U.S. Moreover, in the Seventies, the growing role of French Canadians in the government may also lead Canada to closer relations with French-speaking countries, not only in Europe, but also in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, because of the desire to weaken its heavy cultural, economic, military and political dependence on the U.S.[6]

Historically, Japan was considered as a potential enemy of the U.S. After it expanded its sphere of economic, political and military influence in Asia, Japan embarked on a campaign of destruction precipitating World War II. Although Japan has rebuilt a close friendship with the U.S. and its allies after the War, the U.S. as well as other Asian neighbours have been careful to watch for any sign of a militarist revival in Japan.

With the increased economic power, the possibility of Japan's becoming once again a military giant has also increased. While Canada is threatened by "familiarity" with the U.S., the U.S. may feel threatened by a Japan militarily independent of the U.S. and growing in strength.

From the beginning of the military co-operation with the U.S. in the postwar period, the Canadian majority expressed their support for it, while a large number of the Japanese people were confused by or opposed to their military alliance with the U.S. In Japan, cultural and linguistical differences between the U.S. and Japan has been one of the

greatest barriers to promoting or even maintaining a close military relationship with the U.S.

On the other hand, in spite of (or perhaps, because of) the socio-cultural convergence, the U.S. has posed a threat for Canada culturally as well as politically, militarily and economically. The barrier, in this case, is caused by fear of losing the Canadian identity, and, perhaps in the long run, Canadian sovereignty and independence. Nevertheless, the Canadians, as a rule, maintain a trust in the U.S.,[7] and the U.S. is Canada's closest friend and ally and will remain so.

In the late Sixties, the Japanese people continued to display a distrust of American bases and troops in Japan. Generally, the majority of the people do not believe that, in spite of the existence of the Security Treaty between the two, the U.S. would protect Japan in case of emergency.[8] This lack of confidence seems to have some relation to the great differences in culture between the U.S. and Japan. One Gallup International survey re accomplishments in the Sixties provides evidence contrasting Canadian admiration of the U.S. with Japanese self-admiration.[9]

Question: Which country in the world can look back on the years 1960 to 1969 with the most satisfaction for what it has achieved?

Answer:	Canada	Japan
Own country	25%	35%
U.S.A.	35	20
West Germany	5	10
U.S.S.R.	-	3
China	-	4
Others	16	2
Can't say	19	26

Economic factors also figure significantly in the postwar trends of the military co-operation with the U.S. Throughout the postwar period

Canada's economy has, without a doubt, been heavily dependent upon the U.S. Canada's trade with the U.S. has accounted for sixty per cent of its exports and seventy per cent of its imports. For the U.S., too, Canada has been the leading trading partner. The high figure of U.S. investments in Canada has long controlled a large part of the Canadian economy.

The Japanese economy, similarly, has been heavily dependent on the U.S., but much less so compared with that of Canada. In the Fifties and in the Sixties, less than 30 per cent of Japan's total foreign trade was with the U.S. Taking into consideration that Canada's foreign trade occupies one-third of its GNP compared to one-fifth in Japan, it appears much more important for Canada to maintain close economic relations with the U.S. than for Japan. As economic prosperity is for both Canada and Japan a most important national interest, a change in their military relations with thw U.S. must not cause a reduction of economic co-operation— and this is much more true for Canada.

In addition to these factors of geography, socio-culture and economy, the differences of political systems between Canada and Japan, as already mentioned, may also bear relation to the postwar trends of their military co-operation with the U.S. Absence of any noticeable academic clique among Canadian senior officials and a higher level of educational background may make for a higher degree of variety in Canada's policy outputs compared to Japan. The tendency towards variety of policy outputs is also produced in Canada by the convergence of the two major parties, the Progressive Conservatives and the Liberals, which share the same basic principles on foreign and defence policies, thus permitting the exploration of various means to implement these principles.

In such cases as NATO, NORAD, and the U.N. Peacekeeping force, decisions on Canada's foreign and defence policies have basically been shared by the two major parties. Both parties also agree on reducing military expenditures.

Compared with the Canadian case, the existence of an academic clique and a large number of career men in the Japanese bureaucracy provides a hindrance to the working of foreign and defence policies. Another obstacle to more flexible and broader policy outputs is, in Japan, the uncompromising difference between the conservative government and the opposition. Because of their lack of co-operation in policy-making, policy outputs are very limited in comparison to those of Canada.

While the Canadian opposition has wide representation in the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy of Japan contains hardly any members of the opposition. Furthermore, mainly because of structural and functional characteristics of Japan's Foreign Affairs Ministry, defence policy-making is much more restricted among the bureaucrats of the National Defence Agency. In Canada, the Department of External Affairs and National Defence co-operate with each other, as far as foreign and defence policy-making is concerned. The Japanese bureaucrats in the Defence Agency, on the other hand, suffer the disadvantage of isolation from the Foreign Affairs Ministry. This has some effect on the degree of flexibility and tolerance in their policy-making.

The Japanese military policies which support promotion of increased independence from the U.S. by expanding national armed forces may be near-sighted in terms of the dangerous developments in the Thirties and the Forties. On the other hand, Canada's wide variety of policy

outputs may result in finding a means of escaping from an unacceptable degree of military integration with the U.S., without significantly increasing the cost of defence, such as Canada's support of the U.N. Peace-keeping forces.

Most important of all these factors is the geographical and socio-cultural divergence between Canada and Japan. Thid divergence may indicate a possible direction of the two countries' military co-operation with the U.S., at least in the near future. On the one hand, Canada's heavy dependence on the U.S. will probably continue with little chance of reviving its strategic significance. Japan, on the other hand, is likely to continue to become more independent from the U.S., militarily, economically and politically. Its rapid increase of military expenditures and armed forces seems to suggest that it may expand its military commitments over the western Pacific and Southeast Asian regions. However, it is still too early to say that this will become a firm governmental policy in the near future.

FOOTNOTES
(Introduction and Part I)

1. Roger F. Swanson, "The United States as a National Security Threat to Canada," Behind the Headlines, July 1970, vol. XXIX, nos. 5-6, p. 15.

2. Ibid., p. 9.

3. The sizes of Quebec, Newfoundland and Japan are 523,860 sq. miles, 143,045 sq. miles and 142,775 sq. miles respectively.

4. In 1967, an average of 5.3 Canadians occupied each square mile, while an average of 701.9 Japanese lived in the same area.

