A persuasive God and human freedom an evangelical view.

Gene Kenneth Tempelmeyer

University of Windsor

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A PERSUASIVE GOD AND HUMAN FREEDOM:
AN EVANGELICAL VIEW

by

Gene Kenneth Tempelmeyer

A Thesis
submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
through the Department of
Religious Studies in Partial Fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree
of Master of Arts at
the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

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ABSTRACT

The modern Evangelical movement has become a powerful force in popular Christianity in North America and in the Third World. This thesis explores Evangelical theology with respect to God's causal activity in creation. An obvious corollary to this theme is the theme of creaturely freedom.

Evangelicals rely heavily on reformation theology for a historical understanding of the Christian faith. Evangelicals also distinguish themselves by three commonly shared commitments: (1) biblicism; (2) a very personal soteriology; and (3) a powerful commitment to share that soteriology with the world through the activity of evangelism.

Herein lies a crucial dilemma for the modern Evangelical. The systematic theologians of the movement, by and large, have retained a very Calvinistic view of God and humanity. In this view, God is perceived as working in the world in a quite determinative fashion while humans are bound by both the principle of sin and the decrees of God. The Evangelical evangelist, meanwhile, proclaims a gospel that requires a personal free decision of faith to apply divine forgiveness to sin, which is also a personal free decision or event. The evangelists of Evangelicalism, thus, are explicit in their description of God as persuasive and humans as free.

To resolve this dilemma, a minority of Evangelical
theologians have attempted to describe God in less
deterministic tones. This thesis argues that the evangelists
and this minority of theologians are correct in their view.
The deterministic theology of the majority is rejected as
being internally incoherent. Divine determinism is rejected
further as violating the basic conceptual unity of the
Evangelical movement. Finally, divine determinism is
rejected as being pastorally irrelevant. Some directions
that a new Evangelical theology, firmly rooted in the
concepts of a persuasive God and a free humanity, must now
take are established.

The thesis concludes with an appendix which deals
with the subject of theodicy. Divine persuasiveness is
demonstrated to be a particularly applicable underlying
principle to bring to a possible solution to the problem of
theodicy: the seeming contradiction between a good, just and
loving God and a suffering world.
To my daughter,
BRONWYN.
Her death forced me out of my comfortable theology and into some new thoughts about God. In those questions this thesis was born.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I deeply appreciate the contribution a number of people have made to this thesis. In particular, I express my gratitude to Dr. Barry Whitney who has been the primary reader for this thesis. Dr. Whitney has taught me much, and the student/teacher relationship has blossomed into a warm friendship. I am also grateful to Dr. John Hoffman and Dr. John Lewis who graciously have been readers for this project.

Were it not for the very active support of my wife, Debbie, this work would have been impossible. Not only has she tolerated the high commitment of time and energy necessary, she has encouraged me every step of the way. My children, Michael and Andrea, have also (sometimes not as willingly!) tolerated the time their Dad has spent on this research.

Finally, I would like to express special appreciation to the people of two congregations: the Bricker Street Baptist Church in Port Elgin, Ontario, and the Olivet Baptist Church in Windsor, Ontario. The people of both of these congregations have shared with me a warm and dynamic faith that has often sustained my own Evangelical faith. They have also shared with me their suffering, and thus taught me valuable lessons about what God does and does not do. A special word of appreciation is due the Olivet Baptist Church and the Department of the Ministry of the Baptist Convention.
of Ontario and Quebec. Both organizations have subsidized my studies at the University of Windsor in the last several years.
INTRODUCTION

In 1947 Harold Ockenga gave a name to an infant movement he and others saw growing in the post-war years within conservative Protestantism as a reaction to fundamentalism. Ockenga called this movement "the new evangelicalism." Since that time, what has been known as "the new evangelicalism", "neo-evangelicalism" and finally simply "Evangelicalism" has become a significant force in modern Christianity. While many mainline Protestant denominations have experienced declining membership, Evangelical Churches often have been on the growing edge of the Christian community. George Gallup Jr., on the basis of a Gallup poll taken the same year, called 1976 "The Year of the Evangelical." Other writers have described an "evangelical renaissance", an "evangelical resurgence", and even a "new evangelical majority." Through zealous missionary efforts, Evangelical Christianity has been carried from its North American homeland around the world, particularly to the Third World.

Obviously, since this movement first emerged shortly after World War II, the thought of what Ockenga called "the new evangelicalism" has shaped the vision of God held by significant numbers of people. But who or what is the Evangelical God? We might ask, in particular, how God acts as a causal force in creation. As we shall see, there is
some tension in the Evangelical response to this question. On the one hand, Evangelicals, by and large, have been theologically true to their Puritan roots, which in turn were strongly influenced by the original "evangelicals" of the continental European reformation. Particularly, we shall see that modern Evangelical thinkers generally have maintained a view of God consistent with Calvinistic Christian tradition which has emphasized God's "sovereignty" over all the events of the universe. A frequent corollary of this apparently deterministic view of God has been a very limited view of human freedom.

However, not only have modern Evangelicals been true to traditional reformation theology, they have also been true to a deep sense of mission to declare their faith to those still outside the fold. According to the Evangelicals, all people urgently need a personal conversion to Christ. This conversion results in an experience of "rebirth". Consequently, Evangelicals have been fervent in the task of evangelism: that is, the proclamation of their faith with the goal of "winning converts to Christ". It might be argued that this sense of mission provides more unity to the diverse movement of Evangelicals than does any theological position. However, it is in this mission that the tension in the Evangelical vision of God becomes apparent. While the formal theologians of Evangelicalism seem to portray God in a deterministic fashion, we shall see that the evangelists of Evangelicalism have placed a strong emphasis on the theme of
divine persuasion. While the formal theologians describe humans as bound by sin and the decrees of God, the evangelists emphasize human responsibility and accountability for sin and the need for a personal and experiential choice to accept the gift of salvation, all of which would seem to imply human freedom.

It would appear that there is a strong tension, if not a logical incoherence, between the seemingly deterministic theology held by the majority of Evangelical theologians and the practise of evangelism which is inherent in Evangelical thought and life. There are, however, a minority of Evangelical writers who have recently begun to question this deterministic view of God in favour of a more persuasive God who has sovereignly chosen to relinquish some divine decision-making power in order to share it with His creatures. This persuasive God acts as a causal force in creation by inviting, luring and motivating creatures toward the divine agenda. This persuasion never becomes so strong, however, that it is in fact determinism in disguise.

In this thesis I will explore this tension between the position held by the majority of Evangelical theologians and the Evangelical practice of evangelism. In the first chapter I will define more clearly the Evangelical movement by examining its modern history and its self-identity as found in the unifying concepts that bind it together. The second chapter will describe the theological debate. In this fairly lengthy exposition of the relevant theological
arguments I will examine: the majority position in favour of divine sovereignty and the predestination of human acts and decisions; some logical problems I find with this view; and, finally, a minority position which suggests that God has placed a self-limitation upon divine power. In the third chapter I will explore the subject of Evangelical evangelism, examining the theological assumptions that underlie both the message and methods of the Evangelical evangelist. Particularly these assumptions will relate to the issues of divine sovereignty and human freedom. These two chapters will describe two horns of a dilemma upon which the modern Evangelical movement finds itself. Finally, in the fourth chapter I will suggest a resolution to this dilemma. I will argue that a view of God as persuasive rather than determinitive is the only real option for the Evangelical wishing to remain true to the concepts that bind the Evangelical movement together. It is in this final chapter that my argument will become clear, as material from the first three chapters is brought together into contrast. My intent throughout is not to evaluate Evangelical theology on this question from the standpoint of other Christian streams of thought. Rather, I will provide an internal critique of the Evangelical understanding of God.

While I am convinced that a scholarly treatment of this question is essential for the Evangelical movement, it is not only academic interest that motivates me to write this particular thesis. I approach this subject as a pastor
within the Evangelical movement regularly called upon to articulate an Evangelical vision of God as that vision touches upon the challenges, crises, joys and problems of daily life. Consequently, I am not only concerned with the esoteric theological ramifications of this vision of God, I am convinced that this question—profoundly effects an Evangelical response to a number of urgent pastoral issues. One of the major pastoral concerns effected by this vision of God is the problem of theodicy: the difficulty of reconciling a good, just and loving God with a suffering world. Following the main body of my argument, therefore, I shall add an appendix dealing with the issue of theodicy. I will demonstrate how a vision of God as persuasive rather than as determinitive can help the Evangelical solve this thorny problem.
NOTES


   In an essay entitled "From Fundamentalism, Through New Evangelicalism, To Evangelicalism" Ockenga presents his reasons for selecting this term, and the need for such a term to describe the movement he observed. Evangelical Roots, ed. Kenneth Kantzer (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1978), 35-46.

2. Throughout this thesis I will be using the terms "Evangelical", "Evangelicalism", and "the Evangelical movement" to describe this contemporary movement in conservative protestantism rather than to describe the Lutheran wing of the European reformation or the material of the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John contained in the New Testament. I will more clearly define the place of this movement in the wider Christian community and the concepts that unify the movement in Chapter 1.


6. See Donald A. McGavran, Understanding Church Growth (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1970), especially 41-56. This is an excellent exhaustive and practical study of Christian mission from an Evangelical point of view, which utilizes numerous illustrations of (Evangelical) Church growth in the Third World.


8. The word "evangelism" obviously has the same
etymological root as the word "evangelical". The root is the Greek euangelion meaning "good news; gospel". Thus, the "evangelist" is one who proclaims the good news of Christ, and "evangelism" is the activity of proclaiming this gospel. Certainly, the practise of "evangelism" is not restricted to the movement called "Evangelicalism". It is also the case that Christians in different streams of thought, having a variety of ways to understand the Gospel, also define what evangelism actually is in a variety of ways. To the liberation theologian, for example, the evangel might well be revolution, and evangelism might well be understood to be the promotion of radical social change in light of the liberation theologian's understanding of the Christian Gospel. Consequently, I will refer to "Evangelical evangelism" to describe evangelism as it is understood and practised within the context and theology of the Evangelical movement as opposed to other Christian understandings of the message of the Christian faith. I will more clearly define the content of "Evangelical evangelism" in Chapter 3.


10. In describing Evangelical theologians, I will be using a number of terms that are probably clumsy, but I cannot find a simple description of the group I am trying to describe. When I refer to "formal theologians", "academic theologians" or "systematic theologians" or other similar terms, I am referring to what might be thought of as Evangelicalism's theological "establishment". These are the Evangelical theologians who are professional teachers, thinkers and/or writers who define Evangelicalism's theology. These are the theologians who teach in seminaries, and write in such a technical manner that their books are read by students, and perhaps by some pastors, but very seldom by the Evangelical laity.

The way in which I describe these theologians is not meant to be pejorative. The Christian Church needs professional thinkers given the time to systematically define Christian belief while pushing forward the frontier of Christian understanding. These terms are meant to clarify, however, that there are different ways of doing theology. The layperson might not have the technical language or tools to reflect on the Being of God in this manner, but popular
theology is no less profound for this. Both types of theology are necessary in the Church.

