A hermeneutical study of the existenzials in Martin Heidegger's Being and time.

Raymond Anthony Couture

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A HERMENEUTICAL STUDY OF THE EXISTENZIALS
IN MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME

by

Raymond Anthony Couture

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of Philosophy in Partial Fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at
The University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario
Canada
1985
ABSTRACT
A HERMENEUTICAL STUDY OF THE EXISTENZIALS.
IN MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME

by
Raymond Anthony Couture

This study investigates the term "Existenzial" as Heidegger uses it in Being and Time. Our approach treats the Existenzials as moments of the Existential Analytic. We will show that a close reading reveals seventeen terms that are designated as Existenzials in Being and Time. By order of appearance in the Macquarrie/Robinson translation, these terms are: Being-in, Being alongside, concern, worldness, deseverance, making room, solicitude, the "they", state-of-mind, understanding, possibility, projection, meaning, discourse, truth, Being-towards-the-end and Being-a-whole.

In Ch. I, a definite list of the Existenzials with references to both the English and German texts is presented. A concise explication for each Existenzial is developed in subsections. The point is made that Being and Time is the only book in which Heidegger uses the strategy of designating Existenzials.

Ch. II is an analysis of some terms which Heidegger uses to elucidate the meaning of an Existenzial. Ten clues drawn from the primary statements of the Existenzials gathered in Ch. I are interpreted. By returning to the Existential Analytic we let a pattern emerge that characterizes the Existenz-
ials as constitutive phénomena that belong to the Dasein's state of Being.

Ch. III develops an account of the three functions which the Existenzials have in the Existential Analytic. An account of the Existential Analytic provides a view of the context in which the Existenzials appear as moments. The way that the categories of Being and Time ("presence-at-hand" and "readiness-to-hand") are contrasted with some of the Existenzials is explained. The Existenzials function in these three ways: they disclose the Dasein's existential constitution, they provide an orientation for interpreting the many possible ways of existing and they lead us towards a temporal understanding of the structure of human existence.

Ch. IV discusses the issue of a definite list of Existenzials and offers an interpretation of nine "possible" Existenzials. The approach here is to show that by interpreting the function of a term we can decide whether or not it belongs on the definite list.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The thinking developed in this thesis owes thanks to a family of characters.

R.C. Pinto provided generous supervision, aid in sculpturing the Introduction and careful reading of early drafts.

J.P. Wright's exact challenges and extensive commentary on an earlier draft helped keep the project on track.

W.S. Skakoon's probing reading opened up further reflections on thinking out the consequences of the thesis.

F. Flood is to be thanked for introducing me to Martin Heidegger in a course on Metaphysics in 1980-81.

H.A. Nielsen and R.H. Johnson helped indirectly through patient wrestling and Spartan criticism of my often wild writing over the years.

There have been many other friends who have taught me to work out my thinking with clearer eyes through conversations and encouragement. I also thank Salvatore Ala for his assistance in proofreading the final draft.

I dedicate this work to my own family for they are the first home for my heart.
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INTRODUCTION

This study will be an investigation of the term "Existenzial" as Heidegger uses it in Being and Time. Heidegger employs this term conspicuously as a designation for certain fundamental structures of human existence. Our problem is to develop an account of what he is doing with these terms. In section #9, we say that the Existenziels perform three related functions in the Existential Analytic. First, they establish or disclose the Being of the Dasein in its constitution. Second, they supply a framework for the interpretation or the analysis of particular ways of existing. Third, they lead us up to a temporal understanding of the Being of the Dasein.

1 Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962). This is a translation of Martin Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, seventh edition (Tübingen: Neomarius, 1953). This book was originally published in 1927. We will hereafter refer to Being and Time as the "M/R translation" and use a short form to indicate references (e.g., BT.33). The German quotations which we will use come from the fifteenth edition of Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1979). The pagination is the same as that of the M/R translation which follows the pagination of the eighth German edition (1957) (see "Translators' Preface", BT.15). In this thesis, the German word "Existenzial", which Heidegger uses in Sein und Zeit, and "Existenzials", our English version of its plural (Existenzialien), appear instead of the terms which M/R use in their translation ("existentiale" and "existentialia"). In the secondary literature, the spelling "existential" is often used (see Waterhouse, A Heidegger Critique). We will restore the original German spelling to the passages quoted from Being and Time that use the singular form and substitute "Existenzials" for its plural form.
The key inquiry of Being and Time is directed towards "the existential analytic of Dasein" (BT.34). The overall strategy of the book is to find an adequate way of asking the question concerning Being, but to do this "we must first give a proper explication of an entity (Dasein) with regard to its Being" (BT.27). In the following paragraphs, we will attempt to familiarize the reader with some of these terms.

"The Dasein" is Heidegger's expression for human existence understood as 'my own existence'. This is the name for that personal kind of being that is to be scrutinized and characterized in Being and Time. Heidegger never uses male or female pronouns to discuss the Dasein but only neutral "personal pronouns" like "we", "I" or "you" (see BT.67-8). Heidegger interprets this term literally by breaking it down into its components, "Da" ("there" or "here") and "Sein" ("Being" or "to be") which he calls "an expression of its Being" (BT.33). This term characterizes the human being as being disclosed in such a way that it finds itself "to-be-there" in a definite world.2 The key task of Being and Time is to make the Dasein "stand out" in its existing from all

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2 For an astute and illuminating explanation of the point that Heidegger is making see the "Translator's Appendix" ("A Note on the Da and the Dasein") in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, translated by Albert Hofstadter, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. This is where the quotation "to-be-there" is taken from (BPP.335). Hofstadter gives us a glimpse of the grammar and range of meanings that Heidegger is playing with in this interpretation.
other entities by discovering the phenomena that characterize its existence.

The "Existential Analytic" is the project of interpreting the Being of the Dasein. This investigation is "existential" because it is "guided by the idea of existence" (BT.350) and it expresses the constitutive states or "existentiality" (BT.33) of the Dasein. It is an "analytic" because the thinking moves from a grasp of the constitution of the Dasein (its "existentiality") through an interpretation of its diverse ways of existing (its "existentiell" possibilities) to an interpretation of the full Being of Dasein in the core phenomenon of "care". "Care" (Sorge) is a "basic existential-ontological phenomenon" (BT.240) and it expresses the "structural articulation" of the "Dasein's whole constitution" (BT.244). Heidegger distinguishes the structures of the Dasein's Being (its existential constitution) from the ways in which these structures operate in life. He wants to

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3 It is important to take note of the way that Heidegger uses the terms "phenomenon" and "phenomena". A "phenomenon" is "never" anything like an "appearance" for Heidegger (BT.53). He interprets it as "that which shows itself in itself" (BT.54) but does not offer a simple definition for this term. Phenomena "are never anything but what goes to make up Being" (BT.61). Phenomena are the constitutive structures of Being. The phenomena of the Dasein are the structures of Being that "show" themselves in my own existence. The key idea here is that phenomena "disclose" or "reveal" the Being of the Dasein. It is by studying and interpreting these phenomena that we develop an understanding of existence.
disclose the ontological situation of the human condition in his interpretation and also go on to develop an account of human ways of existing based on this original constitution. We will discuss the Existential Analytic much more fully in section #7 of the thesis.

"Existenzial" is Heidegger's own expression for some of the basic phenomena that constitute and disclose the Da-sein. The vital concern of this study is to deliver an account of this term by showing exactly how Heidegger uses it in Being and Time and to develop an interpretation of the functions of the Existenzials that are designated as such in the Existential Analytic. We will show that by careful reading we can construct a definite list of seventeen particular Existenzials. We will not begin by defining an Existenzial but by showing what Heidegger calls an Existenzial. The aim of our interpretation is to characterize what he is doing by designating the Existenzials and to root this account in a close reading of the text.

The Existenzials are expressions for the phenomena that make up the ontological constitution of the Dasein. They bring into focus the "inner" or "deep" structures of the Dasein's existence. This thesis does bring the Existenzials to the "surface" by constructing a definite list. But the aim of our account will be to show how the Existenzials are embedded in the Existential Analytic and to make them stand
out from the Existential Analytic.

The Existentials are the phenomena of the Dasein which disclose the structure of its Being and guide ontological interpretation. Heidegger says:

So far as existence is the determining character of Dasein, the ontological analytic of this entity always requires that existentiality be considered beforehand. By "existentiality" we understand the state of Being that is constitutive for those entities that exist (BT.33).

Heidegger uses the term "existence" exclusively as a designation of Dasein's kind of Being (BT.67). "Existentiality" is the context behind the Dasein's ways of existing. It is the expression for the constitution of existence. Heidegger goes on to say:

Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them "Existenzials" (BT.70).

The Existenzials express the existentiality of the Dasein and characterize its Being. It is through the Existenzials that we are to interpret the Dasein because they establish a definite character for its existence.

Our problem is to understand the functions of the Existenzials in Heidegger's project of the Existential Analytic. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger provides some insight by characterizing part of the "method" of ontology as "phenomenological construction" (BPP.22).
He goes on to explain this as "projecting of the antecedent-ly given being upon its being and the structures of its being" (BPP.22). The Dasein is "given" as a being but its existence is to be interpreted through the phenomena which constitute its Being. An ontological understanding of the Dasein is to be constructed by studying the phenomena which characterize its existence.

The Existential Analytic of the Dasein is a construction of an understanding of human existence from the phenomena that are obtained by "listening in" (see BT.179) to what is disclosed in that existence. In Being and Time, Heidegger remarks that:

Ontological Interpretation projects the entity presented to it upon the Being which is that entity's own, so as to conceptualize it with regard to its structure (BT.359).

Note here that ontological interpretation constructs its conceptualization by holding fast to the phenomena that express the structure of Being for the entity under study. The interpretation of the Dasein is guided by a primary disclosure that sets forth its "undisguised phenomenal content" (BT.360). In our study, we will emphasize the disclosive force of the Existenzials.

This thesis is a face-to-face encounter with Heidegger's text, and it does not stray off into background discussions on the restless philosophical shadows of Husserl, Hegel, Kant,
Descartes, and Aristotle which haunt the pages of *Being and Time*. We have left aside, any etymological considerations of the "existence" family of terms. Instead of examining the historical roots of the term "Existenzial", we have gone forth to see what is coined as an Existenzial in the text. A story about the word "Existenzial" would be interesting. But if our true aim is to illuminate human existence, then we need to key on the phenomena that these terms express. It will be only in so far as we make the terms of *Being and Time" transparent" for the reader that we will have succeeded in plunging into its thinking.

This thesis fills in a gap in the English secondary literature concerning *Being and Time*. English commentators have not tried to construct a definite list of the Existenzials in order to establish a basis for a discussion of this concept. Among the commentators, there has been no real argument over what is designated as an Existenzial and what is not. The usual practice is not even to refer back to the text when explaining that a term is an Existenzial for Heidegger. The result is that an uprooted understanding of the concept of an Existenzial has prevailed and we need to overcome this by peering back into *Being and Time*.

There are two main instances where the Existenzials have received almost full thematic treatment. C.B. Scott, in his essay "Heidegger and Consciousness", attempts to
develop an interpretation of human consciousness based on a view of the Existenzials as pre-conceptual "forms of awareness". 4 Scott does not follow the texts where Heidegger designates the Existenzials closely but he does offer some interesting elucidations of the concept of an Existenzial. His account is weak on direct references and does not show the reader exactly what Heidegger does with his Existenzials.

Roger Waterhouse, in *A Heidegger Critique*, presents a detailed exposition of the contents of the Existential Analytic and even begins to number the particular Existenzials (see AHG.68-9, "the first existential"). 5 But, in observing Heidegger's designation of "Being alongside" as the second Existenzial (BT.80-1), Waterhouse predicts that "his usage of 'existential' as a structure of Dasein is to be extremely loose" (AHG.69). Waterhouse stops counting at "concern", "the third existential" (AHG.70). He does not follow through and assemble a definite list of the Existenzials, but his work sparked the project of this thesis.

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4 This essay is found in *Martin Heidegger: in Europe and America*, edited by E.G. Ballard and C.E. Scott (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973). Scott's efforts are noteworthy because he shows how much one has to struggle to express the meaning of an Existenzial without reverting to the technical terminology of *Being and Time*.

5 Roger Waterhouse, *A Heidegger Critique* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, Inc., 1981). This is an excellent introduction to Heidegger's work and has, for the most part, clear and tenacious commentary.
The thesis aims to illuminate the concept of an Existenzial by interpreting the Existenzials as precise moments of the text of *Being and Time*. The first task is the construction of a definite list through close reading. By identifying the Existenzials in this direct manner, we prepare ourselves for tracking them through the Existential Analytic and making observations about what they do in that inquiry. A more detailed study of how the Existenzials participate in the structure of care is still needed. A full story on how the Existenzials are to be understood as "modes of the temporalizing of temporality" (BT.352) also needs to be developed. This thesis provides a basis for carrying out these further projects.
CHAPTER I

The Primary Disclosure of the Dasein through the Existenzials

1. Construction of a Definite List of the Existenzials in Being and Time

We will engage ourselves in the task of sifting out those terms which are not designated as Existenzials in Being and Time from those terms which Heidegger names as Existenzials. The aim is to establish a definite list of the Existenzials of Being and Time. To do this, we will track down the passages that show Heidegger designating a term which will be used in his project as an Existenzial. We will make the narrowing assumption that only what Heidegger explicitly calls an Existenzial will be granted that title in our account. We may find certain passages which suggest that a term should be regarded as an Existenzial and our reading will remain flexible enough to deal with cases where the text is not entirely clear.

We will read through sixteen moments in which Heidegger uses the exact assertion that "(x)...is an Existenz-

There are fifteen passages in which an Existenzial is designated alone, and one passage in which two Existenzials are established. Note that there are other places in Being and Time in which Heidegger refers to a term as an Existenzial. The passages which we will examine first are those moments where an Existenzial is designated for the first time. We will call these moments the "primary statements" of the particular Existenzials.
"Existenzial", says that a certain term will be used "as an Existenzial", or indicates in another way that a term will be understood like an Existenzial. We will use the short form of "E 1" to indicate that this term is named as an Existenzial and its place on the list being constructed in our reading. Each Existenzial will be presented in a sub-section with a concise analysis. These brief explications will not be final and we will return to an analysis of the particular Existenzials when we track them through the Existential Analytic. On the next page, there is a Table of the Existenzials with the exact location of the passages in which they are designated as Existenzials in both the English and German. This table is not to be understood dogmatically, and we will remain flexible enough to respond to arguments that point towards revisions.

By studying these seventeen Existenzials, we will witness the primary disclosure of the Dasein through its characteristic existence-structures. The Dasein's constitution as a Being-in-the-world is not merely given, it is constructed in the explorations of the Existential analytic. We can think of the Existenzials as the primary illuminators of the Dasein's kind of being. The establishment of the Existenzials is the point of departure for the analytic concerning the Dasein. The Existenzials are to be understood as the common structures determinative for all human existence.
Table of the Existenzials

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Heidegger thinks that the basic phenomena revealed in the Existential Analytic should be understood as the basis for any ontic interpretations of existence:

The transcendental 'generality' of the phenomenon of care and of all fundamental Existenzials (fundamentalen Existenzialien) is, on the other hand, broad enough to present a basis on which every interpretation of Dasein which is ontical and belongs to a world view must move... (BT. 244).

An ontical science like anthropology must base itself on the phenomena that characterize human existence. Heidegger wants to express the phenomena that belong to all human existence and use these phenomena as the keys that unlock the problem of interpreting the Dasein. The Existenzials are the grounding phenomena in the Existential Analytic. Heidegger argues that previous thinkers have not rooted their interpretations of human existence in such phenomena. One way to understand his task in Being and Time is that he needs to establish the language for interpreting the Dasein in a way that lets its existence be shown by itself for the investigation. The language of the philosophical tradition has been opaque in its interpretations. The Existenzials are

7 Note that we have repaired the M/R text by removing their awkward colnage "existentialia" and substituting our own "Existenzials". See footnote #1 for further explanations of this move. When we include the original phrase from Sein und Zeit in quoting Being and Time where M/R do not, we will indicate this, as above, with modified brackets { }. 
supposed to be transparent, that is, we are to see the Dasein through the Existenzials and let it be manifest for our interpretation.\footnote{We will use "it" as the third person pronoun for the Dasein as Heidegger never attributes a sex to this character in Being and Time.}

This thesis is shaped by the idea of a definite list of the Existenzials of Being and Time. Heidegger himself does not give us a "list" or "table" of Existenzials that looks like Kant's "table of Categories" in the Critique of Pure Reason. I have already gathered this list by listening to the text in order to discover Heidegger's Existenzials. These are to be distinguished from what commentators have called Existenzials without any textual support and also from the abstract concept of an Existenzial. In Being and Time, there is only one full paragraph on the concept of an Existenzial (BT.70-1) and some scattered remarks (i.e., BT.81 and BT.358-9) that concern Existenzials. These passages do not get us very far, and this thesis will attempt to develop the concept of an Existenzial only after the particular Existenzials have been established and explained.
#2: The Seventeen Existenzials

We will now read through the particular passages of *Being and Time* in which Heidegger designates seventeen concepts as *Existenzials*. The strategy here is to identify clearly each *Existenzial* and provide some remarks explaining the phenomenon that is being pointed to by Heidegger. We will focus primarily on the first passage in which a term is clearly called an *Existenzial*. Heidegger reminds us at various places that he is using a concept previously declared to be an *Existenzial* and these passages will only be referred to in this chapter if they can be used to clarify that *Existenzial*. In short, the aim here is to set forth the *Existenzials* of *Being and Time* and make a start in understanding their importance. Note that Heidegger himself does not number the particular *Existenzials* in his *Existential Analytic*. All the following designations ("first *Existenzial..."") are added to organize our understanding and focus our reading more directly on the text. We will also keep an eye on the German passages in which the *Existenzials* are established in order to hold fast to Heidegger's own language.

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9 See, for example, "Being alongside" (BT.81) and also "Being-in" (BT.82).
El: Being-in, In-Sein

The first Existenzial of Being and Time is "Being-in". Here is the moment at which it is introduced as such:

Being-in, on the other hand, is a state of Dasein's Being; it is an Existenzial (BT.79).

In-Sein dagegen meint eine Seinsverfassung des Daseins und ist ein Existenzial (SZ.54).

Just above this passage, Heidegger contrasts this Existenzial with what he calls the "categorial" characteristic of "Being-present-at-hand". The Dasein is not "in" its world as the water is "in" the glass. It is not merely "contained" by its environment, rather it is involved as an inhabitant.

Here Heidegger characterizes this Existenzial as "a state of Dasein's Being (eine Seinsverfassung des Daseins)".

We will study this phrase extensively in Ch. II. For now, we will read two separate passages which show the significance of this distinction:

(a) ...Being-in is not a 'property' which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, and without which it could be just as well as it could with it (BT.84).

---

10 See also BT.82 where Being-in is contrasted with 'the category of the 'insideness' which things present-at-hand can have with regard to one another'. We will deal with the terms contrasted with each particular Existenzial at greater length in section #8.

11 See sections #4-#6.
(b) ...Being-in is not a characteristic that is effected, or even just elicited, in a present-at-hand subject by the 'world's' Being-present-at-hand; Being-in is rather—an essential kind of Being of this entity itself (ST.170).

In (a), we find that this Existenzial is not a property of the Dasein, but rather something like a necessary condition for its existence. This means that it is not an "accident" or "attribute" of the Dasein but rather a characteristic basic to its existence. As Heidegger understands it, the Dasein is never "free from Being-in" (ST.84).

In (b), we are told that this Existenzial is "an essential kind of Being of this entity itself". Being-in does not arise from a subject present in a world of objects by this account, but belongs to the Dasein as a characteristic of its existence. Remember that Heidegger never begins with a "worldless subject" and that the Dasein does not come into existence, it is already in existence. The Dasein has certain basic characteristics which belong to it as it exists.

We are studying that entity which exists as it exists and determining the phenomena which belong to my own existence. We do not study the Dasein before or after it exists but only in its existence.

This is the only Existenzial which Heidegger presents with an etymology (drawn from Grimm's Kleine Schriften, see ST.80). In that discussion, he points out how "in" is embedded in certain verbs which describe living (i.e.,
inhabit). Though etymology plays a major role in Heidegger's later work on poetry and language, this is not his usual manner of treating an Existential in Being and Time.

Heidegger emphasizes that:

"Being-in" is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state (wesenhaft Verfassung) (BT.80).

