Understanding the Canadian Domestic Security Apparatus: Bridging Public Opinion with the Government of Canada's Security Initiatives against Terrorism

Andrew Chronopoulos
University of Windsor

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Understanding the Canadian Domestic Security Apparatus: Bridging Public Opinion with the Government of Canada’s Security Initiatives against Terrorism

by

Andrew Chronopoulos

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies through Sociology and Anthropology in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada
2008
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Abstract

This paper explores some of the central factors in society that determine whether the Canadian public will support or oppose the Canadian government’s domestic security initiatives aimed at preventing terrorism. A recent surge in security awareness in the Western world spurred by the threat of global terrorism has seen the re-formulation of its security structures and the professionals they employ by using intensive surveillance methods and personal information collection previously restrained by law. Previous literature, primarily from the United States, has begun to illustrate the important role that trust and the media have on predicting whether a public will support counterterrorism policies that restrict civil liberties. In light of this, using the *International Surveillance and Privacy Opinion Research Survey* (2006), this thesis attempts to contribute to this range of literature from a Canadian perspective by exploring the role of trust, knowledge, and the media in predicting support or opposition for a more intensive security state and whether knowledge of these security infrastructures mediates their relationship. Bivariate and multivariate analyses reveal that trust in government is the strongest determinant of whether people will support counterterrorism policies. While media is also a significant predictor, it is found that trust, and not knowledge, seems to mediate the relationship of media on supporting these policies. Theoretical frameworks and policy implications are also discussed.
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to those security professionals who take an active role in ensuring the safety of Canadians from the threat of terrorism at home and abroad.
Acknowledgements

This research project would not have been possible without the support and influence of many people. I wish to express gratitude to my advisor, Professor Dr. Reza Nakhaie, who was very helpful and offered invaluable assistance, support and guidance. Deepest gratitude is also due to the members of the supervising committee, Professor Dr. Willem de Lint and Professor Reem Bahdi, without whose knowledge and assistance this study would not have been successful.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Thesis Outline
1.1 From the Plains of Abraham to the Mountains of Afghanistan: The Canadian People and the Threat of Terrorism

"The Leviathan will hold in its hands both the dagger of justice, whereby it maintains internal peace, and the sword of war, whereby it guarantees external defence and punishes the rebel who declares his will to disobey; the internal enemy comes under the law of war because ‘Rebellion is but warre renewed’"

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [XXVIII: setting ‘the multitude against the people’ De Cive, XII, VIII], (1651).

During the early morning hours of September 13, 1759, along the banks of the St. Lawrence River, the young British General James Wolfe, famously immortalized in Benjamin West’s painting, lied dying on the battlefield having secured a British victory in Quebec and forever changed the Canadian landscape. However, although the French and British troops lined up to meet each other that morning as was the custom of the battles of their day, history rarely speaks of the events that took place away from the Plains of Abraham that helped secure a British victory. These events have close parallels to the battles of today and ultimately had the sole purpose of terrorizing and subduing the local population with “unorthodox” methods.

Leading up to the battle the British Army, in its “War of Conquest,” were on the brink of capturing one of France’s last major forts at Quebec City and establishing British governance in Canada (Whitton, 1929). The troops of Wolfe disembarked on the Côte de Beaupré and set fire to the villages under the dismayed eyes of their unarmed inhabitants who were incapable of defending themselves (Ferretti, 2000). Across, on the Southern Coast, General Wolfe’s boats bombarded the coastal cliffs looking for a weakness in Montcalm’s defences. Some of the lead scouts in boats floated quietly towards the cliffs up river from the Citadel and made their way ashore. They were dressed in civilian attire and were quickly challenged by French sentinels on
shore. Wolfe's scouts answered in French and the deception succeeded; as they got around the sentinels they quickly overpowered them, killing them instantly, and started their ascent up the steep cliffs (Whitton, 1929: 31). By sunrise, 4500 British soldiers awaited a fight from the French which did not take long, and as both commanders lay dead on the battlefield, the remaining French garrison surrendered and the British flag flew above the Citadel (Whitton, 1929: 34).

This pivotal battle involved acts that some would characterize as terrorism inside Canadian borders, directed towards the Canadian people, although this could easily be refuted today since no clear, officially recognized definition of terrorism exists. The United Nations does, of course, have a stack of "counterterrorism" resolutions, and continues to hold international counterterrorism conventions but still no clear definition of what terrorism entails has been implemented by the General Assembly. However, on March 17, 2005, a UN panel described terrorism in a report as any act "intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or of compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act" (UN Security Council, Para. 142). Wolfe's troops' conduct in 1759 resembles those which the UN panel identifies as being a form of terrorism, and while scholars may refute the actions against the

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1 Most academics would agree that the act of terrorism (often involving an illegal act(s) with ideological, religious, and/or political objectives in mind conducted by an individual, group, or state) is not a new phenomenon. The highly complex and increasingly large-scale networking that terrorism now entails at the international level constitutes an entirely new challenge to the system of collective security, as represented by the approach of the United Nations Organization. However, an actual academic consensus on the definition of terrorism does not exist and proves problematic in identifying an acceptable definition of terrorism in this study. Thus, applying the UN's notion of terrorism for the purpose of this study, "terrorism constitutes a threat to international peace and security", and it is contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (Security Council Resolution S/RES/1373, 2001).

2 More recently, as part of its response to the events of 9/11, the Sixth Community of the United Nations General Assembly attempted to formulate a comprehensive general definition of terrorism, see Article 2(1) of the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. While the United Nations General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee on terrorism has struggled to formulate a universally accepted definition, a great deal of debate remains by both state actors and academics. The Convention is still in draft form.

3 Note This report does not constitute international law.
French Canadians as being “terroristic,” subsequent events in Canada’s history are not as easily debatable.

In the 1960s, the *Front de Liberation du Quebec* (FLQ) carried out a series of terrorist attacks in Quebec, culminating in the dramatic 1970 “October Crisis.” The FLQ arose out of a larger separatist movement, widespread among French-speaking Canadians and based on the belief that Quebecois cultural and economic interests were not being adequately served (Ross & Gurr, 1989). The policy of not targeting individuals changed drastically during the October Crisis when one of the cells abducted James Richard Cross, a British diplomat appointed to the UK consulate in Montreal (Leman-Langlois & Brodeur, 2005). The FLQ made several demands, one of which was the public reading, on national television, of its manifesto. The Canadian government gave in to this demand and the manifesto was read on television, denouncing the exploitation of Quebec’s working class; it had a profound impact on Quebec public opinion. Unexpectedly, the issue quickly became a full-fledged crisis and the police forces in Quebec were overwhelmed. On October 15th the federal government used forgotten World War One legislation, *The War Measures Act*. The legislation enacted a set of emergency regulations that abrogated civil liberties in Quebec (Brodeur, 1991). Likewise, The Canadian Armed Forces were activated in Quebec and approximately 500 citizens were arrested and put in preventative custody, of which all were later released without criminal charges being laid (Brodeur, 1991). The FLQ continued their struggle until 1973 where it was eventually defeated by the government’s unyielding police and military response, and no longer continued to be a serious threat. Ultimately, as Sean Maloney notes, the Canadian government’s response to the FLQ’s terrorism strategy was
“the creation, through physical and psychological action (direct and indirect) of the situation wherein the moral disintegration of the target players will lead them to accept and take decisions which will produce the desired result. The enemy was to be attacked by provoking fear, paralysis, surprise” (2000: 77)

In the 1980s, international terrorist campaigns by Armenian and Sikh opposition movements spilled over into Canada. On June 23, 1985, Canada found itself on the international terrorism map when two bombs built in Canada detonated within an hour of each other on opposite sides of the world killing 329 people, of which 280 were Canadian citizens or had Canadian landed immigrant status (Zekulin, 2005). Canadian Sikh separatists, disgusted at the Indian government for attacking their religion’s holiest shrine, the Golden Temple, were immediately suspected by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) of perpetrating the worst act of aviation terrorism and causing the largest death toll from a single terrorist incident prior to September 11, 2001 (Lemyre et al., 2006). As the RCMP and other police agencies scrambled to infiltrate a close-knit immigrant community and collect evidence against the suspected terrorists, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was destroying taped telephone calls between the same people the RCMP was investigating (Lemyre et al., 2006).

The Canadian government’s response consisted of amending several pieces of existing legislation including The Aeronautics Act, which contained procedures and regulations regarding air travel and the 1976 Immigration Act, providing more security measures in the

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4 Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Aeronautics Act was again amended under Bill C-44 and passed by parliament in late 2001. Under the Public Safety Act of 2002, section 482 of the Aeronautics Act allows the RCMP Commissioner, the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), or officials designated by them to obtain the same airline passenger information, without warrant, for transportation security purposes, or for a variety of other purposes, some of which are not directly related to terrorism, transportation security or national security. For example, they would be able to obtain this information to enforce arrest warrants where a person has been charged with an offence punishable by imprisonment of five years or more, or arrest warrants under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001, c 27) and the Extradition Act (1985, c E-21) (Wispinsky, Parliamentary Information and Research Center Law and Governance Division, 2006)
application process from foreigners. Concurrently, both examples of legislation were identified as having potential security connotations and in need of revamping (Rempel, 2004). The response from the public was an inquiry, with the participation of the Attorney General of Canada and commenced by the Commission of Inquiry. The Commission was charged with investigating and evaluating multiple facets of the government of Canada’s activities, requiring “broad access to documents in government custody, evidence from government employees and submissions from government departments” (Commission of Inquiry, May 1: 2006). The trial of those accused of the bombing, Ripudaman Singh Malik and Ajaib Singh Bagri, which took over 20 years and became the costliest in Canadian history at nearly 130 million, resulted in the co-accused being found not quality and released. To date, no one has been found responsible for the Air India terrorist attacks in Canada.

Although the threat of terrorism is currently a hotly debated issue found in several of the government’s reactive security measures, it is clear that Canada is no stranger to international and domestic terrorist attacks on its nationals. Subsequently, the most recent and fatal attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, has become the catalyst for rallying behind adopting measures to combat the “war on terror.” There is little doubt that these events were instrumental in seeing Canadian troops deployed to the mountainous regions of Afghanistan while opening a process of re-evaluation that has seen unprecedented levels of policy reform. Canada’s legislative response to 9/11 was C-36: The Anti Terrorism Act (2001), which unlike the Air India response that was solely geared towards amending The Aeronautics Act and creating a counterterrorism task force, this new legislation was more encompassing of:
"an omnibus piece of legislation containing major enactments or amendments to a number of federal statutes, including the Criminal Code, the Security of Information Act (amending and renaming the Official Secrets Act), the Canadian Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, the Charities Registration (Security Information) Act, and the National Defence Act" (Department of Justice, 2005).

While this is simply an in-depth legal explanation, The Anti-Terrorism Act (2001) is designed to close the uncertainties in the Canadian security apparatuses. One of the main paths of action has been the increase of police information and intelligence capacities, thus strengthening coordination among the country’s security agencies, in essence establishing a universal doctrine for prevention that would enhance cooperation with other countries also affected by terrorism and provide a model framework for those countries yet to be affected. The Anti-Terrorism Act (2001) has allowed the Government of Canada to re-develop the security structures and the professionals they employ by using intensive surveillance methods and investigative techniques on the Canadian public that was previously restrained by law. It has been designed to disable and destroy terrorist organizations, provide investigative tools to surveillance and intelligence agencies, while meeting the international standards for combating terrorism and ensuring the preservation of Canadian values through stronger laws against hate crimes and propaganda (Department of Justice Canada, 2005).

One structure that the Anti-Terrorism Act (2001) has generated is the Passenger Protection Program implemented in June 2007 which according to the Minister of Transport, Lawrence Cannon, will “add another layer of security to our aviation system while maintaining efficiency and ensuring the privacy and human rights of Canadians are protected” (Transport Canada, 2006). Essentially though, a Canadian can be declared too dangerous to fly, but not dangerous enough according to the RCMP and CSIS, to be arrested. The report acknowledges
that this is not being put into place to target known terrorists that national security agencies are trying to apprehend, but rather "people who are suspected of being a threat to aviation security" (Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2007).

Therefore, despite significant changes in security laws and what some have argued the consequent intrusion into civil liberties, we have little knowledge about the Canadian public's acceptance or opposition to these ominous security policy changes. Undoubtedly, aside from the obvious contribution that the events of 9/11 had in ensuring a legislative response specifically designed towards terrorism, the Canadian government asserted that there were other reasons for the Anti-Terrorism Act (2001). They stated that one of the main catalysts for Bill C-36 was that the core responsibility of the Government of Canada is to provide for the security of Canadians, which one can assume does not only entail the threat of terrorism. The Canadian Department of Justice (2005) stated that routine evaluations of the existing state of the federal legislation to achieve this objective were deemed in need of improvement. Furthermore, they note that the Government of Canada is determined to strike an appropriate balance between respecting Canadian values of fairness and respect for human rights while helping to ensure that Canadians and the global community are better protected. However, The United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has reminded the international community that "United Nations conventions already provide a legal framework for many of the steps that must be taken to eradicate terrorism – including the extradition and prosecution of offenders and the suppression of money laundering" (UN Human Rights Committee, 2006). These conventions, he said, "must be implemented in full" (UN Human Rights Committee, 2006: para. 13). In light of Annan's assurance that UN members have not only the co-operation of the governing body but the legislative backing to take the steps to combat international terrorism, one needs to take a
step back and critically evaluate the factors that determine whether the public supports an increase in intensive security measures domestically.

Cross-currents of public opinion in the midst of any security issue in Canada is almost certain, nevertheless, as Reinares notes “the legal guarantees enjoyed by the citizens, and the interplay of articulated interests present in the internal security field, are critical factors in the formation and implementation of anti-terrorist policies” (1998: 352). It is true that governments through their democratic institutions may unwittingly magnify the political and social repercussions of terrorism when they are overzealous in their legal response. This is especially likely to occur when they are carried out by state security apparatuses that are inadequate for the task at hand. This means intensive surveillance by means of wire tapping and closed circuit televisions (CCTV) and unlawful detention of suspected terrorists may prove counter-productive. Furthermore, in such instances, the tendency is to stretch the rules to abusive lengths and even far beyond the limits established by law. However, it would be foolish to assume that the threat of terrorism does not exist inside Canadian borders. Canada of course has international obligations to prosecute acts of terrorism5 Essentially, without public support, these measures will only be administered impartially and in many cases it would not be going too far to assert that they represent a greater threat to democracy than the terrorism they are supposed to combat. Thus, in light of this research the modest attempt here aims at investigating the factors that determine the Canadian public’s attitude with the Government of

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International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 9 December 1999, GA Res 54/109, ratified by Canada 15 February 2002, Art 4, 9, see also, UN Security Council Resolution 1456 (2003), 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/RES/1456 “States must bring to justice those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts or provide safe havens, in accordance with international law, in particular on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute” (para. 3) UN General Assembly Resolution 58/81 (2003), 9 December 2003, UN RES/58/81
Canada's expansion of its intelligence and surveillance apparatuses in eliminating terrorism. In this research, it will be crucial to critically measure the Government of Canada's recent anti-terrorism responses with the appropriate theoretical backing.

1.2 Thesis Overview

Despite the importance of such legislations for the legitimacy of the Canadian state apparatus, there is no Canadian research which evaluates factors responsible for the Canadian public's support or opposition to the Canadian government's adaptation of the domestic security structures to the risks and threats inherent to terrorism. There are few studies that take into account the publics' reaction to security legislation as a result of the threat of terrorism. Additionally, most of that research is conducted in the United States.

While research has demonstrated that the factors which influence public opinion can play an important role in the acceptance of security policy and legislation, there is a lack of consensus regarding precisely which factors influence public support of security policy and legislation. Furthermore, much of the literature has not considered the role of these factors in conjunction with one another. In relation to security measures and outcomes, the factors that influence public opinion are combined to create complex views about government liberties and conduct, which is a research project that might not have seen the proper light of day. In the spirit of exploring this area, I will attempt to take stock of what these various factors shaping public opinion about Canadian security policy and legislation represent not only exclusively but also taken in tandem with each other in an effort to acknowledge the complexity of public opinion formation. In all intents and purposes, this study wishes to add to the literature on
domestic security policy by expanding the analysis of the role of trust, knowledge, and the role
media play in shaping public opinion in Canada. It specifically argues that trust in government,
knowledge of security infrastructures and media attention to immigrants, visible minorities, and
stories about terrorism will be significant factors in gauging whether Canadians support
counterterrorism initiatives. Furthermore, the rationale for Canadian public support of more
intensive security measures enacted by the Government of Canada can be found in a
Canadian’s level of trust in government, knowledge of security infrastructures, and awareness
of media attention to immigrants, visible minorities, and stories about terrorism all functioning
in tandem with each other.

On the whole, this thesis reports on the amalgamation of factors which are influential in
the development of an individual opinion in Canada. In doing so, it presents a snapshot of
Canadian attitudes from all segments of society, legitimizing the relationship between the
individual and the state. Is the public in agreement with the Canadian government’s aim at
adapting domestic security structures to the risks and threats inherent to terrorism? If so, what
are the main reasons for the Canadian citizen’s support of counterterrorism policies and the
assembly of more intensive security structures?

