Design for Test and Hardware Security Utilizing Tester Authentication Techniques

Yahia OUAHAB
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Design for Test and Hardware Security Utilizing Tester Authentication Techniques

By

Yahia OUAHAB

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
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Design for Test and Hardware Security Utilizing Tester Authentication Techniques

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ABSTRACT

Design-for-Test (DFT) techniques have been developed to improve testability of integrated circuits. Among the known DFT techniques, scan-based testing is considered an efficient solution for digital circuits. However, scan architecture can be exploited to launch a side channel attack. Scan chains can be used to access a cryptographic core inside a system-on-chip to extract critical information such as a private encryption key. For a scan enabled chip, if an attacker is given unlimited access to apply all sorts of inputs to the Circuit-Under-Test (CUT) and observe the outputs, the probability of gaining access to critical information increases. In this thesis, solutions are presented to improve hardware security and protect them against attacks using scan architecture. A solution based on tester authentication is presented in which, the CUT requests the tester to provide a secret code for authentication. The tester authentication circuit limits the access to the scan architecture to known testers. Moreover, in the proposed solution the number of attempts to apply test vectors and observe the results through the scan architecture is limited to make brute-force attacks practically impossible. A tester authentication utilizing a Phase Locked Loop (PLL) to encrypt the operating frequency of both DUT/Tester has also been presented. In this method, the access to the critical security circuits such as crypto-cores are not granted in the test mode. Instead, a built-in self-test method is used in the test mode to protect the circuit against scan-based attacks. Security for new generation of three-dimensional (3D) integrated circuits has been investigated through 3D simulations COMSOL Multiphysics environment. It is shown that the process of wafer thinning for 3D stacked IC integration reduces the leakage current which increases the chip security against side-channel attacks.
DEDICATION

I would like to thank my Lord at first for this achievement, my wonderful family – parents, groupmate and friends for their helping hand and encouragement from close or far.

Special thanks for my supervisor, Dr. Rashid Rashidzadeh, for his guidance and support (Physical and mental) through my M.A.Sc studies.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC/DC</td>
<td>Alternating/ Direct Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATPG</td>
<td>Automatic Test Patterns Generator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIST</td>
<td>Built-in Self-Test</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSR</td>
<td>Complete LFSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUT</td>
<td>Circuit Under Test</td>
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<td>DFT</td>
<td>Design for Testability</td>
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<tr>
<td>DUT</td>
<td>Device Under Test</td>
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<td>ICs</td>
<td>Integrated Circuits</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ioff</td>
<td>Leakage Current</td>
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<td>Ion</td>
<td>On Current</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPs</td>
<td>Intellectual Properties</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTAG</td>
<td>Joint Test Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPA</td>
<td>Leakage Differential Power Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFSR</td>
<td>Linear Feedback Shift Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPA</td>
<td>Leakage Power Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSI</td>
<td>Large Scale Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISR</td>
<td>Multiple Input Shift Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOSFET</td>
<td>Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transistor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSI</td>
<td>Medium Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFF</td>
<td>Scan Flip-Flop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SISR</td>
<td>Single Input Shift Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>System On Chip</td>
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<td>SSI</td>
<td>Small Scale Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAM</td>
<td>Test Access Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAP</td>
<td>Test Access Port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAPC</td>
<td>Test Access Port Controller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCK</td>
<td>Test Clock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDI</td>
<td>Test Data Input</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDO</td>
<td>Test Data Output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMS</td>
<td>Test Mode Select</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRST</td>
<td>Test Reset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSV</td>
<td>Through Silicon Via</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VLSI</td>
<td>Very Large Scale Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>3D ICs</td>
<td>Three Dimensional Integrated Circuits</td>
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Chapter -1

Background & Introduction

1.1 Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI)

Very large scale integration (VLSI) has been introduced in the early 1980s, with the integration of millions of transistors on one die Fig. 1. As a result, manufacturing tests for such a high density integrated circuit became a major problem to solve. Test engineers faced various challenges on how to perform manufacturing tests as VLSI technology evolved [1].

Figure -1 A wafer of 22nm Ivy Bridge CPUs containing more than a billion transistors [2]

1.2 Why Testing ICs

The steady increase in the number of transistors within a single chip resulted in the progression from small scale to very large sale. Most current VLSI design systems such as, smartphones, workstations and various electronic appliances, incorporate hundreds of millions of transistors. The reduction of feature sizes of transistors to sub-micron and the interconnect wires to tens of nanometers have increased the density of transistors per chip significantly.
The small feature sizes resulted in a substantial increase in the operating frequency of integrated circuits [1]. However, shrinking feature sizes and increasing the number of transistor on a single chip can increase the chance of defects. Considering sub-nanometer technology, defects may occur in manufacturing process that can lead to a faulty transistor or an interconnect wire. Manufacturing defects of ICs are inevitable as it requires a single transistor or interconnect to break down the functionality of the entire chip or at least prevent the system from proper operation at the desired frequency. There is factor known as Part Per Million (PPM) which indicate the quality of the ICs launched to the market. PPM indicates how many ICs out of one million are faulty. In general, a PPM of 50 is considered acceptable for commercial applications. For certain applications such as military projects, this rate much lower and falls below 4 PPM. Thus, it is highly required to test VLSI devices at different stages of device production Fig. 2.

![Diagram of VLSI components](image)

**Figure -2 Different steps involved in the fabrication VLSI components**

Testing ICs can potentially increase the production yield [3]. Enhancing the yield can occur at different steps of manufacturing by tracking the source of defects. Fast and reliable
methods of testing integrated circuits are required to reduce the overall costs of IC fabrication prior to releasing them to the market [4].

According to Fig. 3 from *Advanced Reliable System* (ARES) Lab, the costs of testing per transistor has increased over the last two decades while the fabrication costs per transistor has declined [5].

![Figure 3 Cost (cents/transistor) evolution fabrication and effort for testing [5]](image)

### 1.3 Testing ICs

Testing digital circuits is usually performed based on the needs of consumers and design specifications using an Automatic Test Pattern Generator (ATPG) to generate test patterns [6]. In certain cases, Built-in Self-test (BIST) methods are used to generate the test stimuli to test a device without external equipment [4].

In the test phase, the test stimuli are applied to the circuit under test (CUT) as shown in Fig. 4. The output responses are then captured and compared against the expected outputs to determine fault-free and faulty ICs. A circuit-under-test has to produce desired output responses during the test phase to pass the test, otherwise CUT is assumed to be faulty [7]
1.4 Challenges in testing ICs [11-13 I]:

Fig. 5 presents a physical illustration of a short channel Silicon on Insulator (SOI) fabrication technology with six levels of metals for interconnections. A typical chip in this technology can include more than 60 miles (100 kilometers) of copper wiring. Process variations can affect directly the internal characteristics of the fabricated transistor such us, threshold voltage and transit frequency. The introduction of nanometer technology has increased the probability of parametric and catastrophic failure during ICs fabrication which is considerably high compared to the traditional CMOS technology. Sub-nanometer technology is characterized by high sensitivity to noise due to the lower current that can be delivered [8-10]

Figure- 4 Testing of digital integrated circuits [7]

Figure- 5 Six levels copper metal interconnects of CMOS chip developed by IBM [11]
1.5 Categories of Testing Digital Circuits

Testing of digital circuits is divided into three categories of (a) functional, (b) structural and (c) parametric tests. Testing integrated circuits starts with wafer level testing to mainly determine catastrophic faults and sort wafers.