Here we should also recall that Heidegger has just indicated that Being-in-the-world "is far from sufficient for completely determining Dasein's Being" (BT.79). What Heidegger is doing here is breaking down the whole phenomenon of Being-in-the-world into its constitutive structures. "Being-in" is a determination of the Dasein's existence and expresses its involvement with a world. Heidegger wants to distinguish "Being-in" from something like "being in the house." The "formal existential expression" of "Being-in" is not the same as particular spatial relationships that persons find themselves in. Heidegger says "Being-in is not to be explained ontologically by some ontical characterization" (BT.82) and argues that the "Being-present-at-hand-together" relation does not explain the Dasein's existence at all.12

12 In a further discussion, Heidegger claims that "for the most part" Being-in has been "represented exclusively by a single exemplar—knowing the world" (BT.86). His aim is to explain this phenomenon on a much broader basis as a structure of Being that is "in place" before any knowing. Hence "knowing the world" is a "founded mode in which Being-in is exemplified" (see section #13, BT).
E 2: Being alongside, Sein bei

The second Existenzial is "Being alongside". Heidegger introduces this term as one of the determinations of Being-in. He says:

'Being alongside' the world in the sense of being absorbed in the world (a sense which calls for still closer interpretation) is an Existenzial founded upon Being-in (BT.80-1).

Das "Sein bei" der Welt, in dem noch näher auszulegenden Sinne des Aufgehens in der Welt, ist ein im In-Sein fundiertes Existenzial (SZ.54).

Notice here that Heidegger is saying that one Existenzial (E 2) is founded upon another Existenzial (E 1). "Being-in" appears to be the prime Existenzial as "concern" (E 3) is the name given to "definite ways of Being-in" (BT.83). Also of note in this regard is that the Existenzials of "state-of-mind", "understanding", "possibility", "projection", "meaning", and "discourse" are developed in Heidegger's analysis of "Being-in as such" (Division One, Ch. V). But the point here is that we can still follow the particular Existenzials even if the relations between Existenzials remain obscure.13

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13 Heidegger thinks that these Existenzials are not really separable from the whole phenomenon of the Dasein. He says that "Emphasis upon any one of these constitutive items (Verfassungsmomente) signifies that the others are emphasized along with it; this means that in any such case the whole phenomenon gets seen" (BT.79). Later he admits that "many structures of Dasein when taken singly are still obscure" (BT.424) but the broader phenomenon of care and the understanding of care in temporal terms give us a way for comprehending the definite structures as one whole.
"Being alongside" means that one is among things of the world and thus already in the "position" of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger contrasts this Existenzial with a categorical designation of "the Being-present-at-hand-together of Things that occur" (BT.81). The category here being contrasted with E 2 is "Being-present-at-hand", and this is the same category used to contrast E 1. In this passage, Heidegger's remarks provide a general orientation for understanding what he is doing in designating the Existenzials:

In these analyses the issue is one of seeing a primordial structure of Dasein's Being (einer ursprünglichen Seinsstruktur des Daseins)—a structure in accordance with whose phenomenal content the concepts of Being must be Articulated; because of this, and because this structure is in principle one which cannot be grasped by the traditional ontological categories, this 'Being-alongside' must be examined still more closely. We shall again choose the method of contrasting it with a relationship of Being which is essentially different ontologically—viz. categorical—but which we express by the same linguistic means. Fundamental ontological distinctions are easily obliterated; and if they are to be envisaged phenomenally in this way, this must be done explicitly, even at the risk of discussing the 'obvious'. The status of the ontological analytic shows, however, that we have been far from interpreting these obvious matters with an adequate 'grasp', still less with regard for the meaning of their Being; and we are even further from possessing a stable coinage (Fragung) for the appropriate structural concepts (BT.81).
The "traditional ontological categories" 14 are inadequate because they are based on the existence of things in general and do not distinguish between the Dasein's kind of existence and the Being of a thing. We need to gain sight of the original Being-structures of the Dasein and reconceptualize our understanding of human existence so that it accords with the phenomena proper to human beings. The Existenzials are the phenomena which Heidegger "coins" for understanding the Dasein through the "appropriate structural concepts" that distinguish it from things in general. The Dasein is never to be understood as a thing, but as that entity which "stands out" from things. The Dasein, in its "Being-alongside", is understood as related to things but also distinguishable from mere things. It exists among things, but not as a thing.

3) Concern, Besorgen

Heidegger names "concern" as the third Existenzial. He points to several ordinary meanings of concern such as the

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14 Note that Heidegger is indefinite here and does not name "Hume's categories" or "Hegel's categories". In Being and Time, Heidegger treats "present-at-hand" and "readiness-to-hand" as categories, but does not say that these are the "traditional ontological categories" that he refers to obliquely here (sec ii.1.1).
concern to get the job done, or the concern to solve a problem, or the concern that is apprehensive in face of a task. Instead of contrasting this Existenzial with a category, Heidegger distinguishes it from ordinary or "colloquial" meanings:

In contrast to these colloquial ontical significations, the expression 'concern' will be used in this investigation as an ontological term for an Existenzial, and will designate the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world (BT.83).

Gegenüber diesen vorwissenschaftlichen, ontischen Bedeutungen wird der Ausdruck "Besorgen" in der vorliegenden Untersuchung als ontologischer Terminus (Existenzial) gebraucht als Bezeichnung des Seins eines möglichen In-der-Welt-seins (SZ.57).

Notice here how "Existenzial" in the German has been put in brackets and looks like an afterthought or revision. This appearance is erased in the English translation. "Concern" is the existential term that expresses the ways that the Dasein is involved with things of the world, and remains distinct from any of the particular ways of being involved.

Concern expresses the "Being towards the world" (BT.84) or involvement of the Dasein in its Being-in-the-world with things. Concern is the kind of Being of a "factual" involvement or a kind of interest with things of the world and is exemplified by interest in food, cars, homes or anything except other Daseins. Heidegger says:

Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed (zerstreut)
itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in (BT.83). After giving us some particular examples (such as "having to do with something", "making use of something" or "interrogating"), Heidegger asserts that "All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being..." (BT.83). Concern is a specific phenomenon of Being-in or having an involvement with the world. To have an involvement, one needs to be already in a world with things. Heidegger is not saying that Being-in is "earlier" than concern. As Existenzials, these structures are "equiprimordial", though to understand concern we need to start from the root phenomenon of Being-in.

During his analysis of "fear", Heidegger asserts that "proximally and for the most part, Dasein is in terms of what it is concerned with" (BT.180-1). In his discussion of the "they", he observes:

In that with which we concern ourselves environmentally the Others are encountered as what they are; they are what they do (sie sind das, was sie betreiben) (BT.163).

The average understanding of other persons uses typical roles to characterize those persons and "package" them for easier comprehension. "She is a student", and "He is a lawyer" are examples of recognizable occupations used to understand

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15 See BT.170: "The phenomenon of the equiprimordiality of constitutive items has often been disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from some simple 'primal ground'".
persons through work. This move does not bring forth any full understanding of persons. It is interesting that here solicitude (the relationship between Daseins) gets displaced by concern (the relation between Daseins and things). The Dasein tends to treat other persons in terms of things in understanding them by occupation.

Concern is a point of departure for interpreting the Dasein's facticity and this is one of the roots for understanding the "thrown" kind of existence peculiar to the Dasein. Heidegger goes on to interpret concern as "our circumspective dealings with the ready-to-hand within-the-world" (BT.157). Thus concern is an ontological term that expresses the everyday involvements of the Dasein. Concern stands at the head of the great range of human behaviours, tasks, and pursuits, with the exception of relations to other Daseins. Heidegger distinguishes the relation that the Dasein has to work and things from its relation to other Daseins. We will treat this second relation in our study of 3.7, "solicitude".

3.4: Worldhood, Weltlichkeit

The fourth existential is called "worldhood". This term is a more precise determination than the common term "world". While "worldhood" is a characteristic of the
Dasein, "world" can be understood as the totality of all present entities (see BT.93, #1), and need not refer to any particular phenomenon of the Dasein. Heidegger wants to say that worldhood should be understood as an ontological characteristic of the Dasein's existence. Heidegger also speaks in what could be a misleading way when he asks: "Is 'world' perhaps a characteristic of Dasein's Being?" (BT.92). But his four distinctions at BT.93 are designed to give order to this ambiguity. The fourth meaning of "world" is that it "designates the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood" (BT.93). Heidegger then calls attention to the "a priori character of worldhood in general" in order to distinguish this Existenzial from what is commonly understood as a particular environment.

The term "worldhood" expresses the existence-state of belonging with a world. Here is the way in which Heidegger names this Existenzial:

'Worldhood' is an ontological concept, and stands for the structure of one of the constitutive items (Momente) of Being-in-the-world. But we know Being-in-the-world as a way in which Dasein's character is defined existentially. Thus worldhood itself is an Existenzial (Weltlichkeit ist demnach selbst ein Existenzial). If we inquire ontologically about the 'world', we by no means abandon the analytic of Dasein as a field for thematic study. Ontologically, 'world' is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself (BT.92/SZ.64).
Worldhood defines the Dasein existentially, that is, it is an existential determination or structure of its Being. It is important to remember that Heidegger refuses to consider a Dasein without a world or start with a "worldless subject" in his Existential Analytic. The Dasein is to be interpreted, right from the beginning, as a full being with many basic characteristics. By a basic characteristic, we mean a phenomenon that belongs to every human Exister.

E5: Deseverance, Entfernung

The fifth Existenzial is "deseverance". It is by far the most opaque in English. This is the M/R translation of Heidegger's "Entfernung". M/R explain their efforts in great detail in footnote #2 at BT.138-9. This long footnote tells us about the compromise that"M/R had to settle for in translating this Existenzial. Their "coining" of deseverance does not show us at all what Heidegger means by this term. The complication that Heidegger sometimes adds a hyphen (Ent- ferung) to emphasize the privative prefix adds further wrinkles to this translation.16 Because we are involved in

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16 M/R's asterix (*) indicates an ambiguous case where the prefix "Ent-" has been hyphenated because it appears at the end of a line in Sein und Zeit. See BT.139, last paragraph of footnote #2. Some of these ambiguous cases do not appear in the fifteenth edition of Sein und Zeit which we are using to quote from.
a tracking project of the Existenzials of Being and Time, we cannot simply change this troublesome translation. We should remember that Heidegger is pointing to the distinctions and dimensions that belong as "spatial characteristics" to the Dasein's existence.

Let us turn back to the text and point out how E 5 is introduced by Heidegger:

We use the expression "deseverance" in a signification which is both active and transitive. It stands for a constitutive state of Dasein's Being (Seinsverfassung)—a state with regard to which removing something in the sense of putting it away is only a determinate factual mode. "De-severing" amounts to making the farness vanish—that is, making the remoteness of something disappear, bringing it close. Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be encountered close by as the entity which it is. De-severance discovers remoteness; and remoteness, like distance, is a determinate categorial characteristic of entities whose nature is not that of Dasein. De-severance, however, is an Existenzial; this must be kept in mind (Entfernung dagegen muß als Existenzial festgehalten werden) (BT.139/SZ.105).

Here Heidegger returns to the move of explaining the Existenzial by contrasting it with "determinate categorial characteristics". He does not name the precise category that is behind remoteness, but he does discuss readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand over the next two pages. Deseverance is the phenomenon for the way the Dasein relates itself to distance, it is not the measuring that is the focus here but the way measures are understood and make up ways for existing.
Deseverance is a phenomenon of orientation and location. Heidegger explains that:

Occupying a place must be conceived as a desevering of the environmentally ready-to-hand into a region which has been circumspectively discovered in advance. Dasein understands its "here" (Hier) in terms of its environmental "yonder". The "here" does not mean the "where" of something present-at-hand, but rather the "whereat" (Wobei) of a de-severant Being-alongside, together with this de-severance (BT.142).

The Dasein "stands out" or lives in a world of distinctions and dimensions. It understands itself in the idioms of immediacy, proximity and distance. "I am here", "That tree over there is to my right", or "That tall metal toothpick at the horizon is really the CN Tower", are expressions of this kind of understanding. In the Dasein's existence, there are always established distances or a kind of "communal geography" which we are expected to know in our being with other people. Deseverance is the phenomenon by which the Dasein finds itself thrown into a world in which it can apprehend dimensions.

To understand an Existenzial initially, Heidegger sometimes resorts to comparing it with derivatives of it that are familiar to us from our everyday life. Here are Heidegger's examples of "deseverances in which everyday Dasein maintains itself":

We say that to go over yonder is "a good walk", "a stone's throw", or 'as long as it takes to smoke a pipe'. These measures
express not only that they are not intended to 'measure' anything but also that the remoteness (Entfernung) here estimated belongs to some entity to which one goes with circumspective concern (BT.140).

Heidegger is here calling attention to the way the Dasein understands spatial relations through its concerns. The Dasein is always an oriented being. The Dasein lives with its horizons. In common life, we are often concerned with 'how far we still have to go' or 'how long it will take us to get there'. The Dasein's deseverance is developed in this consistent preoccupation with spatial relations that are oriented towards what one is doing.

"Circumspection" (Umsicht) links deseverance to concern. Circumspection is a specialized kind of concern dealing with objects that are ready-to-hand. It is the 'sight' of the worker. A world with work has been desevered in that it has been set up on a range of measures in order to be able to assign work. Heidegger says:

If Dasein is, it already has, as directing and desevering, its own discovered region. Both directionality and deseverance, as modes of Being-in-the-world, are guided beforehand by the circumspection of concern (BT.143).

The Dasein lives in an ordered world and it perceives this order in its circumspection. "Left" and "right", "up" and "down", "far" and "near", "behind" and "ahead", or "north", "south", "east" and "west" are all examples of this common order of things in which we typically operate. Directions
are part of what it means for the Dasein to exist as a being in a world that has been laid out in spatial significations. Heidegger also relates this Existenzial back to "Being-in" when he says:

De-severance and directionality, as constitutive characteristics of Being-in, are determinative for Dasein's spatiality—for its being concernfully and circumspectively in space, in a space discovered and within-the-world (BT.144).

The Dasein does not merely exist in space. The Dasein exists spatially in its deseverance. "Space" is to be understood from the Dasein's existence and deseverance is the name for this characteristic belonging to its Being. Deseverance is Heidegger's peculiar way of pointing out that the Dasein does not exist first and then live in space but that living with an understanding of spatiality is characteristic for the Dasein's existence.

E 6: Making room, Einräumen

The sixth Existenzial is "making room". This is a 'spatial' aspect of the Dasein's constitution that should be distinguished from "deseverance" (E 5). While deseverance is the phenomenon of separations, distinctions and dimensions, Heidegger links "making room" to "regions" or "places" related to the concerns for ready-to-hand things. "Making room" is like setting up a place or preparing it for the
task that is to be done. This is the way in which Heidegger introduces this Existenzial:

When we let entities within-the-world be encountered in the way which is constitutive for Being-in-the-world, we 'give them space'. This 'giving space', which we also call 'making room' for them, consists in freeing the ready-to-hand for its spatiality. As a way of discovering and presenting a possible totality of spaces determined by involvements, this making-room is what makes possible one's factical orientation at the time. In concerning itself circumspectively with the world, Dasein can move things around or out of the way or 'make room' for them (um-, weg- und "einträumen") only because making-room — understood as an Existenzial— belongs to its Being-in-the-world (zu seinem In-der-Welt-sein das Einräumen—as Existenzial verstanden —gehört) (BT.146/SZ.111).

What could "freeing the ready-to-hand for its spatiality" mean? This phrase means assigning equipment to its place and role in the tasks of concern. This is an act of circumspection that provides "factical orientation" for the Dasein. But "making room" is an Existenzial, and that means that it is not an activity but rather a characteristic of the Dasein. Making room is providing location for our involvements. These remarks remain vaporous, but Heidegger does not really give this Existenzial a clear explanation in section #24 of Being and Time. Heidegger's account on this point is also devoid of examples, unlike his treatment of many other Existenzials.
E 7: Solicitude, Fürsorge

The seventh Existenzial is "solicitude". This concept is introduced just after "Being-with" is discussed. It is meant to express the range of comportments of one Dasein to other Daseins. It is an involvement relation like concern but is distinct because it express the involvement between Daseins. Solicitude is expressed as an Existenzial when Heidegger says:

But we understand the expression "solicitude" in a way which corresponds (entsprechend) to our use of "concern" as a term for an Existenzial (als Terminus für ein Existenzial) (BT. 158/SZ. 121).

The claim that solicitude "corresponds" to "concern" is not as forceful as the straight-forward declaration that "(x)... is an Existenzial". Here, then, the text is weak in direct support for regarding "solicitude" as an Existenzial. Yet it is the way that solicitude functions in the Existential analytic that allows us to regard it as an Existenzial. It explains the relation of one Dasein to other Daseins; it is the basic phenomenon that brings the range of such relations into view.

Solicitude is the characteristic that the Dasein cares for other Daseins. Heidegger asserts that this phenomenon covers an entire range of behaviours, and speaks of the common, "deficient modes of solicitude" such as "passing one
another by, not 'mattering' to one another" (BT.158) and also the two "positive modes" of solicitude: leaping in and dominating another person and leaping ahead to guide that person (BT.158-9). But solicitude is not the set of behaviours that arise in Being with and towards others. It is the name for the characteristic of the Dasein's Being that makes these behaviours possible. To call solicitude "a state of Dasein's Being (eine Seinsverfassung des Daseins)" (BT.159) like Heidegger, does not really explain it in a way that we are familiar with. Heidegger means that solicitude is an original characteristic of human existence. Solicitude is a term for a kind of phenomena, that is, the kind of phenomena that characterize the relations of one Dasein to other Daseins.

The terms "solicitude" and "concern" line up with the central distinction between the Dasein (existence) and entities other than Dasein (things that are present-at-hand or ready-to-hand). Concern and solicitude are "the possible basic kinds of Being-in" (BT.21). These terms distinguish the two basic kinds of involvements which a Dasein can have: with other Daseins and with the things of the world. Later in Being and Time, Heidegger explains that "Care is always concern and solicitude, even if only privatively" (BT.238-9). Care (Sorge) is the expression for the single phenomenon that discloses the full Dasein. Concern and solicitude are the
two basic ways in which care is manifested by the Dasein. Concern and solicitude are characteristics limited by the finitude of the Dasein. Heidegger thinks these terms name structures behind all our behaviours:

As structures essential to Dasein's constitution (Daseinsverfassung), these have a share in conditioning the possibility of any existence whatsoever (BT.308).

At this point, Heidegger is arguing that solicitude and concern have a function in human existence that anticipates the claim that death lays upon each individual. The deficient modes of concern and solicitude which arise from the "they" are to be overthrown in the task of authenticity which each Dasein has as the highest possibility of its being.

Heidegger says that the Dasein's original state of being "lost in the 'they' " determines "the tasks, rules, and standards, the urgency and extent, of concernful and solicitous Being-in-the-world" (BT.312). The need to leap ahead of the "they" prescribes the concern for things and solicitude for persons that aims at discovering oneself and seizing one's ownmost destiny. These 'proper' comportments are expressed as "resoluteness" or "authentic Being-one's-Self" (BT.344). Resoluteness is the way that the Dasein discloses itself to itself. It is how the Dasein begins to understand itself by taking up a stand and seizing upon its "potentiality-for-Being in the manner of concernful solicitude" (BT.345).
The proper concern for things and solicitude for others follows only from the resolute appropriation of the self from the "they". Heidegger explains:

...resoluteness is what first gives authentic transparency to the Dasein. In resoluteness the issue for Dasein is its ownmost potentiality-for-being, which, as something thrown, can project itself only upon definite factual possibilities (31.3,6).

The importance of resoluteness is that it shows us how Heidegger sets 'values' on the range of concerns and solicitude and explains why he speaks of "deficient" and "positive" modes of solicitude.

338: The "they", Das Man

The eighth Existenzial is the "they". This is a neutral, indefinite pronoun in German and is meant to be impersonal. Heidegger names it as follows:

The 'they' is an Existenzial; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution (37.167).

Das Man ist ein Existenzial und gehört als ursprüngliches Phänomen zur positiven Verfassung des Daseins (52.129).

Why does Heidegger say "positive" here? It means that this is a characteristic which belongs originally to the Dasein and not an aspect which it falls into after it has existed for a time. The Existenzials are the original or basic phenomena of the Dasein that characterize its existence.
This account is a reversal of the view that humans begin existing in an innocent or uncorrupted original state. The Dasein is originally in the "they"; it is already fallen or lost in the "they" as it exists. Heidegger emphasizes that his aim "is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein" (BT.211). He wants to make visible "certain definite phenomena" (BT.210) which characterize the Dasein in his ontological analysis.