Using data from the *International Surveillance and Privacy Opinion Research Survey* (only
the data involving Canada will be employed here), collected in 2006 on behalf of Queen’s
University from Canadians selected at random to participate voluntarily, the research objectives
will be to:

1. examine and document the relationship between trust in government, socio-
demographic variables, a socio-economic variable, the willingness of citizens to
sacrifice civil liberties, the attainment of knowledge about security infrastructures, media attention of visible minorities, immigrants, and terrorism-related stories, and;

2. to the extent that relationships exist between these variables on supporting security legislation and policies, the study will explore the intricacy of the public opinion process and address whether or not trust in government is significant or even tempered by other factors in predicting support for Canadian domestic security structures.

In the proceeding chapters detailed discussions and consideration is given to the aforementioned research objectives. We begin in Chapter 2 by establishing a theoretical foundation around the concept of public opinion, moving on to the theoretical backing of how trust, knowledge, and mass media interrelate between the state and the people. This will aid us in facilitating discussion and, more importantly, enable us to draw various conclusions from our results. In Chapter 3 we will review the previous literature on how the public in Western democracies gauge their governments’ recent adaptation of domestic security infrastructure to the threats terrorism now poses on the global stage. Chapter 4 accounts for the methodology used in this investigation including the research hypotheses guiding this study. Next, Chapter 5 will outline the findings from the bivariate and multivariate analyses conducted under the direction of the research questions presented. Following the findings, Chapter 6 will draw on conclusions to the research and provide policy implications for future research in the Canadian context. Lastly, Chapter 7 will illustrate the conceptual and methodological limitations of the study.
CHAPTER 2

Theoretical Framework
2.1 A Pluralistic Phenomenon: Conceptualizing Public Opinion in a Liberal Democracy

"The significant revolution of modern times is not industrial or economic or political, but the revolution taking place in the art of creating consent among the governed. Within the life of the new generation now in control of affairs, persuasion has become a self-conscious art and regular organ of popular government. None of us begins to understand the consequences, but it is no daring prophecy to say that the knowledge of how to create consent will alter every political premise."


The belief that public opinion should legitimize governance can be traced back at least to ancient Greece. Aristotle, in opposition to Plato, felt that there is an element of truth in the principal that “there is more wisdom in a multitude than in an individual because a superior wisdom is created by joining the correct though incomplete bits of knowledge from everyone in the multitude” (Crespi, 1997: 111). Much later, this became a major influence on modern democratic philosophy through Rousseau’s argument, contradictory to Hobbesian thought, that the will of the people is the only legitimate basis of government (Rousseau, [1762]1952). He further maintained that relying on the will of the people is legitimate because it does not require the handing over of inherent individual rights to any individual or set of individuals, such as the king or aristocracy. Instead, an association is created through the voluntarily entered social contract in which “each member is an invisible member of the whole” (Rousseau, [1762]1952: 392).

Today, public opinion is one of the most elusive and complex concepts affiliated with the democratic process. The intrinsic network of democratic decision-making has always involved the system of public opinion formation. However, we must ask whether the systems of public opinion formation always been democratic. Public opinion is both the cause and effect of legislative omni-competence, or the power to govern. It is, therefore, constitutive of popular
sovereignty and essentially the condition needed for freedom (Aikens, 1996: 13). In a state in which the concept of popular sovereignty is operative, the fact that the opinions of the average citizen take on public significance is of positive confidence in any democracy. The political leaders have committed the Canadian people to a long-term and permanent battle against terrorism, and engaged in trade-offs between individual prerogatives and measures to enhance domestic security. Theorists have long debated the public's capacity and the role of public opinion in times of national as well as international crises. The 20th century saw two major schools of thought constructed in order to unearth a theory that could properly account for the formation of public opinion, the traditionalists and the revisionists.

Modern concepts of public opinion in Western democracies and its role in policy processes evolved to form an elitist perspective by the early part of the 20th century characterized by some important propositions. Firstly, traditionalists believe that most citizens lack both the cognitive capacities to understand politically sophisticated and technically complicated issues, and in this, they lack sufficient factual information (knowledge) about most policy issues to develop reasoned preferences. Secondly, underlying dispositions among the general public are insufficient to systematically structure and constrain views in complex policy domains, especially foreign and security policies. Thirdly, for traditionalists, public opinion at the individual level is unstable, subject to rapid swings. Consequently, public opinion at the individual level is susceptible to overreaction which is detrimental to coherent, sustained policy (Jenkins-Smith & Herron, 2005: 599-600). These interpretations (combined with an emphasis on the external nature of public opinion, the fact of its articulation, irrespective of the form thereof) gained wide acceptance among political theorists and academics. Together they helped
shape the “traditional” view that emphasized a limit on the public’s capacity to affect policy decisions.

Arguments for the traditionalist perspective have been advanced, among others, by the classics: Lippmann (1922, 1955), Almond (1950, 1956), and Morgenthau (1948), and more recently Zaller (1992) and Weissberg (2001). Lippmann, while working on propaganda for the United States during the Great War, became concerned with the power of the “new” media to manipulate public opinion and wield influence over affairs of the state (1922: 6). As the most well known traditionalist, Lippmann writes, “the democratic ideal, as Jefferson moulded it...became the political gospel, and supplied the stereotypes which Americans of all parties have looked at in politics” (1922: 7). Yet the Jefferson vision for Lippmann (1922) will forever be ill-suited to the needs of a vast, technologically advanced, commercial nation-state. The traditional democrat took it as a matter of faith that the citizen would be adequately informed. Lippmann investigated the flaws in the proposition that individuals are naturally well enough informed to possess sound political judgement on matters concerning the nation-state. In order to successfully discharge his democratic function a citizen would, realistically, have to have a phenomenal grasp of local, national, and international affairs (Lippmann, 1922: 9).

Three inter-related elements central to the system of public opinion formation proposed by Lippmann include the subsumption of political communication under the economics of mass media, the creation of a culture of “objectivity” in the journalistic profession, and the construction of a system of organized intelligence in elite administrative cycles (1922: 16). The first element constructs political media as being subjected to pressures from the community of businessmen who fund the media product. The news editor acts with the former in mind while controlling the intermediary between the public and government (Lippmann, 1922: 16). The
second element conceptualizes the guidelines and standards of objectivity the editor desires that will avoid offending, confusing the loyal reader and/or advertiser with unconventional, insufficient or clumsy material (Lippmann, 1922: 17). The final element entails a method of constructing a sound public opinion through organized intelligence. This will result from centrally located intelligence agencies staffed by professional scientists, social scientists, and administrators. The better the ability of such institutions as the police, courts, and the legislative branch to organize information, the more likely the objective news service will work with greater precision in reporting the news, and the more likely public opinion will be adequately informed for the political process to function properly. The press for Lippmann is merely a “searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode and then another out of the darkness, into vision” (1922: 22). The pivotal nexus of power is vested in a highly rational policy elite that has invested the time and energy in understanding the complex functionality of the nation-state. Political theorists and academics of the traditional view positing limited public capacity in the democratic process continue to influence many contemporary assumptions about what elites should expect from the general public.

By the latter part of the 20th century, traditionalist concepts came under intense scrutiny by a growing body of theorists and academics now referred to as “revisionists.” The challenges were put forth during the latter part of the 20th century by Chittick, Billingsey, and Travis (1995), Herron and Jenkins-Smith (2002, 2005), Hurwitz & Peffley (1987, 1990), and Shapiro & Page (1988, 1994), with John Dewey being one of the relatively few critics during Lippmann’s writings (1922). They are among the leading scholars whose countervailing propositions suggest that that the complete information is not required for reasoned policy choice. John Dewey was one of the rare critics of Lippmann’s during his writings on public opinion in the early part of the 20th
century. Dewey's understanding of public opinion very much differed from that of traditionalists. Dewey considered an actively involved public an essential element of democracy. If as many possible individuals present as many possible different ideas and facts, all at the same time discussing them with unique arguments, the probability increases that a collectively held view will prevail (Dewey, 1922). Lippmann's objection to this ideal was based on the belief that it is better to leave decision making to selected best-qualified individuals who should decide without people's participation, as the role of public opinion should be that of observers. For Dewey, the democratic political process relies on the level of quality in the judgement of the citizenry. Democratic ideas will not be more closely realized until a system of public opinion formation emerges that aids in the construction of a high level of political judgement on the part of the citizenry (Dewey, 1922). Dewey insisted on the fundamental importance of citizens' education and their participation in deliberation and decision making for any democratic system. Dewey defines the public as "a large body of persons having a common interest in controlling the consequences of social transactions" ([1927]1991: 137).

Revisionists believe that complete information is not required for reasoned policy choice. Specifically, ordinary citizens are cognitively disseminating in order to disregard most of the information they could acquire while retaining information they consider most important to their individual and collective welfare (Jenkins-Smith, 2005: 600). This means that selective information processing is an attribute of rationality and cognitive sophistication, not a result of limited capacities to comprehend, as the traditionalists argue. While over time variation in individual opinions and issue salience is evident, such variations according to revisionists should not be associated with broadly unstable and volatile public opinion. This is true according to Splichal (1999) who illustrates that longitudinal analyses of aggregate public views show
stability in collective opinions that are related to underlying beliefs or that are events-driven. The public can be seen as responding to events through a controlled and rational process while examining as much creditable evidence as is available. Following an event such as 9/11, a traditionalist expectation sees the public vulnerable to reactive policies curtailing rights and freedoms while individual prerogatives are surrendered for security. The public demands retribution and widespread support when overwhelming punitive force is expected. The revisionist expectation is roughly the opposite. It sees the public's response as controlled with a rational threat assessment. Initial support for intrusive policies to enhance security would quickly dampen and core beliefs about individual rights do not change during the public's assessment of the risk.

The aforementioned example is helpful in uncovering the black and white schematic of public opinion but leaves some ambiguity to the links that connect public opinion with public policy. That is, whether we believe in the efficiency of public opinion or not in developing state policy, we must understand the diverse system in which rule is exercised in an advanced liberal democracy (Rose & Miller, 1992). Most research out of the public opinion field has relied on democratic responsiveness theories which “assert that public opinion resulting in one direction or another should be reflected in the policies and laws of a representative government. When public policy shifts, it is expected that the shift was the cause of public opinion shifting by either supporting a particular policy or opposing it” (Rounce, 2004). However, although important conclusions can be drawn from this type of research alone, we are more interested here in what constitutes the most important factor(s) in gaining public support. How can political actors involved in domestic security policy in Canada utilize public attitudes? What factors affect whether or not, when, and how the Canadian public becomes motivated in supporting
government priorities to further securitize the state? It is amidst these factors that we may
draw conclusions about how political power is exercised in a Western democratic society.

In following Rose and Miller’s (1992) formation of how political power is exercised, we
can begin to critically look at how the “intellectual machinery of government” is “rendering the
world thinkable” (1992: 182). Before the state can submit a population manageable, it must
first understand the factors that are of substance to the population when opinion is being
formulated. It is in these factors, these everyday interactions with these crucial elements of
society, that we become amenable to state control. The colossus of connections established
between the ambition of political actors through the activities of individuals and groups are
continuing to assemble programs operable (Rose & Miller, 1992). The mechanisms or what we
have thus far labelled “factors” can be paralleled with what Rose and Miller (1992: 183) refer to
as “technologies of government.” Accordingly, it is through technologies that the government
can extend its political rationalities and the programs that sustain them. The final step is making
them capable of deployment. The utilization of these heterogeneous technologies enables the
modern state to “govern at a distance” and mobilize resources to indirectly lead civil society
towards their own ends (Rose & Miller, 1992). The ever-expanding spheres of government that
exist in society each act as a locale of information. The devices that enable an individual to build
trust in government for example, flow from “network conduits” that transport information to
and from locales (Rose & Miller, 1992: 186). This sustains the political objectives of the state
without encroaching on individual autonomy. Importantly, the locales that work as information
hubs can monitor and dictate what resources pass through the civil society. Rose and Miller
state:
The enactment of legislation is a powerful resource in the creation of centers, to the extent that law translates aspects of governmental programme into mechanisms that establish, constrain, or empower certain agents or entities and set some of the key terms of their deliberations (1992: 189-190).

In 2004, Canada introduced its first national security policy, “Securing an Open Society,” which devotes itself to securing the Canadian population while addressing the remaining “security gaps” within its territory (PCO, 2004: 7). The uncertainty that Canada’s national security policy confronts is consistent with the view that “knowledge about security can foster political closure” (de Lint and Virta, 2004: 466). Furthermore, as Huysmans (1998) illustrates, the threat construction and the externalization of fear moderates the degree of uncertainty a population will experience. The government functions in an active topology of power that diversifies the intricate problems in the emergence of threats, and the dilemma, as Foucault emphasized in much of his work on governmantality, was to know what effects it has and where it attains its source of power in society (Dillon, 2007). The legitimacy of the state as an efficient political unit rests less on how it “manages” enemies, and first and foremost on how it negotiates with the question of ontological security (Huysmans, 1998: 242). Maintaining ontological security, which Giddens (1991) refers to as sustaining continuity and a sense of order in regard to one’s experiences, is now increasingly important to the legitimacy of the state.

When a society, or specific groups thereof, no longer grants political actors the authority to assert their political rationalities through force, then obedience may be restored by increasing the coercive pressure (Haubrich, 2006). As Haubrich (2006) illustrates, this excessive force may be seen as unjustified, and as a result, may bring about further violence. This was seen in Northern Ireland in the 1970’s when London, after only a few years, reversed its harsh
anti-terrorism policy as the people were becoming increasingly more polarized. Western democracies seem to be transforming their security apparatuses by dismantling borders and by no longer having a clear distinction between its external and internal security (Hörnqvist, 2004; Haubrich, 2006). The security-dichotomies that previously characterized the state are being diluted by global terrorism and the domestic and external policies that are responding to the uncertainty of this threat (Haubrich, 2006). This has undoubtedly spawned a security that is basically “comprised of different discourses of danger” where modern political power now functions in a biometric state (Dillion, 2007: 10).

The current national security policy sheds light on how power relations function in Canada. The policy articulates the primary security objective as being the freedom, health, and safety of Canadians. The concept of human security which policy in Canada has emphasised in recent years has taken center stage in combating various threats posed by terrorism. According to this concept, the safety and well-being of people must be rooted in the political, social, and economic institutions that are sustainable and have the confidence of the people they are intended to serve. This focuses on the maintenance of the population as the central national security concern, representing an exit from traditional constructions of domestic security discourse. Previously, security has been imagined as the principal, and more often than not, sole object when framing an exterior threat to national security (Bell, 2006). The Canadian policy rationalizes a security approach that sees domestic security policy oriented towards “ends-means strategies” that are battled as a collective population (Bell, 2006: 148). This further requires the capitulation to regulatory mechanisms that will overcome the uncertainty that now encompasses the very idea of “threat” to the people of the state under what was
declared the motto of the new republic following the French Revolution, and currently what Western democracies strive to maintain, as liberty, equality, and fraternity.

The technologies involved in the public opinion process in regards to domestic security policy are the focus of investigation in this research. The problem for political actors in the latter part of the 20th Century was one of connecting the technologies that exist in society to the calculation and consideration under their authority (Rose and Miller, 1992). Rose and Miller (1992: 195) refer to this as the new “neo-liberal mode of government” where the collective mechanisms of government came together. The authors illustrate that the contemporary “crises” of welfare came out of the problems provoked by the technologies that sought to operationalize new government. Under the new rationality of the government arose “the proliferation of a range of other, more indirect means” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 197). The technologies became more intricate and calculative and the government invested in the entrepreneurial market that would align producers to consumers. We know little about the relevant, nor important, contemporary technologies of government that determine public support for an increasingly securitized Canadian state. However, we can hypothesize that some of the crucial technologies that individuals interact with will directly, and indirectly through other determents, gauge its degree of significance in predicting an individual’s support for recent Canadian domestic security policies.

2.1.1 The Role of Trust

The conventional view is that the state has neither the power of the written signature nor that of the sword, and therefore depends upon the voluntary compliance of the people that
typically springs from legitimacy. In truth, however, no matter how useful legitimacy may be to
the state, no political institution could be effective without some mechanism for inducing
citizens to believe that accepting their policy outputs, even disagreeable ones, is the right thing
to do (Tyler, 1990 & 2006). Government effectiveness, as Foucault (2004) saw it, is measured by
how well the political actors understand the complex forces of factual life. And no substantial
regime, as Tilly argues, “can survive without drawing on the resources held by trust networks”
(2004: 1). Trust in government is multi-faceted, and is arguably the most important mechanism
that legitimizes state practice. Political institutions are often assessed in accordance to their
capacity of promoting the views and interests of the individuals who put their confidence in
them. It has been recent practice for Western democracies to assemble a simple threat
construction in the war against terrorism. This has meant identifying a lethal and uncertain
enemy capable of mass destruction to propagate a shared “us versus them” feeling. As
Huysmans (1998: 235) notes, drawing the boundary in security discourse between “those-one-
can-trust” and “those-one-fears” helps moderate the fear of uncertainty. It is crucial to
understand that uncertainty does not mean a permanent state of crisis or urgency, but rather
the impossibility to hierarchize threats would lead to trust in the ability to keep threats at a
distance to collapse (Huysmans, 1998). This view is shared by de Lint and Virta (2004), who
argue that the reduction of harm is the most logical limitation to otherwise constant ambiguity.

