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The British and American War: Cultural Conflict in the Seven Years’ War

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In August 1758, after the fall of Louisbourg, James Wolfe opined: “The Americans are in
general the dirtiest most contemptible cowardly dogs that you can conceive. There is no
depending on them in action. They fall down dead in their own dirt and desert by battalions,
officers and all. Such rascals as those are rather an encumbrance than any real strength to an
army.” Just as the tide turned in the Seven Years’ War, it would appear that an identity for the
American soldier was crystallizing. Though Wolfe had been in the colonies but a few months,
his opinion of the American had hardened into non-complementary cast, preconceived notions
setting to certitude in war. While Wolfe wrote of American soldiers, British army officers
broadly shared such views and extended the criticism to colonial politicians and the general
population, deemed unsupportive and obstructionist at worse and ineffectual at best in their
support of the war effort. Colonial soldiers, for their part, found regular army officers officious
and condescending, and their application of discipline cruel and unusual. Colonists, more
generally, deemed the British army to be demanding of resources, unmindful of how colonial
politics worked, uncaring of matters of private property and individual liberties, and neglectful of
the subordination of military to civil power within British constitutionalism; seeming at times
more an occupying than a protective force. From this juncture of allied peoples flowed much
conflict producing as often a sense of difference as a shared identity as Britons.

Writing from the years of revolutionary struggle, J. Hector St John De Crevecoeur sought to
pin down the identity of the emergent American people when he asked: “What then is the
Historians have long been as interested in the timing of this creation, whether the American preceded the Revolution or vice versa. David Hackett Fisher wrote of four distinct regional folkways from Britain transplanted to the New World in a series of migrations dating to initial colonization, taking root in specific regions of the colonies. Add to the mix a number of other regional cultures that formed, and the colonies produced a patchwork of cultures rather than a singular identity on the eve of the Revolution. Likewise, Michael Zuckerman maintained that, although “the colonists of British America always strove to be Britons.” There existed at most a colony-based identity, evident only in the more densely settled regions, and still fragmented by ethnic, religious and other divisions. A common identity only began to form in the Revolution, he affirmed. iii Jack P. Greene also noted that, as the power and pull of metropolitan culture grew in the mid eighteenth century “there was a self-conscious effort to anglicize colonial life through the deliberate imitation of metropolitan institutions, values and culture.” Demographic and economic growth, increasing urbanization, general prosperity, and political maturation fostered cultural convergence. “Out of this steady process of convergence emerged the beginnings of an American cultural order that was waiting to be defined during and immediately after the era of the American Revolution.” iv All these historians look to the Revolution as the central event and to the colonists themselves as the key actors in the formation of American identity. Conversely, Timothy Breen argued that the assertion of an aggressive identity by Britain in the mid-eighteenth century had the effect of marginalizing the colonial periphery. Colonists partook of this patriotism into the 1760s when British actions such as the Stamp Act prompted a backlash to their perceived exclusion from being Britons. It was the British who, through their imperial agenda, constructed the idea of the American as something lesser than the Briton. Growing American proto-nationalism flowed from this differentiation. v
Fred Anderson closely examined the military sphere and traced the formation of an American identity to the Seven Years’ War. Being thrown into close contact with regular troops the provincial soldiers of the colonies noted a number of key cultural differences with their British compatriots that contributed to the formation of a separate identity. “The war was an education for both sides, and the lessons that New England soldiers learned reinforced their cultural heritage and their sense of themselves as a distinct people.”

Having, for the most part, benefited from the benign neglect of the metropole during much of the preceding 150 years, a new, assertive and intrusive imperial state invaded the colonial periphery during the Seven Years’ War in the form of the British army. The fiscal and military demands made by Britain upon its colonies, although the norm at home since the late 17th century, struck the colonies with blunt force. In fact, the colonial experience of war making in the Seven Years War differed from that at home at least until 1758 in a fundamental way—in the separation of civil and military power. The British fiscal-military state, according to John Brewer, arose as a result of the political crisis experienced by the state after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. In order to protect the Protestant Succession, Parliament enabled the expansion of the military through the extension of fiscal institutions and state taxation, but on the condition that the Commons exerted public accountability over state war making, and civil law prevailed over military law, particularly in matters of billeting and troop movements. With these guarantees in place, the essential operation of the fiscal-military state could proceed covertly, visible in the form of customs and excise taxes, and long-term government borrowing, but its full grasp on society obscured by the ostensible absence of a standing army on English soil. But the state manifested itself more palpably in America during the Seven Years’ War. In 1754, Whitehall decided that military authority would supersede civil power in key functions of
mobilization, such as the provisioning of the army and the quartering of its troops. This deviation from the constitutional norm manifested itself in human terms when an army ultimately numbering in the tens of thousands landed on American shores, and the military command issued direct orders to civil authorities for funding the war effort, mobilizing troops, providing support infrastructure and supplies, and curtailing certain commercial activities. Colonial leaders quickly decried the militarization of their society, pleading the rights of Englishmen to be free of a standing army. In reality, their status can be seen more as analogous to that other British colony, Ireland, which had long functioned as an island transport ship for the British army, in this way enabling the invisibility of British military forces on the English landscape while maintaining the nation’s battle readiness. Americans aspired to higher status than colonial Catholic Ireland, and there lie the seeds of their identity.

The clash of interests materialized early, with General Edward Braddock, leader of the first wave of Britain’s new military presence in America, complaining in the spring of 1755 of the fractiousness and unwillingness of the colonists to contribute to a central fund to support his expedition. Braddock railed against the “Supineness and Neglect of their Duty they have too long been justly accused of,” and as his fateful march progressed, so did his discontent. Expecting to find 200 wagons and 2,500 horses with forage at Fort Cumberland, as promised by the governors of Maryland and Virginia, he encountered 20 and 200 respectively. The general bitterly noted the “Numberless Instances of the want of publick and private Faith, and of the most absolute Disregard of all Truth” among the colonists. Braddock did spare a good word for Benjamin Franklin, who stepped in to resolve the transport problem, stating he acted with “great punctuality & Integrity.”
Franklin, by comparison, writing safely from the vantage point of years after the fact, provided the “American” perspective on Braddock’s British invasion. “In their first march, too, from their landing till they got beyond the settlements, they had plundered and stripped the inhabitants, totally ruining some poor families, besides insulting, abusing, and confining the people if they remonstrated.” Colonials found representatives of the British army, the central civil and military power during the war, to be officious, demanding, condescending, and at times oppressive. None proved more so than Braddock’s successor, James Campbell, Fourth Earl of Loudoun, who took command of the army in 1756. A combination of inherited aristocratic privilege and acquired superior military command made Loudoun authoritarian by nature and a man who perceived any opposition from those he deemed inferior as outright insubordination, and virtually everyone in the colonies he deemed to be beneath him, and those that were not by nature to be rendered so by the vice regal powers granted with his command. Loudoun arrived in New York on July 23, 1756, and shortly thereafter began expressing his opinions of colonials, albeit under the cover of a letters to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland. In October Loudoun wrote the Duke of Cumberland, at that time commander general of the British army: “The backwardness of the People in this Country, to give any assistance to the Service, is incredible.” Such a negative impression informed Loudoun’s actions, and the message soon came through clearly to the colonists as army mobilization hit North America.