I have used these terms to simply try to identify who I am talking about and how they go about their theological inquiry.

11. When I use the pronoun "Him" to refer to God, I do not mean to imply that God is male as opposed to female. I would be equally comfortable using the pronoun "Her", but I feel that not only would many readers find this confusing, but the pronoun "Her" still only describes half of the reality. I do not use the neuter pronoun "It" because this pronoun would seem to deny the personality of God. It is clumsy to say "Her/Him", though this would be a more accurate reflection of my own understanding of God as both male and female, though even in this approach one pronoun must come before the other, thus leaving room for the misinterpretation that one gender is dominant over the other in the being of God. I find that the simplest course of action is to simply use the traditional "Him", being careful to explain that this pronoun is by no means meant to reduce or ignore the female facet of God's being.

I find myself, nevertheless, uncomfortable with what seems to be a complete lack of any effort on the part of Evangelical writers to use inclusive language. This is an issue that Evangelicals will have to deal with more seriously in the future.
Chapter One: A DEFINITION OF EVANGELICALISM

A serious exploration of any facet of Evangelical thought requires at the outset some kind of definition of Evangelicalism itself. This is true, in part, because despite the large and growing numbers of people influenced by the Evangelical Churches, the movement has not been taken seriously and therefore not studied seriously by those outside the movement. Morris Inch (an evangelical author)\(^1\) observes that: "...evangelical progress must seem puzzling to those accustomed to thinking of evangelicalism in terms of the sawdust trail— a chapter from the American past, the Methodist circuit rider, the Baptist revival— rather than a movement at the cutting edge of religious life today."\(^2\) Bernard Ramm makes a similar observation: "Rather than being a small handful of crank holdouts from the nineteenth century, evangelicals number in the tens of millions. This very fact must be reckoned with by American Churchmen."\(^3\)

It would seem that one of reasons "American Churchmen" have not seriously reckoned with Evangelicalism is that they have apparently often been too willing to live with a stereo-type of the Evangelical as an archaic holdout from the last century. Evangelical beliefs and attitudes that may or may not be accurate have been assumed. James Davison Hunter (in a book unsympathetic to Evangelicalism in many respects) claims that due to such stereo-typing
"Evangelicalism has far too long failed to receive open-minded treatment." Hunter suggests that despite the size and power of the movement, "the stereo-types are comfortable and ostensibly reliable" and consequently Evangelicalism has received little serious academic study. Citing a sociological study that would confirm this problem of stereo-typing, Hunter provides some specific reasons why this takes place:

Among the reasons cited for this lack of research are the political and social class biases of many researchers against what they consider intrinsically lower class, politically conservative, and historically non-progressive (Warner, 1979).

It must be recognised, however, that the problem of stereo-typing is not the only difficulty in defining Evangelicalism. The movement is so diverse that it defies any concise definition. George Marsden suggests that it is appropriate to think of Evangelicalism as "a religious grouping", but it is a dangerous mistake to consider it "a single, more or less unified phenomena. ... Most of the parts, are not only disconnected, they are strikingly diverse." Because of this great diversity, Evangelicals themselves are inclined to define themselves in different ways. Woodridge, Nell and Hatch acknowledge this problem:

Admittedly, if we concentrate on the issue of what evangelical should mean, it would be difficult to come up with a definition that would satisfy all of those in the country who call themselves Evangelicals or whom others refer to commonly by that name.

There are a number of reasons for this diversity. Bernard Ramm suggests, for example, that the diversity was
born in the controversial roots of Evangelicalism. Arising out of nearly a century of debate between orthodox and liberal theology, Ramm suggests that those particular doctrines which were controversial received major attention to the neglect of equally important but less controversial doctrines. The result of this imbalance "...has been to shape evangelical theology into the form of haphazardly related doctrines." Another reason for the diversity might be found in Richard Quebedeaux's rather loose description of Evangelicals: "Evangelicalism ... can well be termed an ideologically conservative movement rather than a Church or denomination." The key word here is "movement"; there is no single organization that represents all Evangelicals that can provide a creed to define Evangelicalism or a structure that can impose unity on the movement. Precisely because it is a movement, the people who describe themselves as Evangelical are committed not so much to the movement per se, but to an ideology growing out of some historical roots that bind the movement together.

There are two ways that we can try to define Evangelicalism. The first is an historical approach. The strength of this approach to defining the movement is that it clarifies the relationship of Evangelicalism to other theological movements in modern Christianity. A historical definition also demonstrates the source of the deterministic vision of God held by many Evangelicals which is one of the major themes running throughout this thesis. Calvinism is
influential in modern Evangelicalism via the strong influence of Puritanism.

The second approach to defining Evangelicalism is conceptual. This approach examines the concepts that all Evangelicals share. This approach is also important to the matter at hand. If it can be demonstrated that the concepts that unify Evangelicalism would themselves seem to deny deterministic theology, then this will certainly present Evangelicals with a difficult dilemma. By the time we reach the conclusion of the third chapter, we will discover that this precise dilemma does, indeed, exist for the Evangelical.

We will now turn our attention to these two different approaches to defining Evangelicalism.

A. A Historical Approach to Defining Evangelicalism

One of the ways Evangelicals define themselves is by examining their historical roots. In broad terms, the historical roots of contemporary Evangelicalism go back to the European Reformation. The reformation commitment to biblicism by which I mean the high view of Scripture and consequent heavy reliance upon Scripture that will become evident in the following section) and the soteriology of the reformers especially find their place in today's Evangelical movement. Many other influences, however, can be found in contemporary Evangelicalism. A number of writers, for example, also see the strong influence of German Pietism and Puritanism. George Marsden provides a long, but still only partial, list of historical movements that have helped to
shape contemporary Evangelicalism: "Puritans, Pietists, Methodists, Baptists, nineteenth-century restorationists, revivalists, black Christians, holiness groups, Pentecostals and others." Donald G. Bloesch summarizes the diversity of contemporary Evangelicalism's roots:

The new evangelicals look not only to the Protestant Reformation for their spiritual and theological illumination, but also to the spiritual movements of purification subsequent to the Reformation: Pietism, Puritanism, and Evangelicalism. A Calvinistic strain is very much present in neo-evangelicalism, but this is only one of several theological currents. The Wesleyan note can be heard, and even Catholic mysticism is represented.

The "very much present" Calvinistic strain is, of course, the source of the doctrine of divine determinism that we will find present in the thought of many Evangelical systematic theologians. Some of the other currents (such as "the Wesleyan note") would lead to a less deterministic view of God. In these conflicting historical streams, we see the root of the present theological dilemma in Evangelicalism which will be the theme of this thesis.

While this examination of historical roots helps us to understand the tone of Evangelicalism, these roots are themselves so diverse that they still do not provide us with a concise definition of modern Evangelicalism. These roots have grown into four major branches of Evangelicalism today: (1) the Baptist tradition; (2) the Holiness-Pentecostal tradition; (3) the Anabaptist tradition; and (4) the Reform-Confessional tradition.

More recent Evangelical history might help us better
to clarify who the Evangelicals are and what they stand for. In the Fall of 1941, a group of Fundamentalists founded the American Council of Christian Churches (ACCC) as a reaction to the Federal Council of Churches (FCC) which had been established in 1908 as an early expression of ecumenism in the United States. Uncomfortable with the tone of the ACCC, in the Spring of 1942 a group of more moderate doctrinally orthodox Christians formed the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). While being similar in doctrine to the ACCC the NAE was determined to be "...no dog-in-the-manger, reactionary, negative or destructive type of organization".18

The years 1946-1948 saw a discernable "outburst of literary production" by the Evangelicals which was "critical of aspects of fundamentalism and called for a conservative reconstruction".19 In particular, these "new Evangelicals" called for a more profound social application of the Gospel than was practised by the Fundamentalists; a more scholarly approach to Biblicism; and a willingness to engage in dialogue and cooperation with other, more liberal Christians.20

As the Fundamentalists battled communism and theological liberalism throughout the 1950s, the new Evangelicals were busy winning converts. Radio broadcasts like "Back to the Bible Hour" and "Old Fashioned Revival Hour"; student organizations such as "Youth for Christ" and "Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship" and the crusades of such preachers as Billy Graham all added to the swelling numbers
of Evangelicals. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the break between the new Evangelicals and the Fundamentalists from whence they had come was complete as Billy Graham included more liberal Churches in his crusades and Fuller Theological Seminary began to re-examine its Statement of Faith regarding the Bible. Both events became the target of harsh rhetoric from the Fundamentalists. As their popularity and numbers increased, those who called themselves "new evangelicals" or "neo-evangelicals" became simply "Evangelicals."

But what were these early modern Evangelicals trying to do? They were trying to steer a middle course between classical Christian Liberalism and Neo-orthodoxy on the one hand and Fundamentalism on the other. While they wanted to remain true to "the historical faith", they also wanted to reject the obscurantism and cultural excesses of Fundamentalism. It is not simply that they wanted to synthesize Liberalism and Fundamentalism; it is rather that they wanted to go beyond both to something new. Bloesch reports that those originally known as neo-evangelicals...were seeking to eschew the excesses of fundamentalism but at the same time remain solidly Biblical. Carl Henry voiced the prevailing issue at the time: "May not evangelical Christianity, dissatisfied with both fundamentalism and modernism, transcend the alternatives of the modernist-fundamentalist controversy?"

Given this initial purpose, it might be helpful to define Evangelicalism as standing between Fundamentalism and Neo-orthodoxy on the theological spectrum, and exploring how
it differs from the two theological positions on either side of it.

It is clear that Neo-orthodox thinkers such as Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Reinhold Neibuhr were helpful to the new Evangelicals.\textsuperscript{26} Woodridge, Noll and Hatch report that although the Evangelicals "...lost no time in pointing out serious deficiencies, yet the service of these neo-orthodox thinkers in clearing away the weeds of modernistic humanism was a valuable one in preparing the American theological soil for more expressly evangelical plantings."\textsuperscript{27} There were three areas in which the Evangelicals could not agree with Neo-orthodoxy. First, they felt that the Neo-orthodox view of the Bible granted to Scripture an inadequate authority. Secondly, they felt that Neo-orthodox thinkers, particularly Barth, side-stepped the need for personal conversion by advocating universal salvation. Thirdly, with the loss of an urgent, experiential need for personal conversion, the Evangelicals questioned whether or not there was any room or need for evangelism in Neo-orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{28} As a postscript to this discussion of Evangelicalism vis-a-vis Neo-orthodoxy, it is interesting to note that as Quebedeaux describes Neo-orthodoxy as passing out of existence "as a viable school of Christian thought with the advent in the mid-1960s of a new radical Liberalism or secular Christianity",\textsuperscript{29} Bloesch suggests that Evangelicalism might well become the spiritual successor to Neo-orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{30}
Perhaps even more important than understanding what distinguishes Evangelicalism from Neo-orthodoxy is understanding what distinguishes it from Fundamentalism. This is the case because these terms are often used synonymously by the popular press, thus creating the inaccurate impression that they are one and the same. Evangelicalism is not Fundamentalism! This has been the case since the beginning of the movement. Quebedeaux writes:

After 1940, Neo-Evangelicalism became recognisable in the United States as a strong force within conservative Christianity - one which holds firm to what it believes is Biblical or historical orthodoxy but at the same time repudiates the theological and cultural excesses of fundamentalism.