Heidegger says that the "they" is "the answer to the question of the 'who' of everyday Dasein" (BT.165-6). Yet there is a danger in regarding the "they" as a group of people (such as "The Establishment") or giving an account that attaches a particular identity to the "they" that is outside of my own existence. The "they" is an ontological characteristic of the Dasein in that it describes the Dasein as being lost from itself. The "they" expresses "who" the everyday Dasein really is as having seized upon its possibilities in an inadequate manner. Heidegger explains that:

Proximally Dasein is "they", and for the most part it remains so. If Dasein discovers the world in its own way (eigens) and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic Being, then this discovery of the 'world' and this disclosure of Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way (BT.167).
The everyday Dasein has no identity of its own, it has been closed off from its own "mineness", it understands itself only as one of the "they". The "they" dominates the Dasein with a "levelled off" or "average" understanding that is not struggled for in a resolute investigation but merely passed along through "idle talk".

Authenticity is the task of reversing the dominance of the "they" over my own existence. Authenticity is maintained not by extricating oneself from the "they" but by transforming or seeing through the impersonal interpretation that covers over my own existence. Heidegger says:

Authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the "they"; it is rather an existentiell modification of the "they" of the "they" as an essential Existenzial (37.160).

The Dasein cannot release itself from the "they". It can change the way of existing which follows the "they", but it can never dissolve this original structure of Being entirely. Authenticity is not "given" for the Dasein but must be earned through resoluteness or commitment to my own existence. Authenticity is not an Existenzial, but an "existentiell modification" of what usually arises from the original structure. What is given for the Dasein, its ensnarement in the "they", sets up its tasks and possibilities. The original phenomenon of the "they" does not prevent the
Dasein from becoming authentic but sets the conditions for authenticity as a way of existing.

The English "they" tends to promote the illusion that we are talking about a group of people rather than a constitutive phenomenon of the Dasein. The "they" structure explains why it is an issue for the Dasein to become itself by returning to its own thinking. When the Dasein begins to think for itself and takes up its own Being as an issue, it does not escape the "they". The "they" belongs to the Dasein as a fundamental phenomenon that expresses the Dasein as having a "corporate mentality" which it must outthink in its search for an understanding of itself. The task of the Dasein is to defend itself from its tendency to slide into the easy ways of the "they" that forget the inward task of taking up a stand as one self.

E 9: State-of-mind, Befindlichkeit

"State-of-mind" is the ninth Existenzial that appears in Being and Time. This basic characteristic of the Dasein is explained as the way in which the Dasein "finds itself" in the world. In addition to the title phenomenon (der Befindlichkeit) which names the ontological characteristic, Heidegger discusses particular states-of-mind (die Befindlichkeit) like fear and anxiety. In the moods of its state-of-mind,
the world is disclosed in "facticity" as that which the
Dasein has been "thrown into": the "there" of its Being-in-
the-world. Ontologically, "we must as a general principle
leave the primary discovery of the world to 'bare mood' "
(BT.177). He uses the term "mood" (Stimmung) to designate
an existentiell modification of the original structure of
state-of-mind that is given for Dasein's Being. Heidegger
introduces this Existenzial as follows:

What we indicate ontologically by the
term "state-of-mind" is ontically the
most familiar and everyday sort of thing;
our mood, our Being-attuned. Prior to
all psychology of moods, a field which
in any case still lies fallow, it is
necessary to see this phenomenon as a
fundamental Existenzial (Phänomen als
fundamentales Existenzial zu sehen),
and to outline its structure (BT.172-
3/SZ.134).

Notice here how Heidegger's account contrasts the Existenzial
with a common or familiar concept (mood) rather than with a
category of professional philosophers. The Existenzial lies
behind what we all know as our moods, or the feelings that
we find ourselves with from day to day. "State-of-mind"
belongs to the Dasein's constitution while any particular
mood may or may not be found at a time. This "state-of-mind"
belongs to the Dasein as the characteristic of its existence
that it has moods in which it finds itself in a disclosed
world.

Heidegger emphasizes the disclosive function of this
Existenzial. He remarks that:

...the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial (ursprünglich) disclosure belonging to moods, in which Dasein is brought before its Being as "there" (BT.173).

Moods are unintellectual but still intelligible ways in which the Dasein expresses itself. The state-of-mind discloses the Dasein to itself in an unconceptualized way or "prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure" (BT.175). The state-of-mind is a kind of primary indicator by which the Dasein reflects its thrownness into a world.

It is the function of the state-of-mind that Heidegger wants to explain. Remember that Heidegger has just finished pointing out how the Dasein always loses itself in the "they". His account then switches to how the Dasein finds itself in a state-of-mind. Heidegger says:

A state-of-mind not only discloses Dasein in its thrownness and its submission to that world which is already disclosed with its own Being; it is itself the existential kind of Being in which Dasein constantly surrenders itself to the 'world' and lets the 'world' "matter" to it in such a way that somehow Dasein evades its very self. The existential constitution (Verfassung) of such evasion will become clear in the phenomenon of falling (BT.178).

Can we explain what "discloses Dasein in its thrownness" means in another way? Heidegger means that this Existenzial
brings the Exister to view itself as a being embedded in a factual world. A state-of-mind reveals to the Dasein how it finds itself living in the world. It expresses how the Dasein feels to find itself in a definite world.

In the disclosure of a state-of-mind, the Dasein does not perceive itself (BT.174). Rather it meets itself; it finds itself in the moods that spring from its stand in the world. Heidegger develops an extensive account of the disclosing function of the states-of-mind of "anxiety", "fear" and "dread".17 The disclosing function of the state-of-mind brings the Dasein to understand itself. Heidegger does not think that there can be a "state-of-mind" without "understanding" (see BT.182).

E 10: Understanding, Verstehen

The tenth Existenzial is "understanding". We need to be careful to distinguish this term from its familiar meanings. Heidegger does not mean anything like to "perceive what is meant" or to point to an "intellectual faculty" of Reason here. This term designates a phenomenon of the Dasein and characterizes the way that it exists. It is commonly used in conjunction with "possibility" (E 11) and

17 See sections #30 and #40 in Being and Time.
"projection" (E 12). Heidegger emphasizes that "A state-of-mind always has its understanding" (BT.182). Heidegger introduces this Existenzial conditionally, but also, I think, unambiguously:

If we interpret understanding as a fundamental Existenzial, this indicates that this phenomenon is conceived as a basic mode of Dasein's Being (BT.182).

Wenn wir dieses als fundamentales Existenzial interpretieren, dann zeigt sich damit an, daß dieses Phänomen als Grundmodus des Seins des Daseins begriffen wird (SZ.143).

The phenomenon that Heidegger wants to call into view is a fundamental understanding that belongs to the Dasein's constitution. This "understanding" is to be taken as "the genuine appropriation of those entities towards which Dasein can comport itself in accordance with its essential possibilities of Being" (BT.214). This is not a cognitive relation but something more basic, namely, an existential phenomenon. Recall that Heidegger says:

In understanding, as an Existenzial, that which we have such competence over is not a "what", but Being as existing (BT.183).

In the Existenzial of understanding, the "knower" is not related to a "known" which is other and present to it, rather the focus is on who is understanding. There is not a "subject matter" that makes up what is thought, but rather

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18 See, for example, BT.188: "As understanding, Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities."
the Dasein has an understanding of who it is.

"Understanding" is more basic than the cognitive connection of a knowing subject with its known object because it is constitutive for the Dasein's existence. Heidegger contrasts "understanding" with "cognition" in this later passage:

With the term "understanding" we have in mind a fundamental Existenzial, which is neither a definite species of cognition distinguished, let us say, from explaining and conceiving, nor any cognition at all in the sense of grasping something thematically. Understanding constitutes rather the being of the "there" in such a way that, on the basis of such understanding, a Dasein can, in existing, develop the different possibilities of sight, of looking around (Sichumsehens), and of just looking. In all explanation one uncovers understandingly that which one cannot understand; and all explanation is thus rooted in Dasein's primary understanding (37.385).

These are the lines which Heidegger uses to lead us into the temporal "re-interpretation" of the existenzial of understanding. His account is that there is an understanding of existence that stands behind all our cognitive projects. This understanding is the basis for the "looking" of inquiry; it is the phenomenon which gives way to conceptual projects.

Heidegger has some remarks which make clearer what this "understanding" is as a constitutive phenomenon of the Dasein. He says:

as a disclosure, understanding always
pertains to the whole basic state \textit{Grundverfassung} of Being-in-the-world (BT.184, see also BT.194).

This understanding has a full view of the existence of Dasein in its world. This means that the Dasein is understood as a definite being with determinate characteristics. The whole basic state of Being-in-the-world is understood through the Existenzials which characterize and express the existence of the Dasein. Here Heidegger is saying that in the Existenzial of "understanding," the Dasein already possesses an understanding of its Being-in-the-world.

There is an "existential" definition or formula for what Heidegger means by understanding that is given in the explanation of the temporality of understanding. He says:

If the term "understanding" is taken in a way which is primordially existential, it means to be projecting towards a potentiality-for-being for the sake of which any Dasein exists (BT.385).

Notice here how Heidegger is using variations of the Existenzials of "possibility" (E11) and "projection" (E12) to explain understanding. Heidegger is arguing that understanding is to be understood as "primarily futural" (BT.387). The relation between understanding, possibility and projection is thick and these terms are often explained with each other or cramped into terse sentences.
E II: Possibility, Möglichkeit

The eleventh Existenzial is "possibility". The Existenzials of "possibility", "projection", and "understanding" are all explained for the first time in section #31, "Being-there as Understanding". This is another indication of how tightly these basic phenomena are explained. Heidegger is not conceiving this "possibility" as the "not yet actual", but rather as who it is possible for the Dasein to be. The "possibility" pointed to here belongs to the Dasein's structure as what it can become in its existence. Possibilities are rooted in a factual understanding and are circumscribed by the definite conditions that Dasein has already been thrown into. We do not have "every" possibility existentially, but have possibilities which arise in an existence so as to belong to that individual Dasein as who it can become. Heidegger names this Existenzial in the following passage:

Possibility, as an Existenzial (Die Möglichkeit als Existenzial), does not signify a free-floating potentiality-for-Being in the sense of the 'liberty of indifference' (libertas indifferentiae). In every case Dasein, as essentially having a state-of-mind, has already got itself into definite possibilities. As the potentiality-for-Being which is is, it has let such possibilities pass by; it is constantly waiving the possibilities of its Being, or else seizes upon them and makes mistakes. But this means that Dasein
is Being-possible which has been delivered over to itself—thrown possibility through and through. Dasein is the possibility of Being-free for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Its Being-possible is transparent to itself in different possible ways and degrees (BT.183).

Here Heidegger is talking through the terminology that he has established so far in the Existential Analytic. A "potentiality-for-Being" (Seinkönnen) is a way that the Dasein can choose to be. Thrown possibility means definite possibilities or possibilities rooted in the facts of the situation. "Transparent" is a term that Heidegger uses to describe an understanding which is "resolute" (BT.346) and "transparency" is "the sight which is related primarily and on the whole to existence" (BT.186). The Dasein is locked into certain possibilities just because it has been thrown into its world. These possibilities belong to its existence as what it can become through its own choices.

"Possibility", unlike "understanding" (which was contrasted with familiar "species of cognition"), is contrasted with a category. The Existenzial is different from the traditional meaning of possibility "as a modal category of presence-at-hand" that is understood as "not yet actual" and "not at any time necessary" (BT.183).19 Heidegger wants to

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19 In Kant's table, possibility (Möglichkeit) is classified as a category "of modality" (see Critique of Pure Reason, A.79-83, B.105-9).
understand possibility as an original phenomenon rather than a negation of the concepts of actuality or necessity. Thus he says that:

...possibility as an Existenzial is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically (BT.183).

All the ways of Dasein's Being can be characterized as "possibilities", though that point would not be enough in itself. The Dasein has its own possibilities and these are distinct from the Existenzial "possibility". The Existenzial of "possibility" belongs to all Daseins as a characteristic of existence, but the particular possibilities belong to particular Daseins rather than all.

The possibilities of each Dasein are restricted not only by finitude but also by the dominance of the "they". From the factual world in which it finds itself, the Dasein is only aware of the possibilities that the "they" gives it. Heidegger calls this a "levelling off" of Dasein's possibilities:

From this world it (the Dasein) takes its possibilities, and it does so first in accordance with the way things have been interpreted by the "they". This interpretation has already restricted the possible options of choice to what lies within the range of the familiar, the attainable, the respectable—that which is fitting and proper. This levelling off of Dasein's possibilities to what is proximally at its everyday disposal also results in a dimming down of the possible as such (BT.23).
The "they" imposes impersonal and standard possibilities on the Dasein. The "they" is not to be regarded as a gang of people, but as a tendency towards uprooted understanding in the Dasein itself. The Dasein tends to understand itself through the familiar and respectable possibilities of roles, careers and stereo-types. Instead of "willing" to become who it wants to be, the everyday Dasein engages in "mere wishing" (BT.239) with regard to its possibilities. The proper comportment towards the possibilities which belong to one's own existence needs to be explained with regards to the task of authenticity rather than in a preliminary exposition of this Existenzial.

E 12: Projection, Entwurf

"Projection" is the twelfth Existenzial of Being and Time. "Projection" is the name for the phenomenon which connects "understanding" and "possibility". Heidegger claims that "the understanding has in itself the existential structure (die existenziale Struktur) which we call 'projection'" (BT.184-5). This is the reason why the understanding always presses "forward into possibilities" (BT.184). Projection is being ahead of oneself and it expresses how the Dasein "always will understand itself in terms of possibilities" (BT.185). Projection is always from an
understanding of factual existence and expresses the possibilities which can follow that existence. Heidegger explains the Existenzial in this way:

Because of the kind of Being which is constituted by the Existenzial of projection (das Existenzial des Entwurfs), Dasein is constantly 'more' than it factually is, supposing that one might want to make an inventory of it as something-at-hand and list the contents of its Being, and supposing that one were able to do so. But Dasein is never more than it factually is, for to its facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially. Yet as Being-possible, moreover, Dasein is never anything less; that is to say, it is existentially that which, in its potentiality-for-Being, it is not yet (BT.185-6/SZ.145).

Heidegger distinguishes what the Dasein is factually from what it can be through its possibilities. But these same possibilities belong to the facticity of the Dasein and should be thought of as possibilities which grow out of its factual existence. The Dasein thinks "ahead of itself" when it conceives itself in terms of its possibilities and this is the phenomenon of "projection".

Heidegger makes an interesting remark in the above passage which has a bearing on our own construction of a definite list of Existenzials. While we seek a list of the Existenzials contained in the Existential Analytic, Heidegger is speaking here of a complete factual list of the "contents" of Dasein's Being. Heidegger suggests here that a full
inventory of the components of the Dasein's existence may be something we cannot assemble. This remark distinguishes what Heidegger is doing in the Existential Analytic from the project of supplying an exhaustive encompassment of all the aspects of human life. Heidegger wants to reveal the existential basis which is common to all human existence and establish a way of characterizing or understanding those phenomena which give a determinate shape to existence.

The Dasein is disclosed to itself as a definite being in its state-of-mind, understanding and through resoluteness. It is able to recognize the facts of its existence and also what can arise from those facts, what can grow out of them through choices. Projection is the linking of possibilities to the facts of disclosure. Projection is the anticipation of future factual existences. We should remark here that Heidegger contrasts this Existential not with a category but with a common conception:

Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being (BT.185).

He distinguishes particular "projects" or "plans of action" from the "projection" that is a phenomenon which characterizes the Dasein in its existence. The resolution to stop smoking does not illustrate the Existential of projection.
Projection is the character of the understanding which anticipates the possibilities that grow out of the facts of the Dasein's existence.

E 13: Meaning, Sinn

The thirteenth Existenzial, "meaning", is introduced by Heidegger in section #32, "Understanding and Interpretation". This translation could be misleading so we need to remind ourselves that Heidegger is not thinking about "meaning" in the sense of our "practices with words" or any property of propositions. Heidegger does not present any theory of meaning here at all, he only points to a basic phenomenon of the Dasein. Heidegger gives this account to establish "meaning" as an Existenzial:

Meaning is the "upon which" of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception. In so far as understanding and interpretation make up the existential state (Verfassung) of Being of the "there"; "meaning" must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness which belongs to understanding. Meaning is an Existenzial of Dasein, not a property (Sinn ist ein Existenzial des Daseins, nicht eine Eigenschaft) attaching to entities, lying 'behind' them or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate domain'. Dasein only 'has' meaning, so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be 'filled in' by entities discoverable in that disclosedness (BT.193/SZ.151).
"Meaning" is understood as the "framework" for the understanding which interprets existence. Heidegger means that existence is already intelligible to the Dasein. The "meaning" which is a phenomenon of the Dasein is distinguished from the "unmeaning" characteristic of things that surround the Dasein. Meaning belongs to Dasein's constitution and things only have meaning within the Dasein's understanding of the entities disclosed to it in its Being-in-the-world.

E 14: Discourse, Rede

"Discourse" is the term for the fourteenth Existenzial. One way that Heidegger expresses this Existenzial is that "Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility" (BT.203-4). Discourse makes manifest the intelligibility that belongs to Being-in-the-world as meaning. Heidegger discusses this Existenzial in the following way:

If discourse, as the Articulation of the intelligibility of the "there", is a primordial Existenzial of disclosedness (ursprüngliches Existenzial der Erschlossenheit ist), and if disclosedness is primarily constituted by Being-in-the-world, then discourse too must have essentially a kind of Being which is specifically worldly. The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world—an intelligibility that goes with a state-of-mind—expresses itself as discourse (BT.204/32.161).
Discourse is the term not for "the act of talking" but for the characteristic of the Dasein that makes talking and hearing possible. Heidegger groups this Existenzial with "understanding" and "state-of-mind" as equiprimordial (occurring at the same time) elements of the disclosedness of the Dasein. Discourse manifests the "intelligibility" of Being-in-the-world (BT.204) in that speech establishes an understanding of one's existence that can be shared with other Daseins.

When Heidegger says that discourse discloses the Dasein, he means that this term expresses a characteristic basic to its existence. He says plainly that "As an existential state (Verfassung) in which Dasein is disclosed, discourse is constitutive for Dasein's existence" (BT.204). This suggests that the constitutive states of Dasein's Being are expressions of phenomena which bring the Dasein into view for our analysis. The Existenzials function as disclosers of the Dasein's Being and, taken together, they express or manifest the kind of Being (or the Dasein) that belongs to every human existence.

Disclosedness is a characteristic of the Dasein in that the Dasein lives in a world which has been "opened" or prepared for its involvement. This curious metaphor makes sense if one understands that an entity which exists must have a "way" cleared for its existing. The Dasein does not exist in a vacuum but rather within what we can express as...
a primordial network of phenomenal structures. These structures together make existence possible in that they provide the opening through which life can arise in the human form. Some sort of "clearing" precedes the Dasein's existence as a condition that makes room for that existing. Through discourse, the Dasein is able to live in a world that is intelligible to it and other Daseins. Discourse is not an "invention" of man as it characterizes human existence. This is a position that Heidegger maintains through to his later work on language. 20

We have not yet explained how discourse (Rede) fits with "idle talk" (Gerede). Idle talk is a "possibility" of Dasein's discourse (BT.213) yet also "one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication" (BT.213). Heidegger understands discourse as a characteristic phenomenon of the Dasein and idle talk as the prevailing tendency in the use of language. Discourse as an Existenzial is not a "tendency" but an expression of the way in which Dasein exists. Discourse is not "one of the ways" in which Dasein speaks like "idle talk" but is the name for an original state of Dasein's Being.

E 15: Truth, Wahrheit

The fifteenth Existenzial is "truth". Heidegger delivers an account in section 144 in which he distinguishes "the traditional conception of truth" from the "primordial phenomenon of truth" as an Existenzial (BT.257). Truth as the "agreement" of intellectus and res (knowing and things) (BT.258) is contrasted with truth as an ontological characteristic of the Dasein. Heidegger declares that:

Truth, when understood in the most primordial sense, belongs to the basic constitution of Dasein. The term signifies an Existenzial (BT.289).

Wahrheit, im ursprünglichsten Sinne verstanden gehört zur Grundverfassung des Daseins. Der Titel bedeutet ein Existenzial (SZ.226).

