Civil society and donor funded democratisation: Sierra Leone case study

Simon Willans

University of Windsor

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Civil Society and Donor Funded Democratisation: Sierra Leone Case Study

by

Simon Willans

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through Political Science
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts at the
University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada
2008
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Abstract

Civil Society and Donor Funded Democratisation: Sierra Leone Case Study

Simon Willans

This thesis evaluates donor funded efforts to utilise civil society as an agent of democracy promotion within their overall development policies. Democracy promotion has risen to the forefront of development aims and achieved prominence in the high politics of national security. In parallel, donors have emphasised civil society as a necessary and vital actor in this process. These dual pillars of donor policy have largely gone unquestioned, and little critical analysis regarding their compatibility and effectiveness has been conducted. The analysis was based on a case study from Sierra Leone, with the actors from the domestic environmental movement used as the primary subjects. The combination of qualitative and quantitative data was collected while working for a local civil society actor, active in the environmental movement. Results indicated that civil society has been ineffective in promoting democracy within Sierra Leone, and critically it may merely perpetuate existing undemocratic political norms.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUTHOR'S DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND POLICY</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Development Thought</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Theories of Development</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Section : United States and United Kingdom</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. DEMOCRACY THEORY AND POLICY</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classical Democratic Thought</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Democratic Thought</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Section</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society and Democracy Promotion</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Evaluations</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. SIERRA LEONE - A POLITICAL JOURNEY</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Protectorate</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Period: 1896-1961</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. CASE STUDY - ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society as a Balancing Agent</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing State Accountability</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicating the Interests and Demands of the Citizenry</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating a New Set of Political Norms</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A : ORGANISATION QUESTIONNAIRE</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B : INDIVIDUAL CITIZEN QUESTIONNAIRE</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA AUCTORIS</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</td>
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<td>APC</td>
<td>All People's Congress</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>CADEM</td>
<td>Community Advocacy and Development Movement</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Civil Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVICUS</td>
<td>World Alliance for Civic Participation</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>CSSL</td>
<td>Conservation Society of Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DACO</td>
<td>Development Assistance Coordination Office</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>District Councils</td>
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<td>DCP</td>
<td>Democratic Centre Party</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>EFA</td>
<td>Environmental Foundation for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENFORAC</td>
<td>Environmental Forum for Action</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Technical Cooperation</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IUCN</td>
<td>The World Conservation Union</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEA</td>
<td>Multinational Environmental Agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>MODEP</td>
<td>The Ministry of Development and Economic Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Native Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEP</td>
<td>National Environmental Plan</td>
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<td>NEPA</td>
<td>National Environment Protection Act</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NPRC</td>
<td>National Provisional Ruling Council</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Protectorate Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>People's Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMDC</td>
<td>People's Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>People’s National Party</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>RSC</td>
<td>Regional Stakeholder Consultations</td>
</tr>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLANGO</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Association of Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLPP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSD</td>
<td>Special Security Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPP</td>
<td>United National Peoples Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPP</td>
<td>United Progressive People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Chapter I: Introduction

In the summer of 1989 Francis Fukuyama suggested in a controversial and often misunderstood article that we may have reached the ‘end of history’, characterised by “the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”¹ Concurrent to Fukuyama's musings, the World Bank released a report entitled Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth which argued that poor governance was the primary factor hindering Africa’s economic growth.² Seizing the momentum generated by the subsequent fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the development community, led by the United States, combined these two ideas and elevated liberal democracy or good governance promotion to the forefront of its policy agendas.³

The rapid spread of liberal democracy across Eastern Europe, Latin America and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to a massive body of academic analysis regarding the critical conditions and processes required for a country to make the transition from autocratic rule to full democratic consolidation.⁴ Many theories and potential characteristics emerged, including catalysing elites, middle class empowerment and minimal economic progress. However it was the idea of civil society empowerment that captured the donors’ imaginations. Focusing on the successful examples of the Solidarity movement in Poland and the large scale civil society alliances in South Africa, donors began emphasising civil society as a critical factor in their

¹ Francis Fukuyama. End of History? (National Interest, Volume 16, Summer-1989), 1
³ A full review of this process is taken up in Chapter III.
⁴ See Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation and Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe for thorough analysis of the subject.
democratisation policies.\textsuperscript{5} Civil society had began to emerge in donor thought prior to this, offering an alternative to the perceived corrupt state as a partner in service delivery and project implementation, however this was a new and untested role.

As Official Development Assistance (ODA) stagnated and ultimately dropped throughout the 1990s, going from US$71 898 million in 1990 to US$67 961 million in 2000, ODA for governance and civil society assistance increased from US$1 733 million to US$2 262 million in the same time period. Similarly, funding directed specifically at non-governmental organisations (NGOs) grew from US$1 050 million to US$1 627 million.\textsuperscript{6} This trend continued with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) net ODA rising to US$102 287 million in 2006, with US$8 611 million targeting governance and civil society and US$1 965 million to support non-governmental organisations.\textsuperscript{7} The number of civil society organisations also mushroomed, with the number of non-governmental organisations registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council growing from 724 in 1992, to 1938 in 1999 and 3052 in 2007.\textsuperscript{8} Although still not representing a large percentage of total ODA flows, it was clear that democracy promotion and civil society had obtained a long-term foothold in donor policy and operations.

The ingrained post Cold War policies of the development community progressed with little internal questioning, however the events of 9/11 forced a reanalysis, once again led by the United States. The opening paragraph of the introduction to the 2002 National

\textsuperscript{5} Thomas Carothers, \textit{Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve} (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 207
\textsuperscript{6} Data is extracted from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development website, Dataset: DAC1 Official and Private Flows. All values are net disbursements in US$ and in 2005 constant prices.
\textsuperscript{7} IBID
\textsuperscript{8} Economic and Social Council Website, www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/ (Viewed November 15, 2007)
Security Strategy echoed the words of Fukuyama, “The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.”\(^9\) Democracy promotion now moved to the forefront of security policy, seen as a critical end goal, a necessity for economic development and vital in the effort to combat rogue states, terrorism and the threats that they pose.\(^10\) Development policy became part of national security interests and quickly aligned itself with the new messianic belief in democracy.\(^11\) Other mechanisms such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) were set up that established minimum policy thresholds as a prerequisite for funding, loosely bundled under the headings of ruling justly, encouraging economic freedom and investing in people.\(^12\) These transformations served to further elevate democracy promotion from a loose policy ideal at the end of the Cold War, to a central tenet in the 90s and finally to not just a central facet of security and development policy goals but a starting point and prerequisite characteristic.

Within Africa there seemed to be a genuine, growing acceptance in the centrality of governance in development policy. At the governmental level, this was signified with the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001.\(^13\)

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\(^10\) Bush, 13-23
\(^11\) See the USAID policy documents, *Policy Framework for Bilateral Aid and At Freedoms Frontier: A Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework* for specific policy. Sections will be analysed in Chapter 4.
\(^12\) *Millennium Challenge Corporation: Annual Report 2006.* (Washington: Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2007), 32
This latest plan for African development explicitly stated, "that development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights and good governance." What may differentiate NEPAD from previous programmes is that it provides for a monitoring process through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), a voluntary instrument designed to allow African Union members to submit to peer review on agreed upon standards of governance. The private sector has also become active in the push for good governance, with one example being the launch of the Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership, a cash prize awarded from the former owner of the telecommunications company Celtel. This award is to be granted to former leaders as a reward and enticement for good governance practices while in office, with the initial prize being valued at US$5 million over ten years and US$200 000 per year after that. It is clear that the notion of good governance as a necessity for economic development has moved beyond western policy and has become an accepted facet of Africa's own development ideas.

This essay will provide a review of the donor policy objective of democracy promotion and the utilisation of civil society as an active agent in this process. The argument will be made that the goal of democracy promotion and the current methods of civil society empowerment and utilisation are often in direct opposition and are not effective. Volumes have been written on the subject so it is critical to specifically describe what is unique in this essay. The vast majority of literature has focused on

14 Ian Taylor. *NEPAD: Toward Africa's Development or Another False Start.* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 17. Provides an extensive list of the various plans that have emerged from Africa for African economic development.
15 IBID, 17
17 The Economist. *A Politicians' Oscar.* (October 27, 2007), 57
advocacy organisations and their role in democracy promotion and consolidation. Doing this provides an isolated and skewed view of the overall impact of civil society in the process and typically focuses solely on the outcomes of the actions of this small subsection of the civil society community. This essay will be based on a case study of the environmental civil society community in Sierra Leone and evaluate these organisations' overall impact on democracy promotion to allow for a more complete understanding of the effects of civil society's actions. It will also allow for more detailed comparison between the specific challenges facing Sierra Leone in its democratic transition and general donor policy.

The essay will be split into a distinct theoretical and policy section and a case study portion. This is intended to introduce the more generic aspects of theory and policy as a necessary base for the specific analysis in the case study. The theoretical and policy section will cover two extremely large themes, the first focusing on development theory and the evolution it has taken and the second looking at the concept of democracy. These are both extremely large fields of theory and only the relevant aspects of each will be discussed. Specific policies and donor definitions will also be introduced in these sections to provide comparison between theory and practice. The section on development theory will trace the evolution of the various theoretical frameworks that have dominated the sector. These theoretical evolutions have often been intimately linked with the policies of the major multilateral and bilateral donors and the shifting geopolitical realities. Specific focus will be given to United States of America (USA) and United Kingdom (UK) policy, the former as they have been the lead in elevating democracy promotion and the latter as they are the largest and most important donor to Sierra Leone. The democracy
theory section will be used to gain a more precise understanding of the term in both theoretical and policy usage. This will be accomplished through an historical review of the theory to understand its core tenets and major classifications and an examination of donor definitions. It is critical to understand what donors envision by democracy as this is directly relevant to their programming strategies and the potential role of civil society.

To introduce the topic the literature review will focus on the debates surrounding civil society and its ability to act as a democratising agent. The debate will be divided thematically, with the earlier debates focussing on theoretical and definitional aspects of civil society and later debates focussing more on practical issues of project implementation. Particular focus will be given to literature regarding African civil society and specific issues related to inclusion and existing social structures. A working definition of civil society developed from donor policy will also be established.

The case study section will focus on Sierra Leone and be divided into two chapters. In the first section, an overview of the political history and current governance status within Sierra Leone will be summarised. The argument will be made that Sierra Leone’s major challenges to democratic consolidation are based on the historical evolution of the state and rooted largely in existing societal structures. This creates unique challenges for donor programming as there is an immediate contradiction between the typical institutional based programming models that are favoured and the specific circumstances present in Sierra Leone. Additionally this complicates the utilisation of civil society in the democratisation process as specific roles and intervention strategies must be established. The second portion of the case study will be based on analysis of the civil society community within the environmental movement of Sierra Leone with a
focus on a national NGO network, the Environmental Forum for Action (ENFORAC) and one of its main member organisations, the Environmental Foundation for Africa (EFA). This evaluation will be based on the theoretical role of civil society in the democratisation process and be a mixture of both more measurable evaluations of efficacy and abstract notions of norm creation and democratic culture. The environmental community provides an excellent location for study as the acknowledged contribution that environmental mismanagement played in the civil war elevates it to a critical level in any effort at democratic consolidation.
Chapter II: Methodology

The research for this essay will follow a multi-strategy approach, focussing on a case study analysis of the environmental movement in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone provides an interesting case study as it is slowly emerging from an eleven year civil war that decimated the country and brought it to the brink of the notorious status of ‘failed state’. It also went through a presidential and parliamentary election in August and September of 2007 that resulted in a peaceful change of government, creating a unique environment for research. The focus on the environmental movement is extremely relevant as the civil war was primarily funded through diamond wealth, elevating environmental management to a critical level in governance issues. Concentrating solely on the environmental movement allowed for a more thorough analysis of a specific section of the development and civil society community. Data from a national survey of civil society was utilised to provide a macro level comparison and increase the reliability of the findings.

The initial portion of the research, intended to outline the current status of governance and highlight the challenges to democratic consolidation, was based on primary government documents and official donor policy documentation. At the governmental level, the Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), the National Environmental Policy (1994), Environmental Protection Act (2000), the Local Government Act (2004) and the various Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers are the most critical formal policy documents regarding governance, the environment and development. From the donor side, the United Kingdom and the United States are the two primary bilateral donors,

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See David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone for a through examination of the relationship between diamond wealth and the civil war.
whereas the European Commission and the World Bank are the largest multilateral
donors. Of these the United Kingdom is most active in the governance sector and will
provide the majority of the formal policy documentation with the Improved Governance
and Accountability Pact (2006), Annual Review of DFID Support To The Anti-
Corruption Commission (2006) and the various Poverty Reduction Framework
Arrangement review documents being the most relevant. Additionally there is a large
amount of official development data available internationally from the World Bank,
OECD and domestically from the Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO),
the primary monitoring and evaluation organisation within the Sierra Leone government.
These policy documents will be compared with each other and against the larger
theoretical framework of democracy to highlight the issues and contradictions posed in
their implementation.

The second portion of the case study is a combination of quantitative and
qualitative research conducted while working with EFA from April to October, 2007.
Additional data was generated through interactions with the various partner organisations
of ENFORAC, a consortium of environmental NGOs within Sierra Leone.

Qualitative data was generated through participant observation. The author’s role
at EFA as a Project Officer, implementing photovoltaic electricity projects, allowed for
interactions with local and national government, domestic civil society actors and
international donors. These experiences facilitated the development of the questionnaire
and also increased the author’s ability to understand the complicated dynamics that exist

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19 Consortium Integration, Evaluation of the Commission’s Support to Sierra Leone-Country Level
Evaluation- (Frankfurt: Consortium Integration, 2006), 33
within civil society organisations and between civil society organisations, government
and donors.

Quantitative data was generated utilising two sets of self-administered questionnaires, one answered at the organisational level and the second completed by employees or volunteers within the organisations. The organisational questionnaires were rooted in Gordon White’s theory on the role of civil society in the democratisation process with between six and ten specific questions being utilised as individual variables for each of the four criteria. The final index which addresses the normative aspects of civil society in the democratisation process was further broken up into five distinct criteria based on Robert Dahl’s five distinguishing characteristics of a democratic process; 1) effective participation, 2) voting equality at the decisive stage, 3) enlightened understanding, 4) control of the agenda, and 5) an inclusive demos. Each of these criteria was evaluated using two questions. The answers were converted to a five point scale with higher values representing a more democratic process. Generic data was also collected on organisational size, structure, funding and focus.

The individual questionnaires were focused on the final aspect of White’s theory and the same five criteria offered by Dahl. These provide comparative data between the organisational level and the individual and illuminate the extent that the normative aspect of civil society has reached the individual level. As with the organisational data, each of the criteria were evaluated using two questions each that were converted to a five point scale with higher values representing a more democratic process. Additional demographic data was collected to evaluate the various criticisms associated with NGOs,

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20 White’s four possible roles are covered in Chapter V.
21 Dahl’s five characteristics are more thoroughly covered in Chapter IV.
regarding their lack of overall representation and an urban, ethnically homogenous,
middle class bias.

The combination of macro level analysis utilising donor and government policy
will provide the baseline for the goals and issues related to the governance initiatives in
Sierra Leone. This information will then be compared and contrasted with the specific
case study analysis to provide a clear picture of the actual contradictions and challenges
that are emerging due to the realities of the NGO community. The focus of this will be on
the discrepancies between the institutional basis of the donor policies and the normative
aspects of privately funded NGOs.
Chapter III: Development Theory and Policy

This chapter will trace the theoretical and practical evolution of international development. Current development policy is a product of experience, critiques and changing politics and to fully understand the current theory and policy goals it is imperative to understand its history. The overview will cover the major theoretical paradigms that have dominated the field and review some of the major donor policies that have emerged. Major multilateral donors such as the World Bank and the UNDP have been prominent in shaping development theory and are discussed in the general overview. Policies of the United States and United Kingdom are used as examples of bilateral donors and discussed in a separate section to provide more focused analysis.

To begin to untangle the development web it is first necessary to understand how people use the term. Thomas provides three standard ways in which the term development is used: as a vision, description or measure of a desirable society, as a process of social change and transformation and deliberate efforts aimed at improvement by various agencies.\(^{22}\) These three broad concepts allow for more focused areas of comparison and contrast for the following analysis.

Historical Development Thought

Although ideas surrounding development have existed since the Enlightenment period, the modern phase of development is often traced back to Harry Truman’s inaugural address in 1949.\(^{23}\) In this speech, many of the ideals expounded by the current USA administration are present, including the belief in the link between democracy,

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freedom, economic gains and security. Truman spoke of four major courses of action as part of the United States’ programme for peace and freedom with the fourth focusing on development and the US role in this mission.

Fourth, we must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas...Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens...Such new economic developments must be devised and controlled to the benefit of the peoples of the areas in which they are established. Guarantees to the investor must be balanced by guarantees in the interest of the people whose resources and whose labour go into these developments.24

Not only did Truman usher in the modern idea of development, he established themes that would become dominant in the period and are still prevalent today. Specifically, the ideas of an underdeveloped and developed world, distinguished by economic wealth and the role of technology in propelling the underdeveloped along the path of development were introduced.

Modernisation theory emerged as the dominant paradigm of the 1960s and 1970s and echoed many of the sentiments outlined by Truman. W.W. Rostow is generally accepted as the theoretical founder of modernisation theory and his 1960 book, The Stages of Economic Growth, as its core text. Rostow outlines five stages of economic growth, the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of mass-consumption that societies inevitably follow in their path.

towards modernisation. Throughout Rostow’s work the interplay between politics, society and economics is emphasised as well as the important role of technology in this evolution. A critical distinction is made in this relationship, as Rostow states, “economic change is, itself, viewed here as the consequence of political and social as well as narrowly economic forces.” A final important emphasis from Rostow was the role of external forces in establishing the required conditions for take-off. Remembering that this work was published during and directly following an intense period of decolonisation, Rostow described a ‘reactive nationalism’ as critical to creating the internal social and political requirements. These changes were driven by the emergence of a new elite that would uproot traditional society because of its failure to “protect them from humiliation by foreigners.” From a theoretical framework, modernisation is measured in limited economic terms but is seen as a transformational process with political and social factors as the primary catalysts. Additionally and most importantly for later comparison with current development thought, external influence is seen as vital, as is the transformation or more aptly the overcoming of a failed traditional society.

Practical modernisation theory, although borrowing heavily from Rostow, diverged significantly in that it placed economics at the forefront, driving political and social change. This divergence was a result of Cold-War politics that saw both sides seeking to create client states in the less developed world, as part of overall national security interests. The west and the USA in particular, saw development assistance as a way to promote economic growth that would serve as an outlet for nationalism, creating social progress and effective political leadership, ultimately resulting in secure

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26 Rostow, 2
27 Rostow, 26-27
democracies. The USA-launched Alliance for Progress represents an excellent example of the practical application of modernisation theory.

The Kennedy Administration was responsible for a number of critical formulations of development policy, including the passing of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, an increase in foreign aid of 33% and the creation of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). However, the Alliance for Progress was their most bold initiative. This policy evolved from the Act of Bogotá and the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank under the previous Eisenhower administration and was an attempt to promote economic and ultimately democratic development in Latin America. The plan was formally announced in a speech to the Latin American diplomatic corps and is interesting for the link it creates between economics and politics, emphasising the perceived relationship in U.S. policy-making circles. In grand rhetoric, Kennedy discusses the common struggle of the Americas to overcome colonial powers and to "demonstrate to the entire world that man's unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions." The formal charter, signed in Punta del Este in April 1961, established the alliance and is a more defined declaration of economic targets. Specific goals are presented including income growth, industrialisation, economic diversification

and agrarian reform and increased productivity, all of which are part of the necessary conditions for ‘take-off’ to occur.\textsuperscript{32}

Although closely linked to the theoretical version of modernisation theory, practical policy varied in that the measure of development was expanded beyond merely economic terms to focus on democratic governance. Also, the interplay between social, political and economic factors emphasised by Rostow is simplified to the point where economic development is seen as causal to political change. The inability of the Alliance for Progress to meet either its economic goals or its grander goals of democracy promotion led to the emergence of strong critiques of both policy and theory. These critiques were heavily influenced by Marxist thought, with dependency theory emerging as the most accepted.

The Marxist conceptualisation of development shares some transformational similarities but has radical departures from the modernisation concept. Marxism understands history as a class struggle with its latest battle being waged between the modern bourgeoisie society and the proletariat masses, over what is defined as the means of production.\textsuperscript{33} Development is conceptualised as a process that transforms the bourgeois, the proletariat and society at large. This political change is driven directly by economics, specifically who controls the means of production. The end goal, or desirable society, is reached when “class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of the vast association of the whole nation...In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonism, we shall have an association, in

which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.\textsuperscript{34} This is in stark contrast to modernisation’s final evolution of a mass-consumption society but there are noteworthy similarities. Firstly, the concept of development still remains firmly lodged in a radical transformation of society, from traditional to modern and from a bourgeois-proletariat conflict to communist harmony. Secondly, economics stays at the core of this transformation rather than some other goal such as enlightenment, environmental sustainability or a less violent society. The goal of the economic transformation is different, maximisation versus equalised distribution, but raw economics does not lose its core role.

Dependency theory has its roots in Marxist thought and also maintains coherence with the ideas of radical societal transformation and economics that modernisation and Marxism share. On a fundamental level, dependency diverges from Marxism in that the inevitability of capitalist development is not assumed to exist in the developing world. It also has a fundamental difference from modernisation theory, in that traditional society is not seen as the starting point but an underdeveloped society, itself a creation of the western dominated capitalist society.\textsuperscript{35} This underdeveloped society is believed to be caused by factors exogenous to the state and is part of the same process that created the developed, capitalist world.

Raul Prebisch laid the theoretical groundwork for the various streams of dependency theory that would emerge. His study, \textit{The Economic Development Of Latin America and its principal problems}, argued that the existing “out-dated schema of the

\textsuperscript{34} IBID, 244
\textsuperscript{35} Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, \textit{Introduction to International Relations: Theories and approaches} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 204-205
international division of labour\textsuperscript{36} was at the root of Latin America’s comparative underdevelopment to the United States. This division of labour relegated regions such as Latin America to the periphery and limited their engagement in the global system to mere suppliers of food and raw materials for the industrialised core.\textsuperscript{37} Although theory predicted that productivity increases in the core would lead to improved terms of trade for the periphery, benefiting all parties, Prebisch illustrated the exact opposite had occurred. He argued that income levels had risen more than productivity in the core while the opposite had occurred in the periphery, resulting in a real decrease in price ratios between primary and manufactured goods.\textsuperscript{38} This decrease was a function of the trading system and would only continue to increase the gap in economic development between the core and periphery. Prebisch proposed a number of specific macroeconomic policies to address the growing economic imbalance and the issues it created. Central to this was the need for industrialisation and a change in the composition of imports. Taken to its furthest extreme was the possibility of intentionally sacrificing exports to allow for an increase in industrial production as a substitute for imports.\textsuperscript{39} Prebisch’s work represented a radical challenge to the existing trading system and spawned numerous subsequent theorists and policy makers.

Radical dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank proposed a complete economic delinking from the developed, capitalist world as the only possible path to overcoming this underdeveloped state of being.\textsuperscript{40} Milder forms of development theory

\textsuperscript{37} IBID
\textsuperscript{38} IBID, 8-10
\textsuperscript{39} IBID, 45
\textsuperscript{40} Jackson, 206
did not propose a radical break from the capitalist system nor did they root the manifest issues of underdevelopment solely in the core. This school instead argued that development was possible with the current system but it would be unequal development both globally and nationally.\textsuperscript{41} Cardoso and Faletto eloquently express their version of dependency theory in \textit{Dependency and Development in Latin America}. In an extremely nuanced set of explanations, the authors expand on the basic dependency theory and argue that dependency and underdevelopment are a result of historical, societal forces both within the nation and at the international level that created and reinforce existing power structures.\textsuperscript{42} Based on this, development is seen as a social process that will lead to economic development. However, the structure of society and therefore the conflicting parties in this social process are "deduced principally from the pattern of income distribution and the structure of employment."\textsuperscript{43} Overall development is conceptualised once again as a radical, societal transformation that alters internal and external relationships and power structures. If this is achieved, then and only then could economic development occur, defined as "less dependency and self-sustained growth based on the local capital accumulation and on the dynamism of the industrial sector."\textsuperscript{44} As with modernisation and strict Marxist theory there is a clear vision of the developed society.

Modernisation theory and the Marxist based dependency theory represent the two dominant conceptualisations of post World War II development. Both sets of theories demand radical changes to society, whether it is a linear transformation from traditional

\textsuperscript{41} Andrés Velasco. \textit{Dependency Theory} (Foreign Policy, Nov-Dec, 2002, No. 133), 45

\textsuperscript{42} Fernando Henrique Cardosa and Enzo Faletto, \textit{Dependency and Development in Latin America} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), xvi-xx

\textsuperscript{43} IBID, 10

\textsuperscript{44} IBID, 10. Pages 1-28 of the book all contribute to the main theoretical basis of the author's arguments.
to modern or a complete overhaul of the existing power structures and organisation of society at large. Additionally, both provide a clear vision of what this developed society would entail, although with polar views on consumption and the organisation of production. Finally, they all maintain economics as the ultimate measure of their vision of a developed society and despite the disagreement between consumption and distribution, economics and wealth are still at the core.

**Current Theories of Development**

Emerging from modernisation theory and Marxist critiques such as dependency theory were neoliberalism and human development, which have dominated recent development thought and provided distinct conceptualisations. Neoliberalism and its practical offshoot, 'the new orthodoxy', maintain continuity with previous thought, emphasising societal transformation, although with an altered focus, and giving primacy to economics. Human development is less radical in its transformational nature, not asserting a discrete vision of society or rigid methods to promote transformation but moves dramatically away from a narrow economic definition of development, instead focussing on a broad set of societal measures. This section will go beyond the generally descriptive nature of the previous section and focus on highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the two development paradigms.

The first of the two paradigms to be analysed is neoliberalism or the Washington Consensus, which has dominated development thought for the last twenty-five years. According to Dani Rodrik, the Washington Consensus (WC) was based on ten core principles, broadly lumped under three categories of stabilise, privatise and liberalise. These principles were fiscal discipline, reorientation of public expenditures, tax reform,
financial liberalisation, unified and competitive exchange rates, trade liberalisation, openness to foreign direct investment, privatisation, deregulation and secure property rights.\(^45\) In 1979, Senegal received its first structural adjustment loan from the World Bank and earned the honour of being the first African country to take this leap.\(^46\) During the period 1980-1989, thirty-six sub-Saharan African countries received 241 different loans from the World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF) and eleven of those countries received ten or more loans.\(^47\) This was the high point of the application of the Washington Consensus (WC) in the development world, although it has been merely repackaged for today’s consumption.

The one-size-fits-all models proposed by the International Financial Institutions (IFI) quickly drew massive critiques focused on the social devastation caused by their reforms. The IFIs and supporters of the neoliberal regime attempted to defend their policies, arguing that partial reform or political issues were the reason for the policies’ failures.\(^48\) The WC represented a dramatic shift in thinking about development that essentially removed people from the picture. Gone was the notion of a human-centred societal change that was present in both modernisation and dependency theories and in its place was a set of institutional norms that would create the framework for economic development. Additionally, economics, important in past concepts of development thought, became the only objective and Gross Domestic Product growth became the only valid measure of development. Emerging from this was what Rodrik describes as the

\(^{46}\) Nicolas van de Walle, *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1  
\(^{47}\) IBID, 7  
\(^{48}\) van de Walle, 13
‘Augmented Washington Consensus’ which added ten new principles to the existing list, corporate governance, anticorruption, flexible labour markets, WTO agreements, financial codes and standards, “prudent” capital-account opening, nonintermediate exchange rate regimes, independent central banks/inflation targeting, social safety nets and targeted poverty reduction. This augmented WC has become the new standard in institutional development thought and has led to what some have described as the ‘new orthodoxy’.

Academics have described this ‘new orthodoxy’ as primarily the confluence of economic development, still largely along neoliberal lines, and democracy promotion, often labelled as good governance. Leftwich argued that the ‘new orthodoxy’ was a result of four dominant factors, “the experience of structural adjustment lending, the resurgence of neo-liberalism in the West, the collapse of official communist regimes and the rise of pro-democracy movements in the developing world and elsewhere”. Within the institutional arena, this new orthodoxy was introduced by the World Bank in a report on sub-Saharan Africa in 1989. This report highlighted the role of the government as an enabler of economic development and the hindrance that ineffective governance had played in Africa’s poor economic performance. As a result of the factors listed a new thinking about democracy emerged and was formalised, a new thinking that forms the backbone of current mandates and policies. Although the policies have converged the debates surrounding their effectiveness have remained active. What was seen as unique in the institutional new orthodoxy was the order of operations. Contrary to modernisation

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49 Rodrik, 3
theory, which saw democracy as the outgrowth of the linear progression of economic development, the ‘new orthodoxy’ argued democracy was a requirement for or a parallel development alongside economic development. Although far less of a radical societal transformation than previous models, the direct linking of democracy with modern society created a more clear process and path and expanded the measures beyond mere economics.

The other current dominant paradigm of human development is a people-centred approach to development and is closely linked to the idea of human security proposed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Although a more recent development paradigm its theoretical foundations emerged from the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s with the works of scholars and practitioners such as Sir Arthur Lewis, Dudley Seers and Mahbub ul Haq.

