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How Municipal and Regional Police Align their Practices with Canadian Security Intelligence
Agencies: A Study in Nodal Governance

by

Danielle Quimby

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminology
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts
at the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

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Agencies: A Study in Nodal Governance

by

Danielle Quimby

APPROVED BY:

J. Deukmedjian
Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminology

V. Manzerolle
Department of Communication, Media & Film

R. Lippert, Advisor
Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminology

May 10, 2022

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the inter-agency cooperation between municipal and regional police agencies and security intelligence agencies, as it seeks to answer the overarching research question: How have municipal and regional police agencies in Ontario aligned their practices with security intelligence agencies in Canada? The goal is to explore and lend insight into how municipal and regional police agencies cooperate with security intelligence agencies, such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to address national security concerns. This thesis uses the concept of nodal governance (Shearing & Wood, 2003) to discuss any partnership or cooperation, as well as David Garland's (1996) concept of 'responsibilization' from the nodal governance and related governmentality literatures (Lippert & Stenson, 2010). Some investigative alignment will be discerned using publicly available documents. The findings will also analyze the general nature of relations, any inter-agency misalignment and conflict, the alignment of training techniques, the alignment of mentalities, and the use of central intelligence hubs and/or communication formats (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997).

Keywords: national security, intelligence-led policing, inter-agency cooperation, information-sharing, interoperability, and collaboration

DEDICATION

To my loving parents and sister – your unconditional love has allowed me to become the woman I am today. Everything I have accomplished thus far has been the result of your endless support. Without the three of you, none of this would have been possible. I thank you for your patience, your motivation, and your confidence.

To Chop – thank you for being my rock. When times get tough, you always know how to centre me. For that, I am eternally grateful. Your calming presence was exactly what I needed to complete this chapter in my life.

To Jessica – thank you for being my voice of reason. There were many times when I wanted to give up, but you always believed in me even when I didn't believe in myself. You constantly pushed me to do my best, and your endless support (and sometimes, competition) is what got me here.

To my friends who have put in countless hours proof-reading each and every draft – your time and efforts have not gone unnoticed.

Finally, to my Nana and Papa – I wish nothing more than to have had you by my side throughout this journey. I know that you both would be proud of the person I have become. There is no doubt in my mind that you two would have been right there with me, every single step of the way.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

9/11 – September 11, 2001
ATI – Access to Information
CBSA – Canada Border Services Agency
CITO – Counter-Terrorism Information Officer
CKPS – Chatham-Kent Police Service
CSE – Communications Security Establishment
CSIS – Canadian Security Intelligence Service
DHS – United States Department of Homeland Security
DOJ – United States Department of Justice
DRPS – Durham Regional Police Service
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIPPA – Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act
FOI – Freedom of Information
IAB – Intelligence Advisory Board
ICAD – intelligence, crime analyst, asset forfeiture and drugs
ILP – intelligence-led policing
INSET – Integrated National Security Enforcement Team
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ITAC – Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre
LPS – London Police Service
MSU – Mobile Surveillance Unit
N-III – National Integrated Interagency Information
NRPS – Niagara Regional Police Service
NSIRA – National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
NSJOC – National Security Joint Operations Centre
OPP – Ontario Provincial Police
OPS – Ottawa Police Service
PACER Report – Police and Community Engagement Review
PIP – Police Information Portal
PRP – Peel Regional Police
RCMP – Royal Canadian Mounted Police
REB – Research Ethics Board
SCIS – Secure Criminal Information System
SECD – Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence
SECU – Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security
TPS – Toronto Police Service
US – United States
WPS – Windsor Police Service
WRPS – Waterloo Regional Police Service
YRP – York Regional Police

I. INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, the focus of municipal and regional police has been on preserving the peace, maintaining order, and fighting crime (Ericson, 1982; Taylor & Russell, 2012, p. 191). Their concerns have not included national security (Deukmedjian, 2020). This thesis focused on the inter-agency cooperation between municipal and regional police agencies and security intelligence agencies. The overarching research question was: How have municipal and regional police agencies in Ontario aligned their practices with security intelligence agencies in Canada? The goal was to explore and lend insight into how municipal and regional police agencies, including but not limited to the Chatham-Kent Police Service (CKPS), Durham Regional Police Service (DRPS), London Police Service (LPS), Niagara Regional Police Service (NRPS), Ottawa Police Service (OPS), the Peel Regional Police (PRP), Toronto Police Service (TPS), Waterloo Regional Police Service (WRPS), Windsor Police Service (WPS), and the York Regional Police (YRP), cooperate with security intelligence agencies, such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to address national security concerns. Addressing this question lent understanding into how public policing mentalities have aligned with security mentalities, while also invoking the concept of ‘responsibilization’ used in the nodal governance and related governmentality literatures. One example of a security mentality is intelligence-led policing, which is a proactive approach to crime (Sanders, Weston, & Schott, 2015). Therefore, this thesis asked the related sub-question: How have municipal and regional police agencies in Ontario shifted from a reactive mentality to a proactive, or pre-emptive, mentality? Information sharing is a key component of all security mentalities. Central intelligence hubs are often used to manage the flow of information for information analysis; therefore, this thesis sought to address a second sub-question: How are municipal and regional

police agencies in Ontario using central intelligence hubs to share information with CSIS and the RCMP? Another sub-question was: What programs and software do municipal and regional police agencies in Ontario use as communication formats (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997) to align their informational practices with CSIS and the RCMP? Lastly, this thesis also asked a final sub-question: Have municipal and regional police agencies in Ontario become responsabilized by security intelligence agencies through this alignment, or vice versa?

As a starting point, this thesis used the concept of nodal governance (Shearing & Wood, 2003) to discuss the partnership and cooperation between the municipal and regional police and security intelligence agencies, or 'nodes'. This thesis also used David Garland's (1996) concept of 'responsibilization' found in both the nodal governance and related governmentality literatures (Lippert & Stenson, 2010) to explore whether and how one police agency or security intelligence agency or node is given some kind of responsibility by the other. Freedom of information (FOI) requests were used to try to access information from municipal and regional police services in Ontario about their relations with CSIS and the RCMP. Relevant documents requested included policies, forms, or other documents referencing alignment of practices and investigations with CSIS and/or the RCMP; policies, forms, or other documents used when assisting or requesting assistance from CSIS and/or the RCMP; policies, forms, or other documents about sharing information these security intelligence agencies; and policies, forms, or other documents regarding the use of central intelligence hubs such as the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC). This research also drew on publicly available documents concerning municipal and regional police practices and their coordination with practices of CSIS and/or the RCMP. These open sources included, but were not limited to, news/media sources, police websites, public policy documents, security trade journals/magazines, press conferences, annual

reports, RCMP news releases, strategic plans, police board meeting minutes, incident reviews, committee meetings, Supreme Court of Canada cases, the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, an autobiography with first-hand accounts of a CSIS intelligence officer (Kirch, 2022), and informal Access to Information (ATI) requests. Interviews with key police service analysts responsible for information sharing were also sought to complement these methods.

This thesis explored how municipal and regional police agencies align their practices, investigations, and mentalities with security intelligence agencies. The intent was to fill the gap in the literature with respect to municipal and regional police agencies' contribution to the inter-agency cooperation regarding investigations into national security concerns, while also invoking the concept of 'responsibilization' in the nodal governance and related governmentality literatures. One way to potentially refine this concept was to look for instances of security intelligence agencies placing responsibility on police agencies or the other way around to serve their respective interests or fulfill goals. Another way was to look for the *kinds* of responsibility regarding information assigned (see Lippert, Walby, & Taylor, 2016), rather than simply 'responsibility' in general.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This research used the concept of nodal governance to examine the inter-agency cooperation between municipal and regional police agencies and security intelligence agencies to explore whether and how their practices, investigations, and mentalities have aligned. Nodal governance is described as “a complex of hybrid arrangements and practices in which different mentalities of governance as well as very different sets of institutional arrangements coexist” (Wood & Shearing, 2007, p. 21). Put simply, nodal governance is a non-monopolistic approach (Aitken, 2020, Quéro & Dupont, 2019) because it assumes and explores the connections among the public and private sectors, or state and non-state nodes (Shearing & Wood, 2003, p. 405) in networks. There is much literature on nodal governance (see, for example, Aitken, 2020; Berg, Nakueira, & Shearing, 2014; Dupont, 2004; Holley & Shearing, 2017; Johnston & Shearing, 2006; Lippert, Walby, & Taylor, 2016; Quéro & Dupont, 2019; Shearing & Wood, 2003; Wood & Shearing, 2007), but most of the research explores public, private, and civil arrangements (see also Lippert & O’Connor, 2006). This thesis focused instead on the public sector. It explored the partnership between municipal and regional police agencies and security intelligence agencies, thus between local and federal public agencies as nodes. Dupont (2004) provided an example of an institutional security network with state police services and the Australian Federal Police (p. 80), but there remained a gap in the literature regarding Canadian municipal and regional policing and how they cooperate with security intelligence agencies especially regarding national security investigations.

It could be suspected that security intelligence agencies are using municipal and regional police agencies to extend their power through alignment, or vice versa. In which case, there would be a hierarchical relationship instead of a lateral relationship. This is known as

‘responsibilization’ (Garland, 1996). ‘Responsibilization’, “wherein one group of actors is asked or compelled by another to assist in a particular strategy” (Zajko, 2016, p. 76), has been incorporated in much research (see, for example, O’Malley & Palmer, 1996; Scoular & O’Neill, 2007). There is limited research, however, on the ‘responsibilization’ of police agencies by security intelligence agencies and vice versa. ‘Responsibilization’ is important, especially for national security concerns, because it allows the state to extend its power and govern at a distance (Zajko, 2016, p. 79, see also Garland, 1997 on government-at-a-distance; Wood & Shearing, 2007 on rule-at-a-distance governance). Security intelligence agencies may use the municipal and regional police to broaden their reach, or potentially, the municipal and regional police may use security intelligence agencies to further their everyday practices and goals.

Palmer and Whelan (2006) incorporated responsibilization into their work on counter-terrorism. They asserted that, traditionally, literature on responsibilization has focused on the macro-level instead of the micro-levels (Palmer & Whelan, 2006). The focus has been on citizens and how they have become responsibilized to manage their own risks (see, for example, Renaud, Orgeron, Warkentin, & French, 2020). Palmer and Whelan (2006) addressed this gap by exploring the responsibilization of the private sector to address national security concerns, especially with the emergence of networked policing. Subsequent literature also explored how the private sector has become responsibilized (see, for example, Lippert & O’Connor, 2006; Lippert, Walby, & Taylor, 2016; Petersen, 2008). In addition, while Palmer and Whelan (2006) examined Australian policing, there remained a gap in the literature regarding Canadian municipal and regional policing and how they assist security intelligence agencies.

