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Locating The Lower Orders:

Recovering The Lives Of 18th Century Soldiers

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The one recurring theme in my work has been violence. The love of the sanguine side of history was sowed here at Trent when, as a fourth year student in search of a research topic for my directed studies course, Elwood Jones pointed me toward the 1841 election riot in Toronto. I became fascinated with the spectacle of collective violence. That paper on Toronto grew into a masters’ thesis at Queens’ on rioting in the city in the 1840s. From there I went to the University of Maryland, where my dissertation on North American canal construction centrally concerned canaller riots. Thereafter, it was but a matter of degree to scale to the heights of violence and to study state-based mass killing, aka warfare. As I matured as a historian I came to appreciate how useful moments of violence are in recovering the history of people located at the bottom or margins of the social structure. Rank in file Orange Lodge members, canal navies, and common soldiers had been rendered largely mute by the passage of time. This was in part due to their low level of literacy, and the fact they had left few first-person accounts of their lives. It also derived from the political economy of the Anglo-American world in the 18th and 19th centuries that isolated plebeians and proletarians apart from the historical record at that same time that it alienated them from the fruits of their labor. Acts of violence on their part, however, forced their way into the authoritarian narrative, which read against the grain, can shed much light on their experience. As a result, the vast majority of my efforts to locate the lower ranks has involved pastiche, sorting through numerous records, pulling out the evidentiary fragments addressing their lives, and assembling a mosaic that purports to capture the complex whole. Rare is the document that provides a coherent and comprehensive account of live in the lower orders. When such a treasure is unearthed, however, it can be juxtaposed to and joined with the fragmented view for a resolution comparable to the master narrative.

In this vein, James Miller’s memoir allows the historian to engage more closely the front
rank experience of warfare, and thereby, to interrogate the elitist biases of military history. Miller, a common soldier of the 15th regiment, wrote of his service in the British army during Seven Years’ War and sent his memoir in 1792, to Sir Jeffery Amherst, his former commander, with a letter requesting a promotion to a lieutenancy. He humbly noted in his preface: "It is very possible that some may think it impertinent, others presumptious, for so humble an individual presuming to give a Narrative, which contains nothing of novelty, or in any degree equal to many in the army". However, unlike the provincial troops of the colonies, few regular soldiers left written narratives of their military service in the war. Moreover, Miller participated in many of the key battles of the Seven Years’ War, and thus provides a much more complete rank and file narrative of the conflict. And, despite the fact that his memoirs constituted a petition to Amherst, they provide candid evaluations of his military service and his commanding officers. In this, it is exceptional, being a rare narrative of a common soldier’s engagement with warmaking that was “not intended, for the public eye,” and thus not sanitized so as to appeal to subscribers or a wider reading public. The journal allows a critical reading of British imperial military enterprise, revealing soldiers’ fundamental role in the making of Britain’s American Empire.

“To have the happiness, of being born a Briton”

James Miller made “his first appearance” in the world in the north of Britain “on the wrong side of the Tweed, A part of the kingdom justly obnoxious to all ‘true born Englishmen’.” Though from North Britain, he nonetheless embraced his status as a Briton. Such a conflicted identity, being both of the vaunted “race” of Britons, but of secondary status due to his northern roots, informs Miller’s telling of his life story as a soldier, enabling both a patriotic embrace of British accomplishment of arms, and a cynical understanding of the class and ethnic dynamics that imbricated the military’s command structure. To be a Briton at the time of the Seven Years’ War
meant to be at the center of a particular configuration of material forces and imperial state power.

To reorient the history of early modern warfare away from its typical nation state based proclivities, it has to be set in the context of the transition to capitalism, and to place state-sponsored armed conflict in the context of imperial aggrandizement in the interests of merchant capital. The Early Modern era witnessed what historians of warfare have called a military revolution, involving relatively swift technological and organizational innovation and marked growth in the scale and intensity of armed conflict, developments which had profound implications for both state and society. Often discussed in curiously bloodless terms of military innovation or state formation. Empire comprised the larger theater of military revolution, where imperial state formation occurred at the expense of soldiers, indigenous peoples and colonists. The war machine provided the force necessary to the creation of international merchant capital and its protection within the imperial sphere.

The Seven Years’ War constituted an important catalyst to these processes. The War marked a significant turning point in the nature of Empire from being distinctly commercial to being increasingly territorial. The army was an essential player in the winning of this territorial empire, and the empire was increasingly dependent on the army for its defense. The army’s red coat would become a more striking signifier of imperial rule than the navy’s blue jacket. In terms of the sheer numbers of troops mobilized, the scale of combat, and the massive investment in military supply and infrastructure, this was warfare as yet unseen in the Americas. The Seven Years’ War principally concerned the acquisition of territories, raw materials, peoples, and markets in the Americas, in India and Africa. In making war, soldiers built empire.

