1973

A comparative case study analysis of American and Soviet military influence on foreign policy decision-making.

Walter B. Pereshluha

University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd

Recommended Citation

https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/536

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email (scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000 ext. 3208.
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF
AMERICAN AND SOVIET MILITARY INFLUENCE ON
FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING

Submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Windsor
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

by

Walter B. Pereshluhn

Faculty of Graduate Studies
1973
Copyright © Walter B. Pereshluha, 1973
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to the staff of the Department of Political Science whose suggestions and encouragement helped to ease the production of this thesis. In particular, I must single out Dr. Vincent C. Chrypsinaki whose patient cooperation encouraged its completion and whose counsel steered the author around many of the pitfalls inherent in such an undertaking. Dr. Walter C. Soderlund was instrumental in directing me towards this particular study and this work has benefitted immeasurably from his frequent examination. Special appreciation is extended to Professor Batia Zakon, of the German and Slavic Studies Department, who kindly consented to step into a breech and whose lively interest in this work not only facilitated its conclusion but provided a most stimulating challenge. Ultimate responsibility for the work is, of course, mine, but I have had the occasion to reflect that it would have been much less satisfying without their valuable appraisals; for this, to each member individually, I am grateful.
ABSTRACT

This study undertakes a comparative analysis of American and Soviet military influence on foreign policy decision-making in light of data provided by the Cuban missile crisis and the 1963 test ban negotiations. Relevant literature suggest two comparable models of military interaction with decision-making: the ruling elite model; and, the interest group model. The position adopted by this thesis maintains that the value inferences in, the lack of empirical confirmation and the output orientation of the ruling elite model make it an inadequate heuristic construct. Sufficient similarities in political context and in salient group features of the militaries, on the other hand, exist to justify the use of the interest group approach, in spite of its inherent limitations as an interpretation of American and of Soviet political reality, as a conceptual framework.

Progressive structural differentiation and role specialization in a modernizing Soviet state have created problems of integration and for total control; in turn, greater opportunities for clustering around specialized roles and interests and increasing possibilities for separate group articulation have resulted. Groups have come to play political roles which are comparable in kind to group roles elsewhere. American and Soviet military group cohesion and group autonomy – the two structural features that bear directly upon a group's effectiveness – reflect some remarkable parallels in cross-polity comparisons. Consequently, few doubts can exist that each military
reflects David Truman's description of interest groups:
aggregates of persons who possess certain characteristics
and share certain attitudes on public issues and who adopt
distinct positions on these issues and make definite claims
on those in authority.

Methodologically, the approach was to conceptualize the
"military" as the officer corps and the measure of influence
as the perceptible alteration of policy along lines suggested
by the military as seen in comparison of the original pro-
posal and final course of action. Two variables were examined
to determine whether they predicted the level of military
influence:

(1) nature of polity - "open" (American) and "closed"
(Soviet).

(2) type of decision - crisis (American Cuban blockade;
Soviet withdrawal).

- non-crisis planning (Soviet installation of missiles; Ameri-
can test ban policy; Soviet test ban policy).

Data, provided primarily by secondary sources from
Western scholarship, supplied the following findings:

(a) American and Soviet crisis decisions were marked
by civilian attempts to systematically exclude military in-
fluence either through the monopoly of information, through
reliance on more manageable ad hoc units, or through role
pre-emption. Military influence attempts to sway the civi-
lian leadership from its desired policy proved inconse-
quential.
(b) Soviet planning decisions demonstrated a uniform lack of military influence as the adopted policy reflected greater Party responsiveness to internal economic and external political demands. American test ban negotiations were distinguished by the administration's arbitrary control of information and exclusion of outside influence. Allied interest group activity during ratification procedures provided the military with greater leverage, but the President's ability to change the agenda and to use his legitimacy to structure political support minimized military influence.

Neither the type of decision nor the nature of the polity was found to affect or to be a reliable predictor of military influence.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. RULING ELITE MODELS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. INTEREST GROUP MODELS</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Soviet Experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The American Experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. TEST BAN TREATY</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Soviet Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA AUCTORIS</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When President Eisenhower, in his farewell address, raised the spectre of improper military influence - "in the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought by the military-industrial complex," - he was not only stimulating and legitimizing discussion about a contemporary phenomenon but, also, articulating an enduring concern in the American political ethos. Similar anxieties play an important role in the political consciousness of many in the Soviet Union. The frequent Party-lining harangues against "Bonapartism," dramatic removals of politically conscious generals such as Marshal Zhukov, and bloody pre-emptive strikes against the military as in the Tukhachevsky affair, are but the most obvious manifestations of concern - perhaps "obsession" would be a more appropriate word - with undue extension of military influence.

The object of this inquiry is to undertake a comparative analysis of the influence Soviet and American military establishments exercise in one particular area of decision-making, that of foreign policy. The choice of these establishments for comparison is essentially an arbitrary one; but, the roles of the two superpowers, controlling massive arsenals of destruction and in postures of mutual hostility, certainly
is suggestive of a high degree of military participation. Specifically, the concern will be with the success the respective militaries have in incorporating their values, objectives, information and intelligence, and judgements into a process traditionally regarded as one of civilian primacy.

A proper perception of military influence on decision-making processes requires an understanding of the structure of decision-making in both systems, as well as a grasp of the mechanics of interaction between military and political spheres. A comparative analysis, in this instance, inherently runs into certain difficulties. The most obvious is the lack of uniformity in and availability of source materials. The range of American writing extends from abstruse theoretical considerations of civilian-military relations to mundane dissections of military budgets. Unfortunately, we suffer no such embarrassment of riches in the Soviet case. The closed nature of that society and its ideological demands make access to relevant information extremely difficult. One soon discovers that a great deal of the available work surrounding Soviet decisional processes is necessarily based as much on conjecture as on fact.

A survey of the pertinent literature indicates two comparable paradigms or analytical models of civilian-military interaction applicable to both politics. One we will call the ruling elite model; the other is designated the interest group
model. Each will be examined in turn, features relevant to
decision-making delineated, and the heuristic advantages and
drawbacks of both assessed. A determination of the most
suitable conceptual framework will be followed by the analysis
of Soviet and American military influence in light of the
experience of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty.
CHAPTER II

RULING ELITE MODELS

The tendency of the literature on ruling elite constructs has been to centre decision-making power exclusively in a single ascendant group. This model has contrasting implications for the extent and intensity of military influence in the respective systems; it makes military influence an integral, even dominant, element in American decision-making but only a peripheral, at times inconsequential, factor in Soviet decision-making.

Perhaps the first systematic American construct of a ruling elite theory incorporating military influence was Harold Lasswell's garrison-state hypothesis. Formulated in response to a perceived perpetual world-wide crisis—the first prototype was an interpretation of the Sino-Japanese conflict—it, its genesis in the American liberal phobia of domestic militarism is, nevertheless, inescapable. The thrust of Lasswellian logic begins with the assumption that natural historical evolution, towards a limited world order based on integrated commercial relations, had regressed in the twentieth century. In its place, a growing tendency to fragment into hostile camps had produced a crisis atmosphere which, in turn, favoured the emergence of a

particular form of social organization, the garrison state.

This particular development was in the realm of probability, rather than inevitability, for Lasswell \(^2\); yet, one discerns a pervasive pessimism as to the ultimate resolution of continued friction among social units. "A deepening crisis cannot help but put a strain on civilian institutions . . . " and "the upshot may be that the garrison state will displace the civilian state." \(^3\) In Japan, he pointed out, private business was already at the sufferance of the military caste. \(^4\) The paramount concern, however, centred on the infectious nature of new forms: "In the present disturbed conditions of world affairs the result of the struggle in one nation reacts immediately upon the relative strengths of the contending parties in other countries." \(^5\) The existence of garrison states in Asia would compromise the security and undermine the prestige of civilian institutions in every nation, especially since the existing tendency is to universalize innovative forms of social organization.

The permanence of hostility, for Lasswell, generated several logical structural peculiarities of organization. The distinct frame of reference in a fighting society being fighting

---


4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.
effectiveness, "all social change is translated into battle effectiveness" and all skills are structured toward this end. With this systematic subordination of all other purposes and the regimentation of all activities to war and the preparation for war, the scope of government, of necessity, expands and becomes practically coextensive with society. Demands for maximized efficiency will militate in favour of centralization of power and the "integration of authority in the hands of a few." Institutional practices long connected with modern democracy will disappear" and "authority (will) flow downward from commanders at the top; initiative from the bottom can hardly be endured." The garrison state, therefore, unavoidably spawns a predominant political elite and, given the pre-eminence of bellicose aims and values, power is seen as devolving upon "men who specialize in violence." This elite will perpetuate itself "through co-option" and "the


7 Ibid., p. 460.


9 In his initial formulations Lasswell identified the "specialists in violence" with the military skill group. His subsequent works include the police as co-directors, with the military, of the garrison state. "Specialists in violence" essentially became identified with a totalitarian security agency, and the garrison state in its ultimate form approaches a totalitarian society. See Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison-State Hypotheses Today," in Changing Patterns of Military Politics, ed. Samuel P. Huntington (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1962), pp. 51-70.
foremost positions will be open to the officers' corps."

The extent of governmental control and the proximity to the apex of power guarantees the military decisive control over all decisions.

An argument along similar lines is advanced by C. Wright Mills who has become, by far, the most formidable exponent of the theory of a power elite in America and whose thesis serves as a starting point for much of the contemporary analysis and rhetoric in this genre. "Within American society," Mills maintains, "major national power now resides in the economic, the political, and the military domains." The trend, within each domain, has been to enlarge, to bureaucratize and to centralize decisional power in the typical institutional unit: the economy has become dominated by two or three hundred giant corporations which together hold the keys to economic decisions; the political order has coalesced into a centralized executive establishment which has concentrated power and penetrated the entire social structure; the military order has turned into an expensive sprawling bureaucratic domain. With enlargement and centralization, the scope of the activities of the respective domains expands, overlaps and, eventually, coincides to an increasing degree. The natural consequence of this process, for Mills, is the consolidation of the leading men in each of the three domains of power.


i.e. the warlords, the corporation chieftains, the political directorate - into the power elite of America. 12

Two features of Mills' analysis are especially relevant in our context: the first centres on the scope of elite decisions; the second addresses itself to the relative position of institutions within the power structure. Scope here refers to the sphere of society over which an elite is presumed to exercise power. Mills argues that the power elite monopolizes sovereignty in that political initiative and control stems mainly from the top hierarchical levels and in that these are occupied by persons committed to a fixed ideology which reflects common institutional needs. In essence, the scope is general, embracing all the decisions which in any way could be vital (e.g. war and peace). The argument is not so much that each decision is directly determined, but rather that the political alternatives from which the "deciders" choose are shaped and limited by the elite through its possession of all the large-scale institutions. One must note in this respect that the evidence supporting his contention is usually of the negative type - e.g., no major decisions have been made since World War II contrary to the policies of anti-communism and corporate or military aggrandizement, ergo a power elite must be prevailing.

The second aspect deals with the position of the military in the American structure of power. Changes in this structure

12 Ibid., p. 9.
Mills contends, have generally come about by institutional shifts in the relative positions of the political, the economic and the military. The period since World War II has been marked by the ascendancy of corporate and military elites with the "warlords" gaining decisive political relevance. The reasons are several and inter-related. For the first time in history the power elite of America found itself in a "military neighbourhood" as a result of technological advances in weaponry. "It is a fearful neighbourhood and this elite is inexperienced and frightened." The seeming permanence of the threat has placed a premium on the military and its function, and has legitimized the perception of all political and economic actions in terms of military definitions of reality.

This ascendancy of military personnel is due less to any greed for power on their part than to a concomitant civilian default of political power:

Politicians hiding behind the supposed expertise of testifying and advising warlords have abdicated their proper job of debating and deciding policies... It is in the vacuum created by such political abdications and hesitations that the military ascendency occurred. It is because of this political vacuum that the warlords have been drawn - often unwillingly - into higher political decisions.

13 Ibid., p. 269.
The involvement of and growing dominance by the generals and admirals in political decision-making, coming at a time in American history when "international issues are truly at the centre of most important national decisions and increasingly relevant to virtually all decisions of consequence," has obvious implications for American foreign policy decision-making. Given the scope of elite power and the military's ascendancy, the model indicates that military influence on foreign policy is paramount. Talk of degrees of intensity and measures of extent seem inconsistent with this model; military influence is, in fact, viewed as omnipotent.

The affirmation of this thesis, coupled with dire predictions about such a state of affairs, serves as a foundation for a number of literary efforts that give the impression of being more inflammatory than explanatory in inclination, more prescriptive than analytic in intent. Cook's The Warfare State and Lens' The Military-Industrial Complex are good examples of the type of literature which adheres to Mills' model but is often theoretically inferior to his intricate account. Mr. Cook's thesis envisions a "military-industrial complex" (MIC), controlled by ultra-conservative classes, turning the United States into a "warfare state". This "warfare state" dominates American society and is attempting

to subvert American democratic traditions and to supplant them with a militaristic ethos through an extensive propaganda campaign:

The extent to which the American people have been propagandized to induce them to discard the non-military tradition of centuries has been but imperfectly understood . . . (and) its significance . . . (even less appreciated) . . . The voting booth would be retained, so would the democratic trappings of our society; but increasingly, all vital decisions would be influenced and predetermined by the uniform — by men whose professional judgement it would be positively unpatriotic to question. 20

Similar sentiments are expressed by Sidney Lens when he maintains that the M.I.C. seeks to "manufacture a public stance of hardline anti-communism . . . , inhibit the process of dissent through loyalty and security measures," and to "generate pressures towards a political monopoly, which is sometimes called the 'garrison state'." 21 The crucial aspect, in our context, again is the notion of totality of military dominance. "In the Warfare State, the only word that counts a tinker's damn is the word of the Military." 22 Not only defence policy but foreign policy is controlled by the military; indeed, there is "hardly an area in which military influence is anything less than supreme." 23

All these ruling elite constructs — Lasawell's garrison state, Mills' power elite, the subsequent conspiratorial elite

23 Ibid., pp. 194-196.
rhetoric—, in spite of their schematic variations of evolution and configuration, owe a common intellectual debt to American sociological thought in the 1930s which had stimulated certain expectations about the inevitability of and conformity in social development. "To a great extent," Daniel Bell claims, "these expectations were a product of a mechanical Marxism which saw all politics as a reflex of economic crisis, and which postulated common stages of social evolution that each country would pass through."24 It became quite fashionable in academic circles to anticipate that American social development would inevitably follow that of Europe, particularly in the emergence of fascism25, and to depict its terminal stage as some form of military oligarchy. The implication of American ruling elite theories came to be that military influence was central to all decision-making, including decision in the foreign policy field.

In contrast, the Soviet ruling elite construct relegates military influence to the realm of impotence since it derives its lineage from the totalitarian model. Totalitarianism has been defined as:

a system in which technologically advanced instruments of political power are wielded without restraint by centralized leadership of an elite movement, for the purpose of effecting a total revolution, including the conditioning of men, on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions proclaimed by the

25 Ibid.
leadership in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population. 26

The basic assumption about decision-making in this definition is that an authoritarian leadership with a highly centralized machinery of planning and control at its disposal is in a position to make up its mind according to its own preferred policy alternatives and to dictate its decisions to all subordinate echelons of party and state for implementation. This premise finds its basis and rationale, in the Soviet context, in the doctrinal strictures of the prevailing ideology, on the one hand, and in the relationship between Soviet policy-making and power acquisition processes on the other.