There is a connection between nodal governance, ‘responsibilization’, and a neoliberal governmentality (Wood & Shearing, 2007, p. 14; Zajko, 2016, p. 79). With a neoliberal

governmentality and a promotion of risk-taking, anyone can be a suspect (Brady & Lippert, 2016; Deukmedjian, 2014). Since securitization is entangled with neoliberalization, we have seen a shift in mentalities from a focus on control and discipline to a focus on security (Deukmedjian, 2013). This is especially true after the events of September 11, 2001 (hereafter, 9/11). Therefore, some federal, provincial, and municipal police agencies in Canada have transitioned from a community-policing mission to a focus on intelligence (Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007). Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is “the collection and analysis of information to produce an intelligence end product designed to inform law enforcement decision making at both the tactical and strategic levels” (Sanders, Weston, & Schott, 2015, p. 712). Despite an abundance of research on ILP (see, for example, Carter & Carter, 2009; Cope, 2004; Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007; Murphy, 2007; Sanders, Weston, & Schott, 2015), literature on how municipal and regional police agencies have increasingly become intelligence-led is limited. Since this research aimed to examine whether and how the municipal and regional police have aligned their practices and investigations with security intelligence agencies, it also explored whether and how municipal and regional police agencies have shifted to this security mentality.

ILP consists of gathering intelligence to make informed decisions. Essentially, it is proactive policing that emphasizes security, surveillance, and risk management (Sanders, Weston, & Schott, 2015). The core of ILP is aggressive information-gathering, which allows police agencies to predict crime and direct police resources accordingly. Most literature on ILP focuses on CSIS, the RCMP, and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) (see Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007; Monaghan & Walby, 2012; Murphy, 2007); however, Sanders, Weston, and Schott (2015) addressed the role of municipal police agencies. Specifically, they explored how police officers make sense of this transition to ILP. While this is important because

it proved that municipal and regional police agencies gather information and conduct risk analyses (p. 711), they did not explore if and how this information is shared to align practices with security intelligence agencies. This thesis sought to address this specific gap.

Deukmedjian and de Lint (2007) focused on how federal policing agencies have shifted to an intelligence-led mentality. Specifically, they outlined how the RCMP transitioned from community-policing to ILP. Though community policing alleviated inefficiencies in information uptake and fostered good public relations, the RCMP viewed community policing more as “social work” than as “real” police work (Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007, p. 245). Community policing also emphasized intra- and inter-agency information sharing, but then-Commissioner Zaccardelli announced the transition to ILP in 2000 (p. 249). 9/11 made law enforcement agencies prioritize counter-terrorism, instead of merely their traditional focus on organized-crime (p. 250). Deukmedjian and de Lint (2007) was important for understanding how a federal policing agency became intelligence-led, but they neglected to address the transition for municipal and regional police services. This is important because terrorism, and other national security concerns, have become pressing national issues expected to be addressed by all levels of government (Stewart & Morris, 2009, as cited in Taylor & Russell, 2012, p. 187). In fact, the CSIS Act emphasizes the partnership and cooperation between CSIS and local-level police agencies, specifically in Section 13 and Section 17 (CSIS Act, 1985). The CSIS Act suggests that, but does not explicitly show how, municipal and regional police agencies have aligned their practices with security intelligence agencies. The same can be said of other governmental policy reports, such as “Building Resilience against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy [Second Edition]” (Public Safety Canada, 2011a) and “Federal Terrorism Response Plan: Domestic Concept of Operations” (Government of Canada, 2017). Therefore, this thesis sought

to explore this partnership and cooperation and, indeed, find instances where this happens in practice rather than as only imagined in this Act and these policies. More specifically, it sought to examine how public policing mentalities have aligned with security mentalities. The municipal and regional police may not be able to align their practices with security intelligence agencies if they did not shift from a reactive mentality to a proactive, or even pre-emptive, mentality since reactive policing deals with the crime after it occurs (see, for example, Dencik, Hintz, & Carey, 2018; Lanfear, Beach, & Thomas, 2018; Scott, 1998).

One key component of security mentalities is intelligence (or information) sharing. Intelligence sharing is necessary for security intelligence agencies, such as CSE, to build target packages against specific targets – taking the ‘known unknowns,’ applying complex mathematical processing, and potentially getting ‘unknown unknowns’ (Deukmedjian, 2014, p. 900; see also de Lint, 2020). Information sharing and inter-agency cooperation have been emphasized after the failure to apprehend Paul Bernardo in the late-1990s (Deukmedjian & Cradock, 2008, p. 373). Over the span of six years, Bernardo sexually assaulted more than 20 women and murdered 2 women in various jurisdictions in Southern Ontario (p. 373). In his report, Justice Archie Campbell (1996) revealed that the police agencies had been conducting “competitive and parallel investigations” (Campbell, 1996, as cited in Deukmedjian & Cradock, 2008, p. 373). Campbell (1996) argued that “Bernardo fell through the cracks” because of Ontario police agencies’ inability to pool information together and cooperate effectively (p. 5). There was no case management information system to ensure effective communication; therefore, Campbell (1996) recommended using automated case management systems “to enable multi-jurisdictional information sharing and analysis” (Deukmedjian & Cradock, 2008, p. 374). After this realization of a lack of interconnectedness, Canadian policing agencies began using

inter-agency databases and forming information-sharing relationships, such as joint task forces (p. 374; see also Christensen & Læg Reid, 2007 on the whole-of-government approach). One example of an integrated system is the National Integrated Interagency Information (N-III) system, which facilitates Canada-wide interoperability and information sharing (p. 381).

Deukmedjian and Cradock (2008) examined the N-III in terms of child protection in both Canada and the United Kingdom. They also argued that much of the related literature emphasized the growth of private networks rather than private/public interoperability (p. 383). There is limited research, however, on the interoperability and information sharing between municipal and regional police agencies and security intelligence agencies.

Ericson and Haggerty (1997), in their famous study of police in the risk society, discussed some of these programs and software as forms of ‘communication formats’ that shape and make possible sharing risk information with other institutions. However, Ericson and Haggerty (1997) did not discuss them in relation to how they were used to share and communicate with security intelligence agencies specifically. This thesis sought to explore how municipal and regional police agencies use programs and software as communication formats to share information with security intelligence agencies if they, in fact, align their practices.

An expansive intelligence hub can host all the information gathered by various law enforcement and police agencies (Deukmedjian, 2020, p. 8). As a result, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the United States (US), along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the US Department of Justice (DOJ), implemented what they call “fusion centres” (Monahan & Palmer, 2009). There has been much research on these central intelligence hubs and intelligence sharing (see, for example, Carter & Carter, 2009; Deukmedjian, 2020; Monaghan & Walby, 2012; Monahan & Palmer, 2009; Murphy, 2007; Palmer & Whelan, 2006;

Regan & Monahan, 2014; Taylor & Russell, 2012; Walby & Lippert, 2015; Whelan, 2017; see also Manzerolle, 2014 on networked communication). The goal of these ‘fusion centres’ is to create better communication and cooperation among all law enforcement entities (Deukmedjian, 2020), including and especially security intelligence agencies. Fusion centres, which were originally called regional intelligence centres, are crucial to “connect the dots” with respect to threats (Carter & Carter, 2009; Monahan & Palmer, 2009; Regan & Monahan, 2014).

Essentially, they manage the flow of information, relying heavily on the active involvement of all police agencies, and sometimes the private sector, to provide such information for intelligence analysis (Carter & Carter, 2009). Much of the literature discussed the strengths and criticisms of fusion centres. For example, Carter and Carter (2009) argued that there is often poor information sharing due to agency ego (see also Whelan, 2017 on information-sharing culture). To address this, Craven, Monahan, and Regan (2015) emphasized that the trust between fusion centres and the local police agencies, as well as the larger community, is very important (see also Quéro & Dupont, 2019; Tilly, 2004 on trust). Monahan and Palmer (2009) also discussed the lack of communication between fusion centres, as well as how the information-sharing process can be hindered by a lack of security clearances. Moreover, Carter and Carter (2009) explored how fusion centres are a two-way street: Not only do they receive information, but they also relay it back to those who need it. This thesis did not seek to analyze and evaluate their practices like previous literature. Rather, this research sought to examine how municipal and regional police agencies as nodes share national security information with security intelligence agencies using these ‘fusion centres’, or similar hubs with a different moniker, to explore if and how they align their practices and contribute to the inter-agency cooperation.

Taylor and Russell (2012) also evaluated fusion centres. They argued that law enforcement agencies undermine the very essence of fusion centres and what they are intended to do (p. 184). More specifically, Taylor and Russell (2012) outlined what hinders the effectiveness and efficiency of information sharing. These obstacles include autonomy and interagency ego (see also, Carter & Carter, 2009). Taylor and Russell (2012), as well as Monahan and Palmer (2009), demonstrated how fusion centres are susceptible to mission creep, but again, the purpose of this research was not to evaluate their practices. The goal, instead, was to examine how municipal and regional police agencies have aligned their practices with security intelligence agencies using these ‘fusion centres’ or similar hubs, or possibly, how they have failed to align their information sharing practices due to such hindrances.

There is much literature on fusion centres; however, the research is limited to the US. In fact, the term ‘fusion centres’ is not used in Canada. Walby and Lippert (2015) explored what they refer to as “municipal corporate security units” and Monaghan and Walby (2012) studied Canada’s ITAC, which both parallel the idea of fusion centres. But municipal corporate security units, which resemble “in-house security offices in private corporations,” have little communication with federal security agencies (Walby & Lippert, 2015, p. 231, 251). The ITAC is “a centralising hub of anti-terror intelligence in Canada” and cooperates with many different federal agencies, including but not limited to the RCMP, CSIS, CSE, and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) (Monaghan & Walby, 2012, p. 140). Of course, the ITAC also coordinates data with municipal and regional police agencies and private nodes; however, Monaghan and Walby (2012) failed to focus on the transfer of intelligence by the municipal and regional police. This research addressed this gap in the literature by exploring the role that

municipal and regional police agencies play in Canadian intelligence hubs, if indeed these police agencies align their information sharing practices with security intelligence agencies.

