Strategies in Dialectic and Rhetoric

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ABSTRACT: According to Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, 1999b) discussants that wholeheartedly comply with norms of reasonable and critical discussion may simultaneously and without reneging on these commitments adhere to a rhetorical strategy. To gain a full understanding of what goes on within a discussion or of what is implied by an argumentative text, strategic behavior of the type they describe and exemplify should not, indeed, be neglected. Yet much of this type of behavior is better characterized as following a dialectical strategy. The issue may seem, but is not, merely a question of terminology. If all considerations of strategy were deemed to belong to rhetoric, this would seriously impair the attempts to construct a viable dialectical model of reasonableness fulfilling the demands of critical rationalism. An earlier version of this paper appeared in Dutch (Krabbe 2000a).

1. Introduction

All the way down from the 5th century BC, dialectic and rhetoric have been on uneasy terms. One may define "dialectic" to comprise the practice and theory of conversation, and "rhetoric" to comprise the practice and theory of speeches. Since conversations may contain speeches and speeches can be interrupted by conversation, it then strikes one how intimately related rhetoric and dialectic are on account of their respective subjects (Krabbe 2000). Yet, the two disciplines are mostly put in opposition to one another as competitive approaches in the realm of argumentation; be it that, as from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, attempts were made to connect points of view from both sides.

In our time, such a connection was pointed out by Frans van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser in a number of papers published in English (1999, 1999a) and in Dutch (1999b, 1999c, 2000). In doing so, they could avail themselves of an encompassing dialectical theory: pragma-dialectics. They wanted to adjoin rhetorical elements to this theory in order to strengthen the pragma-dialectical tools for the analysis and the evaluation of arguments. The primacy of dialectic was not in question. But rhetorical points of view were to be taken into account as well. According to Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, the context of a dialectic process aimed at the resolution of a difference of opinion does not exclude that the participants simultaneously pursue their own ends, in particular, that they each try to resolve the difference in their own favor. Strategic behavior of this kind may, on the contrary, be perfectly compatible with respecting the rules for reasonable discussion aimed at a resolution of their difference. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser speak of a "rhetorical aspect to argumentative discourse". According to them "a rhetorical dimension" should be incorporated into the pragma-dialectical way of reconstructing argumentative discourse (1999, 164). They also introduce the term "rhetorical strategy" for the convergent use of strategic maneuvering "for influencing the result of a specific dialectical stage to one's own advantage" (166). The purpose of this paper is not to doubt the importance of this aspect or dimension put forward by an Eemeren and Houtlosser. Its purpose is rather to discuss whether a number of strategic activities to which they call attention, and which are supposed to occur within the confines of a discussion aiming at the resolution of a difference of opinion, were not better subsumed under the concept of dialectical strategy.
On first sight, strategic behavior seems indeed to constitute one of the very characteristics that interest the dialectician. Aristotle already, in his books on dialectic, gives all kinds of strategic advice, both to the Questioner and to the Answerer (Topics VIII, De Sophisticis Elenchis, esp. 15, 17). The concept of strategy is also of fundamental importance for any model of discussion or dialogue based on participants' choices and with outcomes consisting of a win or a loss, such as the medieval Obligation Game (Hamblin 1970, 125-134, 260-263) and the formal dialogue games of the Erlangen School (Lorenzen and Lorenz, 1978; Barth and Krabbe, 1982). Obviously, there exist, besides rhetorical strategies, such things as dialectical strategies. The question to be asked is: which strategic behavior can better be characterized as rhetorical, and which as dialectical?

Before answering this question, I shall, in Section 2, argue that a dialectical concept of strategy is not easily dispensed with if we want to retain a sufficiently rich idea of reasonableness in argument. After that, I shall, in Section 3, first try to answer the question for behavior in explicit discussions. The answer for implicit discussions (argumentative texts or speeches) will be attempted in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 will conclude the paper with a survey of various cases of dialectical and rhetorical behavior.

