A comparative study of American and Canadian editorial coverage of the Cuban Revolution.

Stephen Mandel

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A Comparative Study of American
and Canadian Editorial Coverage of the
Cuban Revolution

Submitted to the Department of Political
Science of the University of Windsor
in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the Degree
of Master of Arts.

by

Stephen Mandel

Faculty of Graduate Studies
1972
ABSTRACT

This thesis compares editorial coverage of the Cuban Revolution in the Canadian and American press. Using content analysis of a sample of newspapers we examined similarities and differences both between Canadian and American coverage as well as differences with and between mass and elite newspapers.

We have focused on two areas:

(1) the interpretive role of the press, and

(2) the role of editorials in the formulation of government policy.

The first concentrated on editorial interpretations of three main topics:

(1) American and Canadian editorial opinions about Fidel Castro;

(2) American and Canadian editorial opinions about Fulgencio Batista; and

(3) American and Canadian editorial opinions toward the Revolution in general.

The last topic (3) was further sub-divided so as to allow us to compare each nation's editorial reactions to four other topics within the revolution:

(1) The use of guerrilla warfare.
(2) Cuban justice i.e. war trials.
(3) Revolutionary economic policy.
(4) The role of Communism.

Examining editorial evaluations of Castro, Batista and the revolution in general, we discovered basic similarities in Canadian and American coverage. However, by using the variable mass or elite press while controlling
for nation, we discovered editorials in the American elite press resembled most closely editorials in the Canadian mass press.

We examined three possible roles of the press in policy formulation:

(1) the advocate role - editorial statements made in support of the prevailing government policy;

(2) the critic role - editorial statements disagreeing with government policy; and

(3) the policy initiator role - editorial statements suggesting a change in existing government policy or that government should embark on a new policy.

Here we discovered that three roles were confined by and large to the American elite press and that the role of advocate, in particular, characterizes the role of elite press with regard to the Cuban Revolution.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Needless to say, I owe much to the staff of the Department of Political Science in the production of this study. I wish to express my gratitude and appreciation to Dr. Walter Soderlund, without whose guidance criticism and undying assistance at every stage, this study would not have been possible. A special debt of gratitude must also be extended to Professor Richard Price who at every opportunity made his many talents available, and to Dr. Walter Romanow whose advice and encouragement helped me to conclude this work.

Special appreciation and thanks must also be rendered to the Detroit Edison Company which so graciously helped to fund this project. I would also like to express my thanks to Laurie Wagenberg who spent many hours typing the final draft of the study.
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Chapter I

The Research Problem

According to Almond and Powell "the analysis and comparison of the performance of political communication is one of the most interesting and useful means of examining different political systems."\(^1\) By defining political communication as the dissemination of political information by formal and informal structures within a society, comparative analysis is able to focus on any number of channels.\(^2\) In Western democracies, for example, newspapers are an important formal channel of communication. By supplying political information and interpretation, the press helps to formulate opinions and attitudes on various issues.\(^3\) It is the latter or the interpretive function of the press with which this project is concerned.

Most newspapers utilize several types of reporting in their analysis of political events. They may employ wire service copy, special reports, syndicated columns or by-line editorials. Each of these provides the reader with news analysis. However, not all reflect the newspaper's opinion. Since we are focusing on the press' interpretive

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\(^2\) *Ibid.*, p. 167. (for an explanation of the various structures, see pp. 166-170)

function, we want to examine that section which most accurately and consistently represents the newspaper's position on an issue.\textsuperscript{4} We feel that the editorial section meets this requirement.

The importance of studying editorials lays in their impact upon both society and government. On the one hand the editor acts as an 'opinion maker'. This is possible as he is able to regularly transmit, either locally or nationally, opinions about an issue to unknown persons outside his occupational field.\textsuperscript{5} The editor, thus helps to adjust or shape public sentiment. In foreign affairs this role becomes more pronounced as less than ten percent of population pay heed to external developments.\textsuperscript{6} This group, called the attentive public serves as a key link in the vertical channel of communication between opinion makers and mass public.\textsuperscript{7} Support for such a contention is found in Pool's study of the prestige press. According to his findings "editorials in the prestige press seem to be a good expression of elite public opinion on foreign affairs."\textsuperscript{8}


\textsuperscript{5}Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., pp. 39-41.

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid., p. 41.

As a result editorial content can provide a meaningful subject of analysis in the study of elite opinions as well as a guide to the opinions that are being disseminated to the attentive public and mass public.

At the governmental level, decision makers feel that editorial comments are to some extent representative of public sentiment.9 Because of this Dunn believes editorials have their greatest impact on decision centres.10 If this is a valid observation, then discerning the pattern of relations between the press and government is of great value.11

The objective of the study is to use editorial coverage of the Cuban Revolution from July 1, 1958 to August 31, 1959 as a basis for a comparative study of certain Canadian and American newspapers. We shall look at two major areas; (1) editorial attitudes toward various facets of the Cuban Revolution, and (2) the roles of the press in the formulation of government policy.

The Cuban Revolution provides us with an interesting case study to compare the Canadian and American press.

10Ibid., p. 168.
11We were unable to locate any exact figures concerning government officials reading habits, but various authors have stressed the large number of officials who read the interpretive sections of the press. A few of them are: Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963; Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1966; V.O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961.
First it was an international event of considerable magnitude. It was characterized by violence, introduced the cold war into the Western Hemisphere and fomented fundamental societal change within Cuba. Thus, the fourteen month period allows us to examine the Canadian and American editorial reaction to many types of issues.

It is difficult to speculate on differences in Canadian and American press coverage of the Cuban Revolution. On the one hand, Canadian and American studies in the fields of socialization and culture indicate a high correlation between the attitudes, values and beliefs of both nations. Lipset describes both nations as egalitarian and competitive but envisions Canada to be more conservative and class conscious due to British ties.\textsuperscript{12} His results are affirmed by Clark and McRae in their analysis of Canadian society.\textsuperscript{13} The close relationship between both nations on value judgments and attitudes is exemplified by prestige rankings of various occupations where one finds that Canadians and Americans rank occupations in a similar order.\textsuperscript{14} In the

\begin{flushleft}


\end{flushleft}
area of child socialization, Pammett discovers that Canadian primary school students exhibit an early awareness for American leaders and institutions.15

One explanation for this apparent similarity in politically relevant attitudes and values lies in the extent to which the American mass media penetrates Canada. Most Canadians live sufficiently close to the U.S. border that they are exposed to American radio and T.V. broadcasts. Even though the Royal Commission on Canadian media content has attempted to limit foreign control of Canadian radio and television,16 other mediums of communication like cable television and movies still enable the American culture to penetrate Canadian society. Unfortunately, the mass media is not the only communication network being affected by our Southern neighbours. Canadian students often rely upon the interpretation of American text-books while American weekly magazines attract the largest percent of that Canadian market.17 As a result Canadians become inundated by American values, attitudes and beliefs. Therefore when

the time comes to interpret the news, the Canadian might begin with an American orientation. This situation is further complicated as the Canadian press is strongly dependent upon American wire services for international news.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, the level of American penetration helps to explain why both nations exhibit so many analogous traits.

However, the high level of penetration might not provide sufficient cause for making a supposition of national similarity. Some reasons might prevail which help to explain important attitudinal differences between Canadians and Americans, particularly English speaking Canadians. According to Horwitz there is a distinct difference between Canadian and American attitudes in relation to socialism.\textsuperscript{19} Through the emigration of British Socialists Canada's uncongealed political culture received an early introduction to socialism. Therefore in British North America socialism is not perceived as foreign but rather a traditional part of the Canadian culture.\textsuperscript{20} On the other hand American socialism is both Marxist and foreign. It has to compete with Lockean individualism "which has long since achieved the status of a national religion."\textsuperscript{21} Therefore, on arrival,

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 668.


\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid.}
immigrants face a cultural norm that frowns upon socialism. This causes the abandoning of many alien ethnic traits one of which is socialism. One might expect, therefore, Canadian editorials to take a "softer line" on socialist or leftest issues (e.g., agrarian reform) while American newspapers might be more pre-occupied with individual self determination.

Historically, Canada and the United States pursued different roads to independence. Canada preferred to negotiate with Britain in order to achieve nationhood. The United States, on the other hand, sought its independence by revolution. This historical difference might lead one to expect a greater sympathy on the part of American editors to revolution than would be the case with Canadians. However, changes since independence may have altered these attitudes toward revolution. One example might be the United States' negative association of revolution with Communism.

In short, the literature comparing Canadian and American societies contains important contradictions. In view of this, we have decided not to hypothesize either similarity or difference with respect to editorial coverage. Rather we will ask a series of parallel questions regarding editorial opinions and let the data speak for itself.

Our first area of investigation is editorial

\[22\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 62.}\]
attitudes of both nations toward the Cuban Revolution.

For purposes of analysis we are going to divide the Revolution into several components.

I A. What were the editorial attitudes of both the Canadian and American press toward the Cuban Revolution.

B. What were the editorial attitudes of both the Canadian and American press toward the use of violence or guerrilla warfare to unseat a dictator.

C. What were the editorial attitudes of both nations toward the Revolutionary regime with regards to its economic policy.

D. What were the editorial attitudes of both the Canadian and American newspapers toward the role of Communism in the Revolution.

II What were the editorial attitude of both nations' press toward Castro?

III What were the editorial attitude of both nations' press toward Batista?

Differential or similar editorial response to the varying aspects of an event like the Cuban Revolution is only one area in which the press of the two societies can be compared. Another area of investigation concerns the role of the press vis-a-vis the government.

The literature points out a number of possible relationships. Rivers, for example, believes that the press and government are basically adversaries and cites several cases to support his contention. According to Rivers poor relations between president and press go back as far as the Washington administration, when Jefferson established an anti-federalist newspaper, the "National Gazette". It was the loudest critic of federalism as well
as an ardent critic of President Washington. He protested, but to no avail. The trend has continued. In the early twentieth century, President Wilson showed his disdain for the press with these words: "I am so accustomed to having everything reported erroneously that I have almost come to the point of believing nothing I see in the newspapers." In the fifties, President Eisenhower was protected by his aides from intellectual and public criticism. This was accomplished through news management which inhibited the reporter's ability to function properly. If the reporter went too far, a security investigation would be called as a means of indirect reprisal. The sixties did not experience a change in press' conflict with the executive. During the Johnson administration the expression 'credibility gap' was used by the press to describe its lack of confidence in the information being passed out by the President's press secretary.

One of the most publicized examples of press - government conflict occurred in the summer of 1971 when the Nixon administration attempted to halt the publication of the Pentagon Papers. The government's rationale was that to promulgate such news would cause a security breach while the press believed the information to be irrelevant.

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24Ibid., p. 23.
to American defences. The conflict was finally resolved in the Supreme Court of the United States in favour of publication.

Using different evidence, James Reston affirms River's contention that the relationship between government and press is an adversary one. Reston points out that prior to World War II American journalists were the main source of information for developments abroad for both society and government. Since World War II, the government has vastly expanded its own information gathering network which has led to competition and conflict between governmental information and journalistic information and has exacerbated governmental - press relations.26

Even though conflict between the press and government exists, Pool has found that the editorials of the prestige presses are sufficiently institutionalized that they are in some ways tied to the government's point of view.27

Nevertheless one can identify more categories that just 'friend or foe'. Bernard Cohen presents seven possible roles of the press. These include informer, interpreter, transmitter, participant, critic, advocate policy maker and public representative.28 We have been

28Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy.
able to operationalize three (3) of these as follows:

1. The critic: An editorial statement which opposes government policy.

2. The Advocate: An editorial statement which supports government policy.

3. The Policy-Maker: An editorial statement suggesting alternative policies which government should adopt.

By coding Canadian and American editorials according to these definitions we shall be able to determine whether there are significant differences in the role of the press in the two countries.
Chapter II

The Research Methodology

Since our study focuses on editorial coverage of the Cuban Revolution and the relations between press and government during the Revolution, we have employed content analysis as the means of reducing editorial content to a level at which meaningful comparison can be pursued. As a quantitative technique, content analysis requires well defined mutually exclusive categories. These are then utilized as guidelines for the breakdown of editorial content into measurable groups. Once each editorial is coded, various methods can be used so that attitudinal differences and similarities can be measured and inferences made about them.