It was Durkheim who repeatedly stressed that social life without some measure of trust
would be impossible. It is in Charles Tilly’s "Trust and Rule" (2004) that the author applies the
same relationship for the political in a liberal democracy. Marshalled in through historic
evidence, Tilly (2004) argues that trust networks in society cannot survive separately from those
that are already integrated with the state. Tilly seems to almost fully reject the optimism of
Putnam's (1993) work in social capital that praises the independence of trust and associational life as the bedrock of a liberal democracy. At the core of Tilly's (2004) argument is that contemporary democracies face a threat of de-democratization if major segments of the population withdraw their trust from public politics. Modern political regimes, the policies and agendas they seek to incorporate, cannot operate without the extensive integration of trust networks into public politics (Tilly, 2004). In the historically rare account of democracy, the political arrangements that situate the ability of people to invest their trust into systems of political power have potentially set up limits to rulers' exploitation of this resource (Tilly, 2004).

An important contribution to the research in explaining the networking of trust in political policy can also be found in the research conducted by Margaret Levi, who Tilly (2004) also utilizes in his book. Her research focuses on situations where subjects of potential soldiers and governmental agents negotiate their consent out to military service or resistance to that consent during wartime (Levi, 1997: 43). Levi employs a model of "contingent consent" in explaining when individual citizens are more likely to comply with precarious, and possibly costly, demands from their governments. The degree is threefold;

1) Citizens perceive the government to be trustworthy,
2) The portion of citizens complying (that is, the degree of "ethical reciprocity") increases, and

The three elements aforementioned are central in applying theory to the results from our regression models in this research project. Element two deals with the importance of interactions citizens share with each other, and essentially the knowledge one acquires when deciding on an issue of policy in government. Element three builds on element two, but illustrates the fundamental importance that the flow of information, which in a Western
democracy is habitually distributed by the mass media, in building an opinion on governmental policy. Both elements two and three will be covered in the following sections, however, element one is of relevance here. It is straightforward in application, so that as is hypothesized in this study, trust will be the most important predictor in determining Canadians’ support for domestic security apparatuses. This will confirm the importance of trust in the public’s formation for support to governmental policies and draw attention to the state’s ability to control its delicate makeup through other means. It is when we follow Tilly’s (2004) argument, which identifies the de-democratization of modern politics if the public withdraw their networks of trust from governmental policy making, that we understand its critical importance.

More often than not, the government is crucial in establishing the levels of trust among citizens and makes achievable a full range of political, social, and economic transactions that would otherwise be impossible (Levi, 1997: 17). Moreover, the use of coercion is critical to this task, and modern democratic institutions appear to be better astute in utilizing coercion over non-democratic institutions. This lies in the ability to constrain the exercise of coercion to tasks that enhance rather than undermine trust. The “technologies” that make this possible by a multitude of connections link the opinions of individuals to the aspirations of authorities (Rose & Miller, 1992). It is the objects, instruments, and tasks of the government that have the potential to influence the construction or destruction of trust in the domain of civil society. Of course, relatively little attention has been accredited to the role the state plays in influencing generalized trust. Most research in the area of social capital and trust focus on the role the individual and family play (See Coleman, 1990), or intermediate or communal associations (See Putnam, 1993). The state mobilizes trust in more overt ways than is realized. This includes, in Canada, the federally run health care program and the enforcement of humanitarian and civil
rights laws under the Charter, along with the monitoring and enforcing of contracts between independent parties in society. This, as Levi (1997) illustrates, often reduces the need for citizens to trust each other and look to the state as an important mediator on crucial issues. Furthermore, Levi’s (1997) model also implies that although public trust has mostly been drawn from interactions at the individual level, it is better conceptualized on a grander scale at the institutional level. When two parties cannot simply agree on some substantial issue, it is usually the state that decides the final outcome. Trust’s importance to the state is undeniable; its destruction can lead to widespread resentment or even active resistance to government policy (Levi, 1997).

The institutions that maintain compliance are ones of rules and incentives that configure social interactions between individuals and groups, and whose subsistence is common knowledge to the community (Levi, 1997). Individuals lack any incentives to challenge institutional rules and work to what Levi (1997: 21) distinguishes as “structure the individual choices of strategic actors so as to produce equilibrium outcomes.” The “technology” of trust is made into material form through the institutions that render it available to the public. The withdrawal of citizens’ consent is a punitive consequence when policies proposed by the government are ignored and trust diminishes (Levi, 1997). Imperatively, government actors must weigh the probability and cost of non-compliance to possible proposals, and in doing so, weigh the possibility of civil backlash because of that policy or policies (Levi, 1997). Institutions that make promises and commitments creditable through legal means that citizens deem legit will, in most cases, comply with the proposed policy. Levi (1997) argues that the transformation of interpersonal trust from political actors into institutional trustworthiness, through technologies that Rose and Miller (1992) elucidate, affects the degree of compliance with
governmental policy or demands. However, before we can attach this distinction to governmental policy making in Canada, we must first examine the importance of trust in developing public acceptance or refusal to domestic security initiatives. Covered in the next section is the determination of its relationship with the flow of knowledge and the information acquired from media resources relative to security policy. In doing so, we will begin to understand the position of Levi's (1997) "contingent consent" with respect to the recent adaptation of the Canadian domestic security apparatus.

2.1.2 The Role of Media

The popular media, or the mainstream media reaching the most consumers, plays an enormous role in the dissemination and evaluation of information. This influence permeates through civilized society and undoubtedly shapes the conduct of citizens. Levi explains that, "estimates of government trustworthiness and the likely behaviour of other citizens derive from a combination of personal observations and information provided by acquaintances, media, and organizations" (1997: 27). For this reason, it is fairly easy for the general population to be informed about the goings and misgivings of public officials and private citizens alike. According to Levi, "we live in a relatively high information society in which it is hard not to know about the behaviour of government officials and other citizens. So taxpayers soon enough learn about tax evaders and conscripts about draft dodgers" (1997: 27). Furthermore, the media at large has an ongoing interest in characterizing its products as independent, morally upright, and honest. Herman and Chomsky point out the fact that media outlets occasionally bring to light corporate
and government misconduct and in the meantime paint themselves as defenders of the public interest (1988: 1).

However, the tendency in the major media companies to avoid controversy and hard feelings is constant. Herman and Chomsky (1988) are helpful in elucidating this point. “Flak,” according to Herman and Chomsky, refers to the “negative responses of letters, telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and bills before Congress, and other modes of complaint, threat, and punitive action” (1988: 26). The consequences of eliciting these forms of response, whether caused by accurate or inaccurate reporting, often far outweigh the benefits of and public level of expectation to provide the news without restraint. If a media outlet missteps either by incorrect reporting or by criticizing a deeply held status quo, the consequences may include having to defend its position “before legislatures and possibly even in the courts,” consumer goods advertised in that medium are subject to boycotts, and advertisers “may withdraw patronage” (1988: 26). As a result, Herman and Chomsky explain, where certain content is likely to elicit flak, a media outlet is often deterred from presenting that content (1988: 26).

Where major media tends towards an avoidance of penetrating or damning reporting, it nonetheless has deadlines to meet and advertising time or space to sell. As Herman and Chomsky remind us, “many of the large media companies are fully integrated into the market, and for others, too, the pressures of stockholders, directors, and bankers to focus on the bottom line are powerful” (1988: 5). To remain profitable, media outlets must provide a reliable flow of news related to the issues widely thought to be at the forefront of that particular day’s unfolding events, locally and globally. These two motivating factors, the avoidance of controversy in conjunction with the aim of providing timely news, result in the media’s heavy
reliance on "official sources" for content. Herman and Chomsky explain, "taking information from sources that may be presumed credible reduces investigative expense, whereas material from sources that are not prima facie credible, or that will elicit criticism and threats, requires careful checking and costly research" (1988: 19).

Implicitly trusted more than private and corporate sources are official government information sources. As a public agency highly concerned with image and its responsibility to taxpayers, it is typical, though not always prudent, to assume that government information releases tell a reliable story. Government agencies make this assumption easy, by giving the appearance of transparency, and they make access to released information easier. According to Herman and Chomsky, to "consolidate their preeminent position as government sources," government news officers make an extra effort to entice media outlets with cost-cutting, time-saving information releases with as easy access to them as possible (1988: 22). This trend carries with it the privileges of influence and information control because, as Herman and Chomsky explain, bureaucracies become "routine" news sources whose information does not face the same scrutiny as would information developed independently (1988: 22). Where this privileged access occurs, Levi notes, the tellers of tales have been slanted in a particular direction, which is a danger to a freestanding public opinion because "tellers of tales are crucial for effectively activating cultural identity and consequent antagonism to the government and other sets of citizens" (1997: 27).

Over and above the reporting slant the media has in favour of official sources, media outlets are also limited by the space and time constraints of their respective mediums. Given this limitation, the media is scarcely able to do much more than enforce an already unquestioned status quo, meaning that, "the very structure of the media is designed to induce
conformity to established doctrine” (Chomsky, 1989: 10). It is impractical to attempt to elucidate complex or unfamiliar truths about government policy and government agenda where space is constrained and the mainstream audience is not prepared to entertain complexity and unfamiliarity in such short servings. On the other hand, as Chomsky described, the continual propagation of familiar and welcome pronouncements are immune to such issues (1989: 10).

A final consideration of the role the media plays in the construction of public opinion is understanding that media outlets are businesses, and “their market is advertisers, and the “product” they sell is audiences, with a bias towards more wealthy audiences, which improve advertising rates” (Chomsky, 1989: 8). It is predictable that the views found in popular media outlet products cater to the perspectives and interests of wealthy audiences, which would generally reinforce the status quo and the standing of the present government and its policies because wealthy audiences favour stability and continued prosperity. It is hard to imagine an interest in dissent on the part of the prosperous where government policy is concerned. In this case, if we take reporting on government as an example appropriate to this study, government trustworthiness is defined by the economic standing of the elite and the protection of the elite by the government. A sense of ethical reciprocity, or the perception of the extent to which others are compliant with government policies and state laws, is reinforced in this case by the media’s trend of preserving the status quo and serving economic and governmental stability to an audience interested in being served these ideas. On this realization, it becomes clear that the media is not a vehicle of pure information provided to aid the populace in constructing an independent opinion about its world. Rather, the media reacts to its own interests, limitations, and pursuits quite irrelative of what duty the media might have in constructing public opinion.


2.1.3 The Role of Knowledge

In understanding the role of trust in government in the formation of public opinion in modern liberal democracies, one can now begin to understand the multiplicity of sources and dynamic makeup that are involved in its operation. In the forms and causes of trust, there is a rational calculation for interpersonal trust that states whether a "trustee" will act consistently and in accordance with the "truster's" interests depends on the knowledge of the former by the latter (Levi, 1998; Kim, 2005).

The events of 9/11 were broadcast in real time across the globe and given the proximity of the events to Canada itself, replay and fervent analysis of the terrorist attacks continued long afterward. Despite the clear destruction and harm that can be seen in witnessing the events, "there is less clarity with respect to the threat that this event posed – what this event meant for the future" (Gibbs Van Brunschot & Sherley, 2005: 647). As is expected of those governing, we look to our government for guidance on the presumption that these people are in the know. As Gibbs Van Brunschot and Sherley explain, where we are faced with a situation that we have little knowledge or understanding of, the body populace assumes the state's interpretation and reaction to that situation serves our interests (2005: 647). Though sparse actual explanation was provided by the Canadian government, Canada quickly took on the mantle of the fight against terrorism in identifying itself with the plight of the Americans at the time, as "the threat is communicated as being an unfamiliar and global threat against all of civilized society and humanity, and one that must be dealt with collectively" (Gibbs Van Brunschot & Sherley, 2005: 651). The message communicated by the Canadian government of the time seemed to indicate that the attack was blind in its target finding, or that Canada is as susceptible to these threats as
is the U. S. or any other member of the global community given the open characterization of
the attacks as targeted at “civilized nations.”

In a press release from Jean Chrétien’s office on September 11, 2001, the terrorist
attacks on the United States were described as an “unprecedented global threat” and “an
offence against the freedom and rights of all civilized nations” (quoted in Gibbs Van Brunschot
& Sherley, 2005: 651). Less than a week later, the Canadian government reiterated this sense of
shared victimization with the United States in a press release stating, “this was not just an
attack on the United States…. The world has been attacked [and] [t]he world must respond”
(quoted in Gibbs Van Brunschot & Sherley, 2005: 651). In anticipation of a close alignment with
the coming American response to the attacks, the Canadian government made short time of
paving the road to shaping a Canadian public opinion sharing the grief and perception of a
continued threat to general values and sanctities that spill across national borders. Within mere
weeks of the 9/11 attacks, the Anti-Terrorist Act (2001) was introduced to a public that was
highly malleable given the portrayal of the events by the Canadian government and in the
Canadian media. Sympathetic to recent losses, reminded of the kinship between Canada and
the United States, and concerned about the threat to Canadian values and safety inside our
own borders, Canadians were more allowing of an Act that compromised civil liberties than is
typical of a population known to fiercely guard against the dissolving of civil liberties in general.

That the Prime Minister’s speeches shortly following 9/11 were treated as official
statements of Canada’s position in the “war on terror” is unsurprising given the ease with which
they were presented to the population at large and given the relative absence of critical analysis
of the events and Canada’s appropriate stance in relation to the events (Gibbs Van Brunschot &
Sherley, 2005). To begin with, a suitable analysis of the events and what policy should hold
cannot be done in the space of a television program or a seven hundred word newspaper article, as Herman and Chomsky explain about the “limited nature of such critiques” (1998: 2). Furthermore, the ease with which the media can present government statements as news translates into an easy business decision where costs are cut and deadlines are met. Herman and Chomsky note that in their dissemination of information, government agencies “provide the media organizations with facilities in which to gather; they give journalists advance copies of speeches and forthcoming reports; they schedule press conferences at hours well-geared to news deadlines; they write press releases in usable language; and they carefully organize their press conferences and ‘photo opportunity’ sessions” (1988: 19).

The Canadian government kept the anti-terrorism rhetoric going strongly more than a year later in its identification of terrorism as a globally shared concern about a possibility that could unfold anywhere. In an October 2002 speech, Chrétien described terrorism as “the ultimate wrong” to punctuate the “renewed sense of global threat.” According to Chrétien, terrorism has “no moral justification or conscience. Not in Ireland. Not in South or Central America. Not in the Middle East. Not anywhere. Terrorism is about the taking of innocent life. Individually or in groups. At bus stops. In train stations and homes” (quoted in Gibbs Van Brunschot & Sherley, 2005: 653). Though Canadian soil had yet to see a modern terrorist attack and though nothing further had happened in North America since 9/11, the Canadian government was using strong words and vivid imagery in its propagation of its anti-terrorism agenda and policy though there was little more than rhetoric and presumptuousness to back this agenda. Factually there was little on offer. This lack of knowledge and awareness about terrorism and its real threat to Canada, whether serious or not, enabled the Canadian government to make unprecedented distortions to historically inextricable civil liberties.
The Canadian government's continuing shaping of public opinion required a shift in the context through which the threat of terrorism was presented. Two years on, the sense that terrorism was a threat to address in an immediate way began to subside as 9/11 became distant. Official government discourse about security threats shifted from identifying the terrorist threat with the concerns of security and freedom to concerns of "the economy, both local and global, and to the 'trade relationship'" with the United States, "since security for the Canadian state is, primarily, economic security" (Gibbs Van Brunschot & Sherley, 2005: 666).

The popular media influences certain sectors of a population much more than others, meaning the forms of "knowledge" and "awareness" on offer by these means are skewed. As Herman and Chomsky explain, "the mass media are interested in attracting audiences with buying power, not audiences per se; it is affluent audiences that spark advertiser interest. The idea that the drive for large audiences makes the mass media "democratic" thus suffers from the initial weakness that its political analogue is a voting system weighted by income" (1988: 16). As a provider of information, the mass media is unreliable in terms of objectivity and satisfactory critical analysis because of its interest in targeting a particular audience, which means it provides a particular kind of information meant to pique the interest of a certain sector of the information-consuming population. Though other sectors of the population rely on mass media for information about topics such as government policy and the promulgation and enforcement of state laws, the shape of this information is decidedly slanted to the end of optimized profitability. In relation to anti-terrorism policy development and establishment, this slant appeals to the desires and views of the privileged minority, which means the desires and views of the lower-income and visible minority sectors of the population will not be spoken to nor taken into serious account on this model of reporting. This carries with it less of a duty for
policy makers to speak directly to those marginalized portions of the population because there exists no meaningful dialogue where there is of a lack of awareness about government policy on the part of those portions of the population; little is provided to the uninformed where the uninformed scarcely know well enough that they should be better informed and considered for in the policy-making process.

Herman and Chomsky note that a main reason “for the heavy weight given to official sources is that the mass media claim to be “objective” dispensers of the news,” because media outlets aim not only to appear objective but also to avoid lawsuits charging intentional slander or inaccuracy (1988: 19). News officers that handle government press releases shape the release of that information with an eye to promoting the image of the minister or government official who is the face of that information. This creates a manipulation of policy presentation that omits or distorts important information about those policies, and the media is often left to speculate as to the truthfulness of that press release, or worse, to accept the government-produced portrayal of polices involving security initiatives as accurate. In a sense, government sources enjoy some measure of carte blanche with the manner in which certain or limited scopes of awareness and knowledge about events and policy direction is transmitted through the media. Moreover, on this model of quickly relaying official source information, governments can colour policy in a manner best suited to the interests of its audience.