The political norms of Soviet communism reject any particularist interests be they institutional, functional, ethnic, or other, if such interests are articulated outside the Party. As an ideology, communism incorporates a total critique of the antecedent forms of political order and a comprehensive prescription to revolutionize it economically, socially, and culturally. The Party's claim to political and social hegemony over all spheres of Soviet life is sustained by its pretensions of being the sole repository of this ideological truth and the custodian of its purity. Dissenters from the officially approved line, whether individuals or groups, in the totalitarian scheme thus evoke dual jeopardy:

they are seen as an intolerable offence to the grandeur of the ideological enterprise and must be liquidated in the long run for, by definition, they are redundant in the world the totalitarian movement is bent on building; more immediately, they are viewed as challenges to the basis of the Party's legitimacy. The absolutist character of ideology frees the Party from any moral and traditional restraint on the use of power and allows it to consider itself justified in undertaking even the most ruthless steps to consolidate its authority and execute its ideology. The combination of this peculiarly chiliastic vision and such unbridled power generates what Brzezinski calls an "organizational compulsion" to expand state control over society to its widest possible extension; in the process, there is a tendency to destroy any associations or groups intermediate between the individual and state in order to annihilate all boundaries, existing or potential, between state and society. The history of the Soviet Union is filled with the victims of the Party's wrath — individuals, professional groups, entire classes and ethnic communities whom the leadership perceived as actual or potential barriers to its control and challengers to its legitimacy.


29 Ibid., pp. 68-69.
A more practical reason for the Party's suspicion of any particularist interests can be found in the lack of an established procedure for the transfer of power, within the Party and the state. In the absence of such a mechanism, claims to the legitimate exercise of authority rest on the ability to formulate "correct" policies. "Correctness" is based both on success and on sanction by ideology. It follows then that there will be a constant struggle within the Party elite to monopolize both the authority to make policy and the authority to decide whether it is in accord with ideology. Brzezinski points to the central role of policies (foreign and domestic) - "policy proposals are forever directly involved in (even if not always motivated by) the struggle for the consolidation of personal power"30 - and of ideology interpretation - "during succession crises . . . each leadership faction . . . attempts to endow its policy with ideological legitimacy; and each strives to demonstrate the opponents 'deviationism'"31 - as means in the struggle for power in the system.

Theoretically these factors severely limit the ability of elements outside the Party to affect policy making.

"Issues requiring decisions are raised not by society or societal groups, but by the Party, or better, by its topmost

31 Ibid., p. 193.
leaders, without regard for values and interests of other entities.\textsuperscript{32} This political weakness of non-political groups is well documented by the history of the Soviet military, Brzezinski maintains. Of all the possible groups outside the Party, the military "comes closest to having internal cohesion, defined membership, specific interests and its own leadership. Yet not once has this group challenged the political monopoly of the Party or even effectively protected its own personnel against physical and political destruction."\textsuperscript{33} Viewed in terms of such a model, military influence becomes inconsequential and its wishes totally subordinated to an elite leadership which, within the parameters of opportunity and constraints which confront any government, makes national policy choices best suited to serve its perceived ends.


\textsuperscript{33} Brzezinski and Huntington, Political Power USA/USSR, p. 198.
CHAPTER III
INTEREST GROUP MODELS

The interest group model of political interaction explicitly and implicitly denies the existence of an omnipotent, co-ordinated ruling elite. The American political process, as structured by the model, is marked by the lack of a dominant group or clique, by the presence of groups competing for advantages in society, and by diffusion, not concentration as Mills contended, of power. For the Soviet system the model implicitly denies that the direct relationship between citizen and the state is the exclusive one and illuminates a whole range of intermediate political activity by groups that the totalitarian model is incapable of accounting for or explaining away.¹

Samuel J. Eldersveld has remarked that "everywhere today interest groups have become the research vogue, recognized by scholars and political analysts as critical

¹ In this connection one notes with some interest that one of the most authoritative proponents of the totalitarian model acknowledges the existence of "islands of separateness" in his construct, giving tacit recognition to certain pluralistic deviations from monolithic uniformity. However, Friedrich argues that the totalitarian syndrome involves a near monopoly of all effective organization reducing all individual or group initiatives weak or impotent. See Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, pp. 239-289.
centres of power in the political process." This concept of groups as political actors is rooted in "pluralism," the political philosophy which lays emphasis on an increased constitutional role in society for private associations of all kinds and on the restraint on state control over the plurality of these associations. Orthodox group theorists such as Arthur F. Bentley, David Truman and Earl Latham perceived in American society the necessary tendencies for spontaneity, liberty and voluntary association to create a mood favourable to the proliferation and the political efficacy of groups.

Employing groups as political actors, these theorists have attempted to construct a model of the political process which could explain how and why the social structure influences the political system's "authoritative allocations of value" (to use Eastonian terminology). "Inputs" into the political system, according to this model, originate from aggregates of individuals who cluster around some common purpose that reflects their socioeconomic position.


religious belief or primary affiliation. The "outputs", on the other hand, reflect a synthesis of conflicting group interests as well as power relations among the major competitors (i.e. the more powerful a group, the greater its share of the common pie is likely to be).

There are several innate suppositions in this group approach. First, group interests and group behavior are viewed as the fundamental determinants of economic and political processes, with the individual, on the one hand, and the state, on the other, receding into the background.

"American writers on politics," Latham contends, "have increasingly accepted the view that the group is the basic political form." Secondly, the process through which policies are formed is essentially subsystem dominant in that the working of the system as a whole is to be explained.


7 Morton A. Kaplan suggests that political systems may be either system dominant or subsystem dominant. "The political system is dominant over its subsystems to the extent that the essential rules of the political system act as parametric 'givens' for any single subsystem. A subsystem becomes dominant to the extent that the essential rules of the system cannot be treated as parametric givens for that subsystem," System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 16 and Chap. 3.
in terms of the interaction of subsystems such as interest groups. Third, knowledge of the structure of competing interests and the groups representing them allows one to make a fairly accurate prediction as to the outcome of political decisions.

A number of incisive criticisms have been levelled at group theory and its interpretation of American politics. Some of these centre on definitional and conceptual fuzziness, on the crude determinism of its motivational theory and on its implicit value and statist orientation. Basic inconsistencies in its logic have been pointed out, and, perhaps the most trenchant attacks have been on its pretension about offering a comprehensive theory, or even an accurate representation, of the political process. Allowing for all these reservations and caveats, critics have nevertheless agreed that group theory is "a way one can talk about politics;" its usefulness as an analytical tool is not obviated by its shortcomings. One critic has even gone so far as to acknowledge that group theory is "a means, perhaps the best single means, of approaching and understanding any political system."

---

Given the limitations of this approach in interpreting political processes which stimulated its birth in the first place, it is hardly surprising that the application of these concepts to the analysis of a political process, long regarded as unique and exclusive in its practices, should provoke even greater misgivings. As a paradigm, Soviet group analysis is in its infancy and controversy still surrounds its utility for Soviet politics and, by extension, for a comparative endeavour. Basic objections, H. Gordon Skilling maintains, have rested on the following considerations:

Soviet political culture, indeed Russian culture throughout the centuries, was hostile to pluralism in any shape or form. Soviet official ideology not only repudiated "gruppovshchina" (groupism) but set rigid confines within which opinions could be expressed. There were many institutional limitations on freedom of association which hampered the articulation of group interests and made research on the subject extremely difficult, if not impossible. . . . Above all, the overwhelming predominance of the Party apparatus, and the means available to it for the control of other entities and associations, prevented the emergence of groups that had any degree of autonomy of action. Hence like-minded persons possessed no formal ways of expressing their interests and attitudes and could not organize themselves in any meaningful way....

A distillation of these arguments indicates that the case for non-comparability finds its rationale, first, in the political context within which groups operate and, second, in the structural features of groups. The following basic questions beg answers: first, in general, how do American

and Soviet political practices compare with regard to group participation; secondly, and more specific, to what extent do the particular groups under consideration, i.e. the militaries, exhibit such essential pluralistic characteristics as group integration and group autonomy?

Arguments which have rejected comparison on the basis of political context usually imply sets of political practices which are mutually exclusive. The American political system, it is pointed out, in accepting without qualification two significant political principles - the legitimacy of special interests and the autonomy of social organization - furnishes a "political formula" which guarantees the existence of competing groups. Various institutional arrangements (for example, independent tribunals that guard over the autonomy of groups and the observance of the rules of the game, bodies of mediation and arbitration, parliamentary types of institutions for the orderly aggregation of interest) give conventional and legal expression to these guarantees. Consequently, there is both a de jure and a de facto basis for group existence.

In contrast, the argument is pursued, that groups in the Soviet Union are neither sanctioned by the community nor possess legitimate regime status. Moreover, political controls by the Party are sufficiently pervasive to prevent the crystallization of political groups around socio-economic roles and to completely subordinate groups already existing in the form of structured associations, such as the military, to the Party-state. The cumulative effect of these two trends is
to render relations between groups unstable, to make group life ephemeral, to relegate their impact on politics to the haphazard and incidental categories, and to restrict the bulk of transactions between society and political authority to an individual rather than group basis. 14

Questioning the propriety of groups for and their effectiveness in the political order on the basis of legal norms indicates a rather unscientific procedure that tends to ignore functional roles in favour of legal fastidiousness. "It is the kind of conceptual approach which is unrealistic and inhibits a holistic view of the functioning political process." 15 Much more pertinent, it seems, is the question whether subsystem-dominance by the Party is so all-encompassing as to cancel out other group life and influence.

Political systems, argues Kaplan, rarely are system or subsystem dominant in any absolute sense. 16 It has indeed become increasingly evident that, behind the facades of social homogeneity and of monolithic Party control, Soviet society is as complex and as stratified as any other and that the vaunted Party mastery does not preclude a genuine struggle among rival groups and factions. 17 Doubt about the "conflictless" quality of the system became especially prominent during the Khrushchev period when, as a result of trends such as modernization,

16 Kaplan, System and Process, p. 17.
leadership desire to rationalize the decision-making process, the liberalizing of restrictions in the aftermath of de-Stalinization, politically-oriented groups began to acquire a certain visibility. A serious dissatisfaction with the totalitarian model, which by definition rejects the existence of such intermediate political activity, emerged and prompted Western and, eventually, some Communist scholars either to adapt it or to look for some other framework within which to analyze the newly discernible phenomena. Brzezinski and Huntington, for example, discuss various types of groups in the Soviet policy process extensively but do so within the confines of a modified totalitarian construct and, not unexpectedly, their conclusions underscore Party control and minimize group autonomy and influence. 18 Other studies, 19 while acknowledging in varying degree the limiting factors of ideology, Party primacy, and institutional controls, suggest increased possibilities of group articulation and the growing ability by groups to exert some influence on the ultimate decisions affecting such spheres as education, industrial management, legal reforms, and so on. In sum, a growing inclination to question the traditional conservative interpretation of


Soviet political processes, to admit to the existence of politically active groups, and to apply certain concepts derived from Western group theory to the Soviet political context is evident.

These trends do not suggest that Soviet political experience is equivalent to the American or that Soviet groups are mirror images of their American counterparts in structure, function or influence. Style of interest groups, one student of Communist politics has indicated, is always strongly influenced by the entire political culture within which they operate. "In a system where decision-making is highly centralized, where several parties do not exist, and where the representative agencies and elections play a minor role, interest groups will take on forms appropriate to that setting."20 One feature of this style is that outside of specialist entities, such as the military, which already exist in the form of structured associations, groups are seldom formally organized. Another is that "whether organized or not group action usually takes the form of the statements or deeds of a few outstanding individuals who arrogate to themselves the authority to express group interests and are not selected or authorized to act for the group."21 The effect of such articulation is often uncertain, for given the high degree of centralization of power and the accompanying tendency towards unaccountability, the making of policy does not auto-


matically reflect the synthesis of rival group pressures. The above suggests that group conflict is hardly the central feature of Soviet politics and that groups as subsystems are not dominant in the process. The Soviet political setting does not, then, present us with a "genuine pluralism." Yet neither is it pure totalitarianism; "it is rather a kind of imperfect monism in which of the many elements involved, one — the Party — is more powerful than all the others, but is not omnipotent."22 The situation, Skilling suggests, may be characterized as "pluralism of the elites."23

The gist of the above discussion of the two systems indicates that the differences in political practices involving interest groups is one of degree rather than kind and hardly suggestive of mutual exclusivity between them. Convergence in political practices becomes even more striking if V. O. Key's claim about the American system has any substance. The orthodox pluralistic vision, of "a society divided into great groups" whose interaction within a framework of a political system "produces a precipitate of public policy," may not be an accurate one, according to Key.24 Pluralistic actions occur, according to his data, not among massive groups but among leadership echelons; "pressure politics" thus becomes "a politics among activists" with the masses playing no active


23 Ibid.

role in the groups to which they belong.²⁵

In terms of structural conditions, the two most prominent features, which touch on the political effectiveness of groups, as well as on the general relevance of the group model, are the possession of a degree of integration or cohesion and a degree of group autonomy.

David Truman has emphasized that "the degree of (group) cohesion is of critical importance in determining the effectiveness with which groups operate."²⁶ This cohesion, or group integration, is dependent on a specific group's collective self-awareness and on a network of internal communications, which serves to clarify, formulate and articulate the group's interests.²⁷ Much of the collective consciousness that American and Soviet militaries display is directly related to a general consensus these bodies have about distinct group-oriented values and interests.

These values and interests are basically derivative of patterns of socialization and of functional requirements of all military establishments. Socialization is the process by which basic values, attitudes and skills are diffused throughout society. In an instrumental system such as the United States, responsibility for socialization is dispersed

²⁵ Ibid.


among various agencies with no single agent dominating the
process to deny the development of competitive value orienta-
tions. Systemic fragmentation of this sort is particularly
conducive to stimulating inward-looking tendencies among sub-
systems. Describing the self-contained character of military
establishments, Samuel Huntington points out that:

The functional imperatives of security give rise
to complex vocational institutions which mold the
officer corps into an autonomous social unit.
Entrance into this unit is restricted to those with
the requisite education and training and is usually
permitted only at the lowest levels of professional
competence. The corporate structure of the officer
corps includes not just the official bureaucracies
but also societies, associations, schools, journals,
customs, and traditions. The professional world of
the officer tends to encompass an unusually high pro-
portion of his activities. He normally lives and
works apart from the rest of society; physically and
socially he probably has fewer non-professional
contacts than most men. Such exclusiveness of membership and inclusiveness of its
professional and social life militates in favour of the
development and the preservation of value systems reflective
of and functional to the military’s operational responsi-
bilities.

Generally, this caste orientation has distinguished these
values from those held in American society at large; before
World War II, when the military establishment was socially
isolated to a greater extent, it was possible to differentiate

28 Brzezinski and Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR,
pp. 76-90.

29 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State:
The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge,
between military and civilian belief systems on the basis of economic, social and political outlooks. Since then, integrative forces have been breaking down barriers that traditionally segregated the military from civilians with the result that a greater resonance between their values has been reached. Impact of public opinion, efforts at political indoctrination, increased socialization between civilian personnel and the military establishment, the equalized risk of modern warfare, the practice, necessitated by large turnover and volume required, of drawing a large percentage of officers from programmes in civilian universities rather than military academies, have all encouraged this narrowing of differences. But to point out that the military profession now holds values more equivalent to those of civil society does not imply that these differences are obliterated. It is still possible to identify traditional occupation-related outlooks within the military establishment: dissatisfaction with contemporary economic arrangements with regard to national security is pervasive; censure of the perceived inferiority of civilian social and moral standards goes hand in hand with distaste for the hedonistic and materialistic qualities of American culture which are seen as "blocking the essential military virtues of patriotism, duty, and self-sacrifice;" a conservative political orientation is acknowledged by most.


31 Ibid., pp. 248, 275.
officers. 32

All these attitudes are perpetuated and re-inforced by the recruitment system, the military educational experience and professional career patterns. Comparison of political preferences among academy graduates and non-academy graduates, for example, indicated a much stronger gravitation among the former towards the conservative category. 33 This uniformity and perspective is strengthened by the career patterns of senior military officers. The structure of conservative-liberal attitudes by rank, Janowitz found, indicates a progressively stronger correlation between conservative bias and higher position in the military hierarchy. 34 The desire here is not to hold forth at length about the nature of military values, but to indicate two consequences of this function-oriented socialization process.