Once wafers are successfully passed the test, one of the three methods can be chosen to perform tests as illustrated in Fig. 4 [4].

1. Functional test: as its name indicates used to check the functionality of the design. In this method, the test stimuli are chosen based on the functionality of the CUT. A set of test stimuli are applied to the CUT, and the responses are compared against the expected outputs. This method of testing can be very time consuming for modern integrated circuit and the fault coverage can be limited.

2. Structural test: this is a time efficient method of testing. In this approach, fault models are considered to generate test patterns regardless of the functionality of the CUT.

3. Parametric test: this method of testing, AC and DC parametric tests can be performed mainly on analog circuits. The DC parametric tests are commonly conducted to determine open paths, short paths, threshold voltage and leakage current. The AC parametric testing focuses more on the AC parameters such as, frequency, timing, noise, distortion and bandwidth. This approach relies on dedicated instrument (built-in digital signal processing) to perform testing.

1.6 Three Dimensional Integration Circuits 3D (ICs)

Three-dimensional (3D) integration refers to the integration of multiple layers of planar devices on a single chip. In such an architecture, the layers are stacked upon each other and connected using vertical connector called Through Silicon Vias (TSV) as shown in Fig. 6.
There are several manufacturing steps to design such an architecture including TSV formation, wafer thinning, alignment and bonding [13].
3D stacked IC integration can reduce the interconnect delay significantly taking advantage of the vertical interconnect using (TSV). In 3D ICs, each layer is commonly assigned to a specific application. For example, the integration of CPUs, SRAM, logic IC, power and analog modules are designed on different layers. Fig. 7 presents the interconnections of embedded DRAM to a logic circuit using three different technologies.

The current (2D) scheme is a platform where layers are connected horizontally using long wires as shown in Fig. 7 a. System-on-chip (SOC) scheme Fig. 7b incorporates all aspects of system design on a single die. However, it has a negative impact on the silicon area and increases the length of interconnection wires, which in turn increases the path delays. Besides, (SOC) requires a higher material complexity to assemble different technologies in one chip. 3D integration technology can reduce the length of interconnect wires which results in lower power consumption, higher speed of operation and smaller form factor compared to the SOC technology. 3D stacked ICs include various layers on top of each other. Each layer is thinned down and aligned to another layer to form multiple layers with the same size as shown in Fig. 7c. As a result, a 3D integration scheme offers a higher performance and functionality compared to the traditional technologies (2D) and SOC as it permits integration of different technologies [14].

Figure- 7 Connecting DRAM to a logic. (a) Planar technology. (b) System on Chip (SOC). (c) 3D stacked IC [13]
1.7 Research Objectives

One of the most powerful DFT techniques for digital circuit is the scan-based testing method which can increase the controllability and observability considerably. However, increasing the controllability and observability through scan architecture provides opportunities to attackers to use the scan architecture to access critical information such as a private key of an embedded crypto-core. Moreover, the scaling of transistors to a few nano-meter increases the leakage current considerably which can also be used to obtain critical information by hardware attacker.

The objective of this research is to use a tester authentication technique to design a secure scan architecture. Moreover, the effect of wafer thinning on the security of 3D ICs will be investigated. The major focus is on designing area and cost efficient hardware solutions to protect the scan chain from side channel attacks. There is a dependency between the leakage current of a digital circuit on the status of its inputs. The switching of a digital gate from high to low level or vice versa affects the leakage current. Considering this correlation, an attacker can perform static power analysis on digital circuits to extract critical information. The process of wafer thinning reduce the leakage current and lowers the probability of a successful attacks by adversaries.

1.8 Thesis contributions

The research contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows which have been presented in three conference papers:

1. A security solution against scan based attacks using a tester authentication technique has been developed. Unlike previously proposed methods where tester has unlimited access to the CUT, in this method after a certain number of trails the access is denied. The circuit under test (CUT) communicates with the tester requesting an identification key before allowing the tester to access the scan chain.

2. A new security solution using a phase locking loop system (PLL) to obfuscate the running operating frequency of both CUT and tester has also been presented.
3. The effect of wafer thinning on security of 3D integrated circuits has also been studied. The results indicates that wafer thinning lowers the static power consumption improves the chip security.

1.9 Thesis Overview

This thesis is organized as follows:

Chapter-1 Introduction and background, which provides a brief description of current VLSI systems, testing and challenges of testing these devices.

Chapter-2 introduces three main Design for Testability techniques. Also, it provides details of “Scan Architecture” and hardware security threats due to scan chains.

Chapter-3 presents the first published paper entitled” Secure Scan Chain using Test Port for Tester Authentication” in which a tester authentication technique has been presented. In this approach, access to the scan chain is restricted to only certified testers using a secret key in which the number of attempts is limited.

Chapter-4 presents the second published paper entitled” A Secure Scan Chain using a PLL and a Reconfigurable LFSR” in which two layers of security have been added to protect scan chain from side channel attacks. A tester authentication method based on a Phase Locked Loop (PLL) system to obfuscate the clock frequency, and a Built-In Self-Test (BIST) method using internal structure to generate the test patterns are presented.

Chapter-5 presents the third paper entitled” Effect of Wafer Thinning on Hardware Security” in which COMSOL Multiphysics has been used to model two transistors with gate length of 45nm and 22 nm in order to evaluate and analyze the effect of wafer thinning on chip security.

In this chapter, it is shown that wafer thinning process improves the chip security against leakage-based differential power analysis (LDPA) threats.

Chapter-6 concludes the thesis and followed by future works.
1.10 References


Chapter -2

Design for Testability

In the past, designing and testing integrated circuits were considered two separate issues, handled by different groups of engineers. During that time, design engineers used to focus more on how to meet the prerequisite functionally rather than the testability of the circuits. Test engineers had to develop time and cost effective methods to test the designed ICs. With this method, manufacturers achieved high fault coverage for small-scale integrated circuits. The weakness of this method became apparent with the introduction of VLSI systems due to the complexity of VLSI designs.

Designing VLSI systems without test consideration increases the design complexity and the time required for testing. Modern circuit designs are developed based on the design-for-testability (DFT) methods. Currently chip designers have access to powerful CAD tools developed based on efficient DFT techniques. This CAD tools can be readily used to ensure the testability of circuits and desired fault coverage [1].

2.1 DFT

Design-for-Test (DFT) techniques have been developed to improve testability and reduce the costs of testing integrated circuits [2]. DFT techniques help test engineers to save time and effort to develop test solutions for integrated circuits. DFT techniques can reduce the complexity of testing sequential circuits to a degree where the testing a sequential circuit becomes similar to that of a combinational logic. The main DFT methods are (a) Ad hoc, Built-in self-test (BIST) and scan based testing [1].