In a country where economic standing and concerns define values as much as the defence of home grown values like “freedom” and “peace,” the development of third world countries as a defence against terrorism carries as much currency as border defending. At an international conference held in September 2003, Chrétien said the threat is now “the growing disparity between the rich and poor” (quoted in Gibbs Van Brunschot & Sherley, 2005: 654).
Also in 2003, the then Prime Minister stated, “these issues of poverty, trade, and development are in the long run as important to a secure, stable world as addressing the immediate threats we face from terrorism,” and he stated in another speech that year, “when people at risk are made safe and secure in their own countries, we are all made more safe and secure” in reference to Canadian peacekeeping/military efforts abroad (quoted in Gibbs Van Brunschot & Sherley, 2005: 653). It is clear that the Chrétien government of the day recognized that its policy shaping would have to be in line with traditional Canadian values if the susceptibility sensed shortly after 9/11 had begun to fade. If the sense of immediate threats diminished over time, it is imperative that the Canadian government played into the values of cross-border goodwill and charity if indeed the anti-terrorism agenda continued to be buttressed by positive public opinion. Again, the public’s knowledge and awareness of counterterrorism initiatives were not cultivated by fact, predictably. Rather, the Anti-Terrorist Act and the government’s anti-terrorism activity that followed were built on emotional appeals to an uninformed population. Essentially, the Canadian government took license to alter the nature of policy making with regard to civil liberties because of the Canadian public’s high degree of trust in the government’s evaluative practices, which itself rests on the populace not having the tools of knowledge and awareness enough to form a critical analysis of the government’s response and ensuing conduct related to 9/11.
CHAPTER 3

Review of the Literature
3.1 Review of Past Research

Despite the importance of such legislations for the legitimacy of the Canadian state apparatus, there is no Canadian research which evaluates factors responsible for the Canadian public’s support or opposition to the Canadian government’s adaptation of the domestic security structures to the risks and threats inherent in terrorism. There are few studies that take into account the public’s reaction to security legislation as a result of the threat of terrorism. Additionally, most of that research is conducted in the United States.

Studies on the threat of terrorism typically focus on the public’s opinion of the threat rather than the public’s opinion of the modification of specific domestic security structures. There is, however, significant literature stemming from the public’s opinion and reaction to anti-terrorism legislation in liberal democracies that has resulted after 9/11, including in Canada (McMahon, 2002; Cooper, 2004; Rempel, 2005; Crutcher & Budak, 2005), the United States (Gan, 2005; Mostafa & Al-Hamdi, 2007), Australia (Rix, 2006) and Great Britain (Strom & Eyerman, 2007). The majority of research focuses directly on the threat of terrorism as a risk in Canada (Wark, 2005a & 2005b; Vicek, 2007, McDonough, 2007; Kiruebert, 2007; Strom & Eyerman, 2007), often dealing specifically with its influence on immigration (Esses, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2002; Adelman, 2002; Abu-Laban, 2002), and economic repercussions (Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004; Piazza, 2006; Clauset, Young & Gleditsch, 2007). Few studies focus on, nor take into account, the perceptions and opinions of the public on terrorism in Canada (but see Adams, 2004; Lemyre, Turner, Lee, & Krewski, 2006; Kirton & Guebert, 2007) in the United States (but see Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2003; Davis & Silver, 2004; Jenkins-Smith & Herron, 2005;
Lewis, 2005; Fischhoff et al., 2005) and the rest of the international community (but see Sunstein, 2003; Reinares, 2007).

Nevertheless, the research on the public perception and psychological impact of terrorist attacks has increased in recent years due to the occurrence of a number of high profile events such as the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 and 2005 respectively, and the 2007 bombings in Pakistan that lead to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. As no terrorist attacks have occurred on Canadian soil in recent years, the Canadian context distinguishes itself from that of the United States, Great Britain, and Spain for example. Not surprisingly, findings from a 2004 national survey suggested that few Canadians perceived terrorism as posing a significant risk to the health of Canadians (only 13% of respondents indicated terrorism posed a ‘high risk’ to the Canadian public and only 5.7% of respondents indicated that it posed a high risk to their personal health). Furthermore, the study found that Canadians acknowledge the risks associated with terrorism as uncertain, as 73.5% of respondents reported “almost no” personal control over terrorism risks (Cooper, 2004). Since evidence illustrates that the majority of Canadians believe the threat of terrorism does not pose a significant risk to their personal health, it is important to evaluate the publics’ support and/or opposition to legislation that identifies terrorism as being a real threat in the everyday lives of Canadians.

The politicization of acts of violence ensued by acts of terrorism slips into a contest of exceptionalism; politics transforms into a fight about how far the constitutive tensions of liberal democracy can be skewed in support of what Huysmans (2004) refers to as “executive-centered, populist and/or decisionist forms of government” (2004: 327). In these situations security practice, technology, and knowledge often become explicitly paradoxical in the sense
that they sustain and radicalize an intensive skewing of constitutive relations of liberal
democracy in the politics of insecurity. Consequently, in doing so they risk undermining what
they claim to protect. Liberal democracies restrain political power first by requiring its legality.
Here, we have the *Anti-Terrorism Act* (2001), which has now passed through the legality
process, allowing our security apparatuses more privileges into the personal lives of Canadians.

Given this draconian law which suspends individual rights, a critical question arises: how
it is possible that such legislation has been enacted with little public resistance? Surely, this is
not the first time that the Canadian government has passed such legislation, as witnessed by
the *War Measure Act* (WMA) in 1914 (replaced later by the *Emergencies Act*, 1988). However,
in the case of the WMA, it was invoked at times during Canadian history where a direct threat
was present, including the 1970 October Crises that saw the FLQ kidnap, and later murder, of
provincial cabinet minister Pierre Laporte. In contrast to the case of Bill-36, there was no direct
threat to Canada. Such a threat was directed against the United States. There are a few broad
explanations by which such legislation could have been enacted with such ease, none of which
have been tested empirically in relation to the changes in domestic security mandated in this
legislation. First, citizens can accept such legislation if they trust policy makers. That is, a
fundamental characteristic of the state is the high level of political trust necessary for it to
and solidarity that trust helps to sustain is putatively necessary to garner support for policies.”
Affectively, the absence of trust in government policies that require the cooperation of the
public sphere, particularly security matters that have the potential of involving every Canadian
citizen, will likely be costly to sustain and even more difficult to secure. In this sense trust in
government can be conceptualized as a reserve upon which the government can summon when
it needs latitude from its citizens in tolerating restrictions on their civil liberties (Hetherington, 1998). When a high level of trust exists from the people, what limits the extent to which governments can exercise their power over their citizenry?

There is no Canadian research that evaluates the role of trust for the recent government’s security legislation. However, a recent Canadian survey conducted by Krewski et al. (2005) revealed that risk management procedures conducted by the government were rated fairly high in terms of trust by Canadian respondents, considerably in comparison to a previous survey the authors conducted twelve years earlier. Conversely, there is also indication that the Canadian public does not express an overwhelming level of trust for government. When looking at a sample of 1,502 Canadian respondents interviewed by phone, Lemyre et al. (2006) found that the respondents were least likely to turn to government officials as a creditable source of information when dealing with issues of terrorism. This indicates that trust and confidence in the Government of Canada is low among the public. However, Christensen and Laegreid (2002) confirm recent findings that indicate that trust in general institutions of government is normally higher when compared to individual political actors like politicians. This study will look more at the institutional level of trust in government as opposed to the individual level that Lemyre et al. (2006) employ in their study.

Scholz and Lubell identify a “vertical trust” that exists “between citizen and state which can expand the range of collective problems that legal authorities are able to tackle” (1998: 399). Their findings indicate that trust in government affected the American citizen’s compliance with tax laws. The authors concluded that citizens are more willing to pay taxes when they believe that their money will be spent justly and properly. If then, according to Scholz and Lubell (1998), taxes are the prerequisite for spending, then a similar dynamic should
hold true when we investigate support for security legislation if Canadian public opinion indicates a high level of trust in the Canadian Government. Recent studies in the United States have found this precondition to be true. Davis and Silver (2004) found that respondents from the United States, when presented with the threat of terrorism, demonstrated that the more trust they indicated in the federal government, the more willingness they had to concede some civil liberties in favour of security and order. Although Lewis’ (2005) findings demonstrate that the majority of Americans are not convinced that civil liberties are a viable trade-off with security in dealing with terrorism, those who indicated more trust in the government were more likely to support government legislation to combat terrorism. Similarly, Lewis (2005) demonstrated that the majority of Americans who indicated a high level of trust in the government were more likely to support government legislation to combat terrorism. However, in Lewis’ (2005) study, the view that the public is quick to support restrictions on civil liberties was not supported. Not only do Americans support civil liberties, but a majority were not convinced that a trade-off with security is necessary. Lewis (2005) notes that the shift in public opinion following the events of 9/11 was used to support the passage of the USA Patriot Act (2001).

Of importance in this study involving the factors that are crucial when the public supports or rejects security legislation can be traced to the citizens’ knowledge around the topic area. It has been documented that political knowledge is associated with greater support for democratic institutions and processes in the United States (Gibson, 2007) and in Canada (Nakhaie, 2006). Thus, knowledge is an important independent variable not so much because information underpins support, but rather because knowledge is indicative towards the process of socialization to democratic values and exposure to legitimizing symbols. The symbols are
representative and undeniably shaped by the two poles of legitimacy in a liberal democracy: legality and the people (see Huysmans, 2004). Through clever manipulation, these two sources of legitimacy may be used against one another by politicians. Particularly, during a recent transformation in security infrastructure and practices under the government, we see the fusing together of executive and legislative powers: the first source of legitimacy (legality) will override, if not totally dismantle, any resistance from the second one (people) (Huysmans, 2004).

Indeed, difficult issues that are highly technical and involve knowledge at an experienced level, according to Rounce (2004: 9), are likely to warrant an “unknowledgeable” response from citizens. This of course will more likely result in policy makers considering the opinion of the public irrelevant. When and if a sufficient knowledge base does not exist to the citizen, judgements and decisions are channelled by political and social trust (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000). In a study of 91 students conducted in Washington DC, Siegrist and Cvetkovich (2000) looked at whether trust was tempered by knowledge by analyzing activities and technologies associated with policy making that required a high level of knowledge about the events inspiring the policy making. They employed variables that measured ‘perceived risk,’ ‘trust in authorities,’ and ‘self-assessed knowledge’ to properly gauge the relationship that ‘trust’ and ‘knowledge’ have on various hazards. The authors concluded that when an individual lacks knowledge about a specific hazard, trust in authorities managing the hazard was an important determinant in the judgement of perceived risks. Siegrist and Cvetkovich’s (2000) results suggest that the public relies on trust when making judgements of risk and benefits when personal knowledge about a hazard is lacking.
Therefore it is of little surprise that the literature on security discourse also identifies knowledge as an important individual predictor on public support for security legislation and structures. Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003) found that knowledge was an important predictor when looking at airline policies in the United States. In a survey of 278 travellers, the authors found that those who were less knowledgeable about airport security were more likely to support increased security practices that contradicted civil liberties such as profiling. This is an important finding that indicates a willingness from the public to sacrifice civil liberties for security. Moreover, this suggests that the absolute of legal rights, for example those which the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) protect, might not actually be absolute to many citizens who are posed with a threat such as terrorism.

As I have suggested above, the relationship of trust to counterterrorism policies is tempered by the knowledge an individual has about counterterrorism structures and legislation they entail. Those who have little knowledge or a weak base of understanding regarding security infrastructure and laws pertaining to the protection of privacy information are more likely to show a greater willingness to support security initiatives and legislation that aims at combating terrorism if they trust the government. This would pertain to the assumption that citizens who are less informed about security changes and laws that relate to privacy issues will show fewer concerns and are less likely to pursue general probing into the changes the government implements. Presumably, citizens trust the government to carry out these duties justly. That is, when and if a sufficient knowledge base does not exist to the citizen, judgements and decisions are channelled by political and social trust (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000). This is consistent with Jenkins-Smith and Herron's (2005) findings that state when a public is unknowledgeable and under some threat or feeling of anxiety about a national issue, they are
more willing to consider new alternatives. Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003) found similar results when looking at airline policies in the United States. They found that those who were less knowledgeable about airport security were more likely to support increased security practices that contradicted civil liberties.

A majority of Canadians were personally upset about the tragedy that played out on television screens and in the news media following the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. It is fair to say that in the days and weeks following 9/11, the emotions of Canadians ranged from anger and reactive determination to feelings of bewilderment and sheer vulnerability (Kirton & Guebert, 2007). It is important to understand that these events also occurred at a time of overall economic anxiety. The events of 9/11 added to the feelings of anxiety and pessimism among Canadians.

The legitimacy process of the media has not been properly accounted for in the implementation of counterterrorism legislation. Furthermore, previous research has not been able to illustrate the role the media plays in the development of knowledge, and subsequently the trust, an individual relies on when he or she formulates an opinion about counterterrorism legislation. Studies that conceptualize public opinion as a process require researchers to investigate its relationship with other factors in society. As Kwak (1999) states, the media provides the symbolic background against which the public opinion process proceeds on various social and political issues. Additionally, it has been argued that audiences depend on the media for what society thinks about social and political issues. Research on the effects of mass media increasingly suggests that its primary impact is on societal level predictions rather than personal attitudes and beliefs (Mutz, 1998). In other words, the media are far more likely to convince people that public attitudes toward securitizing the Canadian defence apparatus have become
increasingly favourable than they are to alter people's personal attitudes toward the issue. Communication research has shown that the news media can also affect people's emotions, and thereby influence risk judgements and policy preferences that are most vulnerable to manipulation after a dramatic experience (Fischhoff et al., 2005; Lemyre et al., 2006). With the relatively quick passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act (2001) in Canada, it is no surprise that the public showed very little resistance against Bill C-36. The media's preoccupation with dramatic, exceptional, and sensationalized aspects of terrorism on the international stage, along with all the vulnerabilities in the security infrastructure, helped elevate the public's concern.

Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1974) argues that mass media is the essential part of the system which the individual uses to gain information about the environment. Essentially, according to Noelle-Neumann (1974: 50-51), "for all questions outside his immediate personal sphere he is almost totally dependent on the mass media for the facts and for his evaluation of the climate of opinion." Several scholars have suggested that the media exert an influence on audience perceptions of the social opinion climate (Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Kwak, 1999; Tsfati, 2003). This assertion is assumed more often than tested, though a few empirical studies have demonstrated an association between exposure and opinion climate perceptions (see for example Mutz, 1998; Tsfati, 2003). The assertion that the media influences audience perceptions of public opinion is often explained in media dependency terms (see Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Mutz, 1998). These scholars have shown in a mass society, in which direct interpersonal relationship no longer organizes political life, individuals have no real alternative method for amassing collective opinion other than relying on media reports. Indeed, recent research has shown this.
Lemyre et al. (2006) found that 1,502 Canadian respondents reported tuning most often to the Canadian media to obtain creditable information about terrorism. They reported tuning the least often to elected politicians and government officials for creditable information about terrorism. Similarly, Krewski et al. (2006) found that the Canadian public depended on the media as an information hub for potential health risks. These findings suggest a relevant implication involving the Canadian public's motivation to engage in terrorism preparedness alongside the Government of Canada. Likewise, there is substantial American literature showing that when respondents pointed to the mass media as their primary reference source, they were more likely to support counterterrorism policies (Davis & Silver, 2004; Huddy et al., 2005; Joslyn & Haider-Markel, 2007). Davis & Silver (2004) found that 1,386 respondents from the United States reported that the media was the most commonly sought out source for terrorism issues. Likewise, Joslyn & Haider-Markel (2007) found that the 1,417 respondents from the United States indicated that media was the most common information source individuals looked to when measuring support for counterterrorism policies.

Given the convenience and rapid availability of information they disseminate, the media are likely to play an ever increasing role in providing information about terrorism and security to the public. This of course, more often than not, is consistent with the media's obsession with dramatic and exceptional events which has been deemed responsible for the public's elevated concern over international risks (Fischhoff et al., 2005). More so, the media can be seen as not just sensationalizing stories but providing a service for those who potentially have an interest in influencing the information it publishes. As reviewed in detail earlier, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman's (1988) "Manufacturing Consent" argues that since the media are now being run by large corporations, they are under the same competitive pressures as other
corporations. This pressure to create a stable, profitable business invariably distorts the kinds of news items reported. Intriguingly, this occurs not as a result of conscious design but simply as a consequence of market selection and those businesses who happen to favour profits over news quality survive, while those that present a more accurate picture of the world tend to become marginalized. Chomsky and Herman's (1988) relevance to this research is important when looking at the technicalities the Anti-Terrorism Act (2001) encompasses and the new powers under our security and defence forces. Specifically, Chomsky and Herman (1988) point out major issues with the dependency of mass media news outlets upon major sources of news, particularly the government. If a particular outlet is in disfavour with a government, it can be subtly "shut out," and other outlets can be given preferential treatment. To minimize the loss of revenue (through lost readership and advertising revenue that is the primary income for most of the mass media), therefore, outlets will tend to report news in a tone more favourable to government and business, and giving unfavourable news about government and business less emphasis. Previous studies have not spent adequate time investigating the legitimization of counterterrorism legislation that takes place in the media. Importantly, the legitimization process of legislation often begins with the belief that the state will carry out its duties in a legit manner.