2. Dialectic as Providing a Critical Concept of Reasonableness

What is a reasonable way to argue? Actually a fully satisfactory explication of the concept of "reasonable argument" would coincide with a complete theory for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation. Yet, a preliminary and partial explication is needed for, and should precede and direct, the attempts to reach such a complete, or even to build a tentative, theory of argumentation. Since Descartes, the explication of "reasonable argument" has focussed on the concept of "proof" of a thesis, in the sense of providing a full justification or foundation for it, which any rational being should accept. The paradigm for this was provided by the Euclidean axiom system for geometry. It is well known, nowadays, that this road leads to a dead end in the swamp of the Münchhausen trilemma. One has to choose between (1) finding foundations for each premise by adducing yet more fundamental premises, thus sinking into the morass of a regressus ad infinitum; or, (2) admitting a circular argument; or, (3) accepting one or more premises as indubitable axioms or dogmas (Albert 1969, 13). Hence, a critically rationalistic philosophy learns one to see that the core of the concept of reasonableness does not lie in undeniable justifications but in the critical discussion of theses. Thus the ideal of the axiomatic philosopher justifying his theses by strictly deductive methods starting from indubitable axioms is exchanged for that of the reasonable partner in dialogue who accepts his theses to be critically tested, and is willing to retract them if need be.

A consequence, stressed more and more in further elaborations of this Popperian philosophy, is that literally any thesis runs the risk (and will remain to be running the risk) of refutation and withdrawal. William Bartley III, in presenting his panceitical rationalism or comprehensively critical rationalism, explicitly applied this consequence to the thesis that comprehensively critical rationalism itself is correct. But he still exempted a certain part of logic he thought indispensable for refutation (1984, Section 5.4 and App. 5). Those parts of logic that
were thought to be required to enable one to criticize theses could not themselves be subjected to criticism. The last step was taken by Else Barth (1972, 7), who advocated an all-encompassing critical rationalism that did not exempt any part of logic. According to Barth, the problem of how to justify a certain logic, is to be replaced by the problem of making a choice between alternative logics. This choice, again, is not exempted from critical discussion (Barth 1972, 17-18).

Thus we have freed ourselves from the Münchhausen trilemma. But the task remains to specify what exactly is to be understood by a "critical discussion". Only thus can we specify a concept of "reasonable argument". Further explication takes the way of specifying rules and models of discussion. This can be done either formally, through formal systems of dialogue, or informally, as in the pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion. Surely, all these models remain themselves possible targets for critical discussion: they can not count as ultimate, dogmatic justifications of certain ways of arguing as being the only reasonable ones.

At the present state of the art, there is no urgency for the unification of several attempts into one, optimal model for all kinds of discussion. What is optimal depends on the goal of discussion, and different types of discussion aim at different goals. For instance, the goal can be the resolution of a difference of opinion, but also, the establishment of the truth of some matter, or agreement on a common decision, or reaching a compromise, or the exchange of information, or just to carry on a verbal exchange (Walton and Krabbe 1995, Ch. 3). These multiple goals amply justify a multiplicity of concepts of reasonableness and of models of dialogue. Moreover, even for one and the same goal, it might be useful to have more than one model at hand.

One should sharply distinguish the goals of dialogue from the aims of the participants within the dialogues of various types. For instance, within a negotiation dialogue, the goal is to reach a compromise, but each participant aims at a compromise that is as favorable as possible for his or her own party. Within a critical discussion, the common goal of both parties is to reach a resolution of their difference of opinion, whereas each participant aims at convincing the other (Walton and Krabbe 1995, 67).