2.2 AD hoc

Ad hoc is considered a DFT technique dedicated to improving the testability of circuit parts that are unreachable directly. The basic principle of Ad hoc is to add extra circuitry to the original circuit to provide access to the internal nodes using Test Point Insertion. An example is illustrated in Fig. 8 where a 2-to-1 multiplexer has been added as a test point to support controllability and observability over an internal node [1].
2.3 Built-in self-test (BIST):  

Built-in self-test is developed to perform an autonomous system testing where test patterns are internally generated without the need to any external device such as an ATPG [3]. BIST integrates a test-pattern generator (TPG) at its input and an output response analyzer (ORA) at its output to apply test vectors internally to the ICs and analyze the output responses respectively as illustrated in Fig. 9.
2.4 Scan Based Test

Scan based test methodology is considered as one of the most important and efficient DFT techniques. Using a scan-based test method, sequential circuits are converted to a combination of flip-flop chains and combinational logics as shown in Fig 10 a.

![Figure- 10 Converting a sequential circuit into scan design. (a) Combinational logic with ordinary flip-flop. (b) Scan design [1]](image)

Besides, each traditional flip-flop is converted to a scan flip-flop (SFF) as indicated in Fig. 11. A scannable flip-flop has two distinct inputs sources to be selected through a 2-to-1 multiplexer as shown in Fig. 10b. The flip-flops are connected properly together to create a shift register called scan chain.

![Figure- 11 Symbol of Scan Flip-flop (SFF) [1]](image)
The Mux used in SFF permits the scan cell to operate in two different modes:

1. Normal/Capture mode: in this mode, the scan cell operates as a conventional flip-flop where the first input (DI) is selected to update the output.
2. Shift mode: in this mode it is possible to insert test patterns to all scan cell in the scan chain through one or more primary inputs. Also, the content of scan cells supplied by the combinational logic of circuit can be shifted out through one or more primary output as depicted in Fig. 12.

Scan architecture provides direct access into the internal nodes of modern VLSI designs including crypto-chips that could be unreachable without the scan architecture. Although scan based test techniques have been widely adopted for modern circuit testing, it can open a back door for hackers to perform side channel attacks and retrieve secure information. Therefore, novel techniques to protect ICs in the test mode are required to fulfill the requirements of both testability and security [4].

Figure- 12 A typical example of a scan chain [4]
2.5 References


Chapter -3

Secure Scan Chain using Test Port for Tester Authentication

3.1 Introduction

Test engineers seek for greater controllability and observability in order to manage test stimuli and observe the responses. Scan architecture is known as an effective DFT measure for digital circuits. Scan chains are used to increase the testability of circuits to apply test vectors and observe their responses. However scan architecture can also be used as a back door for hackers to break down a chip security [2]. Scan architecture has been used to hack various crypto hardware implementations such as AES, RSA etc. A secure scan architecture to protect CUT against scan-based attacks while maintaining a high controllability and observability has become a design requirement. There are two commonly used methods to provide security for scan architecture against potential attacks. First, the access to the scan chain is restricted using a private controller. Second, the access to the scan chain is open; however, the data are encrypted [3].

3.1.1 Related Works

Many solutions to protect crypto cores against the scan chain attacks have been reported in the literature. In [4] access to the scan chain is granted only if a predetermined key is entered. Test patterns are used as the authentication keys to allow access to the scan chain [5]. A function/test mode control method has been proposed in [6]. It limits the transitions between normal function mode and the test mode for crypto cores. However, this method is not suitable for at-speed online testing.

The second secure scan architecture method allows access to the scan chain but during the scan-out phase, the data is encrypted. In this method, the scan structure is modified using different methods such as adding gates like invertor, XORs, XNORs or scrambling the scan chain. Various encryption methods are used to encrypt the actual scanned output and make the output data as random as possible so that the attacker is unable to deduce the secret keys of the crypto cores. A secure scan architecture using the second method is the flipped
scan technique [7]. In this technique, inverters are randomly placed in the scan chain to confuse the attacker, as the locations of the invertors in the scan chain are not known to the attacker. Although, it is difficult to guess the location of the invertors but a “reset” attack on the system can reveal the location of the invertors. When the flip flops are reset, the scan out become a stream of zeroes with ones indicating the locations of invertors.

Another secure scan architecture is the random placement of XORs between scan cells [8]. This serves to confuse attacker as the nature of the gates inserted would be unclear and the attacker might not consider the possibility. This method offers better security than the above technique since this method passes the “reset” attack. Most of the available solution for a secure scan architecture allow the testers to access the scan chain, apply test vectors and observe the output responses. Moreover, the access to the scan chain is not limited and tests can be performed any number of times. Therefore, there is a possibility of access to critical information through analysis of applied inputs and corresponding outputs.

### 3.1.2 Class of attackers

Depending on the required level of security and the possible class of attackers, different measures can be taken. The solutions range from a basic security solution to a full fledge encryption method. An attacker can be categorized as follows [4]:

1. Beginners: As the name indicates, someone who is new in the field.

   Independents: The hackers of this class are experienced. An independent attacker has large resources, a good knowledge of the field and can easily hack basic security systems.

2. Business: Hackers in this class are performing business secret activities. They commonly work in organized groups with highly qualified attackers. They have access to sophisticated hardware and software packages to wage attacks. These activities are commonly supported by governments trying to access security information. If we consider a novice hacker, the designer has a little to concern about when designing a circuit.
3. The next two levels of the hacker categories require much more effort to prevent an attack. It is extremely difficult to secure a design against government hacking because of the vast resources available to them.

3.2 Proposed Tester Authentication Based Security Measure Against Scan Based Attack

The proposed method consists of two layers of security against hackers (a) tester authentication and (b) scan protection. The proposed internal structure of a CUT is shown in Fig. 13. The CUT consists of a tester authentication block and a scan-chain security block.

![Figure -13 Tester authentication block diagram](image)

In the proposed solution, unlike previously implemented methods, where the tester can apply test vectors to the scan chain, the CUT requests the tester identification code before allowing the tester to apply test vectors to the scan chain as shown in Fig. 14. The number of attempts for the tester authentication is limited and exceeding the maximum number will result in denying further authentication attempts.

3.2.1 Tester Authentication Block

The steps for tester authentication by CUT are described below:

Step 1: Once the connection between the CUT and the tester is established, the CUT applies a Clk signal to the tester to obtain the serial key from the tester through Dout as shown in Fig. 2a.
Step 2: The tester receives the Clk signal and sends the serial key to the CUT as indicated in Fig. 2b.

Step 3: The CUT receives the serial key and compares it with a preloaded serial key in the authentication register.

Step 4: If the authentication is successful, the second layer of security is activated. Else, the CUT sends an authentication failure message to the tester.

Step 5: When the authentication fails, the trial counter is incremented. If the count reaches a predefined number, the pass/fail logic is disabled which in turn blocks the access to the secure scan chain.

![Diagram of test port for authentication](image)

Figure -14 Two phases of test port for authentication

The authentication block in Fig. 15 mainly consists of n-bit authentication register, a key comparator, a pass/fail logic and a counter. The authentication register stores a predefined
n-bit serial key to authenticate the tester. The key comparator compares the tester key and the authentication key and sends the result to pass/fail logic. The counter is used to determine the number of authentication failures and blocks further authentication attempts once a predetermined number of failures has been reached.