Lewis is regarded as a pioneer of development economics and has had a lasting impact on the field. His most influential work, in which he formulated the ‘dual economy’ model, first appeared in the 1954 article, *Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour*. This model theorised two distinct sectors in the economy, the capitalist and subsistence, often equated with industrial and agricultural respectively. Labour is assumed to be in an infinite supply in the subsistence sector and therefore transfers to the capitalist sector at a rate dependent on the availability of capital. As labour transfers to the capitalist sector at roughly the subsistence wage, increased capital accumulation occurs in the capitalist sector perpetuating the cycle until the supply

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52 Leftwich
of labour is exhausted.\textsuperscript{54} This model provides a potential explanation for how growth may occur without a parallel increase in wages. Lewis was also one of the first to expand upon the notion of development as growth, arguing that not just economic activity but also increasing knowledge and human capital were vital in the process.\textsuperscript{55} Often overlooked is Lewis’s contribution to the notion of democracy within the development process. Going against the in vogue one-party rule in Africa during the 1960s, Lewis argued that multi-party democracy was essential due to the social pluralism of African countries. He proposed three key features of a pluralist democracy: proportional representation, a constitutionally guaranteed coalition government, and federalism or provincial devolution.\textsuperscript{56} As a testament to Lewis’s work, he became the first person born outside Europe or North America to be awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1979.\textsuperscript{57}

Dudley Seers was vital in bridging the gap between Lewis’s expansion of the concept of how development occurred with the current people-centred approach of what constitutes development. He was critical of using growth as a proxy for development, even in the economic sense, as it aggregated all forms of economic wealth regardless of equality and type.\textsuperscript{58} Seers argued that unemployment, equality and poverty needed to be included to truly evaluate development, rather than just per capita income.\textsuperscript{59} By challenging the ‘growth as development’ idea, Seers also questioned the primacy given to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} IBID, 9
\item \textsuperscript{55} Patsy Lewis. Grenada: A Testing Ground for Lewis’s Balanced Development Perspectives (Social and Economic Studies, Dec 2005, 54, 4), 206
\item \textsuperscript{57} Craig N. Murphy. The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 116
\item \textsuperscript{59} E. Wayne Nafziger. From Seers to Sen: The Meaning of Economic Development. (Available at www.rrojasdatabank.info/widerconf/Nafziger.pdf) Viewed January 11, 2008, 3
\end{itemize}
capital investment as a spur of growth, suggesting that both correct policies and human capabilities were equally as important. Development theory had evolved from a narrow focus on national-level growth based on classical economic factors to a broad concept based on measures of equality and reliant upon political and societal factors.

Ul Haq built on the available critical analysis of development policy and augmented it with his own experiences as an economist in the Pakistani government and the World Bank. His 1976 book, *The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World*, argued that GNP growth may actually be counterproductive to economic development as this indicator may mask reductions in social standards and increased income inequality. To counter this, he suggested a new development strategy that "should be such as to build development around people rather than people around development." The core of the strategy was to target poverty reduction by focusing on human needs and increasing the productivity of the poor. He also called for a redefinition of development policy measures away from GNP and towards a reduction in the worst forms of poverty such as malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, unemployment, squalor and inequalities. Although an accepted part of current development theory and policy Ul Haq's work was a radical break from the existing paradigms and elevated people to the centre of the development.

The people-centred development concept was formalised in 1990 by Ul Haq in the first Human Development Report from the UNDP, which stated the objective of development "is to create an enabling environment in which people can enjoy long,

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60 Seers, 340
62 IBID, 28
63 IBID, 27-28
64 IBID, 43
The UNDP has established a number of formal statistical indicators to evaluate the level of human development within a country. The Human Development Index (HDI) is the most established and is a combination of three sub-sets of measures. The first measure is a long and healthy life, which consists of a value for life expectancy at birth. The second is knowledge, consisting of adult literacy rate and gross enrolment rate. The third, a decent standard of living is measured by GNP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity. In addition to producing the annual HDI surveys, the UNDP is the main agency responsible for promoting the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), a set of eight goals and targets for 2015: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for development. Within each of these larger goals are specific measures that are related to either the HDI or other indicators. This conceptualisation of development is a radical departure from any of the previously surveyed theories. Despite this, the MDGs have become the focal point of the vast majority of current development programmes. Although progress towards meeting them is inconsistent, the MDGs have served to create a common set of goals despite widespread debate regarding which strategies are most suitable to achieve them.

Human development takes the idea of development directly to the individual and creates an image of a standard of life that involves a much broader measure than merely

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66 IBID, 393-394
67 IBID, 420-422
economics. By focusing specifically on items such as gender and child mortality, this concept also attempts to address discrepancies that can be hidden within aggregates that the other models rely upon. Although it does not specifically lay out a particular political or social structure, it establishes minimum standards that any society must maintain to be considered developed. A major weakness of this conceptualisation is that it does not provide a transformative path to achieve this vision unlike the pre-determined nature of the other models. This does not allow it to address structural, political or societal impediments to achieving the development vision. However, this can also be seen as a strength as it allows individuals and societies to decide their own paths, suitable to their own specific realities. Brilliant and visionary thinkers such as Amartya Sen and Aung San Suu Kyi have taken this freedom to decide and proposed truly alternative ways of thinking about development.

Sen has expressed his ideas in *Development as Freedom*, where development is judged to be the expansion of substantive freedoms. Freedom is critical to the development process for two distinctive reasons. Progress is measured based on whether the freedoms that people have are expanded and that the achievement of development is dependent on the freedoms that people have and express.\(^6\) Although it is impossible to summarise this complex and rich concept in such a small space, the critical aspect is that it allows small incremental increases in freedom such as access to education to be judged as development, rather than part of a process that can lead to development, generally measured in terms of increased enrolment or eventually economic wealth.

Suu Kyi provides an even more radical view of development, going so far as to suggest that economic development or more specifically increased aggregate wealth may

\(^6\) Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: anchor Books, 1999), 1-4
actually be a negligible part of development or even counterproductive to the concept entirely. Drawing heavily on her Buddhist beliefs and the traditional importance of Buddhism in Burmese culture, she argues that a political and social revival along those very lines is required for economic wealth to be advantageous for the people. Suu Kyi uses the Burmese terms of *hsinye*, or an insufficiency of material goods and also physical distress and discomfort of mind and *chantha*, its opposite, to challenge the western notion of poverty and to illustrate how merely addressing economics or even less fundamentally materialist items such as maternal health or environmental sustainability is not sufficient to address this alternate conceptualisation of poverty.\(^69\)

Both the Sen and Suu Kyi conceptualisations of development move outside the traditional institutional and academic models and truly challenge the concepts. Neither proposes a specific vision or path to development, which takes them both beyond the capacities of most policy makers. However, both offer critical insights as the focus shifts directly to the individual and the type of life they want and are empowered to lead. By introducing these departures it forces the development world to constantly reassess its methods, motives and goals based on local realities and individual needs that may be beyond mere material measures.

Jeffrey Sachs is the most well known of the current development economists and his book, *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities For Our Time*, includes a foreword by Bono indicating the level of mainstream acceptance his views have generated. Sachs describes poverty as a trap and development as a ladder or a series of steps. To gain access to this ladder he argues that the poor need to given access to six major kinds of

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capital: human capital, business capital, infrastructure, natural capital, public institutional capital, and knowledge capital.\textsuperscript{70} He is extremely vocal in his belief that large increases in ODA are vital to build the necessary capital accumulations to allow for sustained poverty reduction. Sachs is critical of the structural adjustment era of development economics, stating “In some ways development economics is like eighteenth century medicine, when doctors used leaches to draw blood from their patients, often killing them in the process.”\textsuperscript{71} To remedy these past issues he proposes a system dubbed clinical economics which views each case as a unique patient with a unique set of policy requirements.\textsuperscript{72} Sachs provides a blend of development theory, stressing the need to build the capacities and opportunities of individuals but ultimately relying on economic growth as the primary indicator of development. Although not revolutionary his views have become widely accepted in the policy world.

**Policy Section : United States and United Kingdom**

The major multilateral development agencies, the World Bank and the UNDP, have been extremely influential in shaping development theory and have utilised these approaches in their policies and programmes. Bilateral donor policy has been more diverse, as domestic political and national security factors have led to more pragmatic programming. Despite this there are common theoretical foundations and policy objectives.

The United States is the largest donor and has always been influential in overall policy. Not apologetically, the US has justified its funding not solely on recipient needs

\textsuperscript{71} IBID, 75
\textsuperscript{72} IBID
but as a function of its own foreign policy objectives, which increasingly are seen as linked to democracy promotion.73 In *Aiding Democracy*, Thomas Carothers provides an excellent summary of the history of ‘democracy assistance’ based on the experiences of the United States. Throughout the Cold War period aid had been used as a tool of foreign policy and linked through economic development indirectly to democracy, as a counterweight to communist expansion. Executive and popular support for this theory was cyclical throughout the 60’s 70’s and 80’s and it wasn’t until the end of the Cold War that democracy assistance became a core priority in USA aid allocation.74 Carothers argues that the upsurge in democracy aid was the result of a confluence of three related factors: the global trend toward democracy, the end of the Cold War and most critically, a “new thinking about development”75 which sought to expand the scope of development beyond merely economic and social measures and directly include the form of governance.76

The rethinking of security policy that occurred post-9/11 would hasten and focus this ‘new thinking’ on the role of governance. In the decentralised USA system, foreign aid is delivered by twenty six different departments and agencies. Of these, Defence and USAID with 21.7% and 38.8% of the overall budget respectively are the two main actors, with the latter still being the primary organisation.77 USAID is a coordinated branch of the USA government, working directly with the National Security Council and receiving

73 Development Assistance Committee Peer Review. *Peer Review of the United States*. (Paris: OECD, 2006), 10
75 Carothers, 44.
76 Carothers, 46.
77 DAC Peer Review, 20-21
foreign policy guidance from the Secretary Of State. The starting point for USAID policies is the National Security Strategy (NSS), as it creates the overall framework for international engagement. Within this document, democracy promotion is an overriding theme, seen as a core foundation in preventing terrorism and rogue states, promoting economic development and as an end goal. Development is also elevated, touted as the third pillar of national security alongside defence and diplomacy. The 2002 USAID report, *Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security and Opportunity*, built on the themes of the 2002 NSS, stressing the role of development in national security and the essential role of democracy and good governance in both national security and development objectives. In relation to national security, development is portrayed as a countermeasure to the root causes of threats, in contrast to diplomacy and defence which deal with their consequences or manifestations. Development is portrayed as the ultimate form of pre-emptive strike against security threats such as terrorism and rogue states. Within the development process, democratic good governance is deemed mandatory, as the report argues “greater public resources, better physical infrastructure, and stronger public health and education are essential for development. But they are not enough, and they are not the most crucial factor. No amount of resources transferred or infrastructure built can compensate for ---or survive--- bad governance.” The immediate post 9/11 period led to a dramatic shift in USA

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80 DAC Peer Review, 10
82 IBID, 33-34
development policy, elevating democratic good governance, deemed an imperative for development, to a core facet of national security policy.

The latest USAID official policy document, issued in January 2006, maintains policy continuity with the National Security Strategy and previous USAID reports, outlining the specific role of USAID in achieving the core foreign policy goals of the National Security Strategy. Titled *Implementing Transformational Diplomacy Through Development*, the policy document focuses on five broad-based goals: promoting transformational development, strengthening fragile states, supporting strategic states, providing humanitarian relief and addressing global issues and other self standing concerns.\(^{83}\) The document outlines sets of results and graduation criteria that can be used to formulate country-specific policy and ensure coherence with other agencies and partners. It portrays development as a series of progressions that countries must pass through in their transformation toward the ultimate goal of no longer needing foreign aid. Although lacking the transformational vision of some of the historical theories, the idea of development as a transformative process is still a dominant aspect.

The latest document released by USAID maintains the same policy alignment with security policy as previous policy documents and reports. Entitled *Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2007-2012: Transformational Diplomacy*, governance is once again prioritised "as a matter of principle; as a contribution to U.S. national security; and as a cornerstone of our broader development agenda."\(^{84}\) Under the banner of ruling justly and democratically, four strategic priorities are identified: rule of law and human rights, good

\(^{83}\) USAID, 2006, 7-14

\(^{84}\) Department of State, USAID. *Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2007-2012: Transformational Diplomacy*. (Washington: State Department / USAID, 2007), 18
governance, political competition and consensus building, and civil society.\textsuperscript{85} Specific programmes for each of these priorities are determined by the assigned category definition of each country and are further elaborated on the foreign assistance framework matrix. This represents a continuation of the transformation notion of development and places specific governance criteria for progression. Although more of a continuation of previous policy and lacking any substantial changes it is noteworthy that it is a combined State Department and USAID document. This is a clear indication that as development becomes more accepted as part of overall security policy its core institution will also shift towards closer integration, a reduction in policy that will be interesting to follow.

USA development policy differs from the major multilateral donors in that it is directly associated with the high politics of national interest and security. These gaps have become more acute in the realignment that has occurred post-9/11. Although retaining aspects of theoretical ideals these are more a pragmatic means to an overall ends. At its core, USA policy promotes a transformative process with the ultimate goal of a democratically run, economically viable state.

According to recent Development Assistance Committee (DAC) statistics, the United Kingdom became the second largest bilateral donor in 2006, with an 11.7% increase to US$12 034 million.\textsuperscript{86} Additionally the UK is the largest bilateral donor to Sierra Leone and has an influential presence in the country, stemming from colonial links and its prominent role in ending the civil war. The UK's development infrastructure is dramatically different from the USA model and is centralised through DFID, which had direct control of 84% of total disbursements according to a 2006 DAC peer review

\textsuperscript{85} IBID, 19-21
\textsuperscript{86} Dataset: DAC1 Official and Private Flows
document. \(^{87}\) Adding to the autonomy that fiscal control provides, politically DFID is directly represented in Cabinet by the Secretary of State for International Development and in the House of Commons by three Parliamentary Under Secretaries of State. \(^{88}\) The 2002 International Development Act is the primary governance document for the UK’s development infrastructure and provides general functional guidelines and specific responsibilities for the Secretary of State. Poverty reduction is listed as the sole goal of development assistance and activities are eligible, at the discretion of the Secretary of State, for any action that can contribute to that goal. Development assistance is further defined as “assistance provided for the purpose of – a) furthering sustainable development in one or more countries outside the United Kingdom, or b) improving the welfare of the population of one or more such countries.” \(^{89}\) More functional policy guidance is provided by organisational White Papers with the last three providing insight into the shifts that have occurred.

The first White Paper released in 1997 was built around sustainable development, a concept that became established in global environmental politics a decade earlier with the World Commission on Environment and Development report, *Our Common Futures*. \(^{90}\) Sustainable development received considerable criticism as an overly vague concept and one that was not well developed in practice. \(^{91}\) DFID’s approach was to promote environmental considerations throughout their programme lines, stating “Conservation and sustainable management of the environment is a cornerstone of our

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\(^{87}\) Development Assistance Committee Peer Review. *Peer Review of the United Kingdom.* (Paris: OECD, 2006), 10

\(^{88}\) DFID website. [www.dfid.gov.uk](http://www.dfid.gov.uk) (Viewed January 2, 2008)

\(^{89}\) *International Development Act – 2002.* (2002), 1


\(^{91}\) IBID, 162
approach to international development."

The environment, including the issue of climate change, is also given specific attention as an independent programme line, indicating the importance of environmental concerns in the development community at the time. Another notable inclusion in the 1997 White Paper was the apparent rejection of the Washington Consensus, as the minimalist state and reliance on the all-powerful market it encouraged were put forth as dominant flaws in previous development policy. Governance does not feature predominantly in this document, although it is stated that “Raising standards of governance is central to the elimination of poverty,” little formal policy is dedicated to specific programmes and goals. DFID’s original policy was rooted in the concept of sustainable development and the balance between poverty reduction and environmental maintenance.

The 2000 White Paper represented a significant shift in policy as the concept of sustainable development was cast aside in favour of policies intended to maximise the benefits of globalisation in reducing poverty. Environmental sustainability still maintained a position in programme lines but it was framed in relation to global environmental problems rather than as an overriding theme for development. Reform in the aid system was also a prominent theme, arguing all donors should be “focusing more aid on the poorest, particularly on those developing countries that are pursuing good policies and where there are large numbers of poor people.” Governance also emerged as an important facet of poverty reduction strategy. Three commitments were made by DFID regarding their governance programme: “1) Help developing countries build the

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93 IBID, 12
94 IBID, 30
95 DFID. *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor.* (DFID, 2000)
96 IBID, 86
effective government systems needed to reform their economic management, make markets work better for poor people and meet the challenges of globalisation, 2) Work to reduce corruption, and ensure respect for human rights and a greater voice for poor people, 3) Work with others to reduce violent conflict, including through tighter control over the arms trade."\(^97\) Within its governance platform, DFID stressed the critical role of governance in allowing for efficient markets and specifically targeted corruption as a hindrance to investment and a burden on the poor.\(^98\) By 2000, DFID had moved away from its sustainable development philosophy and focused on policies intended to allow countries to benefit from the globalised economy. Governance also became a more relevant programme line due to its perceived role in facilitating market access and maximisation.

The Gleneagles Summit in 2005 resulted in significant promises on the part of the G8 members to increase and improve aid to Africa. The UK committed to increase ODA to 0.7% of Gross National Income by 2013 and double spending in Africa between 2003/2004 and 2007/2008.\(^99\) Following up on the Gleneagles commitments, DFID released its latest White Paper in 2006 entitled, *eliminating world poverty: making governance work for the poor*. This document clearly promotes governance to the foreground of its policies, bluntly stating that “First and foremost, the fight against poverty cannot be won without good governance. We need to help governments and citizens make politics work for the poor. And we need to make global governance better,

\(^{97}\) IBID, 23
\(^{98}\) IBID, 25
because the international economy affects what happens in each country." Good governance is deemed essential not just for fighting poverty but enhancing stability and responding to calamities. Similar to the USAID country classifications, the DFID document outlines various programme options that will be pursued based on a ‘quality of governance’ assessment.101

Interestingly, the DFID policy moves beyond the domestic level in its governance initiatives and also looks at the international system. It urges for the implementation of international agreements on core issues such as corruption and natural resource extraction as tools to eliminate the complicity of international actors in issues that hinder domestic stability and growth.102 The elevation of good governance to the forefront of donor policy is becoming the standard, however the push for both domestic and international change is unique to DFID policy.

Bilateral donor policy is a product of the domestic politics of the country it emerges from and inevitably is linked to national interests. US policy takes this to the extreme, locating development as a core tenant of the high politics of security. Democracy promotion is seen as vital to achieving development and thus enhancing national security and is the dominant post 9/11 theme in its policies. The UK model has retained separation between security and development policy, allowing DFID to maintain its primacy in the development arena. Democracy promotion is still a priority as it is deemed a necessary domestic characteristic to reducing poverty. A critical point of departure between the two is that democracy is seen as an end goal in US policy, in contrast to its supporting role in DFID policy, a reflection of the missionary zeal that the

100 DFID. eliminating world poverty: making governance work for the poor. (DFID, 2006), 10
101 IBID, 24
102 IBID, 33-35
US approaches its democratising agenda. Having gained an understanding of how development theory and policy has evolved and the preeminent role of democracy in this evolution it is necessary to understand how theory and policy define and understand democracy. This will allow us to know what they are trying to promote, a vital step in evaluating their efforts.
Chapter IV: Democracy Theory and Policy

In order to evaluate a country or a government's democratic credentials and potential for consolidation it is necessary to determine what is meant by democracy. Often the term is merely stated and a certain common sense definition is assumed, however this masks the tremendous variety in the term and the forms of governance that it encapsulates. Work by Paul Collier and Levitsky highlights this mistake as they have coded 550 forms of democracy. This opening section will provide a brief overview of democratic thought beginning with the pure Greek form and progressing to current conceptualisations. From this overview specific characteristics will be presented that have retained continuity with modern ideas. Using these themes, donor definitions and policies will be reviewed to gain a greater understanding of what donors truly mean by democracy. This is particularly relevant to the subsequent chapters focusing on Sierra Leone, as the form of democracy envisioned by donors is problematic to both the specific national context and the ability of civil society to fulfil its role in the democratising process.

Classical Democratic Thought

Any overview of democratic theory has to start with the Athenian system and the thoughts of Plato and his successor Aristotle. The term democracy comes from the Greek demos, meaning 'the people as a whole' and kratia, meaning 'rule of or more literally strength or power in the hands of' and the Athenian model of governance may be the closest to a pure democracy that has or will ever exist. In Athens, the masses were the ultimate sovereign and the assembly, of which every full citizen could participate in the ultimate ruling body. In addition to the assembly, there was a council of 500 members,

drawn from the 139 territorial units of Athens that met daily and handled the co-ordination of other public bodies and the foreign relations of the city-state. Beyond the representative institutional model, democracy was a way of life, "a way of living together in political freedom, which ennobled the characters and refined the sensibilities of an entire community." This noble ideal was not without its detractors and the belief in liberty and freedom were targets of some of the most severe criticism.

Plato (c. 427-347 BC) argued that timarchy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny represented four stages of digression from an 'ideal society' and represented different versions of an 'imperfect society'. According to Plato, democracy evolves from oligarchy and "originates when the poor win, kill or exile their opponents and give the rest equal civil rights and opportunities of office." It was exactly the rule of the masses that Athenian democracy was based upon that Plato so adamantly opposed. He described three groups in a democratic society, with the largest and therefore supreme group being the "mass of people who earn their own living, take little interest in politics and aren't very well off." Plato felt this group was entirely unfit to rule and outlined the need for the Philosopher King, a group of rulers that combined philosophy and political power as necessary for the ideal society to flourish. In a common link between the Athenian model and today's understanding of democracy, Plato agreed that liberty was its highest ideal but felt that rather than this being its greatest asset, it would ultimately lead to its demise into tyranny.

Aristotle (c. 384-322 BC) did not share the radical model of the ideal society proposed by Plato or the necessity or even desirability of the Philosopher King, however.

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105 Dunn, 36.
106 Dunn, 28.
108 Plato, 557a, 292.
109 Plato, 565a, 302.
110 Plato, 473 d-e, 192.
111 Plato, 562 b-c, 299.
he did share a disdain for democracy as a form of governance. Rather than a single form of ideal government or society, Aristotle suggested three, depending on whether the civic body or sovereign consisted of the one, the few or the masses.\textsuperscript{112} He described the corresponding right constitutions as those that serve the common interest and defined those as Kingship, Aristocracy and ‘Constitutional Government’. Additionally, he provided three matching perversions, or wrong types of society, that occur when the constitution does not benefit the common interest, Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy.\textsuperscript{113} Similar to Plato, Aristotle felt that liberty, along with equality were the defining characteristics of a democratic society,\textsuperscript{114} and it was exactly this equality, that led to its perversion, the rule of the poor in the interests of the poor and not the common interest.\textsuperscript{115}

Although dramatically different, in many aspects Plato and Aristotle saw common dangers in the Athenian model of democracy. Both felt that liberty, which has become one of the defining aspects of modern democratic ideals, would ultimately lead to the uncontrolled rule by the poor masses, many of whom were unfit for governance. It was exactly this liberty that would be the undoing of an ideal or right form of governance. The direct-rule, assembly model of Athens is not feasible today for our state system, although it does still exist in individual communities across the globe.\textsuperscript{116} To adapt to the shift from the city state to the state system, democracy has evolved, although the core values of liberty and equality that Plato and Aristotle discussed still remain salient.

A brief analysis of some of the central writings from the period that Dunn has dubbed ‘democracy’s second coming’\textsuperscript{117} provides an excellent bridge between the

\textsuperscript{113} Aristotle, 1279\textsuperscript{a}25-1279\textsuperscript{b}4, 100.
\textsuperscript{114} Aristotle, 1291b30, 144.
\textsuperscript{115} Aristotle, 101.
\textsuperscript{116} The author has visited the Durika Community in Costa Rica which follows an assembly model with limited, controlled administrative management similar to the pure, Athenian version of democracy. The website, www.durika.org/ has limited information about the community and its structure.
\textsuperscript{117} Dunn, 65.
classical works of Plato and Aristotle and the most recent theoretical discussions surrounding democracy. To achieve this, a thematic discussion of selected works from John Locke (c. 1632-1704), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (c. 1712-1778), John Stuart Mill (c. 1806-1873) and Alexis de Tocqueville (c. 1805-1859) will be utilised. Although far from an all-encapsulating summary of the period's thought, it is sufficient for the purpose of this essay and is effective in highlighting the major themes of the period and links between the classic thought and today's conceptualisations of democracy.

Despite being written over a two century timeframe and addressing differing national contexts and themes, there are select concepts that appear in all these works and provide the required continuity of thought. Rather than focussing on the specific institutions of governance, such as executive and legislative structures, the commonalities to be explored deal with the intrinsic meaning of democracy and governance, specifically the concepts of: liberty, majority rule and concerns with majority tyranny, which are at the core of democratic ideals and dilemmas.

Mill most eloquently expresses the idea of liberty and pushes it to its most extreme limits, arguing that individual liberty should not be restrained up to the point that it does harm to others, regardless of the consequences to the individual.\footnote{John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty” in \textit{On Liberty and Other Essays} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 14.} Locke outlines a similar perspective regarding liberty but makes a clear distinction between liberty in what he describes as the 'state of nature' and man living in a society. He argues that in the state of nature man has almost limitless liberty, restricted only by the law of nature that prevents man from destroying himself, the creatures under his ownership beyond necessity and from harming "another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions".\footnote{John Locke, \textit{Second Treatise of Government}. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), 9.} This is compared to liberty in society which expands the potential restrictions to include legislative power and the laws that they create, with the disclaimer that the legislature
must be created with consent and the laws created by the legislature. Rousseau is more opaque than Mill or Locke in his definition of liberty, although similar to Locke he links it to the nature of man and the state of nature, suggesting that liberty is the responsibility to see to his own maintenance and decide the proper means of ensuring this maintenance. Contrary to Locke or the typical Hobbesian’ understanding of the state of nature, Rousseau sees man as most pure outside of society but that despite this it is necessary for man to form cooperative units to avoid ultimately perishing. The remedy he proposes is a ‘social contract’, where the individual and all of his rights and liberties are given in totality to the community. Because this total alienation is voluntary and universal, each individual retains his autonomy and liberty within the security of the supreme sovereign.

De Tocqueville provides a more specific, descriptive analysis of the concept of liberty in the American context, often portraying a contrasting view of the liberties available to the average citizen. In his historical analysis of the early roots of American democracy, a two-fold liberty is apparent which De Tocqueville attributes to the Puritanical roots of the citizenry. Political liberty was nearly absolute, with direct, democratic governance and extremely malleable and responsive political institutions. However, morally and socially, liberties were extremely restricted. Whereas Mill and to a lesser extent Locke argued that personal liberty should be extended to the limits of harm to others, the early American society placed severe restrictions imposed by the “covenant between God and man”. De Toqueville’s analysis of then contemporary American liberalism showed a great expansion of the ideal. Here De Tocqueville describes an almost unrestrained liberty both in the political and social arenas. Politically “every

120 Locke, 17.
122 Rousseau, 147.
123 Rousseau, 148.
124 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America. (Canada: Ryerson Press, 1945), 38-42.
individual has an equal share of power and participates equally in the government of the state".\textsuperscript{125} Socially the covenant with God is still apparent but has been transformed from a repressive, formal social control to a personal relationship. This transformation massively expanded the social liberties of the citizenry to encompass any actions, "unless they are prejudicial to the common weal or unless the common weal demands his help".\textsuperscript{126} Liberty in this sense has been expanded to correspond closely with the ideas of Mill. This expansion essentially pushes liberty to the limits of societal harm.

An understanding of the conceptualisation of liberty and its justifiable limits is an important preliminary but is insufficient unless it is related to democratic governance. The next portion of the essay will attempt to bring the core understanding of democratic governance to the surface as provided by the four authors. This builds on the idea of liberty but focuses on the core aspect of majority rule.

Once again, Mill provides the premier starting point for this discussion as he not only provides the clearest explanation but also is the most vocal proponent of the benefits and necessity of liberty in the democratic process. Mill appears to have a love-hate relationship with democracy or what he more pragmatically describes as representative government. On many occasions, he argues that the near-limitless liberty he expounds, especially as it relates to the civil or social realm, are requirements for the correct functioning of any form of governance. An excellent example of this comes from his arguments regarding the relationship between liberty of thought and discussions and government. Here, he makes a number of interesting arguments, however it is his discussion on 'false opinion' that is most well developed. Without specifying a form of governance he argues that its primary duty is obtaining the "truest opinions they can...and never impose them upon others unless they are quite sure of being right".\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{125} De Tocqueville, 64.  
\textsuperscript{126} De Tocqueville, 65.  
\textsuperscript{127} Mill, 23.
Mill argues that liberty of thought is required for this based on four possible scenarios: opposing opinion may be true; although the opposing opinion may be false it may have a portion of truth and allow the whole truth to emerge; defending a prevailing opinion voids it of perceived prejudice; and, even if accepted, if not challenged it may become enfeebled and lose its vital effects.128

In Considerations On Representative Government, Mill builds on his discussions of liberty and government and applies them directly to representative government, which he describes as “democracy as commonly conceived and hitherto practised”.129 He provides a definition of representative government that highlights the control of the people, stating that

> the meaning of representative government is, that the whole people, or some numerous portion of them, exercise through deputies periodically elected by themselves, the ultimate controlling power, which, in every constitution must reside somewhere. This ultimate power they must possess in all its completeness. They must be masters, whenever they please, of all the operations of government...The power of final control is essentially single, in a mixed and balanced government, as in a pure monarchy or democracy.130

This definition effectively links the pure form of democracy as expressed by Plato and Aristotle to a more modern and realistic form of governance, by illustrating that the core value of control by the *demos*, acting as a single entity remains intact.

This concept of control by the people is explicitly expressed by De Tocqueville under the term sovereignty of the people, almost affectionately waxing, “the people reign in the American political world as the Deity does in the universe. They are the cause and the aim of all things; everything comes from them and everything is absorbed in them”.131 Although recognising that the representative style of governance is not pure, the

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128 Mill, 59.
130 Mill, 269
131 De Tocqueville, 58.
representative nature keeps to the meaning of the system and retains its continuity with democracy’s ideals. Locke portrays a very limited role for the state and its role in relation to liberty, focussing on the requirement of escaping from a state of nature but specifically on the main priority of security one’s property. With this end goal in mind, he describes a perfect democracy as one that encapsulates the entire power of the community within the majority and that all the power for making and executing laws be the sole privilege of officers selected by the majority.\textsuperscript{132} Rousseau offers a similar definition of democracy, stating that it occurs when the people that make the laws also execute the laws, or a unification of the legislative and executive powers.\textsuperscript{133} He further adds to this definition by distinguishing who the sovereign or the members of the social contract entrusts with government, claiming that this is either the majority or the entire people in a democracy.\textsuperscript{134}

Beyond the mere definitions of liberty and democracy as generally understood as rule by the majority, the various authors listed concerns that this combination of liberty and rule by the people created. To effectively link the discussion with the ideas and critiques of Plato and Aristotle, the idea of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ will be the focus.