A second source of support for the recent changes in the domestic security apparatuses may occur if individuals supporting such legislations are not themselves adversely affected by them. Given that according to the United States government a few self-proclaimed radical Islamic groups were responsible for the 9/11 attack, it is of little surprise that the brunt of public opinion prejudice was directed against Canadian Moslems and by extension against visible minorities in Canada, the United States, and Europe. A Canadian study conducted by
Crutcher & Budak (2005) on behalf of the Department of Justice addressed concerns that Canadians of visible minority may be disproportionately affected by analyzing a respondent’s knowledge of the *Anti-Terrorism Act* (2001). The authors’ study found that there was general support for the actions taken by the Government of Canada as respondents felt that such legislation has made Canada safer. Interestingly though, Crutcher & Budak (2005) found that the governmental actions most frequently noted were increased security at airports and increased screening of immigrants/refugees. While these changes were not part of the *Anti-Terrorism Act* (2001), they are the areas Canadians most identify with. This is undoubtedly a result of the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the subsequent media attention paid to airline and border security. It is thus important to account for the effect of being detained at the border for the purpose of a more extensive search. Previous studies dealing with public opinion and domestic security matters have not accounted for the effect of this predictor. This variable might provide insight into how the current procedures at the border are being understood by those who have directly experienced it.

In the United States, immediately following 9/11, a large portion of the public seemed to voice concern over governmental inaction more than a fear for civil liberties. A study conducted by Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003) found that respondents indicated a willingness to trade civil liberties concerns, especially when there were significant efficiency gains in terms of reduced waiting times at major security points. The study also showed non-white respondents were more reluctant than white respondents to support counterterrorism policies such as targeting or to be targeted. Davis and Silver (2004) found that African Americans were less likely than whites to trade off civil liberties for security. Interestingly however, Latinos in their study were just as likely as whites to trade off civil liberties. Huddy et al. (2005) found similar results to
Davis and Silver (2004), however, all visible minorities supported anti-terrorism policies less than non-visible minorities. According to Davis & Silver (2004: 31), African Americans, with their struggle for human rights and subsequent distrust for the government in the United States, may be reluctant “to concede rights that they have worked hard to achieve or to empower a government in which they have little confidence, even for the sake of personal security.” The authors’ study concluded that visible minorities were more likely than non-visible minorities to support civil liberties over increased security. Again, there seems to be a void in Canadian research with respect to the extent of support of security legislation by visible minorities.

While the evidence is incongruent, previous research has illustrated some common themes that emerge when investigating some of the factors that the public utilizes in forming an opinion on counterterrorism security policies. Canadian citizens’ opposition to such security policies was relatively weak and in fact many were generally supportive. The literature suggests that trust, media, knowledge and the extent to which one is affected by such policies are important for the level of support and/or opposition to it. Despite important studies which have evaluated the role of these factors, previous literature is limited in scope. First, to my knowledge, there is no Canadian research that evaluates the importance of any of these factors specifically with respect to Canada’s security legislations. Second, no previous research in Canada or elsewhere evaluates the simultaneous effects of trust, media, knowledge and visible minority status. Finally, a correct specification of the model requires taking into account control variables such as education, age, income, gender, and region that are shown to be related to support or opposition to security legislations and/or the predictor just stated (Lemyre et al., 2006; Joslyn & Haider-Markel, 2007; Davis & Silver, 2004; Huddy et al., 2005). Therefore, using a
recent data set, this thesis aims to evaluate Canadian citizens’ support for security policies, while simultaneously accounting for important variables that may explain the public’s support for or opposition to domestic security policies to counterterrorism in Canada.
CHAPTER 4

Methodology
4.1 Data

This chapter offers a description of the methodological orientation employed in this research. It will outline the methods used in testing the relevant research questions that have been outlined in previous chapters. It will begin by laying out the details of the data set used, its general makeup, and its relevance in answering the questions of this research. Next, the specific research hypotheses that will be analyzed, after which, the conceptual and operational layout of the variables will be outlined. Following this, the measuring and coding procedures used in this study will be explained in detail. Lastly, the statistical instruments used in the analysis will be drawn out and the regression models will be explained.

In explaining the factors that are crucial when the Canadian public forms its opinion on domestic security apparatuses, this study will use an empirical analysis of the information collected on behalf of Queen’s University dealing with privacy and security issues. The *International Surveillance and Privacy Opinion Research Survey* (ISPORS) (only the data involving Canada was employed here) was conducted in the summer of 2006 to 1001 Canadians who were selected at random to participate voluntarily over the phone or through face to face interviews. In this cross-national study, the respondent’s identity has not been disclosed anywhere in the survey and at no time was the respondent required to answer any of the questions asked by the interviewer. Particularly, this research will analyze the questions that deal directly with public attitudes towards the government and security agencies’ exercise of these new powers.
Many of the survey questions reflect the salient issues that exist in the Government of Canada’s move to restructure its security apparatuses under new legal means. Questions from the survey probe issues like surveillance, media coverage, racial profiling, control of information and public trust in government. It is important to note the initial strengths and weaknesses of the survey. The survey was conducted five years after the implementation of the *Anti-Terrorism Act* (2001) which should be a long enough period in order to avoid emotional reactions that initially followed 9/11 which could yield instantaneous attitudinal data that would certainly lack stability over time. In addition, questions that probe such a wide spectrum of security are rare in surveys, even more so in the Canadian context. On the other hand, as stated earlier, the complex phenomena of public opinion make it difficult to capture attitudes on highly technical issues of security through the means of single, close ended questions. Questions that probe personal issues like individual privacy concerns may be seen as intrusive to some respondents and may be reluctant to respond. However, weighing some of the strengths and weaknesses together allows the researcher to properly design a confident model that can exemplify some of the relationships between citizens and domestic security in Canada.

### 4.2 Hypotheses

These hypotheses find their utility in the relatively small volume of literature that exists on public opinion in respect to domestic security in Canada. Much of the methodological underpinnings in this study are reflected in the moderately few empirical studies that have been published after the events of September 11, 2001. The questions already posed, and the hypotheses laid out here, hope to explain a homogeneity in unearthing the complexities that
exist in the formulation of public opinion in regards to security that exists in Canada, and perhaps, in Western democracies. Conventionally, the research model follows a hierarchical modeling method which is helpful in analyzing casual inference and superior to classical regression in terms of data reduction (Gelman, 2005). Essentially this project modestly attempts to provide new insights to the body of knowledge on public opinion and security discourse in general and offer some suggestions for future studies.

The main hypotheses driving this investigation include:

1. The higher the level of trust, the higher the support for security initiatives;
2. The higher the exposure to the media, the higher the support for security initiatives;
3. Visible minorities are less supportive of security initiatives;
4. The less knowledgeable one is of security legislation and security procedures, the higher the support for security initiatives;
5. The effect of trust, media exposure and visible minority status will be mediated by knowledge of security initiatives.

Is the public in agreement with the Canadian government’s aim at adapting domestic security structures to the risks and threats inherent to terrorism? If so, what are the main reasons for the Canadian citizen’s support of counterterrorism legislation and the assembly of more intensive security structures? How can political actors involved in domestic security policy in Canada utilize public attitudes? What factors affect whether or not, when, and how the Canadian public becomes motivated in supporting government priorities to further securitize the state? The theories captured in Chapter 2 offer some theoretical evidence to how trust,
knowledge, and the media in Western democracies are important, and sometimes interrelated, to political actors as a coercive tool in forming public opinion around governmental policies.

It should be noted that the *International Surveillance and Privacy Opinion Research Survey* (2006) was not intended to answer the questions proposed in this study and may provide limited explanations in regards to the questions proposed here. Although optimistic, the analysis may provide only casual correlations that would mean the focus of this study would steer more toward the role the individual variables have in predicting support for security apparatuses and legislation as opposed to the intertwined relationship they share with each other in society. That is, how the formation of trust, knowledge, and mass media is constructed by individuals and their actual transgression through networks in society under the influence of the state. The latter is arguably unfeasible to investigate using any statistical method and data set. However, for the purposes of this research, it is hoped that it will set the stage for future research in Canada around this issue.

### 4.3 Variables of Interest

Often, quantitative studies require the re-configuration of data in order to explain the variables employed in the statistical model. The alteration of data is helpful for organizational reasons and is often utilized to improve the efficiency of the analysis and increase data sample size. In this case, the re-coding of data was used to format and manage the variables for data analysis in SPSS.
Measuring Support for Domestic Security Apparatuses and Initiatives

There are two dependent variables in this study that represent the extent of support for security structures and legislations. Previous research has constructed a variable for support of security structures and legislation through public opinion by creating an index measuring whether the respondents agree or disagree with current security policies or security practices (Davis & Silver, 2004; Huddy et al., 2005; Joslyn & Haider-Markel, 2007). Correspondingly, this survey data provides multiple questions for analysis that specifically indicate the respondent's agreement or disagreement with security procedures and antiterrorism policies. The first dependent variable gauges Canadian's support for intensive surveillance procedures over three questions. The answers to these questions are formatted to represent a Likert scale where respondents specify their level of agreement or disagreement to a statement. Questions include:

1) Some have suggested that everyone should have a government-issued national ID card that they must carry on them at all times and present it when asked by police and other security forces. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this idea?

2) In order to put a national ID cards into use, the government would need to have a national database containing personal information on all citizens. This could include address, gender, race, and tax information. How effective do you feel efforts to protect this type of information from disclosure would be?

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6 In looking at previous studies from the United States that examined what influences public opinion in shaping attitudes towards counter-terrorism policies, some researchers have employed a dependent variable that includes questions concerning civil rights (Davis & Silver, 2004, Huddy et al., 2005) While Joslyn and Haider-Markel (2007) focus solely on counterterrorism proposals. This research attempts to provide a more encompassing measure of support for counterterrorism policies and procedures by including measures from both areas in formulating two dependent variables.

7 As been stated earlier, attitude is a complex thing. Its general makeup through recent research has suggested it involves two dimension, direction and strength. When a Likert scale is used to measure attitude, its standard format consists of a series of statements gauging a respondent's degree of agreement or disagreement. Therein, the scale asserts to measure direction and intensity of attitude of a respondent for the purpose of predicting an individual's support or opposition to counterterrorism polices implemented through the Canadian domestic security apparatus (Albaum, 1997)
3) How acceptable do you feel it would be for airport officials to give extra security checks to visible minorities?

Question 1 is coded from, ‘strongly agree’, ‘somewhat agree’ ‘somewhat disagree’, ‘strongly disagree’, and ‘not sure.’ Question 2 is coded on a Likert similar to question 1 from ‘very effective’, ‘somewhat effective’, ‘not very effective’, ‘not effective at all’, and ‘not sure.’ The last question was coded from ‘very acceptable’, ‘somewhat acceptable’, ‘not really acceptable’, ‘not acceptable at all’, and ‘not sure.’

The second dependent variable gages Canadian’s support for policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizen’s personal information over three questions. The answers to these questions were also formatted to represent a Likert scale where respondents specify their level of agreement or disagreement to a statement. Questions include:

1) To what extent do you think it is appropriate for a government agency to share citizens personal information with third parties, such as other government agencies?
2) To what extent do you think it is appropriate for a government agency to share citizens personal information with third parties, such as foreign governments?
3) To what extent do you think it is appropriate for a government agency to share citizens personal information with third parties, such as private agencies?

All three questions were coded on the same Likert scale. This includes from ‘yes, it is the governments right under any circumstances’, ‘yes, if the citizen is suspected of wrong-doing’, ‘yes, as long as the government has the expressed written consent of the citizen’, ‘no, under no circumstances should government share information about citizens’ and finally ‘not sure.’

Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted in order to evaluate whether or not the six indicators from both dependent variables loaded onto one “support for counterterrorism policies in Canada’s domestic security structure” factor. The premise, and undoubtedly the
The strength of the CFA method is that it enables the researcher the ability to construct a prior specification of the factor structure using a hypothesis testing framework. It also gives the researcher the ability to test the discriminate validity of the constructs through the intercorrelations of the factors (Cohen et al., 2003). The hypothesised CFA model estimated for this research specified that the items purported to measure Canadians support for counterterrorism policies and structural procedures. When the six items entered in the CFA model, two indicators of predicting support for these policies were selected (see Table 1). Thus, as previously stated above, two dependent variables, support for intensive surveillance procedures (eigenvalue of 1.460, 48.7% of the variance explained), and support for policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizen’s personal information (eigenvalue of 1.815, 60.5% of the variance explained) was used in this study to gauge Canadian public opinion around these policies.

Measuring Trust in Government

Trust is measured by questions pertaining to law enforcement officers on the front line and the willingness of the respondent to support the Government of Canada with personal information. Measuring trust itself, according to Kim (2005), is an intimidating task because of its complexity and multidimensional construction. Thus, a more effective measure of trust would be constructed by using multiple items in order to properly account for its distinct makeup. Respondents were asked the following two questions:

1) When it comes to the privacy of personal information, what level of trust do you have that the Canadian government is striking the right balance between national security and individual rights?
2) To what extent do you trust your privacy is respected by airport and customs officials when traveling by airplane?
The first question on trust was coded on a Likert scale measuring on a range from ‘very high trust’, ‘reasonable high level of trust’, ‘fairly low level of trust’, to ‘very low trust.’ The next question required the respondent gauge their level of trust from ‘completely respected’, ‘a lot of respect’, ‘somewhat respected’, and ‘not respected at all.’ Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted in order to evaluate whether or not the two indicators of trust would load onto one trust in the Government of Canada factor. Confirmatory factor analysis confirmed that both questions loaded onto a single trust in government factor (eigenvalue of 1.158, 57.9% of the variance explained).

Measuring Knowledge of Security Infrastructures

Measurement of knowledge with respect to counterterrorism discourse involves the public’s familiarity about specific events or systems in security. Specifically, this measure was constructed by having the respondent self assess the level of knowledge they had around these security infrastructures. In doing so, the respondent was not actually tested through any tests in order to account for the actually knowledge they possessed. The six questions inquire into an individual’s knowledge about various aspects of security mechanisms employed by the state. They include:

1) In general, how knowledgeable are you about the internet?
2) In general, how knowledgeable are you about global positioning system?
3) In general, how knowledgeable are you about radio frequency identification?
4) In general, how knowledgeable are you about closed circuit television?
5) In general, how knowledgeable are you about biometrics for facial and other bodily recognition?
6) In general, how knowledgeable are you about data mining of personal information?
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted and the six indicators of knowledge loaded onto one knowledge of security infrastructures factor (eigenvalue of 2.563, 42.7% of the variance explained). The question is coded on a Likert scale. Specifically it asks respondents to gauge their level of knowledge from 1 ‘very knowledgeable,’ 2 ‘somewhat knowledgeable,’ 3 ‘not really knowledgeable,’ 4 ‘not at all knowledgeable.’

Measuring Media Attention

The International Surveillance and Privacy Opinion Research Survey (2006) provides four questions that can account for the role of media in shaping Canadian public opinion on counterterrorism policies and government infrastructure. The measure does not inquire into the specific media sources a respondent follows, but rather a simplified measure that looks into the level of media a respondent views along these matters. The first two questions are included in the variable “media attention of terrorism-related material” and the next two questions are included in the variable “media attention of visible minorities and immigrants,” they include;

Media Variable 1

1) How much coverage have you seen or heard through the media (TV, radio, newspapers, magazines, online information, advertisements) regarding concerns about the safety of your personal information?
2) Where do you feel the media pays the most attention? Would you say more attention to stories about terrorism or violations in the government?

Media Variable 2

1) How much attention does visible minorities receive by the media?
2) How much attention do immigrants receive by the media?
The first question in Media variable 1 is measured on a scale from ‘a lot of coverage’, ‘some coverage’, ‘not much coverage’, ‘no coverage at all’, and ‘not sure.’ The second question that deals with where the media pays the most attention was measured as ‘terrorism’, ‘stories about violations in government’, and ‘not sure.’ Media variable two’s questions inquired about how much attention visible minorities and immigrants receive in the media from ‘high amounts of attention’ to ‘low amounts of attention’ and the option of ‘not sure.’ Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on all four items and two factors were extracted. Factor one, “media coverage of terrorism-related material” (eigenvalue of 1.437, 71.9% of the variance explained). Factor two includes “media coverage of visible minorities and immigrants” (eigenvalue of 1.505, 75.3% of the variance explained).

**Control Variables**

Previous research has demonstrated that other relevant variables have been shown to affect the public opinion process in the specific area of counterterrorism policies and legislation in Canada (Lemyre et al., 2006) and the United States (Joslyn & Haider-Markel, 2007; Davis & Silver, 2004; Huddy et al., 2005). The International Surveillance and Privacy Opinion Research Survey (2006) dataset includes the variables age, race, education, gender, and income. These variables, with the addition of the region in which the respondents live and a respondents experience with detention have been included in the research models. Education and income will provide a stronger measure for socioeconomic status of the respondent. Measures such as education and income provide a measure for the structural position a respondent assumes in society. This research will use this measure to ascertain the effects on support for government counterterrorism policies that these two factors have while interacting with the other
independent variables. The two questions that make up the socioeconomic status variable include:

1) What is the highest level of formal education that you have completed?
2) Which of the following income categories best describes you?

The categories drawn out for education by the ISPORS were ‘graduate degree, such as Masters or PHD’, ‘completed university degree, such as a Bachelors’, ‘some community college or university, but did not finish’, ‘completed technical or trade school / Community college’, ‘completed high school’, ‘grade school or some high school’, ‘don’t know’, ‘refused.’ In the models, dummy variables have been created from these education categories including, ‘graduate degree’, ‘Bachelors degree’, ‘college’, ‘high school’, and ‘less than high school’ (reference category).