5. The Canadian coastline is one of the longest in the world with a total length of 17,860 miles, excluding the coastlines of islands in the Arctic Ocean which, if included, would make a total of 41,810 miles. (Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada Year Book, 1968, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, p. 13.)

6. Ibid., p. 566.

7. Japan, Prime Minister's Office, Bureau of Statistics, Nihon Tokei Nenkan (Japan Statistical Yearbook), 1963, 1967 and 1968, Tokyo.

8. Canada Year Book, 1968, p. 959.

9. The breakdown of the 15 per cent which constituted Canada's foreign trade in 1966 was: 7 per cent with Asia (including the Middle East and the Communist bloc); 6 per cent with America (excluding the U.S.); 1.5 per cent with Africa; and the remainder with other countries including those of Oceania.

10. Melville H. Watkins, Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa (1968).

11. The Windsor Star, (Windsor, Ontario), March 25, 1970.

12. Yoshihiko Ono, "Konnichi no Teikoku-shugi Mujun to Nichi-Bei Kankei," (The Contradiction of Today's Imperialism and Japanese-American Relationships), Sekai, August 1962, pp. 104-6.

13. Ethnic groups in Japan are usually not identified, because of their considerably small number owing to the strict immigration law. The following nationalities are those who have registered as non-Japanese: Koreans (0.6%), Chinese (0.05%) and Americans (0.016%).

14. Canada Year Book, 1968, p. 208.

15. Peter Russell (ed.), Nationalism in Canada, McGraw-Hill Company of Canada Ltd., Toronto (1966).

16. James Eayrs, "Sharing a Continent," The United States and Canada, John S. Dickey (ed.), Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1964), p. 60.

17. Roger F. Swanson, op. cit., p. 9.

18. Mason Wade, "The Roots of the Relationship," The United States and Canada, p. 36.

19. Ibid., p. 50.

20. Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan, The Viking Press, New York (1965), p. 109.

21. Shigeru Yoshida, Nihon o Kettei shita Hyakunen (Japan's Decisive Century), Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, Tokyo (1967), p. 99.

22. Mildred A. Schwartz, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity, Fitzhenry and Whiteside Ltd., Scarborough, Ontario (1967), p. 70. Forty-two per cent of the responses (in March 1948) revealed that Canadians have generally become more dependent on the U.S. than ten years ago.

23. Ibid., p. 67 and p. 70. The polls were taken on September 27, 1950 and on July 8, 1951. They showed that 48 per cent of Canadians thought their way of life was not being overly influenced by the U.S.

24. Douglas Mendel, Jr., The Japanese People and Foreign Policy, University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, Calif. (1961), pp. 43-55.
The poll taken in September, 1950 showed the following result.

Question: Should Japan be pro-American, pro-Soviet, or neutralist?

Answer:	Pro-American	55%
	Pro-Soviet	0
	Neutralist	22
	Others and don't know	23

25. Ibid., pp. 102-21.
The poll on the same date showed this result:

Question: Do you approve or disapprove the presence of U.S. bases in Japan?

Answer:	Approve	30%
	Disapprove	38
	Others and don't know	32

26. Mildred A. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 67.
Sixty-eight per cent thought it was good for Canada that so much development had been financed by U.S. money. (The poll was taken on July 18, 1956)

27. Ibid., p. 66 and p. 70.

28. Douglas Mendel, Jr., op. cit., pp. 102-21.

Question: Why do you approve (or oppose) the presence of American bases in Japan?

Answer:		February 1953	February 1958
	Approve because		
	Self-defence inadequate	21%	4%
	Fear Communist invasion	5	3
	Others or no reason	7	1
		33	8
	Oppose because		
	Offence to national pride	11	20
	Self-defence adequate	7	14
	May involve us in war	4	9
	Harms national morals	5	4
	Economic costs	8	-
	Others or no reason	7	11
		42	58
	No opinion on bases	25	34

29. Ibid., pp. 68-74.

Question: Do you approve or oppose the idea that Japan needs military forces?

Answer:	May 1954	August 1957
Approve	52%	64%
Oppose	30	19
Others or don't know	18	17

Question: Do you approve or oppose Japan's rearmament?

Answer:	January 1953	August 1957
Approve	50%	31%
Oppose	20	42
Others or don't know	30	27

30. Ibid., pp. 68-74.
This poll was taken in August, 1957.

Question: What is the best way to protect Japan's security?

Answer:	
Our own forces	37%
Collective security	27
American forces	4
Others or don't know	32

31. Peyton Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 1961-63, Oxford University Press, Toronto (1968), Appendix B.

September 1961

Question: Which country do you think is further ahead in the field of long-range missiles and rockets--the U.S.A. or Russia?

Answer:		
	U.S.A.	21.2%
	Russia	50.9
	About the same	15.5
	Don't know	12.4

November 1961

Question: The Russian radio often claims that Russia wants to end the Cold War and seek only peace. Do you feel that this is sincere, or do you think this is only propaganda?

Answer:		
	Sincere	14.0%
	Propaganda	73.4
	Qualified (write in)	2.8
	Don't know	9.9

Question: Should war come, do you think it is more likely to arise through the U.S.A., Russia or some other way?

Answer:		
	Both U.S.A. and Russia	25.3%
	U.S.A.	3.5
	Russia	33.3
	China (volunteered)	5.5
	Other way	12.9
	Don't know	18.3

32. R.B. Byers, Canadian Foreign Policy and Selected Attentive Publics, Prepared for the Department of External Affairs, (Unpublished), December 1967.

Question: Some people think that the best way to prevent war is for the West to increase its military strength so as to be more powerful than the Russians. Others think that this would lead us to an armed race which may cause a war. What do you think? Should the West try to increase its military strength or not?

Answer:		
	Yes, should increase	58%
	No, should not increase	32
	Others or don't know	10

(This poll was taken in November, 1962.)

33. Peyton Lyon, op. cit., Appendix B.

September 1961

Question: Some people say that Canada is becoming more and more dependent on the U.S. for our air defence. Do you, or do you not think that this is happening?

Answer:		
	Yes, it is happening	66.4%
	No, it is not happening	19.4
	Can't say	14.2

Question: If Canada's defence becomes merged more and more with that of the U.S., would you approve or disapprove?

Answer:		
	Approve	68.2%
	Disapprove	21.7
	No opinion	10.1

34. The Gallup Report, The Gallup Poll of Canada, The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, April 11, 1964.

Question: Canada's defence policies are being argued about a good deal. Which of these statements comes closest to what you think Canada should do?