This is not to say that Evangelicalism has nothing in common with Fundamentalism. Indeed, the difference is often more one of attitude and spirit than of doctrinal content. But the difference is no less real for this. Bloesch writes: "Evangelicals unashamedly stand for the fundamentals of the Christian faith, but as a movement it transcends and corrects the defensive, sectarian mentality commonly associated with fundamentalism." Inch reports that Evangelicalism agrees with other modern theological movements in the view of Fundamentalism "as clinging to archaic traditions rather than defending the Scriptures." Hunter identifies the most profound difference between Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism as being a philosophical approach to modernity: "From its earliest times, Fundamentalism ... defined itself in opposition to the world view of modernity", whereas
Evangelicals have maintained "a more positive and constructive, or perhaps conciliatory, approach to modernity."36

We may summarize the historical definition thus: Evangelicalism is a modern movement of Christian thought with historical roots in the European Reformation and subsequent movements of purification that seeks to maintain historic and Biblical orthodoxy in juxtaposition to Liberal and Neo-orthodox Christian thought while avoiding the reactionary bad manners, intolerance, shallow and unscholarly Biblicism, and lack of meaningful social involvement found in Fundamentalism.

B. A Conceptual Approach to Defining Evangelicalism

Alongside an examination of the historical roots of Evangelicalism, a number of writers have also sought to define this widely diverse movement by identifying what Marsden has termed "a conceptual unity"37 (i.e.- the concepts that are shared by all Evangelicals regardless of other disagreements they might have). To the inquiry at hand (divine determinism or human free will), this approach to defining Evangelicalism might be more helpful.38 A number of writers have attempted to clarify Evangelicalism's conceptual unity. To the extent that the following material is repetitive, this approach to defining Evangelicalism is validated.

Marsden identifies five elements to Evangelical conceptual unity:
(1) The reformation doctrine of the final authority of Scripture; (2) the real, historical character of God's saving work in Scripture; (3) eternal salvation only through personal trust in Christ; (4) the importance of evangelism and missions; and (5) the importance of a spiritually transformed life.  

Elsewhere Marsden summarizes his definition: "The key to Evangelical unity lies in a common commitment to Jesus Christ as the divine Saviour from sin, a common purpose to fulfill the great commission and a common acknowledgement of the absolute normativeness of Holy Scripture."  

Woodbridge, Noll and Hatch identify the two beliefs that define the Evangelical most concisely are the following: (1) the conviction that people need to have a proper relationship with God, a relationship that can be brought about only when God forgives our offenses against himself and transforms us into people who can love him and do the things that please him, and (2) the conviction that the Bible has the last word on what man's responsibilities to God are and how God has provided a way for mankind to meet his demands and enjoy his friendship.  

Kenneth Kanzer speaks of "unifying factors" rather than conceptual unity. He identifies the same two concepts as Woodridge, Noll and Hatch: (1) "Biblical authority"; and (2) "the good news how man can be rightly related to God."  

In The Evangelical Renaissance, Bloesch identifies five "salient notes" to modern Evangelicalism: (1) "the divine authority of Scripture"; (2) "[a] stress on the rationality of faith"; (3) insistence "on the need for personal faith in Jesus Christ for salvation"; (4) "the realities of regeneration and sanctification"; the need to express faith in lifestyle; and (5) "the new conservatives tend to underscore the spiritual mission of the Church. The
primary aim of the Church is to preach the gospel and to make disciples of Jesus Christ."45 In *The Future of Evangelical Christianity* Bloesch provides another briefer conceptual definition of Evangelicalism: "Holding firm to the doctrine taught by the prophets and apostles in Holy Scripture, evangelicals stress the need for personal experience of the reality of Christ's salvation as well as the need to carry out the great commission to teach all people to be his disciples and to call all nations to repentance."46

Quebedeaux refers to "theological principles":

...contemporary Evangelicalism is by no means unified in the fine points (and even some not-so-fine points) of doctrine. But it can now be characterized as a school of Christianity which attests to the truth of three major theological principles: (1) the complete reliability and final authority of Scripture in matters of faith and practice; (2) the necessity of personal faith in Jesus Christ as Saviour from sin and consequent commitment to Him as Lord; and (3) the urgency of seeking actively the conversion of sinners to Christ. Among different Evangelical scholars and groups, to be sure, these three points are variously interpreted, but their basic truth is always upheld.47

Inch speaks of a "doctrinal core":48

...contemporary Evangelicals can be identified by their adherence to (1) the belief that the Bible is the inerrant word of God, (2) the belief in the divinity of Christ, and (3) the belief in the efficacy of Christ's life, death, and physical resurrection for the salvation of the human soul. Behaviourally, Evangelicals are typically characterized by an individuated and experiential orientation toward spiritual salvation and religiosity in general, and by the conviction of the necessity of actively attempting to proselytize all nonbelievers to the tenets of the Evangelical belief system.49

Millard Erikson combines the historical approach to defining Evangelicalism with the conceptual approach,
observing that in the relatively short history of modern Evangelicalism the movement has been characterized: (1) a belief in the need for "personal regeneration ... a necessity for individual salvation" (which requires a social response to the Christian gospel), 50 (2) a rational defense of Biblical theology with an emphasis on apologetics and a scholarly approach to Biblical and theological studies, 51 and (3) evangelism. 52

Finally, Bloesch provides us with a very concise summary of all of the above: "In Evangelical theology, Scripture is the source; the atonement or message of the cross is the central content." 53

It would seem to me that the three words which would best describe the conceptual unity of Evangelicalism are all in this statement: Scripture, atonement and message. My own understanding of what it means to be Evangelical, consequently, includes these three points. I would define an Evangelical as one who believes: (1) that the Canon of the Bible as generally recognised by the Protestant Church is the final authority for all matters of Christian faith and life; (2) that humans, alienated from God by freely chosen sin, must accept the atonement made by Jesus Christ for salvation in a personal and experiential decision of faith; and (3) that having accepted and benefited by this message of divine/human reconciliation, the Christian has the obligation to share this message with all other people. These convictions, expressed in a variety of ways, can be found in some form in all the descriptions of Evangelical conceptual
unity. Two of these three convictions will be explored in much greater detail further in this study. At this point, I simply want to argue that these convictions are intrinsic to Evangelicalism; they are the watershed which determines whether or not a particular person, church, or organization can legitimately be labeled, either by themselves or by others, as Evangelical.

Let us now look at how strongly Evangelical thinkers are committed to each of these three concepts.

(1) Biblicism and Evangelical Self-Identity:

Woodbridge, Noll and Hatch trace the commitment to Biblicism among Evangelicals all the way back to the Puritan roots: "The New England Puritans, before all else, were a people of 'The Book'." Evangelicals/continue to label themselves as "Bible believers." It is no wonder that Ramm observes "the evangelical must be thoroughly Biblical," an unbiblical Evangelical is a contradiction in terms. Inch states: "The mark of a true evangelical is the evangelical's advocacy of the gospel as set forth in the Scriptures" and "... the primacy of the Holy Writ in defining the character of faith and practice." Kantzer considers "the formal principle of biblical authority" to be the "watershed" that distinguishes Evangelicalism from most other movements of modern Protestantism. Whatever debate Evangelicals might have about how to interpret either the Bible or the divine inspiration of the Bible, they are united in the conviction that it carries divine and powerful authority.
(2) Soteriology and Evangelical Self-Indentity:

The second concept that unifies Evangelicalism is the Evangelical soteriology of a substitutionary atonement for sinful humanity. Woodbridge, Noll and Hatch point out that this commitment in modern Evangelicalism has historical precedent. Throughout history (except for the earliest reference to New Testament writers) the term "evangelical" has referred to movements, whether in the European Reformation or in the Church of England, that have shared a soteriology involving faith in atonement and personal conversion accompanied by Biblicism. Inch provides a more contemporary observation: "The evangelical vigorously declares the death-resurrection of Jesus as God's solution to man's dilemma, and thereby treats other theological concerns as of secondary importance." In specific terms, what is involved in this atonement soteriology? In the first place, there is the human "dilemma" Inch refers to. The problem is simple: "... all men and women are sinners who need a new birth through personal commitment to Christ as Saviour" (Quebedeaux). This problem is serious, for, as Kantzer observes, the Evangelical believes in "the final righteous judgement of all mankind ... [and] the eternal punishment of the impenitent and disbelieving wicked of this world." Fortunately, the death of Jesus of Nazareth on the cross provides a "... substitutionary atonement in which God did all that was needed to redeem man from sin." However, as Bloesch...
observes, this atonement is only efficacious when met with the human response of accepting faith.

Evangelical theology has always insisted that the atonement has two poles: the objective sacrifice on the cross, and the subjective appropriation of the benefits of this sacrifice in faith. The truth in the moral influence and mystical theories of the atonement is that man must make contact with the cross of Christ if he is to benefit from its saving power. 65

Faith is further defined by Bloesch as "the commitment of the whole man to the living Christ, but this involves knowledge and assent." 66 Without this human response, despite the wideness of its invitation, the cross is powerless to save: "Christ died for all men, but His death is beneficial only to those who believe." 67

(3) Evangelism and Evangelical Self-Indentity:

Finally, the third commitment that defines the Evangelical is stated by Bloesch directly and simply: "To be evangelical means to be evangelistic;" that is, to "be fired by a burning zeal to share this salvation with others." 68

Inch makes an interesting argument that part of the Evangelical milieu is a "remnant" mentality: a sense of being a righteous minority in the face an imposing and opposing majority. Inch suggests that this mentality is carried over from periods in history when the antecedents of contemporary Evangelicalism were, in fact, a persecuted minority: 69 This mentality has led to two dynamics that relate to the theme of Evangelical evangelism. First, this remnant mentality permits the evangelical to take an unconventional stand;" 70
secondly, it motivates the Evangelical to attempt to share the distinct vision and belief system with members of the majority which stand outside the remnant movement, Evangelicalism. 71

These three commitments that define Evangelicalism will be very important to my argument regarding divine determinism and human freedom. If, for example, it can be demonstrated that the Evangelical soteriology in its understanding of human responsibility and accountability for sin and in its demand for a faith response to the atonement of Christ assumes or requires a view of human freedom, then the Evangelical will either have to take this into account in deciding the question of divine determinism or else relinquish something that is intrinsic to Evangelicalism. Or if, for example, it can be demonstrated that the Evangelical commitment to evangelism either assumes or requires a view of human freedom, again, this will have to be taken into account as the Evangelical defines the issue of divine sovereignty, or else there will be a loss of something that is intrinsic to Evangelicalism. These are the questions that will be addressed in the next two chapters. There we will see that there is, indeed, a conflict between the Calvinistic tradition found in some of the historical roots of Evangelicalism and the shared concepts of soteriology and evangelism.
NOTES

1. All of the writers cited in this chapter, unless otherwise identified in the text, are writing from an Evangelical perspective.