De Tocqueville was the most vocal of the writers regarding the potential evils of majority rule and saw it as the predominant threat to the American system. Interestingly the roots of this supposed tyranny spring from the same well as the supposed benefits of the American system, the Deity-like power of the people. De Tocqueville argues that the unquestioned correctness of the majority rule concept comes from the twofold idea that there is more wisdom in the collective than the individual and that group interests are preferable to those of the individual.\textsuperscript{135} He manages, through a very intricate argument, to illustrate how these two pillars combine to limit the recourse of those who do not belong

\textsuperscript{132} Locke, 68.
\textsuperscript{133} Rousseau, 179.
\textsuperscript{134} Rousseau, 178.
\textsuperscript{135} De Tocqueville, 255-256.
to the majority, as social and legislative power become one voice.\textsuperscript{136} An excellent quote summarises his views on the subject: “in my opinion, the main evil of the present democratic institutions of the United States does not arise... from their weakness but from their irresistible strength. I am not so much alarmed at the excessive liberty which reigns in that country as at the inadequate securities which one finds there against tyranny”.\textsuperscript{137} De Tocqueville was also very critical of the quality of legislator that arises from the American system, claiming it was a lower quality than that of an aristocratic system.\textsuperscript{138} This combination of unlimited liberty, without checks on tyranny and the tendency toward poor legislators echoes many of the fears and criticisms of Plato and Aristotle who both argued that democracy led to rule by the poor majority who were typically unfit to rule at the expense of the general good of the citizenry.

Mill expressed many of the same fears and specifically focussed on two ‘positive evils and dangers’ of representative government: general ignorance and incompetence of the controlling body and the danger of it not acting in the interests of the general welfare of the community.\textsuperscript{139} Although the discussion on these two evils is linked, the more relevant section deals with the dangers of majority tyranny. Unlike the classic thought of Plato and Aristotle, Mill does not limit this potential division to rich and poor but to any sectional or class interest that may emerge.\textsuperscript{140} He argues that this tendency toward tyranny is natural when a man gains power and the focus of his interests’ moves from those of the common good to those of his immediate need.\textsuperscript{141} Although not stated in his argument it follows that with the extreme liberty that Mill suggests, this tendency toward tyranny may be exacerbated, as once in power it may not be a distant trip to move from a ‘do no harm liberty’ toward excess.

\textsuperscript{136} De Tocqueville, 260-261
\textsuperscript{137} IBID
\textsuperscript{138} De Tocqueville, 240.
\textsuperscript{139} Mill, 286.
\textsuperscript{140} Mill, 294.
\textsuperscript{141} Mill, 297.
This review has brought us from the Athenian model of direct governance to the early days of representative, democratic governance. Although the mode of governance changed considerably there is a clear connection in the core values of democracy and representative government, the highest and most critical of these being liberty. Plato and Aristotle both saw liberty as the root of democracy and also its main liability as it would ultimately result in the rule by those unfit to rule. Similarly the later authors surveyed maintained this belief in liberty as the highest ideal and combined it with majority rule as expressed through representatives of the people. This combination of liberty and majority rule also drew concern from these authors as expressed in the tyranny of the majority. The next section will look at recent democracy theory and will ultimately lead to a working definition which will be used to analyse the specifics of the Sierra Leone situation.

**Modern Democratic Thought**

The Portuguese military coup of April 25, 1974 signified the beginning of a global transition to democracy, described by Samuel Huntington as the ‘Third Wave of Democratisation’. Huntington would proceed to define a wave of democratisation as “a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period”. More significant than the definition of a wave is how democracy is defined. The previous review argued the core fundamentals of a democratic society, liberty and rule by the majority, have remained consistent since the Athenian period, however is this consistent with Huntington and other theorists of today. This next section will analyse the recent discussions regarding democratic thought and provide a working definition for the remainder of the essay.

143 Huntington, 15.
Huntington utilises a procedural definition for his study, defining a political system as democratic "to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote." This is an altogether unsatisfactory definition that may provide for ease of classification and policy making but ultimately robs the term of any depth and meaning, entirely disconnecting the term with traditional theory and practice. Larry Diamond provides a more expansive classification system for democracy that effectively categorises the numerous definitional strands, proposing a four-fold typology: Electoral democracy, Liberal democracy, Midrange conceptions and Pseudodemocracies and nondemocracies. Within this typology, the first two classifications require further investigation and analysis.

Defining democracy solely along electoral lines is the most minimalist of conceptualisations but often the most salient to policy makers and some academics. Often this definition is related back to Joseph Schumpeter, who specifically challenged the liberal definitions expounded by authors such as De Tocqueville, inverting the importance of the power of the people and the legislature. Schumpeter argued that the traditional definition of democracy made the selection of representatives secondary to the primary purpose of maintaining power in the electorate. He proposed inverting this relationship and elevated the election process to the pinnacle of democratic values and minimised the importance of electoral control. In doing so, he produced a definition of democracy as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote". Przeworski et al proposed a similarly narrow definition of democracy,

144 Huntington, 7.
145 Diamond, 8-17.
147 IBID
defining it as, “all regimes that hold elections in which the opposition has some chance of winning and taking office”. There are two major issues related to the minimalist approach to democracy; firstly it ignores the essence of democracy as a form of societal being or a way of life which is most explicit in the dominance of liberty as an overriding theme in previous thought and secondly it allows many regimes or political systems to be legitimised under the cloak of democracy without achieving or even aspiring to any of the requirements or benefits of democracy. Diamond offers similar criticisms, drawing upon the work of Terry Karl and what he dubbed the “fallacy of electoralism”. He argues that elections mask societal power imbalances, leaving many disenfranchised, more classically described as the tyranny of the majority. He further criticises this minimalist approach as ignoring freedoms or liberty which are necessary characteristics of democracy, using examples of electoral democracies that exhibit overt minority repression such as Russia.

Although a practical and accessible definition of democracy, this minimalist, electoral definition proves unsatisfactory. It loses its vital link with traditional conceptualisations and the essence of liberty and majority rule, lowering the acceptable standard to a point of irrelevance. A closer look at liberal democracy is required to attempt to expand the concept and regain the traditional links.

Not necessarily in opposition to the minimalist view, liberal democracy entails a much more extensive set of criteria. Diamond suggests three broad criteria that take liberal democracy beyond the electoral definition: absence of reserves of power unaccountable to the electorate, accountability of officeholders to one another or, more accurately, checks on the power of the executive; and extensive political and civic freedoms that allow for the expression of interests and values outside of the election

149 Diamond, 9.
150 Diamond, 10.
Building on this, Diamond outlines a specific set of components for a liberal democracy that fulfil the broad criteria: control of the state lies with elected officials, executive power is constrained by other government institutions, electoral outcomes are uncertain and no group is excluded from forming a party, cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups are not excluded from the political process and maintain cultural liberty, formal avenues exist beyond elections for groups to express opinion and that represent their interests, alternative sources of information beyond the government, substantial social liberties including freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, assembly, demonstration and petition, political equality under the law, individual and group liberties are protected by an independent judiciary and rule of law protects citizens from gross violations of the state such as torture and undue interference. This set of criteria effectively blends the institutional requirements of democracy such as restraints on executive power and inclusive political parties which are necessary to protect against devolution to aristocracy or tyranny with traditional notions of individual and political liberty so prevalent in the works of Mill.

Robert Dahl provides a similar description of the democratic ideal and also what he determines to be the maximising approximation, what he calls polyarchy. In comparison to Diamond, Dahl provides a more theoretically driven set of criteria and focuses on the meaning of the democratic character, rather than the definitive institutional requirements. He provides a set of five distinguishing features of a democratic process: effective participation which provides each citizen with the opportunity for expressing their preferences for outcomes in binding decision making, voting equality at the decisive stage among and between the entire citizenry, enlightened understanding which allows each citizen to have equal and adequate opportunity to evaluate the choice that would best serve their interests, control of the agenda regarding what matters are to be decided

151 Diamond, 10.
152 Diamond, 11-12.
through the democratic process, and a demos inclusive of the total adult population subject to the binding decisions of the association.\textsuperscript{153} This definition of democracy exhibits a clear and concise linkage with the traditional thinkers and effectively expresses the democratic norms and ideals that liberal democracy entails. However, Dahl admitted that these lofty ideals have not been achieved and due to issues of scale are not probable, formulating the concept of polyarchy as the functional, institutional display of democracy.

Dahl continues with a description of the institutions required to classify a regime as a polyarchy: elected officials with constitutionally guaranteed policy control, free and fair elections void of coercion, inclusive adult suffrage, right to run for office, although there may be discrepancies between who can run and who can vote, freedom of expression regarding political matters, without the danger of severe punishment, alternative information offered under the protection of law and associated autonomy which allows for the creation of interest groups and political parties.\textsuperscript{154} Dahl is clear that he understands polyarchy as a political order and that it requires specific institutions to meet this classification. However, in contrast to his earlier definition of the term he expands the idea and correlates the institutions with the democratic ideals listed above. In doing so, whether intentionally or not, Dahl reinforces the idea that democracy is a way of living, and reduces the institutions themselves to mere observation and facilitating agents, in effect performing the opposite reversal that Schumpeter executed in pushing his minimalist view.

\textbf{Policy Section}

This section of the review will establish the working definition of the term democracy within donor policy. Volumes have been written on definitions of democracy\textsuperscript{153} Robert A. Dahl, \textit{Democracy and its Critics}. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 108-120. \textsuperscript{154} Dahl, 221.
and its outgrowth good governance and it is difficult to limit the review and establish a suitable definition for future analysis. The United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, United States Agency for International Development and the Department for International Development have been chosen as they highlight many of the convergent themes but also some of the critical divergences in policy circles.

The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are the starting point for the formal development community and the United Nations (UN) concept of democracy and good governance serves as a logical baseline. Interestingly, despite being the lead organisation for the development community, the United Nations lacks an available precise definition of democracy or good governance, with the following being the most suitable:

Governance is the system of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and private sector. It is the way a society organises itself to make and implement decisions — achieving mutual understanding, agreement and action. It comprises the mechanisms and processes for citizens and groups to articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. It is the rules, institutions and practices that set limits and provide incentives for individuals, organisations and firms. Governance, including its social, political and economic dimensions, operates at every level of human enterprise, be it the household, village, municipality, nation, region or globe.  

Within the UN, the United Nations Development Programme has the primary responsibility for the promotion of democratic good governance and views the establishment of good governance as a prerequisite for achieving the MDGs. Within the UNDP, the Democratic Governance Group is the lead group responsible for this initiative, receiving US$1.395 billion or 47% of the UNDP's operating budget in 2005

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and utilising seven service lines in its operation: policy support for democratic governance, parliamentary development, electoral systems and processes, justice and human rights, e-governance and access to information, decentralisation, local governance and urban/rural development, and public administration reform and anti-corruption.\textsuperscript{156} The UNDP definition and service lines represent an all-inclusive governance package with a focus on institutional-based reforms.

The World Bank, the other multilateral organisation of the group, has a similar definition of governance to the UN, defining governance "as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them."\textsuperscript{157} Similar to the UN, the World Bank sees improved governance and specifically reducing corruption, as critical foundations for achieving the MDGs and in 2005 lent US$4.6 billion to programmes intended to build good governance and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{158} Diverging from the UN, they have a more formalised quantification structure for evaluating good governance. This evaluation system is created using thirty-one separate data sources from twenty-five organisations and utilises six discrete indices: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of


corruption. Although sharing a similar all-inclusive definition, the World Bank narrows it significantly through its quantification process, allowing a slight expansion beyond the narrow institutional UN view.

The first bilateral institution to review is USAID which as we have seen places an extremely high level of importance on democracy promotion. An important support document for the bilateral policy, *A Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework*, provides the specific programme methodology for democratic good governance promotion. Although neither democracy or good governance are defined in this document, a definition for democracy and governance programmes is provided as “technical assistance and other support to strengthen capacity of reform-minded governments, nongovernmental actors, and/or citizens in order to develop and support democratic states and institutions that are responsive and accountable to citizens.”¹⁶⁰ Four pillars of democracy are emphasised as critical: rule of law, institutions of democratic and accountable governance, political freedom and competition, and citizen participation and advocacy.¹⁶¹ This definition moves beyond the strictly institution based models to include ideas of freedom and citizen participation, deepening the process, reflective of the liberal strain of democracy favoured in the United States.

The final organisation for comparison is DFID who describe good governance as “not just about government. It is also about political parties, parliament, the judiciary, the media, and civil society. It is about how citizens, leaders and public institutions relate to...

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each other in order to make change happen.' The concept is expanded to include three core characteristics: state capability, responsiveness, and accountability each with a broad set of specific examples. The DFID definition exhibits a large amount of overlap with the other three definitions and does little to add to a clear definition.

Returning to the theoretical considerations Dahl's definition of polyarchy is the most effective description of democracy and is generally accepted as its most suitable substitute for analysis. None of the donor definitions are suitably accurate and the World Bank index is merely an amalgamation of other existing measures. The lack of a finite definition and accurate measures is in itself problematic as there is not a direct measurement of the efficacy of donor programmes. Using common measures such as the Polity IV or Freedom House rankings is an indirect measure of a specific liberal democratic model similar to the United States version but also fails to align with typical donor policies. The donor definitions are also flawed in that they are largely institution-based which creates a similar issue to that of representation mentioned in the civil society discussion, that of a density of programmes in the capital city. Although decentralisation drives are attempting to alleviate that issue it is only a cursory attempt to address the most critical issues hindering democratic consolidation, often rooted in rural communities and involving societal power imbalances rather than simple institutional weakness. The next chapter will analyse the rise of democracy promotion within development policy and civil society's specific role in this objective. Many of the critical debates surrounding civil society will be highlighted, to provide a theoretical background for the case study analysis.

162 DFID. eliminating world poverty: making governance work for the poor., 22
163 IBID
Chapter V: Civil Society and Developing Democracy

To understand how civil society became elevated to its current primary role in democracy promotion it is critical to understand the debate surrounding foreign aid and democracy promotion. Within this debate the overwhelming focus of the literature has been at the state level, analysing the effect of bilateral and multilateral aid to governments of host nations. There are analysts from academia and the development world who believe that foreign aid has been an effective tool in promoting democracy, as aid has allowed governments to use ex-ante governance targets to catalyse positive changes. Critics argue it has been a negative force, propping up despots and corrupt regimes while doing nothing to lead to a movement away from autocratic rule. There is a considerable amount of literature on this subject and a small representative sample is reviewed in depth rather than providing a cursory review of a larger set of studies with overlapping results.

Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion

The overriding theme of the literature argues that aid has been negatively associated with democratic good governance, that foreign aid has provided the funding for existing, authoritarian governments to remain in power and avoid necessary reforms. Nicolas Van de Walle provides the most thorough analysis of this theory, tracing the evolution of African governance practices and highlighting the role of the international aid community in this process. He argues that post-colonial African governments were generally institutionally weak and enjoyed limited popular legitimacy which led to a reliance on intricate patronage networks and the control of elite based economic rent
seeking mechanisms to maintain order and stability.\textsuperscript{164} This description shares many similarities with what Max Weber described as patrimonialism in his analysis of legitimate, traditional ruling structures. Weber described this type of rule as one that "tends to arise whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master."\textsuperscript{165} In their work on democratic transitions, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan prefer to utilise the term sultanism,\textsuperscript{166} what Weber described as the extreme case of patrimonialism, where authority operates primarily on the basis of personal discretion.\textsuperscript{167} Van de Walle argues that the strict Weberian definition does not adequately capture existing political systems and uses the term 'neopatrimonial'\textsuperscript{168} to describe this form of governance, providing four defining characteristics: clientalism, often based on ethnic or clan politics, access to state resources controlled by patron-client networks, the centralisation of power based in the capital and focussed on the president and hybrid regimes that combine the façade of the modern state with the background levers of neopatrimonial control.\textsuperscript{169} Through structural adjustment programmes, implemented in the 1980s and 1990s by the major multilateral aid organisations that advocated a reduction in government spending and overall size, two patterns emerged. First, there was a tendency toward an increase in executive control, through a strengthening of the patron-client networks inherent in the strong institution of


\textsuperscript{166} Juan J. Linz; Alfred Stepan. \textit{Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation}. (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1996), 51

\textsuperscript{167} Weber, 232

\textsuperscript{168} Although used by van de Walle he is not the first to utilise it and it is an accepted term in the larger literature.

\textsuperscript{169} van de Walle, 118-127.
presidentialism. Second, there was a reduction in overall state operations as many development tasks were effectively privatised to independent non-governmental organisations. Rather than a movement towards democratic good governance, foreign aid served to empower specific aspects of the neopatrimonial rule and reduce government accountability to the periphery.

The World Bank has been the leader in research that has attempted to provide a more quantitative explanation for the relationship between foreign aid and democracy and has focussed on the patron-client networks within the neopatrimonial governance model. Interestingly, the relationship between foreign aid and democracy has similar patterns to that of oil wealth and democracy. Studies have shown that oligarchy controlled resource wealth and oil wealth in particular show strong negative correlations to democracy. This is presumed to be as a result of the resistance from elites, themselves a function of patron-client relationships, to the redistribution of wealth expected in an expanded democracy.

A study by Stephen Knack of the World Bank, conducted in 2001, thoroughly investigated the aid-democracy relationship. The study used value changes on the International Country Risk Guide (between 1995 and either 1982 or 1984) as the dependent variable and the average value for ODA as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) as one of the core independent variables. Results showed a negative,

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170 Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transformations in Comparative Perspectives.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 63-65
171 van de Walle, 164.
173 Easterly, William. *White Man’s Burden: Why The West’s Efforts To Aid The Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good.* (New York: Penguin Press 2006), 125
174 The International Country Risk Guide is published by Public Risk Services and measures the political, economic and financial risk ratings for countries. It is not a direct measure of democracy but looks at overall government stability and efficacy in the political risk sub-category.
highly statistically significant correlation between the two variables and that aid explained a substantial portion of the variation in the model, as R² values decreased from 55% to 45% when it was omitted. To confirm the robustness of the findings, the author repeated the analysis with a series of focussed data sets. Most interestingly, the sets involving only those countries with initial per capita incomes below $2000 and Sub-Saharan African countries reveal similar negative coefficients as the overall data set with all results being statistically significant.\textsuperscript{175} Similar studies have supported these findings and have attempted to more specifically quantify rent seeking behaviour.

A study by Djankow, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol confirmed the negative correlation between ODA as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and democracy, although with negligible coefficients, indicating a limited causal relationship. They used a 10-point democracy scale taken from the Polity IV paper and concluded that a 0.6-1.0 point reduction occurred if a case appears in the top 75% of the sample over a five year period.\textsuperscript{176} To quantify rent-seeking behaviour, the authors used government consumption as a proxy variable and compared this to investment. The data reveals a positive, statistically significant correlation between ODA/GDP and government consumption and a negative correlation between ODA/GDP and investment. Additionally there is a negative, statistically significant correlation between consumption and economic growth and a positive, statistically significant correlation between investment and economic growth. The authors argue this data indicates foreign aid is used for immediate government consumption and maintains the rent-seeking behaviour of


\textsuperscript{176} Simeon Djankov; Jose G. Montalvo; Marta Reynal-Querol. \textit{Does Foreign Aid Help?} (Cato Journal, 2006, Vol 26, No.1)
the patrimonial government system. The utilisation of the proxy variable of government spending for rent-seeking is dubious as are the conclusions drawn from the positive correlation between aid and government consumption. Focussing on the sub-Saharan African context, the governments of these nations operate with minimal budgetary leeway and an effective and expected utilisation of foreign aid would be to increase spending to basic services such as education and health care. This would increase the level of government consumption relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the smaller economies of the region and would not have an effect on the immediate level of investment. It is not possible to conclude from this aggregate data that rent-seeking is increased by foreign aid. This would require a more specific study that analysed how the aid was actually spent.

These studies capture the overall trend in the literature and have specific common weaknesses that require highlighting. Most critically, the time period is a major issue as the intent of foreign aid has changed so dramatically during the period studied. During the Cold War period, the intent of aid was often to bolster friendly governments, regardless of the form of governance and little aid was directed at building democratic good governance within these nations. This issue is even more exacerbated within the sub-Saharan African context as the initial rise of democratic reforms in the region only emerged in the early 1990s. Specifically with the Djankov et al. study, this would create a skew in the data toward a negative correlation between aid and democratic good governance as the overall aid period is significantly longer than the period of democracy assistance or any form of democratic rule in the region. A final criticism of the research in this field is the narrow focus on state level aid and specifically Official Development

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177 Djankow, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
Assistance. ODA represents a small amount of the total state level financial flows to the developing world,\textsuperscript{178} with multilateral loans and private loans representing the largest portion, all of which present opportunities for rent-seeking. Using ODA fails to capture the full magnitude of state level financial flows and focuses on the most politically dependent portion of the financing, increasing the issues related to the politics involved in the timeframe of data. Additionally, and most critical for this essay, it ignores the injection point of the aid into the state apparatus and ignores aid that bypasses the state altogether, including funds distributed through civil society agents and private charities or foundations.\textsuperscript{179}

Despite the majority of the research regarding the relationship between foreign aid and democracy indicating a negative correlation, more focussed research has emerged that counters some of these claims. Knack published an updated study in 2004 that included focussed and inclusive time period analysis and also analysed additional measures of democracy. The two measures used were the Freedom House Rankings, which creates a combined index from political freedoms and civil liberty indices and the Polity IV index used in the Djankov et al study. This study concludes that there is no quantitative relationship between ODA and democracy as none of these comparisons were statistically significant. Even reducing the time period to the post Cold War era did not produce statistically significant results and there was negligible variation in the

\textsuperscript{178} Joan, E Spero: Jeffrey, A. Hart, \textit{The Politics Of International Economic Relations}. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth 2003), 201

\textsuperscript{179} Data from the 2007 \textit{Index for Global Philanthropy} published by the Hudson Institute calculated total USA private flows to the developing world at 95.2 billion in 2005. Even excluding remittances this value was 33.5 billion compared to 27.6 billion in ODA.
coefficients between the post Cold War time period and the overall period of analysis from 1975 to 2000.\textsuperscript{180}

Additional studies that specifically analysed sub-Saharan Africa and the Cold War and post-Cold War periods provide an opposing view to the previous studies. A 2001 study by Goldsmith utilised a similar time period to the 2004 Knack study but focussed on Sub-Saharan Africa and used different dependent variables, focussing on ethnicity, form of law and per capita GDP. The results for relationship between ODA and democracy were statistically significant and positive, although the magnitude of the coefficient was small. An interesting addition to the literature provided by Goldsmith was to introduce a time lag analysis for ODA to attempt to evaluate the direction of the democracy measure related to ODA.\textsuperscript{181} These values remained statistically significant and positive, with a positive relationship between the magnitude and time lags. Although far from a clear endorsement of the utility of ODA in democracy building this study did counter the largely negative previous work and create an Africa specific analysis with a limited time period focus.

Utilising the same data set, the analysis was continued and improved upon in 2004 by Dunning, with an additional Cold War focus. In addition to splitting the analysis into two time periods, 1975-1986 and 1987-1997, Dunning introduced a dummy variable for former Soviet client states. This not only provided a clear demarcation of the pre and post Cold War periods, but specifically gave focus to states emerging from Soviet influence, highlighting the effect of Cold War client relationships. The time period analysis resulted in highly statistically significant, positive results in the post-Cold War

period compared to results that were not statistically significant in the Cold War era. This clearly indicates that the overall relationship witnessed from the Goldsmith study is reliant upon the later time period. Interestingly the Soviet client variable resulted in statistically significant correlations in both periods with negative coefficients in the Cold War period and positive coefficients in the post Cold War period. This indicates that aid was most effective in promoting democracy in states that were emerging from Soviet client status and highlights the potential of democracy promotion, as its effects would be most acute in these post-Soviet examples. These studies effectively counter the previous criticism regarding the elongated timeframe and its distorting effects but don’t offer any insight into the reasons for the limited relationship between aid and democracy promotion nor the issues surrounding measures of foreign aid.

Ellen Hauser has provided an incisive analysis of donors’ efforts at democracy promotion, focusing on Uganda in her case study analysis. The article presented a number of potential reasons for the limited success of democracy promotion within Uganda and potential explanations that can be generalised to other states. The article was very explicit that it was analysing bilateral foreign aid and political conditionality rather than specific democracy building programmes supported by foreign aid, which is typical of the previous studies. Hauser arrived at three critical conclusions regarding the utilisation of political conditionality: that donors still retain political interests in the region and this affects their prioritisation of democratic reform, the level of aid dependence is not the most critical factor in whether it is subject to conditionality and that a state’s economic reform and performance affects whether donors push for political

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Although providing keen insights into some of the factors influencing donors, there is still a considerable void in a clear understanding of the causal links between aid and democracy. This study highlighted that even in the post-Cold War era there are still significant political calculations involved in the relationship.

Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson of the World Bank have been leaders in attempting to provide a more reliable, quantitative account of issues related to corruption and rent-seeking behaviour through focussed sector analysis. Their most well known research was conducted between 1991 and 1995 and studied the amount of leakage that existed within the education system in Uganda. This is extremely relevant to the foreign aid debate as it provided a detailed account of the form and magnitude of rent-seeking that existed within the government. From their research they found that on average 12.6% of the funds transferred from the central government to the district level were actually disbursed to the schools. Rather than being utilised for its intended purposes, the money was expropriated by the local government managers to maintain their local system of patronage networks. The authors argued that direct cash transfers, used rather uniquely in the education programme, provided access to funds and chances for rent-seeking that other in kind programmes did not provide. Interestingly the study also found that average income levels were statistically significant and positively correlated to the level of local capture, indicating that the most economically disadvantaged were least likely to receive the appropriate funds.¹⁸⁴

This study is extremely important for two reasons. Firstly, the cash transfer method provides a parallel to foreign aid injection methods and confirms the existence of and quantifies the magnitude of rent-seeking and corruption that can occur. Secondly, the macro research and the neopatrimonial theory of governance focuses on the executive and the top levels of the state and assumes that aid introduced at that level creates or contributes to the consolidation of this form of governance. Additionally the macro research and much of the current thinking in the foreign aid community sees NGO channelled community based aid injection methods as a cure for this issue. The research by Reinikka and Svensson highlights some potential issues with this thinking as the neopatrimonial networks present at the state level are alive and well at the local level, indicating the same issues of rent-seeking and corruption could still persist despite the modified injection point and channel. This is particularly relevant to Sierra Leone where corruption at the chiefdom level as been a constant feature of local politics.¹⁸⁵

This overview of the literature surrounding foreign aid and democracy promotion highlights the perceived lack of efficacy of these efforts. The majority of the critical literature argues that aid has provided access for rent-seeking behaviour which allowed corrupt and ineffective governments to maintain power through patron-client networks. From this analysis the idea of utilising civil society as an implementing partner emerged, providing an injection route that delivered services while avoiding the bloated and corrupt state apparatus.

**Civil Society and Democracy Promotion**

¹⁸⁵ The role of the Chiefs in Sierra Leone politics will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter V.
The next section of the literature review covers the theme of civil society and its role in promoting democratic good governance. As mentioned, utilising NGOs, often directly equated with civil society within the development community, has become the latest trend to combat rent-seeking behaviour and promote democracy from within. Despite the unquestioned endorsements from the aid institutions the effectiveness of civil society as a catalyst for promoting democracy has been subject to massive scrutiny from within the academic community over the last decade. The literature can be split into two broad themes. The first is focussed on definitional debates surrounding the terminology of civil society and its implications and the second deals with more pragmatic concerns regarding what civil society can reasonably be expected to accomplish.

Prior to delving into the academic critiques and debates regarding the terminology of civil society it is necessary to understand how donors define civil society. To immediately narrow the scope of the review and provide a suitable basis for a practical analysis of the development sector, it is critical to look at the concept as it exists within the institutionalised development field. The United Nations (UN), the World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department for International Development (DFID), World Vision and The World Conservation Union (IUCN) have been chosen as they provide a representative cross-section of the major multilateral, bilateral and NGO donors within Sierra Leone.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has a specific mandate to work in conjunction with civil society which it deems as critical to achieving its sustainable human development goals.186 On an institutional scale the UN adopts a broad

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description of civil society without providing an explicit definition. However, summarising the description, the UN includes a vast array of organisations that are not part of the state or a business. They need to be engaged in promoting citizens’ rights, interests or demands or providing direct services and are either mutually or publicly beneficial. The UN provides four classifications for civil society organisations: community based organisations, peoples’ organisations or mass organisations, indigenous peoples’ organisations and non-governmental organisations. It is noteworthy that the UN definition includes NGOs as a separate category within the overall realm of civil society.

The World Bank, the other multilateral organisation of the group, has a more clear definition of civil society than the UN but there is significant overlap between the institutions. The World Bank defines civil society as the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organisations (CSO) therefore refers to a wide of array of organisations: community groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, and foundations.

This definition is broad based and extremely similar to the descriptive definition provided by the UN.

The first bilateral institution to review is USAID which is a coordinated branch of the US government, working directly with the National Security Council and receiving


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foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{189} Civil society is simply defined as "the independent, non-government realm of citizen activity."\textsuperscript{190} Despite this broad definition, the policy directives of USAID narrow the operational definition to include only those organisations that are politically active, what they define as advocacy civil society organisations.\textsuperscript{191} It is these types of organisations that have been the primary target for democracy and governance programming and for studies regarding the role of civil society in the democratisation process.

DFID defines civil society as, "the multitude of associations, movements and groups where citizens organise to pursue shared objectives or common interests. These organisations function beyond the individual or household level, but below the state."\textsuperscript{192}

Further explaining the concept, civil society organisations are defined as

All Civic Organisations, associations and networks which occupy the "Social space" between the family and the State who come together to advocate their common interests through collective action. It includes volunteer and charity groups, parents and teachers associations, senior citizens groups, sports clubs, arts and culture groups, faith-based groups, workers clubs and trade unions, non-profit think-tanks and "issue based" activist groups.\textsuperscript{193}

This is an inclusive definition but one that is clear in its bounds regarding what is and what is not included. The idea of understanding civil society as a space is also an important characteristic. This dual definition of civil society as both a set of organisations and a space for activity features prominently in theoretical and academic debates.