This reading of events would seem to cast soldiers as unwitting instruments of state policies, the stuff of traditional imperial history. By comparison, the new imperial history adopts a subaltern approach. Soldiers, I argue, provide a link between such histories from above and
below, as they are both instruments and objects of imperial authority. As members of armies engaged in warfare of acquisition and defense, they were the myrmidons of expansive commercial imperialism; as individuals enlisted from diverse backgrounds into a dangerous occupation jacketed with restricting discipline, they comprised expropriated labor yoked to imperial design, alienated from civil society, and bracketed at the bottom of the social structure.

The story of James Miller captures both dimensions to soldiering. His martial labor contributed to the imperial design of violent expropriation, but the state appropriated his labor to its own ends, in the process exposing him to the very real physical dangers of empire making. His consciousness of this exploitation of the soldier grew over time, and it is no coincidence that the final “battle” he recounted in the Seven Years’ War was a mutiny that occurred in Quebec in 1763, part of a general mutiny pitting common troops against their officers that wracked the army at war’s end.

**Taking the King’s Shilling**

Miller’s recounted his enlistment nostalgically. “From the earliest recollection, the hearing a drumbeat, set the heart on fire! A soldier, in my idea, must be the first of mortals, being the guardian of his country. Often did I throw myself in their way, wishing to be taken notice of, at last in the year 1756 at a very tender age, had the happiness, as I then thought! Of being singled out, by one of those worthies called crimps, who deal in human flesh, he enter’d into conversation, praised the life, of a soldier, profer’d Gold and every good which was soon accepted of, and now behold me, in the high road to honor. The first night passed in delirium! But on the morning, being hurried away, without having permission to bid farewell to our dear relatives, for there were several boys of us, what grief, what sorrowing many a long and
lingering look we cast behind during the first days march, but the grief went off, as the distance increas’d.\textsuperscript{xi}

Miller was but one of thousands entering the army in 1756-57, as Britain mobilized to fight France on both sides of the Atlantic. The exponential increase in the size of the army in America during the Seven Years’ War—from about 2000 men in 1755 to roughly 25,000 regulars in 1761—necessitated massive recruitment.\textsuperscript{xii} The army went about raising troops in a number of ways. Recruitment of volunteers like James Miller constituted the main means of stocking this work force.\textsuperscript{xiii} Lieutenant Colonel Campbell Dalrymple’s claim that soldiers were “the scum of every county, the refuse of mankind”\textsuperscript{xiv} was the prevalent attitude, but closer scrutiny of soldiers’ economic backgrounds reveals them to be more so the salt of the earth, ordinary people mobilized from the land and the trades either through dwindling opportunity or by the lure of the bounty money—near 50 per cent of the British American army came from skilled backgrounds.\textsuperscript{xv} In the colonies the military found willing volunteers among indentured servants, who “are glad to goe [sic] into the Army to get rid of their Slavery.”\textsuperscript{xvi} Other men were pressed into service by government legislation that specifically targeted the unemployed.\textsuperscript{xvii}

Army recruitment had roots in socioeconomic change. For some enlistment entailed a form of proletarianization; artisans immiserated by or rendered surplus to needs of crafts undergoing the reorganization of production preparatory to industrialization found the wage offered by soldiering a last recourse, or were scooped up by the press as men without means. To indentured servants, proletarian status constituted a welcome escape from bondage. For others already reduced to laboring status, military work amounted to but another form of manual labor, more dangerous of course, but offering steady employment, food, clothing and accommodation. In hard economic times, such as in the late 1750s when army recruiting peaked, it could be seen as
the lesser of evils. Volunteer or pressed, then, there was an element of coercion at work for most army recruits.

**France**

As James Miller’s corps marched into Portsmouth, he first confronted the imperial war machine in which he constituted but a small cog. He marveled at the “Dock Yard, the blacksmiths shop, in particular, where they were forming anchors of prodigious magnitude,” as well as the naval might in port. “The stupendous size of the men of war, on the stocks, and those under repair, strike the eye of every beholder.” Lost in his youthful wonderment at the scale of martial enterprise, he was naturally blinded to the logical outcome of all this activity—bloody warfare that would exact its toll on many thousands. When the order came for his corps to set sail on a secret expedition, he could still exclaim: “what cheerfulness in every countenance, with the glorious expectation of soon seeing a battle!”

Twenty sail of the line, many frigates and 300 transports set sail for points unknown to Miller. The leisure of the voyage gave him time to reflect on his situation.

The accommodation of soldiers, on board ship, are not very conducive to ease or health, all between decks being separated by boards into births, of six foot by six, three feet, six inches high, one tier, over the other, four or five men are allotted to each birth, and they creep into their holes, in the best manner they can, one third of which, are generally kept on deck while at anchor. I seldom went below for there proceeds, such a Disagreeable Stench, of putrid breaths when you are going down the hatch way, that no being, accustomed to fresh air, can bear.
Miller experienced first hand the commonplace for soldiers, whether at sea or on land: cramped, uncomfortable, obnoxious and unhealthy living conditions. When a strong gale hit the fleet, he experienced severe sea sickness. Such travails prompted him to realize his mistake. “[I]t was then, my folly, stared me full in the face, and repentance came too late, for having embraced, a life, of so much misery.”

