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CALCULATED OPENING-UP: EXPLAINING THE  
MOTIVATION BEHIND CHINA'S POLICY ON  
INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS

By

Shuqing Zhou

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies through  
the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminology  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for  
the Degree of Master of Arts at the  
University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

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MOTIVATION BEHIND CHINA'S POLICY ON  
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April 23, 2020

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# Abstract

This thesis explores the motivation behind China's policy on international students. It seeks to explain why China forms a policy without clear benefits for Chinese people. Using the concept of instrumentalist and organizational realist approaches, the thesis is centered on political competition and political pursuit to analyze the documents of China's international education policy. The main findings of this thesis expound that the ruling class makes China's policy on international students an instrument of achieving political goal. The thesis indicates that the policy is not in the best interest of the public and the public have not effectively participated the process of policymaking. It argues that China expects that some of the international students would become the leaderships of their home countries and establish friendly relationships with China in the future. The policy made by the central government suggests China's ambition to vie with western powers; whereas the policymakers from provincial governments and universities attempt to pursue higher political positions. The thesis shows that as the ruling class in China, the Chinese Communist Party used the state as an instrument for pursuing their own interests.

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# List of abbreviations

CCP the Chinese Communist Party

CCPPD Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

CI the Confucius Institute

DFCUP Double First Class University Plan

MOE the Ministry of Education of China

NPC the National People's Congress of China

OBOR One Belt and One Road Initiative of China

OCNP Outline of China's National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform (2010-2020)

PRC the People's Republic of China

SJAP Study in Jiangsu Action Plan

SCP Study in China Plan

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

The number of international students in China has increased double during the last two decades. According to the statistics from the Ministry of Education 2010, international students in China numbered 256,000 (MOE, 2010b), while by the end of 2018 the amount of international students is 492,185 (MOE, 2019). In fact, from the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), China has experienced several phases in international students. During the first phase, 1959–1979, very few international students were admitted. During the second phase, 1979–2000, the number of international students started rising. The third phase represented a period of rapid growth. By 2000 the international student body had increased 5 times (Ke, 2010). This is regarded by authorities as great achievements. This kind of growth has tight connection with China's policy and its rise in economy.

## 1.1 The incredible policy on international students

China developed a series of policies on international students in order to attract international students, and the cost of these policies is considerable. A 2014 news report announced that the government of Jiangsu province had announced what seemed like surprising plan for international student recruitment—*Study in Jiangsu Action Plan* (SJAP) (JSGOV, 2014), which indicated that international students in Jiangsu province would receive large numbers of scholarships (China Youth Daily, 2014). The amount of money would be more than most Chinese people’s annual income. Many Chinese expressed openly their discontent with the international student policies on social media. Nevertheless Jiangsu is only one of the 31 provinces (municipalities/autonomous regions ) of China. After the launch of *Outline of China’s National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform (2010-2020)* (OCNP) in 2010 (The State Council, 2010), all of the provincial governments, local governments, universities, and other institutions in China began to make their own policies on enrolling international students. These institutions have ambitious plans to attract more international students before 2020.

A country generally brings in international students based on its economic, demographic, and technological demands (Sá & Sabzalieva, 2018). Quite understandably, with the largest population and the second largest economy in the world, China does not seem to need a large number of international students in the short term. Given this circumstance, why does China want to enroll international students in the short term? Why

is the plan so important to China? And what is the motivation behind China's policy on international students? These topics are interesting and deserving of study.

Answers to these questions are fundamental to understanding China's acts. Firstly, one of the important reasons for the growth of international students in China will be pinpointed. Secondly, the research could contribute to a proper understanding of the relations between the state and globalization. Particularly, it would assist us in penetrating China's attitude toward globalization. Thirdly, we may gain a different perspective on China's motivation for its education policy. Lastly, this research could help us apprehend the logic of power operating in China.

Due to its authoritarianism with a closed system, China has always confused the outside world, and this makes it impossible to fully understand how it operates. Though it claims to be a peace-loving socialist country with Chinese characteristics, China has been arousing concerns from all over the world because of the aggressive posture it adopts. By answering the questions above, we may learn more about this distinctive country.

## **1.2 The gap in policy analysis**

In prior research, authors (Ascher, 1986; Begley et al., 2019; Boin, 't Hart, & McConnell, 2009; Bovens & 't Hart, 1998, 2016; Dunlop, 2017; Mann & Ingram, 1980; McConnell, 2016) concentrated on how to gain a better policy on a public problem, but paid little attention to policies without

virtual problem. That is to say, researchers and scholars are interested in policies originated from a real public problem. Many authors had examined China's policies (K. Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992; K. Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1990). However, most previous research on this subject has concentrated on China's policies on politics, economy, culture, and higher education itself (S. Guo & Guo, 2016; K. Lieberthal, 2004; B. G. Peters & Zhao, 2017; Wen & Hayhoe, 2015; Wen, Luo, & Hu, 2014; R. Yang, 2014), whereas researchers have seldom focused on its motivation for enrolling international students. Through this research, we can add some knowledge to policy studies. It particularly contributes to the studies on China.

### **1.3 The state as a tool**

In this research, I argue that the ruling class in China used the state as a tool to pursue their own interests. As ruling class, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) controls most key resources in China, including the state apparatus. The CCP members take most important positions in the organizations of this country.

On the one hand, the CCP cadres in the central government work for the legitimacy of the regime and their personal interests. Establishing friendly relationships helps the CCP increase its impact on international affairs and this also consolidates the CCP's power in China. Also, the central government tries to tell Chinese people that the CCP regime is the best. The effort to make China great is one of their methods. The policies

from the central government in Beijing fairly bristle with ambition to become a superpower. An example of this ambition is China's special education policy to support students from so-called "One Belt, One Road" countries (MOE, 2016). These strategies are useful to assist the CCP in staying in power. Moreover, the cadres in the central government use the state to pursue their family and bloc interest. By way of cooperation with their international partners, many state-owned enterprises (Putterman & Dong, 2000; Sheng & Zhao, 2013) operated by higher cadres' families or stakeholders benefit from these international cooperation.

On the other hand, local cadres trend to give priority to their own power and interest. Although policymakers from Chinese provincial governments and universities try to maximize their own interests and do not target the China's international strategy, they in reality are of service to the central government by enrolling more international students. By increasing international students, these policymakers attempt to meet the requirements from the central government therefore improve their political prospects. These cadres need to show their ability and achievements to their superiors so that they may obtain higher positions, because Chinese cadres are responsible for their higher cadres, not the people. As a result, the international student policies from local governments or education institutes do not take into consideration the public's interests, but policymakers own interests.

In short, the actors in the policymaking use the policy as an instrument to pursue their own interests. The central government and other

participants have different calculation, but their joint efforts yield a same result—the increasing of international students. From this perspective, the provincial and other institutional policies are based upon policymakers interests, and they consist the national aim and policy in the meantime.

## **1.4 An overview of the methods**

To add some knowledge to policy studies, I employed Marxist and post-Marxist theories on the state to analyze China's policy for international student recruitment. In particular, instrumentalist and organizational realist approaches (Block, 1981; Keeley, 1983; Miliband, 2009; Zucker, 1987) have guided the research design. In addition to the research questions and rationale, this thesis has examined how prior research connects to my study.

This study is mainly based on document analysis. Major documents are from the governments and universities in China. Also, second hand materials are used to support my propositions. These materials includes journal articles, organization reports, institute news release, and main-stream media reports. I also used some internal mails and publicized materials.

## **1.5 Definition of terms**

Some key terms used in this study are defined as follows:

*Policy* is a fairly broad concept. In this study, policy means public

policy. Public policy is made by elected or designated body and seeks to achieve a desired objective that is deemed to be in the best interest of the public.

*China's policy* in this research includes policies made by provincial governments, local governments, and other institutes. In this respect, all the governments and institutes in China are keeping to a national plan on education, and outwardly, these actors are pursuing a common aim—more international student.

*International students* do not include students from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, because China has special policy these regions. Also, these students only pursue their higher education in China.

*State capitalism* in this study means the state intervenes in markets by state-owned enterprises. That is to say, governments involve themselves in business operation directly in order to accumulate capital (Milhaupt & Zheng, 2014).

*The Public* in this research, this term can be interchangeable with Chinese people.

*Cadres* in this research is interchangeable with officials, because most key positions are taken by the Party cadres.

*Totalitarianism* in this study is regarded as a political mode that officially prohibits opposition parties, and exercises high degree of control over people and society, including control of ideology, weapons, the means of communication, and system of terror. Additionally, a typical totalitarian regime is usually led by a dictator. Its essential feature is that, as Conquest



(2000, p. 74) describes, there are “no limits to its authority in any sphere, and in practice extended that authority wherever remotely feasible”.

## **1.6 A road map to the thesis**

Except introduction and conclusion sections, the thesis has 8 chapters. The introduction shows the research questions, importance of study, and the main arguments. The second Chapter is literature review which explores the connection between my study and the prior research. The third chapter shows main data sources and methods the thesis used. Chapter four, five, six, and seven demonstrate the research findings. The eighth and nine chapters discuss and explain the findings.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Literature review**

This chapter will show what relevant work has been done. Four themes of research are analyzed, including policy analysis, China's policymaking, China's policy on international students, and China's engaging in globalization.

Policy studies is one of the most active parts of the social science since 1950s (Dunlop, 2017; Kerr, 1976; Mann & Ingram, 1980; McConnell, 2010). Scholars and researchers from different disciplines have contributed to the establishment of basic concepts, research methods, and theories (Ascher, 1986; Shore, Wright, & Però, 2011). Their work lays the foundation for policy studies as a field of knowledge (Allison, 2006). However, there is not enough stress on policymaking in totalitarian states. As a branch of policy studies, China's educational policy has not received much emphasis in comparison with other fields of study, and this partly because China's strategies on economy has gained more attraction. Most of prior works on China's education policies that I have reviewed tend to explore the results and effects of certain education policies (Ding, 2008;

Jiani, 2017; Song & Liu, 2014; Wen & Hu, 2018). There is a paucity of research that explores the motivation of these policies deeply. In this review, I evaluated four types of studies which have been done, including policy analysis, China's policymaking, China's policy on international students, and China and globalization.

## **2.1 Policy analysis**

Policy studies is a well established and relatively mature field. Researchers try to answer the following questions: (1) what is public policy; (2) how is a public policy made; (3) what is the best policy, and (4) how is this goal achieved. In short, the core of policy studies is to help us to solve problems. Generally, policy studies can be roughly divided into two categories—policymaking process and policy analysis. policymaking process focuses on the question how a policy is made (J. E. Anderson, 2015; Birkland, 2010).

One key theme that scholars focus on is the elements that play key roles in policymaking. Five theories are involved in prior studies. Elite theory considers that elites have more influence in shaping public policy than the general public (Dye, 2001; Schubert, Dye, & Zeigler, 2015). Group theory argues that public policy is the product of a struggle among different interest groups (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Cigler, Loomis, & Nownes, 2015). Institutional theory emphasizes the formal aspects of governmental structure, but has little emphasis on the willingness of individuals' participation (Stone, 2012). Unlike other theories on

policymaking, rational choice theory borrows concepts and tools from economics and tries to explain public policy with respect to the actions of self-interested policy actors (Ostrom, 1998; Schneider & Ingram, 1997). Political systems theory is a kind of general and comprehensive theory which shows how the political system responds to demands from the public and interest groups. This theory provides us with a way to think about the relationships between policy actors and institutions (Kraft & Furlong, 2017). These basic theories are useful to understand the factors which influence public policy.

Another important theme researchers have discussed is the policy process model (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). Policy process model, also known as the policy cycle model (J. E. Anderson, 2015; Birkland, 2016; Jones, 1984), explores what kind of activities affect the development of public policies. Agenda setting (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cobb & Elder, 1983), policy formulation, policy legitimation, policy implementation, policy and program evaluation, and policy change are used to depict the flow of a policymaking (Jones, 1984; Kraft & Furlong, 2017). The policy process model shows six important aspects of policymaking and can be very helpful to understand how a public policy is produced. This model is regarded useful because its concepts and language have considerable scope for different political system and its policy processes.