\textsuperscript{191} IBID, viewed December 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2006
\textsuperscript{192} DFID. \textit{Briefing: Civil Society and Good Governance}. (DFID, 2007), 3
World Vision is a Christian humanitarian organisation with an operational focus on poor and vulnerable people.\textsuperscript{194} It has grown to become a major source of international aid with 2005 project expenditures in Sub-Saharan Africa reaching US$575.9 million, a value only exceeded by ten bilateral donors.\textsuperscript{195} Although the organisation does not conduct projects with a focus on governance they operate primarily with local communities and community groups making their funding directly salient to civil society organisations and their operations.\textsuperscript{196} Despite this focus none of the major documents from the organisation provide a definition of civil society, community groups or any related organisation.

The IUCN is also included as an NGO example as it has been extremely influential in contributing to and drafting multinational environmental agreements (MEA) and is a primary donor to the Environmental Foundation for Africa, the case study organisation in this work. Bringing together 749 national NGOs, 108 government agencies, 84 State members, 82 international NGOs and 33 affiliate members, the IUCN describes itself as “the world’s largest and most important conservation network.”\textsuperscript{197} At the programme level, in 2006 the IUCN provided SF 25 385 000 (US$ 24 929 754) of funding for Sub-Saharan Africa and SF 8 248 000 (US$8 099 595) in the West Africa region.\textsuperscript{198} However, as with the World Vision example, the IUCN does not provide a detailed definition of civil society or even NGO, an often used term in its documentation.

\textsuperscript{194} World Vision. World Vision: Who We Are. Available at www.wvi.org/wvi/about_us/who_we_are.pdf, (Viewed November 21, 2007), 5
\textsuperscript{195} Values calculated from OECD data and World Vision Annual Reports. World Vision data is grouped as Africa and includes an unknown amount for Mauritania. The ten countries with bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa greater than World Vision expenditures are U.S.A., France, U.K., Germany, Netherlands, Japan, Italy, Sweden, Canada and Norway. Final 2006 OECD data is not available but based on preliminary information World Vision should move to number seven on the list.
\textsuperscript{196} World Vision, 6-7
\textsuperscript{197} IUCN Website. www.iucn.org/en/about/ (Viewed November 21, 2007)
\textsuperscript{198} IUCN. Working for Conservation: Programme Report 2006. (Gland: IUCN, 2007), 45
The membership application form does ask for a more detailed choice of organisational structure but does not provide any clear definitions.\textsuperscript{199}

The definition of civil society shares wide agreement within the development community with the critical defining features being that it is outside the state and represents some form of citizen action or grouping. The USAID definition is unique in that it explicitly focuses on politically active groups, a narrow definition often utilised in academic study of the aid community. However for the purpose of this essay, the DFID definition will be utilised as it is a much more inclusive definition, allowing for development or service provision groups to be included, providing a more realistic encapsulation of the actual civil society environment. Additionally, it includes aspects of both the more practical definitions that focus on sets of institutions and more abstract versions that focus on ideas of social space and normative aspects. It is these two often conflicting perspectives on civil society that form the bulk of the definitional debates that dominated the early literature.

The first area of debate stems from the necessity of operationalising civil society in the donor community. This puts an onus on more practical definitions, or what Van Rooy described as 'civil society as a collective noun'\textsuperscript{200} and is centred on debates of which groups are included and excluded. The most immediate effect of this is a restrictive definition regarding the types of organisations that are included and their representative capacity. Marina Ottaway makes the distinction between traditional civil society, which tends to be more informal and based on existing patterns and networks, compared to modern civil society that is associated with the formal NGO model of the

\textsuperscript{199} IUCN Website. http://cms.iucn.org/about/union/members/join/index.cfm (Viewed June 4, 2008)

\textsuperscript{200} Alison Van Rooy. Civil Society and the Aid Industry: The Politics and Promise. (London: Earthscan Publications Limited, 1997), 15
donor community.\textsuperscript{201} The level of formality is a critical distinction between the two as it helps define the boundaries of the institutions. Modern civil society has rigid boundaries that separate it from the state and the family and also from society at large. Traditional civil society has no clear bounds and blurs into both the family and the state, often performing tasks typically assumed to be the responsibility of the state.\textsuperscript{202} This distinction is more acute in the African context as the majority of traditional civil society organisations are founded on ethnic, kinship or geographical ties and lack the formal structure required by donor policies.\textsuperscript{203} Additionally, the NGOs favoured by donors tend to be concentrated in national capitals and staffed by middle-class elites.\textsuperscript{204} In primarily rural societies with limited transport and communication options, modern civil society will be problematic in its ability to truly represent the masses. It is argued these groups and individuals will have limited ties to the people they claim to represent, operating more akin to trustees.\textsuperscript{205} In its most severe manifestation, epitomised by the USAID focus on advocacy NGOs, this can reduce civil society to "as few as one or two dozen people who happen to have close relations with the donors and are thus characterised as deciding and acting for the entire civil society of the country."\textsuperscript{206} This narrow focus on formal NGOs within the donor community creates a number of issues of inclusion and exclusion, issues that will be expanded upon when considering civil society in more abstract terms.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{202} Ottaway, 126
\bibitem{204} E. Gyimah-Boadi. "\textit{Civil Society and Democratic Development}" in Democratic Reform in Africa. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 111
\bibitem{205} Thomas Carothers; Barndt, William. \textit{Civil Society: Think Again}. (Foreign Policy, Winter 1999-2000, no. 117)
\bibitem{206} Thomas Carothers. \textit{Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve.}, 210
\end{thebibliography}
The second major set of definitional debates overlaps with formal issues of inclusion and exclusion but is concerned with the notion of civil society as, or occupying a social space. This space is often portrayed as an enabling environment where organisations are allowed to operate with limited constraints\textsuperscript{207} and has taken its place alongside what one author described as the "conceptual trinity of market, state and civil society."\textsuperscript{208} When donor definitions are combined, civil society is neatly packaged as one of four spheres, separate from the state, the family and the market. Larry Diamond eloquently outlines this fourfold typology describing civil society,

As distinct from 'society' in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere...an intermediary phenomenon, standing between the private sphere and the state. Thus it excludes parochial society: individual and family life and inward-looking group activities and it excludes economic society: the profit making enterprise of individual business firms...Similarly, civil society is distinct from political society, which encompass all those organised actors whose primary goal is to win control of the state or at least some position for themselves within it.\textsuperscript{209}

On a general level, this orderly division has a number of problems. These spheres are often discussed as equal and distinct or with minor overlap, a vision that does not exist in reality.\textsuperscript{210} Also it does not take into account power inequalities that exist between and within these spheres.

Relations between the state and civil society highlight these issues in a more specific context. From a functional perspective, the notion of separation is primarily challenged on two levels, direct ownership and more indirect political control of civil society activities. Examples abound in the literature of NGOs being established or co-

\textsuperscript{207} Van Rooy, 19
\textsuperscript{208} Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce. \textit{Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration}. (Bolder: Lyne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 189
\textsuperscript{209} Larry Diamond. \textit{Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation}. (Baltimore: The John’s Hopkins University Press, 1999), 221
\textsuperscript{210} Van Rooy, 20
opted by key actors in government or opposition, greatly hindering their ability to act independently and challenging their credibility.\textsuperscript{211} Limited domestic funding opportunities often leads to a reliance on funding from foreign governments which can have similar issues related to agenda setting and legitimacy as domestic political control.\textsuperscript{212} Kasfir discusses the issue of legitimacy regarding the USAID preferred mode of using advocacy NGOs. Not only are they faced with previously discussed representation issues but they are often advocating for reforms that do not have a domestic social base.\textsuperscript{213} The lack of popular support creates an obvious challenge when the ultimate ideal is democracy promotion. Political control can also occur through government legislation that aims to limit the space for civil society to act or to access their sources of funding.\textsuperscript{214}

More covert methods can be used to tie NGO activity into the same neopatrimonial governance practices that they are intended to be addressing, through what Beatrice Hibou refers to as the "privatisation of power".\textsuperscript{215} Hibou uses the example of Mozambique, where a large portion of traditional state functions were being administered by NGOs or private organisations. Although the services were being provided outside the formal state apparatus, the same patterns of "rentier political economy" still existed that strengthened the positions of local ruling elites, only now

\textsuperscript{211} Gyimah-Boadi, 110  
\textsuperscript{212} IBID, 109  
\textsuperscript{213} Kasfir, Nelson, \textit{Civil society, the state and democracy in Africa.} (Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 1998, 36, no. 2) : 132-133  
\textsuperscript{214} Gyimah-Boadi, 109  
\textsuperscript{215} Beatrice Hibou. \textit{"The Social Capital of the State as an Agent of Deception: The Ruses of Economic Intelligence"}. \textit{In Criminalisation Of The State In Africa}. Ed Jean-Francois Bayert, Stephen Ellis and Beatrice Hibou (Indiana University Press, 1999), 96
through private channels. Hibou argues this was a result of “lax attitudes” by the donors, although it may be a pragmatic reaction to the reality of service provision.

A final definitional discussion that is beginning to emerge from the separation of state and civil society is the role of political parties and funding for these groups. Recalling the definitions of civil society from the donors, political parties will fall outside of this sphere, despite the obviously critical role they play in democracy promotion and increasingly within democracy assistance. Carothers discusses many of the issues with ‘Party Aid’, such as the perception of internal corruption and concerns with becoming engaged in partisan politics. The notion of a separate sphere of the state and civil society is problematic, not just in the ability to make finite distinctions but also in excluding groups that may be vital to the democratisation process.

Separation of family and civil society represents a different set of issues for donors. As previously discussed regarding the narrow NGO model preferred by donors, traditional civil society often blurs into the family, eliminating many existing groups. Diamond argues there should be a divide, that “civil society should be distinguished from the more clearly democracy-enhancing phenomenon of civic community.” He argues this is necessary stating, “if civil society is to be a theoretically useful construct for studying democratic development, it is important to avoid tautology that equates it with everything that is democratic, noble, decent and good.” Diamond’s concern is with

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217 This is from the author’s experience in project implementation. The decision has to be made between not implementing what may be a valuable and worthwhile project and succumbing to the realities of local neopatrimonial practices in order to complete the work.


219 Diamond, 227

220 IBID, 227
civil society scholars and practitioners focusing only on the positive organisations within civil society and civic community, rather than the totality of those that fit into standard definitions of civil society.\textsuperscript{221} This is problematic from a theoretical perspective in that it manufactures a sphere of existence for civil society that does not exist and is founded on the false assumption that an existing civic community will have the prerequisite structure to fulfil its promise of democratic enhancement. From an operational and practical perspective it is problematic as this narrow civil society definition can serve to actually marginalise and squeeze out existing groups.\textsuperscript{222} There is also the potential for this type of definition to build up already strong areas of society at the expense of marginalised groups.\textsuperscript{223} Defining civil society as separate from the family is both practically and theoretically problematic and has the potential to make a self-fulfilling prophecy of the notion of a separate civil society sphere.

The final set of spheres to discuss is the separation of civil society and the market. This distinction is part of a common sense definition of civil society and is built explicitly into definitions expressed by donors such as the World Bank and the UNDP. Once again this distinction creates exclusions that are challenging from an operational perspective. By finitely separating civil society from the market, both business groups and unions\textsuperscript{224} must be omitted. In a study by Bratton and van de Walle, they concluded that political protests were a critical factor in democratic transitions in Africa. Furthermore they determined that the number of trade unions and business associations “were positively

\textsuperscript{221} IDIB, 227
\textsuperscript{222} Hearn, 257-258
\textsuperscript{224} Much of the latest excitement surrounding civil society and democratization stems from the success of the Solidarity movement in Poland. Not only was this a union based struggle but it ultimately did rise to power, two distinct characteristics that would eliminate it from the sphere of civil society.
and very strongly correlated with the frequency of protest.” By insisting upon this separation of civil society and the market, critical actors in democratic transition can be left out. This problem may become more problematic as scholar/practioners such as William Easterly and donors such as the World Bank look to directly introduce market mechanisms into development assistance with existing civil society organisations as one of many potential actors.

The definitional conundrums surrounding civil society dominated the early literature regarding civil society and democratisation. These debates have served to narrow the scope of who is included in the analysis, to a specific set of formal NGO model organisations. This is often seen as a necessity to facilitate theoretical and operational issues. However, it has dramatic implications when considering what civil society is intended to contribute to the overall democratisation process. It is these issues that will occupy the remainder of the literature review, starting with more general and theoretical debates and finishing with a more in-depth review of focussed imminent reviews that are beginning to emerge.

James Ferguson provides an outstanding, general critique of the current paradigm surrounding civil society and democratisation. Recalling the historical view of the African state as a nation-building struggle between the modern state apparatus, attempting to overcome the traditional, ‘primordial’ structure, the irony of the new paradigm becomes apparent. The nation-building exercise hasn’t changed but the roles

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225 Michael Bratton; Nicholas van de Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Change in Comparative Perspectives. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 148
226 Easterly has been outspoken in this stance, see The White Man’s Burden: Why The West’s Efforts To Aid The Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good for an overall discussion. The World Bank ‘Development Marketplace’ competition is an example of donor programs intended to integrate ‘civil society’ into market orientated aid programs. See the website at www.lightingafrica.org/index.cfm?Page=Home
have reversed and now it is the ‘dynamic’ civil society attempting to overcome the stagnant and bloated state.\textsuperscript{227}

Gordon White provides an overview of the expectations for civil society in democratisation. He cites four specific and linked roles for civil society: it can play a balancing role to the state and provide a check on its overall power, it can increase the accountability of the state by enforcing standards of public morality, it can assist in communicating the interests and demands of the citizenry to the state and it can redefine political rules along democratic lines, in essence constructing a new set of political norms.\textsuperscript{228} These are many of the same themes that appear in the institutional policies of the development community and will be used as headings to explore the functional debates. They will also be utilised in the case study portion of the essay to evaluate the role of environmental civil society actors in the democratisation process in Sierra Leone.

\textbf{Civil Society as a Balancing Agent}

This concept has wide acceptance within the academic and policy literature although its precise utility remains ambiguous. The essential theory is that democracy cannot develop and consolidate without an opposing balancing force emanating from civil society, a role Van Rooy rather cynically refers to as ‘an antidote to the state’.\textsuperscript{229} Diamond echoes these sentiments in quoting Huntington, stating “The first and most basic democratic function of civil society is to provide the basis for the limitation of state

\textsuperscript{228} White, 13-15
\textsuperscript{229} Van Rooy, 46
power, hence the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control.”

Hearn and Robinson suggest two ways that donors seek to promote or perhaps more accurately create civil society opposition. The first method is “about opening up the public space in which policy debate takes place to encompass previously excluded non-state actors.” This can take a myriad of forms in donor practice. The World Bank has increasingly integrated civil society in its operational protocol, primarily at the consultation level rather than as a direct operating partner. The Annual Report notes that civil society was consulted on 72% of the new loan approvals during 2006 and they have become an active partner in the creation of national level poverty reduction plans.

Another practice, pursued by the IUCN, is to conduct international NGO conferences and support national NGO forums as a way to increase the collective strength of actors in the environmental field.

The second method of promoting civil society is by “funding the programmes and strengthening the capacity of individual organisations.” Foreign funding arrives into civil society from a variety of sources and can fund programmes that have no basis in democracy promotion. However, within the narrow world of democracy aid, programme and capacity building is primarily limited to technical assistance and direct organisational funding. Technical assistance may include such activities as, “training, advice, and information about organisational development and management, advocacy methods, fund

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230 Diamond, 239
231 Hearn, 245
233 The IUCN has provided funding for the Environmental Forum for Action(ENFORAC). EFA is the acting chair of this forum.
234 Hearn, 246
raising, issue analysis and media relations." Direct funding is also provided to cover operational costs and for the provision of equipment such as vehicles and other capital expenditures. This type of funding is typically low unless linked directly to ongoing project work and can hinder the ability of organisations to conduct effective long term planning and programming.

In addition to the previously mentioned issues associated with the definitional dilemma of civil society, there are other potential concerns regarding these civil society strengthening policies. Pearce and Howell provide an interesting critique of programmes that attempt to increase space for civil society. They argue that "donor attempts to operationalise the concept in the form of civil society strengthening programmes threaten to reduce the concept of civil society to a technical tool and so depoliticise it in a way that paradoxically could lead to a constriction of intellectual and political space." If donors reduce civil society to merely purveyors of western ideas, the actual domestic space is reduced. Ottaway warns that much of African civil society is regional based and aligned through ethnic or religious lines. Therefore it has limited utility as a mass movement and also has the possibility of being a destabilising agent if politically motivated. Diamond adds to the mix suggesting that an extremely aggressive civil society could actually overwhelm a weak state through unachievable demands. It is imperative that "The state itself must have sufficient autonomy, legitimacy, capacity and support to mediate among the various interest groups, to implement policies and to allocate resources in ways that

236 IBID, 213
237 Howell, 2-3
balance the claims of competing groups against one another and against the interests of society as a whole.”239 This is akin to what has been touted as the paradox of civil society, “only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society; only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state.”240

Civil society is perceived to have the greatest potential to make positive contributions to democracy development through its ability to act as a balance to state power. However, the literature suggests that this notion is certainly not without concerns and must be part of an overall process of state capacity building to maintain the fragile balance of power between the two spheres.

**Increasing State Accountability**

The ability of civil society to increase state accountability is a specific duty of an empowered civil society and is closely linked to its ability to act as a balancing agent. Within this role, groups such as media, law societies, human rights groups and similar social justice organisations are seen as critical actors. These types of groups serve to monitor government activity and act to illuminate and challenge state wrongdoing.241 Diamond argues this role is even more critical in fragile new democracies with a legacy of authoritarian rule as the state itself lacks the capacity to self-regulate.242

DFID expands this role beyond monitoring and reactive action to include “direct or indirect participation of ordinary citizens or civil society organisations in the policy programme or political cycle.”243 They provide four phases and specific activities for

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239 Diamond, 251
241 Gyimah-Boadi, 101-102
242 Diamond, 239-241
243 DFID. *Briefing: Civil Society and Good Governance.* (DFID, 2007), 5-6
potential action: influencing standard setting, carrying out investigations, demanding answers from the state and applying sanctions where the state is found to be lacking.\textsuperscript{244} DFID is explicit in stating these activities should be a compliment to formal state procedures, an indicator they are aware of the delicate balance of civil society and state power.

**Communicating the Interests and Demands of the Citizenry**

Civil society is often portrayed as a critical bridge between the state and the citizenry. Carothers uses the term ‘transmission belt’ to describe the active role of civil society in articulating the interests of the general populace.\textsuperscript{245} Many of the issues surrounding representation have been covered in the definitional overview and do not need repeating. Despite these weaknesses, others point to the inclusionary benefits that civil society has provided. Gyimah-Boadi touts the role that advocacy and development NGOs have played in bringing formally marginalised groups into the political process.\textsuperscript{246}

Women’s empowerment programming is an often stated goal of donor policy and is an example of specific donor policy to target marginalised groups. As an example, the UNDP has implemented specific projects aimed at increasing women’s political participation, adding to the high importance they place on women’s empowerment in their overall development programming.\textsuperscript{247}

Pluralism appears as a recurring theme throughout the literature and is central to the ability of civil society to convey interests. Once again returning to Diamond, he argues pluralism is an essential component of a democratic civil society. The ability for

\textsuperscript{244} IBID
\textsuperscript{246} Gyimah-Boadi, 104
\textsuperscript{247} UNDP. *UNDP Annual Report 2006: Global Partnership for Development*. (UNDP, 2006), 20-21
multiple groups to compete for representation enhances their abilities and also ensures that the extinction of one individual group does not end the organised representation of that group or set of interests. Kasfir utilises many of the same arguments but also asserts that pluralism allows groups to become more focused and more capable of affecting government opinion and policy. Both warn of the danger of overspecialisation as this has the potential to allow unequal representation to specific interests but the overall assertion is that the representative benefits outweigh their potential flaws.

Creating a New Set of Political Norms

Among donors this is the least developed of the possible roles for civil society within their programmes. Although it often features in donor rhetoric, converting this into practise is problematic as norms are difficult to quantify. As Van Rooy describes, donors often portray civil society to be a training ground for new political norms. White describes the role that civil society can play in the normative aspect of democratisation stating that “civil society creates and sustains a new set of new democratic norms which regulate the behaviour of the state and the character of the political relations between the state and ‘public sphere’ of society and citizens.” Moving beyond the idea of civil society regulating the norms regarding engagement between the state and its citizens, Diamond suggests civil society can also modify traditional patron-client relationships at the local level. This ‘deepening’ of democracy occurs as civil society empowers individuals around common interests and challenges the “psychological and structural

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248 Diamond, 232-233
249 Kasfir, 122-123
250 Van Rooy, 48
251 White, 15
bonds of clientelism."\textsuperscript{252} Civil society is seen as an agent not just for redefining norms at the upper levels of state and citizen interaction but also in changing relations at the grassroots level, addressing democratic deficits in both formal and informal institutions. This normative function is one that every civil society actor contributes to and is neglected by the typical, narrow focus on the activities of advocacy organisations. As civil society expands across all sectors this role will become its most critical contribution to the democratisation process.

Robert Putnam and his study regarding civic traditions in Italy is the most important work regarding the link between civil society or 'civic community'\textsuperscript{253} and democracy. His study, which compared the institutional performance of Italy's twenty regional governments, concluded that the magnitude of civic community was the primary factor in the quality of democratic governance and overall performance.\textsuperscript{254} He further concludes that the type of civil society organisation matters, as those that are horizontally structured will serve to promote institutional success at the broader level. Conversely those based on vertical relationships that mimic existing patron-client relations will do little to promote the social conditions for democracy.\textsuperscript{255} These conclusions indicate that it is not just what civil society does but also how these organisations are structured that affects its contribution to democracy promotion.

Through the ongoing Afrobarometer research project, Michael Bratton is attempting to clarify the relative effect that formal and informal institutions have on

\textsuperscript{252} Diamond, 244
\textsuperscript{253} As previously discussed authors such as Diamond have argued that civil society must be defined as unique from the larger category of civic community. This essay takes the opposite stance arguing that the sum total of civil society affects must be accounted for rather than just the narrow interactions between and within donor defined groups.
\textsuperscript{255} Putnam, 175
assessments and views regarding democracy in Africa. An interesting pattern emerges from Bratton’s data that indicates informal institutions are actually positively related to individual views regarding the ‘extent of democracy’. A statistically significant, positive correlation exists between both trust in the president, clientelism and the perceived extent of democracy.\(^{256}\) This relationship should be disturbing to donors interested in democracy promotion as the illiberal and undemocratic features of governance they are attempting to eradicate are actually being internally conceptualised as part of democracy.

The ability of civil society to create new democratic political norms features in the rhetoric of donors and is largely accepted without disclaimer. The aggregate literature indicates there are issues with this thinking. If structure matters then in order to eradicate traditional neopatrimonial governance practices such as presidentialism and clientalism, civil society must be free of these same practices. If the critical factor is not what you do but how you do it, this has severe ramifications for donors focussed on narrow NGO based definitions of civil society.

**Civil Society Evaluations**

The previous sections have reviewed the bulk of the literature concerned with theoretical debates over how civil society is defined and its role in democratisation. The final section will focus on more recent studies that provide specific, field-based evaluations of the efficacy of civil society in the democratisation process. The Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at Sussex University has done the most thorough work, conducting a comparative study of Uganda, South Africa and Ghana.

Julie Hearn's discussion paper provides the analytical baseline for the IDS study and focuses on two main themes. First, she examines who the donors identify as civil society and the implications of these definitions. Second, she evaluates what their objectives are for civil society and overall development. Hearn concludes that although donors work with a broad spectrum of group types they tend to be the "formal, urban-based, professional, elite advocacy NGOs" rather than the existing rural-based organisations that form the majority of civil society organisations. This is extremely similar to the criticisms put forward by Ottaway, although Hearn goes beyond her concerns and suggests that this policy set is actually strengthening a new African elite, aligned with neo-liberal political and economic ideology. Whereas most previous theoretical criticism has focussed on the lack of accurate representation in the NGO model, directly linking this policy with ulterior economic and societal agendas is unique.

The supporting research for this stance is pursued later in the article where Hearn identifies and explores the two principal objectives of civil society assistance: building democracy and economic reform. Focussing on the democratisation agenda, Hearn argues that donor-funded organisations and programmes tend to be aligned with supporting and developing formal political institutions, often with the narrow focus on elections. This is closely aligned with what she describes as polyarchy, a common procedural definition closely associated with liberal democracy, rather than a more encompassing definition based on social justice concepts. Although this may be an accurate criticism of donor

258 Hearn, 4
259 IBID
260 A thorough analysis of democracy theory and official policy was conducted earlier in the essay. The term Polyarchy comes from Robert Dahl and serves as the baseline for the limits of democratic governance.
261 Hearn, 16
programming it is not clear whether this is a result of specific policy intent or more a result of pragmatic restrictions on implementation that are difficult to quantify outside of the formal institutional setting.

Shifting to economic reform, Hearn’s argument is based on two roles for civil society. The first argues that liberal democracy is believed by the donors to be a key enabling environment for liberal economics.\(^{262}\) The second, more critical argument is that civil society is being brought into the process to provide legitimacy and build support for potentially divisive reforms.\(^{263}\) This argument is not well developed, relying mainly on the existence of funding for liberal think tanks and organisations but providing little evidence in terms of outcomes. The author also allows ideology to dominate, taking as a given that reforms have been negative for Africa, ignoring the opposing literature that argues much of the negative effects can be attributed to incomplete and often insincere attempts at reform.\(^{264}\)

Hearn provides a clear outline of the limitations of donor definitions and objectives for civil society. Subsequent research in the IDS study from Friedman and Robinson built on these themes and attempted to provide insight into the efficacy of the donor policies as measured by civil society’s ability “to influence government policy and legislation and to widen the opportunities available to citizens to participate in public affairs”.\(^{265}\)

\(^{262}\) This is a reversal of Modernisation Theory which saw economic development as a key enabling environment for democratic transformation.

\(^{263}\) Hearn, 19

\(^{264}\) van de Walle makes an extremely compelling argument for this stance in *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis*.

The authors' highlighted two critical issues in the donor policies: a lack of consensus on the specific role of civil society in the democratisation process and little knowledge about the efficacy of civil society in this process, despite general belief in its unquestioned importance.\(^{266}\) The second of these issues formed the dominant portion of the study and focussed on two distinct measures. First, they examined the internal governance of the organisations, as much of the theory on civil society's efficacy relies upon democratic norms existing within these organisations. From the survey work much of the theoretical criticisms held true: NGOs were typically located in the capital with weak ties to grassroots constituencies, were generally dominated by men and in rural areas relied on existing patron-client networks.\(^{267}\) More positively, of the organisations thoroughly analysed, the majority had formal democratic governance structures as exhibited through constitutions, periodic elections and open meetings that provide room for member voice.\(^{268}\) The major issue with this finding is the limited sample size, which focussed on major aid recipients. External donors require these minimal democratic standards be in place prior to funding and it is difficult to determine whether they have any actual relevance. Additionally, it may focus democratic norms in a small portion of the actual civil society community, further increasing the separation between the grassroots and formal, donor-funded communities.

Regarding the overall influence of civil society in formal policy creation, the study determined that there was little consistent engagement between civil society and the policy process and even less overall impact on policy outcomes.\(^{269}\) Of importance, there

\(^{266}\) Friedman, 2
\(^{267}\) Friedman, 21-23
\(^{268}\) Friedman, 27-29
\(^{269}\) Friedman, 11
did not appear to be a direct relationship between policy influence and long-term linkages with government or foreign influence. However, those organisations that were most effective tended to have a high level of internal democratic culture, including high levels of internal participation.\textsuperscript{270} This indicates that the internal structure, generally portrayed as a critical catalyst to less quantitative normative shifts, may be more directly related to efficacy.

In summary, the utility of civil society as an agent in promoting democracy is not as clear cut as the donor community may believe. Substantial issues emerge from the definitional debates, as this determines who is included and excluded from analysis. The majority of the literature and donor policy creates a narrow view of civil society as active in the political process and generally based on a formal western NGO model. Although this narrow definition is useful as an analytical and policy tool, it is insufficient to properly evaluate the extent of civil society on the democratisation process. Organisations that may not fit the ideal mould and may be acting in the development role rather than in strict political terms do contribute to the overall effect of civil society on the democratisation process.

This becomes clear when the role of civil society in democratisation is further analysed. Many of the processes and measures are based largely on participation with little correlation to actual democratic development. When efforts are made to quantify results this is often limited to actual policy inputs. This is also insufficient as it does not reflect the ability or utility of civil society to facilitate and consolidate democracy. The most important role for civil society in this process is in its normative aspects, similar to the model of civic community as suggested by Putnam. This essay will explore both of

\textsuperscript{270} Friedman, 10-20
these weaknesses, expanding the inclusion of civil society beyond the strict advocacy
type organisations favoured by donors and evaluating the internal structure of civil
society organisations as a primary factor in contributing to the promotion of a democratic
political culture that is critical to democratic consolidation. The next chapter will provide
an historical overview of Sierra Leone political development to illustrate the type of
issues that are affecting its democratisation process.
Chapter VI: Sierra Leone - A Political Journey

The theoretical chapters focussed on the evolution of development theory and donor policy and on the meaning of democracy and specifically its understanding and role within these policies. The subsequent chapter outlined the critical debates surrounding conceptualisations of civil society and its utility as an agent in the democratisation process. This chapter is the first of two regarding the case study of Sierra Leone and the ability of civil society to contribute to specific donor policies regarding democratisation and good governance. Rather than concentrating on strictly quantitative indices of governance and their associated measures, obstacles to democratisation will be put in the context of the historical political challenges that have been part of Sierra Leone politics and society since its pre-colonial days. It is these obstacles that will be illuminated in this chapter and form the background for the civil society based field research of the next chapter.