A recognition of different interests quickly emerged and conflict ensued. Briton and colonial mutually hammered out “the American” on the anvil of military needs—the processes of recruitment, supply, trade embargo, quartering, and differences in the nature of military service between regular soldiers and the provincial forces raised by the colonies themselves—needs with profound consequences for the colonies. The disputes between colonials and the army over these
issues were primarily economic in nature—hinging on restriction of trade, compulsory marketing of provisions, requisition of wagons and livestock central to the agricultural economy, recruiting of scarce (free and bonded) labor, and the forced quartering of troops on civilian homes and businesses—although the colonial leaders tended to articulate their opposition to military actions in terms of the defense of British liberties. This paper will concentrate on the two key issues, recruitment and quartering, but I will be glad to take questions on the others.

**Recruiting**

The supply of military labor, both the provincial troops raised by the colonies and the regular troops recruited by the army in the colonies, provided a flash point for internecine conflict. Every year the commander-in-chief informed the colonial governors of the number of provincial troops he expected the colonies to raise for the campaign. These numbers could prove significant for colonies used to perfunctory militia musters. Provincial Governors confronted colonial assemblies with the request for authorization of the expenditure attendant upon the mobilizing of these forces. As a result of the often strained relations between the executive and legislative branches of colonial governments, the assemblies’ control of the purse strings, and in certain instances the prevalence of internal sectarian politics, not to mention the reluctance of men to serve under what they deemed unfavorable terms, the number of provincial troops actually fielded often fell well short of those requested, prompting frustration in the army’s commanders. It must be remembered as well that the scale of mobilization demanded by the British eclipsed past war efforts and the economic wherewithal of the colonies, so resistance was natural. xi

The colonies took advantage of their control over the raising of provincial troops, however the army exercised authority in the recruiting of colonials to the regular forces, and this subject
proved more contentious in the British-American relationship. Colonial resistance to British recruitment to the armed services, in particular impressments to the royal navy, had a long tradition. But in the recruitment of indentured servants sparked the most controversy in the Seven Years’ War. The Pennsylvania House of Representatives advised the lieutenant governor that many masters had complained “a great Number of Bought Servants are lately inlisted by the Recruiting Officers now in this Province, and clandestinely or by open Force conveyed away” to the great oppression of the masters and the province. Moreover, the practice also harmed masters whose servants were not enlisted, “Since they must humour them in every thing least they should be provoked to enlist which they daily threaten.” Other servants pretend to enlist only to run off, their masters giving them up because of difficulty in reclaiming them from the army. Under the law masters had “as true & as just a Property in the Servant bought as they had before in the Money with which he was purchas’d.” The concern expressed here had more to do with capital—the control, discipline and ownership of labor—than with constitutional matters of colonial versus imperial powers.

Masters frequently took the law into their own hands to resist British recruiting parties. Horatio Sharpe, Governor of Maryland, warned “an Insurrection of the People is likely to ensue.” Corbin Lee, who managed an iron forge worked by indentured servants, complained to Sharp when recruiters took two of his servants. “It is not unusual with many of these recruiting Gentlemen when they meet with a person that will not be bullied out of his Property and tamely give up his Servant without any sort of Recompense immediately to deem him an Enemy to his Majesty’s Service.” He believed the actions of the recruiting officer to be “Illegal nay felonious; for they stole into our Plantations disguis’d like thieves in the dead of night made our Servants Drunk forced them to inlist and curried [sic] them off.” Problems inevitably emerged. In 1756
officers of the Royal American Regiment, for example, had many disputes with masters of servants, a few of which were going to court. Colonial lawyers, revealingly, argued that servants, as property, had no free will, and thus could not be taken against the masters’ wishes. Masters also took a more direct approach in reclaiming their property. One tactic was to have enlisted servants jailed on some specious charge to keep them from the army’s clutches.

The army’s recruiting officers did not escape the masters’ wrath, as acting commander in chief William Shirley reported in 1756. “The officers have been arrested for entertaining these Servants, Violences used by the Populace” in Pennsylvania and Maryland “for recovering them from the Officers, and the Servants imprison’d for inlisting.” Pieter Van Ingen, a recruiter for the Royal Americans, enlisted a servant of Samuel Henry at Trenton in August 1756. Henry later confronted him in a tavern demanding his servant or money in recompense, and struck him on the head with an iron-tipped stick when he refused. Van Ingen chased him off with his sword. Henry returned with friends in an attempt to capture the servant, but Van Ingen drove them off again. When he tried to leave, though, Henry attacked him with a pitchfork, which he parried with his sword. He retreated inside and had his men fasten knives to poles, with which they routed Henry’s party, which surrendered the field and the servant. But when mob rule failed, Henry turned to the law, and had a justice send a constable to Van Ingen demanding he give up the man or the money, or go to jail. Van Ingen refused and a writ was served upon him, and he was jailed in a “Stinking” cell without a bed, chair or fire, despite the protest of his colonel as to the illegality of his imprisonment.

The recruitment of free individuals to the regular army also sparked official opposition and popular conflict. Some recruiting officers were subjected to “Vexatious Suits” in the courts of law for performing their duties. Debts owed by putative recruits were invented or inflated and
the men incarcerated to prevent them joining the army, and keep their persons and labor in the local setting. The brothers Thomas Alley and Daniel Alley, both laborers, enlisted with the 40th regiment, but were sequestered in jail at Portsmouth, where they were being held for a debt owed to the son of Col. Warner, a Justice and local magnate. Warner was “one of the principal Men in the Town & as no one hardly cares to oppose him, he generally does what he pleases.”