The first touches on the more general problem of influence on decision-making in foreign policy. Higher education usually is connected with greater concentration of liberal attitudes in the population at large; officers, in general, constitute a deviant group (no pejorative connotations attached) in that higher education strengthens rather than weakens conservative bias. This difference becomes especially relevant at the higher levels of decision-making where the possibilities of

32 Ibid., p. 248.
33 Ibid., pp. 239-240.
34 Ibid., pp. 237-239.
dichotomies in civilian and military values increase. Moreover, conservatism's relatively pessimistic philosophy of human nature suggests to the professional soldier "that violence is the final arbiter of human relations and that, in fact, resort to violence is inevitable."35 Partly as a result of this philosophy and partly as a consequence of the profession's distinctive combat-mindedness that issues from its operational responsibilities, military leaders tend to view the international environment from a more hostile perspective36 and to emphasize the military factor in international politics.37

The second consequence bears upon the immediate problem of group self-awareness. In moulding the peculiar perspective on values, military socialization re-inforces intense group loyalties. The extent to which these values diverge from societal ones is not as important as the existence of this variance; whether it is simply one of nuance or of total dissimilarity the existence of a set of shared values, which are in some way distinguished from other groups, adds to the internal cohesion of the proprietary group.

It is perhaps ironic that, in the Soviet Union where such great emphasis is placed on Party-defined ideological uniformity, conflicts between values, exhibited by the military

---

and those the Party desires to instill in it, have become exacerbated rather than muted. These disagreements, Kolkowicz points out, cover a spectrum of issues: elitism versus egalitarianism, professional autonomy versus proletarian nationalism, detachment from society versus involvement with society, heroic symbolism versus anonymity.38

Within the Soviet context, the efficacy of the Party as a socializing agent is linked with its ability to impose a Party orientation on societal groups, and particularly on specialist groups that have the greatest potential for independent group life. Consequently, such groups as the military are systematically infiltrated, controlled, and manipulated in order to deny them the wherewithal to articulate or aggregate non-Party interests and to develop separate group values.39 Since Stalin, however, the military press has exhibited a growing tendency to counter the Party's claim to primacy in elite socialization (i.e. particular socialization process whereby individuals are socialized into professional occupational roles) and to emphasize its own establishment's responsibility for the development of group values. This depreciation of the Party's role and the enhancement of occupational roles as main socializing agents has been documented in Milton Lodge's analysis of the elite


press. A parallel tendency in the military press has been to consistently emphasize values whose attainment requires specialist co-operation (e.g., economic achievement, scientific advancement, defence of the U.S.S.R.); these instrumental values, according to Lodge, tend to promote elite participation and group cohesion while at the same time degrading those values which underpin apparatchiki dominance (role of the Party should be collective wisdom, socialist democracy, communism).

The Party's attempt to force the military to acknowledge the primacy of the Party's socializing role and to transfer that establishment's exclusive value system into one consonant with its own has turned out to be a Sisyphean effort. Despite occasional set-backs (e.g., Zhukov's fall), when the situation forced at least a pro forma deference to the Party, the military has exhibited a remarkable resilience and tenacity in asserting its establishment's claim to the role of socializing agent. It has thus succeeded in maintaining its distinct value system against Party-directed onslaughts and in the process has strengthened its group solidarity.


41 Ibid., p. 342, Table 6.

The nature of their primary function also structures the interests the militaries seek to advance and protect. Soviet and American officers are continually trying to impress upon political decision-makers the urgency of maintaining a large and efficient military establishment and of subordinating other social and economic objectives to the demands of national defence. In the Soviet Union the contest usually takes shape over priorities in allocations to heavy industry and to military budgets as opposed to light or consumer industry. The military "is single-minded in its pursuit of the ruble," and its line on the allocation of expenditures "is simple, consistent and forthright - resources should be allocated to 'the military' and 'heavy industry' and virtually nowhere else." 43

With the removal of Stalinist restraints, which had isolated the Soviet military from centres of political power, the marshals found themselves in a position to affect decisions on issues of vital concern to their institutional interests. The type of political leverage that they were capable of applying was demonstrated in the power struggle between Georgi Malenkov, a consumers' goods advocate, and Nikita Khrushchev, a judicious if erstwhile supporter of the military's institutional demands. The resolution of this struggle in Khrushchev's favour, as well as the accompanying chorus of opinion stressing the importance of heavy industry, and the Party's subsequent

43 Lodge, "'Groupism' in the Post-Stalin Period," p. 346, Table 10; p. 348.
condemnation of "calico industrialization" were impressive indicators of the military's new found political resource. Wolfe has emphasized the fact that the marshals - either as individuals or as an institution - have never openly challenged the dominant role of the political leadership in the areas which come under state-level policy.\footnote{\textit{Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads} (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 100-104.} The customary absence, at the top of the Soviet policy-making structure, of military figures attests to the formal primacy of political leadership. But with factional maneuvering the normal condition of party affairs, a group that has a monopoly on the state's coercive capabilities will automatically be the object of political courtship, and political decisions touching on its interests will necessarily be made with circumspection.

The American military places great emphasis on the maintenance of high levels of military budgets and on the support of military related industries in the face of demands for a restructuring of priorities to accommodate the problems of the cities, minority group needs, pressures for improved crime prevention and for other domestic problems. The expose and analyses of the American "military-industrial complex," its power and its alleged corruption of both the business and the political climate of the country are legion. The concern here is not to pass value judgements on the propriety of entangling alliances of military and industrial sectors; what is germane is that, whatever the degree of interdependence, a
sizeable constituency has been created outside the military which lends military interests compatible with its own, which helps to lobby for these interests, and which provides political decision-making with serious political and even economic dilemmas.\textsuperscript{45} The political consequences of such a situation, in the absence of a clear national commitment on priorities or even a framework that could measure the relative merits of defence versus socio-economic needs, should be quite obvious. The division of limited national resources between military and non-military demands has proceeded on the basis of a political struggle among the various concerned groups. The cumulative growth of the defence constituency, along with an absence of accompanying growth on the civilian side to champion various domestic constituencies, would seem to give the military an effective political edge in safeguarding its interests.

The position being established in this section—and the view here is that a significant portion of the relevant literature substantiates it—is that the Soviet and American polities contain military establishments whose membership shares an intra-group consensus about distinct values and interests. Complete homogeneity of attitudes and interests within these groups is not suggested, however, for attitudes of individual members are not always determined by their belonging to a particular aggregate. In fact, it soon becomes

clear that cleavages within the respective military establish-
ments are well-established, continuing phenomena lending
themselves to exploitation by civilian authorities to deny
demands and facilitate greater control.46 The rivalry between
"Stavka" generals and the Stalingrad group was used by Khrushchev
to undermine Zhukov and re-impose Party supremacy; similar
rivalries between European (Marshall - Eisenhower) and Pacific
(MacArthur) theatre generals had repercussions all the way to
American presidential politics. The more recent scenarios,
marked by American and Soviet inter-service rivalries center-
ing on issues of military strategy (i.e. between proponents of
conventional and of missile forces), are also cases in point.
Participation in a group does not, then, imply a complete identity
of views nor exclude substantial divergencies on specific issues
among the members.

It does imply, however, a high sense of solidarity in
general on certain narrow group interests and values (e.g.,
retention of privileged economic and social positions, and
freedom from Party control, by the Soviet military; promotion
of a heroic image in the United States) and on broader public
ones (promotion of heavy industry and high budgetary alloca-
tions).47 A disposition, to translate this solidarity into


47 With respect to the broader interests, it is often im-
possible to separate selfish interests reflecting the military's
own position in society and concern for national strength and
security as that group conceives them.
political activity in defence or promotion of these interests, has also been indicated and finds its expression in the constant efforts to impress upon the political decision-makers the social utility of the military role, the need for an industrial base suited to their function, and the necessity for high budgetary allocations to support existing military programmes and institutional empires. This clustering around group interests and values and the attendant activities help to integrate the membership into a cohesive group.

Group cohesion is enhanced by the existence of a network of communications through which interests may be clarified, formulated and articulated. Both military establishments maintain a highly efficient intra-group communications network as part of their functional requirement; but, these channels may lend themselves to interest articulation and to the dissemination of political ideas as well. In the United States, the propriety of using military communications media for formulating partisan positions and seeking to influence the view of others is not an issue. At times, even attitudes that have been quite hostile to the prevailing civilian values have been expressed. 48 The contention that Soviet communications channels are being monopolistically controlled by the central Party apparat, on the other hand, has often cast doubt on the ability of Soviet groups to articulate their own attitudes. Western analysts, however, have

48 See Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 250.
demonstrated that Soviet specialist elites — due to their strategic role in society — "enjoy sufficient leeway in the system to articulate a range of beliefs and values in their specialist journals." 49 Although these specialist journals rarely become vehicles for an open and direct confrontation with the Party, most have developed the facility to air their disagreements with the Party position and to indicate their own position into a fine art. Of course such strategy entails considerable risk and often is applied discreetly; language generally is couched in esoteric terms giving the entire procedure an almost subterranean quality. 50 In spite of its covert qualities, and perhaps because of them, interest articulation occurs spontaneously and frequently, allowing a group such as the military to air its positions, to inform its membership and to alert the political leadership of its attitudes on various issues. 51

Group autonomy is the second structural requisite related to a viable pluralistic approach. Political groups may be considered autonomous if an absence of accountability to outside authority, at least in relation to the issues that are subject to political bargaining in any given situation, exists to some


degree. It ought to be stressed that autonomy implies neither an absolute quality nor necessarily carries legal connotations. The most reasonable way to classify groups in terms of this category is along a continuum. Towards one pole we may place groups whose spheres of competence are unequivocally regulated by custom or contract in the political system. Towards the other extreme we have groups that possess no capability or will to assert themselves politically. In the middle we may place groups operating in the context of ill-defined spheres of competence but enjoying a de facto independent base of power due to their indispensability in the system.

One interesting development has been the convergence of Soviet and American militaries along such a continuum. In spite of the difference in political philosophies—the "pluralist" system ostensibly favouring group proliferation and communist norms inhibiting them—the militaries, for a variety of reasons, find themselves in analogous positions vis-à-vis civilian authority in their respective polities.

It would hardly be an exaggeration to suggest that traditional philosophical, ideological and political hostilities towards the military and militarism have been an abiding feature in both societies. Communist doctrinal inhibitions have been sufficiently compelling to place the Red Army in an extremely ambiguous position within the state. Communist political values affect decidedly anti-military overtones. First, professional armies, in original Marxist ideology, were considered exploiting instruments of the ruling class and
so, by definition, had no place in a classless communist society. The sobering realities of power which necessitated the maintenance of these "exploiting instruments" have created an ideological dilemma that has never been satisfactorily resolved. Second, the institutional position of the military is further weakened by the political norms of the system; this feature was already discussed. So also, for that matter, was the relationship between Party suspicion of independent interest articulation and the succession problem. But let it be noted here that, where the struggle for power is a continuing process, authority usually devolves on the strongest and most cunning, and a faction's or institution's cohesiveness often is a decisive factor in the outcome. Under these circumstances, the military represents the greatest single potential threat to and arouses unique apprehension in the Party. Party leaders have had few qualms in eliminating many groups that challenged or threatened Party control. The case of the military is exceptional because, while being the principal rival for power, it is also the mainstay of the regime. The Party's problem has boiled down to this: how to force the military to wear a horse-collar of ideological and political controls without impairing its vigour, efficiency and morale. The result is that the military is constantly under a network of internal pressures to submit to Party supremacy.

The institutional position of the American military is in

52 Brzezinski and Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR, p. 333.
a somewhat analogous position for a set of different reasons. Arthur Ekrich maintains that the American tradition of anti-militarism has been an important factor in shaping some two hundred years of that country's history. 53 This tradition, accepted as an essential element of American freedom, has been reflected in the philosophical, political and economic aspects of American culture. Alexis de Tocqueville, in *Democracy in America*, dealt with the aversion to large standing armies. The customary American precaution against dangers posed by such armies was to have wholesale draft of citizens as soldiers or to maintain only a small standing army. In the first instance, it was hoped that, by rotating the whole male population through required military service, there would be a civilianization of the army rather than a militarization of the people. 54 Until World War II the military and the business elite regarded each other with mutual suspicion, even hostility. The military often expressed ill-concealed criticisms of the lack of heroic attitudes among the American businessmen and their sons. 55 On the other hand, the pervasive capitalist negativism toward military values became formalized in two ways: opportunities for highest reward in the land have been in fields other than the military; the persistent


hostility and scorn became expressed in the low levels of budgetary appropriations.

The ideological tenets of American individualism find their root in eighteenth century liberalism. An inherently anti-military philosophy, its influence on the American political culture had two consequences for the military professional. First, liberalism's primary focus was the concern with the defence of the individual against the state; it was ill-equipped to justify the defence of one state against another and, in effect, denied the professional a legitimate function in its scheme of things.\(^{56}\) Secondly, it had a tendency to solve difficulties in international affairs by either transplanting successfully-tried domestic solutions to external problems (e.g. Wilsonian constitutional and co-operative approaches) or by becoming alienated and withdrawing.\(^{57}\) This denied the professional a justification for his social utility.

These negative attitudes traditionally have rendered the military's position within each system uncertain: military spheres of competence have been vaguely defined, their existence not safeguarded by legal sanctions, and their fortunes left at the mercy of civilian authorities. A number of developments on the international scene have, in effect, off-set this insecurity and stabilized the positions of the respective

---

56 Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 49.

militaries to the extent that they now possess de facto bases of power.

The most obvious, decisive development is the posture of mutual armed antagonism of the two superpowers. In an environment in which each side tends to define error and illegality in terms of whatever the other side does, trust and "playing by the rules" become extremely rare commodities. A decision-maker charged with the survival of his state is then likely to perceive limited use in alternatives, such as diplomacy, which largely depend on these attitudes. He is more likely to see force as the only means to resolve the antagonisms and to guarantee the survival of his state.

This excessive reliance on coercive means has made considerable military strength-in-being indispensable. While there may be disagreements about the size or the nature of a military establishment, the absence of debate about the need for one is symptomatic of this lack of perceived alternatives.

Quest for security has also coloured the nature of relations between friendly countries; the emphasis is on strengthening the friend or ally militarily. One has only to cite NATO or the Warsaw Pact, Korea or Cuba, Lebanon or Hungary to underline the overwhelming military character of this support. The size of the establishment, as well as the military tenor of the alliance, forces decision-makers to evaluate their foreign policies in the light of military factors - mobilized or potential power, plans and strategies, assessment of risks and contingencies. Military access to decision-making is not
only assured, but essential, and it may result in advice ranging from technical simplicities to options with global overtones.

The militaries' greater claim to influence was also facilitated by other developments during and after the war. The prestige that accrued to the victors paved the way to the seats of power. The most visible manifestations of this in the United States was the influx of military personnel into government positions normally occupied by civilians, the close ties that developed between military and business leaders, and the wide-spread popularity of individual military figures (Eisenhower, MacArthur). A more subtle, yet more pervasive, manifestation was the ascendancy of a mentality which emphasized reliance on military solutions to difficulties. Men more sympathetic to military views and values were assuming positions of power and were often allying themselves with military demands. The relationship between civilian and military values was undergoing a fundamental restructuring, at least in some higher government echelons, with the military viewpoint gaining greater respectability. The Red Army's prestige, in spite of the Party's conscious attempts to rewrite history and take credit for victory, has remained undiminished. Greater ability to challenge the political re-interpretation of the events during the Great Patriotic War is a measure of this prestige.

A greater involvement with the centres of decision-making

was an outgrowth of the war years. During the war the American military became consciously enmeshed in foreign policy decisions as a result of a combination of access by the Joint Chiefs to the President and of the exclusion of civilian advice. The State Department played a minor role in the direction of the war for political, personal and organizational reasons. The military staffs stepped in to fill the vacuum and as the war progressed the involvement, of military organs in political decision-making, penetrated to the lower levels of the military hierarchy. Political decisions were made under the guise of military decisions; once the war ended and the camouflage was stripped away, military staffs just continued to deal more openly with political questions. After the war the diplomatic element was relatively static as countries lined up on one side or the other with the onset of the Cold War. The dynamic element was the relative military and economic strength of the two camps. Military involvement became an accepted condition in American policy formulation, legitimized by precedence and necessity.