Consequently, many types of discussion display both cooperative and competitive features. They are cooperative to the extent that each party, by its willingness to participate in a discussion of a certain type, has shown its adherence to the goal that characterizes that very type, but then they are competitive in as far as each participant pursues his or her own aims within the common setting. (For another view on competitive and cooperative discussions, cp. Wiche 1988, 1991.) Moreover, these two features are functionally related, as means to ends. Mutual competition in the attempt to reach one's own party's aims actually serves to reach the common goal. For instance, in negotiation dialogue, in order to reach the goal - a compromise - a compromise - each party is to play a certain role in the process, most often that of representing its own interests. (But one can imagine a species of negotiation such that each party represents the interests of the other!) Similarly, in critical discussion, each party is to play a role in order to reach a resolution, most often that of defending its own position. (But the roles might be reversed!)

Models of discussion articulate concepts of reasonable behavior in discussion. Because of the plurality of goals of discussion, the concept of reasonable behavior in discussion will break up into a number of related concepts. What is reasonable in a negotiation, need not be so in a
critical discussion. Whether we can call a participant's behavior reasonable thus depends upon the goal of the discussion in which he or she participates. It also depends on the company to which the discussants belong, on the models of discussion that hold within this company with respect to this specific goal, and on the role undertaken by this participant.

Also, the strategic possibilities for a discussant will depend upon the type of dialogue, and so will a distinction between rhetorical and dialectical behavior, if it can be sustained. A characterization of the difference between rhetorical and dialectical behavior will always be relative to some more or less articulated model of dialogue ($M$). In as far as various choices and moves can be analyzed in terms of trying to make a move in $M$, they are properly subsumed under the concept of dialectical behavior, whereas other aspects of behavior, that are analyzed from some other perspective than that of trying to make a move in $M$, may, in a number of cases, be properly called rhetorical. Some behavior may be neither analyzable as dialectical nor as rhetorical. Other behavior may be both. If a discussant's dialectical behavior is, moreover, not merely analyzable in terms of $M$, but also seen to conform to a serious participation in $M$ (a concept to be explained in the next section), then this discussant's behavior can be called "dialectically strategic and reasonable". Discussants that exclusively behave in this way (in dialogues of a certain type), may be said to be reasonable discussants (in dialogues of that type).

The various concepts of reasonable dialectical behavior will also yield further articulations of the concept of reasonable argument. The primary type of discussion in which argument takes place is the critical discussion about a difference of opinion, but other types, such as the negotiation dialogue or the quarrel, that also start from differences or conflicts are close enough to the former to be said to contain argumentative behavior (whether or not this be ultimately analyzed as an embedded critical discussion): they may be called argumentative types of dialogue (but cp. Walton 1990). Other types, such as the deliberation dialogue, the inquiry dialogue, and the information-seeking dialogue, may not be argumentative, but nevertheless comprise interpersonal kinds of reasoning. Thus models of all types of dialogue can contribute to a further explication of the concept of "reasonable argument", even though the further sections of this paper will concentrate on models for critical discussion.

Through models of dialogue, then, we may give content to a critical and dialectical concept of reasonableness, whereas room is left for those wanting to introduce also a rhetorical concept of reasonableness.

3. Strategic Behavior in Explicit Discussion

In this section we shall first have a look at explicit discussions, and decide which kind of strategic behavior, in that context, can best be characterized as dialectical (3.1). Next it will be investigated how much of what Van Eemeren and Houtlosser call rhetorical maneuvering can be subsumed under that title (3.2).

3.1 Dialectically Strategic Behavior of Discussants

A first condition for any conduct to be called "dialectically reasonable (DR)" (given a
company of discussants \( G \) that has adopted a model of discussion \( M \) can be simply phrased as follows:

\[ \text{DR1} \quad \text{Comply with the rules of } M. \]

One may call this the first requirement of dialectical reasonableness, or the first dialectical obligation. The question is, whether it is the only condition and the only obligation. In pragma-dialectics, DR 1 has been ingeniously applied to yield an explication of the traditional concept of "fallacy" (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1982, 1984, 1987, 1992, Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger 1986), which may be rephrased as follows:

A discussant commits a fallacy if and only if he or she does not comply with the rules of \( M \).

This stipulative definition has proved to be very fruitful and inspiring in fallacy theory. But the question remains whether dialectical reasonableness should be equated with not committing a fallacy.