Policy analysis is more heavily emphasized in policy studies. It concentrates on the assessment of policy alternatives (Patton, Sawicki,

& Clark, 2016). Policy analysis explores myriad significant topics and research objectives, methodology, and evaluation are included (Goodin, Moran, Rein, et al., 2008; Gupta, 2011; Schneider & Ingram, 1997). The approaches to policy analysis are discussed by scholars (Bardach & Patashnik, 2016; MacRae Jr & Whittington, 1997). Generally speaking, steps in the policy analysis process include problem defining and analyzing, policy alternatives constructing, evaluative criteria choosing, alternatives assessing, and conclusions drawing. Policy analysis designing that follows these steps has impacts on the policy process (Bardach & Patashnik, 2016; Lindblom & Cohen, 1979; C. H. Weiss, 1978). Also, researchers have developed three types of policy analysis. Scientific approaches are used to study policy for scientific purposes and not to provide policymakers with answers to public problems (Millikan, 1959). Professional approaches are taken by many policy analysts from government or private agencies to produce the best analysis possible. Political approaches emphasize the advancement of values and goals by their studies and findings. Except for the perspectives and approaches mentioned above, there are some other types of policy research that are available on journals or internet. New policy questions, ethics and value questions for instance, are addressed (Bowman & Elliston, 1988; Weimer & Vining, 2017).

In general, prior policy studies furnish us with tools to understand policymaking process and policy analysis. These studies provide distinct perspectives to view public policy. However, these studies emphasize little

on three aspects. Firstly, the defined public problems in these studies are real problems that the public concern. But in reality, some policies do not start from real problems. In other words, policymakers may make a policy to solve a problem which does not exist. Secondly, most of the studies reviewed are conducted in democratic environment. These studies have failed to considerate the situation that the public in totalitarian states may be forbidden to participate policy process, though political system theory deal with some topics in varied systematic environment. If the governments and their affiliates have too much power to use public resources, these models may not be applicable to this situation. Thirdly, previous studies overlook an aspect that policies in different fields have different influence on the state and society. In reality, more attention is paid to financial policy than educational policy. Policymakers may be more discreet to deal with those “important” fields. That is to say, policymakers or even the public do not regard all policies seriously and the quality of policy may be poor.

## **2.2 China’s policymaking**

A fair amount of work has been carried out in the field of China’s policymaking (Birkland, 2010; Heilmann, 2008; B. G. Peters & Zhao, 2017). On the whole, these studies have placed much weight on China’s policies on political and economic reform (Jakobson & Manuel, 2016; K. Lieberthal, 2004; K. Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992; K. Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1990), while there is insufficient research to explain China’s motivation behind its

policies. Yet some valuable work has been done.

Through a case study, B. G. Peters and Zhao (2017) show how Chinese local government makes policy. Drawing on one of the authors' 5-month participant observation of the process of policy making in a western province in China, the authors describe how Chinese citizens participate in the policymaking process. They have managed to display clearly the process of policymaking in China's local governments. In their conclusion, the authors mentioned that local cadres have their own calculation in the policymaking. This conclusion is reasonable and important, though they have not delved deeper. Taking account of the policymaking situation in China, no matter how democratically the process appears, it serves a fundamental aim—power. Local governments in China always commit themselves to obtaining more power. Therefore, this work did not touch the core part of China's policy making which focuses on bureaucrats' career prospects, safety, and more interest. Additionally, from the perspective of methodology, participant observation in the governmental organization, as used by these authors, is somewhat unreliable. Some colleagues including the head of the bureau where one of the authors conducted his ethnography knew that the author was conducting research, and the cadres may have disguised their real action or motivation in order to project a certain image. The authors may have been misled by the bureaucrats. Furthermore, considering the political climate, Chinese authors usually practice self-censorship before they publish their works so as not to get in trouble. Thus the credibility of the study, to some

extent, can be challenged.

Unlike B. G. Peters and Zhao (2017), some scholars have devoted their attention to China's policy on foreign affairs. Lo and Pan (2016) put China's Confucius Institute (CI) project into a framework of tripartite taxonomies proposed by Nye (1990) and Tellis, Bially, Layne, and McPherson (2001). Lo and Pan suggest that China's intention is to promote China's image and exert influence on other countries by its cultural diplomacy ("soft power") via the CI project which aims to promote Chinese language and culture, support local Chinese teaching internationally, and facilitate cultural exchange (Hanban, 2020; Mattis, 2012). In this article, the authors contend that China has failed to create appropriate, non-coercive and inter-cultural strategies to bring about its intentional outcomes. In other words, the authors indicate that the Confucius Institute Project has not achieved its aim. This article is a useful attempt to explain the motivation behind China's foreign policy. As the authors mentioned, the Confucius Institute Project is in the name of cultural promotion, but it has a potential aim of helping China gain considerable advantage in the world system (Ford, 2015; D. L. Shambaugh, 2015). However, the authors neglect three aspects in their article. Firstly, they fail to evaluate the outcomes by limited polls on the image of China because they only interviewed 30 international students from universities in Beijing. Secondly, the bona fide reasons for the launch of Confucius Institute Project is not clear. Thirdly, the authors overlooked the fact that while Chinese universities are major participants in Confucius



Institute Project, these universities have their own calculation in the cooperation with *Hanban* (Hanban, 2019) and foreign partners. In sum, this article can not explain why the project has been operating, and it needs more empirical evidence from Confucius Institutes and *Hanban* system (Hubbert, 2019).

Resting on three cases of hydropower policy outcomes in China, Heilmann (2008) makes contribution to the study of China's policymaking process. He holds that policy entrepreneurs have the ability to influence the outcomes of hydropower strategy. The author situates his study in the concept of "fragmented authoritarianism" developed by K. G. Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988). The author suggests that though the fragmented authoritarianism framework applies to the policymaking process, the cadres from government have involved more marginalized actors (peripheral cadres, NGOs and activists ) in this process, which revealed a tendency towards increasing pluralization. The author observed the shift of political orientation of more participation in the policymaking process, which is probably more significant than election and vote in villages in terms of democratization. Again, although the author attempts to extend his arguments to international trade, this research mainly focuses on domestic affairs. The trend for pluralization would not change the fact that all the processes must be subject to the ruling party's interest, no matter how many participants are involved in the process. The author also mentions that the policy formation has integrated organizational and political goals of various vertical agencies and regions, and outcomes of policy have

been shaped by many participants. This argument is meaningful because it shows a bargaining process among different participants. The concept of “fragmented authoritarianism” is valuable to explain the power of local governments or other participants in the process, partly at least, but all the process has common internal logic of “party-state interest”. Also, the central government and local governments have different pursuit of interest. Pluralization does not necessarily mean that those participants have power to make a final decision. A big hand behind this process is still controlling the operation (Lampton, 2014, 2019; D. L. Shambaugh, 2008).

On the whole, prior research on policymaking in China retains three features. At first, researchers tend to study agenda setting and process, but have little to do with why a certain policy is needed. Further, what they discuss concentrates on domestic affairs of China. Lastly, they fail to separate national interest and organizational interest. The paucity of these parts would provide a good start of my research.

### **2.3 China’s policy on international students**

Apart from policy studies, a great deal of work has been done in the field of higher education in China (Marginson, 2006, 2011; Mazzarol & Soutar, 2002; H. Wei, 2013). These studies may be classified into two types: internationalization of higher education (King, 2014; R. Yang, 2014) and domestic reforms (Wen & Hayhoe, 2015). These studies explore the reasons why international students pursue their education in China (Ferdjani, 2012; Jiani, 2017; Song & Liu, 2014; Wen & Hu, 2018). In

addition, some authors put China's higher education in the context of global competition (Wen et al., 2014). But they seldom deal with the matter why China made grand plans to enroll international students.

By making use of an updated "push-pull" model, Wen and Hu (2018) endeavor to explain international students' rationale to study in China. Based on an interview with 30 international students in Beijing, the authors found that the quality reputation of China's higher education was the major pulling force for international students to China, and economy booming has made China an emerging regional hub for foreign students. Their research evinces that students with different country and culture origins have various trends and views on China's higher education, because they are pulled by varied factors. Students from developed countries care less about economic factors, while students from developing countries mind more about scholarship and jobs. The authors, in general, found economic factors played most important role in driving international students to China. They argue that China has become an important educational destination due to China's planned efforts and sustainable investment into its higher education. Their research has also suggested that there are very few international students in China because of attractions of Chinese culture. This article has contributed to understanding the international students' rationales for choosing China as an important destination for study. Many other studies emphasize economic motivation, though they get involved in different methods (H. Wei, 2013; W. Zhang, 2010). But there are still three questions to answer. First of all, on a

methodological level, the 30 interviewees are not an ideal sample because there are more than 400,000 international students in China. Also, all the interviewees are from Beijing, and it is not necessarily a reflection of the features of the whole foreign students group in China. In addition, the authors used a Chinese university ranking made by Shanghai Ranking Consultancy (ARWU, 2019) which put Chinese universities in better positions, while some rightful world-class institutions in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan are lying lower position in the ranking. In other words, China's universities have not yet gained in worldwide popularity. Their data, therefore, is not enough to support their arguments that international students come to China because of the high quality of Chinese universities.

By studying the internationalization of higher education in China during the past decades, R. Yang (2014) explores why China attempted to pursue an internationalized higher education. He argues that engagement with the international community could be an effective way to help China enhance its status in the world. The author proposes that China's internationalization of higher education is part of a process of cultural integration between China and Western countries. That is to say, China has not yet created an authentic world-class higher educational system and it is at a distance from developed countries in this respect. Furthermore, the author explores the cultural factors that underpin the relations between China and developed countries in higher education. He utilizes Chinese traditional worldview—the concept of *Tianxia* (all-under-heaven) to analyze China's aspirations to return to the center of world stage. The

author tries to add a historical perspective to discuss the internationalization of higher education. This article has shown how and why China pursues an internationalized higher education by way of interpretation. It addresses a cultural question about China's efforts to internationalize its higher education. The author's arguments obtain support from other studies (Gonondo, 2017; S. Guo & Guo, 2016; Ke, 2010; A. Li, 2018). But the author has not provided any empirical evidence to support his arguments. The question on how an abstract concept of *Tianxia* influences the cooperation between China and Western countries is not answered appropriately in the article. Additionally, the author fails to provide a persuasive explanation as to why China pursues internationalization of higher education even on the condition that universities in China are all following western models from 1978 (Hayhoe, 1989, 2016).

In summary, prior scholarships on international students concentrate on why foreign students choose to study in China, but researchers seldom examine why China wants, without clear benefit, many international students to study in China. Some of them mentioned that China has ambition to show its soft power to the world (Cho & Jeong, 2008; Ding, 2008; W. Zhang, 2010). However, China's soft power ambition is far from being proved by scientific research. Hence improving China's soft power may not be the reason for attracting international students. Accordingly, the real causes still need to be explored.

## 2.4 China and globalization

There are two trends in studies of China and globalization. The first is that China is a source of globalization, even from very ancient Rome time.

The second proposition is that China has been absorbing civilization of the western world. Generally, China's globalization could be categorized "inviting the world in" (*yinjinlai*) and "going out" (*zouchuqu*) (Hubbert, 2019, p. 5). To some extent, these studies partly reveal the facts of cultural exchange. However, these studies have not explored that the globalization is used as an instrument to grab interests and power by the dominant class in China.

We have seen a plenty of research on the relations between the state and globalization (Boyer & Drache, 1996; Haggard, 1995; Jotia, 2011; Rodrik, 2011; Rudra, 2002; Sassen, 2003). Many supporters of postmodernism and globalization theories suggest that national state would have no future, given the rise of other non-governmental actors (Edwards & Usher, 1994). In other words, postmodernists and globalists argues that nation-state may lose its control of many affairs which are in charge of governments. With regard to China, scholars and researchers have mainly explored three dimensions of China's attitude towards globalization. As for education policy, many studies show how China embraced globalization (Berlie, 2020) and how globalization impacts on China (S. Wei & Wu, 2001).

Two trends in the studies on the relations between globalization and the state can be observed. Some scholars come to conclusions that

there would be no nation state according to postmodernism to explain the phenomenon, and the Westphalia system would collapse and the boundary among nations would disappear (Bienefeld, 2010). Of course, most studies on this topic are more balanced. They consider that the nation state will not disappear in short time, and the globalization's influence on the nation are more and more serious (Robertson, 2007). I recognize these trends and these arguments are supported by empirical data, given that the multinational enterprises' are widespread throughout the world (Burnham, 1997). With regard to China, however, its relation to globalization has not been clearly explained.