The parallel development in the Soviet Union was the death of Stalin and the liquidation of Beria. Disappearance of the all-powerful institution of autocracy, factionalized the complex political system which had been held together by the dictator as if by a linch-pin; major Soviet institutions automatically gained greater significance and became de facto contenders for political power. The drastic curtailment of the security organs that followed Beria's removal downgraded
the military's only rival with tools of violence at its command, and correspondingly increased the military's political potential. The inner dynamic of the Soviet's political system, irrespective of any conscious reach for the levers of power on the part of the military, thrust the marshals into a position to exercise influence. There is no evidence that their initial intentions were to exercise it; their over-riding concern was the security of the Soviet Union. But this seemingly non-political concern for the posture of the state is precisely what has led the marshals to endorse certain policies and oppose others. In the Soviet scheme of things such stances have crucial political implications. The Red Army's entanglement with decision-making has become progressively more involved.

Development of expensive and complex systems has increased the importance of the military equation in international politics. The expenses involved have often necessitated the jettisoning of alternative approaches, military and non-military, with the consequence that flexibility of political response to external inputs is curtailed and restricted to a few military options. At the same time, the secrecy and technical complexities inherent in the new weapons technology imposes limitations on the responsiveness of military policy to traditional political controls. The long-range planning required for these systems means that important decisions are really made long before they reach the point of official concern and public

consciousness. Once they do enter the decision-maker's perception, the difficulty in comprehension of capabilities places a premium on the advice of the expert, civilian or military. This, in itself, diminishes the layman factor in decision-making. The problem of political control is compounded by the tendency of laymen to avoid the difficulties inherent in mastering the complexities and to take expert advice, especially military expert advice, at face value.

So the presence of these systems gives the military the potential to shape the limits within which certain policies will be made. It also gives them a certain freedom from civilian control. For example, the premium that those systems place on the expert effectively removes one of the Communist Party's favoured levers for ensuring military compliance with Party demands— the expulsion of officers to a less pampered civilian life. Not only are the military technicians less expendable than conventional force officers, but they have desirable options available in civilian life and so are psychologically more resistant to Party threats and reprisals. 60

The cumulative effect of the post-war trends has been to fundamentally restructure the position of the militaries in the American and Soviet political systems. In a social context, they have graduated from pariahs of the system to respectability and even privileged rank; in a political sense,

their traditional impotence has been neutralized to an extent by their indispensability in the framework of superpower conflict. This indispensability gives the militaries a claim to influence in certain spheres of competency, such as foreign relations, and a de facto base of power. The result is that both militaries have established a degree of autonomy via a via the political leadership which, although not recognized by legal norms, has become a feature in the functioning of the system.

In view of what has been said in the discussion of the interest group model it seems difficult to deny that American and Soviet militaries are interest groups in Truman's sense of the word: they are aggregates of persons who possess certain characteristics and share certain attitudes on public issues and who adopt distinct positions on these issues and make definite claims on those in authority. Moreover, they are reasonably comparable with respect to their interaction with the political process and fulfill certain pluralistic conditions that structure political effectiveness. On this basis, it is quite likely that the following assumptions are valid: one, of the two the interest group model is the most consistently logical approximation of reality as far as Soviet and American military interaction with the decisional process is concerned; two, interest group theory provides the most logical tool for cross-polity analysis. Analysis of military influence on foreign

policy decisions will proceed within the conceptual frame-
work of the interest group model.
CHAPTER IV

CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENTS

At this juncture it becomes necessary to clarify key analytical terms, operationalize some of the major concepts and articulate the hypotheses that will be investigated within the conceptual framework selected in the preceding chapter.

"Foreign policy making" may be defined simply as "the more or less deliberate, conscious and specific decisions by authoritative policy-makers of a state to choose one particular course of action toward one or more other states over alternative courses that appear open to them."¹

Delineating the "military" as a distinct analytical category is a more complex exercise. The traditionally accepted definition of the military, as "that group in the state which has the legitimate, primary and specific responsibility for organized and planned employment of the state's physical forces against other states,"² differentiates between the military and the non-military along strictly functional lines. Technological innovations and the contemporary international situation have induced an overlapping of skill competencies


² Ibid.
to the extent that certain difficulties are associated with
the use of function as basis for dichotomizing between civil
and military. The technological revolution, in creating new
tasks for the military which require the professional soldiers
to develop skills and orientations common to civilian leaders
and administrators, allows their employ in many essentially
non-military tasks; at the same time increasing use is made
of civilian researchers, scientists and administrators to de-
velop and organize means of violence against other states.
This narrowing of the skill gap has been under-scored and re-
enforced by the tendency to view international politics as a
struggle for power and warfare but a continuation of that
struggle by other means. General Wheeler's assertion that
"it is very hard to define where the military begins and the
civilians leave off in our form of government"\(^3\) becomes ap-
plicable, then, not only to a situational peculiarity in the
American polity but to most modern industrial societies.
Concomitantly, this statement brings into greater relief the
dilemma facing an analyst seeking dichotomous concepts. All
too often efforts to resolve it have induced a proliferation
of fuzzy categories and such mongrelized terminology as
"civilianized military" and "militarized civilians"\(^4\) which
complicates rather than clarifies the problem at hand.

Our concern with influence and its exercise suggests a

---

4 Edinger, "Military Leaders and Foreign Policy," p. 397.
more restricted definition of the military. The formal heirarchical structure of military establishments confers the greatest influence on a positional elite that is synonymous with the highest ranking officers. The contention that the loci of influence reside in these elites is borne out by the formal and informal lines of communication to decision-makers: Garthoff has indicated that the Soviet Army, as an institution, operates in politics only through its leaders, i.e. the "marshals;"5 in the United States the National Security Act constitutes the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) not only as the "principal military staff of the Secretary of Defence" but also as "the principal military advisors to the President, the Security Council, and the Secretary of Defence" and this, in effect, gives them independent access to the President.6 The logical expectation is that the most profitable area for an investigation of military influence will be found among those with which the elites identify and share common perceptions, values, and interests; for the purpose of this paper, therefore, "military" is defined as the professional officer corps.

"Military influence" implies an asymmetrical relationship between the military and non-military in which the former more or less effects the policy decisions of the latter.7 The pro-

---


cess of military influence may take two forms. The direct form consists of giving advice and participating in face-to-face relationships between decision-makers and military leaders. The indirect form is the conscious or unconscious adoption by the decision-makers of so-called "military factors" (values, interests, techniques) deliberately and consciously promoted by the military elite. In both instances influence may be exerted by furnishing the decision-makers with selective information. Out of strictly functional considerations, for example, senior commanders must participate in political dialogue; this participation, as Dallin points out in reference to Soviet marshals, frequently provides opportunities to "stack the deck" with advice and demands. A more subtle means of exercising influence is through control over the premise of decision; military options regarding weapons systems and force profiles furnish means and end values which may serve to orient decision-makers towards a desired course of action.

A number of "channels" exist which provide military leaders with the means to attempt influence and which are useful, from an analytical perspective, in identifying and differentiating among the various forms of military influence as inputs into foreign policy decision-making. These "channels," Edinger suggests, may be divided into formal and informal, direct and indirect:


1) Formal channels include those which are situated within the legitimate and authoritative policy-making structure of the state.

   a) Formal direct channels are face-to-face interactions between military and non-military leaders, as in the instance of participation by military men in key foreign policy making units or through direct access to key foreign policy makers. The American Joint Chiefs exercise both functions and these interactions are relatively stable.

   The Soviet situation is more complex and, at the same time, marked by greater instability. The most obvious example of formal-direct inputs would be provided by military representation on the Politburo, and, the recent elevation of the defence minister, Marshal Andrei Grechko, to that pivotal organ has stimulated considerable speculation about accretions of influence to the Soviet military. Considerable ambiguity surrounds the stability of this new arrangement and the proximity of this appointment relegates all judgements to the realm of speculation. Does this development initiate a new and permanent power relationship within the state that has arisen out of a realignment of political forces? Or is it merely a transitory phenomena introduced to alleviate a temporary weakness in the political leadership but destined to culminate in suspicions of Bonapartism similar to those that abbreviated Marshal Zhukov's tenure on the Presidium? Definitive conclusions may be premature at this stage; the only certainty at this point is that generally such arrangements have been the anomaly rather than
the rule in the Soviet polity.

Similar doubts about the stability of other institutional arrangements, which permit face-to-face contact, exist. Although the military has been integrated into the Soviet political structure primarily to ensure Party and civilian control over it, the same institutional arrangements may simultaneously serve as channels for military input into policy. The particular function that will prevail at a given time depends on factionalism within the political leadership. When the political leadership is relatively free from factional infighting, these channels serve primarily as conduits for the control and direction of the military by the Party. During periods of intense intra-party quarrels these same channels may become instruments of military influence on policy, either because political factions may seek military support or because the stalemate at the top may create opportunities for the military to exploit.

b) Formal-indirect channels allow influence attempts to be made through legitimate non-military intermediaries. The American military participates indirectly in key foreign policy-making units through such formal intermediaries as the Secretary of Defence and the three service secretaries. Lack of comparable civilian-military liaison roles in the Soviet Union has occasionally prompted the Presidium to establish, by decree, ad hoc

politico-military organs to carry out comparable functions. Of particular note in the post-war era has been a Supreme Military Council which includes select members of the Politburo and professional military officers. Although its precise functions, composition, structure and constitutional origin remain vague, the council apparently acts in an advisory capacity and allows military personnel to communicate with decision units through its civilian membership.

2) The informal "channels" exist outside the legitimate and authoritative policy-making structure of a state.
   a) Informal-direct channels, such as personal and/or group ties between authoritative and legitimate military leaders and non-military elites (e.g., cliques, camaraderies, pre-service and in-service affiliations) which permit members of the military elite to communicate their preference directly to non-military foreign policy decision-makers are very common. For example, in the Soviet case one of the enduring factional alignments of military and non-military personnel arose from the wartime experiences of Nikita Khrushchev on the Ukrainian Front. During his ascendancy the Ukrainian Front generals, or the Stalingrad Group as they are more commonly known, came to monopolize most of the hierarchical position in the Soviet military establishment. 12

---


(b) Informal-indirect channels are perhaps the most difficult to identify and trace, yet, in many respects, they may be the most critical and productive conduits. This category includes the alliances and ties between military and non-military elites which permit the former to communicate their preferences through informal intermediaries. Some examples include spokesmen for allied interest groups such as service leagues and veterans' organizations and leading figures in the respective military-industrial complexes. Incisive analysis, as well as alarmist exposes, of the American "military-industrial complex" are legion and the documentation of the "community of interest" between military, political and industrial sectors as reviewed in Chapter 3 is sufficiently extensive and familiar to render further comment here unnecessary. The Soviet military-industrial complex is also a coalition of various institutions and groups (physical components: the armed forces, the defense industries complex and related research and development institutions, heavy industry, and the conservative wing of the Party apparatus) which often share fundamental assumptions and perceptions about internal needs and external threats and, in turn, advocate priorities which serve their functional, socio-political and economic interests.

Indirect-informal channels may also encompass the various vehicles of public articulation, such as the press. Because of the secrecy surrounding the Soviet decisional process an analyst is often stranded with a dearth of information on how decisions were reached and which inputs played a significant
role in the process. Under these circumstances analysis of decisions often involves a laborious reconstruction of the preferences of the various actors as the basis on which inputs into decision-making may be attributed. Press organs associated with various groups often act as the articulators of a group's position and groups perceive these public discussions to be important forums in which to bring pressure on top leaders. At the same time, these provide the most profitable, frequently the sole, hard data on group preferences.

One of the basic problems facing an analyst is the necessity of providing an operational definition of influence which can be measured, especially where available data, as in the Soviet case, is limited. Robert Dahl, arguing that all measurements of comparative influence are both situational and relative, has suggested the following paradigm: "______ is more influential than ______ with respect to ______ as measured by _______ and ________". A number of advantages issue from this design: first, we can deal with simple ordinal rankings of the actors; second, every rank ordering is cast in terms of influence in a single policy area. On this basis we can determine the rank ordering of the respective militaries in a number of policy areas and proceed to a comparison of influence across policy areas.

For the purpose of this paper, the measure of influence will be the perceptible alteration of policy along lines suggested by the military as seen in a comparison of the original

---

proposal and the final course of action. The use of this measure is based on the premise that pressure from interest groups such as the military can bring about modifications in policy. This method of assessment was selected to minimize the lack of information about informal communications between top political leaders and the Soviet military elite in particular and about decision-making within the Party in general. We can only assume that a shift towards a position as articulated by the military elites through the various "channels" means either that the advice held sway or that some element within the political leadership perceived it to be in its interest to solicit support from the military through the manipulation of policy. Once the validity of this assumption is accepted, we may proceed to measure influence by documenting the respective positions of the potential influencer and the target of influence and by analyzing any shift that takes place in the position of the latter.

**Hypothesis**

The review of literature suggests a number of possible areas for exploration by hypotheses testing. This paper will limit itself to testing two hypotheses. The first focuses on the nature of the political system as a determinant of the level of military influence on foreign policy. In this connection we may ask what the relationship between the nature of a political system (independent variable) and the influence of the military leaders within it (dependent variable) is.
Does the influence of military leaders decrease in the transition from an "open" society (e.g., United States) to a "closed" society (e.g., Soviet Union) under similar circumstances?

The second hypothesis focuses on the relation between the type of decision (independent variable) and the level of influence (dependent variable). In this connection, military influence is examined in light of two different types of decisions - (a) a crisis decision and (b) a non-crisis planning decision. Crisis has been defined as "a series of situational characteristics that are hypothesized to produce certain effects on making foreign policy decisions." 14 These situational attributes, which define the concept of crisis, are: (1) threat to the high-priority goals of the decision-making unit; (2) a restricted amount of time available for response before the situation is transformed; and (3) surprise or the absence of awareness on the part of policy makers that the situation is likely to occur. Charles Hermann argues that a situation "characterized by high threat, short decision-time, and surprise will have different effects on decision-making than a situation that possesses only one or two of these traits." 15 Consequently, situations that lack such attributes as short decision time or surprise (e.g., planning decisions) may provide a comparative setting to test the relationship between type of decision and


15 Ibid., p. 30.
level of military influence. In this context, we may ask whether in a crisis situation the combined factors of limited time and need for relevant technical expertise and support will increase the role of the appropriate specialists (e.g., the military) in the decisional unit. Or will the existence of the crisis prompt the civilian authorities to monopolize decision-making?

Collection of Data

The examination of military interaction with and influence on decision-making will concentrate on two case studies - the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of policies surrounding the negotiations on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. These two cases were selected because they fulfill a number of requirements. Both were instances of the two main protagonists interacting reciprocally, i.e. without proxies. Together they provide the desired range of types of decisions. All three crisis traits were present in the Cuban episode both for the United States and the Soviet Union. President Kennedy referred to the threat factor in his address to the nation on October 22: "This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base ... constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all Americas. ..." The decision time was restricted in the sense that completion of the missile sites would have


presented the United States with a *fait accompli* which would have changed the basis on which future decisions could be made. The surprise element in the deployment has also been documented. 18

The United States response, in turn, precipitated a crisis for the Soviet Union. Evidence that the Soviet leaders were caught unprepared is provided by their efforts to gain more time to formulate an appropriate response (for example, they slowed down the merchant ships and their initial messages were ambiguous). In his address before the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev referred to the threat and time pressures encountered by Soviet decision-makers: "We viewed the received telegrams as signs of extreme alarm. And it was indeed (a state) of alarm .... Immediate action was necessary to prevent an attack on Cuba and to preserve the peace." 19

By contrast, the initial Soviet planning for the Cuban missile deployment was free of threat and time constraints. The test ban policies, in both countries, were also formulated and negotiated at a slower pace and none of the situational attributes connected with crisis decision-making were evident in the test ban processes. This exclusivity of basic characteristics underlying the two decisional processes recommends them for a comparative analysis.

---


Although case study methods usually involve description of units rather than tests of hypotheses, this method has relevance to hypotheses testing. On the basis of using multiple cases, some propositions may be generated which will prove useful in cross-polity comparisons and in this way allow the testing of the two hypotheses.