The advantages gained from using content analysis depend upon the reliability of categories and validity of the measure. Reliability rests on the stability and consistency of the measure so that it provides the same results no matter who applies the measure to the data. In content analysis proper category construction determines the measures stability and consistency. In order to gauge the measures reliability judges are employed. They code a random sample of editorials in order to establish to what degree their codings intercorrelate. This can be determined by Holsti's index of reliability:
\[ R = \frac{2(C_1^2 + \cdots + C_n^2)}{C_1 + C_2 + \cdots + C_n} \]

in which \( C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_n \) is the number of category assignments coders agree on and \( C_1 + C_2 + \cdots + C_n \) is total number of category assignments made by coders.\(^1\) In our project we used three judges and a ratio of .75.

Validity, on the other hand, involves the problem of the instrument measuring what it is intended to measure.\(^2\) In this study, face validity is employed as it relies upon the informed judgment of the analyst.\(^3\)

Sampling procedures provide two further types of problems to overcome. The first is which newspapers to study and secondly, the editorial selection process. The newspapers chosen for this study are of two types - elite press and mass press. The elite press is important in the policy making process. According to V. O. Key, "editorial appraisals of the quality press, founded as they are on far more extensive information than most of the press... are likely to gain special attention in government and near government circles."\(^4\)

Verification of


\(^3\)Ibid.

\(^4\)V. O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, p. 405.
Key's position is found in Bernard Cohen's analysis where he identifies various elite newspapers as the most widely read by government officials. Various studies have been conducted in order to determine which newspapers qualify for such a status. We have decided to accept Merrill's studies as the basis for our selection. According to his research *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, *Toronto Star*, *Toronto Globe and Mail* and *Winnipeg Free Press* meet the established criteria to qualify as a quality newspaper. Some of the necessary newspaper qualities are:

1. Independence; financial stability; integrity, social concern, good writing and editing

2. Strong opinion and interpretive emphases; nonsensationalism in articles and makeup; world consciousness

3. Emphasis on politics, international developments, economics, social welfare, cultural endeavors, education and science

4. Concern with getting, developing, and keeping a large intelligent, well-educated, articulate and technically proficient staff.

5. Determination to serve and help expand a well-educated, intellectual readership at home and abroad; desire to appeal to, and influence, opinion leaders everywhere.

Examples of the mass press were selected so that

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6John C. Merrill, *The Elite Press* (New York: Pitman Co., 1968), Ch. 2, 3, 4 and 5.

7Ibid., p. 30-31.
they would provide maximum coverage for our study. Each performs a specific function in that it fills a 'gap' not covered by the elite press. This group includes *Detroit News*, *Windsor Star*, *Ottawa Citizen*, and *La Presse*. The first two provide an interesting interaction dimension as they are border city newspapers. The third, the *Ottawa Citizen*, gives representation to Canada's capital while *La Presse*, Canada's largest French daily, taps Canada's bilingual culture. Collectively the four can be compared to the opinions and roles expressed in the elite newspapers. Thus, the inclusion of the mass press is of great advantage for our study.

Originally, it was intended that the study reflect a balance between American and Canadian newspapers. However, due to the small number of Canadian editorials, the Canadian dailies had to be increased to make the Canadian sample large enough to draw viable conclusions and to pursue comparative analysis.

Since we were dealing with a fourteen month period and the total number of editorials dealing with the Cuban Revolution was not too great, there was no sampling problem. All newspaper editorials in the selected papers were scanned for the entire period and all editorials dealing with the Revolution were selected for coding.

Each editorial was coded according to a set of pre-determined rules. Since category construction and coding are so crucial to the reliability and validity of content
analysis research, the procedures used in this study are included for examination.

Category and Coding Guidelines:

I A. What were Canadian and American press attitudes toward the Cuban Revolution?

Categories:
1 - Favourable
2 - Neutral
3 - Unfavourable

Coding guidelines
1 - Favourable - if -
   a) the revolution was depicted as being good for the Cuban people
   b) the revolution was depicted as being good for the United States or Canada
   c) expressing an explicit hope for victory
   d) editorial applauds or agrees with Revolutionary change
   e) editorial applauds leadership other than Castro
   f) editorial employs positive phrases to describe the Revolution
   g) other favourable references

2 - Neutral - if -
   Items which reflect neither favourable nor unfavourable conditions either through balance of content or lack of controversial material, but does make reference to the subject matter under investigation. In order to avoid repetition this definition will be used for all questions unless specified otherwise.

3 - Unfavourable - if -
   a) the revolution was depicted as being harmful for the Cuban people
   b) the revolution was depicted as being harmful to the United States or Canada
   c) expressing an explicit hope for failure
   d) editorial condemns Revolutionary change
   e) editorial condemns leadership other than Castro
   f) editorial employs negative phrases to describe the Revolution
g) other unfavourable references

I B. What were the editorial attitudes of both the Canadian and American press toward the use of violence or guerrilla warfare to unseat a dictator?

1 - Favourable if -
   a) editorial agrees with the strategy of guerrilla warfare
   b) editorial believes guerrilla warfare is an advantageous military strategy
   c) editorial comments on the advantages of guerrilla warfare

2 - Neutral - see I A - for definition

3 - Unfavourable - if -
   a) editorial expresses disdain for guerrilla tactics
   b) editorial believes guerrilla warfare is a poor or inferior military strategy
   c) editorial comments on the disadvantages of guerrilla warfare

I C. What were the editorial attitudes of both nations' press toward the Revolutionary regime with regards to its economic policy?

1 - Favourable - if -
   a) editorial acknowledges the need for such change
   b) editorial believes the change would help the Cuban people and/or economy
   c) editorial believes changes would not greatly affect either Canada or the United States' multi-national corporate investments
   d) editorial understands the need for a reallocation of property and goods
   e) other positive references to the regimes economic policy

2 - Neutral - see definition in I - A

3 - Unfavourable - if -
   a) editorial refutes the need for economic change
   b) editorial believes the change would hurt the Cuban people and/or economy
   c) editorial believes economic changes would greatly hurt U.S. and Canadian multi-national corporate investments
e) other negative references to the
economic policy of the Revolutionary regime

I  D. What were the editorial attitudes of both the
Canadian and American newspapers toward the role
of communism in the Revolution?

Categories:
1 - Yes - communism an issue
2 - No - communism not an issue

Coding guidelines
1 - Yes - if -
   a) editorial accuses government of har-
bouring communists
   b) editorial accuses government of con-
taining communists
   c) Accuse Castro of being too sympathetic
to communists
   d) calling Castro or any of his leaders
Communists
   e) Cuba's Communist party played an
instrumental role in the defeat of Batista
   f) Accused revolutionary goals to be
inspired by Communist ideology end/or financed
by a Communist country

2 - No - if -
   a) editorial states that Communists are
not in the Cuban government
   b) Editorial denies Castro being sympathetic
toward Communists
   c) editorial states Castro or any of his
leaders are not Communists
   d) Cuba's Communist Party played a small
or no part in the Revolution
   e) editorial states Revolutionary goals
were not inspired by Communism but rather
democratic ideals.

II  What was the editorial attitude of both the
Canadian and American press toward Castro?

III  What was the editorial attitude of both the
Canadian and American press toward Batista?

Questions II and III are included together because
the same categories and coding guidelines are used for each.

Categories:
1 - Favourable
2 - Neutral
3 - Unfavourable

Coding Guidelines
1 - Favourable - if -
   a) editorial describes his leadership qualities as being positive
   b) editorial compares him with a prominent hero or leader from Canada or the United States
   c) editorial commends the job he is doing
   d) editorial acknowledges his widespread support
   e) editorial supports his policies and/or actions
   f) other positive references about him

2 - Neutral see I - A for definition

3 - Unfavourable - if -
   a) editorial believes he is a poor leader
   b) editorial compares him to a villain, bandit, traitor or dictator
   c) editorial condemns the job he is doing
   d) editorial expresses that the masses do not support him
   e) editorial condemns his policies and/or actions
   f) other negative references about him

Each editorial would have its contents reduced to its simplest form so that a compound or compound-complex sentence would be broken down into simple sentences. Then each sentence would be coded according to the pre-established guidelines. An example of the procedure is the following paragraph taken from the New York Times on January 24, 1959:

The new regime in Cuba has made a well-intentioned but terrible mistake in the method it chose to try the men accused of being war criminals. A spectacle, as was seen in Havana on Thursday, in a sports stadium, with a mob howling for blood was bound to cause revulsion here and everywhere in the world.

Paragraph Contents:
1. Cuba's regime has made a well intentioned mistake
2. Cuba's new regime has made a terrible
mistake in its method of trying war criminals.
3. The mob was howling for blood.
4. There was a spectacle in Havana.
5. This caused revulsion here and everywhere in the world.

According to our "code" all references are to the Cuban Revolution, specifically its policies and practices. Of the five units only the first is favourable. If these were the only references in the editorial to the Revolution and the editorial contained a total twelve units, the calculations would be as follows:

\[ F < U \]

\[ C_u = \frac{fu - u^2}{rt} = \frac{1 \times 4 - 4^2}{5 \times 12} = \frac{-12}{60} = -.208 \]

Therefore the paragraph is unfavourable toward the Revolution.

Through the proper coding guidelines and the use of the coefficient of imbalance we can determine editorial direction. These can then be plotted on graphs to identify the trends of editorial opinion. And finally, the data can be used to compare various Canadian and American editorial attitudes toward the Cuban Revolution, its policies, goals and participants.

The other major area with which this project is

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8Budd, Thorp and Donohue, Content Analysis and Communications, p. 56. "This formula shows the relationship between favourable and unfavourable material. Since the figure is computed on the basis of total relevant (r) and non-relevant content plus relevant content(t), all editorials no matter what length can thus be placed on the same level. The sign (+) or (-) establishes the direction of the editorial, while the number indicates the intensity of that direction. Neutral ranged from +.03 to -.03."
concerned is the role of the press in the formulation of government policy. We are concerned with three specific roles – critic, advocate and policy maker. To be classified as a critic the newspaper has to make an explicit attack upon some aspect of its government's policy or actions. An advocate role consists of praising, supporting and/or upholding any aspect of its government's policy and/or actions. The final role – policy maker – entails any suggestion, new policy, or solution to prevailing governmental policy or action. In any one editorial all three roles might exist. Once these roles are identified, we can then determine which nations' press becomes most active in the policy making process.
Chapter III

Historical Background and Chronology

In order to provide a framework from which editorial opinion can be analyzed, it is necessary to discuss the background conditions giving rise to the Cuban Revolution. As well as give the reader a chronology of events in Cuba during the fourteen month period under direct investigation.

I. Background

The fact that Cuba achieved independence as a consequence of the American victory in the Spanish-American War has had a profound impact on Cuban national development. As Eduardo Ruiz points out, the period during which Cuba was in fact a protectorate of the United States contributed to a sense of national inferiority and political irresponsibility on the part of Cubans.1 It was in large measure this strand of frustrated Cuban Nationalism which provides the key to understanding the role of Fidel Castro in the milieu of the 1950's.

Between 1898 and 1952 all Cuban Presidents were to varying degrees guilty of creating machines bent on graft and corruption. A victory at the polls meant pockets lined with gold. At the same time each President made promises for reforms and a better life. However, few of these became realities. Often, domestic consideration proved

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secondary to maintaining support of the United States. A chief consideration in such support was the maintenance of a climate of political stability in which American investment would flourish.  

The United States managed to direct Cuba's economic and political destiny through a variety of trade agreements and political maneuvers which were engendered to create a stable market for U.S. goods and investments. The more overt means of control included the Platt Amendment which permitted American intervention, Export-Import Bank and the Jones-Costigan Act which controlled sugar allotments. These were supplemented by a loan system, reliance on the U.S. for arms and an extraordinary dependence upon the U.S. for imports and exports.