Many scholars and researchers put emphasis on China's attitude towards globalization in economy and international trade (Branstetter & Lardy, 2008; Kong, 2019). There are different definitions of globalization. I prefer to borrow the concept of globalization: Internationalization, liberalization, universalization or deterritorialization (Patil & Gopal, 2002, p. 23). Previous studies suggest that socialism market economy strategy and so-called Beijing Consensus (Yao, 2015) showed China's open attitude toward the globalization (Halper, 2010). However, Chinese governments at different levels have never stopped intervening in the operation of Chinese enterprises. And still, the state owned enterprises still control the economy in China (O'Connor, Deng, & Luo, 2006). Liang (2007) indicates that China tends to choose those policies which can benefit Chinese national interests.

Interestingly, scholars and researchers have noticed that China

is managing the process of globalization, mainly, in economy (Dong, Bowles, & Chang, 2010). Also, some scholars regard China uses the globalization to increase its economy, but created a series of social problems (C. K.-C. Chan, Ngai, & Chan, 2010). Some scholars emphasize that China has undertaken pressure from globalization. However China mainly follow its own logic, and this state capitalism proved resilient to the 2008 financial crisis (Blecher, 2010). Some researcher points out that China would develop a pro-liberation policy and embrace democracy (Bienefeld, 2010), but China seems to have taken another road. Mathews (2011; 2017; 2012) and his team regard that China helped other developing countries experience a so-called “low-end globalization”. But China itself is only a part of the chain of globalization. From the perspective of China, it is still using the globalization to develop. As so, the government can tolerate Chinese companies’ intellectual property theft which may accelerate China’s economy growth. Some researchers suggest that the income inequality in China has impeded China’s globalization (Xue, Luo, & Li, 2014). Yang (2016) considers that China experienced the cultural effects of globalization. Also, the author regards that China or Chinese people has a feature of counterfeit culture. Even so the author has not shown if the Chinese governments’ attitude to this so-called globalization trend. Furthermore, the author considers that China counters global brands by building the nation’s own brands. But it does not mean China counters globalization. To some extent, this research has proved that that China is an important country in the world and it is utilizing globalization.



Plenty of research focuses on the globalization in China's education department (R. Yang, 2014). Because education is one of the most globalized department, which has been helping China increase its "soft power" (Hubbert, 2019). As I mentioned above, some scholars consider that China's education international policy is not as good as western countries, but China is trying to "regain" the center position of the world (R. Yang, 2014). This research shows the motivation of China's education policy (J. Li, 2018). However policy is always for some people, instead of an abstract nation-state. Some one must benefit from certain policy, even in the name of the nation.

Some scholars call China's expansion is "socialist globalization" (Berlie, 2020, p. 5). They attempt to differentiate China's characteristic from Western expansion hundreds years ago. Also, some scholars regard that China's globalization, in contrast to western countries, is more comprehensive, including "political economy, finance, geopolitics, e-commerce, and world trade" (Berlie, 2020, p. 208). Obviously, China's globalization is considered a new globalization. Still the essence of China's strategy has nothing different from other powers, considering its feature of neo-colonialism (Dollar, 2016; Quinn & Heinrich, 2011). From a perspective of Marxist theory, as representative of the dominant and ruling class, the state of China is trying to control more key sources worldwide, just as the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative (OBOR) made by Mr. Xi Jinping regime.

Many studies on China's globalization concentrate on how China

learns from the world or how China exports its ideology. They have not, however, given a satisfactory answer to the following question: why does China want to do this? Because the facts prove that China as a state has not gained what they want to have. Most of their international “investments” can be seen as a kind of failure. The thesis tries to address this gap by exploring the motivation behind China’s international student policy.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Theoretical framework**

This research employed an instrumentalist approach to analyze the motivation behind China's policy on international students. Due to the significant influence of structuralism on social science, structuralist Marxism has largely displaced the instrumentalist Marxism approach as one of the most important views of social studies (Jessop, 1985, 1990, 2002; Poulantzas & Martin, 2008). This shift happened in the past years partially because class conflict was not emphasized after the end of the Cold War. The structuralist Marxism stresses that the institutions of the state must function to reproduce capitalist society as a whole (Althusser, 1971). Whereas the instrumentalist Marxism suggests that the state serves the ruling class directly and the state are under the control of those members of the ruling class (Miliband, 2009). As the only political party in power, the CCP controls all spheres in China. However, capitalist economy is put into practice in China. Thus China is not a typical socialist country or capitalist country. I consider that instrumentalism is still applicable to the particular situation that it practises

with a mixture of totalitarian politics and market-based economy, so-called *Beijing Consensus* (Ramo, 2004). According to instrumentalist theory, the state functions to serve capitalist interests directly (Miliband, 1969, 2009). Although China calls itself a “socialist” country, it follows a state-capitalism or “crony capitalism” (Pei, 2016) approach with special “party-state” (*dangguo*) system which has basic features of capitalist countries (Gu, Zhang, Vaz, & Mukwereza, 2016; L. Li, McMurray, Sy, & Xue, 2018; D. L. Shambaugh, 2014). This theory is able to be utilized effectively.

From a perspective of instrumentalism, the ruling class:

- (1) owns and controls the means of production,
- (2) it uses the state to dominate the rest of society, and
- (3) state policies further in general the ruling class in maintaining their domination of society (Barrow, 1993, p. 16).

The ruling class in China is a hybrid of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members and the rich Chinese who are close to the party (A. Chan, 2003; Huang, 2008). The CCP and its partners, the ruling class in China, almost occupy all key positions in the state apparatus and own the largest proportion of wealth (Brzezinski, 2014; Davis & Wang, 2009; Ning & You-Gui, 2007). The CCP uses the state machine to control the whole country and makes all fundamental decisions to serve its own interests in China (Edin, 2003; Pei, 2006). In this context, the instrumentalist approach could furnish us with a framework for China’s motivation for international

student enrollment so that we can understand those peculiar policies on international students.

This research also uses an organizational realist approach to explain the motivation of local governments and other institutions for enrolling international students. Organizational realism suggests that state managers focus on enhancing their own institutional power, prestige, and wealth (Barrow, 1993, p. 125). In other words, state managers are always trying to maximize their own interest (Skocpol, 1995). Therefore, states are both decision-making organizations and autonomous organizational actors (Block, 1981; Zucker, 1987). Local governments and other institutions in China as organic parts of the state usually follow rules made by Beijing, whereas they always try to optimize their own interests in their own methods (Huang, 1996). The state organizational realism can be used to explain the policy logic of local governments and institutions.

A state apparatus is composed of the governmental subsystem, the administrative subsystem, the coercive subsystem, and the ideological subsystem (Domhoff, 1978; Miliband, 2009). These subsystems in China are functionally to keep the state operating, though China claims that its system is different from the West (Dreyer, 2015; Heilmann, 2017). Using the instrumentalist approach and organizational realist approach, I can understand how the controllers in China's state apparatus always endeavor to enlarge their own interests. The Beijing central government's policies towards outside world would be used to strengthen the ruling class's domestic position in the name of national interest; while local governments

and other institutions would try to highlight themselves and get more opportunities to climb up on the ladder of power, and thus get access to more key resources.

According to these propositions, I have observed that these organizations tend to pour their resources into fields which they themselves may benefit from, but take no consideration into the interests of ordinary people or society. Therefore, the motivation for some policies made by the state could be measured by the activities of those involved institutions or people. Specifically, there are three dimensions may be taken into account:

(1) Firstly, the beneficiaries of China's international student policy.

Answers to the questions who benefit from China's policy on international students may show us their intentions behind the policy.

(2) Secondly, the willingness on the policymakers' part to maximize the interest of the public. That is to say, we must make it clear whether Chinese policymakers give priority to Chinese people in the policy-making.

(3) Thirdly, the degree of public participation. The public benefit from a democratic policymaking process which helps to produce a better policy (Kingdon, 2011; Mertha, 2009).

Utilizing the two approaches mentioned above, the contradiction and implausibility in China's policies on international student enrollment would be understandable.

# Chapter 4

## Methods and data

This chapter will describe the main methodology the research introduced at first. From there it will describe what kind of data have been collected and how to conduct analysis of these data.

### 4.1 Research tool

I mainly employed the method of document analysis in this research. Several methods may, ideally, be used in the study, including interviews, participant observation, and qualitative survey (Coffey, 2014; Tracy, 2013). However, given the situation that the research objective in this study includes institutions and their documents in China, interview and participant observation proved not to be easy. On the one hand, the political climate does not allow the cadres or public servants who are informed to disclose their internal procedure for policymaking. On the other hand, China's policymaking system is exclusive. That is to say, outsiders have very small chances to know exactly how their important policies are made.

Thus participant observation can not be conducted in the near future. By comparison with interviews and participant observation, document analysis is widely applicable for this type of research (Bowen, 2009). Moreover, it is easy to get access to the documents which I have reviewed. Currently, most of the important institutions, governments, and universities in China have their websites and provide some information on their projects. Consequently, document analysis has great advantages over others in dealing with this research.

## **4.2 Data collection**

Three sources of documents was considered to conduct the research. In most cases, documents about international students issued by the central government, provincial governments, and universities were included. Specifically, the documents with political and competitive motivation were examined. I collected 176 different documents from various levels of institutes in China. Especially, I collected about 144 five-year plans of Chinese universities. These documents indicated participants' pursuit of political interest, and showed their efforts to do better than other peer institutes. In actuality, I analyzed more documents released by provincial governments and universities in China.

Most of these documents are from provincial governments and universities. The first document I need to analyze is the *Outline of China's National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development 2010-2020* (OCNP) (The State Council, 2010). It was released by



the central government of China, and this is the fundamental guideline of China's national education policy. The reason why I chose this document is that it directly presents China's political motivation for increasing international students. At the same year, the Ministry of Education of China (MOE) made a special supporting policy on international students (MOE, 2010a). Other documents under review come from different provinces, municipalities, and educational institutes. These documents were used to interpret China's motivation behind its efforts to recruit more international students.

This research mainly involves policy documents from China issued after 2000. The strategy was designed to make the research a feasible plan. In this regard, three factors are taken into consideration. Above all, China has been in a different policy environment in the post-Cold War era. China claims it to be the largest socialist country and would take the place left by the former-Soviet Union (Ong, 2013). The change of China's position in the world has been reshaping its policymaking. Moreover, the widespread use of internet in China after 2000 (F. Shen, Wang, Guo, & Guo, 2009) has made it easier to retrieve policy documents, and this makes it possible for more researchers to conduct research on this topic without traditional fieldwork. Lastly, it is only in last 20 years that international students have been flocking to China (H. Hu, 2018; Ministry of Education, 2017).

The documents listed above are not all the materials I used in the research. Some regulations on the management of international students in China are included. I have retrieved these documents on official web-

sites of ministry of education, provincial governments, and universities. Although there are also hard copies of these documents, electronic edition would enable other researchers to get easier access to them, so that relevant research may be carried out.

### **4.3 Method of document analysis**

I used two themes to analyze these documents: political interest (power) and competition. According to Marxist theories about the state, political interest can be transferred into power and more key sources in the state system (Barrow, 1993; Isaac, 1987; Jessop, 1990). Consequently, the observable evidence from subsystems of the state—the governmental, the administrative, the coercive, and the ideological subsystem—can be used to measure the motivation behind a policy. Similarly, competition is to gain advantage in the structure of power which is one of the crucial factors behind policymaking in China. Hence the two themes correspond to subsystems of the state.

Specifically, I focus on three special parts of the documents I have dealt with. The first part is the preface of a given document which helps me get useful information about the meaning of the document. Then, I pay much attention to the recall of their past work. This is a certain of tricky part in the document. it indicates some weaknesses or deficiencies in the institutes' work achievements and their room to promote. It is very useful to understand the institute's motivation. The last part I stress is that their goal or aim in the near future. This part shows directly what these

institutes want to achieve.

Through analysis of these documents, a trend could be identified: the various participants within the system of state are all in competition. The central government in Beijing as a representative of China is vying with other countries, especially western powers. Also, the provincial governments are competing with their peer provinces (Hendrischke, 2013; P. Li, 2002). Moreover, the universities are contending with their brother institutes within and outside their provinces for a better position in the rankings. However, the competition with western countries and domestic vying have different forms.

Document analysis is major method in this research, but interviews were conducted. I have interviewed some experts on policy and education fields in China. I decided not to use the data collected from them. As the interviewees said, their arguments or opinions have been clearly expressed in their public publications. Probably, this is a kind of self-censorship. To avoid ethical and political risks, this research used their public statements and publications instead.