Sierra Leone came to be synonymous with a brutal eleven-year civil war, graphically symbolised by images of child soldiers and civilian amputations. The 2006 film, Blood Diamond, brought a stylised version of the conflict to a mass audience and illustrated some of the brutality and corrupting influences of diamond wealth that were its most salient characteristics. Other commentators such as Robert Kaplan described the conflict as representing a “pre-modern formlessness” and representative of the future of conflict, fought at the communal level and indistinguishable from criminal anarchy. What is missing from both these descriptions is an understanding of the causes of the conflict, rooted in recurring themes of Sierra Leone politics: core versus periphery

antagonism, chiefly control and patrimonial governance. The political issues that led to civil war, the most intense form of state collapse, are the same issues that must be overcome for Sierra Leone to continue its nascent transition to democracy. Recapping these themes of Sierra Leone’s political history will be split into three phases: Pre-protectorate, which covers the period up to formal British control as a protectorate, Colonial, from the declaration of the protectorate until independence and Independence to present, including the 2007 elections.

Pre-protectorate

The pre-protectorate period will cover the period up to the formal declaration of protectorate status for the hinterland in 1896. Massive changes occurred in the social and political structure of Sierra Leone during this period, largely in response to contact with European traders and the British government. The most critical aspects are the emergence of two predominant tribes, the Mende and the Temne, rivalry between the core and periphery and the evolution of the chiefdom and the role of the chief.

From what has been formally coalesced about Sierra Leone’s pre-European contact history, its earliest inhabitants lived in small, isolated communities rooted in a kinship structure. Mountains and dense forests protected these communities from invasion by the interior empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai and increased the local isolation.\textsuperscript{272} Political organisation was based on a lineage system, which might be patrilineal or matrilineal and allowed kinsmen to “maintain solidarity for internal

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{272} Christopher Fyfe. \textit{"Peoples of the Windward Coast: A.D. 1000-1800"} in A Thousand Years of West Africa History. Ed J.F Ade Ajayi and Ian Espie (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1969), 149}
organisation and for dealing with the kinsmen of other lineages.\textsuperscript{273} These kinship-based 'stateless societies'\textsuperscript{274} also included various forms of secret societies which provided horizontal organisation that cut across lineage lines. The secret societies served various functions politically that allowed for open deliberation free from lineage pressure and allowed for collective decision making outside of other village institutions.\textsuperscript{275} This informal but structured baseline matches descriptions from early traders that described the area as a series of small independent states, each with its own government. Some of these governments were ruled by a king, but even these extremes were tempered by empowered advisory councils.\textsuperscript{276} The descriptions outline the existence of a limited, guardianship-type, democratic governance structure with a parallel secret society system providing a counterweight to the ruling elite. Undoubtedly there was variance among the communities but the basic form of democratic government was clearly evident, countering any claims of it being an alien form of governance.

Beginning in the 15\textsuperscript{th} century, Portuguese traders began operating along the coast of Sierra Leone, trading European manufactured goods for local products such as ivory and bees-wax. Ultimately this trade expanded to include slaves, usually criminals from within the community or outsiders captured in war.\textsuperscript{277} Early contact was limited to coastal trading, predominantly with the Temne and Bulom who acted as middle men with the inland tribes. Although trade between the coastal and inland tribes already existed along main waterways, this was intensified by the Europeans. The increase in trade allowed for

\textsuperscript{274} Taken from work by Robin Horton and is often referred to in other historical accounts of Sierra Leone, specifically the Type 3 version of the Large Compact Village.
\textsuperscript{276} Fyfe, 154
\textsuperscript{277} Christopher Fyfe, A Short History of Sierra Leone. (London: Longman, 1979), 6-10
an expansion of the chiefs’ responsibilities, access to revenue and western institutions including education.\textsuperscript{278} Although contact was limited between the early European traders and the indigenous population, altered trade patterns began to affect the role of the chief and empowered specific tribes.

Three major migrations of people occurred during the pre-protectorate period that had significant impacts on the current political situation. The first occurred in the mid-sixteenth century when the coastal people were invaded by the ‘Manes’.\textsuperscript{279} The Manes descended along either the Mao or Mano River\textsuperscript{280} and progressed up the coast, invading and conquering the lands of the Temne and Bulum, including the main trading location of the Sierra Leone estuary. Ultimately they were stopped by the inland Susu tribe and retreated, settling into and ruling the Temne and Bulum areas.\textsuperscript{281} Temne society was altered by this interaction; larger political units were implemented, aligned under a king and much beyond the small chiefdoms that had existed, commercial relations were altered including a shift in trade patterns with Europeans away from the Sierra Leone estuary into modern day Guinea and improved methods of warfare were introduced.\textsuperscript{282}

Over the course of about a century, the Manes and the Bulum were slowly assimilated into the larger Temne society and much of the traditional practices regained prominence. The kingdoms slowly reverted to smaller chiefdoms, however the ruling house shifted to Mande-speaking or Fula descendants with “clear-cut patterns of rule based on patricians.”\textsuperscript{283} Increased interactions with outside traders also led to the slow introduction

\textsuperscript{278} Christopher Fyfe, \textit{A History of Sierra Leone}. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 1-10
\textsuperscript{279} Fyfe. \textit{People’s of the Windward Coast}. 158
\textsuperscript{280} The Mano River forms the Eastern border with Liberia.
\textsuperscript{281} Kenneth C. Wylie. \textit{The Political Kingdoms of the Temne}. (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1977), 15
\textsuperscript{282} IBID, 25
\textsuperscript{283} IBID
of Islam into Temne culture. This is significant as it affected the role of the chief, with a split of Temne country into Muslim and society chiefdoms. Within society based chiefdoms, secret societies such as the Porol and Ragbenle maintained significant power and allowed the sub-chiefs and society more independence within the chiefdoms. In contrast, the Muslim chiefdoms were more vertically structured with authority largely based on economic wealth and allegiances based on a common Islamic faith, allowing for more arbitrary rule. The Mane invasion had significant short term impacts and created lasting evolutions on Temne society. Overall it served to increase Temne influence as surrounding cultures were assimilated and direct ties were made with inland tribes and European traders.

The second major migration of people was unique in that it did not originate from within the continent but was the result of emigration from the west in the wake of the abolition of the slave trade. In 1772, a ruling by Lord Mansfield made slavery illegal on British soil, emancipating thousands of slaves. On May 14 1787, roughly 400 of these 'Black Poor' arrived in Sierra Leone from England and negotiated a settlement site with the local Temne chief in the current location of the State House in Freetown. The original settlement soon came into conflict with a neighbouring ruler and the town was burnt down and the settlers dispersed. Seemingly undaunted, a group of 1 100, ex-slaves from the United States arrived from Nova Scotia in 1792 and another 500 originally from Jamaica via Nova Scotia arrived in 1800. These three communities were the original

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284 IBID, 49
286 Leo Spitzer. The Creoles of Sierra Leone: Responses to Colonialism. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 10
inhabitants of Freetown and became known as the Creoles.\footnote{The term Creole will be used in the essay to match the majority of available academic sources. From experience the term is written Krio but the meaning is the same.} In January of 1808, Sierra Leone, which included Freetown and surrounding area on the peninsula, became a Crown Colony, ushering in formal rule over Sierra Leone but not the larger tribal areas. A fourth and final group of settlers followed as Britain established Freetown as a ‘point of liberation’ for slaves freed from the interior or captured by the British navy during its coastal patrols.\footnote{Spitzer, 10-11}

Creole culture was distinct from the interior and tended to reflect the ‘civilising’ mission that was the original intent of the British masterminds. Increased availability of education and capital allowed many to become active traders, although few ventured beyond the peninsula. Governance was completely undemocratic and dominated by the British, through a Governor and seven officials, all appointed by the British government. An extremely modest democratising move was made in 1863 when the Council was divided into an Executive and Legislative branch with one representative of the Sierra Leone community allowed in the latter. This system remained unchanged until the establishment of the protectorate and the amalgamation of the colony and the interior. During this period, a distinct Creole culture emerged that would have important political consequences throughout the colonial period and into independence.

The final major migration was the slow and steady ‘mendenisation’ of the south of the country. This process occurred over the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries as the Mende slowly expanded towards the coastal areas through two distinct patterns. The first was through simple migration and settlement into coastal areas previously occupied by the Sherbo and Vai people. Once sufficient numbers had moved into an area they elected a leader, who
would represent them to the local chief, until the time when they became independent.\textsuperscript{289}

The second form of migration was through mercenary activity. Having gained a reputation as fierce warriors, both the Sherbo and the Vai would utilise the Mende in conflict with their neighbours. Mercenaries were entitled to a share of the spoils and would often stay and posses the lands they had successfully conquered for their employers.\textsuperscript{290}

With the annexation of the coastal areas complete, the Mende settled into a fairly stable form of governance. The war village, consisting of a central walled town with surrounding open villages was the most basic unit. This war-town was governed by a town chief, with the aid of village elders who would be responsible for security and settling disputes among the citizens.\textsuperscript{291} The next tier of organisation consisted of several affiliated war villages and was ruled by a sub-chief, responsible for law and order, settling disputes and representing them at chiefdom councils.\textsuperscript{292} Above this was the ‘state’, encapsulating all the various war towns within the personal control of a centralised leader, headed by a king or paramount chief. By the 1880s there were roughly nine Mende states, categorised by one author as either territorial, with stable territorial limits or personal amorphous, reliant more on the king’s personality for its bounds. In both state forms the king was an elected position and was predominantly responsible for external relations and settling disputes between chiefs, leaving the majority of the daily administrative duties to the sub and town chiefs.\textsuperscript{293}

\textsuperscript{290} IBID, 3-4
\textsuperscript{292} IBID
\textsuperscript{293} Abraham, 35-37.
This stable form of governance structure was dramatically changed toward its current form by the increase of British penetration into the interior. Prior to policy changes starting in the 1870s, British engagement with the interior had been limited to trade and was primarily carried out through Creole middlemen. However, in response to French advances in the north and economic decline in the colony, believed to be a result of up-country conflict and smuggling, more formal direct links were created.\footnote{Fyfe, \textit{A Short History of Sierra Leone}. 92, 106} British policy focussed on the three pronged strategy of ‘roads, policing and treaties’, each with specific impacts on the interior’s governance and specifically on the role of the chief. Roads were introduced to facilitate trade and allow for patrols by the Frontier Police. This had the effect of re-orientating the flow of trade away from the rivers toward the colony and allowed for the rapid deployment of police and other forces from the colony to the interior, increasing central influence.\footnote{Abraham, 93} Policing was initially introduced to maintain security along the frontier road and keep peace between the various settlements but quickly became another mechanism for linking the chiefs to the central government and reducing their overall judicial autonomy.\footnote{IBID, 94}

Despite the changes brought by roads and policing, the treaty rush had the most lasting and dramatic impacts. The first consequence was a dramatic reduction in chiefly autonomy in favour of direct British authority. Standard treaties contained four key provisions: peace between the chief’s subjects and British subjects which included Creoles, free access to the chief’s territories for all British subjects, with the Governor being the final adjudicator regarding this type of dispute, the chief agreed not to enter into war or acts of aggression that may affect the Colony’s trade, and the chief would not cede
any of their territory to another national government without crown approval.²⁹⁷ These conditions eliminated the sovereignty of the chiefs over their territorial domain and dramatically reduced the ability of chiefs to wage war, a large part of Mende traditional culture and chiefly prestige. The second consequence was the fragmentation of the kingdoms and the creation of the office of Paramount Chief. The hierarchical system of chiefly governance was eradicated by the treaty boom as chiefs of all levels signed treaties with the British, marginalising some and empowering others under this homogenous title. Ultimately, from the nine Mende kingdoms and the various sub-chiefs there emerged a multitude of weakened Paramount Chiefs and fragmented political units. In addition to the obvious changes in the governance structure this process served to further reduce the autonomy of the chiefs as many owed their new found status more to the British government than the people that they represented.²⁹⁸

The political history of the pre-protectorate period is critical as the core issues of Sierra Leone governance emerged. Migration led to the rise of the Temne in the north and the Mende in the south as the dominant tribes. The arrival of the Creoles established a distinct African culture in the colony and established the roots of a core-periphery divide. Finally, the increase in British influence began to have dramatic affects on the role of the chief and the traditional governance patterns of the interior. All of these three themes continued to develop in the colonial period and have impacted the country as it headed into independence.

Colonial Period: 1896-1961

²⁹⁷ IBID, 96
²⁹⁸ IBID, 103-112
On August 31, 1896, the British government proclaimed all the territory between the French controlled north and the Liberian border a protectorate and brought in formal colonial control. The colonial period would last until 1961 and consolidated dramatic changes to the governance structure of the interior, the institution of the chief and institutionalised political tension between the core and periphery, critical issues that still trouble democracy in Sierra Leone.

**The Early Days: 1896-1937**

A series of ordinances in 1896 and 1897 established the initial colonial form of governance in Sierra Leone. The Colony remained under the same system of governance with the Governor maintaining strong, central control with the acquiescence of the Executive and Legislative Councils. The Protectorate was divided into five Districts, each headed by a District Commissioner, who shared powers with the Paramount Chiefs. Chiefs were allowed to judge disputes that involved ‘natives’ and impose their own forms of justice such as fines or imprisonment but not corporal punishment. More serious crimes between ‘natives’ were handled through a combined Chief and Commissioner court system while disputes between chiefs, or dealing with witchcraft and Secret Societies were dealt with exclusively by the District Commissioner. This division of the court system continued the process of weakening the role of the chief and brought them under more intimate, colonial control. Another provision in the Protectorate Ordinance that continued the marginalisation of the Chiefs allowed for District Commissioners, with approval of the Governor, to depose of any chief deemed unfit and

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299 Fyfe, *A Short History of Sierra Leone*, 114
300 Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone*, 542
replace them through appointment.\textsuperscript{301} Whereas previous measures had served to limit the bounds of chiefly control and specifically limit judicial powers, this provision brought the entire spectrum of the Chief’s actions into scrutiny. This period can be seen as the formal transition of chiefly accountability away from the individuals under their jurisdiction toward the central government.

Under Britain’s style of colonialism, colonies were supposed to be self financing, necessitating the imposition of a House Tax on the protectorate. This tax was vehemently opposed by all sectors, the Creoles who were opposed to any direct taxation, traders who felt it would undermine commerce, Northern Chiefs who felt it burdened them directly and argued it was too severe for their impoverished people and Southern Chiefs who felt it threatened their traditional societies.\textsuperscript{302} With the ‘Hut Tax’ serving as the final catalyst, war broke out between the British and the protectorate, first in the Temne areas to the north and then in Mendeland to the south and east.

The Temne revolt started on February 26, 1898, and was led by Bai Bureh, a Temne chief with a reputation for a strong warrior past. Rather than a direct military engagement, the Temne revolt was a coordinated guerrilla campaign, with targeted attacks against administrative targets. The British responded severely, burning entire villages and fields, out of proportion to the Temne attacks.\textsuperscript{303} In April, 1898, the revolt spread to Mendeland where it took a much more indiscriminate turn. Rather than just the administration, all aliens were targeted and killed, including Creole traders, European missionaries, officials and their families. By January of 1899, the revolt had been

\textsuperscript{301} Abraham, 129  
\textsuperscript{302} IBID, 133-137  
\textsuperscript{303} Wylie, 151-155
suppressed and the British had regained control of the entire protectorate.\textsuperscript{304} The failure of the revolts was a critical event in the acceptance of British colonial control over the protectorate. For the chiefs it was a final blow to potential forms of recourse to outside control and illustrated to their subjects that the British were capable of stopping any challenges to their authority. Creoles also suffered as many were vocally opposed to the tax and were seen as agitators, beginning the decline in Creole activity in the protectorate.

**Native Administration**

A series of administrative reorganisations occurred throughout the early part of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century as borders and governance structures were redefined in response to changing social, economic and administrative demands. Despite these frequent minor changes it wasn’t until 1937 and the introduction of Native Administration (N.A.) before significant functional changes occurred. Native Administration was based on the model from Nigeria and was intended to utilise existing chief structures to implement an organised local government, similar to the current trend towards decentralisation in development programming. Additional administrative responsibilities were granted to the Chiefs including: the creation of Chiefdom treasuries for each administrative unit, tax authority to each administrative unit and authorisation to enact by-laws and issue orders regarding social services and development functions.\textsuperscript{305} Chiefs under the direction of the District Commissioners were responsible for collecting local taxes and for maintaining the budget of their administrative units, although policy still emanated from the Governor.

\textsuperscript{304} Abraham, 146-153  
Initially Chiefs had the option of joining the NA system or retaining their existing roles and were provided with salaries to entice their compliance.\textsuperscript{306} Gradually chiefdoms moved towards NA, with 2 out of 202 chiefdoms in 1936 versus 121 out of 212 in 1946 operating under this model.\textsuperscript{307} Essentially, NA focussed on reforming and ‘modernising’ the role of the chief, an institution that had already undergone a dramatic transition. Much of the traditional checks on chiefly control and accountability to their people and popular legitimacy had been eroded and replaced by central, colonial control. Given this metamorphosis it is not surprising that the attempt to then utilise the chiefs as the dominant individual in transforming political administration would prove to be problematic. This same tactic was attempted in the post-civil war period with similar issues.

The period of NA had significant consequences for the political landscape of Sierra Leone that would become acute in the drive towards independence and continue to be salient factors in current politics. Firstly, it formalised the chiefdom as the most critical political unit, creating a parochial political climate resistant to mass mobilisation.\textsuperscript{308} The little unity that did develop beyond the chiefdom seems to have manifested not in any large-scale nationalist movement but in rivalry between the colony and the protectorate.\textsuperscript{309} A second critical consequence was the further evolution of the institution of chief. The introduction of wages and taxation rights instituted another link between the central government and the chief and also created an opportunity for

\textsuperscript{306} IBID, 23
\textsuperscript{307} IBID, 29
\textsuperscript{308} Abraham, 231
monetary corruption at the local level.310 As measures of authority and power moved away from traditional forms to be more reliant on approval from the core and economic advantage, current client-patron forms of governance began to become ingrained. The experiment with N.A. served to institutionalise patron-client political relations between the core and the periphery and created further separation between the chiefs and their subjects.

Preparing for Independence

The post World War II period was a time of massive upheaval in the colonial system due to weakened European power and more confident calls from the colonies for independence. Although independence did not reach Sierra Leone until 1961 the preparations for the transition began roughly fifteen years earlier. It was during this timeframe when the dormant political issues of the role of the chief, core-periphery conflict and Temne-Mende antagonism found space for expression.

The first major policy move by the British government was to create the Protectorate Assembly (PA) in 1945 -1946 and was intended to give the protectorate more political influence in Sierra Leone and also allow it to close the perceived political and social deficit of the protectorate in relation to the colony in preparation for independence.311 Initially the PA consisted of forty-two members, twenty-six of these were reserved for paramount chiefs elected by the district councils and native administrations and eleven for officials from government departments. Of the remaining five, one was allotted to European business interests, one to Creole business interests, one to missionaries and two for educated Protectorate Africans selected by Native

310 Kilson, 33
Administrations, although this was later increased to six due to pressure from the newly emerging educated elite.\textsuperscript{312} The creation of the PA was a monumental step toward independence and once again placed the chiefs at the forefront of protectorate governance.

Concurrent with the creation of the PA the British were introduced major amendments to the 1924 constitution that also increased the political presence of the Protectorate within the governance structure of Sierra Leone. Under the amendments, the Legislative Council was expanded to twenty four members, eight official European members and sixteen unofficial members, fourteen of which would be African. Of these fourteen members, four would be selected by direct representation from the colony, nine would be elected from and by the PA and one would be selected from the PA by the Governor.\textsuperscript{313} As the PA was dominated directly and indirectly by the chiefs, representation in the new government would also mirror that reality, creating extreme displeasure in the colony.

Colony citizens recognised that this would lead to them being governed by the Protectorate majority, people they largely considered inferior. Two proposals were put forth by Creole representatives, the first requesting three additional Colony seats, which would then give a Creole-European coalition a majority, and the second that English literacy be a requirement of all Paramount Chiefs that stood for election to the Legislative Council.\textsuperscript{314} The first demand was accepted by the PA with the agreement that three additional seats would also be made available to PA representatives. However, the second was rejected with minimal discussion by the PA, who commented this should be left to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{312} IBID
\item \textsuperscript{313} IBID, 14
\item \textsuperscript{314} Kilson, 164
\end{itemize}
the voters to decide.\textsuperscript{315} Although rejected, this second demand was quite shrewd as it attempted to play on existing divides within the P.A. between progressive chiefs, educated elites and more conservative chiefs. However, rather than exacerbating existing divisions in the Protectorate, the severe opposition from the Colony, combined with pressure from the British government and the personal relationship between Dr. Milton Margai, a leading figure among the Protectorate elite, and influential chiefs assisted in uniting the PA. Critically this led to the formation of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) in 1951, a political party based on an alliance between the Protectorate new elite and the Paramount Chiefs.\textsuperscript{316} The constitutional changes that started in 1947 and the formation of the SLPP guaranteed the Chiefs an important role in not just local but also national politics and also gave structure to the Colony-Protectorate divide. It was under these conditions that Sierra Leone progressed toward independence.

The decade preceding independence involved a slow and steady transfer of power from the colonial government to African leadership, without the antagonism between colonial and local elites present in many decolonisation drives. African members of the Executive council were granted Ministerial positions with policy-making authority in 1953 and Sir Milton Margai was named chief Minister. Some Ministerial positions such as Finance, Justice and External Affairs remained under colonial control until the final few years prior to independence but ultimately were transferred.\textsuperscript{317} The peaceful transfer had a number of implications for the political development of Sierra Leone.

Rather than acting as a unifying element against the colonial powers, the SLPP largely acted as apologists for colonial policy, leading to the creation of additional

\textsuperscript{315} IBID, 166  
\textsuperscript{316} IBID, 161  
\textsuperscript{317} IBID, 173-175
alliances and political parties, rather than what Rostow described as a unified 'reactive nationalism'. Initial opposition came from the United Progressive People's Party (UPP) which consisted of an odd alliance of Creole leadership with broad Protectorate support largely due to displeasure with chiefly rule. As to be expected, due to the existing antagonism between the Colony and Protectorate, the alliance was short lived and the party split in 1959 due to an internal leadership struggle.\(^{318}\) The preceding year, a momentous split had occurred in the SLPP, as Sir Milton's younger brother Albert left the party to form the People's National Party (PNP).\(^{319}\) The PNP attracted broad based support, especially among the young intellectual elements of the country that were uncomfortable with the tight relationship between the SLPP and the Chiefs and their conservative policies.\(^{320}\) Included in the PNP leadership was Siakka Stevens, who would quickly establish himself on the national scene.

A condition of the British for independence was the convening of an all-party conference in London to establish the rules for independence and gain party consensus on these terms. Uniquely, rather than sending the various political factions to the conference, the Sierra Leone contingent consisted of a single body, the United National Front (UNF), which had arisen from the pre-independence conference in Freetown.\(^{321}\) However, this temporary alliance was not the result of prolonged debate and unity but rather a pragmatic decision to expedite the decolonisation process. It was at the all-party conference in London that Siakka Stevens rose to prominence with a grandstanding

\(^{318}\) Collier, 24
\(^{319}\) Interestingly this would not be the last time that a Margai would leave the SLPP due to a leadership squabble. Albert's son Charles left the SLPP in 2005 to form the People's Movement for Democratic Change after losing the leadership contest to Solomon Berewa.
\(^{320}\) Collier, 25
\(^{321}\) IBID, 29
protest against the conclusions of the Constitutional Conference. Upon his return to Sierra Leone, Stevens maintained his protests and after unsuccessfully challenging Albert Margai for leadership of the PNP formed the All People’s Congress (APC) in September 1960.\textsuperscript{322} Taken from the APC’s own historical account, the aim of the party was one of “cross-community and cross-tribal unification in contrast to the sectionalism of the SLPP; a posture of populism against the SLPP’s elitism...to liberate people from the burdens inflicted on them by chieftaincy and enable them to live comfortably without excessive interference.”\textsuperscript{323} The APC portrayed themselves as the everyman party in contrast to the elite, Mende-dominated SLPP. This message and the disillusionment with the process of decolonisation led to rapid support for the APC, mostly from Temne and northern tribes with Creole support.\textsuperscript{324} With the rise of the APC, Sierra Leone now had two main political parties each with regional and tribal support base.

At the eve of independence Sierra Leone was politically divided, under circumstances that would prove disastrous and continue to afflict the current democratisation process. The evolution of the chief under colonial rule eliminated recourse by their subjects and created an integrated patron-client relationship with the central government, initially with the colonial administration and subsequently with the SLPP. Core-periphery relations were strained and often openly hostile as the Creole elite struggled to prevent their privilege and ruling status from being overcome by the Protectorate. Finally, the creation of the APC allowed a formal political outlet for tribal rivalries against the Mende dominated SLPP.

\textsuperscript{322} IBID, 32
\textsuperscript{323} A.P.C. Secretariat. \textit{The Rising Sun: A History of the All People’s Congress Party of Sierra Leone.} (Freetown: A.P.C. Publications, 1982), 55
\textsuperscript{324} Collier, 32
Independence

On April 16, 1961, Sierra Leone gained its independence with Sir Milton Margai as its first Prime Minister. The potential for success seemed high as mineral wealth provided substantial revenue, financial assistance from international sources was available, transportation and social services continued to develop and manufacturing began to emerge.\textsuperscript{325} Although the transition from colonial rule had been without serious conflict between the colonial powers and the new African rulers, there were debilitating internal issues affecting the stability of the new government. The political chasms that existed at the eve of independence would come to the forefront and continue to evolve, ultimately leading the country into a catastrophic civil war, challenging the existence of the state.

SLPP Takes the Reigns: The Protectorate in Charge

In 1962, the first post-colonial elections were held with the SLPP winning, although the APC in alliance with a Kono based party managed to take twenty of the sixty-two parliamentary seats.\textsuperscript{326} Prime Minister Margai led a period of internal détente, appointing Creoles to important positions within the government and civil service and establishing policy “marked with compromise and unaggressive ineffectiveness.”\textsuperscript{327} This atmosphere changed dramatically beginning in 1964 with the death of Sir Milton and the ascendancy of his brother Albert to the position of Prime Minister. In contrast to Milton, Albert relied less on compromise and more on force and intrigue.\textsuperscript{328} This brought him into direct conflict with the Creole elite both within and outside the government and civil

\textsuperscript{325} Fyfe, \textit{A Short History of Sierra Leone}, 151
\textsuperscript{327} Collier, 62
\textsuperscript{328} Allen, 191
service, who accused his government of waste and corruption among other things. There was also internal dissention within the SLPP as many influential older members retained hard feelings from Albert’s defection from the SLPP, as they saw it as the root of the party’s current disorganisation. It was under this tense atmosphere that parliamentary elections were held on March 17, 1967, for ordinary members and March 21, 1967, for chief members. The bitter election featured violence and tribal tension in the rural areas and resulted in the APC, led by Siakka Stevens, being requested to form a government. Before Stevens could begin his rule, Brigadier David Lansana, the Force Commander and a tribesman of Margai declared martial law. Lansana was quickly deposed by three senior officers who formed the National Reformation Council. The Council banned political activities and ruled by coercion until a coup in April 1968 ended their reign and on April 16, 1968 installed Siakka Stevens as Prime Minister. The brief period of S.L.P.P. post-independence rule highlighted the fragility of democracy in Sierra Leone as unchecked by colonial control, regional and tribal animosity led to its breakdown.

**Siakka Stevens and the APC: State Withdrawal**

Few outside of the APC party would describe the roughly twenty-four years of APC rule as anything but a disaster. During this period Sierra Leone moved from a tenuous multi-party democracy to one party rule, with Siakka Stevens as President dominating the political scene. Fred Hayward summed up the standard description of the Stevens era,

On one hand, we have witnessed the centralisation of state power, the personalisation of authority, and the extension of state control into most sectors of society. This process has been paralleled by a steady growth in the size of the state, which has become the largest employer in the nation

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329 Collier, 117
330 Allen, 192
and which has become responsible for the country's economic health. On the other hand, we have observed an overall weakening of state institutions, the development of powerful autonomous political and economic spheres of influence, and the fragmentation of political structures that had guaranteed its hegemony and assured legitimacy in an earlier era. State decline has been intensified by the failure in government performance, escalating corruption and the incapacity of the state to generate sufficient revenue to meet its rapidly expanding budgetary requirements.331

Although the entirety of the Stevens' era is fascinating it is necessary to focus on the period's most salient political legacies. With that in mind, the creation and then strengthening of the role of president, the continuing cooption of the Chiefs by the central government and the essential abandonment of the periphery will be the focus.

Office of the President

Disillusionment within the APC and the armed forces led to a series of coup attempts culminating in March, 1971, and provided the catalyst for the consolidation of state power. In April, 1971, the constitution was changed, establishing Sierra Leone as a Republic with Siakka Stevens being elected by the Parliament as its first President.332 Also in response to these challenges Stevens enlisted military support from Guinea to protect the state apparatus, replacing them with his own personal security force, the Special Security Division (SSD) in 1973. The SSD was recruited from APC strongholds and often made use of APC 'thugs' to intimidate voters and rival politicians.333 Elections in 1973 were boycotted by the SLPP largely due to APC violence, resulting in eighty four of the eighty five seats going to APC candidates, the majority of which ran unopposed.334

The consolidation of the one-party state culminated in 1978 after a dubious national

332 Fyfe, A Short History of Sierra Leone, 155
333 David Keen. Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 17
referendum, in which an incredible 97.15% of the 2,215,646 voters voted yes to the required constitutional reforms. In ten years Stevens succeeded in formally ending multiparty politics in Sierra Leone and created the basis of a strong executive President with his own personal security apparatus.

Informally Stevens may have been even more effective in solidifying the Presidency as the foremost political institution in Sierra Leone. Stevens built the prototypical neopatrimonial governance machine with him at the centre of the network. At the national political level, Stevens used patronage appointments in the civil service and cabinet and parliamentary positions within government to reward allies. He created an elaborate and extensive patron-client network throughout the country by being directly accessible, without the need for Chiefs as intermediaries. Most interestingly, he controlled the economy through "state control of import licences, access to foreign currency, loan guarantees, and other state incentives, to reward those loyal to him." Increasingly, economic control was handled through a small Lebanese contingency, which minimised local ownership and provided for more intimate and manageable control and corruption by Stevens. William Reno provides an intriguing analysis of the relationship between illicit economy and state control in Sierra Leone, describing the process of the rise of informal economies and apparent formal state decline as the creation of a 'Shadow State'.