![Tester Authentication Block constitution](image)

**Figure -15 Tester Authentication Block constitution**

### 3.2.2 Scan based attacks

Scan chains are designed to provide access to the circuit-under test through test access port in order to apply test data to CUT during the test mode. The responses obtained from CUT are also captured by the scan chain for evaluation. A scan-based attack incorporates four operations as follows:

1. **Scan-in**

   This step is divided into two phases as well. First, test data are serially loaded into the scan flip-flops connected to the input pins. Second, the loaded data is applied as a test vector to the CUT.

2. **Response capture**

   The CUT response to the applied test vector is captured by the scan flip-flops at the output pins.
3. Scan-out:

Shifting out the responses captured by the scan-flip to make the data available serially at Test Data Output (TDO).

4. Response evaluation

The CUT response to the applied test vectors is analyzed to unfold the internal circuitry and to determine the position of the secret registers.

To counter the steps involved in the scan-based attack, and make the data obtained from scan chain many solutions have been presented in the literature.

3.2.3 Secure Scan Chain

After tester authentication, access to the scan chain is granted and the tester can apply test vectors to the scan chains and observe the output responses. An authenticated user can encrypt the scan output. There are various encryption methods to prevent the use of scan architecture by attacker. In [11] the flip-flops in a scan chain are dynamically reordered to protect the secrets. However, the scan chain structure can be revealed by statistical analysis of the information scanned out from chips. In [4] a lock and key security solution that is based on a test key to secure the on-chip information is presented. This technique suffers from the problem of large area overhead. A method proposed in [12] where a secure scan chain architecture, based on Mirror Key Register (MKR), is used to maintain testability and security. In this method, the encryption key is used for functional mode of operation however; a fake mirror key is loaded in the test mode to protect the genuine key against unauthorized access.

In this work to protect against the scan-based attacks, the solution presented in [12] is used as the second layer of security for the proposed tow-layer security solution. To ensure protection against scan-based attacks, the encryption key in [12] is generated by an array of flip-flops. The flip-flops are hardwired to generate a private encryption key at the power on state as shown in Fig. 16. To protect the secret code against scan-based attacks, the direct access to the flip-flops has not been provided in the test mode. Instead, a Built-In
Self-Test (BIST) method using a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) is implemented. In the test mode as shown in Fig. 4 an LFSR is formed using the first three flip-flops in the chain of flip-flops. The test patterns generated by the LFSR are applied to the hardwired flip-flops in the test mode. Using such a BIST solution for the flip-flops containing the encryption key eliminates the chance of obtaining the key through the scan architecture.

![Figure -16 Hardwired flip-flops with BIST to store encryption key](image)

### 3.2.4 Implementation

The proposed solution of the tester authentication for scan chain has been implemented with Cadence design tools using CMOS 0.18μm technology as shown in Fig. 17. The area overhead including: test key comparator, counter, 32-bits register and trial counter is reported in table I. The area overhead for the scan protection block depends on the number of bits in the register and the counter. When the register test key size increases, the counter size increases as well. The size of the test key comparator does not change with the variations of the register test key size. The trial counter’s operation is mostly independent of the size of the register test key, which is based on the number of attempts.

For the implementation in work, a 32-bit test key is used. The number of bits in the test register is dependent on the degree of the complexity required to prevent a scan chain against attacks. Increasing the size of the register test key increases the security of scan...
architecture at the cost of a higher area overhead due. A large size test key register make a brute force attack impossible in practice.

In the proposed solution, the number of unsuccessful attempts is limited to four times. After four unsuccessful attempts, the circuit is locked and it has to receive a power on reset to restart. This by default takes about two seconds. Assuming a tester with a clock frequency of 2.9GHz is used to break a 64-bit user identification key through a brute force attack, the estimated time to apply test vectors thorough a brute force attack exceeds more than 15 years. It is assumed that each cycle of applying an input test vector and observing the output response takes 20 clock cycles.

The attacker may try to use a side channel attacks such as power analysis [13] timing analysis [14], or fault injection attacks [15] [16] to obtain the critical information. To perform these side channel attacks, the operation mode for the CUT has to be changed to the test mode. In the test mode, an attacker can apply inputs and observe corresponding outputs. The correlation between the inputs and outputs can provide the required data to extract the security critical information. In the proposed solution, the content of the encryption key registers are protected against side channel attacks in the test mode.

Revealing the encryption key in the proposed solution becomes extremely difficult as the number of bits in the register test key increases.

Figure -17 Area overhead of the authentication block
An unauthorized tester will be able to apply test data for one of the following cases:

- An unauthorized user must first determine the technique used to protect scan chain.
- An unauthorized user has to figure out that there is a limited number of trails for tester authentication.
- If an unauthorized user figures out that there is a tester authentication, the user still cannot access the critical security information due to the implemented BIST for the encryption key.

The proposed solution is scalable and depending on the desired security level, the level of the security can be determined. It is clear that a higher level of security requires more resources and more silicon area for implementation.

3.2.5 Comparative Analysis

There is a range of solutions in the literature for security against scan-based attacks [4, 7]. The proposed approach, presents tester authentication to prevent unauthorized tester from gaining access to the scan chain. In [11] 31234 gates are used to implement a secure scan architecture using a mirror key register. The area occupied by the secure scan architecture is 412 gates that is 1.32% of the original area.

The area overhead for implementation of Lock and Key security solution [4] on a chip is relatively low for 4 bits (327 gates). However, increasing the number of bits to 12 bits has a significant effect on the area overhead (5817 gates) due to the use of linear shift registers (LFSR’s) and decoders. The proposed solution uses a minimum number of components including resulting in an area overhead of about 2200 gate using CMOS 0.18 µm technology.
3.3 Conclusion

This paper presents a new approach to protect scan architecture against attacks. The proposed solution has two layers of security. First, the circuit-under-test identifies testers by requesting an identification code through test access port. The tester authentication process limits the access to the scan chain only to known testers. Once the tester is successfully identified, it is allowed to carry out tests however, the tester still cannot access critical security information in the circuit-under-test due to the second layer of security. The private encryption key, which is the target for attackers, is not accessible through the scan architecture. In the proposed solution, a built-in self-test measure is used to test the private key generator rather than the scan architecture.

The proposed solution has been implemented using Cadence design tools in CMOS 0.18µm technology. A comparative analysis was also performed in order to evaluate the area overhead for the different solutions verses the proposed method in this work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Size (µm x µm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A counter</td>
<td>18 × 189.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An XOR</td>
<td>5.8 × 6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A trial counter</td>
<td>6 × 73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Area overhead</td>
<td>55 × 110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4 References


Chapter 4

A Secure Scan Chain Using a Phase Locking System and a Reconfigurable LFSR

4.1 Introduction

Design for Test (DFT) has been introduced to enhance the testability by improving controllability and observability. Scan based test methodology is widely known as the dominant DFT technique to improve the testability of digital circuits. The testability is enhanced by adding additional logic to each flip-flop in the circuit to build a shift register, or scan chain. While the scan architecture is indispensable for testing integrated circuits, it can be utilized by attackers to access critical information within secure chips [1]. Scan chains are susceptible to various attacks such as differential power analysis [2], timing analysis [3], fault injection attacks [4, 5]. Scan chains have been utilized to access valuable data such as a secret key [6] of a crypto core. Enhancing both testability and security is a difficult task and commonly a trade-off is maintained between the requirements for testability and security [7]. In the scan mode, attackers can monitor the circuit behavior to obtain the secret key.