Answer:		
	The U.S. should take responsibility for defending Canada	3%
	Canada should maintain her own defence	17
	Defence should be a joint effort between Canada and the U.S.	67
	Canada should disarm and become a neutral nation	11
	Can't say	2

35. Tokyo Shimbun, July 19, 1959.

Question: Do you think that the new treaty will involve Japan in war or make Japan more secure?

Answer:		
	Will involve Japan in war	44.5%
	Will guarantee Japan's security	21.5
	Don't know	34.0

Central Research Company (for the Prime Minister's Office), October 9, 1959.

Question: Are you in favour of or opposed to Japan's general co-operation with the U.S. in the future?

Answer:		
	In favour	53%
	Opposed	17
	Uncertain	30

36. Central Research Company, December 1965.

Question: Are you reassured or worried about Japan's security in the future?

Answer:		
	Reassured	22.1%
	Worried	49.8
	Don't know	29.1

Question: Do you, or do you not think that, as civilization progresses, the possibility of war decreases?

Answer:		
	Yes, decreases	14.5%
	No, does not decrease	59.7
	Don't know	25.8

37. Ibid.

Question: We now belong to the "free world" bloc. Do you think that we should continue to be part of the "free world" bloc, change to the Communist bloc, or be neutral?

Answer:		
	The "free world" bloc	50.0%
	The Communist bloc	0.9
	Neutral	25.4
	Don't know	23.8

38. Ibid.

Question: If conditions call for it, do you think that we should be involved in war?

Answer:		
	Should not be in war	75.8%
	Depends upon the conditions	12.6
	Don't know	11.6

39. Ibid.

Question: Do you approve or oppose the Self-Defence Forces?

Answer:		
	Approve	81.9%
	Oppose	4.9
	Don't know	13.2

40. R.B. Byers, op. cit., June 1967, pp. 85 and 95.

Question: At the present time Canadian foreign policy places considerable emphasis on the peacekeeping role. Do you feel that this emphasis is--

Answer:		
	Not enough	26.6%
	About enough	54.4
	Too much	15.2
	Undecided	2.5
	No answer	1.3

Question: If Canada only had the military and financial capability to support one of the following foreign policy activities --NATO, NORAD, or peacekeeping--which would you consider most important?

Answer:		
	Peacekeeping	53.2%
	NATO	26.5
	NORAD	15.2
	No answer	5.1

41. Ibid., June 1967, p. 96.

Question: Should Canada pursue a more independent foreign policy?

Answer:		
	Yes	63.3%
	No	20.2
	Undecided	7.6
	No answer	8.9

42. Ibid., June 1967, pp. 96 and 33.

Question: In your opinion should Canada renew the NORAD agreement with the United States in 1968?

Answer:		
	Yes	63.3%
	No	21.5
	Undecided	12.7
	No answer	2.5

Question: Presuming NATO continues after 1969 should Canada remain a member of the alliance?

Answer:		
	Yes	75.9%
	No	13.9
	Undecided	9.9
	No answer	1.3

43. The Gallup Report, March 28, 1970.

Question: Do you think Canada is becoming more dependent on the U.S., or less dependent, than it was, say, ten years ago?

Answer:	National	Quebec	Ontario	West
More dependent	50%	42%	57%	54%
Less dependent	22	22	20	20
No difference	18	15	15	19
Can't say	10	19	8	7

44. Ibid., January 24, 1970.

Question: Looking ahead ten years, which country do you think will have the most to offer ordinary people for their happiness?

Answer:		
	Canada	54%
	U.S.A.	14
	Others	8
	Can't say	24

45. Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, Kiroku: Kokkai Anpo Ronso, Tokyo (1968), vol. 2, p. 204.
April 7-9, 1968

Question: They continue to produce nuclear weapons in Communist China. Do you, or do you not feel threatened by it?

Answer:		
	Yes, strongly	35%
	Yes, somewhat	37
	No, not at all	17
	Can't say	4
	Others or don't know	6
	No answer	1

46. Ibid., p. 188.

Question: Concerning relations with Communist China, which of the following would you think the best?

Answer:		
	Remain intact	10%
	Promote friendlier relations	35
	Normalize relations	34
	Keep out	8
	Others or don't know	22
	No answer	1

47. Asahi Shimbun, January 5, 1969.

Question: Some people say that Japan's economic prosperity in the postwar period depends upon the American protection of Japan. Do you approve or oppose this?

Answer:		
	Approve	55%
	Oppose	26
	Others	6
	No answer	13

48. Ibid.

Question: Do you think that the U.S. soldiers and bases in Japan are necessary or unnecessary to protect Japan today?

Answer:	Necessary	28%
	Unnecessary	56
	Others	2
	No answer	14

49. Ibid.

Question: Do you, or do you not think that the Americans will seriously protect us in case of an emergency?

Answer:	Yes, they will	24%
	No, they won't	51
	Others	6
	No answer	19

50. Mainichi Shimbun, July 1, 1968.

Question: Do you, or do you not think that the Self-Defence Forces are necessary?

Answer:	Necessary	82%
	Unnecessary	15
	Others	3

51. John Holmes, "Canadian External Policies Since 1945," International Journal, The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, XVIII, (Spring, 1963), pp. 137-47.

52. Ibid.

53. Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japanese Export Picture.
It shows that in 1952, for example, 65 per cent (or $800 million) of the total exports of Japan was war income (offshore procurements) resulting from the Korean War.

54. Shigeru Yoshida, op. cit., p. 175.

55. David Cox, "Peace-keeping in Canadian Foreign Policy," An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, Stephen Clarkson (ed.), McClelland and Stewart Ltd., Toronto (1968), p. 188.

56. Richard Lowenthal, "Diplomacy and Revolution: The Dialectics of Disputes," China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command, Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. (1967).

57. Paul Martin, "Canada and United States' Foreign Policies," Statements and Speeches, Information Division, Department of External Affairs, No. 67/4.

58. Pierre Trudeau, "Canada and the World," Statements and Speeches, No. 68/17.

FOOTNOTES
(Part II)

1. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The King's Printer, Ottawa (1947), pp. 68-9.

2. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Annual Report, 1948 and 1949, The King's Printer, Ottawa.

3. The number of officers increased from 259 in 1950 to 402 in 1959, and the total number of employees were 1,350 in 1950 and 1,859 in 1959.

4. They are the Central Planning Staff, the Inspection Service, the Special Research Bureau and the Departmental Advisor on Bilingualism.

5. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan, Report of the Government Section, September 1945 to September 1948, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. (1948), viii.

