University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor

Electronic Theses and Dissertations | Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers

2018

CLASS AND POLITICS IN POST-REVOLUTION IRAN: DESCRIPTIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE

Ali Dadgar
University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd

Recommended Citation

Dadgar, Ali, "CLASS AND POLITICS IN POST-REVOLUTION IRAN: DESCRIPTIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE" (2018). *Electronic Theses and Dissertations*. 7352.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/7352

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters' theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email (scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208.

CLASS AND POLITICS IN POST-REVOLUTION IRAN: DESCRIPTIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE

by
Ali Dadgar

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminology
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the
University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

© 2018 Ali Dadgar

Class and Politics in Post-Revolution Iran: Descriptive and Substantive Justice

by

Ali Dadgar

APPROVED BY:

_____
M. Mahdavi, External Examiner
University of Alberta

_____
T. Najem
Department of Political Science

_____
B. Adam
Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Criminology

_____
R. Cheran
Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Criminology

_____
T. Azadarmaki
University of Tehran

_____
R. Nakhaie, Advisor
Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Criminology

[December 15, 2017]

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis and that no part of this thesis has been published or submitted for publication.

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, my thesis does not infringe upon anyone's copyright nor violate any proprietary rights and that any ideas, techniques, quotations, or any other material from the work of other people included in my thesis, published or otherwise, are fully acknowledged in accordance with the standard referencing practices. Furthermore, to the extent that I have included copyrighted material that surpasses the bounds of fair dealing within the meaning of the Canada Copyright Act, I certify that I have obtained a written permission from the copyright owner(s) to include such material(s) in my thesis and have included copies of such copyright clearances to my appendix.

I declare that this is a true copy of my thesis, including any final revisions, as approved by my thesis committee and the Graduate Studies office, and that this thesis has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other University or Institution.

ABSTRACT

Iranian society has undergone significant transformations since the 1962 Land Reform and the modernization plans implemented by its different governments. These transformations include industrialization, bureaucratization, population explosion, rural-urban migration, increase in the size of the working class, massive entry of women into the labor force, and the subsequent 1979 Islamic Revolution. Since the Revolution, the class structure and the composition of Iran's political elites have changed significantly. Previous research has been particularly less attentive to the relationship between the structure of classes in Iran and the demographic composition of elected members of parliament (MPs). This study aims to enhance previous research by studying the nature and extent of representativeness of members of the Iranian parliament since the Revolution. Special attention will be paid to the descriptive representation of MPs by calculating the index of dissimilarity. Utilizing data on the occupational distribution of the general population and parliamentarians, this study will identify social class representativeness of MPs in each of the ten parliamentarian elections from 1980 to 2016. It employs a mixed methodology placing emphasis on the demographic (gender, age, ethnicity, etc.) and socioeconomic (education and occupation) dimensions of political representation. Using various theoretical models, it will test the extent to which each of the liberal-pluralist, instrumentalist and structuralist Marxists, or cultural reproduction theoretical approaches fit the evidence. The current study finds that educational credential, as a measure of credentialized cultural capital, is an important predictor of being elected as a member of parliament in Iran, supporting the cultural reproduction theory. Evidence also supports Marxist theory in that working class is underrepresented in the Majles, and that education itself is class-based. Finally, this study observes strong representation of professional and managerial class among the parliamentarians which lends support to liberal-pluralist theory.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my wife; without her, this success would not have been possible.

I dedicate this dissertation to my beloved father and mother.

I also dedicate this work to the memories of my grandfathers and my grandmother; God bless them.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincere gratitude to Dr. Reza Nakhaie, my supervisor, for guiding and supporting me over the years. He has helped me greatly in a variety of situations and provided the tools and guidance that I needed to pick the right path and successfully complete this dissertation. I would also like to thank the internal readers of my dissertation, Dr. Barry Adam, Dr. Rudhramoorthy Cheran, and Dr. Tom Najem for their valuable feedbacks and comments. I wish to extend my appreciation to my external examiner, Dr. Mojtaba Mahdavi, and the Special Member of the dissertation, Dr. Taghi Azadarmaki for their special help in improving my work. I am very grateful to all of my dissertation committee members.

My thanks also go out to the University of Windsor's Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminology for offering me the financial support that allowed me to fulfill my Doctoral studies. My thanks to all the professors of the Department, especially Dr. Nicholas Harney, the head of the department, Dr. Glynis George, chair of the graduate program, and Dr. Paul Datta for their constant support.

This research would not have been possible without the generous help and collaboration of many friends and well-wishers. I would like to thank the helpful staffs of the Statistical Centre of Iran, especially Mr. Farhad Nouparast, as well as the staff of the Library, Museum and Document Center of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran for helping me to access the datasets that I required to conduct this research. I would also like to express my gratitude to my fellow graduate students, Erwin Selimos, Amy Peirone, Travis Reitsma, and Jane Mcarthur for their enthusiasm and encouragement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY III

ABSTRACT IV

DEDICATION V

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS VI

LIST OF TABLES IX

LIST OF FIGURES XI

LIST OF APPENDICES XII

INTRODUCTION 1

Statement and Significance of the Problem 2

Structure of Dissertation 9

CHAPTER ONE: THEORY OF CLASS AND POLITICS 11

The Study of Class-state Relations 12

CHAPTER TWO: THE STUDY OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 25

CHAPTER THREE: THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF IRAN 48

The Advent of the Revolution 49

Rising Expectation Model 51

Modernization Model 52

Shah (dictatorial) Control 53

A Class Analysis of the Revolution 53

Iran's Postrevolutionary Structural Changes 62

Socio-demographic Transformations 63

Expansion of Education 68

Secularization 70

Iranian Postrevolutionary Political Economy 75

CHAPTER FOUR: THE STRUCTURE OF POWER AFTER THE REVOLUTION 85

The Structure of Power 86

Human Rights Issues 96

CHAPTER FIVE: CLASS AND POLITICS IN AN IRANIAN SETTING 100

The Study of Class in Iran 101

The Study of Political Elites in Iran 113
CHAPTER SIX: THE PLACE AND ROLE OF MAJLES IN THE POLITICAL APPARATUS OF IRAN 131
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 139
CHAPTER SEVEN: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 144
Methods 145
Data 146
Measures 147
Statistics 167
Ethical Concerns 168
CHAPTER EIGHT: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 169
Descriptive Analysis 170
Class and Occupational Representation 174
Educational Distribution 188
Representation of Clerical Stratum 195
Representation of Religious Minorities 199
Place of Residence 201
Age Distribution 204
Gender Representation 209
Intersectionality Analysis 212
Multinomial Logistic Regression 215
Summary 219
CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION, AND FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 221
Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research 240
Implications for Policy 243
REFERENCE 245
APPENDICES 263
Appendix A: Presidential and Majles terms and correspondent censuses 264
Appendix B: Chronology 265
VITA AUCTORIS 272

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Population of urban and rural areas 66
Table 2: Migration by type and year 67
Table 3: Educational Distribution by Gender and the Level of Education 70
Table 4: Active Population by Occupational Categories (1000 persons) 105
Table 5: Class Distribution of Iranian Society 111
Table 6: Main indices of the Iranian Majles since the Revolution 135
Table 7: Giddens Class Map 150
Table 8: European Socio-economic Classification (EseC) 153
Table 9: Wright class scheme 154
Table 10: Nine and three class versions of EseC and the corresponding Iranian Occupational Groups 159
Table 11: Educational levels by the average number of years spent in each level 163
Table 12: Cross-tabulation of Census Years by Majles Terms and number of MPs 166
Table 13: Majles Terms by the percentage of first time representatives 171
Table 14: Percentages of reelected representatives by frequency of being elected 172
Table 15: Descriptive statistics of variables of the Study 173
Table 16: MPs' occupational and class background and the number of election 175
Table 17: Cross-tabulation of Majles terms and MPs' occupational background 176
Table 18: Cross-tabulation of Majles terms and MPs' class background 178
Table 19: MPs' occupational and class background and clerical status 179
Table 20: Clerical MPs' occupational and class background 180
Table 21: Mean Years of Modern and Religious education by MPs' Class Background 181
Table 22: Socioeconomic representation of MPs by Census Year 183
Table 23: Socioeconomic representation of MPs in same age groups by Census Year 184
Table 24: Occupational Representation of MPs in the 2011 Census 186
Table 25: MPs' Pre-election Occupations 188
Table 26: MPs' Modern Educational Attainment for First time and All MPs 189
Table 27: MPs' Level of Traditional Education 190
Table 28: Crosstabulation of Religious and Modern Education for MPs, 1980-2016 190
Table 29: MPs' Mean Years of Modern Education 192
Table 30: MPs' Mean Years of Traditional Education 193
Table 31: Educational representation of MPs by Census 194
Table 32: Clergy Status of MPs by Gender 195
Table 33: Cross-tabulation of Clergy Status and the Majles Term 196
Table 34: MPs' times of election and clerical status 197
Table 35: Clergy Status in General Population and among MPs 198
Table 36: Religion Distributions for the General Population and MPs 200
Table 37: Cross-tabulation of MPs' Place of Birth and Majles Terms 201
Table 38: Number of the Iranian Cities by Size 203
Table 39: Descriptive Statistics of the Age Distribution of MPs 204

Table 40: MPs' mean age by Majles terms and representation history 205
Table 41: Age Distributions for the General Population and the Majles Representatives 209
Table 42: Gender Distribution of Representatives 210
Table 43: Gender Distributions for the General Population and the Majles Representatives 212
Table 44: Ethnic distribution of the Iranian MPs 213
Table 45: Intersection of MPs class, ethnicity and gender 214
Table 46: Multinomial Model Fitting Tests 216
Table 47: Multinomial Pseudo R-Square 216
Table 48: Logged odds of class background of MPs by predictors 218
Table 49: Overall Class Representation and the Pattern of Change 226
Table 50: Class and educational attainment cross-tabulation 236

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: The theoretical constellations and the empirical core of this study 12
Figure 2: Iran's Oil Revenues; percentage of GDP 51
Figure 3: Age distribution of the Iranian Population (both sexes) by Census (1000') 65
Figure 4: Iran's Population Pyramids from 1950 to 2050 66
Figure 5: Types of Migration 68
Figure 6: The constitutional structure of power in postrevolutionary Iran 92
Figure 7: Active Population by Occupational Categories 106
Figure 8: Class Distribution of the Iranian Society 112
Figure 9: Major Class categories as a percentage of total representation 136
Figure 10: Class background of MPs by Number of Majles 179
Figure 11: Socioeconomic Representation of Upper Class 185
Figure 12: Socioeconomic Representation of Intermediate Class 185
Figure 13: Socioeconomic Representation of Working Class 185
Figure 14: Clerics versus Non-cleric MPs 197
Figure 15: Distribution of MPs by Place of Birth 202
Figure 16: Age distribution of MPs by Year 207
Figure 17: Age distribution of General Population by Year 208

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix A: Presidential and Majles terms and correspondent censuses..... 264
Appendix B: Chronology 265

INTRODUCTION

Statement and Significance of the Problem

Despite the fact that Iran is prominent in the international media, it has been subject to misrepresentation and misunderstanding even in academia, let alone the media (Amuzegar 2014). A conventional approach in the West is to attempt to understand Middle Eastern countries, in general and Iran in particular, through ideological lens. Iranian studies, particularly those that focus on the postrevolutionary period, are often too concerned with the religious and political aspects of Iranian society, a form of religious and political reductionism which has under-analyzed the sociological dimensions of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Moaddel 1991). While there are scholarly studies on the class apparatus of post-revolution Iran (for example Nomani and Behdad 2006, and Amir Arjomand 2009b), there are limited studies that focus on the relationship between class structure and the political system in Iran.

The current study suggests that the societal system, particularly the class structure, is actually central to explaining and understanding the dynamics of Iranian society. It postulates that a sociological analysis is necessary to complement the religious and political narratives. Moreover, following Bill (1972:vii), this study assumes that an understanding of the interaction between class structure and the political system provides valuable insights into the dynamics of Iranian society. In order to fill the scholarly void, this current study endeavours to investigate the parallel shifts in the class structure and the composition of political elites in Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

In effect, this study aims to examine the mechanism of exchange and interconnection between the state and social classes of contemporary Iran. In order to do so, it will seek to explore the changes in the economic and social structures of Iran, and to explain how they correspond with the political configuration at the state level. At its core, this research is a

theoretical and empirical analysis of how the postrevolutionary socioeconomic structure in Iran corresponds with the composition of elected political elites as represented in parliamentary membership. The precise aim of the present study is to determine the extent to which the post-revolution composition of Iran's parliament reflects the characteristics of the general population that elected them: in other words, the extent to which the political representatives of the post-revolution Majleses mirror the characteristics of the general Iranian population. Thus, this study sits within the long tradition of examining the socioeconomic dimensions of political representation. It seeks to contribute to political sociology by answering the prolonged question of how the state and social classes relate to one another. This is the first empirical study that seeks to standardize Iranian members of parliaments' socioeconomic (education and occupation) and demographic (age, gender, religion, ethnicity, place of residence) representativeness, over the time period spanning from the first Majles after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 to the most recent Majles in 2016.

The current study aims to meet five goals:

1- To describe the significant changes that have occurred in the recent history of Iran, particularly in terms of class structure and the composition of political elites.
2- To identify the distribution of Iranians by gender, occupation and education.
3- To identify the gender, occupational, and educational composition of Parliament.
4- To create indices of similarity and dissimilarity of members of parliament (MPs) to be used to evaluate education, occupation, gender, age, and place of residence representation in Iran.
5- To explain both changes in the Iranian class structure and the composition of political elites.

The significance of this project lies in two factors: the singularity of Iran as a case study; and the importance of studying political representation in general, and studying political representation in Iran, in particular. Foucault has argued that the Iranian revolution is an impressive "attempt to open a spiritual dimension in politics" (Foucault 2005:208). At the same time, it could be argued that the primary motive of the 1977-9 movement was not religious for the majority of the participants and sympathizers. One supporting indicator for this assertion is the fact that the first two rallying cries, even at the outset of the victory of Revolution, were independence from extra-national states, and political freedom and reform. To look at the picture from a historical perspective, the heart of the revolutionary zeal was the restoration of 'Iranian confidence' (Rajaee 2007:238), which had been lost under the impacts of modernity and longstanding foreign intervention. In another sense, as is discussed under the Advent of the Revolution in chapter 3, the Revolution was a reaction to the conflicts which rapid development had brought about (Abrahamian 2008, Rafipour 2000). For many of the participants, the overthrow of the Shah was seen as the cure for all problems through the 'Islamic Republic' - the third rallying point of the Revolution - for it was considered to be a trustworthy vehicle for fulfilling the people's demands and dreams.

The political system of the Islamic Republic is an innovative system that incorporated the presidential political model with the principle of the guardianship of an Islamic Jurist for the first time in the history of politics. Iran is argued to be the world's only true Islamic Republic, in accordance with its blending of Islamic Shari'ah and republicanism (Abootalebi 2009:11). This fact highlights the importance of closely scrutinizing such a system. As is elaborated under the chapter entitled the Structure of Power after the Revolution, the president of the Republic, members of the Iranian Parliament (Majles), and members of the Assembly of Leadership

Experts (who are in charge of selecting the ruling jurisconsult) are elected by the Iranian people's vote[3]. The Majles and the Presidency are vanguards of the directly elected pillar, and the Supreme Leader sits on the top of the indirectly elected pillar of power in Iran. Failing to realize the distinction between these two powerful pillars of power, which has been termed political 'hybridity', as well as diversity of political power centres in Iran, which does not have close analogous in the region or elsewhere (see Amir Arjomand 2009b, and Brumberg and Farhi 2016), has been an important source of misleading analysis and observation of the Iranian political system.

The Islamic state, which is the outcome of the Revolution, has institutionalized specific kinds of political and economic approaches that are not necessarily analogous to capitalist democracy in its conventional Western sense, nor to a socialist model. At the same time, the Islamic Republic of Iran is deemed to be a non-democratic system[4]. Many discussions in academia and the media make common assertions about Iran, claiming that republican governance and religious doctrine are not compatible, that elections in Iran are rigged, that 'authoritarianism' or 'modern sultanate' are the most fitting descriptions of the Iranian political system, and that the level of illegitimacy is rising in Iran (for example see Assadi 1996, Chehabi 2001a, Ganji 2008, Totten 2016, Zahedi 2010). Despite such assertions, Iran has established institutions that are potentially democratic such as a parliament and a variety of political, semi-party factions. At the same time, Iranian society has created a certain kind of public space that, although not necessarily synonymous with traditional civil society (see Dadgar 2013), it is vibrant and dense at least by regional standards. This Iranian variant of democracy has arisen

[3] However, the candidates of the presidential, Majles and Assembly of Expert's elections are subject to approval by the Guardian Council
[4] According to Freedom House 2017, Iran's freedom rating is 6, when 7 is the worst.

from one of the most popular movements in world history, the Islamic Revolution, in which more than 10% of the population took active part in demonstration, street and political confrontation with the state apparatus and subsequent regime change (Kurzman 2004:vii-viii, Skocpol 1982).

Theoretically, and regardless of its practical outcome, the formulation of an 'ideal human' as socially responsible individual who is attentive and committed to others is shared by a number of thinkers in Islamic tradition. These thinkers included: Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, Eghbal Lahori, Ruhollah Khomeini, Mehdi Bazargan, Mahmoud Taleghani, Morteza Motahari, Hosein Ali Montazeri, Mohammad Beheshti, Ali Shariati, Mohammad Bagher Sadr (see Adelkhah 2000:5). This conceptualization of human beings could be, arguably, seen as an alternative to the Hobbesian perception of a self-centered individual. In the Islamic paradigm, the focus is largely on human dignity, honorability, and otherworldly salvation (see Weber 2005 [1930]) rather than mere worldly economic and material success.

This conception is then related to the protection of human dignity which is reflected in the ideology of the Islamic state: "the Islamic Republic is a political system based on faith in rule of Allah, and eminent dignity and value of human beings, […] and the negation of the perpetration or the suffering of any injustice or dominance" (2007 [1989]:5). Likewise, the first assumption of the theory of the state in Islamic jurisprudence is that no human being has guardianship over another: "the state, from the viewpoint of Islam, is not a product of the class system or individual or group domination, but, is the crystallization of the political ideal of a nation that has the same ideology and religion and organizes itself to move through an ideological evolution towards its final goal, a movement towards Allah" (Islamic Republic Constitution 2007 [1989]:10). Accordingly, the significance of the current study arises from the

novelty and uniqueness of the philosophical and ideological insights[6] which gave birth to the Islamic Republic of Iran. More importantly, studying the way in which this philosophical ideal has been translated into practice is worthy of systematic analysis.

The importance of the current study is underscored in the light of the fact that the social sciences are eager to improve their understanding and to obviate their relative shortage of knowledge about Middle Eastern countries in general and about Iran in particular. The difficulties in explaining the Iranian 1979 Revolution, and more recently, in understanding and also predicting the aftermath of what was excitedly named the Green Movement and Arab Spring, underlines that shortage of knowledge.

A second line of importance is drawn from the salience of the idea of political representation in the political sociological tradition. Political representation sits at the heart of democracy (Dahl 1989, WeBels 2007:833, Tormey 2015). Ideal representation would guarantee that policy makers are representative of, and responsive to, the wishes of the people (Powell 2004), and at the same time safeguard political justice. From a sociological point of view, however, the point of interest is the implication which class, gender, racial-ethnic and other societal divisions could have for the analysis of proportional representation. From this perspective, as is further discussed in the chapter entitled The Study of Proportional Representation and Social Justice, the underrepresentation of various segments of society has negative implications for political equality and may challenge the legitimacy of a given political system.

[6] Iran is the only Islamic state that is built on the Shi'i doctrine of Islam.

Specifically, the significant need for a better understanding of the relationship between the social class transformation and the corresponding changes in the composition of political elites will be further highlighted as this study outlines the extent to which existing scholarship has been relatively inattentive to this relationship: not only in the global setting (see Wauters 2010:183), but particularly with regards to Iran (but see Ashraf 1994, and Amir Arjomand 2009a). This has caused the question of economic representation, or more precisely, the class representation of political elites, to remain unanswered in the political sociology literature on Iran.

Finally, Iran is an interesting case from another angle. As will be further analyzed in chapter 6 under the Place and Role of Majles in the Political Apparatus of Iran, the quest for a fair and representative parliament has been central in Iranian democratic movements throughout the 20th century and most obviously during the Islamic Revolution. It is important to analyze the extent to which political equality and the rule of *Mostaz'afan*[7] as core revolutionary appeals (Ashraf and Banuazizi 2001:241), has been realized in the three decades since the Revolution.

This study finds that the possession of higher education degrees and the quality of loyalty to the ideals of the revolution as the most advantageous factors that one can possess when s/he desires to be recruited into the circle of the political elite in post-revolution Iran - the political elite here being defined as membership in parliament. Furthermore, the importance of higher secular education has increased in recent years as that of religious education and seminary decreased. Given that Bourdieu (1977, 1984) has conceptualized education as 'credentialized' cultural capital, the thesis provides strong support for the cultural reproduction theory. The role

[7] Oppressed and disinherited strata of the society

of education can also be conceptualized as supportive of the Marxist theory because education itself is class-based. However, given that the professional and managerial occupations are overrepresented in the Majles, the explanatory importance of the liberal-pluralist theory cannot be overlooked.

Structure of Dissertation


This volume is composed of eight chapters, as well as an introduction and a conclusion. Chapter 1 reviews the extant literature on class and politics. It includes previous research on the relationship between social classes and political elites. Chapter 2 lays out the study of representation and proportional representation, as well as its implications for political justice and the well-being of democracy. A principal distinction in the literature between descriptive and substantial representation will also be discussed in chapter 2. In chapter 3, after a brief explanatory narrative of the Islamic Revolution, an analysis of the contemporary structural transformations of Iranian society is delivered. These transformations are traced along three lines, including changes in the socio-demographic characteristics of Iranian society, the expansion of education, and the trend towards secularization. Later, in the same chapter, Iran's post-revolution political economy is examined. Chapter 4 offers a description of the structure of power in the Islamic Republic and sheds lights on difficulties in understanding the political system of post-revolution Iran. The fifth chapter reviews the existing studies of the class structure and that of political elites, as well as the recent interplays of the two in Iran. Class analysis is discussed in relation with the changes in the political economy of post-revolution governments and development plans (section 3 of chapter three), and the analysis of power elites, in turn, is formulated in relation to the general structure of power in Iran (chapter 4). Chapter 6 focuses on the history and the role of the Parliament in the political apparatus of Iran. It

demonstrates the political orientations of the majority of parliamentarians in different terms of the Majles since the Revolution. In the latest section of this chapter, the existing studies of the socioeconomic composition of the Majles' representatives in pre- and post-revolution are reviewed. Based on that reviewed literature, a section then follows which presents theoretical hypothesis and questions. Methodological considerations concerning, e.g., the measurement of the main research variables, as well as the sources of data and the statistical analysis that have been utilized in this study, are discussed in chapter 7. Chapter 8 is devoted to statistical analysis and presents the results of the current study's analysis in ten sections. A final chapter concludes and explains the findings, addresses the limitations, discusses policy implications and offers final remarks.

CHAPTER ONE: THEORY OF CLASS AND POLITICS

This study will apply the existing explanations of the relationship between state elites and social classes to the case of Iran. As portrayed in figure 1, two main, interrelated theoretical constellations can guide this study to answering a core empirical problem: the representation of Iranian members of parliament. They will be discussed within both Iranian and non-Iranian contexts. The theoretical constellations are the cluster of class-state relationship theories that are discussed in this chapter, and a cluster of proportional representation theories that focus on the class representation of parliamentarians, which will be discussed in chapter two. Although such distinctions have been made for the sake of analytical purposes, the segregation between these two collections of theories is certainly far from clear for they are deeply interrelated.

Figure 1: The theoretical constellations and the empirical core of this study



The Study of Class-state Relations

The development of class studies is greatly indebted to the discipline of sociology. Class is of significant importance to sociological knowledge whether it be ‘class’ as an indicator of material belongings and interests, or ‘class analysis’ as the study of the impacts of one’s class on the

different aspects of one's social life (Hout, Brooks and Manza 1999). However, the conceptualization and operationalization of class has always been subject to contestation within sociology.

The concepts of class and class relations play a central role in Marx's elaboration of society. For Marx, class is not merely composed of different income groups. Instead, Marx defines classes in direct relation to the process of production and also within exchange relations (Wright 2005b). Class positions, according to Marx, are determined by the lines of ownership of valuable productive resources or by having control over the process of production. Those who have ownership of the means of production and who control the production process are able to extract surplus value from propertyless workers; they have the right to control the production process, and sit in a position of superiority which makes them able to expropriate others' surplus value. The development of capitalism, in Marx's analysis, tends to polarize the class structure of society into two antagonistic classes: a dominant capitalist class and a subordinate working class. Those theoretical approaches to class whose focuses are material capital, common interests, and economic relations around the means of production are typically inspired by Marx.

Weber's class theory is considered to be the earliest attempt to critique Marx's theory of class (Giddens 2008a:132). Weber extended Marx's formulation of social class by adding dimensions of marketable skills and power, and introducing the concept of status. For Weber, class and status represent different aspects of the distribution of power in a society (Weber 1978), which in turn determine different sources of inequality (Grabb 1997). According to Weber, people occupy different positions in the class-situation of a society based on the marketable skills that they can offer to the social market, within which a hierarchical distribution of power exists. Class-situation, for Weber, is determined by the ownership or non-ownership of

material goods or of definite skills within a market situation, and those in the same class-situation are referred to as a class (Weber, Mills and Gerth 1946:181-83, also 405). One's position in the class system, then, determines his/her 'life chances' and the limits of his/her own and inter-generational social mobility (Breen 2005:32-33). Weber also introduced a 'status' based stratification. According to this, people can be classified under same status group if they adopt similar lifestyles and subjective value systems. In Weber's class model, four 'social classes' are distinguished: a working class; a petty bourgeoisie; a propertyless intelligentsia and specialists (which includes technicians, various kinds of white-collar employees, and civil servants); and, lastly, a privileged class (Weber 1978:305). In a Weberian model of stratification, difference in the possession of market-relevant assets translate into differences in the distribution of life-chances, and are the economic basis of inequality, which sits alongside other sources of social inequality such as ethnic membership, gender and so on (Breen 2005:35 and 49). In addition, Weber introduces a third form of distribution of power in societies, asides from class and status. For Weber, while classes sit within the economic order, and status is worked out within the social order, parties live within the house of power (Weber, Mills and Gerth 1946:194). The main goal of parties, as Weber argues, is influencing communal action. The means of attaining power in parties varies from the use of naked violence to more subtle forms, but most commonly consists in struggling to obtain votes using money, force of speech, suggestion, and social influence. Modern class theorists, who have based their analysis on the subjective and symbolic systems, lifestyles, power relations, and status location within stratification apparatus, are indebted to Weber.

Durkheim's conception of class is built on the basis of the disposition of the division of labor within a society. If, for Marx, the position of an individual in the class structure is

determined by his/her access to the means of economic production, for Durkheim, it is the occupational position one occupies within the division of labor of society that defines social classes. Those models which emphasize the occupational division of labor as the source of the class stratification in society lie within a Durkheimian tradition. As Grusky (2005:59) notes, the practical implication of Durkheimian formulations is their focus on detailed occupations, unlike models which group occupations within big classes.

After WWII, a novel body of theoretical arguments arose to explain Western society's changing class structure, which was then named the 'post-industrial' era. Enormous social and economic changes, such as ever-increasing specialization, advanced technological innovations, domination of the corporate market economy, the information revolution, and globalization were taking place (Wright 1997, chapter 3). There were several signs that first signified a change in the class structure: the differentiation of the capitalist class into owners and financial capitalists; differentiation among the working class, based upon skill and income; and the proliferation of a propertyless class of clerical, bureaucratic, and white-collar workers (Dahrendorf 1959). More recent scholars like Bell (1973) and Giddens (1981a, 2007) identified the replacement of the manufacturing economy by a new 'knowledge/service economy.' Others stressed intensification of the role of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1977, Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley 1998), the emergence of the global division of labor (Esping-Andersen 1999), and the process of de-industrialization. What theorists of class who addressed advanced capitalism had in common was the notion that recent socio-economic transformations brought about a substantial shift in modern class divisions, which required early formulations of class to be revised. Alongside attempts in revising class models to be more adaptable to the post-industrial era, an effort has also been

made to analyze the political importance of social class and to theorize about the dynamics of class-state relations, as well as the mechanism of exchange between classes and the state.

Within such contexts, there are two discernible approaches: those who see class and class analysis as out of date and obsolete (for example Clark and Lipset 1991, Nisbet 1959, Pakulski and Waters 2008), and those who see class as a politically and socially pertinent division (for example Goldthorpe and Marshall 1992, Goldthorpe 2001, Hout, Brooks and Manza 1999, Wright 1980, 1985, 2005a). The latter group of theorists believe that class background remains a significant determinant and predictor of life chances, most notably of access to political power. This is where Porter (1965), for instance, begins his analysis of the relation between social classes and state elites in Canada. According to his account, the economic elites who benefited from extensive corporatization and the concentration of economic power have the greatest chance of acquiring political power.

In a broader sense, all of this could be translated into the question of the mechanisms of interplay between social classes and the structure of political elites. Advocates of class dissolution thesis are more likely to adopt a liberal-pluralist approach rooted in the functionalist paradigm. According to this approach, best reflected in Davis and Moore (1944) and in Dahl's (1967) works, the system of social occupation works on the basis of a functional hierarchy, one rooted in one's capacity and skills with which to contribute to society. The concept of functional hierarchy means that the occupations most valuable to society's survival are the most prestigious and most rewarded ones. Thanks to equal access to education, the most competent people of different class backgrounds have become able to experience intra- and inter-generational mobility and are more likely to occupy a society's most important jobs (Dahl 1967, Knuttila 1987, also see Nakhaie 1996:524).

With regards to the concept of power, the liberal-pluralist paradigm maintains that, within a society, power is essentially dispersed and distributed among different groups - such as classes and status groups - and that, potentially, all groups with appropriate skills and capacities have equal access to power. Political elites, thus, are those who are best fitted to sit in decision-making occupations. In a pluralist society, according to Dahl (1961), community interests are represented through open and democratic political processes. From a liberal-pluralist point of view, the state is a neutral establishment. Thus, polyarchy, as he terms the ideal form of a state, is supposed to be a 'value-free broker' (see Brym 1985:13); this means that such a state is supposed to represent the interests and wills of all segments of the population and mirror the characteristics of the general population.

The liberal-pluralist account of the class-state relationship, however, has not escaped criticism. Research has shown that free class mobility does not translate into real world applications (see Goldthorpe 1987). Numerous studies have illustrated that, for example, education itself is class-based, and that the possession of cultural capital by parents strongly facilitates educational achievement in their children (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1978, Bourdieu 1977, Bowles 1977, Guppy, Mikicich and Pendakur 1984, Nakhaie 1996). These critiques have tried to show that, contrary to liberal wisdom, having access to power is more feasible for well-to-do people. It might be reasonably argued then that since upper classes have had better access to educational credentials, they have better chances to get prestigious occupations, and therefore, their interests and preferences are more likely to be addressed and considered within the state apparatus[8]. Critics also argue that power is not dispersed and that the state is not a neutral broker and, that, therefore, trusting open and democratic political processes to create an equal political

[8] For a discussion on the 'principle of specialization' and the link between education and political recruitment, see chapter two.

community, as Dahl 1961 suggests, is unrealistic (see Das 1996, for example). Two sets of theories rivaling the liberal-pluralist view, have also been developed: instrumentalist and structuralist. Both approaches are rooted in the Marxist theory of power, which suggests that the state's main function is protecting the economic basis of power, i.e., the capitalist system, and reflecting the interests of the corporate and dominant classes.

Ralph Miliband (1969) presents an instrumentalist approach to class-state relationships. He maintains that the state serves as an instrument of the wills and interests of the capitalist class. He tried to show that in advanced capitalist societies, the capitalist elites and economically superior classes rule the state. This happens because state officials, themselves, largely come from a capitalist class background. In order to ensure its predominance, according to Miliband (1969:227-29), the economically dominant class needs not only to control the means and the flow of material production, but also control and lead the means of mental production. This includes mass media (press, magazines and book publishing, cinemas, theatres), religion, and all levels of academia, through which the capitalist elites legitimize capitalist rule. In this view, the state becomes an instrument in the hand of the capitalist elites to protect their interests.

State intervention in the encounter between conflicting groups and classes, following Miliband, is always and necessarily partisan: "as a class state, it always intervenes for the purpose of maintaining the existing system of domination" (1977:91). According to an instrumentalist approach, since the state's personnel and policy-makers, or what Miliband (1969) calls 'state elites,' share an upper class background, they also share a bourgeois perception and ideology that secure the interests of the dominant class (Jessop 1990). Although Miliband rejects that there is an 'automatic translation' (Miliband 1977:67) of economic power into state power, he argues that:

> In contemporary capitalism, members of the bourgeoisie tend to predominate in the three main sectors of social life, the economic, the political, and the cultural/ideological - the political being understood here as referring mainly to the state apparatus. [Where the state personnel] are not members of the bourgeoisie by social origin, they are later recruited into it by virtue of their education, connections, and way of life (Miliband 1977:68-69).

The instrumentalist approach emphasizes the physical presence of economically upper class people within the state apparatus, which according to this approach ensures that their interests are reflected in policy-making. However, this claim has been questioned on the basis that having a common upper class origin does not necessarily translate into having the same or even similar view or ideology among the state personnel (see Giddens 1981b:chapter 9). Others also underline the 'growing globalization of capital' which makes the link between a national state with national capital quite unclear (see Das 1996:30). In all, as Poulantzas (1976:74) notes, the state is not simply a passive tool in the hand of a specific class or faction.

As an alternative to the instrumentalist thesis, a structuralist view rooted in works of Nicos Poulantzas (1975) emphasizes the structures that limit the state's action and policy-making in a way that secures the capitalist class's interests (see Brym 1985). Poulantzas deems there to be a 'relative autonomy' of the state from the dominant classes. He argues that "on a terrain of political domination occupied by several classes and class fractions and divided by internal contradictions, the capitalist state, while predominantly representing the interests of the hegemonic class or fraction (itself variable), enjoys a relative autonomy with respect to that class and fraction as well as to the other classes and fractions of the power bloc" (Poulantzas 1975:97). This relative autonomy is considered to be embedded in the structure of capitalist states by the separation of their political and economic dimensions, and is a "necessary condition for the role

of the capitalist state in class representation and in the political organization of hegemony" (Poulantzas 1975:98). By relative autonomy, Poulantzas also means "the state's relation to the field of the class struggle, in particular its relative autonomy vis-à-vis the classes and fractions of the power bloc, and by extension vis-à-vis its allies or supports" (Poulantzas 1975:256).

The idea of relative autonomy stands opposed the instrumentalist thesis of 'fusion and the single mechanism' (Poulantzas 1975: 161). According to a structuralist perspective, although the state enjoys relative autonomy from the dominant class in this instance, it takes responsibility for the interests of a monopoly's capital (Poulantzas 1975:158). With this shift in focus, the question is no longer who controls the state. Instead, the question is one of the structural constraints that the capitalist class imposes on the state which make the capitalist state represent the interest of their class while simultaneously leaving the state to exercise relative autonomy. This relative autonomy, according to Poulantzas is necessary for the state to handle its political functions properly and to ensure the smooth operation of a capitalist economy. In another words, this autonomy is essentially due to a spatial separation of the juridico-political level from the economic level (Albo and Jenson 1989:182) of society. The importance of relative autonomy for class representation lies in the recognition of the fact that no state simply belongs to a specific monopoly group. Rather, there are structural forces that channel policy-making in a way that ensures the reproduction of capitalist relations and the benefit of the bourgeoisies. A relative autonomy of the state from classes is necessary in order to control conflict between antagonistic social forces in a capitalist society. It is also necessary for maintaining the well-being of capitalist relations of production. While a structuralist approach accepts the relative autonomy of the state from the capitalist class, critics such as Block (1987) and Das (1996) demonstrate that

the mechanism through which the upper classes constrain the state's action is unclear in the structuralist approach.

To summarize, there are two ideal types of understanding and explaining the mechanism of relationships between social classes and power elites. The first is 'state-centred' (Moaddel 1989) or liberal-pluralism, which sees the state's behavior as independent and autonomous from the interests of social classes, and holds that political elites are fair representatives of classes. The second is a 'class-centred' or Marxist approach (translated to instrumentalist and structuralist theories) which emphasizes the centrality of class interests by highlighting that a state's political elites represent and safeguard the specific interests of capitalist elites.

Above and beyond the liberal-pluralist and Marxist distinctions, several empirical analyses have been conducted to scrutinize the class-state relations in different settings. In *The Power Elite* (1973 [1956]), C. Wright Mills holds that America was dominated by a small group of big industrialists and businessmen, high-ranked politicians, and military leaders. Mills reasons that this group of elites, who are predominantly men and have both mutual interests and a shared agenda, had come to threaten the American democracy more than ever. Most crucial decisions in different spheres, according to Mills, are made by this group of elites. Through the mediation of a middle level of power, the power elites sit on top of an atomized mass society. Mills argues that power elites have similar social backgrounds and that the majority of them come from the upper class; that they attend Ivy League colleges; and that they mix with one another on the golf course, in gentlemen's clubs, etc. These commonalities and associations, as Mills argues, cement what power elites feel they have in common and provoke a sense of unity and, more importantly, help create ties among them. In addition, Mills observes an interchange of personnel among power elites, which, in turn, enhances the closeness of government, military and business. Mills

concludes that the psychological affinity, as well as high level of association between power elites, makes them a whole in such a way that nowhere in America is there as great a 'class consciousness' as among the elite (Mills 1973[1956]: 283, also see chapter 12 and 13).

Porter's (1965) analysis of census data from 1931, 1951, and 1961 finds a pattern of ethnic inequality in Canada in which the British were at the top of the occupational structure and, at the same time, were overrepresented in elite positions. Porter argues that in a 'mosaic' setting, which is composed of different socioeconomic, cultural and ethnic groups, one's chance of acquiring a position in the structure of power is assigned more or less based on his/her position within those vectors of division. The task of the sociology of power, he continues (1965:207), is to study people who fill those roles and also the channels through which elites are recruited.

Porter observes a 'concentration of economic power,' or an extensive corporationalization: "a process by which a large part of a nation's economy comes into the hands of a relatively few large firms which become linked together and to the main financial institutions" (22). Later investigations revealed that "the concentration of economic power was still on the rise, with a shrinking group of large, often interconnected, and mainly private sector corporations," most prominently in the financial sectors, which includes banks, insurance companies, and financial institutions, "at the centre of Canada's ownership structure" (Grabb 1999:5). Such economic concentration according to Porter, has translated into the centralization of political power in such a way that Canadian political elites[9] are not representative of the general population in terms of education, occupations, ethnic affiliation, and class origins (1965:388-394). According to Porter, a quarter of the political elites come from the upper strata

[9] Including federal cabinet ministers, the provincial primers, justices of the Supreme Court, presidents of the Exchequer Court, and the provincial chief justices

while the working class has been greatly underrepresented among political leaders. Porter (1965:395) finds that the majority of Canadian political leaders came from the middle class.

For Porter, those groups who have better income and education reproduce their privileged positions via hardening the patterns of selection (patterns of preference and exclusion), as well as kinship links (they marry within their own group), which bring them class continuity and prolong their elite status (Porter 1965: 264-266; also 526). Porter goes on to say that prominent families have their own social life, which is promoted in their clubs, associations, and extensive interlocking networks, and help them to notice their high status. These networks of grouping and cross-membership are important means through which the elite elect each other, reproduce their privileged position, and generate solidarity.

Olsen (1980) argues that Canadian political elites between 1953 and 1973 have been exclusive in occupational background. Guppy et al. (1987) shows that during 1965-1984, Canadian MPs have come increasingly from high-status occupational backgrounds. Nakhaie (1997) emphasizes that the pattern of under-representation of French and other ethnic groups amongst Canadian elites is still persistent. Wauters (2010), in his case study of the structure of the Belgian political representation since WWII, concludes that the working classes are not well represented in parliament, and that their share in parliament has always been rather low.

With regard to the relation between society and the state, thus, the liberal approach predicts that the most qualified individuals (the best-fitted persons regardless of their socioeconomic origin) serve at the highest level of the power hierarchy. Seeing things in this way, one would predict that the more educated and expert individuals occupy the higher-ranking elected and non-elected positions in the state. Alternatively, instrumentalist and structuralist

theses predict that the state guarantees the economic and political interests of the capitalist class, either through the actual domination of their representatives in the body of the state, or through such structural constrains as benefit the dominant classes. Thus, from a liberal-pluralist point of view, if the working class is underrepresented, the cause would be assigned to their lesser personal capacities in acquiring the requirements for upward mobility. By contrast, in the Marxist paradigm, the causes of the underrepresentation of workers would be assigned to the fact that the upper class has secured its presence, as well as its preferences, within the apparatus of the state by the physical or structural exclusion of the working class. As will be discussed in the next chapter, having unequal access to education, as a class-based asset, is another explanation for the underrepresentation of working classes from a Marxist perspective.

CHAPTER TWO: THE STUDY OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Political equality is a fundamental premise of a well-established representative democracy (Dahl 2006). The systematic study of the concept and implementation of 'representative democracy', since Pitkin (1967), has been concerned with the idea of proportionality and political justice (Anderson and Goodyear-Grant 2005, Callenbach and Phillips 1985, Dahl 2006, Phillips 1995). Although the aura of the 'official representative' politics seemed to be fading away recently in liberal democracies (see Tormey 2015), proportional representation still continues to have strong theoretical implications for democracy and justice. A proportionate representation, in the sense that all segments of society are able to have a voice in the political apparatus, is a necessary condition for an ideal democracy, as well as a just representative political system.

There is no doubt that modern societies are 'diverse' entities in terms of gender, racial, ethnic, religious, etc., and socioeconomic characteristics. Sociological diversities determine differences in the life chances of individuals, and bear upon both their unequal access to positions of power and their unequal possibility to be represented in the apparatuses of public decision-making. Thus, the extent to which a society's political representation, as the most basic principle of a modern democratic system, is a correct, balanced and proportional reflection of the diversity of social settings is a substantive factor, when justice and socio-political equality are considered.

Totally equal representation, however, is not a realistic prospect. As Dahl (2006:8) implies, perfect political equality is simply a desirable and ideal goal "as a standard to which we ought to aspire, and against which we can measure the good or value of what has been achieved". Alternately, high levels of underrepresentation of specific groups could challenge the legitimacy of a democratic system. With respect to female representation, for instance, concerns

are raised about how a democratic system can be considered equal and legitimate if it fails to represent up to half of population (Tremblay, Arscott and Trimble 2013:9).

Within this context, the following section explores important factors that influence political representation and class-political relations. These include sociological categories such as class, gender, ethno-racial divisions and the implications that they may carry with regards to the analysis of equal and proportional representation. It is likewise important to discuss the effects that these social divisions may have under the title of 'intersectionality.' In addition, it is important to evaluate the theoretical controversies around a well-known distinction of 'descriptive' from 'substantive' representation, and discuss the importance of the 'politics of presence' for political equality. This section also contests liberal-pluralist claims which view 'education' as a neutral opportunity to reduce inequality in access to power.

According to Dahl (1989:29), representation is the concept that "transformed democracy from a doctrine suitable only for small and rapidly vanishing city-states to one applicable to the large nation-states of the modern age". These then provide us with two ideal types: while in 'direct' or assembly democracy, people personally participate in political decision through their direct presence, in a 'representative' or delegative democracy, citizens give power to elected representatives through free, fair and regular elections, who then in turn govern on behalf of those citizens. In a representative democracy, holding 'regular elections' is the most pivotal principle. As Rawls (1999:195) insists, "Sporadic and unpredictable tests of public sentiment by plebiscite or other means" do not suffice for a regime to be dubbed representative.

In an 'ideal' assembly democracy "every member must have an equal and effective opportunity to vote and all votes must be counted as equal" (Dahl, 2006:9). Moreover, all members of society should have equal and effective opportunities, to not only learn and search

for knowledge about the proposals and policies, but to exercise control over the political agenda. In an 'actual' or representative democracy, these rights are translated to the entitlement to free participation in fair elections and to run and serve in elective offices (Dahl, 2006:12). Moreover, in actual democracies, the government must be responsive to "the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals" (Dahl, 1971:2). Central to the articulation of the political equality within democratic theory is that people in society must be treated as 'political equals.'

The idea of justice is an essential and irreplaceable component, embedded in the very definitions of representative democracy. The focus of this review is on the fairness and universality of the process of electing representatives. A conventional perception defines democracy as "regular, free and fair election of representatives on the basis of universal suffrage" (Huber and Stephens 1999:761). In the beginning of her book, *The Concept of Representation*, Pitkin (1967), one of the first scholars who endeavor to define and explain the concept of representation in the context of modern democracy, argues that the popularity of representation is due to its link with the ideas of democracy and justice. For Phillips (1995), political justice is considered one of the key principles of democracy, in so far as it is held that all interests should be adequately addressed and representatives are meant to be typical samples of various interests spread across society (also see Callenbach and Phillips 1985). As Anderson and Goodyear-Grant (2005:1031) argue, free, fair, and regular elections, for which all segments of society are eligible to stand and equally participate, ensures the 'expression of popular values and policy goals' by the hands of a democratic government.

The demand for political equality in representative democracy, has, over time, been expanded to the "demand for equal representation of women with men; demands for a more even-handed balance between the different ethnic groups that make up each society; and

demands for the political inclusion of groups that have come to see themselves as marginalized or silenced or excluded" (Phillips 1995:5). From the point of view of representational justice, all segments of society should have equal rights and the access needed to engage in political decision-making. As a result, representational justice might be defined as a mechanism that warrants all social groups and their interests to be proportionally represented in the legislative and executive bodies of the state.

Theoretical debates that address the problem of 'disproportional representation' in recent democracies, however, are too concerned with the political dimensions of the problem, while justice, as a dimension of representation, has remained relatively under-explored. The majority of such research is carried out by political scientists who largely focus on the crisis of democracy in general, defective electoral laws and rules (Luna and Zechmeister 2005, Norris 2006, Powell 2004), trust in government (Williams 1998), trust in politicians (Dalton 2004), and the lack of political participation (Macedo et al. 2005, Verba and Nie 1972). Although one may argue that the issue of political inequality has always been discussed within the context of exploring the democratic deficits, the idea of justice seems to merit further exploration in the domain of political representation studies.

In exploring the justness of representation, three main areas are distinguishable: class or socioeconomic representation, gender-sexual representation, and ethno-racial representation. Before discussing these areas, an established distinction between two forms, or more precisely, two dimensions of representation is worthy of brief discussion.

A separation between 'who' or 'what' is to be represented has been the root of a distinction between two bases for representation: a descriptive versus a substantive base.

Although the distinction is far from neat, it has been used since its introduction by Hanna Pitkin (1967) in political analysis to distinguish the 'composition' of politicians and their 'activities.'

From the point of view of descriptive representation, the composition of representative bodies is scrutinized to discover whether it corresponds with the composition of society in terms of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. A member of parliament, as Wauters (2010) puts it, descriptively represents someone in the general population by matching him or her with respect to a relevant attribute, such as gender, ethnic origin, religion or class. This form of representation is also termed the 'politics of presence' (Phillips 1995), or has been translated to 'vote-seat' or procedural representation in a party representative systems (Powell 2004). The focus in a descriptive paradigm of representation is on who politicians are, rather than their behavior.