Miller’s remorse deepened as a result of his first campaign. The fleet, under command of Commodore Howe, sailed along the French coast into the Bay of Biscay near Aix, where a fortification was bombarded and grenadiers landed to take the town and French prisoners. After this auspicious start, the expedition did little but sail further along the coast before sail was set for England. This turn of events mortified Miller, who admitted, “we certainly cut but a poor figure, on our return, and were frequently insulted, in our quarters, as if soldiers, were answerable, for the conduct of their superiors. I was now, pretty well cured, of all the romantic notions, imbibed in youth, and have had some cause, to lament, the wrong bias, of education.”

New France

Miller sailed for North America in 1758, in May arriving at Cape Breton and the French citadel of Louisbourg, gateway to the St. Lawrence and New France. General Jeffery Amherst ordered the troops loaded into flat boats for an amphibious assault, despite what Miller called “a great swell.”

Every precaution, had been taken by the enemy, to oppose our landing, the whole shore was one continuous battery, and the french troops, were concealed, from our sight by branches of trees, cut down. They reserved their fire until our boats got near the shore, when such a tremendous [sic] one commenced, from their
great guns, and small arms, as I have never since, beheld! Several boats, were sunk, others overset, by the swell, a boat carrying our grenadier company, was sunk by which, one Officer, two Serjeants, and thirty fine fellows were lost. xxxi

James Wolfe, who commanded the assault, identified a part of the shoreline, where the army landed and over the course of the next few days, cannon were brought ashore and trained on the French artillery emplacement and ships in the harbor. These were all rendered useless, the British artillery advanced and several breeches were made in the fortification. The anticipated “orders to storm them” were preempted by the French surrender. xxxvi Miller noted: “Thus with much perserverance, loss and fatigue, we had taken the strongest Garrison in N’th. America, and opened the road to Canada.” xxxv

Early in the Spring of 1759, Miller’s regiment joined the campaign against the heart of New France. Miller compresses the campaign against Quebec, which lasted several months, in his narrative, skimming over General Wolfe’s increasingly desparate efforts to find a way of getting his army safely across the river and in a defensible position outside the city, and instead concentrates on the ultimate battle, not surprising in that strategizing is the domain of generals and fighting falls to soldiers. Finally, in September, Wolfe identified a cove upstream from Quebec, where he believed the cliffs could be scaled. The troops rowed past Quebec at night in flat boats with oars muffled, landed at the cove and ascending the heights, securing position on the Plains of Abraham, where the enemy marched out to join them in battle.

The french army, collected from their different posts, were formed in two lines, with Indians and Canadians in front, they attacked us with great spirit, however our men reserved their fire, until the enemy, was within forty paces, when every
shot told [?], and the french were repulsed almost immediately and drove from the field.

With the French general, Montcalm, dead, and their army in flight, the city soon yielded to the British. This is a rather sketchy rendering of the soldiers’ story of the fall of Quebec. Miller reserves more color for the victory’s emotional centerpiece: “the great loss to our army which check’d our joy was the [?] Commander in Chief, Wolfe, who fell, after receiving three wounds. However he met with the most happy, the most glorious death, that a soldier could wish.” The second great piece of French dominion in North America had tumbled to British might of arms.

The British fleet provisioned the regiments left to garrison Quebec, Miller’s among them, and sailed down the St. Lawrence before the river froze up. Interestingly, his account of the hardships endured that winter achieves greater depth than did his rendition of the battle for Quebec.

A severe winter, now commenced, while we were totally unprepared, for such a climate, neither fuel, forage, or indeed anything, to make life tolerable. The troops, were crowded into vacant houses, as well as possible, numbers fell sick, and the scurvy made a dreadful havoc among us. The duty became extremely hard, for after being up all night, on guard, the men were obliged to go near six miles, through the snow, to cut wood, and then to drag it home on Sledges. From the severe frost, the wood was as hard as marble, and Europeans, who had never been accustomed to cut wood, made but small progress, a constant, and daily supply, was however necessary, and required the greatest perseverance [sic]. In short, the fatigues of the winter was so great, that the living, almost
envied the dead. . . . Many men, lost the use of their hands, and feet, during the
winter. I was also frost bit, in the right foot, while on guard . . . however by taking
it in time, lost no bones. 

In April, a French army attacked Quebec. The smaller British army marched out to give
battle, “but the french line, when hid by the bushes, kept up a fire, and with such effect, as threw
us into confusion.” Miller’s regiment took refuge in a hollow that shielded it from French
musketry. It advanced again, which gave the French “an opportunity of cutting us up, they being
drawn up under cover, and taking aim at leisure . . . In short, in half an hour, ten Officers, from
Twenty, were dropped, twelve Serjeants, from twenty four, and near two hundred, rank and file,
from less than four hundred in the field! The corps was broken, and retreated to their former
ground, happy would it have been, had they never left it.” The remainder of the British army
fared no better and retreated “confusedly” to Quebec in defeat. The British lost some 2000 men
in the battle. They were only spared the loss of the city by the serendipitous arrival of a British
fleet, causing the French to decamp. Thus, Miller’s first experience of military defeat turned
into a victory of sorts, yet his painful recording of the “butcher’s bill” of casualties suggests a
further souring of his view of military life.