6. The organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is referred to in: Kokkai Benran (Handbook of the Diet), 43.8, Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, Tokyo (1968); Mainichi Nenkan (Mainichi Yearbook), 1966 and 1969, Mainichi Shimbun Sha, Tokyo; and Asahi Nenkan (Asahi Yearbook), 1966, Asahi Shimbun Sha, Tokyo.

7. Quoted from The Art of the Possible by James Eayrs, University of Toronto Press, Toronto (1961), p. 43.

8. Sixty-four higher officials have been chosen for this paper; 31 are officials at home and the rest are those who were posted abroad in 1968. These officials at home held such high positions as Under-Secretary, Deputy Under-Secretary, Assistant Under-Secretary, Head of Division, or Director General of Office in October, 1969. Those abroad were all ambassadors or high commissioners to important nations or international organizations at the end of 1968. (The decision on what nations are considered important is made by the author.)

9. This number excludes those who have left the Department temporarily for education, military training and wartime services.

10. The data on education for one of these 64 officials is not available.

11. Among them there are: 10 second Bachelor's degrees, 28 Master's degrees, a second Master's degree, 11 Bachelor of Law degrees, 5 Ph D s, and 10 Doctor of Law degrees (including honorary degrees).

12. Among the 64 officials there are 27 who were born in Ontario, 13 in Quebec, 4 in British Columbia, 3 each in Manitoba and Nova Scotia, 2 each in New Brunswick and Saskatchewan, one in Newfoundland, and 9 in foreign countries such as the U.S.(3), China(2), Britain(2), Russia(1) and France(1).

13. The top 58 officials in 1968 are those who held such high positions as Permanent Vice-Minister, Foreign Affairs Counsellor, Chief of the Minister's Secretariat, Chief of Bureau, Chief of the Training Institute, Chief of the Osaka Local Liaison Office, Vice-Chief of Bureau, Chief of Protocol, Chief of the International Material Department, and 36 ambassadors (considered important by the author).

14. Of the fifteen, ten have been temporarily transferred to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

15. James Eayrs, op. cit., p. 12.

16. R. Barry Farrell, The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy, Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., Scarborough, Ontario (1969), p. 12.

17. James Eayrs, op. cit., p. 3.

18. R.B. Farrell, op. cit., p. 12.

19. He was an associate professor of law before elected to the House of Commons in 1965. As an MP, he was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister (1966 and 1967) and Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada (1967).

20. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, 4th ed., University of Toronto Press, Toronto (1963), p. 204.

21. R.B. Farrell, op. cit., p. 13.

22. Mainichi Henkan, 1969.

23. Yoshida had been an ambassador to Great Britain before the Second World War and one of the leading officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ashida also started his career in the Foreign Ministry, became a Dietman and was reputed to be most fluent in English in the Diet. Kishi was a career man in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Sato, a brother of Nobusuke Kishi, was also a career man in the Ministry of Transport before he was elected to the House of Representatives in 1949.

24. Naoki Kobayashi, Kenpo o Yomu (Comprehending the Constitution), Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo (1966), pp. 164-5.

25. Junsei Misawa, "Seisaku Kettei Katei no Gaikan" (Outlook of the Policy-Making Process), Nempo: Seijigaku, 1967, Nihon Seijigaku Kai (ed.), Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo (1967), pp. 16-7.

26. All Prime Ministers except Tetsu Katayama have represented conservative parties. Katayama was a Socialist and formed a Socialist coalition government with the conservatives in 1947.

27. In the Department of External Affairs there have been seven Ministers: L. St. Laurent, L. Pearson, J. Diefenbaker, S. Smith, H. Green, P. Martin and M. Sharp. Seven in the Department of Finance: D. Abbott, W. Harris, D. Fleming, G. Howlan, W. Gordon, M. Sharp and E. Benson; seven in the Department of Trade and Commerce: J. MacKinnon, C. Howe, G. Churchill, G. Hees, M. Sharp, R. Winters and C. Drury; and six in the Department of National Defence: B. Claxton, R. Campney, G. Pearkes, D. Harkness, P. Hellyer and L. Cadieux.

28. All Foreign Ministers in the period are: S. Yoshida, H. Ashida, R. Nemoto, K. Hirokawa, K. Okazaki, K. Shigemitsu, N. Kishi, A. Fujiyama, Z. Kosaka, M. Ohira, E. Shiina, T. Miki, E. Sato and K. Aichi. There have been thirteen Ministers of Finance: T. Ishibashi, S. Yano, T. Kurusu, T. Kitamura, S. Izumiyama, H. Ikeda, T. Mukai, S. Ogasawara, M. Ichimada, E. Sato, M. Mizuta, K. Tanaka and T. Fukuda; twenty-two Ministers of International Trade and Industry: J. Hoshijima, C. Mizutani, S. Oya, H. Inagaki, H. Ikeda, S. Takase, R. Yokoo, R. Takahashi, S. Ogasawara, S. Okano, K. Aichi, T. Ishibashi, M. Mizuta, S. Maeo, T. Takasaki, M. Ishii, E. Shiina, H. Fukuda, Y. Sakurauchi, T. Miki, M. Sugano, and M. Ohira; twenty-two Directors General of the National Defence Agency: S. Yoshida, A. Kimura, S. Kimura, A. Sugihara, S. Sunada, M. Funada, T. Ishibashi, H. Kotaki, J. Tsushima, G. Sato, S. Ino, M. Akagi, M. Enaki, M. Nishimura, S. Fujieda, K. Shiga, T. Fukuda, J. Koizumi, Y. Matsumoto, E. Kambayashiyama, K. Masuda and K. Arita.

29. Warren Tsuneishi, Japanese Political Style, Harper and Row Publishers, New York (1966), p. 49; and Robert Ward, Japanese Political System, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1967), pp. 95-6.

30. Takeshi Ishida, "Yoron to Gaiko Seisaku" (Public Opinion and Foreign policy-Making), Sekai, July 1967, p. 37.

31. R.B. Farrell, op. cit., p. 175.

32. Ibid., p. 161.

33. Junsei Misawa, op. cit., p. 31.

34. For example, a large number of Canadians (46%) were dissatisfied with the defence policy of the Diefenbaker Government in 1960, and a majority of Canadians (62%) approved nuclear weapons for the Canadian Forces in 1961. Although government policy had changed very little in reaction to these public opinion poll results, the people did not actively oppose the government. (For the public opinion poll results, see R.B. Byers, prepared for the Department of External Affairs, Canadian Foreign Policy and Selected Attentive Publics, pp. 67-9.)