The case method was employed in answer to the mentioned inadequacy in available Soviet data. Very little is known about the internal mechanics of Soviet decision-making objectively. Only secondary sources, most emanating from Western scholars, are available to the student. Despite the obvious bias of such works, it is believed that a fairly high consensus exists on certain aspects of Soviet decision-making to allow us to proceed, even on such tenuous grounds, towards some valid generalizations.

In the following cases, military inputs into foreign policy are regarded as functions of promotion and protection of interests and values in the decisional context. The measure of influence, as indicated, will be the perceptible alteration of policy along lines suggested by the military as seen in the comparison of the original proposal and the final course of action.

---

CHAPTER V

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

I. The Soviet Experience

Examination of Soviet decision-making during the Cuban missile venture reveals that the dominant Party element and the marshals differed radically on what constituted state security and on the means of achieving it. The Party's method of securing the Soviet Union's posture, defensively and offensively, threatened the military's interests and ignored military advice to the extent that hostility and bitter re-cremitions became the legacy of this episode.

The Cuban crisis was merely an episode, although a central one, in this festering security dispute; some background information about this contentious issue should place the venture in proper perspective. Stalin's passing had not only removed the restraints on the factions in the system, as indicated, but had revived the moribund Soviet theory on military strategy. A debate centering on the problems of adapting Soviet military theory and force structure to the new environment of the missile age developed. Rival schools of thought, within the military, polarized around what may be termed "modernist" and "traditional" outlooks with various shades of "centrist" opinion existing in between. The "modernists" or "progressives" who were ranking officers in the technical services emphasized the primacy of inter-conti-
nental warfare, stressed the decisiveness of the initial period of war, and thus argued for the radical adaptation of the fruits of technology.¹ The "traditionalists" or "conservatives" consisted mainly of ranking officers in the Ground Forces who tended to cling to the theatre operations concept, doubted the decisiveness of strategic nuclear weapons and stressed the role of the combined-arms theatre force in any future war.²

Until 1960, missile forces were part of the artillery branch of the Soviet Ground Forces and this subordination accented several developments in military posture and top command composition. The traditional mission and the experience of artillery officers encouraged organizational and procurement activity related to the support of Soviet ground forces in Europe. The dominant theoretical scenarios delineated either artillery rockets defending the Soviets from a NATO invasion or, conversely, supporting the Red Army's advance towards the Atlantic with the result that an imbalance between continental and strategic missiles developed; procurement eventually attained a triple overkill capacity for Europe but the relegation of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)

---

¹ Kolkowicz, Conflicts, p. 3.
capability to secondary significance slowed the development of a direct attack capacity against the United States. This inability of the advocates of ICBM strategy to operate from an independent base of power within the military establishment not only muted the effectiveness of their claims but aided supporters of the continental warfare concept in establishing a commanding position in the hierarchy in the Ministry of Defence.

Two major innovations by Khrushchev eventually allied him with the "modernists" and laid the foundation for conflict over Cuba between the Party and the High Command. The first innovation, announced at the Twentieth Party Congress (1956), brushed aside the "inevitability of war" thesis, thus broaching the idea that world balance could be altered without war. The second was the introduction of his strategic "new look" which on the practical level meant emphasis on the missile with a corresponding downgrading of conventional ground forces, and on the conceptual level implied a shift from pre-occupation with continental land warfare to concern with problems of intercontinental strategic war and defence. In January 1960, a series of guidelines emphasized: a reduction of international tensions; a new dynamic of nuclear warfare stressing automatic response; an enlargement of the role of the strategic missile forces; guaranteed security for the Soviet state through ICBM superiority; a one-third cut in conventional forces.  

---


4 Kolkowicz, Soviet Military, pp. 150-151.
This espousal of "modernist" doctrines arose out of Khrushchev's desire to remedy what he perceived as a potential international political disadvantage rooted in strategic inferiority while rationalizing a domestic scarcity of resources. But the guidelines had a shocking effect on the High Command for they were interpreted as a transparent assault on the roles, privileges and interests of the traditional elements of the military. The premise of a future dynamic of war in the form of sudden brief nuclear exchanges narrowed the range of necessary strategic options and curtailed contingency planning. The reduction of tensions implicit in an uneasy but workable balance of terror removed further justification for large defence budgets. Force reductions consigned the conventional forces, where much of the elite resided, to the historical scrapheap and destroyed a number of institutional empires. In response, the hierarchy at the Ministry of Defence encouraged inertia, deterioration in discipline, bureaucratic foot-dragging, and sniping at Khrushchev's "push-button war" to the extent that the Party was forced to downgrade and disgrace two senior commanders, Marshals Koniev and Sokolovskii, for their "sabotage" of the new programme.

Vindication for Khrushchev's course, and the concomitant ability to keep military critics at bay, depended largely on the external environment; it was credible as long as it sustained a sufficiently viable international political offensive.

5 Ibid., pp. 165-171.
By 1962, however, it was becoming obvious that this political offensive was beginning to deteriorate. The myth of Soviet ICBM superiority, which Khrushchev had so assiduously nurtured and which sustained the offensive to a large degree, dissolved, first in the face of a rise in the Western "threshold of concessions" and, then, on the basis of a more realistic appraisal of comparative strategic capabilities. The perceptible change in the world climate that these developments stimulated had a debilitating effect on over-all Soviet posture. The Russian Berlin offensive again ground to a halt in desultory and inconclusive negotiations. The Chinese Communists were beginning to subject the Soviets to vitriolic abuse about their inept leadership and to press ahead for an independent nuclear capability. Restored Western confidence made the outlook for new Soviet inroads bleak. By the fall of that year the worldwide Soviet position that needed reinforcing was not only its strategic one vis-a-vis the United States, but its bargaining position on a whole range of political issues whose outcome was importantly affected by this strategic imbalance.

The Soviet dilemma centered on achieving, in the fact of manifest U.S. strategic superiority, a military posture adequate to support Soviet policy objectives. Increasing concern

---


was voiced in Soviet circles that the new American disposition to vocally flaunt its strategic superiority was merely a prelude to more provocative foreign policy ventures. Some way had to be found to negate this nuclear edge or, as one Red Star article phrased it, "to be able, when it becomes necessary, to put a strait jacket on the madmen at the right time." Military pressure agitated for parity through a costly programme of armament which would build up the deficient intercontinental capability without neglecting the conventional capacity. Khruschev's domestic economic ambitions, on the other hand - he was attempting to restructure priorities on a greater consumer-oriented basis - dictated a course that would place less strain on the already overtaxed resources. Within this context, the decision to deploy medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Cuba was made sometimes in the spring of 1962.

As a "quick fix" to improve Soviet strike capabilities the move was of questionable military value. The potential political benefits, however, were extremely impressive forcing even John F. Kennedy to acknowledge that ersatz ICBMs in Cuba "would have politically changed the balance of power; it would appeared to (change it) and appearances contribute to reality."

8 Krasnaia Zvezda (Red Star), October 12, 1962, as cited by Kolkowicz, Conflicts, p. 9.
10 Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power, p. 138.
The sagging diplomatic position of the Soviets would have improved; pressure could have been exerted on the Chinese to conform; a renewed Berlin offensive would have had more potential. Domestically the lesser drain on resources would have saved the new Seven Year Plan, Khrushchev's position in the Party would have been enhanced, and he could have dealt with his military opponents on his own terms. No other option promised such benefits as quickly and as cheaply.

Post factum evidence suggests that military elements had serious reservations about the Cuban build-up on several grounds. Military evaluation of this policy undoubtedly led to a different view of its efficacy. The politically subjective perceptions of American reaction obviously clashed with the military's dispassionate assessment of American tactical and strategic superiority at the point of conflict. Military limitations inherent in such a "quick fix" were also evident to the marshals and the omen such a move held for large-scale Soviet re-armament was inescapable and, consequently, odious. Moreover, the necessity of stripping existing emplacements in Europe to accomplish the Cuban task certainly must have given the High Command even greater reason to pause and evaluate the rationality of this policy.

In the end the military fought against this move as risky and unnecessary. Changes in the High Command at the time when the first decisive decisions about Cuba were made support the civilian-military friction hypothesis. In April 1962, K. S. Moskalenko, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Deputy Minister
of Defence, and commander-in-chief of the rocket forces was replaced in his missile command by Marshal S. Biryuzov, one of Khrushchev's most reliable Ukrainian-front clients; by July, Moskalenko's fall from favour was underscored when the title of Deputy Minister of Defence was stripped from him as well. The link between this official disgrace and the Cuban affair is more than coincidental for as the man most responsible for this branch of the service and one most anxious to preserve its equipment intact, Moskalenko had the most compelling reasons to be apprehensive about the prospect of shipping his most secret weapons with their nuclear warheads to such a highly exposed site and the greatest vested interest in opposing the plan.

Continued friction was even more manifest in the latter stages of the crisis. The firm American response appears to have caught the Soviet leadership by surprise. The psychological pressure, intensified by ominous signs of American preparations for an invasion, apparently caused confusion and near panic in Moscow. Actions taken by Khrushchev, especially between October 26 and 29, were puzzling and contradictory, indicative of strong internal pressures. One source of the difficulty was centred in the military for whom the physical commitment of troops and equipment to Cuba had created a fresh dilemma. With its organizational prestige now hostage to the successful conclusion of the mission and suspicious

that a retreat would signal a renunciation of first-class power status by the Party in the foreseeable future, the Soviet military may have considered confrontation with the Americans in a game of nuclear brinkmanship the lesser of two evils.

Analysis of the editorial position of Red Star, the central organ of the Ministry of Defence, demonstrated that it differed extensively from that of Pravda and Izvestia, the central Party and governmental organs, on the acceptable Soviet response. 12 On the basis of such analysis it is possible to say that, at the very least, the military blamed the Party for the fiasco; more than likely, it may have insisted on a quid pro quo from the Americans even at the risk of having to undertake military action. A sequential examination of these papers indicates progressively tougher demands on the Americans in the military paper corresponding with increasingly conciliatory attitudes expressed in the other two. Traditionally these organs have expressed the official views of their bureaucracies.

On October 24, all three papers carried an official government statement containing a "serious warning" to the United States; for the first time in the crisis, Red Star went beyond the government's position to label American demands "the limits of impudence" and to emphasize American

12 Kolkowicz, Conflicts, pp. 9-34.
culpability for a military presence on the Soviet borders. As American attitudes stiffened, Red Star carried a tough article (October 26) which was in direct contrast to a very moderate and conciliatory editorial in Pravda.

Pravda editorial entitled "Reason Must Triumph":

The Soviet Union, loyal to its peaceloving policy is itself prepared to do everything possible in order to prevent the outbreak of war and to prevent military catastrophe (Emphasis supplied).

Red Star article:

History teaches that one must not give in to pirates. A policy of appeasement of an aggressor has always led to tragic consequences for countries. A decisive demand grows in all countries: destroy the criminal intentions of warmongers (Emphasis supplied).

This defence organ editorial comes very close to open criticism of Khrushchev, who must already have been contemplating negotiations with the Americans and could scarcely have welcomed this inflammatory appeal to military prejudice.

On October 27, the morning after Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy offered to dismantle the Cuban missile basis (without a quid pro quo), Red Star demanded: "Why should not American military equipment and troops be removed from hundreds of bases located around the Soviet Union?" A partial response to this pressure seems to have occurred on October 28. A second Khrushchev letter to Kennedy did demand a reciprocal

13 Ibid., p. 12.
15 Ibid., p. 15.
action from the Americans and raised speculation in the West that the Soviet leader was bowing to Kremlin hardliners. The content of this letter was carried prominently in all national newspapers and indications were that, for several hours, this was the official government policy. Khrushchev's subsequent acceptance of American demands, the third major policy shift within a week, appears to have been made in spite of military opposition.

Belligerence in the military press may be dismissed as the predictable reaction of the military mind in a crisis, and on the grounds that its purpose was simply to raise morale, indicate readiness to face the enemy, and so on. In view of Khrushchev's apparent concern (repeatedly expressed in his letters) about the possibility of a military entanglement with the West over Cuba, it seems highly unlikely that he would have approved or ordered such uncompromising calls to action as those that appeared in Red Star. Post-crisis developments support this latter position. Remarks to an American interviewer and a Kosygin speech, which referred to "some people" in the Soviet Union who questioned the wisdom of concessions to the Americans, indicate the opposition's existence.


18 Pravda, November 6, 1962.
Ensuing Party–military dialogue, the dismissal of the Chief of Staff, Marshal Zakharov, who opposed the venture, the military's greater self-assertion vis-à-vis the Party as indicated by a greater predisposition to re-assess journalistically the role played by Khrushchev and the Party in the crucial battles of World War II, and the abusive vilification of Khrushchev's "hare-brained scheming" and "adventuristic aggressiveness" that filled the military press after his fall, testify to military intransigence during the Cuban episode and to the legacy of friction in party–military relations in its wake.

Twice during a crucial period in Soviet foreign policymaking the military had challenged the Party leadership over the premise on which it had conducted that policy. The Party leader was criticized, first, for presumably taking a great gamble and, subsequently, for not assuming the risks of a firmer stand. Any apparent inconsistencies in these criticisms are resolved if we consider that the real motive of the critics

19 It ought to be stressed that historical debates among prominent personalities in the Soviet Union often bear a distinct relationship to current events and are used to support or justify current acts, views or policies. The raft of articles that suddenly appeared in the military press, especially on the issue of Stalingrad, centered on the presumed role of Khrushchev in the planning of the successful counteroffensive that vastly influenced the outcome of the war. Malinovskii, the Minister of Defence, explicitly and methodically destroyed the claims for Khrushchev's key role in planning the counteroffensive; by analogy he also attacked his Cuban policy.

was resentment at political planning that involved military weapons but took insufficient account of military opinions and interests. In spite of the obvious pressure the political leadership appears to have wavered only momentarily (October 27-28) and in the end opted for its original policies. No perceivable shifts were apparent. Political demands and needs dominated policy thoroughly over those of the military and the political leadership monopolized both decision-making and its premises.

II. The American Experience.

Discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba caught the American political leadership off-guard and precipitated a period of crisis management in decision-making. To facilitate analysis of military influence in this instance, it would be useful to distinguish the premise of and the process of decision-making.

Once intelligence reports indicated the missile emplacements, a consensus quickly developed among American decision-makers that, because of their strategic and, especially, political implications, the missiles had to be removed. Decision-making boiled down to choosing among alternative methods of accomplishing this. Alternatives "A" (send emissaries to Khrushchev to demand immediate withdrawal) and "B" (arraign Cuba and the Soviets before the United Nations) were the "go slow" or diplomatic solutions, significantly had few supporters, and were quickly discarded. 21 Adlai Stevenson, the American ambassador to the United Nations, was the only one who per-

sitionally held out hope for some diplomatic accomodation and his ensuing fate is perhaps revealing about prevailing attitudes in American decision-making: his suggestion for an exchange in Turkey or Guantanamo was ridiculed, he came in for personal abuse over his alleged advocacy of a "Caribbean Munich" and Robert Kennedy sent hard-line, bi-partisan "help," in the person of John J. McCloy, to deal with the Communists at the United Nations.

The military options, "C" (naval blockade), "D" (air strike) and "F" (invasion), had considerably greater support among the decision-makers. Yarmolinsky points out that during the crisis (October 14-28) the Executive Committee spent at least ninety percent of its time studying alternative uses of troops, bombers and warships. Part of the reason, as he contends, is structural; non-military agencies, under-manned in comparison with the Pentagon, had fewer expedients to place before the President. The crucial time factor magnified this structural distortion in favour of a military option. But I would suggest that the basic causes were attitudinal. The prevailing civilian views entertained military options

---

23 Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 114.
as the only credible ones. Some of the most eloquent and vociferous advocates of hardline options were not the military chiefs but the civilians. The Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, took the position that "if we don't do this (remove the missiles) we go down with a whimper. Maybe it's better to go down with a bang." Cold Warrior incarnate, Dean Acheson, was perhaps the most forceful partisan of the air strike, retained this intransigent position to the bitter end, and when the decision went against him recalled with some regret:

We were too eager to liquidate this thing. So long as we had the thumbscrews on Khrushchev, we should have given it another turn every day. We were too eager to make an agreement with the Russians.