#### **4.4 Trustworthiness of the study**

This research is based on original documents and combined with expertise in this field. It is a reliable and responsible study. Three methods may be used to verify its validity.

Authentication verifying may be conducted. The materials used in this research are from public publishes, so it is easy to verify their

authentication. Most of the documents can be obtained from the internet. Up to now, the five-year plans of the universities supported by the Ministry of Education are still downloadable on its official website. I have also kept copies on my local hard drives. Some important documents, the OCNP for example, was translated into English by some experts, and these documents were kept by individuals or institutes. Researchers can have access to these materials to conduct further studies.

Also, the study has included reference to prior research. This research has not started from scratch. It followed prior research on policy in China, as mentioned in the literature reviews. Some reasonable explanation in this research can be supported from other scholars. For example, there are different opinions about the nature of the CCP, and my research takes those testified and reliable arguments. Again, these public published studies by other experts are not difficult to retrieve over the internet.

Last, thanks to the current time of mass media, people can get more useful experience evidence from social media. I obtained a large number of information from social media about the policy on international students. To some extent, the complaints about public policy on Wechat (*Weixin*, FaceBook and WhatsApp's competitive service) and Sina Weibo are very helpful to understand China's policies and their social reaction. I collected some documents on education in Jiangsu Province through social media and they are useful. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to verify these claims. Sometimes, the social media in China provides useful clues to explore further.

Generally, the data collected for this research is verifiable, and the methods used are practical and to some extent repeatable. Therefore I can write up reasonable findings in the following chapters.

# **Chapter 5**

## **Public policy not for the public**

One of the findings in this research is that China's international student recruiting policy is of low relevance to the interests of most Chinese people. In other words, Chinese people do not benefit from this policy. First, no evidence indicates that China needs more international students. Second, there is no real description of the reasons for the policymaking except some blurred expression. That is to say, this policy on international students is not a typical public policy which is considered to be in the best interest of the public .

### **5.1 No shortage of international students**

China's shortage of international students, if it is true, is not mentioned in the documents I have reviewed. The research shows the reasons why Chinese governments need to introduce the current international student enrollment policy, and three reasons can be identified:

(1) according to some guiding principles of a certain meeting held by the

CCP;

(2) following some leaders' intention;

(3) to improve internationalization or China's education standard....

The CCP's National Conferences are, nominally, one of the major origins of some policies. Usually, the CCP's national conferences give guiding principles (*jingshen*) to the development of the country. Also, the Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee of the CCP is another significant origin of policies. For example, Mr. Deng Xiaoping launched the "reform and opening up" policy at The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1978.

Rather than respond to people's requests directly, like presidents in democratic countries, Chinese leaders prefer to formulate policies top-down. Most of the policies are carried out even without public support. Under certain circumstances, the CCP's policymakers do not ask the public for advice even if their policy is good to people, especially during the last two decades. This may partially explain why I have not found any logical explanation of the reason for the policymaking in the documents.

First of all, the central government's policy, the OCNP, describes the reason for the policymaking in its preamble:

The Party and the State have all along put a premium on education. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the entire Party and society, working hard under the leadership of Party's three generations of central collective leadership

with Comrades Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin at the core, and the Party's Central Committee with Comrade Hu Jintao as General Secretary, have blazed a road to develop socialist education with Chinese characteristics, established the world's largest education system, and guaranteed the right to education for billions of Chinese. . . . In the face of unprecedented opportunities and challenges, we must stay levelheaded about the fact that education in this nation is still lagging behind the requirements of national socioeconomic development and people's demand for fine education. (The State Council, 2010)

It shows only leaderships care about China's education, and China must improve its education standard. If it is true that "our concept of education and our teaching contents and methodology are relatively outdated" (The State Council, 2010), enrollment of more international students apparently is not an ideal solution. The document does not show why China should recruit more international students. However, these ideas are not from Chinese people without a doubt. In China, the CCP claims that it represents the people, but there is no mechanism to make it represent people under the undemocratic environment.

Also, there is no convincing reasons for increasing international students in the documents from provincial governments. Shanghai Municipality's policy document, for instance, indicates that:

To improve the quality and standard of Shanghai higher ed-



ucation, to build better socialist universities with Chinese characteristics, and to speed up to realize the modernization of higher education, . . . , we made this policy. (SMEC, 2017)

Of course, this document also says it follows the “spirit” (*jingshen*, guiding principle) of the OCNP guideline for education from the central government. In the same document, we can read between the lines that Shanghai needs to increase the number of international students but there is no explanation why Shanghai needs to do this, needless to say if it is necessary for the public. Documents from other provinces are similar to Shanghai’s wording. Generally, the public in China do not need more international students in China. At least, Chinese people are not beset by the “shortage” of international students.

The third, there is no justification for the recruitment of international students in the universities’ five-year plans. Some documents contain the reasons but they are unconvincing because those reasons are not based on facts. For example, a Chinese university supervised by Zhejiang provincial government claimed that it needed more international students. Therefore the university launched an aggressive plan to recruit international students (ZJNU, 2016), but its basic function is to train teachers for primary schools. This university plainly does not have enough education resources to support its international education. The university, however, still tried to enroll more international students, which is clearly showed in its five-year plan. All the universities supervised by the Ministry of Education of China (MOE) made five-year plans and demonstrated their ambition to

enroll more international students (MOE, 2015, 2017b).

Evidently, China's policy on international students is not a typical public policy which aims for the interest of the public. No evidence indicates that China is short of international students. Moreover, the policymakers have not given a logical explanation of the reasons. This policy can bring about a problem that other departments of universities may lose some resources which belong to them because of this policy. Therefore shortage of international students is not a real problem.

Contrary to the claim in the official documents, ordinary Chinese people indeed worry about too many international students in China, which may occupy Chinese own citizen's education resources (Zhou, 2019). China's policy on international students seems to have originated from some reasons, but making the policy for interest of the public is not among them. Actually, the governments never tell the public why they made this policy except some slogan-like sentences in the document.

## **5.2 The CCP cadres' concern**

The foregoing section reveals that the public has no cause for concern about the shortage of international students. Nevertheless, there must be some reasons for the policymaking. Some vague clues have been found in the official documents.

What the central government cares about is China's international position or impact. In the OCNP, China expresses clearly that its education policy aims to "enhance the nation's global position, influence and

competitiveness in the field of education” (The State Council, 2010). As for the specific policy, the essential arrangement is that “more international students shall be admitted for studies in this country” (The State Council, 2010). Though the document from the central government sets the background of its policy as “the changing international and national situation”, it does not define what is the “situation”. Similarly, the document does not explain why the “situation” needs to increase the amount of international students. Without a doubt, much more money from Chinese taxpayers is needed to carry out the policy. Again, the public can not be happy to get more international students to spend their own money.

As the most important guideline about international students from the central government, “Study in China Plan” (SCP) made by the Ministry of Education releases details on China’s official concerns. The policy document has clarified why the government made the plan: “The plan aims to strengthen exchange and cooperation in education, to help more international students to study in China, and to improve the standard of internationalization” (MOE, 2010a). Also, at the very beginning of the document, it says that the policy is to carry out the national plan. The document makes no effort to explain the connection between this policy and the needs or interests of Chinese people just as I discussed about the policymaking above.

Provincial governments in China take more notice of Beijing’s opinion, rather than the public’s attitude in the process of policymaking. In the documents from provincial governments, I have not found the

expression of ideas from the public. Anhui province suggests that the policy on international students is the implementation of “Study in China Plan” and a promotion of Anhui’s international education (APDE, 2013). The policies on international students in other provinces and municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing) are similar to that of Anhui province.

There are two features of stylized narratives in the policies made by provincial governments. To begin with those policies are under direction of the central government, or the fulfilment of national plan. This means that China’s local governments try to show their respect for the central government in Beijing. The next feature is that these provincial policies emphasize the characteristics of their own jurisdictions. In other words, different provinces have their own calculation based their own realities or inclinations of top cadres. The documents I have reviewed include some high frequency words like “the Party and the state”, “the Party and government”, “emphasize”, “we need”, “not good enough”, “compare with”, and “require” etc. . . . . However, one can not find and trace any bases for their claims. Particularly, none of these polices show that the policymakers have taken into consideration of the public’s opinions. Jiangsu province’s response to the question from the public was removing posts and forbidding discussion.

Universities’ policies on international students do not show their relation to the public. Within China’s framework of governance, not only do provincial governments stay away from the public, but also

the universities do. It is difficult to find real problem statements in the documents from Chinese universities. Needless to say, causes descriptions are reduced to empty and conventional phrases. For example, Southwest Jiaotong University describes its problem as “existence wide gap between our university and other peers” (SJU, 2016, p. 9). But gaps always exist. Typically, three types of reason statements can be found in these plans for the development of university:

- (1) The requirements of causes of the Party and the state;
- (2) the demands for the development; and
- (3) the need for additional reforms and openness.

The first reason statement means that the causes (*shiyue*, aims) of the CCP and the state require a university to make certain policy. However, there is no definition of these causes. The word “cause” here is not a real aim or goal written on paper, but a kind of abstract and undefinable “revolutionary cause”. In short, this is not a real reason. The second statement shows that the “development” requires a university to frame certain policy. Here “development” is close to progress. Again, I have not found clear definition of the development in the documents. With regard to “reform and openness”, this sort of cliché has nothing to do with their policies. In practice, the three statements above are nothing but hand waving or cant. Some universities even formulate statements which can not be verified. Jilin University addresses its problem that its achievements have not met the expectations of the Party, the state, and

people (JLU, 2016, p. 6). One can not prove that the public or the state indeed has shown the aspiration. Apparently, the public's concern is not embodied in the documents, but the cadres' opinions are expressed.

In general, it is difficult to trace the origin of a problem that China's policy on international student enrollment intends to resolve. No evidence shows that China suffers from shortage of international students. In other words, the public do not benefit from China's policy on international students. On the contrary, some proofs indicate that there are too many foreign students for Chinese people (Zhou, 2019).

## **Chapter 6**

# **Policy without effective participation of the public**

Based on the analysis of the documents, I found that the public are kept apart from the policymaking process. Also, the public have no approaches to the policymaking, even if some people want to get more information about the policy. Furthermore, outsiders are difficult to have access to the policymaking due to its absence of openness and transparency.

### **6.1 The public has little influence on the policy process**

People's voice is difficult to be heard or expressed in the policymaking. Basically, the public are not involved in the process of policymaking. According to some research, the public do not have opportunities to participate policymaking (K. Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992; B. G. Peters & Zhao, 2017). Apparently, the governments in China are willing to hold a monopoly on the policymaking.

At the level of central government, the national plan of education

is devised according to the CCP's purpose. The first sentence of the policymaking is "in terms of the 17th National Congress of the CCP on 'giving priority to education and building a country with strong human resources'" (The State Council, 2010). The Chapter 16 of this document, "Further Opening China's Education" deals with international education. Specifically, only two sentences in the Chinese edition of the document focus on international student enrollment:

More international students shall be admitted for studies in this country. Chinese government scholarships shall be increased, with financial assistance offered mainly to students from other developing countries, and the composition of students coming to this country for studies shall be optimized (The State Council, 2010, p. 35).

The "Study in China Plan" made by Ministry of Education is based on this document. However, the narrative is too simple and arbitrary. Similarly, I have not found any information on whether the public had participated the policy making. Common sense suggests that the delegates in the National People's Congress (NPC) are not elected by Chinese people and do not represent Chinese people (O'brien, 2008). Granted that people's delegates indeed speak on behalf of Chinese people, I have not discovered any meaningful proposals concerning the enrollment of international students formulated by the delegates. Apparently, at the central government level, Chinese people do not have an effective way to participate the policymaking.



At the level of provincial government, it is a formidable challenge to fathom how a policy works out. However, some basic procedure for the policymaking can be found. Mainly, provincial governments' policies are based on guidelines or orders from Beijing central government and provincial governments' competition for key sources. That is to say, provincial governments make their policies according to Beijing's requirements on the one hand, and they calculate and maximize their own interests via policymaking on the other.

Jiangxi province, for example, developed its policy on education which includes guidelines for international students enrollment. At the beginning of the document, it says "this policy is made according to the spirit (*jingshen*, guiding principle) of the policymaking (the OCNP), and the actuality of Jiangxi province" (JXPDE, 2012). There is only one sentence to prescribe Jiangxi's action on international students: to speed up internationalization of education, and keep more than 10,000 international students studying in Jiangxi province (JXPDE, 2012). Jiangxi province's policy almost copied the title of the central government's document.