Heidegger is not pointing to any property of propositions or characteristic of language. What is the point of regarding truth as an Existenzial? It makes truth out to be an original structure of existence rather than a way of existing.

Heidegger explains that what he means by this Existenzial by relating it to the "truth of existence" in this later passage:

Truth must be conceived as a fundamental Existenzial. In our ontological clarification of the proposition that 'Dasein is in the truth' we have called attention to the primordial disclosedness of this entity as the truth of existence (die Wahrheit der Existenz); and for the delimitation of its character we have referred to the analysis of Dasein's authenticity (BT.313).
The "truth of existence" is the transparency of the Dasein with regards to its own Being. This is an existential modification of the "they". We should note that there is a tension between the Existenzial of "truth" and the "they" as these opposing characteristics are both constitutive for the Dasein.

The Existenzial of "truth" is difficult to explain because of Heidegger's thesis that "Dasein is equiprimordially both in the truth and in untruth" (BT.265). Heidegger only designates "truth" as an Existenzial but appears to understand the Existenzial as including both truth and untruth. The Existenzial of the "they" shows that the Dasein is originally entangled in an understanding uprooted from itself. Heidegger thinks that the Dasein is not first in truth and then later in untruth but in both at once. The Dasein always has both possibilities but remains caught in "untruth" in its everyday existing:

The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein's very understanding of Being—that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle (BT.268).

There is a puzzle to be expressed out of these remarks. The Dasein is caught in the currents of untruth by the "they" but truth belongs originally to its existence and can be retrieved by overcoming the force of the "they".
Heidegger thinks that because "truth" is an Existenzial of Dasein "all truth is relative to Dasein's Being" (BT.270). "Uncovering" is an event of the Dasein's existence and this is the expression Heidegger uses to describe the disclosure of "truth" (see BT.263). While the Dasein is always entangled originally in the "untruth" of the "they", it is also "ahead of itself" in that the possibility of uncovering the truth of its existence belongs also to its original state of Being. Heidegger is refusing to split asunder the co-existing phenomena of truth and untruth. His account can only be understood if we think that the Existenzial of "truth" encompasses both possibilities of truth and untruth.

E 16: Being-towards-the-end, Sein zum Ende

Heidegger regards "end and totality" as "ways in which Dasein gets a definite character ontologically" (BT.285). The passage which establishes "Being-towards-the-end" as an Existenzial is the same passage which we will use to say that "Being-a-whole" is an Existenzial. This passage is unlike the previous texts used in this chapter in that it does not indicate the name of the Existenzials. Here, Heidegger speaks of "end" (Ende) and "totality" (Ganzheit):

Keeping constantly in view the existential constitution (Verfassung) of Dasein already set forth, we must try to decide how inappropriate to Dasein ontologically are
those conceptions of end and totality which thrust themselves to the fore, no matter how categorically indefinite they remain. The rejection (Zurückweisung) of such concepts must be developed into a positive assignment (Zuweisung) of them to their specific realms. In this way our understanding of end and totality in their variant forms as Existenzials (Ende und Ganzheit in der Abwandlung als Existenzialien) will be strengthened, and this will guarantee the possibility of an ontological interpretation of death (BT.285-6/SZ.241-2).

Here Heidegger distinguishes between the prevailing conceptions of "end" and "totality" and the variations of such concepts which he sees as Existenzials. Heidegger is trying to find a way to pose "the existential question of the state-of-Being of 'end' and 'totality'" (BT.280). These two Existenzials together are to be used to establish an ontological understanding of death.

The explanation of the Existenzial of "Being-towards-the-end" is the key for understanding the finitude of the Dasein. The Dasein anticipates its finitude by understanding that it is a "Being-towards-the-end", or that it is "on the way" to its own death. Heidegger says:

The "ending" which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein's Being-at-an-end (Zu-Ende-sein), but a Being-towards-the-end (Sein zum Ende) of this entity. Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is (BT.289).

Heidegger is saying that death is a "moment" of existence in so far as Being-towards-the-end expresses the finitude
characteristic of the Dasein.

Heidegger wants to show how this way of conceiving the Dasein's finitude can lead us into an understanding of how the Dasein can be said to be "whole" in its existence. Thus he says:

...the existential meaning of Dasein's coming-to-an-end must be taken from Dasein itself, and we must show how such 'ending' can constitute Being-a-whole for the entity which exists. (BT.285).

Finitude makes the Dasein "whole". "Being-towards-the-end" is understood as how the Dasein approaches its death and finds itself radically individualized. This finite individuality constitutes the "wholeness" of the Dasein's existence.

E 17: Being-a-whole, Ganzsein

We read "Being-a-whole" as the seventeenth Existenzial based on the same passage to show Being-towards-the-end as such (BT.285-6). That passage does not name "Being-a-whole" directly as an Existenzial but merely says that a variant form of "totality" (Ganzheit) will be understood as an Existenzial. To be an Existenzial, the term must characterize the Dasein by expressing a basic phenomenon of the Dasein's existence. "Being-a-whole" is the phenomenon that expresses the "oneness" or "unity" of its existence. When we conceive the Dasein as "whole", we express that it is one
existence independent of other existences like it. "Being-a-whole" is conceived through an understanding of the Dasein's "Being-towards-the-end". Heidegger remarks:

But if 'ending', as dying is constitutive for Dasein's totality, then the Being of this wholeness itself must be conceived as an existential phenomenon of a Dasein which is in each case one's own. In 'ending', and in Dasein's Being-a-whole, for which such ending is constitutive, there is, by its very essence, no representing. These are the facts of the case essentially; one fails to recognize this when one interposes the expedient of making the dying of Others a substitute theme for the analysis of totality (BT.284).

The Existenzial of "Being-a-whole" is constituted by the Existenzial of "Being-towards-the-end". This means that the Dasein can be whole only because its being on the way to death gives it an understanding that it is entirely on its own, it is whole in that it lives its own existence unto its own death. This account is much simpler and shorter than the explanation that Heidegger gives. Indeed he declares that "The question of Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole and of its existential constitution still hangs in mid-air" at BT.311. The question of Dasein's "Being-a-whole" leads into the analysis of care as the "ontological term for the totality of Dasein's structural whole" (BT.296) which occupies Heidegger from BT.312-382.
Remarks on Heidegger's use of the Existenzials in his other works

A key point for this thesis is that the explicit "designating" or "naming" of the Existenzials occurs only in Being and Time. Heidegger does not use this strategy in any other work. We can spot some of the Existenzials that are designated as such in Being and Time in neighbouring works. Heidegger does not call attention to the status of these terms as Existenzials in these works. This is key for working out a definite list because a full focus on Being and Time allows us to track down all the Existenzials explicitly designated by Heidegger. The declaration of the Existenzials which we have shown in exhibiting the primary statements is unique to Being and Time. In this brief section, we will comment on the three main works of the period immediately following Being and Time that are now available to English readers.

From lectures taught in Marburg (1925-6), Riga (September, 1928) and Davos (March, 1929), Heidegger wrote Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. In this work, the

21 See Heidegger's Preface to the first edition (KFM, xxiii) in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, translated by James S. Churchill, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1962. This was first published as Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik in 1929. The Churchill translation was done at the same time as the translation of Being and Time with no apparent collaboration. The main discrepancy with the M/R translation is that Churchill uses "concern" for "Sorge" when M/R use "concern" for "Beforogen" and "care" for "Sorge".
Existenzials are discussed in the fourth section with regards to the finitude and transcendence of the Dasein. Heidegger also coins a term here which does not appear in Sein und Zeit. He calls "Sorge" a "Grundexistenzial" (see Kp.215). Churchill covers this up by translating this with "concern" being called a "fundamental existential" (Kp.247).

In Being and Time, M/R use "fundamental existentialia" for Heidegger's "fundamentalen Existenzialien" (see BT.244/SZ.199). This point is crucial because it helps to clarify the status of care with regards to the Existenzials.

Heidegger never calls "care" an Existenzial but it is the "single primordially unitary phenomenon" (BT.226) which culminates the interpretation of the Dasein's existential constitution and phenomenal content. Heidegger does not explicitly designate "care" as the "Grundexistenzial" in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics in the same way that he establishes the Existenzials of Being and Time.

The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is a major early work that Heidegger held back from publication for 48 years.

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22 Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Vol. 24 in the Complete Works, first published in 1975 by Vittorio Klosterman, Frankfurt. We refer to the translation by Albert Hofstadter, published by the Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982. This work consists of a course given at Marburg in the summer of 1927 (see Translator's Preface, BPP.xi). It treats, in an incomplete manner, the themes announced in Part II.2-3 in the "Design of the Treatise" sketched out at BT.54. It also contains the fullest discussion of both temporality and the problem of the ontological difference (beings/Being).
In this work, Heidegger goes back over his analysis of the Dasein with explicit regard to the concepts of "transcendence" and "intentionality". At one point, he explains what he is doing in a way that adds light to the view we have taken of Being and Time:

We shall now attempt to define the Dasein in its ontological structure by drawing the moments of the definition itself from the actual phenomenal evidence pertaining to this being (BPP.166).

In this book, Heidegger's treatment of the Dasein is sketchy compared to the extended analysis of the Existential Analytic. He refers to the meaning of "world" as worldhood (BPP.166), "projection" (BPP.168,277), "truth" (BPP.216), "understanding" (BPP.276), "possibility" (BPP.276) and "being-in" (BPP.291,301) but he does not "run through them in their systematic order" or give "an express exposition of the Dasein's basic constitution" (BPP.227). He indicates that this work will "presuppose" the "essential result of the existential analytic", that is, "the constitution of the Dasein's being is grounded in temporality" (BPP.228). The analysis in this book is, for the most part, very general, though at many points the insights developed in Being and Time are expressed in a more lucid manner.\(^{23}\) We can see Heidegger working with the Existenzials in this book, but

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\(^{23}\) See, for example, the discussion of how the Dasein is to study itself, BPP.159-60.
it is beyond the scope of this thesis to compare passages with what we have found in Being and Time. One particular passage could be read as a new designation of an Existenzial. Hofstadter's translation says that "Transcendence is an existential concept" (BPP,162). We have not looked back at the German to check Heidegger's own terms so this passage may stand as an exception to our claim that all the Existenzials are designated in Being and Time.

The Essence of Reasons

is the third work from this period that is currently available to the English reader. It is the last work that is expressed in the kind of language that is found in Being and Time. The Existenzials of "truth" (ER,21), "understanding" (ER,23), "project" (Entwurf, ER,46-7) and "Being alongside" (ER,101) can be spotted scattered through this text. Heidegger's remarks in this work do not aim at an exposition of the Dasein's phenomenal content. This treatment of the Existenzials is quite differ-

24 Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, 1929. The text we refer to is a bilingual edition translated by Terence Malik, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1969. In his Preface, Heidegger says that this book "was written in 1928, at the same time as the lecture What is Metaphysics?" (ER,3). This 131 page book (both German and English included) has much more importance than is generally recognized. In it, Heidegger examines Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason and develops a historical account of the concept of "world" in much the same language as he used in Being and Time. There is a very interesting footnote (#59) by Heidegger concerning the "transcendental" aim of Being and Time which shows that he is still working out the problems developed in its last sections (ER,96-9). This helps us to date Heidegger's interest in the project of Being and Time from 1919 through to at least 1929.
ent from the direct declarations found in *Being and Time*.

This brief survey shows us that our efforts to understand the Existenzials are best concentrated on the Existential Analytic of *Being and Time*. These neighbouring works may make use of the Existenzials, but they do not manifest the project of establishing the Being of the Dasein in a definite manner through the Existenzials. We will not attempt to deliver an account of the use of the Existenzials in these works though we do recognize that a complete study of the Existenzials would explain this matter adequately. Due to the scope of this thesis, we will only point to what needs to be explained by further work on this theme.

In the background, there lurks the question of why Heidegger dropped the Existenzials and turned away from the Existential Analytic in his studies of metaphysics, the history of philosophy and poetry.
CHAPTER II

A Second Look at the Characteristics of the Existenzials

We will take a second look at some of the clues from the primary Existenzial statements that have already appeared in Ch. I. Our aim here is not merely to repeat what was said there, but to begin searching for a pattern among the texts that will express what an Existenzial means for Heidegger (section #4). After establishing these clues, we will track the Existenzials through the Existential Analytic briefly in order to see if the clues found in the primary passages recur in any significant pattern (sections #5). Section #6 will be a brief analysis of the particular terms that surround the designated Existenzials.

#4: The Ten Clues of the Primary Existenzial statements

We have already seen the primary statements in which Heidegger designates the Existenzials. There is no factor which runs through these passages besides the use of the term "Existenzial" or its plural. The clues which we do find should not be treated as criteria for establishing which terms are Existenzials. The clues are elucidations that cast light on the use of Existenzials. Heidegger's project
in *Being and Time* was not to establish a "knockdown" definition for an Existenzial. There is no simple definition given for an Existenzial in the text. Thus we need to turn back to our definite list and study the passages that belong to it again. Here, we will not consider each Existenzial by turn but rather examine these statements to find the neighbouring terms which appear along with the Existenzials.

The first clue of the primary Existenzial statements is the simple assertion that "(x)...is an Existenzial". This is visible in E 1, E 2, E 4, E 8, E 13 and E 14. This move is a direct naming or declaration that a term is an Existenzial. This does not really explain the concept of an Existenzial but it shows us how Heidegger uses it. Though Heidegger deliberately designates certain Existenzials, he never sets forth a specific set of Existenzials such as is found in our list. Heidegger only expresses six of the seventeen Existenzials with this assertion. To explain why he did not do this for all, we could say that he favoured the use of elucidations that develop the initial ways in which the Existenzials are understood. It is these elaborations that we seek to discover in examining the other clues. One note here: In § 5, the H/R translation contains this simple assertion but it is not present in the German. Since it represents a "quirk" in the translation, we will not count it under this clue but in the next.
The second clue from these statements is that Heidegger declares that he will regard a certain term "as an Existenzial" or certain terms "as Existenzials". This can be seen in E 3, E 5, E 6, E 7, E 9, E 10, E 11, E 16 and E 17. The term "as" (als) is important because it indicates that the work Heidegger is doing at this stage of the Existential Analytic is a kind of interpretation. He uses what he calls the "as-structure of interpretation" (BT.192) which is the "phenomenon" (BT.202) of association by which the understanding interprets itself. Heidegger is interpreting the basic state of Being-in-the-world through the Existenzials which first bring the complex fullness of the Dasein's existence into the light. This strategy presupposes that we have already understood the meaning of an Existenzial and that this forms the "foresight" for regarding terms as Existenzials.

Notice that this clue belongs largely to the middle and last Existenzials whereas the simple assertion appears in the first Existenzials. The pattern here is that Heidegger begins by simply designating the Existenzials but then switches to saying that other terms will also be treated as Existenzials in the Existential Analytic. The pattern also includes the way both "Being-in" and "Being-alongside" are first designated as Existenzials (BT.79, BT.80-1) and then discussed as Existenzials (BT.82, BT.81).
The third through tenth clues are much less prominent than these first two. The third clue has several variants which have closely related meanings. It is the expression "belongs to..." (gehört zu...). In §6, it is "belongs to its Being-in-the-world". In §8, it is "belongs to Dasein's positive constitution (Verfassung)". In §15, it is "belongs to the basic constitution (Grundverfassung) of Dasein".

Heidegger uses the phrase "belongs to..." in a strong sense in that he means these Existenzials cannot be missing from the Dasein's existence. Belonging indicates that these constitutive structures are possessed by all Daseins. The Dasein does not acquire these structures but rather these phenomena are "given" along with its existence.

The fourth clue from the statements is that Heidegger describes an Existenzial as a "phenomenon". This appears in §8, §9 and §10. Heidegger thinks that a phenomenon is a way in which an entity "shows itself in itself" (§T.59). If these Existenzials are regarded as phenomena, then they are understood as manifestations of the Dasein in its Being. We could borrow Heidegger's phrase "phenomenological concept" (§T.60) to describe the Existenzials used to express and interpret the Dasein. A phenomenon is "that which shows itself as Being and as a structure of Being" (§T.91). A phenomenon is not an "appearance", or mere "sense-data", or a representation for Heidegger but rather it is a disclosure
of Being. This means that it expresses existence and manifests Being. It does not conceal the queer "thing-in-itself" from us. Phenomena are the ambassadors of Being rather than the shields that keep us from being familiar with the most real. Heidegger coins the term "phenomena of existence" (Existenzphänomen) (BT.280/SZ.237) but does not use it frequently. We can understand the Existenzials as the "phenomena of existence" or those phenomena which express the structure of human existence by taking up this clue in our interpretation.

The fifth clue is that Heidegger says that an Existenzial term will be "ontological". He does this for E 3, E 4 and E 9. All the Existenzials are "ontological" terms in that they arise as the basic concepts in the development of the fundamental ontology of the Dasein. This clue does not differentiate an Existenzial from a category as both are ontological terms (see BT.81). It distinguishes an Existenzial from an existentiell modification or way of existing that does not explicitly express the Being of the Dasein. This clue means that an Existenzial is a term for the science of Being or ontology. It distinguishes it from an "ontical" or "existentiell" term that is used in the analysis of "the question of existence" (BT.33). Existentiell terms like "resoluteness" or "authenticity" do not concern the original constitution of the Dasein but concern the choices that the
Dasein makes for its existence (or "how" the Dasein lives). This clue also sets the Existenzials apart from "the pre-ontological understanding of Being" (BT.35) which belongs to every Dasein before it undertakes any ontological inquiries.

The sixth clue from the statements exhibited in Ch. I is that an Existenzial is called a "state of Dasein's Being" (Seinsverfassung des Daseins). This is visible only in E 1 and E 5. Remember that the Dasein's "own specific state of Being...remains concealed from it" (BT.37) until "one's ownmost state of Being is considered as an ontological theme" (BT.36) in an Existential Analytic. The first task of the Existential Analytic is to express the states of Being which show us who the Dasein is. The family of "Verfassung" terms (Seinsverfassung, Grundverfassung, Daseinverfassung, Verfassungsmomente) gets used throughout the Existential Analytic. This key set of terms gets buried in H/R's translation because they use unrelated terms to represent this group of German words. In footnote #1 at BT.28, they indicate that they will use "constitution", "constitutive state", or "state" as translations for the term "Verfassung". Their "Constitution" is the translation for Heidegger's "Konstitution". The looseness of H/R's translations submerges the regularity of these terms and destroys an important pattern. For "Seinsverfassung", H/R use "state of Being", "state-of-Being", and sometimes "state of Dasein's
Being" (for "Seinsverfassung des Daseins"). In the last paragraph of Being and Time, "constitution-of-Being" is used for "Seinsverfassung". M/R disperse these German terms into a variety of phrases that are loose enough to weaken the force of important distinctions made in the Existential Analytic.

What does "state of Being" or "Seinsverfassung" mean as Heidegger uses it? If we look at Bt. 34, where Heidegger repeatedly calls "Being-in" a "state of Being", we can see that he means that it is a determination of the Dasein in its existence. "State of being" is the term for expressing the characteristic phenomena which belong to every Dasein. A "state of Being" is constitutive for the Dasein in that it is a structure that helps make up its existence. An Existenzial is a "state of Being" in so far as it is a constitutive phenomenon of the Dasein.

The seventh clue from the statements is the phrase "the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world" (des Seins eines möglichen In-der-Welt-seins). This is found only in the primary passage of 2.3. This clue can be dangerous because it invites existentiell misunderstandings of an ontological term. We can say that "being happy" is a possible way of living through human existence. But "being happy" is not an Existenzial because it is not a basic and necessary structure of the Dasein. In Heidegger's account, it would
be derived from the Existenzial of "state-of-mind" as a "mood". Heidegger's emphasis is on "the Being of a possible way..." rather than on "way". "Way" is simply too general to be useful in distinguishing the Existenzials from other concepts. "Ways" is better applied to what flows out of existentiality even though Heidegger speaks in this way:

All the structures of Being which belong to Dasein, together with the phenomenon which provides the answer to the question of the "who" are ways of its Being (sind Welsen seines Seins) (BT.149).

This is Heidegger's lead into an analysis of the Existenzial of the "they". Heidegger's task in the Existential Analytic is to make the Dasein's Being definite by exhibiting its determinations. The quote above is not nearly as fitting as saying that an Existenzial is a "constitutive state" of the Dasein. "Ways of its Being" should be kept distinct from the Being of its ways of existing. The Existenzials are not to be characterized as behaviours but as the phenomena of existence that are in place prior to behaving.