In brief, despite there being much literature on nodal governance, the focus has largely been on private and civil nodal arrangements. There has been only limited research using a nodal governance perspective to explore whether and how (public) municipal and regional police agencies have aligned their practices with security intelligence agencies. Furthermore, there was much literature on the responsabilization of the private sector and the responsabilization of citizens as it pertains to national security concerns, but there has been little scholarship examining whether municipal and regional police agencies have become responsabilized by security intelligence agencies, or vice versa. To align their practices with security intelligence agencies, public policing mentalities must align with security mentalities, but there has been, so far, a dearth of research examining how the municipal and regional police agencies have adopted a security mentality such as ILP. In addition, there was an abundance of research on the US but not in Canada, and there clearly are differences in how security information is shared in the two countries (see Walby & Lippert, 2015). Even when the research did focus on Canada, it neglected to address the role of municipal and regional police agencies. Moreover, much literature sought to merely evaluate their practices. This thesis did not seek to evaluate municipal and regional police practices, rather the goal was to explore whether and how municipal and regional police agencies have aligned their information sharing practices, investigations, and mentalities with security intelligence agencies in Canada. This research lent understanding into whether municipal and regional police agencies, understanding them as nodes in a network, have become ‘responsibilized’ by security intelligence agencies, or vice versa.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis incorporated the concept of nodal governance (Shearing & Wood, 2003) to discuss the partnership and cooperation between municipal and regional police agencies and security intelligence agencies in networks. Nodal governance emerged toward the end of the 1990s (Quéro & Dupont, 2019, p. 283). It is defined as “a multiplicity of governance authorities and providers that coexist in multiple ways to produce diverse security outcomes” (Wood & Shearing, 2007, p. 13). As Wood and Shearing (2007) explained, ‘security’ is something we imagine, which in turn shapes our mentalities and practices of governance (p. 6). Therefore, nodal governance is not only characterized by institutional hybridity, but also by hybridity in ways of thinking and acting (p. 33). Nodal governance includes both nodes and networks: “Coordination between nodes is made possible via networks” (Holley & Shearing, 2017, p. 167). Nodes are points of intersection where attempts are made to shape the flow of events (Wood & Shearing, 2007, p. 149, as cited in Holley & Shearing, 2017, p. 165). They are, essentially, “auspices” and “providers” of governance (Holley & Shearing, 2017). This research examined the police services as nodes. Networks simply comprise these nodes (Lippert, Walby, & Taylor, 2016, p. 19).

Nodal governance “draws its inspiration” from the governmentality literature (Berg, Nakueira, & Shearing, 2014). Michel Foucault introduced the term governmentality in the 1970s, but the term did not become popular until the mid-1990s (Rose, O’Malley, & Valverde, 2006, p. 83; Valverde, 2010, p. 49). Foucault argued that governmentality was an “ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power” (Foucault, 1979, p. 20, as cited in Rose, O’Malley, & Valverde, 2006, p. 86). Governmentality is concerned with power: “[It]

encapsulates the shift in the exercise of power from negative, punitive governing to a positive, productive one” (Foucault, 1991, p. 92, as cited in Yesil, 2006, p. 410). Put simply, governmentality is a way of thinking about “the conduct of conduct,” where conduct is directed by the government (Silcock, Payne, & Hocking, 2016, p. 2) or other authorities. In governmentality literature, the term ‘government’ refers to all endeavours that shape the conduct of others (Rose, 1999, p. 3). Governmentality literature does not see one single body, such as the state, as responsible for conducting conduct. Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde (2006) stressed that “this perspective recognizes that a whole variety of authorities govern in different sites, in relation to different objectives” (p. 85). Therefore, governmentality can be deduced to any technique or procedure that directs human behaviour (Rose, O’Malley, & Valverde, 2006, p. 83).

Instead of focusing on the state and politics, governmentality literature investigates programs, strategies, and technologies for ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Rose, 1999, p. 3). Programs are, essentially, the plans for conducting conduct. Miller and Rose (1990) described programs as the space for the objectives of government (p. 14, as cited in Lippert & Stenson, 2010, p. 477). A strategy, which was later called a ‘rationality’, is:

A way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced (Foucault, 1991; Gordon, 1991, p. 3, as cited in Lippert & Stenson, 2010, p. 477).

Lastly, technologies are the intellectual and material means required to conduct conduct (Lippert & Stenson, 2010, p. 477). There is much to the concept of ‘technology’ (Sokhi-Bulley, 2016, as cited in Hamilton & Lippert, 2020). Technologies range from risk management techniques to “technologies of power” and “technologies of the self” (Hamilton & Lippert, 2020, p. 130; Lippert & Stenson, 2010, p. 477). The central intelligence hubs, programs, and software that this thesis explored are examples of such technologies.

In nodal governance, there is an emphasis on cooperative alliances, “constituting a web” (Quéro & Dupont, 2019, p. 283). Perhaps, this is why some scholars have argued to shift terminologies, for example, to ‘the policing web’ (Brodeur, 2010, as cited in Holley & Shearing, 2017). Nevertheless, nodal governance emphasizes “governing through others,” or more specifically, governing through enrolment and alignment (Wood & Shearing, 2007). Wood and Shearing (2007) asserted that enrolling a range of persons with a range of knowledge (or information) is required for effective governance (p. 9). A nodal actor is not forced into this relationship: “The person (or persons) chooses to act in ways that are aligned with a particular governing objective because it fits with their objectives” (Foucault, 1988, p. 2, as cited in Wood & Shearing, 2007, p. 20). Therefore, the power to shape events is produced by enrolling others; it is produced through ‘action-at-a-distance’ (Wood & Shearing, 2007, p. 9). Though action-at-a-distance is only a small part of nodal governance (p. 13), governing at a distance plays a big role in the overall governmentality literature, especially within a neoliberal context (Fitzgerald & Spencer, 2020; Rose & Miller, 1992; Pyysiäinen, Halpin, & Guilfoyle, 2017).

Governing at a distance involves governance without a subject being present (Hermer & Hunt, 1996, p. 477). ‘Responsibilization’ stems from the nodal governance and related governmentality literatures as a new form of governance-at-a-distance (Garland, 1996, p. 454, see also Garland, 1997). ‘Responsibilization’ was introduced as a strategy to govern crime (Garland, 1996) among myriad other forms of conduct and things. In this strategy, the central government does not directly act upon crime through state agencies; rather non-state agencies and organizations are those tasked with taking action (Garland, 1996, p. 452). Phoenix and Kelly (2013) suggested that ‘responsibilization’ is a strategy that shifts the governance of crime “from a sovereign state monopoly towards something more akin to community governance” (p. 422). It

has been described as a liberal, as well as an adaptive, strategy of government (Rose, 1999, p. 74, 239).

‘Responsibilization’ is an important concept in the governmentality literature because it is a way to exercise power (Garland, 1996, p. 454). Though the state does not act directly, it becomes more powerful through extending its capacity for action, coordination, and influence (Garland, 1996, p. 454, see also Zajko, 2016). ‘Responsibilization’ and ILP are closely related. Garland (1996) associates ‘responsibilization’ with key terms such as ‘strategic planning,’ ‘partnership,’ ‘inter-agency cooperation,’ and ‘multi-agency approach’ (p. 452). Similarly, ILP is described as a “*strategic, future-oriented and targeted approach to crime control*” (Maguire, 2000, p. 316; emphasis added). In addition, ILP also emphasizes partnership, information sharing, inter-agency approaches, and cooperation with other agencies (Maguire, 2000).

Nodal governance and ‘responsibilization’ differ because the former does not give conceptual priority to any actor (Shearing & Wood, 2003), such as security intelligence agencies in relation to police agencies. Nodal governance emphasizes horizontal partnerships and coordination, rather than the traditional top-down system (Dupont, 2004; Holley & Shearing, 2017, p. 167; Quéro & Dupont, 2019, p. 283). This thesis primarily sought to explore enrolment and alignment. This research did not assume any hierarchical relationships (but see Walby & Lippert, 2015). However, Johnston and Shearing (2003) argued that nodal governance can provide opportunities for transforming existing relations (as cited in Dupont, 2004, p. 83). Therefore, it was suspected that security intelligence agencies are using municipal and regional police agencies to extend their power through this alignment, or perhaps, police agencies are using these alignments with security intelligence agencies to further their traditional focus on crime, order maintenance, and other service provisions.

IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

The municipal and regional police agencies I studied included, but were not limited to, CKPS, DRPS, LPS, NRPS, OPS, PRP, TPS, WRPS, WPS, and YRP. Given the size of their operations, these police services were more likely to enroll with security intelligence agencies (Dupont, 2004). They are also in or close to Windsor and, consequently, may have been more willing to disclose information. The two security intelligence agencies on which I focused were CSIS and the RCMP. This research only focused on the federal role of the RCMP, rather than their role in contract policing. Again, the goal was to explore whether and how these municipal and regional police agencies align their practices and investigations with CSIS and/or the RCMP to cooperate on national security issues.

This type of research required a qualitative methodology. This thesis conducted a document analysis (Coffey, 2014) using publicly available documents, as well as FOI requests to access documents from municipal and regional police services that would otherwise remain unknown to the public. This is “a way of collecting data when it is not possible to conduct interviews, which is the case with RCMP and CSIS [...] in Canada” (Monaghan & Walby, 2012, p. 138). I then intended to conduct interviews with the police agencies above to further explore the relationships and related alignment that were identified in the acquired documents.

FOI requests were to be used to acquire documents concerning municipal and regional police practices and their coordination with practices of CSIS and the RCMP. Documents were only requested from these municipal and regional police agencies, not CSIS or the RCMP. Relevant documents requested included policies, forms, or other documents referencing alignment of practices and investigations with CSIS and/or the RCMP; policies, forms, or other documents used when assisting or requesting assistance from CSIS and/or the RCMP; policies,

forms, or other documents about sharing information these security intelligence agencies; and policies, forms, or other documents regarding the use of central intelligence hubs such as the ITAC. Unfortunately, the numerous FOI requests resulted in the police agencies eventually claiming “no records exist” about this. Current and previous project reports may have revealed how, as well as how often, these municipal and regional police agencies align their practices with CSIS and the RCMP. These project reports may have also revealed any rationales behind the alignment between the agencies. Since this research sought to examine information regarding how these municipal and regional police services have adopted a security mentality, threat assessments may have revealed the strategies and/or tactics used when assisting CSIS and/or the RCMP. Sharing information is a key component of ILP, so documents concerning the procurement of communication technologies, as well as software and technology requisitions, may have revealed the programs and software used by these municipal and regional police services to share information with CSIS and/or the RCMP. Budget reports could have also been very telling. Not only would they have potentially revealed a great deal about information sharing technologies but also, perhaps, would have allowed for some inferences to be made about responsabilization. Lastly, information logs document the receipt of information from CSIS and/or the RCMP, as well as the relay of information back to CSIS and the RCMP. This may have revealed information sharing between the police and security intelligence agencies. Unfortunately, the FOI requests failed to generate these various documents.