4.1.1 Related works

Many attacks utilizing scan chains have been reported in previous works. It is shown how scan chains can be used to extract the characteristics of the circuit under test and gather a considerable number of signatures [8-10]. Yang et al. in [11] have demonstrated that the conventional scan chains are susceptible to reveal critical information of advanced encryption standard (AES). As a remedy for this information leakage, a mirror key register (MKR) method has been proposed where the path to the secret key is separated from the data path. The MKR method protects the secret key from unauthorized access by loading the scan chain with a fake secret key.

The chip secret information such as a cryptographic key can be obtained through a scan chain if enough test patterns are applied to the CUT and responses are captured. The steps required to grant access to the secret key through a scan chain are presented in [12]. The
solutions reported in the literature to protect crypto cores against the scan-based attacks can be classified into two techniques of (a) limiting the access to prevent attackers from observing the scan data [7] and (b) concealing the secret information while providing access to all users.

The first method commonly leads to a high timing overhead. In [11] secure-scan DFT architecture has been presented in which two modes of operation insecure/insecure are defined and switching between the test mode and the normal mode is controlled. The transition from test mode to normal mode is authorized as long as the circuit is at the insecure mode. Conversely, the transition is not allowed at the secure mode, and the circuit is kept in the normal of operation. Furthermore, there is no condition to switch between the modes of operation. This scheme requires a power-OFF/reset to return from the secure mode that might affect the critical information within the scan cells [13]. In [6] the conventional scan chain is changed to control the output data. The output information is altered by adding inverter gates randomly to the scan cells. However, the location of inverters can be determined if proper inputs are applied to the scan cells.

Another approach adding XORs randomly into the scan chains has been presented in [14]. This method overcomes the issue of static configuration of scan cells in which the location of the inverter gates is fixed after fabrication. A low-cost solution has also been introduced that involves adding dummy flip-flops to the scan design. If the right key associated with the location of these flip-flops is not entered, a random data will be shifted out [15].

4.1.2 The proposed method

The proposed method in this paper consists of device authentication and Built-In Self-Test (BIST) based reconfigurable Linear Feedback Shift Register LFSR. The first stage has been constrained in terms of attempts, and surpassing a certain number of trail will result in denying further verification endeavors. The circuit under-test in this study functions as an authentication module by requesting a secret key before permitting users to apply test patterns to the scan chain as indicated in Fig. 18. Moreover, the actual operating frequency of both CUT and Tester is obfuscated using a PLL based synthesizer for extra level of security. In the second stage of the proposed solution, the immediate access to the scan
chain is not permitted to test the circuit. However, a self-test method (BIST) is introduced to test the circuit. In addition, various sizes of test patterns are applied to the scan chain by configuring the existing flip-flops as a reconfigurable (LFSR).

![Diagram of test port for authentication](image)

Figure -18 Two phases of test port for authentication Sequences

4.1.3 Paper’s organization

The paper is organized as follows. The device authentication based security solution is presented in Section II. Section III explains the proposed secure scan design. The proposed method implementation and the area overhead comparison are given in section IV. The conclusions are covered in Section V.

4.2 Device Authentication Security Measure

The proposed solution for authentication includes: a PLL based synthesizer and authentication controller.
4.2.1 Synthesizer

The block diagram of a typical PLL consists three blocks of (a) Phase Frequency Detector (PFD), (b) Low Pass Filter (LPF) and (c) Voltage Controlled Oscillator (VCO) as shown in Fig. 19a. The PFD compares the phase and the frequency of the reference input and the VCO output to generate an output that is linearly proportional to the phase difference ($\Delta \Phi$). An (LPF) filter is required to suppress the ripples of the control voltage. When the control voltage is zero, the VCO frequency is set to a center frequency that varies linearly proportional to the control voltage. The PLL block can readily be modified by adding divider to design a synthesizer as shown in Fig. 19b. In this case, the relationship between the frequency of the input reference signal, and the VCO output signal is given by:

$$F_{out} = \frac{M}{N} F_{in}$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

![Block diagram of (a) a Conventional PLL and (b) a PLL based Synthesizer](image)

Figure -19 Block diagram of (a) a Conventional PLL and (b) a PLL based Synthesizer

4.2.2 Authentication Controller Block Constitution

The authentication controller presented in this study Fig. 20 is constituted of the following: an n-bit register, XOR gate, n-bit counter and trial counter. The controller functions as follows. An n-bit secret key is defined by the designer and stored in the n-bit register in
order to be compared against the n-bit tester input using the XOR gate. If the two keys match each other, pass flag will be raised and the access to the scan chain is granted. However, in the case of mismatch, a trial counter is incremented. The trail counter is dedicated to track the number of failures and prevents further attempts after a preloaded maximum number of trails.

4.2.3 Tester Authentication sequences

The tester authentication is performed in two phases as described below:

1. Phase 1:

   The CUT is equipped with a PLL system to synthesize a new frequency equal to Fin (M/N). Where M and N are two constants known by the designer and Fin is the frequency of the Voltage Controlled Oscillator (VCO) within the PLL. The CUT sends an interrupt signal via Dout and waits for the tester to provide the authentication information through Din as shown in Fig. 18.

2. Phase 2:

   The tester receives the synthesized clock signal running at Fin (M/N) frequency. The PLL has to be able to lock on the signal and generate a clock running at Fout frequency. Otherwise, the tester and the CUT will operate at different frequencies. As a result, the data

![Tester Authentication Module](image-url)

Figure -20 Tester Authentication Module

![Diagram of Tester Authentication Module]
applied to the scan chain by the tester will not propagate within the scan chain properly due to synchronization problem.

Once the tester successfully captures the lock and synchronizes with the CUT, it sends its authentication key, which is compared against the content of a preloaded authentication register to verify the tester. The access to the scan chain will only be provided if the tester is successfully authenticated. Otherwise, the CUT requests for a valid authentication key. Contrarily to the reported methods where limitless attempts are allowed to apply input test pattern to the CUT and observe its responses, the number of attempts is limited in the proposed solution in this work.

4.3 The Proposed Secure Scan Chain Architecture

In the proposed solution, we define two modes of operation safe mode and test mode. At the safe mode of operation, the secret key is produced by a group of flip-flops within the scan chain as shown in Fig. 21. Note that, after the tester has been authenticated, access to the scan chain is granted. However, to protect the scan chain against possible attacks, the access to the scan cells is not directly granted in the test mode. This will protect the CUT from fault injection attacks where the CUT operation mode is abruptly changed from the test mode to the safe mode to scan out critical information.

![Diagram](image-url)

Figure -21 Proposed architecture of N-bit secret key at the safe mode
Switching the mode of operation to the test one will provide an opportunity for an unauthorized access. Therefore, a reset signal is proposed to clear the secret key held by the flip-flops in order to protect it from access by an attacker and to overcome the issue of power-OFF in [11].