Respondents were asked their yearly total income. The categories for income have been separated by increments of 10,000, starting with ‘less than 10,000’ all the way to ‘100,000 and more’ with the option of ‘don’t know’ and ‘refused.’ There are ten categories for income and all were used in the analysis. A common problem with survey based studies in using an “income” variable is the relatively lower response rates when compared to less intrusive questions. The response rate for income in the ISPORS was 87%, a significantly strong response rate. However, responses for “total income” are missing in 13% of the cases and this can be problematic and may pose a threat to the overall validity of the study. Thus, as Cohen et al., (2003: 444) note, “mean plugging for modest proportions of missing data in IV’s, especially when used with a missing data dichotomy, has several advantages.” Since plugging the mean is a convenience rather than an estimated score, it does not actually “make up” data. In this study, the missing 13% of the data involving income was successfully replaced using the mean plugging method. In
addition, Included in the analysis is an income variable that accounts for the thirteen percent that have been added in order to verify any bias's that might exist in the “mean plugged” income variable. Thus, included in the analysis are both the “mean plugged” variable and the Income “dummy” variable.

The socio-demographic variables that will be included in this model were chosen based on their established use as predictors of support for counterterrorism policies. The control variables of most interest in this research are age, minority status, gender, and region. Region is an important element to the demographic makeup of Canada and is relevant to account for the diversity of opinion that Canada encompasses. This is most notably common with issues of counterterrorism policies and support for the war on terror with respect to the diverse variation of attitudes found in Quebec when compared to the rest of Canada regarding this issue (see for example Adams, 2004; Kirton & Guebert, 2007). As previous research has concluded, age and gender will also provide valuable information about the population’s support for counterterrorism policies. The socio-demographic questions include:

**Gender**

3) What is your gender?
   a. Male
   b. Female

Respondents in the survey were asked their gender and a variable was created that dummy coded this nominal measure as male (coded as 1) and female (coded as 0, the reference category).

**Ethnicity**

1) Are you?
   a. Hispanic
The survey inquired the respondent’s ethno-racial origins. Ethnicity has been coded ‘non-white’ and ‘white’ similar to Viscusi and Zeckhauser’s (2003) study. Unfortunately, the survey does not provide a more detailed break-down of ethnicities that would be more realistic of the Canadian population. This is specifically troublesome when trying to account for those of Arab origin who in this survey have been collapsed into the ‘other’ category. This is essentially the reason this study will compare minorities against non-minorities in looking at ethnicity.

Age

4) What is your age?
   a. 18-24
   b. 25-34
   c. 35-44
   d. 45-54
   e. 55-64
   f. 65+

The respondents were asked their age, measured in number of years.

Region of Residents

5) What region of Canada do you reside in?
   a. British Columbia
   b. Prairies
   c. Ontario
   d. Quebec
   e. Atlantic Provinces
Respondents were asked their region of residency in Canada. The original categories were recoded to ‘British Columbia’, ‘Prairie region’ (which includes Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba), ‘Quebec’, ‘Atlantic provinces’, and ‘Ontario’ (Reference category).

The final control variable utilized in this research gauges the effect of a respondent’s previous experience with detention on support for counterterrorism policies. The respondents were asked the following questions:

1) Have you personally, the best of your knowledge, ever experienced detention at a border checkpoint resulting in a search?
2) Have you personally, the best of your knowledge, ever experienced detention by airport officials resulting in being denied entry into a country?
3) Have you personally, the best of your knowledge, ever experienced detention by airport officials resulting in not being able to board the airplane?

The respondents were asked to indicate “yes”, “no” or “not sure” Respondents who indicated “not sure” were included in the recoding of the variable under “no.” Few studies have actually taken the role of having personally experienced detention when looking at the public support or opposition to these polices.

4.4 Statistical Analysis

It is crucial that the statistical model employed in this research is the best fit possible. That means a series of tests was conducted to assure that the data was a logical fit and ensure that comparisons across measures of support for domestic security aimed at deterring terrorism could be made accurately. Before beginning any analyses, the problem of missing
values in the data was addressed and the method of mean plugging was utilized\textsuperscript{8} to estimate, and essentially, impute a value for these missing cases. A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was used on the dependent variables as explained earlier in this section, along with the main predictors for the purpose of producing a one-dimensional structure from a number of similar predictors. Furthermore, tests were conducted in order to confirm a linear relationship exists between the dependent variables and their potential confounders. Testing for outliers which could possibly have a dramatic effect on the coefficients in the model, along with tests that looked at the collinearity or the chance that a variable(s) is redundant with one or more of the other predictor variables. Finally, interaction tests looked at whether any of the variables in the study were causing each other, or interacting, in causing a prediction in the dependent variables. Satisfied with providing the best possible fit of the variables to the models, we are ready to move to the regression analyses.

In order to understand the relationship between the variables used in this research, the hypotheses stated earlier have been tested using regression models. Initially, this has been done through bivariate tests such as cross tabulations which provide information to the extent to which the variables are related. Bivariate tests further aid in constructing a well-built regression model. The bivariate analysis provides the correlations of support for intensive surveillance procedures and the support for policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizen's personal information with all the confounding variables.

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\textsuperscript{8} Missing data can cause problems with statistical models because multiple regression procedures require that every case have a value on every variable that is used in the analysis. It should be noted that some methods might reduce the variance of the variable substantially and can bias the correlation downwards. For the purpose of this research, both methods for solving missing values in the variables will be utilized to determine which yields the best fit. (Cohen et al., 2003).
Multivariate analysis, using ordinary least square regression, has been employed to examine and estimate probability in order to disclose the best predictors of supporting Canadian counterterrorism initiatives in this research. Ordinary least squares regression not only provides the researcher with parameter estimates indicating the direction and magnitude of change the explanatory variables have on the dependent variable, but also their reliability and a measure of the overall goodness-of-fit of the regression model (Cohen et al., 2003). This has been conducted using hierarchical modeling as it provides the researcher with the ability to separately estimate the predictive effects of an individual, or group of predictors in order to weigh the effects of including other relationships. Specifically, hierarchical regression models have been created in order to assess both the independent main effects (predictive power) and the interaction effects of the variables in the model. It has already been stated that some predictors constitute the primary focus of this research, while others constitute a secondary focus based on their influences with other variables and their explanatory relationship on the dependent variable. The role of trust in government, knowledge of security infrastructures, and information attained from the mass media comprise the prime importance in this study. The influence of the three primary predictors has not been empirically evaluated with supporting security apparatuses and thus, their presumed influence is to be explored.

The hierarchal sequence for this study begins by running the regression model in determining support for Canadian domestic security apparatuses by trust, knowledge, media coverage of terrorism stories, media coverage of visible minorities and immigrants, while controlling for experience with detention, gender, age, ethnicity, education, income, and region. In the first model, the relationship between supporting counterterrorism initiatives and socio-demographics’ is analyzed. The second model takes into effect the role of socio-economic
variables, and ethnicity. The third model accounts for the role of experiencing detention plays in predicting supporting counterterrorism initiatives. The fourth model takes into account our main predictors such as media coverage of terrorism-related events, media coverage of visible minorities and immigrants, and the role of knowledge of security infrastructures play in predicting supporting counterterrorism initiatives. The fifth and final model takes into account the role of trust in government over and above all other variables in supporting counterterrorism initiatives;

**Model 1)** Support Counterterrorism Initiatives = Socio-demographic variables

**Model 2)** Support Counterterrorism Initiatives = Socio-demographic variables + Socio-economic variables

**Model 3)** Support Counterterrorism Initiatives = Socio-demographic variables + Socio-economic variables + Experience with detention

**Model 4)** Support Counterterrorism Initiatives = Socio-demographic variables + Socio-economic variables + Experience with detention + Media attention of terrorism + Media attention of visible minorities and immigrants + Knowledge of security infrastructures

**Model 5)** Support Counterterrorism Initiatives = Socio-demographic variables + Socio-economic variables + Experience with detention + Media attention of terrorism + Media attention of visible minorities and immigrants + Knowledge of security infrastructures + Trust in government
CHAPTER 5

Analysis of Findings
5.1 Bivariate Analysis

This chapter begins by offering a preliminary assessment in the form of a bivariate analysis for the support for domestic security initiatives and the predictors already indicated in the previous chapter. Table 2 highlights the relationship between support for intensive surveillance apparatuses with all other exogenous variables, while table 3 highlights the relationship between support for citizen's personal information collection and sharing databases with all other exogenous variables. The condition under which the bivariate tests were chosen in this section is based on statistical theory that takes the association of variables into perspective by setting up the analysis for the subsequent multivariate analysis. The results from both the bivariate and multivariate analysis will address relationships that are statistically significant at a p value of .005 (99.5%) based on previous statistical theory. Essentially, a p value is a measure of inductive evidence against the null hypothesis in the study and the smaller the value the greater the evidence (Goodman, 1993).

Measures of support for intensive surveillance apparatuses and their association to the main predictors of this study are relatively consistent in their significance with a generalized support for more intensive counter-terrorism measures. With the exception of media coverage of terrorism-related events, negative media, knowledge or security infrastructures, and trust in government were all statistically significant in the expected direction (p≤.001). Trust in government with a Pearson's correlation of .273 had the highest association with support for intensive surveillance apparatuses, thus adding evidence to the aforementioned hypotheses that predicted trust in government to be crucial to individuals with formulating an opinion.
about counter-terrorism initiatives. Likewise, media coverage of immigrants and visible minorities had a moderately strong association with support for intensive surveillance apparatuses. As such, we can say that those who perceive that media pays more attention to immigrants and visible minorities will more likely support policies that allow for the implementation of intensive surveillance apparatuses. Furthermore, knowledge of security infrastructures also indicated a moderately strong association with support for intensive surveillance apparatuses allowing the researcher to conclude that the less knowledge a Canadian has about security infrastructures, the more likely that individual will support policies that allow for intensive surveillance apparatuses. Among the control variables, male, older, and respondents from Quebec, are all more likely to support policies that allow for intensive surveillance apparatuses to exist in Canada (see Table 2).

Measures of support for Canadians’ personal information collection and sharing databases and their association to the main predictors of this study are all significant in predicting Canadians’ support for more intensive counter-terrorism measures (see Table 3). Consistent with the other dependent variable, those who indicated that they trusted the Canadian government were far more likely to support policies that allow personal information collection and sharing databases than those who indicated that they didn’t trust the Government. Canadians who indicated that they believe that the media pays more attention to terrorism-related stories and concerns about personal information were more likely to support these policies rather than those who believe that the media pays more attention to terrorism-related stories and concerns about personal information. Similarly, Canadians who believed media pays too much attention to immigrants and visible minorities were more likely to support these policies. The perception of media attention of visible minorities and immigrants is
associated with both dependent variables. Knowledge of security infrastructures, consistent to the other dependent variable, was significant and we can say that the less knowledgeable a Canadian is about security infrastructures, the more likely they are to support policies that allow for personal information collection and sharing databases. (Cohen et al., 2003).

The control variable’s relationship with the first dependent variable, support for policies that allow personal information collection and sharing databases, differed when compared to the first dependent variable, support policies that allow for the implementation of intensive surveillance apparatuses. Those Canadians who reside in the Prairie Provinces were slightly less likely to support policies that allow personal information collection and sharing databases as compared to those who reside in Ontario. The analysis also indicated that age was slightly negatively associated. Thus, as Canadians get older, they are less likely to support policies that allow personal information collection and sharing databases to exist in Canada. Furthermore, age effect differs in Tables 2 and 3. Visible minority status of the respondent is an important control variable in this research and from these results we can say that those Canadians of visible minority status were less likely than non-visible minority status to support polices that allow personal information collection and sharing databases. Those with a high school diploma were less likely to support policies that allow personal information collection and sharing databases. As the first dependent variable suggests, the more education an individual attains, the less likely they are to support counter-terrorism policies in Canada. However, only respondents with a bachelor’s degree differ significantly from those with a high school education. In terms of total income, as a Canadian’s income increases, the more likely he or she is to support policies that allow personal information collection and sharing databases. A respondent’s experience with detention was the last control variable to be significant.
Surprisingly, those respondents who indicated they went through some process of detention (for example, a search was conducted), were slightly more likely to support policies that allow personal information collection and sharing databases to exist in Canada (see Table 3).

In looking at the bivariate analysis, there is support for hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4. However, the complex nature of interactions between the independent variables has not yet been realized, and as argued in previous chapters, will be crucial in order to understand the intricate mechanisms that constitute the Canadian public's opinion on domestic security initiatives. At the multivariate level of analysis we can investigate whether or not the relationships between trust, negative media, media coverage, and knowledge with the two dependent variables are factual or simply due to cofounding effects of each other or the control variables. Such analyses will also provide information and answers to the final hypothesis of this research which postulates the effect of trust, media coverage, negative media, and minority status is mediated by knowledge of security infrastructures. The next section is dedicated to analyzing the Canadian public's support for domestic security apparatuses through the process of support for intensive surveillance procedures and support for policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizens' personal information.

5.2 Multivariate Analysis

In the remainder of this chapter, results from the multivariate regression analyses are presented for the relationships between both dependent variables, support for intensive surveillance procedures and support for citizens' personal information collection and sharing databases with predictor variables. Herein, results explore the effects of the Canadian
population supporting such domestic counterterrorism measures based on a progression of analysis that employs a hierarchical or sequential regression technique that enables the researcher to isolate and path out the unique effects the variables have. This research is interested in the effects of media, knowledge, and most importantly, trust on the support for domestic counterterrorism measures. However, it is important to include other variables that may also be controlling for the effects on this direct relationship. To make sure these predictors do not explain away the association that has been hypothesized to exist between our main predictors and support for counterterrorism policies, they are added in the first models. This will ensure that no shared variability is given to the variables that are not associated with the dependent variables and our main predictors become independent of factors that affect whether a Canadian supports or opposes domestic security policies. The five regression models for each of the dependent variables have already been outlined in section 4.5 and can be found in Tables 4 and 5 respectively. As was the case with previous analyses, only the results of predictors that represent a significant (at the .005 level or less) relationship with the dependent variables will be discussed here.

**Dependent Variable 1: Canadians’ Support for Intensive Surveillance Procedures (Table 4)**

The analysis of Model 1 in Table 4 included only socio-demographic variables that established the independent and additive effects of an individual’s region of Canada in which they reside, gender, and age on support for policies that allow for intensive surveillance apparatuses to exist in Canada. Residents of Quebec (b=.443, p<.05) according to Table 4 are more likely than residents of Ontario (reference category) to support intensive surveillance policies. Males (b=.847, p<.001) were far more likely than females to support intensive
surveillance policies. Lastly, the age of a Canadian was significant in the first model (b = .137, p ≤ .05) and it can be said that as a Canadian becomes older he or she is more likely to support intensive surveillance policies (see Table 4).

Model 2 includes the addition of socio-economic variables and minority status to. However, the addition of education, total income, and minority status does not affect Canadians’ support for intensive surveillance policies. Generally, the inclusion of these socio-economic variables does not significantly alter the effect of socio-demographic variables. Model 3 included the addition of experience with detention to the previous two models. The variable is not a significant predictor of Canadians’ support for intensive surveillance policies.

The last two models contain the main predictors hypothesized to affect Canadians’ support for intensive surveillance policies. Model 4 includes the additive effects of media coverage about terrorism, media coverage of immigrants and visible minorities, and knowledge of security infrastructures on the regression analyses. Males’ (b = .741, p ≤ .001) support is still much greater than females’ but there emerged a small drop with the addition of these new predictors. In contrast, there emerged an increase in support from residents of Quebec (b = .517, p ≤ .05) when the addition of media influence and knowledge of security infrastructures was introduced into the model. Age now has a stronger effect when compared to the previous model. Education categories, including those who completed a bachelors degree (b = -.803, p ≤ .05) and graduate degree (b = -.958, p ≤ .05) are also significant for the first time in the regression analyses. Contradictory to the bivariate analyses that concluded some confusion around the effect of education, controlling for the additive effects of the other predictors, we see that as an individual’s education increases, his or her support for intensive surveillance procedures strongly decreases. In sum, the effect of age, gender, region of residence, and
education on supporting intensive surveillance procedures seems to be mediated by media coverage and knowledge of security infrastructures.

In looking at our main predictors, media coverage of terrorism-related threats and events is insignificant. However, Media attention of visible minorities and immigrants (b = .139, p ≤ .005) is a significant predictor of supporting intensive surveillance procedures. Thus, those Canadians who have seen media coverage of visible minorities and immigrants are more likely to support counterterrorism policies over those who have not witnessed these stories in the media. This support might be a result of the fear that is often associated with the “outsider” of western society as many people associate the global war on terrorism with the fundamental jihadists of the Middle East or people of “other” cultures. The role of knowledge of security infrastructures (b = .056, p ≤ .05) is also a significant predictor in the support for intensive surveillance procedures. The more Canadians knew about the infrastructures involved in maintaining domestic security, the slightly more likely they are to support counterterrorism policies.

The final model of the regression analyses incorporates the role of trust in the Canadian government. Controlling for all other variables in the model, trust in government (b = .397, p ≤ .001) is a significant and strong (see beta coefficients in Model 5) predictor in the support for intensive surveillance procedures. Thus, as a Canadian’s level of trust in government increases, the more likely they are to support intensive surveillance procedures engaged in the protection of the nation’s domestic security apparatuses. However, when trust is introduced into the final model, the support for intensive surveillance procedures from the residents of Quebec dramatically declines and is no longer significant. This also suggests that Quebecers are supportive of these policies, simply because they trust the government. Otherwise, they are
neither supportive nor unsupportive. This is also the case for knowledge of security infrastructures which seems to be only effective in predicting support when the role of trust is not accounted for in the model. With the exception of media coverage of visible minorities and immigrants which saw a slight decrease in effect, all other predictors including males, age, those with a bachelors and graduate degree somewhat increased their likelihood of supporting intensive surveillance procedures when trust in government was included in the model.