Add to this atmosphere of corruption and foreign domination a national hero whose actions and words advocated a society built upon equality, honesty and diversification, one can easily visualize the explosiveness of the actual


Ibid., p.163.

Ibid., pp. 83-102. This provides a discussion of how the U.S. used loans to control Cuban stability in favour of U.S. economic interests.

Ibid., pp. 166-7. This exemplifies the degree of dependence on United States for both sugar and tobacco exports, a very high percent of imports about 73.4% in 1955 and U.S. investment was the only significant foreign portfolio that amounted to any importance.
conditions in Cuba. Spurred on by their hero Martí and their oppressor Machado, the Cuban people finally revolted in 1933. Instead of gaining the reforms they sought, their goals were temporarily halted through the efforts of Fulgencio Batista. This was possible as Batista controlled the Army and retained the U.S. Ambassador's support.\textsuperscript{6} Therefore the first major attempt to enact political reforms since the War of Independence achieved few immediate benefits.

However, the leaders of the 1933 revolt namely Grau San Martín and Prio Socarras were elected to the Presidency in 1944 and 1948 respectively. Finally the ideals of 1933 could become a reality. Unfortunately these leaders, in the years previous to their election, had lost their earlier idealism and continued to follow the established patterns of graft and corruption.\textsuperscript{7}

The failure of both of these leaders to change the status quo had a profound impact upon the Cuban state of mind. Cubans' confidence in the system was lost. For years they had rationalized that once their reformist leaders gained power conditions would change. Instead they received more of the same. What in fact was necessary was

\textsuperscript{6}Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1971), Ch. IV, LVI, LVII, LVIII. These describe the turbulent days of September, 1933 to January, 1934. Thomas incorporates all factions who participated in the 1933 revolt and provides a fine descriptive analysis.

\textsuperscript{7}For an account of the 1944-1952 period especially the Grau and Prio regimes see, Ruiz, Cuba: The Making of a Revolution, pp.109-110; Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom pp. 737-738 (Grau Regime) and pp. 759-786 (Prio Regime).
not a change in leadership but a change in system.

Why should people support a system that had brought only corruption, foreign dominance and frustration. These people wanted a better way of life including land redistribution, a better standard of education, better social benefits, a chance for all classes to be socially mobile and many other changes that Cuba's system for sixty years had been unable to provide. Some might argue that because Cuba ranked much higher than most Latin American nations in education, income and welfare benefits Revolution would be unlikely. However according to theorists like Brinton and Davies revolution is most apt to occur in societies where a certain level of development has taken place and further advancement is unlikely due to the system's restrictions.\footnote{See Crane Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1938) and James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review, XXVII, Feb., 1962, pp. 5-19.} Cuba was such a case.

With the level of frustration and alienation that Cubans had experienced, they were ready for change. However, whether they would trust another 'reformer' was another question. On the one hand what was needed was a movement capable of organizing the disenchanted elements in the Cuban population, on the other, a government sufficiently brutal, to alienate even those sectors of the population that received the greatest benefits under the system. Just such a combination of circumstances existed in the
mid 1950's with the rebel leadership of Fidel Castro and the government of Fulgencio Batista.

Batista came to the forefront of Cuban politics during the chaotic months of the 1933 Cuban revolt. His position at the head of the Sargeant's Revolt enabled him to manipulate circumstances in such a direction that he became the de facto head of Cuba in January of 1934, a position he maintained until 1940 when he was elected to the Presidency.

Batista's period of rule is difficult to evaluate. Between 1934 and 1937 he suppressed all opposition. This might be explained by his desire to consolidate his position and secure American recognition. Between 1937 and 1944, he made an abrupt about face. He legalized the Communist Party, passed many reformist pieces of legislation particularly labour reforms and instituted a new constitution which was a liberal document. According to one scholar when Batista turned the Presidency over to the Autenico's leader Grau San Martin in 1944, his tenure in office rated as the best government Cuba had enjoyed.9

It came as little surprise that after the 1952 coup, Batista faced no real immediate opposition. The church, the old bourgeoisie, the Communists and labour unions all came to his side to pledge loyalty and

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assistance. The only group that opposed Batista was the students.

Batista's major effort to legitimize his usurpation came in April of 1952 when he replaced the 1940 constitution with a new one. This document empowered him to suspend freedom of speech, assembly and press, to suspend all political parties, to disband the legislature and to postpone elections for eighteen months. This piece of legislation greatly angered the opposition groups, especially the students. Their alienation took the form of various acts of sabotage which culminated in the unsuccessful attack upon the Moncado barracks in July of 1953. The leader of this attack was a young revolutionary student named Fidel Castro, whose impassioned defence at his trial was heavy in its debt to Jose Marti.

Between the sentencing of Castro in October of 1953 and his landing in Oriente province in December of 1956, Batista faced only minimum opposition. This was due in part to the inability of the opposition forces to overcome traditional ideological differences. Moreover, Batista had retained the support of the Communists while maintaining reasonably close political and economic ties with the United States. As long as the economy remained strong

11 Ibid., p. 790.
Cuba's upper class and merchant groups were content. In other words Batista's position seemed secure.

The system of corruption which had for so long plagued Cuba was extended and elaborated to an everyday system of business.\textsuperscript{13} Large percentages of departmental budgets were consumed in graft. The impact of such a system was extensive as Cuba's bureaucracy was its second largest employer.\textsuperscript{14} Being an innovative man, Batista believed the tourist trade could be expanded through widespread gambling and prostitution.\textsuperscript{15} In order to promote such a venture he turned the enterprise over to American racketeers.

Facing such a system of corruption one would think that the Cuban people would flock to the opposition groups. Such was not the case. Whether they were content with such a system or too frustrated due to past experience is difficult to determine. What in fact Castro found was support from the peasants in Oriente province, but little else. As Batista's attempts to weed out the rebels failed his retaliation against many innocent Cubans increased. With each passing day he became more brutal until his executions and tortures reached and often surpassed ten per week in Havana alone.\textsuperscript{16} Stories of women being beaten and vicious

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 168-183. These pages provide several examples of Batista's brutality.
attacks upon peasants were common place. Gradually Batista's support began to dwindle. When he was unable, in May and June of 1958, to successfully complete his major offensive, the Rebel army began to grow. On the other hand Batista's soldiers refused to fight and preferred to desert.  

What in fact happened was that Batista through his brutality managed to alienate the bulk of Cuban society. As a result they turned to the only available mechanism capable of combatting his injustice — Castro and his rebels. Therefore Castro's function during the military confrontation was that of a guerrilla leader. As long as his forces maintained ties with the peasants of Oriente province and as long as he could continue harassing the countryside and the government, the probability of success would increase. 18 His patience was rewarded as on December 31, 1958, the Batista regime capitulated with the sudden departure of their leader.

Once Batista fled, Castro became the dominant figure in Cuban politics. Who could compete with the man that defeated one of the most brutal dictators in the history of Latin America? In Cuba no one. Thus the future

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18 By reading some of the Revolutionary Methodological books especially Ernesto Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Random House, 1968) and Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution (New York: M. F. Press, 1967), one can understand what exactly Castro's role was prior to January 1959.
of Cuba lay in the hands of the thirty-two year old rebel. Once taking control of Cuba's destiny, Castro faced a perplexing situation. He could allow the reigns of government to return to Cuba's traditional inept leadership or he could renovate Cuba's system. Since Castro believed no middle road existed, he decided upon the latter. Such a policy required numerous internal and external realignments. The one most widely known was his acceptance of Soviet aid and Communism in place of American domination and manipulation and a liberal platform. To pass judgment on his decision would not be in accord with our study. However, failing to consider the frustration which gave rise to two revolutions would be grossly unjust as it is through such a tradition that Castro's policies and actions can best be understood.
Chronology - July 1, 1958 to August 31, 1959

July 1958. Batista's major offensive which began in May of 1958 was faltering badly. On July 1st a battalion of 1,000 men under Colonel Sanchez was badly beaten by 300 of Castro's rebels. The reason for the tremendous success of Castro's rebels lays in several areas. They had superb intelligence, a fine communication network and treated all prisoners with dignity. On the other hand the Batistianos used torture and brutality on their prisoners.

Throughout July Batista's forces were plagued by desertion and defeat. By the end of the month the Rebels had forced the army to retreat from the Sierra Maestra. Casualties were extremely high as Batista lost the 11th, 18th, 19th and 22nd battalions while the Rebels suffered about 30 fatalities.

At the end of June and again in the middle of July Americans and Canadians were kidnapped. The uproar and disdain for such actions caused a great deal of criticism for Castro's Rebels. American newspapers covered this issue while Canadian newspapers neglected to devote it editorial space. In the end, all prisoners were released.

*All information for the Chronology was taken from the following texts.
Castro's reason for such action was to protest U.S. aid of Batista. His protest was unfair as Washington had ceased to supply Batista with arms several months before.

In early July the Cuban Communist Party (P.S.P.) met with the July 26th Movement in order to gain the support of the P.S.P.'s influence with labour. They did not reach an agreement as the P.S.P. came out with an appeal for elections which was an apparent retreat from Castro.

In other meetings during July the P.S.P. received sympathy from Raúl Castro, but only suspicion from Castro.

On July 20th in Caracas the Junta of Unity was formed which brought all opposition groups except the P.S.P. and electoral parties into one camp. This move provided for a common strategy to defeat Batista. Castro was named Commander in Chief of the Army.

August 1958. August 1 - 14 negotiations between Castro and P.S.P. proceeded. Their purpose was to bring the Communists into the Junta. By the middle of the month an agreement was reached. The agreement did not mark a close association between the P.S.P. and Castro: rather it applied only to the Civil War period. No mention was made of the P.S.P.'s role after Batista fell.

August 18 - 19, Castro spoke to his fellow Cubans telling them of his successes over the past few months. He pleaded with them to rise up and expel Batista. In the same speech, he invited all Cuban officers to join the
Rebels.

Raul Castro met with anti-Communist Labour leaders. He convinced them that unity was imperative, and they agreed to allay their differences.

September. Castro sensing victory began to think more about political consequences than guerrilla tactics. As a result he called for Manuel Ray, head of Havana Civic Resistance to meet with him. Castro wanted Ray to work out a scheme for Agrarian Reform.

In early September Cienfuegos and Guevara had expanded the military manoeuvres into new provinces. Successes far outweighed losses.

Disorder was running extremely high as traditional celebrations were being cancelled in order to prevent unnecessary crowds from forming.

Batista’s lieutenants were using the C.I.A. sponsored anti-Communist Organization called B.R.A.C. to torture the Rebels. On a visit to Cuba in September, Kirkpatrick (C.I.A.) reported such atrocities, as 80% of the people were against Batista and Batista would not last the year.

U.S. Ambassador Smith showed close contact with Batista as he questioned the U.S. rationale for the arms embargo.

October. Negotiations with the P.S.P. for labour unity were reached. This produced P.O.N.U., an organization which really never got off the ground prior to January of 1959. At the same time the text of the Agrarian reform
was announced. In essence it stated that State lands and
Batista's lands would be divided among all those having
less than 150 acres. Castro also threatened all participants
on the November election with death or prison terms if
they participated.

The rebel army made continuous advances through
Camaguey, until Guevara and Cienfuegos linked up in the
mountains of Las Villas. They received support from P.S.P.
and the July 26th Movement. Due to the ever-increasing
number of desertions from Batista, the Rebels met less
opposition and gained more support.

November. Cuban elections were held on November 3,
1958. Under a suspended constitution, heavy censorship,
guerrilla attacks, and Regular Army guard, few Cubans went
to the polls. Legal opposition had only one viable candi-
date in Sterling, but he had no chance. The result was
victory for Batista's candidate, Rivero Aguero. He was to
take office on 24 February. However Batista still con-
trolled the strings. To give one an idea of how dishonest
the election was, the Army drew up a phony set of election
papers which were printed up and distributed long before
the election.