In order to test the circuit, a reconfigurable LFSR is proposed to implement a Built-In Self-Test (BIST) method. The proposed architecture of reconfigurable LFSR in the test mode is shown in Fig. 21. The N flip-flops of the scan chain are converted to an n-bit reconfigurable LFSR to act as an Automatic Test Pattern Generator (ATPG) for the array of flip-flops configured in the test mode.

The access to the output of the shift register is granted through the scan-chain. This allows the tester to use the scan chain to capture the data and perform evaluation of the responses. The data captured is compared against the golden response of the circuit to determine whether it is fault-free or faulty. The length of the key needed for testing is mainly determined by the number of the D-flip-flops implemented for the required operation

Figure -22 Proposed architecture at the test mode in which a reconfigurable LFSR is formed using scan chain flip-flops.

The proposed reconfigurable LFSR consists of the following: a Multiplexer and an XOR gate.
As shown in Fig. 22, the circuit can be configured for four different lengths of LFSR. The control bits C1/C2 will determine the length of the LFSR through a 4×1 multiplexer. However, the configuration might be extended further using a larger multiplexer depending upon the nature of application required.

4.4 Implementation

Cadence design environment using TSMC CMOS 65nm technology has been used to implement the proposed solution to secure a scan chain. The level of the complexity depends on the size of the key register. The total area overhead for implementation of the proposed solution to secure the scan chain using 128-bit secure key and a 32-bits register for tester authentication is about 1847.05 µm² as shown in Fig. 23. If the size of the register key increases, the security of the encryption key increases at the cost of extra area overhead.

![Area overhead of the proposed solution using TSMC 65nm CMOS technology](image)

4.4.1 Area Overhead

Various solutions have been reported in previous works to secure conventional scan chain [17, 6]. The area overhead of Lock and Key security solution [17] is reported moderately low (327 gates) for 4-bit. However, a noteworthy impact on the area overhead (5817 gates) is reported if the number of bits increases to 12-bit due to the LFSRs and decoders.
In the proposed approach in this work, the area overhead is limited since a reconfigurable LFSR is utilized.

A 128-bit LFSR and a 32-bits authentication module are implemented using 1436 gates. To implement the LFSR, N flip-flops of the scan chain are converted to an n-bit reconfigurable LFSR. The LFSR is used as an ATPG in the test mode.

The gate overhead of the proposed method compared to the LCCS method [15] for ISCAS benchmark 1989 is shown in Table II. The second column shows the total number of gates and flip flops for each benchmark’ series before the secure-scan architecture is implemented. The third column shows the number of gates and flip flops for both 32-bit tester authentication and 128-bit secure key generator. The fourth and fifth column indicate the area overhead incurred by (LCSC) and the proposed secure-scan architecture respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmark Name</th>
<th>Total # of Gates</th>
<th>Overhead (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>Proposed scheme</td>
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<tr>
<td>S13207</td>
<td>8620</td>
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<td>1436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S38417</td>
<td>23815</td>
<td>1436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The area overhead of the proposed solution is not significant for the circuits in the ISCAS benchmark. The area overhead of the proposed technique compared with the existing methods such as LCCS is much lower as shown in the column four of Table I. Moreover, as the circuit become larger, the area overhead becomes less significant as long as the scan size is fixed.
4.5 Conclusion

Scan architecture is widely used to develop an efficient design-for-test methodology for digital circuit. It increases the observability and controllability of the circuit-under-test significantly. While scan architecture is considered an indispensable tool for test engineers, it is almost equally a great tool in the hands of attackers to obtain secret information within the device under test. This paper presents a new approach to protect the scan architecture using two layers of security. The proposed solution prevents unauthorized testers from getting access to the scan chain while limiting the number of attempts.

In addition, a PLL synthesizer has been utilized to obfuscate the actual operating frequency of the CUT. As a result, the data applied to the scan chain by a tester will not propagate within the scan chain if the tester is not authenticated. Moreover, a built-in self-test method using the scan flip-flops as a reconfigurable LFSR has been developed to test the scan cells. Cadence design tools are used to implement the proposed solution using TSMC CMOS 65nm technology. The area overhead of the proposed method is lower than the area overhead of the existing solutions.
4.6 References


Chapter-5

Effect of Wafer Thinning on Hardware Security

5.1 Introduction

Semiconductor industry is currently confronting a defining moment on how to realize the next generation of large-scale integrated circuits [1]. Three-dimensional integration has been widely studied and considered as a promising technology with potential to improve system performance, well beyond the traditional two-dimensional integration [2]. 3D-ICs which contain multiple layers of active devices can enhance chip performance, functionality, and device packing density significantly. However, the introduction of the third dimension has elevated the complexity of the integrated circuit design.

Wafer thinning is considered an important step in 3D integration which affects the overall thickness of the 3D stack layers, TSV aspect ratio and the final form factor [5]. As a result, thinner wafers allow higher density of vertical interconnect, reduce the stress on the TSVs and improve the operating frequency. In wafer thinning process, the final wafer thickness is commonly about 5-10% of the original thickness with less than 1-2µm uniformity. Currently, most 3D processes require wafers with less than 100µm thickness [4].

In bulk Si based 3D integration, the typical thicknesses for a robust process has been defined to be in the range of 20-40µm. Unlike bulk process, in SOI based 3D ICs, less than 10nm surface uniformity can be achieved. The main advantage of SOI 3D integration is the minimal thickness across the wafer that supports high density interlayers [17].

5.1.1 Related Works

Research studies have been conducted using current-voltage I-Vs curves to assess the performance of transistors, using numerical device simulations. These simulations provide a method to not only extract the electrical properties of different transistors but also evaluate their security. The studies in [6, 7] have been projected on the performance of InAs and GaAs versus Si n-MOSFETs with a gate length of 13nm. Various metrics were presented such as, current, capacitance and delay to evaluate the material features, and
detect where III-V n-MOSFETs have an improved performance over Si material. In [10] a scaling scheme for short channel thin-body SOI MOSFETs is developed to investigate the intrinsic parameters due to the variations in substrate thickness. M. Luisier, et al. have studied the impact of the gate oxide thickness Tox on the intrinsic threshold voltage in deep sub-micrometer [11]. Tunneling issues on performance of ultra-scaled transistors have been discussed in [12]. Authors stated in this study that the transistor turn-on current (Ion) degrades when scaling transistor gate length. In [13-15], I–V characteristics comparison at low and medium drain voltage have been considered, in contrary to previous studies where only comparison at high drain voltage are presented.

Evaluating the security of crypto-chips as transistors scale down to submicron technology has attracted the attention of many researchers. A study of the susceptibility of CMOS crypto-chips to leakage current based on differential power analysis (LDPA) has been introduced in [16]. Simulations in regards of the leakage current dependence on input patterns using SPICE have been reported. The study has targeted three CMOS technology 90nm, 65nm and 45nm. Authors have implemented a two-input NAND and demonstrated on DES cryptosystem that the leakage of the designed gate has a significant dependency on the input patterns. Also, similar conclusion regarding this static power consumption has been reported for various standard cells such as, inverters, NOR and XOR gates [18-19]. The leakage Power Analysis (LPA) procedure that relies on the measurement of leakage current of CMOS integrated circuit depending on their given inputs are presented in [20]. Several attacks, using the static power rather than the dynamic power, have been presented to obtain the secret key from crypto-chips by attackers.