The eighth clue from the statements also gets obscured by the M/R translation. It is visible in E.4 when "worldhood" is called one of the "constitutive items of Being-in-the-world" (konstitutiven Momentes der In-der-Welt-seins). Note that "items" is M/R's translation for the German "Momentes". Their use of "moment of vision" for "Augenblick"
(see BT. 376, footnote #2) may be the reason for not using "moments" for "Momenten". The meaning of "constitutive items" is not quite the same as "constitutive moments". "Item" is an expression for a "thing" while "moment" is a temporal expression. We should not try to understand the Existenzials as "parts" or "items" of the Dasein's existence. Rather the Existenzials are "moments" or "phenomena" that express and disclose the Dasein's Being.

The ninth clue is that Heidegger calls understanding (E 10) a "basic mode of Dasein's Being" (Grundmodus des Seins des Daseins). "Mode" here can be interpreted as a "disposition" or "aspect" of the Dasein's Being. Heidegger uses this term throughout the Existential Analytic to interpret the relations of the phenomena of Dasein's Being. "Fear" is a "mode" or "state-of-mind" and that means that it belongs to particular persons as a way of existing but not to the Dasein's original Being. Heidegger applies the term "mode" to indicate a relationship of being "grounded in..." or to show how one phenomenon is rooted in another more basic phenomenon. A mode of Dasein's Being (such as the existential structure of understanding) is ranked differently than a mode of an Existenzial (such as fear which is a way to be). Heidegger later calls the Existenzials the "modes of the temporalizing of temporality" (BT. 352). "Mode" is one term that is used to establish the order of concepts in the text.
The tenth and final clue is found in § 12 where "projection" constitutes a "kind of Being" (Seinsart) for the Dasein. Here, Heidegger means that the Existenzial characterizes the ontological structure of the Dasein in a way that expresses it as a distinct sort of existence. This expression is like "state of Being" but it is weaker because it is not as definite. The Dasein's "kind of Being" is made determinate by the Existenzials which constitute it as states of Being. We should still remember this key question that Heidegger asks:

How is the kind of Being which belongs to a person to be ascertained ontologically in a positive way (BT.73)?

Heidegger does not think that this question is to be answered by breaking down existence into component parts like "body, soul and spirit" and then determining the particular kind of Being of each component (BT.74). He wants to approach the Dasein by showing how its constitutive phenomena are always linked or interwoven rather than "parts" which can be discussed independently. Heidegger's aim is to discover "an unequivocal and ontologically adequate answer to the question about the kind of Being which belongs to those entities which we ourselves are" (BT.75). Heidegger wants to show how the human being is a distinct kind of Being that stands out from all other things. His strategy is to use the Existenzials to point out the ontological character-
istics which distinguish the Dasein from entities with a character other than Dasein.

We have brought forth the particular clues which appear in the passages where Heidegger designates the Existenzials. We have examined the terms which appear alongside the Existenzials and given a short explication of the significance of these terms. The clues of "(x)...is an Existenzial" and "as an Existenzial" show us how Heidegger uses the word as a term in the Existential Analytic. The other eight clues give us a glimpse of the meanings that Heidegger attaches to the term "Existenzial". These observations are only preliminary because they focus on the primary passages. In the next section, we will take our orientation from the clues exhibited here and study the terms which Heidegger attaches to his discussions of the particular Existenzials. The aim of tracking down these other passages is to bring forth a larger pattern which will illuminate how Heidegger uses the Existenzials.

#5: Exhibition of the Characteristics of each Existenzial

The following study is not meant to be exhaustive but merely to show us how Heidegger treats the Existenzials at various points in the Existential Analytic. Here we will note how the clues from the primary statements resurface in other passages concerning the Existenzials. We will also
be looking to see if we have missed any important phrases that explain the Existenzials which did not appear in our survey of the statements in the previous section.

Being-in is explained "as an Existenzial" at BT.82. It is called an "existential state" (existenzialen Verfassung) at both BT.82 and BT.84. It is called a "phenomenon" at BT.86. It is distinguished from any sort of "presence" relation and called "an essential kind of Being (Seinsart) of this entity" at BT.170. We can see here that the clues already studied occur in other passages concerning this Existenzial.

Being alongside is discussed "as an Existenzial" at BT.81. "Being-already-alongside-the-world" (an expression related to E 2) is explained as "essentially constitutive for Dasein's Being" (das Sein von Dasein wesenhaft von konstituiert) at BT.80. This is significant because the idea that an Existenzial is constitutive for the Dasein is conveyed in an alternate way that complements the "Verfassung" pattern. Heidegger uses "Seinsverfassung", "konstituiert", and "Konstitution" in discussing the Existenzials. The general pattern that an Existenzial is to be regarded as a constitutive structure of the Dasein's existentiality coalesces here.

Concern, along with solicitude, has a 'share in conditioning the possibility of any existence whatsoever' because
they are "structures essential to Dasein's constitution" (Daseinsverfassung) (BT. 308). Concern is called a "character-of-Being" (Seinscharakter) at BT. 157. It is described broadly as "a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein" at BT. 403. Concern is that phenomenon of the Dasein which expresses its involvement in the world with things. Concern "belongs to the essential constitution (Verfassung) of care" at BT. 404. Again, the "constitutive" characteristic of the Existenzial for the Dasein is what becomes visible in this survey.

Heidegger calls worldhood a "phenomenon" at various places (BT. 94, 114, 119, and 131). He says that "worldhood itself belongs" to the Dasein's "state of Being" (Seinsverfassung) at BT. 116. The worldhood of the Dasein is its necessary and basic placement as a being that has a world. Heidegger treats the concept of "world" in much the same way as worldhood when he calls world "a Strukturmoment of Being-in-the-world" (BT. 134 and BT. 169). In explaining how worldly things cannot be understood until the phenomenon of the world has been clarified, Heidegger says that world "as an essential Strukturmoment of Being-in-the-world, belongs to the basic constitution (Grundverfassung) of Dasein" (BT. 252).

Heidegger means that the Dasein belongs in a world and that

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25 M/R use "item in the structure" and "structural item" to translate Strukturmoment. I have restored the original German because it shows us the temporal meaning that Heidegger is attaching to this term and the German is not opaque to the English reader.
"having a world" is to be understood as a structure of its full existence. Our eighth clue in section #4 was "constitutive item" which appeared in the primary statement of worldhood. The use of "Strukturnmoment" is another way of conveying the constitutive function of the Existenzials.

Deseverance is one of Heidegger's ways of expressing the "spatiality" of the Dasein existentially. It is called a "state of Dasein's Being" at BT.144. "Directionality" and "deseverance" are called "constitutive characteristics of Being-in" (BT.144). Deseverance is a "structure of Being-in" at BT.142. It is also "a kind of Being which Dasein has with regard to its Being-in-the-world" (BT.139). These remarks show that the "constitutive" pattern that has been emerging in our study also holds for Heidegger's treatment of deseverance.

Making room is the other way in which Heidegger expresses the Dasein's involvement with space. The world of the Dasein has apportionment because "making room" is a constitutive characteristic for its existence. Heidegger only gives us one paragraph in his first analysis of this Existenzial (see BT.146) and does not attach any further clues to "making room" at this point. In discussing "The temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein" (section #70), Heidegger explains that "Dasein's making room for itself is constituted by directionality and deseverance" (BT.149). He
also adds that "To Dasein's making room for itself belongs the self-directive discovery of something like a region" (BT.420). Heidegger does not do a very good job of characterizing this Existenzial. A search through Being and Time for clues about "making room" will return almost empty-handed. We are only able to turn to general characterizations of the Existenzials such as "constitutive items (Verfassungsmomente) which are essential" to Being-in-the-world (BT.187) in order to determine how we are to understand making room as an Existenzial.

Solicitude is called a "state of Dasein's Being" (Seinsverfassung des Daseins) at BT.159. Concern and solicitude are called "the possible basic kinds of Being-in" at BT.221. We have already noted that both these terms are called "structures essential to Dasein's constitution" at BT.308. These remarks add no new clues to our account, but they do reinforce the pattern that is emerging concerning the constitutive function of the Existenzials.

The "they" is called a "state of Being" (Seinsverfassung) at BT.168. The "they" also functions as the answer "to the question of the 'who' of everyday Dasein" (BT.165-6). Heidegger is careful to deny that the "they" refers to a group of people when he says "The 'they' is not the genus to which the individual Dasein belongs" (BT.166). Heidegger says that "the Self of everydayness is the 'they' " (BT.296).
These remarks do not add to the pattern that we are assembling, but we have already observed that in the primary statements the "they" is linked to Dasein's "positive constitution" (BT.167).

Heidegger says that "state-of-mind" is a "basic existential species" of the disclosedness of the Dasein in its "there" (BT.176). We have already explained how "state-of-mind" discloses the Dasein to itself because it means "finding" oneself in a certain mood with regards to the world. Heidegger also says that the "Dasein essentially has a state-of-mind belonging to it..." (BT.225). He later adds that "in any state-of-mind some mode of having been is made manifest for existential analysis" (BT.390) and this characterizes "state-of-mind" temporally. The most important point to remember here is that state-of-mind constitutes "the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world" (BT.203) as a fundamental Existentzial.

Heidegger also names understanding as a constituent of Being-in-the-world at BT.203. Understanding is characterized as "a primordially existential kind of Being" (BT.161). It is also called "one of the constituents (mitkonstituierenden) of the Being of the 'there' in general" at BT.152. Heidegger says that "As Existentzials, states-of-mind26 and

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26 In Sein und Zeit, no article appears before "Befindlichkeit" and M/R use states-of-mind where it is clear that Heidegger is referring to "state-of-mind" (see 32.148).
understanding characterize the primordial disclosedness of Being-in-the-world" (BT.188). Understanding is "conceived primarily as Dasein's potentiality-for-Being (Seinkönnen)" (BT.210). Recall that, for the Dasein, understanding "discloses in itself what its Being is capable of" (BT.184). Understanding is constitutive for the Dasein in that it is the existential link between the Dasein's facticity and the possibilities that belong to that facticity. Understanding is called a "state-of-Being" (Seinsverfassung) at BT.236. Heidegger also says that "understanding as such makes up a basic kind of Dasein's Being..." (BT.363). These remarks point towards understanding an Existenzial as a constitutive structure for the Dasein also.

Heidegger's account of possibility distinguishes the "merely possible" (BT.183) which is a "modal category of presence-at-hand" from the possibility proper to the Dasein, or "thrown possibility". The Existenzial of "possibility" is expressed as a characteristic of the Dasein rather than as an aspect of things in general. Heidegger does not provide any further clues than those already noted in his initial analysis of possibility in section #33. Possibility becomes a theme in the analysis of Being-towards-death. There Heidegger says that "Death is Dasein's ownmost possibility" (BT.307). Heidegger understands death as "dying" and thus means the
"anticipation" of death is the authentic way for the Dasein to be. Heidegger does use "possibility" extensively in explaining the "authentic existence" and "Being-towards-death" of the Dasein but does not really offer further characterizations of this Existenzial after it is introduced.

Heidegger says "To Dasein's state of Being (Seinsverfassung) belongs projection—disclosive Being towards its potentiality-for-Being" (BT.264). Projection is constitutive for the Dasein because it belongs to its state of Being. In this passage, we can note that the difficulty of finding alternative characterizations of the Existenzials of "understanding", "possibility" and "projection" arises because Heidegger usually explains these Existenzials in terms of each other. Projection is called an "existentially constitutive state-of-Being" (existenziale Seinsverfassung) at BT.185. Heidegger also often uses the phrase "the character of understanding as projection" (BT.185) which shows how these phenomena are explained together.

Meaning "is rooted in the existential constitution (Verfassung) of Dasein" (BT.195). This is another way of saying that this phenomenon is constitutive for the Dasein. Heidegger discusses this Existenzial by using the expression "the concept of meaning" (BT.193 and BT.199). He calls it "the existential phenomenon" at BT.199. Meaning is a phenomenon which characterizes the Dasein's existence and Heidegger
thinks that mere things or non-Daseins have the opposite "ontological characteristic" or "unmeaning" (BT.193). Here we may note that a phenomenon which is constitutive for the Dasein is not constitutive for the Being of things.

Discourse is called "the existential-ontological foundation of language" at BT.203. Heidegger means that it is the ontological characteristic of the Dasein that is at the root of all its ways of speaking. Heidegger asserts that discourse is "constitutive for Dasein's existence" because it is an "existential state (Verfassung) in which Dasein is disclosed" (BT.204). Heidegger's aim in his discussion of language in section #34 is "merely to point out the ontological 'locus' of this phenomenon in Dasein's state of Being (Seinsverfassung)" (BT.210). Discourse belongs to the Dasein's existence, it is not something invented by a Dasein. Heidegger later adds that discourse "belongs to the essential state of Dasein's Being (Seinsverfassung) and has a share in constituting Dasein's disclosedness" (BT.213). These remarks reinforce the pattern that brings out the constitutive function of the Existenzials for the Dasein.

Heidegger interprets truth as "Being-uncovering" and bases this view on the ancient Greek word "ALETHEIA" (BT.262). He goes on to say that "Uncovering is a way of Being-in-the-world" (BT.263). He also adds that "only with Dasein's
disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon of truth attained" (BT.263). The Existenzial of truth is the phenomenon of the Dasein by which the Dasein is disclosed to itself and Heidegger reminds us "that the disclosedness of its ownmost Being belongs to its existential constitution \(\text{Verfassung}\)" (BT.263). Thus truth is a constitutive phenomenon of the Dasein. Heidegger says that:

\[\text{...truth, in the most primordial sense, is Dasein's disclosedness, to which the uncoveredness of entities within-the-world belongs (BT.265).}\]

Truth is what makes up the Dasein's disclosedness. Heidegger characterizes truth as a "phenomenon" (BT.265). His explanation of truth involves a contrast between "the existential phenomenon of uncoveredness" (BT.267) and "the ontologically derivative character of the traditional conception of truth" (BT.268). But Heidegger's story is complex because he regards both truth and untruth to be characteristic of Dasein's Being. He says "because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of being is such that it is in 'untruth' " (BT.264). Though only truth is designated as an Existenzial, untruth is said to be "equiprimordial" with truth (BT.265). We can note from this that not all of the Dasein's constitutive characteristics are called Existenzials, or that the Existenzials are a particular kind of constitutive structure.
We have already noted that Heidegger expresses Being-towards-the-end and Being-a-whole as "ways in which Dasein gets a definite character ontologically" (BT.235). This means that these phenomena characterize the Dasein in its existence. The Dasein is always an existing being and the task of fundamental ontology is to understand the Dasein in its existence. The Dasein's death is to be understood from within this existence. Heidegger wants to analyse death "merely in the way in which it enters into any particular Dasein as a possibility of its Being" (BT.292). We need to understand the Existenzial of "Being-towards-the-end" as a moment of Dasein's own Being.

Heidegger calls Being-towards-the-end a "phenomenon" (BT.294) which "becomes plainer" (BT.295) in clarifying the existential conception of death. Being-towards-the-end "belongs essentially to Dasein's thrownness, which reveals itself in a state-of-mind (mood) in one way or another" (BT.295). In section #50, Heidegger characterizes Being-towards-the-end in terms of the structure of "care" (see BT.293). He asserts at the end of his analysis that:

Existence, facticity, and falling characterize Being-towards-the-end, and are therefore constitutive for the existential conception of death (BT.296).

In this section, Heidegger explains what he means by Being-towards-the-end by referring back to "existence", "facticity"
and "falling" which he calls "the fundamental characteristics of Dasein's Being" as expressed by the existential formula of care (BT.293). In section #51, he begins to discuss "everyday Being-towards-death" which is a "constant fleeing in the face of death" (BT.298). The "they" dominated Dasein evades the issue of its own death through a "mode" of "concern" which Heidegger describes as "an untroubled indifference towards the uttermost possibility of existence" (BT.299). At this point, Heidegger is not merely explaining the Existential of "Being-towards-the-end", but he is showing us the everyday way in which the Existential is operative. We will not follow the analysis of an "authentic Being-towards-death" here. Being-towards-the-end expresses the ontological structure by which the Dasein is involved with its death. It is a constitutive phenomenon of the Dasein because it characterizes a determinate way in which the Dasein exists.

Heidegger announces that he will "disentangle" the variations of "end" and "totality" and distinguish the "existential concepts" from those ordinary conceptions "which thrust themselves to the fore" (see BT.285-6). To follow him here, we need to recognize Being-a-whole as an Existential and distinguish it from the existentiell term "potentiality-for-Being-a-whole" (Ganzseinkönnen) (see BT.276). Being-a-whole is "constituted by Being-towards-the-end" and is an
expression of the Dasein's finitude. The Dasein has the characteristic of Being-a-whole because its possibilities are determined by its finitude. Dasein is a whole because all its possibilities flow from its own Being. Heidegger says:

In Dasein, as being towards its death, its own uttermost "not-yet" has already been included—that "not-yet" which all others lie ahead of (BT.303).

Being-a-whole is constitutive for the Dasein because it is the phenomenon which expresses the full existence of the Dasein in terms of possibilities determined by finitude.

Heidegger does not explain the Existential of "Being-a-whole" with any of the clues noted in section A, of the thesis, except in the primary passage (BT.285) where the "as" clue appears. His discussion of "the question of the potentiality-for-Being-a-whole" is much more extensive and complex as it stretches from section A.5 to section 302.

The existential interpretation of the Dasein is concerned with the particular possibilities of the Dasein's life rather than the ontological structure from which such ways of existing arise. It is concerned with expressing the ways in which the Dasein is authentic, undifferentiated, or inauthentic. From the "uttermost possibility" of Dasein, "being-towards-death", the "ontological possibility" that the Dasein can be a whole by being authentic emerges (BT.311). Heidegger does not think that this resolves the
question and goes through an analysis of "conscience" and "anticipatory resoluteness" that leads to his interpretation of "temporality as the ontological meaning of care" (BT.349).

For the Dasein to be authentic, it must have "anticipatory resoluteness", which means it must recognize the possibilities which belong to its existence and act so that it lives the best of those possibilities for itself. The authentic Dasein is "whole" not because it is all of its possibilities, but because it becomes those possibilities which give it a full existence. In this passage, Heidegger tells us how far he has departed from the initial way in which he asked the question concerning how the Dasein can be whole for the Existential Analytic:

> The question of the potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is one which is factual and existentiell. It is answered by Dasein as resolute. The question of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has now sloughed off the character indicated at the beginning, when we treated it as if it were just a theoretical or methodological question of the analytic of Dasein, arising from the endeavour to have the whole of Dasein completely 'given' (BT.357).

Here Heidegger is referring back to his questions at BT.276. The Existential Analytic in Division One was, in part, concerned with showing the Dasein as it is "proximally and for the most part", in "everydayness". But the "they" dominated Dasein is "lost" to itself, and as such is less than a "whole". To become whole, it must become itself by "dispersing all fugitive Self-concealments" through "anticipatory
resoluteness" (BT.357). Heidegger's project in Being and Time is to disclose a view of both the "average Dasein" in its fallenness and "authentic Dasein". Heidegger's account polarizes around these two extremes. Heidegger does indicate how to leap ahead of the everyday state of Being to a moment of authentic existence. It is not our task here to fill out what Heidegger thinks the characteristics of the authentic Dasein are. We will only note that the Existenzial of "Being-a-whole" is at odds with the existentiell question concerning how a Dasein can be whole. The Dasein has the original characteristic of Being-a-whole in that it is one full existence. Yet, because of the "they", which also belongs to its original structure, the "mineness" of the Dasein becomes an issue for it. Being-a-whole is a strange Existenzial because it expresses the phenomenon which the Dasein covers from itself. But it is an existentiell characteristic of the Dasein that it must become "whole". These remarks do not represent a full analysis of the text. There are harder questions to be asked to defuse the paradox whereby the Dasein can be existentially "whole" through a state of its existentiality and still have the existentiell task of becoming "whole" (its own self) through authenticity.

27 Heidegger calls what is neither authentic nor inauthentic the "modally undifferentiated" (der modalen Indifferenz) (BT.78/SZ.53). This mode of indifference also has its own modes, such as "averageness" (BT.69).
#6: A Concise Characterization of the Existenzials

Our task is to give a brief account of our previous analyses of the particular terms that surround the designated Existenzials. The prevailing pattern that has emerged from our reading is that an Existenzial is a constitutive phenomenon that belongs to Dasein's state of Being. In this pattern, we bring together several of the clues already discussed separately in section #4. Heidegger never says anything as terse as this in *Being and Time*. We have assembled this pattern by developing the texts. In this section, the significance of this characterization of the Existenzials will be discussed. We will begin by asking a broad question and try to answer it simply. We will then show how these observations are combined in an articulate understanding of the concept of an Existenzial.