November 15. Aguero called on Smith to propose
a plan which would alleviate Cuban problems and appease
about 90% of the people. He needed U.S. backing. A week
later Smith went to Washington to gather support, but U.S.
officials felt that U.S. aid would hinder the situation
and solve nothing. Smith also reported that he felt Castro's movement was Communistic.

On November 27 American diplomats met in Miami to discuss Cuba. They decided to send Pawley, an ex-U.S. Ambassador, large landholder and investor in Cuba, to talk to Batista. He was to plead with the Dictator to step down in favour of a military junta. This would at least stop Castro.

November saw the economy take a tremendous drop due to high level of sabotage, unemployment, and civil disorder. Batista's only hope was either an end to the U.S. arms embargo or U.S. intervention.

December. On the first of December the Directorio and Guevara signed a pact which agreed to full collaboration in military affairs, and to Castro's Agrarian Reform.

December 9. Pawley arrived to talk with Batista and tell him of the Miami discussion. Batista wanted assurances and Pawley could not give any. Thus Batista refused to step down.

Smith while visiting Washington, was told that the U.S. would neither provide Aguero with support nor recognition and would no longer support the present Cuban regime.

By the middle of December Batista realized his situation was hopeless.

December 17. Smith officially met Batista and told him of the American position. Batista asked if the U.S. could intervene and Smith said no.
At the same time Batista's chief, General Tabernilla, had ordered Colonel Cantillo to begin negotiations with Castro. This step was taken behind Batista's back.


Guevara made great advances in Las Villas Province. On December 18 Fomento fell, on December 22nd Cabaiguán capitulated, and Guevara then turned toward Havana and en route large towns fell without a fight.

In December General Tabernilla approached Smith to see if the U.S. would recognize a military junta. Smith said, "no".

On December 31 Batista fled, leaving his many followers to find refuge for themselves.

January 1, 1959. Cantillo told his officers of Batista's decision. The news rapidly spread throughout Havana causing pandemonium. As a result of Batista's departure Cuba possessed no legitimate government.

As well, Santiago, Santo Clare, and Havana came under rebel control.

Cantillo ordered a general cease fire, but his Batistiano troops had no desire to fire on the rebels.

Castro, in an urgent broadcast, pleaded for the Cuban people not to take the law into their own hands. Fortunately, violence was minimal, considering the hate that had built up over the years, specifically in 1957 and 1958. On the same broadcast Castro declared that Santiago would become the new Cuban Capital, with Urrutia as
Provisional President. Urrutia, in 1953, had stood up against Batista for the unjust trials of Castro and the students over the Moncado attack. Because of his stance Urrutia was forced into exile, losing all his possessions and positions.

January 2-5, 1959 (approx.). The July 26th Movement and the Student Directorate took over the role of police. This was done in order to limit the violence against the Batista supporters. At the same time all labour unions came under new leadership.

January 6, 1959. The Cuban Communist Party (P.S.P.) published a statement promising loyalty and support to the new provisional government. It is difficult to evaluate their position, but it is clear that the P.S.P. was not totally sure as to where they stood. In order to strengthen their position they felt it necessary to keep abreast to Castro's program by at least publicly supporting it. (Because of the controversy concerning Communist involvement in Cuban affairs, the situation is dealt with in greater length following this chronology. Therefore, the following on P.S.P actions or statements will be cited but not analyzed).


January 8, 1959. Castro's march across Cuba ended in Havana. The roads throughout the march had been lined with people cheering their new hero.
January 8, 1959. The war trials were continuing. From January 1, 1959 to the 10th, about 200 were executed, but these were all army officers and police. On January 1st, Castro and his legal advisors issued a decree that made the arrest and trials the role of the rebel army. It not only warned any Batista supporters of what lay ahead, but probably limited the mass violence against the defeated regime. History had shown Castro that Cubans become very emotional and revengeful when given the opportunity. This was verified by the bloodshed after the fall of Machado in 1933. By January 10th the informal trials had been replaced by regular tribunals. These were composed of two or three rebels, an assessor, and a respected citizen. The state had a prosecutor and the defendant had counsel. Contrary to what the American and Canadian press publicized, there was a genuine attempt to determine guilt. Those who were guilty of murder and torture were executed, while others received less severe penalties depending on their crime.

January 9, 1959. The Communist Party was no longer outlawed. Batista issued a statement from the Dominican Republic, that his supporters had forced him to flee. This rational was incorrect as an early departure enabled him to rob the treasury.

January 11, 1959. United States Senator Wayne Morse, head of Latin American Committee, harshly censured Castro for war trials. He suggested that if Castro would not change his style of justice the United States would
take drastic steps. Some of his alternatives were: direct invasion, embargo on Cuban goods, and stoppage of American tourists into Cuba. His position in the next few days gathered support. Only a handful of Congressmen, namely Powell and Porter, attempted to understand the Cuban position. Nevertheless, United States public and governmental criticism of Cuba continued.

January 14, 1959. Castro replied in private that if the United States intervened, 200,000 gringos would die; and, in a public speech, Castro invited United States statesmen and journalists to come to Cuba to witness the trials. Only two statesmen Powell and Porter decided to accept the invitations.

January 20, 1959. Blanca, a known Batista henchman, was tried in the Havana sports stadium before 1500 screaming people. Originally Castro had wanted to show the foreign journalists that the trials were not a disgrace to justice; rather, instead Cuban law was for the people to witness and in which to participate. Even though numerous witnesses accused Blanca of atrocities, the atmosphere of the trial was chaotic, noisy, and caused the show of justice to be interpreted as a show of injustice. The trial thus became a symbol of the American and Canadian press of Cuban "justice".

January 23-26, 1959. Castro visited Venezuela to celebrate the first anniversary of the fall of Dictator Perez Jimenez. Castro's speech denounced dictators and stressed the necessity to rise up against them.
January 27, 1959. The government abolished numbers games; government subsidies to newspapers and magazines were cancelled; and the free drink policy to police was eliminated. These policy announcements were meant to reduce the level of corruption that had riddled the Batista and all earlier Cuban regimes. Other provisional decrees of January included: dissolution of Batista's Congress; dissolution of all past criminal tribunals; abolition of all political parties; elimination of all candidates from the 1954 and 1958 elections from political life; and a freeze on all bank accounts of all civil servants. All these measures were directed at reducing corruption and/or legitimizing the new Provisional government.

February 1-8, 1959. The Agrarian Law which had been drawn up by the rebels in October of 1958 was partially implemented in the Oriente. This was not an act or decree of the provisional government, but of the rebel leader Castro. Landless farmers received from 33 1/3 to 100 acres of land. The policy affected 200,000 families.

The Cuban Constitution was amended in order to grant Che Guevara native-born status and to reduce the presidential eligibility age to 30 years. Castro thus became legally eligible. Nevertheless, Castro did not make any overt gestures to depose Urrutia. At the same session, legislative power was transferred from congress to the Cabinet.

February 8, 1959. By this date 288 had been
executed.

February 13, 1959. Castro replaced Miro as Prime Minister. This shift of position was necessary. Castro to Cuba, had become a hero of such magnitude that his word could literally make or break a government policy. If Cuba was to run efficiently Castro had to take on the responsibility in an official capacity. This was accomplished by his acceptance of the new post.

February 16, 1959. "Revolucion", the official newspaper of the July 26th Movement, published an editorial called "The Permanent Revolution". It suggested the necessary direction which Cuba had to take. This included agrarian reform and nationalization of certain industries. Nevertheless, the article was not communist inspired. It merely reflected the movement's aspirations. On the other hand, the article was published the day Castro became Prime Minister. Once could thus speculate that the two were not mere coincidence.

February 19, 1959. The new American Ambassador Philip Bonsal arrived in Cuba. From January 9, the day Smith resigned until February 19th, the United States did not have a Cuban Ambassador. The implications of this void are of utmost importance because this 6 week period was marked by great strain in Cuban-American relations. The needed official representation was not only an insult to the Cuban regime, but eliminated an important American-Cuban link. Whether an early arrival of Bonsal would have
improved the chance for better Cuban American relations is
difficult to determine, but it would have definitely
facilitated official communications. Instead the United
States was represented by attaches who might have been
competent, but still lacked officislity.

March 6, 1959. An official announcement was made
that telephone rates would be lowered, as well as government
intervention would begin in the management of the Telephone
Company.

March 10, 1959. Rent rates were lowered by as
much as 50% and empty houses or apartments had to be sold.

The effect of these last two actions (March 6 & 10)
was to free more money so as to allow the Cuban economy to
develop out of its impoverished state. Since January the
instability and unemployment had been relatively high,
thus producing a decrease in cash flow. By lowering certain
public fixed costs, the average citizen would be able to
spend more money.

March 13, 1959. The Cubans celebrated the Anniver-
sary of the Presidential Palace attack in 1957. The Cuban
Communists, the student Directorate, and the July 26th all
were involved. Castro's speech was very left wing. As a
result one could consider the festivities to be a victory
for the communists.

March 22, 1959. Jose Figueroa, the ex-President of
Costa Rica attempted to have Castro declare his foreign
policy position as to where the new Cuban regime would
stand in the East-West conflict. Castro replied that he was less worried about Communist-inspired aggression than from Miami or Santo Domingo. This reference was not, I believe, directed at the United States. Rather, it was meant for Batista's "compadres" whom Castro felt were planning a counter-revolution.

March 26, 1959. A C.I.A. report was sent to Eisenhower proclaiming that Castro was rapidly moving forward toward dictatorial powers.

April 10-14, 1959. United States Ambassadors to the various Caribbean Nations met to decide on what approach to use concerning Castro. During the meeting strong debate between Hill (Mexico) and Bonsal (Cuba) broke out over the direction and attitude the U.S. should take toward Castro. Hill wanted a strong anti-Communist attitude, while Bonsal wanted patience. In the end Bonsal won, as he managed to convince his associates that a strong communique would hinder his chances of dealing with Castro.

April 15, 1959. Herbert Motos, military governor of Camaguey and rebel major, violently denounced the communists.

April 15 - May 7, 1959. Castro left for Washington at the invitation of the Newspaper Editors, not the American government. His trip lasted until May 1st and included stops in Canada and certain Latin American countries. However he did not return to Cuba until May 7, 1959. During the American visit Castro was followed by large and
attentive audiences. He met once with Vice-President Nixon, but never with President Eisenhower. In the Nixon meeting, Castro was confronted with the Cuban Communist file and refused to look at it. After that Nixon's opinion of Castro was not good. Throughout his trip, Castro proclaimed he was not a communist. He also revoked an earlier stance on his neutrality in the East-West cold war. He now sided with the West. On several occasions during the visit Raul Castro contacted his brother and once met him in Texas. Their conversation was not known but, from Castro's pro Western statement while in the U.S., one could deduce that Raul, a supporter of widespread revolutionary change, desired to reinforce his brothers revolutionary integrity.

May 7, 1959. Ambassador Bonsal met Castro at the airport. This marked the last interchange between the two until June.

May 9, 1959. Castro restated his American pledge of democracy for Cuba.

May 11, 1959. The University of Havana reopened, but a committee was established to purge the anti-revolutionaries. This act was in accord with Castro's May 9th pledge.

May 17, 1959. Agrarian Reform Law was put into operation. The law established a limit of 1000 acres per farm unless it exceeded the national average of 50%, where it was extended to 3333 acres. Exceptions could be allowed
if the government approved. The law affected 10% of the farmers but only 40% of the land. All expropriated property was to be compensated by 4½% 20-year bonds. The law was to be managed by the Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA). The new agency's powers were broad and included not only expropriation and redistribution but the road building, health, education, and housing. It also absorbed other stabilization institutes. The new law also provided for cooperatives, whose profits would be returned to the workers. The effect of the law was to lower the sugar prices on the New York Stock Exchange. Strong attacks were made by large landowners and a fear expressed that the small farms would be too insufficient for productive profitable results.