Miller enjoyed but a brief respite, as his corps joined the expedition against Montreal.
Amherst had planned a three-pronged attack on the city. As well as the fleet advancing from
Quebec, he himself led a army from Lake Ontario and another advanced up Lake Champlain.
The three armies met outside Montreal at the same time, and the French, surrounded on all
fronts, yielded to the British. Miller reported:
A Capitulation took place, and all Canada was given up, a Country of more extent than Britain, and Ireland, inhabited by at least, one hundred thousand inhabitants. Thus after a series of hardships, in a climate, unknown to british constitutions, an immense country was added to the British Empire, a country producing every necessary for man. We flatter’d ourselves, with the hopes of enjoying repose, after such fatigues, but was disappointed.

Miller’s corps was ordered to Crown Point on Lake Champlain, where “they were employed in raising a fort, but for what purpose, it is unknown, except, to enrich some individuals, for by the conquest of Canada, there was no enemy to dread, in that Quarter.” Here, we can see Miller’s cynicism about the military and its priorities increasing, a theme that soon becomes dominant in his memoirs. After a month of such construction work they were ordered to New York, from whence they departed on an expedition for the West Indies.

The Caribbean Islands

William Pitt had instructed Amherst to provide 6,000-8,000 troops for Monckton’s campaign against Martinique. Although Miller does not mention it in his memoirs, he likely felt trepidation at being posted to the West Indies. Military service in the Caribbean was notorious for its high mortality in war and peace, yellow fever and malaria being the main killers.

On Christmas Eve, 1761, Monckton arrived at the Barbadoes with 10 different regiments and some companies of American Rangers. The fleet then left for Martinique, where the British forces made a landing and advanced on the battery under heavy enemy fire. Miller was injured in the action.
As we were entering the works . . . a musket ball grazed my neck, which in a few moments swelled to such a degree, that I thought I should have choaked and attempted to swallow water, but could not, I contin’d with the company in the Situation, the afternoon, and part of the next day when the Surgeon fearing, a mortification, sent me on board an hospital ship, where I remain’d in the same deplorable state three days, at last when all hopes of life was over, a violent perspiration came on, the swelling subsided, and I was soon able to join the corps. xxxv

During his illness, the army had encircled the fort and the garrison surrendered. The island did so shortly afterward, followed soon thereafter by St. Lucia, Grenada, and St. Vincent. xxxvi “Thus a conquest was made, of the capital of the french Islands in those seas, it was [?] striking at the root of their strength, in that quarter, and almost totally annihilated, their West India trade.” xxxvii War with France had effectively ended, but the victory came at the near cost of James Miller’s life.

War having been declared on Spain in January 1762, the government’s next objective became Havana. The inexperienced Earl of Albemarle, given command of the invasion force, brought 4000 men from England to combined with Monckton’s troops, making for an army of 14,000. xxxviii Yet sickness had already sapped Monckton’s victors of Martinique, being “very sickly, many dead, and the sick list increasingly daily.” xxxix

The army made a landing on Cuba in early June, and began its slow advance on the fortifications guarding Havana, under fire of Spanish ships and repeated assaults by enemy troops. Miller wrote That “the fatigues of this Siege pass description, the foundation, being a solid rock, an no earth to cover us, part of the army, were employed in bring sand bags, two
miles distance, amidst showers of grape shot. The soldiers named this road bloody lane!”

Unfortunately, the battery they built, “the labour of several weeks”, caught fire and was reduced to ruins, and they “had the whole work, to begin again, in this burning climate, when the men were less able, to perform that duty, being already exhausted, by the excessive fatigues.” Moreover, “the bad water brought on disorders, which were mortal, you would see the mens tongues hanging out parch’d like a mad dogs, a dollar was frequently given for a quart of water.”

On July 27, Amherst reinforcements arrived. Surrounded, outnumbered and its defenses breeched, Havana finally fell in mid-August. Miller recounted:

> a capitulation took place, when the city, with all the riches, contained therein, eleven ships of war, exclusive of other vessels, fell into our hands. The wealth found in the custom house, was immense, the whole suppos’d to amount to near four millions sterling! Little however came to the share of Non commission’d Officers, and private men, owing to the two commanders in chief sharing one third of the whole between them! How far this was consistent with equity must be submitted to posterity, and whether after the most extraordinary fatigues, in such a climate, the blood of britons should be lavish’d to agrandize individuals. By the above conquest the key to all the riches, in america were in our hands.”