In contrast, a substantive study of representation addresses the correspondence between citizens' viewpoints and the policy preferences of their representatives. Therefore, from this perspective, what policy makers do and what policy preferences they represent, rather than who they are, is important (Wauters 2010). Substantive approaches begin with representatives' preferences and interests. Substantive representation is also termed 'politics of idea' (Phillips 1995), a term that refers to the relationship between the general population's preferences and that of their political delegates. Put simply, a black man representative 'descriptively' represents black men in society, while a white women who may defend black men's rights 'substantively' represents black men.

One may remark that there are similarities between the descriptive approach and the instrumentalist approach to the relationship between state and classes, in so far as they both

emphasize the physical presence of specific population groups in power. Likewise, there are similarities between the substantive dimension of representation and the structuralist approach, in so far as the focus is on the policies and the processes which guarantee the interests and preferences of a specific group of people. However, one should bear in mind that descriptive and substantive theories of representation are concerned with class, gender, ethnic-racial, age, and all other divisions in a society; whereas the instrumentalist and structuralist views specifically focus on the representation of advantaged and privileged economic classes.

In another domain, a controversy exists over the question of the interrelationship between descriptive and substantive divisions as two generic bases of representation. Some are skeptical of the benefits which descriptive representation may have for the representation of ideas. From such a perspective, the behaviors and activities of representatives, and whether they defend voters' interests, rather than merely their demographic similarity, is what really matters (Pitkin 1967). Other theorists see a trade-off between descriptive and substantive representation (Sawer, Tremblay and Trimble 2006, Swain 1993), in the sense that increasing the former will not necessarily promote the latter, if not undermines it.

In contrast to this view, others observe a correlation between a politics of presence and a politics of ideas. Scholars have shown that minority representatives are likely to pay more attention to the issues and problems of groups they descriptively belong to (Owens 2005, Wauters 2010). It is also assumed that descriptive representation occurs prior to substantive representation, meaning that the physical presence of women, racial minorities, and lower class representatives is the necessary, not sufficient, condition for their preferences to be considered. As Porter elaborately puts it, if "a person's beliefs about social reality are shaped by the social milieu to which he has been exposed, we can see that the definitions of reality which provide the

framework for making political decisions depend much on the social background and life experiences of politicians". Porter concludes that "the predominance of some occupational groups and people of one class background means that limited perspectives are brought to bear on public issues" (Porter 1965:390-91). Others (see Phillips 1995, and Wauters 2010 for example) argue that a common life experience, a common structural position, and having suffered from shared deficiencies in society motivates politicians to devote more attention to the people with social characteristics similar to their own. For example, Vakili-Zad (1994) found a strong correlation between the socio-economic background of the deputies of Iranian Majleses and their political orientation. Carnes and Lupu (2015) provided evidence from Latin American parliaments to show that lawmakers from different class backgrounds bring different economic attitudes into the legislation process.

Along these lines, other research suggests a positive association between descriptive representation and the political empowerment of minority groups. By having descriptive representation, minority groups start to increase their participation and their electoral turnout (Bobo and Gilliam 1990). It is also shown that descriptive representation enhances minority representation by affecting their group pride, trust in government, and also via the mechanism of 'communicative advantages' (see Banducci, Donovan and Karp 2004:538-40). Moreover, Sawer et al. (2006:15-20) demonstrates that the physical presence of women in the legislative body of state, for instance, brings new perspectives and new experiences into the political process, thereby improving the functioning of deliberation in a democracy.

In the light of this description, it is clear that descriptive representation has significant implications for political equality and justice. As Trimble et al. (2013) argue, although descriptive representation is an insufficient condition for substantive representation, it is 'crucial

marker of equality' in representative politics. Proportional existence of diverse sociological categories in the parliament, cabinet, and other elective institutions could increase the likelihood of the fact that lower class and minority groups have a voice in democratic institutions, which in turn has an important implication with respect to political justice.

The following paragraphs shall address equality in representation with respect to class, gender, and ethno-racial divisions, and its importance for a sociological analysis of political representation.

Socioeconomic and class representation in the political system has been the last empirically-developed factor in the literature on representation (but see Phillips 1995, Wauters 2010). Wauters (2010:185-88) attributes this underdevelopment to three causes: a waning relevance of class in contemporary society, the increasing non-class tendencies among political parties, and the methodological problems of class politics analysis. It has been controversially argued that due to the increase of education and meritocracy in post-industrial situations, class background has lost its decisive impact on the life chances and identities of individuals (see for example Pakulski and Waters 2008). Wauters also refers to a direction of 'catch-all parties,' through which political parties aim to attract a broader range of interests, not necessarily those interests that are limited to one class cleavage. Lastly, it is argued that class analysis is grappling with some methodological issues, like disputes over the classification of occupational and class categories. Nevertheless, as discussed in the study of class-state section, many researchers still maintain that the political significance of class is still strong (Goldthorpe 2001, Wright 1985), and that equal class representation plays an important role both in the quality of representation and the requirements of justice in a democracy, and, thus, merits more attention.

One of the areas of focus in the study of economic proportional representation is the representation of poor and impoverished groups. It has been shown that people who live in poverty participate less than wealthy people in political activities (Macedo et al. 2005). As a consequence of lower rates of participation, impoverished people are the least likely to gain political representation (Hickey and Bracking 2005, Jusko 2008, Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Bartels (2002), for example, finds that representatives and politicians in the United States are 'vastly' more responsive to the upper third of the income distribution, and that views of the lower third of income distribution receive the least weight and attention in the policy making process.

One may therefore conclude that economic inequality contributes significantly to political inequality and exclusion. This comes about by different mechanisms. The political participation mechanism is one of the most discussed ones. As was mentioned, electoral turnout is reported to be lower among poor people. In another words, lower income groups are less likely to vote and have lower incentive to participate in political elections. In addition, it is believed that they are politically less knowledgeable and less informed, which in turn makes them less capable of formulating their preferences and to monitor their representatives (Bartels 2002:25). Moreover, it is assumed that poor people have fewer opportunities and resources to contact, communicate, and lobby their representatives. Other studies refer to the 'electoral rules,' notably single-member district (SMD) and multi-member district (MMD), which may limit or diminish the electoral power of lower classes and strata (see Jusko 2008).

Another cluster of studies emphasizes occupational groups that are more likely to be recruited into the political elites. For Weber (as cited in Guppy, Freeman and Buchan 1987:418), since the French Revolution, modern democracy 'belongs to lawyers.' Porter (1965:396)

likewise finds that “all the significant differentiations in Canadian society seem to be represented by lawyers and businessmen with university degrees”. Different studies in a Canadian context showed that the composition of parliamentarians and representatives has become increasingly homogeneous in terms of occupational background (Guppy, Freeman and Buchan 1987, see also Young 1998). This has been partly explained by the ‘principle of specialization,’ which justifies decision-making positions being filled by professionals and highly trained individuals. It, in turn, highlights the position of education in advanced capitalist societies and calls into question the role of education in the context of a socioeconomic match between the general population and their representatives. In another words, it is important to determine how education contributes to provoking or mitigating unequal and disproportionate representation.

It is often proclaimed that education, as a form of human capital, can play an equalizing role in advanced capitalist societies in the way that having equal access to educational opportunities will realize the rule of the most competent. In such a situation, all individuals, regardless of their socioeconomic status, will potentially find equal chances to experience upward mobility and to be recruited into positions of power. Thus, a short look at the relevant theoretical debates in this field seems to be called for.

From a liberal-pluralist point of view, by expanding the division of labor in advanced capitalism, during which the rigidity of the class structure has been significantly decreased, those who gain access to the privileged positions at the top of the institutional hierarchies are competent because they were successful in the equal competition of superiority and excellence (see Nakhaie 1996). In such a perspective, thus, what matters in recruitment into political elites, a status which entails decision-making and the exercise of power, is one’s achieved competencies. It is also argued that knowledge and skills have become important assets in

modern societies, most especially when they contribute to the redistribution of economic resources and the reduction of inequality (see Bowles and Gintis 2001). According to this thesis, equal access to educational opportunities creates a situation in which people of different class backgrounds become able to experience intra- and inter-generational mobility.

On the other hand, a considerable amount of literature has been aimed at debunking the liberal-pluralist tradition, showing that ascriptive status is still central to determining one's class of destination in contemporary society (Bourdieu, 1978, Bourdieu, 1977, Bowles 1972, Bowles 1977, Guppy 1984, Guppy, Mikicich and Pendakur 1984, Nakhaie 1996). This body of literature demonstrates that education may serve as a double-edged sword. If individuals have unequal access to education based on their socioeconomic status, education may amplify inequality by way of the fact that well-to-do families can provide better opportunities for their children, which leads to the reproduction of their class advantages and their superior access to the power positions. As Porter (1965:195) puts it, "where parents have high occupational status they will also have more education, higher income, and smaller families. Their children will have a greater chance to complete their education and inherit parental status than children with parents of lower occupational status."

In the United States, Bowles and Gintis showed that parental economic status is passed on to their offspring by providing unequal access to educational opportunities (Bowles and Gintis 1976, 2002). In their analysis, one's level of schooling is an important mechanism of intergenerational status transmission. Schooling, for Bowles and Gintis does much more than enhance individuals' cognitive skills and help them to succeed in the labor market; it develops motivational and behavioral traits and qualities such as self-reliance, leadership, and industriousness, which determines subsequent occupational status, attainment and earnings

(Bowles 1972, Bowles and Gintis 2002). They argue that schooling, can thus, promote traits that are advantageous to groups which themselves determine the structure of schooling.

In his theory of cultural reproduction, Bourdieu emphasizes the role of education in linking one's class of origin and of destination (Bourdieu 1977, also see Nakhaie and Curtis 1998). In Bourdieu's theory, educational credentials are considered an instrument which reproduces the structure of power relations and the structure of the distribution of cultural capital. This is so, because parents who possess cultural capital facilitate and even guarantee the educational achievement and success of their children.

Cultural capital, in Bourdieu's tradition, is "the ensemble of high-status culture and cultivated dispositions which manifest themselves in such things as appreciation of higher education and the best schools, attendance at museums, art galleries, theatres and concerts, appreciation of classical music and knowledge of composers, and strong language and literary skills." (cited in Nakhaie and Curtis 1998:486). Bourdieu argues that since possession of cultural capital, which is indispensable to the success of pedagogic communication, is unequally distributed among children from different social classes, education finally legitimizes the patterns of inequality (Bourdieu 1977:494).

Bourdieu, then, refers to the 'system of strategies of reproduction' whereby each generation tries to transmit the capital and advantages it has at its disposal. Whereas heredity and inheritance has been a traditional strategy for transmitting economic capital and ownership of the means of production, in specialized economies, dominant classes transmit their advantageous class positions to their children by equipping them with access to higher education (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1978). As Bourdieu (1977) argues, this new strategy of transmitting advantages via

educational credentials legitimates 'the transmission of power and privileges' among ruling classes.

Other studies also affirm the relationship between educational attainment and one's class background. Bowles, for example, seriously questions the efficiency of education as an equalizer of income, and asserts that the previous view of the relationship between social class and schooling, which maintained that education is responsible for the equalization of economic opportunity and income, has gradually been discredited (Bowles 1972:220). He finds that social class background determines 'both educational attainment and economic success' and is more important that what has been imagined (Bowles 1972:222). He insists that the children of upper-class families are more likely to receive more years of schooling and enjoy enrolment in higher quality schools, both in terms of the internal structure of the schools and the content of schooling. The 'amount' of schooling and the 'content' of education "greatly facilitates their movement into positions similar to their parents" (Bowles 1977:141). He also highlights that the 'child's personality attributes' - e.g., self-reliance vs. obedience attributes - which generally characterize the forms of socialization focused upon in upper- and lower-class families, in turn help to explain an individual's success in gaining a higher income, rather than the 'apparent' contribution of schooling (Bowles 1972:226). Bowles concludes that the education system reinforces the inequalities generated by the capitalist system, breeds concentration of capital, reproduces the structure of social classes from generation to generation, and contributes in the intergenerational perpetuation of inequality.

With respect to the chances for access to higher education in Canada, Guppy finds that "chances for obtaining a university degree have been consistently better for middle and upper class English-Canadian males." (Guppy 1984:89). Moreover, in the relationship between

educational attainment and the socioeconomic background, Guppy et al. (1984) concludes that while this relation has weakened over time, the influence of one's social origin in the level of one's schooling is still 'strong'. Porter's (1965) description may be the best to summarize this issue when he states that "Because going to university is largely a result of class position, those who receive this training are not always the most intelligent" (195).

Thus, there is evidence confirming that there is not as much class fluidity in advanced capitalist societies as is usually claimed by the pluralist view; that class mobility is contingent upon anindividual's class of origin (Goldthorpe 1987); that access to and the quality of education is not equally distributed among classes; that cultural capital can be largely translated into economic advantage; and that ascriptive status is still a strong determinant of individuals' destiny. As discussed, evidence suggest that there is a vigorous association between one's social class origin and one's access to valuable assets: particularly education. The mechanism of the effect is as such: because valuable assets increase the chance of one's social mobility, they therefore facilitate one's ability to enter positions of power. Stated differently, if the mechanisms of class reproduction are strongly established, the children of the upper classes have the greatest chance to be recruited into the political elite. This has negative implications for political justice and for proportional class representation. When the majority of representatives in different political institutions come from higher socioeconomic backgrounds, the political system faces the problem of disproportional class or occupational representation. In such a situation, not only do some demographic and socioeconomic groups remain underrepresented, a situation considered to be a deficiency from the point of view of descriptive representation, but also several parts of society are left without enough legislators to support their interests and to defend

their point of view, which is considered to be a deficiency from the perspective of substantive representation.

However, as discussed earlier, the study of representation is not confined to class and socioeconomic representation. Representation is also extended to gender-sexual categories and those of ethno-racial minorities. If there is a lack of gender or ethnic representation among the elites, this can call into question equal access to power positions for these groups.

Ethno-racial minority representation is the subject of another cluster of research. Porter's study, one of first systematic accounts of the issue in Canada, demonstrates the overrepresentation of British Charter groups in the economic elite. Porter states that "economic power belongs almost exclusively to those of British origin, even though this ethnic group made up less than half of the population in 1951" (Porter 1965:286). It is also found that white men are overrepresented in Canada's parliament (Young 1998:12). Although Porter's 'vertical mosaic' thesis is objected to by some research which points to a recent decline in the British proportion and the increase in the French and other ethnic groups' proportion in all categories of elites since 1935 (Ogmundson and McLaughlin 1992 for example), it has still remained pertinent, especially with regards to the underrepresentation of minorities (for instance see Nakhaie 1997).

With respects to women's representation perspective, the main concern, both for justice and women studies, is women's engagement and participation in legislative politics. In this paradigm, the goal is 'gender balance' via recruiting more diverse women into representative institutions. Tremblay et al. (2013) identify three periods of research on women's political representation. An early research cluster in 1970s and 80s compared female legislators and male legislators with an emphasis on their numbers, socio-economic, and demographic characteristics,

including their age, marital status, occupation, and education. A second generation of study concerned the 'obstacles' which women encountered in their route to political office. The third phase of research focused on the 'opportunities for enhancing women's representation in political life,' underrepresentation of marginalized and racialized women, and the actual achievements which women made in politics with respect to the goal of creating a better life for women (Tremblay, Arscott and Trimble 2013:3-9). As Norris (2006:198) suggests, the "under-representation of women in parliament may have important consequences for the public policy agenda and for the articulation of women's interests, as well as for the legitimacy of democratic bodies."

Campo (2005:1719) finds that women are underrepresented in the different spheres of power in Latin America. According to her, women in Latin American countries confront cultural, institutional, structural, and even psychological difficulties when trying to gain access to political positions. Borthwick et al. (1991) found that the representation of women in the British House of Commons has always been small. According to their study, the share of women in the British parliament was 3.8% between 1945 and 1970 and, after a drop in 1979 entry to 3%, the proportion of women amongst both Conservative and Labor parties has increased to 6% of all MPs respectively in 1987 entry (Borthwick et al. 1991:715-16). Women's representation is reported to have improved significantly in subsequent years in which women made up 9% of MPs in 1997, 20% in 2010 (Hunter and Holden 2015:3), and 29% of all members of the British parliament in 2015 (Audickas 2016).

Another cluster of studies addressed the representation of sexual minorities. Studies have focused on issues such as mass attitudes regarding this minority group (Lewis and Rogers 1999), the political elite's attitudes against them (Schroedel 1999), the policies that impact their life

(Klawitter and Hammer 1999), and also people's attitudes regarding minority politicians (Herrick and Thomas 1999). The latest research, for example finds that students in American government courses affirm that minority candidates are 'less electable' than straight candidates. The researchers also find that religious respondents are less likely to vote for them to be their representatives. Another study, which has been conducted with a view to the descriptive dimension of representation, shows that the actual presence of minority elected officials in political offices is essential in the process of antidiscrimination minorities policy-making (Haider-Markel, Joslyn and Kniss 2000). Haider-Markel, Joslyn and Kniss found that the presence of minority officials significantly increases the likelihood of the adoption of domestic partner policies and increases the chances of domestic partner registration (2000:573-575). These findings are in line with the positive correlation between descriptive and substantive representation of lower classes, women, black and other minority groups.

With regards to the matter of sexual minorities in Iran, the Iranian Railroad for Queer Refugees (IRQR)[11] claims that Iran does not recognize sexual orientation and gender identity as human rights. IRQR claims that this has forced Iranian sexual minorities to flee Iran and seek asylum. According to their website that claims provides support and counselling to minorities, the majority of Iranian minorities refugees flee to Turkey and file claims for asylum with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR): "the UNHCR assesses each claim and if a claim is determined to be valid, the UNHCR identifies a new country for the refugee. Often that country is Canada and the United States of America". Despite these claims, as has been discussed later, the right of Trans people has been recognized by Iranian law.

[11] http://irqr.ca/2016/?page_id=163

Other studies devoted attention to broader patterns of inequality among those who are categorized as a 'double minority' or are doubly disadvantaged. For instance, in his examination of the level of ease or difficulty of successfully entering the political elite by minority women, Black (2000) finds significant inequities in the process of political recruitment for women of colour. In a double minority situation, an individual is the possible subject of two simultaneous disadvantages because of, for example, her gender and ethnic characteristics (Black 2000), or because of her ethnic category and class status (Anthiyas and Yuval- Davis 1992). The study of double minority (or double-jeopardy) groups was actually born when academics, especially those in women's studies, found some 'neglected points' in the study of the lived experiences of women. Understanding a black woman, for instance, was impossible by referring to gender or race studies since the former was designed to study white women and the latter focused on black men (McCall 2005:1780).

The interlocking nature of identity, or what has been largely termed as 'intersectionality', refers to the "interaction between gender, race, and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power" (Davis 2008:68). This term, originally coined by feminist theorists who were studying the interaction of gender and race through the experience of women of colour, has expanded to refer also to the experience of poor women of colour, which outlines the intersectionality of class, gender, and race. This calls into question how categories of race, class, and gender intersect (Davis 2008:71).

Historically, intersectionality was introduced into sociology within the context of general critique which found that women have remained invisible in most sociological analysis and theories (Denis 2008:677). In the 1980s, feminist scholars had started to integrate gender into the

analysis of class, ethnic and racial subordination. Socialist feminism challenged notions of a 'genderless' class relation which was postulated by many of the Marxist and socialist theories, and the notion of 'classless' gender relations which was assumed by many feminist theorists (Stasiulis 1999). At the same time, the axis of race was added to the focus of studies of domination and oppression. This new paradigm in sociological analysis began to take into account the interaction of various social locations and their interlocking mechanisms.

To put it another way, intersectionality studies address the differences among human beings and highlights those differences which engender inequality and create structures of domination and subordination, exclusion, and marginalization. As Denis (2008) argues, intersectionality consists in "analyses of multiple, intersecting sources of subordination/oppression, and is based on the premise that the impact of a particular source of subordination may vary, depending on its combination with other potential sources of subordination" (677). The study of intersectionality addresses the added difficulties which different social categories face in entering into the political elite and highlights substantial deficiencies in justice in the patterns of representation of women and ethnic groups.

To conclude this section, the literature demonstrates that the representational justice of lower socio-economic groups, women, and ethno-racial minorities in politics is improved with the physical presence of legislators belonging to the same category. Moreover, the literature acknowledges that the descriptive representation of these groups is strongly predicted to be a prerequisite for substantive representation. Representation of poor people, accordingly, makes a contribution to the development of anti-poverty policies and has encouraged welfare state policies. Moreover, it is shown that the representation of women brings new insights and

experiences into the legislation process and that the presence of ethno-racial groups empowers minorities and motivates their political participation.

In the light of the literature reviewed in the previous two chapters, the current study will go on to its core issue: the proportional representation of members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran (Majles) since the Islamic Revolution. This empirical core is situated within two broad theoretical constellations: class-state relations theories, and proportional representation theories.

With regards to the dynamics of relations between state and classes, a class-centred approach suggests that certain classes are in better positions to maintain their hegemonic authority over lower social classes by representing the interests of dominant classes. A liberal-pluralist approach, by contrast, typically considers the state and its branches to be neutral entities that tend to represent people based on meritocratic and functional imperatives. Empirical studies that have been conducted from within the class-centred paradigm generally show that political elites are not representative of the general population. A pluralist paradigm, in contrast, suggests that those who are most meritorious and most talented would naturally be recruited into the elite stratum.

A proportional representation paradigm also directs researchers' attention towards the notion of the political justice. For the purpose of this study, such a normative paradigm helps to test the extent to which political representation in post-revolution Iran has fulfilled the ideal of equal representation, which was one of the goals of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. A descriptive approach, similar to an instrumentalist notion to class-state relations, assumes that the physical presence of representatives of different segments of a society suffices to ensure that the

interests of those specific groups are considered during policy-making. On the other hand, the substantive dimension of representation, much like a structuralist thesis, places emphasis on 'what' rather than 'who' is to be represented, and admits that not merely the physical presence, but the actual preferences of political elites should be taken into consideration.

The aforementioned theoretical frameworks are utilized here to explain the dynamics of exchange between society and the elected political elites in Iran. Any evidence of overrepresentation of specific segments of Iranian society among the elected political elites, specifically those segments that are in advantageous positions, or underrepresentation of subordinate groups (particularly the working class) provides support for the class-centered paradigm of class-state relations, and conversely challenges the pluralist notion of such relations. From the viewpoint of the liberal-pluralist assumption that the most meritorious and skilled people will naturally occupy upper-level positions in society, and the related principle of equality of opportunity (most importantly to education credentials), it would be predictable to see meaningful representation of Iranian citizens by skilled and educated political representatives from different social backgrounds. The proportional representation of Iranian citizens in the Majles also provides a sign of the measure of success of the Islamic Revolution in fulfilling its promises: political justice and the rule of disadvantaged peoples. An intersectionality analysis can also be used to examine the disadvantaged situation of double- or triple-minority groups among Iranian MPs. In the case of this study, as will be discussed in chapter seven, the interaction between class, ethnicity, and gender is matter of further investigation that has been neglected in the literature on the political elites in Iran.

In the next two chapters, a brief description of the social transformation that Iranian society has undergone during the past three decades, and the structure of political power in post-revolution Iran, will be discussed.

CHAPTER THREE: THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF IRAN

The Advent of the Revolution

During a dinner ceremony on New Year's Eve, 1978, which was hosted by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in the Niavaran palace in Tehran, Jimmy Carter, the president of the United States, claimed that under the leadership of Shah, Iran has been "an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world" (Public Papers of the President of the United States 1978). Ironically, just a few days later, on January 9th, 1978, a sequence of riots, strikes, and mass demonstrations were triggered in different cities throughout Iran (See Appendix B for a sequence of incidents). There are debates among scholars over the moment that the Revolution wagon started moving. Some designate the publishing of an anti Ayatollah Khomeini article in *Ettela`at* newspaper on January 7th, 1978, which angered his followers, as the nominal starting point of the Revolution. Others suggest that it began in 1977 on the last night of ten-nights of lectures and poetry readings held between October 10th and 19th in the Iran-German Cultural Institute[12] when a great number of intellectuals and university students went to the streets chanting against the Shah (Karimi-Hakkak 1985; also see the Goethe Institute entry in the Encyclopædia Iranica). Other scholars (see Keddie 2006:25) highlight the death of Ali Shariati in June 1977; the death of Mostafa Khomeini, the son of Ayatollah Khomeini, in October 1977; or the Cinema Rex fire that happened on August 19th of the same year. These events were considered mysterious by anti-Shah protesters and were largely seen to have been precipitated by SAVAK[13].

[12] Goethe Institute

[13] A Persian abbreviation of the Organization of National Intelligence and Security

Other scholars observe the situation as being much more complex and emphasize the downsides of the Shah's White Revolution in the 1960s (Ashraf 1994). They denote the prolonged accumulation of discontent among different segments of society during these years as the root of conflict (Abrahamian 2008, Keddie 2006, Zibakalaam 1996), or even date it back to the American-British sponsored coup against the democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953 (Kinzer 2003, Rajaee 1999). Whatever the starting point, the result was decisive: the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in February of 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Studies that contributed to understanding of the Islamic Revolution have mainly tried to explain two general questions: what caused the fall of the Pahlavi regime, and what accounts for the religious groups - among other forces and cooperators in the overthrown of the monarchy - coming to power? As Rajaee (2007) formulates the latter, it would be good to know how, in the new political regime, 'Islamic-minded' groups instead of other participants, such as secular intellectuals, nationalists, liberals, Islamic liberals, Marxists, Sovietists, and Maoists, each of who had a significant role in overthrown of the Shah, rose to power.


Extensive literature has investigated the causes of the Revolution, and the roots of success of the religious groups' domination (Abrahamian 1980, 1982, 2008, Ashraf 1994, Bashiriyeh 1984, Enayat 2005, Foran 1993, Halliday 1979b, 1982, Kamrava 1990, Katouzian 1981, 2007, Keddie 1981, 2006, 2015, Kurzman 1995, Milani 1994, Moaddel 1993, Rafipour 2000, Rajaee 2007, Skocpol 1982, Zibakalaam 1996). By drawing on this broad literature, an explanation can be offered here. Because discussion of the causes of the Revolution (the first

question) and the reasons for the coming to power of Islamist groups (the second question) are not within the aims of this study, a brief explanation will need to suffice.

Rising Expectation Model

The continuing increase of Iranian oil revenues during 1960s and 70s and the quick price boom, which started in 1973, enabled Mohammad Reza Shah to pursue an ambitious and speedy Western-style modernization through his so-called White Revolution (1963-1972) and the three subsequent Socioeconomic Development Plans (1962-1978). The 'oil-induced growth' suddenly congealed and turned into an unexpected stagflation when the global oil price dropped in 1975 (see figure 2), which fueled mass discontent and grievances. According to the J-curve model (Davies 1962), revolutions occur when a period of progress, that raises expectations, is followed by a period of sharp reversal and decline.

Figure 2: Iran's Oil Revenues; percentage of GDP
Source: World Bank Web[14] (2014)



[14] Available: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS?locations=IR25 [Accessed 25 September 2016]

Modernization Model

The implementation of state driven modernization, also known as modernization from above, and particularly the national Land Reform project[15], which was largely funded by petrodollars, created far-reaching socioeconomic and structural changes. The Shah's modernization in the economic and, to some extent, the societal arenas, however, did not permeate into the political domain. While economic development had created large, demanding and participatory middle and working classes, the political system was increasingly moving toward a repressive one-party state following the establishment of the *Rastakhiz*, or Resurgence Party, in the early 1970s. For this reason, scholars used labels such as 'imbalanced development' (Lerner 1958), 'lopsided modernization'(Keddie 1977), 'disproportionate development' (Lipset 1959), 'malformed economic expansion' (Halliday 1979a), or 'uneven development' (Abrahamian 1982), to highlight the conflicts and tensions that it generated within Iranian society. According to proponents of the modernization explanation of revolution, rapid modernization created great discontentment, particularly among religious and traditional segments of society which saw the Shah's modernization efforts as incompatible with their values and beliefs (see Zibakalaam 1996:32-37).

Moreover, due to this form of modernization, the size of the state expanded and its importance as the largest economic entity in the country, increased. At the end of the third Development Plan in the late 1970s, more than one third of the active work force was employed by the government, the average share of state consumption had become threefold,

[15] The enforcement of Land Reform was one of the conditions that the International Monetary Fund and US government established for granting the emergency fund to Iran. The Shah's government had sought international financial aid to cope with the economic crises of the last years of the 1950s. Other conditions were adoption of austerity policies and appointing liberal members in the cabinet (see Abrahamian 1982:422).

and the average share of the public sector in capital formation (GDP) had increased by about 20% from the mid-1950s (Ashraf 1994). Terms like 'rentier capitalist state' or 'state capitalism' have been largely used among analysts to refer to the form of the Iranian state under the second Pahlavi, in order to describe the version of capitalist modernization in Iran.

Shah (dictatorial) Control

Because oil revenues had freed the state from tax collection, the state remained largely independent from Iranian society and became capable of standing over and against it. Shah, who saw himself as the architect of one of the rapidest bursts of economic growth in the world and was quite jubilant at having the most powerful military power in the region[16], began to repress human rights, enforce interventionist policies, shut off political reform mechanisms, and block the safety valve. He suppressed different, discontented segments of society, with which he might have consolidated his legitimacy. Most importantly, at the moment of the crisis, his passivity and inaction in peaceful managing the conflicts (Huntington 1984:202) led to the quick and unexpected downfall of his regime.

A Class Analysis of the Revolution

During the years of Mohammad Reza Shah's reign, the powerful state deliberately weakened the internal cohesion of Iranian social classes, particularly the upper class, which he felt seriously threatened by (Bill 1972). This disrupted the natural process of formation of a functional and autonomous upper class, which could effectively support the Shah's regime at the time of crisis. In terms of the class origin of the participants of the movement, different

[16] Shah rhetorically called Iran the 'gendarme of the region' (Marschall 2003:9)

forces have been recognized. An alliance between traditional middle classes - Ulama and bazaar[19] classes - and modern middle classes - professionals and intelligentsia - constituted the foundations of the movement. Urban marginal and poor classes soon joined the middle class mobilization (Milani 1994). The industrial working class was among the last groups to join, and whose massive strike struck disorder in the very functioning of the Bakhtiar government and played a significant role in the success of the revolution (see Ashraf and Banuazizi 1985).

The expansion of the modern middle and working classes was a direct outcome of state-led modernization and the development of the state bureaucracy. From one side, the Development Plans implemented by Mohammad Reza Shah industrialized Iranian society and consequently increased the size of the industrial working force at the expense of peasants and employees of the agriculture sector. The Shah's investment in human development projects, which led to the striking increase in the urban population and also the development of education and specialization, and the expanding bureaucratization, helped the explosive growth of a 'modern' middle class in Iran (Liaghat 1980). The evidence indicates a dramatic increase in the number of secondary school and college students, teachers and authors, college professors, and also professionals, administrators and bureaucrats during 1960s and 1970s (Milani 1994). By blocking political reforms as well as repressing the modern middle class, the Shah dissatisfied this important, up-and-coming social force (Abrahamian 1982:496-510), which otherwise could have supported the Shah's welfare state and might have been his ally in breaking the back of traditional class powers.

[19] Merchants, artisans, and market traders who were mostly self-employed

A robust class explanation of the Revolution emphasizes the ongoing conflict of interests between a newly formed 'dependent bourgeoisie' and the old 'bazaar classes,' including petty bourgeoisie and merchants (Moaddel 1991, also see Akhavi 1987:202-203 and Amir Arjomand 1986:400-402). This class antagonism represented the basis[20] for revolutionary struggle. The latter group was the big loser of the state's economic policies. Before the Revolution, economic policies had benefited a group of less than one thousand Iranian capitalists which was consisted of "the Pahlavi family; aristocratic families engaged in urban ventures; enterprising aristocrats who survived land reform by setting up agribusiness, banks, trading companies, and industrial firms; elder politicians, senior civil servants, and high-ranking military officers who prospered by sitting on managerial boards and facilitating lucrative government contracts; old-time entrepreneurs, and a half-dozen new entrepreneurs" (Moaddel 1991:317). As scholars like Nomani and Behdad (2006) argue, this group should be referred to as the nascent capitalist class, which was forming in accordance with state capitalism under the Shah. However, partly due to the fact that it was in early stages of its formation, the nascent capitalist class could not defend its position and interests in the battle with the well-established petty bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie also enjoyed a historic alliance with Ulama, which, thanks to its religious authority, had significant leverage for mobilizing the masses. As Amir Arjomand (1981) argues, the tie between urban petty bourgeoisie and clergy created an enduring alliance against a common enemy which had always been the monarchical state in pre-revolution Iran.

The Islamic Revolution, though, was a consequence of a series of factors, and cannot simply be attributed to one. As was discussed above, while economic problems created

[20] To use Marx's terminology

discontent among the public, underdevelopment of the political system and the use of power to suppress human rights angered many people and made them come to the conclusion that the Shah's regime was not 'reformable' (see Zibakalaam 1996:86). Moreover, as discussed under a class analysis of the Revolution, the Shah failed to gain support from specific class-based sources. Instead, the repressed modern middle class and the loser petty bourgeois class united to create a strong class base for overthrowing the Shah. What Zibakalaam adds to the existing explanations of the Revolution is the requirement to understand the Revolution from within the contemporary social and historical context of Iran (Zibakalaam 1996:104). What he finds to be the deepest root of the Revolution, is an intense conflict between a developing economic system and an unchanged and outdated political structure that never was resolved during the Shah's reign (for a similar explanation see Abrahamian 1980, 1982, and 2008). At the core of this explanation, it is argued that if one cleans the frills from the statue of modern Iran under the Shah, the political articulation of the country was not very different from its premodern period (Zibakalaam 1996:113). This political underdevelopment is the most important reason for the chronic opposition to the Shah's regime that finally led to his overthrown. This recalls what Marx (1904:2) referred to as the contradiction between the mode of production of material life (its economic foundation) and the political superstructure which takes place at a certain stage of development and finally leads to the transformation of the superstructure.

In what follows, the reasons for the coming to power of the Islamist anti-Shah group (the second question) is discussed. Ideologically, at least three main anti-Shah discourses had independently formed in the political culture of Iranian society and had gained their supporters

from different segments of the population (see Ashraf 1994; Maloney 2015). Together, they were fundamental in establishing a massive anti-Shah and anti-imperialist movement. The first was a people-centric[21] Islamic discourse that mainly called attention to inequality, poverty, and the suffering of disadvantages, and sought to restore human dignity and social justice. The second discourse was that of leftist groups, either secular (*Tudeh and Fadaee's*) or Islamic socialists (*Mojahedin*) whose appeal were basically anti-imperialism and egalitarianism. The third discourse was the nationalist, either secular (*Mellat* Party of Iran) or Islamic (*Nehzat-e Azadi*), that focused on emancipation from domestic autocracy, and foreign dependency and intervention. These three discourses shared much ground in common and therefore formed a significant coalition against the Pahlavi regime. In a sense, Ulama, Leftists, and nationalists united to topple the Shah.

To understand the level of influence of Islamist leaders and to understand the reasons for the success of Islamist groups in attaining power after the Revolution, it can be helpful to explore the importance of Shi'i tradition in Iranian history. Following the victory of the *Usuli* School over the *Akhbari* School[23] in their long controversy in the early 19th century, Muslims were required to follow a living *marj'a* in their religious affairs (Enayat 2005). A definite political implication of this event was that the penetration and significance of Ulama increased. It also had dramatically enhanced the economic power of Shi'i Ulama in Iran inasmuch as they gained the undisputed authority to collect religious taxes.

[21] I intentionally opted this term to avoid negative connotation of the term 'populist'

[23] In contrast to Akhbaris, Usulis believe in reasoning and consensus in Islamic rule-making in modern world and believed in following or imitation (*taghlid*) of the source of emulation (*marja'e taghlid*).

Ayatollah Khomeini, later named Imam Khomeini, as a progressive clergyman, had written his *Kashf Al-Asraar* (1980 [1941]) in the early 1940s and had sewn the idea of the participation of Ulama in political affairs (not yet the formation of an Islamic state) when he mildly criticized the wrongdoings of Reza Shah and his son. In this stage of the development of his discourse, Ayatollah Khomeini did not yet challenge the principles of the monarchical political system (Mahdavi 2014:28). Under his exile in Najaf (1965-1978), Ayatollah Khomeini developed his theory of *Velayat-e Faghih*[24] in his book under same title ([1971] 1994) and escalated his criticism of the monarchy. This was the inception of the discourse that was further developed in subsequent years and led to the establishment of the Islamic state in 1979.

On the other hand, during the years of his reign, Mohammad Reza Shah always encouraged a Western-like and secular life style. One may argue that the Shah had perhaps some reasons to do so: to stimulate consumerism in order to accelerate state-centered capitalism, and to divert the public's attention from the underdevelopment of the political sphere, in other words, to 'depoliticize' Iranian society. Whatever was his motivation, this policy had a detrimental aftermath: it largely alienated the religious strata of society, motivated religious leaders, mobilized the religious masses against the Shah, and made Iran a fertile ground for the acceptance of Ayatollah Khomeini's ideology and leadership (see Abrahamian 1982). The establishment of a national secular and modern educational system and the implantation of the Pahlavi's judicial reforms, as Amir Arjomand (1981:300) notes, had eroded clerical control over those institutions, and was considered to be the state's encroachment upon clerical prerogatives.

[24] guardianship of the jurist

But how, one might ask, could this religious group obtain public support? During the 1960s, the White Revolution in general and the Land Reform national project in particular brought about several structural transformations. However, this state-sponsored modernization, which included a six-point reform program, did not lead to political development in the way that modernization theory predicts. Rather, it brought about socioeconomic and cultural transformations which were largely manifest in the expansion of the urban sector (Abrahamian 1982, Amir Arjomand 2009). This took place as a result of freeing a large number of peasants from their vassalage obligations, as a result of the Land Reform, which was amplified by the problem of aridity that the agricultural system was grappling with, and creating a corps of urban poor immigrants. These urban immigrants, who had lower socioeconomic status and potentially were more likely to be attracted and mobilized by religious beliefs (see Zibakalaam 1996), later formed the foot-soldiers of the movement and played a significant role in the victory of the Revolution.

Economic development also had an indirect impact on strengthening religious figures and communities. The clerical stratum always had a strong relation with the traditional bazaar class. For many years, the bazaar class supplied funds for the religious organizations and supported the seminaries. According to Shi'i jurisprudence, *Khoms*, which was a 20% religious tax on the annual wealth of every person in an Islamic society, was owed to Imams or to leading religious authorities[25] (Al-Sadr 2003:179). Whenever the bazaar class benefited from economic prosperity, more funds became available to sponsor religious affairs and establishments.

[25] During Imams' absence

Another element that contributed to the reinforcement of the role of religious group was the Shah's fear of communism. The Shah was warned by his Western confederates, especially by the United States, about the threat of communism (see Rafipour 2000, and Zibakalaam 1996). Although he repeatedly attacked both communists and fanatical clergy by labeling them the *red and black reactionaries* respectively, part of the Shah's anti-communism tactic, at least up to 1975, was granting relative freedom to religious establishments to train clerics, collect funds, and expand their domain and influence. The Shah, perhaps, saw the moderate religious leaders as influential allies in his struggle with communist ideology. In the absence of a vibrant and dense civil society, mosques and other religious gatherings were vital organizational tools that helped to mobilize the masses.

During the last years of the 1970s, the Shah was under international pressure from human right institutions and the Carter government to mitigate political surveillance. While the Shah began to open the political atmosphere and to mitigate censorship and other pressures upon the civil society, the opposition groups used the opportunity to challenge the regime (Ashraf and Banuazizi 1985:20). In this new situation, different groups of intellectuals and human right activists began to write open-letters to the Shah, religious groups were gaining important power and organizational integration. Although other opposition groups, such as liberals, nationalist, Marxists, radicals, guerrillas, and other nonreligious parties had their own resources, organizations, mobilization lever, and advocates, in the last months of the movement, they mostly cooperated with and supported Ayatollah Khomeini's strategies to combat the Shah's regime (Ashraf 1994). In sum, the presence of massive rural-urban migration of traditional and religious poor peasantry, the destruction of the civil society by the Shah, and

religious groups' organizational abilities were collectively instrumental in the success of the religious groups. Thus, after overthrowing of the Pahlavi dynasty, it was the religious group that came to power and played a prominent role in the forthcoming state.

Due to their involvement in the previous political system, royalists and the older generation of political elites either had to leave Iran, or else face being purged or isolated. Furthermore, a sizable number of non-political but notable professional and Western-educated fellows, who could potentially have been future politicians, left Iran too. Some of them found nothing in common with the religious style of life that dominated after the Revolution, and others fled the dangerous and devastating Iran-Iraq War. The immigration data illustrates that shortly before and after the Revolution, large numbers of high ranked military personnel, bureaucratic officials, entrepreneurs, bankers, leftist and liberal intellectuals, and highly skilled professionals such as engineers, dentists, physicians, lawyers, and other academics fled Iran (Hakimzadeh 2006). This immigration trend generated a void in the area of political affairs for educated and skilled elites. This gap was firmly filled by the clergy.

To understand the rise of Islamist groups, the 'charisma' of the Ayatollah Khomeini[26] cannot be dismissed. It is evident from the composition of the participants in the movement that, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, education, and socioeconomic characters, a huge number of Iranians considered Ayatollah Khomeini to be a unique, mysterious, and extraordinary person who could be trusted to lead the movement (Abrahamian 2008, Zibakalaam 1996:90). His intrinsic strength, self-mastery, tranquility, high-ranking position in

[26] Who was called 'Imam', which is synonymous to the highest religious leader in Shia doctrine.

the seminary hierarchy[27], and his white beard, altogether, brought him widespread legitimacy and authority, even among non-religious anti-Shah activists. After the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, as Ashraf (1994, Zibakalaam 1996) notes, Imam Khomeini ascended to the 'theocratic position of the national political leadership' as supreme leader, or what was initiated and introduced by him known as *Vali-ye Faqih*.

All in all, the Islamic Republic of Iran emerged out of a multi-force movement in which almost all the participants united and shared the goal of overthrowing the Shah, and accepted the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. The joint collaboration of different classes and social segments, each of which had their own resources for mobilization, synergized their power and made the triumph of the Revolution feasible.

Iran's Postrevolutionary Structural Changes

Today, Iran is dramatically different from the Iran of the last years of the Pahlavi regime or even from the Iran of the first decade of the Revolution. Iranian society has undergone a significant transformation in different levels and dimensions. The following section presents a discussion on the structural changes that have taken place since the Revolution in Iran. This discussion is classified into four sections: socio-demographic transformations, the expansion of education, secularization, and post-revolution political economy.

In a general sense, unlike political revolutions, social revolutions are phenomena that cause drastic social changes and violently disrupt the entire organization of a society. They challenge the old 'order' to establish a new one. Revolutions also break down the previous

[27] As a leading source of emulation

'relations of production' that have been in place in order to guarantee the interests of dominant and superordinate classes. In another words, social revolutions free a society from its restrictive ties, unbinding the dominant groups' hegemonic restraints. In a postrevolutionary situation, geographic dislocation, which is best illustrated by rapid urbanization, speeds up. In addition, access to education, which is often limited to specific strata and specific families, becomes universalized. These changes bring about profound structural transformations which in turn alter the face of a postrevolutionary society. This section provides a picture of the existing Iranian society, a society that has experienced not a superficial 'political' but a full-fledged 'social' revolution.

Socio-demographic Transformations


The number of people who live in a designated social setting is a structural factor determining the framework of the social relations of production and for the formation of social classes. Age and gender distributions not only draw the contours of societal divisions, but determine the portion of the economically active population in a society. Thus, as will be further discussed in this chapter, the actual population pyramid and the rate of a society's population growth have important political and policy implications. Moreover, we will see that the changes in the age structure of Iran's population are important to the purpose of the current research, and its aim in examining the level of match between political elites and the general population. It also shows how population dislocation and migration trends changed the pattern of urbanization since the Islamic Revolution.

The annual population growth of Iran leapt from 2.7% in the decade of 1966-1976 to 3.9% in the subsequent decade. After the Revolution, the family planning policies pursued by the Shah's regime since the early 1970s, which were aimed controlling the size of families, were

abandoned. Ideological conditions after the Revolution encouraged motherhood for women, and the circumstances of the war with Iraq also encouraged society to form larger families (Afary 2009:265). However, by the end of the war in 1988 and after the Iranian government confronted the devastation and economic difficulties, a series of new policies were implemented to persuade families to confine themselves to two children (Karamouzian, Sharifi and Haghdoost 2014). This reduced the annual population growth from 3.9% in 1986, to 1.2% in 2003. During the same period of time, the fertility rate shrank from 7 children per woman to just 3. This success was admired by the UN as "the most successful population control program in the whole world" (Abrahamian 2008:184). In 2012, however, when the fertility rate (1.6) fell below the replacement level[28], the Iranian government shifted its family planning policy once again toward having more babies per family. The Iranian population has more than doubled since the Revolution, from 37 million in 1979, to 78 million in 2016. The recent population pyramid shows a shift from a young population to a middle-aged population, where the largest proportion of the population is in the middle age groups (Hosseini-Chavoshi and Abbasi-Shavazi 2012). Over one third of the population in 2011 was still young, between 20 to 34 years old (Statistical Center of Iran 2011). Figure 3 illustrates this shift by comparing the population of both sexes in 1986 and 2011 censuses. Figure 4 also portrays the prospects of the population growth in Iran.


[28] Especially in rural areas which experienced a negative annual growth rate

Figure 3: Age distribution of the Iranian Population (both sexes) by Census (1000')
Source: UN Demographic Profile (2015): 385-387



As scholars emphasize, setting aside the family planning policies, structural factors such as the age structure of the population, the number of females in the population, and, more importantly, cultural-behavioral factors such as changes in the pattern of age at marriage, which for women increased by 5 years after the Revolution, have been significant contributors to the population structure of Iran in recent times. The age structure of the population has important implications for the political economy of the country. It not only determines the size of the economically active population and demands certain investment in job creation, but predicts and affects the future composition of social classes. As Nomani and Behdad (2006: 73-77) argue, one of the most important effects of the age composition of a population is on the labor force supply in general, and the supply of specific groups of workers based on the population growth rate of those groups, in particular. As an example, members of the Iranian baby-boom generation (those who were born in the 1980s) started to enter the job market in the 2000s and have pushed the government to create more jobs.

Figure 4: Iran's Population Pyramids from 1950 to 2050
Source: UN Population Division Web (2017)



At the moment of the revolution, the Iranian population was equally divided between urban and rural areas. However, by the fourth decade after the Revolution, the rural areas held less than 30% of the population, though the rural decline was slower after 2006. Table 1 represents the rate of urbanization since 1976 census, a period of rapid urbanization.

Table 1: Population of urban and rural areas

	1976	1986	1996	2006	2011	2016
Total	33708744	49445010	60055488	70495782	75149669	79926270
Urban population	15854680	26844561	36817789	48259964	53646661	59146847
Rural population	17854064	22600449	23237699	22235818	21446783	20730625
Rate of urbanization	47%	54.3%	61.3%	68.5%	71.4%	74%

Source: Statistical Center of Iran: Migration (2014): 15-19

While in the last years of the old regime and the first decade of the Revolution (1976-1986) there was a high level of migration from rural to urban centres, this trend decreased after the

Revolution in favour of city to city migration (Statistical Center of Iran 2006, 2011). Rural to rural migration was 28% in 1985 and reduced to 13% in 2011, while the rate of city to city migration increased to 65% (see table 2 and figure 5). This trend had a significant impact on the increase in the size and number of small towns[29] and larger cities[30].