May 21, 1959. Castro proclaimed his revolution to be different from both Capitalism and Communism, and to be for the Cuban - he called it "Humanism". He discredited Communists for demanding higher wages as well as being linked to counter-revolutionaries.

May 24, 1959. Communist labour leaders formed a new labour alliance to support the July 26th Movement.

The alliance eventually won control over all major unions by the end of May.

May 30, 1959. P.S.P. formulated a declaration proclaiming moderation and loyalty to the revolution. This move was necessary if the Communists hoped to retain any position within the new regime. However, they had important allies in Raul Castro and Guevara. Through these two the
Communists had received positions in the INRA.

June 1-5, 1959. Cattlemen began to organize in protest against the acreage limit of the new Agrarian Law. They argued such limits were inadequate to make business profitable.

By early June, Cuba was politically divided among several factions. The Communists were weakened by the events of middle May, but still retained important allies and positions. The July 26th Movement had gained ground by the labour victory, but was poorly organized; the large business concerns were financially strong, but politically weak; and then there was Castro, who was definitely not in any one camp, but probably somewhere between the Communists and the July 26th sentiments.

June 11, 1959. United States sent an official note to Cuba which expressed concern about the expropriations. The act is of importance because American tradition in the Caribbean has not been one of philanthropy. Instead the American government has attempted to protect its multinational interests. An example was Guatemala in 1954. Even if Washington did not have any plans of intervention, historical precedence could have frightened Castro. The reaction might have pushed Castro further to the left or to the Communists.

June 12, 1959. Liberal Ministers resigned due to differences with Castro.

June 13, 1959. Castro violently attacked all
critics of the Agrarian Reform claiming that such action was the mark of a traitor.

June 15, 1959. Cuba rejected U.S. note of June 11 in that prompt compensation was not possible. The communique was moderate in other areas of Cuba - U.S. relations.

June 11 - 15, 1959. Several bombs exploded in Havana. As a result the Constitution was amended to provide the death penalty for any counter-revolutionary activities. One right wing, lawyer Llaca Ortez, was arrested. The judiciary ordered his release while the rebels demanded a trial. Castro lost because he could not discard the right of 'habeas corpus'. Thus Castro could only go so far under the 1940 Constitution. If this incident is observed on a wider scale its impact is magnified. If Castro legitimately desired revolutionary change and if he were to be limited by the Constitutions principles, he would have had to limit or eliminate the barrier. From the Llaca incident on, Castro never again criticized the Communists. Instead he attacked those who were anti-communist.

June 14, 1959. An expedition from Cuba landed in the Dominican Republic. This manoeuvre, had it succeeded in engendering another Civil War, would have increased Castro's prestige: however, it failed.

June 29, 1959. Diaz Lanz, head of the Air Force, strongly criticized Raul Castro for indoctrination classes that included elementary Marxism. Fidel's reaction was to
upbraid Diaz Lanz and force his resignation. Fearing his life, Diaz Lanz fled to Miami.

June 30, 1959. President Urrutia, in a television broadcast, denounced Communism.

June 30, 1959. A C.I.A. report argued that Castro was pro-communism and surrounded by either communist or pro-communist advisors.

July 3, 1959. Castro’s reply to Urrutia and Diaz Lanz stated that it would have been unfair to attack Communists just because others accused Cuba of being Communist. This statement almost officially declared the quasi-alliance between the Communists and Castro. The indications are that by early June the two had reached a rapprochement.

July 13, 1959. Another interview with Urrutia took place in which the Cuban President reiterated his fear of Communism gathering ground in Cuba.

July 14, 1959. Diaz Lanz appeared before an American senatorial Committee and denounced Cuba as being controlled by Communists.

July 17, 1959. As a reaction to Diaz Lanz and Urrutia, Castro resigned. That night he bitterly attacked the President and all Urrutia had done. Support for Castro began pouring in and Urrutia resigned.

July 23, 1959. A general strike was organized by the Cuban Trade Congress in order to return Castro to power.

July 26, 1959. A celebration of the Cuban Independence
movement took place. Thousands of people gathered at the Plaza Civico in support of Castro. Castro spoke for hours in which he acknowledged his supporters.

End of July. Castro now felt extremely secure about his position, which had received such a massive public mandate, and began to search out sources of securing arms. The alternatives were limited, since the U.S. and Cubans had turned him down. He now, at last, thought about the Soviet Union.

Middle of August. Trujillo employed two conspirators to land an invasion of Cuba. Had they succeeded they were to have contacted Santo Domingo for reinforcements. Little did Trujillo know that his conspirators had relayed the invasion plan to Castro. All invaders were arrested. This counter-revolutionary attempt provided Castro with the opportunity to round-up many of those who he felt would try to stifle the Revolution.
Chapter IV

Canadian and American Editorial Coverage of the Cuban Revolution

Our investigation of Canadian and American editorial coverage of the Cuban Revolution centres upon three main topics: Fidel Castro, Fulgencio Batista and the Revolution. The general topic of the Revolution is in turn subdivided so as to facilitate assessment of editorial opinions toward the use of guerrilla warfare, revolutionary justice (i.e. the War Trials), revolutionary economic policy and the role of communism in the Revolution. Because these four attendant sub-units of the Revolution relate in part to either Castro or Batista, their discussion is left to the end of the chapter. Of the three main topics Fidel Castro receives the most extensive editorial coverage. For this reason we will begin our analysis by examining editorial attitudes to the leader of the Cuban Revolution.

I  What were the editorial attitudes of the Canadian and American press toward Fidel Castro?

Out of a total number of one-hundred and forty-nine editorials Castro was mentioned by name in one hundred and twenty-five of them, or 63.9% of the editorials. Assessments of Fidel Castro were favourable in thirty-eight or 25.5% of the editorials, neutral in twenty-eight or 18.7%, and unfavourable in sixty-five or 45.9% of the editorials. Table I shows the differences between
Canadian and American editorial attitudes toward Castro.

Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Canada (N)</th>
<th>(N) (%</th>
<th>United States (N)</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favourable</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavourable</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though editorial coverage in the United States greatly exceeded that in Canada the press in both nations seemed to evaluate Castro similarly. However, if we further examine the data according to whether editorial opinions were located in elite or mass newspapers within the two countries, we get quite a different picture as Table 2 reveals.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Canada (N)</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>United States (N)</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favourable</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavourable</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>94.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Viewing the data in this way we find that, on the one hand, the Canadian mass press and the American elite press exhibited a similar attitudinal distribution,
balancing favourable and unfavourable opinions. On the other hand the Canadian elite and especially the American mass press have far fewer favourable editorials. However, in the case of the American mass press our analysis was restricted to only one newspaper, the Detroit News and therefore our data can not be taken as representative of the American mass press. The major difference between the Canadian elite and mass press lies in a greater number of neutral editorials as opposed to favourable ones. The American elite evaluated Castro far more favourably than did Canadian elite press.

We can further refine our analysis by examining the data on a month by month basis. Table 3 covers the period from January 1959 to August 1959, months which contained the largest number of editorials devoted to Castro. Broken down by country and type of press, the table gives two percentages: Column A, the percent of favourable, neutral and unfavourable editorials of all the editorials for a particular month and Column B, the percent each month represents of the aggregate total.

We see from Table 3 that editorial coverage of Castro is concentrated in three months, January, April and July. These three months contain 66.5% of all editorials written in 1959 and 55.7% of all editorials in our entire fourteen month period. The most favourable press opinion toward Castro is found in January of 1959. In January the Canadian elite and mass press plus the
Table 3

Editorial Attitudes Toward Castro on a Monthly and Yearly Basis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>Fav.</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neut.</td>
<td>25.</td>
<td>75.</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfav.</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>Fav.</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neut.</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfav.</td>
<td>50.</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Fav.</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neut.</td>
<td>50.</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfav.</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Fav.</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>50.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neut.</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfav.</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Fav.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neut.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfav.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Fav.</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neut.</td>
<td>50.</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>50.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfav.</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Fav.</td>
<td></td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neut.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfav.</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Fav.</td>
<td>20.</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neut.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfav.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

American elite press contributed a significant percent of their total favourable editorials to the new leader. Only the American mass press did not greet Castro with a positive editorial. A typical favourable example is found in the New York Times of January 11, 1959:
"One measure of greatness has always been a refusal to accept defeat. No one can deny Fidel Castro that quality."

Another is found in the Ottawa Citizen of January 6, 1959:

"He wants to put an end to dictatorship and the repressive measures through which these regimes are so often maintained, and to institute genuine democracy."

Nevertheless, January is also marked by a reasonably high level of unfavourable editorials. However, these relate primarily to the war trials, an issue which we intend to examine separately.

Upon Castro's accession to power both nations' elite press and all but the Windsor Star of the Canadian mass press welcomed Castro's victory as being an important step in the creation of a democracy in Cuba. Comments like, "Castro, to his credit, has shown no signs of desiring to return to politics as usual," in the Washington Post of January 6, 1959 typifies most editorials. However, this sanguine view of Castro had not prevailed during the earlier insurgency phase of the Revolution. During that period the American elite press commented on Cuba in twenty-one editorials of which only nine concerned Castro. Of these nine, two were favourable while seven were unfavourable. Thus, January 1, 1959 seemed to be a line of demarcation between attitudes of disdain and respect toward Castro. Since there was no Canadian editorial comment prior to January 1959, we do not know if this switch in opinion is idiosyncratic with regard to the
United States. However, there is a high degree of similarity between all but the American mass press in the initial response to Castro's victory.

The second month of concentrated coverage occurred during Castro's visit to Canada and the United States in April of 1959. During April the Canadian mass press reaction to Castro was more closely aligned with the American elite press than was the Canadian elite press. This positive reaction pertains not only to his visit to Canada and the United States, but towards his role in Cuba as well. In April, even the Detroit News, an implacable foe of Castro, contributed a neutral editorial. Perhaps this surge of favourable opinion can be attributed to editors' attempting to put visiting dignitaries in the best possible light. This seems to be the case with Castro, for prior to his journey he received strong editorial condemnation over his administration of justice. However we would have to examine other cases in order to see if this is a general phenomena.

In July, Castro received consistently unfavourable press comment when charges of communist infiltration and political demagoguery were levied on Castro. Reaction was that of condemnation in the Canadian and American newspapers, elite as well as mass. On July 16, 1959 the Windsor Star commented, "Castro accused of being a Red and is compounded by the fact he persists in acting like one", while the Toronto Star of July 22 clamied "There is a disturbing trend in the tactics Fidel Castro is now
pursuing in Cuba. His resort to demagogy to force the
resignation of President Urrutia --- have implications
more alarming than the largely unsupported charges of
communism levied against him." Finally the St. Louis Post
Dispatch on July 20, 1959 pointed out that "his demagogic
exhibition has encouraged his critics and enemies in this
country."

In general, then, we find similarities between
the Canadian mass and elite press and the American elite
press with regard to attitudes toward Castro during the
most salient periods of editorial coverage. However, the
exception to this trend is the American mass press, i.e.
the Detroit News, which consistently contained unfavourable
editorial references toward Castro. However as we mentioned,
since only one newspaper was used to tap the American mass
press opinion, we do not know how representative the finding
is of mass press opinion in the United States.

Thus far we have discussed editorial appraisals of
Castro by country and according to newspaper type. There
are, of course, other important areas of difference speci-
fically among the newspapers in Canada and pairs of news-
papers between the two countries.

Within Canada we selected six (6) newspapers to
insure regional and cultural representation. We discovered
wide regional variations with Ontario providing the highest
proportion of Canadian editorials. Out of the forty-nine
editorials the four Ontario newspapers contained forty-one
or 83.8% of the Canadian editorials. Since Ontario papers comprised 66% of the Canadian sample, if coverage were balanced we would expect the regional press to contain twenty editorials, but that was not the case. One can speculate on the reason for this variance between Ontario and the rest of Canada, but clearly the regional press differed in number of editorials as compared with the Ontario press. Numerical discrepancies were not the only difference as the opinions espoused in the regions differed from those in the Ontario press. For example, neither the Winnipeg Free Press nor Le Pressé contained an unfavourable editorial toward Castro. The former was neutral while the latter was favourable. Comparing this with the four Ontario newspapers where 17% of the editorials were favourable, 19.2% neutral and 48.9% unfavourable toward Castro, we see that there were differences between Ontario and other regions both in terms of extent of coverage and evaluations of Castro.