Other provinces even local province follow the same logic. Hubei province has similar policy called *Outline of Hubei's Provincial Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development (2011–2020)*. It indicates in its introduction that the policy is based on the national outline and Hubei's actualities. Its basic task is to improve the development of education, to build stronger province with better education and human resources, and to make Hubei the most important province in

the rise of central part of China (HBPDE, 2011). These assertions from cadres about education show no participation by the public in the process of policymaking.

The absence of the public's participation is not merely limited in governments, but it is also at the university level. To large extent, teachers and students should have taken part in the policymaking because they are closer to the decision makers. However, teachers and students are not involved in the policymaking process. In its introduction to international students, the policy of Guizhou University indicates that the program aims to improve the internationalization and to promote development of the international education of the university (CIEGU, 2019). The description of goal is similar to that of the central government and provincial governments. This type of narrative is not uniquely in Guizhou University's document. Fudan University shows in its 13th five-year plan that the plan is designed to carry out the Party's "strategic decision" on the "Double First Class University Plan" (DFCUP) launched by the central government (Office of Planning, 2016; M. A. Peters & Besley, 2018). As a matter of course, the public have no roles to play in the policymaking.

Normally speaking, the policymakers at universities in China may seek advice from faculty or professionals. Thus they may gain some information about a policy. But the public have little chance to know how the process goes through. The public is the last to get to know the policy. Of course, the policymakers at university some times release a final draft

to ask the public for advice. According to China's regulation (The State Council, 2008), they may post a phone number and/or an email address on the internet to get feedback from the public. But they rarely respond to questions so that the public can not follow up easily (Enserink & Koppenjan, 2007; K. Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1990). For example, Zhen University (pseudonym) publishes new policies on its official website, and asks the public for comments. However, the public do not know how the policymakers handle people's comments or advice. Furthermore, ordinary people do not show consideration for people "beyond" their own lives. Policy on international students is nothing special to the public. Consequently, the public lose the opportunities to participate public policymaking.

Overall, the policymaking starts from the above and ends at the above. Regardless of the central government, provincial governments, or universities, the policies on international students are neither introduced nor formulated by the public. The central government's policy is a result of a certain "leader"; a province's policy is a kind of response to the national plan, and universities comply with the requirements from governments. There is no direct evidence to show people's effective participation in the process. Also, no firm support for the view indicates that the policymakers in this system care about the public. Thus the public in China have little influence on policymaking.

## 6.2 Lack of transparency in the policymaking

Outsiders have little knowledge of how the policies on international students are formulated. The policy document from the central government does not introduce the public to the process of the policymaking. The provincial governments and universities also conceal the basic information regarding the procedure or steps of the policies.

The central government does not properly explain its policy in the document. The “Study in China Plan” (SCP) only stipulates what the country should do without details except that the amount of international students China should have by 2020. That is to say, this document is full of general and vague description of prospects, only the number of international students may become reality. For example, this document shows that the aim of China’s international education is to make China the largest destination for international students by 2020 and nurture a large number of international students who understand China, befriend China, love China, and espouse China (*zhihua, youhua, aihua, qinhua*) (MOE, 2010a). Also, its work plan includes one sentence: to increase the scale, to optimize the structure, to standardize the management, and to enhance the quality of international students (MOE, 2010a). However, it is not clear who framed this policy. The process of policymaking seems to be kept in a black box so that the public have no way to trace.

Much the same as the central government, policies on international students from provincial governments are lack of transparency. Provincial governments operate the same mechanism as the central government.

Chinese provincial governments have similar structures and methods for policymaking to that of the central government. A Chongqing Municipality's policy on international students shows that its policy is based on the spirit (*jingshen*, guiding principle) of the 18th National Congress of the CCP (including the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Plenary Sessions), the State Council, and Ministry of Education (CMPG, 2017). This document seems to have mentioned most of the relevant "guidelines" from the Beijing central government. However, it does not shed light on how the policy was planned and executed. For the most part, the public pay no attention at all. Some people might wish to receive information about the policy, but the governments do not make it available.

Under the direct leadership of the CCP, the lack of transparency in the universities' policymaking has much in common with Chinese governments. It is normal that the faculty of a Chinese university know nothing about their policy on international students. From my own experience at university, I had little knowledge of international education policy, though I had worked there for years. Lanzhou University had planned to recruit 1000 international students in its 13th five-year plan (LZU, 2016, p. 57). However, faculty and staff do not know why they need 1000 international students. Moreover, the university planned to improve facilities and amenities for international students, though its policy had repeatedly come under strong criticism on the internet. Also, other than its generous allowance or scholarships, the university tries to develop English courses (LZU, 2016, p. 42) to attract more international students.

Considering that most Chinese families are not rich, the public would not like to see taxpayers' money on international students if they know well about the policy. Unfortunately, the public manifestly are kept out of the policymaking.

In short, the public in China have not really participated in the public policy. In practice, ordinary Chinese people are kept out of the whole process. The public's will have not been expressed in the policy let alone exert influence on the policy.

# Chapter 7

## Political motivation in the policy

Several factors have played key roles in the policymaking decisions on international students. First, the leaderships at all levels of institute in China tend to dominate all crucial processes of policymaking. Second, political prospects are primary consideration for cadres in variety of institutes, and cadres are not willing to take any political risks to make any policy. Third, political demands decide the goals and tasks of a policy.

### 7.1 The leadership is a key factor in policymaking

The CCP's leaders dominate important policymaking in China. In Chinese political context, the term "leader" is not only used to call the top cadres in the central government in Beijing, but also used by all the cadres to call their superiors. The leaders on different levels are accountable to their superiors (Brødsgaard, 2012), so the leaders' propositions perform crucial roles in policymaking. Also, Chinese incumbents need endorsements from some "great leaders". Consequently, this kind of information can be read

directly in the documents I have examined:

... working hard under the leadership of the Party's three generations of central collective leadership with Comrades Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin at the core, and the Party's Central Committee with Comrade Hu Jintao as General Secretary, have blazed a road to develop socialist education with Chinese characteristics, ... (The State Council, 2010)

The leaders' name mentioned in the document is politically motivated. Chairman Mao and Mr. Deng Xiaoping are considered as "great leaders" in China because Chairman Mao is the founder of the People's Republic of China (Cheek & Blight, 2002), and Mr. Deng Xiaoping earned him the reputation as the "Architect of Modern China" by leading China to a market-based economy reforms (Vogel, 2011). These names represent certain legitimacy in China, which means the policy is unchallengeable. As for Mr. Jiang zemin and Hu Jintao (Brown, 2012; Gilley, 1998), they were incumbents when the OCNP was made. Such names give a true reflection of the leaders' place in the CCP's history. Therefore some leaders are in the document, but some are not. This is about politics rather than policy.

Unlike policies from the central government, provincial governments and universities rarely mention any leaders' name in their policies. Also, no provincial top cadres' names are mentioned in the documents. For instance, Henan province's 13th five-year plan for education emphasizes that it is under the leadership of the CCP provincial committee and



provincial government to work out the policy (HPDE, 2017). All the documents from provincial governments I have reviewed do not show any cadre's name.

That no top cadres' names are shown in provincial policy documents does not mean "leaders" at provincial level are unimportant. In truth, the CCP provincial committee secretaries have tremendous power in policymaking in their own jurisdictions. As the most important cadre in the Party/government at the level of province, a provincial party committee secretary has dominant influence on policymaking. All provincial governors are deputy party committee secretaries. These top leaders in a province have power to approve and veto any policy in their own provinces. Commonly, they are in name of certain CCP's national congress, leaders, higher tier governments, or the CCP organization to make their policy, but they consider more of their own interests. For example, the party committee secretary is able to hire or fire most cadres (his/her subordinates) in the government without normal procedures. The top cadres' ability to shape any policies in China is unbelievable.

The process of policymaking at university is dominated by the party committee secretary who is the most powerful official at university. A president of Chinese university usually is deputy party committee secretary. Consequently, the party committee secretary at university has power to decide hire or fire a professor, let alone making of policy on international students (Jungblut, 2015). The CCP at Chinese university plays a very powerful role, and its committee secretary is not only a power

representative, but a decision maker, administrator, and coordinator (Jiang & Li, 2016). The Party committee secretary at Zhen University even directly take part in the making of policy on international students. What this party committee secretary considers is how many more international students he can get, instead of the education quality or students' standard. In short, the party committee secretaries need fascinating statistics as political achievements to show their superiors. Finally, the party committee secretary of Zhen University succeeded to get a higher position in the capital city. And then, this person may qualify for free summer retreat at the Beidaihe resort (summer camp for high-level cadres) every year (Gilley, 2004), which is a symbol of status in the official circle.

In general, the CCP cadres dominate all policies in China. The Central government's policies follow the spirit (*jingshen*, guiding principle) of "leaders". Provincial top cadres perform decisive role in the process of policymaking, though their names may not show in the policy documents. In addition, universities in China are miniatures of Chinese governments. They use the same logic in dealing with policymaking. Consequently, the leadership in a totalitarian regime like China hold a virtual monopoly in policymaking.

## **7.2 Politically correct rules are applicable**

Political correctness is apparently expressed in many documents I have studied. There are two aspects to show. First, the ideology of CCP must be displayed in certain form. Second, there are no essentially negative aspects

have been shown in the documents.

The policy on international students from the central government must highlight ideology and political base. A document from the Ministry of Education about the quality of international education indicates why that policy was made:

To seriously carry out the spirit (*jingshen*, guiding principle) of the 19th National Congress of the CCP, to promote the connotative development of higher education, the ministry made the standards . . . (MOE, 2018).

The above quote clearly articulates that the Party is source of the policy. The OCNP states that the 17th National Congress of the CCP required to “give priority to education and turn China into a country rich in human resources” (The State Council, 2010). That is to say, all these requirements are from the CCP, and should be followed and carried out without condition. Moreover, in the same document, there are some sentences which seems to be utter futility of propaganda, but in actuality very important for the cadres who led the policymaking:

Upholding the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, taking Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents as the guideline, implementing the Scientific Outlook on Development in depth, carrying out the strategy of rejuvenating the nation through science and education and the strategy of making the nation strong by

relying on talents or professionals, giving priority to education development, improving a socialist modern education system with Chinese features, running education to the satisfaction of the people, and building our nation into a country rich in human resources. (The State Council, 2010)

Though these words have no concern with the national guideline for education itself, the document places great emphasis on socialism and the CCP leaders' thoughts. Former General Secretary of the CCP Jiang Zemin (1989–2002 in office) propounded “Thought of Three Represents” which reiterates the CCP’s autocracy (Backer, 2006; China Daily, 2007). Also, Mr. Hu Jintao had his political philosophy “Scientific Outlook on Development” (Xinhua, 2012), and the current chairman of China Mr. Xi Jinping has developed his own ideology—“Xi Jinping Thought” or “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (Buckley, 2017, 2018; Xinhua, 2018). The ideological messages must be embodied in all documents otherwise the policymakers have poor prospects for their career. In extreme case, these policymakers may be put in jail because of political strife. To protect themselves, as a rule policymakers adopt self-censorship. Therefore any policymakers in China must take great care to ensure political correctness and avoid political “red line”. As a result, political correctness has become a standard practice in policymaking.

The policies on international students from provincial governments strongly emphasize ideology. Jinlin province’s policy on education

points out that the 13th five-year plan is crucial to completely invigorate the economy and “comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society”(xiaokang shehui). This situation imposes new and further requirements on the development and reforms of education (JPDE, 2017, p. 2). In reality, “moderately prosperous society” is only a political slogan made by the CCP, and it has no bearing on education development. However, the policymaker in Jilin province put these sentences at the very beginning of the document. In other words, this suggests that policymakers try to declare their allegiance to the Party and its top leader in Beijing. Instead of attempting to make an effective policy, the policymakers lay more stress on their own pursuit of interests. In the documents from provincial governments I have reviewed, all the policymakers claim that they follow the spirits (*jingshen*, guiding principle) of the central government or certain leader(s) of the CCP.

At the university level, the policies on international students not only follow the requirements from the central government, but also comply with provincial orders. Hunan University is publicly funded by the Ministry of Education, and the university logically is supervised by the central government. Therefore its policy on education says that it must “highly uphold the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and comprehensively carry out the Party’s education policy” (HNU, 2016, p. 10). At the same time, this university document shows it responds to the pleadingly expectations from Hunan provincial committee of the CCP and Hunan Province People’s Government. Except some professional aims, a

large part of these documents manifest their makers' political awareness and calculation.