35. Robert Ward, op. cit., p. 91.

36. J.R. Mallory, "The Structure of Canadian Politics," Party Politics in Canada, Hugh G. Thorburn, Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., Toronto (1963), p. 24.

37. Ibid., p. 26.

38. The definition of "cadre" and "mass" parties is taken from F.C. Engelmann and M.A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure, Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., Scarborough, Ontario (1967), p. 6.

39. In the 1947 election, the Socialist Party won the largest number of seats (143), but, since it was far from the majority (234 seats), it had to set up a coalition government with the Liberal (131 seats) and Democratic (121 seats) Parties, both of which were conservatives.

40. Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Ottawa, May 30, 1967.

41. R.B. Farrell, op. cit., p. 161.

FOOTNOTES
(Part III).

1. It was the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who first used the famous phrase, "iron curtain," in his telegram to U.S. President Harry Truman in May, 1945. Since then, Churchill devoted himself to warning the U.S. and other European allies of the Soviet Communist threat in Europe on various occasions.

2. John Gellner, Canada in NATO, The Ryerson Press, Toronto (1970), p. 5.

3. Escott Reid, "The Birth of the North Atlantic Alliance," International Journal, vol. XXII, Summer 1967, p. 427.

4. Statement of Prime Minister King, quoted by R.A. Spencer, in Canada in World Affairs, Oxford University Press, Toronto (1967), vol. V, 1946-1949, pp. 249-50.

5. Escott Reid, "The Birth of the North Atlantic Alliance," op. cit., pp. 428-29.

6. The Brussels Treaty was concluded between Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg on March 17, 1948. The most important part of the Treaty was Article 4, which based the defence policy of the treaty partners on the principle of "one for all and all for one," without room for evasion or limitation of responsibilities.

7. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Statement of Secretary of State for External Affairs St. Laurent, 1948, vol. IV, p. 3449.

8. The Vandenberg Resolution allowed the U.S. Government to pursue within the U.N. Charter its participation in "regional and other arrangements for individual and collective self-defence."

9. John Gellner, op. cit., p. 14.

10. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Statement of Secretary of State for External Affairs Pearson, 1949, vol. I, p. 239.

11. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty reads:
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding on the principle upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

12. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Statement of George Drew, 1949, vol. III, pp. 2066-71.

13. Jon B. McLin, Canada' Changing Defence Policy, 1957-1963, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore (1967), p.12.

14. Agnes J. Groome, M.J. Coldwell and C.C.F. Foreign Policy, (M.A. Thesis), University of Saskatchwan, Regina (1967), p.214.

15. Michael Barkway, "Atlantic Pact--New Horizons," Saturday Night, May 2, 1950, p.11.

16. Escott Reid, "Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance," Behind the Headlines, vol. XXVII, June, 1969.

17. Brooke Claxton, Speech to the House of Commons, on February 5, 1951, quoted from Canada in NATO, by John Gellner, op. cit., pp.26-8.

18. Jon B. McLin, op. cit., pp.173-5.

19. Ibid.

20. Yasukichi Yasuba, "Amerika Tai-Nichi Keizai Gaiko Seisaku," (The Economic Foreign Policy of the U.S. towards Japan), Nichi-Bei Kankei no Kenkyu, (The Study of the Japanese-U.S. Relations), Hasshaku Takagi (ed.), Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, Tokyo (1968), vol.I, pp.260-69.

21. Some examples which show social instability at that time are incidents such as the Taira, Shimoyama, Mitaka and Matsukawa Incidents.

22. The American Economic Aid to Japan, 1946-52

in millions of U.S. dollars

Year	Gifts	Loans	Total
1946-8	965.7	14.0	979.1
1949	501.5	-	501.5
1950	365.3	-	365.3
1951	290.3	-	290.3
1952	63.6	-	63.6

Source:U.S. Foreign Assistance and Assistance from International Organization, United States Aid.

23. Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs, The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass. (1962), pp. 264-5.

24. Ibid., p. 266.

25. Katsuo Okazaki, in the three-man talk on "Gyosei Kyotei no Jittai o Tsuku," (Talk about the Truth of the Administrative Agreement), Kaizo, April 1952, pp. 51-2.

26. The article read:
The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two governments.

27. Shigeru Yoshida, op. cit., p. 269.

28. Ibid., p. 270.

29. The Agreement was ratified by all members of NATO other than the U.S. in June, 1951. What it was mainly concerned with was that an offence committed while the offender was on official duty should be judged by United States military courts, while an offence committed when off duty should be judged by the courts of the country in which the offender was stationed.

This agreement was opposed by the U.S. Senate on the grounds that the American forces were remaining in Europe in order to preserve the freedom of the Europeans.

30. The public opinion poll taken by Yomiuri Shimbun on September 29-October 2, 1951 showed the uncertainty of the public whether the Security Treaty would increase Japan's security.

Question: Do you think the Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan will increase our security?

Answer:		
	Yes	31.1%
	No	16.4
	Don't know	52.5

31. Hirotake Koyama, et. al., Anpo Joyaku Ronso Shi, (Historical Survey of the Security Treaty Controversies), Shakai Shimpo, Tokyo (1968), pp. 16-18.

32. Ibid.

33. Katsuo Okazaki, op. cit., p. 50.

34. Mainichi Shimbun, September 14-15, 1951.

Question: Do you support the Japan-U.S. Security Pact?

Answer:		
	Yes	79.9%
	No	6.8
	Don't know	10.4
	Other answers	2.4
	Don't know the Pact	0.5

35. Hitoshi Ashida, "Kempo wa Nishukan de Dekitaka?", (Symposium: Was the Constitution made in two Weeks?), Kaizo, Special Issue, 1952, pp. 19-20.

The first paragraph of Article 9 of the Constitution reads:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

And the second paragraph of the Article originally read as follows:

Land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained; the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Foreign Minister Ashida merely added: "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph," in front of the original second paragraph. Thus, remains the possibility of interpreting the whole Article to allow Japan to keep the right of self defence.

36. Mainichi Shimbun Sha, Anpo to Jieitai, op. cit., pp. 19-30

37. Ibid. There were 380,000 applicants for the fixed number of jobs--75,000. The wage was 4,500 yen per month, and a retirement pension of 60,000 yen was also guaranteed.