We had sought to include French opinions in the hope of comparing them with English editorials, but French coverage was too limited to allow comparisons with the English editorials. However, during Castro's visit to Canada in April of 1959 Le Pressé's editorial - "Un Latin on visite chez d'autres Latins" - emphasized the many analogous traits that the French and Latin cultures share. This might explain Le Pressé's five favourable editorials toward Castro. Yet a total of five editorials is too
small a sample from which to accept the cultural similarity thesis advanced in *La Presse*.

Regional and cultural editorial opinions about Castro have suggested certain differences within Canada, but we can also compare groups of newspapers according to other criteria. The *Toronto Globe and Mail* and the *New York Times* have been described as the closest thing to national newspapers each nation possesses and as such are interesting to compare. Upon examination we find that editorial attitudes toward Castro are quite different as Table 4 indicates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Toronto Globe &amp; Mail</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>New York Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Favourable</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Unfavourable</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we compare editorial references to Fidel Castro it is apparent that our two elite newspapers adopted significantly different editorial positions. Nearly fifty percent of the references to Castro in the *New York Times* were favourable; conversely, 67% of the *Globe and Mail*'s references were unfavourable. Furthermore, their editorial style differed. The *Toronto Globe and Mail* discussed
Castro by use of innuendo. For example, on February 21, 1959 the Globe contained an editorial discussing "how the fine glow of idealism which surrounded the Cuban Revolution ... seems to be wearing off rather rapidly." They also compared his stated intentions of January with his performance upon becoming Prime Minister in February and concluded with these words: "In Cuba as elsewhere, the more things change the more they remain the same." On the same subject the New York Times editorial of February 17, 1959 stated: "But for the present there is obviously no alternative to the assumption of official responsibility for policy by Fidel Castro." Thus both editorials evaluated the same development, i.e. Castro's official assumption of leadership, in different directions. The former by referring to past events and the latter to the requirements of the present situation. These examples are typical of how each paper covered Fidel Castro.

While the Times and Globe and Mail represent one type of elite press; i.e. a national newspaper, the Ottawa Citizen and the Washington Post represent another type—the capital newspaper. Differences between the two capital newspapers are shown in Table 5.

By comparing editorial attitudes we can see that the Washington Post adopted an unfavourable position toward Castro in 58.6% of its editorials. No specific position can be discerned in the Ottawa Citizen's editorial opinions about Castro.
Table 5

Editorial Opinions of the Ottawa Citizen and the Washington Post toward Castro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ottawa Citizen</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Washington Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we compare Table 4 with Table 5 we can readily see that the New York Times and the Washington Post, both American elite newspapers, view Castro quite differently. The former is definitely favourable while the latter is consistently unfavourable. In this same vein the Toronto Globe and Mail is in close alignment with the Washington Post's attitude toward Castro. Of the four newspapers, the Ottawa Citizen's editorials were considerably more heterogeneous in that almost no numerical difference existed in the number of favourable neutral and unfavourable editorials. In short, the Ottawa Citizen is the only one of the national and capital newspapers which failed to convey a distinct editorial position.

The third pair, the Windsor Star and the Detroit News, are border newspapers and were selected because of the proximity of the two cities. Table 6 displays the editorial positions of these border newspapers.

Data from Table 6 reveals that both newspapers
Table 6

**Editorial Attitudes of the Windsor Star**

and the Detroit News Toward Castro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Windsor Star</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Detroit News</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

reacted to Castro unfavourably - the News to a greater extent than the Star. They consistently attacked him while never praising his motives. An example of this tendency was found in the Windsor Star on March 9, 1959: "Let him (Castro) get a shower and shave and see what can be done about getting his country on safe and stable ground." In the same vein a Detroit News editorial on May 25 commented, "Within less than three months as Premier, while flitting about the hemisphere he has made up his mind what is the best thing not only for the millions of Cuba's underprivileged, but for the agricultural well-being of the nation as a whole. The best brains in the field of scientific farming and marketing and the ablest technicians on the subject of collective operations could not do it in that time." We may ask what does a leader's dress and appearance have to do with his leadership ability or what does the advice of experts mean when the Cuban people demanded Agrarian reform? Neither of these questions
LEAF 62 OMITTED IN PAGE NUMBERING.
was dealt with in the *Windsor Star* or the *Detroit News*. Furthermore, Castro's attempt to clean up governmental graft, police corruption and gambling were never discussed. Both newspapers often employed satire to discredit Castro, rather than attacking the Cuban leader on the merits of his policies.

Whether these two newspapers are representative of other border city pairs would require further investigation, e.g. an examination of newspapers in Seattle and Vancouver, Buffalo and Fort Erie, etc. Additionally, it must be emphasized that Detroit has two major daily newspapers and we examined but one. Possibly if we had chosen the *Detroit Free Press* our results would have been quite different. Nevertheless both newspapers manifested a distinctly unfavourable editorial policy toward Castro.

Of the six newspapers the only pair which evaluated Castro in a similar fashion was the *Detroit News* and the *Windsor Star*. However, of the remaining four newspapers only the *Toronto Globe and Mail* and the *Washington Post* followed the above pattern by exhibiting unfavourable opinions about Castro. Only one newspaper the *New York Times* was favourable and only one the *Ottawa Citizen* failed to clearly define its position. Thus, four out of these six, two elite and two mass, were unfavourable, one, an elite newspaper favourable and one, a mass paper non-committal in attitudes toward Castro.

If we classify our total sample of newspapers
according to whether they adopted a favourable attitude, an unfavourable attitude, or no definite position toward Castro, we can see from Table 7 that editorial attitudes cannot be predicted either on the basis of nation or whether the newspaper is elite or mass.

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Editorial Attitudes Toward Castro For Each Newspaper*</th>
<th>At Least 45% Unfavourable</th>
<th>No Clearly Observable Position</th>
<th>At Least 45% Favourable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Windsor Star (C-M)</td>
<td>Winnipeg Free Press</td>
<td>La Presse (C-M)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto Globe and Mail (C-E)</td>
<td>Toronto Star (C-E)</td>
<td>New York Times (A-E)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit News (A-M)</td>
<td>Ottawa Citizen (C-M)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post (A-E)</td>
<td>St. Louis Post Dispatch (A-E)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion by grouping editorial references to Fidel Castro simply by nation (Table I) we find a similar distribution of attitudes. However, once we divide national press into our elite and mass categories, we discover that the attitudes of the Canadian mass press more closely resemble those of the U.S. elite press (Table 2) than (1) elite press in Canada or (2) mass newspapers in the United States. In addition, the Canadian elite press reviews Castro more unfavourably than the Canadian mass newspapers. These findings fail to confirm the proposition that elite

*C-E Canadian-Elite  A-E American-Elite
C-M Canadian-Mass  A-M American-Mass
and mass presses in different countries display similar editorial attitudes. Nevertheless we did locate certain periods during which editorial opinions of most newspapers in both countries and of both types (Table 3) were in agreement. In fact as Table 7 indicates, editorial attitudes toward Castro were more a product of each newspaper's particular predisposition than its National or Mass-Elite classification. While there is this wide variation between newspapers there are general trends. Favourable editorials reached their peak in January of 1959. By the spring of that year the percentage of favourable comments had diminished. By the summer of 1959 only the New York Times commented favourably on the Revolutionary leader.

II What were the editorial attitudes of the Canadian and American press toward Fulgencio Batista?

Of the one hundred and forty-nine editorials, Batista was discussed in sixty-eight of them or 45.6% of all editorials. The preponderance of editorial opinion regarding Batista was unfavourable (83.9%). There were no favourable editorials while 16.1% were neutral. Table 8 gives a breakdown of editorial opinion toward Batista by country.

Since coverage in the American press extends over a period of fourteen months while Canadian editorials are limited to the last eight months of our study, comparative inquiry concerning editorial attitudes toward Batista during his period of rule is impossible. The problem is
Table 8
Editorial Attitudes Toward Batista by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Favourable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfavourable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

further compounded by Batista's lack of saliency after January of 1959. In those seven months - February to August - the Canadian press expressed an opinion about him in only three editorials while the American editors mentioned the deposed dictator in twelve editorials. Our comparative analysis of attitudes toward Batista is therefore limited to the month of January 1959. Table 9 reveals the distribution of attitudes toward Batista by country during this month.

Table 9
American and Canadian Editorial Attitudes toward Batista in January 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Favourable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfavourable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows that newspapers in both Canada and the United States evaluated Batista unfavourably.

If we dichotomize all editorials according to newspaper
type within each country we uncover a different pattern as shown in Table 10.

Table 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Editorial Attitudes Toward Batista</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Elite</td>
<td>Mass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(N) %</td>
<td>(N) %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>9 32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>19 57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>28 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Viewing the data in this way we see that in the United States elite press Batista received unfavourable comment in 51% of the editorials. In no other instance did newspapers so often comment unfavourably about Batista. Once again the Canadian mass press came closest to the United States elite press in attitudinal distribution. If we look at the relationship between unfavourable and neutral, we can see that the Detroit News (the only American mass press sampled) is the only newspaper with fewer unfavourable editorials than neutral ones.

Generally editorial appraisals of Batista were too few in number to permit a comprehensive analysis. What emerges from the data we do have is that Batista was viewed unfavourably in all newspapers regardless of national origin or newspaper type. The American elite press is most critical, the American mass press the least critical
while the Canadian press both mass and elite fall in between.

III What were the editorial attitudes of the Canadian and American Press toward the Revolution?

In assessing editorial attitudes of the press toward the Cuban Revolution in addition to attitudes toward the Revolution in general, we have chosen four specific issues to examine: (1) the use of guerrilla warfare (2) revolutionary justice as reflected in the War Trials (3) implementation of the Revolution's economic policy (4) the role of communism in the Revolution.

III - A - The Revolution in general

Regarding the Revolution in general, ninety-six of the one-hundred and forty-nine editorials coded (64.5%) expressed an opinion. Since we previously noted that 84% of the editorials dealt with Castro, our findings reinforce the key position which the leader Castro played in the Revolution. It is interesting, however, that editorial attitudes toward the Revolution were generally more favourable than those toward Castro. Of the editorials dealing with the Revolution thirty-eight were favourable, sixteen neutral and forty-two unfavourable. Table 11 shows a comparison of editorial attitudes toward Castro and the Revolution.

As we see, in both cases the number of unfavourable editorials exceeds the number of favourable ones, although the difference is far smaller regarding the Revolution.
Table 11
Comparison of Editorial Attitudes Toward Castro and the Revolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Toward Castro</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Toward the Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>149</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As was true with regard to both Castro and Batista, there appears to be a basic similarity between Canadian and American editorial opinion toward the Revolution as indicated by Table 12.

Table 12
Canadian and American Editorial Attitudes Toward the Revolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>28.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the Revolution appears to be a more salient topic in the American press, we find with regard to both nations a balance between favourable and unfavourable attitudes, with the unfavourable slightly exceeding the favourable. Since there were only eight Canadian editorials dealing with the Revolution after February 1959, it is difficult to examine trends in attitudes. What appears to
have happened in the Canadian press was that Castro became the personification of the Revolution and editorial coverage focused on him rather than on the programmes of the Revolution.

We can further analyze attitudes toward the Revolution by type of newspaper within each country.