To this equation one could object that a discussion that steers free of fallacies need not lead to a conclusion that is true or even only plausible. For instance, the discussants could, in the opening stage, agree on a premise that is actually false, and after an otherwise impeccable procedure this could bring the Opponent (the Antagonist) to a forced withdrawal of her original doubt with respect to a thesis (a standpoint) that happens to be false as well. In such a situation one might be reluctant to call the discussion a reasonable one, even though no fallacies (infringements of rules) were committed.

But actually this reluctance is based on a misconception of what an ideal model of discussion is about. It is not pretended that discussions following the pattern of the model will always lead to the truth. If that were the case the model would constitute a model of justification in disguise, and we would be back to the Münchhausen trilemma. To put this into a simple slogan: Models should be ideal, but not too ideal.

What we expect of an ideal model \( M \) of discussion is that, in principle, it will not exclude the following situation:

Discussant \( X \) is in the right. The discussion follows the rules of \( M \). Yet \( X \) loses.

For example:

(1) The Proponent (Protagonist) defends a thesis that is true. No fallacies are committed. But the Proponent fails to adduce a clinching argument, and loses the discussion.
Or:

(2) The Opponent (Antagonist) criticizes a false thesis. No fallacies are committed. But the Opponent concedes too much, and loses the discussion.

An ideal model of discussion that is to be a model of critical testing and not of ultimate justification should not exclude such situations. The occurrence of such situations constitutes no proof for a failure in respect of dialectical reasonableness.

But on the other hand, neither can such results be called "optimal". Meeting with such a situation, one may suspect that the discussion was carried on in a suboptimal way. For instance, if the Proponent had put in a little more effort he could have produced a better argument; or, if the Opponent had been more on the alert she would not have conceded all these points. If we want to use model $M$ as a model of fully reasonable discussion, we should ask more of both discussants than that they neatly conform to the rules of $M$ (i.e., that they commit no fallacies). The discussants should also put an effort into the discussion. The character of this effort is determined by the dialectical allocation of tasks: the Proponent should try to avoid a situation such as (1) above, whereas the Opponent should try to avoid a situation such as (2).

The requirement of putting an effort into the discussion is part and parcel of the concept of reasonableness that is articulated by the model. An Opponent who gratuitously grants all kinds of concessions, or a Proponent who omits the obviously most solid reasons, can not in all respects be looked upon as reasonable discussants, even if they commit no fallacies. Their lack of effort is, indeed, no impediment to a formal resolution of the difference of opinion underlying the discussion, but may all the same impair the intellectual solidity and the long term tenability of the result.

Therefore, a second requirement of dialectical reasonableness needs to be adjoined to the first one. Since it can not be presumed that the discussants know who is right and who is wrong, we should not ask the parties to "promote that whoever is in the right shall win". Rather we can simply formulate the second requirement as follows:

DR2 Try to win!

The second requirement stresses the competitive character of critical discussion. But ultimately this competitive character is meant to serve the common goal of reaching the best possible result. Competition is an integrated part of the explication of the concept of "reasonable discussion", and therefore of the concept of "reasonable argument". For that reason, strategic behavior, within the bounds of DR 1, aimed at winning the discussion is most properly regarded
as dialectical. To call such behavior rhetorical seems off the mark.

If we want to acknowledge DR 2, but all the same want to adhere to the pragma-dialectical explication of the concept of "fallacy", we should say that whosoever at a certain occasion conforms to DR 1 but not to DR 2 does not, indeed, commit a fallacy, but can be charged with another kind of transgression, for instance with a kind of blunder.