Confidential interviews were going to be requested with ten municipal and regional police services to complement the FOI disclosures. I submitted a full ethics proposal to the University of Windsor Research Ethics Board (REB), following completion of the latest online research ethics training module. Confidentiality would have been ensured since the focus would

be on the kinds of information that is shared and whether and how this is done that reveals details of alignment, not the specific information such as a person's name or other personal information. However, unfortunately, the University's REB would not clear the project and required voluminous revisions that would have made it exceedingly difficult to proceed with these interviews. The time and additional work it would have required, coupled with no guaranteed timeline or outcome of subsequent REB decisions, made proceeding simply untenable in the time available for this research. Interviews were scarcely used in the literature above, so this method may have complemented and provided unique insights into how these specific municipal police agencies have aligned their practices, investigations, and mentalities with CSIS and the RCMP. Some questions would have probed police agencies' relationship with CSIS and the RCMP, the alignment of their practices, the alignment of security mentalities, how their joint task forces work if any are in existence, specifically whether and how they share their information, how they use communication formats, and how the alignment with these security intelligence agencies helps with their everyday policing if at all. More specific questions may have arisen after I conducted the preliminary analysis of public and FOI requested documents.

Since the FOI requests and interview procedures in one way or another did not produce some sought after data for this thesis (other than crucially in one instance noted later on), this thesis shifted to collecting and analyzing information from publicly available documents only. These open sources included, but were not limited to, news/media sources, police websites, public policy documents, security trade journals/magazines, press conferences, annual reports, RCMP news releases, strategic plans, police board meeting minutes, incident reviews, committee meetings, Supreme Court of Canada cases, the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, an autobiography with first-hand

accounts of a CSIS intelligence officer (Kirch, 2022), and previously available disclosures from ATI (the federal equivalent of FOI) requests from a federal government database open to the public. The news/media sources included, but were not limited to, *CBC News*, *CTV News*, *Global News*, *The Globe and Mail*, the *National Post*, the *Ottawa Citizen*, the *Toronto Star*, and the *Windsor Star*. These online sources were chosen for convenience, popularity, and legitimacy purposes. Three of these are known to be popular sources of news in Canada (see “2019 Newspaper Web Rankings,” n.d.). For the online sources, as well as the ATI database, key search words included “national security,” “intelligence-led policing,” “central intelligence hubs,” “inter-agency cooperation,” “information-sharing,” “interoperability,” “joint task forces,” and “partnerships.” Many more arose as I began conducting the research. The number of documents that would ultimately be available for collection and analysis was unknown at the outset. In the end, it is estimated to have involved 4000 pages of text for analysis. Analyzing these systematically collected open source documents often required reasonably inferring from what was available to respond to the research question and sub-questions.

There was one limitation that is worthy of acknowledgment. As expected, the ATI requests did not disclose all the relevant information and/or in many cases were heavily redacted. However, because I requested twelve (12) previously released ATI requests based on my search terms, this increased the chances of receiving enough relevant data to analyze. One peculiar aspect was that while all the previously released and redacted ATI disclosures were located in January, after finding out about the database¹, and then requested, their transfer to me could not

¹ The existence of this little-known database came to my attention through Dr. Kevin Walby, University of Winnipeg, whom I thank for this reason.

have been more sporadic, with some arriving within a few days, others after many weeks or more, and another only a week from submission of this thesis.

Following the collection of data, themes and modality were examined to see whether and how municipal and regional police services in Ontario have aligned their practices with CSIS and the RCMP. Rationalities were also examined if there was any explanation as to why CSIS or the RCMP had chosen the specific municipal and regional police services. Coffey (2014) noted that one way to conduct a document analysis is to look at the frequency of words, phrases, or other elements. A thematic analysis was used to identify, analyze, and report patterns within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79). Terry, Hayfield, Clarke, and Braun (2017) discussed two basic approaches to thematic analysis: “(1) an approach defined by an emphasis on coding reliability; (2) a more qualitative approach that advocates for a flexible approach to coding and theme development” (p. 5). This research took the first approach, where themes were determined in advance (Terry, Hayfield, Clarke, & Braun, 2017, p. 5). Such themes included alignment, assistance, cooperation, information sharing, interoperability, and intelligence gathering. Pre-determining theoretical concepts provided “a foundation for ‘seeing’ the data” (Terry, Hayfield, Clarke, & Braun, 2017, p. 10).

V. FINDINGS

The documents collected and analyzed for this thesis revealed a great deal about the relationship and alignment between police and intelligence agency nodes in Canada. It was found to be one mostly of cooperation on national security issues. Before delving deeper into these findings, it is necessary to note that my findings empirically show that there is such cooperation in national security investigations, something which, as noted above, is usually only assumed or imagined in law and policy, and only rarely systematically documented through open or other sources external to these agencies. Thus, many news articles revealed that local police agencies and security intelligences agencies join forces to address national security threats. For example, a *Global News* article stated that the conviction of Mohamed Hassan Hersi, the first person convicted of trying to leave Canada to join a terrorist group (Parole Board of Canada, 2021), “was the culmination of Project Severe, undertaken by the RCMP’s Integrated National Security Enforcement Team [INSET] as well as [TPS]” (Weisz, 2014). Similarly, a *Globe and Mail* news article showed that “[t]wo people have been arrested on terrorism-related charges in a joint RCMP/Ottawa police operation” (Blatchford & Freeze, 2010). In the 2011 Al Shabaab terrorist suspect arrest press conference on YouTube, RCMP Inspector Keith Finn, Officer in Charge of O-INSET, stated that “Project Severe was co-led by the RCMP and [TPS]” (Toronto Police Service, 2011, 3:36). In addition, a *CTV News* article remarked that the RCMP was “working closely” with Kingston (Ontario) Police after a youth allegedly tried to get someone to plant a bomb (The Canadian Press, 2019). Similarly, the Strathroy-Caradoc (Ontario) Police Service’s 2018 annual report expressed that they work closely with the RCMP and other agencies in the exchange of criminal intelligence (Strathroy-Caradoc Police Service, 2018). It can be inferred that there is an exchange of national security intelligence as well, since the Strathroy-Caradoc

Police collaborated on the Aaron Driver, a terrorist sympathizer, case (Public Safety Canada, 2016). As recently as August 2021, an article was posted on the Public Prosecution Service of Canada's website about the Saad Akhtar case that was "jointly investigated" by TPS and the RCMP. Saad Akhtar, an Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) supporter, was "Canada's first conviction under section 231(6.01) of the *Criminal Code*, which deems murder to be first degree if it is committed in the course of terrorist activity" (Public Prosecution Service of Canada, 2021). Lastly, the *Ottawa Citizen* stated that the RCMP's INSET worked with OPS to investigate a terrorist hoax after city officials received a letter that warned of a terrorist attack on federal government buildings (Duffy, 2018). Although these revealed that local police agencies work with security intelligence agencies, they provided only limited information about how police and security nodes work together or align their interests. However, news accounts, such as one in the *Toronto Sun*, were decidedly more telling. In this case, INSET was apparently notified when TPS suspected an act of terror (Warmington, 2017). After the notification, the potential terror part of the investigation would be apparently handled by INSET, led by the RCMP, but the article also noted involvement of "officers from a number of law enforcement agencies including the [Ontario Provincial Police; OPP] [...] and [PRP]" (Warmington, 2017). The centrality of the RCMP is not surprising given that the Security Offences Act dictates that the RCMP has primary responsibility for any offence relating to national security (Security Offences Act, 1985). Similarly, in another news account, we learned that INSET had "taken the lead" in the NRPS investigation into an unaccounted large quantity of ammonium nitrate (*CTV News*, 2010), often used for terrorist bomb-making, perhaps most infamously seen in the earlier Oklahoma City bombing incident (Jenkins, 2021).

In his account on life as a CSIS intelligence officer, remarked upon in the methods section, Andrew Kirsch (2022) said: “Most stages are a team effort and involve a lot of time, people and collaboration. However, when you execute a plan, it’s not a democracy. The lead calls the shots” (p. 22). Yet, the hierarchical relationship that he described is not immediately obvious in other data. For example, in 2012, there was a possible terrorist plot in Windsor. The *Windsor Star* noted that INSET, “along *with help from* [WPS] and OPP,” eventually arrested the terrorist suspect, Abdul Elsafady (Waddell, 2013; emphasis added). Analyzing this statement, it can be interpreted that the RCMP’s INSET led the investigation and that WPS was under its direction. A similar statement regarding the case of two Ottawa men arrested and charged with terror-related offences was found in the *National Post*: “The arrests were made by [INSET] *with the help of* [OPS] and the [OPP]” (National Post, 2015; emphasis added). Although Assistant Commissioner James Malizia acknowledged the “collaborative efforts” in this case, assuming the accuracy of the news article accounts, we can infer that the RCMP dominated that relationship and were merely ‘helped’ or aided by other police agencies that adopted a supportive role.

There were two additional recent terror-related cases where the local police had to relinquish control to the RCMP. In 2020, evidence in two separate homicide investigations led by TPS suggested a terrorist-related offence (Freeman, 2020; Hayes & Freeze, 2020). In both cases, TPS apparently contacted INSET following the gathering of this evidence. However, only one article suggested that “investigative *assistance* was requested” by Toronto police (Freeman, 2020; emphasis added). This suggests TPS cooperated with INSET on the possible terrorist case, instead of merely passing the case to the RCMP.

Cooperating on such cases may not always be the usual practice, though, as revealed in the documents related to the terrorism charges laid against Ayanle Hassan Ali in May 2016 (ATI

request A-2019-07528). These documents included the following query: “Will the RCMP or [TPS] be leading this investigation [into Ayanle Hassan Ali]?” The response was: “The RCMP is leading the investigation into the terrorism-related charges. [TPS] is leading the investigation into the other charges.” This response suggests that municipal and regional police agencies do not fully align their practices with security intelligence agencies when an opportunity arises, but instead conduct separate investigations.

When there is alignment, the previous examples suggest that it is the local police that contact the security intelligence agencies for assistance where and when terrorism is suspected. Yet, even this is apparently not always the case. For example, a *Global News* piece discussed the aftermath of a terrorist hoax to blow up Canadian Parliament in Ottawa. It revealed that CKPS was contacted by the RCMP to follow up on the alleged threat (The Canadian Press, 2015). This suggests that security intelligence agencies, specifically the RCMP, seek assistance from municipal and regional police agencies too, although the RCMP still seemed to be directing the Chatham-Kent police to act in this instance.