38. Ibid., p. 43.

39. Yasukichi Yasuba, op. cit., Appendix 5, p. 315.

40. During the negotiations, the U.S. insisted that the Japanese forces be increased to 350,000, and, possibly in the future, take over the military role in the Far East which had been played by the U.S.

But Japan refused the U.S. request, because of these internal conditions: (1) legal condition (the Constitution), (2) political and social condition (the completion of peace education), (3) economic condition (the domestic instability of the economy), (4) practical condition (the impossibility of collecting enough people). Finally, in October, Japan's offer to increase men to 180,000 in three years was accepted by the U.S. in 1953. (Anpo to Jieitai, op. cit., pp. 49-54.)

41. J.L. Granatstein (ed.), Canadian Foreign Policy since 1945, The Copp Clark Publishing Co., Toronto (1969), p. 93.

42. John Gellner, op. cit., pp. 50-53.

43. Jon B. McLin, op. cit., Chapter III.

44. Ibid., p. 41.

45. The final sample of the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion showed a 37 to 43 per cent margin for the Liberals, although the final result of the Gallup Poll showed, in mid-March, 1958, 56 per cent of valid votes for the Conservatives. (J. Murry Beck, Pendulum of Power, Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., Scarborough, Ontario, 1968.)

46. Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, June 1958.

47. Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's Statement on September 23, 1958. (See Jon B. McLin, op. cit., Appendix II.)

48. John Gellner, op. cit., p. 61.

49. Prime Minister Diefenbaker's Statement on September 23, 1958, op. cit.

50. Jon B. McLin, op. cit., p. 146.

51. John Gellner, op. cit., p. 44.

52. Ibid., pp. 59-60.

53. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Statement of Lester Pearson, 1959, vol. II, p. 1225.

54. Quoted from Canada in NATO, by John Gellner, Statement of Lester Pearson, p. 62.

55. Peyton Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, Oxford University Press, Toronto (1968), vol. XII, 1961-63, p. 124.

56. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Statement of Lester Pearson, 1962-63, vol. III, p. 3117.

57. Donald Smiley, The Canadian Politcal Nationality, Methuen, Toronto (1967), xii.

58. Ibid.

59. The Gallup Poll on Popularity of the Progressive Conservative Party and the Liberal Party, 1957-1963:

	PC	Lib
August 1957	47%	35%
January 1958	50	35
September 1960	38	43
September 1961	32	47
May 1962	36	44
February 1963	33	44

Source: J.M. Beck, op. cit., pp. 291-373.

60. Both CAGE and the CF-105 Arrow (aircraft) had been developed by the Canadian Defence Research Board in order to discover a cheaper alternative to the American-developed semi-automatic ground environment system (SAGE) and Bomarc aircraft.

61. Canada, Department of Defence Production, Report of the Department of Defence Production, 1959, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa (1960), p. 25.

62. U.S. Expenditures in Canada

	1957 - 1958
1957	Can. $61.1 million
1958	68.2

Canadian Expenditures in U.S.

	1957 - 1958
1957	Can. $36.1 million
1958	41.7

62. U.S. Expenditures in Canada

	1959 - 1962
1959	Can. $96.3 million
1960	112.7
1961	142.3
1962	254.3

Canadian Expenditures in U.S.

	1959 - 1962
1959	Can. $31.2 million
1960	58.7
1961	51.8
1962	37.7

Source: Canada, Department of Defence Production, Report of the Department of Defence Production, (1957-62).

63. John Warnock, "Canada and North American Defence," Alliances and Illusions: Canada and the NATO - NORAD Question, M.G. Hurting Ltd., Publishers, Edmonton (1969), pp. 47-48.

64. Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., The Japanese People and Foreign Policy, University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, Calif. (1961), pp. 102-121.

The public opinion poll results in October 1957 and February 1958 show strong opposition to the presence of U.S. bases in Japan.

Question: Do you approve or oppose the presence of U.S. bases in Japan?

Answer:	October 1957	February 1958
Approve	18%	8%
Oppose	60	58
Don't know	22	34

65. Theodore McNelly, Contemporary Government of Japan, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, Mass. (1963), p. 197.

66. George Packard III, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. (1966), pp. 3-10.

67. Hirotake Koyama, op. cit., p. 78.

68. Asahi Janaru (weekly magazine), November 1, 1959.

These four principles are taken from Foreign Minister Fujiyama's answers to the publicly-announced questionnaire from the academics.

69. The provision of economic co-operation was seen not only in the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 2), but also in the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty (Article 2), the ANZUS Treaty (Article 2), the U.S.-Korea Security Treaty (Article 2), the SEATO Treaty (Articles 2 and 3) and the U.S.-Formosa Treaty (Articles 2 and 3). However, the Foreign Minister particularly stressed the importance of the Ottawa Proclamation of the NATO Council in September, 1951, and the result of the NATO Council in Paris in May, 1956, both of which dealt with economic and political co-operations among the NATO partners. Later the Prime Minister agreed with the Foreign Minister. (Morinosuke Kajima, Nihon no Heiwa to Anzen (Peace and Security of Japan), The Kajima Kenkyujo, Tokyo (1969), pp. 57-67.)

70. Theodore McNelly, op. cit., p. 181.

71. Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., op. cit., pp. 101-110.

72. Ibid., p. 95 and pp. 115-16.

73. The public opinion polls shown in Protest in Tokyo by George Packard III, (pp. 147-52), and in The Japanese People and Foreign Policy by Douglas Mendel, Jr., (p. 102).

Question: Do you approve or oppose the presence of the U.S. bases in Japan?

Answer:	Oct. 1957	Feb. 1958	July 1959
Approve	18%	8%	31%
Oppose	60	58	28
Don't know	22	34	41

74. George Packard III, op. cit., pp. 82-90.

75. The People's Council for Preventing the Revision of the Security Treaty was composed of the JSP, JCP (an observer), The National Federation of Neutral Labour Unions, Tokyo Joint Struggle Council for Safe-Guarding Peace and Democracy, and another 134 organizations throughout the country. (Protest in Tokyo, pp. 120-24.)

76. One of the most crucial splits in the Japan Socialist Party was that of the Nishio faction, the right-wing. The more than 30 members of the Nishio faction organized their own party--The Democratic Socialist Party, in January, 1960.

77. Shuzo Hayashi, "Nichi-Bei Anzen Hosho to 1970-nen," (The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Year 1970), 1970-nen Mondai, (Problems in 1970), Kokumin Koza: Nihon no Anzen Hosho (ed.), Hara Shobo, Tokyo (1968).