Other recruiting parties met with collective violence. A Philadelphia mob attacked recruiters in 1756, beating a sergeant to death, jailing the rest, and liberating the enlisted men. Three riots took place in Wilmington, Delaware in the fall of 1757, in which Independent Company recruiters had been beaten. The mob leaders were known but the recruiting officer did not trust local authorities to prosecute. Colonial officials inevitably became embroiled in the conflict. It was reported from Boston in February 1758 that a “Broil . . . between a Mob, & some of the Recruiting Parties” took place and that mobs were forming against recruiting parties for perpetrating unscrupulous acts. “To see a Drunken Man lugg’d thro’ ye Streets on a Souldiers back guarded by others wither [sic] it was or was not to carry him before a Justice to swear must certainly give a Strong impression of ye method of enlisting & certainly have an ill effect on an inflam’d Mobb,” warned Governor Thomas Pownall. Samuel Mackay reported from Portsmouth, Maine in December 1757: “I have had my party out in the Country but they generally get Mob’d; one of them was beat in the Streets the other Evening by five Sailors.”

In Chester County, Pennsylvania that same month, John Baldwin, a tavernkeeper discovered Sergeant James Jobb of the New York Independent Companies attempting to enlist two young men in 1757. He “Swore by God that he would beat the brains of any Scoundrell [sic] Soldier” recruiting in his inn. Moreover, he said “God Dam [sic] Lord Loudoun and his Army too, they are all Scoundrells and a burden upon the Country,” and asked “What had he or his Army done
Since their coming but deprived the people of their hands”? Baldwin then attacked Jobb, wounding him and chasing him off. He attacked him again when he discovered Jobb in another tavern in Wilmington.\textsuperscript{xxv} Baldwin had laid his hands not only on one poor recruiting sergeant but also on the pulse of the conflict over recruiting: who was to control America’s labor, army officers or colonial masters, and to what ends, martial or material?

Attempts to recapture men who had deserted His Majesty’s service also inflamed colonial passions.\textsuperscript{xxvi} A crowd of people in Boston in January 1757, beat a sergeant who had captured a deserter from the 50th Regiment, rescued the absconder, and warned that any officers that came would be treated likewise.\textsuperscript{xxvii} Such actions often proved to be in response to perceived transgressions of parties sent to recover deserters. For instance, in Sept. 1757, soldiers came to Hugh Brady’s door in Perth Amboy in the evening when he was in bed and his wife undressed and ready to go to bed. They banged on the door demanding entry, saying they were looking for deserters. The soldiers seized Brady’s wife when she opened the door, hit Brady with a gun butt on the head, wounded him in the neck and shoulder with a bayonet, and dragged him into the street. Several neighbors tried to liberate them, but the troops fought them off.\textsuperscript{xxviii}

The ongoing furore over recruitment in the colonies necessitated parliamentary intervention.\textsuperscript{xxix} Before the end of March 1756, legislation had been adopted, which addressed the recruitment of both free individuals and indentured servants. First, the act attempted to quell any complaints that free men had been duped into enlisting. A recruit had to be taken to a justice of the peace or magistrate within four days but not before 24 hours of his listing to swear his willingness or unwillingness. If the latter, he had to return the levy money and pay 20s. sterling for expenses within 24 hours; failing this he was considered enlisted. Anyone who had taken the enlistment money but refused to go before a magistrate would be treated as if they had taken the
oath. Second, the act addressed the thorny issue of recruitment of indentured servants. The legislation made it lawful to recruit indentured servants who volunteered, but stipulated that, if the owner protested within six months, the recruiting officer must either give up the servant upon being repaid the enlisting money, or pay the master compensation based on the original purchase price and the amount of time left to be served. Further, the act established that no one who voluntarily enlisted could be taken out of the service through legal process unless for criminal causes or matters of debt, thereby preventing masters from reclaiming their servants by filing bogus charges in a sympathetic court. Parliament with this act codified the fiscal-military state’s premise that the army’s need for manpower prevailed over private interest, whether communal or familial concern for the liberty of individuals who enlisted, or masters’ property in human labor for the purpose of individual economic gain. In taking this position the act effectively made the army the preeminent employer of labor in the colonies, at once master to free laborers and bonded servants purchased from reluctant owners. The recruiting legislation did not prevent conflict from occurring over mobilization in the colonies, as it did not remove the root issue of control of labor power.

The American colonies for a variety of reasons, then, did not produce as many regular soldiers as the army wished, yet yielded a surplus of obstruction and outright opposition. “We shall have a great deal of difficulty to recruit of our Regiment,” confessed an officer, “the People of this Country having no great affection for a red Coat, nor do they stay long with us after they list when they find an opportunity to take their leave.” Another recruiting officer concurred: “the Generallity of the People Instead of Encouraging the Regular Service they Discourage men from Enlisting.” Another observed that “there is a general backwardness in the people of this province to the Kings service, which is but too much encouraged by all sorts of people, as they seem to
consider every man, we enlist, as a real loss to the Province.”xxxii Such reluctance to serve in the
regulars played a role in Pitt’s decision to send more and more regular regiments to the North
American theater, which in turn lessened the conflict over recruiting in the colonies, although
crowds attacks on British soldiers occurred.xxxiii

An account of recruiting in America gives a clear indication of the military’s role in creating
free workers from indentured servants, apprentices and craftsmen, and of drafting existing
laborers into a more rigorous form of manual work. Great differences existed between regions,
most strikingly between north and south because of the latter’s growing dependence on slavery.
But in the mid-Atlantic region and New England, the two main areas of recruitment for the army,
petty production based upon the household in both agricultural and craft sectors proved the
norm, with familial labor playing an important role and, particular in the mid-Atlantic, bonded
labor making significant contributions. At the same time, labor scarcity prevailed throughout the
colonies. Military recruitment exacerbated this situation and this clash between household
production and state-sponsored enterprise on an Atlantic scale partly explains the at times violent
response to mobilization. A strategem developed and long used in the colonies to overcome
deficiencies of labor, indentured servitude figured centrally in the colonial American economy.
First without any explicit policy, then with the backing of a British parliamentary act, the army
“freed” many servants from bondage and introduced them to paid military labor. Although it
promised reimbursement for the loss of contract time, cash could not immediately replace scarce
labor. Done at the expense of masters, this theft of human capital harmed their household
economy and sowed the seeds of discontent with the Mother Country. Similarly, the conflict over
proper recruiting of free men had much to do with the nature of the colonial labor market. While
ostensibly untethered workers, recruits tended to be young men with important familial and
community ties, with economic responsibilities to parents or employers, and enlistment in the regulars usually meant a loss of their labor to these networks for years. Their freedom of choice was thus balanced by these collective concerns, which provided a potential check on their unfettered movement into the military.\textsuperscript{xxiv} This loss of labor power constituted one reason why colonials looked more favorably upon enlistment to the provincial regiments; as the term of service was by the year, it was not considered as much a loss as a means of accumulating capital in the form of wages (paid by the colony, largely reimbursed by London) to the soldier and indirectly to the family and community. To the extent that the regular army (with the government’s backing) facilitated the recruitment of such men and their abstraction from family and village for longer periods, it directly impacted basic economic units. British demands for support thus met with American recalcitrance and outright resistance to the effort to mobilize manpower in the great war for empire. In the process of a massive mutual enterprise, feelings of difference sharpened, acquiring an edge that the infusion of funds from the British fiscal-military state and the shared military success of the later war years blunted, but the blade had been tempered and needed but another imperial crisis to whet the distinction between Briton and American.