Despite the Security Offences Act granting the RCMP primary responsibility in such instances, the Honourable Dennis O’Connor, the former Associate Chief Justice of Ontario, noted that, “[a]s more information is obtained and corrected, jurisdiction over the incident might shift back and forth” (O’Connor, 2006a, p. 121). Thus, until security intelligence agencies become involved, the Government of Canada’s federal terrorism response plan dictates that, “[d]uring a terrorist event, the original responding police service (if not the RCMP) exercises ‘lead responsibility’” (Government of Canada, 2017, p. 5). This was the case with London’s fatal truck attack in 2021. Several news articles stated the LPS led the investigation even *after* the RCMP became involved. A *Toronto Star* article noted that INSET was “engaged” by LPS after

considering potential terrorism charges (Boutilier & Cohen, 2021). In this article, Cpl. Dmitri Malakhov, a spokesperson with the RCMP's Ontario division, stated that "[t]he RCMP is giving full support to [LPS] who are investigating the incident" (Boutilier & Cohen, 2021). A *Global News* article also noted that INSET "was brought in to assist with the investigation" (Bell & McDonald, 2021). This language suggests that LPS dominated this specific relationship. However, the RCMP's news release about this case stated that "[t]he investigation is ongoing and will continue to be *a collaborative effort* between [LPS] and RCMP INSET" (RCMP O Division Media Relations, 2021; emphasis added). This statement did not give LPS the credit that the other articles assigned to them. In this instance, it is especially important to consider the data source, since it is possible the RCMP's publisher framed it this way to avoid the RCMP appearing inferior or subservient to a local police service.

There was another instance where the local police service led the investigation. Project Kakia included the DRPS, the RCMP, the OPP, Peterborough Police Service, TPS, Belleville Police Service, and the CBSA (Media Relations, O Division, 2021). This joint investigation into organized crime was led by the DRPS Gun and Gang Enforcement Unit. Throughout the RCMP news release, the DRPS was listed *before* the RCMP, which is inconsistent with other data. The other articles, especially those on the RCMP website, listed this federal agency first. It can be inferred that the RCMP ensures they take precedence in national security investigations, but are perhaps less concerned with supremacy in organized crime investigations.

The municipal and regional police agencies seemed to have aligned their practices and investigations with the RCMP, but there was no mention of CSIS in these articles. In the *National Post*, however, it was revealed that CSIS's disclosures of information to the RCMP is still "very limited and not always useful" (Bronskill, 2021), despite their Memorandum of

Understanding emphasizing enhanced cooperation and information sharing. If CSIS is unwilling to align their information sharing practices with another federal agency, it stands to reason that they may be even more reluctant to work with municipal and regional agencies. Within the documents related to the ITAC and Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB) briefing notes and memorandum to the CSIS executive pertaining to the threat of right wing violent extremism and/or far right/white supremacy/neo-Nazi extremism in Canada, there was a list of CSIS's domestic arrangements from 2018 to 2019 (ATI request A-2020-144). Though they included some redactions, they did not appear to list any municipal or regional police agencies. But to say that CSIS does not work with local police would be false. The "Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar; Factual Background" (O'Connor, 2006b, p. 14-15) document indicated that CSIS asked for assistance from TPS and PRP. This was not the only case. In fact, under "Examples of Interactions with CSIS" in the "A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities" document, TPS suggested that it is in "direct, regular contact with CSIS [...] either within the context of the Ontario INSET or on an ad hoc basis" (O'Connor, 2006a, p. 216). It was also stated that they occasionally received "uncaveated information from CSIS to help with a criminal investigation" (p. 216). Similarly, in the London Police Services Board's public agenda for a meeting in March 2021, it was noted that the Criminal Intelligence Unit has monthly regional intelligence sharing meetings. Among the participating agencies was CSIS (London Police Services Board, 2021, p. 5). Such examples demonstrated an alignment of investigative and information sharing practices between CSIS and municipal and regional police agencies.

Though not a security intelligence agency, it was found that the OPP were sought for specialized help in a cyber terrorism case too. After the Stratford Mayor was targeted by an

online ransom attack, a *CBC News* article revealed that Stratford Police Service reached out to the OPP for help (Simpson, 2019). It is surprising that neither the RCMP nor CSIS were contacted for assistance in this terrorism case, which would be consistent with the analysis presented above. At the very least, it would be expected that the Stratford Police Service contacts CSE, another security intelligence agency, before the provincial agency, but there was no evidence this occurred.

The General Nature of Relations

Just because two nodes align their practices, one cannot presume they always have a positive relationship. However, this does seem to be the case between local police agencies and the RCMP as a security intelligence agency. For example, in the OPP's review of the RCMP's involvement in relation to the shooting incident on Parliament Hill, it expressed that "[t]he [OPS] and the RCMP have a very healthy working relationship and their collaboration is excellent" (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2015). Similarly, in a Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU) committee meeting in 2013, C/Supt Larry Tremblay said:

Even where we don't have an INSET, there's a high level of collaboration throughout. The INSETs [sic] allow us to formalize that and work closely together. The level of sharing at the provincial, federal, and municipal levels is outstanding. (House of Commons of Canada, 2013).

This statement speaks to the information sharing relationship between the agencies. The Belleville Police Service's 2016-2018 "Community Safety Plan" was also telling of information sharing relationships between the agencies. It was noted that their working relationship, intelligence sharing, and investigative collaborative efforts with security intelligence agencies are strong and they intend to enhance this "area of expertise" (Belleville Police Service, n.d., p. 26). In addition, in an RCMP news release about potential terrorist activity, Superintendent Christopher deGale, Officer in Charge, INSET, O Division said: "We will continue to support

[TPS] as we remain focused on the safety and security of Canadians” (RCMP O Division Media Relations, 2020a). If this was not a ‘healthy working’ relationship, it can be inferred that the RCMP would likely not publicly announce they will maintain it. Lastly, in Canada's first counter-terrorism strategy document, “Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy [Second Edition],” it was noted that the relationship with security intelligence agencies has strengthened over time (Public Safety Canada, 2011a, p. 2). Not only do local police agencies and security intelligence agencies have ‘healthy working’ relationships, but they seem to be getting stronger. A recent article in the *Ottawa Citizen* supports the aforementioned public policy document’s statement. It said that Chief Charles Bordeleau, retired OPS chief, proposed that the partnership between OPS and the RCMP “has never been stronger” (Yogaretnam, 2020). This feeling may not be mutual, though, because in a Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SECD) report, TPS “voiced concern about interoperability issues between municipal, provincial and federal emergency responders” (Senate of Canada, 2015, p. 20). Assuming that the federal emergency responder to which they were referring was the RCMP, there was no justification for this claim in this SECD report. Such interoperability issues are discussed more below.

Shedding more light on these relationships, in a Government of Canada news release about the arrest of two individuals charged with conspiring to carry out a terrorist attack against a VIA Rail passenger train, the RCMP explicitly thanked TPS, YRP, PRP, and DRPS, among other agencies (RCMP National Media Relations, 2013). Similarly, in the *Toronto Star*, Supt. Christopher deGale, the head of INSET, commended TPS for a thorough investigation into the homicide-turned-terrorism charge (Edwards & Gillis, 2020). In addition, in his speech at the 111th Annual Conference of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, Minister Goodale

paid tribute to the RCMP, OPP, LPS, and the Strathroy-Caradoc Police: “They were professional, seamless, courageous and effective” (Public Safety Canada, 2016).

While much of the data acknowledged the specific municipal or regional police agencies with whom the security intelligences agencies were collaborating, some news articles did not give the local police agencies prompt and/or much recognition. For example, at the beginning of an RCMP news release about Haleema Mustafa and Ikar Mao, local police agencies were only referred to as “partner agencies” (RCMP O Division Media Relations, 2020b). It was not until later in the article that the RCMP specified the cooperation and collaboration with YRP, Guelph Police Service, and TPS, among other agencies. A similar instance was found regarding the Shehroze Chaudhry’s terrorism hoax case. In a *CBC News* article, INSET was given credit for the arrest (Hristova, 2020). Only at the end of the article did it mention the involvement of the Halton Regional Police Service and other agencies. Regarding another national security investigation, there was no mention of local police involvement in the youth terrorism case in the *Belleville Intelligencer*, despite the arrest following a raid by the RCMP and Kingston Police (The Canadian Press, 2021; Forestell, 2022). Since the first example was released by the RCMP’s media division, it can be inferred that the arrangement of the article was perhaps strategically manipulated to make the RCMP appear superior in the relationship. The following examples suggest that the information released to media by the RCMP did not properly include the role(s) and/or contribution of other nodal actors. Again, perhaps this was done to manipulate the structure of the news releases to magnify the role of the RCMP in national security investigations.

The data also revealed that some municipal and regional police agencies were not continually acknowledged for their contribution regarding national security investigations. For

example, with respect to news articles on the Kevin Omar Mohamed arrest, the Canadian citizen who was convicted for trying to join ISIS, one article in the *National Post* stated that DRPS and the OPP played a “significant role in this case” (Bell, 2016). In another article posted just two days prior, neither DRPS nor the OPP were recognized. Only WRPS was recognized for assisting the RCMP (Blackley, 2016). Yet another article acknowledged the RCMP’s partnership with OPS (Robbins, 2015). In three different articles on the same case, the RCMP was said to be working with several local police agencies, but not all together. On the one hand, this suggests that the local police agencies were not properly acknowledged by media, perhaps following the incomplete release of information by the RCMP; on the other hand, this implies that the RCMP may collaborate individually with several different municipal or regional police agencies on the same national security investigation.

There was an additional instance where the municipal and regional police were not acknowledged at all by the RCMP itself. In an article on Project Severe in the *Blue Line Magazine*, Canada’s national law enforcement magazine, RCMP Inspector Keith Finn, Officer in Charge of O-INSET expressed that, “[t]he RCMP plays a critical role in the fight against global terrorism, and this investigation is an example of our dedication to this important cause” (Jennings, 2011, p. 7). Meanwhile, this was a joint national security criminal investigation with TPS’s Intelligence Division (p. 7). Following the possible incomplete release of information by the RCMP, local police agencies are consequently not acknowledged for their contribution by the public either. For example, Project Smooth involved INSET and TPS, YRP, PRP, and DRPS, among other agencies. Meanwhile, records pertaining to the press conference related to the arrests of Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser, the two men convicted in the VIA Rail terrorism plot, included the following statements (ATI Request A-2019-06995):

I commend our Canadian Counterterrorism partners, particularly the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, for their efforts in stopping a major terrorist plot which was intended to cause significant loss of human life including New Yorkers.

New York Congressman Rep. Peter King

Amtrak appreciated the actions of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in their ongoing investigation regarding a terror plot against our colleagues at VIA Rail.

Amtrak CEO, Joe Boardman

Our security agencies are extremely vigilant. CSIS, working together, not only with our American counterparts but around the world to identify threats to be able to — not only identify them and mitigate them, but stop them, but not just in Canada, but around the world. We don't — not only do we not want to be attacked by terrorists, we don't want Canada to be a safe haven where terrorists can raise money and organize.

Candice Bergen, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety

Well, in terms of the VIA Rail plot, we're very pleased obviously that the — our security agencies have done such a good job working with each other but also working with agencies across the border.