Kanter argues that the reformation itself was characterized by "the phenomena of unity in the midst of diversity", and that thus, twentieth century Evangelicalism is simply showing another facet of its reformation roots in its great diversity beyond a very basic conceptual unity.


11. This is not to say that some organizations have not tried to put themselves into position to speak on behalf of all Evangelicals. The National Association of Evangelicals
in the United States, and the younger Canadian Evangelical Fellowship of Canada undoubtedly speak for many Evangelicals, yet many more remain independent of such organizations. Further, these organizations speak out of perceived Evangelical consensus on a given issue rather than trying to shape Evangelical thought (though it might be argued that such influence is present in the publications of both organizations). These organizations seem to view themselves as giving a voice to Evangelicals regarding issues upon which they agree rather than determining or disciplining Evangelical thought and/or practise.


It is important to note that the reformer most significant to contemporary Evangelicalism is John Calvin. This is perhaps the case because Calvin gave the Reformation an exhaustive systemized theology. Whatever the reason, when we discuss Evangelicalism and Divine determinism, we will discover (in Chapter Two) that Calvin's unapologetic argument for divine determinism and human predestination will remain the position of the majority of modern Evangelical theologians.


15. George Marsden, "The Evangelical Denomination", x.


24. For a good description of Evangelicalism between Neo-orthodoxy and Fundamentalism, see Millard Erickson, *The New Evangelical Theology*, 44, 45.

For a more extensive study of the course the "new Evangelicals" were trying to take between what they saw as the excesses of both Liberalism and Fundamentalism, the two following articles describe the relationship between Evangelicalism and both of these poles: Joel A. Carpenter, "From Fundamentalism to the New Evangelical Coalition", ed. George Marsden, *Evangelicalism and Modern America*; and Leonard I. Sweet, "The 1960s: The Crises of Liberal Christianity and the Public Emergence of Evangelicalism", ed. George Marsden, *Evangelicalism and Modern America*.


It is interesting to note that Ramm has written an entire book exploring Neo-orthodox theology as a way of coming to a definition of his own Evangelical theology. In this book, Ramm reports a significant and direct influence on his own thinking by Karl Barth. Bernard Ramm, *After Fundamentalism: the Future of Evangelical Theology*, 8.


32. Jerry Falwell, a well-known Fundamentalist, verifies this statement. In an interview he provides his definition of the distinction between an Evangelical and a Fundamentalist: "I always say a fundamentalist is an evangelical who is mad about something—abortion or pornography or the moral direction of the nation." (emphasis added).


38. A full understanding of Evangelicalism really requires both a historical appreciation of the roots of the movement as well as a grasp of a few major concepts that are shared. Different areas of study are nevertheless clearly assisted more by one than the other. A study of Evangelical social concern would probably find the historical approach more helpful in the long run. In this thesis, however, we will find that the conceptual unity involves issues at the very heart of the debate between divine determinism and human freedom.


42. Kenneth Kantzer, "Unity and Diversity in Evangelical Faith", 59.

43. See Kenneth Kantzer, "Unity and Diversity in
Evangelical Faith", 59.

44. See Kenneth Kantzer, "Unity and Diversity in Evangelical Faith", 73.


50. See Millard Erickson, *The New Evangelical Theology*, 32.

51. See Millard Erickson, *The New Evangelical Theology*, 33, 34.


58. See Kenneth Kantzer, "Unity and Diversity in Evangelical Faith", 59.

59. See, as one example of Evangelical disagreement about the meaning of inspiration, but not about the authority of the Bible, a discussion of the debate which took place in 1962 regarding Fuller Seminary's Statement of Faith regarding the Bible reported by John D. Woodridge, Mark A. Noll, and Nathan O. Hatch, *The Gospel in America: Themes in the Stories of America's Evangelicals*, 128.

For further agreement and disagreement among


63. Kenneth Kantzer, "Unity and Diversity in Evangelical Faith", 73.

64. Kenneth Kantzer, "Unity and Diversity in Evangelical Faith", 73.


   See also Donald G. Bloesch, *The Future of Evangelical Christianity: A Call for Unity Amid Diversity*, 16.


THE THEOLOGICAL DEBATE

How does the Evangelical God relate to creation? From the previous chapter we can conclude that Evangelicals believe God to be a self-revealing, gracious Being who invites humans to salvation from sin. But is He also the cause of all events; does He predetermine the events of the universe? Or does He, rather, give the gift of freedom to His creatures?

There is some debate as Evangelicals respond to these questions. John H. Gerstner, for example, writing in an article entitled "Theological Boundaries: The Reformed Perspective", argues that to the degree that Evangelicalism loses its Reformed doctrine of God, particularly Calvin's emphasis on divine initiative, Evangelicalism moves beyond the boundaries set by its historical roots. At risk are... some significant aspects of [Evangelicalism's] Reformation heritage, especially as these relate to the doctrines of grace, the depth of human depravity, and the indispensable need of God's saving initiative not only in sending His Son, Jesus Christ, to accomplish salvation but also inclining sinners to accept it.¹ (Emphasis added)

Gerstner describes Pelagianism (by which he seems to mean any view of human freedom) as "the utter antithesis of evangelicalism."²

Other Evangelical writers will question this view. They wonder whether such a view of either God or humanity is logically compatible³ with the Evangelical view of divine
love and the Evangelical understanding of salvation. Synan Vinson argues that just as there are unquestionably Calvinistic roots of Evangelicalism, there has also always been an Armenian wing (albeit a minority) in Evangelicalism that affirms human freedom and responsibility. The writers that argue human freedom represent, however, clearly a small minority of Evangelical scholars.

In this chapter I will examine the theological arguments made by each side in this Evangelical debate over the meaning of divine sovereignty. The largest part of the chapter describes in detail the apparently quite deterministic view of God which is held by the majority. This section will begin with a brief summary of what Carl Henry (one of the foundational scholars of Evangelicalism, and still a dominant force in the movement) has written on the subject. Following this exposition, I will discuss the thought of a number of Evangelical scholars as they: (1) define divine sovereignty; (2) apply divine sovereignty: (i) in a general sense to creaturely acts and events; and (ii) in a very specific sense to the doctrine of election to salvation; (3) discuss divine sovereignty with reference to human sin; and (4) observe the relationship between the divine attributes of sovereignty and omniscience. This section will conclude with a brief summary of the thought of another significant Evangelical theologian, Donald G. Bloesch, who seems to see the problems with such a view, but nevertheless also seems to find himself unable to reject this
traditional Calvinistic view of God in favour of something else.

In the following section I will demonstrate what I believe to be a fatal logical incoherence within the Evangelical theology of divine determinism. I will then turn in the next section to report on a small minority of Evangelical writers who question the majority view, favouring instead a strong view of human freedom. Finally, I will point out that neither side in this debate wishes to completely reject the view of the other: those arguing determinism will argue that they are not, in fact, rejecting human freedom; while those arguing human freedom will also assert divine sovereignty.

(A) The Majority View

(1) Carl Henry: A Preview of the Majority Position:

As we saw in the last chapter, Carl Henry has been a leader of modern Evangelicalism, and a powerful shaper of Evangelical thought from the very beginning of this movement. It is for this reason that his writing on the issue of divine sovereignty is so important. Despite his rather voluminous material, however, Henry has not written much on the subject. What he has written (in the final volume of his six-volume work, God, Revelation and Authority) does provide us with a good overview of an Evangelical doctrine of divine determinism.

Henry uses several words, depending upon the context,
to describe God's initiating activity. He refers to God's sovereignty, providence and election. Henry describes providence as the working out in minute detail God's purposeful plan.

The Biblical view of providence is dramatically specific; it unqualifiedly affirms particular divine providence, that is, God works out his purposes not merely in life's generalities but in the details and minutiae of life as well. The Bible relates to divine providence not only general and universal structures but also personal experiences; nothing falls outside God's will and concern. Not just the mass of humanity but each individual is significant to God as are life's particularities. Since all things fall within God's purview, even seemingly chance events should be considered divine providences.6

In other words, God goes far beyond defining general boundaries for creaturely acts. Henry repeatedly asserts the universality of God's providence, and its direct application to every part of creation. Not only does providence effect the predestination of the elect, it also extends to "the divine purpose for the entire time-space universe and all creatures and their destiny."7

This divine purpose is fulfilled by God "in creation and redemption by ordering both nature's movements and human affairs."8 Nature itself "is suspended on the eternal plan of the unchanging God who is free to decree as he pleases and who in his 'good pleasure' decrees a space-time matrix that by his willing becomes as necessary as God himself."9 Were God to cease to function as the omnipotent, omnipresent "governor of all things" who "upholds and maintains the created universe", the entire natural order would instantly
collapse, reverting to "the nihil or nothingness that prevailed before God's creation." Fortunately, God continues to uphold the universe "for the sovereign purpose and goal for which he initially created it." Just as the divine initiative pervades and determines the natural universe, "God, moreover, implements his divine purpose throughout the course of human affairs and not just sporadically or in isolated events. All history reveals the certainty of events decreed by God." Among the human events determined by God is when "...God in determinate mercy provides redemption for some fallen creatures" (emphasis added). It is important to note that Henry retains the Calvinistic doctrine of election including both the notion that grace is unconditionally determined by God and the related notion that only some humans are the beneficiaries of that "determinate mercy". Henry identifies the heart of his doctrine of election as the freedom of God who can do as He wills and save who He wills: "The free God of the Bible binds man to himself by divine choice."

Henry leaves us with a world completely ordered by the sovereign determination of God:

The Christian assessment of history is ... grounded in a worldview unshaken in its confidence in a supernatural creator of all who has revealed his almighty will and purpose, and is the providential constrainer and ruler of men and nations. "... [B]iblical theism insists on God's providential activity in universal history, an outworking of his sovereign purposes in history as a totality that includes the special redemptive events by which he achieves the divine salvation of penitent sinners."
Finally, it needs to be observed that Henry's view of divine sovereignty is related to divine omniscience. The decrees of God implemented by divine providence indicate "divine forepreparation" and underline "the divine anticipation of all things that would harmoniously accomplish God's predetermined purpose." 17

It is obvious that Carl Henry does not only imply a doctrine of divine determinism, he explicitly states such a doctrine. It is equally clear, particularly with reference to the doctrine of unconditional election, that Henry has a very restricted view of human freedom. These themes in Henry's thought will also be reflected by other Evangelical writers that represent the majority position of Evangelicalism on this issue.

(ii) A More Detailed Examination of the Majority Position:

In this section, I will treat the majority Evangelical position on divine sovereignty as a number of specific issues. I will describe the thought of Evangelical theologians on (a) a definition of divine sovereignty; (b) divine sovereignty practically applied to the world of events and decisions; (c) the relationship between divine sovereignty and sin; and (d) the related divine attributes of sovereignty and omniscience.