Table 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mass</th>
<th>Elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Mass</th>
<th>Elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Editorial attitudes of the elite press of Canada and the United States differed greatly. In the United States 34.1% of the editorials in the elite press viewed the Revolution favourably, while in the Canadian elite press the percent of favourable views was only 19. Likewise the unfavourable percentages were reversed 23.1% unfavourable in the American elite press as opposed to 38% unfavourable in the Canadian elite press. Again as was the case with attitudes toward Castro, there was a similarity between the American elite press and the Canadian mass press in terms of favourable - unfavourable ranking. The biggest difference occurred in the far greater percentage of non-
applicable editorials — 60.6% in the Canadian mass press as opposed to only 29% in the American elite press. The major finding here substantiates the relationship discovered while analyzing attitudes toward Castro was the relative uniqueness of the Canadian elite press in terms of consistently unfavourable editorial opinion accorded to Fidel Castro as well as to the Revolution.

During the three periods of peak coverage of Fidel Castro (January, April and July of 1959), we find that the Revolution received coverage primarily during January and July. Looking specifically at January we find that both Castro and the Revolution got approximately equal editorial coverage, the only exception being the Canadian mass press.

Table 14
Comparison of Opinions Toward Castro and the Revolution — January 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass</td>
<td>Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castro Revol</td>
<td>Castro Revol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 14 indicates, in January, the Revolution was viewed in more favourable terms than Castro. This was most pronounced in the American elite press and the Canadian mass press where the ratio of favourable to unfavourable was higher with regard to the Revolution than
toward Castro. By July 1959 we see that the number of editorial comments had decreased most materially in the Canadian press and that those comments became increasingly unfavourable both with regard to Castro and the Revolution in both countries.

Table 15
Comparison of Opinions Toward Castro and the Revolution — July 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mass</th>
<th>Elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revol</td>
<td>Revol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castro</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mass</th>
<th>Elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revol</td>
<td>Revol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cat</td>
<td>Fav</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mass</th>
<th>Elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revol</td>
<td>Revol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neut</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mass</th>
<th>Elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revol</td>
<td>Revol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfav</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In our analysis of Castro we noticed that newspapers of both types differed considerably in their editorial attitudes. By classifying newspapers according to the same procedure as used in Table 7, we find the following distribution.

In Table 16 we can see that many (40%) of the newspapers analyzed failed to maintain a consistent pattern of evaluation. Two newspapers the Washington Post and Windsor Star shifted from an unfavourable position on Castro to no specific position on the Revolution. Other differential patterns of evaluation are also apparent. The Winnipeg Free Press moved from no clearly stated position on Castro to a favourable position on the Revolution. Conversely La Presse moved from a favourable position
Table 16

Editorial Attitudes Toward the Revolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At Least 45% Unfavourable</th>
<th>No clearly stated position</th>
<th>At Least 45% Favourable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toronto Globe and Mail (C – E)</td>
<td>Ottawa Citizen (C – M)</td>
<td>Winnipeg Free Press (C – E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Toronto Star (C – E)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>La Presse (C – M)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Washington Post (A – E)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St. Louis Post Dispatch (A – E)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

on Castro to no specific position on the Revolution. In no instance did any newspaper evaluate Castro (i.e. favourable or unfavourable) and the Revolution in opposite directions. Hence, in most cases newspapers were consistent in their editorial assessments of Castro and the Cuban Revolution in general. Although the use of the elite–mass dichotomy does not appear to be useful in predicting attitudes in aggregate the data points to a less unfavourable attitude toward the Revolution than toward its leader Fidel Castro. However, as time passed editorials about the Revolution decreased in number with respect to the number of editorials devoted to Castro.

*(A – E) – American Elite (C – E) – Canadian Elite
(A – M) – American Mass (C – M) – Canadian Mass
The trend of attitudes both with regard to Castro and the Revolution were those of increasingly unfavourable comment over the period January to August 1959.

III - B What were the editorial attitudes of the Canadian and American press toward the use of guerrilla warfare?

Since the Canadian press did not comment on the Revolution during its insurgency phase comparison of national editorial attitudes toward the use of guerrilla warfare is impossible. In spite of its revolutionary origin, American editorial comment on the use of political violence was generally negative. Eleven out of a total of sixteen editorials indicated unfavourable attitudes. Some of the guerrilla tactics that provoked American editorial disfavour were the kidnappings of American and Canadians working in Cuba, threats of execution aimed at participants in the November Cuban election and Rebel disruption of the Cuban economy. However, editorials failed to discuss the relationship between guerrilla tactics and increased public support for the rebel movement.

III - C What were the editorial attitudes of the Canadian and American press toward War Trials?

The war trials, which began shortly after Castro took power in January 1959, provided the first concrete evidence that Castro represented more than the usual Latin American caudillo - and did much to turn initial
editorial optimism about the Revolution to almost universal condemnation. For this reason, the war trials are among the most salient events of the early revolutionary period.

Upon gaining power in Cuba, the rebels and their followers began to try, convict, and execute Batista officials. Provocation was not lacking as many hundreds of rebel sympathizers and innocent bystanders had been brutally tortured by the Batistianos. Revolutionary justice was dispersed summarily and with great emotional fervor. The reaction to the war trials in both the American and Canadian press editorials was unfavourable. A total of nineteen editorials commented on the war trials with all but one being unfavourable. Table 17 indicates the distribution of editorial attitudes according to nation and type of press.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 17</th>
<th>Editorial Attitudes Toward the War Trials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elite Mass Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 0 Favourable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 1 Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 4 Unfavourable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, there is some evidence that the war trials had a direct impact on editorial attitudes toward other issues. In three newspapers, the Windsor Star, Detroit News, and Toronto Globe and Mail there were several references to Cuban justice in the post-January period.
For example, on April 13, 1959, concerning Castro's trip to Canada the *Windsor Star* commented editorially as follows:

"Since Castro does not realize the full meaning of justice and liberty, he should not be a welcome guest here."

A more pervasive negative reaction toward the Cuban Revolution is demonstrated by the following editorial comment from the March 25 edition of the *Toronto Globe and Mail*.

"As Havana sees it, you can not stand somebody up against a wall on Good Friday or Easter Sunday or Easter Monday. But come Tuesday, everything will be back to normal and the shooting will be resumed."

The war trials seemed to be the type of event that established a mood of negativism in both Canadian and American press toward the Revolution and its leader in its very early phases. The war trials were a particularly significant event in the Canadian press, where total editorial coverage actually exceeded that received in the American press. The fact that so many editorials were devoted to the war trials is noteworthy when one considers that American editorials out-numbered Canadian editorials by two to one over the entire period of the Revolution. The trials, while perhaps understandable in terms of the conditions in Cuba were tremendously costly to the revolutionary government in terms of establishing sympathetic understanding toward the Revolution in the North American press.
III - D What were the editorial attitudes of the Canadian and American press toward Revolutionary economic policy?

One of the early economic policies of the Cuban Revolution was the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Spring of 1959. It sought to redistribute land to impoverished rural peasants. Under provisions of the Agrarian Reform Law land was expropriated but owners were to receive compensation. The law provided us with a substantive issue on which we can compare American and Canadian editorial reactions to Cuban revolutionary economic policy.

Table 18
Comparison of Canadian and American Editorial Attitudes toward Revolutionary Economic Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canadian Elite</th>
<th>Canadian Mass</th>
<th>American Elite</th>
<th>American Mass</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree with its need</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Agree with its contents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Disagree with its need</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree with its contents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Hurt respective National Corporate interests</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Not hurt respective National corporate interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Neutral to economic policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Editorials Devoted to topic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we can see from Table 18 eleven editorials commented on the Agrarian Reform Law. Eight of these appeared in the American press while only three Canadian editorials concerned themselves with this aspect of the Revolution. Of the seven editorials in the American elite
press four agreed with the need for agrarian reform, while three disagreed with this particular agrarian reform policy. Disagreements with the reform focused upon the question of expropriation which it was felt would hinder American investment in Cuba and thus negatively affect an already weak economy. Editorial comments were thus indirectly protective of American investments as obviously American corporations would be affected. Comments like "it will dry up investment and shake confidence," appearing in the St. Louis Post Dispatch on June 16, 1959 or "a confiscatory policy which dries up the flow of investment funds and shakes confidence in a national regime would be a high price to pay for land reform, however meritorious, the basic objective may be," which appeared in the Washington Post on June 4, 1959 were typical of the elite press' attitude toward the Agrarian Reform Law. However, the American elite press did not directly attack Cuba for expropriation of American property, rather it warned that such a policy would adversely affect the Cuban economy. Therefore, the elite press' attitude was not as protective of American interests as one might expect.

III - D What were the editorial attitudes of the Canadian and American press toward the role of Communism in the Revolution?

As we noted, during the insurgency phase of the Revolution the Cuban Communists did not support the rebels until Batista's May and June offensive had been defeated.
In fact, their initial gestures toward Castro fell upon deaf ears. However, the Communists were befriended by Castro's brother Raul and it was through his initiative that the Cuban Communist Party entered the United Front. Nevertheless, at best, they remained on the periphery of the rebellion.

On the whole there seemed to be little evidence to substantiate claims that communism inspired the Revolution. Indeed, none of the editorials appearing in 1958 referred either to Communism or to the Cuban Communist Party. Nevertheless, the Communist issue did begin to appear in editorials during January. At that time the Washington Post, St. Louis Post Dispatch and the Winnipeg Free Press (all elite newspapers), refuted the notion that the Communists were a significant factor in the Revolution.

After the departure of Batista the Cuban Communists began slowly to make inroads. Their success, which was not totally apparent until July of 1959, was due to several factors, the most important being the influence of Ernesto Guevara and Raul Castro, fear of the United States politically and economically and the organizational strength of the Cuban Communist Party.

Again with regard to the issue of Communism, the major difference between Canadian and American coverage is that there are far more American editorials dealing with this issue, fourteen, as opposed to seven for the Canadian newspapers surveyed.
Editorial reaction to the participation of the Cuban Communist Party in the Revolution did not appear until April of 1959. It was brought up in conjunction with Castro's visit to the United States as one of the myths he would have to shatter. However only four editorials even discussed the issue of communism. Three editorials, one each in the New York Times, Washington Post and Winnipeg Free Press actually stated that Castro would have to dispell the rumours of communist infiltration while a fourth in the Windsor Star felt conditions in Cuba favoured communist takeover. In no case did editorials suggest that rumours of communist involvement had any substance. In fact those references to Communism, the first since January of 1959, provided evidence that there was little fear of a communist government coming to power in Cuba.

In the next two months, May and June, communism became increasingly more salient. Out of fourteen editorials during this period five referred to Communism. However no editorials accused either Castro or his government of being sympathetic to or being communists. In fact two editorials which appeared in the New York Times and Washington Post, respectively, applauded Castro for attacking and discrediting the communists while a third in the Toronto Star reiterated the earlier concern with deteriorating economic conditions.

Accusation of Communist involvement in the Revolutionary movement did not appear until July of 1959.
at which time the *Windsor Star* and *Detroit News* accused Castro of collaborating with and supporting the Cuban Communists. Other newspapers including the *Washington Post*, *Toronto Globe and Mail*, *Toronto Star*, *St. Louis Post Dispatch* now felt that conditions in Cuba were conducive to a communist takeover yet none accused either Castro or his government of actually being communist.

We can see that the issue of communism was salient mainly in reference to fears that conditions in Cuba might deteriorate so that the communists might come to power. In the early months the Revolution and its leader were defended against charges of pro-communist leanings and by the summer of 1959 only two editorials had openly accused Castro of Communist sympathies. In short the issue of communism seems not to have exacerbated relations between Canada and the United States and Cuba during the initial phase of the Revolution.
Chapter V

The Roles of the Press

In Chapter I we described a few authors' interpretations of how the press and government interact. Two writers, William Rivers and James Reston advanced the proposition that the government and representatives of the "fourth branch of government" are adversaries rather than allies in the policy-process. Since this project focuses on editorial attitudes toward the Cuban Revolution we have an opportunity to analyze particular roles of the press in one particular event. In our previous discussion we focused on three roles, all of which relate to the press' reaction to government policy. These included the role of advocate, critic and policy initiator. The first, the advocate, incorporates statements made to support the policy or actions of government; the second, the critic, disagrees with how the government is handling a situation or situations; while the third, the policy initiator, offers suggestions as to what changes need to be made in the prevailing policy or what new policies or actions should be pursued.