Liberal MP Francis Scarpaleggia

In all these public statements, only the RCMP and/or CSIS — as national security agencies — were commended for stopping this terrorist plot. In fact, consider the following “tweet”: “All Canadians should be grateful for the good work done by dedicated CSIS & the RCMP officials to track & disrupt would-be terrorists” (ATI Request A-2019-06995). The public did not recognize that local police were involved in Project Smooth because the RCMP seemingly releases incomplete information that depreciates or ignores the role of municipal and regional police agencies. Public Safety Minister, Vic Toews, however, “commended the work of the RCMP, CSIS, *local law enforcement* and security partners to foil the alleged plot targeting a ‘specific’ Via [sic] train route — from Toronto to New York (ATI Request A-2019-06995; emphasis added). It can be inferred that Public Safety Canada is aware of all participating agencies in a national security investigation, while other sources who are getting their information from the RCMP are not aware of every node in national security investigations, perhaps due to incomplete information.

The documents related to the terrorism charges laid against Ayanle Hassan Ali further revealed that the role of the municipal and regional police regarding national security concerns is depreciated by the RCMP. These documents included a rough draft of a news release article on Ayanle Hassan Ali. In the published article, Assistant Commissioner Jennifer Strachan, Commanding Officer of the RCMP "O" Division, said: "I would like to highlight the efforts of our INSET here in Ontario which worked diligently to obtain the evidence required for these charges" (ATI request A-2019-07528). The rough draft included the following statement that was not published: "The RCMP acknowledges the valuable contribution of its INSET partners, including [TPS], CSIS and...?" (ATI request A-2019-07528). Evidently, TPS's role in this case was not significant enough to publicly commend them. However, the RCMP Media Relations team apparently understood the importance of the municipal and regional police because the rough draft also included the following statement that was not published: "It is through shared responsibility at the national, provincial and local levels that threats to our country's security can be identified at the early stages to prevent terrorist attacks" (ATI request A-2019-07528).

A similar instance was found among the records pertaining to the press conference related to the arrests of convicted terrorists Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser. The rough draft of the news release stated that "[t]he RCMP takes national security seriously and is committed to keeping all Canadians and our allies safe from terrorism" (ATI Request A-2019-06995). It was revised to say: "The RCMP *and our partners* are committed..." (ATI Request A-2019-06995; emphasis added). In addition, the rough draft consistently mentioned the "RCMP," but this was changed to "INSET" throughout the published article (ATI Request A-2019-06995). This suggests that the RCMP wanted to take full credit for the arrests and did not want to recognize their local police partners. There was a lack of recognition between the nodes. Perhaps the

RCMP did not feel as though the local police were of much importance in national security investigations, hence the omission in the rough drafts; however, this is difficult to support when the rough draft for the Ayanle Hassan Ali case specified a “valuable contribution” (ATI request A-2019-07528). This seems to be another example of manipulating the wording to avoid the RCMP appearing inferior or subservient in the security network. Overall, while many of the publicly available documents did not reveal the specific role(s) of the local police in national security investigations, the relationships can be inferred, and they reveal that security intelligence agencies do not always value the partnerships with municipal and regional police agencies, even though governmental policy reports accentuate local and federal inter-agency cooperation.

Inter-Agency Misalignment and Conflict

Sometimes the relations involved some level of misalignment and conflict beyond a lack of acknowledgement. As discussed earlier, and in a recent article in *Just Security*, a forum on law, rights, and US national security, CSIS was claimed to be “stingy” with sharing intelligence with the police (Roach, 2022). This remains true when CSIS is collaborating with the RCMP too, possibly for fear of revealing covert intelligence sources, methods, and/or assets (Mah, 2014, p. 60). Take the Supreme Court of Canada case *R. v. Ahmad* (2009), for example, which revealed that CSIS knew the location of a terrorist training camp and did not inform the RCMP, nor did they intervene when they knew that the RCMP was following a wrong person (*R. v. Ahmad*, Supreme Court of Canada, 2009). CSIS apparently neglected to share intelligence regarding this terrorism case with local police too. The NRPS commenced a separate investigation into Toronto 18’s ringleader, Fahim Ahmad. It appeared that CSIS had information that could have assisted the police investigation, but chose not to share that intelligence. Communication from CSIS to local police is so scarce that municipal and regional police agencies often may not even be aware

that some police agencies' contacts have been identified as radicals, extremists, supporters or terrorists (Senate of Canada, 2015, p. 13).

Another example of misalignment came from the CSIS intelligence officer's rare, published account of investigations and pre-emption practices which sometimes involved local police (Kirch, 2022). It discussed local police being used to back up CSIS officer interviews or visits from time-to-time, thus obviously demonstrating cooperation, but also that sometimes the CSIS officer's lone visits or calls to people's homes would result in the police being called on the CSIS officer (p. 98). It also revealed one instance in which the police overplayed their hand by arriving to assist the CSIS officer at night, but then unhelpfully berating and frightening the interviewee for not cooperating when, in fact, the person had yet to be interviewed and was not deemed a national security threat (p. 101).

As Mah (2014) suggested, "[t]he differences found in the professions of policing and intelligence, however, can result in inter-agency conflict" (p. 59). Examination of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) review of the CSIS-RCMP relationship revealed that CSIS sometimes used "seemingly" illegal activities in support of warrant applications (NSIRA, 2021, p. 10). Similarly, the RCMP used apparently illegal police tactics during an undercover operation (Omand, 2016). Local police agencies and security intelligence agencies may therefore conflict over such tactics, potentially leading to a reluctance or lack of inter-agency cooperation.

Shedding more light on joint national security investigations, it was revealed in the *Toronto Star* that municipal and regional police agencies are obligated to regularly share intelligence with the RCMP (Rankin & Gillis, 2017). However, the research revealed a disconnect, or even conflict, between the two agencies. For example, there was great

miscommunication, or “fragmented policing,” between the RCMP and local police at Parliament in 2014, which resulted in the death of a soldier guarding the Ottawa war memorial (Roach, 2022). Miscommunication can sometimes be as detrimental as no communication at all. In another instance, the Edmonton Police were unaware that a woman was allegedly recruited to join ISIS. The RCMP only informed Edmonton Police shortly before the story was published (Huncar, 2015). Essentially, the local police were left in the dark. There was no exchange between the nodes in the network. However, no other published articles revealed that the RCMP left the municipal and regional police agencies out of the loop regarding national security incidents. In fact, then-Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli of the RCMP emphasized: “In terms of working with our partners, on the domestic front we have put into place some very concrete activities to ensure that our partners are in the loop on law enforcement initiatives with regard to terrorism” (House of Commons of Canada, 2001). While, this statement was made over 20 years ago, it may still be largely valid today.

Lack of communication, or even hierarchy as it was demonstrated earlier, can result in a failure of the nodes to align or inter-agency conflict (Mah, 2014). One news article revealed a different form of inter-agency conflict (Yogaretnam, 2020). Two Ottawa police officers were transferred from the RCMP’s INSET, where they had been assigned, to return to OPS patrol duties. It was suggested this was “indicative of a strained relationship between city police and the national force” (Yogaretnam, 2020). In that same year, a previously seconded member from the RCMP was removed from LPS’s Guns and Drugs Section due to restructuring (London Police Services Board, 2021, p. 4).

‘Loaning’ officers, such as in the instances above, is not unusual. For example, in the recent “Freedom Convoy” in Ottawa, a national security incident, the local police service

“lacked the resources to end the demonstration and requested additional support from other jurisdictions” (Mitchell, 2022). As a result, 1800 officers from the RCMP and OPP were requested (Roach, 2022); the Hamilton Police Service and TPS lent support (Mitchell, 2022); St. Thomas police officers were deployed (Thompson, 2022); and four Stratford police officers were ready to deploy to Ottawa (Simmons, 2022). Chief Greg Skinner argued that the Stratford Police Service could not lend more officers given their “operational needs here at home” (Simmons, 2022). Oftentimes, police are reluctant to devote their attention to counter-terrorism because it diverts their resources away from community policing (Mah, 2014, p. 60). However, a lack of resources was not the only issue with the “Freedom Convoy”; The OPS did not recognize this as an extremist-led national security related incident and was therefore “thoroughly unprepared” (Spears, 2022). Meanwhile, CSIS cannot “go bursting in” to help the local police because “these investigations are delicate” (Spears, 2022). The entire *Ottawa Citizen* article implied that CSIS should have done better to recognize the threat and inform the local police. In fact, their briefing notes showed that they expected a lone actor against a high-profile target, instead of “a group of angry truckers” (Spears, 2022). Yet, the security intelligence agency was not blamed for this “failure” (Roach, 2022) in the rest of the news articles on the “Freedom Convey.” Rather, OPS was criticized for being “ineffective” in handling the demonstration (Tasker, 2022). The local police service was asked to “take a back seat” so that the OPP and RCMP can provide more “adequate” and “effective” policing (Tasker, 2022). This was not hierarchy or leadership. Instead, this implies that the federal, and even provincial, police agencies do not trust the municipal and regional police to work on national security investigations.

The “Freedom Convoy” was not the only case where the local police were blamed for a joint investigation gone wrong. In *The Globe and Mail* article on the Kingston youth charged

with terrorism, the RCMP was credited for the arrest at the beginning of the article. There was no mention of the Kingston police, even though they were involved in the raid, until the end of the article when it was revealed that “the youth’s arrest [...] caused a stir” (Berthiaume, 2020). An RCMP surveillance plane, that was supposed to be “virtually undetectable” (Faris, 2019), was “puzzling” and “annoying” some residents (Berthiaume, 2020). In response, the RCMP argued that the aerial support “helped police” as it preserved public safety and mitigated risk (Berthiaume, 2020; Faris, 2019). Ironically, it was in this section where the other agencies involved in the investigation were listed. This implies that the RCMP would take full responsibility for a national security investigation unless something in the investigation has gone wrong, which in turn, suggests that the RCMP will blame any ‘failure’ in a national security investigation on local police, even though this federal agency has primary responsibility. This may potentially result in a reluctance to cooperate on such issues, or perhaps competitive and parallel investigations.

Alignment of Training Techniques

Not only do municipal and regional police agencies align their investigative practices with security intelligence agencies, but they also align their training techniques. This is another way the two nodes can connect. In a *Global News* article, it was revealed that, just north of Brockville, Ontario, police officers can train alongside security personnel (Davis & Cunningham, 2017). Among the personnel was an undercover CSIS agent who shared his experience about terrorism and radicalization. Similarly, *The Hamilton Spectator* outlined “Operation Midnight Express,” which staged a terrorist attack. The RCMP, along with other emergency services, also took part in this staged national security threat. Hamilton Deputy Chief Ken Leendertse said, “The exercise was designed to test the ‘interoperability’ of area police agencies — their ability to

communicate, share information and work with each other” (The Hamilton Spectator, 2016). Not only does this show an alignment of training techniques, but this also implies an alignment of investigative practices. When municipal and regional police agencies cooperate with security intelligence agencies on national security investigations, this training will hopefully allow them to work together “seamlessly,” as they did in the previously mentioned terrorist sympathizer case (Public Safety Canada, 2016).