What is an Existenzial? We have found many clues to help us answer this question. It is a basic term in the Existential Analytic of *Being and Time*. It is an ontological characteristic of Dasein's Being. It is a constitutive phenomenon for the Dasein. This means that it is one of the "structures of Being" that make up the human kind of existence. It is an expression that discloses Being-in-the-world. It shows us "who" it is to be as a human being. It illuminates the basic human condition. It is a common structure of Being that belongs to all Daseins. It characterizes
the state of Being of the Dasein. The Existenzials, as an ensemble, do not give us a complete picture of human existence. They are intended only to bring forth the basic phenomena of human existence and express the original state of Being which is the common foundation for the particular ways in which humans exist.

There is an observation to be made about Heidegger's use of the term "state of Being". The Dasein has a state of Being in general which is the totality of its basic structures. 28 The Dasein also has states of Being which make up or constitute its Being-in-the-world. An Existenzial is one of the states of Being which constitute Dasein's state of Being. The Existenzials are not the only terms which Heidegger calls "states of Being". He describes "Being-with" (BT. 158), "understanding-of-Being" (BT. 251), "disclosedness", "thrownness", and "falling" (BT. 264) and "anticipatory resoluteness" (BT. 374) as such. We cannot use "state of Being" or "belongs to the Dasein's state of Being" as criteria for separating the Existenzials from other terms.

We will return now to the broad formula that we have proposed as a characterization for an Existenzial. An Exist-

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28 The proper name for this state of Being is "existentiality" (Existenzialität). See BT. 33: "By 'existentiality' we understand the state of Being that is constitutive for those entities that exist." This is the title for all the Existenzials taken together.
enzial is one of the constitutive phenomena that belongs to Dasein's state of Being. We understand it through its constitutive function as an expression that discloses the ontological foundation of Being-in-the-world. This simple formula does not exclude concepts which are not designated as Existenzials by Heidegger as a phenomenon like "Being-with" fits here too. For this reason, we will not regard this formula as a definition of an Existenzial. This characterization has enabled us to develop a vocabulary for showing what Heidegger is doing. In the next chapter we will take a broad look at the Existential Analytic in order to construct an interpretation of the functions of the Existenzials.
CHAPTER III

On the Context and Functions of the Existenzials

In Ch. I, our task was to show the Existenzials as moments of the Existential Analytic. In Ch. II, we reviewed some clues from the primary statements in order to develop and establish a pattern for the use of the Existenzials. In Ch. III, our task will be to show more precisely how the Existenzials function within the Existential Analytic. This interpretation will provide us with an overview of the concept of an Existenzial based on a close reading of particular texts.

In this chapter, we will begin by giving an account of the Existential Analytic. Our aim in section #7 will be to establish the purpose of the Existential Analytic and to show its scope or limitations. We will describe its stages briefly and explain its connection to the "temporal analysis of Dasein". This background will enable us to establish the context in which the Existenzials appear. In section #8, we will discuss the well-known distinction between Existenzials and categories. Here we will look at particular Existenzials to find places where they are opposed to categories. We will attempt to identify whatever terms are in fact set up in contrast to Existenzials. In
section #9, we will develop a concept of an Existenzial based on the function of the Existenzials in the Existential Analytic.

#7: The Existential Analytic

The Existential Analytic is the title that Heidegger gives to his analysis of human existence in terms of the structures of its Being. It stretches from at least section #9 (BT.67) through to section #53 (BT.311). The purpose of this interpretation of human existence is to set forth the constitution of the Dasein's Being-in-the-world and to explain the phenomenon which reveals its full meaning (care). In his introduction to Ch. V, Division One, Heidegger looks back in this way to what he has already worked out:

In the preparatory stage of the existential analytic of Dasein, we have for our leading theme this entity's basic state (Grundver-fassung), Being-in-the-world. Our first aim is to bring into relief phenomenally the unitary primordial structure of Dasein's Being, in terms of which its possibilities and the ways for it 'to be' are ontologically determined (BT.169).

The "first aim" of the Existential Analytic is to bring

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29 It is difficult to delimit exactly how far the Existential Analytic stretches. The title of Division One (Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein) seems to indicate that it would cover it all. But Heidegger attempts a "primordial existential interpretation" of the dying of the Dasein in Ch. I, Division Two. Section #54-#63 appear to be existential interpretation, with section #63 being the transition point to the explicit theme of temporality.
forth the phenomena of the Dasein which stand out as the ontological characteristics that determine the existentiell ways for it to be. Heidegger is distinguishing between those structures of Being which are "a priori" for existence\(^{30}\) and the particular behaviours that the Dasein performs in its existing. The task here is one of sorting out those phenomena which belong to all Daseins as the common structures of human existence from those phenomena which a Dasein can be in its existing. The first phenomena are not possible ways of being but the ontological foundation that underlie all possible ways for humans to be.

The Existential Analytic has two avenues along which it proceeds. It engages in an interpretation of the "kind of Being" in which the Dasein "is its 'there' in an everyday manner" and also characterizes "the primary Constitution of the Being of disclosedness" (BT, 171). The study of the everyday Dasein brings forth how this being is "proximally and for the most part". The analysis of the disclosedness of the Dasein shows us the phenomena which form the basis for understanding existence. The disclosed kind of Being

\(^{30}\) These structures do not come before existence but are to be understood as the equiprimordial foundation for the diverse ways of existing. These phenomena must already be in place for existence but are to be understood as the "earliest" or "first" structures of the Dasein's Being. For a concise explanation of how Heidegger treats "a priori" as a "time-determination" see BFP, 321-5.
is "earlier" than the everyday kind of Being which is based on a closing off of the Dasein's disclosure of itself to itself when it exists under the power of the phenomenon of the "they".

The first move for ontological interpretation is to establish the phenomena which will guide the analysis. Rather than beginning with "an idea of man" (BT.226) or with a proposition that asserts a self-evident truth about the human condition, Heidegger uses the phenomena which uncover human existence in a fundamental way as his points of departure. These phenomena provide a "fore-sight" for our interpretation. Heidegger says:

In ontological Interpretation an entity is to be laid bare with regard to its own state of Being (Seinsverfassung); such an Interpretation obliges us first to give a phenomenal characterization of this entity we have taken as our theme, and thus to bring it into the scope of our fore-having, with which all the subsequent steps of our analysis are to conform (BT.275).

By bringing forth the phenomena of the Dasein that reveal the structure basic to its Being, we will establish the state of Being that is to be analysed.\[31\] The Existential

\[31\] The real purpose of the phenomenological disclosure of the Dasein through the Existentzials is to provide a structure for the interpretation of human existence. For Heidegger, the phenomena are not merely to be described, they are to be used to interpret and mold our
Analytic can thus be described as a movement of thinking from the basic phenomena of the Dasein to an understanding of its existence expressed in interpretive terms that arise from these original phenomena.

The Existential Analytic is thus a "hermeneutic of the Dasein" (BT.62). This phrase tells us that it is an interpretation of human existence but does not characterize the method to be followed. Heidegger later summarizes his method in the following passage:

Like any ontological Interpretation whatsoever, this analytic can only, so to speak, "listen in" to some previously disclosed entity as regards its Being. And it will attach itself to Dasein's distinctive and most far-reaching possibilities of disclosure, in order to get information about this entity from these. Phenomenological Interpretation must make it possible for Dasein itself to disclose things primordially; it must, as it were, let Dasein interpret itself (BT.179).

(31...) understanding. Thus the job is not finished when we make the Existenzials "stand out" in order to characterize the Dasein. We still need to flesh out these original structures and follow them out into particular ways of existing for which they are the root. See BT.61: "Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation." The intention of describing the phenomenal content of the Dasein is to set up an explicit interpretation of Dasein's originally opaque understanding of Being (see BT.61-2).

32 A full discussion of Heidegger's method in Being and Time would require a close study of section #7. We will not deal with this section here but rather look into several shorter passages which characterize his "method" only at a simple level. Sections #61 and #63 (BT.350) are also important for a full understanding of his method.
The Existential Analytic does not "invent" the phenomena which it interprets, but rather these phenomena are drawn out of the existence of the Dasein and arise as, I, the inquirer, study my own existence resolutely. But there is a tension between the Dasein's "own tendency to cover things up" and the task of capturing the Being of the Dasein by "exhibiting the phenomena in their primordiality" (BT.359). The everyday ways of the Dasein's tendency to "cover up" are in conflict with the primordial disclosure of the phenomena which form ontological characteristics for its existence.  

In a way, the Existenzials are reminders for the Dasein as they turn it back to what it has forgotten of itself because it has heard too much "idle talk". Heidegger presents some questions which show us how to challenge the method of the Existential Analytic. He asks:

Where are ontological projects to get the evidence that their 'findings' ("Befunde") are phenomenally appropriate? Ontological Interpretation projects the entity presented to it upon the Being which is that entity's own, so as to conceptualize it with regard to its structure. Where are the signposts to direct the projection, so that Being will be reached at all? (BT.359).

33 There are more questions to ask Heidegger here. How did he overcome his own "tendency to cover things up" and find the basic phenomena that determine the character of human existence? If we think that in Being and Time the Dasein is disclosed in the truth of its existence, how will we describe the basis for Heidegger's analytic? Does Heidegger have special powers for revealing what human existence is all about? How is it that his own existence becomes transparent?
Heidegger answers this question about the basis of the Existential Analytic with another question. The reader is to listen carefully to the interpretation of the Dasein and understand its language and then decide of his or her "own accord whether, as the entity which it is, it has that state of Being for which it has been disclosed in the projection with regard to its formal aspects" (BT.352). For Heidegger, the phenomena that arise from the inquiry of the Dasein are grounded only because they have their source in my own existence. The task of the Existential Analytic is to free "Dasein's undisguised phenomenal content" for interpretation (BT.359). But the Existential Analytic "does not do any proving at all by the rules of the 'logic of consistency' " (BT.363). The Existenzials do not "prove" that the Dasein exists but show me how my own existence is determined by certain basic phenomena in its existing.

The task of the Existential Analytic is to bring forward the "existentiality" of the Dasein (BT.33). The Existenzials are expressions for this existentiality. Heidegger distinguishes the analysis of the "ontological structure of existence" from the study of particular ways in which it can live. He calls this latter study "existential interpretation" (BT.37). It complements the Existential Analytic because it is an interpretation of what flows from the ontological
structure of the Dasein (see BT. 14). The Existential Analytic is thus not opposed to an existentiell interpretation of the Dasein. Heidegger often begins by naming the ontological structure as an Existenzial and then following it through to its existentiell possibilities. The Existential Analytic is opposed to an analysis of human existence that uses the basic concepts concerning things in general to understand human existence. Thus Heidegger says:

The analysis of the characteristics of Being of Being-there (Da-seins) is an existential one. This means that the characteristics are not properties of something present-at-hand, but essentially existential ways to be. We must therefore set forth their kind of Being in everydayness (BT.172).

This passage occurs in the prelude or sketch for Ch. V, Division One. In this chapter, Heidegger establishes six Existenzials (E. 9-E 14) and then gives an interpretation of how the Dasein falls away into the ways of existing which close it off from its original disclosure to itself. The Existenzials and the existentiell modes which spring from them are understood as characteristics which only belong to Dasein's kind of Being. We will discuss the distinction Heidegger makes between Existenzials and categories in the next section.

Disclosing the Dasein by establishing the Existenzials as the structures of its Being is the first task of the Existential Analytic. The second task follows from this
preparatory analysis, and it is the search for the phenomenon which establishes the unity of the existential structures. Heidegger explains:

The Being of Dasein, upon which the structural whole as such is ontologically supported, becomes accessible to us when we look all the way through this whole to a single primordially unitary phenomenon which is already in this whole in such a way that it provides the ontological foundation for each structural item (Strukturmoment) in its structural possibility (BT.226).

"Care" is the grounding phenomenon or foundation for understanding the particular phenomena that determine the Dasein's existence. But when Heidegger interprets the structure of care, we can see that it is a compression of certain Existenzials. The formula for care is "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)" (BT.237). Here "projection" (ahead-of-itself), "Being-in", "worldhood", "Being alongside" and "concern" (entities encountered within-the-world) are constricted into an Existenzial formula. Notice also that this includes the first Existenzials (E 1, E 2, E 3, E 4) and also E 12. The Existential Analytic ends with the establishment of care as the meaning of Dasein's Being. The last chapters of Being and Time involve an analysis of "care" in terms of temporality and the explication of the ultimate temporal structure of the Dasein's Being. But at the end, Heidegger's
temporal analysis, "breaks off" and he ends the book with questions instead of conclusions.

The Existential Analytic is the "way" along which we proceed to reach a temporal understanding of the Dasein. For this reason, it is "provisional" (völlig) and only a "preparatory procedure by which the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting Being may be laid bare" (BT.38). We can express the three key movements of Being and Time in the following simple manner:

1) Being-in-the-world is disclosed through the Existenzials which are constitutive for the Dasein.

2) The meaning of care is expressed by "envisaging phenomenologically in a full and constant manner Dasein's existential constitution" (BT.351).

3) By explaining the temporality of care, we get "a conception of the entire phenomenal content of Dasein's basic existential constitution in the ultimate foundations of its own ontological intelligibility" (BT.351).

We should observe that in each stage the Existenzials play a different role. In the first, they disclose or illuminate the Dasein. In the second, they are used to interpret the structure of care. In the third, they point to a temporal understanding. The aim of the last stage (the temporal re-interpretation) is not merely to review or repeat the first analysis but rather "to make plainer the inter-
connection of our earlier considerations and to do away with whatever is accidental and seemingly arbitrary" (BT, 380-1). At this point, we have described the tasks, methods and end of the Existential Analytic in a manner that provides adequate background for understanding the context of the Existenzials. Notice that we have not summarized the "content" of the Existential Analytic but attempted to show its scope. This effort to outline the Existential Analytic is not meant to be substituted for a face-to-face reading of Being and Time.

#3: Existenzials and Categories

We will study the distinction that Heidegger makes between Existenzials and categories. We will examine the paragraph in which this distinction is made. Then we will show how Heidegger sometimes uses the method of contrasting an Existenzial with a category in the Existential Analytic. We will attempt to identify the contrasting terms used along with each Existenzial in order to see if it is a category. This analysis will show that the categories which are opposed to the Existenzials are not the categories of Aristotle, Kant, or Hegel, but the categories of "presence-at-hand" and "readiness-to-hand" as developed in Being and Time. We will see in our study that the distinction which we take as our theme is not as simple or unproblematic as it may first seem.
The distinction between Existenzials and categories accords with the contrast between "existence" and "Being-present-at-hand" (BT.67). Heidegger wants to interpret the Dasein as the being that "stands out" among things. The Dasein is not to be understood as a thing and the concepts applied for understanding things in general are suspended in our interpretation of its existence. The Existenzials are the basic concepts of existence and the categories are the basic concepts for understanding things. Heidegger says:

All explicata to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by considering Dasein's existence-structure. Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them "Existenzials". These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call "categories"—characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein (BT.70).


Here Heidegger does not say that Existenzials are directly opposed to categories but that each term applies to a different kind of Being. Any being other than the Dasein can be understood through categories, but the Dasein's characters
of Being are understood through Existenzials which set it apart from mere things. Heidegger goes on to say that "Existenzials and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters of Being" (BT.71). By that he means that these two primary ways are the main ways in which beings can be thought about. But we cannot stop at this general explanation. We will return to the text and examine the terms Heidegger uses in contrast to the particular Existenzials.

Heidegger first mentions the "method of contrasting" an Existenzial with a "categorial" relationship of Being in his explication of "Being alongside" (BT.31). This is a strategy which he uses to explain some but not all of the Existenzials. The only two categories which Heidegger explicitly names in Being and Time are "readiness-to-hand" and "presence-at-hand" (BT.121). These are also the only categories which he consistently uses as contrasts for the Existenzials. We will now turn back to Being and Time and track down the terms which are used in explicit contrast to the Existenzials. We will determine whether this contrast-

34 The German here is: "Existenzialien und Kategorien sind die beiden Grundmoglichkeiten von Seinscharakteren" (SZ.45).

35 See the passage already quoted in Ch. I, E 2, "Being alongside", page 20 above.

36 This claim is made because only possibility (E 11) is contrasted with the traditional "category" of "possibility" (Moglichkeit) as found in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (see BT.183).
The term is linked to a category and also classify it in some other way if it is not related to a category. Our effort here is not so much aimed at explaining the categories of *Being and Time* as at showing precisely how the categories are related to the Existentials.

*Being-in* is contrasted with what Heidegger calls "insideness" or "the category of the 'insideness' which things present-at-hand can have with regard to one another" (BT.82). He also explains this "categorial" ontological characteristic as "Being-present-at-hand 'in' something which is likewise present-at-hand" (BT.79). Heidegger discusses "insideness" further as a "way of Being in space" that is not "the kind of spatiality which is constitutive for Dasein" (BT.134). Heidegger later describes his procedure as a "clarification of the existential meaning of 'Being-in' as distinguished from the categorial signification of 'insideness'" (BT.233). These remarks show us that "insideness" is a categorial signification that is based on the category of presence-at-hand. The category of presence-at-hand is only indirectly opposed to the Existential of Being-in through its variant structure of "insideness". Thus, the contrast between this Existential and the category is not a simple opposition.

*Being alongside* is contrasted with the categorial "relationship of Being" of "the Being-present-at-hand-together of Things that occur" (BT.81). Heidegger argues that this
Existential does not mean anything like two present-at-hand entities being in a spatial position together. "Being-present-at-hand" is a relationship that the Dasein has to entities which have a different character of Being than itself. "Being-present-at-hand" characterizes the way entities are involved with the Dasein's existence and it is not a characteristic that entities can have without the Dasein. Two things are never present-at-hand to each other, because a thing is only present-at-hand to a Dasein. We can observe here that it is a categorial signification rather than the straight category of "presence-at-hand" that is used in this comparison.

Concern is not contrasted with a category but rather with "colloquial ontical significations" such as "to carry out something, to get it done, to 'straighten it out'... apprehensiveness" (37.33). Thus common ways of conceiving "concern" are distinguished from what Heidegger wants to regard as the Existential of concern. Concern is later linked to the category of readiness-to-hand which is interpreted as "that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use" (37.95). This later move does not occur in an effort to explain the Existential of concern but in an effort to understand the category of "readiness-to-hand". Again, we can observe that a straight contrast between the Existential and the category does not show us what is happening in the
text. The category is explained as a "kind of concern" rather than in contrast to concern.

Worldhood is explained by sorting through four distinct meanings for the word "world". World (1) is an "ontical concept" that "signifies the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world" (BT.93). This is an ordinary conception that regards all things as the world. World (2) is an "ontological term" that means the Being of all things that appear. This second meaning is a "categorial" signification but it is not employed as a direct opposite for the Existential. World (3) also has "another ontical sense" as "that wherein a factual Dasein as such can be said to 'live' " (BT.93). This means something like an "environment". Though the second meaning of world is categorial; it is not the only contrasting meaning used to explain world (4) or "worldhood". "Having a world" as a characteristic of one's own Being is not the same as being involved with a world of entities that are present-at-hand. Again, the point is that the Existential is contrasted with a categorial signification in an unsimple way.

Just before his discussion of deseverance, Heidegger makes the point that the "spatiality" of the Dasein is not to be interpreted as "Being-present-at-hand" or "Being-ready-to-hand" (BT.133). Deseverance is explicitly contrasted with "remoteness" and "distance" which are each a "deter-
minate categorial characteristic of entities whose nature is not that of Dasein" (BT.139). Heidegger links distance to the "present-at-hand" and remoteness to the "ready-to-hand" (BT.141). Deseverance is thus contrasted with variations of both categories rather than explicitly opposed to one category.

Making room is not explicitly contrasted with an opposing term. Heidegger explains it as the constitutive characteristic of the Dasein that makes possible the "regions" or specific sites of "involvement" of the ready-to-hand (BT.145-6). This existenzial is explained through its priority to the spatial involvements of the ready-to-hand. Heidegger goes on to discuss "the Being of space" but his point is that it has neither the "kind of being" which belongs to the categorial characteristics of "ready-to-hand or present-at-hand" nor "the kind of being which belongs to Dasein" (BT.147). Thus even if the "Being of space" is one of the terms which Heidegger uses to contrast making room, it is not to be regarded as a categorial contrast. Making room is used to explain the spatiality of ready-to-hand entities rather than in contrast to it. The distinction between category and existenzial does not help us here at all.