In general, policies on international students made by Chinese governments and universities are politically correct. The CCP's policymakers try to avoid political risk, even if the policies never amount to anything. Highlighting the CCP's leadership, showing respects to incumbent top leader or influential former leaders, as a kind of political correctness weighs heavily in the documents I have analyzed.

### **7.3 Policy is a container for propaganda**

The CCP puts considerable emphasis on publicity. All over the important institutions in China are being gradually penetrated by tentacles of the Publicity Departments of the CCP (D. Shambaugh, 2007). The governments and their affiliated institutes have their divisions of publicity. In the light of the CCP's ruling status, its Publicity Department of Central Committee (CCPPD) leads the propaganda about socialism, the Party's leadership, and other ideological work, including media (press) censorship. At the level of provincial government, the Publicity Departments of the CCP are in charge of ideological-relevant work in the corresponding province. Aside from ideology propaganda, the CCP's publicity departments involve getting publicity for variety of "great" things in their jurisdictions.

Policies from the central government indicate that the CCP is the "greatest" ruling party. In the policymaking, the policymaker boasts:

(The CCP) established the world's largest education system, and guaranteed the right to education for billions of Chinese. Education funding is growing by large margins, while school-running conditions have improved dramatically. . . . Remarkable progress has also been made in achieving education equity. Improvements in education has vastly enhanced the quality of the entire nation, . . . thereby making irreplaceable and significant contributions to China's economic growth, social progress, and the betterment of people's livelihood. (The State Council, 2010, p. 5)

The document shows that the policymaker attempted to display the CCP's worthy record of achievements, though all these things are entirely irrelevant to the policy. The policy is regarded as a propaganda tool to help the CCP consolidate its power. Thus political motivation is incorporated into the policy.

Tremendous compliments have not only been given in the policies from the central government, but integrated into policies from provincial governments. The Outline of Guangdong Provincial Plan of Education points out:

Upholding the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, taking Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents as the guideline, implementing the Scientific Outlook on Development in depth, carrying out the strategy of rejuvenating the province (Guangdong) through

science and education and the strategy of making the province strong by relying on talents or professionals, ... (GDPDE, 2010, section 1, chapter 1)

These words are ideological propaganda of the CCP, and all the policies on education just repeat the sentences except this document used the *province* to replace the *nation* in the OCNP. This expression in the policy is nothing more than political allegiance to the Party Center (the CCP's central committee, called *dangzhongyang* in Chinese) because it does not have any relevance to the development of education in Guangdong province.

In the same document, the provincial policymaker repeats the words used in the policy of the central government to describe Guangdong's "great" achievements. It declares that "the provincial committee of the CCP and the provincial government ascribe great importance to education" (GDPDE, 2010). Again, it almost a copy of the central government's policy with the exception of the replacement of *nation* by *province*.

One of the common characteristics of these policies on education is that the policymakers boast about what they have achieved. Guangdong province's policy recalls that how the province built the largest education system in China, and how it contributed to the development of science, culture, economy, society, and people's lives (GDPDE, 2010). Guangdong is not the only province who cares about their achievements. As an underdeveloped region in China, Gansu province is obviously boastful about its "extraordinary" accomplishments. Gansu's Outline of Provincial



Plan of Education describes its educational success as:

Under the leadership of the CCP's provincial committee and provincial government, our education has made considerable strides in recent years. . . . The development of education substantially contributes to the innovation of science and technology, the development of economy, the social progress, and the cultural florescence. (GSPDE, 2010, preamble)

The provincial governments are immodest about their success in education no matter how much difficulty the province may have. The policy documents from Chinese universities reveal the policymakers' inclination to exaggerate their performance in their self-evaluation of education.

China's policies on education do not show real negative aspects. It is difficult to find any valuable "negative" assessment in the documents I have examined. For example, the Outline of Guangdong's Provincial Plan states their problems about international students as "it does not completely meet our people's request for education and developing economy" (GDPDE, 2010). It means that their previous policies are not perfect. However they have not clarified the situation in its education. Similarly, Fujian province's policy on education says: "Standing at a new historical point of departure, we must see it clearly that the education does not fit in with the needs of the development of social economy and does not get with our people's expectations of education" (FJPDE, 2011).

All the policy documents I have reviewed present that the development of education has great historical base and outstanding expected results (YNPDE, 2011, preamble). However these policies do not mention the possible risks and what kind of measures they may take to resolve problems. Most of the documents do not show information about prior policies' weaknesses. Policies from the central government and provincial governments never mentioned the shortcomings or defects of previous policies. At the university level, some policies have demonstrated the flaws in former policies, but those are not helpful on how to improve the policies. Instead, the arrangement for weak aspects of prior policies is to balance the document text, but there are no solutions to handle cases in failure.

In general, policies on education are immersed in political interests. The policymakers at variety of levels attempt to show their allegiance to Beijing, and try to display their merits and achievements at the same time. The policies here are not in the best interest of the public, but are considered as tools that may assist the CCP's cadres to pursue political careers.

## **Chapter 8**

# **Calculated opening-up to international students**

International students in China are managed according to China's political necessity. China's central government tries to influence young generation of other countries (MOE, 2010a; Wang, 2014). The provincial governments and universities tend to improve their own positions in China's political system. China's openness does not mean that the CCP government accepts the mainstream ideology or institutions from international communities. China maximized the CCP's interests from its educational policies instead of Chinese people's interests.

### **8.1 Double standards in student management practice**

China uses different methods to manage domestic students and international students. Basically, three respects can be recognized. First, international students in China may gain much better service than Chinese students (Tencent News, 2019). This phenomenon has been discussing

on Chinese internet communities (Jianshu, 2019). Most of Chinese universities or other educational institutes provide international students with better facilities and amenities than they offer to Chinese students. For example, universities install air-conditioners for international students in their apartments but Chinese students do not have this privilege. It is reported that “luxury” apartments are allocated to international students at Peking University. Individual bathrooms, air-conditioning system, heating system, gyms, rest rooms, TV sets, and decorations, etc., are included in international students’ dormitories. Four Chinese graduates, by contrast, must crowd in shabbier room less than 15 m<sup>2</sup>, without balcony and separate bathroom which looks like the rooms in the movies of the 1990s (Beijing Youth Daily, 2015). In material respect, obviously, international students in China get preferential treatment which is called “super-national treatment” (*chaoguomin daiyu*) by some Chinese media (L. Shen, 2019; Zhao, 2019).

Second, direct political indoctrination has not been required component of curriculum for international students. Unlike Chinese students, international students in China do not need to take ideology courses. Chinese students must attend classes such as “Mao Zedong Thought and the Theoretical System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, “Deng Xiaoping Theories”, “Three Represents”, “Scientific Outlook on Development”, and “Xi Jinping Thoughts” (Lu, 2017), even PhD students must take them as compulsory courses. Many Chinese students consider these courses to be a kind of mind-numbing ideological propaganda,

though the selection of “political thoughts” course is mandatory at all universities (Zeng, 2016). Compared with Chinese students, international students are supposed to learn the history and culture of China or other subjects which may embody the CCP and Chinese nation’s “greatness”.

Third, international students do not need to strictly satisfy academic requirements for admission and keeping their positions at Chinese universities. Due to the unbalanced distribution of education resources in China, those universities located far away from “National Central Cities” (China Daily, 2018) may not keep international students to stay. In other words, international students tend to go to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other major cities in China to pursue their higher education. As a result, those universities in small cities do not have equal opportunities to enroll international students. In the circumstances, the universities in non-central cities prefer to relax their entrance requirements in order that they can maintain amount of international students (Tian, 2017). In actuality, even top university like Tsinghua University (U.S. News & World Report, 2019) has been questioned that it has relatively lower standard of enrollment for international students than that for Chinese students (Sha, 2017). This means the number of international students is the most important factor for the international education at university.

Also, Chinese universities choose to lower the quality standards in the evaluation of program so that many international students may achieve their academic aim with ease (H. Zhang, 2019). A clear illustration is that there are variety of promises about improving the quality of international

education in five-year plans made by Chinese universities. For instance, Chang'an University declares in its 12th plan: “ the university is going to attract excellent international students, and improve the education quality” (Chang'an University, 2011, p. 30). According to Study at Chongqing University Plan, the university would build a better international education system, improve the quality of education, recruit more excellent students, and invest more capital in international education (Chongqing University, 2017, p. 20). These requirements in policies to some extent prove that the quality of international education in China is poor. It seems that this education quality is a problem need to resolve. But it is difficult to evaluate this quality, no institutes are willing to invest in the quality.

In brief, China apply different methods to international students and domestic students. International students enjoy overall better service, regardless of hardware and software, than their Chinese classmates. It suggests that the CCP authorities have been doing this on purpose.

## **8.2 International students' limited freedom in China**

Different from their Chinese classmates, the international students in China indeed enjoy some basic freedoms, although there are some limitations. Firstly, international students can have religious freedom in China. A document from the MOE of China provides that:

Higher education institutions shall respect the national customs and religious beliefs of international students, but are forbidden

to provide places for religious rituals. Any missionary activities and religious gathering are forbidden on campus. (MOE, 2017a, article 29, chapter 4).

International students obviously do not relish full religious freedom in China. They are allowed to perform rituals at churches, temples, or mosques because these places are completely controlled and under supervising by Chinese authorities. The police even strictly prohibits family religious gathering let alone organize religious activities in dormitory.

In 2011, a group of international students at Zhen University assembled in their dormitory to celebrate their religious festival. But the university authority dispersed the students by threat of consequences. As a rule, the outcome may include a warning notice (label), cancelling scholarship, informing to the students' embassies or other diplomatic agencies in China. One of the extreme consequences is deportation. Especially, the authorities pay a close attention to how international students communicate with their Chinese classmates. In some cases, the students cadres from Student Unions or other organization would report international students' activities to the authorities.

As for Chinese students, they theoretically should have this freedom according to China's constitution. However it has been taken away in reality. Moreover, Chinese students who have expressed their faith are always faced with considerable pressure from the authorities if they are not from ethnic minorities.

Another freedom international students in China may enjoy is to

use international internet service with virtual private network (VPN). The Great Firewall (GFW) helps Chinese authority regulate the internet domestically (D. Anderson, 2012; Roberts, 2018). A great number of international internet services are blocked in China, including FaceBook, Google, and Twitter etc., (Dowell, 2006; Stevenson, 2007). However, international students usually had connection with friends or family members in their home countries and they need to visit those internet service blocked in China. Chinese authorities turns a blind eye when the international students bypass internet censorship (Internet censorship circumvention ). Contrary to international students' privilege, Chinese students would not be so "lucky". They are confronted with risk of being admonished, fined, detained, even imprisoned. There are striking cases that Chinese netizens who used VPN to "break" the Great Firewall had been sentenced (Griffiths, 2018; Haas, 2017).

In addition, international students in China may have freedom of association. According to the No. 42 order from three Ministries (the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Public Security), international students may form their own organizations:

With permission from the higher education institutions, international students may form their own on-campus organizations for promoting friendship, which shall conduct activities within the scopes defined by Chinese laws and regulations, and are subject to the leadership and management of the higher education institutions. (MOE, 2017a, article 27, 28)



Although international students in China do enjoy some freedoms, China has been further tightening its political controls. According to the Ministry of Education's No. 9 Order (issued in 2000), international students may organize inter-school or inter-region organizations on condition that they need to "apply to competent authorities of the Chinese Government for approval" (MOE, 2000, article 32, chapter 6). But the No. 42 Order (issued in 2017) removed the above content which means the CCP authorities worry about international students' association with other people. It indicates that the CCP attempts to re-assert its influence over academia. Plainly, international students would not be exempted from these efforts (Horwitz, 2017).

It is understandable that China requires all international students to obey Chinese laws, by-laws and regulations. However the authorities impose strong restrictions on freedoms of religion, movement, internet, speech, assembly and association. Despite the loss of some rights and freedoms, international students are in a better position than their Chinese classmates.

### **8.3 China's expectations for international education**

At the central government level, China aims to make international students understand, befriend, love, and espouse China (*zhihua, youhua, aihua, qinhua*). It accordingly hopes international students to back to their home countries after graduation. In addition, China expects these students to become powerful people in their own countries in order that they may

develop friendly relationships with China in the future.