Within the documents pertaining to the press conference related to the arrests of the VIA Rail terrorists was a question asking what the RCMP is doing to keep Canadians safe. The list included: “The Counter-Terrorism Information Officer (CITO) workshop.” The CITO workshop provides frontline police officers with terrorism awareness training, drawing on the expertise of intelligence officers (ATI Request A-2019-06995). Supt. Stacey Talbot, in a *Simcoe Reformer* article, argued that this program “harmonizes” the work of the law enforcement community (Yates, 2018). This training about recognizing terrorism trends, tactics, and practices is supposed to improve national security resources and also strengthen ILP (Yates, 2018). Again, when municipal and regional police agencies cooperate with security intelligence agencies on national security investigations, the CITO training may allow them to work together “in harmony.”

Local Police Agencies: Reactive or Proactive/Pre-emptive Mentality?

The public data sources were somewhat limited in revealing whether and how local police agencies have shifted mentalities but did provide some insights. Public policing has always been “result-oriented”; whereas security intelligence is “information-oriented” (Roach, 2009, p. 160), but the documents revealed that public policing mentalities have, to some degree, now aligned with security mentalities. More specifically, the municipal and regional police agencies in Ontario claim to have shifted to ILP. While not all intelligence related to ILP in

police agencies is regarding national security or of use to national security agencies, the adoption of such a mentality does strongly suggest an alignment or potential alignment in practice between the two nodes. To begin, YRP, TPS, and WPS were all part of “Project Folkstone” (SooToday, 2010). This joint task force focused on cross-border smuggling, which is related to national security, and the article specifically stated the task force used an intelligence-led approach. Another article outlined how WPS joined forces with neighbouring police agencies to conduct undercover operations (Corey, 2011). This collaboration consisted of a sting operation, as well as information and resource sharing – all key components of ILP.

In the Windsor Police Services Board’s February 18, 2021 public agenda document, they discussed the Mobile Surveillance Unit (MSU) in their Criminal Intelligence Unit (Windsor Police Services Board, 2021). Their MSU specializes in covert physical surveillance to obtain intelligence. In 2020, they received 233 requests to assist other units within WPS (p. 33). The London Police Services Board’s March 25, 2021 public agenda document also revealed that many London police officers have been trained as undercover operators (London Police Services Board, 2021, p. 4). Though this does not reveal specific alignment of practices with security intelligence agencies, it demonstrates how they have adopted security mentalities, which, as noted above, suggests a kind of alignment with security intelligence agencies’ aims.

The NRPS has a Special Investigative Services Unit, according to their 2019 annual report (Niagara Regional Police Service, 2019). Like Windsor Police’s MSU, this unit conducts the surveillance and undercover operations for various investigations (p. 50). The annual report revealed that they have a Covert Operations Unit as well, which not only supervises the undercover operations but also deals with confidential informants (p. 57). The NRPS also now has an Intelligence Unit, which is responsible for monitoring and investigating organized crime

and extremism. They cooperate with other agencies and share information locally and, most importantly, nationally and internationally (p. 50). The NRPS has plainly shifted to an intelligence-led mentality given that two units are dedicated to gathering and sharing intelligence. If representative of other local and regional police agencies, this is evidence of the presence of a proactive or pre-emptive mentality characteristic of ILP as well.

The Strathroy-Caradoc Police Service's 2018 annual report emphasized that they employ a "variety" of ILP initiatives (Strathroy-Caradoc Police Service, 2018). Similarly, the Peterborough Police's ICAD (intelligence, crime analyst, asset forfeiture and drugs) unit also uses the ILP model, according to their website (Peterborough Police Service, n.d.). This unit uses surveillance, confidential human sources, undercover "buys," and tips from Crime Stoppers (Peterborough Police Service, n.d.). Meanwhile, CKPS's strategic plan for 2021-2024 indicated that they aspire to "augment investigations with the use of covert techniques and identify crime trends through intelligence information" (Chatham-Kent Police Services Board, n.d., p. 20). This suggests that CKPS is at least seeking to shift to an intelligence-led mentality too.

In the Ottawa Police Services Board's 2021 budget consultation plan summary, a re-design initiative will see the completion of two ILP pilots, as well as an implementation plan to mature the OPS's ILP practices (Ottawa Police Services Board, 2021, p. 37). Though this suggests that there is room for more implementation, this still reveals that they have embraced ILP. In fact, TPS's Police and Community Engagement Review (PACER Report) contained similar language. Recommendation 26 of the PACER Report suggested that they should "review and evaluate the current capacity of intelligence led policing practices," as well as improve all existing intelligence gathering and dissemination methods (Toronto Police Service, n.d., p. 18). Both of these documents suggest that OPS and TPS have already shifted to a proactive or pre-

emptive mentality, aligning or potentially aligning with Canada's security intelligence agencies' mentalities.

Local Police Using Central Intelligence Hubs

Public policy documents, news/media sources and other public data revealed that municipal and regional police agencies have largely aligned their practices and mentalities with security intelligence agencies. The foregoing analysis demonstrated that local police agencies have been cooperating and collaborating with the RCMP on many national security investigations, as well as that local police have shifted to a proactive or pre-emptive mentality. The "how" of this could have been explored through the information sharing processes, but the evidence suggests that local police agencies in Ontario do not use central intelligence hubs to link with national security nodal actors. The ITAC's 2019-2020 annual report was released in an ATI request (ATI request A-2020-373). This document stated that "[t]he ITAC relies on information provided by the Canadian national security and intelligence (S&I) community and its foreign partners" (p. 7). While there is no mention of municipal or regional police agencies, this report included the ITAC's unclassified portal list (p. 13). Among others, it listed "provincial and municipal partners, such as ___, " with the rest redacted. The context suggests that these partners may well be police agencies and that they are given access to unclassified information. If these partners do not include the police, though, evidence suggests that the ITAC is trying to keep them in the loop. Thus, one recommendation suggested "to better inform first responders," "provided they have a 'need-to-know'" (p. 34). Assuming that "first responders" included local police, it appears local police may use central intelligence hubs, such as the ITAC. Additionally, their use of the term 'better' suggests that there already exists some level of communication with "first responders," perhaps local police officers, but that relationship remains somewhat unclear.

A *Globe and Mail* article discussed the RCMP's National-Security Joint-Operations Centre (NSJOC), which rapidly shares information in real-time; however, the exchange of information is limited to federal agents (Freeze, 2016). It is clear, here, that the local police are not involved in NSJOC. Even the Integrated Command Centre that was set up to address the "Freedom Convoy" was limited to the RCMP and the OPP (Tasker, 2022). The provincial police was granted access, given that they are the lead investigating agency on far-right issues in Ontario (Spears, 2022); however, the municipal police were asked to "take a back seat" (Tasker, 2022). Consistent with what was previously discussed, this implies that the RCMP, as well as the provincial police, do not feel as though the municipal and regional police are of much importance in national security investigations.

Communication Formats and Informational Alignment with CSIS and the RCMP

No evidence revealing specific programs and software used to share information with security intelligence agencies came to light during data collection. While this could be because computer interoperability has been kept hidden, this is unlikely since merely announcing its existence would hardly jeopardize national security. More likely, it has yet to be achieved in Canada (see, for example, Mah, 2014, p. 4), and this seems to be true at the federal level as well. In fact, the RCMP 2020-2021 Departmental Plan said it hopes to "adopt more efficient digital methods to deliver services and exchange information with its law enforcement partners" (Royal Canadian Mounted Policing, n.d., p. 4). Similarly, the "Communications Interoperability Strategy for Canada" from 2011 stated that while Public Safety Canada has apparently worked with federal, provincial, territorial and municipal agencies to improve data interoperability (Public Safety Canada, 2011b, p. 2), it also recognized that the "lack of common standards for the exchange and use of data is a serious impediment to effective interoperability" (p. 2). Some

specialized computer systems have been developed, but they are becoming less interoperable (p. 1). For example, the Secure Criminal Information System (SCIS) is RCMP's classified national security information management system. Access to this database is very restricted; information is only released on a "need-to-know" basis to RCMP personnel directly involved in a national security matter, with the appropriate security clearance (O'Connor, 2006a, p. 111). Therefore, municipal and regional police do not have direct access to this national security information management system. All Canadian law enforcement agencies do, however, have access to the Police Information Portal (PIP) for information sharing purposes (The Canadian Press, 2018). PIP is maintained by the RCMP. Importantly, this suggests another instance of hierarchy. Hierarchy was explored above with respect to the alignment of practices, and it was determined that the RCMP often dominated the relationship with local police agencies. RCMP 'maintaining' PIP suggests that they dominate the information sharing partnership as well. The RCMP also asserts their dominance by attaching caveats on all outgoing documents. This way, the RCMP can control how, and for what purposes, the information is used (O'Connor, 2006b, p. 31).

Since computer interoperability has not been fully realized, national security information sharing between nodes in the mid-2000s, at least, was relatively informal (O'Connor, 2006a, p. 113). Taking into consideration the year, the "Police Information Sharing in Canada – Status Report 2003" discovered that telephone calls were the preferred method of sharing information with outside organizations (LeBeuf & Paré, 2005, p. iii, see also Sanders, Weston, & Schott, 2015). If this has continued, this could also explain why the municipal and regional police agencies to whom the FOI requests were sent more recently stated "no records exist." Joint investigations also involve a lot of unstructured data, including hand-written notes that are quickly jotted down in an officer's notebook (personal communication, January 2022). In

addition, in their research, Sanders, Weston, and Schott (2015) discovered that one police service was over five months behind in logging their information (p. 721). While fusion centres can perform an erasure too (Monahan & Regan, 2012, p. 316), there is not much evidence from this thesis research that suggests fusion centres are even operative in Canada, or if they are, they do not include local police agencies, unlike in the US.

The FOI requests asking various police agencies about these programs and software was also telling, one of the few bonafide revealing aspects of these numerous time-consuming requests undertaken for this thesis research. As noted, without exception, the police agencies indicated that 'no records exist' regarding this specific FOI query. While it could be argued that these police agencies simply did not want to reveal the existence of these means and arrangements to the public, it so happens that they are legally required to point out the exception in the FOI legislation (FIPPA Ontario) about why they are withholding requested records if they do exist. The fact that, firstly, none of the police agencies broke rank to do so and, secondly, that not even one indicated they had some records about this and did not want to or could not release them due to a security exception, very strongly suggests that they truly do not exist. If we are to take the queried police agencies at their word, and there is no reason to suspect they would not follow the law or were not knowledgeable of FOI law requirements since they regularly disclose information through such means and are very familiar with FOI legislation and its exemptions in Ontario (see, for example, Lippert, Walby, & Wilkinson, 2016), this supports this notion. More importantly, the fact that they do not exist further suggests a lack of alignment between municipal and regional police agencies and security intelligence agencies, although only regarding this specific area. Overall, this thesis research supported the notion, in this respect, that

information sharing of the kind that is of interest is apparently antiquated (Bronskill, 2015), a point returned to in the conclusion of the thesis.