\textbf{Quartering}

The issue of quartering troops even more acutely threw into relief the developing perceived differences between the authoritarian British and the unpatriotic, grasping colonists. Operating on the constitutional principle that the military should be subordinate to the civil power, colonists opposed quartering as a threat to British liberties. The annual mutiny acts passed in Britain stipulated that quartering could not be forced upon citizens, but the mutiny acts applied to the
colonies in 1723, 1754 and 1756 excised this prohibition against quartering, and left the matter in the hands of the commander-in-chief in North America. Beneath the discourse of constitutional principles there lurked a more primary concern. Liberty at root connected to property, and the people who were to house and provide for the soldiers deemed quartering a theft of property inadequately recompensed orchestrated by the military rather than a representative government. Such material considerations fused with higher ideals of defending British liberties to provoke widespread opposition to quartering in the first few years of the war, which military power nonetheless overturned repeatedly through the threat of force, in the process confirming the fears of the military and contributing to the negative image of the British. In the end, however, Britain’s fiscal-military state would resolve the controversy by restoring the separation of civil and military authority, and by borrowing money and subsidizing the building of barracks in America, thus taking the onus off of colonial officials and, for the most part, sparing individual citizens the need to accommodate soldiers.

Lord Loudoun spluttered from Albany in 1756 that colonials had “assumed to themselves what they Call Rights and Priviledges, Tottaly [sic] unknown in the Mother Country and are made use of, for no purpose, but to screen them, from giveing any aid, of any sort, for carrying on the Service, and refusing us Quarters.” While Albany was the only town that had given any quarters for the troops, when a detachment left, they would give no quarters to them when they returned. Loudoun tried “by Gentle means, to get the better of this Obstinacy [sic]” for almost a fortnight, but the mayor informed him that he knew the law and did not have to give quarters. Loudoun thus determined that he would “take the Civil Magistrate along with me, If they would assist me, if they would not, I must Follow the Custom of Armies, and help my self.” The mayor remained obstinate so Loudoun had his own quartermaster pick the quarters. In the future, he
warned, any leading man who shuts out the troops would have his house confiscated and converted into a hospital or store house, “and let him shift for himself.” Later in the fall, when the mayor and people of Albany delayed in providing winter quarters for about 300 troops, Loudoun threatened to march in more battalions and to force them all on the city. The opposition crumbled and city officials decided to create a fund to pay citizens for quartering expenses. “Here, this opposition seems not to come from the lower People, but from the leading People, who raise the dispute in order to have a merit with the others, by defending their Liberties, as they call them.” Faced by an adamant Loudoun and his armed might, the opposition ultimately crumbled and soldiers were quartered in Albany homes.  

The city of New York also initially failed to provide quarters for soldiers, other than in barracks and blockhouses. Loudoun asserted the right to quarters and in the fall of 1756 threatened to seize them by force if necessary. The Mayor, and town council finally buckled, and the colonial assembly voted to build barracks for the Royal American battalion to be stationed there. However, Loudoun admitted that there were too many troops to rightly expect people to fully supply them, so he provided them with palliasses for beds and wood for their fires. But, as those in Albany resisted, he intended to make the citizens supply beds and wood, as he would in Philadelphia.

General Braddock had set the tone on quartering there early when in 1755, frustrated by what he saw as obstructionist colonial officials, he informed the Pennsylvania Assembly that he would exercise his power to quarter troops where he would and “take due care to burthen those colonies the most, that show the least loyalty to his Majesty.” Loudoun, proved equally adamant. “As to quarters in Philadelphia and every other place . . . where I find it necessary to have Troops, I have a Right to them, and must have them.” Loudoun requested quarters from
Governor William Denny in Philadelphia in September 1756, and a month later gave notice that a battalion of the Royal Americans and an Independent company would winter there. The Pennsylvania Assembly responded in November, despite Denny’s best efforts, with quartering legislation that only provided for troops to be accommodated in public houses and not private homes as required by the military. Henry Bouquet, commander of the Royal American detachment, arrived in the town where essentially no quarters had been prepared. A new hospital able to hold 500 troops plus officers lay unused, but the Assembly refused to let him take possession. “During these Transactions, a very deep Snow fell, succeeded by a sharp Frost,” wrote Denny. “In this severe Weather the Troops marched into Town, the Small pox raging in every Part, and were crouded [sic] into public Houses, where they suffered extreme Hardships and caught the Infection. The Surgeons declared every House would be an Hospital, unless the sick were removed into one Place, and those who were less crouded and better accommodated.” Still 124 men “lay upon Straw” and 62 beds were wanted, but the Assembly “suffered the Men to lye in this miserable Condition,” while recruits continued to arrive. Fear of a smallpox epidemic in the city as much as concerns for British liberties prompted opposition to quartering. Denny wrestledmightily with the Assembly maintaining the line that the commander-in-chief was empowered to request quarters as needed, from private as well as public houses, while the Assembly’s champion, Benjamin Franklin, heroically fought the “contest for political liberty.” As officials in Philadelphia had not adequately quartered troops and provided none for officers, Loudoun, in what would become standard procedure, threatened to march troops into Philadelphia to take quarters by force if necessary. With that threat over their heads, the Assembly finally buckled, renting additional housing for the troops and freeing hospital space for the sick.
Henry Bouquet, dispatched from Philadelphia to South Carolina, discovered that southern climes exacted a similar toll on soldiers denied quarters. In June 1757, he arrived with five companies of Royal Americans in Charleston, and encamped outside town as some men had contracted small pox in the passage from Philadelphia. Officers applied for quarters on July 26 “as the Troops were ill supplied with Straw, the Camp full of Water, and the Number of the Sick encreasing every Day,” he reported. “Four bad empty houses were given to them, where the Men were obliged to ly upon the Floor” until September 21, when 160 men were given quarters in public houses, but the rest remained where they were. Officers were not quartered until August 2. The Highland Battalion arrived September 3, having lost seven men in the Atlantic passage, but with only 16 sick men. They were only given quarters in “a half finishd [sic] Church without Windows, in damp Store houses upon the Quay, and in empty houses, where most of the Men were obliged to ly upon the Ground without Straw or any Sort of Covering. Immediate Sickness was the Consequence of such a Reception after so long a Voyage.” By end of September, 500 Highlanders were sick, and 60 died within three months. The Commander of the Highlanders noted “this Climate Do’s not agree with our Northern Constitutions.” Some local inhabitants took pity on them and admitted 200 men into their homes. Securing quarters in town, Bouquet complained to Loudoun, proved “the eternal Struggle in America.” Despite his repeated pleas he had achieved no results by mid-October. “Private Interest is always the first point here, and Public Spirit is no more the Second,” he confided to Loudoun, and “too great a tenderness for the People, and too Strict an adherence to Forms in Such Circumstances, might be of great prejudice to the Troops.” In October the Colonial Assembly resolved to build barracks for 1,000 men but initially made no provision for furniture or bedding, and issued insufficient firewood. Bouquet complained to the governor, who took the matter to the Assembly, which agreed to provide one
cord of wood for every 100 soldiers, and one blanket per man, but made no further provisions for hospitals, guard rooms or officer quarters. \textsuperscript{xl} Loudoun instructed Bouquet that if South Carolina did not provide sufficient quarters, he should use troops to quarter themselves on citizens, but in the end decided to deploy the Royal Americans to New York so as to ease the crush on Carolinian resources. \textsuperscript{xli} Yet, as late as March 1758, not all regular officers had been provided with quarters or barracks. \textsuperscript{xlii}