3.2 Dialectical Behavior and Rhetorical Maneuvering

Van Eemeren and Houtlosser distinguish three levels of rhetorical maneuvering:

"Rhetorical manoeuvring can consist (1) in making a choice from the options constituting the topical potential associated with a particular discussion stage, (2) in deciding on a certain adaptation to auditory demand, and (3) in taking a policy in the exploitation of presentational devices. Given a certain difference of opinion, speakers or writers (1) can choose the material they find easiest to handle; they (2) can choose the perspective that is most agreeable to the audience; and they (3) can sketch this perspective in their verbal presentation in the most flattering colours. On each of these three levels of manoeuvring, they have a chance to influence the result of the discourse strategically." (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999, 165, stress as in the original, numbers added.)

What they mean by topical potential is clarified as follows:

The topical potential associated with a particular dialectical stage can, in our view, be regarded as the collective of relevant alternatives available in that stage of the resolution process. (Loc. cit.)

But even so there seems to be an overlap between the first two levels, since one way of making a choice from the relevant alternative moves would be to select a move that is adapted to auditory demands or preferences.

However that may be, these are important aspects of what a rhetor has to do. Only, in as far as these choices aim at an optimal execution of a dialectical strategy in an explicit discussion, I would prefer to speak of dialectical, and not of rhetorical maneuvering. But I hasten to add that Van Eemeren and Houtlosser did not primarily discuss explicit discussions; rather their papers focus on implicit discussions.

In explicit discussions, both the Proponent and the Opponent may display dialectically strategic behavior. For the Proponent, this means among other things that he selects those arguments that he thinks may convince the Opponent of the truth or correctness of his thesis. For the Opponent it means among other things that she selects those criticisms that she thinks may bring the Proponent to abandon his thesis.

Given that DR2 is part and parcel of our concept of dialectical reasonableness, it is dialectically reasonable for both discussants to display such strategic behavior, whenever they have to select a move. They should take into account both, what they themselves need in order to defend (respectively, to challenge) the contested thesis, and what they think would be acceptable for the other party. Thus the first two levels mentioned by Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, when
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applied to a context of explicit discussion, refer to a reasonable type of behavior; however, this behavior appears to consist of dialectical rather than of rhetorical maneuvering.

As to the third level, that of the presentational devices, these devices should conform to the Rule for the Proper Use of Language:

"A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous and he must interpret the other party's formulations as carefully and accurately as possible." (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, 196.)

If we may suppose that the model of discussion \( M \) contains such a rule, compliance with the rule is implied by compliance with DR1. So, compliance with this rule would not be a matter of dialectical strategy; even so it would be a matter of reasonable dialectic behavior. Purely rhetorical aspects of presentation must be sought elsewhere: for instance, in the beauty and elegance of a presentation, or in its use of ethos and pathos.

Yet it should not be denied that the selection of dialectical moves can be governed by other than purely dialectical motives. Thus a selection of moves by the Proponent could take into account certain interests or sensitivities of the Opponent's. On such grounds the Proponent may prefer one line of reasoning over another. Bystanders, too, may have their influence. In such cases it would be appropriate to speak of rhetorically strategic behavior. Since DR1 and DR2 may still leave room for a number of options, a discussant could under circumstances, at the same time, display strategic behavior in both the dialectical and the rhetorical sense.

4. Strategic Behavior in Implicit Discussion

Starting from the pragma-dialectical point of view that any argumentative text or speech is best looked upon as an implicit discussion (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 43), the first task in this section will be to present an analysis of the dialectical obligations of the arguer (4.1). (This is a presently much discussed topic: see Johnson 1998, 2001; Govier 1998; Krabbe 2001.) After that, Section 4.2 will again take up Van Eemeren and Houtlosser's descriptions of rhetorical maneuvers to see to what extent these coincide with strategies that originate from dialectical obligations.