(a) Divine Sovereignty Defined:

A number of Evangelicals define divine sovereignty as the omnipotent ability of God not only to plan creaturely
events according to God's own purpose, but also to then implement those events in a determinative fashion. Arthur Pink,\textsuperscript{18} for example, provides a lengthy definition of divine sovereignty.

What do we mean by this expression [the sovereignty of God]? We mean the supremacy of God, the kingship of God, the Godhood of God. ... To say that God is sovereign is to declare that He is Most High, doing according to His will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of earth, so that none can stay His hand. ... To say that God is sovereign is to declare that He is the Almighty, the Possessor of all power in heaven and earth, so that none can defeat his Counsel, thwart His purpose, or resist His will. To say that God is sovereign is to declare that He is "The Governor among the nations" (Psm. 22:28), setting up kingdoms, overthrowing empires, and determining the course of dynasties as pleaseth Him best.\textsuperscript{19}

It is evident that Pink means us to understand by the phrase "the sovereignty of God" that God not only has the ability to determine creaturely events, but that God in fact does determine these events. Kingdoms are established not because humans freely choose their rulers (or rulers freely choose to oppress their subjects) but because God has decreed that it shall be. God's purpose and pre-ordained plan can be neither thwarted nor resisted.

Andrew Rule emphasizes the scope of this determinative divine activity. He defines the action of sovereign providence as the divine ability

...to look ahead, to foresee, and thus to plan in advance. But as used here, it also means to carry out the plan. And since the agent of providence is the all-knowing, all-powerful God, literally everything is included.\textsuperscript{20}

Augustus Strong appeals to God's omnipotence which he
defines as "the power of God to do all things which are objects of power, whether with or without the use of means". There is an important qualification on divine ability here that needs to be noted: "Omnipotence does not imply power to do that which is not an object of power; as, for example, that which is self-contradictory, or contradictory to the nature of God." God's power is thus limited by logical possibilities. It would be "self-contradictory", for example, for God to make a square circle. God's power is also limited by His own "nature" or character: "God has all the power that is consistent with infinite perfection - all power to do what is worthy of himself." In other words, God is incapable of evil or sin. This, of course, raises a number of problems. If God is sovereign in all events and incapable of sin, how then did sin enter the world? If God is sovereign in all events and incapable of evil, why is there so much evil and suffering in the world? Though Strong does not identify or respond to these problems, he argues that were there not such limitations on divine power, God would be held hostage to his own omnipotence:

Omnipotence does not imply the exercise of all power on the part of God. He has power over His power; in other words, His power is under the control of a wise and holy will. God can do all He will, but He will not do all He can. Else His power is a mere force acting necessarily, and God is slave to His own omnipotence.

This is a very fascinating statement in that it might suggest (though Strong would clearly deny such as a suggestion) that
God has the ability to share power with His creatures if it is consistent with His character and/or divine plan to do so. A majority of Evangelicals view sovereignty as God's omnipotent ability to plan, determine and implement His will in every facet of creaturely existence. While these Evangelicals do place some limits on God's omnipotent sovereignty, those limits are imposed either by the logical structure of the universe (a structure that, to the Evangelical, has its origin in God) or by the character of God, Himself. To state it another way, God's sovereignty is not limited in any fashion by creaturely freedom. This heavy emphasis on omnipotent sovereignty clearly stresses divine determinism, and just as clearly limits human freedom as to make it almost a meaningless concept. This will become even more clear as we see how these Evangelicals apply the concept of the sovereignty of God.

b. Divine Sovereignty Applied:

A survey of the literature written by the the school of thought representing a majority of Evangelical theologians reveals an application of the sovereignty of God on two levels. The first level at which the issue of divine sovereign predetermination is outlined is on the general level of all creaturely acts and events. This predetermination becomes much more specific, however, as Evangelical writers turn their attention to the Calvinistic doctrine of unconditional election which holds to a view that God has predestined some to grace while predestining others
to wrath. These levels might be broken down into even more specific categories by some writers, but the two basic categories remain.

This distinction is made by William Childs Robinson in his defense of a doctrine he calls "triple predestination" which he traces back to Augustine. This doctrine distinguishes between a general predestination, a special predestination, and a preterition:

...general predestination or providence, which magnifies God's wisdom in governing all things; special predestination or election in which His free grace is seen in the choice of His people; and preterition or reprobation by which He passes by and leaves other sinners to the due dessert of their guilt and manifestations of his power and justice.26

Arthur Pink similarly categorizes the application of divine sovereignty. He argues that God is sovereign in His exercise of power as evidenced by the fact that He helps some, but not others, with miracles and other manifestations of divine ability.27 Pink argues that God is also sovereign in His exercise of grace and mercy, as evidenced by the fact that He saves some, and leaves others to judgement and condemnation.27

A definition of sovereignty provided by Peter Toon also contains the same two elements. He defines divine sovereignty as "... the activity of God in creating, upholding and guiding the universe, as well as guiding history and bringing salvation, [which] is the activity of the omnipotent Lord."28

J.I. Packer places a strong emphasis upon the
general application of God's sovereign will. In his book, *Knowing God*, he argues that God exercises "unlimited dominion over all his creatures."\(^{30}\) Not only is God, according to Packer, "Lord of all that He has made", He has the ability to change or supersede the order He has created.\(^{31}\) If God wishes to violate a natural law, for example, He has the ability to do so as sovereign Lord of the created universe. All is subject to His will. Further, divine direction or involvement is not a matter of occasional isolated events. In the book *Evangelism and the Sovereignty of God*, Packer argues that God "'worketh all things after the counsel of his own will' (Eph. 1:11), directing every process and ordering every event for the fulfilling of His own eternal plan."\(^{32}\)

Lest we conclude that this general exercise of determinative sovereignty excludes human acts or decisions, Packer further argues that God exercises sovereignty over the nations of the world and their rulers:

Do you suppose that it is really these great men who determine which way the world shall go? Think again; for God is greater than the world's greatest men. He is, as the Prayer Book says, "The only ruler of princes".\(^{32}\)

According to Packer, God's determination of human events never ceases. There is never a gap when humans function apart from God's sovereignty, for "[i]t is not only at isolated moments God takes control of events, either; all
history is under His sway." Packer is not arguing that God merely influences history by prompting people, or presenting them with an ideal. God is controlling every event, act and decision played out on the human stage.

Arthur Pink also describes the general exercise of determinative sovereignty. God is not, argues Pink, "a far-distant Spectator taking no immediate hand in the affairs of earth". "[T]he material world is regulated by law" which is not only given, but administered by God. Thus God exercises the ability as sovereign Lord to involve Himself in the affairs of creation, including the ability to violate natural law if such violation suits His purpose. This divine government is seen by Pink as necessary for the continued existence of the universe:

(Observing that) there is an imperative need for God to rule over our world, let us now observe further the fact that God does rule, actually rule, and that His government extends to and is exercised over all things and all creatures.

Pink claims this government of God extends to inanimate matter. For example, argues Pink, the weather is controlled by God. God controls the acts of "irrational creatures;" He is the governing king of the animal kingdom. God exercises determinative sovereignty over people. All humans are, according to Pink, governed by God whether they know it or not; like it or not; accept it or not. "Though many are in ignorance of it, all men, good and bad, are under the jurisdiction of, and are absolutely subject to the administration of the Supreme Sovereign."
If the determinitive nature of the exercise of God's sovereignty as understood by these Evangelicals were not already evident enough in the general exercise of divine sovereignty, it becomes even clearer as we examine their doctrine of salvific election. God is seen by them as irresistibly drawing the elect into salvation. Salvation is a gift that depends solely upon God as the initiator of saving faith.

Gordon Girod appeals to the Canons of the Synod of Dort (1618-1619) for a definition of the doctrine of election:

Election is the unchangable purpose of God, whereby, before the foundation of the world, he hath, out of mere grace, according to the sovereign good pleasure of his own will, chosen, from the whole human race, which had fallen through their own fault, from their primitive state of rectitude into sin and destruction, a certain number of persons to redemption in Christ, whom he from eternity appointed the Mediator and Head of the elect, and the foundation of salvation.

Augustus Strong provides us with a more recent definition of election that is no less deterministic:

Election is that eternal act of God, by which in His sovereign pleasure, and on account of no foreseen merit in them, he chooses certain out of the number of sinful men to be the special recipients of the special grace of His Spirit and so to be made voluntary partakers of Christ's salvation.

It completely eludes me how an individual can at one and the same time be "made" to be a partaker of Christ's salvation and be a "voluntary" partaker of Christ's salvation. Here in this contradiction we see the problem these writers are going to have with their doctrine of election - a problem I will
discuss further later.

In this doctrine of election (which is shared by the majority of Evangelical theologians), salvation is completely God's work and contains no element of human work. Girod writes, "...when God has chosen a man unto salvation, the Holy Spirit will bring conviction of sin to man's heart, and God Himself will put a saving faith within the heart of the man." J. Norval Geldenhuys agrees. "Scripture teaches that the effectual calling is the sovereign, free and irresistible act of God in Christ, through His Spirit, by which guilty lost sinners without merit of their own are brought into living and saving fellowship with Jesus Christ."44

In this soteriology (in the words of Girod) "grace is prevenient; it comes first, before any response by the sinner." The "evangel" (the proclaimed message of the Gospel leading to personal conversion), argues Gerstner, should be seen as "the divine application of grace" rather than a "divine offer of grace." After all, an invitation requires a response: a freely chosen decision on the part of the one invited to either accept or reject the invitation. But, as Girod states, "... it is God Himself who makes the choice, and ... there is nought in us that leads Him to make that choice."47

It might then be asked of these Evangelicals, if only a select number of people are recipients of God's grace,
can divine grace be consistent with divine justice? M.
Eugene Osterhaven responds to this objection by
distinguishing between two kinds of grace. "[C]ommon grace"
which, being available to everyone, "enables a man to repent
and believe if only he will", while "special grace", given
only to the elect, "working with the will, constrains him to
do so." 48 It seems to me that this argument is specious
indeed! In Osterhaven's thought, one cannot "repent and
believe" apart from the special grace that constrains the
will to do so. Without special grace, man will not repent
and believe because he cannot will to do so. What kind of
divine grace is it that holds a promise across a chasm of
impossibility? There might be many words to describe such an
act, but "grace" is not among them!

Arthur Pink is more forthright in answering the
question raised regarding those not of the elect. He writes,

The unsaved are lost because they refuse to believe;
the others are saved because they believe. But why
do these others believe? ... It is God Himself who
makes the difference between the elect and the
non-elect. ... Faith is God's gift, and "all men have
not faith" (2 Thess. 3:2); therefore, we see that God
does not bestow this gift on all. 49

William Childs Robinson responds to the question of divine
justice with an affirmation of divine love in the face of
seeming injustice. "...[T]his God, who personally
predestines, acts in His love. In mercy, He chose for
adoption into His family of children even us rebellious
sinners." 50 The argument being made by Robinson is that if
God were just, all sinners would be condemned. That some,
even if only a few, are saved by the unconditional, irresistible grace of God surely is evidence of God's love.