The quartering controversy developed later in Boston because William Shirley had convinced the Massachusetts legislature to build barracks on Castle William Island in Boston harbor in 1755. When Loudoun in August 1757 informed Governor Pownall, his former secretary, that a regiment of soldiers would need to be quartered in the city, the legislature decided to pay for additional barracks to be built at Castle William to prevent quartering in private homes. \textsuperscript{xliii} Loudoun remained unconvinced of Massachusetts’ commitment to the war effort, and began to voice doubts about the governor’s trustworthiness as a servant to the Crown. Pownall was a man:

\begin{quote}
from whom I forsee more trouble to whoever commands in this Country than from all the People on the Continent . . . As to his Notions of what is necessary for an Army and the Powers that must be in the Person that commands them at the time that war is actually in the Country, he has formed them from a superficial Reading of Law at School without any Practice. Every act of a general is an Infringement on the Liberty of the People, and if the Civil Magistrate, does not furnish Carriages, every thing must stand still, and, if he does not give Quarters,
\end{quote}
the Troops must perish in the Streets, but where his own power is concerned, there he has no Bounds.\textsuperscript{xlii}

All remained quiet until early November 1757 when recruiting parties were denied quarters in Boston. The officers had reported to Pownall who gave them a list of justices of the peace of whom to request accommodation, but these men told the officers that, as no law relating to quartering extended to the colonies, they could not be accommodated and would only quarter the soldiers at Castle William.\textsuperscript{xlv} In fact, the Massachusetts General Court drew up An Act for Regulating the Militia, which stated: “No officer, Military or Civil, or other Person, shall quarter or billet any Soldier or Seamen upon any Inhabitant within this Province without his Consent . . . notwithstanding any Order whatsoever,” excepting in public houses. An £100 penalty would be assessed for an infraction, to be split between government and offended party. Pownall explained to Loudoun that the law was meant to protect “an Essential right of the Subject that no one could be quartered upon, unless by Law and there was no Law.” The commander-in-chief, beset by problems on the frontier and choleric by nature when challenged, proved in no mood to be lectured to on the law. If Massachusetts did not immediately settle the quartering issue, he warned, three battalions would march into Boston, and more if necessary. Pownall conveyed Loudoun’s threat to the assembly, which passed legislation empowering magistrates to provide quarters to recruiting parties that Pownall signed into law. An Act making provision for the Quartering and Billeting Recruiting Officers and Recruits stipulated that magistrates should provide quarters in public houses, while recruiting officers were to pay for quartering and provisions at rates set by Parliament. The law was to remain in effect for one year. This measure could not satisfy Loudoun, precluding as it did the right to quarter in private homes. By this act
the members of the assembly were attempting “to take away the King’s undoubted Prerogative, and the Rights of the Mother Country; they attempt to take away an Act of the Brittish [sic] Parliament: they attempt to make it impossible for the King either to keep Troops in North America, or if he had them in his Forts to make it impossible for him to march them thro’ his own Dominions either for the Defence of those Dominions, or for the Protection of the Lives and Properties of his Subjects.”

If he were to acquiesce, Loudoun maintained, every other colony would follow Massachusetts’s lead. For it’s part, the Assembly reaffirmed that adequate quarters had been provided in the barracks on Castle Island, and that provision of additional quarters elsewhere must first be voted for by the government, which act they were willing to produce, but reminded the governor “the inhabitants of this Province are intitled [sic] to the Natural Rights of English born Subjects.” Pownall was not unsympathetic with this position. At this juncture, he wrote Loudoun: “in a Free Government where there is a Public Legislature and people Act by their Representatives, a Governor must endeavor to lead those people for he cannot drive them . . . Your Lordships Situation is very different--Your Lordships [sic] has not only Power, but the uncontroled means of executing it, whenever you shall think it prudent to exert such.” Loudoun’s threat of settling the quartering dispute with troops if implemented would alienate the people from the military, Pownall maintained. Already he as governor had been implicated with the army and some alleged they conspired to impose a military government. For whatever reason, Loudoun wrote on December 26 that he had decided to countermand his orders to march troops into Massachusetts.

For the first time in the quartering wars Loudoun retreated and allowed the Massachusetts’ law to stand. Although he claimed victory for asserting the army’s prerogative, he in fact yielded the presumed right of the military to quarter soldiers in private homes. The defeat no doubt
further entrenched his negative view of colonials, while his authoritarian approach, however much grounded in imperial policy, made the British-American relationship ever more bilious, as did the actions of certain individual soldiers quartered in private homes.