Havana yielded booty worth £368,000 to the army. Private soldiers who participated in the siege each received just over £4 as their share; a tidy sum, but a pittance when compared to the princely £122,697 Lord Albemarle earned for his questionable generalship.

The cost for this stupendous victory was high. Approximately 1,800 British troops had died during the siege, while thousands were wounded or had become sick. Then the real dying began.
Miller remembered: “The army, in general became sickly, after marching into town.” With no real hospital, the British had to use tents and a large storehouse for the many sick. Fresh food being very scarce, the sick were fed with salt provisions. In mid-October it was reported that 273 men had been killed during the siege; 246 had died by their wounds; and 4,380 had died by sickness. Miller’s 15th regiment was one of the unlucky ones left behind to garrison Havana, exposed to illness and avaricious provisioners alike, which exacerbated the grievance felt from the inequitable distribution of booty. The manner of the garrison’s withdrawal from Havana cemented this cleavage.

When peace was declared in 1763, Miller and his mates “flatter’d ourselves, with the hopes, of soon being relieved from this unhealthy climate, an event that did not take place for more than six months after.” In June 1763, word was received that Cuba was to be returned to Spain, and the departing British troops believed that they were heading home to England. “We now enjoyed in Idea, the happiness of being blessed once more, with a sight of all that is dear to man, his country, parents &ca &ca.” “But alas! there is nothing certain under the sun for before we cleared the gulph of Florida, a packet from England fell in with the fleet, she brought orders, for a distribution of the troops, our Corps, was order’d back to Canada.” “It is astonishing, what effect this disappointment had on some of the men, several of whom absolutely fell sick and died! Others never held up their heads untill we arrived at N. York, which was near three weeks after.” There, they immediately set off by boat up the Hudson to Albany, and began the long march to Quebec.

**General Mutiny**

I have always been an advocate for rigid discipline, knowing the absolute necessity of it. But here it was carried to a degree of excess, never before known
in the Corps. Marched to Crown point, and crossed to lake Champlain, in batteaux, to S'. Johns, marched down Sorrel river, crossed the S'. Lawrence, and proceeded on, to Quebec; compleated a journey from N. York only, of six hundred miles. On the Corps, arriving at the Governors farm, near Quebec, he was pleas’d to look at them, they were reduced to few in number, notwithstanding they had been filled up twice, since leaving Quebec in less than three years. He order’d each man a pint of wine, and expressed himself to one of the Grenadiers, of whom he used to take notice . . . I did not know you, you look so black! the soldier replied, we have been on black service, and have got very little white money for it! 

The work of war had exacted quite a toll from the soldiers, leaving many feeling disgruntled. As is common with disaffected workers, the martial laborers combined to secure justice by force. The hard service of the Caribbean constituted one cause for the ensuing mutiny, failure to be returned to England at war’s end another. The catalyst for mutiny, however, came with alterations to the pay of soldiers. With the official cessation of hostilities in 1763, the War Office sought to economize by ordering that stoppages (i.e. withholdings) to soldiers’ wages of 4d. per diem for rations be implemented, as far as it could be done “without causing a disturbance among the Soldiers”. This hope proved forlorn.

Miller believed that it was impossible for the soldiers to pay the four pence stoppage, “and keeping themselves, in the necessarys suitable to the duty, of the severe climate”, and this “ought to have been obvious to every one, that knew the service.” When word had been received at Quebec of the stoppages, “one morning after guard morning, a drum was heard, beating to arms, the different Corps, turned out, without Officers, and marched up to the grand parade, some
Officers, who wanted to stop their men, were on the point of being shot, for it is said, the bad men intended to murder every one, who did not join with them, they began firing in the Street”.

Governor Murray sent an officer inquiring as to “the meaning of their assembling in an unsoldier like manner,” and it was decided that the mutineers would return to their barracks, and Murray would speak to them on the grand parade the following day.

Next morning the Gen., with all the Officers in the Garrison, come on the parade, where the soldiers were already drawn up, He then inquired what was their complaints, or cause of such mutinous conduct? One of the 60th Reg. who was their commander and spokesman, replied, they . . . consider’d it as the heighth [sic] of injustice, after having at the risk of their lives, conquer’d countries, in every climate, that now on a general peace, the reward is want and misery, which unavoidably must be the case, should four pence P day be stopped from their pay, for provisions, What is left? To provide cloathing, proper for this severe climate? Better to die on a gibbet! Than perish by inches!

The general assured them that no money would be stopped until further word was heard from England. The soldiers were ordered the next morning to march under their colors, and had the Articles of War read to them before they returned to their quarters, symbolizing their readmission into good faith status within the army. Shortly afterward, Murray discharged the ringleaders. The others were placated by the reduction of the stoppages from four pence to two and a half pence."