335 IBID
336 Keen, 19
337 Hayward, 168
338 IBID, 175
339 In his book Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone Reno argues that what appears to be state collapse or state failure is actually a reorganisation of state sovereignty. The formal state apparatus allows and somewhat regulates the informal economic sector allowing it to maintain both territorial and political control despite the outward appearance of near anarchy.
Through formal constitutional measures and informal neopatrimonial manipulation, Stevens created a strong executive office at the head of Sierra Leone’s government. This is a reality that remains a core issue in Sierra Leone’s democratisation process. Although Stevens was sure to expand his network to all reaches of society he was acutely aware of the importance of the Chiefs in any system of control.

**Cooption of the Chiefs**

Minimising the autonomy of the Chiefs was a priority for the APC government as they had been historically aligned with the SLPP. In an interview in early 1970, Stevens discussed his plans for altering the tenure and autonomy of the chiefs, stating, “Since we can’t have a government for more than five years, it is hard for some people to understand why we should have a chief for life...Now what we might do is have chiefs for four years...If he is satisfactory, if he is fine for the people then he can stay in. If he is not, then just like the national government he goes out. Now if we do that we will have a very different kind of chief.” Stevens ensured that chiefs would not remain in power without the support of the central government, using profit and power as levers of control and replacing uncooperative chiefs with APC appointees. Specifically, methods such as controlling diamond licences were used as they represented access to limited forms of local revenue.

Stevens recognised the chiefs were critical agents in maintaining control in the periphery and made concerted efforts to bring them into his patron-client networks. In doing so, he continued the colonial process of undermining the legitimacy and accountability of the chiefs to their subjects. The power of dismissal and appointment

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340 Hayward, 168
341 Keen, 20
was a powerful tool of control and was aided by presidential decision making regarding access to rent seeking opportunities in fields such as diamond mining.

**Abandonment of the Periphery**

The core-periphery nexus has been a central feature of the political development of Sierra Leone and was originally divided along Creole versus Protectorate lines. This began to change shape after independence as the Creole population lost its position of advantage in government and the economy and became a minority within the overall population of Sierra Leone. The formation of the APC split the former Protectorate along tribal lines, with the SLPP becoming ensconced as the Mende party and the APC representing the Temne and other northern tribes. Despite these changes, the core-periphery divide did not disappear but transformed under Stevens as the periphery was essentially abandoned by the central government, creating a deep chasm between Freetown and the rest of the country.

In 1972, the District Councils (DC) were abolished, leaving rural governance under the control of the chiefs, administered by the Minister of the Interior.\(^{342}\) The APC argued this was done to reduce Government expenditure as they had become a drain on the country’s resources.\(^{343}\) A more reasonable explanation is that the DCs represented an alternative venue for political expression and representation outside Stevens’ reaches. Reno suggests that it was done to squash the formation of programmes by grassroots APC organisers.\(^{344}\) Regardless of the exact motives, the move served to void the rural periphery of any form of political pluralism. Chiefs, already seen as illegitimate and

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\(^{342}\) Fyfe, *A Short History of Sierra Leone*, 156

\(^{343}\) A.P.C. Secretariat, 399

unaccountable, became the sole local representatives and political control shifted toward the centre. Combined with the one-party state implemented by the APC, space for political expression ceased to exist and the needs of the periphery became unheard in the capital.

The abandonment of the periphery manifested itself most acutely in economic stagnation and decline. Paul Richards notes that the “political economy of Sierra Leone is dominated by two contrasts – between the capital Freetown and the more isolated rural districts, and between the mining sector of the economy and the stagnant semi-subsistence agricultural sector.” Agricultural production was discouraged by state policies for a number of reasons. Prices were kept low to appease urban residents, high rates of tax were used to provide government revenue and state monopolies were used as part of the overall neopatrimonial system. Agriculture, the primary economic resource of the periphery, came to be a vital element of political control and elevated a small urban elite at the expense of the rural majority.

The Stevens era introduced profound changes to the political structures of Sierra Leone. The nascent multi-party democracy was reduced to a one-party state led by the President’s office and specifically Stevens. Chiefs became further ingrained in and controlled by central party politics and became the sole representative of rural political expression, effectively cutting the periphery from governance. Finally, the historical core-periphery divide was transformed as the rural hinterland was neglected by a central government more focused on maintaining its intricate neopatrimonial system of governance rather than developing a nation.

345 Paul Richards. Fighting For The Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone. (Oxford: James Currey, 2004), 49
346 Hayward, 175
‘Civil’ War: 1991 - 2002

On March 23, 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) entered the Kailahun District of Sierra Leone from Liberia. The rebel incursion started a devastating eleven year civil war that led to the near collapse of the formal state structure. A summary of the various factions and shifting alliances during the war is beyond the scope of this analysis. Instead the focus will be on how the political circumstances of the time were related to the conflict, the political aspect of the conflict and its combatants and the political landscape that emerged in the immediate post-conflict period. This focus is imperative as the civil war represents the most severe reaction to governmental neglect and should serve as a reminder of the potential challenges and risks associated with democratisation in Sierra Leone.

The International Crisis Group (ICG), an independent NGO that provides research and reports on conflict resolution, has written extensively on the conflict. Their analysis summarises the general sentiment in the literature, citing the following root causes: bad government, unaccountable military, ethnic politics and the exclusion and militarisation of youth. Slightly deviating from this dominant perspective, bad government will be taken as the primary root cause and the other aspects discussed within this context.

As noted by the ICG, “Independence was preceded by lengthy colonial rule which, although including a strain of authentic democratic tradition, was characterised by patronage and authoritarian government, especially in rural areas.” Under Stevens, governance was dominated by neopatrimonial rule, the abandonment of the periphery and

347 Richards, 4
348 ICG. Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy ICG Africa Report No 28. (Freetown/London/Brussels: ICG, 2001), 4-9
349 ICG, 4-5
the cooption and further delegitimising of the chiefs. These characteristics borrow heavily from the colonial period but became institutionalised under Stevens and created the necessary political and social climate for the rebellion. This climate led directly to the violence Richards describes as a reaction to "past corrupt patrimonial manipulation of educational and employment opportunities" and a "manifestation of a wider social movement of marginalised youth."  

Similar to Richards, Keen analysed the conflict as one with diverse causes and interests and concluded,

> The violence has not one but many meanings. The conflict in Sierra Leone has seen the acquisition of wealth by the impoverished, the assertion of power by the powerless, and a widespread eruption of anger on the part of diverse groups who have felt somehow humiliated, exploited, betrayed or simply forgotten. This study has stressed the erosion of the state and its already fragile systems of economic and physical protection. At root, it is neglect and systemic humiliation that have fed the abuses and humiliations of a brutal war. Where you see little stake in the system, you may be tempted to destroy it. Where others have abused their power over you, you may be tempted to abuse those over whom you yourself have power. Many – adults and especially children – were simply coerced into violence, though they often subsequently acquired a desire to use it.  

Governance patterns created during the colonial period and institutionalised under Stevens created the necessary social and political conditions for rebellion. Once underway, the war would be dominated by gruesome violence but certain political aspects existed under the apparent chaos.

The war period saw a number of regime changes as the various factions and alliances sought to gain political control of the state. With the exception of the SLPP under Ahmed Kabbah, which would form the first post conflict government, none had a lasting impact on the politics of Sierra Leone. Despite this, there are two core aspects of the conflict that merit further analysis: the political aspect of the RUF, and the 1996

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350 Richards, 174
351 Keen, 289-290
elections. Each of these were products of the political realities of the period and have affected current politics.

Keen has provided a thorough analysis of the RUF as a political movement, concluding that whatever limited political motivation may have existed was grossly overshadowed by the contradicting brutality and mayhem of their actions. The 1995 RUF document, *Footpaths to Democracy*, is their primary philosophical document and provides an erratic outline of their supposed political goals and grievances. Taken at face value, it is a manifesto based on empowering the citizens of Sierra Leone politically and economically and aimed directly at politicians who have used the state to enrich themselves at the expense of the general citizenry. Critics describe it not as an overall guiding theory but an ad hoc reaction to RUF experiences in the forest and guided by “survivalist tactics to win support from the very public it terrorised.” Regardless of the political motives of the RUF, what they had to say is still relevant. Whether as an actual manifesto of political grievances or an attempt at pandering, the themes of disenfranchisement and anger aimed at the central government were and continue to be salient characteristics of Sierra Leone politics.

The 1996 election is an important event as it was the first election to be held under the new Constitution of 1991 that returned Sierra Leone to multi-party politics. The victory of the SLPP, led by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, was significant in that it represented a rejection of the APC but it also highlighted the degree to which tribal affiliation had become associated with party politics. Due to security and pragmatic concerns, the

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352 Keen, 39
parliamentary election was based on proportional representation rather than single member plurality reducing the personalisation of the election and the previous levels of interparty violence.\textsuperscript{355} The campaigns were limited to the major urban centres and featured little issue or policy-based differentiations between parties, with each seeking to portray itself as the best suited to ending the rebellion and ushering in peace.\textsuperscript{356}

Results for both the Parliamentary and first round Presidential elections were congruent and highlighted the regional and by proxy tribalism of the voting patterns. The Mende south was dominated by the SLPP and Kabbah, receiving 88.15\% and 88.06\% of the votes in their respective elections. The Northern and Eastern regions initially showed splits among the voters due to multiple candidates with regional ties. The United National Peoples Party (UNPP) and People’s Democratic Party (PDP)\textsuperscript{357} garnered substantial support in the North with 53.16\% and 27.39\% of the parliamentary votes followed by the APC and SLPP with 10.36\% and 5.59\% respectively. Voting in the Eastern region was split between the SLPP and the Democratic Centre Party (DCP)\textsuperscript{358} with 52.17\% and 18.74\% of the parliamentary votes. The Western region was the most contested of the four with the SLPP, UNPP and PDP all gaining between 25\% and 30\% of the votes. The Presidential run-off, contested by the SLPP candidate Kabbah and the UNPP candidate Karefa-Smart, eliminated the diluting effects of the other parties and highlighted the extreme levels of division. Kabbah increased his hold on the Mende south and Kono-Mende east with 91.75\% and 89.58\% of the votes. Similarly the majority of the Northern

\textsuperscript{356} Ibid, 99
\textsuperscript{357} The PDP was led by Thaimu Bangura, a former Minister of Information in the APC government under Stevens.
\textsuperscript{358} The DCP was led by Abu Koroma, a former attorney- general in the 1960s, and represented the interests of Kono elites.
voters moved toward the UNPP, earning it 78.32% of the votes, while the West remained largely divided between the two parties, representative of the heterogeneous make-up of the region.\textsuperscript{359}

The 1996 election was the first multi-party election in Sierra Leone with any degree of legitimacy since 1967. Despite this long gap and the theoretically unifying force of the destructive rebellion, tribalisation at the party level was still a dominant force in the political equation. The SLPP returned to dominance in the South and East, while the UNPP, more of an anti-SLPP force due to the discredited APC, carried the day in the largely Temne North.

Despite the optimism brought on by the elections and the subsequent Abidjan Peace Accord, Kabbah and his government faced a daunting task as they inherited a country still plagued by war and with little money to begin any sort of rebuilding programme. The optimism was brought to a stunning end on 25 May, 1997 when a RUF and military alliance overthrew the government in a bizarre coup, with Kabbah fleeing to Guinea.\textsuperscript{360} The ruling junta, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), was led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who argued that regional and tribal factionalism under Kabbah had necessitated the action. He also claimed the government policy of utilising the \textit{kamajors}\textsuperscript{361} as soldiers in the war had grown to be a direct threat to the vitality of the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{359}] Results for the elections were taken from the article by Kandeh and checked against the values listed on the Sierra Leone government website, \url{www.sierra-leone.org/govt8.html}. The results on the government website confirm the total values but were not listed by region. Calculations based on the absolute votes were conducted by the author.
\item[\textsuperscript{360}] Keen, 193
\item[\textsuperscript{361}] The \textit{kamajors} are the Mende civil defense forces (CDF). Koroma is correct in his analysis that the government was using them rather than the military to combat the RUF. The CDF were working with Executive Outcomes during their time in Sierra Leone and were being funded by the government. Funding appears to have increased once Kabbah, a Mende, took office. The army was largely seen as corrupt and there were widespread reports of SOBELS (soldiers by day rebels by night) collaborating with RUF forces in the critical diamond rich areas.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
military.\textsuperscript{362} The AFRC regime would be short-lived as Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops engaged in a series of bloody battles with junta forces and restored Kabbah to power in March 1998.\textsuperscript{363} The subsequent lull would not last long as the RUF mounted their largest assault on the capital, ‘Operation No Living Thing’, in January 1999. This brutal campaign resulted in thousands of deaths, with all sides committing atrocities and perhaps due to its brutality led to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement later that year.\textsuperscript{364}

Lome did for the RUF what eight years of war had failed to do, giving them a place in government and direct control of the diamond areas as the RUF leader Foday Sankoh was made head of a new mineral resources commission and given the title of Vice President.\textsuperscript{365} The agreement also gave a blanket pardon to all members of the RUF, AFRC, Sierra Leone Army and civil defense forces (CDF) for their actions since March 1991.\textsuperscript{366} A disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration campaign was outlined in the document, with the government requesting the existing UN mission to be the lead organisation and calling for a phase out of ECOMOG forces.\textsuperscript{367} However, for a variety of reasons the Lome agreement quickly unravelled, culminating in the capture of roughly 500 UN troops by a faction of the RUF in May 2000.\textsuperscript{368} This event seemed to be the final straw for the international community as the British intervened directly by the end of May and the UN mission was expanded to over 20 000 troops over the course of the next

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{362} Keen, 200
\item \textsuperscript{363} IBID, 215-220
\item \textsuperscript{364} The documentary \textit{Cry Freetown} was filmed in Freetown during this campaign and graphically shows the brutality of the battles.
\item \textsuperscript{365} \textit{Lome Peace Agreement Act 1999}. (1999) Available at www.sierra-leone.org/laws.html
\item \textsuperscript{366} IBID
\item \textsuperscript{367} IBID
\item \textsuperscript{368} Keen, 253
\end{itemize}
two years.\textsuperscript{369} This massive response finally brought an end to this confusing and devastating civil war and started the slow building process that is still in its nascent phases.

**Reconstruction: 2002 Elections to 2007 Elections**

The final historical section will provide a quick recap of the post war period, including the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections. This period has seen slow yet steady economic progress and an historic electoral change of government as the APC party returned to prominence. The current democratic status and the most important challenges to democratisation in Sierra Leone will be discussed. This discussion will return to the original three recurring themes in Sierra Leone’s political history and will also focus on the policies and programmes of DFID during this period.

On January 18, 2002, President Kabbah officially declared Sierra Leone’s war over. Four months later, on May 10 and 14 Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held reaffirming Kabbah and the SLPP government. A district block system was introduced to replace the previous proportional representative system which divided the country into fourteen electoral districts, each sending eight representatives to Parliament.\textsuperscript{370} The elections were notable for two primary reasons, ethnic division despite the size of the Kabbah victory and the re-emergence of the APC as an important player in national politics. Although eleven parties registered for the elections, it was a two party race between the SLPP, led by Kabbah, and the APC under the leadership of Earnest Bai Koroma. Kabbah won the Presidential race in a decisive first ballot victory, gaining 69.77% of the total vote. His tally in the West, East and South was comparable to the

\textsuperscript{369} IBID, 264-266

1996 run-off with marginal (1-4%) gains made in each of the three areas. Surprisingly, Kabbah was able to make slight inroads into the North increasing his share from 21.68% to 31.9%, largely attributed to an agricultural micro-credit scheme that was extended to thousands of farmers and business people in the area.\textsuperscript{371} The APC emerged as the main rival to the SLPP in the West and returned to majority in the North with 33.54% and 52.95% of the Presidential votes in these areas.\textsuperscript{372} Post-conflict elections occurred across the country, reaffirming the SLPP as the governing party. These elections were seen as a reward for the SLPP in ending the civil war and starting the process of reconstruction and national reconciliation.

\textbf{The British are Coming}

The reconstruction effort in Sierra Leone has been supported by the donor community with the United Kingdom being the largest bilateral donor and a significant policy advisor. The 2004 Department for International Development (DFID) document, \textit{Poverty Reduction Framework Arrangement Between the United Kingdom and Sierra Leone} outlined a ten-year development partnership for the period 2002-2012. The document lists six core areas: resolving conflict, improving standards of governance and combating corruption, reforming the security sector, reducing poverty, ensuring macro-economic stability, and developing human resources.\textsuperscript{373} This is a broad list, however the document prioritises improving governance and provides more focused programme objectives and measures. Six areas are highlighted as part of the DFID governance

\textsuperscript{371} IBID, 201
\textsuperscript{372} All values are calculations by the author based on data available through the Sierra Leone government website, \url{www.sierra-leone.org/electioncoverage.html}. Slight discrepancies exist between results depending on the source, although all are within 1% of each other, an acceptable deviation given the limited utilisation of the data.
\textsuperscript{373} DFID. \textit{Poverty Reduction Framework Arrangement Between the United Kingdom and Sierra Leone}. (DFID, 2004), 4-6
strategy: anti-corruption strategy, strengthening financial management systems, civil service reform, elected local government re-established, diamond industry strengthened, and free and independent media introduced. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper released in 2005 placed promoting good governance as the most critical pillar in the strategy and echoed many of the priorities listed in the DFID agreement, such as decentralisation and anti-corruption. Good governance was given a high priority in the donor community, seen as a vital requirement for Sierra Leone economic development. Much of the programme focus has been on rehabilitating and improving the capacity of government institutions and has indirectly attempted to address some of the recurring issues in Sierra Leone’s political development.

Restoring the Paramount Chiefs to office was an early priority of the Kabbah regime, allegedly because it would provide an indicator to refugees and internally displaced persons that security had improved enough to return to their homes. In a speech to Parliament in 2000, Kabbah emphasised decentralisation through elected district councils, the restoration of Paramount Chiefs, and elections for vacant chieftaincies as key policies in the government’s aim to “enhance grass-roots participatory governance.” DFID supported the government’s efforts through the Paramount Chief Restoration Programme, although this appears to have been a pragmatic decision based on a lack of clear alternatives rather than a desired policy approach. Chiefdom

374 IBID, 9-10
376 Brian Thompson. Sierra Leone: Reform or Relapse? Conflict and Governance Reform. (London: Chatham House, 2007), 21
elections proceeded in 2002 and 2003 with sixty-three vacant chieftaincies being filled. Kabbah followed this series of elections with a brief tour speaking about the vital role of the chief in governing the rural hinterland. In his speech, repeated at Bo, Makeni and Port Loko, major urban centres outside Freetown, he rather nostalgically emphasised the traditional role of the chief as defender of the people and vowed “to restore the past, and where necessary modernise the governance structure of the chieftaincy to make it more effective, relevant and democratic.” Fanthorpe has conducted considerable research regarding post-war chieftaincy politics and indicates that many of the same pre-war complaints such as outside control, exploitation of the people and limited legitimacy still exist. These are critical issues for the government and donors to address as a lack of local government capacity and grievances against the chiefs were important reasons for the conflict and the recruitment of combatants. Reforming or replacing the institution of the Paramount Chief remains an important challenge for continued democratisation.

A major move in the governance reform goals of the donor community and the Sierra Leone government was the release of the Local Government Act of 2004 in March of that year and subsequent local government elections in May. The Act established the boundaries for the councils, consistency of the District Councils and provided for a significant devolution of responsibilities. Of the nineteen local councils that were established, thirteen were at the district level, five at the town level and the one remaining in Freetown at the city level. Chiefs were given a presence in the councils ranging from a

379 Chiefdom elections are not conducted through universal suffrage with voting limited to Chiefdom councilors. A review of the results indicated that most elections were limited to one or two family names, indicating that ruling families still dominate the institution of the chief. Clearly there is little democracy within the selection process.
381 Fanthorpe, 40-45.
minimum of zero in Freetown, Western Rural and Bonthe Town to three in five of the other councils. As the minimum size of each council is twelve, this provision, combined with the ineligibility of chiefs to run for elected positions, can be interpreted as a direct attempt to limit the influence of chiefs at the local level. Overall reviews of the decentralisation process are mixed, with some small-scale service delivery and local taxation occurring, despite overall funding and capacity issues. An interesting observation made by the Campaign For Good Governance, a Sierra Leone NGO, was that many of the councillors did not reside in their wards and rarely attended meetings, limiting their ability to act as effective representatives for their constituents. Building capable and legitimate local institutions without allowing them to be plagued by local neopatrimonial characteristics is vital to the overall democratisation process. Beyond the many logistical challenges, finding the appropriate balance between the chiefs and the local councils will be pivotal in their ultimate success.

Corruption is a primary characteristic of neopatrimonial governance and a definite hindrance to effective governance in Sierra Leone. Data from Transparency International (TI) and the World Bank (WB) show that the perception of corruption has actually increased in the post-war period. TI’s *Corruption Perception Index* is a ten point scale and measures perceptions of public sector corruption. Comparing data from 2002 – 2007 Sierra Leone has actually moved slightly backwards from a 2.2 in 2002, to a high of 2.4 in 2005 to 2.1 in 2007, with a score below three indicating the perception that corruption

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382 Government of Sierra Leone. *Local Government Act, 2004.* (Freetown, 2004), 5-6, 61-62
is rampant. The WB's *Worldwide Governance Indicators* project measures government performance utilising six indices, including control of corruption, defined as "measuring the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests." As in the TI index, Sierra Leone has backslid on this scale, dropping into the bottom 10% globally and seeing its standard deviation from the mean drop from -0.78 in 2002 to -1.22 in 2007. Both these scales are based on perceptions and imperfect, however recognising the depth of the issue DFID and the donor community at large have been active in attempting to reduce corruption.

The Anti-Corruption Act was passed in 2000 and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was established. The Commission was granted a broad mandate and substantial powers including those of search, seizure and arrest, although prosecution was to be handled by the Minister of Justice and the Attorney-General. DFID listed anti-corruption first in its programme lines for improving governance and dedicated funding for the ACC, two judges and a prosecutor for anti-corruption trials in the 2004 Framework Agreement with Sierra Leone, continuing previous funding. Perhaps foreshadowing the limited space the ACC would be given to carry out this broad mandate, both the commissioner and deputy commissioner are Presidential appointees. The *National Integrity Systems TI Country Study Report Sierra Leone 2004* indicated that corruption was rampant throughout the public and private sector, with bribery, political

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386 Ibid, 93
388 DFID, 8
clientalism and embezzlement almost being elevated to standard operating procedures, with the ACC being described as under-funded, understaffed and hampered by political interference and internal corruption.\textsuperscript{390} A scathing report from DFID in 2007 evaluated the operation and results of the ACC against a series of previous recommendations. Of these, none had been met and most had not seen any progress made toward achieving the measures with the blame being squarely placed on the Commissioner. The report ultimately recommended ending funding for the ACC and shifting its anti-corruption work into existing programmes aimed at judicial and security reform, financial management and decentralisation.\textsuperscript{391} Neopatrimonial governance remains a constant characteristic of the governance structure of Sierra Leone. Despite donor efforts and government rhetoric the issue appears to be endemic throughout both the public and private sectors, creating a significant challenge to democratic consolidation.

\textbf{2007 Elections}

The 2007 elections were notable for being the first post-conflict elections since the United Nations security mission ended and for seeing an electoral change of power as the APC returned to national prominence. Civil society played a prominent role in the election process, through mass peace campaigns in the run-up to the election and a national observer presence on voting days.

The District Block system, pragmatically used in the 2002 Parliamentary election, was replaced by a constituency-based system with the APC taking fifty-nine seats, the


\textsuperscript{391} DFID. \textit{Annual Review of DFID Support to Anti-Corruption Commission: Phase II in Sierra Leone.} (DFID, 2007)
The Presidential race was primarily contested between three men: Ernest Bai Koroma of the APC, former Vice President Solomon Berewa of the SLPP, and Charles Margai of the PMDC, although seven candidates received votes. Margai’s PMDC was a breakaway faction of the SLPP, formed after he lost the party leadership contest in 2005 to Berewa. As expected, this led to a split in the SLPP stronghold region of the Mende south, with Margai receiving 41.26% of the vote in that region. What was unexpected to many was Margai’s endorsement of Koroma in the subsequent run-off election. This endorsement had two important effects. Many voters did follow their leader, with the APC increasing its results in the South from 3.09% in 2002 to 28.03% in 2007. Equally as important, voters in the south stayed away from the polls as turnout dropped from 557353 in the 2002 Presidential election, to 377722 in the 2007 Presidential first round and 308149 in the run-off. These were major contributing factors in the eventual APC Presidential victory and could have interesting implications for future political campaigns.

The 2007 elections were notable as they resulted in a democratic, election-based change of power with civil society playing a prominent role in the process. However, the same regional and tribal voting patterns re-emerged as the unity of the immediate post-war period moved into the past. The movement by Margai to support the APC was seen...
as a potential bridge across the tribal divide but it will be interesting to see if there is any real movement toward unity once the government begins its work in earnest.

This chapter has attempted to illustrate that the major challenges affecting the consolidation of democracy in Sierra Leone have their roots in the pre-colonial phase of Sierra Leone’s political development. Three core issues have emerged that have challenged the political development of Sierra Leone since its earliest formal conceptions and continue to this day: national versus local power relations, tribal disputes, and elite control and patrimonial governance. These issues were most severely manifested in the brutal eleven year civil war that is so often associated with Sierra Leone. Post-conflict donor and government programmes have attempted to address these historical challenges, but the weakness of the local councils, the ethnic and regional split seen in the latest national elections and the continuing neopatrimonial governance patterns and rampant corruption clearly indicate that they still pose a significant threat to the consolidation of a stable, liberal democracy. The final chapter will focus on the specific case study of the environmental movement within Sierra Leone and evaluate the effectiveness of civil society in contributing to the democratisation process and its ability to support donor policies aimed at tackling the issues retarding its progress.
Chapter VII: Case Study - Environmental Movement

Evaluating the efficacy of civil society in promoting democracy is complicated as it is impossible to isolate the effect of civil society from the overall process. This chapter will be based on a case study of organisations within the ENFORAC, a consortium of environmental NGOs in Sierra Leone, with additional focus on the EFA. In contrast to the majority of studies that have focused on advocacy organisations, none of these groups are primarily organised for that purpose, although many do conduct advocacy campaigns in their programmes. Typical studies have utilised the extent of policy influence as the primary dependent variable and analysed the impact of a variety of organisational characteristics on this measure. This type of analysis will be part of the evaluation criteria but an expanded set of measures will be used based on White’s four possible roles for civil society and related to donor policies regarding democratic governance and the historical issues hindering its consolidation in Sierra Leone.

The simplest test of the efficacy of civil society in the democratisation process is to compare the macro level measures regarding the breadth of civil society and the level of democracy in Sierra Leone. The Ministry of Development and Economic Planning (MODEP) is the governmental organisation responsible for coordinating and monitoring NGO activity. As part of the NGO Policy Regulation of 2004 all NGOs operating in Sierra Leone are mandated to register with MODEP and with the Sierra Leone Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (SLANGO), an umbrella organisation created by the government. The regulation offers a standard civil society style definition of NGO as “any independent, non-profit making, non-political and charitable

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organisation, with the primary objective of enhancing the social, cultural and economic well-being of communities. In addition, the operations of an NGO shall not have a religious, political or ethnic bias.\textsuperscript{399} Notably, the regulation makes a clear demarcation between NGOs and community-based organisations (CBO) which are not eligible for registration with MODEP.\textsuperscript{400} This distinction eliminates a large portion of the actual civil society organisations in Sierra Leone, however the registry is still the best indicator of civil society's breadth. According to available information, the number of registered NGOs in Sierra Leone has risen from 47 in 2000 to 189 in 2005, an over 300% increase.\textsuperscript{401} This increase is disproportionate to the increase in ODA, which rose from US$ 246 million in 2000 to US$344 million in 2005, a 39.8% increase.\textsuperscript{402} In the post-war period, the number of NGOs operating in Sierra Leone has risen dramatically and the disproportionate rise compared to ODA indicates they have become a more significant sector within the development community.

There are numerous indices available that are used to measure democracy at the national level, with Freedom House rankings being the most commonly referenced. The Freedom House ranking is split into two categories, political rights and civil liberties. The political rights score is based on questions that measure the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government with electoral freedom consisting of freedom of expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.\textsuperscript{403} Sierra Leone scored a three

\textsuperscript{399} IBID, 2
\textsuperscript{400} IBID
\textsuperscript{401} David Tam-Baryoh. \textit{African Media Development Initiative: Sierra Leone Research Findings and Conclusions}. (London: BBC World Service Trust, 2006), 29
\textsuperscript{402} Dataset: DAC1 Official and Private Flows
in political rights and a five in civil liberties in 1999, and a four in political rights and a three in civil liberties for 2006, values that categorise it as partially free. According to this data, Sierra Leone has made progress in civil liberties but has regressed in political rights, with its measure of the functioning of government being the primary driver with a score of four on the twelve point scale. A 2006 Freedom House Report, entitled *Countries at the Crossroads*, provided more in-depth analysis of the situation, suggesting that general government corruption and weak institutional capacity was at the root, recommending a focus on local government as the remedy although recognising the difficult political negotiations that would be required with the chiefs for this to be effective.

However, this data is inconclusive as a judgement of civil society’s efficacy in the democratising process. Some minor improvement has been made in civil liberties which may reflect the donor work with the various media outlets or may merely be a reflection of a country transitioning from civil war. However, the overall government performance has degraded and corruption still appears rampant, indicating that progress toward good governance has stalled. The recommendations of increased localisation match the donor decentralisation policies but the chiefs are cited as a challenge to this process. This shows a remarkable consistency with the historical review as the chiefs once again appear as the primary institution challenging governance reform.

The remainder of the analysis will be centred on the ENFORAC and EFA case study and evaluated based on White’s four possible roles for civil society in

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404 Ibid
democratisation. Additional macro level data is drawn from The World Alliance for Civic Participation (CIVICUS)\textsuperscript{406} report that conducted a thorough evaluation of the state of civil society within Sierra Leone.

\textbf{Civil Society as a Balancing Agent}

In theoretical terms, this concept is tied to the idea of a strong and vibrant civil society as a counterweight to the state. It is not defined by any specific actions but merely its presence as an overarching institution able to ensure that the state apparatus is controlled or at least checked by society. Donor policy has focused on two sets of ideas: ensuring that there is space for civil society to operate and building the capacity of civil society to allow for it to serve this purpose. To evaluate these efforts, the following criteria will be evaluated: the overall vitality of civil society, and the overall impact on policy.