While typically dealt with in constitutional terms at the level of colonial governance, on the ground the quartering issue involved property rights and the matter of personal safety. At best, quartering purloined provisions and control of personal space from citizens with the promise of reimbursement; at its worse, it was as if one’s home had been invaded by members of a looting army. Officers hardly set a good example. An official in Elizabeth Town, New Jersey warned Loudoun in January 1757, that people in the colonies were unused to “War and martial Discipline,” and thus “to prevent Tumults and Disturbances between Your Officers and the Inhabitants where the Troops are quarter’d I hope You Lordship will give the strictest Orders for Moderation and Lenity to be exercised at all Times.” This request went for naught. In March, various citizens of Elizabeth Town made complaints against Captain Porter of the Royal American Grenadiers and his conduct towards local residence. He bought three barrels of cider but would not pay the agreed price when delivered, argued with a local citizen and struck him with fist and sword. Also, a landlord complained a foreign captain of the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment threatened to cut his head off and beat his wife because she would not roast a sheep for him. It is not any wonder then, that private soldiers sometimes took advantage of their strength in numbers while quartered on the public. In the fall of 1756, a company of Royal Americans was ordered into quarters in George Town, Maryland. A group of these soldiers moved into a house owned by William Wethered in November and on January 17, through their carelessness he alleged, the house burnt down, together with a storehouse, stables, fencing, a garden adjoining house, and two small houses that were pulled down to prevent the fire.
spreading. Wethered sought reimbursement, and Governor Horatio Sharpe, as desired by Loudoun, persuaded the Assembly to pay him £300 for his house.\textsuperscript{li} Shortly thereafter in Charlestown, Maryland, two companies of soldiers took over John Kirkpatrick’s house and outbuilding for barracks. They totally wrecked the premises, burning floors and doors and ruining brickwork. He complained several times to their captains, who treated him derisively. The worth of the house he put at £500 and the outbuilding at £70.\textsuperscript{lii} In November 1757, Jannetie Ten Eyck petitioned Loudoun that since the beginning of the war her house in Albany has been full with stores, officers and soldiers. At that time a sergeant and three men quartered there, “who use her with insufferable Insolence, threat’ning, to take the Bed whereon She lays, or come to Bed to her, tho’ she hath already . . . given them the Straw bed from under her.” They also threatened to cut the doors and windows if she did not find them firewood, for which she was obliged to the kindness of her neighbors, being upwards of 50 years old, weak and sickly, and with no man to assist her. She begged relief from the commander-in-chief.\textsuperscript{liii} Threats of violence could be eclipsed by actual physical violence. Governor Fitch of Connecticut complained that in March 1758, some of Simon Fraser’s Highlanders grievously wounded a citizen, and Captain John McDonald refused to give up the culprits when legally summoned. Fitch asked for an investigation, and if the facts support this version of events, the men to be handed over to civil authorities for trial. The army needed to make an example of soldiers who do such things, he maintained, otherwise it would only give ammunition to the cries against quartering.\textsuperscript{liv}

While these incidents of property damage and violence, threatened and real, were not the norm, they proved notorious enough to give a more personal dimension to the opposition to quartering. The clergy referenced the conflict in their preachings. In one published sermon
preached to regular officers and soldiers in 1759 at Elizabeth Town, the site of quartering conflict with the army the year before, the reverend offered a biblical rebuke to the congregation. Although King David of Israel was a brave soldier, he was not violent in disposition and “was not inclined to take away the property of his countrymen by force of arms, without asking their consent, and contrary to reason and law.” In Philadelphia, another hotbed of the quartering controversy, Rev. William Smith sermonized the Royal American forces on the evil of committing violence against their fellow subjects or terrifying them so as to take their money on penalty of forfeiting their salvation.iv

The quartering controversy, part constitutional crisis and part interpersonal conflict, powered a cultural clash in the British-American relationship. British funding of the war effort would paper over the issue, but left the root problems unresolved. When Parliament finally legislated a quartering act for the colonies in 1765, that allowed for quartering in private homes if barracks and taverns provided insufficient space, the controversy erupted again with more enduring consequences.

Conclusion

The rupture between British military power, embodied by John Campbell, Fourth Earl of Loudoun, and American colonial civil authority, most clearly rendered by Thomas Pownall, Governor of Massachusetts, distracted the army from war-making and threatened defeat for the empire. Acting on his orders and willing to exercise the vice regal powers granted him, Lord Loudoun sought to impose a unified military order on the colonies.iv Colonial leaders refused to yield the powers they believe civil authorities wielded and chafed at the military’s air of superiority. Recognizing this danger, William Pitt resolved the standoff largely in favor of the
colonial governments. By December 1757, he decided no longer to treat the colonies as wholly subordinate political entities subject to forced contributions to a common war fund, but rather in a manner analogous to allies whose contributions to the war effort would be subsidized by Whitehall. Moreover, Loudoun’s successor as commander-in-chief would not wield direct control over colonial governments, which once again fell under the control of the secretary of state for the Southern Department. With these decisions, Pitt eased both the economic and constitutional sources of military-colonial tensions, and enlisted more wholehearted American support of the war.

More so than in the recognition of cultural difference, the seeds of American identity lay in the collision of Britain’s fiscal-military state and the economic realities of the American colonies. Competition over scarce resources such as manpower or the physical plant and food products of colonial farms, and the forced insertion of soldiers in colonists’ homes where their pressed hoists were to provide for them sparked conflict. This conflict quickly fed into the political arena where the peculiar ways of colonial governance generated incipient constitutional arguments against British rules. It is important to remember, however, that Parliament assuaged most of these tensions by reining in the excesses of recruitment and funding the war effort from 1758, while the series of victories that began in that year bred a sense of British fellowship. To imagine Crevecoeur’s American striding forth from the Seven Years’ War on a planned march to the Revolution is to commit the grosses of sins, conjuring teleology not writing history.

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2 J. Hector St John De Crevecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer.
...down the crowd, but not before it became clear that the imposition of imperial authority on the colonial populace would not go unchallenged. Thousands took control of the city streets for several days, seized some naval officers and destroyed British property, and confronted Governor [REDACTED].

LO 564/12; Braddock to Robinson, 19 April 1755, LO 572/12; Braddock to Robinson, 5 June 1755, LO 581/13; Rogers, Empire and Liberty, 52.


BRADDICK TO SIR THOMAS ROBINSON, 18 March 1755, LO 560, box 12; Council held at the camp at Alexandria, Virginia, 14 April 1755, LO 564/12; Braddock to Robinson, 19 April 1755, LO 572/12; Braddock to Robinson, 5 June 1755, LO 581/13; Rogers, Empire and Liberty, 52.