It is not clear exactly what role Miller played in the mutiny at Quebec. He speaks of the mutineers as if he was not one of them, and further isolates the “bad men” who wished to do
violence to the officers. At the same time, he certainly expressed his sympathy for the cause of the uprising. Miller also tended to play down the insurrectionary potential of the soldiers’ actions, whereas other reports portrayed it as more threatening. Murray deemed it a "most horrid Mutiny". "It was so general, so violent, and so sudden, their [sic] was no resisting at the time". And private Charles McDonell of the 60th Regiment called it a “Revolution”. Clearly, it was not in the best interests of Miller’s petition for promotion to Amherst to side with a mutiny that had occurred in his regiment.

Quebec was not alone in experiencing a mutiny; from Newfoundland to Florida the troops rose up. This wave of rebelliousness would force Jeffery Amherst, commander-in-chief of North America, to reduce the wage deductions, placating many of the troops. And Quebec’s mutiny fizzled much more quickly than elsewhere. Soldiers of the 40th Regiment in Halifax and the 45th at Louisbourg were not won over by the reduction. Late into the spring of 1764, they refused to work unless freely supplied. The mutineers finally yielded, but not before extracting further concessions from the King, who promised to rotate all regiments so that none would remain in North America endlessly. But all those who remained mutinous, the monarch warned, would be sent to the Caribbean islands, where they would continue until “the Advisers and first Movers in these unmilitary, disobedient Disturbances” were given up for punishment. Many soldiers knew all too well the dire nature of this threat.

**the blood of britons**

The mutiny and promised rotation did not draw James Miller’s war in America to a close. His regiment marched to Montreal in 1765. He served there and in the back forts for two years then returned to Quebec in the winter of 1767, before the regiment’s repatriation in 1768. In the spring of that year, Miller recorded that “the Corps . . . sailed for England, a hundred and fifty,
Officers included, had been filled up, four times during the course of ten years, a consumption of near twenty to one. Is the population of Britain and Ireland adequate to such waste of men?"**vi**

Sadly, time would answer this question in the affirmative.

James Miller directly contributed to the defeat of the French and the Spanish in the Americas. A new, expanded empire constituted the output of the sum total of labors of such soldiers as James. These warriors built a new world order, with Britain the emergent superpower. The blood of Britons was the necessary ingredient to this empire; it stained the ground, washed into the river systems, and flowed into the Anglo Atlantic.

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" Historians have characterized the empire in the 17th and 18th centuries as commercial in nature, a broad and loosely connected mercantile market ultimately made more systematic by what Daniel Baugh calls Britain’s “blue-water” policy, which prioritized the defense of Britain, and valued the colonies insomuch as they contributed to trade that paid for this defence. The “Atlantic system” that began to take shape under this blue-water policy required a large navy and a growing bureaucracy to pay for it by managing taxation. Baugh calls this empire a ”maritime-imperial system” in that it was based on maritime commerce rather than the acquisition of new territories. See: Daniel A. Baugh, “Great Britain’s ‘Blue-Water’ Policy, 1689-1815,” *International History Review*, vol. 10, no. 1 (Feb. 1988), 40-41; Daniel A. Baugh, "Maritime Strength and Atlantic Commerce: The uses of 'a grand marine empire,'” in Lawrence Stone, ed., *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815* (London: Routledge, 1994), 185-88.
Britain’s policy had always been to allow the colonies largely to defend themselves, valuing them more for their exports than their territories, and relying on the Royal Navy to keep the sea lanes of commerce clear for the flow of commodities. But the stakes of empire building had risen by the mid-18th century, involving control of the American interior, its crucial resources and indigenous peoples. It was at this point that the military landscape of North America, in fact British colonial policy itself and the very nature of the Empire began to change. The prior state of affairs, in which colonies and proprietorial companies were expected largely to manage and pay for their own defense would be supplanted by an imperial policy whereby standing armies in the colonies would perform these duties in a fashion that was more answerable to political officials in London.

The Seven Years’ War has long been considered a seminal period in Anglo-American history. The key text on the imperial significance of the war is Lawrence Henry Gipson’s magisterial The British Empire before the American Revolution, Vol. 6, The Great War for the Empire: The Years of Defeat, 1754-1757 (Orig. ed. 1946; New York: Knopf, 1956), Vol. 8, The Great War for the Empire: The Culmination, 1760-1763 (New York: Knopf, 1953), and Vol. 9, The Triumphant Empire: New Responsibilities within the Enlarged Empire 1763-1766 (New York: Knopf, 1956). More recently, Kathleen Wilson has called the war “Britain's greatest imperial effort” in the eighteenth century, “the fulfillment and ultimate expression of mercantilist imperial aspirations.” Wilson, "Empire of Virtue: The Imperial Project and Hanoverian Culture c.1720-1785," in Stone, ed., An Imperial State at War, 144, 148.

P. J. Marshall views the Seven Years’ War being “the watershed.” “The war revealed that most of those who ruled Britain were investing Empire with a new significance. It was seen as vital to Britain’s economic wellbeing, to her standing as a great power, and even to her national survival. British governments began to concern themselves with colonial issues and to commit resources to overseas war on an unprecedented scale.” The British Empire thus began to assume its modern form with the Seven Years’ War. By century’s end, Britain had become a global power and empire now entailed “world-wide . . . rule over lands and people,” an important element of British identity P. J. Marshall, “Introduction,” The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. II. The Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1, 4-8, 20, 8, 18; Marshall, Preface to ibid., x.