The premise on which decisions were subsequently made was due less, then, to military influence than to structural peculiarities of American government and, especially, to attitudinal inclinations among the civilian leadership.

Expectation of distinct advantages for military considerations in such a milieu is premature, however. Analysis of the process of decision-making in this instance reveals that the

25 Congressional leaders were even more belligerent in their reaction to the eventual disclosure of the Soviet move. Senator William Fulbright firmly opposed Kennedy’s quarantine, advising "military action rather than such a weak step." This leadership was solidly in support of an air strike or an invasion indicating that devil theories of communism and hawkish poses were not uniquely the occupational hazards of the denizens of the executive branch. See Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1971), pp. 31-32.

26 Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 56.

27 Ibid., p. 162.
military and the administration were pursuing different objectives. The Kennedy policy, for effecting the removal, that evolved was basically structured on political imperatives and, to a considerable extent, was shaped by factors other than those precipitated by the crisis itself. Sorensen once had observed in a different context:

Presidents rarely, if ever, make decisions – particularly in foreign affairs – in the sense of writing their conclusions on a clean slate.... The basic decisions which confine their choices, have all too often been previously made.28

In a very real sense some of Kennedy's prior decisions and pronouncements on Cuba politically confined his freedom of action and foreshadowed the form of initial response. Prior to the crisis, the start of the 1962 Congressional elections had produced rather abrasive confrontations between critics, who called for more decisive action against Cuba, and the administration. Kennedy's counter-attack against this political opposition took the tack of condemning "irresponsible" calls for and "loose talk" about an invasion of Cuba; as late as the day before the U-2 flight, which brought evidence of the missile build-up, the President was lashing out against "self-appointed generals and admirals who want to send someone else's sons to war."29 Adoption of his critics' stance now would not only have made him seem foolish but would have been


29 Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 188.
an admission of ineptness and thus created a serious political vulnerability. The domestic political context, therefore, favoured a range of action less drastic than an invasion or an air strike.

External political considerations also disposed Kennedy to favour caution. A more circumspect response would give the Soviets every opportunity to climb down from the limb on which they had found themselves and thus kept at a minimum the possibility of a "spasm reaction." Secondly, a more measured reaction removed the justification, as the Americans perceived it, of a Soviet countermove to shift the venue to Berlin where the political stakes were higher and the American position weaker. As early as the first Thursday of the crisis, the President began to indicate his own preference for a blockade which permitted a minimal yet unequivocal response but did not close out a gradually escalating application of force. Certain moral considerations came to play a decisive part in solidifying the administration's preference for the blockade. The killing of innocent Cubans, a distinct probability raised by the more bellicose options, could alienate Latin Americans, disturb Europeans and undermine traditional American claims to moral certitude.30 Robert Kennedy rejected the "Pearl Harbour in reverse," implicit in an air strike or invasion, by insisting that "my brother is not going to become the Tojo of the 1960's."31 All factors combined to incline the administration

30 Kennedy, Thirteen Days, pp. 16-17.
31 Cited in Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 51.
towards limited ends and means to resolve the crisis. In contrast to these political needs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff attempted to influence the administration to take cognizance of military requirements. Communist Cuba complicated hemispheric defence both from a tactical (Castro allowed construction of a Soviet submarine base) and a potentially strategic standpoint. Elimination of the island as a Communist stronghold was one of the military's abiding objectives and they had been preparing contingency plans for this eventuality. The Bay of Pigs in 1961 had provided one opportunity but the exiles' invasion was badly bungled. Now the missiles provided a second occasion and the Chiefs, convinced that the President had no other reasonable recourse, pressed for an air strike and an invasion with abandon. Anything less than a large strike, they contended, would "destroy (U.S.) credibility before the world and leave (the) nation in intolerable peril. Moreover, this was a heaven-sent opportunity to get rid of the Castro regime forever and re-establish the security of the hemisphere." 32 This was their persistent theme and the adamant posture left some, like the President, "discouraged and disgusted" 33 and others alarmed by the options the military blithely considered (e.g., pre-emptive strikes against the Soviets) in pursuit of


these goals. 34

The nature of the process of arriving at decisions during the crisis circumscribed the channels of military influence. The Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom) as the decision-making body in this instance consisted of a select group of official and unofficial advisors whose opinion the President valued or required. These restrictions limited the channels to the Secretary of Defence and to the Joint Chiefs.

One could hardly classify Robert S. McNamara as a partisan of military interests and values. Roherty, for example, points out that, although the Secretary was prepared to live with the National Security Act, the provisions of the law giving the Chiefs independent access to the President puzzled him; he felt strongly that there was "no need" for a Chief to appeal directly to the President since he, the Secretary of Defence, would have already presented a "balanced" view to the Commander-in-Chief. 35 Moreover, the Secretary was quite candid in stating that "never has there been as little hesitation to over-ride the recommendations of a particular service when that service's recommendations appeared to be directed to the parochial interests of the service rather than the national interest." 36 In connection with this outlook, McNamara issued a series of guidelines which had the effect of subordinating

---

34 Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 119.
36 Ibid.
the personal opinions of the Chiefs to the "departmental position" - one presumably defined by the Secretary.

A more obvious philosophy of civilian control of the military is difficult to find. In supporting the blockade against the military's wishes, the Secretary went ever further by not only insisting on civilian control over policy but control of even the smallest procedural details. The celebrated McNamara-Anderson confrontation in the Navy's Flag Plot over the technical aspects of the blockade, which culminated in the admiral ordering the Secretary from the operations room - "Now Mr. Secretary, if you and your deputy will go back to your offices, the Navy will run the blockade" - is perhaps symptomatic of the mistrust of the military in the Kennedy administration. This McNamara penchant for riding herd on the military was not without an appreciative audience. Assessing the crisis on the day it ended, Kennedy remarked that:

An invasion would have been a mistake - a wrong use of our power. But the military are mad. They wanted to do this. It is lucky for us that we have McNamara over there.

Basically the military case was left up to the Chiefs and the over-whelming impression is that it stood very little chance. Kennedy's ensuing policy indicated that he decided against an air strike or an invasion almost immediately and the long discussions over the next days served less as a

37 Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 137.

38 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 831.
policy-making forum than a means to bring the "hawks" around and, failing that, at least to have the record show that their alternative was given a full and complete hearing. After the Bay of Pigs the Administration had felt that some advisors had shown unseemly haste in publishing their absolutions and their complaints of Executive unresponsiveness to outside advice. So while Kennedy had indicated his preference for a "blockade" - or rather for the more antiseptic-sounding "quarantine" - he delayed making his decision final mainly because of the continued opposition of the Joint Chiefs to this blockade and their preference for more forceful action. It was not that he saw merit in their position, but that he felt it politically expedient to cover himself:

It was clear that some of the memoranda being written was not so much to present this case or that case to the President - since he had already heard them all - but to build a record. If something went wrong, many of these papers would obviously begin to leak. Any alternative he chose was chancy at best, and it was elementary prudence for a President to protect himself from the charge that he had overruled his military advisors on a "military issue." 39

With this in mind Kennedy maintained frequent consultations with the Chiefs, but this constant access is hardly an accurate measure of their influence on the policy process. Kennedy intended, Sorensen points out, to keep the Chiefs of Staff on a tight rein 40 and these consultations basically were viewed as a catharsis for the military. Perhaps the most

39 Roger Hilsman, To Have a Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1967), pp. 204-205.

40 Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 205.
extraordinary feature of presidential action during the Cuban crisis was the degree to which the Commander-in-Chief insisted on "personal direction of the quarantine . . . (in order) not to let needless incidents or reckless subordinates escalate so dangerous and delicate a crisis beyond control." From the positioning of ships, to the methods of boarding, to the precise words and actions to be taken by individual soldiers and sailors, the President and his civilian advisors were in direct command. This circumvention of the chain of command and "the accompanying countermand of the autonomy of local commanders" (conscious disregards of two sacred military doctrines) created serious friction (e.g., McNamara-Anderson confrontation mentioned above) and fueled the military's frustration over the indifference to its advice and interests. The bitterness over this treatment was reflected in the charge, levelled by one of the Chiefs in post-crisis evaluations, that they "had in some way been betrayed" because Castro was unscathed.

41 Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 128.
42 Ibid.
43 Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 119.
CHAPTER VI

TEST BAN TREATY

1. The Soviet Union.

By shattering any illusions Khrushchev may have had about Soviet omnipotence, the Cuban missile crisis set off a period of internal re-appraisal to determine what should be done to retrieve the Soviet strategic position. The political leadership was faced with two broad choices. One was to plunge forward into an accelerated arms race with the United States, and considerable pressure to adopt this option came from the High Command. One of the lessons drawn from the Cuban experience, the Minister of Defence, Marshal Malinovskii, claimed, was what "real reasons exist which force the government and the Communist Party to strengthen the Soviet armed forces." Evidence that the political leadership bent in this direction momentarily came from Khrushchev himself when he made, on February 27, 1963 the "painful admission that the satisfaction of consumer needs would again have to be postponed so that 'enormous resources' required to keep Soviet military capacity from falling behind that of the West might be available."^2

Liabilities of a protracted arms race with the West could

---

1 Wolfe, Soviet Strategy, p. 43.
2 Ibid.
not, however, be ignored. An excessively formidable Soviet posture could have the negative effect of spurring the West to greater efforts and, given the Soviets' relative disadvantage in resources available for the task, would leave the USSR probably no better off in the military sphere vis-a-vis the West, and perhaps a great deal worse off economically.

Coupled with the awareness of its potential futility was a growing conviction that a large-scale re-armament programme was unnecessary to provide immediate security. Experience had demonstrated that the Soviet Union could live for a considerable period in a position of strategic inferiority to its major adversary without being subjected to the "imperialist" attack so often predicted.

Cultivation of an atmosphere which aimed in part at slowing down the competition for military pre-eminence began to assume greater expediency under these circumstances. While this second alternative implied the temporary acceptance of a second best position, Party strategists saw in it the possibilities of keeping the strategic gap from widening. Political and economic considerations made this option a practical necessity. This is not the place to detail factors favouring detentist policies; but, one may point to a decelerating economic growth rate, to difficulties plaguing agriculture, to the growing feud with China, to existing possibilities of exploiting NATO fissures for Soviet political advantages, to parallel Western interests in achieving a more stable East-West relationship as reinforcing the Party's assessment of
the military disadvantages of an arms race. For all these reasons Khrushchev had shifted, by April 1963, to emphasizing domestic economic development and international detentist policies such as a test ban treaty.

It is a truism, demonstrated by the history of Soviet military policy that the fortunes of the military establishment are likely to rise and fall in accordance with the temperature fluctuations of the international political climate. Not surprisingly, the new political directions provoked another heated Party-military dialogue. The dispute revolved around the rather esoteric proposition that nuclear wars could be won and that "winning" had meaning. What at first sight appears part of the metaphysic of nuclear war took on great relevance for, as one military spokesman candidly pointed out, "the possibility of war is more than a theoretical question, because on it hinged the question of levels of military allocations."5

The Party position, articulated by Khrushchev, was that "winning" a nuclear war had no meaning and from this premise

3 Bloomfield, et al., Khrushchev and the Arms Race, pp. 244-50, 276-280.


flowed logically a series of decisions. First, a condition of strategic inferiority was justified if an adequate Soviet deterrent existed to checkmate a potential aggressor. By June, 1963, Khrushchev was claiming that the Soviet Union had indeed achieved such deterrent capability. Implied in the premise was a political formulation of the low probability of war which again justified the minimum in terms of force needed to assure Soviet security. Khrushchev's formulation of this minimum was a "one variant" war which excluded from the outset the possibility of waging it without nuclear weapons. In this context he indicated that cuts in ground forces could proceed, with the savings being diverted to non-military sectors, and demanded that the defence establishment make the most effective use of its allocations, i.e. maximum firepower rather than massive manpower should govern the scale and composition of military forces. Finally, such an evaluation would encourage not only comparatively cautious foreign commitments but a positive policy to help stabilize the international situation enough to ensure that the danger of large-scale war could be kept under control. The test ban treaty was, therefore, favoured by the political leadership not solely for its intrinsic ability to limit nuclear testing but, perhaps more importantly, for its symbolic value in fore-shadowing a political accommodation with the West.

Military objections to the political formulations on

---

security took the parallel forms of theoretical attacks on the Party's conceptualization of nuclear conflict and a lobbying effort against the test ban treaty. Whereas the Cuban crisis alerted the political leadership to the need to seek some kind of an accommodation with the West, it had also provoked a determination within the military establishment not to be caught short in any future confrontation with the United States. The narrow visions of the "traditionalists" and the "modernists" became discredited and a reassessment and synthesis of their ideas took place.\(^7\) One basic outcome of this revaluation was the theme, constantly reiterated in contemporary Soviet military writing, that a "meaningful" victory in a nuclear war was possible, even though it would be costly;\(^8\) if "winning" had meaning then military superiority had tangible significance. Throughout the subsequent Party-military dialogue this need for superiority in a wide spectrum of weapons systems, from strategic missiles to modernized conventional forces, in order to make credible selective responses to any situation that might crop up became a bone of contention between the Party and the marshals. Khrushchev's "minimax" programme (minimum deterrent, maximum efficiency) on the other hand, the marshals argued, was contributing to a further Soviet strategic maladjustment: by depriving any flexibility to the Soviet Command,

\(^7\) Roman Kolkowicz, "Strategic Elites and Politics of Superpower," *Journal of International Affairs,* XXVI, p. 52.

\(^8\) Roman Kolkowicz, *The "Red Hawks" on the Rationality of Nuclear War,* The RAND Corporation, RM-4899-PR, March 1986, pp. 31-49.
he was committing the Soviet Union to unacceptable rigidity at a time when the chief foe was going into multiple contingency planning and paying considerable attention to his conventional forces; by implementing his "cut-rate" defence he was condemning the country to a "mix" of weapons that was neither qualitatively nor quantitatively adequate and that was becoming increasingly less credible as a deterrent. The Party leader's "atomic fetishism," they pointed out, was encouraging a Maginot line mentality which would seriously compromise Soviet security once this deterrent proved ineffective.

All these military frustrations coalesced around the test ban treaty, for it not only promised to sustain a condition that justified the Party's military retrenchment policies but imperiled the interests of specific services within the establishment. For the first time the modern services felt fundamentally threatened by Khrushchev's policy; the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and the Air Defence Forces (PVO) - services based on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems - had much more at stake in the outcome than the other branches for they saw their opportunities restricted in proportion to the length and scope of the treaty. The total effect of the political direction was to unify the military community in its opposition to the state's foreign policy initiatives to a greater extent than ever before.

9 Kolkowicz, et al., The Soviet Union and Arms Control pp. 13-14.
Indications are that considerable lobbying went on up to, and even after, the signing of the treaty.\textsuperscript{10} In general, whatever the US defence chiefs may have said in the early stages of the test ban debate was probably closely paralleled by what was said in Moscow by the Soviet military leaders;\textsuperscript{11} in particular, the dissatisfaction seems to have centered around the feature which permitted underground testing since this was seen by the military as a specific item which favoured the Americans.\textsuperscript{12}

This opposition manifested itself several ways. The most unmistakable example was the conspiracy of silence by the military press. Silence, as one Soviet commentator noted, "also means something, also expresses some point of view."\textsuperscript{13} A blackout of all commentary and favourable publicity on the test ban treaty existed in the military organs at a time when Pravda and other Soviet newspapers were celebrating the negotiations and signing with editorials and pages of congratulatory letters from abroad. Between the initialling of the treaty on July 26, 1963, and its signing on August 5, 1963, Red Star, the one press organ that ought to have expressed an authoritative military opinion, had nothing to say of the


\textsuperscript{11} Victor Zorza, "Military Critics of Kr. K.\textsuperscript{,}" (Manchester) Guardian, October 4, 1963, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13} Cited by Skilling, Interest Groups, p. 390, n. 17.
treaty. Even on the day of the signing, Red Star's leading article was devoted to a totally irrelevant subject; while all other Soviet papers gave pride of place to the communique on the treaty, Red Star squeezed it in on the bottom of the first page.