LOUDOUN TO CUMBERLAND, 29 Aug. 1756, LO 1626/52; Loudoun to Cumberland, 3 Oct. 1756, LO 1968/44; Loudoun to Cumberland, 22 Nov.-26 Dec. 1756, LO 2262/52.

The army requested 9,000 provincial troops for the 1756 campaign against Fort Crown Point. In the end, the force included 2136 men from Massachusetts, 2155 from Connecticut, 1260 New Yorkers, 365 from New Hampshire, and 437 Rhode Islanders, plus 81 artillerymen, for a total of 6434 privates and noncommissioned officers. Massachusetts, although it resolved to raise 3000 men, fell considerably short in the end, and Connecticut pleaded that the colony was in debt and facing heavy taxation from the previous year’s campaign. See: James Abercromby, Return of Provincial Forces of the Several Colonies raised for the reduction of Crown Point, 26 June, 1756, LO 1254/28; [William] Shirley to Sir Thomas Robinson, 11 Aug. 1755, LO 662.13; Massachusetts General Court. Resolutions regarding Crown Point. 14 Jan. 1756, LO 759, box 17; Connecticut. General Assembly. Resolution on the raising of men and money for operations in 1756, 21 Jan. 1756, LO 763/17. For the 1757 campaign, Loudoun, determining to be as “moderate” in his demands as possible, requested only 4,000 men from the northern colonies. He also mandated that Pennsylvania produce 1400 men, Maryland 500, Virginia 1000, North Carolina 400, and South Carolina 500 for the defense of the southern frontiers. See: [Loudoun] To Sir Charles Hardy, 31 Jan. 1757, LO 274/261; Loudoun to Mr. Fox, 8 Feb. 1757, LO 280/263; Minutes taken at a meeting of the Governors of North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania [sic] with the Earl of Loudoun . . . 15 March 1757, LO 306/68. Immediately, Governor Denny of Pennsylvania indicated that he would not allow the Assembly’s money bill to pass as it did not conform to the orders of the colony’s Proprieters. Yet the province’s troops threatened to disband, as they already had not been paid for six months, and hence refused to march to Fort Augustus in Georgia as ordered by Loudoun. The commander-in-chief asked Denny to ignore the Proprieters’ instructions and to accept the money bill to support the military effort. In June, however, Loudoun complained to Pitt that neither Pennsylvania nor Virginia had raised the men promised, nor sent the troops to South Carolina they were supposed to, and Maryland, while raising the men, placed such extraordinary restrictions on their use as to nullify their effectiveness. See: [Loudoun] to Gov. Denny, 21 March 1757, LO 3128/69; [Loudoun] to Wm. Pitt, 17 June 1757, LO 384/58. In preparation for the 1758 campaign, Lord Loudoun indicated to the governors of the northern colonies that upwards of 7,000 provincials would be required expeditions against Louisbourg and forts Carillon, Frontenac and Duquesne. The New England legislatures, primarily at the instigation of Governor Pownall of Massachusetts, had already sent commissioners to a conference to discuss the establishment of a common military policy independent of the commander-in-chief, which naturally infuriated him. Before Loudoun could impose his will, however, he received notice of his recall to England. See: Anderson, Crucible of War, 223-26. His replacement, James Abercromby, called for 20,000 provincial troops in total for the 1758 campaign, backed up as Loudoun never was by Pitt’s promise to the colonial governments to reimburse their expenditures. Nonetheless, in April he reported that less than 18,000 had mobilized. See: [Abercromby] Circular Letter to the Governors of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, 15 March 1758, AB 45, box 1, Abercromby Papers, Manuscript Department, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California [hereafter in form AB45/1]; [Abercromby] to Wm. Pitt, 28 April 1758, AB 21/55. “I believe the real Truth is in attempting to raise 7,000 Men, we have overreached our Strength, the last thousand edges too near upon those who from their Situation & Circumstances thought it would not come to their Share,” confessed a now more compliant Pownall in June. “Laws will execute themselves while they extend only to a given rank of Men, but when they begin to entrench upon a Rank above that, you are sensible how much they labour and are obstructed.” See Pownall to Abercromby, 19 June 1758, AB 366/8. The Governor of South Carolina pleaded in May that he was trying to complete the provincial regiment to 700, but only had about 200 troops in the field. Men proved very difficult to raise in his province, he affirmed, and he had suggested to the assembly a draught from the militia but it turned him down and instead put forward a bill to enlist vagrants. To help speed mobilization, he expressed his intention to increase the bounty. See William Henry Lyttelton to Abercromby, 16 May 1758, AB 258/6. Other governors were not so scrupulous, while most assemblies proved equally evasive, prompting expressions of frustration from British officers in the field. John Forbes, entrusted with the campaign to the Pennsylvania frontier, complained: “The Province of Maryland have been extremely dilatory in their proceedings, not do I yet find, that they have come to any Resolution about granting supplies...The Province of Virginia have voted to augment their Troops to two thousand Men, and are to garrison their forts and Frontiers with their Militia. But I doubt much if that Province will be able to raise that Number of Men, altho’ they give ten pounds enlist money...There is nothing expected from the Carolinas.” See Forbes to William Pitt, Philadelphia, May 1, 1758, in Writings of General John Forbes Relating to his Service in North America, ed. Alfred Proctor James for the Allegheny County Committee of the Pennsylvania Historical Society of the Colonial Dames of America (Menasha, Wisconsin: The Collegiate Press, 1938), 76-77.

Most notably, in November 1747, when Commodore Charles Knowles sent a press gang into Boston, an angry crowd numbering in the thousands took control of the city streets for several days, seized some naval officers and destroyed British property, and confronted Governor William Shirley in the Province House. When the militia Shirley called out refused to mobilize, he armed the provincial lawmakers and faced down the crowd, but not before it became clear that the imposition of imperial authority on the colonial populace would not go unchallenged.

Rogers, Empire and Liberty, 52-53.
“As finding a replacement would entail expense, masters found little appeal in this olive branch and conflict continued.”


In an attempt to stem the furor over enlistment of indentured servants, William Shirley had ordered that any of these recruits who wished to return to their master should be so restored if the master did “furnish an able Bodied Man fit for the Kings Service, in lieu of every servant they lost.” As finding a replacement would entail expense, masters found little appeal in this olive branch and conflict continued. See Shirley to Robert Hunter Morris, 20 Feb. 1756, in Charles Henry Lincoln, ed., Correspondence of William Shirley Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in America 1731-1760 (New York: MacMillan, 1912), vol. 2, 391-92, n. 1; Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 107.