Two decisions undergirded this transformation: the unprecedented commitment of tens of thousands of troops to the American theater; and the stationing of a standing army in North America at war’s end to protect the new acquisitions.

* Ibid., ix.
* "Memoirs of an Invalid, 8-9.


Regimental recruiting parties targeted market towns, local fairs or manufacturing districts, taverns. Their orders would be presented to a local magistrate, then they would beat their drums and invite all likely lads to join up, with acceptance of the “King's shilling” signifying enlistment. Recruiting in England was made difficult by the competition among regiments for what were the favoured troops. Some regiments turned to “crimps” to round up men for them, often none too scrupulously. In Scotland a quota system often was at work, where peers or local gentry promised to raise a certain number of men. In Ireland, the army ran into the problem that it was illegal for Catholics to be enlisted, so it tended to avoid recruiting there except when really pressed for numbers, and the Seven Years’ War was such a time. In Germanic Europe, competition for bodies came from Prussian and Danish recruiters. Steppler, "Common Soldier in the Reign of George III," 1-18; Sylvia R. Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 3-4; George Brereton [to Loudoun], 8 April 1756, no. 1026, box 23, Loudoun Papers, North America, Huntington Library [hereafter cited in form LO 1026, box 23]; Joseph Yorke to Maj. Gen. Napier, 23 March 1756, LO 959, box 21. Tales of recruiting officers getting men drunk or using subterfuge to entice them to take the King's shilling were part of folklore, and no doubt did take place given the manpower requirements. James McDonell, for example, claimed that while he was drinking with a friend, he fell in with a recruiting party from the New York Independent Companies of the regular army, "as he was told next Morning, being that Night so Drunk that he doth not remember seeing a Red Coat in the house, and was greatly surprised in the Morning when the said Corporal told him he was enlisted." He deserted and was punished with 200 lashes. Court Martial Proceedings, Judge Advocate General’s
Parliament passed a Press Act at the beginning of the Seven Years’ War, which ran until 1758 when political pressure made Pitt abandon it. Yet 500 men were pressed in London in 1756 for service in America. Loudoun to Daniel Webb, 27 March 1756, London, LO 974, box 21; Gilbert, “Last Army Press,” 7. Gilbert suggests there was much local resistance, as measured by the low proportion of men actually pressed from amongst those brought before the commissioners. See Arthur N. Gilbert, An Analysis of Some Eighteenth Century Army Recruiting Records, Journal of the Society of Army Historical Register, vol. 54, no. 217 (Spring 1976), 39. The press also operated in Scotland. For example, justices of the peace met with local gentlemen at Inverness to draw up a list of “fitt and proper” men to be apprehended and pressed into the North American service. Humphrey Bland to Loudoun, 1 April 1756, Edinburgh, LO 999, box 22; Inverness County, Commissioners of Supply and Justices of the Peace, Extract minutes ... of the Commissioners ... pursuant to an Act of Parliament annent the speedy recruiting of His Majesty’s Land Forces, 5, 6 April 1756, LO 1017, box 22; Francis Grant, List of the men of the 42nd Regiment who have Inlisted for a Term of Years according to the Press Act, 16 April 1757, LO 4214, box 74.
sickly that it takes the few well men they have to look after the sick”, while Albemarle confided that the “17th, the Royal Highlanders [42nd], and the 77th are so reduced by sickness that I am obliged to send them to a northern climate in hopes that the change of air may recover them.” They were duly shipped to New York, where barracks had to be converted into hospitals to care for them. See: Keppel to Admiral Sir George Pocock, 17 July 1762, in Syrett, Siege and Capture of Havana, 251; Ablemarle to Pocock, 8 Aug. 1762, in ibid., 281; Webster, ed., Journal of Jeffery Amherst, 291-92.

—Fortescue, History of the British Army, vol. 2, 541, 544; Ablemarle to Amherst, 18 Aug. 1762, in Syrett, Siege and Capture of Havana, 293.

Miller felt aggrieved with the sharing of the spoils, “The specie was shipped for England, and when a distribution of Prize money, took place, a Serj.' received only 22 Dollars, and a private man, eleven, certain it is, that it cost each man more for water during the siege, exclusive of blood and fatigue, which surpass’d every thing undertaken by the best troops we read of.” Miller reported that another dividend was paid four years later at Montreal, when privates received a further four dollars and sergeant eight, “but these may be consider’d as nothing compared with the gettings, of great men.” Miller, Memoirs, 69-70.