Table 2: Migration by type and year

Type of migration	1976-1986	1986-1996	1996-2006	2006-2011
Rural to rural	690218 (14.1%)	943095 (11.1)	1064043 (9.0)	368706 (7.2)
Urban to rural	678717 (13.8)	1540694 (18.2)	2004011 (17.0)	755546 (14.8)
Rural to urban	1535527 (31.4)	1889905 (22.4)	2330054 (19.8)	655251 (12.8)
Urban to urban	1912240 (39.0)	4062171 (48.1)	6385665 (54.1)	3259040 (64.0)
Total	**4892647**	**8435865**	**11783772**	**5089354**

Source: Statistical Center of Iran: Migration (2014)


Both the Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War created large dislocations and forced internal migration, which accelerated the processes of urbanization in Iran. At the same time, the development of cities and their incorporation into the national economy further helped drive rapid urbanization. People in less developed areas left their homes in order to find better economic opportunities in larger towns or cities. The influx of Afghani and Iraqi refugees to Iran due to the Afghanistan war and the suppression of the Shi'i minority in Iraq by Saddam Hussein

[29] with a population of less than one million

[30] Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz and other metropolitans with population over one million

in the 1990s is another factor that must be considered when one analyzes urbanization and migration in post-revolution Iran.

Figure 5: Types of Migration
Source: Statistical Center of Iran: Migration (2014)



This section provided a general picture of the age composition of post-revolution Iran, as well as the flows in the population. In the light of this description, the current study will be able to answer the question of the extent to which the age distribution of the elected political elites is proportionate to the age structure of the general population. The answer to this question will help this study to identify the extent to which different age groups are well represented in the Iranian Majles, and also the extent to which the rural-urban status of the members of parliament matches the urbanization trends.

Expansion of Education

Two further characteristics of postrevolutionary Iran are the remarkable decrease in illiteracy and the expansion of pre-university and higher education. The youth literacy rate was 99% in 2012 (UNESCO 2012). As table 3 shows, the enrolment in primary and secondary school as a percent of the total population almost doubled from the 1970s to the 1980s and increased a further 37%

from the 1980s to the 1990s. The growth of enrolment continued from 1995 to 2005, but then started to decrease in recent years. According to Paivandi (2012), from 1979 to 2005, the number of students who enrolled in primary and secondary schools increased by more than 30% on average. In higher education, the figures are even more remarkable. According to the Institute for Research and Planning in Higher Education (IRPHE), total enrolment showed a more than fivefold increase from 1979 to 2004, and the number of university students in the 2000s is more than six times greater than in the 1980s (Zohoor 2005:9). The decrease of the school-age group in the general population and the contrasting increase in the number of university students in the same age group can be explained by the change in the age pyramid of Iranian population. The population growth rate started to decrease significantly beginning in 1986 and showed its effect in the following decade, leading to a decrease in the school-age population. Given that the population increased more than two-fold, the rate of growth is somewhere around 2.5 times. Although overall male participation in higher education is slightly higher than that of women, in some disciplines the number of women surpasses that of men.

The expansion of education in both secondary and higher levels is a result of implementation of egalitarian education policies, namely free national primary education, by post-revolution governments. Education is recognized as a civil right in Iran and higher education is sponsored by the public purse. This contributed to the development of educational opportunities for both the lower classes and women, and brought about remarkable progress in scientific activity in Iran (Khosrokhavar 2009). Semi-private universities also played a significant role in increasing the rate of access to higher education, thus making educational attainment widespread.

The expansion of education has significant implications for the composition of political elites in Iran. As is discussed in chapter 8, the remarkable shift in the composition of the members of the Iranian parliament in terms of the level of modern education they have received, and the increased minimum educational requirement for political nomination reflect this expansion in education among the general population. In light of this description, the current study expects that we will observe an increase in the level of education of the members of the Iranian parliament. In other words, it is expected that we will see a leap in the chances of being elected and reelected by those Majles candidates who have received a greater number of years of education.

Table 3: Educational Distribution by Gender and the Level of Education

		1966-1975*	1976-1985*	1986-1995*	1996-2005*	2006-2013***
Primary and Secondary School	**Men**	63%	60%	55%	52%	51%
	Women	37%	40%	45%	48%	49%
	Total N	3077979	7784935	14704105	17046108	13115015
	(% of same age group)	(23%)	(42%)	(60%)	(81%)	(84%)
	Total population in same age-group (5-19 age group)	13179916	18621396	24678068	20944412	15555200
Higher Education	**Men**	NA	NA	69%	52%	51%
	Women	NA	NA	31%	48%	49%
	Total N	NA	NA	463524	1639842	3891965
	(% of population in 20-34 age group)			(5%)	(10%)	(22%)
	Total population in same age-group **	-	-	9931136	16236374	17087151

Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of Iran (2010-2014) *, National Census Data **, and UN statistical Yearbook (2016):45 ***

Secularization

In the postrevolutionary period, a strong wave of 'Islamization,' based on Shi'i doctrine, was promoted and supported by Iranian governments. From the perspective of the Islamic

government, the application of Islam in politics would create a more humanistic, moral, and secure society. From such a perspective, Islam would provide the answer to most modern dilemmas. It was argued by the Islamist thinkers[31] that Islam, in contrast to Christianity, is a sociopolitical religion and therefore is capable of serving as the means of emancipation of the masses. Accordingly, Islamic faith was the inspiration for the constitution and the criminal law in Iran after the Revolution. Moreover, the education system became Islamized, and the observation of religious norms, such as wearing the *hejab* for women and the prohibition of selling, buying, and consuming of alcohol were enforced in the post revolution era.

In contrast to the flow of Islamization, the requirements of running a modern state, which is subjected to growth of rationalization, 'disenchantment' (to use Weber's term), bureaucratization, expansion of education, institutional differentiation, and specialization have been underway in Iran since the early twentieth century and were continued after the Revolution. From a sociological point of view, these trends of modernization paved the way for secularization and are in contradiction with the Islamization measures that were adopted by the Iranian government. As is argued by Abazari et al. (2008), the flow of rationalization and bureaucratization are even extended to religious establishments and organizations, such as seminaries in postrevolutionary Iran, when they reorganized their bureaucratic structure and adopted rational programming.

For the analysis of the nature and the extent of secularization in Iran, two distinct approaches have been developed. One approach (for example see Vakili-Zad 1994 and Kian-

[31] For example, Ali Shariati was one of the prominent theorists of an emancipatory Islam. This thesis was later developed by religious elites and advocators of the Islamic state (see Adelkhah 2000).

Thiebaut 1998) argues that the expansion of the pro-secularization process of modernization will inevitably secularize Iranian society. Advocates of such a perspective argue that:

> Contrary to the widely held belief, the Islamic Republic of Iran is far from a theocratic state. In fact, it has been continually moving toward secularism, capitalism and separation between the state and the church. […] The Iranian Islamic state is moving constantly toward consolidating the state power and moving away from religion as the basis for its economy and the polity […] Although high ranking clergies among the membership of powerful Guardian Council have remained faithful to the [idea of a theocratic state,] they have been gradually replaced […] by a younger generation clergy/technocrat with a desire to improve the economy (Vakili-Zad 1994:620-21).

Referring to the conventional distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective' secularization, this body of argument postulates a positive correlation between these two processes of secularization. Seen in this way, secularization in the institutional sphere (objective) inevitably entails secularization at an individual level (subjective). Another line of argument within this approach addresses the creation of a large middle class as a definite outcome of modernization, in turn playing an important role in the direction of secularization in Iran (Kian-Thiebaut 1998). Kian-Thiebaut argues that secularization will come, and that despite its present failure, it will be in place sooner or later. In contrast, but still within the same general approach, Moaddel (2009) argues that although the institutionalization of secular values and the process of value change among Iranians in post-revolution Iran is far from an inevitable outcome of the modernization and development of modern social classes, however, Iranians today are less religious and tend toward individualism and other values of liberal democracy. For Moaddel, this shift in the public's value orientations is best explained by

considering the politics of resistance and opposition to the dominant discourse promoted by the government.

The theme of 'inevitable secularization' is further strengthened by evidence of 'post-Islamism' discourse (see Bayat 1996, also Mahdavi 2011). The notion of a post-Islamism is rooted in the prolonged question of the compatibility of Islam and democracy (Bayat 2007:13). As not only a conscious 'attempt' to reconcile Islam and modernity, post-Islamism is also considered to be a 'condition' by which the legitimacy of the project of Islamism is both being exhausted, and thus, compelled to criticize and reform itself (Bayat 2007: 18-19). Although one may argue that this process is not necessarily synonymous with secularism, it has strong secular connotations.

Conversely, one group of scholars (for example see Rajaee 2007, Kazemipur and Rezaei 2003, and Abazari et al. 2008) takes a more contextual approach toward the specific characteristics of Iranian society. This body of scholars points to the strong historical interweaving of religion with the life-style of Iranians. They underline the special hallmark of Islam as a social religion, as well as the geopolitical coordinates of Shi'ism, to argue that unlike what has taken place in Western societies, religion is too central in the life of Iranians to be easily removed from their hearts. Rajaee (2007, 2013), for example, remarks that religion has become an important component of the 'Iranian identity' and had always played a leading role in the public sphere and more importantly within Islamic movements throughout twentieth century. To question the postulated positive correlation between objective and subjective secularization, Kazemipur and Rezaei (2003) reason that despite the secularization projects that were implemented in prerevolutionary Iran, the degree of religious sentiment, or religiosity, on a personal level remains strong. However, they maintain that a gradual decline is evident in the

degree of engagement in the collective religious practices in recent years, contrary to the 'de-secularization' policies of Islamic Republic of Iran. Kazemipur and Rezaei observe a process through which religiosity in Iran is becoming 'personalized'. Abazari et al. (2008) argue that on an individual level, Iranians still respect the 'sacred symbols', religion is still highly valued by many, and religious beliefs remain important in the lives of Iranians. According to the World Value Survey (2008), more than 80% of Iranians see themselves as a 'religious person' and about the same proportion of people believe that God is very important in their lives. These findings obviously support the position of the second approach in analyzing the trend of secularization in Iran, at least on a subjective level.

From a sociological perspective, although the Islamic Revolution aimed to restore the Golden Age, the reign of Prophet Mohammad, and led to the 'sacralization' of politics (Amir Arjomand 1988:131 and 181), secularization remained robust in post-revolution Iran and was supported by different segments of society. When the main social supporter of the Islamic Republic, the traditional and lower middle classes, adopted the ethico-political structure of the new state and gained a new sense of identity (Afary 2009), other segments of Iranian society, specifically modern educated middle classes adopted a less religious and more Westernized life-style. These trends were accompanied by the need for educated professionals to administer the government, as well as by the expansion of the internet and new communication technologies. As Moaddel (2009) argues, the rise of secular values in recent Iran cannot be seen as an inevitable outcome of modernization; rather, it has been dependent upon the existence of social support and the effort of secular intellectuals and policy makers.

Having an understanding of the trends of sacralization and secularization will help to shed light on the manner by which this study explains the change in the composition of members of parliament since the Revolution, particularly in terms of the number of clerical MPs.

Iranian Postrevolutionary Political Economy

From the commencement of the Revolution, one of the most controversial topics was the economic model that the Islamic Revolution should pursue. With the exception of the *Nehzat Azadi* - Liberation Movement - almost all the various groups and political fronts, including members of the Revolution Council[32], had leftist tendencies and were advocates of socialist and anti-capitalist economic models (Ahmadi-Amuii 2004). However, throughout the years following the Revolution, different economic orientations were adopted by different governments. Through the lens of political economy, we can see and identify three separate periods: the Revolutionary honeymoon, the state-centric economy, and a zig-zag economic liberalization.

The honeymoon of the Revolution lasted for only a few months (Ashraf 1994). It began with the establishment of the 'provisional government' headed by Mehdi Bazargan in February 1979, and ended with its resignation in November of the same year. During this period, the first stages of the power transfer were taking place and many groups that were involved in the Revolution were still recognized as 'insiders'. The government tried to stabilize the country's affairs as well as its economic processes, and took a moderate stance in its decision-making and foreign policy. Their moderate position, however, discounted many militant and revolutionary forces who expected to see sharp and quick changes in the style of governance. Bazargan and his

[32] A group of high-ranked clergies and lay persons who were selected one month before the triumph of the Revolution by Ayatollah Khomeini to manage the revolutionary affairs. The clergy members were Ayatolleah Motahari, Beheshti, Musavi Ardabili, Rafsanjani, Taleghani, Khamenei, Bahonar, Mahdavi Kani etc.

cabinet resigned following the takeover of the United States embassy in Tehran by *Khat-e Imam* students (Imam Khomeini's line) on 4th of November 1979[33].

The second period began with the election of Bani-Sadr as the first president of the Islamic Republic on January 25, 1980. Disorganization, insecurity, and destabilization intensified after the resignation of the provisional government. This was accompanied by the unrest of the workers and led to the closure of factories and stoppage of production in the country. Workers disobeyed the factories and industries' regulations in order to put pressure on the managers to increase their income. In some cases, workers arrested industrial or company's owners or managers and handed them over as *Taghouti*[34] to the revolutionary tribunals. For this reason, many owners or managers of industries did not show themselves, and many firms were left without supervision. To manage this situation and resume production, the Revolution Council, within which an 'interventionist' economic approach was dominant, decided to mandate the nationalization of industries. To prevent the flight of capital from the half-dead body of industry to non-productive but profitable sectors such as speculation or brokerage, the Council also ordered the nationalization of banks and insurance companies as well as foreign trade (Sahaabi 2004:10-32).

Simultaneously, the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980 brought about the destruction of Iran's infrastructures and disrupted both the production and the export of oil. This led to an intense reduction in Iranian revenues. This came about during a situation in which Iran was already under sanctions and more than $10 billion of its assets and properties were being blocked by the United States on account of the hostage crisis. The dismissal of Bani-Sadr and the

[33] The embassy take-over happened as a reaction to the decision of the Carter's administration that let the Shah go to the United States.
[34] the remnants of the Shah's regime

assassination of several members of high-ranking political elites from both the government and the leaders of the Islamic Republic Party further complicated the situation. In the presidential election of October 1981, the Iranian people elected Ayatollah Khamenei as president and he appointed Mir Hosein Mousavi as the prime minister. The commitment of the Iranian government to supply the necessities of life to all Iranians during the war, sanctions, and internal disorganization, forced it to adopt highly state-centric economic policies, wherein the state owned the majority of industries and resources and intervened in the functions of the free market.

The political economy that was adopted during the first decade of the Islamic Republic was not far from the ideals and promises of the Revolution: antagonism to the private ownership of capital, support for the subordinate and oppressed segments of the society, the Islamic idea of the class equilibrium, and hostility to foreign capital and investment - inspired from Marxist and dependency paradigms - were always popular among the anti-Shah combatants (Nomani and Behdad 2006). The implementation of state-centric policies also had an unintended consequence: the over-enlargement of *Bonyads* (foundations) such as *Bonyad-e Mostaz'afan* (Disinherited Foundation), *Bonyad-e Shahid va Janbazan* (Martyr and Veterans Foundation), and *Bonyad-e 15 khordad* (15th of Khordad Foundation). By taking over the confiscated wealth, properties, estates, and tenements of the royal family and Pahlavi functionaries, as well as the confiscated Pahlavi state properties, these Bonyads became large economic entities[35].

The pursuit of a state-centric economy, however, debilitated the capitalist relations and market institutions that had formed during Pahlavi's capitalist modernization. During the first decade of the Islamic Republic, the percentage of public sector employees sharply increased

[35] For example, by 1991, the Disinherited Foundation had a holding of $12 billion which had made it as the largest economic entity in the Middle East (Maloney 2015).

from one-third of the total urban work force in 1976 to around one-half in 1986. The economy also witnessed a jump in the ratio of public to private industrial establishments, during which the state-owned industries with 100 or more workers; the ratio increased by 75% from 1976 to 1982 (Ashraf 1994:120). Consequently, the shrinkage of private capital caused economic growth to fall to only half of its 1977 level in 1988, though the Iranian GDP had grown by 6.6 percent annually between 1960-1977 (Salehi-Isfahani 2009). Due to the Iran-Iraq war and the dominance of politicians who advocated state-centrism, a five-year postrevolutionary 'Development Plan', which was prepared in August 1979 and had liberal and pro-market tendencies, was neither ratified nor implemented.

A period of rationing of basic goods, price controls, and coupon distribution for the necessities of life lasted until the end of the war in 1988 and the passing of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989, who himself supported pro-dispossessed economic policies. At this time, there was an intensification of the economic crisis due to the devastations of war and the collapse of the global oil price in 1986. At the same time, the position of advocates of state-centric policies weakened in government and the Majles. The economy after the war was in free-fall: oil prices fell again after the cease-fire, Iran's exports collapsed, the per capita income shrank by 45%, inflation was about 29%, and the war caused an estimated $1 trillion in damages (Maloney 2015:194). In this situation, Ayatollah Khamenei was appointed as successor of Imam Khomeini, and Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected as the new president in the spring of 1989. Hashemi favored the elimination of the position of 'prime minister' via the amendment of the 1979 Constitution, which strengthened the role of the president. He shifted the economic orientation towards economic liberalization. Hashemi's administration started to seek foreign capital, and to apply economic development plans recommended by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank

for developing countries. This was followed by the normalization of economic activities, the revival of capitalist market relations, the promotion and protection of foreign investments, liberalization of prices, floating the Rial exchange rate, the lowering of trade barriers, the privatization of state institutions and holdings, and the downsizing of the government bureaucracy (see Maloney 2015, chapter 5). It was also accompanied by a normalization of relations with the international community within the diplomatic realm, which was done to promote the bargaining power of the government which sought international financial support.

Hashemi's government (1989-1997), labeled as the 'construction government,' actually transformed the discourse of the Islamic Republic political economy from a justice-oriented to a growth-oriented one. Although the implementation of the economic liberalization policies were accompanied with some mismanagement, and thus, confronted opposition and resistance[36], the Iranian economy during the 1990s recovered much of the ground it had lost in 1980s (Salehi-Isfahani 2009). This was mainly the result of having well-organized, though somewhat ambitious, economic development plans. As Amuzegar puts it, the:

> Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1989–93) adopted a multi-pronged strategy aimed at reconstructing war-torn areas, expanding basic infrastructure neglected during the war, and reviving the private sector under a structural adjustment programme called ta'deel eqtesadi. The Plan promised to transform the war economy into a market-oriented, investment driven and more efficient system through trade liberalization, wage-price deregulation, privatization of state enterprises, and other economic reforms (Amuzegar 2014:8).

[36] The liberalization policies caused one of the highest levels of inflation in the history of the Iranian economy.

Through the five subsequent Economic Development Plans (1995-2016), the liberal economic policies were continued under the later presidential terms of Khatami (1997-2005), Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), and the existing government of Rouhani (2013-now). The swing of the Islamic Republic governments between justice and growth approaches, however, has given a zig-zag character to the nature of the economic liberalization in postrevolutionary Iran (Nomani and Behdad 2006). Though the Khatami and Ahmadinejad governments adopted diverse strategies, they promised to satisfy strong demand for a more equal distribution of wealth within society. President Khatami had a robust line of leftist supporters in his presidential campaign and President Ahmadinejad owed his election to an anti-Hashemi atmosphere, which brought him to power largely through the support of those who suffered on account of economic liberalization.

Oil has always played an indisputable role in contemporary Iran's political economy, and the well-being and progress of development plans have been linked to the global oil price (Amuzegar 2014, Salehi-Isfahani, Mohaddes and Pesaran 2013). Thus, exploring its booms and busts during the last four decades offers important insights when attempting to analyze the economic policies that different governments have adopted, or in understanding their successes or failures. The first price boom started from 1973 and lasted until 1977. It enabled the Shah to accelerate his ambitious economic development. Then a brief oil boom happened in 1990 to 1992, during the first years of Hashemi's first term as president. It helped him to heal the postwar deficiency. The next period of oil price increases took place from 1999 to 2002. This time, Iranian revenue, which doubled within this period, helped President Khatami deal with foreign debt. A third oil boom in 2003-2005 doubled Iranian's oil revenues again while Khatami was leaving office. President Ahmadinejad also enjoyed the last oil boom from 2007 to 2011, which ended with international sanctions being imposed on Iranian oil exports in 2012. Negative

oil shocks (see Amuzegar 2014, Dreger and Rahmani 2014) also adversely affected the economy and created periods of recession from 1979-1980, 1986-1989, 1993-1999, and finally 2011-2014.

Analysts and observers disagree about the effect that postrevolutionary economic policies have had on the reduction of poverty and inequality in Iranian society. Some question whether or not the state-managed economy of the 'structural involution' or the pro-market reforms of the 'Thermidor' period could realize one of the most popular demands of the Revolution: poverty and inequality reduction (see for example Amuzegar 2014, Nomani and Behdad 2006, and Salehi Isfahani 2007). According to Salehi-Isfahani (2009), the 'social policies' that were implemented during the state-centrist economy of the first decade of Islamic Republic, which continued during subsequent governments, as well as growth-favoured economic policies which were established in the reconstruction period and pursued under later presidential terms, both contributed to a reduction in poverty. He argues that, consistent with the global evidence that confirms that growth reduces poverty, the economic policies in postrevolutionary Iran made the poverty rate fall significantly, into the single digits. At the same time, the social policies,

> Improved the lives of the poor by building infrastructure and by providing social protection. After the Revolution, electricity, safe water, health and education services were extended to most rural and poor urban areas. Similar increases had taken place in poorer urban areas. An ambitious health and family planning program, started in 1989, brought basic family health to most rural families. By 2005, about 90% of the rural population was served by rural Health Houses. Schooling was extended to nearly all rural areas raising educational attainment of the rural families. Considerable social protection was also offered through a vast system of subsidies and the labor market (minimum wage legislation and job security legislation). Vast subsidies for food, fuel, and medicine, though poorly targeted, greatly benefited the poor. Semi-public charities

> that had sprang up after the Revolution, most notably Komiteh Emdad Imam Khomeini, provided direct assistance to the very poor (Salehi-Isfahani 2009:17-18)

The UN Human Development Reports acknowledges this claim, indicating that Iran's human development index has increased from 0.44 in 1980 to 0.74 in 2012 (cited in Amuzegar 2014:17). With regard to inequality, however, the Islamic Government has not been so successful. While postrevolutionary income inequality, illustrated by the Gini coefficient, receded to its pre-oil boom of 1970s level, meaning 0.42-0.45, it has stayed stable in its relatively high level, excepting a decline in 2006 when Ahmadinejad's redistribution policies were taking effect (see Salehi-Isfahani 2009, 2016). All in all, the evidence indicates a decline in both poverty and inequality immediately after the Revolution, while the former continued to decline but the latter remained relatively stable in subsequent years. This can be restated thusly: Iran's poor "are better off than before but they are also more similar to each other" (Salehi-Isfahani 2009:25).

The structural changes discussed in this section illuminate the context within which the transformation of classes and the composition of political elites have taken place in Iran. The trends in population growth basically determine the supply of the labor force in society, which in turn affects the extent and the shape of change in the configuration of social classes during corresponding decades, as reflected in censuses. This effect has been referred to as the 'employment effect' (Nomani and Behdad 2006:219), and represents the change in the size of the labor force. The population trends are also central to understanding and predicting the sociopolitical attitude of a society. The Second of Khordad, called as a political reform movement, which came into existence in 1997 is an example of the progressive demands of the youngest generation of Iranians since the Revolution (Bayat 2010:244). The transformation of

the structure of Iran's age distribution has been accompanied by the post-revolution modernization programs, the increase of urbanization, as well as the post-war development of infrastructure, which for instance, broadened access to the Internet, and in turn, facilitated the transfer of knowledge and information. These trends, which paralleled the waves of secularization, have changed the values of Iranians regarding competent political representatives.

In addition, the expansion of education changed society's attitudes towards the priority of merit (*takhassos*) over religious commitment (*ta'ahod*), and in turn, improved the level of public trust toward well-educated politicians and representatives. The universality of public education also helped the enlargement of the professional middle class (Kian-Thiebaut 1998).

The economic policies that were adopted during the decades of post-revolution Iran have defined the economic opportunities for different segments of Iranian society to empower their position as well as to improve their political representation in the political arena. The structural economic changes during the first decade of the Revolution created a pause in the capitalist development of social classes in Iran, but was revived in the second decade of the Islamic Republic. The economic liberalization of the second Republic, as will be further analyzed in chapter 5 under the Study of Class in Iran, helped the enlargement of the capitalist and professional middle class. The size of the working class first decreased as a result of the deproletarianization of the first decade and then slightly increased in the 1990s and 2000s.

In light of the descriptions that were presented in this chapter, this study has several expectations: that the average age of the elected representatives will have increased since the Revolution, that the mean years of education that representatives received will have increased over time, and that the size of certain social segments, particularly the middle class, which have

benefited from and have been enlarged by the development of a service economy since the second decade of the Revolution will have increased within the composition of the elected political elites.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE STRUCTURE OF POWER AFTER THE REVOLUTION

The Structure of Power

Having a thorough understanding of the structure of power in postrevolutionary Iran is necessary to explore the interplay between its social and political systems. There are other reasons that make such an understanding even more indispensable. First, not many scholarly accounts have been written to delineate a picture of the structure of power in postrevolutionary Iran (but see Buchta 2000, Rakel 2008 and 2009); Iran's political structure has usually been misunderstood (Takeyh 2006), as many assume it resembles the single-party or autocratic system of the neighboring regimes. Iran's post-revolution political system is not analogous to despotic autocracies, nor to Western democracies. Rather it has a distinctive character, which thus makes it somewhat difficult for non-Iranian observers to understand its political system. This section underscores some of the main characteristics of the post-revolution political structure. Under the Study of Political Elites section in chapter 5, a more exhaustive analysis of the factionalism within the Iranian political system will be presented.

Discerning the 'two-layer' nature of the power structure in Iran is critical to understanding it. Unlike the ideal-type representative democracy in which control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally and exclusively vested in officials elected by citizens (Dahl 2005:189), and also unlike autocratic political systems in which power is concentrated in the hands of and exerted by one person who is not subject to the popular control, the Islamic Republic has been labeled as a 'hybrid' political system (Amir Arjomand 2009b, Brumberg and Farhi 2016). It sits somewhere between these two models. Scholars have used concepts of dual sovereignty (Curtis and Hooglund 2008), overlapping authorities (Thaler et al. 2010), and bifurcated authority (Maloney 2015) to distinguish two layers of political

authority which I have opted to use the 'directly elected' and 'indirectly elected' organs of the Iranian political structure.

According to the Islamic Republic's Constitution, which was ratified in 1979 and amended in 1989 (2007 [1989]), Iran is a 'republic' rooted in three independent branches: the executive, legislative, and judicial. According to the Constitution, the head of the executive branch (the president); members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, also known as the parliament or Majles; members of the Assembly of Leadership Experts; and the members of City and Village Councils are elected by direct public vote. However, except for the City and Village Council nominees, other candidates are required to pass a vetting process as carried out by the Guardian Council.

The president, as the highest-ranked executive official in the country, is responsible for the implementation of the constitution and exercises executive power (Article 113). Ministers are appointed by the president and presented to the Majles for a vote of confidence (Article 133). As the legislative branch of the state, the Majles consists of 290 representatives, and may enact laws on all matters within the limits of the Constitution (Articles 64 and 71). The Majles is also responsible for appointing six lawyers to the Guardian Council who are suggested to the Majlis by the head of the judiciary. The Assembly of Leadership Experts has 88 members and is in charge of appointing and dismissing the leader of the Islamic Republic (Article 107 and 111). City Councils are responsible for the appointment of mayors and attending to municipal affairs (Article 102). These institutions collectively form the directly elected pillar of the power structure of the Islamic Republic.

As a Shari'ah-driven document, Iran's Constitution has an indirectly elected pillar consisting of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, and the National Security High Council. According to Article 110 of the Islamic Republic Constitution, the Leader is responsible for determining the general policies of the system after consulting with the Expediency Council, for supervising the performance of the system, for decreeing referenda, for holding the supreme command of the armed forces, for resolving disputes and coordinating relations between the three branches of the republic, for signing the order of appointment of the president, for dismissing the president in such case of his/her violation of the constitution, for declaring war or peace, and for appointing, dismissing, or accepting the resignations of several officials[37]. The Guardian Council consists of six jurisconsults and six lawyers who are appointed for a period of six years. The Council's main duties are approving the candidates for electoral posts, supervising elections, and ensuring the conformity of legislation passed by the Majles with the principles of Islam and the Constitution (Articles 91, 92 and 94).

The primary reason for establishing the Guardian Council can be understood by reviewing the detailed discussions that were carried out in the Assembly of Constitution Experts which were held in August 1979. At that time, the Council was named the 'Guardian Council of the Constitution' and was designed to protect the Constitution by both ensuring that future decision-making does not contradict the Constitution, and in doing so preventing the influence of power centers and authorities on the legislative process (Assembly of Constitution Experts

[37] Jurisconsults of the Guardian Council, head of the judiciary, members of the Expediency Council, the head of Broadcasting Corporation, chief commanders of the armed forces, and two representatives of the Leader in the National Security High Council, Friday Prayers, and Leader's representatives in all offices in the country.

1985:944-55). Moreover, according to Article 67 of the Constitution, a member of parliament should be 'righteous'[38], such that s/he can protect the 'sanctity' of Islam, and should safeguard the tenets and achievements of the Islamic Revolution. MPs should furthermore be able to uphold the trust placed in them by the nation, always remain faithful to the independence and dignity of the country, and defend the Constitution (Islamic Republic Constitution 2007 [1989]:24) during their entire professional life as a Majles representative. Accordingly, from the view point of the Guardian Council, which is in charge of supervising elections, allowing individuals to enter the Majles who are not committed to the principles of the Islamic Revolution, are not loyal to the tenets of Islam, and are not righteous would be regarded as in contravention to the Constitution. It has even been argued that the Guardian Council must perform the role of a filter in order to prevent 'impurities' from entering the country's political system (Khamenei 2005). In addition to formal nomination requirements, such as age restrictions, educational requirements, being an Iranian citizen, not being a convicted in an Iranian court, etc., there are substantive qualifications required for parliamentary candidates, such as theoretical and practical observation of Islam, and loyalty to the Constitution of the Constitution and to the principle of the Velayat-e Faghih (Guardianship of the Jurist). During the process of vetting presidential, Majles, and Assembly of Experts candidates, the Guardian Council holds meetings, discusses the competency of the candidates, and then votes on each candidate. Each of the 12 members of the Council have one vote, and a minimum of seven votes (half plus one) is required for a candidate to be confirmed. According to the law, the Guardian Council should explain in writing the reasons upon which the qualification of a

[38] Saaleh

candidate has been denied or rejected (Rezaee Zadeh and Daavari 2016). In the case of presidential elections, the Council decisions are final, except in the exceptional case that the Supreme Leader requests a reexamination of a candidate[39]. In the case of election of MPs for the Majles, candidates who have been deemed 'incompetent' have a right to appeal the Council's decision twice. Therefore, it can be argued, as is discussed in the concluding chapter of this study (see three mechanisms of reproduction) and elsewhere, that the candidate vetting process is not an arbitrary mandate in the hands of the Guardian Council. Instead, it is a medium for safeguarding and reproducing the discourse of the Islamic Revolution discourse, which is the principle resource for governing the state of the Islamic Republic. Moreover, the vetting process is considered a vital means of preventing individuals who do not believe in said discourse from entering into the central core of power of Iran. This line of argumentation often points to similar institutions and processes which are in place to safeguard the constitutions and national covenants in a variety of other political systems, for instance the Constitutional Court of Belgium, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, and the Constitutional Council of France (Fereshtian 2003, Nemati 2013).


As a counter argument, one may argue that, from a political viewpoint, the Guardian Council undermines the principles of free election, as well as the power of the Iranian Majles, for its members are themselves only appointed. Moreover, it is not clear if the seletion process is based on strict standards applied to all Canadidates. For example, when candidates meet all the above-mentioned criteria, it is not obvious how and why some are approved and others

[39] This happened once in the history of the Islamic Republic when Ayatollah Khamenei requested reexamination of two reformist candidate in 2005.

rejected. Accordingly, it could be argued that, as a conseqence of substantial power embeded in the Council, the MPs in the Majles may not represent the population and/or reflect the interests of the people. Nevertheless, while the Guardian Council affects the process of the representation of Iranians in the Majles, the current study prefers to somewhat bracket the role of the Council, and analytically minimalizes its effects, not because the 'political' aspects of the situation are unimportnt, but because overemphasing them prevents us from focusing on other dimensions of representation in Iran. Since there is no imminent prospect of a political system without the Guardian Council, a researcher may not want to deprive him/herself from being involved in the effort to provide a picture of the 'social' aspects of parliamentary representation in post-revolution Iran. In fact, the very nature of MPs socioeconomic or demographic representation can tell us something about the potential bias of the Guardian Council. Eitherway, the findings of this study have been duly informed by the important implications which the existence of the Council has for Iran's political system.

The Expediency Council was created in the 1989 amendment as the advisory and supervisory arm of the supreme leader and is in charge of solving disputes among state organizations (Article 112). The National Security High Council is headed by the president and is meant to safeguard national interests, and protect the principles of the Islamic Revolution, its territorial integrity, and national sovereignty. This council consists of the heads of the three branches, the chief of the armed forces, several ministers, the chief of the Plan and Budget organization, and two representatives nominated by the Leader (Article 176). Figure 6 portrays the constitutional structure of power in postrevolutionary Iran.

Figure 6: The constitutional structure of power in postrevolutionary Iran
Based on the Islamic Republic Constitution ([1989] 2007)



The concept and position of *Vali-e Faghih*, or ruling jurisconsult, is pivotal in the novel constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Under the 'Rule by the Just Faghih,' the 1989 Constitution remarks that "the Constitution will lay the ground for the realization of leadership by the fully qualified Faghih recognized by the people as their leader so that the Faghih may safeguard against any deviations by various organs of state from their true Islamic function" (Islamic Republic Constitution 2007 [1989]:6). However, the first Constitution of the Islamic

Republic, ratified in 1979, required the Leader to be the source of emulation[41]. It was primarily due to the fact that the leadership in the first Constitution of the Islamic Republic's life was designed as a spiritual position that suited the rule of Imam Khomeini. In other words, the garment of *Valayat-e Faghih* in the Constitution was designed to fit his stature. Imam Khomeini had, at the same time, two high authorities: religious authority as the source of emulation and political authority by possessing the position of ruling jurisconsult. His role as founder of the Islamic Republic and his personal and charismatic characteristics brought him the influence of an undisputed leader. Accordingly, Ayatollah Khomeini had more than enough legitimacy, popularity, and confidence, provided by the overwhelming majority of Iranian society, to sit at the supervisory position of the supreme leader. As Weber remarks (1978:1121-25), although charisma may be transferred to a second leader or to an inheriting institution (i.e., depersonalization of the original charisma), the loss of the original charismatic leader will inevitably lead to a 'waning' of the pure form of charisma via the process of the 'routinization' of authority. Through this process, charismatic authority is transformed into other types of authority: traditional, or else rational-legal authority. The designation of a successor, for Weber, is necessary not only for the continuity of domination, but also for ensuring the cohesion of the charismatic community. In this particular situation, the charismatic authority of Ayatollah Khomeini transferred to the institution of *Velayat-e Faghih*.

In April 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini had suggested the formation of the council for the revision of the Constitution to decide on several issues, most importantly, eliminating the

[41] Marj'a-e Taghlid, in the Shi'i tradition is a high-ranked clergy whose ability in Ejtehaad and the interpretation of the Islamic law is approved. Shi'as are required to choose and emulate a Marj'a-e Taghlid.

condition of the source of emulation from the Leadership requirements and making it sufficient to be a *Faghih*. The day after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini on June 3, 1989, the Assembly of Leadership Experts convened an emergency meeting to select the next Leader. The Assembly selected Ayatollah Khamenei as the new Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. While it was seen as one of the most smoothest successions in the history of the world's revolutions (Amir Arjomand 2009b), it marked a crucial shift in the life of the Islamic Republic in terms of the structure of the political system. This succession coincided with a series of constitutional changes, which were reflected in the Constitution's revisions and constitutional amendments, and were ratified by a referendum in July 1989, less than two months after Ayatollah Khomeini's death. Thus, the post-Khomeini era is highlighted by a transition to a more conciliar system. The 1989 amendment endorsed the role of the Guardian Council, which was originally established to supervise presidential and Majles elections; strengthened the position of the Assembly of Leadership Experts, which was originally in charge of selecting the Supreme Leader; and established the Expediency Council, as an advisory body for the Leader. This is the line that differentiated what has been labeled the 'second republic' (Ehteshami 2002), which follows the 'first republic' of Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini.

The two-layer nature of the structure of power in Iran, however, is not the only cause of misunderstandings of the political system of postrevolutionary Iran. The second dimension of complexity of the Iranian political system emanates from something that is described as "discrepancies between announced principles and daily practices of the constitution" (Tilly 2007:7). This discrepancy is conceptualized in a distinction between 'formal' and 'informal' power structures. The former is referred to as the structure of power that is determined in the

Constitution; the latter refers to the practical exercise of power in Iran. To simplify the structure of informal power, some observers portray 'concentric rings' of power. Buchta (2000:7-10), for instance, differentiates four rings that increase in size from inner to the outer circles. The central ring is composed of the most influential figures who represent the most powerful decision-making body of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The second ring is composed of high-ranking executive, legislative, and judicial officials, and provincial governors and administrators. The third ring includes those officials who control various revolutionary entities and organizations. The fourth and final ring consists of individuals who have had an important role in the power structure in the past but have been marginalized after their retirement.

In Rakel's (2008, 2009) analysis, the four concentric rings of power have been categorized into three concentric circles of informal power, each of which has a different degree of political influence. The 'inner-circle elite' includes the most powerful members of the political elite from three state branches, as well as members of the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Leadership Experts, the Expediency Council, heads of religious foundations and representatives of the Leader. The second circle, entitled the 'administrative elite,' is composed of secondary administrations from the state branches, mayors of important cities, and technocrats. Rakel recognizes a third circle of a 'discourse elite' that includes journalists, writers, and leaders of NGOs who influence the atmosphere of the political discourses in Iran. Amir Arjomand (2009a:117), alternately, distinguishes two strata: the narrower 'ruling' stratum, and a much broader 'second' stratum. He contrasts a predominantly clerical composition of the ruling stratum with the more or less layered feature of the administrative cadre of the revolutionary and developmental administration of the second stratum.

These complex dimensions of the complexity of the postrevolutionary structure of power in Iran, namely its two-layer nature and its *de facto* and *de jure* discrepancy, have made applying a conventional label to the Iranian style of governing controversial. While labels like theocratic republic, Islamic theocracy, and democratic centralism have been widely used in the media (for example see Frontline 2002), the terminology that the native political elites use, namely religious democracy seems to be more befitting. It captures both the layers of popular participation in electing critical state organizations, as well as the supervisory characteristic of the ruling jurisconsult, which is driven by a theory of Islamic government. To summarize, Rajaee as formulated the matter (2007:225), the Islamic Republic is characterized by two branches of government (the presidency and the Majles) that represent the 'republican' apparatus of the state, and the office of Leader, the Guardian Council, and the Assembly of Experts which represent the 'Islamic' apparatus for the sake of guaranteeing that no measures are taken outside the Islamic framework.

Human Rights Issues

The Iranian government is blamed by human rights' critics for pursuing what has been called the politics of 'monolingualism, and 'monoculturalism' (Asgharzadeh 2007). The critics argue that the post-revolution political system has systematically excluded and marginalized certain ethnic and religious minority groups from their basic rights. It is further proclaimed that the policies of exclusion are not only implemented through the coercive forces of the government, such as by repressing and silencing the activists who advocate for the rights of marginalized groups, but also through the use of the education system to enforce assimilatory policies which attempt to alienate minority cultures (Asgharzadeh 2007:200). According to

these debates, “controlling people's dress codes, stopping mixed-sex swimming, not allowing women to attend soccer matches, censoring music, banning card games” (Bradley 2007:2-3, for a list of suppression of civil rights also see Kashefi 2008:86-87) are said to be examples of the implementation of repressive policies in post-revolution Iran.

Human Rights Watch blames the hardline faction, which has a superior position, according to HRW claims, in the hybrid political system of Iran, for cracking down on Iranian citizens for no more than the legitimate exercise of their rights: particularly freedom of speech and free aggregation (Human Rights Watch 2017a). According to human rights claims, the main areas of human rights violations consist in the high number of death penalties; limitations in providing fair trials, particularly for individuals charged with national security crimes; restrictions on free speech and dissent especially in the case of student and women’s rights activists, human rights defenders and political activists, civil society actors, journalists, bloggers, and online media activists exercising their right to freedom of expression; the blockage of hundreds of websites, including social media platforms; the disqualification of liberal and reformist election candidates by the Guardian Council; arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, discrimination against women in cases of divorce, inheritance, and child custody (Amnesty International 2016, Human Rights Watch 2017b:334-39, UN Human Rights Council 2016, US Human Rights Report 2015).

A counter argument challenges the above-mentioned claims by stating that the international accusation of the Iranian government’s human rights violations is used as a political measure aimed at isolating Iran within the international community. These lines of reasoning argue that Western powers in the international community are manipulating and

using appeals to human rights for political gains (Zarif 2016). While accepting that there are deficiencies regarding human rights in Iran which need to be addressed solely by Iranians, this body of argument criticizes selectivity and double standards, as for example in comparison with the violation of human rights in the occupied territories by the Zionist regime, or by Saudi regime in Saudi Arabia and in Iran. Other observers and scholars point to the efforts of religious intellectuals who have begun challenging the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam as a sign of progress in the disposition towards human rights within Iran (for example see Mir-Hosseini and Tapper 2006; for a discussion of this challenge on the gender equality also see Moallem 2005:chapter 5). Another group of scholars notes the role of civil society, albeit restricted, in the efforts to improve human rights improvements: "Iranian civil society is sustained by students, teachers, lawyers, writers, artists, journalists, and a host of other civically minded, democracy-seeking activists" (Azimi 2008:448-49). Others emphasize the republican apparatuses of the Islamic Republic and reason that Iran is doing better than its neighbours in the region (see Baktiari 1996). Observers argue that with regards to elections, for example, while Iran has held regular elections (an average of one election a year) since the Islamic Revolution, elections are non-existed or very limited in the Persian Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar. In the case of Saudi Arabia for example, as an absolute monarchy, the king of the country is at the same time the head of government, in which the members of the ruling family prevail, and a situation in which the members of the Saudi Parliament are appointed by royal decree. While the Iranian women have had suffrage since 1963, Saudi women had been excluded from elections until 2015 (PressTV 2017).

To summarize, the notion of 'hybridity' of the political system of the Islamic Republic has important implications for this study. It should be noted that, in the final analysis, it is the 'Islamic apparatus' that has the power to decide what an approved framework is. According to Article 98 of the Islamic Republic Constitution ([1989] 2007:30), the interpretation of the constitution is the responsibility of the Guardian Council. According to the law, the interpretations are to be approved by a three-fourths majority of the Council members. As discussed earlier, the Guardian Council has the right to vet candidates and reject their competency before the Iranian people can decide who they wish to vote for. Thus, any analysis of the composition of the Iranian Member of Parliament should take the notion of hybridity into account. The hybridity of the Iranian political system emphasizes that when there is a block of power which is elected by the vote of the people, at the same time, there are indirectly elected and non-elected pillars of power which have strong voices in Iranian politics (Abootalebi 2009). This chapter aimed to highlight the nature of the structure of power in Iran in order to inform our analysis of the exact meaning of representation in the country. Therefore, if this study finds support for either Marxist or liberal-pluralist explanations, it must be qualified by the fact that Majles representatives in Iran are only members of one pillar of power and do not necessarily have the final word in policy-making. This is also true with regards to other aspects of representation related to gender, religion, education, place of birth, ethnicity, etc. All in all, the socio-economic and demographic representation of the Iranian people by members of Majles should be reflected on from within the context of hybridity in Iranian politics.

CHAPTER FIVE: CLASS AND POLITICS IN AN IRANIAN SETTING

The Study of Class in Iran

Despite the importance of having an updated and detailed understanding of the configuration of a society's classes for any social analysis, there have been very few works on the postrevolutionary class structure of Iran (for example see Behdad and Nomani 2009, Nomani and Behdad 2006). Based upon a review of the literature, this section will provide a picture of social class in postrevolutionary Iran.

The economic modernization plans inaugurated at the outset of the twentieth century in Iran, which was accompanied by the educational development and an increase in the population, due to Pahlavi's investment in human development projects, brought about widespread industrialization, specialization, and a modern division of labor. This process dramatically accelerated the changes in the morphology of the class structure of Iranian society, which had otherwise remained relatively intact for several decades. The Islamic Revolution was the second turning point in the class structure of Iran, when it transformed the configuration of Iran's social system. The Islamic Revolution not only changed the direction of the country's socio-cultural and economic development, but changed the structure of political supremacy and subordination.

One important factor which contributed to the reshuffling of the class structure in the wake of the Islamic Revolution, was the disruption of the Shah's capitalist economic modernization policies for a period of one decade, a period which has been labeled as the 'structural involution' (Nomani and Behdad 2006). This disruption accompanied the reordering of the old relations of production and rapid dislocation (e.g., migration). This was also accompanied by the call for 'redistribution of wealth' policies, which were then implemented

by the Islamic state in the first decade after the Revolution. These policies disrupted property rights and the accumulation of economic capital in that first decade after the Revolution, in favour of 'disenfranchised' groups and were furthermore directed against capitalists, landowners, and even merchants, Bazaaris and conservative Ulama. This period has also been named the 'social revolutionary phase' (Moaddel 1991) to address the rebellion of the working and peasant classes against the upper classes, who were empowered by the support of top revolutionary figures, particularly Ayatollah Khomeini himself, the council of the Revolution, and later prime minister Mousavi during his two cabinet terms (1981-89), under Ayatollah Khamenei's Presidency. Although the 'reversal phase' of the Hashemi government undid what had been done in the revolutionary phase, nevertheless, the ratification of postrevolutionary land reforms, the nationalization of foreign trade, industries and banks, labor law reforms, etc., had an effect on class structure in the first decade of the Islamic Republic (Nomani and Behdad 2006). Partial fulfillment of such policies earned the working class an improvement in control of production processes through labor councils, a reduction of working hours and increases in income. It also earned peasants a reversion to smaller scale private economic ventures in rural areas, seizure of larger and more fertile lands, the nationalized forests, and the right to refuse to pay payments. Succinctly put, it increased the peasantization[44] of agriculture (see Moaddel 1991 and Nomani and Behdad 2006). Consequently, these three structural changes together disrupted the capitalist-like class formation that was initiated by Pahlavi's modernization.

If during the 'first Republic,' which had put the clerical elites on the top of the social hierarchy, the lower classes were encouraged to move up, or rather, the possibility of their

[44] Returning of peasants who had immigrated to cities to their villages

upward mobility was facilitated, then the 'second Republic' favoured state employees and functionaries, petty bourgeoisie and Bazaaris, and a second generation of clerics and Bazaaris who had family connections within the established politico-economic power (Amir Arjomand 2009a). The Islamic Republic also performed an essential favour to the national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeois class by controlling and tightening the presence of transnational corporations within the Iranian economy, otherwise they would have been seriously endangered.