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Anderson, Crucible of War

James Abercromby to Loudoun, 20 Dec. 1756, LO2373/55. Loudoun ordered a survey of the homes in Albany, which he put at 329, and calculated could quarter 190 officers and 2,082 men, or five soldiers per house. See Rogers, “Colonial Opposition to the Quartering of Troops,” 11, n. 13.

Rogers, “Colonial Opposition to the Quartering of Troops During the French and Indian War,” Military Affairs, vol. 34, issue 1 (Feb. 1970), 7; Anderson, Crucible of War, 769, n. 5.

Loudoun to James Abercromby, 19 July 1757, AB42/1. Lyttleton put the cost of quartering the regular forces in South Carolina from June through November 1757 at £20,210 10s. 5d.

Lyttleton to Loudoun, 10 Dec. 1757, LO4987/110; [Loudoun] to Gov. Lyttleton, 13 Feb. 1758 is attempting to buy property. Loudoun decided to keep the highlanders rather than the Royal Americans as originally planned to address this claimed that Bouquet’s actions from the first “been Squared & measured upon all occasions by his views of establishing himself here,” where he is interfering, and told it that if province could not support all troops, should appeal to Loudoun to have part of the forces withdrawn. The governor informed that these could not be provided until a law was drafted similar to that of Massachusetts, and they were forced to pay for billets until a legislation that they had no problems getting billets. When recruiters requested quarters in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, however, they were informed that these could not be provided until a law was drafted similar to that of Massachusetts, and they were forced to pay for billets until a bill was put to the assembly in a week. William Cox to Col. Forbes, 11 Dec. 1757, LO4996/110; Nicholas Cox to Col. Forbes, 11 Dec. 1757, LO4995/110; Samuel Mackay to Col. John Forbes, 9 Dec. 1757, LO4977/110; Richard Nicleson [to Forbes], 9 Dec., 1757, LO4976/110.


J. Alan Rogers, “Colonial Opposition to the Quartering of Troops During the French and Indian War,” Military Affairs, vol. 34, issue 1 (Feb. 1970), 7; Anderson, Crucible of War, 769, n. 5.


Braddock’s words paraphrased by Edward Shippen, cited in Rogers, “Colonial Opposition to the Quartering of Troops,” 7; Loudoun cited in ibid., 7.


Henry Bouquet and others, Resolution sent to the Governor of South Carolina, 2 Dec. 1757, LO4937/109; Archibald Montgomery [to Loudoun], Oct. 1757, LO4727/104; Bouquet to Loudoun, 16 Oct. 1757, 4649/102; Petition from Bouquet and officers under his command, 2 Dec 1757, AADD 21643, BP6/48.

Loudoun to Bouquet, 25 Dec. 1757, LO5099/112. The decision to remove the Royal Americans resulted from a complaint from Governor William Henry Lyttleton, who complained he had been close to securing all the army wanted from the assembly when Bouquet interfered, and told it that if province could not support all troops, should appeal to Loudoun to have part of the forces withdrawn. The governor claimed that Bouquet’s actions from the first “been Squared & measured upon all occasions by his views of establishing himself here,” where he is attempting to buy property. Loudoun decided to keep the highlanders rather than the Royal Americans as originally planned to address this complaint about Bouquet acting as “a proprietor.” Lyttleton to Loudoun, 10 Dec. 1757, LO4987/110; [Loudoun] to Gov. Lyttleton, 13 Feb. 1758 LO5570/120. Lyttleton put the cost of quartering the regular forces in South Carolina from June through November 1757 at £20,210 10s. 5d. [Wm. Lyttleton] Account of the Charges for accommodating the King’s Forces in the Province of South Carolina, 1 Dec. 1757, AB4/1.

Bouquet to Lyttleton, 28 Feb. 1758, AB25/1; Lyttleton, Message to the Assembly of the Province of South Carolina, [15 March 1758, AB42/1.

Rogers, “Colonial Opposition to the Quartering of Troops,” 9.

Nicholas Cox to Col. John Forbes, 4 Nov. 1757, LO4760/105; Robert Mackinen, 4 Nov. 1757, LO4763/105. See also: Thomas Pownall to Loudoun, 4 Nov. 1757, LO4757/105; John Cosnan to Col. Forbes, 7 Nov. 1757, LO4783/106; Abstracts of the Letters of the Recruiting Officers from Halifax now at Boston, with remarks from Col. Forbes, 13 Nov. 1757, 4815/106.


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Loudoun to Pownall, 6 Dec. 1757, LO4955/110. Recruiting officers in Boston and Marblehead reported after the adoption of the legislation that they had no problems getting billets. When recruiters requested quarters in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, however, they were informed that these could not be provided until a law was drafted similar to that of Massachusetts, and they were forced to pay for billets until a bill was put to the assembly in a week. William Cox to Col. Forbes, 11 Dec. 1757, LO4996/110; Nicholas Cox to Col. Forbes, 11 Dec. 1757, LO4995/110; Samuel Mackay to Col. John Forbes, 9 Dec. 1757, LO4977/110; Richard Nicleson [to Forbes], 9 Dec., 1757, LO4976/110.

Mass. Bay, General Court, Message from the two Houses to Pownall, 16 Dec. 1757, LO5021/111; Assembly cited in Rogers, “Colonial Opposition to the Quartering of Troops,” 10.


William Wethered, Petition to Loudoun, 18 May 1757, LO3653/80.

John Kirkpatrick to Loudoun, 2 April 1757, LO3261/72.

Jannetie Ten Eyck, Petition to Loudoun, 17 Nov. 1757, LO4851/107.

[Abercromby] to Simon Fraser, 19 July 1758, AB457/10.
Military Character of King David, Display'd and Enforced, in a Sermon, Preached March 8, 1759, to the Regular Officers and Soldiers in Elizabeth-Town (New York: H. Gaine, 1759), 9; William Smith, The Christian Soldier's Duty ... A Sermon Preached April 5, 1757, In Christ-Church, Philadelphia, to the first Battalion of his Majesty's Royal American Regiment; at the Request of their Colonel and Officers (Philadelphia: James Chattin, 1757), 8-10.

Fred Anderson notes that Loudoun’s ideal approximated the military union proposed at the Albany Conference of 1754 and rejected outright by the colonies. Anderson, Crucible of War, 183.

Anderson, Crucible of War, 214.