78. Asahi Janaru, February 28, 1960, and June 5-29, 1960.
Both terms were considered very important in relation to Japan's involvement in American wars in the Southeast Asian and Far Eastern regions, where the Vietnam War, the Korean tension and the U-2 Incident were great controversial issues.

79. Ryoichi Ando, "Sono Yo no Kokkai o Mokugeki shite," (Witnessing the Diet procedure that night), Ampo: 1960, Yoshimi Usui (ed.), Tsukuma Shobo, Tokyo (1969), pp. 105-9.

80. Robert Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan, University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles (1962), pp. 134-36.
The result of a poll taken shortly after the May 19 Incident by Asahi Shimbun showed the Kishi cabinet as least popular in the postwar period.

Question: Do you support the Cabinet?

Answer:	Kishi May 1960	Hatoyama August 1956	Yoshida May 1954	Ashida July 1948
Yes	12%	29%	23%	16%
No	58	41	48	52
Don't know or indifference	30	30	29	32

81. The Treaty had been approved by the House of Representatives on May 19, 1960. According to the Constitution of Japan, a treaty would come into effect automatically thirty days after ratification by the lower house, if not approved before that time by the House of Councillors. Therefore, June 15 was only a few days before the automatic effectiveness of the new Security Treaty.

82. Yasukichi Yasuba, op. cit., p. 313.

83. Ibid., Appendix 2-1.

84. The first Defence Programme (1958-1960)
Ground Self-Defence Force: 180,000 men, 20,000 reserves.
Maritime Self-Defence Force: 34,000 men, 124,000 tons, 200 airplanes.
Air Self-Defence Force: 41,586 men, 1,300 airplanes, 24 radar locations.
Estimated Expenditures: Approximately $1,260 million.

85. U.S. Troops in Japan, 1955-60

	in number of men			
	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total No.
1955	--	--	--	150,000
1956	--	--	--	117,000
1957	17,000	20,000	40,000	77,000
1958	10,000	18,000	37,000	65,000
1959	6,000	17,000	35,000	58,000
1960	5,000	14,000	27,000	46,000

Source: Asahi Shimbun Sha, Jieitai, p. 266.

86. The second Defence Programme (1962-1966)
Ground Self-Defence Force: 180,000. (The first Programme had the same number, but altogether 28,500 men still had to be recruited to reach the number 180,000.)
Maritime Self-Defence Force: 143,669 tons, 235 airplanes.
Air Self-Defence Force: 1,036 airplanes (priority placed on F-104 J fighters).
Estimated Expenditures: Approximately $3,611 million.

87. Asahi Shimbun Sha, op. cit., pp. 160-63.

88. Ibid., pp. 156-59.

89. Ranking of the Top Ten Defence Industries in Japan, 1962-66

in millions of yen

Name of Company	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Mitsubishi Nihon Heavy Industry	1 (87.6)				
Shin Mitsubishi Heavy Industry	2 (81.5)	1 (55.0)	2 (100.9)	1 (203.8)	1 (200.3)
Kawasaki Airplane Industry	3 (56.8)	5 (19.5)	6 (19.4)	3 (43.7)	3 (67.0)
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industry	4 (36.3)	2 (53.1)	3 (37.9)	2 (92.4)	2 (70.2)
Mitsubishi Shipping Company	5 (30.6)				
Komatsu Industry	6 (26.6)			10 (16.5)	7 (21.5)
Nippon Steel	7 (25.9)				4 (24.2)
Mitsubishi Electric	8 (25.1)	3 (28.4)	8 (18.7)	4 (36.6)	5 (22.5)
Fuji Heavy Industry	9 (22.0)		10 (17.5)	8 (22.9)	10 (19.2)
Nippon Oil	10 (15.3)	10 (14.4)			
Kawasaki Heavy Industry		4 (23.1)		6 (28.7)	
Nihon Electric		6 (16.6)	7 (19.3)	7 (24.8)	6 (22.5)
Sumitomo Shoji		7 (15.4)			9 (19.5)
Mitsui Shipping Co.		8 (15.3)		9 (20.7)	
Uraga Heavy Industry		9 (14.8)			
Nippon Aviatronics			1 (108.1)		
Hitachi Limited			4 (37.5)		
Nippon Kokan			5 (22.3)		
Maizuru Heavy Industry			9 (18.1)		
Shin Meiwa Electric				5 (36.3)	8 (20.4)

Note: Shin Mitsubishi Heavy Industry became Mitsubishi Heavy Industry after it merged with Mitsubishi Nihon Heavy Industry in June, 1962.

Source: Asahi Shimbun Sha, Jieitai, Appendix.

90. The Agreement was concluded between Japan's Air Marshall Hisoo Matsumae and U.S. Commander Robert W. Burns on September 2, 1959. It regulated the operational management of the Japanese sky, in which Japan managed its own commanding authority completely independent and separated from that of the U.S., in theory. In practice, however, ASDF operated in close co-operation with the American system of command.

91. Asahi Shimbun Sha, op. cit., pp. 24-7.

92. John Warnock, "Canada and the Alliance System," Canadian Dimension, Winnipeg, vol. 3, 1966, pp. 36-9.

93. The doctrine of "flexible response" originated in the statement of Christian Herter, the nominee for the U.S. Secretary of Defence. He said, in April, 1959, "I cannot conceive of any President involving us in all-out nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly that we are in danger of all-out devastation ourselves." It meant that dependence upon strategic and tactical nuclear weapons would be reduced, and that the provision for conventional forces would be increasingly emphasized.

94. John Gellner, op. cit., p. 77.

95. Lester Pearson, "A New Kind of Peace Force," Maclean's, May 2, 1964.

96. The French Government under General de Gaulle had been reducing its military contribution to NATO ever since 1959, when the doctrine of "flexible response" was introduced by the U.S. On March 11, 1966, it finally proposed to withdraw completely from the military organization of NATO and, three weeks later, addressed the memorandum to the other 14 NATO countries, setting April 1, 1967, as the date when allied installations had to be removed from French soil.

97. Harold von Reikhoff, "NATO: To Stay or Not to Stay," An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, Stephen Clarkson (ed.), McClelland and Stewart Ltd., Toronto (1968), p. 167.

98. Statement of Prime Minister Lester Pearson, quoted from Canada in NATO by John Gellner, p. 86.

99. James Steele, "Canada's Vietnam Policy: The Diplomacy of Escalation," An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, p. 69.