In contrast to typical immigration countries, China does not want to turn its international students to citizens or permanent residents. With 1.4 billion people, China is the most populous nation in the world. Its limited resources can not support too many people. A fact is that China can not provide enough jobs for Chinese people, although some of its sectors are faced with serious shortage of labor force. China needs a great deal of low-end work force and high-end human resource. To be very much in evidence, international students in China are neither “low-end” nor “high-end”. Chinese authorities believe that only top universities such as Berkeley, Cambridge, Harvard, Oxford, and Stanford can produce talents they need. That is why China launched the Thousand Talents Plan (TTP) or Thousand Talents Program to enroll scientists and professors from western countries (Barry & Kolata, 2020; Leonard, 2019).

Also, China does not have a shortage of labor force with higher degrees. In past years, many Chinese university students were in an embarrassing situation that no sooner had they obtained their degrees than they became unemployed (The Economist, 2019). There were more than 8.3 million graduates competing in the labor market in 2019 (Bloomberg News, 2019). Documents show that Chinese authorities should help international students get into China’s labor market:

Where a foreigner holding a residence permit for study intends to engage in off-campus work-study or internship, he or she shall, upon the approval of the school, apply to the exit and entry

administration authority of the public security organ to have such information as the location and duration of the work-study program or internship placement specified in his or her residence permit.

A foreigner holding a residence permit for study shall not engage in any off-campus work-study or internship unless the information prescribed in the preceding paragraph is specified in his or her residence permit. (The State Council, 2013, article 22, chapter 3).

However, another regulation does not allow international students to work after they finish their programs in China:

Foreign students are not allowed to take up jobs, operate business, or engage in other business-related activities during their study in China. However, work-study activities in accordance with college rules are permitted. (MOE, 2017a, article 30, chapter 4)

In fact, Chinese governments did little to help international students work in China in past years. Also, China seldom issues work visa to international students, although it officially has changed its visa policy to attract excellent international students to stay (F. Li & Wang, 2017). China clearly does not think highly of international students and does not hope them to stay in China after they graduate.

What China really wants is that some of the international students go back to their home countries and become “power elites” (Mills &

Wolfe, 2000). China's international student policy is apparently aimed at nurturing "friends" who understand China, befriend China, love China, and espouse China (Chinese pinyin: *zhihua, youhua, aihua, qinhua*) (Byram & Stoicheva, 2019; Press Office of MOE, 2014). As one of the most important policies on international students, "Study in China Plan" made by the Ministry of Education clearly indicates that "(The Plan's) goal is to train a large group of international students who understand and befriend China" (MOE, 2010a, article 1). In actuality, "understand, befriend, love, and espouse China" is well known to China's diplomats and intellectuals.

In other words, China needs these international students to go back to their homelands to gain power so that China may establish better relationships and control these potential leaders and their countries. To do so, even China's state-owned enterprises have participated the strategy and supported "fostering foreigners and making them understand, befriend, love, and espouse China" (BIT, 2017; GEOHARBOUR, 2018).

In general, China has been investing in international relations in future. Naturally, China does not count on these international students to be brought up as real "Talents" and work in China. China is just using the international students and try to establish a kind of relationships (*guanxi*) to their home countries. Further, China harbors an ambition to control or rule these countries in the future. Thus some Chinese diplomats boasted that a former president of an African country was "our man", because the CCP supported him since he was very young.

At the levels of provincial government and university, the most important part of the international education policy is the “number” of international students because it may substantially help the policymakers scramble for political achievements. Therefore most documents of international student policy I have examined indicated that they (provinces or universities) would greatly increase the amount of international students. For example, Beijing Foreign Studies University planned to enroll 1000 international students by the end of 2015 in its 12th five-year plan (BFSU, 2013, p. 7). Another university’s policy showed that it would increase its international students up to 3000 in the year 2015 (NJU, 2011, p. 30). In fact, it is difficult to work out how they calculated this number. Majority of Chinese universities have numbers of international students in their plan.

Correspondingly, practical measures are taken to enroll students. The provinces and universities try to increase their intake of international students by provision of scholarships (HNPDE, 2018; SPDE, 2016). Those comparatively developed provinces or municipalities such as Guangdong province and Shanghai municipality have greater ability to attract international students, while poorer provinces in the west part of China proved to be more difficult to implement their plans.

Different from the central government, provincial governments and universities in China have little interesting to educate and turn international students into China’s friends. Therefore provinces or universities seldom set their aim for international education as “fostering international students who understand, befriend, love, and espouse China”. On the contrary,

they tend to attain higher rank by increasing the intake of international students. Some provinces changed the slogan above into “ understand, befriend, love, and espouse (certain province)”. A report shows Shandong province’s slogan is: trying to enroll more international students who can understand, love, and publicize Shandong province (SDPDE, 2018, p. 10). Provincial governments plainly do not consider international education seriously except the number of students which can be easily shown to their superiors.

Chinese universities set their goals for policies on international students also relate to politics. All the documents from Ministry of Education are parts of certain national five-year plan. The universities affiliated to the central government (MOE) correspondingly have their own five-year plans. Most of these documents have shown ambitious goals. Comparing its 12th plan with the 13th plan, I found that Xiamen University did not accomplish its aim. For example, the university had 1200 international students in 2005, and in the year 2010 it had 2500 international students (ODP, 2011, p. 1). The university set a goal that 1500–2000 international students would pursue degrees in 2015 (including visiting students) (ODP, 2011, p. 7). While this university established higher aim in its 13th plan (ODP, 2016, p. 13). Evidently, the university had not achieved its aim. These universities rarely think seriously whether they can reach their goals or not. Like the nation’s GDP, “Growth” becomes a significant policy objective. This policy just shows a stance or their attitudes.

In short, China's administration of international students adheres to a rule of "distinguishing inside and outside" (*neiwai youbie*). That is to say, China enforces double standards to treat domestic students and international students. International students enjoy more material comforts and political freedoms. However, the CCP has exerted growing influence over international students since Mr. Xi Jinping rose to power. China prefers sending these international students home rather than letting them stay in order that they may become the leaderships of their home countries. As for Chinese universities and provincial governments, political achievement is the primary consideration. With the result that China's opening its education up to the world serves the CCP's ambition of global strategy. This is also China's philosophy of globalization. Capitalism has been trying to change China into a democratic country by market-based economy, but currently, the world situation shows that China has its own methods to change the world. One may question the CCP's pursuit is China's national interests. Chinese people, however, are not beneficiaries.

## **Chapter 9**

### **The state as a tool to serve the ruling class**

The findings described above have shown that China's policy on international students, as a part of the state institution, is not in the best interests of the public. Also, the CCP cadres' view is determinative in the policy framing, while the public have little chance to influence the process.

Furthermore, opening up to the world or globalization in China's context is only a tool to serve the CCP's purpose. The findings indicate that the public's interests are not seriously considered in China's international student policies. In other words, the policymakers or participants do not work for Chinese people. The policymakers (the CCP cadres) in China are accountable to their superiors and finally, they serve the ruling class in stead of Chinese people.



## **9.1 The regime taking no accountability to people**

Chinese people's interests are not respected in the policymaking. The CCP cadres create policies in order to achieve their own political aims. Winning in the competition with other cadres or countries is their pursuit. To do this, the totalitarian regime uses taxpayers' money at will. That is why one can not find their detailed budget in their plans. In some cases I can read several vague numbers about the budget of their plans, but no valuable information to follow up. Shandong province's investment of CNY¥8,000,000 per year (about CAD\$2,000,000) in international students is a typical example (SDPDE, 2018, p. 2). Generally, the CCP cadres are not accountable to the public.

Public policy is usually designed for achieving desired goal which should be in the public interest. However, I have not found firm evidence to show that China needs huge amount of international students in the short term. That is to say, the policy does not aim at maximizing the public's interest. Why does China make this kind of policy? A reasonable explanation is that the cadres need this policy and utilize it as an instrument. If the public's interest is not the aim of the policy, the ruling class should be the beneficiary.

The reality in China is that the CCP controls the most power and key resources. Under the circumstances, the CCP has power to frame policy without much limitation. This means the CCP may make policies according to their own needs, even if certain policy is not in the best interest of Chinese people. It is not difficult to read words in the documents like

“important to help our nation”, “significant to change China’s status in the world”, and “important to break through the blockades from western world” (MOE, 2010a; The State Council, 2010). It is doubtful that Chinese people really understand why those claims are important. In addition, it is highly debatable that the public are able to participate the process of policymaking. The CCP cadres allege that they themselves represent the people, while those members sitting in the rubber-stamp—the National People’s Congress (NPC)—are CCP cadres or tycoons who have benefited from the regime (O’Brien, 1988; O’Brien, 2008). People’s voice is not easy to be heard via CCP’s organizations and people’s interests are not best served by pursuing the ruling class’ gains.

Probably, one may consider that we have misunderstood the CCP and it may serve Chinese people from the depths of heart as they claims. However we can not ignore the fact that Chinese people are not beneficiaries of these educational policies because it is they who finally pay the money. For example, the Confucius Institute (CI) program administered by the Ministry of Education through the *Hanban* is one of them. Though it could have been a type of cultural exchange organizations, the CI program is used for ideological propaganda (Paradise, 2009). Also, in many cases, the CIs are wasting Chinese taxpayers’ money. Most the CIs have US\$100,000–\$200,000 budget per year (Hartig, 2015, p. 106), but many directors of the CIs may use this money by their own arrangement without serious supervision and audit. These programs have nothing to do with Chinese people.

Only a totalitarian regime like China may spend people's money freely without punishment (Hildebrandt, 2013). Considering the tremendous amount of money China spends on the international students and the poor service Chinese governments offer to domestic students (Liao & He, 2018), we have reason to believe that China's policy on international students is also utilized by the ruling class to realize their own interests.

In the light of the CCP's manipulation of power in China, political prospect is the primary calculation for the CCP cadres. The cadres in this system are in highly competitive situations. Due to the CCP's top-down management system (S. Li, 2016), many cadres are clever political climbers. The CCP cadres believe the proverb that "Those soldiers who are not willing to be a general are not good soldiers". Thus they use all possible methods to get promotion (Kou & Tsai, 2014). Only if a cadre is in a higher position may he have more power and control more key sources. For these cadres in CCP's system, being the winners in competition among rivals is an effective way to protect themselves and their subordinates or followers (Kennedy & Chen, 2018; Mertha, 2017). Logically, as a functional part of the CCP regime, the educational cadres or other local cadres do not really respect the people.

Undoubtedly, this does not only happen in China. Besides North Korea, Iran, and several other countries, many quasi-democratic countries have been practicing a certain kind of authoritarianism. However, the existence of opposition parties and freedom of press has shaped far better social and political environment in most democratic nations, while China

is going farther and farther on the opposite track.

## **9.2 Responsible to cadres of higher rank**

The leading cadres of all levels can decide who could get promoted in China's bureaucratic system (Edin, 2003). Given that Chinese people in actuality can not vote to elect officials, a practical way for the lower cadres is to please their superiors or higher-ranking cadres to get promoted (S. Li, 2016). China has a pyramid-like power structure (Marinaccio, 2016) in which all the cadres in relatively lower positions may need to please their own superiors to get promotion. Therefore in this system, successful cadres usually are crafty sycophants except the appointment of nepotism. Also, the cadre who wants personal advancement needs to show some political achievements (*zhengji*) when they are at their posts (Gao, 2017). Thus the cadres in lower tiers do their best to satisfy the elusive requirements from higher governmental authority or higher officials, taking no consideration of Chinese people's demands.

Undeniably, some policies have beneficial effects on the people, and the cadres in charge may get approval from their superiors as well (Whiting, 2004, pp. 109–110). But the policies they made are not necessarily of service to the people. In many circumstances, the CCP cadres and governments' interests may be in conflicts with the people. Nevertheless the cadres tend to obey the order from their superiors in stead of the people. The resistance from Chinese people to some policies must be cracked down without doubt. Mostly, as members of the CCP, the cadres'

interests are based on their power invested with by their superiors. Seeing that Chinese people do not have an effective way to constrain them, the cadres accordingly use the government and other state apparatus as tool to serve their own interests without restrictions (Miliband, 1969; Quinney, 1980).