\textbf{Vitality of civil society}

Capacity building is an often heard buzzword in development circles and is frequently the primary goal of donor engagement. The overall strength of civil society is more than just the number of organisations but also their internal capacity and available resources, both of which relate directly to their ability to conduct effective programme activities.

The CIVICUS report provides a more in-depth picture of the actual magnitude of civil society than the registration data. According to the publication, 73\% of individual

\textsuperscript{406} CIVICUS is an international alliance of civil society members that works to strengthen citizen action and civil society throughout the world. Civil Society Index (CSI) is a participatory needs assessment and action planning tool for civil society with the two primary goals of the CSI are: to enhance the strength and sustainability of civil society, and to strengthen civil society's contribution to positive social change. The Sierra Leone report was compiled by the Campaign for Good Governance in collaboration with Christian Aid-Sierra Leone.
respondents were members of at least one civil society organisation, with 48% being members of two or more. Cooperatives and farmer/fisherman associations, with 24% and 16% respectively, were the most common types of organisations. On the opposite end of the spectrum only 2% listed NGOs and 1% environmental groups as the type of organisation that they were members.\(^{407}\) This data indicates that civil society activity is widespread in Sierra Leone but that formal NGOs or the environmental movement are not an important feature of overall national membership. This aligns with typical criticism that donor funded organisations only represent a small sub-section of the overall civil society community.

The amount and type of funding is critical to the ability of civil society to conduct programmes and direct their agendas. The CIVICUS data indicates 77% of stakeholders felt that funding for civil society was inadequate.\(^{408}\) ENFORAC relies on membership dues for its daily operations, with project funding coming from the international donor community. Collecting dues from members had been problematic, with many organisations either behind or having never paid their dues.\(^{409}\) As a result, total available funding was US$1,468\(^{410}\) according to a recent interim income statement and the limited and sporadic dues-based revenue stream is not sufficient for active programming. International donor support has been available from sources such as the IUCN, UNDP and the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), however it is earmarked for specific projects without direct budget support and limited administrative allowances. The most recently awarded project funding from the UNDP will disperse US$320,000 over a one

\(^{407}\) Campaign for Good Governance. *CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for the Republic of Sierra Leone.* (Available at www.civicus.org/new/CSI_SierraLeone.htm), 27-30
\(^{408}\) CGG, 37
\(^{409}\) Participant Observation, ENFORAC meeting, 20JL07
\(^{410}\) All values are converted from Leones at 3000 Leones per 1 US$
year period and be split among the eleven participating organisations. ENFORACs' ability to act as an effective umbrella organisation is hindered by a lack of accessible funding. Donors frequently mention the need for collective action to create a more effective balancing voice but their programme-specific funding limits the ability for this function to develop.

EFA's funding follows the same pattern as ENFORAC's, with the vast majority of funds coming from three international donors, Irish Aid, IUCN and UNHCR and being allotted for specific project purposes. Financial data from 2006 shows a total income for the Sierra Leone office of US$479,285 with US$467,219 or 97.5% of this coming through donor grants. Typical budget lines include a 5% value for administration and a 3% value for unforeseen costs, however the bulk of this funding must be allocated and accounted for through direct project purchases. Logistical support has also been provided, such as vehicles and fuel from the UNHCR but these are intended solely for project implementation and fuel is monitored through a monthly voucher system. This type of funding ends when the project is completed without leaving any long-term resources. Additional resources such as generators and fuel for electricity, computers and the internet are more problematic unless they can be specifically justified as a project imperative. Without a substantial source of private funding EFA is limited to primarily project related work which requires the direct approval of international donors and stringent reporting procedures.

411 Participant Observation, Staff meeting, EFA, 10AU07
413 Participant Observation, 09JL07
414 Participant Observation, 22JL07
The utilisation of project based funding by donors is largely a pragmatic response to minimise waste and corruption, however this funding model does little to facilitate the growth of a true opposition voice from civil society. Project implementation becomes necessary for groups to survive and dominates organisations’ limited resources and staff. Maintaining umbrella organisations, deemed critical as a collective voice by donors, is problematic as project implementation must balance the needs, wants and capabilities of its member organisations. The ability of groups to form their own ideological stance is also tempered as projects, even if they are advocacy based, must meet donor’s priorities to receive funding. Although civil society is widespread in Sierra Leone and funding is available to the various environmental groups, current methods of disbursement greatly hinder its ability to act as an active and vital balancing agent to the state.

Policy Impact

It is critical to note that the evaluation of policy impact is strictly a magnitude and ignores the democratic nature of this impact. Although the process is important for the representative aspect of democratisation, that will be addressed in a later evaluation criteria. This is not just a pragmatic separation but is indicative of previous academic evaluations and consistent with donor policies.

The two primary legacy environmental policies are the National Environmental Policy (NEP) of 1994 and the National Environment Protection Act (NEPA) of 2000. The NEP was created during the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) period and states its overarching goal “is to achieve sustainable development in Sierra Leone through

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415 NaCEF Website. [www.nacef-sl.org](http://www.nacef-sl.org) (Viewed January 5, 2008)
sound environmental management. This echoed the sustainable development models favoured by donors such as the UN and later DFID which established sustainable development as a core value in its programming during the 1990s. The NEP also established a number of sectors each with their own general policies, many of which would establish their own legislation as the policy framework matured. Public participation and gender issues were also included and justified as necessary in the relationship between development and the environment. The NEPA built upon the NEP, creating an administration with a National Environmental Protection Board and a Department of the Environment which would be established within an existing Ministry. It also created a formal environmental impact assessment system and licensing procedure. The responsibility for environmental issues would ultimately reside in the Ministry of Lands, Country Planning and the Environment although forestry-related issues fell under the administration of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security.

To rectify the conflicting agendas that often occurred between the two organisations and create a single entity for environmental issues, the National Commission on the Environment and Forestry (NaCEF) was created on 20 July 2005. It became responsible for project implementation, monitoring and priority setting with respect to the environment and forestry and reports directly to the President’s office. The Commission is split into two divisions, forestry and the environment each with distinct

417 National Environmental Policy
419 With the change in government from the SLPP to the APC in September 2007 NaCEF’s role is being severely challenged. As of the time of publication it was unclear whether NaCEF would survive and who would become the lead organisation for environmental issues.
responsibilities. Both were Departments in Ministries prior to this amalgamation and reconciling their administrative structures was noted as a challenge.\(^{420}\)

ENFORAC and more specifically EFA and the Conservation Society of Sierra Leone (CSSL), are working partners with NaCEF, with frequent consultation between the government and civil society representatives.\(^{421}\) At the policy level, ENFORAC was consulted on the creation of the Strategic Action Plan, suggesting significant administrative changes and attempting to strengthen the overall document. The most important recommendations involved the elimination of separate forestry and environmental divisions, a more inclusive and defined role for civil society and a shift towards a more conservation based approach to resource management.\(^{422}\) Comparing the draft and published versions of the document, the majority of recommendations were not included and critically civil society is not mentioned in the document other than in a tree planting capacity.\(^{423}\) The document establishes a neo-liberal model of sustainable development that views nature as a resource for economic growth in contrast to the conservation approach favoured by many in the international and domestic environmental movement.

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is the lead document for Sierra Leone’s development policy and it is important to evaluate the level of priority given to the environment and civil society’s contribution. PRSPs are by definition avenues for civil society input as they “are prepared by governments through a participatory process

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\(^{421}\) Both EFA and CSSL are listed as partners on the NaCEF website. ([www.nacef-sl.org](http://www.nacef-sl.org)) From the author’s experience there is frequent contact between NaCEF and EFA and a close working relationship.


\(^{423}\) NaCEF. *Strategic Action Plan*
involving civil society and development partners, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Interim PRSP released in June 2001 was a reconstruction plan divided into Transitional and Medium term phases. Given the extent of the damage from the civil war, issues such as security, the provision of basic services and re-launching the economy were prioritised. Environmental concerns were limited to the impacts of the mining industry and not addressed even as part of the economic recovery strategy. A World Bank report from 2004 evaluated a cross section of PRSPs for environmental mainstreaming, using four main headings: diagnosis of environmental issues, analysis of poverty-environment links, environmentally relevant actions, and the extent to which participation and consultation processes have allowed environmental concerns to be heard. Of the 53 full and interim PRSPs reviewed, Sierra Leone finished 49th with a score of 0.6 out of 3.0, with zero representing no mention and one indicating mentioned but not elaborated. Overall, the Interim PRSP lacked environmental concerns and was created without meaningful engagement with civil society. This lack of inclusion and consultation can be largely attributed to the reconstruction focus and the 2005 full PRSP is a more accurate judgement of policy impact.

The 2005 PRSP involved extensive consultation with civil society and the general population during its creation. Methods such as focus group discussions and participatory poverty assessments were utilised to gain a grassroots perspective and "collect

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426 IBID
428 IBID, 15-16
information on poverty by asking the poor themselves about their experiences of poverty.429 Civil society representatives were part of this process but not the focal point, as it was intended to be a representative process. Another participatory technique utilised was civic engagement which was designed to promote learning about the PRSP process and gather feedback. This programme was conducted by civil society agents and targeted many local civil society actors for training.430

The environment was one of five sector reviews conducted in support of the PRSP. This review was a sprawling document that attempted to portray the environment as a cross-cutting issue, linking it to all aspects of development. Despite the lack of coherence, the document listed five significant issues: weak institutional framework and lack of logistical support, land degradation and deforestation, urban degeneration due to poor housing facilities, poor coverage of water and sanitation as well as waste management for the poor, loss of biodiversity, and pollution.431 Civil society engagement is not indicated, however three ENFORAC members are highlighted in the document and CSSL reported being active consultants during the PRSP process.432 However, despite the participatory process and status given to the environment through the sector review, environmental issues remained largely outside of the final PRSP document. Mention was given to the specific targets within the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), however they were merely mentioned in a section displaying the links between the PRSP and the MDGs with little concrete policy to support this claim.433 The small section dedicated to

430 Ibid, 15
431 Poverty and Environment Environmental Contribution to the PRSP of Sierra Leone. Available at http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/4_strat/4_lprsp.htm (Viewed January 7, 2008)
432 Organisation Questionnaire, Appendix A
433 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper., 77
the environment gave a cursory acknowledgement of the sector review stating some of the core issues from the report but did not offer any sort of strategy or funding to address these issues.\textsuperscript{434} Although improved from the Interim PRSP, the environment was not mainstreamed in the full PRSP process.

The ability of civil society to act as a balancing agent to the state regarding environmental issues is weak. Although numerous NGOs exist, the organisations within the movement are reliant on project funding for their survival and have limited additional resources to effectively organise and conduct campaigns. Larger groups within the sector such as EFA and CSSL have close government ties and independently or through ENFORAC have become part of the consultative process. However, this has not translated into policy as NaCEF has followed its own vision and the environment has remained outside of major development policy. This situation will be further complicated if environmental management reverts to its previously divided structure.

Increasing State Accountability

This concept is a specific function of a strong civil society and is a straightforward criteria to evaluate. Seen in theory as largely the domain of human rights, lawyers and media organisations, environmental groups do have a role in providing sector specific expertise. To evaluate this concept, both the overall efforts of civil society and the sector specific work are important as they serve complimentary purposes.

Returning to the CIVICUS report, both the opportunity and the success of civil society in challenging the state are assessed. The data indicates that civil society actors feel that there is little interference from government, with 41.4\% of Regional Stakeholder

\textsuperscript{434} IBID, 105
Consultations (RSC) respondents claiming that the state rarely intervenes in their activities, compared to 16.1% citing frequent government intervention.\textsuperscript{435} Focussing on advocacy campaigns or actions that criticise the government, 89.3% of respondents stated that the government imposes either minimal, defined restrictions or no restrictions at all on their activities.\textsuperscript{436} Civil society is less enthusiastic about the efficacy of its monitoring activities despite the apparent opportunity. Only 48.3% of respondents answered that civil society has been active in this area and 91.8% of respondents answered these efforts have been minimal or unsuccessful in holding the government accountable.\textsuperscript{437} This data indicates the space exists for civil society to investigate and challenge the state regarding its activities, however this has not translated into success. This could be a manifestation of issues related to the project funding model of donors, but is also a reflection of the brazen nature of the state as illustrated by its actions that rendered the ACC ineffectual.

Accountability in the environmental sector is critical to Sierra Leone’s development and is reliant on strong government policy and action. The role of conflict diamonds in funding the civil war is well established and highlights the potential repercussions of illicit trade in the mineral sector. At the policy level Sierra Leone is a member of the Kimberley Process, an initiative aimed at stemming the flow of illicit diamonds and has national regulations such as the Core Minerals Act and the Sierra Rutile Agreement that establish industry standards aimed at increasing transparency and minimising environmental degradation.\textsuperscript{438}

\textsuperscript{435} CGG, 54
\textsuperscript{436} IBID, 52
\textsuperscript{437} IBID, 73
\textsuperscript{438} See www.sierra-leone.org/laws for links to many of the critical laws and regulations passed by the government.
ENFORAC has hosted a national conference on sustainable environmental management and a regional conference on biodiversity with government involvement. However, these activities were intended as sensitisation events and the group has been inactive in direct government or industry monitoring campaigns.\footnote{Munro, 30-31} Some campaigning has been done regarding the Aberdeen Creek Estuary, a wetland area located near Freetown, but without sustained efforts.\footnote{Munro, 31} ENFORAC has recently begun a State of The Environment multimedia project that aims to dramatically raise awareness of domestic environmental issues. Although in the early phases it is planned as a sustained initiative and has the potential to increase the visibility of environmental issues and affect state policy.\footnote{Participant Observation, 13MY08}

EFA has through partnerships started monitoring campaigns at the Sierra Rutile location and in the diamond industry. The Sierra Rutile Act outlines the overall interaction of the company and the government regarding their mining operations and has specific clauses related to the environment, such as controls on noxious and poisonous discharge, limits on tree cutting and a commitment to contribute to an agriculture development fund.\footnote{Government of Sierra Leone. \textit{Sierra Rutile Agreement Act}, 2002. (Freetown: Government of Sierra Leone, 2002)} A specific section is dedicated to the rehabilitation and reclamation of mined out lands, mandating the company to submit a "detailed programme for the progressive reclamation and rehabilitation of lands disturbed by mining and for the minimisation of the effects of such mining on adjoining land/water areas."\footnote{IBID, 32} Monitoring the environmental aspects of the agreement is being done through a project entitled \textit{Novel}
and Practical Conservation Strategies Following Rutile Mining in Sierra Leone. This project is funded by the Darwin Initiative and led by the UK based Centre for Ecology and Hydrology but involves representatives from EFA, Njala University, the Community Advocacy and Development Movement (CADEM), Sierra Rutile Limited, Fourah Bay College and local community representatives. In 2005 and 2006 the various groups conducted a complete social, environmental and economic analysis of the impact of rutile mining. The subsequent report concluded that previous company attempts had failed to create ecologically healthy environments, soil quality is low and that lakes caused by the mining process, while meeting standards for potable water were occupying land that could be used for farming or forest cover. This report does not illustrate egregious violations of the Sierra Rutile Act but this type of data and investigation is required for effective monitoring to occur.

EFA also works with Global Witness in their in-country programmes, focussed on implementing the Kimberly Process. In 2006 Global Witness led a three day workshop intended to “identify ways in which all stakeholders can work to improve monitoring in the artisanal mining sector in Kono district, as well as to develop a better understanding of what effective monitoring is and how it can be achieved.” Attendees included national government officials, district and local councils, Paramount chiefs, union representatives and local CBO representatives but none of the major Freetown based environmental NGOs were present. A 2007 visit by Global Witness representatives to former conflict zones indicated the potential issues as they “found evidence of a

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444 EFA, CADEM and Njala are all members of ENFORAC. Fourah Bay is a major university in Freetown.  
446 IBD  
persisting pattern of youth marginalisation and tension linked to enduring corruption and mismanagement of the mineral sector.\textsuperscript{448} State and private sector corruption was a major facet of the civil war and highlights the need for robust monitoring activity as the potential repercussions are severe.

The limited environmental monitoring campaigns that exist in Sierra Leone are largely led and conducted by international non-governmental organisations (INGO). Although a partnership model is being utilised in the Sierra Rutile case the critical programme and research design is being handled by the INGO partner. In the Global Witness case, EFA provides predominantly logistical support to the organisation and has limited direct involvement beyond the Director level. This type of arrangement limits any knowledge transfer that could allow local groups to develop their own campaigns. Combine this with the funding issues that have been discussed and the ability of civil society to act as an effective agent in improving state accountability is severely limited.

Another issue that would require further evaluation is the role and capabilities of the news media to act as an effective tool in publicising monitoring activities. Although the Standard Times\textsuperscript{449} publishes a regular environmental column, issues affecting the environment receive little coverage. Additionally, papers are a limited medium for reaching a mass audience as they have little penetration outside Freetown and the low level of national literacy hinders its overall efficacy. Radio programming is widespread and a potential ally but also provides little coverage to environmental issues. Monitoring, reporting and subsequently disseminating this information to a mass audience is critical.

\textsuperscript{448} Global Witness. Peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone must address natural resource governance. Press Release, 10 October 2007 (Available at www.globalwitness.org/data/files/pages/peacebuilding_efforts_in_sierra_leone.pdf)

\textsuperscript{449} See the standard Times website, http://standardtimespress.net
for civil society to effectively hold the state and private sector accountable. Although local groups are working in partnership to maximise their impact they face many challenges to become effective in this role.

**Communicating the Interests and Demands of the Citizenry**

Carothers referred to civil society as the ‘transmission belt’, shuttling the interests and demands of the general citizen to the government.\(^{450}\) Pluralism plays a critical role in this function, as it allows a variety of actors to be available for citizen expression, facilitating both an increase in citizen voice and the ability of civil society to become more specialised and therefore more adept at meeting specific needs of society. Donor policy has taken a more specific view and focussed on groups that have been typically underrepresented in government circles such as women and the rural poor. This criterion is complimentary to the magnitude of policy influence as it is attempting to deepen the democratic structure to ensure that policy inputs reflect the views of those that have been previously marginalised. To evaluate this it is necessary to look at the breadth of civil society and how effectively they have incorporated these disenfranchised groups.

The CIVICUS data is useful to understand the efficacy of civil society in this vital role. Recalling the previously referenced data, 73% of respondents were members of at least one civil society organisation, while only 2% listed NGOs and 1% environmental groups as the type of organisation to which they belonged. This data illustrates two critical aspects of the representative capacity of civil society with regards to the environment. Clearly the environment is underrepresented nationally in civil society participation as it only represents a small section of overall group membership. This

\(^{450}\) Carothers, 211
immediately limits the overall capacity of civil society to act as a medium for conveying citizen demands regarding environmental issues. The issue is exacerbated by the type of organisation that exists within the environmental movement. All of the ENFORAC members are located in Freetown or its immediate vicinity and only CSSL currently has a functioning field office in the provinces, located in Kenema for their Gola Forest project. Programming is more widespread with project work being conducted in all provinces and districts, although it is difficult to assess whether this represents a response to a local movement or is just the result of centralised programming. All of the respondents to the organisational survey either agreed or strongly agreed that it was important to engage local citizens in programme design and implementation. This is typical of the participatory methodology that is required by international donors for funding and often acts more to facilitate acceptance by local community members of pre-designed projects than actual planning input.

Overall, the environmental movement in Sierra Leone is a small portion of civil society and dominated by NGOs, focused in and around Freetown. This combination severely limits its ability to act as an effective medium for conveying citizen demands and issues as argued by many of the academic critiques of current civil society models. The issue is exacerbated by the requirement for specialised knowledge that exists within the environmental field when dealing with donor partners as this further serves to narrow the ability for citizen participation.

An interesting companion to the limitations created by the requirement for specialised knowledge is the educational campaigns that civil society conducts. EFA has

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451 Organisation Questionnaire, Appendix A
452 Organisation Questionnaire, Appendix A
created a workbook entitled *Our Environment: Taking Care of Our Future* and conducts training for teachers on how to integrate environmental teaching into the curriculum. Another ENFORAC member, Tacugama Chimpanzee Sanctuary, also conducts a school based educational programme that uses volunteers to “present workshops on habitat conservation and environmental awareness.” The Union of Environmental Journalists conducts a multifaceted educational programme that includes a weekly television programme, which, although having a limited audience, reaches an influential portion of the population. One study that attempted to measure the overall efficacy of its campaign work was the Western Area RARE Pride Campaign. The ‘Pride’ campaign was a programme designed to increase overall awareness of the importance of conservation for the Western Area Peninsular Forest Reserve and used the Rock Fowl or *Picathartes gymnocephalus* as its flagship species. Data from the study indicates that knowledge regarding the threats to the reserve increased and actual levels of harmful behaviour such as farming inside the reserve decreased, indicating that sustained campaigns can have positive effects.

Overall, each of the ENFORAC members have educational and awareness campaigns that seek to educate citizens regarding environmental issues. The ability of individuals to participate in the democratic process is unquestionably affected by their knowledge level, a requirement Dahl referred to as ‘enlightened understanding’.

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453 *EFA Annual Report*, 19
454 Tacugama Chimpanzee Sanctuary Website. [www.tacugama.com/community.html](http://www.tacugama.com/community.html) (Viewed January 11, 2008)
456 The Western Area Peninsular Forest Reserve is located on the same peninsular as the capital Freetown. Significant encroachment has occurred from a variety of sources. It is critical for a variety of reasons but primarily as the water source for Freetown and the larger peninsular population.
458 Sesay, 31-43
Disseminating this knowledge is an area in which civil society has been active although it is difficult to ascertain whether these campaigns have led to increased public demands for environmental safeguards within the democratic process.

A specific focus of donor policy in this area is to empower marginalised groups, with a particular focus on women. The CIVICUS data indicates the results at the national level are mixed. RSC data shows a high level of groups and programming aimed at women's issues, many of which work in governance related activities. Of the respondents, 50.7% felt that civil society had performed a significant role in promoting gender equality, while 40% felt that it had been successful in empowering women to make choices. However, civil society has been less successful at integrating gender equality within its own organisations. Of RSC respondents 60.3% held that women are somewhat under represented while 28.8% felt they were severely under represented. Overall, civil society programming does incorporate women-specific projects however civil society organisations remain the primary domain of males.

The environmental movement mimics the overall trend regarding programming and has similar issues with internal gender inequality. Many of the groups conduct programmes aimed at women with eco-stove production being a staple of this type of work. At the organisational level, of the groups that responded, women represented 17.6% of total employees and 33.5% of total members. Of the female employees, only 36.8% are involved in non-administrative roles, further highlighting the lack of participation at the programme and executive level. EFA serves as an excellent example of this under representation as only three of thirty-three employees are

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459 CIVICUS, 77-78
460 IBID, 65-66
461 Organisation Questionnaire, Appendix A
female. Of these three, one is responsible for administration and personnel with the other active in the programme work with Tiwai Island and its administrative body, Tiwai Island Administrative Committee (TIAC). The notion of gender equality is a documented goal of ENFORAC, however the reality falls far short of the professed intent.

Civil society’s ability to act as a ‘transmission belt’ for environmental concerns is limited. The movement itself represents a small portion of the overall civil society community and is dominated by NGOs based in the Freetown region. This limits its overall representative capacity and creates a type of guardianship situation. Educational campaigns that are intended to increase local knowledge and spur behavioural change have been largely ineffective and have not yet increased citizen demands regarding environmental issues. Finally, the donor focus on women’s empowerment has been largely unsuccessful in civil society in general and the environmental movement in particular as women remain underrepresented as employees and members and virtually non-existent at the executive level. This is particularly disconcerting as many of the environmental issues in Sierra Leone disproportionately involve and affect women.

**Creating a New Set of Political Norms**

Although there are large institutional issues in Sierra Leone’s democratisation process, this essay has argued that the fundamental issues are rooted in historical developments that have become dominant features of the power structures in society. As such, even if institutional reform was implemented it would have limited reach and longevity, as the same persistent issues of chiefly control, patrimonial governance and

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462 Organisation Questionnaire, Appendix A
463 The ENFORAC constitution stipulates that each member organisation must “Have a clear agenda toward gender equity within every sector of her operations” as a requirement for membership.
core-periphery antagonism would remain. Therefore it is imperative that civil society create new political norms that make historical modes of governance unacceptable and obsolete. Diamond argued that civil society does have the ability to alter relationships, not just between the state and society but also local patron-client relations. Putnam in his work displayed that how organisations are structured is a critical factor in their ability to modify the existing hierarchical relations. Consolidating these ideas, it is apparent that for civil society to create new norms of democratic governance, they must be democratic in structure themselves. This requirement is particularly critical in the Sierra Leone context as the specific issues hindering its democratic consolidation are more closely linked to societal norms than institutional malaise.

To evaluate the internal structure of the organisations a democracy audit was conducted based on Dahl’s five features of a democratic process: effective participation which provides each citizen with the opportunity for expressing their preferences for outcomes in binding decision making, voting equality at the decisive stage among and between the entire citizenry, enlightened understanding which allows each citizen to have equal and adequate opportunity to evaluate the choice that would best serve their interests, control of the agenda regarding what matters are to be decided through the democratic process and a demos inclusive of the total adult population subject to the binding decisions of the association. This audit focuses on EFA but includes ENFORAC and other member groups. Two sets of questionnaires were used to evaluate the individual groups and the ENFORAC forum. For the group evaluations, individual employees and members were asked to respond, whereas the ENFORAC evaluation was

464 The term historical rather than traditional is used to differentiate between who governs and how they govern. The chiefs are the traditional rulers, however the modes and norms of governance are a product of historical evolution.
completed by member group representatives. A total of thirty-seven individuals and five organisations responded to the survey.

**Effective participation**

Effective participation is related to influence and opportunity for expression over items on the agenda during the process of binding decision making. The intent is to ensure that those affected by decisions have the ability to add items to the agenda and openly express their preferences regarding the outcome.\(^{465}\)

The answers to these questions were somewhat contradictory as respondents felt that there was opportunity for open expression regarding critical decision making while also stating much more should be done to promote open and inclusive participation. Regarding the ability to express preferences, the individual score was 3.38\(^{466}\) and the ENFORAC rating was 4.0 with scores of 1.91 and 1.67 regarding whether more should be done to promote participation.\(^{467}\)

These values are difficult to interpret although it may indicate that people feel they have the opportunity to be heard but that their opinions or concerns are not acted upon. This would indicate an overly strong executive which would align with the business formal NGO structure typical of the civil society actors in the environmental movement. With this type of model, typical vertical structures found in Sierra Leone government from the chiefs to the central institutions would actually be replicated and not challenged through a more horizontal structure.

**Voting equality at the decisive stage among and between the entire citizenry**

\(^{465}\) Dahl, 109  
\(^{466}\) Individual Questionnaire, Appendix B  
\(^{467}\) Organisation Questionnaire, Appendix A
The criterion of voting equality, one person-one vote, is the one most closely associated with a democratic process and specifically with narrow definitions of electoral democracy often touted by donors. In its simplest form, it means that at the decisive stage each individual has the opportunity to express a choice that will be given equal weight to those of other individuals.468

This set of questions received the strongest and most polarised responses with many additional comments being provided. When evaluating whether their organisation’s voting system was fair, individuals were either in favour or in direct opposition to current voting practices with an average score of 2.35, with sixteen of the respondents indicating that there was no voting system within the organisation.469 Individual respondents also indicated that they felt an equal voting system would improve the overall efficacy of the organisation with an average score of 3.95. Interestingly, of the seventeen individuals who either agreed or strongly agreed with the existing voting, fifteen of those felt that a shift to an equal voting system would improve the organisation.470 This data indicates that decision making is consolidated in a select section of the organisation. Although it is not possible to confirm from the data, it can be assumed that those who have a say in the final decision making process concur with the current system while those on the outside are opposed. This data supports the data from the first set of questions, indicating that organisations are based on strong central control rather than more inclusive forms of democracy.

The ENFORAC results revealed an opposite pattern as organisations approved of the current voting system and did not feel a single vote per member system would

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468 Dahl, 109
469 Individual Questionnaire, Appendix B
470 Individual Questionnaire, Appendix B
improve the organisation's operations. The current ENFORAC constitution entrenches voting inequality based on the amount of monthly contributions made to the organisation. This sliding scale has four categories of members, ranging from non-voting to those with three votes.\textsuperscript{471} Despite this formal inequality, only one of the respondents was neutral with the remainder agreeing or strongly agreeing with the current system, for an average score of 4.17. Correspondingly, one of the groups strongly approved and one approved of a change in the system and the remainder where either neutral or disagreed.\textsuperscript{472}

Although finite interpretations of this data cannot be made, it is important to highlight that voting inequality is formally ingrained into the structure of the forum. This is clearly not conducive to forming more inclusive democratic norm and is more aligned with ideas of guardianship.

**Enlightened understanding**

The concept of enlightened understanding is based on the premise that individuals must be informed to effectively make decisions that best serve their interests.\textsuperscript{473} It is an essential building block for voting equality and effective participation as without this access to knowledge these first two criteria cannot be truly met.

This has been an issue within many emerging democracies in direct and indirect ways. State monopoly over media and other basic channels of information has been largely utilised as a direct tool by governments to limit access to information. Indirectly, low levels of education and corresponding high levels of illiteracy have created large obstacles to access to information and leave the democratic process susceptible to manipulation.

\textsuperscript{471} ENFORAC constitution – Section 3: Obligations to the forum
\textsuperscript{472} Organisation Questionnaire, Appendix A
\textsuperscript{473} Dahl, 112
The majority of individual respondents felt that their organisation provided adequate access to information, with twenty five of thirty seven respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that their organisation provided sufficient information to evaluate decisions.\textsuperscript{474} ENFORAC evaluations were less positive, with three agreeing, one disagreeing and one strongly disagreeing.\textsuperscript{475} A commonality between the individual and group respondents was the manner of information gathering. Both sets of respondents received the bulk of their information from group meetings, indicating that most information sharing is done in an open and democratic nature. Thirty-two of the individual respondents indicated group meetings as their primary source of information with four others indicating individual meetings and one respondent the website.\textsuperscript{476} Four of the five group replies indicated group meetings as their primary source of information with the other replying through individual meetings.\textsuperscript{477} This data indicates the organisations are effectively disseminating information to their members and employees in an open and democratic manner.