Have Agencies Become Responsibilized Through This Nodal Alignment?

There is limited evidence suggesting that the municipal and regional police agencies in Ontario have become responsabilized by security intelligence agencies through this alignment or vice versa. The extensive number of open source documents revealed cooperation between local police agencies and security intelligence agencies on national security threats, and revealed the notion of hierarchy and an alignment of mentalities. However, these publicly available sources did not suggest that the RCMP and/or CSIS is using local police agencies to extend its power and govern at a distance, at least not on a regular basis at the level of practices. Additionally, the evidence did not suggest the opposite either, that local police use or seek to use the RCMP and/or CSIS to extend their power. One barrier to this happening, at least, is because “information obtained by officers seconded to the INSET from other agencies may not be passed on to those other agencies except through normal national security channels” (O’Connor, 2006a, p. 103). Municipal and regional police officers cannot use intelligence from these investigations to assist their own police agency. Whether it does happen in practice on occasion, despite this, is unknown. Perhaps the techniques and tactics used in these collaborations can be used to further a local police agency’s investigation, but this was not revealed in the publicly available documents analyzed for this thesis.

VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Overall, the foregoing analysis reveals that municipal and regional police agencies in Ontario and security intelligence agencies in Canada cooperate to address national security concerns. However, open sources provide only limited information on all the ways these nodes work together or align (or fail to align) their practices and especially investigations or preventing national security threats. As dictated in the Security Offences Act, the RCMP has primarily responsibility for any offence related to national security. Yet, the hierarchical relationship was not always immediately obvious. Paying particular attention to the language used in the data, we can infer that the RCMP dominated most relationships and were merely ‘helped’ or aided by other police agencies that adopted a supportive role. With exception, however, some national security investigations were led by the local police. In such cases, the RCMP’s publisher seems to frame the relationship in a way to avoid the RCMP appearing inferior or subservient to a local police service in their news releases. The analysis also suggests that security intelligence agencies, specifically the RCMP, seek assistance from municipal and regional police agencies too, although the RCMP still seems to be directing the local police from afar.

When local police agencies and security intelligence agencies cooperate on national security investigations, some data acknowledges the specific municipal or regional police agencies with whom the security intelligences agencies are collaborating, but there are also some news articles that do not particularly give the local police agencies prompt and/or proper recognition, suggesting that one of the nodes may well release information to media that paints them in a better light compared to the other node with whom they are connected. This might happen because, in the end, media is very dependent upon what these nodes release to them about their practices, rather than media having the capacity to explore their practices

independently, investigative journalism style. It was also discovered that some local police agencies are not continually acknowledged for their contribution regarding national security investigations, or different agencies are credited for the same investigation. The analysis suggests that the RCMP collaborates individually with several different municipal or regional police agencies on the same national security investigation, instead of all together. In addition, there are many instances where the municipal and regional police are not acknowledged at all by the RCMP and media, even though they are suspected of having made a valuable contribution. Though the data does not reveal the specific role(s) of the local police in national security investigations, the analysis suggests that, for the most part, security intelligence agencies do not value the partnerships with municipal and regional police agencies, even though governmental policy reports accentuate local and federal inter-agency cooperation. Law and policy is usually only assumed, but this thesis actually systematically and empirically documents where inter-agency cooperation does or does not occur in practice.

While most of the foregoing analysis suggests an alignment, there is some evidence that suggests police agencies do not fully align their practices and investigations with security intelligence agencies. In fact, some police services have voiced their concern about interoperability issues. Meanwhile, there is still much evidence suggesting ‘healthy working relationships’ between municipal and regional police agencies and security intelligence agencies. But with regards to inter-agency misalignment and conflict, it is revealed that CSIS occasionally neglects to share intelligence that may help a local police agency in their investigation. The latter may well be due in part to the absence of the communication formats that police indicated, through FOI requests, ‘do not exist’. Local police agencies and CSIS may also conflict over tactics, potentially leading to a reluctance to cooperate on national security issues. The RCMP

and local police have also been accused of “fragmented policing.” However, limited published articles reveal that the RCMP leaves the municipal and regional police agencies completely out of the loop regarding national security incidents. Such misalignment or even conflict between nodes means that the larger security network of which they are a part, according to nodal governance literature, is weakened or lacks strong ties (see, for example, Granovetter, 1982; Völker & Flap, 2001 on measuring the strength of ties within networks).

It is also discovered in the analysis that local police seem to be blamed for any ‘failure’ in a national security investigation. It seems that the RCMP will take full responsibility for a national security investigation unless something goes wrong, even though this federal agency has primary responsibility. This may potentially result in a reluctance to cooperate on such issues, or perhaps competitive and parallel investigations. It also suggests the RCMP are in a higher position to make such claims to, for example, media.

The removal of seconded RCMP and police officers also suggests at least some level of conflict or a lack of alignment. In addition, when the local police are asked to “take a back seat” on a national security investigation, this implies that federal police agencies do not trust the municipal and regional police to work on national security investigations with them.

However, for the most part, not only do municipal and regional police agencies align their investigative practices with security intelligence agencies, but they also align their training techniques. When municipal and regional police agencies cooperate with security intelligence agencies on national security investigations, this training will allow them to work more closely together and avoid inter-agency conflict.

The foregoing analysis also reveals that public policing mentalities have now aligned with security mentalities. More specifically, the municipal and regional police agencies in

Ontario claim to have shifted to ILP. While not all intelligence related to ILP in police agencies is regarding national, the adoption of such a mentality does strongly suggest an alignment or potential alignment with security intelligence agencies. The data discloses that the local police engage in sting operations and covert physical surveillance, as well as share information locally, nationally, and internationally – all key components of ILP. This implies at least potential for a stronger security network involving these two nodes in the future.

Since information sharing is a key component of ILP, it is surprising that fusion centres do not seem to be working in Canada, unlike the US. Central intelligence hubs do not seem to be the major way to share communications among nodes at this time, with municipal and regional police at least. The NSJOC is limited to federal agencies, and the Integrated Command Centre for the “Freedom Convoy” was limited to the RCMP and OPP. Consistent with what was previously discussed, this implies that the RCMP, as well as the provincial police, do not feel as though the municipal and regional police are of much importance in national security investigations. Similarly, no evidence that reveals specific programs and software used to share information with security intelligence agencies came to light during data collection. It seems that computer interoperability has yet to be achieved in Canada. In fact, some specialized computer systems have been developed, but they are actually becoming less interoperable. For example, SCIS is very restricted. While PIP is available to municipal and regional police officers, PIP is maintained by the RCMP. This suggests yet another instance of hierarchy.

Lastly, it was uncovered that joint investigations involve a lot of unstructured data, which could explain why the municipal and regional police agencies to whom the FOI requests were sent stated “no records exist.” The fact that they do not exist further suggests a lack of alignment between municipal and regional police agencies and security intelligence agencies, although only

regarding this specific area. Overall, information sharing of the kind that is of interest to this thesis is apparently antiquated.

To conclude, there is limited evidence suggesting that the municipal and regional police agencies in Ontario have become responsibilized by security intelligence agencies through this alignment. The data does reveal the notion of hierarchy and an alignment of mentalities, but these publicly available sources do not suggest that the RCMP and/or CSIS is using local police agencies to extend its power and govern at a distance, at least not on a regular basis at the level of practices. Additionally, the evidence does not suggest the opposite either, that local police use or seek to use the RCMP and/or CSIS to extend their power. Recall that one goal of this research was to reveal if local police agencies have become responsibilized by security intelligence agencies, or vice versa.

Primarily using the concepts of ‘nodal governance’ and ‘nodes’, the purpose of this research was to explore whether and how local police agencies align their practices and mentalities with CSIS and the RCMP to cooperate on national security issues. Nodal governance is characterized by institutional hybridity (Wood & Shearing, 2007, p. 33), and there is an emphasis on cooperative alliances (Quéro & Dupont, 2019, p. 283). This aligns with what was revealed in the analysis because, despite any conflict or lack of communication, it was clear that various local and federal police agencies join forces to address national security concerns. Nodal governance not only emphasizes governing through alignment but also through enrolment. This was evident as municipal and regional police agencies contacted security intelligence agencies for assistance when evidence suggested a terrorist-related offence. Similarly, the data revealed that security intelligence agencies also contacted municipal and regional police agencies for assistance when they had a national security related task for them. However, the security

intelligence agencies still seemed to be directing the local police to act, which is consistent with the concept of ‘action-at-a-distance’ in the nodal governance literature (Wood & Shearing, 2007, p. 9). Nodal governance also emphasizes horizontal partnerships and coordination, rather than the traditional top-down system (Dupont, 2004; Holley & Shearing, 2017, p. 167; Quéro & Dupont, 2019, p. 283). This research did not assume any hierarchical relationships; however, it became clear that the security intelligence agencies dominated the relationships, or at least made it appear as though they were superior to local police agencies. Lastly, ‘responsibilization’ stems from the nodal governance and related governmentality literatures as a new form of governance-at-a-distance (Garland, 1996: 454, see also Garland, 1997). It was suspected that security intelligence agencies were using municipal and regional police agencies to extend their power through this alignment, or perhaps, police agencies were using these alignments with security intelligence agencies to further their traditional focus on crime, order maintenance, and other service provisions. Surprisingly, very limited evidence suggested any kind of responsibilization through this alignment.

Some alignment was discerned by systematically collecting and analyzing open source documents. On a methodological note, while it would have been preferable to have gained access to interviewees and more agency documents besides the open source ones, the use of open source documents still revealed aspects of relations nonetheless, often by inference.

Supplemental research should explore in-depth the techniques and tactics used in these joint investigations possibly by arranging direct access to these relations and practices. This will take considerably more time and effort than was available, but it will potentially lend more insight into the role of municipal and regional police agencies in national security investigations and more insight into how the nodes relate to one another. This would be a way to further

address the gap in the literature regarding municipal and regional police agencies' contribution to the inter-agency cooperation on national security concerns even more than what was done in this research.

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VITA AUCTORIS

Danielle Quimby was born in Windsor, Ontario in 1997. Danielle is fluent in both English and French, and she graduated from Belle River District High School in 2015. In 2020, she obtained her BA[H] in Criminology at the University of Windsor, earning the Board of Governors Medal in the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminology. During her MA, Danielle was awarded the Ontario Graduate Scholarship (OGS), and she worked with Dr. Randy Lippert on his research project that delves into the inner workings of condominium life.