Let us turn our attention now to those who are elect. It is clear that this majority of Evangelicals sees the decision to receive grace as a decision made by God rather than by the recipient of grace. This is necessary, argues Geldenhuyse, because

[unredeemed man is spiritually blind and dead and unable to regenerate or truly convert himself. ...]

[The New Testament] clearly and consistently teaches us that through the sovereign and omnipotent power and grace of God, we are effectually called to become the inheritors of the salvation wrought by God through Jesus Christ. ...

[I]t is clear that by "calling" ... is meant not merely an invitation, but that mysterious, glorious and efficacious act of God through the Holy Spirit that brings man into true, dynamic fellowship with Jesus Christ. ... God is the 'all-sufficient cause, origin and executor of the calling.'

Packer argues that it might at times seem that the conversion decision comes as the result of human effort and struggle, but this is an illusion. To those who would argue that they made a free choice to accept God's grace, Packer would respond that it was God's work "that you saw your need of Christ and came to trust Him as Saviour." That an individual came under Christian influence, attended Church, heard the gospel or read the Bible, is all due to God who caused these things to occur, according to Packer. Girod agrees:

... the spiritual egoists who boast of their
salvation forget that if they have heard the evangelist preach, it was only because it was foreordained that they should hear him, and because the Spirit of God sent them to hear him. They forget that if they were moved to make a decision, it was only because God foreordained that they should, and because the Spirit of God moved upon their hearts.54

God Himself is always found at the focus of salvific election in the thought of these Evangelicals. Robinson writes,

The golden chain which ties together the acts of God, from their foundation in His eternal purpose to their consummation in His making us who are sinners like unto the image of His Son is nothing else than just God Himself. He loved us; He foreknew us; He predestined us; He called us...55

Reviewing the way this majority of Evangelicals defines and applies divine sovereignty to creaturely decisions, it is quite clear that God is, to them, a very determinative Being. There is little room for creaturely choice or freedom. It is God's purpose and plan that always triumphs, that must necessarily triumph. God's sovereignty is, to these Evangelicals, synonymous with divine determinism.

(c) Divine Sovereignty and Sin

I have already alluded to the problem of divine sovereignty and sin. If sovereignty is to be understood (as these Evangelicals understand it) as the activity of God in determining all the events of the universe including human acts and decisions, a question must be raised concerning God's role in sin. This becomes more urgent when God's sovereignty is limited by nothing other than His divine
character of perfection and holiness. Certainly, if God is omnipotent in His relationship with His creatures, He is capable of preventing sin. Certainly, if He is perfectly holy, it would be His desire to prevent sin. How then can holy sovereignty and sin be found in the same world view?

The school of thought representing the majority of Evangelicals makes two arguments in response to this problem. There is an argument made that God does, in fact, exercise a sovereign restraint upon sin. There is also an argument made that it is the depth of human sin that actually demands a doctrine of unconditional election and the partner doctrine of irresistible grace.

A number of Evangelical writers assert that God does exercise power over sin. It will be remembered that Strong asserted that God's omnipotence extends only to those things which are "objects of power". Since Strong considers the prevention of sin to be "an object of power", he concludes that God can prevent sin if and when He wills to do so.56 Andrew Rule agrees that God exercises sovereign control over the sinful state of His creatures:

God's providence embraces not only the whole, but its parts as well - "all His creatures and their actions". This includes "free" creatures, their "free" actions (even their evil ones), and their sinful state."57

J. Oliver Bushwell also argues that God exercises control over sin, but recognises "an inscrutable paradox" in such an argument.

The Christian determinist is usually driven to an
inscrutable paradox. He might accept all that the Bible says about primeval sin as factually true, but the biblical statements afford no philosophical explanation. Satan sinned necessarily. God is rightly angry with sin. So be it! ... Calvin and Calvinists generally ... agree in denying that God is in any sense the author of sin. Nevertheless, we find that God "worketh all things after the counsel of His own will". We cannot deny that "whatever comes to pass" is within the eternal decrees of God. Sin must be within God's decrees in some sense in which He is not the author of it.58

Bushwell concludes that God must permit but not cause sin, and that the reason He does so is good: He wishes to reveal both the inevitability of His wrath and His ability to save.

We must conclude, then, that within the decrees of God, there are decrees of permission of those things of which God Himself is not the author. This is not mere permission of the unavoidable. ... It is God's permissive decrees for His own purpose of revelation.59

A similar case is made by Osterhaven, who argues that God does restrain sin, but that at times He also permits sin as a means of revealing both human need for salvation, and also the extent to which human life would be marred by sin were God not restraining evil. He quotes Calvin:

"God by His providence restrains the perverseness of our nature from breaking out into external acts, but does not purify it within" (Institutes, II,iii,3). In a variety of ways, internally and externally, God checks human sin. In some instances He ceases His restraining ability and gives men over to a reprobate mind in order that their sin may work itself out in utter godlessness and corruption. Even this, however, shows that previously He had prevented their sin from running its natural course and that He had held it in abeyance.60

While these writers are to be commended for recognising and attempting to deal with a serious problem in their position, it seems to me that this proposed resolution
of the difficulty is insufficient. In the first place, when God is described in such absolutely determinative terms as we have seen within this majority position, the question of whether God causes or merely permits sin is irrelevant. In permitting what could have been prevented, God must take some responsibility for the reality of sin. Furthermore, to argue revelation of either divine wrath or the extent of divine mercy as the reason for the permission of sin begs the questions of sin's origin. Were sin never permitted, there would be no occasion for divine wrath and no need for divine salvation from sin. These arguments are simply inadequate.

This majority of Evangelicals turn the issue of sin around, however, to a defense for the doctrine of unconditional election. They argue that it is the very depth and immense reality of sin that requires God's saving initiative. Accompanying Calvin's doctrine of unconditional election is the Calvinistic anthropology that views humans as totally depraved and unable to do good or turn to God.

Robinson reflects this pessimistic anthropology when he writes that

[t]here is no place here for human conceits. God did not bestow His electing love upon us before the foundation of the world because of any fanciful "infinite value of the human soul". We had no value...

Pink maintains that since the fall, the human person has been completely impotent to either choose Christ, or any other undiluted good. For Pink, the human being bound by sin, has freedom to do wrong, but not to do right. "In and of
himself, the natural man has power to reject Christ; but in and of himself he has not the power to receive Christ ... because he has a mind that is 'enmity against' Him (Rom. 8:7').

Strong agrees that human depravity means that humans are prone to sin, and indeed have no choice but to sin. Consequently, argues Strong, any right acts achieved by humans (including the act of faith by which saving grace is appropriated) are attributable only to God. The pervasiveness of sin is traced by Girod to an orthodox understanding of the fall (Genesis 3), resulting in the "corruption of every facet of man's being", leaving humanity with a nature entirely corrupted. This corruption is so deeply engrained and so complete that the only possible solution to the problem of sin is for God to grab the initiative and determine the faith and repentance that, although necessary to salvation, is beyond corrupt humanity. This is, in fact, what God does in conferring a "new birth" upon His elect. "The new man owes his new nature entirely to God who made it possible by the operation of the Holy Spirit." The pervasiveness of sin, therefore, requires a determinative God. In this anthropological argument, were election conditional, and were grace resistable, no human could ever possibly be saved.

(d) Sovereignty and Omniscience

In reviewing the majority Evangelical view of divine determinism, it is necessary to briefly observe that there is
a strong correlation between the notion of divine omnipotence expressed in determinism and divine omniscience. This relationship is described by Pink:

Is it not self-evident that if God foreknows all things, He has also fore-ordained all things? Is it not clear that God foreknows what will be because He has decreed what shall be? God's foreknowledge is not the cause of events, rather are events the effects of His eternal purpose.68

Strong rejects the notion that God's election could be based on mere divine foreknowledge of an individual's faith.

"[T]here can be no foreknowledge, unless there is something fixed in the future, to be foreknown; and this fixity can be due only to God's predetermination."69

This relationship between God's predetermination and foreknowledge will present a telling argument against the minority of Evangelicals who find themselves more comfortable with Armenianism than with Calvinism. Traditionally, Armenians have argued that election is-conditional upon what God foreknows of an individual's free response to the proclamation of the Gospel.70 It would seem reasonable to assume, however, that if God knows what will be, then that event must come to be. Otherwise, God's omniscience must be less than perfect. By the same token, if one assumes predetermination, then foreknowledge is a completely logical outcome of that assumption, for presumably God must know of His own plans.
(iii) Recognising the Problems: Donald Bloesch

One prominent Evangelical writer who has tried to understand God's sovereignty in a way less inhibiting to human freedom is Donald Bloesch. Bloesch carefully observes the concept of God's sovereignty. "If there is anything that characterizes the evangelical and Reformed tradition it is the stress upon the sovereignty of God. ... [T]he living God of the Bible ... is sovereign over heaven and earth - this is the God of evangelicalism."71 Bloesch also seems to be aware, however, that the way Evangelicals have been prone to define God's sovereignty has resulted in a view that effectively denies human freedom. Bloesch would like to preserve human freedom in his theology.

A sovereign God has a sovereign plan and purpose which he chooses to realize in the world. But predestination is a theological concept and must not be confused with the philosophical concept of fate or destiny. It means that God's election of men to salvation in Jesus Christ ... does not override the freedom of man but is realized in and through this freedom, though it is the new freedom given in Christ and not natural free will. Predestination is not a de dictum absolutum that tends to deny the free movement of history but a working out of the purposes of God in history.72

Bloesch leaves room in the world for events which are not the will of God. For example, God "sustains the world in its sin and misery" with an "overarching providence", but "is not the direct cause of its sin and misery."73 All that happens, argues Bloesch, happens by the sanction of God, but not necessarily by the affirmation of God.

We affirm the reality of God's foreknowledge and also his sovereignty over all events of time and space,
but we do not hold to a rigid foreordination that excludes the free movement of history. Nothing happens, to be sure, apart from God's sanction, but this is not to say that God expressly wills everything that happens. There are some things that happen that God does not will and that have their reality precisely in God's negation instead of his affirmation (Barth). 74

Bloesch tries to bring together divine determinism and human freedom by arguing a predetermined plan of God that, rather than denying human freedom, uses human freedom for its ultimate accomplishment:

The plan of God is predetermined, but the way in which He realizes it is dependent partly on the free cooperation of His subjects. This does not detract from His omnipotence, for it means that He is so powerful He is willing to attain His objectives by allowing a certain room for freedom of action on the part of man. 75

Not only is humanity (at least somewhat) free in Bloesch's view, God is also free to change His mind regarding what He has foreordained:

God has the freedom to change His mind or the ways in which He deals with His people, though He remains inflexible in His ultimate purpose for them. God is not immobile, but He is immutable at least in several basic senses: He is unchanging in His basic purposes; His being is indestructible; and His promises are inviolable. 76

Perhaps the most promising element of Bloesch's thought is a redefinition of the term "omnipotence":

God's omnipotence does not mean that he is the direct or sole cause of all that happens. It means that God is omnicompetent, capable of dealing with all circumstances, that nothing can ultimately defeat or thwart his plan for his people. (emphasis added). 77

While pointing Evangelical thought in some promising directions, unfortunately Bloesch also seems unable to let go
of the traditional Calvinistic understanding of how God applies His sovereign power to the general events of creation and to the specific concept of election:

We contend that if we are to remain true to the biblical heritage of our faith, as well as the consensus of the Catholic tradition, we must maintain the idea of God as a sovereign power. 