More overt signs of opposition came from the defence minister. At the ratification meeting of the Supreme Soviet Praesidium, the man who should have commended it as militarily desirable from the Soviet point of view sat in silence. Marshal Malinovskii was merely noted as being among those present while the argument that the treaty posed no threat to Soviet security was outlined by a civilian deputy foreign minister. When he broke his silence, finally, the marshal deliberately went out of his way to disagree with the Party leader. Whereas Khrushchev merely acknowledged the shortcomings of the treaty in ending the arms race, Malinovskii added that the "imperialist camp" was doing everything to hinder the easing of tensions; while Khrushchev spoke of the "goodwill of the Great Powers," the defence minister accused the imperialists of bad faith. An authoritative volume on Soviet military theory, Sokolovskii's Military Strategy, published at this time, also underscored this military hard-lining. Its author took a parting shot at the treaty by cautioning against reliance on the "goodwill of the imperialists"

14 Zorza, "Military Critics of Mr. K.," p. 15.
15 Ibid.
and by stressing the "might of the socialist camp" as the most reliable insurance against war.\textsuperscript{16}

This concerted opposition did little to prevent Khrushchev from pursuing the test ban and showing a high degree of flexibility to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion. In the end, mutual East-West suspicions proved a more potent threat to the treaty than military recalcitrance. In December of 1962 the Soviets indicated a willingness to accept a limited number of on-site inspections in connection with a comprehensive nuclear test ban,\textsuperscript{17} but the prospects for such an agreement evaporated the next spring. Later Khrushchev complained to a visiting American journalist that he had with difficulty persuaded his colleagues to accept these inspections only to be made "to look foolish" when the United States declined to accept a limit of three inspections.\textsuperscript{18} Undeterred, the Russian leader made known, on July 2, the Soviet Union's readiness to conclude a partial test ban agreement on terms acceptable to the West. The cordial and brief three-power negotiations that followed in Moscow, during which the Soviet side dropped an initial attempt to link the test ban with a NATO-Warsaw bloc non-aggression pact, culminated on August 5 with the signing of a treaty which banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under water.

\textsuperscript{16} Wolfe, \textit{Soviet Strategy}, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{17} Bloomfield, et al., \textit{Khrushchev and the Arms Race}, pp. 187-188.

\textsuperscript{18} Cousins, "Visit with Khrushchev," p. 58.
II. The United States.

Since the nuclear test ban treaty was such a controversial issue, American policy-making relative to it involved a variety of participants who formed broad coalitions either in support for or in opposition to it. For example, the latter category included not only members of the military services or some Senators who consistently opposed rapprochement with the Soviets but even large segments of the administration which remained suspicious: certain state department officials were apprehensive about adverse effects on Germany and France; scientists in the Atomic Energy Commission feared that their laboratories would become moribund and so on. Construing the policy process largely as a contest between one component pitted against another at best gives only a partial description of reality. In defence of this procedure it must be pointed out that the Chief Executive was the main architect of this particular course and its primary animating force: he initiated policy; he helped mould public opinion; he worked closely with interest groups; he lobbied Congress; he consolidated the diverse elements and interests in his administration; he negotiated with foreign governments. 19 John Kennedy was also the principal target of influence attempts by the military which found this particular policy dysfunctional to its missions and interests. It is this particular relationship between the centre of policy making and the elements in the

military attempting influence to restructure that policy that is examined.

A basic goal of the Kennedy administration was to maintain a relatively stable international environment which would minimize the chances of nuclear war and which would be functional to American interests such as national security. Kennedy regarded a sufficiently strong military posture as the prerequisite insurance for peace and security, but also argued that there was a point beyond which acquisition of military power could be self-defeating. Nuclear proliferation, radioactive fallout and the continued arms race were deleterious to peace and security, and steps should be taken to eliminate the first two and decelerate the third. A nuclear test ban, he felt, offered several benefits in this direction: it would at least discourage those phases of the arms race which required large-yield nuclear explosions in the atmosphere; it would discourage proliferation; it could act as a forerunner for other agreements, e.g., elimination of orbital weapons in outer space; most importantly, it would create a psychological improvement in Soviet-American relations.

Arms limitation and test ban talks between the two sides had been going on for a decade but they had always exhibited more the qualities of public posturing than of sincere negotiations. Kennedy had long professed the desirability of moving these negotiations into more serious and productive phases, but in the first two years, after two notable diplomatic defeats and a series of stand-offs, the administration feared
it would be bargaining from a position of weakness and was reluctant to pursue serious initiatives under these circumstances. The Cuban crisis was, in many ways, a turning point in its confidence and resolution. Kennedy and his advisors believed the episode demonstrated "a sense of American determination and responsibility in the use of power" thereby strengthening the American bargaining position. Sorensen maintains that it increased Kennedy’s popularity among Americans and allies and undercut the influence of critics who held that he did not appreciate the realities of power politics and did not understand Soviet foreign policy.

On a more elementary level, Cuba taught Kennedy that misjudgments could lead to war, strengthened his determination to pursue some sort of understanding with the Soviets, and moved the test ban treaty up on his list of priorities.

Late in 1962 he urged the Soviets to take action on the draft treaties— a comprehensive one prohibiting all nuclear tests, and one banning tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water—the United States had tabled at Geneva in August. The comprehensive ban, as indicated, foundered on mutual suspicions. By the middle of 1963 prospects that at least a limited treaty might be concluded revived.

The military services viewed a test ban with varying

---

degrees of misgivings and hostility. Each had its own mission or purpose, tended to approach strategic requirements on the basis of this mission and viewed the treaty in terms of its effects on the weapons systems which enabled it to perform its perceived functions most effectively. The Air Force had always maintained that clear superiority in American nuclear striking power was the foundation of the country’s defence, as well as its world influence; the Cuban missile crisis, the Air Force Chief of Staff, Curtis LeMay, intoned, demonstrated that “superior US strategic power, coupled with obvious will and ability to apply this power, was the major factor that forced the Soviets to back down.”

The proposed treaty, the Air Force feared, would place the severest limitations on its role, particularly through restrictions on the study of missile site vulnerability and on the development of high-yield weapons. Opposition became particularly pronounced as many in this service tended to view the treaty as another step in the continuing downgrading of its mission. Under Eisenhower the Air Force had been almost the exclusive custodian of American military power, but the new administration had discarded the doctrine of massive retaliation in favour of flexible and selective response, nuclear superiority was being replaced by

23 Terchek, Test Ban Treaty, p. 42.


nuclear parity, and manned bombers were being downgraded in favour of the missile. Air Force generals had regarded this progressive trend towards forcing them out of the blue skies into dark holes, to become "the silent silo-sitters of the seventies," with a certain amount of distaste. Now treaty restrictions were seen as impairing even this ability to contribute to national defence and, they felt, such a development would severely weaken the country.

The Navy found that the prohibition on testing nuclear devices under water would affect the new roles it had assumed with the advent of nuclear power; testing of anti-submarine devices and the study of the effects of Polaris warheads would be proscribed. Least affected, it appears, was the Army which, while incorporating some tactical nuclear weapons, was primarily concentrating on large, flexible, conventional land forces. But the Army was given the responsibility for the development of an anti-missile missile and many in its establishment, especially the scientists, objected to the adverse effects the treaty might have on the system's perfection. This fear of a freeze on technical capabilities became the unifying ground of treaty opponents; their basic argument was that the Soviets had disproportionately advanced a series of high megaton tests and the technical knowledge collected enabled the Communists to develop an anti-missile system,

leaving United States in an inferior defensive position.\textsuperscript{27}

But while the objections by the military centered on the issue that the treaty favoured the Russians by banning all testing except underground – the argument that the Russians would cheat, anyways, was thrown in for good measure\textsuperscript{28} – the concern went beyond immediate technical deficiencies. A rather candid statement, by General Maxwell Taylor, pointed out that:

The most serious reservations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the treaty are more directly linked with the fear of a euphoria in the West which will eventually reduce our vigilance and the willingness of our allies and our country to expand continued effort on our collective security.\textsuperscript{29}

Generation of a psychological climate which might not only perpetuate the perceived immediate maladjustment but militate against future military interests was an equally powerful incentive for opposition. There has never been a satisfactory explanation of the position of the JCS when the 1962 draft treaties were formulated,\textsuperscript{30} but there is reason to


\textsuperscript{28} "Wisdom of the Test Ban: McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Differed," U.S. News and World Report, August 5, 1963, p. 36.


\textsuperscript{30} Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians, p. 451.
believe that the Chiefs did not regard these efforts as serious undertakings (see below).

By June 1963, however, the Chiefs were before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee denouncing the proposed treaty as "not consistent with national security" because it was not "adequate to prevent the Soviet Union from making important advances in nuclear weaponry that could alter the present relationship in favour of the Soviets," and, demanding a number of safeguards should such a treaty be agreed to by the administration.

The policy process in this particular case had two distinct phases: the negotiations phase culminated with the signing of the treaty on August 5; from then until late September, when the Senate gave its advice and consent, the battle was over ratification. One of the most striking features of the first phase was the President's ability to increase his personal control over the policy making process by isolating such oppositional agencies as the military services and nuclear laboratories from the immediate decisions relative to the July negotiations. A Committee of Principals, composed of relevant agencies, had been charged with developing the American position on disarmament and arms control; in May 1963 the JCS Chairman was officially appointed a member to mollify Congressional criticism. In initiating the attempt to break the negotiating

---

31 Preparedness Subcommittee, Nuclear Test Ban Proposals, p. 305.
32 Terchek, Test Ban Treaty, p. 46.
deadlock via the American University speech on June 10 and in carrying out the negotiations, Kennedy ignored both the Committee and other agencies. The administration's desire to go at it alone stemmed from Kennedy's determination to make a strong plea for peace without contending with circles who perpetually argued that qualifications must be added. Sorensen, the drafter of the American University speech, reports that the President was:

determined to put forward a fundamentally new emphasis on the peaceful and the positive in our relations with the Soviets. He did not want the new policy diluted by the usual threats of destruction, boasts of nuclear stockpiles and lectures on Soviet treachery. 34

The President's manner of conducting the negotiations precluded internal debate and forestalled public attacks that might be stimulated by leaks to the press by disgruntled officials. In the process the military was unable to exert any influence on the substance or direction of the talks. These were conducted by a small delegation of American civilians, headed by W. Averell Harriman, who sent progress reports back to Washington after each session and received new instructions before the next meeting. The communiques from the negotiating team had a restricted circulation list (nine copies) and were not shown to anyone not included on it; the Joint Chiefs were briefed orally by General Taylor but never saw the reports directly. 35 Only six top officials outside the White House (Rusk, Ball, McNamara, McCon, Thompson, and Foster) were part

34 Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 730-731.
35 Terchek, Test Ban Treaty, p. 22.
of the small team that read the cables, reviewed the progress of the talks and made recommendations. By keeping very close personal control over all the happenings and sharing a minimal amount of information, the President precluded early opposition to and dilution of the treaty and presented its opponents, like the military Chiefs, with a fait accompli.

One inescapable impression is that the Chief Executive adroitly had manoeuvred his military subordinates into a corner on this issue. There had been periodical JCS-administration consultations on the talks, in Geneva and later in Moscow, from August 1962, when the original proposals were tabled in the Swiss city, until August 1963, when the treaty went before the Senate. "The President had been careful," according to Sorensen, "to obtain in advance the agreement (on the desirability of a test ban) in principle from Taylor's colleagues."36 It appears in retrospect, however, that the JCS had agreed on the assumption that the test ban, like all other disarmament proposals, was only a diplomatic pose unlikely to achieve reality. Testifying before the Preparedness Subcommittee, General LeMay reported that it had not been until he saw the instructions to Governor Harriman on July 14, 1963, that he realized "we were really serious about trying to negotiate a treaty."37 Confronted with reality the Chiefs began to hedge on their

36 Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 738.

37 Preparedness Subcommittee, Nuclear Test Ban Proposals, p. 607.
"agreement in principle." The fait accompli had, by now, made such a retreat politically embarrassing and costly. LeMay went on to testify that he "would have opposed the limited ban if the signing of the treaty had not created a situation where its rejection would have serious international consequences." 39

The ratification battle provided the military with greater opportunity to exert pressure precisely because more diversified channels of influence were open. At the same time the military elite laboured under a number of handicaps which effectively restricted ability to affect policy. The treaty had become official government policy and an accomplished fact; opposing it became immeasurably more costly politically since the President was firmly committed to its success. Moreover, ever since the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy exhibited a growing skepticism of the foreign policy advice of some of his military officers; 40 this diminished leverage with the Chief Executive was underlined by JCS failure to impress him with the argument that Russian tests gave the Soviets substantial benefits.

Lack of unanimity within the defence department further weakened the military case. McNamara shared both the President's view of the relationship between national security and a stable national environment and his skepticism that the risks inherent in the treaty were sufficient to reject it. The Secre-

38 Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 738.
40 Ibid., p. 295.
tary's known preference for his civilian staff over his military advisors—who, he believed, "did not possess the necessary flexibility to evaluate all the facets of a proposal"—combined with the President's unreceptiveness, created considerable uneasiness among military officers and gave rise to the feeling that their influence was systematically excluded from the top echelons of government.

The military case received a more friendly reception from segments of Congress and certain allied anti-treaty groups. The sympathetic Senate Preparedness Subcommittee provided officers, such as SAC chief General Powers, with a forum to denounce the treaty as damaging to national security. Some of the heaviest anti-treaty attacks came from scientists like Edward Teller, AEC chairman Lewis Strauss, former Chiefs Burke, Radford, and Twining, and Senators like Goldwater, Russell, and Stennis. Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), the John Birch Society, the Americans for National Security, etc., were interest groups that carried the military's message by campaigning and lobbying against the treaty. The cumulative pressure succeeded in steering the Senate debate away from the treaty's political ramifications to military considerations and causing sufficient concern in the White House for the President to consider JCS endorsement of the treaty necessary to maintain the required two-thirds margin in the Senate.

This does not imply that John Kennedy was without the

---

political tools necessary to neutralize this pressure. In fact, he was able to frustrate it on every occasion. Unofficially, he encouraged the formulation of pro-treaty bipartisan pressure groups, e.g. "Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban," to counter anti-treaty groups. He actively campaigned for public support with the result that opinion polls rose from 52% favourable in July to 81% in September. Potentially damaging Congressional hearings involving the military had their impact minimized when the White House refused to allow the Chiefs to appear before the anti-treaty Preparedness Subcommittee until General Taylor had testified before the more friendly Foreign Relations Committee. Here Taylor emphasized that "arm twisting by superiors" was not responsible for the Chiefs "reconsidered" opinion that:

the risks inherent in this treaty can be accepted in order to seek important gains which may be achieved through a stabilization of international relations and a move towards a peaceful environment in which to seek resolution of our differences."42

Taylor's is perhaps an overly-benign account of the motives behind the switch. Without question pressure was applied on the Chiefs although not in so flagrant a manner as to create possible political liabilities. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that all the Chiefs switched their position except Admiral Anderson, of missile crisis fame, who was slated for retirement; presumably he saw no further need to safeguard his position. To ease the way the administra-

42 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
tion found it expedient to accommodate military requests for certain safeguards. But, the treaty remained intact and subsequently was ratified by the Senate. Kennedy never lost control of the process nor was he forced to alter his essential goals and policies.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The number of contrasting decisional settings provided by these case studies facilitates a comparative analysis on an inter-polity and intra-polity basis. The American decision to blockade Cuba and the ensuing Soviet decision to withdraw the missiles were reached under conditions whose situational characteristics define a crisis; the Soviet decision to deploy the missiles, and the American and Soviet decisional processes culminating in the test ban treaty have been categorized as planning decisions. Each decisional setting will be scrutinized individually, the motivations that structured and the measures that facilitated that particular outcome summarized, and the impact of two variables (type of decision, nature of polity) on military influence assessed in the light of these outcomes.