Miller partially blamed the British army’s love of alcohol for the pervasive illness. “It was very usual to meet Officers, and soldiers, drunk every hour of the day!” Astounded by this behavior, the Spanish “consider’d Englishmen, as beings weary of life, and who therefore must court death, in every shape”. Certain it is that for seven years soldiers like Miller had courted death, in fact it comprised their job description, while the toils of the Caribbean campaign may not have made them weary of life in general, but perhaps of the military life. It is possible that “sacrificing to Bacchus” amidst such death and dying might help preserve their human spirit until a time in which it could be freed.

In the end, the taking of Havana led to death of 40% of the 14,000 soldiers involved, most likely to a combination of yellow fever and malaria. Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War, vol. 2, 282; Syrett, Siege and Capture of Havana, 299; General return of officers, sergeants, drummers, rank and file killed, died by wounds, died by sickness, deserted, and missing from the 7 June to 18 October, 18 Oct. 1762, in Syrett, Siege and Capture of Havana 1762, 305; Amherst to Murray, 28 Oct. 1762, WO34/3/177-78; Syrett, “American Provincials,” 387-89; McNeill, “Ecological Basis of Warfare,” 36.

The dying continued, however. One brigade of four battalions, which had been sent back to America lost 360 men within a month of its return, and Amherst reported that 200 men from the brigade that returned to New York from Havana had died in the hospitals in the month following September 23. The weakened soldiers continued to die on into the next year. For example, between 20 August 1762 and 5 April 1763, 21 men died in Captain Kennedy’s Company of the 17th Regiment, which had been at Havana; with an original strength of 90, this made for a 23.5% mortality rate. Amherst also noted in May 1763, that those who survived had frequent relapses. Muster Roll of Capt. Kennedy’s Company, 17th Regiment of Foot, 9 May 1763, Regimental Muster Books, vol. 3405, p. 24, Series 12, War Office Papers; Webster, ed., Journal of Jeffery Amherst, 304.

A board of customs was set up, which imposed a 5% customs duty on imported goods “for the enriching of some favourite individuals”, so soldiers could not afford the available produce, and “by these impositions, we soon got rid of our Prize money, and pay.” Memoirs of an Invalid, 73-74.

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4 Memoirs of an Invalid, 79-84.

5 Murray [to Amherst], 21 Sept. 1763, WO34/2/225; Murray to Gage and Gov. Barton, 21 Sept. 1763, WO34/2/227. See also: Orders to the Garrison of Quebec, 18 Sept. 1763, WO34/2/231; Ja. Pitcher to Amherst, 23 Sept. 1763, WO34/4/120.

6 Petition to Brig. General James Murray, n.d., WO34/2/239. An anonymous officer's report from The Annual Register likewise paints a more mobbish picture of events. The troops "assembled to a man" to parade before the governor's house. When officers intervened with drawn swords, the soldiers ran to the barracks "took their arms, and marched in good order, with drums beating, towards St. John's Gate." There Murray confronted them, a few guns were fired and the troops "loudly declared their resolution to march to New York, with two pieces of cannon, and lay their arms at general Amherst's feet" as "it was impossible for them to live without their provisions." However, their superiors managed to get Quebec's gates shut and to persuade the men, though they "had already struck several officers," to move to the parade ground where Murray addressed them on their duty. The soldiers in turn reiterated "that they would not serve without provisions," but were coaxed back to their barracks. The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politicks, and Literature, For the Year 1763 (Second edition; London, 1765), 159-60.

7 At St. John's, Newfoundland, "the order for Retrenching the Provisions disgusted the Men Prodigious" when issued in mid-August 1763, and soldiers of the 45th Regiment refused to do duty. Troops of the 40th Regiment at Halifax "with one consent, threw down their Arms and Accoutrements, and with one voice declared, That it was Impossible 'for them to Serve in this Country upon these Terms'". The reading of the order in Louisbourg on September 17, prompted soldiers of the 45th Regiment "to a man" to inform their commander that "it was impossible for them to Subsist were they to pay for their Provisions, and [they] gave to understand that they would no longer do duty." The commander of New York's Crown Point, wrote that "the men came in a body and complained of the grievance they labored under in being Stopp'd for their provisions". At Montreal, Thomas Gage's men "began to show signs of an intended Revolt," but were broken up, prompting several to desert; as did several members of the recently arrived garrison at St. Augustine, East Florida. Gualy to Amherst, 17 Aug. 1763, AP3; Proceedings of a Council of War, 3 Sept. 1763, AP3; Tulleken to Amherst, 12, 19 Sept. 1763, AP2; Beckwith [to Gage], 29 Sept. 1763, vol. 9, Thomas Gage Papers, American Series, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan [hereafter in form GP9]; Thomas Gage to Amherst, 29 Sept., 2 Oct. 1763, WO34/5/322, 326; James Robertson to Amherst, 26 Sept. 1763, AP1.

8 Ellis to Gage, 21 Jan. 1764, Thomas Gage Papers, English Series, Clements Library; Gage to Ellis, 9 Dec. 1763, 13 April, 12 May 1764, ibid.

9 Memoirs of an Invalid, 86.