In its categorization of the 'employment status' of the employed population, the Statistical Center of Iran breaks the population into five major categories: employers, self-employed, private sector employees, public sector employees, and unpaid family workers (see Table 4). This provides a general picture of the employment categories of the economically active population and the trends in the size of each category in contemporary Iran.

The employer class had been rising slightly ever since the beginning of Mohammad Reza Shah's modernization of the 1960s, but recently, according to the 2011 census, the employer class has experienced a decrease. The size of the employer class increased between the 1976 and 1986 censuses, when the capitalist development plan of the Shah had started taking effect. It remained almost intact during the revolutionary period, between 1986 and 1991, and then increased from 3% to 7.5% until 2006 when the liberalization policies of Hashemi and Khatami had taken effect. With regard to this increase in the portion of upper class (employers), it should however be noted that due to lack of data regarding the size of the enterprises, it is always possible that the number of employers as being over-counted, for example by self-employed persons being mis-categorized in censuses as employers. It should also be noted that recent research shows that a significant proportion of the post-revolution Iranian capitalist class

are involved in financial business and speculation, rather than in productive economic activities (Asr-e Iran 2010). This section of Iranian capitalist class, has often had the Iranian government's support and enjoyed a secured margin in their economic activities (Idjadi 2014).

However, in the subsequent five years (2006 to 2011), the size of the capitalist class decreased again to 3.7% of the total active population. This can be partly explained by Ahmadinejad's assertion that the oil money must be brought back to people's tables, which translated into his administration's redistribution and inequality reduction policies, such as the Subsidies Targeting Act and the distribution of Justice Stocks. Implementation of these nation-wide policies resulted in the size of the government, partly measured by government's investment and expenditure, to increase at the expense of the size of private entrepreneurs. Although some privatization programs were enforced during Ahmadinejad's period, the state shares were largely purchased by semi-state institutions and foundations, such as the Revolutionary Guard and *bonyads* (see Habibi 2013). The shrinking of the number of employers might also reflect Ahmadinejad's ambitious domestic and foreign policies, which led to political anxiety, economic insecurity, and financial irregularities, as well as the implementation of crippling international sanctions against the Iranian economy, and in turn, made capitalists apprehensive about investing money in Iran.

Alternately, the self-employed (bazaar) class showed a 10% increase from 1960s to end of the first decade of the Revolution and then experienced a slight decline before plateauing. This class category constituted about 42% of the economically active population in 1991. Private sector wage and salary earners saw a reduction from 1976 to 1986, but increased by 9 percent in subsequent decades. This was consistent with the privatization wave of 1990s. In

contrast, the public sector wage and salary earners grew by 12 percent up to 1991 but decreased afterwards (see table 4). As will be elaborated upon in the following pages, when Nomani and Behdad's class model is introduced, it shows that the size of the middle and working classes changed, due mainly to the economic policies implemented after the Revolution. It is important to remind that the Iran-Iraq war encouraged interventionist policies during the first decade of the Islamic Republic, which is reflected in the increase in the number of public sector employees up to 1991 (also see the discussion under the political economy of the first decade of the Islamic Republic in chapter 3).


Table 4: Active Population by Occupational Categories (1000 persons)

Year	Occupational Categories						Employed Population
	Employers (bourgeoisie)	Self-employed (petty bourgeoisie)	Private sector wage and salary earners	Public sector wage and salary earners	Unpaid family workers	Not stated	
1976	182	2810	3072	1673	1021	41	8799
(%)	(2.1)	(31.9)	(35.0)	(19.0)	(11.6)	(0.4)	(100)
1986	341	4390	1875	3453	484	458	11002
(%)	(3.1)	(39.9)	(17.0)	(31.4)	(4.4)	(4.2)	(100)
1991	396	5453	2348	4346	337	217	13097
(%)	(3.0)	(41.6)	(18.0)	(33.2)	(2.6)	(1.6)	(100)
1996	528	5199	3270	4258	797	463	14572
(%)	(3.6)	(35.7)	(22.5)	(29.5)	(5.5)	(3.2)	(100)
2006	1530	7366	5485	5025	683	387	20476
(%)	(7.5)	(35.9)	(27.0)	(24.5)	(3.3)	(1.8)	(100)
2011	769	7333	6292	4323	861	968	20547
(%)	(3.7)	(35.8)	(30.6)	(21.0)	(4.2)	(4.7)	(100)

Source: Statistical Center of Iran: Manpower (2013a)

Overall, as figure 7 illustrates, the effect of the state modernization plans of the Shah (i.e., an increase in the number of public sector wage earners), and economic liberalization and privatization of the post-revolution (i.e., an increase in the number of private sector wage earners) are seen to be reflected in the configuration of the employment statuses. During this period, the employer and self-employed classes have experienced a relative overall increase, though with some fluctuations.

Figure 7: Active Population by Occupational Categories
Source: Statistical Center of Iran: Manpower (2013a)



Nomani and Behdad's (2006, and also Behdad and Nomani 2009) work on the quantitative composition of the postrevolutionary social classes in Iran is one of the few, if not the only, investigation in this area. Their analysis is based on the four decennial censuses conducted - Iran's National Census of Population and Housing (1976, 1986, 1996, 2006). They

differentiated two processes of economic involution and deinvolution, which were carried out in the postrevolutionary period. It has been argued that economic policies were implemented specifically during the longer period of the deinvolution which created new 'politico-socioeconomic opportunities' for some and limited these opportunities for others. This is a critical point because it highlights that the economic policies affected the structure of social classes. As Behdad and Nomani put it, under such policies:

> These changes affect the distribution of employment, as well as the pattern of employment status and occupational positions. In 'normal' circumstances, these changes are generally effected in a long-run trend in response to technological, demographic, or socioeconomic changes. In the transitional process in the postrevolutionary conditions, changes in the occupational pattern of the workforce are abrupt and unstable (Behdad and Nomani 2009:85-86).

Behdad and Nomani (2006) investigated the sources of expansion or contraction of class locations of the Iranian workforce caused by involutionary and de-involutionary processes in the postrevolutionary decades. It is hypothesized by Behdad and Nomani (2006) that the 'structural involution' period (1981-1989) brought about the deproletarianization of the urban economy, the peasantization of agriculture, and a significant increase in small-scale service activities. This trend is reversed during the 'de-involutionary period,' which is marked by economic liberalization and is hypothesized to have led to the proletarianization of the workforce and the de-peasantization of the rural economy.

In their analysis, five neo-Marxian class categories and one author-created category are identified based on the ownership of property, authority, and skill dimensions. These include capitalist, petty bourgeoisie, unpaid family workers, middle class, political functionaries, and

working class. As Nomani and Behdad (2006:6-7) write, their suggested class model is inspired by Erick Wright's, and is based on three dimensions of ownership, organizational authority, and possession of skills and credentials in economic activities. Inspired by Wright's conceptualization of state employment, Nomani and Behdad (2006:23-24) argue that the state has two apparatuses: the political state and decommodified state services (or social services). Nomani and Behdad (2006:24-25) argue that the social services apparatus of the state is engaged in production of decommodified (non-market) services, such as public education, public health, and public recreation. They add that in Iran, the state also is engaged in the production of a long list of goods and products, which constitute the 'economic activities' of the state in Iran (a possible third apparatus of the state). However, the only state employees that are categorized as the 'political functionaries of the state' are employees of the political apparatus of the state: "executive and administrative, legislative, and judiciary branches of the government. It also includes the coercive arms of the government- the police, military, and paramilitary group" (2006:24-25). They continue to say that although high-level professional managers and military personnel, and administrators are in many ways similar in their characteristics to the middle class, they are not classified as middle class. Likewise, "those who work at the lower ranks of the political apparatus of the state, but have little autonomy or expertise, constitute the rank and file of political functionaries" (Behdad and Nomani 2009:87), and while they in many respects are close to the working class, they are not as a group included in the working class category (Nomani and Behdad 2006:23). The employees of other two apparatuses of the state, however, are grouped in the same manner as employees in the private sector.

Nomani and Behdad try to justify this separation by saying that in oil-exporting countries, the state is in a peculiar position that enables it to enjoy a monopoly over valuable resources, and such a state "has a giant administration and bureaucracy, large military and paramilitary forces" (Nomani and Behdad 2006:22). It is also discussed that political functionaries are in an ambiguous class location because they are just instruments in the hands of the government and that they don't have a definite role in the relations of production, thus their separation from the middle and working classes is justifiable (Behdad 2010:5). However, the extent to which a political functionary class appropriates surplus value, or oppresses the working class is not clarified in their formulation. Moreover, since the political functionary class seems to include members who otherwise could be categorized in both middle and working classes, the consistency in which social classes are defined or operationalized in their study is questionable.

In their class model, the capitalist and petty bourgeois classes are divided into two categories: modern and traditional[45]. Alternately, the middle class and working class are broken into private sector[46] and state employees, while political functionaries are divided into administrative and managerial, professional/technical, rank and file, and military and paramilitary forces. What distinguishes the middle class from other classes, according to Nomani and Behdad's operationalization, is the skills or credentials that they have, as well as the relative degree of authority that they enjoy in their work. On the other hand, those who "neither own property, nor have skills, credentials, or organizational assets, and have little

[45] The peasant farmers have been categorized under traditional petty bourgeoisie.
[46] Agriculture workers have been categorized under private sector working class.

autonomy in their work process" are located in the working class (Nomani and Behdad 2006:18).

Behdad and Nomani also present a class composition of the employed worked force of Iran from 1976 to 2006. They selected the census of 1986 to be representative of the involutionary period and three censuses of 1976, following the capitalist development under Shah, 1996, and 2006 to be indicative of the period of deinvolution. A 'decomposing technique' has been applied to control the employment effect, which is the effect of the natural increase in the number of those in employment from one census to another.

They found that the working class, which at just over 40% comprised the largest class of the employed workforce in 1976, substantially decreased to 24.6% during the involution phase (1976-1986), mainly as a result of the deproletarianization of the urban economy. The petty bourgeoisie increased from 31.9% in 1976 to 39.9% in 1986, thus becoming the largest class category. This represents the expansion of the petty commodity economic activities. There was also a sharp increase in the absolute and relative size of the political functionaries, which suggests that the enlargement of the political apparatus of the state absorbed the middle classes, and that the disruption in capitalist production dismantled a large segment of the working class during the involution process. Many of the latter were attracted by newly established revolutionary military organs such as *komiteh*, *basij* and the Revolutionary Guard, or joined the volunteers fighting in the Iran-Iraq war, while others were absorbed into petty commodity production.

During the deinvolution period (1986-2006), the size of the capitalist, middle, and working classes increased vigorously. However, while the increase in the size of the capitalist

and middle classes continued after 1996, the share of the working class remained at 30% during the period spanning 1996 to 2006. During this period, the petty bourgeoisie first declined (1986-1996), but then increased slightly (1996-2006) and stayed at 30% of the employed workforce. This class category, however, would equal 40% if unpaid family workers were included in its count. The political functionaries, as a group, experienced a steady decline, which is seen as a result of 'demobilization of the military forces' after the war. The composition of class structure in Iran as of 2006 breaks down as follows: 40% are petty bourgeoisie (including unpaid family workers), 30% are working class, 7.5% are capitalist, 12% are middle class, and 9% are political functionaries (see table 5).

Table 5: Class Distribution of Iranian Society


	1976		1986		1996		2006	
	Total 1000	%	Total 1000	%	Total 1000	%	Total 1000	%
Capitalist class	182	2.1	341	3.1	528	3.6	1530	7.5
Middle class	477	5.4	774	7.0	1,493	10.2	2,514	12.3
Petty bourgeoisie	2,810	31.9	4,390	39.9	5,199	35.7	7,366	36.0
Working class	3,535	40.2	2,702	24.6	4,474	30.7	6,215	30.4
Political functionaries	732	8.3	1,851	16.8	1,618	11.1	1,780	8.7
Unpaid family workers	1,021	11.6	484	4.4	797	5.5	683	3.3

Unspecified	41	0.5	458	4.2	463	3.2	387	1.9
Total	**8,799**	**100**	**11,002**	**100**	**14,572**	**100**	**20,476**	**100**

Source: Nomani and Behdad (2006:218), Behdad and Nomani (2009: 91)

Figure 8 illustrates changes in the five major social classes of Iran from 1976 to 2006, which is drawn from Nomani and Behdad's work. The only classes that experienced an increase were the upper and middle classes, which have been growing at the expense of other classes over 35 years.

Figure 8: Class Distribution of the Iranian Society
Source: Nomani and Behdad (2006:218), Behdad and Nomani (2009:91)



Behdad and Nomani (2009:96) conclude that "the class structure of the workforce in 2006, in sheer contrast to that in 1986, depicts a change toward resembling that of the prerevolutionary class structure." This conclusion has been challenged by those who argue that

the 1979 Revolution 'did matter,' or those who criticize the author's failure in assessing the impact of Iran-Iraq War, or the rentier economy on class relations (see for example Moaddel 2007, and Salehi Isfahani 2007).

Such study of class in Iran suggests that social classes have been affected by the interventionist or liberalist economic policies that have been implemented since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Research shows that economic privatization, liberalization, and the development of a service economy have helped the capitalist and middle classes to enlarge. The primary decline in the working class during the first decade of the Revolution and its subsequent increase has also been discussed. In the next section, an analysis of the disposition of political elites in postrevolutionary Iran will be presented. That analysis is grounded in the context of the postrevolutionary political economy, the structure of political power, and the class apparatuses that have been discussed in earlier sections and chapters.

The Study of Political Elites in Iran

The next step in the study of the relations between Iranian social classes and politics is conceptualizing the political elite, and more generally, the study of elites. The following section briefly reviews the classic theory of elites in a general manner, and then provides an exhaustive account of the Iranian political elite. It is argued that in the context of developing countries, and a political condition of opposition between modern and tradition forces into account, the importance of leaders and political elites is even more enhanced (Bottomore 1993).

An elite is defined as a select group of citizens who control large amounts of power or are situated at the top of society (Vergara 2013). A political elite, specifically, is "persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements,

are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially" (Higley 2009:3). Elite studies emphasize the role and importance of political elites in accordance with the nature and pace of social change in different social settings. According to the literature, the elite strata, in the most general sense, shares two main attributes: they do their best to preserve their privileged position, and they would like to make themselves distinct from the rest of the society by different means (Bourdieu 1984, Daloz 2010).

The study of elites in the modern era began with Mosca (1939), Michels (1959), and Pareto (1968). They, of course, remained highly indebted to earlier generations of modern political philosophy thinkers, such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau (Butterworth 1980:12), and at the same time tried to offer an alternative version of elite theory to the mainstream 'radical' Marxist approach (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2007:820). For Pareto, the stratification of a system is represented in the number of 'social pyramids' in which a few talented people, based on their higher abilities, characteristics, and qualities, sit on the vertex of, while the wide base of each pyramid is composed of lower level people. Consequently, Pareto recognizes the existence of several groups of elites in society, however, there will be a considerable overlap between the pyramids of social and political power (Kolegar 1967:355-56). For Pareto, the characteristics of a market-based economy, which arose out of liberal ideology, ensure maximum social mobility as well as normal circulation of elites, during which the 'economically fittest,' or those who are best fitted, sit as the 'governing elite.' In addition to their superior intelligence and education, elites, in Pareto's thesis, are superior in possessing two out of six classes of residues (qualities) as specific and immutable traits. Class I represents the instinct for combination, which is responsible for innovations, ingenuity, and intelligence;

and class II represents the persistence of aggregates, which drives loyalty and stable orientations in both economic life and in systems of values, beliefs, habits, and customs (Hartmann 2007:13-14). The distinction is between those who possess these traits and those who don't, which in turn, separates elites from non-elites in Pareto's theory. The natural process of elite circulation takes place gradually via the slow infiltration into the corridors of power of the governing elite's adversaries. However, if the normal processes are blocked by barriers that limit the ability of 'new blood' to replace the elite in power, then the risk of revolution and social crisis increases and reaches the point where the old ruling elite is abruptly replaced be a new one (Hartmann 2007:20). Pareto, thus, sees the history as the 'graveyard of aristocracies.'

In his *The Ruling Class*, Mosca divides human society into two classes: a ruling or elite class, and the masses or the ruled or governed class. The root of such a distinction for Mosca is the permanent attempt of human kind to attain superiority over others (Barkley 1955). One of the main assumptions of Mosca's elite theory is that the elite class does its best to maintain its power and supremacy. On the basis of this assumption, Mosca rejects Rousseau's concept of 'popular sovereignty,' which assumes that the ruling class chooses the way to best serve the public interests (Butterworth 1980:44-45). Mosca also introduced a second 'stratum' into the hierarchy of political elites, which is defined as those who live below the highest level of the ruling class. For Mosca, as for Pareto, revolutions are a point in which a new political class emerges.

Mills (1973 [1956]) belongs to the following generation of theorists who extended the theory of elites to the post-war circumstance. For Mills, the power elites of the United States

who sit in top positions in major social institutions - including military, government, and business - are a socially homogeneous group from upper social strata who share common interests and values (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2007:822). In Mills formulation, elite recruitment is not merely based on expert qualification (Mills 1973 [1956]:240), rather, most of the power elites in the three aforementioned sectors come from the upper echelons, whose life style, professional career, and personal contacts make them alike (Hartmann 2007:42). Mills (1973 [1956]:241) writes "neither professional party politicians, nor professional bureaucrats are now at the executive centers of decision. Those centers are occupied by the political directorate of the power elite." Mills theory can be considered to be in-line with class-centred theories of power that, as previously argued, hypothesize that particular groups enjoy a monopoly over power. Critics (for example see Domhoff 1990), however, argue that this theory is limited to US society and has little analytical utility in other social settings.

The study of modern political elites in Iran was initiated by Zahra Shaji'ee (1965, 1983), James Bill (1963, 1972), and Marvin Zonis (1971). As the first Persian researcher in the field of the contemporary political elites, Shaji'ee tried to investigate the social origins of Iranian presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, and Majles deputies following the Constitutional Revolution up to the Islamic Republic. She recorded a bibliography of elites, and tried to provide a picture of the prerevolutionary Iranian political community. Although it is a descriptive work, Shaji'ee's study is one of the first and most valuable sources of the study of political elites in the social system of pre-revolution Iran.

Zonis (1971), likewise, studied the correlation between personal, or what he calls 'psycho-cultural,' and socioeconomic factors of Iranian political elites and their attitudes and

behaviors in prerevolutionary Iran. Zonis defines political elites simply as those members of Iranian society "who exercised and possessed political power to a greater degree than other members" of society (Zonis 1971:6). According to his method of elite selection under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's reign, Zonis first identified the holders of formal positions within the government, as well as members and officeholders of political parties and interest groups. Then he sought the occupants of key social, economic, and civil roles. Accordingly, a list of 'general elites,' classified according to 30 categories and including three-thousand names, was constructed. As a second stage, the list was ranked by a panel of 10 knowledgeable rankers to attribute 'various levels of political power' to the peoples in the list and then a cut-off point of 10% consistent with three hundred high-ranked elites, was defined (Zonis 1971:345-52). To discover their social background, 167 members of the political elite were interviewed and the biographical information of the remaining 140 persons was collected where applicable. This data included variables such as birth place and residence, religion, elite parents or offspring, education, knowledge of a foreign language, the frequency of foreign travels, and their previous and present occupations.

In terms of the elites' attitudes and orientations, Zonis found signs of feeling personal and occupational 'insecurity,' especially among old and high status Iranian elites, which has underlined their political behavior. He (1971:241) points out that "the very security that members of the elite seek in multiple association memberships and occupational positions contributes to their felt insecurity". Zonis also addressed attitudinal characteristics of cynicism, mistrust, selfishness, and xenophobia towards foreign governments among political elites. He emphasized the significance of education in the elite circulation process in Iran which opened

the way for young elites to gain high-ranking positions and compete with their older counterparts, who were from a higher social status but received the same levels of education. Zonis named these younger groups the 'up-and-coming members of elites' (Zonis 1971:266). All told, as Harik (1980:59) asserts, the most salient contribution of Zonis to the study of elites has been identifying a direct relationship between the socialization experiences of elites, which itself is a class-based process, and their political attitudes.

As discussed, the Islamic Revolution shifted and reconfigured the structure of power attainment in Iran. One of the most significant contributors to this reconfiguration was the Islamic Republic's ideological pledge to expel the '*Taghouti*'[47] from power and to abolish it in order to help the 'dispossessed' groups govern. This ideology dramatically helped to shift the composition of political elites after the Revolution. While the pre-revolution generation of elites was overwhelmingly secular, more or less aged, usually came from higher and often feudal socio-economic backgrounds, and often had substantial connections with the monarchical regime (Ashraf and Banuazizi 2007), the post-revolution group of elites were primarily young, comparatively less educated, and often came from lower or middle socioeconomic backgrounds. It was immediately after the transition of power to the revolutionary elites by the Islamic Revolution, that the process of state reconstitution started. Throughout this process, new groups and classes, usually in the form of political parties, began to seize a share of power and gradually formed the new generation of political elites in Iran.

[47] A segment of the upper class whose advantageous position was not believed to be possessed as a result of its competences but due to its unjust access to the power centers and its loyalty to Shah in the monarchical regime.

In what follows, previous investigations into the link between social classes and the structure of the political elites will be reviewed. As a first step, it is critical to look at the literature on postrevolutionary political elites.

To have a solid picture of the configuration of political elites in postrevolutionary Iran, the role of the Revolution itself is the first thing that should be considered. It has been argued that revolutions, in general, by freeing social restraints, accelerate the pace of and facilitate social change. As Amir Arjomand (2009a) argues, in the postrevolutionary condition, which was accompanied by the growth of urbanization and expansion of education, social mobility became easier. This led to the opening and broadening of the social base of the political community[48], which in turn paved the way for new elite groups to come to power. This is what Brym (1985) deems the 'significant redistribution of power,' or what has been termed the 'circulation of power' by classic elite theorists.

The significance of the postrevolutionary political opening is further highlighted when one considers the almost non-circulative political system under the Shah. When the Shah stood at the centre of power and the decision making process, the cadre of power elites in the Pahlavi regime was confined to the Shah and royal family patronage, a group of military officers, and a limited number of loyal Ulama, high-ranked bureaucrats, and large landlords. The Shah himself appointed the commanders of the military forces, as well as prime ministers (see Rakel 2009). Moreover, the members of the cabinet and parliament were all subject to his approval (Rakel 2009:107). As Abrahamian (1982) suggests, the one-party regime officially began in 1975 by the

[48] adopting John Locke's thesis

establishment of *Rastakhiz* Party, which further limited the possibility of the circulation of elites in an underdeveloped political system.

When the 'broadening of the political community' (Amir Arjomand 2009b) and decentralization of power became feasible because of the Revolution, a plurality of political forces and elites were witnessed in the early months of the Revolution. Simply put, the postrevolutionary power claimants clearly reflected the revolutionary forces that had actively participated in the overthrown of the Shah. Asides from a common antagonism to the Shah, they also accepted Imam Khomeini as the leader of the Islamic Revolution. However, as time went on, a process of 'fragmentation' of the resistance forces (Foran 1993:397) occurred and several groups were eliminated from power, and the state remained in the control of a more homogeneous group of elites. This elimination of the opposing political forces and the consequent centralization of power occurred at different points of time and corresponded with different sociopolitical circumstances.

Diverse periodizations of the postrevolutionary stages have been presented by scholars. For instance, Moaddel (1991, 1993) used the 'revolutionary and reversal phases' to differentiate two forms of the postrevolutionary class conflicts. Rajaee (1999, 2007) distinguishes the 'politics of revolution and Islamism' from the 'politics of restoration' in order to underline different generational reactions to identity tensions in the country. Ehteshami (2002) and Amir Arjomand (2009a) adopted 'first and second republics' and 'revolutionary and Thermidor decades' respectively to emphasize the different constitutional and political dispositions that were adopted in the pre- and post-Khomeini eras. Also, basing themselves upon the political economy dimension, Behdad and Nomani (2009, Nomani and Behdad 2006)

introduced ‘structural involution and deinvolution’ to address the openness of the economic policies towards a capitalist mode of production. These periodizations could be linked to the issue of the exclusion of political groups: a first stage of excluding all secular and less-religious groups occurred and lasted up until the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, and a second stage of ‘factional rivalries,’ to use Rakel’s (2008, 2009) term, began in the 1990s and continued onwards.

In the first stage, the first groups from the new political elite to be excluded from power were liberals. This started with the resignation of the Bazargan’s provisional government in November 1979. The second round of political tightening began after the dismissal of Bani-Sadr, the first president of the Islamic Republic, in June 1981. This round led to the defeat of the Mojahedin and other military opponents to the Islamic republic and continued with the banning of the Tudeh party and other non-religious leftist elements in 1983. This process of political cleansing, and the social integration that war had caused, not only helped to stabilize the political situation, but consolidated the Islamic Republic’s political system. As Ehteshami (2002) argues, at the moment of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, the backbone of the Islamic Republic’s political leadership had been formed.

However, that is not to say that the remaining groups of Islamic elites were uniform. A second stage of factional rivalries, this time among the loyal elites of the Islamic Republic, soon arose. The post-Khomeini rivalries helped the entrance of new groups into the league of political elites at the expense of driving others out. Although the controversies among Islamic-minded groups existed from the eve of the Islamic Revolution, the presence of Ayatollah Khomeini and his charismatic accommodation reduced such infighting. However, the first signs

of such ‘intra-elite rivalry’ (Rakel 2009) appeared among the members of the Islamic Republic Party and became one of the reasons of its dissolution in June 1987.

The appearance of factionalism among Islamic elites originally stemmed from different interpretations of Islam, which emerged before the Revolution. Ali Shariati was the speaker of a ‘radical’ Islam that advocated a levelled and equal society to be ruled by intelligentsias. Bazargan, and to a lesser extent Ayatollah Taleghani, were the voices of a ‘liberal’ Islam that dreamed of amalgamating Islam and modernity. Ayatollah Khomeini was the defender of a ‘militant’ Islam to be realized through the establishment of an Islamic state as a result of a revolution. Lastly, there was a ‘traditionalist’ interpretation supported by an alliance of conservative Ulama and Bazaaris (see Ashraf 1994, Maloney 2015, and Mahdavi 2014).

Beside their prerevolutionary dissension, four other primary factors contributed to the divergence of the Islamic-minded factions. The first reason was their disagreement over policy-making with respect to the economic, societal, political, and cultural issues. This included the way in which the economic system should be designed, as, for instance, either a state or market-based capitalistic economy; the way that the civil society and public life should be organized; the direction of foreign policy; and the level of openness and tolerance regarding the cultural production of society (Ashraf 1994). Depending on the views that different political elites had for these dilemmas, diverse political factions formed.

A second reason for factional diversity among the postrevolutionary political elites was the existence of diverse sources of privilege, which was introduced by the Islamic Republic and in some cases formed rival sources of power. These new factors of privilege in the political apparatus of Iran functioned analogously to the conventional bases of determination of one’s

location in the social stratification system such as family's socioeconomic status, education, occupation, and income. Those who were students of Ayatollah Khomeini, figures such as Mohammad Beheshti, Morteza Motahhari, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ayatollah Montazeri, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ahmad Jannati, Mohammad Yazdi, Ali Meshkini, Mahdavi Kani, and Sadegh Khalkhali, found themselves with the great chance to sit as the top echelon of the political elite of Iran after the Revolution. There were also significant privileges that helped some, regardless of their socioeconomic status, to experience quick upward mobility. These included being a political prisoner or being exiled by the Shah's regime, membership in anti-Shah Islamic associations and clubs, participation in the Revolution, and serving in revolution-generated organizations, institutions, and committees. This new system of privilege continued after the revolution and extended to other cases, such as having a history of participation in the Iran-Iraq War, becoming a war veteran, or being a child of a martyr or veteran. Ashraf (1994:126) demonstrates that about 80% of post revolution cabinet members had served in revolutionary tribunals, committees, Bonyads (foundations), the Revolutionary Guards, and other revolutionary organizations. These diverse sources of power and legitimacy created sometimes conflicting power centres.

The third reason for rivalry among insiders relies on the nature of the organization of Shi'ism. As Milani (1993:84) argues, in Shi'ism, a multiplicity of religious powers is acknowledged from which faithful Muslims can select their source of emulation from among existing Ulama. Such religious polycephaly has been reflected in the political sphere and translated into the existence of rival factions. A fourth factor that encouraged the rise of political factions has been the republican attributes of the Iranian political system, which

brought about the holding of regular elections by which different groups and wings could find opportunities to control the government and the Majles. These elections created an Islamic pluralism (Rajaee 1999) and a heterogeneity of elites. As Amir Arjomand (2009a) notes, the Majles elections alone present more than 50 new members to the cadre of the Iranian political elites every four years.

The plurality of political factions led to the formation of several power centres in the public domain, which created another source of ambiguity for Western observers and scholars seeking to understand Iran. To illustrate the situation, Buchta (2000) used the phrase 'Iran's maze of power centres,' while others adopted terms such as 'intense factionalism' (Rakel 2009), 'endemic factionalism' (Ehteshami 2002), or 'the labyrinth of Iran's factional politics' (Milani 1993). In the situation that these scholars describe, political factions, instead of conventional political parties, rooted themselves in diverse sources of legitimacy and social and ideological credits, and tried to capture and hold positions of power. Conquest of the government, the highest executive institution of the country, has long been the ultimate goal of Iranian political factions. This is consistent with Alavi (1972), who emphasized the importance of the control of government for the elites in, what then was termed, the Third World during the postcolonial era.

Although the overall configuration of the main political factions and the distribution of Iranian elites among them has remained the same, they have experienced some fluctuation since the Islamic Revolutions. Two, three, or four political factions have been recognized by different commentators. Buchta, for instance, recognizes a left-wing and a right-wing as the two main ideological factions and claims that both power centres are controlled by Islamic

revolutionary leadership elites that are composed of clerics and religious lay persons (Buchta 2000:9-10). He argues that the conventional 'radical versus moderate' dichotomy is a flawed approach when trying to explain the factional divergence in Iran. He continues to say that the right-wing faction is divided into a traditional right and a moderate right. Bashiriyeh (1984:130-38) recognizes two dominant factions with different class bases who occupied the early postrevolutionary power blocks: a moderate modernist wing, more or less liberal, and a religious fundamentalist anti-liberal wing. While the supporters of the former were primarily found among high-ranking officials, entrepreneurs, professionals, lawyers, managers, and cleric, the latter had strong ties with the traditional petty bourgeoisie and lower class masses.

Rakel (2009), though, distinguishes two camps of power: the conservative camp and the radical left camp. The former consists of conservatives, moderates, and pragmatists, and the latter includes hardliners and reformists. Rakel also recognizes four periods of rivalry for power among these two political camps and their sub-factions since the Revolution: from 1979 to 1989 (left Mousavi cabinet), from 1989 to 1997 (pragmatist Hashemi cabinet), from 1997 to 2005 (reformist Khatami cabinet), and since 2005 (conservative Ahmadinejad cabinet). One may extend these courses to the end of president Ahmadinejad's term and a fifth course beginning in 2013 in which the moderate, pragmatist Rohani cabinet came to power. Ashraf (1994:131-33) observed three main factions: rightists, leftists, and pragmatists. Ashraf continues to say that rightists are supportive of Ulama and Bazaari interests, advocates of privatization and economic liberalism, and are strict on social and cultural issues. Leftists are pro-public economy and pro-income distributive policies. The pragmatists, who are composed

of the religious technocrats and professionals, take a moderate stance to reconcile extreme tendencies among leftists and rightists.

Katouzian and Shahidi (2008) introduced a fourfold spectrum in which a radical fundamentalist faction on the right extreme and a revisionist reformist faction on the left end are moderated through a conservative tendency that is closer to the right end, and a pragmatic tendency that is closer to the left end. Rajaee (1999) distinguishes the traditional right (*Rast-e Sonnati*), the modern right (*Rast-e Modern*), the left (*chap*), and the radical right (*rast-e Efrati*). He introduces the term 'Islamic Yuppies' as the primary members of the second and third factions, while the 'Islamist coalition' forms the first and last factions. According to Rajaee (1999), as an outgrowth of the globalization and recent modernization, Islamic Yuppies have a middle class and intelligentsia background and reflect a voice of the Islam of modern universities. It is in such socioeconomic backgrounds that this generation of political elites advocates for political and cultural tolerance and pluralism.

Historically speaking, the leftist elites dominated the political arena until the demise of Ayatollah Khomeini. In spite of several efforts from rightists, Ayatollah Khomeini did not allow their exclusion. They had the upper hand in the Mousavi's cabinet as well as first and third Majleses. After Ayatollah Khomeini's death and abatement of the revolutionary atmosphere, leftists were left out of the government by President Hashemi Rafsanjani, and also kept out of the fourth Majles by the Guardian Council which remained in charge of evaluating the qualification of candidates for the Majles election. However, pragmatists, also known as *Kargozaran*, and moderate leftists of the Hashemi cabinet were coupled with a nascent faction called the reformist wing and won the 1997 presidential election, as well as the sixth Majles in

2000. A coalition of conservative technocrats and the traditional right coalesced under the '*Osul garaa*' faction for the election of the second City Council in 2003 and won the subsequent seventh Majles election in 2004 and the presidential election of 2005 (see Rakel 2008 and Maloney 2015). Later, a coalition of centrist rightist and leftists, forming a moderate faction called '*Etedal garaa*,' won the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections and the tenth Majles in 2016. The political factions that remained active in Iran's political structure as of 2017, therefore, are fundamentalists (*Osul garaa*), moderates (*E'tedal garaa*), and reformists (*Eslah talab*)[49].

To link this factionalism with Weber's concept of party, it should be noted that in the absence of political parties, Iranian political factions used their social and economic resources in elections to support their fellow MPs. Examples include *Khaane-ye Kaargar*[50]*,* which is in charge of supporting the deputies who safeguard the interests and preferences of the working classes, which has been under control of pragmatist and reformist camps in two recent decades (i.e., since the 1990 by election of Alireza Mahjoub as the president of the House); and *Hezb-e Mo'talefeye Eslami*[51]*,* and *Jame'e-ye Anjomanha-ye Eslami-ye Asnaaf va Bazaar*[52], which are traditionally supporters of conservative candidates in both presidential and Majles election (see the statement of the Islamic Coalition Party in supporting the conservative candidates in 2016 Majles election[53]).

[49] Table A.1 in Appendix A portrays the history of post-revolution presidential and Majles elections, presidents, Majles speakers and the election turnouts.
[50] The House of Worker
[51] The Islamic Coalition Party
[52] The Society of Islamic Associations of Guilds and Bazaar
[53] http://www.mehrnews.com/news/ [Accessed 11 August 2017]

The affiliated political elites of each of these factions not only represent the interests of diverse groups and strata in the society, but also enjoy different financial resources (see Akhavi-Pour and Azodanloo 1998). Moderate and reformist elites primarily represent the middle classes, the intelligentsia and the modern bourgeois strata. When they are in power, they also enjoy the benefits of major state economic enterprises and service industries. Alternately, fundamentalists represent the interests of the conservative Ulama, traditional Bazaaris, and the highly religious segment of the public. Their institutions and their elites receive official resources as well, but also enjoy non-official sources of income, usually independent of the government. These include payments to mosques, holy shrines, religious taxes and donations, and financial supports from revolutionary Bonyads (foundations)[54] (Rakel 2009, and Maloney 2015).

To summarize, the Islamic Revolution, was not merely a political transference of power, but was also a social revolution that transformed the structure of the political class in Iran. The abrupt replacement of the old league of elites with a new one might be called an immediate effect of the Revolution's circulation of elites. The main actors in this phase of circulation were members of the Council of Revolution, members of the Islamic Republic Party, and Ayatollah Khomeini's clerical students. According to Ashraf (1994:112), these new men of power came from Ulama families, petty bourgeois families, and peasant farmers. In subsequent years, the Islamic Revolution also created other bases for the later phases of elite circulation. These bases represented the secondary effect of the Revolution on elite recruitment. These two effects helped to change the structure of elite recruitment, from an exclusive system under the Shah to

[54] Revolutionary-generated Bonyads control about 40 percent of the Iranian economy (Amir Arjomand 2009b).

an integrative one, or what Keshavarzian (2007:280) calls an 'inclusionary mode of rule,' under the Islamic Republic.

Embedded in the secondary effect, the Revolution facilitated upward mobility by enhancing accessibility to education and through the "integration of small towns on the periphery of Iranian society" (Amir Arjomand 2009a:117). Later, affiliations based on familial ties, clerical background and religious education in seminaries, service in revolutionary forces, and participation in the Iran-Iraq War (Thaler et al. 2010:53) comprised extra ladders for upward mobility. These elements helped the intelligentsia, and children of the first generation of political elites and of religious families, to find greater chances to elevate themselves and to be recruited as the second generation of the Islamic Republic's political elite.

The inclusionary system of elite recruitment in postrevolutionary Iran was institutionalized and consolidated by the electoral bases of the Constitution. On average, there has been one election a year since the Revolution. Evidently, each public election in the life of the Islamic Republic has introduced numerous new personalities to the league of political elites. The Majles, particularly, has been an exceptional way to enter the new elites and has the potential to introduce 290 new men and women of power every four years. Presidential elections have also enabled different factions to come to power and have introduced new groups of high-ranking ministers who, as discussed earlier, hailed from different factions, and in turn, represented diverse class backgrounds.

What the current study expects to find, based on the literature reviewed in this chapter, is the inclusion of all class backgrounds in the composition of the Majleses, particularly in their early terms when the egalitarian ideology of the Revolution were more prevalent and political

factionalism was in its earlier stages. As argued, the Revolution contributed to opening and broadening the social bases of the political elites. The literature also discusses the increasing accessibility of education after the Revolution. These two principals predict that post-revolution political elites will come from more diverse backgrounds. However, with regards to the pattern of change, a trend towards more homogeneity among political elites emerges - especially when considering the elimination of outsiders, and intra-elite rivalry. An increase in the size of political elites who once served as state or bureaucratic officials and managers is also expected. As discussed, state officials and political functionaries have been deemed to serve as a springboard for future generations of political elites in Iran. This trend happened at the expense of the decrease in the size of those political elites who have traditional middle-class (Ulama and bazaari) backgrounds. Therefore, the decrease of political elites with a clerical status is also anticipated. This study also assumes a link between the economic policies implemented after the Revolution and the composition of Iran's political elites. Thus, whenever liberal and pro-service economy development helped to enlarge the professional stratum in Iranian society, an increase in the proportion of professionals among the political elites is expected to be observed. In addition, it is anticipated that we will observe an increase in working class representation in the 1990s and 2000s, at time when the size of the working class in Iranian society slightly enlarged.

The next chapter, which emphasizes the Iranian post-revolution Majleses, will guide us in reaching for a more tangible perception of the composition and origins of the members of the Iranian parliament.

CHAPTER SIX: THE PLACE AND ROLE OF MAJLES IN THE POLITICAL APPARATUS OF IRAN

In the historical lecture that Ayatollah Khomeini delivered at Behesht-e Zahra cemetery upon his return to Iran from exile on 1st February 1979, he spent some time remarking on the illegitimacy of the Pahlavi regime. The main focus of his reasoning was the Majles under Pahlavi and its deputies' lack of legitimacy. He stated that "since the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, with the exception of a few deputies in a few periods of time, Majleses were not the real representatives of the public" and that most did not know who the deputies in their own constituencies were (Khomeini 1979). He later emphasized his assertion by repeating a well-known phrase: "Majles is an institution above all other institutions in the country."

Iran has one of the oldest parliamentary heritages in the region. The quest for parliamentary democracy has been central to all social movements against autocratic political systems, most notably in the two full-scale revolutions that occurred in Iran during the 20th century: the 1906 Constitutional Revolution and the Islamic Revolution. The former earned Iran the 'National Consultative Assembly,' which opened in November 1906, and 24 terms were convened until 1979. The Islamic Revolution, in turn, revived the Iranian Majles, which had become quite ceremonial, particularly after the dismissal of Prime Minister Mosaddegh's democratic government by an American-British organized coup in the summer 1953. Ten terms of the 'Islamic Consultative Assembly' have been held since the Revolution, every four years since 1980.

The first postrevolutionary Majles opened in March 1980. Among other things, this Majles had unique characteristics and is exceptional in some senses. Thirty-four members of this Majles were killed, mostly in the terrorist explosion of the Islamic Republic Party on July 8th, 1981, and others perished the Iran-Iraq War. The second supreme leader of the Islamic

Republic, five out of six future presidents[55], and about 20 subsequent ministers were members of this Majles. Many others deputies of the first Majles later served as the imam in Friday prayer in various provinces and many got positions in the judicial branch of the state. As is evident, this Majles actually acted as a spring-board for many men of the next generation of the political elite in Iran. A second exceptional characteristic of the first Majles was its high level of political diversity and plurality. Since the Guardian Council, which has long been in charge of vetting election candidates, had not yet been formed at the moment of the first Majles election, a wide range of political orientations, from the National Front and the Liberty Movement to the Islamic Revolution Mojahedin, and from radical left to radical right (Hojjatieh association) were present in this Majles. By establishing the Guardian Council in July 1980, Majles candidates had to prove their theoretical as well as practical observance to the tenets of Islam[56].

The deputies of the first Majlis were predominantly clerical figures and largely from the leftist camp, which was consistent with the revolutionary atmosphere as well as Ayatollah Khomeini's support. They lost their majority, though not their strong influence, to the rightists in the second Majles (1984-1988). They regained a large majority in the third Majles (1988-1992). When Hashemi Rafsanjani, the incumbent speaker of the third Majles, was elected as president in July 1989, the leftist representatives selected Karoubi, a revolutionary leftist, to sit as the new speaker. Nevertheless, it was the third leftist Majles that approved the post-

[55] President Rajaee, Khamenei, Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Rohani

[56] Which has been termed *Nezarat-e Estesvaabi* (approbationary supervision) in the Iranian political literature since 1991.

Khomeini liberal economic orientation of the Hashemi government. This was actually the last Majles inaugurated in the 'first republic' era, during which Ayatollah Khomeini did not allow the marginalization of leftists.

Later, in one of the Friday prayers of March 1992, the new Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, criticized the leftists (Ehteshami 2002:61), which in turn led to wide rejection of the qualifications of leftist candidates by the Guardian Council in advance of the fourth Majles election (1992-1996). Rightist technocrats and pragmatists kept their upper hand in the fifth Majles (1996-2000), though ironically began opposing the Hashemi government's liberalization and economic adjustment plans, as its implementation had dissatisfied the public. As Ehteshami (2002:63) argues, the political composition of the fourth and fifth Majleses indicates the rise of a new generation of parliamentarians who had looser ties with the political discourse of the Ayatollah Khomeini decade. In the sixth Majles (2000-2004), the rightists lost their dominance to a newly-formed 'reformist' coalition of pragmatists and moderate leftists. The sixth Majles was the outcome of an opening-up political approach that was adopted by the Guardian Council, which let the insider opposition group come to power. This Majles coincided with the reformist Khatami presidency and supported his agenda. However, the guardian Council changed its vetting approach again, making it harsher, when the sixth Majles's representatives seriously challenged the established authority of the central core of power. By having a hardliner like Ahmadinejad come to power, this time reorganized under the 'fundamentalist' wing, conservatives and rightists won the three subsequent Majleses (2004-2016) but lost their majority again in the current tenth Majles (2016-2020) to 'moderates' who had a margin of support from the moderate president, Rohani (see table 6).

Table 6: Main indices of the Iranian Majles since the Revolution


The Islamic Majles Terms	Year*	The Majority Faction**
First	1980-1984	Leftists
Second	1984-1988	Rightists
Third	1988-1992	Leftists
Fourth	1992-1996	Rightists
Fifth	1996-2000	Rightists
Sixth	2000-2004	Reformists
Seventh	2004-2008	Fundamentalists
Eighth	2008-2012	Fundamentalists
Ninth	2012-2016	Fundamentalists
Tenth	2016-2020	Moderates

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)*; Maloney (2015)**

With regards to the socioeconomic composition of Majleses, Ashraf (1994:121-23) found that a shift towards a decreasing representation of landowning families (agricultural land owners), merchants, government employees, and professionals had begun after the 21st Majles of the Shah's regime in 1963. According to him, the Revolution merely accelerated this trend and helped three groups of people: the traditional intelligentsia, such as the Ulama and lower level clerics; the petty bourgeoisie, including shopkeepers and artisans; and peasant (non-

owner agricultural workers) representation to increase at the expense of the aforementioned categories (see figure 9). Although Ashraf's findings show that there was no particular turning point, it is clear that the structure of representation was reversed during this period of time. Ashraf's evidence shows a trend toward more representation of managers and professionals, rising to up to 47% in the third term of Islamic Majles, at the expense of Ulama who's share fell to 27%. Vakili-Zad (1994) confirms that the socioeconomic background of the deputies indicates an orientation towards secularism as Iranian society was moving away from the revolutionary days.

Figure 9: Major Class categories as a percentage of total representation
Adopted from Ashraf (1994): 121-123.



Studies that concentrated on the early postrevolutionary Majleses observe an overrepresentation of traditionalists, as well as of the religious, deprived, and rural strata of society (Amir Arjomand 2009a, Vakili-Zad 1994). According to these studies, the occupational background of the first Majles reveals that one third of deputies were from peasant families. This fact has been taken as an indicator of a sharp contrast to the structure of political elites in the prerevolutionary Majleses. Moreover, the three first Majleses were predominantly filled by deputies who were born in small towns or villages. However, the high representation of peasants, 30% in the first Majles, looks proportional to the population since the same portion of the population was active in agriculture. Again, the configuration of postrevolutionary parliamentarians by their place of birth seems proportionate to the population distribution of the 1970s, when less than one third of population was living in major cities[57].

Moradi (1995), who assessed the social status of members of four periods of Majles (1980-1992), found that the majority of MPs had a middle class background. He also reported a decline in the number of clerical representatives from the first to fourth Majlis. Moradi demonstrates that the educational attainment of members of parliament has been higher in each subsequent parliament. He also showed that female participation in the political sphere, particularly in parliament, has increased from 1980 to 1992. Amir Arjomand (2009b) shows that over 60% of the parliamentarians in the 1990s and 2000s were recruited from a second stratum: the administrative cadre of the revolutionary and developmental administration. This highlights how important membership in revolutionary institutions and organs are with respect to getting elected as a representative to the Majles.

[57] Capitals and main industrial cities of provinces

Saee (1998), who analyzed the first five Islamic parliaments after the Islamic Revolution in terms of the demographic and the socioeconomic status of their members, found a positive linear relationship between the number of years that passed after the Revolution and the number of representatives who have modern educations. In contrast, according to his findings, the proportion of parliamentarians who received religious education decreased from the first to fifth Majlis. Ketabi, Ghasemi, and Masoumi (2004) studied the first to sixth Majleses and found that in the first and second Majlis, the majority of parliamentarians had no more than high school education, while in the fourth, fifth and sixth Majleses, the majority of MPs had a bachelor's certification. According to them, the average of parliamentarians who solely had religious education declined from 46% in the first two Majleses to 6% in the sixth Majles.