Initially we had planned to examine the roles of the press both within and across national boundaries. As Figure I indicates there are four possible relationships.

Unfortunately we have very little data on the two international relationships, (i.e. C & D), indicating
that at least in this case newspapers confined themselves to comments on their own government's policy. Not one American editorial mentioned Canadian policy toward Cuba, while only two Canadian editorials referred to American policy — both were critical of United States' policy. The earliest editorial appeared in the Winnipeg Free Press on April 17, 1959 and criticized United States' paranoia about communism which it felt clouded its objectivity. The other appearing in the Toronto Star of July of 1959, expressing dissatisfaction with the United States' lack of control over attacks on Cuba by exiles from Miami, Florida.

Looking now at the role of the press within each country vis-a-vis their own government policy, we find (1) that in Canada only two editorials concentrated on Canada's policy toward Cuba. One was critical of the fact that Canada recognized Cuba but not The People's Republic of China (the Toronto Globe and Mail on January 19, 1959). An editorial in La Presse, January 10, 1959, praised the
Canadian government for its speedy recognition of the Provisional Cuban government. Thus lack of Canadian editorial comment about government policy may indicate that in the case of the Cuban Revolution, there simply was little or no Canadian foreign policy to comment on. At any rate Canadian editorial coverage was basically restricted to discussions of the Cuban Revolution's internal developments. When we look at the role of the American press we find a greater concern with government policy than in Canada. However, this more extensive coverage was primarily limited to American elite newspapers, for the American mass press (i.e. the Detroit News) commented on United States' policy in but two editorials. In both instances the Detroit News criticized the (American) policy of not supporting Batista (July 28, 1958 and December 31, 1958). The News suggested that the United States should supply Batista's regime with arms (July 28, 1958) and that travel to Cuba should be halted (December 31, 1958). After the success of the revolutionary movement, the Detroit News did not discuss United States' policy toward Cuba.

Again, we must reiterate that we limited the composition of the United States mass press to only the Detroit News and thus its opinions can not be taken as representative of the American mass press.

Of all the American newspapers analyzed the three elite newspapers were the most involved in commenting on governmental policy, as is shown in Table 19.
Table 19

Roles of Elite Newspapers in the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>New York Times</th>
<th>Washington Post</th>
<th>St. Louis Post Dispatch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocate (Supportive)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critic (Disagree)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Maker (Suggestions)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we can readily see from Table 19 the major role of the American elite press with regard to Cuban policy was a supportive one (66% of the editorials supported government policy). Regarding the type of discussion that characterized the advocate role, we found in most instances that it was quite general. For example, on January 3, 1959 an editorial in the Washington Post contained the following statement: "Although some errors have been made, the United States' record is on the whole a good one with regard to Cuba." Another editorial in the New York Times of February 23, 1959 applauded the United States choice of a new Ambassador to Cuba while a third editorial which appeared in the St. Louis Post Dispatch of July 20, 1959 pointed out that the United States had been patient with Castro.

Shifting to the role of critic, we find that editorial comments were even more general as five out of the eight critical editorials discussed the ineptness of past United States policy to Cuba. These editorials
referred to the long since repealed Platt Amendment and to military aid to Batista. Thus, only three editorials criticized the prevailing United States policy. With specific regard to these three editorials, we find that none analyzed the basic issues of United States policy toward Cuba. One commented on abuse of the American sugar quota system (*St. Louis Post Dispatch*, May 21, 1959), another on the use of United States Marines to protect the water tanks near the Guantanamo Bay military installation (*Washington Post*, July 30, 1958). Thus, the type of criticisms of American policy we find in the editorial sections of the United States elite press hardly seem to meet the requirements of the adversary role.

Examining the third role, that of policy maker, we again find no suggestions on basic policy issues. Editorial suggestions ranged from optimistic hopes that the United States Ambassador to Cuba would be acceptable to Cuba's new government (*Washington Post*, January 10, 1959) to suggestions that the United States find other ways of guarding the water supply at Guantanamo Bay (*New York Times*, July 30, 1958). Even though these editorials suggest a new policy they do not demonstrate great original thinking on the part of the elite press. Thus the roles of "critic" and "policy initiator" were clearly less prevalent than the role of policy advocate. Since the advocacy editorials appeared more frequently than the other two combined, it would seem to indicate that the role of the United States
elite press was to support government policy, at least in the case of Cuba. However, due to the generality of comment even the advocate role would not seem to be too substantive.

In conclusion, we find that in the Cuban case, transnational editorials (both American and Canadian) are too few in number to permit analysis. While the American elite press did discuss its own government's policy, most of the commentary was superficial. Of the three roles, the advocate role best describes the activities of the United States elite press.
Chapter VI

Conclusion

In the presentation and analysis of our data, we sought to discover patterns in editorial contents and policy orientation among a sample of Canadian and American newspapers in their editorial coverage of the Cuban Revolution. Through the use of content analysis we examined editorials in ten newspapers. Although more Canadian than American newspapers were selected for this project, the number of editorials dealing with the Cuban Revolution was much greater in fact nearly twice as great in the United States (one hundred United States editorials verses forty-nine Canadian editorials). This national variance in saliency was further compounded by a high concentration of editorials in the Canadian press during January of 1959 and the consequent lack of editorial coverage between July and December of 1958. As a result our comparative analysis was restricted to 1959, and even then American editorial attention to the Cuban Revolution was more distributed through the months of 1959.

Even though the number of editorials varied markedly between the two nations in aggregate their editorial opinions did not. After examining editorial coverage of our three main topics i.e. Castro Batista and the Revolution - we found that in each case the press made similar editorial evaluations. In each case evaluations between
countries differed only slightly and never in direction (i.e. favourable in Canada and unfavourable in the United States). Of the three issues in question Castro received the greatest amount of attention in both countries. Editorial attention to the Cuban leader gradually increased in proportion to the coverage of the Revolution. Between January and August of 1959 we observed a distinct trend in the direction of editorial content. While in January Canadian and American editorials were balanced i.e. favourable toward Castro, by August they were primarily unfavourable. Even though Castro was personally the object of considerable controversy and comment editorials generally separated the man from the movement. In both Canada and the United States we found a less unfavourable opinion about the Revolution than of Castro. Nevertheless, editorial coverage of the Revolution followed a trend to that of Castro (i.e. increasingly unfavourable comment from January to August of 1959). Canadian and American editorials also evaluated Batista in a similar fashion—unfavourably. Not one editorial in either country evaluated Batista favourably.

Revolutions, of course, make considerably more than a change in government by 'illegal' means: The Cuban Revolution like its Russian ancestor resulted in widespread alterations in the political, social and economic sectors of society. Editorials were attuned to four characteristics of the Revolution in addition to the charismatic leadership
of Fidel Castro: guerrilla warfare, Castro's well orchestrated War Trials, the threats and realities of revolutionary economic policy plus the shadow and substance of Cuban Communism.

The War Trials received more attention than any specific revolutionary issue. All editorials condemned Cuba's style of 'justice'. However, by comparing the number of editorials devoted to the War Trials on a national basis, we find that the Trials had a far greater saliency in Canada than in the United States. This finding can perhaps be explained in the light of Lipsett's proposition that civil liberties are a greater concern in Canada than in the United States.¹

We could not test for cross national differences in attitudes toward the use of guerrilla warfare as there were no Canadian editorials dealing with this issue. While American coverage of the use of political violence was not extensive, editorial evaluation was negative.

Revolutionary economic policy received more attention in the United States and Canada. We discovered that American editorials were surprisingly enough neither extensively or intensively protective of American corporate investments in Cuba. Initially we strongly suspected that Cuban expropriations of land and industry would be met

with strong editorial condemnation. The last of our four issues, the role of Communism was covered similarly in both nation's editorials. Again as was the case with all but the War Trials greater attention was manifested by the American press. The preponderance of editorial opinion in both countries did not link the Revolution to Communism. In fact the majority of editorial comment either defended Castro against rumours of Communist sympathy or pointed out that economic deterioration might lead to circumstances favourable to the Communists.

In addition to comparing American and Canadian editorial reaction to the Cuban Revolution, we categorized each nation's newspapers according to a mass - elite typology. These representative categories provided us with yet another dimension of comparative analysis. Here we sought to discover whether or not these two classes of newspapers varied in editorial attitudes toward the Cuban Revolution both within and across national boundaries. According to the logic of Figure 2 newspapers classified in cells 1 and 4 (i.e. elite presses in Canada and the United States or mass presses in Canada and the United States) should have responded similarly to the Revolution as well as to past and present leaders.

Ironically, the mass elite distinction ostensibly had no independent effect on press attitudes toward the Revolution, for we discovered that contrary to our expectations editorials in the American elite press did not
correspond to editorials in the Canadian elite press (cells 1 and 2) rather than they corresponded to editorial attitudes in the Canadian mass press (cells 2 and 3). The category of the American Mass press (cell 4) would have to include more newspapers before we could reliably analyze mass press attitudes toward the Cuban Revolution. Nevertheless editorials in the *Detroit News* were significantly more unfavourable toward the Revolution and Fidel Castro as well as less severe in its criticisms of Batista than any newspaper in any other category.

Even though we discovered variations between classes of newspapers as well as within each class, we determined that editorial opinions espoused by each newspaper were quite consistent. Verification of this was shown in the relationship between individual newspaper editorial opinions about Castro and the Revolution, in general. At no time did an individual newspaper express opposite opinions about Castro on the one hand and the Revolution on the
other. Instead, shifts in editorial opinion marked changes from either a previously favourable or unfavourable assessment of Castro or the Revolution toward a newly adopted no specific position.

Prior reactions to the Revolution also seemed to vary by region. Within Canada we observed a disproportionately large number of editorials devoted to the Cuban Revolution in the four Ontario newspapers when compared with the number of editorials contained in the other regional tabloids. Furthermore, these numerical variations were accompanied by markedly different opinions about Castro and the Revolution. Whether this variance is symptomatic of regional variations within Canada poses an interesting question for further investigation.

Another dimension of our inquiry involved comparing editorial positions in each nations' 'national' newspaper. We found that the New York Times and the Toronto Globe and Mail advanced markedly different opinions about the Cuban Revolution - the former favourable and the latter unfavourable. Again whether this pattern is symptomatic of just our case would require further investigation.

In general, then, we found at the national level similarly between American and Canadian editorial coverage of the Cuban Revolution. However once we divided our ten newspapers into various groups either within or across national boundaries we noted that editorial opinions began to vary. The degree of variation depended upon what
type of group we were discussing. Therefore before we can draw any concrete conclusions as to the interpretive function of the editorial page, further case studies would be required.

Comparative analysis did not focus exclusively on the interpretive role of the press i.e. editorial coverage of the Cuban Revolution. We also used editorial content as a means for looking at three other roles of the press in relation to government policy. On this question while our data is not extensive, we found that in Canada, on the one hand, editorials seldom mentioned its government's policy toward Cuba and equally less frequently was the United States' Cuban policy discussed. We feel that this is probably a phenomena related to this specific case and would change if an issue more salient to Canadian foreign policy had been chosen. In the United States on the other hand, editorials commented more frequently on the American policy toward Cuba. However, those comments were predominantly found in the United States' elite press. Its reaction to American policy was for the most part supportive. In other words, newspapers are advocates of existing policy. By examining the type of policies and the reactions to those policies we noted that editorials in the United States elite press focused on generalities and failed to comment on basic policy. In fact our study showed that the role of critic was applied in most instances to past policies rather than present
United States policy. Likewise alternate policies of a fundamental nature were not presented. On balance the roles of critic and policy maker appear to have been performed poorly by the American elite press in the case of American policy toward the Cuban Revolution. Whether this ineptness is symptomatic of the American elite press' participation in the policy formulation process would require further investigation of other cases.
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