As Bloesch describes this "sovereign power", it is clear that he is talking about more than just "omnicompetence" to handle any situation. He is talking about determination. God, for example, is described by Bloesch as "a Supreme Intelligence who plans and shapes man's destiny." Like others, Bloesch insists that God, as the "Power above all powers", determines the actions and decisions of those who rule. He bestows wealth and honour upon those who He chooses. Thus, the power to govern or the acquisition of wealth is not dependent upon human effort or freedom, but upon the choice of God.

When he comes to the doctrine of election, Bloesch returns to a more traditional determinism that seems to belie his concern regarding human freedom. "The sovereignty of God means that God's will is free not only to carry out the decree of election, but also to determine it" (emphasis added). Bloesch rejects the tendencies of modern popular Evangelicalism which...

is sometimes inclined to place a limit on the sovereignty of God. It is said that God only offers man salvation, but does not effect salvation. Salvation is made dependent on man's free will rather than divine election. In popular evangelicalism God is portrayed as powerful, but not invincible. His loving mercy is exalted, but not his universal Lordship.
Alongside others in this majority of Evangelicals who write that an individual's coming to faith is really the act of God, not of that individual, Bloesch writes:

Although our salvation is to be attributed to the grace of God alone, it must be received by faith if it is to benefit us. Yet faith itself is a gift of God, for we cannot believe until the Holy Spirit grants us the power and motivation. Both the awakening to faith and the repentance that follows signify that we are already recipients of divine grace.  

It is not free will, according to Bloesch, that allows us to receive the gospel. "Evangelical theology affirms against all kinds of Pelagianism and synergism that we are saved not by free will but by free grace."  

When we place all of these statements by Bloesch side-by-side, it seems that Bloesch would like to have it both ways. He would like to argue that divine sovereignty does not intrude upon human freedom. At the same time, he would like to argue that God governs over human affairs in specific detail. In particular, he would like to argue in favor of the doctrine of unconditional election which is bound up with irresistible grace and total human depravity. He would like to evade the pitfalls of Calvinistic determinism without rejecting the foundational assumptions of Calvinistic determinism. Thus Bloesch is left in a quandry of self-contradictions. His thought is helpful to us, however, in that he, as one prominent Evangelical in the majority school of thought with regard to divine determinism, recognizes the implicit denial of human freedom in this view.
of divine sovereignty, and, if he could, would find a way not to make such a denial.

When we bring together the thought of Bloesch, Henry and the other Evangelical writers cited in the previous pages, we are left with a majority Evangelical interpretation of divine sovereignty that is quite deterministic. This is evident in the conviction that every minute detail of created life is found in the preordained purpose or decree of God. Determinism is even clearer in the doctrine of unconditional election: that without reference to anything else, God has simply chosen those who will be saved and those who will not be. Living in the shadows of this divine determination are humans, utterly depraved and thus utterly unable to choose to accept God, or any other good. We are free to sin, but we do not have sufficient moral freedom to seek to be saved unless God initiates and implements our salvation for us. God is completely powerful and completely free. We are powerless, and bound by both the principle of sin and the decrees of God.

(B) A Fatal Logical Problem with the Majority View

The understanding of divine sovereignty found in the writings of the majority of Evangelical theologians is flawed by a serious logical problem. There are three propositions that these thinkers hold to be true: (1) God sovereignly determines human events and decisions; (2) humans are responsible and accountable for their sinful decisions and
consequently will face divine wrath unless they repent and accept the gift of salvation offered by God in Christ; and (3) God is just and loving. In this section I will briefly demonstrate that all three of these propositions are, in fact, part of the theology of this majority of Evangelicals. I will then describe the logical difficulty I find with this view. Finally, I will describe and critique the efforts made by a few of these thinkers to defend their view in the face of this logical problem.

It has already been aptly demonstrated in the previous section that a significant number of Evangelicals maintain proposition (1) above. As one representative of this school of thought, Pink writes, "We read the Scriptures in vain if we fail to discover that the actions of men, evil men as well as good, are governed by the Lord God." Again he writes, "...every action of the most lawless of His subjects is entirely beneath His control, ... the actor is, although unknown to himself, carrying out the secret decrees of the Most High." Those that remain in their sinful state do so not because they have freely chosen to do so, but because "God ... hardens the hearts of wicked men and blinds their minds".

It would seem that this should suggest a lack of human responsibility for sin. But these Evangelicals continue to argue human responsibility and accountability. Carl Henry maintains that unconditional election does not "erode moral responsibility and significant human choice."
Strong also defends human responsibility for moral decisions and acts.

All sin ... is voluntary as springing either directly from will or indirectly from those perverse affections and desires which have themselves orginated in will. ... [W]hatever springs from will we are responsible for.89

Bloesch argues that if anyone is damned, they have damned themselves "by not acknowledging God's grace and glory."90 Despite a very deterministic view of God, Girod also maintains human responsibility.

[The reprobate] is lost, precisely because he does not want to be saved. ... And in the day of judgement this will be their condemnation, that they preferred darkness to the light, that they would not come into the light because their deeds were evil. ... Therefore, no soul shall ever say to God: "I would have come, but ye would not have me."91

These Evangelicals argue that sinful persons, being morally responsible for sin, will have to confront the judgement of a God moved to wrath by their sin. Julius R. Mantey warns that "[m]en need to know that their sins will bring the inescapable judgement of God upon themselves."92 Divine retribution is viewed by Packer as the inevitable response of God to sin:

...[R]etribution appears as a natural and pre-determined expression of divine character. ... Retribution is the inescapable moral law of reaction; God will see that each man sooner or later receives what he deserves - if not here, then hereafter.93

The sinner faces the wrath of God, defined by Bloesch as "the searing reaction of God to continued violations of his law. It is his righteous indignation against wrong-doing."94
Lest we worry that God's condemnation of sinners is unfair, Packer reminds us (with the support of others) that God is confined by His own character to being just. We can conclude, therefore, "God is the judge, so justice will be done."

It seems to me that these three propositions (God determines events and decisions; humans are responsible; God is just) are simply not compatible. Any two can be taken together without contradiction. It could be argued, for example, that a just God would hold humans responsible for their sinful acts. But this argument can only be logically made if those acts are not pre-determined by God. By the same token we could argue that God determines all human events and decisions and also retains His justice. But in this event we would be bound to accept that God does not hold humans responsible for their sin, nor punish the sin that He has determined. We might even argue that God determines human events and decisions while holding humans responsible for those events and decisions. But we would then have to reject any notion of divine justice. Any two of these propositions can be logically held together, but clearly all three are logically incompatible.

The writers that maintain this view recognize the problem, and a number have tried to address it. Pink simply contents himself with the unamplified statement, "Two things are beyond dispute: God is sovereign, man is responsible."

We have already seen that Donald Bloesch attempts to
find a way to argue both human responsibility and divine
determinism, but in the final analysis falls short of this
goal.

Rule rejects as an artificial dualism the assumption
"that if God rules in any action, then it is God's act and
not a free man's, and if a man acts freely, then it is man's
act and not God's." He understands every event and
decision as belonging to both a completely sovereign God and
an entirely free, responsible human:

The relations between man and God, in these free
human actions, is simply not a voluntary cooperation
of two independent actors. It is much more intimate
than that. ... [W]e are to work out our own
salvation, for it is God that worketh in us both the
willing and the doing.

This argument is quite similar to that offered by Bloesch,
and falls on the same weaknesses. Rule does not explain how
God, who he has described as carrying out His plan with all
power and all foreknowledge, can simultaneously relinquish
sufficient power and freedom to humans that such an intimate
cooperation is possible. If God has all the power (the
literal meaning of omnipotence), we clearly have no power of
decision. It is interesting to observe that when Rule writes
about "'free' creatures", he places the word "free" in
quotation marks. This is because our apparent freedom is
held in the "embrace" of God's providence which determines
"all His creatures and their actions." Like Bloesch, Rule
would like to have it both ways. But reason demands that he
cannot.
Packer and Geldenhuys offer a different defense against the illogic of their position. Packer recognizes

... an apparent opposition between divine sovereignty and human responsibility, or (putting it more biblically) between what God does as King and what He does as Judge. Scripture teaches that, as King, He orders and controls all things, human actions among them, in accordance with His own eternal purpose. Scripture also teaches that, as Judge, He holds every man responsible for the choices he makes and the courses of action he pursues. Thus, hearers of the Gospel are responsible for their reaction; if they reject the good news, they are guilty of unbelief.¹⁰⁴

Packer describes this "apparent opposition" as an "antinomy:"

... [A]n antinomy is neither dispensable nor comprehensible. It is not a figure of speech, but an observed relation between two statements of fact. It is not deliberately manufactured; it is forced upon us by the facts themselves. It is unavoidable, and it is insoluble. We do not invent it, and we cannot explain it.¹⁰⁵

Packer confesses himself able to live with this logical incoherence, believing it to be a puzzle he simply cannot solve.

Geldenhuys agrees. "We cannot explain the mystery of divine calling and human responsibility."¹⁰⁶ Indeed, not only are we unable to unravel this mystery, "[i]t is futile and even misplaced to try to analyze or describe this divine act".¹⁰⁷

This way of dealing with the problem seems to me to be not only intellectually irresponsible, but also a violation of one of the principles Evangelicals have been trying to stand for. It will be remembered from the first chapter that one of the objectives of Evangelical movement is "its stress on the rationality of faith" (Bloesch).¹⁰⁸ Carl
Henry describes "the separation of revelation and reason" as "a costly misadventure." Indeed, argues Henry, one of the commitments that distinguishes Evangelicalism from Neo-Orthodoxy is that "... [Evangelicals] stand against Barth on the side of coherence, emphasizing the intelligible content and universal validity of divine revelation" (emphasis added).110

Packer and Geldenhuys are arguing instead that it is not necessary to try to understand the intelligible message of revelation; they are content to assume that faith is not necessarily rational. They are willing to separate reason and revelation. It must be admitted that this might become necessary, if and only if no reasonable solution can be provided for a given theological problem. However, to give up on finding a rational faith (and much more, to call such a quest "misplaced") is counter-productive, or else all theological inquiry is irrelevant.