The study of Islamic Majles in Iran, however, has largely remained limited to the first two decades of the Revolution and rarely extended to recent Majleses. Moreover, previous research did not measure the proportion of each occupational, age, gender, and educational groups among the parliamentarians to that of their respective general population. This is the gap that the current study intends to fill.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS

Based on the literature that has been reviewed in previous chapters, this study has established several research questions and hypotheses to be answered and tested. In the first instance, the current study examines the transformation in the composition of parliamentarians since the Islamic Revolution. Then, it seeks to establish the extent to which the structural changes in Iranian society after the Revolution are reflected in the composition of the membership of the Iranian Majles. Likewise, this study tries to answer whether there is a match or mismatch between the class background of the members of the Iranian Majles and the distribution of social classes in Iranian society. In a broader sense, the current study tries to answer the question of the extent that the socio-demographic characteristics of the Iranian Majles matches that of the general population.

As the class-centred theory of power predicts, people with an upper class background have a greater chance to acquire political power. If this is the case, we should expect to see that members of parliament from an upper class background will be overrepresented in the Majles. The review of the economic policies that have been implemented in post-revolution Iran has shown that economic liberalization helped the upper and intermediate classes to grow. Thus, this study also expects to see corresponding changes in the composition of the Majles. The study of the early Islamic Majleses also predicts an increase in MPs with a state occupation background. On the other hand, a liberal-pluralist theory of power predicts that state institutions are autonomous from social classes. The focus here is on the skills and competence of individuals who serve in the state apparatus. If a liberal-pluralist theory of power is to have explanatory power in the case of Iran, we should observe that skilled and competent people, regardless of their class background, occupy Majles seats.

Marxist and liberal-pluralist theories are similar in that they try to understand the nature of the state and are theories of power. However, discrepancies arise when answering the question of whom has power and how they use it. While Marxist approaches place emphasis on who rules the state, pluralist theories see the state as a field in which different social groups participate. Alternately, while the main focus in a Marxist's paradigm is on the importance of economic interests, a pluralist approach will recognize other sources of influence, such as educational credentials. From a Marxist perspective, educational attainment itself is considered to be class-based, and the relevant question is whether advantaged classes have a better chance to be represented because they possess more economic resources and have better access to education.

Concerning changes in the age structure of the population, this study predicts a shift towards older ages in the Majles. Through an exploration of the expansion of pre-university and higher education, the current study hypothesizes that the Majles' configuration reflects these changes in the general population. With regard to the waves of secularization, two rival approaches in the literature were reviewed. As discussed in chapter three, the first approach maintains that secularization is strongly in place at both the political and social levels, and that Iran is not exceptional. This line of argument emphasizes the unavoidable consequences of modernization, and also the role of an ever-increasing middle class as relentless demanders of secularization. The second approach, however, highlights the intrinsic and integral role of religion in the Iranian culture and does not see secularization as inevitable. This study seeks to determine whether the composition of members of parliament in postrevolutionary Iran represents a trend toward electing a greater or fewer numbers of religious deputies.

The literature acknowledges that the Islamic Revolution brought about a new basis for social stratification by introducing new sources of social prestige. An 'integrative' system of elite

recruitment, which allowed a more open circulation of elites to operate, entails that political representatives, the Majles deputies in this case, should epitomize a proportional representation of all social classes. This fact is further highlighted when considering appeals to political justice and for the elimination of the *Taghouti* class as core demands of the Islamic Revolution, and noting that the Islamic state promised to be the state of the 'dispossessed' and to represent their interests and needs. The results of this study could locate the position of the Iranian political apparatus on a political spectrum in which 'liberal-pluralist' and 'Marxist' sit as the extremes. A liberalist approach predicts that competent individuals from different social backgrounds sit in the position of power, and a Marxist thesis suggest that these are advantaged classes that are better represented descriptively (instrumentalist view) or substantively (structuralist view). A Marxist paradigm assumes that education is an instrument of class reproduction in the society. This means that privileged classes benefit their better access to education and translate it into better occupational attainments, including access to power, for their offspring. Thus, this study seeks to explore the extent to which the evidence supports the reproduction thesis respecting the way in which access to power position in Iran is associated with class.

Inspired by a normative proportional representation thesis, this study maintains that to have a just representation of the interest and tastes of all segments of society, a representative institution should be 'descriptively' proportionate to its social classes. As argued, the research shows that people are more likely to pay attention to, as well as to have better understanding of, the issues and problems of their own socioeconomic status. In order to adhere to the Revolution's ideals of 'egalitarian redistribution of wealth and power,' to use Fraser's (2010) terminology, it could be hypothesized that the Majles, as an elective institution of the Islamic Republic, should recruit representatives from all social backgrounds. This study seeks to

determine to what extent this process of elite circulation via the Iranian Majles matches the overall social transformations in the country, and has been proportionate to the social class, place of birth, size of religious minorities, age, gender, and education in the general population.

To Summarize, the current study primarily seeks to identify:

1- The class backgrounds of the members of the post-revolution Iranian parliament
2- The extent to which MPs' class background matches the class distribution of Iranian society
3- The extent to which MPs' class background has changed since the Islamic Revolution
4- The extent to which the changes in MPs' class background matches changes in the class distribution of the Iranian society.

CHAPTER SEVEN: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Methods

This study aims to categorize and frame the changes in the configuration of parliamentarians since the Revolution and determine how these changes correspond to the structural changes throughout Iranian society. Thus, this study seeks to answer four major questions. The first and second address the class backgrounds of the Iranian MPs and how the composition of parliamentarians, most importantly their class background, matches the overall class distribution in Iran. The third and fourth questions explore the extent to which MPs' class background changed and to what extent these changes corresponded with the class configuration of the general population. In terms of the research method, this study would be a case study and in terms of the research techniques, secondary data analysis and historical techniques are utilized.

One may categorize the topic of this study under different areas of sociology, such as social change, political sociology, and/or social stratification wherein historical research has been always a common method of acquiring knowledge (Neuman 2007:305). Given that the questions of class and political elite transformation are historical by nature, a 'historical technique' has been used to answer the study's core questions. This study used primary and secondary historical evidence to develop its argument and to address the trends of change occurring during the period of investigation. Moreover, in order to locate historical data, such as the family background of MPs, the ordering of their occupations, and their place of birth and residence, the researcher referred to historical resources such as newspapers, diaries, and life histories. These resources are used in cases that the main source of information for MPs either did not provide information, or the provided information was inaccurate or ambiguous. Thus, through a 'secondary data analysis' technique, the data from reliable sources (see the next section) such as government and bureaucratic documents are utilized to assist this study in

answering its empirical questions. However, since the Iranian Parliamentary Guide, which is used as the main source of information for MPs, is a quite complete source, the use of historical sources has been granted minimal importance and they have been used in only a few cases. It is also worth noting that the information that has been gathered from historical sources does not look to be limited to some specific groups and is distributed randomly among Iranian MPs. With respect to ethnicity, this study utilizes information regarding cities of birth, which are themselves ethnically diverse, and will run an intersectionality analysis. This will be further discussed in the measures section of this chapter.

Data

This study uses two main sources of data. First, a series of decennial national censuses called the "National Population and Housing Census" (NPHC), which were implemented in 1986, 1996, 2006, and 2011 by the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI). These censuses identify the distribution of Iranians according to education, occupation, gender, and region of residence. The second source is the biographical dataset (The Iranian Parliamentary Guide) of Iranian representatives compiled by the Islamic Consultative Assembly. This dataset provides background information on members of parliament since the Islamic Revolution and identifies their names, previous education, occupation, gender, age, and their region of residence.

In addition, several key data sets are used. These include Labor Force and Employment Surveys[58] (used to identify the changes in the size of economically active population in Iran), The Iran Data Portal, based at Syracuse University[59] (used in referring to the regulations of Majles elections); The Nashriyah Project which provides digital versions of Iranian newspapers

[58] Available at http://www.amar.org.ir/english/Statistics-by-Topic/Labor-force#2222531-meta-data
[59] Available at http://irandataportal.syr.edu/

and periodicals and is found at the University of Manchester[60] (used in checking the number of MPs for each Majles, and election turnouts, as well as for in finding the political tendencies of the parliamentarians); The Households Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES)[61] ; The World Bank's Data Group[62] (used in identifying fluctuations of international oil prices); The Statistical Economic and Social Research and Training Center for Islamic Countries[63] (used in checking the enrolments numbers in the higher education); and The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)[64] and UN Statistical Yearbooks (used in examining the population pyramid and trends). These complementary sources of data strengthen the study's data set and helped to quantify its argument.

Measures

Two main concepts and six variables are to be operationalized for the purposes of this analysis: the concept of 'political elites' and the concept of 'class'. The variables are the strata of clergy, modern and religious education, age, place of birth, religious minorities, and gender.

The political elite is measured here by the members of parliament. This study considers the members of parliament to be political elites. As discussed in chapter five, political elites, in both classic and current elite theories, are actors who sit in key positions of the state. Members of parliament in Iran are in the position of legislating for the country, and therefore they are in a strategic position that gives them decision-making power. However, it should be noted that MPs in Iran are not the primary group of elites (see chapter 4). For the purpose of this study, a 'member of parliament' is someone who has been elected to act as a political representative in

[60] Available at http://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/about/projects/nashriyah-digital-iranian-history/
[61] Available at http://www.amar.org.ir/english/Statistics-by-Topic/Household-Expenditure-and-Income#287685-definitions--concepts
[62] Available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/iran-islamic-republic
[63] Available at http://www.sesrtcic.org/oic-member-countries-infigures.php?c_code=25
[64] Available at http://iran.unfpa.org/Country%20Profile.asp

the Islamic Consultative assembly. On the basis of parliamentary terms, there have been 2814 members of the Iranian parliament who have been elected through ten parliamentary elections since 1980 up to the tenth parliamentary election in 2016, some of whom have been elected more than once.

In the operationalization of 'class' as a sociological concept, there are two generic approaches: a property-based formulation of social classes (inspired from a Marxian conceptualization of class) versus an occupational-based one (inspired heavily from a Weberian differentiation of class situation according to skills and authority, and the Durkheimian division of labor perception). In the first approach, class categories are primarily split over lines of relation to the means of production and to other assets within the process of production. Models that are premised on this approach usually recognize three or four classes (capitalist, petty bourgeoisie, middle class, and working class). The class theories of Poulantzas (1975), Bourdieu (1984), and Wright (1985) could be considered as examples of this approach. A second approach bases its classification on occupational categories. The models of Giddens (1981a) including eight categories, and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) with eleven categories are examples of this approach. However, Wright's (1985) and Erikson and Goldthorpe's (1992) class analyses are examples of efforts in integrating those two paradigms in the study of class.

In Bourdieu's (1984) model, professionals and 'cultural producers,' including artists and intellectuals, are recognized as nascent class positions. For Bourdieu, the occupational division of labor creates a system. Within such occupational system, the objective positions are structured and occupied by individuals according to the volume and composition of their economic and cultural capitals. Bourdieu goes on to argue that with regards to the 'volume' of cultural and economic capital, three occupational classes are distinguishable: a 'dominant class', sometimes

called a bourgeoisie, on the top; and a 'working class' in the bottom. Between them is a 'petite bourgeoisie class' that includes small business owners, technicians, secretaries, and primary school teachers (Bourdieu 1984:Part I, Weininger 2005:86-88). Within these classes, there are several strata according to the 'composition' of economic or cultural capitals. Within the dominant class, there are professors and artistic producers, who hold greater cultural capital but the least economic capital; and also industrialists and commercial employers, who hold greater economic but less cultural capital. Within the petite bourgeoisie, the situation is the same between school teachers and small business owners. In Bourdieu's theory of class, a concept of 'time' is embedded, which is the most innovative aspect of his formulation. According to this concept, a class analysis must include an awareness of class transformation over time corresponding with changes in the volume, composition, and also 'conversion' of one type of capital into another.

The other leading class model is associated with Giddens's recent works. Giddens identifies the shift in the occupational system and the class division in contemporary society by referring to statistical figures. He explains that in the era that manufacturing industries have been closed down, "at least 50 percent of jobs in the knowledge/service economy demand a high level of cognitive and/or personal skills" (Giddens 2008b:1016). According to his account, despite the fact that the blue-collar working class was the largest group in the industrial age, it is a minority in today's knowledge/service economy. Likewise, unskilled workers are replaced by a class of semi-skilled and skilled workers, including clerical workers, whose job requires different levels of knowledge of informational technology or other skills such as 'face-to-face social skills' (Giddens 2008b:1017).

Giddens (1981a, 2007) suggests an 8-level model of class structure in post-industrial society. The upper layer consists of “cosmopolitan elites who centered around government, business and the top echelons of the professions”. The second class groups are “professionals and managers”. The third groups are “IT/high-tech specialists,” and what Giddens calls “Apple Mac” groups. “Wired workers,” including clerical workers, sit in the fourth stratum. “Owners of small businesses” locate at the fifth layer. “Big Mac” workers posit in the sixth class. Finally, “industrial working” class and “farm workers” are located in seventh and eighth class categories respectively. According to Giddens, class groups 3, 6, and then 4 represent the largest numbers of the labor force in England (see table 7).

Table 7: Giddens Class Map

Social Rank	Class Categories
1	Cosmopolitan elites centered around government, business and the top echelons of the professions
2	Professionals and managers
3	IT/high-tech specialists - 'Apple Mac' groups
4	Wired workers - including clerical workers
5	Owners of small businesses
6	'Big Mac' workers
7	Industrial working class
8	Farm workers

Adopted from Giddens 2007

Goldthorpe’s schema (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, Goldthorpe 1987, Goldthorpe 2001), as a third leading class theory, is profoundly rooted in organizational economics and tries to distinguish occupations in terms of their position in the labor market. As was earlier noted, the combination of the social division of labor (based on the ownership dimension) and the technical

division of labor (based on work differentiation), has made Goldthorpe's formulation of classes central to synthesizing the two aforementioned approaches in the study of class. In other words, Goldthorpe model is an attempt to combine production-based and market-based criteria (Jakopovich 2014). As a result, this model is one of the most-used class schemas to have been employed in the operationalization of class in recent years (Breen 2005). Essentially, Goldthorpe's account could be read as the class allocation of occupations in which class cleavages are divided along the lines of ownership of the means of production (proprietorship), and then based on dimensions of 'asset-specificity' and 'monitoring difficulty' (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, also see Breen 2005:36-37). The resulting disaggregated class model consists of the seven class categories which follow.

Class I includes higher-grade self-employed individuals, professionals, legislators, managers, and large proprietors. Goldthorpe notes that although it is unfortunate that employer, self-employed, and employees should be combined in this class, what makes them similar is their high levels of income; the nature of their positions, which involve the exercise of an authority that offers freedom from others' control; and/or their high levels of expertise (Goldthorpe 1987:41). Class II is made up of lower-grade professionals, higher-grade technicians, lower-grade administrators and officials, managers in services and in small businesses, and supervisors of non-manual employees. These first two classes include occupations that have a 'service relationship', in the sense that they enjoy the highest degrees of discretion and autonomy and are subjected to the lowest degree of monitoring or control. Thus, they are the 'service classes'. Class II members, however, tend to be located in the middle and lower ranges of hierarchies because they are subject to more or less systematic control from above. Class III are routine non-manual employees in administration and commerce, and other rank-and-file employees in

services. Class IV is constituted of small proprietors, self-employed artisans, and all other own account workers, which is equated to with what is termed petty bourgeoisie in neo-Marxist class analysis (Goldthorpe 1987:42). Class V is made up of lower-grade technicians and supervisors of manual workers, Class VI is composed of skilled manual wage-workers in industry, and Class VII includes all manual wage-workers in industry in semi- and unskilled grades. According to Goldthorpe, the last two classes could be equated with the working class.

To bridge the two approaches to class operationalization, Goldthorpe has tried to justify the classification of large employers (bourgeoisie or capitalist class in Marxian concept) into class I. He argues that owners of large enterprises should be places in class I because "in so far as such large proprietors tend to be quite extensively involved in managerial as well as entrepreneurial activities, they may be regarded as having a yet greater affinity with those salaried managers to be found in class I who have a substantial share in the ownership of the enterprises in which they work" (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992:41). At the same time, it should be noted that Goldthorpe's formulation has maintained its distance from a Marxian formulation of classes in such a way that it does not consider classes to be responsible for social changes, or to be in an exploitative relationship, or to be positions that automatically develop a class consciousness (Breen 2005:42-43).

The European Socio-economic Classification (ESeC) has been developed as an operationalization of the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) schema (Harrison and Rose 2006, Rose and Harrison 2007, for a practical application also see Wauters 2010). In this classification employees are classified according to the 'employment relation of their employment' (Harrison and Rose 2006:6). Consequently, a nine-class model is designed, though six, five, and three-category versions have also been created. As shown in table 8, the nine-

category classification is analogous to the second approach of class measurement, and the three-category model is closer to the first class measurement approach based on the ownership and possession of authority and skills.

Table 8: European Socio-economic Classification (EseC)

Code	EseC Class	9 Class Model	6 Class Model	5 Class Model	3 Class Model
1	Large capitalists and employers, higher grade professional, administrative and managerial occupations	Higher salariat	Salariat	Salariat	Salariat
2	Lower grade professional, administrative and managerial occupations and higher grade technician and supervisory occupations	Lower salariat			
3	Intermediate occupations	Higher grade white collar workers	Intermediate employee	Intermediate employee	Intermediate
6	Lower supervisory and lower technician occupations	Higher grade blue collar workers			
4	Small employer and self-employed occupations (excluding agriculture etc)	Petit bourgeoisie or independents	Small employers and self-employed	Small employers and self-employed	
5	Self-employed occupations (agriculture etc)	Petit bourgeoisie or independents			
7	Lower supervisory and lower technician occupations	Lower grade white collar workers	Lower grade white collar workers	Lower grade white collar workers	Working class
8	Lower technical occupations	Skilled workers	Skilled workers	lower technical and routine occupations	
9	Routine occupations	Semi- and nonskilled workers	Semi- and nonskilled Workers		
10	Never worked and long-term unemployed	Unemployed	Unemployed	Unemployed	Unemployed

Source: Harrison and Rose (2006)

A fourth well-known class formulation is Wright's (1980, 1985, 1997, 2006) model of class structure in post-industrial society, which is heavily based on the concept of ownership of capital assets and has the notion of exploitation in mind. For Wright, as a neo-Marxist class analyst, a simple model of the class structure should be initially constructed based on the linkage between property rights in the means of production and exploitation in capitalist society. Thus, Wright's primary model is composed of three classes: a bourgeois or capitalist (exploiter) class,

a worker class (exploited), and a petty bourgeois class (neither exploiter nor exploited). Based on the relationship to the means of production, capitalists and petty bourgeois are categorized as owners, and workers are categorized as employees. Wright (1997:20-27) goes on to introduce a more nuanced set of class categories. As a first step, a middle class must be recognized between capitalist and worker class positions. In differentiating of sub-class locations within the middle and working classes, Wright introduces two dimensions: the first is the relationship of individuals to authority within the production process, and the second is their possession of skills or expertise. Along the axes of the relationship to authority, the locations of managers, supervisors, and non-managerial staff are differentiated. Three categories have been delineated along the spectrum of scarce skills: expert, skilled, and non-skilled. Moreover, in the differentiation of the owner classes, the dimension of the number of employees distinguishes capitalists (many employees), small employers (few employees), and the petty bourgeoisie (no employees). Altogether, in an elaborated typological model of class, there are twelve class locations (see table 9) .

Table 9: Wright class scheme

Number of Employees	Relation to Scarce Skills			Relation to Authority
1.Capitalists (many employees)	3.Expert managers	3.Skilled managers	3.Nonskilled managers	
1.Small employers (few employees)	3.Expert supervisors	3.Skilled supervisors	3.Nonskilled supervisors	
2.Petty bourgeoisie (non employees)	4.Experts	4.Skilled workers	4.Nonskilled workers	

Source: Wright (1985:88 and 1997:21), also Grabb (1997:144)

1= capitalist class, 2= petty bourgeoisie, 3= middle class, and 4= working class.

The application of Wright's model or any other model of social class to the case of Iran should be done with caution. Such applications face some difficulties. Firstly, the existing petty bourgeoisie[65] in Iran is known as a traditional 'middle class' (for example see Abrahamian 2008), which differentiates them from the new or modern middle classes that are largely a product of modern education and bureaucratization. This has made class analysis in Iran somewhat ambiguous, especially when one seeks to address a newly emerged (modern) petty bourgeoisie that is not connected to the traditional bazaar. Thus, the concept 'middle class' in the Iranian context may paradoxically contain traditional and modern petty bourgeoisie as well as the propertyless white collar salariat.

The second difficulty, a more or less quantitative issue, arises when we consider the level of industrialization. Wright's class model was originally designed to analyze the class structure of advanced capitalist societies, which not only has gone through a fully-fledged technological industrialization, but has entered the era of 'post-industrialism,' a condition in which farm workers comprise less than 5% of the labor force (Giddens 2008b). One third of the Iranian population still lives in rural areas. According to the Statistical Centre of Iran (2015), about 20% of the Iranian labor force is working in the agriculture sector. Another quantitative issue is that the Iranian economy could still be labeled a state-economy. According to the Iranian Business House newsletter (2015), the participation of the private sector in the Iranian economy is less than 30%. This indicates that the majority of the labor force still works for the state or state-controlled enterprises which is not the case in advanced capitalist societies. In addition, the

[65] The self-employed property owning class traditionally comes together around the institution of the bazaar that includes bazaaris and merchants.

location of the clerical stratum is another problem in the application of class models of Western origin, which will be elaborated on later in this chapter.

Social classes can be operationalized in several different ways depending on diverse theoretical frameworks. However, empirical measurements of class are limited to the availability of data. In addition to the above-mentioned limitations with regards to the applicability of the reviewed class models, the available data regarding the general population's occupation, as well as of MPs' occupational history, limits the measurement of a well-established model of class for the purpose of this study. The main difficulty is ambiguity concerning ownership. There is no information in the Iranian censuses, or in the Majles Guide which represents the ownership disposition of respondents. However, there are available data that classify people based on their occupation.

The Statistics Center of Iran has classified Iranian occupations based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations 1988 (ISCO-88) and 2008 (ISCO-08), which is proposed by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The ISCO classification enumerates occupations in 10 major and about 500 sub-major groups (Statistical Centre of Iran 2014:28). In this classification, 'Legislators, senior officials and military officers, and high-grade managers' (occupational group I) are those who formulate policies, plan, direct, coordinate, and evaluate the overall activates of governments, enterprises, and other organizations. Performance in most occupation in this group normally requires high skill levels (International Labor Organization 2012:88). 'Professionals' (occupational group II) conduct research, develop theories and operational models, and apply knowledge relating to various fields of sciences. Competent

performance in most occupations in this category usually requires the highest levels of education and skill[66] (International Labor Organization 2012:110).

Technicians and associate professionals (occupational group III), as the third occupational category includes those who perform technical work connected with research and the application of operational methods in the fields of the physical sciences, life sciences, and social sciences; those who carry out technical services related to trade, finance, and administration; and those who provide technical support for the arts and advertisement (International Labor Organization 2012:169). Clerks or clerical support workers (occupational group IV) record, organize, store, compute, and retrieve information, and perform the clerical tasks in connection with money handling operations, travel arrangements, requests for information, and appointments. Performance in most of occupations in this category usually needs an average level of education (International Labor Organization 2012:219). Service and sales workers (occupational group V) are those who demonstrate or sell goods in wholesale or retail shops, stalls or markets, or those who provide personal or protective services related to travel, housekeeping, catering, and personal care (International Labor Organization 2012:235).

The category of skilled agricultural, forestry, and fishery workers (occupational group VI) includes those who prepare soil, sowing, plant, spray, fertilize, and harvest field corps; grow fruits and other tree and shrub crops; grow garden vegetables and horticultural products; gather wild fruits and plants; breed, raise, tend, or hunt animals to obtain meat, milk, hair, fur, skin, or sericulture, apiarian or other products; cultivate, conserve, and exploit forests, breed or catch fish, cultivate or gather other forms of aquatic life, and sell their product to purchasers or at market (International Labor Organization 2012:261). Craft and related trade workers

[66] The concept of skill, which is central in formulation of the ISCO's classification is defined as "the ability to carry out the tasks and duties of a given job" (International Labor Organization 2012:11)

(occupational group VII) are defined as those who apply specific technical and practical knowledge and skills to produce or process foodstuff, textiles and wooden, metal, and other articles, including handicrafts goods; to construct and maintain buildings; form metal; erect metal structures; set machine tools or make and repair machinery or tools; and carry out printing work (International Labor Organization 2012:277). The next group, plant and machine operators, assemblers and drivers (occupational group VIII), includes those who operate and monitor mining or other industrial machinery and equipment for processing metal, minerals, wood, etc.; drive and operate trains and motor vehicles; and assemble products from component parts according to strict specifications (International Labor Organization 2012:313). Elementary occupation workers (occupational group IX) are those involved in the performance of simple and routine tasks which may require the use of simple tools and considerable physical effort and usually requires no or low levels of skill (International Labour Organization 2012:337).

The current study proposes a model for the study of class composition in Iran based on the classification of 'occupational groups' suggested by the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI) as described above. The European classification (EseC) has been utilized here as a guideline for converting nine occupational groups into a three-class model (see table 8). The first SCI occupational group (legislators, senior officials, and managers), similar to the first two occupational categories in EseC has been labeled the upper class. Professionals, and technical and associate professionals are located in the second class category: the intermediate class. These occupations are higher-grade white- and blue-collar employees in the nine-category classification of EseC. And lastly, clerks, service and sales workers, agricultural and fishery workers, crafts and related trades workers, plant and machine operators, assemblers and drivers, and elementary

occupations workers are what has been classified as lower-grade white-collar workers and other skilled to non-skilled workers in EseC and are labeled the working class (see table 10).

Table 10: Nine and three class versions of EseC and the corresponding Iranian Occupational Groups

EseC Classification	9 class version	ISCO 08 (Iranian Occupation Classification)	4 class version
Higher salariat	1	1- Legislators, senior officials, and managers	**Upper Class (Salariat)**
Lower salariat	2		
Higher white collar workers	3	2- Professionals 3- Technical and associate professionals	**Intermediate Class**
Higher grade blue collar	6		
Small employer and self-employed occupations (excl. agriculture etc.)	4		
Self-employed occupations (agriculture etc.)	5		
Lower white collar workers	7	4- Clerks 5- Service workers and shop and market sales workers 6- Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 7- Crafts and related trades workers 8- Planet and machine operators, assemblers and drivers 9- Elementary occupations workers	**Working Class**
Skilled workers	8		
Semi-/unskilled workers	9		
Unemployed	(10)	-	-

The most important feature of the class model suggested here is its compatibility with the classification of Iranian occupations, which classifies occupations primarily based on the skill levels that each occupation requires (recalling Weber's concept of marketable skills). As was noted above, the available data do not allow us to determine whether an individual is an employer or self-employed. This limitation prevents this study's class model from being a Weberian model. Weber sees the possession of market relevant assets as a criterion for class

placement. However, as Harrison and Rose (2006) note, EseC assumes that it is one's position in the market that largely determines his/her life chances, and occupation is taken to be its central indicator. This emphasis on the market, as well as the notion of life chances, makes the class model that is used in the current study close to that of Weber.

At the same time, the class model that is used here is different from Goldthorpe's because unlike his, this study's class model does not include bourgeois and petty bourgeois classes. However, as Rose and Harrison argue, when only occupational data (coded to ISCO88) are available, meaning that there is no data available regarding ownership status (which is the case in this study), a 'simplified mode' of Goldthorpe's (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) Weberian-inspired class schema (note that Goldthorpe does not consider his model to be necessarily Weberian (see Breen 2005:42)), could be applied (Rose and Harrison 2007; also Harrison and Rose 2006). This simplified model bases its class categorization only on the information on occupation that is used in this study. Therefore, it could be concluded that the class model of the current study is linked to both Weber's and Goldthorpe's models of class analysis. Alternately, the class model of this study can be said to differ from a neo-Marxian class model, which would mainly emphasize the concept of ownership of capital assets, and the notions of exploitation, class consciousness, and class action (but see the discussion regarding the testability of Marxist theory in the concluding chapter).

The proposed model enables the current study to investigate the level of match or mismatch between the general population and Iranian political representatives in terms of their social background. Informed by the literature, this study theorizes that class has important implications and outcomes: both Weber and Goldthorpe emphasize that class positions are associated with differences in life chances. These life chances, in turn, determine one's valuable

resources, such as one's access to education. This argument suggests that educational attainment is a class-based outcome. As Goldthorpe and Jackson argue in the case of Britain (Goldthorpe and Jackson 2007, also see Breen and Goldthorpe 2001), class origin is strongly pertinent in shaping the class of destination. Due to their different life chances, upper and intermediate classes are more likely to gain valuable economic assets and cultural resources including higher education, and therefore have greater chances of experiencing upward mobility, or becoming political representatives. In other words, while the upper class is assumed to have more economic resources, the intermediate class has skills and educational credentials (cultural resources) that can help this group to gain political popularity. Similarly, in the case of Iran, it could be predicted that the higher the class position, the higher the chance of gaining economic and cultural resources, and thus, the higher the chance of being elected as an MP.

Thus, to understand the dynamics of class-state relations in Iran, the current study, first, classifies the population and parliamentarians based on the nine occupation categories. Second, the general population and MPs are classified based on the three-class model. The present study aims to examine the extent to which the composition of occupational categories and class categories in the general population corresponds with that of parliamentarians.

As mentioned earlier, the primary data source for the occupation of MPs is the Iranian Parliamentary Guide. For identification of MPs' class background, the occupation that is reported by them as their latest occupation before their election has been regarded as the source for deciding on their socioeconomic and class status. However, some MPs reported several occupations which made it difficult in ascertaining their occupations just before their election. To solve the possible validity problem, I chose the highest occupation of those MPs whose

occupation list did not seem to be in a historical order, assuming that the highest occupation is more likely to be the occupation of an MP just before his/her election as a parliamentarian.

One remaining issue in the class measurement is the status of the clergy. According to conventional class structures in advanced capitalist settings (International Labour Office 1990:68 and 163), religious experts are categorized as a sub-group under the category of 'professionals'. The current study presumes that, in the case of Iran, it is necessary to create a separate category or stratum for clergy. This is justifiable because a) ascendancy of religious groups just after the revolution, resulting in their significant role in the legislature and the state's functionality, b) in the doctrine of most Islamic Shia factions, religion and politics are deeply intertwined, and c) the process of secularization, at least in an institutional level, is not officially pursued in Iran. Therefore, religious groups and occupations constitute a proportion of the population that is significant enough to be individually classified.

In this study, *clergy* is defined as those who have received Islamic education in the seminary or religious schools and at the same time wear clerical dress, work in an Islamic religious profession, or both. In this case, for example, a clergywoman who received Islamic education and is in religious occupation but does not wear a clerical dress is categorized as clergy stratum and, alternately, a man who received Islamic education but neither wears clerical dress nor works in a religious occupation, is categorized as a layperson. Religious education has been classified based on the stages of seminary education. In the preliminary stage, *Moghaddamat*, which takes approximately 4 years, seminary students are taught Arabic literature and introductory courses. The intermediate level, *Sotouh*, takes a minimum of 5 years and includes *Fighh* and *Osul-e Feghh* courses. The advanced level, *Kharej*, which is designed to develop the analytical and reasoning skills of the students, takes between 8 to 10 years. *Ejtehaad*

is the highest level of Islamic religious education and is the certification of the successful completion of the *Kharej* level. Clergies, however, are not considered here as a class.

With regard to the modern educational distribution of the Iranian population and its variation during the past three decades, this study utilizes the available data provided by the Statistical Center of Iran, the Iranian ministry of Education, the Organization for Educational Research and Planning, the Iran Data Portal of the Syracuse University, and the World Bank development data. This study adopts a five-group categorization for the level of the education among both Members of Parliament and the general population. These categories include 'less than high school,' 'high school diploma,' 'bachelor,' 'masters and GP (general practitioner),' and 'professional and specialty doctorate.' The number of years spent in each level of modern and religious education in the Iranian education system are reported in table 11.

Table 11: Educational levels by the average number of years spent in each level

		Number of years	Cumulative years
Religious Education	Moghaddamat	4	4
	Sotouh	5	9
	Kharej	8	17
	Ejtehaad	2	19
Modern Education	Less than high school	8	8
	High school	4	12
	Bachelor	4	16
	Masters and GP (general physician)	3	19
	Professional and specialty doctorate	4	23

Source: Howzeh Elmiyeh (2016), Ministry of Education, Statistical Center of Iran

The age variable is categorized based on the Statistical Center of Iran classification. This classification is composed of 5-year age groups, i.e. 15-19, 20-24, etc. In the dataset of Iranian representatives, the date of birth of MPs is identified and, therefore, for the sake of the analysis, is calculated to show their age at the moment of the election.

Likewise, based on the Statistical Center of Iran's definition, the residence status reflects the distribution of the Iranian population who live in urban or rural areas. According to SCI, each geographical area with a municipality is considered an urban centers, while, contiguous spaces and lands - agricultural or nonagricultural - located outside of city borders and having independent, registered or conventional boundaries are considered rural (Statistical Center of Iran 2013b:96). For the major and medium city versus small city divisions, to be consistent across all years, this study categorizes the capital of each province as well as cities with economic and population[67] importance as major and medium cities and counts other cities as small. With a few exceptions, this pattern is justifiable for all years when cities in each category remained in the same category during the time. The exceptions are the cities of Karaj (Alborz province), and Islamshahr and Shahriar (Tehran province), which have seen explosive growth in recent years and have gone from unimportant and underpopulated cities to mega-cities. Since this study takes the place of birth of members of parliament as the indicator of their residence status, these exceptional cases have been treated as small cities because they were rather small 30 years ago when the younger MP in the ninth Majles was born.

Due to the lack of data on ethnicity in the Iranian national censuses, calculation of an index of dissimilarity for ethnic representation is not possible. An intersectionality analysis, however, is presented to investigate whether being in a double-minority situation, e.g., being an

[67] More than 100 thousands population

ethnic minority woman in the case of this study, contributes in locating a MP in a disadvantaged status. Based on different estimates, between 16 and 24% of the Iran's population are Azari (Turks). Iranian Turks mostly live in eastern and western Azerbaijan, Ardebil, Zanjan, and Qazvin provinces, and are also scattered throughout many other cities of Iran. Between 7% and 10% of the country's population is estimated to be Kurd, making Kurds the second largest ethnic minority in Iran. Iranian Kurds mainly reside in the west side of the country, such as Kurdistan and Kermanshah provinces and in southern cities of the Western Azerbaijan province. Iranian Lors compose about 5% of whole population and is the third largest ethnic group in Iran. They live in the south-west of western Iran, mainly in Lurestan and Kermanshah provinces. Iranian Baluchis comprise around 2% of population and reside mainly in Baluchistan province. Turkmans approximately compose 2% of Iran's population, and live in the Turkoman Sahra and in the Gorgan plains on the north-east borders (see Rashidvash 2013:220-23). The birthplace of an MP (city) has been regarded as an indication of his/her ethnic origin.

The censuses suffer from non-existing data regarding the number of Sunnis[68] in the general population. Data are however available for the population of legally recognized non-Muslim religions: Armenians, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Jews, and Zoroastrians. They have been identified in both the general population and among the members of the parliament and the index of dissimilarity has been calculated to assess the religious representation in Iran.

Another important issue is the correspondence between the Majles terms and censuses. In the period of our analysis, 10 Majles have been inaugurated and 4 subsequent censuses have been conducted by the Statistical Center of Iran. In this study, MPs year of election are compared to the nearest census (see table A1 in Appendix A). Thus, the first, second, and third terms of

[68] It is estimated that between 5% and 10% of the Iranian Muslims are Sunni.

Majles (1980, 1984, and 1988) have been linked to the results of the 1986 census; the fourth, fifth, and sixth terms of Majles (1992, 1996 and 2000) are connected to the 1996 census; the seventh and eighth Majleses (2004 and 2008) are linked to the 2006 censuses; and the 2011 census corresponds with the ninth and tenth Majleses (2012 and 2016).

Table 12: Cross-tabulation of Census Years by Majles Terms and number of MPs

Majles Term		Census Year				Total
		1986	1996	2006	2011	
	1980	329				329
	1984	277				277
	1988	278				278
	1992		267			267
	1996		248			248
	2000		274			274
	2004			281		281
	2008			285		285
	2012				286	286
	2016				289	289
Total		884	789	566	575	2814
(% of total)		(31.4)	(28.0)	(20.1)	(20.4)	(100)

To obtain the most accurate results, all comparisons must be based on the 25-74 age group of the population, which is close to the range of MPs' age. However, while the data for this age group was available for some years but not available for some other years, I examined whether its use as a yardstick makes a difference. In other cases, when the data is unavailable for all years, the closest age groups (population in the voting age or the economically active population) have been used for the comparison and it has been noted that the results should be treated with caution. In this case, the index of dissimilarity potentially contains the error of comparing two groups that does not necessarily have similar characteristics. This is specifically highlighted when one considers that the young generation is unevenly distributed among social

classes. To the extent that the upper class representatives tend to be more senior, the result of comparison might be biased. In addition, every possible effort is made to minimize the size of missing or unspecified cases, specifically in the case of the members of the Iranian parliament. These efforts include, but are not limited to, consulting newspapers, webs and blogs, interviews, biographies and diaries, personal communications, and utilizing the aforementioned complementary sources of data[70].

Statistics

To standardize MPs' socioeconomic representation across time, the conventional 'index of dissimilarity' will be calculated. This index represents the ratio of the proportion of various class categories among Iranian parliamentarians in the numerator, and the corresponding proportion of the Iranian population in the denominator (see Guppy, Freeman and Buchan 1987). A figure of 1.00 implies equal representation of a given class category, a figure over 1.00 denotes overrepresentation, and a figure below 1.00 denotes underrepresentation. The dissimilarity index helps to answer the question of class representation, specifically, the extent to which each class category of parliamentarians proportionally represents its counterparts in Iranian society.

The Index of Diversity is also generated in order to provide the answer to the question of how diverse/concentrated is the distribution of MPs within class categories. This index has been calculated using the formula of $1 - [\Sigma\, n(n-1)/N(N-1)]$, where 'n' represents the number of people in each class category and 'N' represents the total number of people in all categories (see Knoke, Bohrnstedt and Mee 2002:46-47).

[70] In 14 cases, the researcher referred to MPs' biographies to identify their previous occupations. In two cases, the MPs' interviews was utilized in finding their demographic and socioeconomic background. In addition, in about 30 cases, MPs' resumes was used to identify their place of birth.

Moreover, a multinomial logistic regression is performed to more accurately estimate the effect of predictors, such as education, clerical status, age, gender, and residence on the nominal outcome variable of class status of parliamentarians. A multinomial analysis will enable the current study to determine which variables are important, and which are not, for predicting the class background of MPs when controlling the effects of other variables.

With regard to ethnicity, this study utilizes information regarding those specific cities that are ethnically diverse and will run an intersectionality analysis.

Ethical Concerns

As Neuman (2007:245) notes, since people are not directly involved in 'nonreactive' types of research, such as historical and secondary data analysis, ethical issues are not a serious concern in the current study.

CHAPTER EIGHT: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

The main propose of this study is to understand the pattern of change in socioeconomic representation in the Iranian politics, as illustrated by the membership of the Iranian parliament as well as by finding an answer to the question as to whether all Iranian social classes have a voice in the Majles. This chapter will first provide general information about and a description of ten post-revolution Majles terms. In the next step, a comprehensive comparison between the Majles' composition and the characteristics of the general population is delivered in order to enable this study to answer its research questions, to test its hypothesis, and to justify its position in the context of the literature. This comparison takes place along seven lines of analysis: class background, educational attainment, clerical verses non-clerical distribution, representation of religious minorities, residence status, gender distribution, and age distribution. The focus here is on trends and patterns of change and the level of match or mismatch between the composition of political representatives and the general population. A full discussion of the implications of the results, however, is presented in the Discussion and Conclusion chapter.

Descriptive Analysis

According to Article No. 63 of the Islamic Republic Constitution (2007 [1989]), the election of each Majles term should be conducted well prior to the termination of the incumbent Majles, and in such a way that the country never remains without a Majles. Ten terms of Majles have been inaugurated, one at every interval of four years, since 1980, the year following the Islamic Revolution. During the past 37 years of Majleses, 1764 persons have occupied 2814 representative positions. That means that the remaining 1050 persons have been elected twice or more as Majles deputies. According to the law, there is no limitation on the number of times that one person can register in the Majles elections as a candidate. As table 13 shows, with the

exception of the first Majles, in which all the deputies had been elected for the first time, more than 50% of each subsequent Majles were new representatives[71] (Ministry of Interior 2017).

Table 13: Majles Terms by the percentage of first time representatives

Majles Term	Year	Number of deputies	First-time deputies N (%)
1 (1980)	1980-1984	329	329 (100)
2 (1984)	1984-1988	277	170 (61)
3 (1988)	1988-1992	278	152 (55)
4 (1992)	1992-1996	267	157 (59)
5 (1996)	1996-2000	248	127 (51)
6 (2000)	2000-2004	274	170 (62)
7 (2004)	2004-2008	281	161 (57)
8 (2008)	2008-2012	285	154 (54)
9 (2012)	2012-2016	286	166 (58)
10 (2016)	2016-2020	289	178 (62)
Total	**1980-2020**	**2814**	**1764 (100)**

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011), Ministry of Interior (2017)

Table 14 contains information regarding the representatives who have had previous experience sitting as Majles deputies as well as the number of times that they have been elected. This table reveals that on average, 65% of MPs have been elected once or twice and 35% have entered the Majles three times or more. This table also shows that Majles terms 7 and 9 have

[71] For a discussion of how the Guardian Council Vets MP candidates see chapter 4.

contained the most experienced MPs with 48% of its members having been elected three times or more. Data, however, have not yet been released for the tenth Majles.

Table 14: Percentages of reelected representatives by frequency of being elected

Majles Term	Representation History		Total N
	Two times	Three times or more	
2	100%	0.0%	107
3	67.5	32.5	126
4	58.2	41.8	110
5	64.3	34.7	121
6	51.7	35.6	104
7	58.8	47.5	120
8	52.5	41.2	131
9	64.4	48.3	120
10	NA	NA	111
Total	**65.3**	**35.7**	**1050**

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Table 15 paints a descriptive picture of all variables of the study. More than half of the representatives had an upper class background while 40% and 7% came from intermediate and working class background respectively. With regards to MPs' modern education, most of the members of parliament have some university education or Master's degrees, ranging from 16 and 19 years of modern education. Those who received religious education are mostly in the third level of religious education: *Kharej*, who receive 17 years of religious education on average. One fourth of MPs have been non-clergy, while non-Muslims constituted about 2% of

representatives. The majority of MPs were born in small cities or villages. About 3% of MPs are women. The mode of the age groups is 35-44 years old, and fewer that 40% of representatives are elected more than once.

Table 15: Descriptive statistics of variables of the Study

Variables	N	%	Valid %
Class[72]			
Upper Class	1296	51.3	52.0
Intermediate Class	1020	40.4	40.9
Working Class	175	6.9	7.0
Total	2491	98.7	100
Missing	34	1.3	
Total	2525[1]	100	
Modern education			
Less than high school	159	5.7	6.3
High school	219	7.8	8.6
Bachelor	840	29.9	33.1
Masters and GP	814	28.9	32.1
Professional and specialty doctorate	505	17.9	19.9
Total	2537	90.2	100
Unknown	277	9.8	
Total	2814[2]	100	
Religious education			
Moghaddamat	106	3.8	11.5
Sotouh	241	8.6	26.1
Kharej	454	16.1	49.2
Ejtehaad	121	4.3	13.1
Total	922	32.8	100
Not applicable	1892	67.2	
Total	2814[2]	100	
Clergy status[73]			
Clerics	713		25.3
Non clerics	2101		74.7
Total	2814[2]		100
Religion			
Christian	26		1.1
Jewish	9		0.4
Zoroastrian	9		0.4
Muslim	2481		98.3
Total	2525[1]		100

[72] A detailed classification of occupations is presented in next section of this chapter.

[73] Total number of clergy is different from those who have religious education because, as described in the methodology chapter, some MPs who received religious education neither wear clergy dress, nor work as a clergy.

Place of Birth		
Major and Medium Cities	1114	44.2
Small Cities/Villages	1386	55.0
Outside Iran	21	0.8
Total	2525[1]	100
Sex		
Men	2726	96.9
Women	88	3.1
Total	2814[2]	100
Age groups		
25-34	361	14.3
35-44	1017	40.3
45-54	856	33.9
55-64	244	9.7
65-74	47	1.9
Total	2525[1]	100
Representation History		
Once	1586	62.8
Twice	604	23.9
Three times or more	335	13.3
Total	2525[1]	100

1: excluding Majles 10
2: including Majles 10

Class and Occupational Representation

The aim of this section is to provide an answer to the main research question of this study: what is the pattern of socioeconomic representation of post-revolution Iranian MPs and how has the pattern changed since the revolution? As discussed in the methodology chapter, and based on their pre-election occupations, members of parliament have been classified into three class categories: an upper class (Legislators, senior officials and military officers, and high-grade managers), an intermediate class (professionals and associate professionals), and a working class (clerks, service and sales workers, agricultural workers, semi-skilled and elementary workers). The overall result of nine terms of Majles indicates that MPs are mostly divided between those who had an upper class (51%) and those from an intermediate class backgrounds (40%). About 7% had served as a worker in his/her pre-election occupation. A more detailed distribution of

occupations among members of the parliament is presented in table 16. As shown, the distribution of first-time elected MPs between class categories is almost the same as their distribution when all members are taken into consideration. This finding provides a primary indication as to whether or not the occupational background of an MP can predict the chance of his/her reelection. The distinction between first-time elected MPs and total MPs, however, indicates that members of the upper class are slightly more likely to be reelected than MPs from intermediate or working classes.

Table 16: MPs' occupational and class background and the number of election

Class and Occupation Categories	First-time MPs		All MPs	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Upper Class	**793**	**50.0**	**1296**	**51.3**
Legislators and senior officials	381	24.0	635	25.1
Managers	381	24.0	602	23.8
Military officials	31	2.0	59	2.3
Intermediate Class	**651**	**41.0**	**1020**	**40.4**
Legal, social, and cultural professionals	353	22.3	547	21.7
Teaching professionals	233	14.7	376	14.9
Science and engineering professionals	22	1.4	41	1.6
Health professionals	34	2.1	43	1.7
Technical and associate professionals	9	0.6	13	0.5
Working Class	**114**	**7.2**	**175**	**6.9**
Clerks	30	1.9	47	1.9
Service workers and market salesmen	74	4.7	115	4.6
Skilled agriculture and fishery workers	10	0.6	13	0.5
Total	1558	98.2	2491	98.7
Missing Cases	**28**	**1.8**	**34**	**1.3**
Total	1586	100	2525	100.0

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

The next table reports the distribution of the MPs' occupational backgrounds for each Majles. It shows the pattern of change in socioeconomic representation of MPs since the Islamic Revolution. This table demonstrates that the percentage of legislators (25%), managers (24%),

legal, social and cultural professionals (22%), and teaching professionals (15%) have been high in all Majleses. The percentages of legislators and managers have increased since the Revolution, particularly after the 3rd Majlis. In contrast, the percentages of legal and professional groups, including clerics, has continuously decreased (see tables 19 and 20). The decrease in the share of the legal and professional group is associated with the striking decrease of number of clerics in Majles. As will be further discussed in the next chapter, the significant increase of the number of legislators, senior officials, and managers, who, in Nomani and Behdad's terminology, are referred to as political functionaries, can be explained by the political resources that these groups were able to obtain by serving the political state. It could also be assigned to the vetting process by the Guardian Council that naturally tends to trust those who have already proven to be insiders. The data show that the share of MPs with a background in petty commodity and skilled agricultural occupations has started to drop since the fourth Majles in 1992. This trend seems to be in concordance with the same trend of a relative decrease in the size and importance of the petty bourgeois class in the general population as a result of the introduction of liberalist economic policies beginning in 1989 (see chapter five).