A story begins to emerge, and as previously hypothesized, the role of trust is the strongest predictor from our main variables in explaining Canadians' support for intensive surveillance procedures. This is also seen in the change on R squared and F-value from the fourth model to the final model. The significance of the F-value indicates whether the addition of a variable or set of variables makes a significant contribution to the model. Although the F-value did not change in the fourth model after the role of media and knowledge was introduced, the addition of trust in government doubled the F-value from 4.611 to 8.957 (p.<.001). Furthermore, many of the predictors added to the model did not appear to make comparatively much of a difference in the explained variance of the model, as indicated by the R-square value. When trust in government was introduced into the final model, the explained variance of the model greatly increased from .070 in Model 4 to .135 in Model 5. Essentially, controlling for all other variables, those Canadians who trust the government and have seen media coverage of visible minorities and immigrants are more likely to support intensive surveillance procedures.
Dependent Variable 2: Canadians Support for Citizens Personal Information Collection and Sharing Databases (Table 5)

The analysis of Model 1 in Table 5 includes only socio-demographic variables that establishes the independent and additive effects of an individual’s region of Canada in which they reside, gender, and age on support policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizens’ personal information. Those living in the Prairies (b= .723, p<.005) are far less supportive of policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizens’ personal information compared to those in Ontario. Similarly, age (b= -.169, p<.005) has a negative effect on this supporting citizens’ personal information collection and sharing databases, as was the case for the first dependent variable, however, in the opposite direction. That is, as Canadians become older they are less likely to support policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizen’s personal information.

Model 2 illustrates the additive effects of socio-economic variables and minority status to the analyses. The addition of these predictors slightly diminishes the power of those residing in the Prairies (b= -.695, p≤.005) and age (b= -.150, p≤.005) on supporting policies that allow for collection and sharing of citizens’ personal information. Minority status (b= -.632, p≤.005) is also a significant predictor when controlling for socio-demographic and socio-economic predictors. Thus, those Canadians of visible minority status are far less likely than non-visible minority Canadians to support policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizens’ personal information.

Experience with detention (b= .469, p≤.05) was the only predictor added to Model 3. Its addition to the regression model weakened the predictive power of those residing in the Prairies, had no effect on age, and actually strengthened the relationship of visible minority
status in predicting support policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizens' personal information. Surprisingly, those Canadians who experienced some form of detention were more likely to support policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizens' personal information over those who had no experience with detention.

The last two models contain the main predictors hypothesized to affect Canadians' support for policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizens' personal. Model 4 includes the additive effects of media coverage about terrorism, media coverage of immigrants and visible minorities, and knowledge of security infrastructures on the regression analyses. Those residing in the Prairies, age, visible minorities and experience with detention all saw their predictive power on the support of these policies decrease when the main predictors were added to the model, suggesting that some of their effect was due to these predictors. All of the main predictors in Model 4 were significant. Canadians who viewed media coverage of terrorism-related events (b= .175, p<.05) were more likely to support policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizens' personal information over those who did not. Similarly, those Canadians who viewed stories about visible minorities and immigrants in the media (b= .101, p<.05) were also more likely support policies that allow citizens' personal information collection and sharing over those who did not. The more knowledge a Canadian has about security infrastructures (b= .049, p<.05), the more likely they are to support policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizens' personal information. These three main predictors all appear to play an independent role in the support for counterterrorism policies. However, the fully specified model introduces the role of trust while controlling for all other variables.

The final model of this regression analyses incorporates the role of trust in the Canadian government and the story begins to change as was the result in the first dependent variable,
support for intensive surveillance procedures (see Table 5, model 5). Controlling for all other variables in the model, trust in government \( (b = .253, p \leq .001) \) is a significant predictor in the support for intensive surveillance procedures. Thus, as Canadians level of trust in government increases, the more likely they are to support policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizens' personal information to further securitize the Canadian border. Furthermore, when trust is introduced into the final model, the effect of one’s knowledge of security infrastructures is no longer a significant predictor of supporting these policies. This suggests that the knowledge of security infrastructures effect is due to trust. Media attention of terrorism-related stories \( (b = .160, p \leq .05) \) and media stories about visible minorities and immigrants \( (b = .088, p \leq .05) \) slightly decrease their effect on these policies when the role of trust is introduced (compare models 4 and 5); however, they still remain significant in predicting support for policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizens' personal information. The effect of a Canadian’s experience with detention, being a visible minority, and those residents living in the Prairies all increased in predicting support for policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizen’s personal information.

Consistent with the first dependent variable, support for intensive surveillance procedures, trust in government as was previously hypothesized, was the strongest predictor from our main variables in explaining Canadians’ support for policies that allow for the collection and sharing of citizen’s personal information. The multivariate analysis confirms this as the F-value improves from 5.272 \( (p \leq .001) \) in the fourth model to 7.016 \( (p \leq .001) \) in the final model when trust in government was introduced. Furthermore, many of the predictors added to the model did not appear to make a significant difference in the explained variance until the main predictors were added to the model, as indicated by the R-square value. An increase in
the R-square from .055 to .079 occurred when media coverage of terrorism-related stories, media stories about visible minorities and immigrants, and knowledge of security infrastructures was introduced. However, when trust in government was introduced into the final model, the explained variance of the model greatly increased from .079 in Model 4 to .109 in Model 5. Essentially, controlling for all other variables, those Canadians who trust the government and have seen media coverage of terrorism, visible minorities and immigrant-related events are more likely to support counterterrorism policies aimed at allowing governmental authorities the right to collect and share citizens' personal information.

Interactions included in Dependent Variable One, Canadians' Support for Intensive Surveillance Procedures (Table 6) and Dependent Variable 2, Canadians' Support for Citizens' Personal Information Collection and Sharing Databases (Table 7)

To conclude the analysis portion of this chapter, it is important to test for interactions among the predictors before we can draw conclusions for our regression models. Essentially, interactions involve the interplay of predictors between each other that produces an outcome on the dependent variable(s) that is different from the sum of the effects taken from the individual predictors (Cohen et al., 2003). The consequence of an interaction left unaddressed in the model leads to misleading results and implications to the design of the models in the experiment. With the inclusion of an interaction term, we can better describe the relationships between the dependent and independent variables. Finally, according to Friedrich (1982), including interaction terms in the regression models is a "low-risk strategy" in that if the interaction term(s) are significant then the researcher can simply keep it in the model or otherwise they can be dropped from the model altogether. For the purpose of this study there
were four interaction terms included in the regressions for both dependent variables (see Tables 6 and 7). All of the interactions involve the main predictor variable, trust in government. In order to account for the interaction, both variables are multiplied together and included in the full model one at a time. Tables 6 and 7 show the four models (for the four interactions) included in the model separately in order to properly estimate the affect of each interaction on the predictors in the model. The four interactions include trust in government with visible minority status, trust in government with knowledge of security infrastructures, trust with media attention of visible minorities and immigrants, and finally trust with media attention to terrorism-related events.

In Table 6, the full regression model with the addition of the four interaction terms are included with the first dependent variable, support for intensive surveillance procedures. None of the four interaction terms included in the full regression model are significant. This means the four combinations - trust in government with visible minority status, trust in government with knowledge of security infrastructures, trust with media attention of visible minorities and immigrants, and finally trust with media attention of terrorism-related events; are not interacting in accounting for the variance in Canadians supporting intensive surveillance procedures.

Table 7 shows the full regression model with the addition of the four interaction terms for the second dependent variable, support for personal information and collection databases. Similar to the first dependent variable, none of the four interaction terms included in the full regression model are significant. Meaning, the four combinations - trust in government with visible minority status, trust in government with knowledge of security infrastructures, trust with media attention of visible minorities and immigrants, and finally trust with media attention to
of terrorism-related events are not interacting in accounting for the variance in Canadians supporting personal information and sharing databases. Thus, the additive effect of trust in government in the full model for both dependent variables is not interacting with visible minority status, knowledge of security infrastructures, media attention of visible minorities and immigrants, and media attention of terrorism-related events. Although there exists two schools of thought on whether to keep interaction terms in the final model when drawing conclusions (see for example Brambor et al., 2006), it is concluded that because all of the original variables in the model are still present in the analysis, the four interaction terms can be taken out. This is weighed against the possibility that including the interaction terms in the final model increases multicollinearity between the variables, thereby increasing the standard errors (Brambor et al., 2006). Finally, it is important to note that no significant changes resulted in the final regression models when the interaction terms were included despite each being added separately to the full model.
6.1 Conclusion and Discussion

Throughout this thesis, questions surrounding the Canadian public’s support or opposition to the recent changes in the domestic security infrastructures to combat terrorism have been addressed and explored. Essentially, this research has inquired about the underlying factors in society that help gauge Canadian attitudes, and more specifically, the role media viewership, knowledge of security infrastructures, and trust in government play in predicting Canadian support or opposition to counterterrorism initiatives. Overall, the findings indicate that attention to media and trust in government affect the public’s willingness to curtail some of its civil liberties and support domestic security measures in the hope of thwarting terrorism in Canada. At a closer examination of the multivariate analysis, support for counterterrorism polices is unrelated to Canadians’ knowledge of security infrastructures when trust in government is introduced in the models for both dependent variables. In fact, this research finds that not only is Canadians’ trust in government the strongest predictor of whether they support or oppose counterterrorism measures, but it can be considered as a mediator of some of the other predictors.

Summary of Research Hypothesis

**Hypothesis 1: Trust in Government and Support for Domestic Security Initiatives**

This hypothesis postulates that the more trust a Canadian has in the Canadian government, the more likely they will be to support domestic security initiatives aimed at combating terrorism. The hypothesis is supported in Models 5 for both dependent variables, where trust is significantly correlated with both counterterrorism measures exemplified in these
two measures. Therefore, the argument that a Canadians' trust in government is highly correlated and the most important predictor in gauging public support for counterterrorism policies is substantiated.

The results here provide some revelations into what effects Canadians support for counterterrorism policies. Specifically, the importance of trust in government in Canada is confirmed with those studies conducted in the United States. As Davis and Silver (2004) found, when respondents were presented with the threat of terrorism, the more trust they had in the federal government, the more willing they are to concede some civil liberties in favour of security and order. Likewise, Lewis (2005) demonstrated that the majority of Americans who indicated a high level of trust in the federal government were more likely to support legislation to combat terrorism.

**Hypothesis 2: Mass media Viewership and Domestic Security Initiatives**

This hypothesis puts forward the notion that the more exposure a Canadian has to mass media resources that exhibit stories of terrorism, visible minorities, and immigrants, the more likely they are to support domestic security initiatives aimed at combating terrorism. The hypothesis is supported for collection and sharing of personal information and partially for intensive surveillance procedures. With respect to the latter, only media attention of visible minorities and immigrants is important. Thus, individual exposure to media events about terrorism, visible minorities, and immigrants will generally result in more support for counterterrorism measures in the country’s domestic security apparatuses.

Previous literature has illustrated the relationship between media viewership and its influence in shaping public opinion to be strong. The findings here are consistent with Davis and
Silver (2004), Huddy et al. (2005), and Joslyn and Haider-Markel (2007) that all found that Americans who used the mass media as their primary reference source for information about various undesired events involving terrorism were more likely to support counterterrorism policies. This research suggests that the same pattern is being played out in Canada as similar results were found here. Although no previous studies in Canada properly weigh the role of the media in affecting individual support for counterterrorism initiatives, it appears to have an effect on Canadians when attention is drawn to stories of terrorism and undesired repercussions of failing to address the threat of terrorism such as immigration problems and visible minorities.

**Hypothesis 3: Visible Minorities and Domestic Security Initiatives**

This hypothesis postulates that individuals that are of visible minority status in Canada will be less likely to support domestic security initiatives aimed at combating terrorism. Surprisingly, this was only supported in one of the two dependent variables in this study. In Model 5 (Table 5) minority status was significantly correlated with supporting the collection and sharing of personal information databases, but in Model 5 (Table 4), the hierarchical modeling illustrated that minority status was never significant in predicting support for intensive surveillance procedures. Therein, we can say that while controlling for all other variables in Model 5 (Table 5), visible minorities in Canada were far less likely to support the collection and sharing of personal information databases than non-visible minorities. As stated before, our finding may be somewhat due to our measurement which did not allow us to separate Arab/Muslims from other visible minorities.
The results of our hypothesis on dependent variable two, support for the collection and sharing of personal information databases, is supported in the previous literature stated earlier. To reiterate, Davis and Silver (2004) found that with the exception of Latinos, all visible minorities in the United States were less likely to support counterterrorism policies over non-visible minorities. Huddly et al. (2005) found similar results to Davis and Silver (2004), although in their study they found that all visible minorities were less likely to support counterterrorism policies over non-visible minorities. The results here help provide some insight and fill the void on where visible minorities in Canada stand on counterterrorism polices.

**Hypothesis 4: Knowledge of Security Infrastructure and Support for Domestic Security Initiatives**

This hypothesis estimates that the less knowledgeable a Canadian is about security infrastructures and legislative procedures, the more likely they are to support domestic security initiatives aimed at combating terrorism. *This hypothesis is not supported* in the multivariate analysis for either counterterrorism measures investigated in this study. Knowledge of security infrastructures is not associated with supporting or opposing counterterrorism measures. While knowledge of security infrastructures appeared to be correlated with support for counterterrorism policies in the fourth model (in both dependent variables), with the introduction of trust in government, knowledge became statistically insignificant. Therefore, this author suggests that trust, irrespective of knowledge, is the main component that Canadians utilize when forming an opinion on domestic security initiatives aimed at preventing terrorism in Canada. This finding supports the main argument of this study that states trust in
government is the most important predictor of whether people will support or oppose counterterrorism measures.

Although results here did not support our original hypothesis, previous literature has found that knowledge is an important factor in predicting support for security policies. This was shown in Viscusi & Zeckhauser (2003) study that reported those Americans who were less knowledgeable about airport security practices, were more likely to increases security practices that contradicted civil liberties such as profiling. This is consistent with Jenkins-Smith and Herron's (2005) findings that saw Americans were more willing to consider new alternatives in policies when they were unknowledgeable about the issue. Although this relationship was mediated by the level of anxiety the individual felt towards the issue. It should be noted that the difficulty of constructing a consistent measure of knowledge across studies make it difficult for researchers to conclude similar results.

Hypothesis 5: Trust in Government, Media Attention, and Visible Minority Status will be mediated by Knowledge of Security Infrastructures.

This hypothesis maintained that the knowledge a Canadian has about security infrastructure mediates the relationship between trust in government, media exposure, and visible minority status in supporting domestic security initiatives aimed at thwarting terrorism. This hypothesis was not supported as knowledge of security infrastructure was not significant in Model 5 (Table 4 and 5) in predicting support or opposition for counterterrorism measures. Interestingly, it appears that trust, not knowledge, mediates the relationship between media attention for visible minorities and immigrants as well as terrorism-related stories, and visible
minority status in supporting domestic security initiatives aimed at thwarting terrorism. This will be reviewed in further detail in the next section.

The media predictors used in this study were both significant predictors of support for counterterrorism initiatives, however, when trust was included into the model for support for intensive surveillance procedures, only media coverage of visible minorities and immigrants was significant. According to Mutz (1998), the national media supplies the public with information dealing with situations and people outside of their personal experiences. Studies by Lemyre et al. (2006) and Fischhoff et al. (2005) did not actually validate the media’s role in supporting counterterrorism initiatives, but rather looked at where individuals sought information about terrorism-related stories. Their results indicated that mass media resources were most often utilized for information about terrorism-related stories in the United States (Fischhoff et al.: 2005) and in Canada (Lemyre et al.: 2006).

The addition of their findings to this study provide some insights into the role the media plays in building support for counterterrorism policies. If people trust the media as their primary source of information about terrorism and media stories related to terrorism and coverage of immigrants or visible minorities lead Canadians to support counterterrorism measures, then we can begin to understand the negative consequences of government-influenced media that Herman and Chomsky (1992) stressed. As Herman and Chomsky note, governments and wire services define the news agenda and supply the national and even international news to lower tiers of the media, and evidentially to the general public. The centralization of ideas is increasingly making objective media opaque. A relationship between the media and governmental communication apparatuses undermines the commonly held view
that the media speaks for the people and defends against governmental misconduct. The media in a modern democracy are likely to play an ever more increasing role providing terrorism-related threats to the Canadian public given the rapid and convenient availability of information they afford.