We have already noted that solicitude is to be understood in contrast to concern. This contrast of existenzials does not fit the distinction we are studying.
also contrasted with "empathy" which Heidegger regards as an inadequate conception of "Being towards Others" (BT.162). Empathy "is not a primordial existential phenomenon" (BT.163) as it becomes "possible" through "Being-with" (BT.162). Empathy is not a categorical term, but an ontic or psychological term for how we understand the "psychical life of Others" (BT.161). Again, the distinction between Existenzial and category does not represent the treatment given to this Existenzial in the text. Heidegger does say that "Being towards Others is ontologically different from Being towards Things which are present-at-hand" (BT.162). Empathy is not explained in terms of "presence-at-hand", but it is clear from this last remark that categorical significations are not to be employed in understanding Being-with Others.

The "they" is explained in contrast to conceptions drawn from traditional logic which are not categories. Heidegger says that "the 'they' is not something like a 'universal subject' which a plurality of subjects have hovering above them" and "not a genus to which the individual Dasein belongs" (BT.166). The "they" is not to be understood as a group or logical classification of which the Dasein is a member. Though a "category" is ordinarily understood as a classification, "genus" is not one of the categories of Being and Time. There is an indirect link to categories in this contrast which Heidegger expresses as follows:
That even traditional logic fails us when confronted with these phenomena, is not surprising if we bear in mind that it has its foundation in an ontology of the present-at-hand (BT.166-7).

Here we can see the complexity of the relation of an Existential to a category. The Existential is contrasted with a term which arises from "an ontology of the present-at-hand". Observe that the Existenzials belong to a way of thinking that remains distinct from the way of thinking in traditional logic. This suggests that the distinction between Existenzials and categories is not merely between kinds of terms but between kinds of thinking. This begins to explain why the relation of Existenzials to categories is complex.

State-of-mind is contrasted in several ways in Being and Time. It is first compared to the ontical term "mood" (BT.172). The mood of "fear" is explained as "an existential possibility of the essential state-of-mind of Dasein in general" (BT.182) or "as a mode of state-of-mind" (BT.179). The facticity which is disclosed to the Dasein by its state-of-mind "is not the same 'that-it-is' which expresses ontologically-categorically the factuality belonging to presence-at-hand" (BT.174). Here a derivative structure of the Existential is distinguished from a derivative structure of the category. Heidegger goes on to contrast this Existential with the "psychical condition" (BT.175) of "the reflective apprehend-
ing of something 'within' " (BT.176). The common conception of introspection is distinguished from the Existenzial by this point. The distinction between Existenzials and categories does not give us a clear view of what is happening in these remarks.

Understanding gets contrasted with ontical significations. The Existenzial is not to be regarded as an "understanding", which like "explaining" is "one possible kind of cognizing among others" (BT.182). There is no category behind this way of explaining the Existenzial.

Possibility is the only Existenzial which is clearly contrasted with a corresponding "traditional ontological category". The Existenzial of possibility is demarcated from possibility "as a modal category of presence-at-hand" (BT.183). The possibility that belongs to the Dasein is contrasted with "what is not yet actual and what is not at any time necessary" (BT.183). The distinction between Existenzials and categories is applied in a clear way at this point. Heidegger goes on to separate "something still outstanding as not yet present-at-hand" (BT.184) from the possibility belonging to the Dasein. The distinction we are investigating shows us what is happening at this moment in the text.

Projection is usually explained as a "character of understanding" (BT.185). This does not involve a contrast be-
tween an Existenzial and a category at all. Heidegger distinguishes this term from an ordinary connotation of projection as "comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out" (BT.185). A "plan for living" belongs to the Dasein's ontical affairs or the choices that it makes along the way of existing. This Existenzial is thus distinguished from an existentiell mode in which the Dasein can be.

Meaning is contrasted with the "unmeaning" that is an "ontological characteristic" for "all entities whose kind of Being is of a character other than Dasein's" (BT.193). This accords with the distinction between ways of thinking about entities other than Dasein (through categories) and ways of thinking about the Dasein (through Existenzials). But "unmeaning" is not a category at all. It expresses an ontological characteristic of things that are to be thought about through categories. This suggests that wanting to say that each Existenzial has an opposing and corresponding category is a foolish way to understand the distinction between Existenzials and categories.

Discourse is contrasted with language as a "totality of words...which we may come across as ready-to-hand" (BT.204). Here the Existenzial is distinguished from a categorial way of understanding language. The Existenzial refers to a characteristic of Dasein's Being rather than language as human activity. Here Heidegger links the Existenzial up
with a categorial way of thinking which understands language as a thing which the Dasein uses in its existing.

The Existential of "truth" is explicitly contrasted with the "traditional conception of truth" where truth is considered as "the agreement of knowledge with its object" (Heidegger's quote from Kant, see BT.258). In the traditional conception, Heidegger thinks that truth is understood "as agreement between things which are present-at-hand within-the world" (BT.268). Truth as such is the correspondence of the knowledge of the subject to the object which is present. Here, a way of thinking about truth which has categorial foundations is opposed to a way of thinking about truth as a phenomenon which "belongs to the basic constitution of Dasein" (BT.269).

Being-towards-the-end is first contrasted with the ordinary conception of death as a "stopping" (BT.289). Heidegger says that this can mean "either 'passing over into non-presence-at-hand' or else 'being-present-at-hand only when the end comes'" (BT.289). He links this ordinary way of thinking about death to categorial foundations that determine it. Being-towards-the-end is not to be understood as "Being-at-an-end" because "then Dasein would thereby be treated as something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand" (BT.289). Here again we can note that the contrasting terms are not simply categories, but ways of thinking that have a categorial basis.
Being-a-whole is explained in contrast to the view that "there is constantly something still to be settled" (BT.279) in the Dasein's existence. This is an expression for how the Dasein is "ahead of itself" through care. Heidegger also uses the "lack of totality" of the Dasein as a contrast to Being-a-whole. He links this way of thinking up to its categorial foundations when he says: "Entities for which anything is still outstanding have the kind of Being of something ready-to-hand" (BT.286-7). But Dasein does not have this kind of Being which is expressed in categorial terms. Thus the distinction between Existenzials and categories appears here in the same way as we have already observed.

This investigation of the categories which are used along with the Existenzials has shown us that Heidegger is not laying out corresponding sets of terms which match up as opposites. In his distinction between Existenzials and categories he is pointing towards fundamentally different ways of thinking. This point is significant because it will prevent us from matching up the Existenzials with categories expressed by Aristotle, Kant and Hegel. If we understand that there is no simple opposition of these terms but a complex opposition of distinct ways of thinking, then this well-known distinction will not lead us away from the text.
In section #9, we will develop a brief account that describes the particular functions of the Existenzials within the Existential Analytic. By "functions" we mean no more than the roles that these terms play. Our aim here will be to show how the Existenzials perform several functions. While other terms may share one of these functions, we will point out that only the Existenzials have three related functions. This study will enable us to characterize the Existenzials in a way that is keyed to what work they do in the interpretation of the Dasein.

The Existenzials disclose the Dasein in its existential constitution for an ontological interpretation. The Existenzials make the phenomena which constitute Being-in-the-world "stand out" (BT.65). Recall that Heidegger says:

Being-in-the-world is a state \(\text{Vergessung}\) of Dasein which is necessary \(\text{a priori}\), but it is far from sufficient for completely determining Dasein's Being (BT.79).

Being-in-the-world remains a starting point and the task is to make it definite. Being-in-the-world is a "unitary phenomenon" that "cannot be broken up into contents which may be pieced together" (BT.78). The Existenzials are "constitutive items in its structure" (\text{konstitutiver Strukturmomente dieser Verfassung}) (BT.79/52.53). They are the
phenomena which are determinative for the Dasein's existence. They have the function of making definite the original character of the Dasein. By this, we mean that they express the basic phenomena which belong to human existence. As Heidegger reminds us in a recapitulation, "Our first task was to go forth" (Vorzugehen) towards the phenomena" (BT.350). In this inquiry, the "basic phenomenal content" of the Dasein is "revealed" (BT.350). The Existenzials establish the basic characteristics of the Dasein.

But the Existenzials belong to a whole way of thinking about human existence which Heidegger calls the Existential Analytic. They are embedded among many other terms which also are phenomena that show us determinative characteristics of Dasein's Being. Terms like "falling" and "thrownness" help to give us a definite view of the Dasein. How is it that the Existenzials form a separate "set" apart from such terms? Can we express a distinctive function which only the Existenzials perform? Perhaps the Existenzials are used to explain these other basic terms or give us an orientation which brings these other phenomena to view for our inquiry. To show this, we would need to study the other basic concepts of the Existential Analytic and check for the involvement of the Existenzials in their explanations. We can show that the Existenzials appear along with other basic terms and we will do this in our next chapter. But showing that there
are different sets of designated terms does not help us to distinguish the function of the Existenzials from the function of similar basic terms.

Does Heidegger explicitly assign a function to the term Existenzial? To answer this we return to where Heidegger says that care and the fundamental Existenzials "present a basis on which every interpretation of Dasein which is ontical and belongs to a world-view must move" (BT.244). The Existenzials function as a foundation for existentially interpretation and as such are a priori for understanding the particular ways of existing. The Existenzials are the phenomena which guide our analysis of the particular ways in which the Dasein exists. They "mark out" the path for interpretation of the ways of living.

The first fact about the Dasein is that it has a "vague average understanding of Being" (BT.25). But "this very indefiniteness is itself a positive phenomenon which needs to be clarified" in the Existential Analytic (BT.25). The meaning of the Being of the Dasein is to "be conceived in a way of its own, essentially contrasting with the concepts in which entities acquire their determinate signification" (BT.26). The research into the Being of the Dasein is an inquiry which "fills out" or "makes definite" the phenomenal content of the basic states (Grundverfassungen) of Dasein (BT.29). The Existential Analytic is a fundamental ontology
of the Dasein which means that it is a study of the basic concepts which are determinative for that entity's existence. Heidegger goes on to say that:

...this preliminary research, from which the basic concepts are drawn, signifies nothing else than an interpretation of those entities with regard to their basic state (Grundverfassung) of Being. (BT. 30).

Heidegger uses the term "Grundverfassung" to designate "everydayness" (BT. 38), "Being-in-the-world" (BT. 85) and "care" (BT. 243). These basic phenomena are not initially definite. The Existenzials are used as the component structures which make these basic states of Being definite for our analysis. The Existenzials are not the only constitutive phenomena of these basic states. But the Existenzials are the basic phenomena which "stand out" as points of departure within the Existential Analytic. The Existenzials are the heads of families of phenomena and we move through them and their relatives in an inquiry of the Dasein. They provide a "fore-sight" for the Existential Analytic because they disclose, in a primary way, the entity which is to be investigated in our interpretation.

The way from a "pre-ontological understanding of Being" to an understanding of the Dasein's Being in "its peculiar ontological character" is found through an analytic that orients itself to the basic phenomena that characterize the
Dasein in a determinative manner. Here we need to "listen in" to an important recapitulation which Heidegger makes just before moving into a temporal analysis of the basic structures of the Dasein that were revealed in the Existential Analytic:

Dasein has been put into that which we have in advance, and this has been done primordially—that is to say, this has been done with regard to its authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole; the idea of existence, which guides us as that which we see in advance, has been made definite by the clarification of our ownmost potentiality-for-Being; and, now that we have concretely worked out the structure of Dasein's being, its peculiar ontological character has become so plain as compared with everything present-at-hand that Dasein's existentiality has been grasped in advance with sufficient articulation to give sure guidance for working out the existenzials conceptually (BT.358-9).

In this passage, we obtain a glimpse of the complex of relations with which the existenzials are surrounded. First, the existenzials have a hand in the "clarification of our ownmost potentiality-for-Being". This means that the existenzials show us the ontological determinations which shape all the possible ways in which the Dasein exists. Second, the existenzials are the basic concepts of a way of thinking that is opposed to categorial ways of thinking based on presence-at-hand. This means that the existenzials bring into view a way of thinking that characterizes the
Dasein's existence without using the categories which define entities in general. Third, the Existenzials articulate the Dasein's existentiality in a determinate way that puts us in a position where we can go on to interpret the Dasein's basic existential constitution in terms of temporality (see BT.351). This means that the Existenzials "open the way" or lead us to the "clearing" in which the Dasein can be understood as the being structured through and through by time determinations (see BT.383-4).

We have now obtained a view of the functions of the Existenzials. The Existenzials characterize the Dasein by disclosing it through a way of thinking that is opposed to categorial interpretation. The Existenzials supply an orientation for the analysis of the particular possible ways in which the Dasein can be. The Existenzials lead us to a temporal analysis of Dasein's Being. The Existenzials are the only "set" of terms which perform all of these functions in the Existential analytic. Though other concepts may also perform one of these functions, only the Existenzials perform all of them. The distinctive function of the Existenzials is found in their central role in shaping the direction of the Existential analytic.
CHAPTER IV

The Issue of a
Definite List of Existenzials

#10: On the "definiteness" of the list

We have presented a definite list of the Existenzials which is composed by all of the terms that are designated as Existenzials in *Being and Time* (Ch. I). We took a closer look at the clues that appear at the moments of the text where an Existenzial is designated and constructed a pattern from this analysis (Ch. II). We then developed an interpretation of the functions of the Existenzials based on an understanding of the context of the Existential Analytic (Ch. III).

In this chapter, we will let the arguments behind the construction of the definite list emerge and show how it can be challenged.

A definite list is supposed to express an exclusive set. Yet its definiteness should be defensible by argument. Here we will examine what makes the list definite and show how it can be so and still be open to revision.

Our list is definite because we base it on a close reading of the text. This writer is not able to read *Sein und Zeit* so this account is based on a translation. A truly direct reading of the German text would bring further and more authoritative insight into the issue of the Existenzials.
Our list identifies the particular terms that Heidegger calls Existenzials. There is a factual basis to this claim and it can be checked out by reading Being and Time closely. There is also an interpretative basis to this claim and this is that it is essential that Heidegger call the term an Existential. It is by pointing to this move of designating an Existential and emphasizing it in our interpretation that we have arrived at our definite list. Our reading has remained flexible enough to include cases like "solicitude" (E 7), "Being-towards-the-end" (E 16) and "Being-a-whole" (E 17) when Heidegger does not directly declare that these terms are Existenzials.

If Heidegger had erected a table of the Existenzials at the head of Being and Time, then there would be no need to argue about which terms are Existenzials in Being and Time. But he never gives us a definite list and never suggests that there are a definite number of Existenzials. Heidegger "confers" the title of Existential only on certain terms. Yet he never does this in a separate section or in a systematic manner. Instead the Existenzials are embedded along the way of the Existential Analytic. The definite list singles out these Existenzials as moments of the Existential Analytic.

There is a possibility that the assumption that Heidegger must clearly call a term an Existential is too constrictive.
Though we could admit that it is important to call attention to where Heidegger explicitly emphasizes the status of a term as an Existenzial, we could add that there may be instances of unnamed Existenzials. We would not have to say that Heidegger "forgot" to call these terms Existenzials, but merely that he chose not to emphasize their status as such.

Heidegger may have regarded many of the terms in *Being and Time* as Existenzials. How could we single out some of these as unnamed Existenzials? Perhaps we can identify them through the function that they have in the Existential Analytic. For this point, the work of the thesis provides a solid basis. We did not use the general statements that Heidegger makes about Existenzials (in contrast to categories) to say what the function of an Existenzial is. Rather we tracked down the identifiable Existenzials and then developed an interpretation of the functions. It is only by establishing a precise view of what Heidegger is doing with the Existenzials that we get in a position to say whether a term is or is not an Existenzial. Note that in this thesis we do not deal with the other way of attacking the definite list, that is to say, with the charge that one (or more) of our terms does not belong on a definite list of the Existenzials.
11: Investigation of other "possible" Existentzials

We will turn back to *Being and Time* to study what may be regarded as other "possible" Existentzials that were left aside in our construction of a definite list. We do not want our list to be understood dogmatically as the "only true list of Existentzials". The absence of a list by Heidegger creates a "leeway" for variant readings.

We will retain the provisionality of our analysis by examining these terms as "possible" Existentzials. The following is a short list of the terms (and their German equivalents) to be studied in this regard: "understanding of Being" (*Seinsverständnisses*); "mineness" (*Jemeinigkeit*); "averageness" (*Durchschnittlichkeit*); "care" (*Sorge*); "directionality" (*Ausrichtung*); "Being-with" (*Mitsein*); "disclosedness" (*Erschliessenheit*); "facticity" (*Faktizität*); and "thrownness" (*Geworfenheit*).

Heidegger says that "Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being" (BT, 32). In a passage jammed with what we have examined as the clues of the primary statements, Heidegger calls understanding of Being a "phenomenon...that belongs to Dasein's state of Being (*Seinsverfassung*)" (BT, 424). It "belongs to" the Dasein at many places (see BT, 37, 118, 226, 228, and 244). Yet Heidegger also explains it as "that ontical characteristic of Dasein which we call 'understanding of Being' " (BT, 256). An
Existential is an ontological determination of the Dasein and not an ontical structure in the Existential Analytic. But can "understanding of Being" be excluded from the circle of the Existenzials so easily? What passages are to be weighed in favour of including it?

Heidegger says that this understanding of Being "belongs to Dasein's state of Being" (BT.251). At BT.274, it is added that understanding of Being "belongs to the constitution (Verfassung) of the entity called Dasein". In the next sentence, he explains it as a "element in Dasein's Being" (Seinsmoment) that gets clarified in the primordial interpretation of the Dasein. In these texts, the very terminology in which the Existenzials are embedded appears. Why not regard understanding of Being as an Existenzial? 37

Here we need to ask what the function of "understanding of Being" is in the Existential Analytic. The Dasein always has an understanding of Being whether this understanding of Being is pre-ontological, ontical, or ontological. The Dasein has the possibility of setting "itself the task of giv-

37 C.E. Scott, in his essay, "Heidegger and Consciousness", treats understanding of Being (Seinsverständnis) as an Existenzial when he says "this term designates a form of awareness which conditions all other forms of awareness" (MHEA.93). "Forms of awareness" is Scott's interpretation of what Existenzials are. Scott does not refer to any place in Being and Time where understanding of Being is designated as an Existenzial.
ing a primordial Interpretation for its own Being" (BT.119) and can recapture an understanding of its own Being by taking a fresh look at the phenomena which arise in its own existence. The "Dasein's understanding of Being" is made up by a "familiarity with the world" that need not be "theoretically transparent" (BT.119). Heidegger goes on to say that "understanding" (3.10) "holds" the relations of this familiarity with the world in "disclosedness" (BT.120). Thus "understanding of Being" is made explicit through the Existenzials of understanding, worldhood, concern, Being alongside and Being-in. The Dasein's understanding of Being can be as simple as seeing itself as a Being-in-the-world, as confused as seeing itself as an isolated subject confronted by many objects, or full enough to see its own existence through the Existenzials. We want to say that understanding of Being is not an Existenzial because it is the way of existing with an interpretation of Being.

Recall how the first "characteristic" of the Dasein is announced in the opening lines of the Existential Analysis:

We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is in each case mine (BT.67).

"Mineness" is "the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible" (BT.78). Heidegger is saying that the Dasein is a personal existence but also that it has to
choose whether or not to be itself in its existing. The Dasein is a personal existence that gets caught up in ways of existing that impersonalize it. The Dasein does not need to be "authentic" in order to have "mineness" as a characteristic of its existence. Rather than being an Existenzial, mineness is the issue of the Dasein's existence. To be myself or not to be myself; that is the question for my own existence. 38

Here we need to read a key passage and show what Heidegger is doing with "mineness":

Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself; its Being is in each case mine. This definition indicates an ontologically constitutive state, but it does no more than indicate it (BT.150).