5.1.2 Contributions

In this work 45nm and 22nm transistors are designed using COMSOL Multiphysics. Simulations have been conducted to plot the I-V characteristics and electrical properties at low and medium drain voltage (VD). The main objective of this study is to determine the impact of wafer thinning on the performance parameters of the device such as subthreshold leakage current (Ioff), threshold voltage and ON-current (Ion), while thinning down the Si wafer from 400µm to 6µm. Furthermore, the correlation between the leakage current and
the inputs of the device as the wafer is thinned down has been analyzed to determine the effects of wafer thinning on chip security. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter II presents the model definition. Chapter III explains the results and discussions and finally chapter IV concludes the paper.

5.2 Model Definition and Parameters

Fig. 24 shows a typical MOSFET with the main electrical connections highlighted. Such a transistor is implemented in the CMOSOL environment and used to perform simulations in this work.

5.2.1 (3D) Model Structure

The doping profiles are shown in Fig. 25-26. The modeled doping consists of three regions (n, p, n). The physical gate lengths are 22 and 45nm, and initial silicon body thickness is 400um with a low p-type doping acceptor concentration of 1E11/cm3. The source and drain region are heavily doped with n-type doping acceptor concentration of 1.5E19/ cm3.
It can be observed in Fig. 25 that the drain and source have the highest dopant concentration which decreases as we move towards the center of the MOSFET from both sides [15]. The simulated transistors 45/22nm have the same properties in terms of gate oxide (dox), Depth (D), Height (H), work function ($\phi_m$), electron affinity $\chi$, Temperature (T) and W/L ratio, but different channel length. The subthreshold current $I_{off}$ of both technologies is set to be less than 0.3uA for the initial thickness (H=400um) by adjusting $\phi_m$ of the metal gate contact, dox and $\chi$.

The device parameters used to perform simulations are given in Table III.
In this section, DC characteristics are presented where the generation and transport of charges in 45 and 22nm transistors as a function of the terminal voltages are presented. The source and the base terminals are grounded and the voltages applied to the drain and the gate are varied. Considering an n-MOSFET connected as shown in Fig. 1, as VG becomes more positive, a depletion region is created. As VG exceeds the threshold voltage (VTH), the transistor is “tuned on” and a “channel” of charge carriers is formed under the gate oxide between the source and the drain.

Fig. 26 is the volume plot showing the electron concentration of an n-MOSFET. When a drain voltage of VD= 50mV and a gate voltage of VG=0 V are applied, the channel of carriers has not been created yet. Increasing VG up to 0.4 V, results in a small channel which is represented with yellow color. At VG =1.5 V, a complete channel explicitly appears which is represented in red color. The ID–VGS, ID-VDS characteristics comparison for both n-MOSFET 45 and 22nm at high/low drain voltages VD have been presented in Fig. 27-28 (a-d).

### 5.2.2 MOSFET I/V Characteristics Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value [µm/nm]</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>45 or 22 [nm]</td>
<td>Gate Length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>0.2 [µm]</td>
<td>n-MOSFET Depth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>90 or 45 [nm]</td>
<td>n-MOSFET Width</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>6-400 [µm]</td>
<td>n-MOSFET Height</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_{ox}</td>
<td>1.2 [nm]</td>
<td>Thin oxide gate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φ_m</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Work function of the gate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χ</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Semiconductor electron affinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>295 [k]</td>
<td>Absolute temperature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this initial study, the Si wafer thickness is set to (H=400) for both 45 and 22nm technologies. Fig. 27_a represents ID-VG characteristic for VD equal to the power supply (VDD), while VG varies from 0 to 1.5 V. In addition, a log plot the current ID flowing between the source and the drain is used to observe the turn-on/off voltage of the device Fig. 27_b. It can be observed that the leakage current for both 45 and 22nm, obtained at VG=0 V and VD=VDD, is equal to 42 and 266nA respectively. The threshold voltage VTH has been determined by using the constant current method at 100nA × W/L [21]. Using this method, the VTH of both transistors 45 and 22nm is approximately 0.3V and 0.2V.
respectively. As expected, the simulated results show lower $I_{\text{off}}$ and higher $V_{\text{TH}}$ for 45nm compared to 22nm due to subthreshold region ($V_g < V_{\text{TH}}$) where weak inversion takes place. As the channel decreases, current from source to drain increases and consequently, $V_{\text{TH}}$ decreases. The ID-VG characteristics when the drain voltage ID sweeps from 0 to 1.5 V at two different values of gate voltage VG (0.9 and 1.2 V) are shown in Fig. 28 (a, b) respectively.

![Graph](image)

*(a)*

![Graph](image)

*(b)*

Figure -28 Simulation results for I-V characteristics for both 45/22 [nm] n-MOSFET; (a)-(b) ID versus VD for VG=0.9 -1.2 V respectively.

The three regions (linear, nonlinear and saturation) are distinguishable which validates the implemented model. The current flows along the channel increases for both transistors as
the drain voltage rises to the saturation current. In Fig. 28_a, the maximum current ID obtained for 45 and 22nm at (VG =0.9V) is 466.57uA and 619.89uA respectively. The maximum current presented by 45 and 22nm at (VG= 1.2) is 950.49uA and 1.045mA respectively.

5.3 Results and Discussion

For a chip, on a Si wafer the device performance depends on the final wafer thickness. The simulated 45 and 22nm n- MOSFET transistors in Fig .24-25 have been investigated in terms of performance and security by scaling the Si body from 400um down to 6um.

5.3.1 Performance Analysis

From the I-V characteristic curves presented earlier in section II, key technology parameters such as, Ioff, Ion, VTH are extracted for each device as scaling down the wafer thickness from 400um to 12 um. Fig. 29-32 show the variation of drain current as an effect of scaling the Si body. For these simulations, the gate voltages (VG) were chosen 0.9 and 1.2 V. Simulation results show a decrease in the current ID for both 45 and 22nm.

Figure -29 ID–VD characteristics comparison as function of the Si body thickness (H) from 400 to 6 [nm] for n-MOSFET 45 [nm] at medium VG voltage (0.9 V)
From these results, it is evident that the scaling of the wafer reduces the effect of channel length modulation. This is accounted for by the decrease of the leakage current. The effect the channel length modulation becomes almost negligible for Si body less than 25nm.

Figure -30 ID–VD characteristics comparison as function of the Si body thickness (H) from 400 to 6 [nm] for n-MOSFET 45 [nm] at high VG voltage (1.2 V)

From these results, it is evident that the scaling of the wafer reduces the effect of channel length modulation. This is accounted for by the decrease of the leakage current. The effect the channel length modulation becomes almost negligible for Si body less than 25nm.