Table 17: Cross-tabulation of Majles terms and MPs' occupational background

Majles Term	Occupation Categories (%)											Total
	Legislators and senior officials	Managers	Military officials	Legal, social, and cultural professionals	Teaching professionals	Science and engineering professionals	Health professionals	Technical and associate professionals	Clerks	Service workers and market salesmen	Skilled agriculture and fishery workers	
1	17.6	16.6	1.6	35.5	17.9	0.3	0.6	0.0	1.6	5.8	2.6	313
2	16.2	12.4	2.3	37.6	17.3	1.5	0.8	0.8	3.0	7.1	1.1	266
3	22.1	18.1	1.8	28.3	12.0	2.9	1.4	1.8	3.3	8.0	0.4	276

4	29.2	22.1	3.7	22.8	10.1	1.5	1.5	1.1	2.6	4.9	0.4	267
5	34.7	28.2	3.7	11.8	11.0	2.4	1.2	0.8	1.2	4.9	0.0	245
6	38.2	35.7	2.2	9.2	8.1	1.1	2.6	0.4	1.1	1.5	0.0	272
7	22.1	31.0	1.4	17.1	19.2	2.5	1.1	0.0	1.1	4.6	0.0	281
8	26.3	29.8	2.5	16.8	17.9	1.4	1.4	0.0	2.5	1.4	0.0	285
9	25.2	24.5	2.4	16.4	21.0	1.4	4.9	0.0	0.7	3.5	0.0	286
Total	635 (25.1)	602 (23.8)	59 (2.4)	547 (22.0)	376 (15.1)	41 (1.6)	43 (1.7)	13 (0.5)	47 (1.9)	115 (4.6)	13 (0.5)	2491

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

For a picture of the changes in the class background of Iranian members of parliament, refer to table 18. This table demonstrates that the percentage of upper class MPs increased from the first Majles up to 6th Majles before decreasing. Contrarily, MPs with an intermediate class background have shown an overall decrease in representation since the Revolution up until the sixth Majles, with slight increases afterwards. With regards to the significance of the sixth Majles, it should be noted that the Guardian Council applied a more restrictive approach to vetting Majles candidates after the sixth Majles, during which a relatively open-minded vetting by the Council had facilitated the election of members of the reformist camp to the Majles; reformist MPs of the sixth Majles started to challenge established political procedures in Iran (see chapter 4). Thereafter, the Council started to vet candidates with higher degrees of precaution and began to trust less well-known insider professionals and figures (see chapter six). The considerable change in the turnout of the Majles election can also be seen as responsible for the observed shift in the composition of Majleses, though the exact mechanism is unclear: the turnout dropped in the seventh Majles by 16% as compared with the sixth Majles election and remained low for the eighth Majles election. The seventh Majles's turnout was the lowest election participation since the Revolution (for turnout percentages see Table A1 in Appendix A).


Members of parliament from a working class background decreased, though with fluctuations, and remained small in number in recent Majleses. As will be discussed in the concluding chapter, this low representation can be explained by a lack of resources and the lower level of human capital which the working class possesses. The following table and figures indicate the change in MPs' class background. Overall, the data underline public sentiments towards the upper and intermediate classes at the expense of the working classes.

Table 18: Cross-tabulation of Majles terms and MPs' class background

Majles Term	Class Categories (%)			Total
	Upper Class	Intermediate class	Working class	
1	35.8	54.3	9.9	313
2	30.8	57.9	11.3	266
3	42.0	46.4	11.6	276
4	55.1	37.1	7.9	267
5	66.5	27.3	6.1	245
6	76.1	21.3	2.6	272
7	54.4	39.9	5.7	281
8	58.6	37.5	3.9	285
9	53.1	43.7	4.2	286
Total	1296 (52.0)	1067 (42.8)	60 (5.1)	2525

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Figure 10: Class background of MPs by Number of Majles



To identify the class background of clerics, table 19 focuses upon them as a group. As shown, the percentage of occupational categories has increased significantly in two cases when clerical members are included in the analysis: legal, social, and cultural professions, and teaching professions. This implies that the majority of clerics had served in these two occupational groups before their election as MPs.

Table 19: MPs' occupational and class background and clerical status

Class and Occupation Categories	Clergies excluded		All MPs	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Upper Class	**1102**	**60.3**	**1296**	**51.3**
Legislators and senior officials	532	29.1	635	25.1
Managers	527	28.8	602	23.8
Military officials	43	2.4	59	2.3
Intermediate Class	**575**	**31.4**	**1020**	**40.4**
Legal, social, and cultural professionals	255	13.9	547	21.7
Teaching professionals	225	12.3	376	14.9
Science and engineering professionals	40	2.2	41	1.6
Health professionals	42	2.3	43	1.7

Technical and associate professionals	13	0.7	13	0.5
Working Class	**136**	**7.4**	**175**	**6.9**
Clerks	43	2.4	47	1.9
Service workers and market salesmen	88	4.8	115	4.6
Skilled agriculture and fishery workers	5	0.3	13	0.5
Total	1813	99.1	2491	98.7
Missing Cases	**16**	**0.9**	**34**	**1.3**
Total	1829	100	2525	100.0

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

As table 20 shows, the next largest group that clergy came from are the occupations of legislator and senior officials (14%), and managers (10%). Given that the presence of representatives from the clergy has strikingly decreased since the second Majles[74], it could be concluded that the change in occupational composition of MPs is partly due to the change in the number of clerical representatives, who largely tend to come from specific occupational groups.

Table 20: Clerical MPs' occupational and class background

Class and Occupation Categories	Clerical MPs	
	Frequency	Percentage
Upper Class	**194**	**27.9**
Legislators and senior officials	103	14.8
Managers	75	10.8
Military officials	16	2.3
Intermediate Class	**445**	**64.0**
Legal, social, and cultural professionals	292	42.0
Teaching professionals	151	21.7
Science and engineering professionals	1	0.1
Health professionals	1	0.1
Technical and associate professionals	0	0.0
Working Class	**39**	**5.6**
Clerks	4	0.6
Service workers and market salesmen	27	3.9
Skilled agriculture and fishery workers	8	1.1

[74] See the Representation of Clergy Stratum section in this chapter

Total	678	97.4
Missing Cases	**18**	**2.6**
Total	696	100

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Table 21 illustrates the average number of the years spent in modern and religious education as reported for each class category. With regards to mean years of modern education, the upper class has the highest mean number of years of education (17.8 years). The intermediate class category has a mean of 16.7. These two averages years of education together constitute a degree somewhere between a bachelor's and a Master's in Iran. The high mean of modern education in these two classes is reasonable given that this category contains the highest echelon of industrial and bureaucratic officials and managers, as well as higher-grade professionals who are in positions that requires high levels of qualification. The working class predictably holds the lower levels of mean education, somewhere between high school and bachelor's degrees. The Eta test (0.19, p-value=0.03), shows that the differences in means are significant. As will be discussed later, the level of education (as a human capital), particularly modern education, that MPs have received, could thus be converted for use a predictor of their other forms of capital (Abazari, Varij Kazemi and Faraji 2008), and in turn, their chance of being individually reelected as a parliamentarian.

Table 21: Mean Years of Modern and Religious education by MPs' Class Background

	Modern Education			Religious Education		
	Mean	Std. Deviation	N	mean	Std. Deviation	N

Upper Class	17.79	3.44	1223	12.51	5.64	317
Intermediate Class	16.70	4.54	854	14.53	4.53	513
Working Class	14.98	3.57	151	12.11	4.85	62

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Table 22 shows the socioeconomic representation of members of parliament and its changes since the Islamic Revolution. It shows an overrepresentation of the upper and an underrepresentation of the working classes in all terms of the Majles since the Islamic Revolution. Members of the intermediate classes are underrepresented in the first three Majleses, underrepresented in the next five Majleses and somewhat overrepresented in the last three Majleses. While underrepresentation of the working classes has not improved over time, the data indicate that the overrepresentation of the upper class has decreased significantly by about six times. Although there has been some decrease in the index of representation for the intermediate class, its change has been in a state of flux. The most significant contributor to the change towards more equal representation of the upper and intermediate class categories seems to be demographic in nature: increase in the population size of these groups (see chapter five).

The percentage of the upper class in both the general population and occupying seats in the Majles has increased over time, though it had a sharper slope in the general population. This table also shows that while the percentage of the intermediate class has increased somewhat in the general population, its counterpart members of parliament experienced a diminishing share in the Majleses from 53% in 1986 to 44% in 2011.

For the purpose of comparing class diversity in both the general population and Majles, the Index of Diversity has also been calculated. It shows that unlike the general population, in

which the diversity of classes has increased since the Revolution, from 0.41 to 0.55, it has slightly decreased among parliamentarians from 0.58 to 0.53. This suggests that the extent of diversity among MPs compared to the general population has decreased.

Table 22: Socioeconomic representation of MPs by Census Year

Class categories	General Population (1000 persons)				Majles Representatives			
	1986	1996	2006	2011	1st,2nd&3rd Majleses	4rd,5th&6th Majleses	7th & 8th Majleses	9th Majleses
Upper Class	44 (0.9)	325 (5.5)	608 (6.4)	746 (7.5)	310 (36.3)	517 (65.9)	320 (56.5)	149 (52.1)
I of D[75]					**40.3**	**11.9**	**8.8**	**6.9**
Intermediate Class	1421 (27.9)	2334 (39.6)	3926 (41.3)	3794 (38.2)	452 (52.9)	224 (28.6)	219 (38.7)	125 (43.7)
I of D					**1.9**	**0.7**	**0.9**	**1.1**
Working Class	3637 (71.3)	3234 (54.9)	4963 (52.3)	5383 (54.2)	93 (10.5)	43 (5.5)	27 (4.8)	12 (4.2)
I of D					**0.1**	**0.1**	**0.1**	**0.1**
Total N	5102[1]	5893[1]	9497[1]	9923[1]	855	784	566	286
Index of Diversity[76]	**0.41**	**0.53**	**0.55**	**0.55**	**0.58**	**0.48**	**0.53**	**0.53**

1- Economically Active Population

Sources: for distribution of class categories in general population data are from the Statistical Center of Iran (2015); for members of parliament's occupation data come from the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011).

As was discussed in the methodology chapter, to produce an accurate comparison, the population should be limited to the same age group as MPs (25-74). However, I was only able to access data for the age groups 25-65 and over, and 20-65 and over only for the 1986 and 1996 censuses, respectively. The following table compares the number of MPs in three classes with

[75] Index of Dissimilarity: the ratio of the MPs (numerator) to the general population (denominator) in each specific category.

[76] Index of Diversity: how diverse/concentrated is class distribution, using 1 – [Σ n(n-1)/N(N-1)] formula (see chapter seven).

the population in the same age group to show whether this yardstick would make a difference if the data was available for other censuses. A comparison of table 22 and 23 shows that implementation of an age yardstick does not alter the index of dissimilarity for the upper class. However, the overrepresentation of the middle class somewhat increases and that of working class decreases. Nevertheless, the pattern for all classes remained the same.

Table 23: Socioeconomic representation of MPs in same age groups by Census Year

	General Population (1000 persons)		Majles Representatives	
	1986	**1996**	1st,2nd&3rd Majleses	4rd,5th&6th Majleses
Upper class	44	323	310	517
	(0.9)	(5.8)	(36.3)	(65.9)
I of D			**40.3**	**11.4**
Intermediate	1383	2308	452	224
	(31.0)	(41.5)	(52.9)	(28.6)
I of D			**1.7**	**0.7**
Working	3079	2930	93	43
	(68.3)	(52.6)	**(**10.5**)**	(5.5)
I of D			**0.1**	**0.1**
Total	4506[1]	5561[2]	855	784

1- Population in 20-65+ age group 2- Population in 25-65+ age group

Source: for distribution of class categories in general population data are from Statistical Center of Iran 1987 and 1996; for members of parliament's occupation data come from the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011).

The figures 11-13 display the fluctuations of the class representation of Iranian MPs in four periods. An MPs' line above that of the general population denotes overrepresentation and vice versa. As table 50 in the conclusion chapter summarizes, the direction of change in size of each class has been regarded as an indication of match or mismatch. For instance, the size of the upper class in the general population has been increasing since 1986, which matches the same trend among the parliamentarians.

Figure 11: Socioeconomic Representation of Upper Class




Figure 12: Socioeconomic Representation of Intermediate Class





Figure 13: Socioeconomic Representation of Working Class



In order to have a more detailed understanding of occupational representation, table 24 has been derived from the 2011 census, for which the necessary data is available. The 2011 census is available from the Statistical Centre of Iran. This dataset contains a subset (1,481,586 cases which is a sample of 2%) of the general population (74,016,630 persons). Since a stratified sampling method has been applied in extracting the sample, the census data had to be weighted in order to generate valid results. Table 24 affirms the overrepresentation of the highest echelon of the occupational hierarchy, legislators and managers, in corresponding Majleses (2008-2016). Science and engineering professionals are the only group among professionals that are close to equal representation, while other professional occupations are all substantially overrepresented. Technical associate professionals, skilled agricultural and fishery workers, craft and trade workers, and semi- and unskilled workers are occupational groups that have not had representation in the Iranian parliament in recent years, and clerks and service workers have been extremely underrepresented. Armed force and military employees, however, were almost equally represented (I of D = 1.1).

Table 24: Occupational Representation of MPs in the 2011 Census

	General population		MPs	I of D
	Frequency	Valid %	%	
Legislators, senior officials, and managers				
Legislators and senior officials	22671	0.1	25.7	10.0
Managers	715146	3.6	27.1	7.5
Professionals				
legal, social, and cultural professionals	489582	2.5	16.6	6.6
Teaching professionals	900332	4.6	19.4	4.2
Science and engineering professionals	219317	1.1	1.4	1.3
Health professionals	191486	1.0	3.2	3.2
Technical and associate professionals	1113722	5.6	0.0	0.0

Clerks	878009	4.5	1.6	0.4
Service workers and shop and market sales workers	2312599	11.7	2.5	0.2
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	3554481	18.1	0.0	0.0
Crafts and related trades workers	3496461	17.7	0.0	0.0
Planet and machine operators, assemblers and drivers	2240262	11.4	0.0	0.0
Elementary occupations workers	3136531	15.9	0.0	0.0
Armed forces	436802	2.2	2.5	1.1
Total	19707401	100.0	100	
Missing System	54309229			
Total	74016630			

Sources: for distribution of occupational categories data are from the Statistical Center of Iran website (https://www.amar.org.ir/english/Population-and-Housing-Censuses); for members of parliament's occupation data come from the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011).

A re-classification of pre-election occupations of members of the parliament will enable the current study to analyze the composition of parliamentarians in further details. For this purpose, Iranian parliamentarians have been classified in eleven categories as shown in Table 25. This table shows that the most populated occupational category, consisting of about one-fourth of MPs, is that of university and seminary professors. Governors and public sector managers are the next largest occupational groups, entailing 18.6% and 18.1% of parliamentarians respectively. Religious and cultural professionals, and teachers and civil employers together constitute 25%. Only 5.4% of Iranian members of parliament used to serve as judges, lawyers, or judiciary officials, and the share of businesspersons, merchants, and Bazaaris is just 1.2%. The extent of representation of legal professionals and the business class has important implications for the study of occupational representation, particularly with regards to the extent to which representatives are from selective socioeconomic statuses (see the next chapter).

Table 25: MPs' Pre-election Occupations

Pre-election Occupation of MPs	Frequency	Percent
Governors and political functionaries	496	18.6
Judiciary officials, judges and lawyers	145	5.4
Public sector managers	482	18.1
Private sector managers	122	4.6
Merchants, Bazaaris, and businesspersons	31	1.2
Professors (university and seminary)	542	20.4
Teachers and civil employees	318	12.0
Religious and cultural professionals	351	13.2
Engineers and technicians	54	2.0
Physicians	61	2.3
Military officers	59	2.2
Total	2661	100
Missing	153[1]	
Total	2814[1]	

1- Including 10th Majles

Sources: for Majles one to nine data are from The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011); for members of 10th parliament occupation data come from the Ministry of Interior. 2017

In the following sections, the representation of Iranian members of parliament and its changes is tested in six categories: educational attainment, clerical verses non-clerical distribution, religious minorities, place of birth, gender distribution, and age distribution. These sections investigate the extent to which parliamentarians proportionally represent their electorates.

Educational Distribution

In terms of educational background, the Majles representatives can be divided based upon the type of education which they have received: religious or modern. Table 26 shows that in all terms of the Majles, among MPs who reported their level of modern education, the majority

(60%) had Bachelor's or Master's degrees. Less than 20% had received professional or specialty doctorates and the rest, less than 15%, had a high school diploma or had received lower levels of education. About 10% of MPs did not report their modern level of education, and who are mostly the clergy members of parliament. A separation between first-time elected and all MPs reveals that the education variable can be regarded as a predictor of being elected more than once. As shown in the last two categories of education, those with higher levels of education, e.g., Master's and Doctorates, are more likely to be elected more than once.

Table 26: MPs' Modern Educational Attainment for First time and All MPs

	First-time MPs		All MPs	
Modern Education	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Less than high school	105	6.6	159	6.3
High school	141	8.9	219	8.6
Bachelor's	532	33.5	840	33.1
Masters and GP	419	26.4	814	32.1
Professional and specialty doctorate	235	14.8	505	19.9
Total	1586	100.0	2537	100.0

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

With regards to religious education (table 27), out of 931 members of parliament in all Majleses who had received religious education, the majority are in *Kharej* level, whose certification of completion is equivalent to an academic PhD degree in a modern education, according to the Iranian Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution (SCCR).

Table 27: MPs' Level of Traditional Education

Religious Education	Frequency	Percentage
Moghaddamat	106	11.5
Sotouh	241	26.1
Kharej	454	49.2
Ejtehaad	121	13.1
Total	922	100
Inapplicable	1883	
Total	2814	

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

There is a high number of cases, 1883 (67%), who did not report their religious education. To make sure that this high rate of cases is not missing and does not pose a serious problem with the validity of the education data, table 28 was created. This table, a cross-tabulation of modern and religious education, includes all MPs with both types of education. It shows that almost all (except 4 who are missing cases) of those who did not report any type of education are those who had received the other type of education. Among the 227 missing cases in the modern education, 223 cases are members of the clergy who instead, possessed a religious education.

Table 28: Crosstabulation of Religious and Modern Education for MPs, 1980-2016

Modern Education	Traditional Education					Missing	Total
	Moghaddamat	*Sotouh*	*Kharej*	*Ejtehaad*	Other		
Less than high school	1	36	81	25	2	14	159
High school Diploma	9	37	86	18	0	69	219

Bachelor's	43	65	59	6	5	662	840
Master's and GP	33	45	33	6	2	695	814
Professional and specialty Doctorate	20	16	23	7	0	439	505
Missing	0	39	175	59	0	4	277
Total	106	238	457	121	9	1883	2814

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

To identify the changes in the religious and modern educational qualifications of representatives within the ten terms of Majles, tables 29 and 30 have been generated[77]. These two tables help this study to highlight the opposing relationship that exists between the two forms of education in post-revolution Majleses. Table 29 shows that since the first term of Majles, the frequency of parliamentarians with higher levels of modern education has increased. The average year of schooling of each Majles shows this trend. The percentage of religiously educated MPs shows the opposite trend: the number of MPs who have received religious education has been steadily declining. This is compatible with the trend of declining clerical representatives since the Revolution. The increase in the general level of modern education among MPs could also be seen as a result of the technical change in the minimum educational requirements for Majles candidates which came to effect in 2006. This change required that the Majles candidates have at least a Master's degree or its equivalent. It should be noted, however, that the new regulation exempted candidates who formerly served as Majles representatives. This is why the frequency of the educational categories lower than a Master's degree is not zero after the eighth Majles when the new regulation was in place.

[77] Note that the difference between figures in this table and the findings of Vakili-Zad (1994) and Gheisarianfard and Khosravizadeh (2012) is due to the different N used in calculating the percentages. In other words, they compared, for instance, modern educated MPs in each category with all MPs, while the current study compared them just with those who had modern education and excluded the religiously educated MPs from the total N, which obviously creates more accurate results.

Table 29: MPs' Mean Years of Modern Education

Majles Term	Level of Modern Education						Mean years of modern education (8-23)	Standard Deviation	% of religiously educated MPs in each Majles	Total
	Less than high school	High school Diploma	Bachelor's	Master's and GP	Professional and specialty Doctorate	Total				
First	21.0	17.9	34.0	16.4	10.7	262	14.84	4.665	20.4	329
Second	22.1	23.4	40.7	10.4	3.5	231	13.85	3.995	16.6	277
Third	10.4	21.2	52.8	10.8	4.8	250	14.98	3.519	10.1	278
Fourth	4.9	13.6	47.7	23.9	9.9	243	16.47	3.486	9.0	267
Fifth	5.0	3.6	43.7	32.9	14.9	222	17.49	3.440	10.5	248
Sixth	1.2	3.1	38.2	37.5	20.1	259	18.31	3.022	5.5	274
Seventh	0.0	3.9	30.1	38.7	27.3	256	18.92	3.004	8.9	281
Eighth	0.0	0.4	30.7	40.9	28.0	257	19.17	2.728	9.8	285
Ninth	0.4	1.5	12.0	51.6	34.5	275	19.88	2.648	3.8	286
Tenth	0.0	0.4	8.5	51.8	39.4	282	20.29	2.363	2.4	289
Total	159	219	840	814	505	2537	17.51	3.970	-	2814

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Table 30 shows the distribution of levels of traditional education within the ten terms of Majles. Unlike the ever-increasing levels of modern education, the average number of years spent in religious education has not changed across different terms of Majles. Likewise, the majority of representatives have had *Kharej* certification, and accordingly, the mean of the

religious education remained well above the average (average=13.7). The number of non-religiously educated MPs, however, increased. Together, tables 29 and 30 illustrate the composition of MPs in terms of the level and the type of education they received and the pattern of change since the Revolution. As will be further discussed later, the striking incremental increase in the number of modern-educated MPs is consistent with the same trend in the expansion of modern education within Iranian society since the Revolution.

Table 30: MPs' Mean Years of Traditional Education

Majles Term	Level of Religious Education					Mean of religious education (4-19)	Standard Deviation	% of modern educated MPs in each Majles	Total
	Moghaddamat	*Sotouh*	*Kharej*	*Ejtehaad*	Total				
First	11.0	23.4	48.2	17.4	218	14.05	5.066	33.7	329
Second	5.6	24.0	58.1	12.3	179	14.60	4.432	35.4	277
Third	14.3	26.9	45.4	13.4	119	13.26	5.305	57.2	278
Fourth	17.9	21.1	46.3	14.7	95	13.28	5.552	64.4	267
Fifth	20.0	23.8	38.8	17.5	80	12.85	5.735	67.7	248
Sixth	7.5	32.1	50.9	9.4	53	13.64	4.776	80.7	274
Seventh	7.4	32.4	55.9	4.4	68	13.54	4.657	75.8	281
Eighth	9.1	38.2	41.8	10.9	55	12.98	4.953	80.7	285
Ninth	16.7	27.1	50.0	6.3	48	12.79	5.351	83.2	286
Tenth	0.0	42.9	57.1	0.0	7	13.57	4.276	97.5	289
Total	106	241	454	121	922	13.68	5.066	-	2814

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Table 31 examines the educational representation of MPs in the general population based on the available data from the 2006 and 2011 censuses of those with university educations. It shows a high rate of overrepresentation of university educated MPs in all terms of Majles[78], which by itself, supports the liberal-pluralist thesis (see the conclusion chapter). The overrepresentation of educated MPs, however, has been decreasing among bachelor and master's degree holders as a result of the expansion of education in the society, or what has been termed 'inflation of educational credentials' (Collins 2011).

Another interesting finding of table 31 is that the higher the level of education, the greater the educational overrepresentation, which could be partly due to the increase in the minimum educational requirement for Majles candidacy. The overrepresentation of professional and specialty doctorate is as high as 125 and 179. The explanations and implication of this pattern will be discussed in the next chapter of this study. A class-based explanation will also ask the extent to which education is a class-based asset.

Table 31: Educational representation of MPs by Census

Level of modern education	General Population		Majles Representatives	
	2006	2011	7th & 8th Majleses	9th &10th Majleses
Bachelor's	3927686 (11.6%)	5689701 (14.0%)	156 (27.6)	57 (10)
I of D			**2.3**	**0.7**
Master's and GP	336467 (1.0%)	577260 (1.4%)	204 (36.0)	288 (50.1)
I of D			**36**	**35.8**
Professional and specialty Doctorate	62844 (0.2)	93614 (0.2)	142 (25.1)	206 (35.8)
I of D			**125**	**179**
Total N	**33736247[1]**	**40686959[1]**	**566**	**575**

[78] except bachelors in 2011

1- Population in 25-74 age group

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011), Statistical Centre of Iran, UN Statistical Yearbook (2017)

Representation of Clerical Stratum

The clerical stratum of the Islamic Republic's Majles has always been a strong and effective group. The discourse of the clergy, as men or women who profess Islamic ideology, has always played an important role in the process of legislation. Nevertheless, the actual presence of the clergy in the Majles has been decreasing. As table 32 shows, 25% of the MPs in all 37 years of the Islamic Majleses have been members of the clerical stratum. Among them, there are 20 women clerics who constitute 23% of the total number of women in all Majleses.

Table 32: Clergy Status of MPs by Gender

Clergy Status	Gender		Total N (% of Total)
	Men	Women	
Cleric	693 (97.2%)	20 (2.8%)	713 (25%)
Non Cleric	2033 (96.8%)	68 (3.2%)	2101 (75%)
Total			2814

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

A detailed observation of the percentage of clerical representatives within each Majles provides valuable information regarding the pattern of change in the size of clerical

representatives (see table 33). With two exceptions, namely the second and seventh Majleses, the overall proportion of clerical representation has been in decline since the Revolution. The greatest decline occurred in the most recent Majles, when clerics lost 50% of their seats in the 2016 Majles election which marked an 88% and 90% decrease when compared to the first and second Majleses, respectively. In another words, while more than half of the first and second Majleses were clergy, that number has dropped to only 6% in the tenth Majles.

Table 33: Cross-tabulation of Clergy Status and the Majles Term


Majles Terms	Clergy Status			Total N
	Cleric	Yearly change in size of cleric MPs (%)	Non-cleric	
1	167 (50.8%)	-	162 (49.2%)	329
2	154 (55.6%)	+ 9	123 (44.4%)	277
3	87 (31.3%)	- 44	191 (68.7%)	278
4	68 (25.5%)	- 18.5	199 (74.5%)	267
5	56 (22.6%)	- 11	192 (77.4%)	248
6	35 (12.8%)	- 43	239 (87.2%)	274
7	49 (17.4%)	+ 36	232 (82.6%)	281
8	45 (15.8%)	- 9	240 (84.2%)	285
9	35 (12.2%)	- 23	251 (87.8%)	286
10	17 (5.9%)	- 52	272 (94.1%)	289

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Figure 14 depicts this decline, starting with the second Majles and following through to the tenth Majles. This trend can be partly assigned to institutional secularization in Iran.

However, as is argued in the next chapter, society's perception of the role of the Iranian parliament and of who is more competent to serve as a legislator seems to be a stronger contributor to this decline.

Figure 14: Clerics versus Non-cleric MPs



To explore whether the clergies are more or less likely to be elected for two or more times, table 34 is created. The data does not support the hypothesis that clerics experience a noticeable difference in the chance of reelection as an MP.

Table 34: MPs' times of election and clerical status

Times of election	Clergies Excluded		All MPs	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Once	1190	65.1	1586	62.8
Twice	420	23.0	604	23.9
Three times or more	219	12.0	335	13.3
Total	1829	100	2525	100.0

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2012)

Table 35 examines clerical representation in Iranian Majleses over time by calculating the Index of Dissimilarity. Based on the available data, two sections of Majleses corresponding with the 1996 and 2011 censuses have been compared. Based on the availability of the data, the cleric and non-cleric MPs are compared with their counterparts among the active population in 1996 and 2011, and among the population of voting age in 2016. Since a comparison between these two populations would entail potential errors, these figures should be treated with caution. However, as I noted in reference to table 22 and 23, this shortcoming produces minimal error. With regards to the number of clergy in the general population, there seems to be an overestimation in the size of the clergy in Iran, as high as 360,000 persons (Khalaji, 2016). However, the current study bases its analysis on the census data. Based on the 1996 and 2011 censuses, 0.5% and 0.2% of the population, respectively, were in clerical occupations like Islamic missionary, prayer imam, marriage officiant, preacher, religious expert, *Mojtahed*, or source of emulation. These figures, of course, exclude seminary students[79] and those for whom clerical occupations are not the source of sustenance. As shown in table 35, the proportion of clergy among MPs has significantly declined over 20 years.

Table 35: Clergy Status in General Population and among MPs

Clergy Status	General Population			Majles Representatives		
	1996	2011	2016 (Maximum estimation)[3]	4rd and 5th Majleses	8th and 9th Majleses	10th Majles (2016)

[79] *Talabeh*

Clerics	72533 (0.5%)	42676 (0.2%)	360000 (0.6)	124 (24.1%)	80 (14)	17 (6%)
I of D				**48**	**70**	**10**
Non-clerics	14499467 (99.5%)	20504324 (99.8%)	57620544 (99.4)	391 (75.9)	491 (86)	272 (94%)
I of D				**0.8**	**0.9**	**0.9**
Total N	14572000[1]	20547000[1]	57980544[2]	515	571	289

1- Economically active population
2- Population in the voting age
3- Khalaji (2016)

Source: Statistical Center of Iran: The Labor Force Survey (2015); The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

The results show a high overrepresentation of clergy among MPs in the early years after the Revolution, which has increased over time. The increase in the Index of Dissimilarity for the clergy's representation, while observing a significant decline in the number of clerical MPs, affirms that the proportion of clergy in the general population has consistently declined alongside the substantial decrease of clerical representation in Majles; otherwise, the clergy representation index would have decreased. Even if we accept the maximum estimations for 2016, which includes clerical students and those for whom religious activities are not the source of sustenance, the clergy's overrepresentation, even though decreasing, is still high (see I of D in the last column of the table 35).

Representation of Religious Minorities

According to Article No. 2 of the Regulations of the Majles Election (2011), three seats are secured for Christian citizens, including Armenians, Assyrians, and Chaldeans in every Majles, and two seats are also secured for the Zoroastrian and Jewish minorities in Iran. The official administration of all religious minorities' elections, except for the Southern Armenians, is in the

Tehran constituency and that of the Southern Armenians is centred in Isfahan constituency. There are no available data regarding the number of Sunni or other religious minorities, either in the Iranian censuses, or in the parliamentary guides. Thus, these groups are excluded from our analysis.

The data indicate that legally recognized religious minorities have never been underrepresented, but they are largely overrepresented in the Majleses of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The index of dissimilarity also represents an equal representation of Muslim MPs (see table 36). While the proportion of religious minority MPs has remained the same in the time since the Revolution, data shows a fluctuation in religious minority representation. This is due to the changes in the total numbers of representatives, as well as changes in the number of religious minorities in the general population. The data show that Jewish Iranians have been better represented than Zoroastrians, and Zoroastrians in recent decade have been better represented than Christians in the Majles. As has been noted before, due to the inavailability of data for the same age group of MPs (25-74), the comparison entails potential errors, and thus, the figures should be treated with caution.

Table 36: Religion Distributions for the General Population and MPs

Religion	General Population			Majles Representatives		
	1996	2006	2011	4th,5th&6th Majleses	7th&8th Majleses	9th Majleses
Christian	78745 (0.13%)	109415 (0.16%)	117704 (0.16%)	8 (1.0%)	6 (1.1%)	3 (1.0%)
I of D				7.7	6.9	6.9
Jewish	12737 (0.02%)	9252 (0.01%)	8756 (0.01%)	3 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.3%)
I of D				20	40	30

Zoroastrian	27920 (0.05%)	19823 (0.03%)	25271 (0.03%)	3 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.3%)
I of D				**8**	**13**	**10**
Muslim	59788791 (99.8%)	70097741 (99.8%)	74682842 (99.8%)	775 (98.2%)	545 (98.2%)	281 (98.3%)
I of D				**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**
Total N	59908193	70236231	74834573	789	566	575

Sources: Statistical Centre of Iran (2013, 2009), and the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Place of Residence

The birthplace of post-revolution members of parliament indicates that the majority of them come from small urban centres and villages (see table 37). Each Majles also has a small number of members who were born in non-Iranian cities, particularly shrine cities in Iraq.

Table 37: Cross-tabulation of MPs' Place of Birth and Majles Terms


Majles Terms	Place of Birth			Total N
	Major and medium cities (%)	Small cities/villages	Non-Iranian cities	
First	40.4	58.4	1.2	329
Second	35.4	64.0	0.7	277
Third	33.5	65.7	0.7	278
Fourth	36.6	62.0	1.5	267
Fifth	33.8	65.3	0.8	248
Sixth	37.4	62.6	0.0	274

Seventh	37.0	62.6	0.4	281
Eighth	33.0	66.3	0.7	285
Ninth	34.0	64.7	1.4	286

Source: the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

As table 38 shows, the pattern of MPs from small cities and villages outnumbering other MPs has generally persisted and has slightly strengthened since the first Majles. In another words, the number of representatives from small cities or village backgrounds not only has not decreased over time, but maintained and even increased its majority (see figure 15).

Figure 15: Distribution of MPs by Place of Birth



With regards to the distribution of the general population in terms of place of residence (see chapter 4), the urbanization of Iran accelerated during the post-revolution modernization plans starting in the 1990s. This caused the rate of urbanization to leap from 54.3% in 1986, to 71.4% in 2011 at the expense of the number of people who live in rural areas. Accordingly, as the data show, the population of rural areas has decreased by about 20%. The data also assert that

post-revolution modernization helped to decrease the number of villages in the country from 68,122 in 1996 to 61,748 in 2011 (Statistical Center of Iran 2012). This trend of rapid urbanization, accompanied by a decrease in the population and in the actual number of villages, seems to be in contrast to the overrepresentation of Majles representatives who come from small cities and villages. However, a closer look at the urbanization data shows that small cities[80] constitute over 90% of the Iranian urban centres in 1996, and the process of urbanization even increased the proportion of smaller cities to 93% in 2011 (see table 38).

Table 38: Number of the Iranian Cities by Size

Census	Type of the City			Villages
	Major and medium	Small	Total N	
1996	59 (10.0%)	553 (90.0)	612	68122
2006	80 (8.0)	932 (92.0)	1012	63125
2011	86 (7.0)	1053 (93.0)	1139	61748

Source: Statistical Centre of Iran (2012b)

Apparently, urban-to-urban migration, the only type of migration that is rising at the expense of other types of migration (see table 2 in chapter 3), has greatly helped population increases in small cities, which is reflected in the increase of the quantity of such cities. This increase, interestingly, has a slow pace similar to the increase in the number of MPs with a

[80] cities with population of less than 100,000

background in small cities. In other words, in accordance with the increase of the number of small cities from 1986 to 2011, a similar increase in the number of the representatives who come from the small cities has occurred. This correspondence suggests that as far as the population size of the place of birth is considered, the post-revolution members of parliament represent the general population very well, because the number of MPs from each district is decided based on the city's population size (see the next chapter).

Age Distribution

According to the Regulations of the Majles's elections (2011), the minimum and maximum age requirement for the candidacy of Majles is 30 and 75 years old. Table 39 shows the mean and median age of members of ten Majleses. The table shows an ever-increasing mean age of MPs over time. It also shows that members of the tenth parliament have become more than 11 years older on average, when compared with the first Majles.

Table 39: Descriptive Statistics of the Age Distribution of MPs

Majles Terms	Minimum Age	Maximum Age	Mean	Median
1	25	74	39.7	38
2	25	69	39.8	38
3	27	68	40.1	39
4	27	69	42.4	41
5	31	69	44.0	43
6	31	71	45.0	44
7	31	74	47.1	46

8	32	73	48.4	48
9	31	73	49.0	49
10	32	73	51.0	-

Source: the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Table 40 shows that the mean age is higher among those who have been elected more than once. The mean age of reelected members of parliament is 6 years higher than the mean of first-time elected representatives.

Table 40: MPs' mean age by Majles terms and representation history


Majles Terms	First-time elected MPs		Two or more times elected MPs	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
1	39.7	329	-	-
2	38.0	170	42.6	107
3	37.1	152	43.8	126
4	40.3	157	45.3	110
5	41.1	127	47.0	121
6	43.7	170	47.2	104
7	44.7	161	50.2	120
8	46.0	154	51.3	131
9	46.2	166	53.0	120
Total	41.7	1586	47.66	939

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Since the number of times elected variable is positively skewed (skewness = 2.2), it is logged. As the correlation between the age of MPs at the time of their election and the log number of times MPs are elected shows, there is a positive relation between those two variables (Pearson = 0.369, p-value 0.000). This means that the increase in the mean age of MPs, at least in part, is related to the number of times MPs are elected. However, as shown in table 13, the pattern of reelection has followed an almost steady trend, when, at least, 40% of the members of every Majles, except the first Majles, have been previously elected MPs.


Figure 16 displays the numbers of representatives in different age groups in the first two and last Majleses, which shows the shift of age distribution over time. This comparison reveals a shift toward an increasing mean age of representatives and demonstrates that the majority of the MPs in the first and second Majleses (1980-1988) have been in the 30-39 age groups, while in the eighth and ninth Majleses (2004-2012), they were in the 45-54 groups.

Figure 16: Age distribution of MPs by Year



As discussed under the Socio-demographic Transformation section in Chapter 3, the majority of the age distribution of the post-revolution Iran is shifting upward toward the middle-age groups. To highlight this shift, the age distribution of both sexes in the general population in 1986 and 2011 are compared in figure 17. For the purpose of the analysis in this section, and since there has not been a MP younger than 25, age groups of less than 25 years have been excluded in this figure. As is evident, the population in the 0 to 9 years in 1986, 34% of the total population, reached to the 25-34 year-old population category in 2011. It should be added that the high rate of population growth continued until the early 1990s which in turn, helped the population in the three age groups of 20-34 in 2011 to enlarge to one third of the total population.

Figure 17: Age distribution of General Population by Year



To determine the extent to which the structural shift in the age distribution of the general population matches the changes in the age configuration of MPs, table 41 has been generated. This table reveals that in the three first terms of the Majles, the 55-74 age groups have been underrepresented and 25-54 age groups have been either equally represented or overrepresented. This pattern has to some extent been reversed in 8th and 9th Majleses, when the 25-44 age groups are underrepresented and those in their 45-64 age group have been equally or overrepresented. This is to say that while the early Majleses after the Revolution included a younger generation of political elites when the age distribution of the society was younger, the recent Majleses have become more representative of the middle age groups, compatible with the population shift in the same direction.

Table 41: Age Distributions for the General Population and the Majles Representatives

Age Groups	General Population		Majles Representatives	
	1986	2011	1st, 2nd & 3rd Majleses	8th & 9th Majleses
25-34	6580280 (38%)	15644578 (38%)	277 (31.3%)	11 (1.3%)
I of D			**0.8**	**0.03**
35-44	3772562 (22%)	10477767 (26%)	354 (40.0%)	159 (18.5%)
I of D			**1.8**	**0.7**
45-54	3254369 (19%)	7557889 (19%)	195 (22.1%)	281 (32.7%)
I of D			**1.2**	**1.7**
55-64	2522378 (15%)	4543026 (11%)	49 (5.5%)	103 (12.0%)
I of D			**0.4**	1.1
65-74	915816 (5%)	2463699 (6%)	9 (1.0%)	17 (3.0%)
I of D			**0.2**	**0.5**
Total N (25-74 age group)	17045405	40686959	884	571

Sources: Statistical Centre of Iran (2013, 2009), the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Gender Representation

By law, Iranian women have equal rights to register as candidates in Majles elections. In terms of gender distribution, the post-revolution Iranian Majles have witnessed a slight increase in the representation of women since the Revolution. Table 42 presents the frequencies and percentages

of post-revolution parliamentarians by gender. As shown, the most recent Majles (2016-2020) includes the highest presence of women in the history of the Islamic Republic Majleses.


Table 42: Gender Distribution of Representatives

	Gender			
Majles Terms	Men	% of total	Women	% of total
1	325	98.8	4	1.2
2	273	98.6	4	1.4
3	274	98.6	4	1.4
4	258	96.6	9	3.4
5	238	96.0	10	4.0
6	263	96.0	11	4.0
7	269	95.7	12	4.3
8	277	97.2	8	2.8
9	277	96.9	9	3.1
10	272	94.1	17	5.9
Total (N)	**2726**	**96.9**	**88**	**3.1**

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

The data show that the number of women increased 125% in the fifth Majles compared to the first Majles. After a slight decline in the eight and nine Majleses, it increased 88% in the tenth Majles compared to the fifth Majles. This marked a 325% increase over 35 years. In another words, with the exception of Majles 8 and 9, the presence of women in the legislative body of the Iranian state has been generally on the rise since the Revolution (see figure 18).

Figure 18: Gender Distributions of MPs



The distribution of the general population, however, indicates a significant underrepresentation of women in the post-revolution Majleses. Table 43 represents the gender distributions among the general population and the Majles representatives within the four censuses, corresponding with Majles terms. The data indicate that only 1.4% of representatives in the first three terms of Majles from 1980 to 1992 were women, which increased up to 4.5% of MPs in last two terms of Majles. In the general population, women normally constitute about half of the population. This means that Iranian women have been strikingly underrepresented during the same period of time (I of D = 0.03 to 0.09 respectively). The pattern of change from the first to the tenth Majleses, however, shows a slight increase toward greater representation of women over time.

Table 43: Gender Distributions for the General Population and the Majles Representatives

Gender	General Population				Majles Representatives			
	1986	1996	2006	2011	1st,2nd&3rd Majleses	4rd,5th&6th Majleses	7th & 8th Majleses	9th&10th Majleses
Men	8693156	11876757	17205485	20750349	872	759	546	549
	(51%)	(51%)	(51%)	(51%)	(98.6%)	(96.2%)	(96.5%)	(95.5%)
I of D					**I.93**	**I.90**	**I.89**	**I.87**
Women	8352248	11411001	16530761	19936609	12	30	20	34
	(49%)	(49%)	(49%)	(49%)	(1.4%)	(3.8%)	(3.5%)	(4.5%)
I of D					**0.03**	**0.08**	**0.07**	**0.09**
Total N	17045405[1]	23287759[1]	33736247[1]	40686959[1]	884	789	566	575

1- Population in 25-74 age group

Sources: Ministry of Interior, Statistical Centre of Iran, and the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Intersectionality Analysis

To explore the extent to which class, ethnic and gender characteristics intersect in placing MPs in a disadvantaged and unequal position, an intersectionality analysis has been presented. First, a description of the MPs' ethnic distribution needs to be drawn. As discussed in the methodology chapter, because of the lack of official data for ethnicity in Iran, this study has measured the ethnic background of the members of Iranian parliament based on their city of birth. MPs who were born in cities with a high concentration of specific ethnic groups are assumed to belong to the respective ethnic minority. Accordingly, five ethnic minority groups have been distinguished in this study: Azaris, Kurds, Lors, Balouchs, and Turkamans. As table 44 shows, parliamentarians with Azari background constitute the largest ethnic minority group in the

Majles, making up 16% of total MPs. This is consistent with the estimations of the size of Azaris in the general population (see chapter 7). Kurds, Lors, and Balouchs also showed to be at least descriptively represented almost equally by their counterparts in the Iranian Majleses as 6 %, 5.7%, and 2.5% of parliamentarians are from these three ethnic background respectively. The findings show that Turkamans are underrepresented, as their share of 0.4% is lower than their estimated size of 2% in the society. A cross-tabulation between ethnic status and class background indicates that there is no relation between these two variables (Pearson Chi-Square= 6.22, df = 10, p-value = 0.796), which suggests that MPs from ethnic minorities do not seem to come from less privileged class backgrounds.

Table 44: Ethnic distribution of the Iranian MPs

Ethnic groups	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Fars	1720	68.1	69.2
Azari	401	15.9	16.1
Kurd	150	5.9	6.0
Lor	141	5.6	5.7
Balouch	63	2.5	2.5
Torkaman	10	0.4	0.4
Total	2485	98.4	100
Missing	40	1.6	
Total	2525	100.0	

Source: Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

An intersectionality analysis of class, ethnicity, and gender suggests that with an exception of Lors, male MPs of all ethnic groups are more likely to belong to the upper class. The analysis also shows that among female MPs, except for Azaris, all other ethnic groups are more or equally likely to have an intermediate occupational background. However, the Pearson

Chi-Square test (6.22, df = 10, p-value = 6.225) indicate that the difference is not statistically significant, meaning that there is no pattern of advantage or disadvantage for women based on their occupation or ethnicity. This is to say that there is not enough evidence to confirm that an intersection between gender and ethnicity amongst Iranian MPs which places women and ethnic minorities in a more disadvantageous situation compared to their Fars men counterparts. This can be attributed to the Majles electoral system in Iran, which ensures that all provinces and districts have representatives in the Majles[81]. It could also be due to the small number of women among MPs.

Table 45: Intersection of MPs class, ethnicity and gender

Gender	Ethnicity	Social Class			Total
		Upper Class	Intermediate Class	Working Class	
Male	Fars	53.5%	39.9%	6.6%	1640
	Azari	52.7%	39.3%	8.0%	387
	Kurd	52.1%	37.0%	11%	146
	Lor	46.7%	48.9%	4.4%	137
	Balouch	48.4%	40.3%	11.3%	62
	Turkman	50.0%	20.0%	30.0%	10
	Total	52.8%	40.0%	7.2%	2382
Female	Fars	25.5%	72.7%	1.8%	55
	Azari	88.9%	11.1%	0.0%	9
	Kurd	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	2
	Lor	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	3
	Balouch	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	1
	Turkman	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0
	Total	32.9%	65.7%	1.4%	70
	Fars	52.6%	40.9%	6.4%	1695

[81] The electoral system of the Iranian Majles will be further discussed in the conclusion chapter.

Total	Azari	53.5%	38.6%	7.8%	396
	Kurd	52.0%	37.2%	10.8%	148
	Lor	45.7%	49.3%	5.0%	140
	Balouch	47.6%	41.3%	11.1%	63
	Turkman	50.0%	20.0%	30.0%	10
	Total	1280 (52.2%)	1046 (42.7%)	126 (5.1%)	2452

Source: Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Multinomial Logistic Regression

The aim of a multinomial logistic regression is to help researchers to deal with nominal polytomies (Arnold 2015:273). The outcome variable here is the class status of MPs, which is broken down into three categories. The selected reference category is the upper class. The multinomial analysis of class background helps this study to determine which predictors are important and how they affect the outcome variable. One also might consider an ordinal logistic regression as an analytical method, however, since the dependent variable is not truly ordered, the preferred analysis would be a multinomial logistic regression.

In interval predictors, such as age, Majles number, and modern education, the logistic regression coefficients (b_s) tell how much the logit or logged odds increase for a one-unit increase in the independent variable or when we go from one category to another. For binary predictors, however, coefficients indicate that one category of independent variable compared to the other is more, equally, or less likely in the given category versus the reference category of the dependent variable.