Here Heidegger is saying that "mineness" points to an "ontologically constitutive state" (zeigt eine ontologische Verfassung) rather than that it is one. Heidegger interprets this state through the Existenzial of the "they". The everyday Dasein has lost hold of its mineness and falls into ways of existing determined by the standard possibilities of the "they". The "they" is "a definite kind of Being which Dasein possesses" (BT.152) and it is the phenomenon which expresses how the everyday Dasein is its mineness. Notice that the

38 In Scott's essay, "myownness" (Scott's translation of Jemeinigkeit) is discussed as an Existenzial though not directly named as one (see MHEA.98).
"they" functions as a counterpoint to the ordinary idea that the human being is a private or subjective existence. Saying that the Dasein is characterized by "mineness" does not really "disclose" much. But Heidegger's interpretation of the everyday Dasein as caught up in the "they" discloses the struggle to be oneself in a dominating world. Heidegger does not really use mineness to disclose the "identity" of the Dasein but the "they". "Mineness" functions as an overall orientation to the Dasein in the Existential Analytic rather than as an Existenzial.

Heidegger discusses "averageness" just before the critical paragraph in which he contrasts Existenzials and categories. Averageness is a "positive phenomenal characteristic" of the Dasein (BT.69). Heidegger says: "Out of this kind of Being—and back into it again—is all existing, such as it is" (BT.69). Averageness is a "kind of Being" that is to be interpreted through certain of the Existenzials. The Existenzials of "concern" and "solicitude" are developed into modes which characterize the average Dasein. Averageness is called "an existential characteristic of the 'they' " (BT.164). The Existenzial of "discourse" is developed into its possibility of "idle talk" to characterize the average Dasein (BT.21). "Averageness" gets developed in explaining the ways of existing which flow from the Existenzials. We want to say that averageness is not an Existenzial because
we understand it through the Existenzials. "Averageness" does not disclose the Dasein. Rather the Dasein is disclosed through the Existenzials which can be developed to show us the ways of existing that are average, or most usual, for the Dasein. "Averageness" is an existentiell term rather than an expression of existentiality.

Care is the central phenomenon of Being and Time. Care expresses the fundamental stance of the Dasein. Care is "a basic existential-ontological phenomenon" (existenzial-ontologisches Grundphänomen) (BT.240). It is called a "state of Being (Seinsverfassung) which is already underlying in every case" (BT.244). On the same page, Heidegger uses care to express the whole constitution of the Dasein's Being in an articulate way:

Thus Dasein's whole constitution (Daseinsverfassung) itself is not simple in its unity, but shows a structural articulation; in the existential conception of care, this articulation becomes expressed (BT.244).

If we look back at the structure of care, as it is first

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39 Scott, in the same essay, names "care" as an Existenzial when he refers in a general way to "'care' and all the other existentials" (MHEA,102). J.S. Churchill, the translator of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, also explains care as an Existenzial. This latter case is complicated because Churchill uses "concern" to translate "Sorge" while M/F use "care" for "Sorge" and "concern" for "Besorgen". While concern (Besorgen) is designated as an Existenzial in Being and Time, "care" (Sorge) is not. Churchill offers no text to show that "care" is called an Existenzial in Being and Time (see footnote #9, KPM.224).
expressed at BT.237, we can see the Existenzials that structure it. Being-in, worldhood, Being alongside, concern and projection (ahead of itself) are expressed in this formula. The concept of care is formulated out of selected Existenzials and the Dasein is understood in a fundamental way through this one phenomenon.

Care, for the Dasein, "is the 'a priori' character of its state of Being (Seinsverfassung)" (BT.249). Care is related to the "state of Being" of the Dasein also at BT.270, 273,402, and 437. It is called a "state" (Verfassung) at BT.273,274 and 404. Heidegger stresses that it is more precisely the "basic state" (Grundverfassung) at BT.290,291, 293,303 and 464. Care is called "the totality of the structural whole of Dasein's constitution (Daseinsverfassung)" at BT.276. It is the "sum" or "ensemble" of the Existenzials rather than an individual Existenzial itself.

The Existenzials are the basic existence-phenomena that are to be interpreted in formulating "the totality of the structural whole" of the Dasein. But here it is not a matter of adding together "elements" into a sum (BT.226). Since section #7 ("The Phenomenological Method of Investigation"), the declared method of Being and Time has been to exhibit and interpret the phenomena that show themselves in my own existence. The phenomenon of care is to be interpreted as the phenomenon that gives us access to the Dasein's Being in
a "simplified" and "primordial" way (BT.226). Care clears the way for a more "transparent" understanding of the Dasein's constitution. Yet care "is not simple in its structure" (BT.240). Care is a structure that the Existenzials make determinate. Care is a more primordial phenomenon than the Existenzials and forms the most basic disclosure of the Dasein's Being in Heidegger's account.

Deseverance (E 5) is often discussed along with "directionality". (see BT.138,143,144, and 145). Here it is crucial to read slowly and carefully.40 Though Heidegger chooses to speak in a double way, we are to understand "directionality" from "deseverance". Recall that:

As deseverant Being-in, Dasein has likewise the character of directionality... Both directionality and deseverance, as modes of Being-in-the-world, are guided beforehand by the circumspection of concern... One must notice, however, that the directionality which belongs to deseverance is founded upon Being-in-the-world (BT.143).

While Heidegger may speak of these terms in a paired form for the most part, directionality belongs to deseverance. This is because deseverance means that the Dasein belongs in a clear and distinct world. When one interprets such an orientation, directions follow from it.

40 Roger Waterhouse, in A Heidegger Critique, discusses deseverance and directionality as "two existential structures" (AHC.77) which is his phrase for an Existenzial.
Here we come to what could be declared the most contentious case. Heidegger says that "Being-with" and "Dasein-with" are structures of the Dasein "which are equi-primordial with Being-in-the-world" (BT.149). Recall that Being-in-the-world has not been established as an Existenzial, rather it is what gets made definite by the disclosure of the Existenzials. In "Being-with Others" and "Being-there-too", Heidegger sees essential characteristics of the Dasein. Hence he says:

'With' and 'too' are to be understood existentially, not categorically. By reason of this with-like (mithäften) Being-in-the-world, the world is always one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world (Mitwelt). Being-in is Being-with Others (BT.154-5).

Here the contrast amplified earlier between an Existenzial

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41 Waterhouse, in the same book, regards "Being-with" as an "existential structure of each individual Dasein" (AHC.80). By this, he means that Being-with is an Existenzial of the Dasein. Here, the phrase "existential structure" is interesting because it makes use of the adjective "existential" to replace the noun form (Existenzial). It may well be correct that Being-with is an existential structure but this is not the same as being a designated Existenzial. Overall, Waterhouse remains quite close to the text as he only includes three terms not named as explicit Existenzials ("Being-with", "directionality" and "sight") and misses just six from our own list ("possibility", "projection", "discourse", "truth", "Being-towards-the-end" and "Being-a-whole"). While Waterhouse does discuss these latter terms, he does not call them Existenzials directly or emphasize their status as such (see AHC.66-93).
(phenomenon of the Dasein) and a category (conception of entities present-to-hand or things in general) appears. In other discussions, Heidegger uses this kind of language to isolate Existenzials. Yet notice here how "withness" is explained by referring back to world and Being-in. Being-with means only shared Being-in-the-world.

But Heidegger is ready to say: "The phenomenological assertion that 'Dasein is essentially Being-with' has an existential-ontological meaning" (BT.156). This means that it is not an ontical or accidental characteristic of the Dasein, but an "essential structure" (BT.157). Being-with is interpreted as the Dasein's "state of Being" (BT.158). Being-with belongs among the basic features of the Dasein's existence. It is called "an existential constituent of Being-in-the-world" (BT.163). Yet the everyday Dasein is entangled in the "they" and its Being-with is more simply understood as being lost in the "they". Heidegger also adds later that:

In discourse Being-with becomes 'explicitly' shared; that is to say, it is already, but is un-shared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated (BT.205).

Thus the Existenzials of the "they" and "discourse" are interpreted to show Dasein's "Being-with".
Heidegger supplies this definition later in the book: "However, when we speak of 'Being-with', we always have in view Being with one another in the same world" (BT.282). "Being-with" is really explained as a duplication of Being-in-the-world. "Being-with" distinguishes the Dasein from things that are merely side-by-side, but this phenomenon gets unpacked by examining the "they", "solicitude", "discourse" and the other Existenzials which indicate how the Dasein is "with" others.

Disclosedness is the expression for the Dasein's way of "Being-there". Heidegger asserts:

By its very nature, Dasein brings its "there" along with it. If it lacks its "there", it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness (BT.171).

Heidegger calls this italicized sentence an "existential proposition" and sets his task as "characterizing the primary Constitution of the Being of disclosedness" and interpreting "the everyday Being of the 'there' as falling" (BT.171).

The primary Constitution is discussed through the Existenzials of "state-of-mind", "understanding" and "discourse" (BT.224). "Falling" is named as the characteristic movement (or tendency) of the disclosedness of everyday Dasein rather than as an original constituent structure. It should be understood as an expression for Dasein's "absorption" in the "they" (BT.264). The point here is that disclosedness is interpreted
by establishing certain Existenzials (E.9-E.15). Heidegger explicitly says that "disclosedness in general" belongs to the "Dasein's state of Being" (BT.264). Disclosedness is made determinate in terms of Existenzials so it cannot be ranked as one.

What about "facticity"? It is a "characteristic of Dasein's Being" (BT.174). Earlier, Heidegger says: "Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact, and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein's 'facticity' " (BT.82). But at BT.174, "facticity" is discussed as the Dasein finding itself "thrown" into the definite circumstances of the world. The Dasein brings itself to its "there" by finding itself in a "state-of-mind" (BT.173). The Dasein is entirely "factual" but that does not make "facticity" an Existential. Heidegger says: "Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity" (BT.236). Here he means that existence is finite, definite and factual. Facticity is not an Existential because it is the expression for how the Dasein finds itself in the "that-it-is" of its "there" (BT.174). It is an expression for the finite structure of human existence with its horizons and limits determined by personal possibilities. But this "facticity" is part of what gets established in the Existential Analytic. Just as the concept of "existence" gets dissolved into the Existenzials, the concept of "facticity" is crystallized by establishing the
Existenzials which are the determinations of the Dasein's Being.

The last candidate to be considered is the "thrownness" which belongs in a discussion of "facticity" and "falling". Again at BT.264, it is named as belonging to "Dasein's state of Being". It expresses the definiteness of the situation in which the Dasein always finds itself disclosed in.

"Thrownness" means "the facticity of its (the Dasein's) being delivered over" (BT.174). This thrownness is what gets formulated in the Existential analytic through the revelation of the constitutive structures which are determinative for the Dasein's kind of existence. Thrownness is to be understood through the Existenzials rather than included as an Existenzial on our list.

We have seen in this section that there are certain strategies for resisting the addition of terms to our definite list. While we can admit that there may be "possible" Existenzials which are not named as such in Being and Time, we can still protect the list by looking closely at the function of the proposed term. We can also express the relation of this term to the Existenzials already established on our list to help locate its function. In this section, we have not defended against every term that could be proposed as an Existenzial. We have shown how we want to argue if any reader wants to add further Existenzials to the list.
CONCLUSION

In Ch. III, we developed an account of three ways in which the Existenzials function in the Existential Analytic. This account was directed by the foresight established by the definite list. Our observations about the Existenzials show that these basic terms play a central role in the text. In this conclusion, we will offer some remarks about how the list is helpful in reading Being and Time. We will develop an account based on Heidegger's views of "basic concepts" as expressed in section #3 of Being and Time. At minimum, setting forth a definite list based directly on the text makes the issue of what an Existenzial is arguable.

The definite list shows precisely how the Existenzials stand out as a key "set" of basic concepts in Being and Time. The list itself gives us the focus for viewing the Existenzials as a set of particular terms. But why do we need a definite list of the basic concepts which Heidegger uses in his interpretation of existence? The definite list

42 Nicholas F. Gier, in Wittgenstein and Phenomenology, says that: "Many commentators on Being and Time complain that we are never given a definite list of existentials and it is never clear what sort of interrelations they all ultimately have" (WP.129). Gier does not help us out with a footnote that says who these commentators are or where they have said this. He thinks there are "specific existentials" like "hope, joy, anxiety" and "general existentials" like "state-of-mind" (see WP.128-9). He also calls Being-in-the-world "the most comprehensive existential" (WP.130). It is an account like Gier's that makes us need a definite list based clearly on the appropriate texts.
provides us with a basis for working out what Heidegger meant in designating a term as an Existenzial in his interpretation. It gives us a way of developing the indefinite insights which Heidegger sets forth with regards to the concept of an Existenzial in general (see BT.33,70-1, or 244). In this account, we will examine our purposes in bringing forth such a list and make clear how this move accords with the basic project of Being and Time.

The basic project of Being and Time is to capture the ground from which the question concerning Being is asked. This means that our starting point is a clarification of the Being of the inquirer (BT.27). We ourselves are the inquirers so we need to give an account of our own Being to get underway. Where is such an account to get liftoff? For Heidegger, the source is those phenomena which arise from the Dasein’s own Being and show themselves as determining structures for that Being. Our Existential Analytic is to grow out of a grasp of the basic phenomena which constitute human existence. The Existenzials are the conceptual terms which give expression to these phenomena in our interpretation.

The Existenzials are the basic concepts which express the determinative phenomena for human existence. They are not the most basic concepts in Being and Time. This status belongs to "Being-in-the-world", "everydayness" and "care"
which are each named as a basic state (Grundverfassung) of Dasein's Being. But these basic states of Being are initially indefinite, and the Existentials serve to disclose them in a definite or determinate manner.

The strategy behind the definite list is that it is used to gather and concentrate the basic concepts used to give expression to the Dasein's Being. We need a definite list to provide a sharper focus for our study of human existence. Heidegger holds the view that positive sciences like anthropology, psychology and biology have failed to set forth the "phenomenal content of Dasein" (BT. 72). Such sciences have been based on "inadequate ontological foundations" (BT. 74) and the Existential Analytic is a corrective for this problem. These sciences have still been able to pursue research, and have generated a "plethora of information" (BT. 77) about human life. But all this information does not give us a genuine understanding of the Dasein, rather it "disperses" or "dilutes" our understanding, and the appetite for further information leads us astray from the problems which lie in the basic concepts used to set up the research projects. Heidegger wants to resurrect the problems that occur at the foundations of our interpretation by putting us in a state of "crisis" with regards to the basic concepts used for interpreting human existence. Thus
Heidegger observes that:

"real progress comes not so much from collecting results and storing them away in 'manuals' as from inquiring into the ways in which each particular area is basically constituted (Grundverfassungen)—an inquiry to which we have been driven mostly by reacting against just such an increase in information (BT.29)."

The need to renew our basic concepts arises as a reaction to the great increase of "knowledge" and "information" concerning human life. In our culture, there are many schemas ready-to-hand to be used to conceptualize human existence. The ideas of Kant, Darwin, Nietzsche, Freud, or Skinner are all available for one engaged in the task of delivering an account of human existence. But the concepts of an autonomous rational being, a member of the human species, an expression of the will to power, a struggle between the id, ego, and superego, or a being determined by its stimuli and behavior do not make a problem out of the meaning of being which is inherent in all these conceptions. To return to the problem of the meaning of being, we need to "let go" of those schemas and find our way back to the phenomena that arise prior to explicit conceptualization. The definite list provides us with a "phenomenal content" of the Dasein that we can "hold fast" and raise to a conceptual level in the Existential Analytic. It brings us back to the phenomena and
lets us focus our understanding with only minimal information.

One of the aims of constructing a definite list is to make the conceptions developed in a fundamental ontology available for an "existentially a priori anthropology" (BT.227). We need to distinguish this from the prime aim of Being and Time which is to work out a fundamental ontology of the Dasein in order to gain genuine access to the question concerning the meaning of Being in general. This aim is distinct from "rounding out" the interpretation of the Existential Analytic by using the a priori conceptions of existence to construct a "philosophical anthropology" (BT.170). The investigation of Being and Time "aspires neither to a thematically complete ontology of the Dasein nor even to a concrete anthropology" (BT.238). Even though "the analytic of Dasein is not aimed at laying an ontological basis for anthropology", working out the fundamental ontology of the Dasein presents a "basis on which every interpretation of Dasein which is ontological and belongs to a world-view must move" (BT.244). The Existential Analytic makes room for an anthropology based on conceptions drawn out of the determinative phenomena of human existence. The definite list facilitates the use of these conceptions in such an anthropology because it presents the ontological characteristics that determine the ways of existing that are to be studied.
We still need to explain exactly how *Being and Time* can be used by an anthropologist. With an understanding of the phenomena which are *a priori* determinations for human existence, one could undertake research that would bring forth the more precise ways in which the human being exists. This would involve more exact characterizations of the modes of concern and solicitude. This would be an existential interpretation guided by the Existential Analytic. The problem for such an anthropologist would be to fill out the diverse phenomena which belong as particular ways of existing to the broad phenomena expressed in the *Existentials*.

But this view brings forth a program for research that appears to have no end. How would one know when all the phenomena of human existence had been brought forth? Heidegger is really proposing a method for this anthropology rather than the specific aim of working out the full *Being* of the *Dasein* by bringing forth every last phenomenon. In short, *Being and Time* could be used by an anthropologist to give direction and method to the study of human existence.

But what is the "payoff" of an intense concentration upon the basic concepts? We have already noted that it gives an understanding of human existence that has not been saturated with information. But a return to basic concepts opens the way for a renewal of the language used to express an understanding of human existence. Heidegger
claims that:

...the ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from levelling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems (BT.262).

The payoff of the Existential Analytic is that it brings out the basic terms used to understand the Dasein through an intelligibility that has an adequate ontological basis. The definite list makes the "force" of the Existenzials "stand out" from terms like "subject" and "object" which conceal a relationship of Being-present-at-hand. The "force" of the Existenzials is that they express the Dasein through the determinative phenomena of its existence. The "weakness" of "subject" and "object" is that they do not disclose the Dasein as it exists. The payoff of "suspending" such concepts is that it strengthens our understanding of the Dasein by rooting it in manifested existence.

We will complete this account by making several observations about the scope of our definite list. It is not a "complete" list of all the phenomena which are determinative for all human existence. We could say that it is composed of the "first" phenomena of the Dasein. By "first" we mean that these are the phenomena which disclose the Dasein in
a determinative manner for our interpretation. The Existenzials do not appear as the first phenomena mentioned in the Existential Analytic. Rather they occur "along the way" of the interpretation of the Dasein and are embedded along with many other structures which constitute the Dasein. We only suggest that they are first in so far as they first disclose the Dasein in a determinate manner.

The definite list does not present a full picture of human existence. Rather it sets forth the determinations which belong to the ontological foundations of the Dasein's Being. The aim of our list is not to "sum up" human existence, but to present the basis for a full understanding of the Dasein. The list gathers together the distinct points of departure that Heidegger uses in showing us the determinations which shape and ground human existence. The aim of constructing the definite list is to supply a "map" that shows us the way that Heidegger goes in interpreting the existence of the Dasein. It provides a hermeneutical schema for understanding how the Dasein gets made definite in the Existential Analytic. The Existenzials which are made to "stand out" from the existential Analytic by our list cannot really be understood apart from that Existential Analytic or without its terms. Through our analysis of the neighbouring terms which occur along with the Existenzials, we have shown
how the Existentials are understood within the Existential Analytic. Though the construction of the list introduces the Existentials in a way that is initially uprooted from the Existential Analytic, the continuous task in our hermeneutical study has been to return to exactly how these terms arise in *Being and Time*. Our account of the functions of the Existentials as disclosures of the Dasein, as providing an orientation for interpreting the many ways of existing and as leading up to a temporal analysis of Dasein's Being, shows what Heidegger does with the terms that he designates as Existentials. It is through a kind of "phenomenological reading" that we gain sight of the Existentials as moments of the Existential Analytic.
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**Selection of Secondary Literature Consulted**


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Raymond Anthony Couture was born on July 9, 1960, in Summerside, Prince Edward Island. He has also lived in Ottawa, Ontario; Rivers, Manitoba; Bagotville, Quebec; Borden, Ontario; Barrie, Ontario and Windsor, Ontario. He received secondary school instruction at the Base Borden Collegiate Institute. He began undergraduate studies at the University of Windsor in 1978. He received the John N. Deck Memorial Prize in Philosophy in 1981 and 1982. He was also awarded the Major H.P. Swann Prize in Philosophy in 1982. He was the editor of the student literary publication, Generation, in 1982. He has published various poems and stories in Generation (1980-85) and in The Lance's literary supplements (1979-84). He wrote a column called Bunkum for the 1982-83 edition of The Lance. His name was signed "Tony Couture" for all these writings. He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts (Honours English and Philosophy) in 1983 and was named as a Board of Governors Medalist. He was awarded a Summer Research Scholarship by the University of Windsor's Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in 1984.