Figure -31 ID–VD characteristics comparison as function of the Si body thickness (H) from 400 to 6 [nm] for n-MOSFET 22 [nm] at medium VG voltage (0.9V)
Fig. 33-36 show ID-VG characteristics comparison for both n-MOSFET 45nm Fig. 33-34 and 22nm Fig. 35-36 as a function of Si thickness (H).

Figure -32 ID–VD characteristics comparison as function of the Si body thickness (H) from 400 to 6 [nm] for n-MOSFET 22 [nm] at high VG voltage (1.2 V)

Figure -33 ID–VD characteristics comparison as function of the Si body thickness (H) from 400 to 6 [nm] for n-MOSFET 22 [nm] at high VG voltage (1.2 V)

Thinning down the wafer from 400um to 6um at low drain voltage (VD = 50mV) results in a decrease of the leakage current from 0.042e-6 A to 2.736e-12 A and 0.266e-6 A to 1.550e-12 A in 45nm and 22nm technologies respectively. Moreover, there are
considerable changes in the threshold VTH which is approximately 1.5 times higher than the initial VTH. However, thinning below 12um increases the leakage current considerably.

Figure -34 ID–VD characteristics comparison as function of the Si body thickness (H) from 400 to 6 [nm] for n-MOSFET 22 [nm] at high VG voltage (1.2 V)

Figure -35 ID–VD characteristics comparison as function of the Si body thickness (H) from 400 to 6 [nm] for n-MOSFET 22 [nm] at high VG voltage (1.2 V)
As a consequence of the advent of VLSI designs and the introduction of sub nanometer technology, static power (leakage current) became the most dominant contributor to the power budget. So, we will discuss about the dependency of the leakage current on both the silicon wafer thickness and the applied input patterns in this section. An n-MOSFET transistor designed in COMSOL is configured with three input patterns as shown in Fig. 37.

![Drain Current ID Characteristics](image)

Figure -36 ID–VD characteristics comparison as function of the Si body thickness (H) from 400 to 6 [nm] for n-MOSFET 22 [nm] at high VG voltage (1.2 V)

5.3.2 Security Analysis

As a consequence of the advent of VLSI designs and the introduction of sub nanometer technology, static power (leakage current) became the most dominant contributor to the power budget. So, we will discuss about the dependency of the leakage current on both the silicon wafer thickness and the applied input patterns in this section. An n-MOSFET transistor designed in COMSOL is configured with three input patterns as shown in Fig. 37.

![Commonly Accepted Leakage Currents Dependence](image)

Figure -37 commonly accepted leakage currents dependence based on input patterns of four terminals n-MOSFET on input patterns
Different leakage currents have been denoted for each configuration based on the input patterns applied. They are defined as follow: Tunneling current between gate and substrate ($I_{gb}$), the current between gate and channel ($I_{gc}$), the current between gate and source ($I_{gs}$) and the current between gate and drain ($I_{gd}$). These dependency can be verified for p-MOS transistor as well.

Fig. 38 shows the leakage current for 45nm & 22nm CMOS transistors while thinning the wafer from thickness of $H=400\mu \text{m}$ to $6\mu \text{m}$. Increasing VDD can improve $I_{on}$; however, a high VDD would rise the static power consumption. As the wafer thickness decreases, the leakage current decreases as well.

Table. IV presents the leakage current versus the input patterns for three configurations as represented in Fig. 37. Simulations were conducted to obtain the leakage current for two different thicknesses using CMOS technologies 400/25um and 45/22nm respectively.

Figure -38 (a)-(b) Leakage Current $I_{off}$ ($\mu$A) Vs Si thickness for n-MOSFET 45 and 22nm respectively;
5.4 Conclusion

The effect of wafer thinning on the security and DC electrical characteristics of CMOS 45 and 22nm technologies have been presented in this paper. COMSOL Multiphysics has been used to model a 3D semiconductor device and simulate the electrical characteristics of the transistors. Simulation results indicate that wafer thinning reduces the leakage current considerably and consequently improves chip security against leakage-based differential power analysis (LDPA) threats. Through this study, it is shown that the leakage current (Ioff) and on current (Ion) have been improved by scaling the Si substrate, thus suppressing the short-channel effects and improving the chip security.

Table IV. LEAKAGE CURRENT DEPENDENCE ON WAFER THICKNESS AND INPUT PATTERNS

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<tr>
<th>Configuration</th>
<th>Leakage current (in μA)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45nm n-MOSFET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thickness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>400um</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>0.04210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>9.5425E-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1.0364E-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.5 References


Chapter -6

Conclusions and future works

6.1 Conclusions

Scan based testing is a powerful technique and has been widely used to test digital circuits. Scan architecture supports a strong controllability and observability in the test phase. However, the scan architecture can be utilized by hardware attackers to access critical information. Test and security contradict one another and trade-offs have to be maintained. Therefore, new secure methods of testing are required to satisfy the requirements for secure testing.

In this thesis, tester authentication techniques have been proposed to enhance the hardware security. The effect of wafer thinning process in 3D ICs on chip security has also been studied. Two solutions are presented to protect scan enabled microchips from side channel attacks.

In the first solution, the tester is authenticated by the circuit-under-test (CUT) to limit the access to the scan architecture to known testers. Moreover, the number of attempts before granting access to the tester is limited to make brute-force attacks practically impossible. In the second security solution, a phase locked loop is utilized to protect CUT against scan based attacks. In this method, the operating frequency of both CUT/Tester is obfuscated. In this method, the direct access to the crypto-cores are not provided through the scan architecture. Instead, a built-in self-test method (BIST) is utilized to test crypto-core in the test mode.

The transistor scaling to nano-meter technology has increased the circuit density and processing power significantly. However, the new fabrication technologies increase the leakage current considerably which raises the static power consumption. The elevated leakage current can be monitored by hardware attacker to extract security information through power analysis. The effect of leakage current on security of 3D ICs is investigated.
In this study, the effect of wafer thinning on the security and performance of n-channel MOSFET has been studied. COMSOL Multiphysics was used for numerical simulations to model a transistor in two technology nodes of 45nm and 22 nm. The substrate thickness was varied from 6µm and 400µm to analyze the effect of wafer thinning on the leakage current. Simulation results indicate that the process of wafer thinning not only improves the electrical characteristics but also offers a higher protection against side-channel attacks using power analysis.

6.2 Future Works

Three-dimensional 3D integration technology is a promising solution to meet the performance requirements for new generation of portable devices. This new technology supports as increased bandwidth, reduced latency, and lower power consumption.

3D-ICs technology will not be fully adopted if the security related problems are not properly addressed. With the technology advancement, developing new solutions for 3D-ICs to prevent them against potential attacks become more apparent.

A hardware security enhancement for 3D ICs utilizing tester authentication techniques can be developed. Analysis of Through Silicon Vias (TSVs) on the hardware security of 3D ICs is a good topic for future work. COMSOL Multiphysics can be used for simulations to model TSVs with different sizes and their effect on the security of 3D stacked ICs.
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Publications:

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<td>Chapter-4</td>
<td>Y. Ouahab, R. Rashidzadeh, R. Muscedere, “A Secure Scan Chain Using a Phase Locking System and a Reconfigurable LFSR,” IEEE 30th Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering (CCECE), Windsor, On, Canada April 2017.</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
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