4.1 An Arguer’s Dialectical Obligations

In a monological argument (an argumentative text or speech) the arguer (the author or rhetor) is left to his own resources. He is not only to take the part of the Proponent, but also that of the Opponent. The arguer must try to convince every member of his audience (every reader or listener) of the correctness of his theses. His audience can be reconstructed as a set of virtual opponents: \( O_1,\ldots,O_n \). The arguer has to carry on a critical discussion with each of them. Therefore, the arguer's text or speech should incorporate the criticism of each virtual opponent, \( O_i \), and the arguer must try to rebut this criticism. We cannot stipulate that the arguer must be successful, but nevertheless his dialectical obligations commit him to a serious effort to convince every \( O_i \) by carrying on an (implicit) critical discussion conforming to D1 and D2 with respect to each discussant. Only then will the text or speech satisfy the conditions of an ideal model of reasonable argument. In other words, what the arguer should do is to take care that his argument
contains for every opponent $O_i$ a line of reasoning that will, in a reasonable way, convince this $O_i$. The implications of this requirement can be specified as follows:

An argument for a thesis $T$ can reasonably convince a person $X$ if and only if $X$ is capable to reconstruct from that argument a critical discussion $D$ such that:

$D$ is a critical discussion about $T$ between $X$ and the arguer, with the arguer taking the part of the Proponent of $T$, and $X$ taking the part of the Opponent, and such that the choices by $X$ in $D$ are the same as those that would have occurred in an explicit discussion (conforming to DR1 and DR2) between the same parties about the same issue.

In particular: $D$ does not contain any fallacies.
$D$ is won by the arguer and lost by $X$.

Consequently, one of the dialectical obligations of the arguer is to take into account the demands of his audience ($O_1,...,O_n$) as he selects his premises. These premises should not only be acceptable to the audience but also in other respects be as suitable as possible for the construction of a dialectically reasonable and convincing line of reasoning. The presentational devices should, from the point of view of dialectics satisfy the Rule for the Proper Use of Language, cited above. Altogether, much of the strategic behavior of the arguer is better characterized as dialectical than as rhetorical.

It is by no means the case that the arguer has an obligation to render, within the confines of his text or speech, all possible ways the discussion could be carried on. On the other hand, in many contexts one course of discussion will not suffice. To put it briefly, the arguer should at each turn where the opponent is to select a move take into account every admissible move that some person in his audience ($O_1,...,O_n$) could have made in an explicit discussion; whereas, whenever he himself - as a Proponent - is to select a move, he may restrict himself to one well-chosen move. For instance, if the arguer is defending a certain policy $P$, he must rebut all the objections cherished among his audience, but he need to adduce only one advantage of the advocated policy, provided that it prevails over all the disadvantages his opponents can think of. (What the arguer is trying to approach is known in formal dialectic as a description of a winning strategy.)

In sum: the discussions rendered by the arguer must satisfy DR1 and DR2 and among these discussions there should be, for any opponent, $O_i$, in the audience, an exemplar in which $O_i$'s criticism is brought up and rebutted, so that this discussion's line of reasoning carries conviction for $O_i$. Further, all discussions displayed must be won by the Proponent.

An obvious way of putting things would be to say that an arguer who in constructing an argument makes a number of decisions in order to live up to his dialectical obligations is following a dialectical strategy and executing dialectical maneuvers.
4.2 Dialectical Obligations and Rhetorical Maneuvering

An arguer's living up to his dialectical obligations does not exclude that at the same time he could be involved in some kinds of rhetorical maneuvering directed at other than dialectical aims. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, 165-166; 1999b, 147-148) present a survey of rhetorical maneuvering in all four of the stages of critical discussion distinguished by the pragma-dialecticians: the confrontation stage, the opening stage, the argumentation stage, and the concluding stage. Since in each stage rhetorical maneuvering may take place on each of the three levels mentioned above, there are twelve combinations to consider. Some of the kinds of maneuvering they discuss do indeed not fall within the compass of the rather wide notion of dialectically strategic behavior advocated in this paper.

One may admit that rhetorical maneuvering occurs in the following cases: (1) when the level of rhetorical maneuvering is that of presentational devices (unless the maneuvering is a matter of trying to comply with the Rule for the Proper Use of Language), and this at all stages of discussion; (2) when the level is that of making an expedient selection from the topical potential or that of adaptation to auditorial demand and, also, the stage of discussion is either the confrontation stage or the concluding stage.