A second measure is the ability of group members and employees to effectively utilise this information in their decision making processes. Sierra Leone has a reported adult literacy rate of 34.6\% and a gross enrolment rate of 44.6\% which is a severe limiting factor in its transition to democracy.\textsuperscript{478} Of the survey respondents, thirty four were able to read English, thirty-three of the respondents had completed primary school and thirteen had attended university.\textsuperscript{479} This data indicates that the group members and

\textsuperscript{474} Individual Questionnaire, Appendix B
\textsuperscript{475} Organisation Questionnaire, Appendix A
\textsuperscript{476} Individual Questionnaire, Appendix B
\textsuperscript{477} Organisation Questionnaire, Appendix A
\textsuperscript{479} Individual Questionnaire, Appendix B
employees will have the capacity to utilise the information they receive in their decision making process, which has the potential to create a more democratic structure within the organisations.

**Control of the agenda**

This concept is closely linked to the first which looked at the ability of individuals to question and comment regarding items on the agenda. Control of the agenda refers directly to the ability of the individual to determine what will be on the agenda as an item to be evaluated through the democratic process.\(^{480}\)

Both individual and group respondents indicated that there was adequate opportunity to introduce items to the agenda, with average scores of 3.97 and 4.2. When asked if other individuals or groups had the same level of opportunity there was little change in the answer with scores of 4.0 and 3.67.\(^{481}\) The high score in this category is related to the group meeting format of the organisations which encourages open dialogue. Items are brought forth at the start of the meeting for discussion and any of the members or employees are given a chance to introduce items.

When combined with previous data, this data helps to highlight the gap in the democratic process. Individuals feel they can introduce items to the agenda and that they do have the ability to voice their opinions. The gap occurs between this and the final decision making process which becomes more closed and concentrated, leaving many to feel unheard and outside the overall process.

**An inclusive demos**

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\(^{480}\) Dahl, 113

\(^{481}\) Organisation Questionnaire, Appendix A; Individual Questionnaire, Appendix B
The final criterion relates to who has the ultimate control over the decision making process. For this criterion to be satisfied, all those affected by the binding decisions of the organisation must be included.

This was the most problematic of the five criteria, as seventeen of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that their group made binding decisions that directly affected them without their inclusion. Furthermore, thirty four of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that their organisation needed to do more to promote inclusive participation in daily activities. The average scores of 2.69 and 1.89 were the lowest aggregates of any of the categories and indicate there is a high feeling of exclusion from the final decision making process. These sentiments were paralleled in the ENFORAC data with 2.8 and 1.33, also being the lowest of the aggregates.

This final set of data supports the previous responses and focuses on the primary democratic weakness within the organisations. Both at the individual and group level respondents felt they were left out of the general decision making process.

The overall data provides insights into the democratic structure of the various civil society organisations. High scores were recorded in categories related to the ability of members and employees to introduce items to the agenda and the availability of information. This frequent group meetings act as a forum for all members and employees to bring items up for discussion and serve as effective information sharing venues. The major weakness in the democratic process occurs in the decision making stage as many of the members and employees feel they are left out of the process, even on critical decisions that directly affect them. The formal inequality built into the ENFORAC constitution and the lack of a voting system in the organisations is problematic for any
sort of democracy building to occur. It is unclear whether this gap between participation and final voting is representative of the overall societal structure or is more a result of the formal NGO model that the majority of the organisations follow but must be closed for civil society to effectively act as a catalyst for democratic growth.
Conclusion

Democracy promotion has become elevated to more than just a donor programme objective but a perceived starting point for economic development and security policy. In parallel, the notion of using civil society as a core agent in promoting democracy has become an accepted facet of donor policy. Civil society is often seen as a safe haven of operations, outside the perceived corrupt and lethargic state apparatus and vital for creating the necessary conditions for democratic transition. Despite the overwhelming donor acceptance of the necessity of democracy promotion and the utility of civil society in this project, there are numerous potential pitfalls. This essay has utilised a case study example of the environmental civil society community in Sierra Leone to analyse the role of civil society in democratic transition and in doing so highlight some of the issues with the concept.

The initial section of the essay dealt with the two overarching theoretical themes of development and democracy. Both are massive fields and only selected aspects were discussed to provide a background for the case study analysis and to provide context to current donor policies and programming.

Development theory was recapped from its modern conception at the end of World War II to illustrate the evolution of both theory and practice. Multinational institutions such as the United Nations and World Bank have been leaders in theory and policy, often driving the overall development agenda. Specific focus was given to USA policies to illustrate the emergence of democracy building within the development framework and the elevation of development to the high politics of national security. UK policy was reviewed, as they are the primary bilateral donor to Sierra Leone and have
taken a similar shift toward democracy promotion in their development theory and practice.

Emerging from this recap were a number of critical issues affecting the role of civil society in overall development policy. Narrow, economic based definitions, such as those supported by the World Bank, essentially eliminate people from development. This leaves civil society with an extremely limited role in the process. In its benign form this has meant civil society appears in a consultative roll during project design, but with little real overall input to the final direction. More critical analysis, has argued that civil society is being used to justify the overall neoliberal agenda and allow damaging changes to be accepted by society at large. The concept of democracy promotion as a core facet of development, favoured by many of the large bilateral donors, also presents issues for civil society. Within this concept, democracy has been elevated from a by-product of economic advancement, to a parallel activity, and finally to a direct measure of development. Civil society has also gained prominence as a vital actor in the democratisation process and programming of bilateral donors. This relationship is problematic as the pragmatism of donor programming severely restricts the scope of civil society engagement. Additionally, there is an undefined relationship in donor policies regarding the direct link between civil society and democracy.

The chapter on democracy theory traced the concepts from its Athenian roots to current donor understandings, often contained in the overall idea of good governance. Historical democracy theory highlighted core societal aspects, such as liberty nad majority rule, without stressing specific institutions. Within this concept donor policy, democracy has often been reduced to minimalist definitions, hovering between strictly
electoral democracy and western, liberal models more commonly linked with Robert Dahl's definition of polyarchy. This is largely a pragmatic shift to allow for more simplistic programming and targets institutional reform rather than tackling more abstract societal and normative aspects of democracy promotion. This creates an immediate compatibility issue as the type of role civil society is theoretically suited to perform in democratisation is limited when strictly institutional reform is targeted. It also serves to impose a specific version of democracy, based on pre-determined institutions rather than a domestic reality. This can create a hollow democracy, void of any meaning to the domestic constituency and with little strength when challenged. There is also the potential for the formation of pseudo democracies, governments that have the external appearance of functional democracies and are accepted by the outside world, but lack any true domestic democratic structure.

The following chapter literature review focussed on the substantial critiques that have come from within the academic world, encapsulating both definitional and operational debates. Many of the definitional debates surrounded the very nature of civil society in the developing world context, as the typical western definitions created areas of inclusion and separation that do not exist in reality. The DFID definition was the most broad as it included a wide variety of organisations and also broached the vague concept of civil society as a social space. Despite this broad definition, typical critiques have argued that programming has minimised civil society to a small group of organisations based on the NGO model and located in the capital. This reduction has minimised the efficacy of civil society to represent the masses, one of its primary roles in the democratisation process. The USAID focus on advocacy organisations is more
problematic as it can further serve to reduce civil society to a mere handful of individuals who speak for the vast civil society community.

The concept of the sphere of civil society as distinct from the family, state and the market was also heavily critiqued. This notion of a separate sphere is argued to be extremely critical in the African case, as many organisations are based on family, kinship or tribal lines. In addition to the reducing affect these distinctions can have, it is also possible that empowering certain sections of civil society may actually increase societal gaps as power imbalances can be exacerbated.

The discussion regarding operational debates was divided into a generic section based on theoretical roles for civil society and a second section focused on more focussed, case-study reviews of the concept. Gordon White’s four potential roles for civil society in democratisation were introduced and used as a framework for a general review of the concept. Three of these roles are interrelated and linked to the direct relationship between the state and society while the fourth is concerned with the more abstract concept of norm creation.

The role of civil society as a balancing agent is accepted by donors as critical but has been particularly critiqued throughout the literature. At the general level this enthusiasm is confusing as it represents a reversal of earlier development theory and policy. Theoretical frameworks such as modernisation theory portrayed the nation-building and development mission as one that needed to overcome a stagnant, traditional society, yet now it is this same society being asked to overcome a weak state. One of the methods donors use to promote civil society in this role is by funding their programming and general operations. However, current funding practices, that are largely short-term
and linked directly to projects, serve to limit the overall ability of civil society to act as an independent entity. Organisations are forced to chase donor funds, which severely hinders their ability to conduct long-term programmes and campaigns, limiting their overall efficacy. There is also the potential that this funding model forces civil society organisations to adjust their agendas to a Western model, which has the potential to actually shrink the overall policy debate.

On a more abstract level the ability of civil society to create new democratic political norms is unique, as it strays from the practical aspects of the relationship between the state and society. Proponents from academia, such as Larry Diamond, have argued that civil society has the ability to not just modify political norms at the formal government level but also address the local, patron-client relationships that are built into societal structures. This is extremely relevant to the Sierra Leone situation where many of the challenges to democratisation exist in the societal framework of the country. Robert Putnam contributed to the understanding of this role for civil society, suggesting that if the organisation is more horizontally structured, it will be more effective in creating democratic institutions and norms. In the Sierra Leone example it is critical that democratic norms exist within civil society, for them to act as effective mediums for normative shifts.

More recent academic work was reviewed that has provided case-study analysis of the actual efficacy of these programmes. The general conclusion indicated that there has not been a discernable relationship between civil society programmes and state level democratisation. Two critical issues were highlighted: a lack of donor consensus on the role of civil society in the democratisation process and little understanding about its
actual efficacy. In addition to echoing many of the theoretical criticisms of civil society's role the author also argued that the extent of internal democracy was positively linked to its efficacy in influencing policy. This is important as it indicates that internal democracy is not just important from a normative perspective but is also directly linked to performance.

The final section of the essay covered the specific case study of Sierra Leone with an additional focus on the environmental civil society community. This was split into two sections with the first looking at the political history of Sierra Leone and the second focussing on the contribution of civil society actors in the environmental movement to the overall democratisation process.

The historical review was used to highlight the primary recurring themes affecting Sierra Leone’s political development. The review was split into three time periods to illustrate how these themes developed and highlight some of the major events and policies. It was argued that three major issues have developed: national versus local power relations, tribal disputes, and elite control and patrimonial governance. The nature of these issues lies largely in societal structures and political norms which have evolved over time and more rapidly since the first contact with Europeans. This creates compatibility issues with typical donor policies and programmes which focus on governmental institutions rather than addressing the societal aspects of democratisation. In the Sierra Leone example this is leading to the growth of a façade of overall governance, without the required societal support mechanisms. Recent election results indicate that many of the recurring issues have resurfaced, as the war moves into the historical background. This also creates specific issues and roles for civil society in the
democratisation process. With the donor focus on institutions, much of the task of modifying political norms along democratic lines is left to civil society.

The final section of the essay focused on the case study analysis from the environmental movement in Sierra Leone, focusing on the national forum, ENFORAC and EFA, one of the largest NGOs in the overall community. Gordon White's four potential roles for civil society was used as a theoretical framework for the analysis and Robert Dahl's five criteria for a democratic process was used to evaluate the specific function of civil society as an actor in norm creation.

It was found that civil society had not been effective in affecting policy, although it had access to government and considerable societal space to conduct its operations. Similarly it has had limited success in holding the state accountable for adhering to existing policies. Much of this was attributed to current donor funding practices which severely restrict the autonomy of civil society actors. Funding is typically limited to direct project implementation and administrative overhead with little provided for discretionary spending. Although often justified as a pragmatic response to avoid corruption and waste it severely limits the ability of organisations to conduct sustained, long term campaigns necessary to affect true change. This also affects which issues are pursued as often donor agendas establish the priorities, with civil society left to chase funding.⁴⁸²

Civil society's effectiveness in acting as a medium to improve state and citizen communication was also mixed. The actors adhered to typical critiques of civil society in that they were located in the urban centres, in this case the capital Freetown, and had

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⁴⁸² Climate Change is emerging as an excellent example of this issue. Although a global environmental and development issue funding is rapidly flowing into this area and shifting priorities away from many of the more salient and controllable issues in Sierra Leone.
limited representative capacity for the majority of citizens. This issue was exacerbated by the limited scope of environmental NGOs within the overall civil society community as environmental groups and NGOs were both extremely small portions of national participation levels. Civil society organisations within the environmental movement also did poorly at providing voice to typically marginalised groups. Women’s empowerment is a core facet of donor programming, yet NGOs in the sector were typically populated and controlled by men.

The final criteria that was evaluated was the ability of civil society to create a new set of political norms aligned with democratic standards. Dahl’s five criteria for a democratic process were used for this evaluation. This is extremely vital in the Sierra Leone example as it was argued that the core issues hindering its democratic consolidation are rooted in societal structures. Overall the organisations had mixed results in this capacity. Employees and members were given ample opportunity to raise issues and express preferences, however the process broke down at the decision making stage. This is largely based on the formal NGO structure of the civil society actors which serves to consolidate decisions making with upper management, aligning it with executive political control. This is problematic as the vertical structure of civil society mimics the issues with existing governance structures and dramatically limits its ability to act as a location for reform.

Despite the predictions of the slow and steady procession of democracy and the efforts of donors to fulfil this prophecy there are still sever hurdles in many transitional countries. The ability of civil society to facilitate this transition, although generally accepted in donor rhetoric, is also problematic. Donor definitions of democracy will have
to be expanded and programming developed to address societal and normative issues for sustained progress to be made. Additionally funding models will have to be adopted that allow for local actors to develop their own programming in response to domestic concerns rather than external priorities. Within civil society, democratic norms will have to become part of daily operations and overall governance structures for it to achieve its full potential in this critical role.
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Appendix A: Organisation Questionnaire

Section I – Organisational Information

1) Organisation code. (Do not answer, this is assigned to ensure the results are confidential)

2) What year was your organisation formed? 

3) What operational structure best describes your organisation? ( 
   □ Business Orientated Non-Governmental Organisation – Primarily paid staff / Public benefit / Limited or no members / Primarily donor funded
   □ Voluntary Non-Governmental Organisation – Primarily voluntary staff / Public benefit / Limited or no members / Primarily donor funded
   □ Indigenous Peoples’ Organisation – Mixed or primarily voluntary staff / Public benefit / Organised along ethnic, language or territorial lines / Can operate locally, nationally or globally / Mixed funding
   □ Peoples’ Organisations or Mass Organisations – Primarily voluntary staff / Mutual(member) benefit / Group of CBOs or peoples’ (ie women, farmers) association / Expanded geography beyond the community / Primarily member funded
   □ Community Based Organisation – Primarily voluntary staff / Mutual(member) benefit / Limited geography / Primarily member funded

4) What is your organisation's primary source of funding? 
   □ Foreign donor – Private
   □ Foreign donor – Government
   □ Domestic government
   □ Domestic donor
   □ Members

5) How many people are part of your organisation? 
   Active Members _____ Employees _____ Volunteers _____

6) How many women are part of your organisation? 
   Active Members _____ Employees _____ Volunteers _____
7) How many women are part of your organisation - excluding secretarial and support staff?
Active Members ____ Employees ____ Volunteers ____

8) What is the primary focus of operation for your organisation? (check only one)
   □ Advocacy (i.e. addressing government, creating policy, monitoring)
   □ Large Scale Programme management (i.e. managing nature reserves, large rehabilitation projects)
   □ Educational or training (includes research, workshops, etc)
   □ Small Scale Programme implementation (i.e. treeplanting)
   □ Providing basic services (i.e. installing wells, building latrines, etc)

9) What other areas of operation are you involved? (check all that apply)
   □ Advocacy (i.e. addressing government, creating policy, monitoring)
   □ Large Scale Programme management (i.e. managing nature reserves, large rehabilitation projects)
   □ Educational or training (includes research, workshops, etc)
   □ Small Scale Programme implementation (i.e. treeplanting, beach clean-up)
   □ Providing basic services (i.e. installing wells, building latrines, etc)

Section II: Democracy Audit

10) How many times has your organisation met with National government officials in the previous year regarding environmental issues?
   □ 4 or more
   □ 3
   □ 2
   □ 1
   □ 0
   If more than four please estimate the total number: ____

11) How many times has your organisation met with District government officials in the previous year regarding environmental issues?
   □ 4 or more
   □ 3
   □ 2
   □ 1
   □ 0
   If more than four please estimate the total number: ____
12) How many times has your organisation met with Paramount Chiefs in the previous year regarding environmental issues?

- 8 or more
- 6 - 7
- 4 - 5
- 2 - 3
- 0 - 1

If more than eight please estimate the total number: _____

13) Which level of government does your organisation think is most important to work with regarding environmental issues?

- International Governmental Organisations (i.e. U.N., World Bank)
- International Non-governmental Organisations (i.e. IUCN, WWF, Greenpeace)
- National government
- District government
- Paramount Chiefs
- None of the above

14) How effective has your organisation been in contributing to National Environmental Policy?

- Formal policy creation (i.e. wrote or provided direct research on major policy such as PSRP or NEP)
- Large consultative role (i.e. consulted on major policy such as PRSP, NEP)
- Minimal consultative role (i.e. sent letters or had numerous meeting)
- Minimal contribution (i.e. contributed to another organisations efforts)
- No contribution (i.e. no impact whatsoever)

15) Does your organisation think it should be involved in policy creation and advocacy?

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neutral
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree
16) Would you like your organisation / ENFORAC to become more active in policy creation and advocacy?
   □ Strongly agree
   □ Agree
   □ Neutral
   □ Disagree
   □ Strongly disagree

17) How many times has your organisation been involved in monitoring activities in the previous year? (ie evaluating and reporting on government or industry policy)
   □ 4 or more
   □ 3
   □ 2
   □ 1
   □ 0

18) Would you like your organisation / ENFORAC to become more active in monitoring activities?
   □ Strongly agree
   □ Agree
   □ Neutral
   □ Disagree
   □ Strongly disagree

19) Does your organisation have its financial records maintained by a certified accountant? (If yes please skip question 16, if no please answer question 16)
   □ Yes
   □ No

20) Does your organisation have its financial records maintained by a university/college trained accountant?
   □ Yes
   □ No

21) Does your organisation have financial records that are open to internal audit?
   □ Yes
   □ No
22) How often does your organisation have external audits of its financial records?
- Bi-annually (twice per year)
- Annually
- Semi-annually (Less frequently than once per year)
- Upon request (ie. by donors)
- Never

23) Does your organisation have a formal policy regarding conflict of interest? (Do potential financial or other interests need to be declared when making project decisions that may create benefit)
- Yes
- No

24) Does your organisation have a formal policy regarding nepotism? (Hiring family members)
- Yes
- No
- Not applicable (no paid staff)

25) What does your organisation think is the most critical, general environmental issue in Sierra Leone? (please pick 1)
- Protecting and conserving biodiversity
- Conservation of living things (ie forests and aquatic life)
- Desertification
- Hazardous waste and toxic chemicals
- Ocean pollution – protecting the commons
- Atmospheric pollution (includes but not exclusive to Climate Change)
- Other ____________________________________________
26) What does your organisation think are the most critical, specific environmental issues in Sierra Leone? (please pick 5)

☐ Protecting wildlife from extinction
☐ Reducing the trade in animals (i.e. Bush meat or poaching)
☐ Biopiracy (theft of indigenous plant knowledge for medicine without compensation)
☐ Biotechnology and genetic engineering
☐ Protecting ocean wildlife and the ocean resource
☐ Deforestation
☐ Access to safe water
☐ Access to sanitation
☐ Land degradation
☐ Erosion from road construction and urbanisation
☐ Urban degradation and pollution
☐ Number of people living in slums
☐ Mined out lands
☐ Pesticide and fertilizer usage
☐ Ocean based waste disposal
☐ Ocean based habitat destruction
☐ Interior air pollution
☐ Air pollution (i.e NOx and SO$_2$)
☐ Ozone depletion (CFC usage)
☐ High carbon energy use (i.e. carbon based fuels)
☐ Climate change
☐ Other ____________________________
27) **For what issues does your organisation have programmes?** (tick all that apply)

- Protecting wildlife from extinction
- Reducing the trade in animals (i.e. Bush meat or poaching)
- Biopiracy (theft of indigenous plant knowledge for medicine without compensation)
- Biotechnology and genetic engineering
- Protecting ocean wildlife and the ocean resource
- Deforestation
- Access to safe water
- Access to sanitation
- Land degradation
- Erosion from road construction and urbanisation
- Urban degradation and pollution
- Number of people living in slums
- Mined out lands
- Pesticide and fertilizer usage
- Ocean based waste disposal
- Ocean based habitat destruction
- Interior air pollution
- Air pollution (i.e. NOx and SO\textsubscript{2})
- Ozone depletion (CFC usage)
- High carbon energy use (i.e. carbon based fuels)
- Climate change
- Other

28) **Does your organisation think it is important to engage local citizens in your policy and programme design?**

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neutral
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

If applicable please provide a brief example of how your organisation engages local citizens in your policy and programme design:
29) In which Provinces does your organisation have projects?

☐ Western Area Province
☐ Eastern Province
☐ Southern Province
☐ Northern Province

30) In which Districts does your organisation have projects?

☐ Western Urban
☐ Western Rural
☐ Kailahiun District
☐ Kenema District
☐ Kono District
☐ Bo District
☐ Bonthe District
☐ Moyamba District
☐ Pujehun District
☐ Bombali District
☐ Kambia District
☐ Koinadugu District
☐ Port Loko District
☐ Tonkolili District

31) Please list all the Chiefdoms that your organisation has projects?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Section III: ENFORAC Evaluation

32) Does your organisation think ENFORAC provides each group an opportunity for expressing their preferences on critical decision making?
   □ Strongly agree
   □ Agree
   □ Neutral
   □ Disagree
   □ Strongly Disagree

33) Does your organisation think ENFORAC should do more to promote open and inclusive participation regarding critical decision making?
   □ Strongly agree
   □ Agree
   □ Neutral
   □ Disagree
   □ Strongly disagree

34) Does your organisation think the current ENFORAC voting system is fair?
   □ Strongly agree
   □ Agree
   □ Neutral
   □ Disagree
   □ Strongly disagree

35) Does your organisation think a single vote per organisation system would improve the effectiveness of ENFORAC?
   □ Strongly agree
   □ Agree
   □ Neutral
   □ Disagree
   □ Strongly disagree
36) Does your organisation think that each group is provided with sufficient information to evaluate decisions that are voted on by ENFORAC members?
   ☐ Strongly agree
   ☐ Agree
   ☐ Neutral
   ☐ Disagree
   ☐ Strongly disagree

37) How does your organisation gain access to information regarding decisions that are to be voted on by ENFORAC members?
   ☐ Group meetings
   ☐ Individual meetings
   ☐ Website
   ☐ Secondary source
   ☐ Individual research

38) Does your organisation think it has enough opportunity to introduce items to the ENFORAC agenda?
   ☐ Strongly agree
   ☐ Agree
   ☐ Neutral
   ☐ Disagree
   ☐ Strongly disagree

39) Does your organisation think that other groups have enough opportunity to introduce items to the ENFORAC agenda?
   ☐ Strongly agree
   ☐ Agree
   ☐ Neutral
   ☐ Disagree
   ☐ Strongly disagree
40) Does your organisation think there are decisions made regarding ENFORAC without inclusive discussion? (i.e. not all members are aware or consulted)

☐ Strongly agree
☐ Agree
☐ Neutral
☐ Disagree
☐ Strongly disagree

41) Does your organisation think that ENFORAC should do more to promote inclusive participation in the daily operations of ENFORAC?

☐ Strongly agree
☐ Agree
☐ Neutral
☐ Disagree
☐ Strongly disagree

42) Please write any additional comments on any of the questions above. (please note the question number next to the comment)

43) Please write any additional comments your organisation feels are applicable regarding the democratic structure of ENFORAC.
Appendix B: Individual Citizen Questionnaire

Section I: General Information

1) **Organisation code** (Do not answer, this is assigned to ensure the results are confidential)

2) **Where are you currently living?** (write the name of the Chiefdom, District and Province)

   _______________________________________________________

3) **Where were you born?** (write the name of the Chiefdom, District and Province)

   _______________________________________________________

4) **What tribe are you?** (tick the one that is most applicable)
   - [ ] Mende
   - [ ] Temne
   - [ ] Limba
   - [ ] Kuranko
   - [ ] Kono
   - [ ] Fula
   - [ ] Creole (Krio)
   - [ ] Sherbo
   - [ ] Kisi
   - [ ] Susu
   - [ ] Loko
   - [ ] Mandingo
   - [ ] Other  _______________________________________________________

5) **What languages do you speak?** (tick all that apply)
   - [ ] English
   - [ ] Krio
   - [ ] Mende
   - [ ] Temne
   - [ ] Limba
   - [ ] Kuranko
   - [ ] Kono
   - [ ] Fula
   - [ ] Sherbo
   - [ ] Kisi
   - [ ] Susu
   - [ ] Loko
6) What languages do you read? (tick all that apply)

- □ English
- □ Krio
- □ Mende
- □ Temne
- □ Limba
- □ Mandingo
- □ Loko
- □ French
- □ None
- □ Other

7) Gender

- □ Female
- □ Male

8) How old are you?

- □ 55 and above
- □ 40 - 54
- □ 30 - 39
- □ 25 - 29
- □ 20 - 24
- □ 15 - 19

9) Do you practice any of the following religions? (tick ONE of the following boxes)

- □ Islam
- □ Christianity
- □ None
- □ Other
10) What is your main occupation? (tick one of the following boxes)
- Farming
- Fishing
- Trading
- Housewife
- Traditional healer
- Association / group leader
- Government worker
- NGO worker
- Cookery
- Other

11) What is the highest level of schooling you have attended? (tick ONE of the following boxes)
- Post-graduate University / College
- Undergraduate University / College
- Teacher Training College
- Technical / Vocational Institute
- Senior Secondary School
- Technical / Vocational Centre
- Junior Secondary School
- Primary School
- Pre-primary School
- None

12) Are you a participant in any kind of clubs or associations? (includes Women's Associations, political parties, church groups, etc)
- Yes
- No

13) Who do you rely on for giving the most reliable information? (tick ONE of the following boxes)
- Teachers
- Religious leaders
- Traditional leaders
- Government workers
- Community associations / clubs
- NGO workers
- Media (radio, newspapers etc)
- Friends
- Other
14) What do you feel is the most critical, general environmental issue in Sierra Leone?

☐ Protecting and conserving biodiversity
☐ Conservation of living things (ie forests and aquatic life)
☐ Desertification
☐ Hazardous waste and toxic chemicals
☐ Ocean pollution – protecting the commons
☐ Atmospheric pollution (includes but not exclusive to Climate Change)
☐ Other ____________________________

15) What other specific issues do you feel are important environmental issues in Sierra Leone? (please pick a MAXIMUM of FIVE)

☐ Protecting wildlife from extinction
☐ Reducing the trade in animals (i.e. Bush meat or poaching)
☐ Biopiracy (theft of indigenous plant knowledge for medicine without compensation)
☐ Biotechnology and genetic engineering
☐ Protecting ocean wildlife and the ocean resource
☐ Deforestation
☐ Access to safe water
☐ Access to sanitation
☐ Land degradation
☐ Erosion from road construction and urbanisation
☐ Urban degradation and pollution
☐ Number of people living in slums
☐ Mined out lands
☐ Pesticide and fertilizer usage
☐ Ocean based waste disposal
☐ Ocean based habitat destruction
☐ Interior air pollution
☐ Air pollution (ie NOx and SO₂)
☐ Ozone depletion (CFC usage)
☐ High carbon energy use (i.e. carbon based fuels)
☐ Climate change
☐ Other ____________________________
Section II: Democracy Audit

16) Do you think your organisation provides each member / employee opportunity for expressing their preferences on decision making?
☐ Strongly agree
☐ Agree
☐ Neutral
☐ Disagree
☐ Strongly disagree

17) Do you think your organisation should do more to promote open and inclusive participation regarding critical decision making?
☐ Strongly agree
☐ Agree
☐ Neutral
☐ Disagree
☐ Strongly disagree

18) Do you think your organisation’s voting system is fair?
☐ Strongly agree
☐ Agree
☐ Neutral
☐ Disagree
☐ Strongly disagree
☐ Not applicable (i.e. issues are not voted on)

19) Do you think a single voting system (one per member / employee) for your organisation would improve its effectiveness?
☐ Strongly agree
☐ Agree
☐ Neutral
☐ Disagree
☐ Strongly disagree
20) Do you think your organisation provides each member / employee with sufficient information to evaluate decisions that are voted on?

☐ Strongly agree
☐ Agree
☐ Neutral
☐ Disagree
☐ Strongly disagree

21) How do you gain access to information regarding decisions that are made by your organisation?

☐ Group meetings
☐ Individual meetings
☐ Website
☐ Secondary source
☐ Private research

22) Do you think your organisation provides you with enough opportunity to introduce items to the agenda?

☐ Strongly agree
☐ Agree
☐ Neutral
☐ Disagree
☐ Strongly disagree

23) Do you think your organisation provides other members / employees enough opportunity to introduce items to the agenda?

☐ Strongly agree
☐ Agree
☐ Neutral
☐ Disagree
☐ Strongly disagree

24) Do you think your organisation makes decisions that directly affect you without inclusive discussion? (i.e. not all members are aware or consulted)

☐ Strongly agree
☐ Agree
☐ Neutral
☐ Disagree
☐ Strongly disagree
25) Do you think your organisation should do more to promote inclusive participation in its daily operations?
  □ Strongly agree
  □ Agree
  □ Neutral
  □ Disagree
  □ Strongly disagree

26) Please write any additional comments on any of the questions above. (please note the question number next to the comment)

27) Please write any additional comments you feel are applicable regarding the democratic structure of your organisation.
**Vita Auctoris**

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<th>Simon Willans</th>
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<td>Alexandria, Scotland</td>
</tr>
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<td>YEAR OF BIRTH</td>
<td>1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Belle River District High School, Belle River, Ontario 1987-1992</td>
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<td></td>
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