CRISIS DECISIONS

1 American Blockade of Cuba

Response to the Soviet initiative in Cuba was marked by complete civilian control over the process of decision-making and the implementation of the decision. Determined to effect the removal of the missiles yet anxious to execute this policy without restricting Soviet alternatives to a humiliating retreat, the Kennedy administration isolated its proposed policy
From negative influences. Reliance on an ad hoc unit (ExCom) and on the constraints of secrecy insulated the policy process from a wider debate, limited conflict over ends and means, and facilitated presidential control. Decisions rarely are immutable, however, and the danger of alteration of detail or even reversal of principle by bureaucracies or organizations which have specific values, objectives and problems of their own is an occupational hazard for decision-makers. Acutely aware that the meaning of the "controlled response" could be changed by the manner of execution, civilian officials engaged in direct administrative supervision of the blockade. The President himself decided which ships to stop, when and where; the Secretary of Defence invaded Navy Flag Plot and proceeded to give specific orders to the admirals. Consequently, at every stage in the decisional process the military was frustrated in its attempts to influence the decisional outcome. Military inputs into the policy process were negligible as its channels of influence were restricted, its advice ignored and its interests dismissed; during implementation, the military chain of command was bypassed and its relevant technical expertise abandoned. The belligerent overtones to Kennedy's actions reflected his own style and the civilian groups he responded to rather than a reaction to military pressure.

2 Soviet Removal of Missiles

The removal of Soviet missiles under American pressure attested to the domination of political expediency over military demands. Like his American counterpart, the Soviet leader
felt obliged to take command of and control his internal game. The established formal machinery for decision-making was bypassed in favour of an ad hoc group (which included A. Mikoyan, A. Kosygin, M. Suslov, L. Brezhnev and F. Kozlov); Presidium candidates were not summoned to Moscow and some Presidium members who lived in the city were left out of the deliberations. This conscious attempt to restrict decision-making, especially to more reliable political clients, was undertaken at a point in time when the military was beginning to interpret its involvement in terms of prestige and a withdrawal as a retreat from certain success. The political leadership, on the other hand, laboured under the explicit threat of an air strike and invasion and the attendant loss of Soviet prestige and power that such an invasion would trigger. Given the tactical imbalance in the area of conflict, the only options that were perceived as avoiding such an adverse scenario were either a withdrawal or the use of nuclear weapons. No political leader who understood the implications of a nuclear war could risk the latter. Party leaders ignored military pressures to confront the Americans and selected the only options that appeared viable to them — withdrawal and the minimizing of losses.

**PLANNING DECISIONS**

1. Soviet Emplacement of Missiles.

The decision to redress an imbalance in strategic capabilities which favoured the Americans was rooted in the Soviet

---

perception of the political weakness that flowed from such a disparity. The military solution calling for massive budgetary re-allocations to facilitate rapid procurement of strategic rockets was rendered inoperative by organizational demands in other sectors of the economy. Moreover, neither the behaviour of the Strategic Rocket Forces nor existing budgetary splits among Soviet military services offered the Party much hope. From a political perspective the deployment of existing equipment in Cuba seemed the only feasible alternative.

Even this option had to be made "live" since it went against the grain of existing practices in the conservative military establishment; the stripping down of existing defence postures and the exposure of equipment to capture drew an especially negative reaction from the command structure of the Strategic Rocket Forces. To activate this option the Party bypassed the established chain of command by removing Moskalenko, the artillery-trained rocket commander, and replacing him with Khrushchev's dependable, Ukrainian-front ally, Biryuzov. Recourse to this action was, at the same time, a recognition of the intensity (and extensity) of the military hierarchy's opposition to the plan and an attempt to isolate this opposition from decision-making. The military was unable to dissuade the political leadership from its Cuban undertaking.

2 American Test Ban Politics.
Policy making involving the test ban treaty passed through

2 Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 117.
two stages. During the initial one, encompassing the administration's formulation of its position on the test ban and the ensuing negotiations in Moscow, White House supervision over the cables exchanged between the two capitals amounted to control and suppression of information. This arbitrary regulation minimized the possibility of premature activation of vigorous military pressure and rendered military influence inoperative at this stage.

Ratification procedures enabled the opposition to mount a more sustained attack on administration policy and military hostility to the treaty's terms became both the focus of and the rationale behind much of this resistance. But, several administration strategies allowed it to occupy the high ground in its maneuvering vis-à-vis the military and to reduce the latter's influence. Submission of a signed treaty to the ratification process permitted the President to set the parameters of debate. Potential opposition now had to consider not only the intrinsic merits of the treaty but the consequences of a Senate rejection on the international community. American security is in part related to the support of American policy by foreign governments and publics and the rejection of an internationally popular agreement may have had negative repercussions for American interests abroad. These considerations account, to a considerable extent, for the shifting position of the service chiefs which in turn had a bearing on the integrity of the treaty's opponents. Military hierarchical loyalty restrained visible antagonism against the Chiefs'
shifting attitude and reduced active opposition to covert attacks, news leaks and the scattered public disagreements of a few retired officers and the head of Strategic Air Command. On an issue where only a widespread and united military stance could have placed the credibility of the President’s contention, that national security was not endangered, in question, the truncated military agitation aroused no widespread concern.

What concern there was, the administration sought both to drown by mobilizing an outpouring of support for the treaty and to alleviate by accepting certain safeguards proposed by the Joint Chiefs. The President’s stronger claim as the protector of the national interest and his greater access to the public, mass media and interest groups favoured his efforts over those of his opponents in building support to legitimize his position. The acceptance of safeguards catered to certain senatorial skepticism about military ramifications in order to ensure the necessary two-thirds ratification margin in the Senate. The cumulative effect of administration measures was to guide the treaty through the negotiation and ratification procedures without significant alteration in substance and tenor.

3 Soviet Test Ban Policy.

Disagreement over the test ban treaty found its roots in differing military and political assessments of national security needs. The military perception of the need for vigilance and a maximum defence effort was inextricably bound
up with the desire to alleviate the threat inherent in the lessening of international tensions to existing military empires, interests and values. Basic to the military's concern was the misgiving that the Party's retrenchment policies, which would follow in the wake of and be sustained by this treaty, would condone a second-class Soviet military status and eventually compromise national security. These anxieties were sufficiently pervasive and compelling to produce a united military front and public disagreement with the political leadership by the marshals.

The political case for a detentist initiative rested on economic imperatives which fostered a more rational approach to resource allocation and on perceptions of Western passivity which justified the relaxation of vigilance. The Party leadership conducted negotiations with Americans on a basis that implied a much greater responsiveness to these internal economic and external political considerations and an ability to withstand the widespread opposition from military circles.

The above data holds a number of implications for our hypothesis positing (1) type of decision and (2) nature of polity as variables determining the level of military influence on foreign policy.

Charles Hermann has argued that a crisis will have effects on decision-making different than a situation lacking any of the high threat, short decision time, surprise attributes of a crisis.\(^3\) The staff capabilities, crisis orientation and

\(^3\) Hermann, *Crises in Foreign Policy*, p. 30.
ability of the military to determine the outcome of international clashes by supplying or using armed might places this organization in a unique position to supply relevant expertise to decision-makers who operate under constraints of time, surprise and threat. As one American defence official boasted: "When it comes to crisis planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff can beat the State Department to the punch with concise, clear-cut proposals. The military command posts are on the alert around the clock and they have their staffs ready to move fast." 4

A logical assumption would be that the combination of structural peculiarities and situational attributes may provide the military with inordinate leverage on decision-making and facilitate the dominance of the military viewpoint over that of the civilians.

Our data indicate, however, that crises do not necessarily generate more propitious conditions for the military to increase their influence on decision-making. In both the American and Soviet scenarios, crises had just the opposite effect; there was a marked tendency on the part of the civilians to monopolize decision-making via the management of information and via ad hoc decisional units which facilitated control. Moreover, civilians exhibited little dependence on vaunted military expertise, ignoring or bypassing it as warranted by the situation: American civilians dismissed the navy's competence in conducting a blockade and administered the key moves in order

---

to structure the tenor of the response: the cautious Soviet reaction to the blockade attests to central control and supports the conjecture that the relevant moves were decided upon by Party leaders.

Planning decisions are also characterized by low levels of military influence. Soviet and American leadership was able to employ various stratagems to maximize their control over decision-making in these instances. During American negotiations for a test ban, the administration's monopoly of information forestalled the activation of potential opposition groups such as the military. Ratification procedures permitted only a marginal opportunity to influence the outcome of the debate. The President's ability to change the agenda by submitting a signed document to the debate and his access to greater resources for influence set the parameters and conditions for the debate. In essence, the debate took place on his grounds and by his rules; under such conditions, the only tangible success the military opposition could muster was the imposition of safeguards.

One may with a certain justification, in view of our delineation of the channels of influence in Chapter II, suggest that the safeguards represented a significant shift from the original administration policy and, as such, a measure of military influence on it. Caution must be exercised, however, both in ascribing causality and in assessing the effectiveness of the safeguards. The problem of causality is exceedingly troublesome, especially in the Cold War context, since military
leaders and civilians might follow the same policies either because of independently arrived at conceptions of national interest or because one group is influencing the other. Measuring influence becomes difficult since we cannot create a laboratory situation in which the question "What would the attitude of marginal supporters in the Senate be if there had not been any military opposition?" can be answered. Ascription of causality between military resistance and senatorial misgivings may, in fact, represent an unwarranted assumption.

The second aspect of doubt centers on the extent to which the safeguards modified the thrust of Presidential policy. Kennedy's two major biographers disagree on this point. Schlesinger maintains that the chiefs attached safeguards to their support and this led to an immediate increase in underground testing. "The President was prepared to pay this price to commit the nation to a treaty outlawing atmospheric tests." Sorensen, on the other hand, intimates that the chiefs were simply "reassured" that there would be continued underground testing. Lack of clarity in terms of motivation and of effectiveness make the safeguards a questionable barometer of military influence. At best, influence of the military in this case may be termed "minimal".

A similar pattern of civilian control over the internal game is evident in the Soviet setting. Adoption of the plan

6 Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 738.
to supply Cuba with missiles was accompanied by a conscious attempt to isolate military dissidents from decision-making; the Party, in effect, practiced role pre-emption by replacing the regular leadership of the rocket forces with more pliable clients who could be counted on to carry out its directives faithfully. While there is no clear-cut evidence about top-echelon shuffling in the military to produce acquiescence in the test ban decision, the commendation of the treaty to the Supreme Soviet by a civilian rather than the customary military figure again points to the Party's willingness and ability to pre-empt roles to structure the internal game in its favour. This manoeuvring has proven sufficiently effective in insulating the desired political policies from military pressure.

The available evidence suggests that the variable, type of decision, has only a minimal, if any, effect on the level of military influence. Communist Party command over foreign-policy making exhibits no fluctuation in relation to the military as one passes from crisis to planning decisions. To a considerable extent this condition of civilian supremacy holds true for the American polity. The possible exception to this dominant pattern is linked to the activity of allied interest groups in the United States which share the military's perceptions and interests. The implication is that such associated activity increases military leverage on policy proposals; but, the evidence is insubstantial and, in our study, tempered by a number of caveats.

The general absence of military influence regardless of
situational conditions indicates that the second variable, nature of polity in terms of an "open" and "closed" society, is not a factor which allows us to predict the level of influence on decision-making. The tendency of strategic civilian groups in both polities to dominate their internal decision-making processes, either through bypass of established formal machinery in favour of more reliable and manageable ad hoc groups, through control of information or through pre-emption of roles and competencies, has produced similar end results: inability by respective militaries to exercise significant influence on policies that threaten their values and interests.

One must inevitably confront the more general concern that gave impetus to this study and reconcile it with its findings. Concern with improper military influence had originally found expression in the sophisticated constructs of Lasswell and Mills and in the more incendiary rhetoric of lesser lights. In general, this analysis is pervaded with indignation and the prognosis with pessimism. Mills work, for example, seems animated by his anguish and helplessness over what he perceives as convergent tendencies towards bureaucratization of modern life and military pre-eminence; Lasswell's anxiety and pessimism is rooted in the liberal's phobia of militarism. All these constructs, in the final analysis, bear little relation to reality. In spite of this, their power rhetoric has sustained its appeal among the disenchanted.
Contemporary concern with military influence, especially its effects on foreign policy has escalated in conjunction with the higher visibility of military figures - a bemedalled general is surely an imposing and highly visible entity - in the post-World War II environment. Confusion of appearance with reality seems to be at the root of this particular anxiety and the findings of this study advise that Gabriel Kolko's suggestion, that the military is composed "of lackeys, mindless bureaucrats... who do what they are told and should not be taken into account..." while somewhat crudely articulated and starkly overdrawn, may represent a more accurate assessment than some of the contempora- rily fashionable deval theories of military influence.

Visibility, after all, may be a two-edged sword and both the studies at hand and historical experience confirms that is need not necessarily symbolize influence. The political practice of using military figures as embellishments for policies is a routine practice: Truman consistently utilized Generals Bradley and Marshall to support his policies; pro forma endorsements of party military policies by the Soviet military heirarchy has become such an established procedure that the exception rather than the occurrence is looked upon as a deviation. Conspicuousness may also have its more sinister aspects as the occasional recourse to scape-goating bears witness. Hans Morgenthau has suggested that the Military has become a scapegoat for people who could not explain the changes in

America's political situation:

The influence of the military has declined in recent years. But people who look for a scapegoat ... hit upon the military as the cause of all evil. The military takes the place that munitions makers held following World War I. (The result is) the myth of the all-powerful Pentagon which dominates the life of the nation.8

Scapegoating is not the exclusive preserve of the politically unsophisticated as illustrated by the consequences following the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Even though the Joint Chiefs' involvement in the improvised CIA-refugee plan or its subsequent execution was peripheral, this did not prevent the military from being implicated and blamed. A legacy of mutual suspicion, which made military recommendations suspect in the Kennedy administration and which disposed the service chiefs to render their estimates and caveats on paper during decision-making, was the product of this incident. Such political fronting and such vulnerability to censure hardly disputes our findings about lack of significant influence.

This lack of significant influence underscores the imbalanced relationship than favours civilian groups in foreign policy decision-making. Developments in the post-Stalin era encouraged the Soviet military to attempt inroads into such Party-state level policy areas as foreign affairs. The above delineation of military positions on issues indicates that this intrusion largely manifested itself in the military's bid for greater influence in the formulation of military

---

8 Quoted in Clotfelter, The Military in American Politics, p. 4.
doctrine and strategy, both of which overlap into the foreign policy—whether to advance national interests as the marshals interpret it or to cater to more narrow establishment interests. The political leadership has been extremely sensitive to such encroachments and has jealously guarded its jurisdictions. In spite of the military resurgence during the Cold War, the Party leadership had been successful in the period under consideration in isolating foreign policy decisions from military pressures and in structuring these according to its ideological and political perceptions of the world.

Similar civilian pre-eminence has been sustained in post-war America. Truman, as mentioned, found the generals convenient legitimizers his policies. Eisenhower, for all his military background, shared mutual goals with corporations rather than the military; he found it not at all difficult to ignore the generals and admirals clamouring for more money while he pursued his version of a "one-variant war". The military may have received all it wished from the Kennedy administration, but it was not as a result of the military's ability to impose its world view on the civilians. Rather it was the "New Frontiersmen" who enforced their "liberal" beliefs that the world could be ordered through the rational use of power and geared the military build-up to levels consistent with their perception of America's political goals and ideological conceptions. The above study indicates that the civilians were very much the drivers; on occasion the generals and marshals went along for the ride, sometimes
joyfully at other times with less enthusiasm. Yet they rarely succeeded in steering the political leadership from its desired path.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:


---


---

The "Red Hawks" on the Rationality of War. RM 4899-PR. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1966.

---


---


---


---


Articles:


Documents:

VITA AUCTORIS

FAMILY: Walter Pereshluha, son of Mr. and Mrs. Nicholas Pereshluha.

EDUCATION: Primary education received at Driehoven, Belgium and St. Joseph's Separate School, Port Arthur, Ontario.

Secondary education at Assumption College School, Windsor, Ontario.

Registered at Assumption University, Windsor, Ontario, and received a Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University of Windsor in 1967.

Attended the University of Windsor on a part time basis as a Special Student from May, 1971.

Admitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies Department of Political Science, University of Windsor, 1971-72, for a Master of Arts Degree.