The likelihood ratio test (Chi-Square) of 420 with a p-value < 0.000 demonstrates that the whole model fits the data significantly better than a model with no predictor. The Pseudo R-Square measures also indicate an acceptable model fit (see tables 46 and 47).

Table 46: Multinomial Model Fitting Tests

Model	Model Fitting Criteria	Likelihood Ratio Tests		
	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	2626.327			
Final	2205.633	420.695	16	.000

Table 47: Multinomial Pseudo R-Square

Cox and Snell	.158
Nagelkerke	.189
McFadden	.096

Table 48 shows, multinomial logits for MPs class backgrounds. The exponential coefficients for each predictor are also reported in this table. The coefficients of ethnicity, Majles year, and birth place of MPs are not significant, suggesting that these variables do not predict the class status of members of parliament, or said differently, the MPs' class status in comparison with the capitalist class, has nothing to do with their ethnicity, the year of election, and place of birth. Accordingly, it could be said that being an MP from among the upper or lower classes is equally distributed between both Fars and others ethnic groups, among different years of Majles election, and between those who were born in small or large cities.

The variable of age is the only explanatory variable for which its coefficients are significant among both intermediate and working classes. This suggests that a one-unit increase in age is associated with a 0.37 and 0.35 decrease in the log odds of being in the intermediate and working classes respectively, versus the upper class. The exponentiated coefficients suggest that the ratio of an MP being a member of the intermediate or working class as against a member of

the upper class decreases by 32 (1-.68=.32) and 30 (1-.70=.30) percent, respectively, for unit change in age.

Gender shows to have a negative effect on an MP being a member of the intermediate class rather than upper class by 35 percent. This means that males are less likely to be from an intermediate as opposed to upper class, when compared to females. In other words, females, on average, are 65% less likely to come from the upper class than the intermediate class when contrasted with their male counterparts.

In the case of clerical status, b_s implies that clerics whose pre-election occupation was in the intermediate class rather than the upper class are more likely to become MPs when compared to non-clerics. In another words, MPs who are clerics are 5.4 times more likely to be from an intermediate class than from the upper class when compared to non-clerics. To put it another way, the odds of being an MP from the upper class is much higher among non-clerics than clerics.

Religious denomination as the third predictor of class status is created as a binary (Muslim vs. non-Muslims) variable. Its coefficients are significant only among the intermediate class. The result shows that Non-Muslims when compared to Muslim MPs, are 2.4 times more likely to be from an intermediate class background than an upper class background. In other words, Muslim MPs are more likely to come from an upper class than intermediate class categories.

Regarding the education variable, the coefficient is significant among the working class. Data indicate that the increase in the years spent in modern education by MPs is associated with a decrease in the log odds of being a working rather than a member of upper class. In other

words, one unit increases in the level of education exponentially increase the log odds of being a member of the upper class versus e working class by 50%.

Table 48: Logged odds of class background of MPs by predictors

Predictors	Class Background (Reference category=Upper Class)			
	Intermediate Class		Working Class	
	b	exp (b)	b	exp (b)
Sex				
Male	-1.04***	0.35	0.87	2.39
Ethnicity				
Fars	-0.13	0.87	-0.16	0.89
Age	-0.37***	0.68	-0.35**	0.70
Clergy Status				
Cleric	1.69***	5.46	-1.14	0.32
Birth Place				
Major and medium cities	0.03	1.03	1.01	1.10
Religion				
Non-Muslims	0.89**	2.43	0.51	1.66
Year of Majles	0.07	1.00	-0.06	0.93
Education	0.23	1.02	-0.68***	0.50
DF	16			
McFadden R-Squares	0.096			

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
Variables age, year of Majles, and education (years) are treated as interval.

The multinomial analysis helps this study to discern which factors are more important in predicting the class backgrounds of MPs when other predictors are controlled. Thus, it can be concluded that the class compositions of the MPs are influenced by their age, education, clerical status, religion and gender. In contrast, place of birth and ethnicity does not influence the class composition of MPs.

Summary

The statistical analyses in this study demonstrate that in the ten terms of the Iranian Majles spanning the time period of 1980 to 2016, 1734 persons were introduced into the political elite. During this period, more than 50%, 170 out of 280 persons on average, of MPs of each Majles were recruited as an MP for the first time. The proportion of MPs with upper class backgrounds increased from 36% to 52%; their colleagues from an intermediate class status were reduced from a proportion of about 53% to 44%; and the share of MPs from the working class background dropped from 11% to 4%.

In terms of class representation, the data reveal that the upper class was significantly overrepresented in early Majleses but ended up with more moderate overrepresentation in recent terms of the Majles (a decrease of 33 points). The overrepresentation of the intermediate class has also been mitigated since the first Majles and has tended towards equal representation (I of D=1.1). Underrepresentation of the working class, which has always been extremely high and has not been corrected, indicates that they are barely represented among MPs. Clerical representatives show a significant decline from their share of over 50% in the first and second Majleses to as low as 6% in the most recent Majles.

The analysis shows a high level of overrepresentation of the more educated population among MPs. It also reveals that the representation of women is overwhelmingly low but is showing signs of gradual improvements. In contrast, legally recognized religious minorities have never been underrepresented. The distribution of age shows that the Majles MPs are becoming older: the mean age has increased from 40 years of age in 1980, to 51 in 2016. In terms of the place of birth of MPs, the pattern of those born in small cities and villages outnumbering others has remained robust in all years of the Majles. Furthermore, the intersectionality analysis reveals

that coming from different ethnic backgrounds does not have a demonstrably significant effect on the class status of Iranian members of parliament. Moreover, there is no empirical evidence to affirm that an intersection between gender and ethnic status would worsen the socioeconomic status of MPs. The implication of these findings will be discussed in the next chapter.

CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION, AND FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

This study aimed to contribute to our understanding of the socioeconomic dimension of political representation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It asked to what extent the political representatives in the post-revolution Majleses mirrored the Iranian population. It also asked how the changes in the social structures of Iran corresponded to the changes in the configuration of elected officials in the Majles. On a broader level, this study was concerned with two themes: 1) the extent to which the Revolution has been successful in meeting and upholding its goals and ideals, and 2) what the quality of political representation tells us about the nature of the political system in Iran.

This research was motivated by the assumption that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a nascent political system that seems to be reluctant to follow the conventional definition of democracy and to comply with the characteristics of a conventional democratic state. At the same time, it has developed its own definition of a desirable political system. Within such a system, the Majles, as the legislative institution, is meant to reflect the interests and preferences of all segments of society in the process of law making. Success in accomplishing this will enhance the Majles's function and have important implications for political justice in Iran.

In chapters two and three, the theoretical context of this study was delineated. It explained the substantial structural changes that post-industrial societies have undergone in terms of their class apparatuses. It addressed two mainstream theoretical approaches to explaining the mechanism of exchange between social classes and political elites: first, a liberal-pluralist approach which sees the state's action as independent and autonomous from the interests of social classes; second, a class-centred or Marxist approach, translated into its instrumentalist and structuralist variants, which places class interests at the centre of analysis of a state's behavior. In the liberal-pluralist paradigm, the political elites are seen as fair representatives of classes and occupations, but in Marxist approaches, elites tend to represent the interests of the upper strata.

For the first approach, access to power is open to all segments of the society who have relevant skills and competency, whereas in the second approach, it is known to be more straightforward for well-to-do people.

Several empirical studies in Canada and elsewhere have shown that the upper classes are overrepresented in democratic institutions, and that elected officials are increasingly coming from exclusive segments and occupations (Olsen 1980, Guppy et al. 1987, Nakhaie 1997, Wauters 2010). From a normative point of view, it has been argued that disproportionate representation will harmfully affect the principle of political justice and the quality of democracy. While making a crucial distinction between 'descriptive' and 'substantive' representation, previous studies have identified a correlation between those two attributes of representation in such a way that the former helps enhancing the latter. This has been discussed along the lines of economic/occupational, ethnic minority, and gender representation.

In chapter four, the transformation of contemporary Iranian society was discussed. It was shown how population growth, the increase in the rate of urbanization, the expansion of education, and waves of secularization affected the fabric of Iranian society, particularly after the Islamic Revolution. These changes were accompanied by the implementation of economic policies in the form of Development Plans in post-revolution Iran. Throughout the state-centric political economy of the first decade of the Islamic Republic, the Iranian state adopted an interventionist approach not only to manage the economic crisis caused by the Revolution, but also to handle the hardships of the wartime period. This form of political economy was also favourable to the discourse of anti-Shah advocates. The main themes of this discourse were opposition to the private ownership of capital, support for the subordinate and oppressed segments of the society, the Islamic idea of class equilibrium, and hostility to foreign capital and

investment. This decade helped to increase the number of public-sector wage earners, as well as increase the ranks of the self-employed class, which was already active in petty commodity economic activity.

In the post-Khomeini period, characterized by subsiding revolutionary enthusiasm, Iranian governments made a shift towards economic liberalization which continued for three decades (1995-present), though with notable ebbs and flows. It brought about the revival of capitalist economic relations and the privatization of state institutions, and also accelerated the movement towards a service economy. These policies helped to increase the size of the capitalist, middle, and working classes, especially those involved in the private sector. The petty bourgeoisie remained generally unchanged under economic liberalization. The substantial growth of the middle class in the post-revolution era is observed to have happened as a result of population growth, the expansion of education, the enlargement of state and private bureaucracy, and the fast movement toward a service economy.

The impact of postrevolutionary trends on the interaction between the structure of social classes and the reconfiguration of political elites was investigated in chapter five. The redistribution of power that became possible because of the Revolution created new generations of elected and non-elected political elites. The first generation of the post-revolution political elite, concordant with the 'first Republic,' was composed mostly of clerical elites, hailing from social origins in the middle, petty bourgeois, and lower classes. They were Islamists and revolutionaries but at the same time, had little political experience. Corresponding with the 'second Republic,' a new generation of political elites were recruited from those who had served in revolutionary organs and institutions or had family connections with the first generation of political elites. They, in part, had previously been state employees or what may be termed

political functionaries. The semi-state economic foundations which still remained wealthy and powerful in the second Republic, as well as Bazaar-based political factions and associations such as *Hezb-e Mo'talefeye Eslami* or *Jame'e-ye Anjomanha-ye Eslami-ye Asnaaf va Bazaar*, also contributed to the rise of high-ranked semi-state officials and introduced them into the political arena, there to be joined to the second generation of political elites. At the same time, a stratum of middle class professionals started to seek their cut of power. This stratum of professional power seekers tended to be supported by the middle class of the general population, since the latter were both from the same class background and had gained a measure of political knowledge and awareness - thus, they tended to elect experts to serve as their representatives. Consequently, there emerged a shift from the first generation of the political elite, mainly rooted in the clergy and petty bourgeois strata, to a second generation, drawn mostly from political functionaries and from new middle class backgrounds who started to fill elected political institutions.

It is within this context that the current study posed its empirical questions: To what extent is the composition of the post-revolution political elite, measured in terms of members of parliament, proportionate to the character of the general population? How have these two factors changed as time has passed since the Revolution? What theoretical frameworks can explain the whole picture?

The findings of this study revealed that in the ten terms of the Islamic Republic Majles, members of the intermediate and particularly the upper classes were overrepresented, and members of the working class remained extremely unrepresented amongst parliamentarians. The pattern of overrepresentation of the upper and intermediate classes in Majles, however, is decreasing, partly because the portion of these classes in the general population is on the rise (see

table 22). With regard to the pattern of change over 37 years, as is presented in table 49, the data imply that the fluctuation of the composition of MPs and the general population matches in the case of the upper and working classes but is a mismatch with the intermediate class. This is to say that the overall increase of MPs from the upper class since the Revolution and the overall decrease of the working class MPs since 1996 match the same trends in Iranian society, though not at the same rate; but the decrease of MPs from an intermediate background is out of step with exactly opposite trends within the general population (see figures 11-13).

Table 49: Overall Class Representation and the Pattern of Change

Class categories in General population	Overall representation status in Majles	Overall pattern of change
Upper class	overrepresented	match
Intermediate class	equally represented on average	mismatch
Working class	underrepresented	match

Despite the large size of the working class in the general population, this class has not been equally represented, at least descriptively, in the Majles. Underrepresentation of the working class in the Majles was in contrast to this study's prediction, when it assumed that the revolutionary ideology of the rule of *Mostaz'afan* would have been reflected in the composition of Majles representatives - and this even though, structurally, some policies were actually favourable to the working class. Kashefi (2008) posited an explanation why the outcomes of the Iranian Revolution were at variance with the initial demands of the uprising, when he argued that

the working class was the main loser after the Revolution simply because the Islamic government failed to establish an advanced economic system in order to manage inequality. Working class underrepresentation is, however, aligned with a similar wave of decreasing representation of the working class in many parliaments in consolidated democratic countries, as for example has been shown by Bartels (2002) and Wauters (2010). The inability of the working class to mobilize its members and to obtain representation is to be associated with the shortage of political and economic resources that this class possesses (also see Hickey and Bracking 2005, Jusko 2008, Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).

The high presence of MPs from an intermediate class background over the past three decades in Iran is associated with the universal tendency toward the principle of specialization and meritocracy (Young 1998). The middle class of Iran, which itself has been growing increasingly since the Revolution, tended to trust their counterpart candidates as more competent deputies to sit on the legislature and to pursue its goals and interests. The popularity of professionals in Iran, reflected in the large number of representatives from a professional class background, has been in the same direction as the findings of Porter regarding the high numbers of Canadian political elites who have a middle class origin (1965:395). Our findings also confirm the previous findings in early Iranian Majleses (Ashraf 1994, Moradi 1995, Vakili-Zad 1994). This study, however, did not find any evidence for the existence of a strong link between lawyers and the representatives of Majles in Iran, as Weber asserted. As table 25 shows, when the social and cultural professions are separated from legal professions, MPs with a background in the latter, only made up 5.5% of all MPs.

The explanation for the overrepresentation of the upper class and the increase of their presence in Majles since the Revolution is to some extent similar to that of the intermediate

class. Upper class members, being those who serve in the highest status managerial professions, gained popularity due to the experience that it is assumed they have gained in the legislative and political affairs. Such experience is considered by the electorates as a credit, and has always been highlighted by Majles candidates during their electoral campaigns in Iran. Our finding on the representation of legislators and senior officials and managers is consistent with those studies which see a pattern of exchange between high status occupations and political elites (for Canada see Clement 1975, Guppy, Freeman and Buchan 1987, Hunter 1981). The findings of the current study are also consistent with Amir Arjomand (2009a), that sees the 'second stratum' as a springboard for the political elites in Iran. Our findings are also a strong support for Ashraf's evidences regarding the replacement of members of the intelligentsia (especially the clerical intelligentsia) by state managers and bureaucratic elements in post-revolution politics (1994:125). It is worth noting that there is a very small group of capitalist-employers (less than 1%) that are enumerated within the upper class in the Majles, including construction contractors and factory bosses, who owe their presence in the political arena to the economic liberalization policies implemented since the second decade of the life of the Islamic Republic. By encouraging capitalist relations and privatization, the capitalist class regained its importance and in fact started to enlarge in the 1990s and 2000s. In addition, in the post-revolution period, thanks to the proliferation of the semi-state economic foundations, a *nouveau riche* generation of economic elites emerged. However, a lack of information regarding the size of the economic enterprises of capitalist MPs prevents this study from going into further detail about the characteristics of the capitalist and employer representatives in post-revolution Majleses.

These finding must be qualified by the fact that in any hypothetical scenario in which the Guardian Council would not exist, the composition of any of the post-election Majleses may

have been different. However, since research has shown that political views and ideologies are almost equally distributed amongst different social classes in Iran (see Harris 2015, Morady 2011) - meaning that, for example, there are about equal conservative people amongst upper, middle, and lower classes - it could be predicted that any such difference may actually be minimal in the case of the class composition of MPs. Alternately, the hypothetical difference in the composition of the Majles could imaginably be substantial especially in such cases as the under-representation of the working class, women, and of non-clerical or non-religious selected as representatives.

This study revealed that Iranian women are not equally represented in the Iranian Majles. In recent years, however, women have been attaining a larger share in the Majles and their presence has increased fourfold compared to first two early terms of Majles. This has been largely indebted to the expansion of education in general, and the wide access of higher education for women, in particular, in such a way that female university enrolments have even surpassed men in some cases. The increase in the number of representative women is consistent with observations that claim that Iranian women, particularly educated women, increasingly aspire to equality with men and strongly support women's participation in the labor force (Kurzman 2008). The multinomial analysis showed that women MPs, compared to their male counterparts, are less likely to have an upper as opposed to intermediate class background. The intersectionality analysis also affirmed that the majority of women MPs are from an intermediate rather than an upper class background.

Our findings on the underrepresentation of women in the Iranian Majles is somewhat similar to international reports, for example those of Latin America (Campo 2005) or the United States (Berg 1994). Comparing women's representation in the Iranian Majles with their share in

the Parliament of one of the oldest democracies in the world, England (see Audickas 2016, Borthwick et al. 1991, Hunter and Holden 2015), reveals that although the figures of the last 30 years of the twentieth century are not extremely different: 3% against 1.2% in 1980 and 9% against 3.4% in 1992 in Britain and Iran respectively, by 2016 this difference increased to 23%.

With regard to women's representation, however, one narrative in the Islamic Republic of Iran disagrees with the promise that the equality of political presence of men and women is necessarily desirable or positive (Howzeh Encyclopedia 2017). Thinkers within this narrative argue that if the political engagement of women harms their familial and maternal obligations, in the long run, it creates more loss than gain (Hoseini et al. 2008:525-31, also see Motahari 1990:chapter five). This discourse refers to studies that show that women in political occupations are disrupted in their ability to efficiently fulfill their responsibilities as a wife or a mother. This doctrine recommends a sexual division of labor at the family level through which men are more responsible for affairs outside of the home and women are seen to do a better job at home. This is in the same line with the well-known distinction between 'instrumentalist' and 'expressive' gender role divisions (Parsons and Bales 1956).

There is no reliable estimation of the size of sexual minorities in the general population. This lack of information makes any kind of accurate analysis regarding their representation difficult. From a legal point of view, according to the *Ghanoun-e Mojazaat-e Eslami*[84] (2013), homosexuality is to be punished by death (in cases of the use of force and coercion) or lashes (in voluntary cases) (Articles 234). In one instance, Iran has developed progressive policies with respect to a sexual minority: the law recognizes the rights of transgendered citizens. According to law, reassignment is allowed and is even financially supported by the government. Although

[84] The Islamic Penal Law

this policy has been criticized within the larger context of Iranian laws against sexual minorities (for example see Najmabadi 2008), many observers welcome it on the basis that Iran has adopted a very progressive law (Pikulicka-Wilczewska 2015), in case of sexual minorities.

This study found evidence for the overrepresentation of recognized religious minorities in the Iranian Majles. We know that Baha'is, as the largest non-Muslim religious minority in Iran, are not eligible to be candidates for any election in Iran. As contrary to other non-Muslim minorities who enjoy the status of the people of the Book, Baha'ism is seen to be a devious and illegitimate religion, because of its questioning of the main tenets of Islam. Accordingly, they are not given freedom of religion by law, and have been subject to exclusion from the civil services. According to the American Bureau of Human Rights and Labor (2015), Baha'is are excluded unless they did not identify themselves as Baha'i.

In terms of place of birth, data show that the majority of MPs (55%) were born in small cities or villages. This can be explained by the nature of the Majles election, or in another words, the electoral system of the Iranian Majles, as a multi-member district (MMD) system based on proportional representation seat allocation rules. As used in many democracies, this system guarantees that all 206 Iranian electoral districts (in 2012) have a representative in the Majles, based on their population. Each MP is supposed to be elected from a specific constituency in such a way that residents of all districts of the country have a voice in the Majles. In small constituencies, it is more likely that those candidates who were born there will be trusted and elected by people of a region. This contributes to the higher numbers of MPs from small cities or villages.

The dramatic decline of the share of the clergy in the Iranian Majles is one of the most substantial changes in the structure of the Majles in past 30 years. Unlike religious minorities,

the clerical stratum does not enjoy any guaranteed seats, thus, their presence in the Majles is dependent upon their success in gaining votes from the public. This trend could be seen as a result of the clergy's reluctance to run for political office. The decreasing number of MPs from the clergy could also be seen as an effect of the secularizing forces in Iranian society (Banuazizi 1995, Moaddel 2009). In other words, if one takes the decrease of clerical parliamentarians as an indicator of secularization in Iran, then this study confirms Kian-Thiebaut (1998) and Vakili-Zad's (1994) theses which posits secularization to be an ongoing and inevitable phenomenon, and is in the same line as the post-Islamism discourse which highlights the strong trends of reconciliation and reform within Islamism (Bayat 1996, Mahdavi 2011). This finding also supports Kazemipur and Rezaei's (2003) evidence regarding the personalization of religion and the decline in religiosity in recent Iran.

The distribution of parliamentarians in terms of their level of modern education reveals that MPs are much more educated than the general population. This, of course, shows that MPs mostly belong to an educated stratum. Furthermore, the findings of this study indicate that MPs' mean years spent in modern education increased by 6 years in the time from the first to tenth Majleses. This meaning that, while the majority of parliamentarians in the first Majles received less than bachelor's degree, the tenth Majles' MPs mostly had Master's or a higher-level degree. The increase in MPs' education resulted from the educational expansion and subsequent inflation of educational credentials (Collins 2011), as well as the policy change regarding the minimum requirements for becoming an MP. The multinomial analysis also reveals that the effects of education are higher for an upper class MP relative to those of the working class. This, in turn, questions the liberal notion of meritocracy in case of the Iranian MPs and supports class-centered theorists and the cultural reproduction thesis, and emphasizes the centrality of ascribed status

(Bourdieu 1977, Bourdieu and Boltanski 1978, Bowles 1972 and 1977). This body of argument asserts that the upper class is able to transform its inherited wealth (economic capital) into credentials (cultural capital) which can be used for access to power.

In explanation for increase of MPs' education it should also be noted that in the post Iran-Iraq War period, Iranian technocrats and professionals played an impressive role in reconstructing the infrastructures of the Iranian economy, which were partly destroyed as a consequence of the eight-year war. A survey conducted in 2008 showed that 60% of Iranian respondents believe that 'having experts make decision' is very good or fairly good for the successful management of a country (World Values Survey 2008). Although this is a cross-sectional finding, it still could be taken as an indicator of the level of trust that Iranians give to educated and expert individuals, which may be reflected in their voting behavior. Another explanation is the relative openness of the political system toward educated persons (those who, of course, remained committed to the values and ideals of the Revolution) wishing to enter into the elite of Islamic Republic of Iran. The Guardian Council, which is in charge of vetting election nominees, began to trust some of these groups to participate in the highest levels of policy-making. The evidence for this assertion is that the Council confirmed the competency of a wide range of candidates from different political orientations in the fifth and sixth Majles elections (1996 and 2000). These two elections, specifically the sixth Majles, are among the most free and fair Majles elections in Iran since the establishment of the Guardian Council. Statistically speaking, the percentage of those candidates who were allowed to run for the 1996 and 2000 elections were 83.13% and 83.78% respectively, which are amongst the highest rates of Majles candidate approval by the Guardian Council (Maloney and Borden 2016). As discussed earlier, the Guardian Council took its trust in experts and educated persons even

further by ratifying a bill in 2006 increasing the required level of education for Majles candidacy. As was described in chapter 8, since its implementation, the new rule, which is still in place, has contributed to the increase in the mean years of education of MPs in the Majles. As noted earlier, the freedom and fairness of these elections has to be considered with the limitations that the Council poses on the people's election. Given that the Council gives priority to candidates' ideological commitment to the principles of the Islamic Revolution, one can infer that the level of freedom and fairness of any Majles election is also dependent on the proportion of Majles nominees who are committed to the clerical ideological Islam and are loyal to the ideals of the Revolution.

Before making any conclusions with regards to the explanatory power of class-state theoretical paradigms, two issues should be noted. First, one can claim that a Marxist approach can convincingly explain a situation only if one or both of the following conditions are satisfied: one, that the capitalist class is overrepresented; two, that the working class is underrepresented. Second, occupation-based classifications of classes, like what has been employed in the classification of occupations in Iran in this study, do not necessarily separate ownership and therefore do not precisely match a Marxist model of class. Nevertheless, this study uses the occupations that have been classified as upper class as an indication of dominant classes, to use the Marxian term. This is justifiable due to fact that the highest status occupations are usually associated with higher levels of income and accordingly with higher chances of accumulating economic capital. This association is even further promoted through the line of educational credentials as is theorized by the cultural reproduction thesis. The International Labor Organization (2012) assigns skill levels of 3 and 4[85] to the highest group of occupations

[85] This is the highest level of education that is assumed to be obtained "as the result of study at a higher educational institution for a period of 3-6 years leading to the award of a first degree or higher qualification" (International Labor Organization 2012:13)

(managers, senior officials, and legislators). Thus, while remaining aware of the difficulties of comparing different operationalizations of class, to the extent that it is possible, some inferences regarding class-MP relations can be provided here.

This study has found that the upper classes have been overrepresented, and that the working class is not represented at all in the Majleses. These findings support the instrumentalist approach. We also observed that the Iranian Majleses, in different terms and in different compositions, supported the implementation of liberal economic policies. These policies ensured privatization and the expansion of a capitalist economy, which supposedly benefited the capitalist class. Such findings support the structuralist approach. All told, the evidence provides some support for Marxist or, better said, a classed-based explanation of the relationship between the state and society at the level of the parliamentarian political elites in Iran.

On the other hand, to the extent to which the intermediate class, the class of professionals, constitute the second-largest segment of MPs, we can suggest some support for the liberal-pluralist theory of power in the case of the Iranian Majles. In addition, the distribution of MPs in terms of their level of education shows that the Iranian representatives are skilled, meritorious, and competent, which provide further support for the liberal-pluralist thesis, which maintains that MPs should be and are from amongst the most skilled and competent individuals in the population. The minimum educational requirement for becoming an MP highlights the fact that the Iranian Majles is a place of highly educated and by extension expert people. This overrepresentation of educated people might also be referred to the inflation of educational credential thesis (Collins 2011).

However, a crosstabulation of class and educational attainment (table 50) shows that there is an association between an MP's education and class: most MPs, 52%, whom received

the highest levels of education (professional-specialty doctorate and masters) are among the upper and intermediate classes. The multinomial analysis also suggested that those with high education are more likely to be among MPs with upper rather than lower class backgrounds. This evidence, of course, highlights the class-based character of education, and challenges the liberal-pluralist theory. Moreover, table 26 revealed that those with higher levels of education, masters and doctorates, are more likely to be re-elected as Majles representatives. It is important to emphasize that while the youngest MP in the most recent Majles was 30 years-old, on average, MPs acquired their education more than 30 years ago. Education in prerevolutionary Iran was not as widespread as it is now (see table 3) and was largely in the possession of the wealthy urban population (see Arasteh 1962). In addition, since higher education was, and is still, the prerogative of the upper class, it could be concluded that these MPs have had upper class family backgrounds (which means the class of their parents). As was shown in table 21, mean years of modern education has been significantly higher among upper and intermediate class, suggesting the association between class and education.

Table 50: Class and educational attainment cross-tabulation

Class	Level of education					Total
	less than high school	high school	bachelor's	masters and GP (general practitioner)	professional and specialty doctorate	
Upper	3.6%	5.3%	38.8%	34.3%	18.0%	1223
Intermediate	11.2%	13.0%	31.0%	25.3%	19.4%	854
Working	11.3%	21.2%	47.7%	16.6%	3.3%	151
Total	7.0%	9.3%	36.4%	29.6%	17.5%	2228

Source: Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Even more recently, several studies in Iran have shown that access to education for children is strongly linked to the economic situation of their families (Aminfar 2005, Bazargan 2007), as is the ability of parents to provide the minimum requirements of education, such as tuition fees, educational equipment, and transportation to school (see Biabangard 1996). Dehnavi (2005) also studied 1,082,856 applicants of post-secondary education in Iran who attended the university entrance exam (*Konkour*) in 2003. He found that parents' class and level of income have a positive association with their children's entrance exam scores. Dehnavi's findings showed that applicants with an upper class background have had the highest (36.6%) and those from a lower class background have had the lowest chance (17.9%) of being accepted into universities in 2003. Other research that studied pre-university students of the Khorasan province in 2001-2002 confirms that the combination of cultural capitals of one's family, measured by objective (books or art paintings) and embodied (visiting museums or studying habits) types of cultural capital, and the family's economic capital (wealth) increased the chance of children's access to post-secondary education in Iran (Noghani 2007). Mirashrafi, Khodaie, and Jamali (2016) analyzing the data of higher education applicants in 2010, found large positive effects of the socioeconomic status of one's family (measured by family income) upon entrance exam scores. In another study, using the higher education applicant data in 2008, Mirashrafi, Bol, and Nakhaiezade (2013) showed that the mean total score of the entrance exam is significantly greater for those applicants whose family income are higher. The logistic regression showed that the chance of obtaining university admission is higher among applicants of higher income levels. They also showed that the mean of applicants' scores is significantly higher among those whose parents have university degrees.

These findings are in the same line with evidence of the transmission of parental socioeconomic status to their offspring via education, which in turn translate into the latter finding higher-status occupations (Bowles 1972, Bowles and Gintis 1976, Bowles 1977, Bowles and Gintis 2002). The evidence also supports the cultural reproduction theory. As Bourdieu has emphasized, besides economic capital, non-economic forms of capital, especially cultural capital (parents' education for instance), are subject to conversion into other forms of capital. In the past, economic capital transmission (inheritance) was used by dominant classes as a strategy for inter-generational reproduction. In recent times, it is educational credentials which are used as a means of class reproduction, which in turn reproduces the pattern of dominance instead of serving as an instrument of equality (Bourdieu 1974, Nash 1990). In the case of this study, it can be concluded that the mechanism of class reproduction seems to be projected in the elite reproduction, specifically when one takes the evidence of the class-based importance of education and importance of education for becoming an MP in Iran into consideration.

Indeed, there are two other mechanisms of reproduction. The first is the vetting process by the Guardian Council. The members of the Council, one of the most central institutions of the Islamic Republic, have been carefully selected among the trusty and faithful individuals who have already proved their loyalty. As discussed earlier, six powerful jurisconsults of the Council are directly selected by the supreme leader, and six lawyers are suggested by the head of the judiciary (who is himself selected by the supreme leader). A cursory review of the biography of the current and former jurisconsult members of the Guardian Council[86] reveals that they are a small number of high-ranked clerics who are ideologically committed to the principles of the Revolution and strongly believe in Shi'ite. The conscious of the issues and needs of Islamic

[86] See the official website of the Guardian Council at: http://www.shora-gc.ir/Portal/home

society, according to the Article 91 of the Islamic Republic Constitution (2007 [1989]), is a required condition for their selection. Moreover, referring to the post-revolution factors of privilege discussed in chapter five, members of the Council have been drawn from among the revolutionaries and have been direct students of Ayatollah Khomeini (Ahmad Jannati, Mohammad Yazdi, Yousof Sanei, Mehdi Mahdavi Kani, Mohamad Emami Kashani, Mahammad Momen, Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi), born to high-ranking clerical families (Lotfollah Safi Golpayegani, Sadegh Larijani, Hosein Shabzendedaar), served as high officials in key revolutionary and governmental organizations during the first Republic (Gholamreza Rezvani, Mohammad Modarresi Yazdi, Gholamhosein Elham, Abbas Ali Kadkhodaee), or were vetarans of the Iran-Iraq War (Mohsen Esmaeili). As officials whose main duty is to ensure that all civic, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other affairs and regulations are based on Islamic criteria, the members of the Guardian Council tend to approve candidates with similar backgrounds. As discussed before, the vetting process of the Guardian Council is not arbitrary. The Council tends to confirm the competence of individuals who are, of course, highly educated and are committed to the Revolution. Therefore, those who have participated in the revolution and Iran-Iraq War, or are from among martyr families, or have held important revolutionary and governmental positions, or are religious, and have theoretical and practical commitment to the principals of the constitution of the Islamic Republic are more likely to be vetted. In other words, a kind of elite reproduction seems to occur through the vetting process.

A second mechanism of reproduction takes place by help of what Porter (1965) and Mills (1973 [1956]) referred to as networks of affinity and connection amongst the upper echelons of Iranian elites. Such networks exist in the form of intermarriages and kinship relations, club

memberships, etc. In Iran, there are social networks such as mosques and *hoseiniyeh*, religious and political gatherings, religious schools, and Friday congregations that serve as means of connection between some members of elite groups. Moreover, family and kinship connections help the top echelon of elites to tie themselves together. The most obvious evidence is the high rate of intermarriage among offspring of grand Ulama (for instance between Khomeini and Sadr families, and between Mousavi Ardabili and Hashemi Shahroudi families) and high-ranked governmental and ruling elites (for example between Khamenei and Haddad, and between Meshkini and Reishahri's families). These interlocking networks between the upper echelons of power elites not only served as a separation line, demarcating insiders from outsiders, but provided a place for existing and future elites to mix with one another, to strengthen their relationships, to enhance their sense of solidarity, and, more importantly, helped foster class and elite reproduction in Iran.

Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research

The current study remains limited to the post-revolution Majleses. A comprehensive study of the Iranian Majles would entail conducting two further investigations. On one level, the demographic and socioeconomic background of parliamentarians taken as a while, and its match or mismatch with the general composition of Iranian society in the pre- and postrevolutionary periods would have to be compared. On a second level, the composition of Iranian deputies could be compared with that of other parliaments in the region, with other societies in the process of transitioning to democracy, or with that of older democratic regimes. Such investigations would produce valuable insights regarding the impact of the Revolution on the composition of Iran's political elites, as well as the disposition of Iranian democracy in comparison to other political systems.

This study remains limited by the available data up to the 2011 census. The result of the 2016 census will be released in the near future. Moreover, the complete information for the tenth Majles members of parliament, inaugurated in 2016, has not been published to date. Future research may want to include such information to determine whether the trends which were demonstrated in this study continue.

The conceptualization and operationalization of class in this study has drawn on the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) schema which was adjusted by the author to match the classification of occupations in Iran. In addition, as discussed earlier, a lack of the information regarding upper class ownership prevented this study from providing a fully-fledged Marxist analysis. Thus, this study remained confined to a limited application of the Marxist theory of class-elite relations. Further studies may try to access reliable data on the ownership status of upper class MPs, and also may consider using other typologies of class to check the accuracy of this study's findings.

Wauters (2010: 187-88) argues that "Ideally, descriptive analyses should take the whole professional career of parliamentarians into account. Practical problems, however, often constitute an obstacle for this kind of analysis. As a consequence, researchers are often forced to consider only the most recent profession of a person, which frequently is already a salaried political function." Due to the limitations of the data that were described in the methodology chapter, this study selected the most recent occupation that MPs served before their election as a parliamentarian. A more complete occupational history of members of the parliaments, as well as complementary information regarding their class of origin and their family backgrounds, will enrich the findings of this study.

The findings of this study should be complemented by a parallel research on 'substantive' dimensions of representation in the Iranian Majles. We discussed that descriptive and substantive representation are strongly correlated. However, existing empirical evidence suggests that the existence or non-existence of descriptive representation does not necessarily entail the existence or non-existence of substantive representation. For example, a shortage of representatives from the working classes in the Majles has sometimes been compensated for by the presence of deputies of the labor unions (for example representatives of the *Khaane-ye Kaargar*[87]) who themselves are not necessarily members of the working class.

Any study of the political system of Iran, particularly the study of the elected institutions, should take seriously the role of the Guardian Council in vetting the election nominees for the Majles, the office of Presidential, and the Assembly of Experts. The Council, as described in chapter 4, has the right of rejecting the qualifications to stand for election of any candidate based solely on their collective assessment. The implications of this vetting procedure for the present study is that, while it is technically correct to say that the Iranian people elect their representatives directly, they do so only when the respective candidates have already passed through the filter of the Guardian Council. Therefore, any discussion regarding the applicability of Marxist, liberal-pluralist, or elite-centric theoretical approaches to the case of Iranian Majles should be informed by the fact that the Iranian people are not the first and last electors of their representatives. Future studies, may wish to direct their focus to looking at the list of Majles candidates (particularly those whose qualifications have been rejected), to find out the extent to which the rejected candidates are from particular social backgrounds.

[87] The House of Worker

On another level, the findings of this study might be contextualized within the larger framework of democratization in Iran. This would include a discussion of the theories of democratic transition and consolidation, as well as examining the level of fairness and freedom of elections; the extent of the institutionalized separation of power of the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches of the state; the density of Iran's civil society; the degree of the rule of law, civil liberties, and political rights; the level of the state's responsiveness and transparency; and the presence of democratic institutions such as political parties in Iran.

Implications for Policy

As table 24 shows, despite their considerable share in the Iranian labor force, technicians and associate professionals, agricultural and fishery workers, craft workers, planet and machine operators, assemblers, drivers, and workers in elementary occupations are not represented at all in Majles, at least since 2008. Alternately, legislators and senior officials and managers are represented in the Iranian Majles at a proportion more than 5 times that of their actual size in the general population. If a more just representation of Iranian society is desired, policy makers should take the required measures, perhaps through reviewing the vetting process, or determining quotas, to ensure that not only all occupational groups, but the working class, and also all segments of society, including women, find equal chance to be represented in the legislative body of the Iranian state.

This study would recommend that the Statistical Centre of Iran considers adding questions to its Population and Housing Census questionnaire in order to distinguish large employers (owners who employ many employees) and small employers from self-employed groups (owners who do not employ employees). Such distinction will enable further studies to utilize other models in mapping social classes in Iran. This study also recommend that the

Statistical Centre of Iran and the Islamic Consultative Assembly consider gathering information with regards to ethnicity. It is recommended that the Islamic Consultative Assembly request MPs to identify their first and their latest occupations before their election as a representative, and also have them to include information regarding their families' socioeconomic backgrounds, particularly, their fathers' occupations.

REFERENCE

Abazari, Yousef Ali, Abbas Varij Kazemi and Mehdi Faraji. 2008. "Secularization in Iranian Society." in *Media, Culture and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic State*, edited by M. Semati. England: Routledge.
Abootalebi, Ali R. 2009. "Iran's Tenth Presidential Elections: Candidates, Issues, and Implications." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 13(3).
Abrahamian, Ervand. 1980. "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution." *The Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)* 87:21-26.
Abrahamian, Ervand. 1982. *Iran between Two Revolutions*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Abrahamian, Ervand. 2008. *A History of Modern Iran*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Adelkhah, Fariba. 2000. *Being Modern in Iran*. Translated by J. Derrick. New York: Columbia University Press in association with the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales Paris.
Afary, Janet. 2009. *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ahmadi-Amuii, Bahman. 2004. *Eqtesad-E Siyasi-Ye Jomhuri-E Eslami (Political Economy of the Islamic Republic)*. Tehran: Gam-e Naw.
Akhavi-Pour, Hossein and Heidar Azodanloo. 1998. "Economic Bases of Political Factions in Iran." *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studiess* 7(13):69-82.
Akhavi, Shahrough. 1987. "Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran." *Middle East Journal* 41(2):181-201.
Al-Sadr, Muhammad Baghir. 2003. *Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence*. Translated by R. Mottahedeh. Oxford, England: Oneworld Publication.
Alavi, Hamza. 1972. "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh." *New Left Review* 1(74).
Albo, Greg and Jane Jenson. 1989. "A Contested Concept: The Relative Autonomy of the State." Pp. 180-211 in *The New Canadian Political Economy*, edited by W. Clement and G. Williams. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
Aminfar, Morteza. 2005. "Elal Va Avamel-E Oft-E Tahsili (Causes of Educational Failure)." *Quarterly Journal of Education* 1(1):9-36.
Amir Arjomand, Said. 1981. "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran." *Government and Opposition* 16(3):293-316.
Amir Arjomand, Said. 1986. "Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective." *World Politics* 38(3):383-414.
Amir Arjomand, Said. 1988. *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Amir Arjomand, Said. 2009a. *After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Amir Arjomand, Said. 2009b. "Constitutional Implications of Current Political Debates in Iran." in *Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics*, edited by A. Gheissari. New York: Oxford University Press.
Amnesty International. 2016, "Annual Report for Iran", Amnesty International Website. Retrieved June 3, 2017 (https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/iran/report-iran/).

Amuzegar, Jahangir. 2014. *The Islamic Republic of Iran: Reflections on an Emerging Economy*. New York: Routledge.
Anderson, Cameron D and Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant. 2005. "Conceptions of Political Representation in Canada: An Explanation of Public Opinion." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 38(4):1029-58.
Anthiyas, Floya and Nira Yuval- Davis. 1992. *Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and the Anti-Racist Struggle*. London: Routledge.
Arasteh, Reza. 1962. *Education and Social Awakening in Iran*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
Arnold, Robert. 2015. *Intermediate Social Statistics: A Conceptual and Graphic Approach*. Ontario, Canada: Oxford University Press.
Asgharzadeh, Ailreza. 2007. *Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism, and Democratic Struggles*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ashraf, Ahmad and Ali Banuazizi. 1985. "The State, Classes and Modes of Mobilization in the Iranian Revolution." *State, Culture, and Society* 1(3):3-40.
Ashraf, Ahmad. 1994. "Charisma, Theocracy, and Men of Power in Postrevolutionary Iran." Pp. 101-51 in *The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*, edited by M. Weiner and A. Banuazizi. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
Ashraf, Ahmad and Ali Banuazizi. 2001. "Iran's Tortuous Path toward Islamic Liberalism." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 15(2):237-56.
Ashraf, Ahmad and Ali Banuazizi. 2007. *Tabaghat-E Ejtemaie, Dowlat Va Enghelab Dar Iran (Social Classes, State and Revolution in Iran)*. Translated by S. Torabi Farsani. Tehran: Niloufar Press.
Asr-e Iran. 2010, "Who Are Iranian Millionaires?". Retrieved December 25, 2017 (http://www.asriran.com/fa/news/114839/%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%86%D9%87-%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AF).
Assadi, Bahman. 1996. "Iran: A Barren Ground for Democracy." An M.A. Thesis in Political Science, University of Regina, Saskatchewan.
Assembly of Constitution Experts. 1985. *Mashrouh-E Mozaakerat-E Majles-E Barrasi-E Ghanoun-E Asasi-E Jomhouri-E Eslami-E Iran (the Detailed Discussions on the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran)*. Tehran: Islamic Consultative Assembly Publishing Center.
Audickas, Lukas. 2016, "Social Background of Mps 1979-2015": House of Commons Library. Retrieved April 22, 2017 (http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7483).
Azimi, Fakhreddin. 2008. *The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle against Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Baktiari, Bahman. 1996. *Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional Politics*. Florida: University Press of Florida.
Banducci, Susan A, Todd Donovan and Jeffrey A. Karp. 2004. "Minority Representation, Empowerment, and Participation." *The Journal of Politics* 66(2):534-56.

Banuazizi, Ali. 1995. "Faltering Legitimacy: The Ruling Clerics and Civil Society in Contemporary Iran." *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 8:563–78.
Barkley, Raymond. 1955. "The Theory of the Elite and the Mythology of Power." *Science & Society* 19(2):97-106.
Bartels, Larry M. 2002. "Economic Inequality and Political Representation." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston.
Bashiriyeh, Hossein. 1984. *The State and Revolution in Iran: 1962-1982*. London: Routledge.
Bayat, Asef. 1996. "The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society." *Middle East Critique* 5(9):43-52.
Bayat, Asef. 2010. *Life as Politics : How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Bayat, Asef 2007. *Islam and Democracy: What Is the Real Question?* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Bazargan, Zahra. 2007. *Taghir Va Now Avari Dar Madreseh (Change and Innovation in School)*. Tehran: Parents and Teachers Council Press.
Behdad, Sohrab and Farhad Nomani. 2009. "What a Revolution! Thirty Years of Social Class Reshuffling in Iran." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 29(1):84-104.
Behdad, Sohrab. 2010. "An Interview with Sohrab Behdad." edited by K. Mozaffari and A. Akhavan: retrived from http://www.ofros.com/mosahebe/alborz_behdad.htm
Bell, Daniel. 1973. *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*. New York: Basic Books.
Berg, John C. 1994. *Unequal Struggle: Class, Gender, Race, and Power in the U.S. Congress*. Boulder: Westview.
Biabangard, Esmaeel. 1996. *Ravesh Haaye Pishgiri Az Ofte Tahsili (Methods of Preventing Educational Failure)*, Vol. 4. Tehran: Roshd Publication.
Bill, James A. 1963. "The Social and Economic Foundations of Power in Contemporary Iran." *The Middle East Journal* 17:400-18.
Bill, James A. 1972. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill.
Black, Jerome H. 2000. "Entering the Political Elite in Canada: The Case of Minority Women as Parliamentary Candidates and Mps." *The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 37(2):143-66.
Block, Fred. 1987. *Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Post-Industrialism*. Pennsylvania: Temple University Press.
Blondel, Jean and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel. 2007. "Political Elites." Pp. 818-32 in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, edited by R. J. Dalton and H. D. Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bobo, Lawrence and Franklin D Gilliam. 1990. "Race, Sociopolitical Participation and Black Empowerment." *American Political Science Review* 82(4):377-94.
Borthwick, George, Daniel Ellingworth, Colin Bell and Donald MacKenzie. 1991. "The Social Background of British Mps." *Sociology* 25(4):713-17.
Bottomore, Tom. 1993. *Elites and Society*. London: Routledge.
Bourdieu, P and L Boltanski. 1978. "Changes in Social Structure and Changes in the Demand for Education." in *Contemporary Europe: Social Structure and Cultural Change*, edited by S. Giner and M. Archer. London: Routledge.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1974. "The School as a Conservative Force: Scholastic and Cultural Inequalities." in *Contemporary Research in the Sociology of Education*, edited by J. Eggleston. London: Methuen.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. "Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction." in *Power and Ideology in Education*, edited by J. Karabel and A. H. Halsey. New York: Oxford.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. *Distinction : A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. USA: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Bowles, Samuel. 1972. "Schooling and Inequality from Generation to Generation." *The Journal of Political Economy* 80(3):219-51.
Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 1976. *Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life*. New York: Basic Books.
Bowles, Samuel. 1977. "Unequal Education and the Reproduction of the Social Division of Labor." Pp. 137-53 in *Power and Ideology in Education*, edited by J. Karabel and A. H. Halsey. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 2001. "Schooling in Capitalist America Revisited." Paper presented at the Sociological Association in Philadelphia, USA.
Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 2002. "Schooling in Capitalist America Revisited." *Sociology of Education* 75(1):1-18.
Bradley, Mark. 2007. *Iran: Open Hearts in a Closed Land*. London: Authentic Media.
Breen, Richard and John H Goldthorpe. 2001. "Class, Mobility and Merit: The Experience of Two British Birth Cohorts." *European Sociological Review* 17(2):81–101.
Breen, Richard. 2005. "Foundations of a Neo-Weberian Class Analysis." in *Approaches to Class Analysis*, edited by E. O. Wright. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brumberg, Daniel and Farideh Farhi. 2016. "Politics of Contention and Conciliation in Iran's Semiautocracy." in *Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation*, edited by D. Brumberg and F. Farhi. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Brym, Robert J. 1985. "The Canadian Capitalist Class, 1965-1985." Pp. 1-20 in *The Structure of the Canadian Capitalist Class*, edited by R. J. Brym. Toronto: Garamond Press.
Buchta, Wilfried. 2000. *Who Rules Iran: The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic*. Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Bureau of Human Rights and Labor. 2015. “Iran 2015 International Religious Freedom Report.” United States Department of State, Washington.
Butterworth, Charles E. 1980. "Philosophy, Stories, and the Study of Elites." in *Elites in the Middle East*, edited by I. W. Zartman. New York: Praeger.
Callenbach, E and M Phillips. 1985. *A Citizen Legislature*. Berkeley, CA: Banyan Tree Books.
Campo, Esther del. 2005. "Women and Politics in Latin America: Perspectives and Limits of the Institutional Aspects of Women's Political Representation." *Social Forces* 83(4):1697-726.
Carnes, Nicholas and Noam Lupu. 2015. "Rethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1):1–18.
Chehabi, Houchang E. 2001a. "The Political Regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Comparative Perspective." *Government and Opposition* 36(1):48-70.