The policy succeeds when its political aim achieves. If the central government in Beijing requires that certain work should be done in 5 or 10 years, and then this work must be finished within that time limit. For example, after the CCP general secretaries declared that China would build a “moderately prosperous society” in 2020 (J. Hu, 2007; Xi, 2017), all Chinese provinces, even universities must follow. However action does not always mean success. Obviously, this “secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects” (Xi, 2017) will not become a reality in 2020. No province, clearly, will accomplish this task. Even though, the CCP cadres would not take responsibility for this kind of policy. Likewise, policies on international education are only words and numbers in the document. Comparing China’s 12th five-year plan with the 13th, one can find that policymakers do not seriously deal with the policies except political consideration. Also, the policymakers would not accept blame, even certain policy has proven unsuccessful. Plainly, the number has no relation to the Chinese people, but just a reflection of politics.

### 9.3 Policy used as a political instrument

As constituent parts of the state (Anter, 2014; Jessop, 1990; Pierson, 2004), governments and other institutes are used as political tools by the ruling class. In the circumstance, education policy works as a political instrument as well. Through international education, the central government in Beijing aims for its impact at the level of globe, while Chinese provincial governments and other educational institutions try to pursue political prospect. Consequently, the CCP policymakers' political pursuit is the main motivation behind China's policy on international students.

The central government does not represent Chinese people in the policymaking. The State Council and its Ministry of Education make national policy cater to the CCP leader's will. The policy from the central government has connection to the top leader's political achievements (*zhengji*), just as Mr. Xi Jinping's "China dream" and "One Belt, One Road" initiative (Berlie, 2020; Ferdinand, 2016; Swaine, 2015). The CCP leaders want a "stronger" state while the minister serves this purpose. The policy on international students is part of the leaders' political strategy and has little consideration of people's interests.

Unlike democratic states, China's provincial and local governments mainly obey the orders from Beijing instead of Chinese people. Therefore the provincial governments in China must pay more attention to the political correctness, and no local cadres are willing to take a risk of making political mistakes. Chinese Provincial governments follow the policies or other guidelines from the central government. Moreover, the

CCP cadres have little chance of promotion in jobs without their superiors' endorsement. For this reason, the most important work for the local cadres is to fawn on superiors. With regard to the public or people, it is not the CCP cadres' prime consideration.

Similar to provincial governments, Chinese universities make policies for their own need. The universities in China are very different from those in western countries. Chinese universities are direct under control of the CCP. Universities' power structure is a copy of government. Each university in China has a party committee secretary (*dangwei shuji*) who is the real decision maker at certain university (Jiang & Li, 2012). Furthermore, the president of a university is usually a deputy party committee secretary. For this reason the policies made in the university system are apt to be more political. The party committee secretaries at universities follow the same tract of promotion with other cadres in governmental system (Jiang & Li, 2016). Therefore certain policy and its possible results are parts of the party committee secretaries' achievements. The interest of the public, or the people, is the last thing that the CCP cadres consider.

For the CCP policymakers, securing political interests outweighs all other considerations. Due to the absence of opposite parties, no independent organizations act as watchdog over governments or cadres except their own departments, the Commission for Discipline Inspection (*jiwei*) (X. Guo, 2014) and the CCP Supervisory Commission (*jianchawei*) (Gong, 2008) for instance. Hence the CCP cadres are players and referees

at the same time. Even if the public question what the cadres have done, the CCP holds the power of final adjudication. Furthermore, the Publicity Departments at all levels, including university, control all the media. In this kind of climate, policies certainly have no concern with people. Accordingly the cadres of the CCP at different levels pay little attention to the public's interests and they tend to make policies based on their own political calculation.



# Chapter 10

## Conclusion

This chapter will reiterate the main arguments of this thesis at first, and then summarize the study. From there, a reflection on the research will be shown. Lastly, recommendations and contributions will be discussed in brief.

### 10.1 The motivation behind the policy

By documentary analysis, this research has answered the question I addressed. First, it has explained why the intention of China's policy on international students seems difficult to understand. Second, it revealed that the motivation is to use the policy as a tool to maximize the ruling class' interests.

China's policy on international students is aimed at enhancing its political influence on other countries by training their younger generation of potential leaderships. As the ruling class in the Party-State (*dangguo*) (Suzuki, 2016), the CCP controls the most key resources in China, includ-

ing the state apparatus. The CCP members take most important positions in the organizations of this country. To large extent, the party is the state and vice versa. The CCP cadres in the central government work for the legitimacy of the regime and their personal interests. By international education, China may gain a group of foreign friends who understand, befriend, love, and espouse China. These potential power elites may help the CCP increase its impact on international affairs and this also can consolidate the CCP's power in China.

The central government tries to tell Chinese people that the CCP regime is the best. The effort to make China great is one of the methods. The policies from the central government in Beijing fairly bristle with ambition to become a superpower. This is why China has special education policies to support students from so-called "One Belt, One Road" countries (MOE, 2016). Moreover, the cadres in the central government use the state to pursue their family and bloc interest. By way of cooperation with their international partners, many state-owned enterprises (Putterman & Dong, 2000; Sheng & Zhao, 2013) operated by higher cadres' families or people from the same bloc benefit from these international cooperation.

Although the policies on international students from Chinese provincial governments and universities reflect that the policymakers try to maximize their own interests and do not target the China's international strategy, these participants in reality are of service to the central government by enrolling more international students. Through increasing international students, the provincial and other institutional participants

attempt to meet the requirements from the central government therefore improve their political prospect. In other words, the central government and other participants have different calculation, but their joint efforts yield a same result—the increasing of international students. From this perspective, the provincial and other institutional policies are based upon policymakers interests, and in the meantime, they consist the national aim and policy.

China's policy on international students fails to consider Chinese people's interests. However these policies are at the expense of the people. The policymakers evidently do not represent the people, and nevertheless they are just in the name of people to secure the advantage of China's ruling class—the CCP and its supporters.

## **10.2 Summary**

With the most populous and the second largest economy in the world, China does not seem to need a great number of international students in the short term. However China has made a series of plan to enroll more international students. The reasons for China's acts are interesting and deserving of study. According to instrumentalist and organizational realist approaches, the state functions ultimately to serve capitalist interests. Although China calls itself a “socialist” country, it follows a state-capitalism or “crony capitalism” approach with special “party-state” system which has basic features of capitalist countries.

Drawing on analysis of policy documents, the research shows that

China's organizations tend to pour their resources into fields from which the policymakers themselves may benefit, but take little consideration into the interest of ordinary people or society. The policymakers create policies without real consideration of the public and the process of policymaking is lack of transparency. Under the CCP's control, the public do not have chance to participate the policymaking.

Several factors have played key roles in the policymaking decisions on international students. First, the leaderships at all levels of institute in China dominate most crucial processes of policymaking. Second, political prospects are primary consideration for cadres in variety of institutes, and cadres are not willing to take any political risks to make policies.

International students in China are managed according to China's political necessity. China's central government tries to train young generation of potential leaders for other countries. The provincial governments and universities tend to improve their own positions in China's political system. China's open does not mean that the CCP government accepts the mainstream ideology or institutions from international communities. China maximized the CCP's interests from its educational policies instead of Chinese people's interests.

The findings have shown that China's policy on international students, as a part of the state institution, is not in the best interest of the public. Also, the CCP cadres' view is determinative in the policy framing, while the public have little chance to influence the process. Furthermore, opening up to the world or globalization in China's context is only a tool

serving the CCP's purpose. The findings indicate that the public's interest is not seriously considered in China's international student policies. In other words, the policymakers or the participants in the policymaking do not work for the interests of Chinese people. They are accountable to their superiors and finally, they serve the ruling class instead of Chinese people.

### **10.3 Reflection on the research**

This research has several limitations. First, limitations of access to inside documents might have negative influence on this research. Policy documents published by Chinese governments may not reflect policymakers' real attitudes or intention, so an ideal method to solve this problem is to obtain their inside documents, including their daily work logs, year plans, working emails and so on. But this work is too arduous to carry out considering the minimal degree of openness and transparency in the governments' policymaking in China (Horsley, 2007; Piotrowski, Zhang, Lin, & Yu, 2009). Of course, researchers can still conduct research by indirect approach (Abrams, 2006; Feldman, 2005).

Second, the availability of alternative data is also a limitation on the quality of this research. It is difficult to interview the policymakers or participants who have taken part in the policy process. Some of them rejected my interview request due to concern about safety. In some cases, the interviewees would describe briefly what happened in the process of policymaking after their self-censorship. Obviously, this description may not be useful for the research (D. L. Shambaugh, 2017).

An important assumption have been made in this research is that the fairly low level of participation by the public in China in the process makes the policymaking on international student enrollment undemocratic. Although there are probably some professionals who took part in the policymaking (Ma & Lin, 2012; B. G. Peters & Zhao, 2017; Wang & Zhang, 2018), they are not representatives of the public in China. These professional people are not elected by the public, but selected by the CCP authorities. In view of this, the research considers that the policy on international students does not have enough support from the people. Even in democratic countries the public may not participate the education policymaking, they at least have the right to take part in it.

China is defined as a totalitarian state in this research, notwithstanding there are other definitions of this regime (Hildebrandt, 2013; J. C. Weiss, 2013). As the only real political party, however, the CCP controls absolute power and key resources and does not allow any opposition parties. The political realities in China manifestly accords with the intension of totalitarianism. What is more, “China” is regarded as a single unitary actor in this research. In other words, all the institutional participants, provincial governments, and universities are parts of the state in policymaking and they carry out the “order” and follow the guidelines on educational policy from the central government, though their pursuit of power may differ from higher cadres in the central governments.

This study is mainly based on policy documents from China issued after 2000. It does not mean there are essential difference between the

policies before the year of 2000 and after 2000. The strategy was designed to make the research a feasible plan. In this regard, three factors are taken into consideration. Above all, China has been in a different policy environment in the post-Cold War era. China claims it to be the largest socialist country and would take the place left by the former Soviet Union (Ong, 2013). The change of China's position in the world has been reshaping its policymaking. Moreover, the widespread use of internet in China after 2000 (F. Shen et al., 2009) has made it easier to retrieve policy documents, and this makes it possible for more researchers to conduct research on this topic without traditional fieldwork. Lastly, it is only in last 20 years that international students have been flocking to China.

#### **10.4 The contributions of the research**

This exploration may extend to existing knowledge in the area of China and Policy Analysis. Aside from its additions to policy analysis, several contributions of this research to knowledge are to be expected.

At first, it is likely to provide us with an alternative explanation for the growth of international students in China. Unlike other studies that emphasize the “pull” factor of China's economy growth, this research tends to accentuate the role of China's policy on international students. Typically, international students contribute to the economy growth, the social and cultural diversification, and the growth of population. However, China does not seem to need these contributions. This study may answer the question why China is eager to enroll international students without

consideration of the public's interest.

In addition, we may gain a different perspective on China's motivation for its education policy and the process of policymaking. In most cases, policies are designed to achieve desired goals in the best interest of the public. However, some of China's policies are designed to help the ruling class to consolidate their own power and positions but not for the public.

Moreover, this study shows China's general attitude toward globalization is "using". China's opening its education up to the world serves the CCP's ambition of global strategy. This is also China's philosophy of globalization. The discovery would help us understand how the CCP attends and changes international institutions.

Lastly, this study could help us know more about the logic of power operating in China. China is one of the several countries which lack transparency in modern world. Outsiders are not easy to fathom out how the cadre bureaucracy make various decisions. Due to its authoritarianism with a closed system, China has always confused the outside world, and this makes it impossible to fully understand how the state operates. Though it claims itself to be a peace-loving and socialist country with Chinese characteristics, China has been arousing concerns from all over the world because of the aggressive posture it adopts. By answering the questions, we may know more about China's acts.



## 10.5 Relevant recommendations

Based on above research findings and conclusion, several more studies may be conducted in the future to understand the CCP's policy and its regime. The possible topics may be explored as follows:

- (1) How the CCP uses globalization and international institutions to consolidate its regime. This study may help us to explain China's acts in the international community.
- (2) How globalization (migration) discourse influences domestic politics of China. Undoubtedly, China utilizes globalization as a tool to pursue their own interests. However, international institutions also have impact on the ways of thinking. It would be interesting to explore how much the CCP cadres would like to accept universal value.
- (3) How China's local cadres choose their policies to maximize their interests. Certain policy may have more probability to lead the CCP cadres to higher posts. What are these policies and how the policymakers make their decision would be interesting topics.
- (4) How domestic institutes use globalization or internalization as a tool to pursue their own interests. Chinese universities are interested in making themselves "internationalized". What they can benefit from this kind of policy should be studied if we want to understand more about China's policymaking.

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