With respect to knowledge, it was proposed, and later rejected, that knowledge would facilitate the role of trust in predicting support for counterterrorism initiatives. This was contradictory to Siegrist and Cvetkovich’s (2000) findings that reported Americans’ trust was significantly mediated by the knowledge, or lack thereof, a citizen had about hazardous threats. Likewise, it was also in disagreement with Viscusi and Zeckhauser’s (2003) study that found knowledge to be an important predictor of Americans supporting profiling measures in airports at the cost of giving up some civil liberties. Causally, it was hypothesized that knowledge precedes trust in forming an opinion as the researchers believed that an individual requires the former to actually construct the latter. One rationale for knowledge’s insignificance to Canadians in supporting these policies may be the complexity of acquiring knowledge of security infrastructures as they become more intensive and secretive. In the domestic security case, the public may rely on government institutions to do the work of information gathering and monitoring, therefore solving the problem of a lack of knowledge around security infrastructure as being an essential pre-requisite of building trust in government. This of course may provide assurances as to why knowledge was not a significant factor in the Models proposed in this study when trust in government was introduced. However, we have to be careful in rejecting the role of knowledge since questions measuring knowledge do not directly relate to security policies, but rather, security infrastructures employed by the Government of Canada.
Drawing on the theories of public opinion, we might be inclined to draw some conclusions after completing this analysis. Revisionists' direct opposition to traditionalists is geared by the idea that complete information is not required for reasoned policy choices. Citizens are cognitively disseminating individuals requiring only pieces of knowledge they deem important and not the specific technicalities nor instruments of that policy. This is not because of a limited capacity to comprehend, as traditionalists argue, but through selective information processing. However, on the other hand, traditionalists, more specifically Lippmann's argument that the shadow of political communication that flows through mass media may still be prominent in today's society. The role of the media in publishing stories in regards to terrorism threats and paying attention to immigrants and visible minorities might be sending the appearance that the threat is constant, inside our borders, and in the mist of the general population. Further research in Canada between these relationships would prove worthwhile.

Finally visible minority status was also found to be a significant predictor of support for collection and sharing of personal information databases. As stated previously in this section, the hypothesis that stated Canadians of visible minority status were far less likely than Canadians of non-visible minority status to support this counterterrorism initiative was substantiated. This finding is consistent with Davis and Silver's (2004) study from the United States. These findings may be the result of visible minorities' strong stance in supporting civil liberties because of the struggle they endured to make Canada an equal and free society. Thus, pressed with the threat of terrorism, Canadians of visible minority status in Canada are not willing to empower the government with more privileges even when their personal security is threatened. This could also be due to the fact that many non-visible minorities in Canada may see such initiatives like targeting visible minorities through profiling measures as not being
unfair. This research suggests that the Government of Canada has a need to properly orchestrate its policies specifically to visible minorities with the assurance that their fundamental rights will be protected, especially since Canada is a mosaic of different ethnicities that prides itself on living in a country of fundamental rights and unrestricted opinion.

The central focus of this research has been the role of visible minority status, media viewership, knowledge of security infrastructures, and trust in government play in predicting Canadian support or opposition to counterterrorism infrastructures and initiatives. Past studies have shed some light on, and at the same time, called into question the mechanisms an individual utilizes when forming an opinion on domestic security policy. This study finds that when the proposed main predictors of shaping public opinion around domestic security initiatives are entered into the equation, the importance of trust in government is highlighted. While all the main predictors are generally significant in supporting domestic security initiatives, trust in government is the strongest determinant of Canadians' views on counterterrorism initiatives. Trust also tends to mediate the effect of other predictors. This finding is consistent with research on the American population where Davis and Silver (2004) and Lewis (2005) found that the more trust a citizen indicated in the federal government, the more likely they were to support government legislations and initiatives to combat terrorism.

Trust in government uniformly leads Canadians to favour a set of security initiatives needed to counter the threats of terrorism even if it costs civil liberties and increased government surveillance. The total makeup of trust is not restricted to security-related matters, but rather trust in government is also made possible through macro-factors such as economic prosperity or an increased social security net. Therefore, if knowledge of those security infrastructures presently in place takes on an increasingly biometric make-up, then a relatively
uninformed population around the restructuring of security might be more inclined to support policies when Canadians are supportive of a government that has prospered in other segments of the society such as the economy or health care for example. Moreover, democratic institutions from other segments of society may be better at producing generalized trust than non-democratic institutions because they are better at constraining the use of coercion to tasks that enhance rather than undermine trust. This can be seen in the roles government agents play in society as they facilitate the transference of trust from one domain to another. For example, Canadians who trust the government as the protector of legal rights may also trust government when the passage of anti-terrorism legislation is required. This machinery seems to function in unison with Hirschman’s (1997) assertion that trust increases trust and its non-use diminishes it.

The importance of trust is shown here to affect how Canadians view domestic security as a solution to the indeterminate danger posed by terrorism but also as a solution to the preservation of our civil rights. The magnitude that trust in government entails when the Canadian public formulates its attitude on domestic security policies is consistent with studies from the United States that have evaluated its relationship (Davis & Silver, 2004; Lewis, 2005). While no study has evaluated trust in government in a domestic security context in Canada, we can begin to understand how trust in a modern democracy can be manipulated, and evidentially, utilized in curtailing fundamental freedoms in combating the threat of terrorism. Charles Tilly (2007) emphasized that democracy is not so much about the institutions and ideas that spawn from it so much as the crucial relationships between the rulers and the ruled. Accordingly, you can oust world leaders all you want, but the institution of democracy will not thrive unless the promises governments and citizens make to each other are honoured.
If we follow Levi's (1997) model of “contingent consent” we can begin to conceptualize the importance of trust at the institutional level when analyzing public support for counterterrorism security initiatives. Previous studies have emphasized the role of other underlying variables in determining public opinion towards this issue, and not the role of trust. This research supports Levi's arguments with respect to trust and offers some insight into explaining why Canadians would comply with precarious, and what may prove to be costly demands from the Government. Trust in the government may have additional consequences in terms of governance as well. Its destruction may lead to a pervasive antagonism to security initiatives and policy (Levi, 1997). Levi explains, “a trustworthy government is a necessary but insufficient condition for large-scale contingent consent” (1997: 143). Although we have shown that a trustworthy government is the most important factor that leads individuals to support Canadian security initiatives, its effects will be enhanced by that addition of citizens following media events of terrorism, immigrants, and visible minorities.

If democracy is a prerequisite of a motivated trusting citizenry to work in unison with a trustworthy government and is unquestionably essential in providing institutional protections, then scepticism and public caution of intense security initiatives should be a catalyst for an even more democratic state. It is crucial to resist allowing democratic institutions the ability to undermine citizenry in areas such as trust. Directly, it is the role of the free press and oversight organizations to put government agents under extensive scrutiny, and indirectly, the general citizenry. Research and open discussions contribute to this building of trust between the citizens and the state by lowering the costs to the normal Canadian in terms of restricting civil rights and securing our defence capabilities in addressing the threat of terrorism.
6.2 Policy Implications

It is difficult to propose the most effective way of constructing initiatives to defeat terrorism domestically that the Canadian public and government can agree on. Policies that have been implemented in response to the threat of terrorism cannot be assessed on their effectiveness without properly identifying the characteristics of the terrorist cells which these policies are directly targeting. This of course epitomizes the threat of terrorism and how security according to de Lint is being understood in the West as “static rather than transitory; unambiguous and determinate” (2008: 168). The findings from this study have suggested some of the important factors that determine what will lead the Canadian population to support policies, irrespective of an individual’s knowledge of those infrastructures. It must be understood that the increased alignment of surveillance, and undoubtedly of security, with the life of the Canadian population are inconsistent with substantive democratic principles of equality and freedom. Surveillance, it has been suggested “produces an inner compatibility between democracy and totalitarianism” (Lyon cited in Bell, 2006: 163).

It must be noted that while a shift in public opinion following 9/11 might have been used by the Canadian government to support the relatively quick passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act (2001), this does not make it bad legislation. Nor does it necessarily mean that the initiatives that seek to further securitize the country are not required to prevent terrorism inside Canadian borders. After all, to assume terrorism does not pose a threat to Canada would contradict some of the events in the not so distant past that clarified its very real consequences. However, the government must remember that Canadians have a great amount of respect in their fundamental freedoms and will require the public’s acceptance of future initiatives and policies.
if its hopes to prevent any terrorism incidents inside Canadian borders. We must remember, as James Madison acknowledged just after the United States became a nation; “public opinion sets bounds to every government, and is the real sovereign in every single one” ([1791]1962: 6).

Unfortunately, this empirical investigation has not provided information on how future domestic security policies in Canada can be more encompassing of the population. Nonetheless, it has shown that if Canadians trust government, the latter can legislate draconian polices under the banner of terrorism threats. Furthermore, Indicators from the study point to the important role the mass media plays in providing direct information about terrorism and related events. The possibility of providing specific changes to policies, or the implementation of new policies in the media would not only make the media more objective, but steer away from sensationalized stories that solely focus on the threat. Furthermore, truly independent media, although difficult to come by, could play a more prominent role. It would be worthwhile for future research to investigate how the relationships between some of the factors assessed in this study actually interact and to investigate their relationship to the government. This means investigating the public’s perception of trust, media, and knowledge in terms of its importance to Canadians in gauging governmental activities. This would provide more substantial literature in security discourse around terrorism and the reactions of domestic policies to it. Understanding how the Canadian government interacts with the public when it looks for acceptance to its policies will only increase the citizen’s cooperation. Institutional arrangements that would require citizens taken on the role of agents empowered as partners in planning, implementing, and overseeing security polices and initiatives. An institutional arrangement that would strengthen acceptance of these policies and initiatives and ensure accountability by not only the Government of Canada, but also the citizens who directly have impute in its implementation. This will lead to
more interactive involvement from Canadians with government decisions by sharing common values and obligations to protect human security. It will enable a vigorous and effective action that will counter terrorism through a carefully measured strategy that least curtails civil liberties while maintaining safety and order in Canada.
7.1 Methodological Limitations

There were several limitations from the methodological standpoint of this study. To begin with, one of the more pressing concerns involved the conceptualization of variables used in this study. The *International Surveillance and Privacy Opinion Research Survey* (2006) created difficulties for this study in various instances. For example, the focus of the study was geared towards the global flow of personal data which created difficulties in constructing measures that would have been more encompassing of the research here. This would have included more measures that looked at the role of the media and the knowledge of specific terrorism-related events as opposed to security infrastructures. Thus, this research employs second hand data that aims at investigating security issues around terrorism that the original data was not created for. In terms of media as a predictor of supporting counterterrorism policies, the real effect of media is uncertain as the antiterrorism legislation passed in 2001 is well before the ISPORS has been conducted. This variable has been tested after the policies have been put into place so the real affect of media must be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, measuring variables can often be interpreted many different ways by researchers. For example, trust in government can be measured in many different ways and although this study employed a measure of trust that was encompassing of a few factors, many different survey questions could properly construct a viable measure of trust for accounting for public attitudes towards counterterrorism legislation.

Nevertheless, we emphasize that trust is a multi-dimensional concept and there is simply no one-factor explanation for variations in citizens' trust in government. This is an important implication of this analysis when drawing results as causal relations are complex and multi-faceted. Future research should focus on better understanding trust in governmental
institutions on a whole by taking a comparative approach by looking at trust in a domestic security context through changes in other countries, among different institutions, and across changes over time.

The study had some difficulty constructing models and departed from studies reviewed in the literature review due to the scarcity of research in domestic security discourse. Although studies from the United States were utilized, research that attempts to take into account the relationships of the variables explored here, especially in the Canadian context, is almost nonexistent. And while the theoretical underpinnings of the study were unique to the author, the general construction of the variables used in this study drew heavily from previous studies in the domestic security of nations that have seen the deployment of counterterrorism initiatives.

Owing to the unavailability of data, this study fails to directly examine how, as Rose and Miller put it, “sought to utilize, instrumentalize and mobilize techniques and agents other than those of ‘the State’ in order to govern ‘at a distance’” (1992: 181). As is argued here, it is inconceivable to the author how to empirically examine how the government influences the media, trust, and knowledge in the public domain in order to coerce a population to support policies that would undoubtedly restrict civil liberties in combating terrorism. However, this study was able to draw modest insight into the factors that are important to the public when it wages its support for supporting counterterrorism initiatives.

7.2 Conceptual Limitations

There were several limitations from the conceptual standpoint of this study. First, it must be noted that survey-based studies often have problems inherent with results based on
aggregated measures which can have the potential for bias. Although the response rate for the survey was relatively high, it is possible that the non-respondents may have had substantially different views on security-related matters and decided not to participate.

Furthermore, the International Surveillance and Privacy Opinion Research Survey (2006) was developed to investigate the attitudes from multiple countries and not just Canada. It did not take into account ethnicity, but rather focused on race to gauge the background of the respondent. This is especially problematic in regards to the cultural diversity that makes up Canada. Unfortunately, the survey is not exhaustive in the categories the respondent could indicate when completing the survey. That is, there is only Asian – Pacific islander, Black – African, Caucasian – White, North American Indian – Inuit, Mixed Population Group, and Another Population Group. Thus, respondents of Middle-Eastern descent were actually grouped into the “Another Population Group” which is problematic for the purpose of this study that inquires into counterterrorism initiatives that are aimed at and in response to the terrorism of 9/11 that had its links to Al Qaeda terrorist cells most prominently located in the Middle-East. While it would have been worthwhile to be able to test groups separately, it was decided that the best way to deploy this variable was to test visible minorities against non-visible minorities. Had the data given more detailed information about the respondent’s ethnic/racial group, the study would have been better apt to estimate how ethnic groups stand in relation to each other on supporting or opposing counterterrorism initiatives.

Similar to the ethnic and racial shortcoming stated previously, the variable region of Canada in which the respondent resides was also poorly representative of the Canadian population. Residents of the northern territories were not included in the survey for unknown reasons. For the purpose of this study that is problematic. The obvious reason is that the survey
is not properly representative of the population, but more importantly to the research here, in the last couple of years the Arctic territory has been heavily disputed between Canada, Russia, United States, and Denmark. The Canadian government has pledged its commitment to defend its sovereignty in the north and has invested resources in securing it, expanding the use of its domestic security apparatuses. Thus, it would have made sense to take into account the opinions of those residents in the northern territories, especially the native populations that reside there in constructing Canadian opinion on supporting counterterrorism initiatives.

Conceptually, employing a variable such as knowledge is problematic for the sole reason that surveys often have the respondent self assess their level of knowledge around a specific topic, in this case, security infrastructures. Another way and some scholars would argue a more accurate measure of knowledge, would be to require physical questions that actually provide correct and incorrect answers. This of course would eliminate the problem of respondents feeling embarrassed or guilty in registering an unknowledgeable response and provide an unbiased measure of knowledge about security infrastructures. This is something future researchers should consider when employing a measure of knowledge about security related material

Lastly, it would be useful to address the construction of the dependent variable into two final outcome variables that each focused on a specific element of counterterrorism initiatives. The questions that gauged support for counterterrorism initiatives did not properly load onto one factor and in order to improve the model the questions were revised into two dependent variables. Although the author is content with two outcome variables in drawing conclusions around support or opposition to counterterrorism initiatives, it must be noted that one dominant variable might have made results easier to interpret. This was only a minor limitation
as inference was not an issue as both support for intensive surveillance procedures and support
for the collection and sharing of personal information databases were strong measures of
counterterrorism initiatives.
References


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Legislation


APPENDIX A

Data Tables
Table 1: Factor Structure of Support for Counterterrorism Initiatives Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Factor Loadings of Dependent Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for Intensive Surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Some have suggested that everyone should have a government-issued</td>
<td>.769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national ID card that they must carry on them at all times and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>present it when asked by police and other security forces. To what</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extent do you agree or disagree with this idea?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) In order to put a national ID cards into use, the government</td>
<td>.704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>would need to have a national database containing personal information on all citizens. This could include address, gender, race, and tax information. How effective do you feel efforts to protect this type of information from disclosure would be?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) How acceptable do you feel it would be for airport officials to</td>
<td>.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>give extra security checks to visible minorities?</td>
<td></td>
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Eigenvalue: 1.46, 1.82
Percentage of Variance: 48.6, 60.5
Table 2: Correlations between Support for Intensive Surveillance Procedures and Exogenous Variables

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Control Variables

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*ps.05
Table 3: Correlations between Support for Canadians Personal Information Collection and Sharing Databases and Exogenous Variables

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**Control Variables**

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**Source:** The International Surveillance and Privacy Opinion Research Survey (2006)

*p ≤ .05
**Table 4: Standardized and Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Canadians Support for Intensive Surveillance Procedures**

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|                      | N       | 1001     | 1001     | F        | 6.068***| 4.324*** | 4.019***| 4.611***| 8.957***|          |          |          |          |          |          |
|                      | p<0.05* |          |          | p<0.005**|         |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
|                      | p<0.001*** |        |          |          |         |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |

## Table 5: Standardized and Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Canadians Support for the Collection and Sharing of Personal Information Databases

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p≤0.05*  
p≤0.005**  
p≤0.001***

**Source:** The International Surveillance and Privacy Opinion Research Survey (2006)
The table below shows the regression coefficients for each interaction term in the model predicting support for intensive surveillance. The coefficients are presented for each model, with standard errors in parentheses.

**Procedures**

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*p≤0.05*  *p≤0.005**  *p≤0.001***

**Source:** The International Surveillance and Privacy Opinion Research Survey (2006)
Table 7: Standardized and Unstandardized Regression Coefficients With Each Interaction for Canadians Support for the Collection and Sharing of Personal Information Databases

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**p<0.05  *p<0.005  ***p<0.001

Andrew Chronopoulos was born in 1981 in Windsor, Ontario. He graduated from General Amherst High School in 2000. From there he went on to the University of Windsor where he obtained a B.A.(H) in Criminology in 2006. He is currently a candidate for the Masters Degree in Sociology with a specialization in Criminology at the University of Windsor and hopes to graduate in Fall 2008. Andrew currently serves in the Canadian Armed Forces as an infanteer and has served in the Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia) in 2003 as a peacekeeper and is currently training for Afghanistan with the intention of deploying in early 2009. His experience in domestic security also includes his work as a Canadian Customs Officer at the Windsor bridge and tunnel crossing with the United States and as a Youth Councillor in an open detention security facility.