Chehabi, Houchang E. 2001b. "Goethe Institute." Pp. 43-44 in *Encyclopædia Iranica*, Vol. XI, Fasc. 1; Available online at: http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/goethe-institute.
Clark, Terry Nichols and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1991. "Are Social Classes Dying?". *International Sociology* 6(4):397-410.
Clement, Wallace. 1975. *The Canadian Corporate Elite : An Analysis of Economic Power*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
Collins, Randall. 2011. "Credential Inflation and the Future of Universities." *Italian Journal of Sociology of Education* 2:228-51.
Curtis, Glenn E and Eric Hooglund. 2008. *Iran: A Country Study*. Washington: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress.
Dadgar, Ali. 2013. "Democratization in a Non-Western Setting: Toward a Synthetic Theoretical Framework - the Case of Iran, 1906-1979." Master of Literature, School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin.
Dahl, Robert. 1961. *Who Governs? : Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dahl, Robert. 1967. *Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Contest*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dahl, Robert A. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Dahl, Robert A. 2005. "What Political Institutions Does Large-Scale Democracy Require?". *Political Science Quarterly* 120(2):187-97.
Dahl, Robert A. 2006. *On Political Equality*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1959. *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
Daloz, Jean-Pascal. 2010. *The Sociology of Elite Distinction: From Theoretical to Comparative Perspectives*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Dalton, Russell J. 2004. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices : The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Das, Raju J. 1996. "State Theories: A Critical Analysis." *Science & Society* 60(1):27-57.
Davies, James C. 1962. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." *American Sociological Review* 27(1):5-19.
Davis, Kathy. 2008. "Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science Perspective on What Makes a Feminist Theory Successful ". *Feminist Theory* 9(1):67-85.
Davis, Kingsley and Wilbert E Moore. 1944. "Some Principles of Stratification." *American Sociological Review* 10(2):242-49.
Dehnavi, Hasanali. 2005. "Barasi-Ye Pishine-Ye Ejtemae-Ye Motaghazian-E Voroud Be Amuzesh Ali Dar Saal-E 1382 (Social Background of the Applicants of the Post-Secondary Education in 2003)." *Quarterly Journal of Research and Planning in Higher Education* 10(4):93-123.
Denis, Ann. 2008. "Intersectional Analysis: A Contribution of Feminism to Sociology." *International Sociology* 23(5):677-94.
Domhoff, G. William. 1990. *The Power Elite and the State: How Policy Is Made in America*. New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Dreger, Christian and Teymur Rahmani. 2014. "The Impact of Oil Revenues on the Iranian Economy and the Gulf States." Paper presented at the German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin.
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. 2002. *After Khomeini : The Iranian Second Republic*. London: Routledge.
Enayat, Hamid. 2005. *Modern Islamic Political Thought : The Response of the Shi'i and Sunni Muslims to the Twentieth Century*. London I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd.
Erikson, Robert and John H Goldthorpe. 1992. *The Constant Flux. A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1999. *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Eyal, Gil, Ivan Szelenyi and Eleanor R Townsley. 1998. *Making Capitalism without Capitalists : Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe*. New York: Verso.
Fereshtian, Hassan. 2003. "A Comparison between the Constitutional Council of France and the Guardian Council of Iran." *The Islamic State Quarterly* 30:113-26.
Foran, John. 1993. *Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution*. Oxford: Westview Press.
Foucault, Michel. 2005. "What Are the Iranians Dreaming About?" Pp. 203-09 in *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution : Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, edited by J. Afary and K. Anderson. Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Fraser, Nancy. 2010. *Scales of Justice : Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Frontline. 2002, "The Structure of Power in Iran: An Overview of the Iranian Government and Political System". Retrieved June 1, 2017 (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html).
Ganji, Akbar. 2008. "The Latter-Day Sultan: Power and Politics in Iran." *Foreign Affairs* 87(6):45-66.
Ghanoun-e Mojazaat-e Eslami. 2013. *Ghanoun-E Mojazaat-E Eslami (the Islamic Penal Law)*. Tehran: Islamic Consultative Assembly Publishing Center.
Gheisarianfard, Hadi and Sabbah Khosravizadeh. 2012. "Moghayese-Ye Jame-E Shenkhti Akharin Majles-E Asr-E Mashroutiat Ba Avalin Dowrey-E Ghanoungozari Jomhouri-E Eslami-E Iran (a Historical Comparison between the Last Constitutional Majels and the First Islamic Majles)." *Payam-e Baharestan* 16(2).
Giddens, Anthony. 1981a. *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*. London: Hutchinson.
Giddens, Anthony. 1981b. *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism: Power, Property and the State*. London: Macmillan.
Giddens, Anthony. 2007. *Europe in the Global Age*. Cambridge: Policy Press.
Giddens, Anthony. 2008a. "The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies." in *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective*, edited by D. Grusky. Colorado, United States: Westview Press.
Giddens, Anthony. 2008b. "Social Justice and Social Divisions." Pp. 1016-22 in *Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective*, edited by D. Grusky. Colorado, United States: Westview Press.

Goldthorpe, John H. 1987. *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modem Britain*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Goldthorpe, John H and Gordon Marshall. 1992. "The Promising Future of Class Analysis: A Response to Recent Critiques." *Sociology* 26(3):381-400.
Goldthorpe, John H. 2001. "Class and Politics in Advanced Industrial Societies." Pp. 105-20 in *Breakdown of Class Politics: A Debate of Post-Industrial Stratification*, edited by T. N. Clark and S. M. Lipset. Washington D. C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Goldthorpe, John H and Michelle Jackson. 2007. "Intergenerational Class Mobility in Contemporary Britain: Political Concerns and Empirical Findings." *The British Journal of Sociology* 58(4):525-46.
Grabb, Edward. 1999. "Concentration of Ownership and Economic Control in Canada: Patterns and Trends in 1990s." in *Social Inequality in Canada: Patterns, Problems, Policies*, edited by J. Curtis, E. Grabb and N. Guppy. Scarborough, Ont: Prentice-Hall Canada.
Grabb, Edward G. 1997. *Theories of Social Inequality: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives*. Toronto, Ont: Heather McWhinney.
Guppy, Neil. 1984. "Access to Higher Education in Canada." *The Canadian Journal of Higher Education* 14(3):79-93.
Guppy, Neil, Paulina D Mikicich and Ravi Pendakur. 1984. "Changing Patterns of Educational Inequality in Canada." *The Canadian Journal of Sociology* 9(3):319-31.
Guppy, Neil, Sabrina Freeman and Shari Buchan. 1987. "Representing Canadians: Changes in the Economic Backgrounds of Federal Politicians, 1965-1984." *Canadian Review of Sociology & Anthropology* 24(3):417-30.
Habibi, Nader. 2013. "The Economic Legacy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad." *Middle East Brief* 74:1-9.
Haider-Markel, Donald P, Mark R Joslyn and Chad J Kniss. 2000. "Minority Group Interests and Political Representation: Gay Elected Officials in the Policy Process." *The Journal of Politics* 62(2):568-77.
Hakimzadeh, Shirin. 2006. "Iran: A Vast Diaspora Abroad and Millions of Refugees at Home." *The Online Journal of the Migration Policy Institute. Retrived from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/iran-vast-diaspora-abroad-and-millions-refugees-home.*
Halliday, Fred. 1979a. "The Genesis of the Iranian Revolution." *Third World Quarterely* 1:1-16.
Halliday, Fred. 1979b. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. New York: Penguin Books.
Halliday, Fred. 1982. "The Iranian Revolution: Uneven Development and Religious Populism." *Journal of International Affairs* 36(2):187-207.
Harik, Iliya. 1980. "Power and the Study of Elites." in *Elites in the Middle East*, edited by I. W. Zartman. New York: Praeger.
Harris, Kevan. 2015. "Class and Politics in Post-Revolutionary Iran: A Brief Introduction." *The Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)* 45.
Harrison, Eric and David Rose. 2006. "The European Socio-Economic Classification (Esec) User Guide." Colchester: Institute for Social and Economic Research (University of Essex).
Hartmann, Michael. 2007. *The Sociology of Elites*. London: Routledge.
Herrick, Rebekah and Sue Thomas. 1999. "The Effect of Sexual Orientation on Citizen's Perception on Candidate Viability." in *Gays and Lesbians in the Democratic Process :*

Public Policy, Public Opinion, and Political Representation, edited by E. D. B. Riggle and B. L. Tadlock. New York: Columbia University Press.
Hickey, Sam and Sarah Bracking. 2005. "Exploring the Politics of Chronic Poverty: From Representation to a Politics of Justice?". *World Development* 33(6):851-65.
Higley, John. 2009. "Elite Theory and Analysis in Political Sociology." Paper presented at the Speaker Series, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary.
Hoseini, Hadi, Ali Ahmad Rasekh, Hamid Nejaat and Mohammad Hakimi. 2008. *Ketaab-E Zan (Women)*. Tehran: Amirkabir Publications.
Hosseini-Chavoshi, Meimanat and Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi. 2012. "Demographic Transition in Iran: Changes and Challenges." Pp. 97-116 in *Population Dynamics in Muslim Countries: Assembling the Jigsaw*, edited by H. Groth and A. Sousa-Poza. London: Springer.
Hout, Mike, Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza. 1999. "The Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Societies." in *Debates on Social Inequality: Class, Gender and Ethnicity in Canada*, edited by M. R. Nakhaie. Canada: Harcourt Brace.
Howzeh Elmiyeh. 2016. "Howzeh Elmiye Qom Portal." Available: http://www.howzeh-qom.ir/page/Amoozesh_Howzeh [Accesed 10 December 2016].
Howzeh Encyclopedia. 2017, "Women' and Political Participation". Retrieved April 2 2017 (http://www.hawzah.net/fa/Article/View/65622/%D8%B2%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%AA-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C).
Huber, Evelyne and John D Stephens. 1999. "The Bourgeoisie and Democracy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives." *Social Research* 66(3):759-88.
Human Rights Watch. 2017a, "Iran". Retrieved June 2, 2017 (https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/iran).
Human Rights Watch. 2017b, "World Report". Retrieved June 2, 2017 (https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf).
Hunter, Alfred A. 1981. *Class Tells : On Social Inequality in Canada*. Toronto: Butterworths.
Hunter, Paul and Dan Holden. 2015, "Who Governs Britain: A Profile of Mps in the 2015 Parliament", UK: The Smith Institute. Retrieved April, 22, 2017 (https://smithinstitutethinktank.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/who-governs-britain.pdf).
Huntington, Samuel P. 1984. "Will More Countries Become Democratic?". *Political Science Quarterly* 99(2):193-218.
Idjadi, Jalal. 2014. *Jameh-Shenasi Asib-Ha Va Degargooni-Haye Jame Iran (Sociology of Fractures and Changes in Iranian Society)*. London: H&S Media.
International Labor Organization. 2012. *International Standard Classification of Occupations: Isco-08. Volume 1: Structure, Group Definitions and Correspondence Tables*. Geneva: International Labour Office.
International Labour Office. 1990. *International Standard Classification of Occupations: Isco-88*. Geneva: International Labour Office.
Iranian Business House. Iranian Business House newsletter, January 2015, Tehran, Iran
Islamic Republic Constitution. 2007 [1989]. *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Tehran: Islamic Consultative Assembly Public Relations and Cultural Affairs.

Jakopovich, Daniel. 2014. "The Concept of Class." *Cambridge Studies in Social Research* 14:2-29.
Jessop, Bob. 1990. *State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in Their Place*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Jusko, Karen Long. 2008. "The Political Representation of the Poor." PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, United States.
Kamrava, Mehran. 1990. *Revolution in Iran, the Roots of Turmoil.* London: Routledge.
Karamouzian, Mohammad, Hamid Sharifi and Ali Akbar Haghdoost. 2014. "Iran's Shift in Family Planning Policies: Concerns and Challenges." *International Journal of Health Policy Management* 3(5):231-33.
Karimi-Hakkak, Ahmad. 1985. "Protest and Perish: A History of the Writers' Association of Iran." *Iranian Studies* 18(2/4):189-229.
Kashefi, Mahmoud. 2008. "Why the 1979 Iranian Revolution Did Not Bring an Advanced Mode of Production with a Representative and Reduced State Power? A Sociological Explanation." *International Review of Modern Sociology* 34(1):77-93.
Katouzian, Homa. 1981. *The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979*. New York: New York University Press.
Katouzian, Homa. 2007. *Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic of State and Society*. New York: Routledge Curzon.
Katouzian, Homa and Hossein Shahidi, eds. 2008. *Iran in the 21st Century : Politics, Economics and Conflict*. London: Routledge.
Kazemipur, Abdolmohammad and Ali Rezaei. 2003. "Religious Life under Theocracy: The Case of Iran." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 42(3):347-61.
Keddie, Nikki R. 1977. "The Midas Touch: Black Gold, Economics and Politics in Iran." *Iranian Studies* 10:243-66.
Keddie, Nikki R. 1981. *Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Keddie, Nikki R. 2006. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Keddie, Nikki R. 2015. "Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective." *Iran Nameh* 30(3):308-28.
Keshavarzian, Arang. 2007. *Bazaar and State in Iran: The Politics of the Tehran Marketplace*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ketabi, Mahmoud, Vahid Ghasemi and Reza Masoumi. 2004. "Barrasi-E Barkhi Az Vijegihaye Ejtemaeye Namayandegan-E Majles-E Shoraye Eslami Dar Khelel-E Shesh Dowreye Ghanoungozari (Analysis of Social Characteristics of Islamic Consultative Assembly Members During Six Sections of Legislation)." *Journal of Applied Sociology* 17:31-58.
Khalaji, Mehdi. 2016. "The Shiite Clergy Post-Khamenei: Balancing Authority and Autonomy." *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy* 37.
Khamenei, Ali. 2005. "A Meeting with the Members of the Guardian Council." Retrieved January 2, 2018 (http://www.shora-rc.ir/Portal/home/?generaltext/11831/20103/20105/).
Khomeini, Ruhollah. 1979. *The Speech Delivered in Behesht-E Zahra Cemetry*.
Khomeini, Ruhollah. 1980 [1941] *Kashf Al-Asraar (the Disclosure of Secrets)*. Tehran.
Khomeini, Ruhollah. [1971] 1994. *Velayat-E Faghih (Guardianship of the Jurist)*. The Institute of Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works: Tehran.

Khosrokhavar, Farhad. 2009. "Iran's New Scientific Community." in *Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics*, edited by A. Gheissari. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kian-Thiebaut, Azadeh. 1998. *Secularization of Iran: A Doomed Failure? The New Middle Class and the Making of Modern Iran*. Paris: Institut d'etudes iraniennes and Diˆusion Peeters.
Kinzer, Stephen. 2003. *All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons.
Klawitter, Marieka and Brian Hammer. 1999. "Spatial and Temporal Diffusion of Local Antidiscrimination Policies for Sexual Orientation." in *Gays and Lesbians in the Democratic Process : Public Policy, Public Opinion, and Political Representation*, edited by E. D. B. Riggle and B. L. tadlock. New York: Columbia University Press.
Knoke, David, George W Bohrnstedt and Alisa Potter Mee. 2002. *Statistics for Social Data Analysis*. New York: Peacock Publishers.
Knuttila, Murray. 1987. *State Theories: From Liberalism to the Challenge of Feminism*. Toronto: Garamond Press.
Kolegar, Ferdinand. 1967. "The Elite and the Ruling Class: Pareto and Mosca Re-Examined." *The Review of Politics* 29(3):354-69.
Kurzman, Charles. 1995. "Historiography of the Iranian Revolutionary Movement, 1977- 79." *Iranian Studies* 28(1-2):25-38.
Kurzman, Charles. 2004. *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kurzman, Charles. 2008. "A Feminist Generation in Iran?". *Iranian Studies* 41(3):297-321.
Lerner, Daniel. 1958. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. New York: The Free Press.
Lewis, Gregory B and Marc A Rogers. 1999. "Does the Public Support Equal Employment Rights for Gays and Lesbians?" in *Gays and Lesbians in the Democratic Process : Public Policy, Public Opinion, and Political Representation*, edited by E. D. B. Riggle and B. L. Tadlock. Columbia University Press: New York.
Liaghat, Gholam. 1980. "Changes in a New Middle Class through the Analysis of Census Data. The Case of Iran between 1956-1966." *Middle East Journal* 34(3):343-49.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *The American Political Science Review* 53:69-105.
Luna, Juan P and Elizabeth J Zechmeister. 2005. "Political Representation in Latin America: A Study of Elite-Mass Congruence in Nine Countries." *Comparative Political Studies* 38(4):388-416.
Macedo, Stephen, Yvette Alex-Assensoh, Jeffrey M. Berry, Michael Brintnall, David E. Campbell, Luis Ricardo Fraga, Archon Fung, William A. Galston, Christopher F. Karpowitz, Margaret Levi, Meira Levinson, Keena Lipsitz, Richard G. Niemi, Robert D. Putnam, Wendy M. Rahn, Rob Reich, Robert R. Rodgers, Todd Swanstrom and Katherine Cramer Walsh. 2005. *Democracy at Risk: How Political Choice Undermine Citizen Participation and What We Can Do About It*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.
Mahdavi, Mojtaba. 2011. "Post-Islamist Trends in Postrevolutionary Iran." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 31(1):94-109.
Mahdavi, Mojtaba. 2014. "One Bed and Two Dreams? Contentious Public Religion in the Discourses of Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati." *Studies in Religion* 43(1):25-52.

Maloney, Suzanne. 2015. *Iran's Political Economy since the Revolution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Maloney, Suzanne and Emma Borden. 2016, "Iran's Guardians' Council Has Approved a Record-Low Percentage of Candidates. What Will That Mean for the Upcoming Vote?": Brookings. Retrieved May 16, 2017 (https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/02/24/irans-guardians-council-has-approved-a-record-low-percentage-of-candidates-what-will-that-mean-for-the-upcoming-vote/).
Marschall, Christin. 2003. *Iran's Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami*. London: Routledge Curzon.
Marx, Karl. 1904. *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. Chicago: International Publishing Co.
McCall, Leslie. 2005. "The Complexity of Intersectionality." *Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 30(3):1771-800.
Michels, Robert. 1959. *Political Parties : A Sociological Study of the Oligarchial Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. Translated by E. C. Paul. New York: Dover Publications.
Milani, Mohsen M. 1993. "The Evolution of the Iranian Presidency: From Bani Sadr to Rafsanjani." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 20(1):83-97.
Milani, Mohsen M. 1994. *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution : From Monarchy to Islamic Republic*. Boulder: Westview Press.
Miliband, Ralph. 1969. *The State in Capitalist Society*. New York: Basic Books.
Miliband, Ralph. 1977. *Marxism and Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mills, C. Wright. 1973 [1956]. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ministry of Interior. 2017. "Savabegh-E Shoghli Va Tahsili Namayandegan-E Dahomin Dowre Majles-E Shoraye Eslami (Educational and Occupational Background of Representations of the Tenth Islamic Consultative Majles)." Tehran: Ministry of Interior Portal.
Mir-Hosseini, Ziba and Richard Tapper. 2006. *Islam and Democracy in Iran : Eshkevari and the Quest for Reform*. London: I.B.Tauris.
Mirashrafi, Bagher, Georg Bol and Gholamreza Nakhaiezadeh. 2013. "The Effect of Family Background and Socioeconomic Status on Academic Performance of Higher Education Applicants." *International Journal of Technology and Inclusive Education (IJTIE)* 2(1).
Mirashrafi, Bagher, Ebrahim Khodaie and Ehsan Jamali. 2016. "Family Background and Socioeconomic Status Effects on Educational Performances by Data Mining Methods: A Case Study in Iran." *International Journal for Cross-Disciplinary Subjects in Education (IJCDSE)* 7(1).
Moaddel, Mansoor. 1989. "State-Centered Vs. Class-Centered Perspectives on International Politics: The Case of U.S. And British Participation in the 1953 Coup against Premier Mosaddeq in Iran." *Studies in Comparative international Development* 24(2):3-23.
Moaddel, Mansoor. 1991. "Class Struggle in Post-Revolutionary Iran." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23(3):317-43.
Moaddel, Mansoor. 1993. *Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Moaddel, Mansoor. 2007. "Book Review of Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter? By Farhad Nomani and Sohrab Behdad." *American Journal of Sociology* 113(3):876-78.

Moaddel, Mansoor. 2009. "The Iranian Revolution and Its Nemesis: The Rise of Liberal Values among Iranians." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 29(1):126-36.
Moallem, Minoo. 2005. *Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister : Islamic Fundamentalism and the Politics of Patriarchy in Iran*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Moradi, Ahmad. 1995. "Barrasi-E Tatbighiy-E Mansha-E Ejtemaei Namyandegan-E Majles-E Shoray-E Eslami (a Comparative Analysis of the Social Status of the Representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly)." PhD thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tehran.
Morady, Farhang. 2011. "Who Rules Iran? The June 2009 Election and Political Turmoil." *Capital and Class* 35(1):39-61.
Mosca, Gaetano. 1939. *The Ruling Class*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Motahari, Morteza. 1990. *Nezam-E Hoghough-E Zan Dar Eslaam (Women's Right in Islam)*. Tehran: Sadra Publication.
Najmabadi, Afsaneh. 2008. "Transing and Transpassing across Sex Gender Walls in Iran." *Women's Studies Quarterly* 36(3):23-42.
Nakhaie, Reza. 1996. "The Reproduction of Class Relations by Gender in Canada." *The Canadian Journal of Sociology* 21(4):523-58.
Nakhaie, Reza. 1997. "Vertical Mosaic among the Elites: The New Imagery Revisited." *The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 34(1):1-24.
Nakhaie, Reza and James Curtis. 1998. "Effects of Class Positions of Parents on Educational Attainment of Daughters and Sons." *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 35(4):483-511.
Nash, Roy. 1990. "Bourdieu on Education and Social and Cultural Reproduction." *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 11(4):431-47.
Nemati, Leila. 2013, "Does Other Countries Has Similar Institutions to the Guardian Council?", The Guardian Council Official Website. Retrieved January 1, 2018 (http://www.shora-gc.ir/Portal/home/?news/11390/11001/9953/%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%83%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%8A%E2%80%8C%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%9F).
Neuman, William Lawrence. 2007. *Basics of Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Boston: Pearson.
Nisbet, Robert A. 1959. "The Decline and Fall of Social Class." *The Pacific Sociological Review* 2(1):11-17.
Noghani, Mohsen. 2007. "Tasir-E Nabarabari-Ye Sarmayeh Farhangi Bar Movafaghiyat-E Tahsili Danesh Amuzan Pish Daneshgahi Dar Dastyabi Be Amuzesh Ali (the Effect of Inequality in Cultural Capital on Success in Entrance to the Post-Secondary Education)." *Quarterly Journal of Education* 91(3):71-101.

Nomani, Farhad and Sohrab Behdad. 2006. *Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter?* New York: Syracuse University Press.
Norris, Pippa. 2006. "The Impact of Electoral Reform on Women's Representation." *Acta Politica* 41(2):197-213.
Ogmundson, R and J McLaughlin. 1992. "Trends in the Ethnic Origins of Canadian Elite: The Decline of the Brits?". *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropolog* 29(2):227-41.
Olsen, Dennis. 1980. *The State Elite*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
Owens, Chris. T. 2005. "Black Substantive Representation in State Legislatures from 1971-1994." *Social Science Quarterly* 86(4):779-91.
Paivandi, Saeed. 2012. " Education in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Perspectives on Democratic Reforms." Paper presented at the Legatum Institute's workshop on Educational Reform.
Pakulski, Jan and Malcom Waters. 2008. "The Death of Class." in *Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective*, edited by D. Grusky. Colorado,United States: Westview Press.
Pareto, Vilfredo. 1968. *The Rise and Fall of the Elites : An Application of Theoretical Sociology*. Totowa: Bedminster Press.
Parsons, Talcott and Robert Freed Bales. 1956. *Family : Socialization and Interaction Process*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Phillips, Anne. 1995. *The Politics of Presence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Agnieszka. 2015, "Transsexuality in Iran: A Liberal Law in a Conservative State": Middle Eeast Eye. Retrieved April 28, 2017 (http://www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/features/transsexuality-iran-liberal-law-conservative-state-1887443646).
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley University of California Press.
Porter, John A. 1965. *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada*. Toronto Toronto Uuniversity Press.
Poulantzas, Nicos. 1975. *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*. Translated by D. Fernbach. London: New Left Books.
Poulantzas, Nicos. 1976. "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau." *New Left Review* 95(1):63-83.
Powell, Jr. G. Bingham 2004. "Political Representation in Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7:273-96
PressTV. 2017, "A Look at Elections in Iran Versus Other Persian Gulf States", Press TV Website. Retrieved May 19, 2017 (http://217.218.67.231/Detail/2017/05/19/522450/Iran).
Public Papers of the President of the United States. 1978. "President Jimmy Carter, Remarks (Dec. 31, 1977)." in *Book II*, *2221*.
Rafipour, Faramarz. 2000. *Towse'e Va Tazad (Development and Conflict: An Analysis of the Islamic Revolution and Social Problems in Iran)*. Tehran: Sahamiye Enteshar.
Rajaee, Farhang. 1999. "A Thermidor of "Islamic Yuppies"? Conflict and Compromise in Iran's Politics." *Middle East Journal* 53(2):217-31.
Rajaee, Farhang. 2007. *Islamism and Modernism: The Changing Discourse in Iran*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Rajaee, Farhang. 2013. *Moshkeleye Hoviyat-E Iranian Emruz (the Problematic of Today's Iranians Identity)*. Tehran: Ney Publication.

Rakel, Eva Patricia. 2008. "The Iranian Political Elite, State and Society Relations, and Foreign Relations since the Islamic Revolution." PhD, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam.
Rakel, Eva Patricia. 2009. "The Political Elite in the Islamic Republic of Iran: From Khomeini to Ahmadinejad." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 29(1):105-25.
Rashidvash, Vahid. 2013. "Iranian People: Iranian Ethnic Groups." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 3(15):216-26.
Regulations of the Majles Election. 2011. "Ghavanin-E Entekhabat-E Majles Shoraye Eslami (the Regulations of the Islamic Consultative Majles)." The Department of Election Affairs of the Guardian Council.
Rezaee Zadeh, Mohammad Javaad and Mohsen Daavari. 2016. "Mabani Va Osoule Tashkhise Salaahiyat-E Namayandegaan-E Majles-E Shoray-E Eslaami (the Basis of Evaluation of the Islamic Consultative Assembly Candidates)." *Public Law knowledge Quarterely* 14(5):117-42.
Rose, David and Eric Harrison. 2007. "The European Socio-Economic Classification: A New Social Class Schema for Comparative European Research." *European Societies* 9(3):459-90.
Sahaabi, Ezzatollah. 2004. "An Interview with Ezzatollah Sahaabi." in *Eqtesad-E Siyasi-Ye Jomhuri-E Eslami (Political Economy of the Islamic Republic)*, edited by B. Ahmadi-Amuii. Tehran: Gam-e Naw.
Saie, Ali. 1998. "Barrasi-E Tabagheye Ejtemai-E Namayandegan-E Majles-E Shoray-E Eslami (Social Class of Members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly)." *Modares* 8:37-63.
Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad. 2009. "Poverty, Inequality, and Populist Politics in Iran." *Journal of Economic Inequality*:5-28.
Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad. 2016. “Long Term Trends in Poverty and Inequality in Iran.” *Inequality and Poverty.* Salehi-Isfahani's Weblog.
Salehi-Isfahani, Hadi, Kamiar Mohaddes and M Hashem Pesaran. 2013. "Oil Exports and the Iranian Economy." *Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance* 53(3):221-37.
Salehi Isfahani, Djavad. 2007. "Book Review of Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter? By Farhad Nomani and Sohrab Behdad." *Middle East Journal* 61(1):162-63.
Sawer, Marian, Manon Tremblay and Linda Trimble, eds. 2006. *Representing Women in Parliament: A Comparative Study*. London: Routledge.
Schroedel, Jean Reith. 1999. "Elite Attitudes toward Homosexuals." Pp. 89-117 in *Gays and Lesbians in the Democratic Process : Public Policy, Public Opinion, and Political Representation*, edited by E. D. B. Riggle and L. T. Barry. New York: Columbia University Press.
Shaji'ee, Zahra. 1965. *Namayandegan-E Majles-E Shoray-E Melli Dar Bisto Yek Dowrehye Ghanoungozari (Representatives of 21 Legislative Majles)*. Tehran: Social Studies and Researches Institute.
Shaji'ee, Zahra. 1983. *Nokhbegan-E Siyasi Iran from Mashruteh Ta Enghelab-E Eslami (Iranian Political Elites from Constitutional Revolution to the Islamic Republic)*. Tehran: Sokahn.
Skocpol, Theda. 1982. "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution." *Theory and Society* 11:265-83.

Stasiulis, Daiva K. 1999. "Feminist Intersectional Theorizing." Pp. 347-97 in *Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada*, edited by P. S. Li. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Statistical Center of Iran. 1987. "Natayej-E Tafsili-Ye Sarshomari Omoumi-Ye Nofous Va Maskan 1365 (the Overal Result of the 1986 Census)." Tehran: SCI.
Statistical Center of Iran. 1996. "Natayej-E Tafsili-Ye Sarshomari Omoumi-Ye Nofous Va Maskan 1375 (the Overal Result of the 1996 Census)." Tehran: SCI.
Statistical Center of Iran. 2006. "Natayej-E Tafsili-Ye Sarshomari Omoumi-Ye Nofous Va Maskan 1385 (the Overal Result of the 2006 Census)." Tehran: SCI.
Statistical Center of Iran. 2011. *Statistical Yearbook 2011*. Tehran: SCI.
Statistical Center of Iran. 2012. *Statistical Yearbook 2012: Population*. Tehran: SCI.
Statistical Center of Iran. 2013a. *Statistical Yearbook 2013: Manpower*. Tehran: SCI.
Statistical Center of Iran. 2013b. *Statistical Yearbook 2013: Population*. Tehran: SCI.
Statistical Center of Iran. 2015. "The Labor Force Survey." Tehran: SCI.
Statistical Centre of Iran. 2014. "Natayej-E Amargiri Nirouy-E Kaar (the Manpower Survey Result)." Tehran: SCI.
Swain, Carol M. 1993. *Black Faces, Black Interests : The Representation of African Americans in Congress*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Takeyh, Ray. 2006. *Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic*. New York: Times Books.
Thaler, David E, Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jerrold D Green, Charlotte Lynch and Frederic Wehrey. 2010. *Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics*. USA: National Defense Research Institute (RAND).
The Iranian Parliamentary Guide. 2011. *Ashnaee Ba Namayandegan-E Majles-E Shoraye Eslami (the Islamic Consultative Majles Guide)*. Tehran: Islamic Consultative Assembly Publishing Center.
Tilly, Charles. 2007. *Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tormey, Simon. 2015. *The End of Representative Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Totten, Michael J. 2016, "No, Iran Is Not a Democracy" *The Online Journal of World Affairs*. Retrieved April 20, 2017 (http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/michael-j-totten/no-iran-not-democracy).
Tremblay, Manon, Jane Arscott and Linda Trimble. 2013. "The Road to Gender Parity." in *The Representation of Women in Canadian Governments*, edited by L. Trimble, J. Arscott and M. Tremblay. Vancouver: UBC Press.
UN Human Rights Council. 2016, "Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran", New York: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved June 3, 2017 (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session34/Documents/A_HRC_34_40_AEV.docx).
UNESCO. 2012. "Adult and Youth Literacy,1990-2015: Analysis of Data for 41 Selected Countries." Quebec: UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
United Nations. 2015. "Demografic Profiles." Available: https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Graphs/DemographicProfiles/ [Accesed 6 February 2017]: Population Division.

US Human Rights Report. 2015, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices", Washington: United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Retrieved June 3, 2017 (https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253135.pdf).
Vakili-Zad, Cyrus. 1994. "Conflict among the Ruling Revolutionary Elite in Iran." *Middle Eastern Studies* 30(3):618-31.
Verba, Sidney and Norman H Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York: Harper & Row.
Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Henry E Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Vergara, Luis Garrido. 2013. "Elites, Political Elites and Social Change in Modern Societies." *Revista Internacional de Sociologia* 28:21-49.
Wauters, Bram. 2010. "Bringing Class (Back) In: Methodological Reflections on Social Class and Representation." *Representation* 46(2):183-95.
WeBels, Bernhard 2007. "Political Representation and Democracy." Pp. 833-49 in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, edited by R. J. Dalton and H. D. Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weber, Max, C. Wright Mills and H. H Gerth. 1946. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. New York: Oxford university press.
Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Weber, Max. 2005 [1930]. *The Protestant Ethic and the Sprit of Capitalism*. Translated by T. Parsons. London: Routledge.
Weininger, Elliot B. 2005. "Foundations of Pierre Bourdieu's Class Analysis." in *Approaches to Class Analysis*, edited by E. O. Wright. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.
Williams, Melissa S. 1998. *Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
World Bank. 2014. "Oil Rents (% of Gdp)." Available: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS?locations=IR25 [Accesed 25 September 2016].
World Values Survey. 2008. "Wvs Wave 5." Madrid: Spain: World Values Survey Association.
Wright, Erik Olin. 1980. "Class and Occupation." *Theory and Society* 9(1):177-214.
Wright, Erik Olin. 1985. *Classes*. London: New Left Books.
Wright, Erik Olin. 1997. *Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wright, Erik Olin. 2005a. "Conclusion: If Class Is the Answer, What Is the Question?" in *Approaches to Class Analysis*, edited by E. O. Wright. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wright, Erik Olin. 2005b. "Foundations of a Neo-Marxist Class Analysis." Pp. 4-30 in *Approaches to Class Analysis*, edited by E. O. Wright. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wright, Erik Olin. 2006. "Class Analysis." Pp. 143-66 in *Social Class and Stratification: Classic Statements and Theoretical Debates*, edited by R. F. Levine. USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, INC.
Young, Lisa. 1998. "Electoral Systems and Representative Legislatures." *Canadian Parliamentary Affairs* 21(3):12-14.

Zahedi, Dariush. 2010. "Prospects for Democratization in Iran: Policy Implications." *Insight Turkey* 12(2):223-40.

Zarif, Mohammad Javad. 2016, "Human Rights in Iran", Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Accessed on June 3, 2017 (http://en.mehrnews.com/news/117369/VIDEO-Zarif-s-speech-on-human-rights-at-SIPRI).

Zibakalaam, Sadegh. 1996. *Moghadamei Bar Enghelab-E Eslami (the Islamic Revolution: An Introduction)*. Tehran: Rozaneh Publication.

Zohoor, Hassan. 2005. "Development of Higher Education in Iran." Paper presented at the International Council for Open and Distance Education (ICDE), New Delhi.

Zonis, Marvin. 1971. *The Political Elite of Iran*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Presidential and Majles terms and correspondent censuses

Postrevolutionary Governments	Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis)	Censuses
1st Presidential Term Started: Feb 1980 Turnout: 68% President: Abolhasan Bani-Sadr (PM: Rajaee)	**1st Majlis Term Started: Mar 1980** Turnout: 51% Speaker: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani	**1st Census after the Revolution: 1986**
2nd Presidential Term Started: July 1981 Turnout: 64% President: Mohammad Ali Rajaee (PM: Bahonar)		
3rd Presidential Term Started: Oct 1981 Turnout: 74% President: Ali Khamenei (PM: Mousavi)	**2nd Majlis Term Started: May 1984** Turnout: 65% Speaker: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani	
4th Presidential Term Started: Sep 1985 Turnout: 55% President: Ali Khamenei (PM: Mousavi)	**3rd Majlis Term Started: May 1988** Turnout: 60% Speaker: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani / Mehdi Karoubi	**2nd Census: 1996**
5th Presidential Term Started: Jul 1989 Turnout: 55% President: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani	**4th Majlis Term Started: May 1992** Turnout: 58% Speaker: Aliakbar Nategh Nouri	
6th Presidential Term Started: Aug 1993 Turnout: 50% President: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani	**5th Majlis Term Started: Jun 1996** Turnout: 71% Speaker: Aliakbar Nategh Nouri	**3rd Census: 2006**
7th Presidential Term Started: Aug 1997 Turnout: 80% President: Mohammad Khatami	**6th Majlis Term Started: May 2000** Turnout: 67% Speaker: Mehdi Karoubi	
8th Presidential Term Started: Aug 2001 Turnout: 67% President: Mohammad Khatami	**7th Majlis Term Started: May 2004** Turnout: 51% Speaker: Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel	
9th Presidential Term Started: Aug 2005 Turnout: 63% President: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	**8th Majlis Term Started: May 2008** Turnout: 51% Speaker: Ali Larijani	**4th Census: 2011**
10th Presidential Term Started: Aug 2009 Turnout: 85% President: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	**9th Majlis Term Started: May 2012** Turnout: 64% Speaker: Ali Larijani	**5th Census: Nov 2016**
11th Presidential Term Started: Aug 2013 Turnout: 73% President: Hassan Rohani	**10th Majlis Term Started: May 2016** Turnout: 62% Speaker: Ali Larijani	

Appendix B: Chronology

1891: Tobacco Movement; the first national protest against Western (British) imperialism

1906: Constitutional Revolution

1951: Oil nationalization movement

1953 (August): American-British coup d'état against Prime Minister Mosaddegh

1961 (March): Death of grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi; a conservative and apolitical jurisconsult who prevented clerics from involving themselves in political activities

1963: The launching of the White Revolution and implementation of the Land Reform

1963 (June): The first antigovernment uprising and riots led by Ayatollah Khomeini

1978 (January 20): The beginning of the presidential term of Jimmy Carter in the USA

1979 (January 12): Formation of the Revolution Council by Ayatollah Khomeini - headed by Motahari, and including Beheshti, Hashemi, Ardabili and Bahonar.

1979 (February 1): Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran after 15 years of exile

1979 (February 4): Appointment of the Provisional Government headed by Mehdi Bazargan

1979 (February11): Shah's Prime Minister Bakhtiar flees Iran

1979 (February 11): The official triumph of the Revolution

1979 (February 12): Formation of the Revolutionary Committees

1979 (February 13): Formation of the Revolutionary Tribunals

1979 (February 28): Establishment of the Foundation of Disinherited to confiscate properties of the Shah and his disciples

1979 (March 1): Departure of Ayatollah Khomeini to Qom

1979 (March 20): The formation of the Islamic Republican Party - IRP

1979 (March 30): Islamic Republic referendum - yes/no

1979 (May): Establishment of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps

1979 (August 3): The election of the first Majles

1979 (November 4): Takeover of the US embassy

1979 (November 6): Resignation of the Bazargan's cabinet

1979 (November): Passing of the new constitution by the Constitution Assembly of Experts

1979 (December 24): The occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Army

1979 (January 23): Ayatollah Khomeini's heart attack which led to bringing him to Tehran - he resided in *Jamaran* until his death

1979 (May 1): Assassination of Morteza Motahari

1980 (January 25): The first presidential election; election of Bani-Sadr as the first president of the Islamic Republic - prime minister: Rajaee

1980 (March 14): The first Majles election; Hashemi was elected as the Speaker

1980 (April 24): Failure of the Eagle Claw operation ordered by American President Carter to rescue the US embassy hostages in Iran

1980 (April): The Revolution Council approved the progressive land reform bill, which was designed by Ayatollah Montazeri, Beheshti, and Meshkini to end the peasant-landlord/conservative Ulama dispute.

1980 (June): Beginning of the Cultural Revolution - closure of the universities

1980 (17 July): Opening of the Guardian Council

1980 (27 July): Death of Mohammad Reza Shah in Cairo

1980 (September 22): Iraq invades Iran; the beginning of an eight years long war

1981 (January 19): Algiers agreement signed between Iran and the US, ending the hostage crisis

1981 (January 20): Start of the presidential term of Ronald Reagan in the USA

1981 (January 20): Release of the American diplomats

1981(June): Dismissal of president Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr by Majles

1981 (June 27): Assassination attempt against Ayatollah Khamenei

1981 (June 28): Explosion at the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party and assassination of Beheshti and over 70 political figures

1981 (July): Isolation and defeat of Mojahedin Khalgh

1981 (July 24): The second presidential election; election of Rajaee as the second president of the Islamic Republic - prime minister: Bahonar

1981 (August 30): Bombing of the Prime Minister's office and assassination of President Rajaee and Prime Minister Bahonar

1981 (October 2): The third presidential election; election of Ayatollah Khamenei as the third president of the Islamic Republic - prime minister: Mir Hosein Mousavi

1982 (April): Majles passes the nationalization of the country's foreign trade bill.

1982 (May 24): The liberation of Khoramshahr after about 580 days of occupation by Iraq

1982 (December): Reopening of the universities following the implementation of the Cultural Revolution

1983: Banning of the Tudeh party

Mid 1980s: Decline in the fertility rate commences

1984 (April 12): The second Majles election; Hashemi elected as Speaker

1985 (August 16): The fourth presidential election; reelection of Ayatollah Khamenei - prime minister: Mir Hosein Mousavi

1985 (November): Selection of Ayatollah Hosein Ali Montazeri as the deputy supreme leader of the Islamic Republic by Ayatollah Khomeini

1986 (March 26): Ayatollah Khomeini's second heart attack and his provisional death for a few seconds - he was revived after the intervention of the emergency medical team of the Jamaran Heart Hospital

1986 (March): Oil price collapsed

1987 (June): Dissolution of the Islamic Republic Party

1987 (July 29): Resolution 598 adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council calling for an immediate cease-fire between Iran and Iraq

1987 (July 31): Over 400 deaths after Saudi solders' open fire against a demonstration by Iranian pilgrims in Mecca

1988 (Feb): Creation of the Expediency Council

1988 (April 8): The third Majles election; Hashemi elected as Speaker and office then passed to Mehdi Karoubi

1988 (June): Ayatollah Khomeini appoints Hashemi Rafsanjani as the acting Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces

1988 (July 3): Shooting down of the Iran Air passenger flight - Tehran-Dubai - by the US Navy which led to 290 civilian fatalities

1988 (July 20): Iran's acceptance of the 598 Resolution

1988 (July and August): *Forough-e Javidan* operation by Mojahedin Khalgh and Iraq's help and the official end of the War

1988 (August): Assassination of Mojahedin Khalgh and Tudeh advocators in the Evin prison

1989 (February 14): Ayatollah Khomeini declares Fatwa against Salman Rushdie

1989 (March): Ayatollah Montazeri's resignation as deputy supreme leader

1989 (May): Ayatollah Khomeini's command for the formation of the council of revision of the Constitution

1989 (June 3): Death of Ayatollah Khomeini

1989 (June 4): Selection of Ayatollah Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader

1989(July): Ratification of the Constitution amendment

1989 (July 28): The fifth presidential election; Hashemi elected as the fifth president

1989-94: First Five-Year Economic Development Plan

1989 (November 9): The fall of the Berlin Wall

1990 (January): Karbaschi selected as mayor of Tehran - until 1998

1990 (August): Iraq's occupation of Kuwait

1991 (January): Desert Storm operation to liberate Kuwait

1991 (February): Opening of *Salam* newspaper as the main leftist voice

1991 (December 26): Dissolution of the Soviet Union

1992 (April 10): The fourth Majles election; Nategh Nouri elected as Speaker

1992-94: Deaths of three grand ayatollahs - Ayatollah Khoee (August 1992), Ayatollah Golpayegani (December 1993), and Ayatollah Araki (November 1994)

1993 (March): First signs of the setback in the economic liberalization plan

1995-2000: Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan

1993 (June 11): The sixth presidential election; reelection of Hashemi as the sixth president

1994 (October): The emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan

1996 (February): Establishment of the *Kargozaran* Party as the political organization of pragmatists

1996 (March 8): The fifth Majles election; Nategh Nouri reelected as Speaker

1997 (May 23): The seventh presidential election and election of reformist president Khatami

1997 (November 19): Placement of Ayatollah Montazeri under house arrest, which lasts five years

1998 (August 8): Nine Iranian diplomats killed by Taliban in Mazar-i Sharif, Afghanistan

1998 (September 21): Khatami introduced the idea of the 'Dialogue between Civilizations' in the UN General Assembly

1998 (December): Disclosure of the chain murders of the Iranian intellectuals and writers

1999 (Feb): The first City Council election

1999 (July): The student protests of 18 *Tir*

2000 (February 18): The sixth Majles election; Mehdi Karoubi elected as Speaker

2000- 2005: Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan

2001 (June 8): The eighth presidential election and reelection of Khatami

2001 (September 11): Attacks on the World Trade Center towers

2001 (October 7): The invasion of Afghanistan by the US

2002 (August): The beginning of the Iran's nuclear program crisis following the West's claims of the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak

2003 (February 28): The second City Council election; fundamentalists gain the majority and appoint Ahmadinejad as the Meyer of Tehran in May of the same year

2003 (March 20): The invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies

2004 (February 20): The seventh Majles election; fundamentalists gained a majority and Haddad Adel elected as Speaker

2005 (June 24): The ninth presidential election and election of Ahmadinejad

2005–2010: Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan

2006 (December 15): The third City Council election

2008 (March 12): The eighth Majles election; Ali Larijani elected as Speaker

2009 (June 12): The tenth presidential election and reelection of Ahmadinejad

2009 (June-August): Disputation over the results of the presidential election under the leadership of Mousavi and Karoubi

2009 (December 20): The demise of Ayatollah Montazeri

2010 (November): Enactment of the Subsidies Targeting Act by president Ahmadinejad

2011 (February 20): Placing of the Mousavi and his wife - Zahra Rahnavard - and Karoubi under house arrest

2011-2016: Fifth Five-Year Economic Development Plan

2012 (January): The imposition of sanctions against Iran's oil exports and its Central Bank operations

2012 (February): Major drop in Iran's national currency as a result of sanctions

2012 (March 2): The ninth Majles election; Ali Larijani was reelected as Speaker

2013 (June 14): The eleventh presidential election and election of Rohani

2013 (June 14): The fourth City Council election

2016-2020: Sixth Five-Year Economic Development Plan

2016 (January 16): The implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed between Iran and five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany to put an end on the Iranian nuclear program crisis

2016 (February 26): The tenth Majles election; Ali Larijani was reelected as Speaker

2017 (January 8): Death of Hashemi Rafsanjani

2017 (May 19): The twelfth presidential election, which led to reelection of incumbent Rohani

VITA AUCTORIS

NAME:	Ali Dadgar
PLACE OF BIRTH:	Iran
YEAR OF BIRTH:	1983
EDUCATION:	Shahid Beheshti University, Bachelor of Sociology, Tehran, Iran, 2005
	Shahid Beheshti University, Masters of Sociology, Tehran, Iran, 2008
	University College Dublin, MLitt in Politics, Dublin, Ireland, 2013