100. John Holms, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., Toronto (1970), p. 169.

101. Lester Pearson, "Canada, the United States and Vietnam," Statements and Speeches, Information Division, Department of External Affairs, No. 67/8

102. Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japanese

Export Picture, 1967, Tokyo.

103. The Christian Science Monitor, February 23, 1967.

104. Pierre Trudeau,"Canada and the World," Statements and Speeches, No. 68/17.

105. Ibid., April 12, 1968.

106. John Gellner, op. cit., p. 100.

107. Pierre Trudeau, Statements and Speeches, April 3, 1969.

108. John Holmes, op. cit., p. 166.

109. Address by Dalton Camp, in the Progressive Conservative Party, Report on the Montmorency Conference, August 7-19, 1967, Ottawa.

110. David Cox, "Canadian Defence Policy: The Dilemma of a Middle Power," Behind the Headlines, November 1968, vol. XXVII, no.5.

111. R. Barry Farrell, The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 76.

112. John Holmes, op. cit., Chapter 5, part 1.

113. Lester Pearson, op. cit.

114. Robert Reford, "Merchant of Death?", Behind the Headlines, vol. XXVII, October 1968, no. 4, p. 18.

115. Walter Stewart, "Proudly We Stand the 'Butcher's Helper' in Southeast Asia," Maclean's, March 1970, p.13.

116. Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Defence Commodities, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa (1967).

117. Site I (Thule, Greenland) and Site II (Clear, Alaska) are under the U.S. Air Force Air Division Command, 9th Aerospace Division, and Site III (Fylingdale Moor, England) comes under the Royal Air Force Fighter Command, with a detachment of USAF ADC's 71st Surveillance. (Marian Talmadge and Iris Gilmore, NORAD, Dodd, Mead & Company, New York, 1967, pp. 36-8.)

118. John Warnock, "Canada and the North American Defence," p. 67.

119. Ibid., p.64.

120. The Windsor Star (Windsor, Ontario), January 6, 1970.

121. Time, March 2, 1970, p. 28.

122. Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, "Gaiko-Boei Seisaku ni taisuru Yoron,"

(Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policies), Kiroku: Kokkai Anpo Ronso, (Report: Debates on the Security Treaty in the House of Representatives), Tokyo (1968), vol. 2.

123. Statement of Prime Minister Sato, translated by the author, Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, op. cit., p. 71.

124. The Hawk, the Nike Hercules, the Mace B missile and many other manned bombers are reported all to be equipped with nuclear warheads.

125. Tadao Hisazumi, "Anzen Hosho Rongi ni okeru Okinawa Mondai," (The Question of Okinawa in relation to the Security Treaty), Anzen Hosho to Nichi-Bei Kankei, (The Security Question and the Japanese-American Relations), Kokumin Koza: Nihon no Anzen Hosho Iinkai (ed.), Hara Shobo, Tokyo (1968), pp. 167-200.

126. The American installations in Okinawa covers nearly one-fourth of the entire land. There are more than 100 bases, including 28 main ones. B-52 missions to Vietnam are staged from Kadeno airfield, one of the biggest bases in Okinawa. (The New York Times, November 22, 1969)

127. The three principles are: 1) not producing nuclear weapons; 2) not having nuclear weapons; 3) not acquiring nuclear weapons from abroad.

128. Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, op. cit., p. 56.

129. The New York Times, November 20, 1069.

130. Ibid., November 21, 1969.

131. Masao Makiuchi, "Kaku Seito no Boei Seisaku," (The Defence Policy of Each Party), 1970-nen Mondai, (Problems of the Year 1970), Kokumin Koza: Nihon no Anzen Hosho Iinkai (ed.), Hara Shobo, Tokyo (1968), pp. 85-101.

132. Policies of the opposition parties towards the Security Treaty and the Okinawa problem are mainly referred to in : Tadao Hisazumi, op. cit., and Masao Makiuchi, op. cit.

133. Asahi Shimbun Sha, Jieitai, p. 156.

134. Ibid., p.77.

135. Mainichi Shimbun Sha, Anpo to Jieitai, p. 76. The total estimates of $6,500 million for the third Defence Programme were divided in these categories:

$2,925 million (45%)	Personnel expenses
$3,575 million (55%)	Non-personnel expenses.

Of the non-personnel expenses, taking $3,575 million as 100 per cent:

$1,339 million (38%)	Non-weapons expenses
$2,236 million (62%)	Defence weapons expenses.

Of the defence weapons expenses, taking $2,236 million as 100 per cent:

$1,476 million (66%)	Renovation of old weapons expenses
$ 760 million (34%)	New weapons expenses.

136. Herbert P. Bix, "The Security Treaty System and the Japanese Military-Industrial Complex," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, January 1970, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 38.

137. Ibid., p. 40.

138. Ibid., p. 32.

139. Mainichi Shimbun Sha, op. cit., pp. 103-4.

140. Ibid., p. 89.

141. Ibid., p. 128.

FOOTNOTES
(Conclusion)

1. James Eayrs, "The Military Policies of Contemporary Canada: Principles, Problems, Precepts, Prospects," Contemporary Canada, Richard H. Leach (ed.), Duke University Press, Durham, N.C. (1967), p. 242.

2. Canada, Department of National Defence, The White Paper on Defence, 1964, Ottawa.
According to the Paper, the equipment expenses were to increase from 13.3 per cent to 25 per cent in the years 1964 to 1974, by way of reducing the number of men under arms.

3. The Toronto Telegram, October 31, 1970.

4. In the ten years 1955-1964, the average increase of military expenditures in Japan was 6.7 per cent annually. But the rate of increase of the 1965 military expenditures was 19.9 per cent, compared to the 11.6 per cent increase in 1964 expenditures.

5. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Statement of Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson, 1949, vol. I, p. 239.

6. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians--Europe, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa (1970), p. 15.

7. See the section on the Attitude of the Public towards the U.S. in this paper.

8. See footnote 49 in Part I of this paper.

9. The Gallup Report, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, December 31, 1969.

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KIROKU KATO was born in Japan on June 1, 1942, in the city of Soka, just north of Tokyo. One of four sons of Mr. and Mrs. Shoichi Kato of Soka, Japan, he studied Law at Waseda University in Tokyo and obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree there.

Following his study of English at the American Language Institute in San Francisco, he entered the University of Toronto for a make-up year and, in 1969, was enrolled in the Faculty of Graduate Studies at the University of Windsor.

He married Carol Arikado, a Japanese Canadian, in June 1970.