Moves in the confrontation stage, such as the selection of a thesis, are to determine what the discussion will be about. But the concept of following a dialectical strategy presupposes that an initial difference of opinion has been given. Consequently, the establishment of the initial difference falls outside of the scope of dialectical strategy and the maneuvering that takes place at this stage may well be called rhetorical. It should be noted, however, that moves introducing refined formulations of the difference opinion (once the argument is under way) could belong to the dialectic rather than to the rhetoric.

According to Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, rhetorical maneuvering on the level of a selection of moves from the topical potential at the concluding stage of the discussion could occur "for instance by pointing out the consequences of accepting a certain complex of arguments" (1999, 166). Again, this type of maneuvering is not dialectical, since a dialectical strategy is exclusively concerned with the process of discussion itself, and not with the external effects. The same holds for the move of emphasizing the common responsibility for the outcome of the discussion, which Van Eemeren and Houtlosser adduce as an example of rhetorical maneuvering on the level of adaptation to auditorial demand at the concluding stage (1999b: 148), and will probably hold for other examples of rhetorical maneuvering at that stage.

Selection of moves at the other two stages of discussion (the opening stage and the argumentation stage) will, however, in most cases derive from the dialectical obligations of the arguer, and will therefore present us with instances of dialectical rather than rhetorical maneuvering.

Yet it must not be thought that the rhetoric in an argumentative text or speech will only be found in the exordium and the peroration. First, the rhetorical maneuvering on the level of presentational devices takes place at all stages. Second, in practice the different stages will often be intertwined. Third, arguments may contain subarguments such that the stages will occur again
for the subargument. And finally, convincing one's audience may not be the only aim that the text or speech is to serve. (Any further motive for writing or speaking might be given as an example.) To achieve these other aims, rhetorical maneuvers may be employed. And though there will often be a tension between these other aims and the dialectical obligations, we must agree with Van Eemeren and Houtlosser that some rhetorical maneuvers are dialectically permissible, whereas others are not (1999b: 152).

5. Survey

The survey presented below consists of two parts: (A) a survey of different kinds of behavior of language users in explicit discussions, and (B) a survey of different kinds of behavior of the monological arguer. Some terminology for these types of behavior will be introduced as well. Aims will be classified as either dialectical (convincing the other) or rhetorical (other aims). The possibility to give a more restricted interpretation of rhetoric and to introduce a third class of aims that are neither dialectical nor rhetorical will not be pursued in this paper. Nor is the question pursued which rhetorical behavior would appropriately be called "strategic" (cp. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999: 166, who put restrictions upon the use of the term "rhetorical strategy").

A. For explicit discussions it is stipulated that:

1) Whoever conforms to DR1 displays a type of explicit dialectical behavior that is at least minimally reasonable.

2) Whoever, moreover, conforms to DR2 displays a type of explicit dialectical behavior that is both dialectically strategic and dialectically reasonable.

3) Whoever behaves in a way that derives from other aims than the dialectical aim of convincing the other through a process of resolution conforming to DR1 displays rhetorical behavior.

B. For implicit discussions (argumentative texts and speeches) it is stipulated that:

1) Whenever the discussions that are implicitly contained in the argument conform to DR1, the arguer displays implicit dialectical behavior that is at least minimally reasonable.

2) If, moreover, the discussions that are implicitly contained in the argument conform to DR2 in as far as the behavior of the Proponent is concerned, then the arguer displays implicit dialectical behavior that is minimally strategic.

3) If the discussions that are implicitly contained in the argument do also conform to DR2 in as far as the behavior of the Opponent is concerned, and if, moreover, the arguer pays sufficient attention to opposition of all kinds, then the arguer displays implicit dialectical behavior that is both optimally strategic and dialectically reasonable.

4) If the arguer behaves in a way that derives from other aims than the dialectical aim of
convincing the other through an implicit process of resolution conforming to DR1, then he displays rhetorical behavior.

References