There are a small band of Evangelical writers who are pointing toward a view of divine sovereignty that eliminates the illogic of the three propositions with which I began this chapter. Their approach is to deny proposition (1): that God determines all human events and decisions. They argue that God sovereignly bestows freedom upon His creatures. It is to their thought that we turn next.
(C) A Minority View

Many Christians outside of the Evangelical movement have observed the incoherence of a completely deterministic God and a free and responsible humanity inhabiting the same universe. The well-known process theist, Charles Hartshorne, for example, challenges Evangelicals and others:

Those who stand deep in the classical tradition are likely to object to the new theology that it fails to acknowledge "the sovereignty of God". To them we may reply, "Are we to worship the Heavenly Father of Jesus (or the Most Holy Merciful One of the Psalmist or Isaiah), or to worship the heavenly king, that is, a cosmic despot? These are incompatible ideals; candid thinkers should choose and not pretend to be faithful to both.\textsuperscript{111}

This observation has not been limited, however, to non-Evangelicals. Reviewing Evangelical history, Millard Erickson observes (as an Evangelical)\textsuperscript{112} that

\textit{[e]xtreme forms of Calvinism tended to place so much weight on God's holiness and righteousness that love and mercy were somewhat atrophied. God, for His own glory, saves whom He wills and damns whom He wills in a rather arbitrary fashion.}\textsuperscript{113}

Recognizing this weakness, Millard does not, unfortunately, offer a fresh Evangelical interpretation of divine sovereignty for consideration.

Gerstner, in his defense of Calvinism as one boundary for Evangelicalism complains that within Evangelicalism the traditional notions of divine sovereignty and divine initiative are now being threatened. But he does not identify by whom or for what reason, at least on the contemporary Evangelical scene.\textsuperscript{114}

Responding to Gerstner's article, Vinson Synan
replies that there has always been an "Armenian tradition" within Evangelicalism paralleling the Reformed or Calvinistic tradition that presently forms the majority. This Armenian movement has often identified itself by the concept of free-will (as in the denomination, "Free-Will Baptists"). Armenian Evangelicals have refuted divine determinism, particularly focusing their attack on the doctrine of unconditional election. Vinson describes the Armenian view of salvation; that is that Christ died for all and that all who accept him as Saviour can be saved. Man can exercise his free will and refuse the offer of salvation. ... The key to this view is God's sovereignty through which salvation is offered to all, and man's free moral agency whereby the individual can accept or reject God's proffered grace.

This Armenian tradition remains the minority position of Evangelical theologians today for two reasons, both of which relate to the history of its two primary groups of adherents. Whereas the majority of theologians in Evangelicalism today trace their theological roots from Luther to Calvin to the puritans, the Armenian wing of the movement traces its roots from Luther to Wesley. As a consequence, the early Methodists in North America posed a significant challenge to Calvinistic Evangelicalism. When the Methodists began to grow rapidly after the American revolution, they often came into sharp conflict with the "old school" Calvinism that dominated much of American Protestantism through the middle of the nineteenth century. To the Calvinist claim of "unconditional election" (some are predestined to be saved while others are predestined to be lost), the Methodists answered with the theory of "conditional election" (predestination is based on God's foreknowledge of what a person will do, not
Methodism today does not form a significant part of Evangelicalism. This is not because their numbers have declined, but because in the early part of this century North American Methodism moved away from the kind of theological foundations that have shaped Evangelicalism in favour of more liberal theology. (There are, to be sure, exceptions to this trend, notably in the southern United States).

Another Armenian stream of Evangelicalism, according to Synan, are the Pentecostal, Holiness and Charismatic Evangelicals. They can also be traced through Luther to Wesley. However, this wing also does not affect a large number of modern Evangelical theologians because they have traditionally been "very small players" in Evangelicalism. It is also unfortunately the case that Pentecostalism and its cousins have not had a large theological affect upon other Evangelicals simply because the Pentecostal movement has not produced very many of its own serious, academic theologians. Although there have always been a small minority of Armenians defending human freedom in Evangelicalism, they have not made much of an impact upon the Evangelical theological establishment. Currently, however, there are a number of writers from mainstream Evangelicalism who are questioning divine determinism, and its impact on our understanding of human freedom. Their concerns seem to be pastoral rather than theological. But out of this pastoral concern they are pointing Evangelicalism in some exciting new
theological directions.

John Claypool, for example, approaches the question of divine sovereignty as it applies to the experience of suffering. He observes that Evangelicals are inclined to face suffering with passive resignation to the inevitable, believing themselves to be, despite their suffering, located in the will of God. Claypool finds this unacceptable, believing that it reduces all of life to a mechanical power transaction. To be sure, a leaf submits to the wind without saying a word, and a rock allows the flood water to do whatever it pleases without murmur, but are these appropriate analogies for the relation of God and man? According to the Bible they are not, for in this document the mystery of Godness is depicted as involving more than brute power.

Claypool argues that the determinism of traditional Calvinism "undermines the most precious dimension of our existence, the personal dimension." Traditional determinism reduces human persons to objects acted upon by a force equally impersonal (because if we are merely objects of divine power, we are not capable of relationship with God, and if God cannot engage in relationships, He cannot be said to be personal).

The Evangelical understanding of sovereignty and determinism is approached by Richard Foster from the standpoint of another pastoral issue: the issue of prayer. Foster suggests that Evangelicals would find it easier to practise and understand prayer if their vision of God were somewhat different:
It is easy for us to be defeated at the outset because we have been taught that everything in the universe is already set, so things cannot be changed. We may gloomily feel this way, but the Bible does not teach that. The Bible pray-ers prayed as if their prayers could and would make an objective difference.124

Foster completely rejects the closed universe of Calvin, arguing instead for a universe radically open to new directions:

... [T]he Bible stresses so forcefully the openness of our universe that, in an anthropomorphism hard for modern ears, it speaks of God changing His mind in accord with His unchanging love.125

To thus change our view of God, argues Foster, is to also effectively change our view of ourselves. As humans, we are much more aware of our freedom in such an open universe.

The Apostle Paul gladly announced that we are "co-labourers with God" (1 Cor. 3:9); that is, we are working with God to determine the outcome of events. It is stoicism that demands a closed universe, not the Bible. Many with their emphasis upon acquiescence and resignation to the way things are as "the will of God" are already closer to Epiteteus than to Christ.126

It is clear that this awareness which underlines human freedom also comes "as a genuine liberation to many of us but it also places a tremendous responsibility before us. We are working with God to determine the future!"127

Another Evangelical writer who has dealt with the tension between omnipotence and human freedom is Anthony Campolo. Like Claypool, Campolo's starting point is theodicy. Campolo suggests that the usual responses Evangelicals make to suffering are inadequate:
It is not enough to say that it is not God's will that these evils be corrected; or that there are great lessons He is trying to teach us through such trials; or that such terrible events are part of some wonderful plan we will someday understand. 128

Campolo further suggests that these traditional responses to suffering, with their underlying assumption that God has determined the suffering, undermine what is perhaps the most important element of our understanding of God: His love.

We evangelicals have hailed the Lord as one who controls events and dictates the way things should be. And yet, it may be that our overemphasis on His omnipotence has dealt Him an injustice. It may be that by upholding His power we have called His love into question. 129

Campolo appeals to "a deeper understanding of the incarnation of Jesus" 130 for support of his denial that God possesses the only real power in the universe:

In Jesus, God expressed Himself in a way that is shocking. He expressed Himself as a God of love and in the process set aside power...

God did not incarnate Himself as a superboy who dazzled His peers with magic tricks. The Church fathers knew that Jesus grew up as one of us, taking on our frailties and weaknesses. They knew that in Jesus, God had abandoned His power and majesty in order to present Himself as one whom we could imitate. If it had been otherwise, He would not have been able to ask us to be like Him. 131

Jesus' modus operandi in the redemption and salvation of the world was "sacrificial self-giving, rather than through awesome demonstrations of power." 132

After demonstrating that the God revealed by Jesus Christ is a God who empties Himself of power, Campolo then asks the question, "What can such a God offer us?" 133 This
question has some extremely practical implications in terms of how we live out faith in such a God: "...if praying to God won't automatically cure my mother's cancer, result in my child's salvation, or keep my friend from being killed in Vietnam, what does He offer me?" The answer Campolo offers to this question is love: "...the empathy of love, the concern of love, the fellowship of love, the sharing of love." Thus, God's response to human suffering is to suffer with us: "He weeps with those who weep and suffers with those who suffer."

Campolo makes it clear that, in his view, this "limitation" on God's power is self-imposed: "God has limited Himself -- His limitation is self-imposed." Campolo clarifies that God can and occasionally does use His power (i.e., ignore His self-limitation): "I am not saying that God has no power to perform miracles ... God is God and He can do what He wants when He wants." Indeed, Campolo looks to an eschaton in which God no longer limits His ability to end suffering: "I do not want to suggest that God could not stop it all [suffering] from happening. What is more, I want to affirm that one day He will stop it all."

The question might then be raised, if God has limited His power only temporarily, why has He done so? Campolo's answer is consistent with the strong Evangelical emphasis on evangelism. "If God had come to us in power...we would be reduced to nothing before Him...But the good news is that He comes to us in love and invites us to be His friends (John
Due to an error in pagination page 72 does not appear.
Campolo reiterates:

God has chosen to set aside His power in His efforts to win us to Himself. He does not seek to overwhelm us with wonders and miracles, but rather seeks to draw us to Himself as a sacrificial lover...

We are drawn to a God who presents Himself not as one who can put the stars in space and set the earth spinning on its axis, but as a broken man nailed spread-eagled to a Roman cross outside a city wall.

In summary, Campolo views God as voluntarily limiting His power for a specific purpose. His purpose to to make it easier for an individual to come to personal faith in and thus engage in a personal relationship with Him.

This minority of Evangelicals who are trying to understand God as they encounter pastoral human issues argue that Evangelicalism needs to move beyond Calvinistic determinism. They might find some unexpected support in Augustus Strong who admits that "Omnipotence in God does not exclude, but implies the power of self-imitation." Indeed, suggests Strong, "We are likest the omnipotent One when we limit ourselves for love's sake."

(D) A Qualification on Each of These Views

We have seen two Evangelical understandings of divine sovereignty. On the one hand there are a majority of Evangelical theologians that define sovereignty in fairly deterministic terms. On the other hand, there is a minority which, emphasizing human freedom, understand self-limitation on divine power as the option and act of divine sovereignty.

It must be recognised that neither group completely
denies the position of the other. We have already seen quite clearly that the majority which argue in favour of unconditional election nevertheless refuse to deny human responsibility and therefore retain in their thought (at least a measure of) human freedom. The majority would agree with Strong that "[h]uman freedom is not rendered impossible by divine omnipotence, but exists by virtue of it."\textsuperscript{144} It might be the case, as I have argued, that this is a logically untenable position. But it is also the case that it is the position held by a majority of Evangelical theologians.

By the same token, it should not be thought that those Evangelicals who argue in favour of a God who willingly confers freedom upon His creatures do not deny divine sovereignty. Packer (writing from the majority viewpoint) observes that

\begin{quote}
\[1\text{t is not true that some Christian believe in divine sovereignty while others hold an opposite view. What is true is that all Christian believe in divine sovereignty, but some are not aware that they do.}\textsuperscript{145}
\end{quote}

The minority are aware that they believe in divine sovereignty. They simply define it differently. It will be recalled that Synan identified two thoughts at the center of Armenian soteriology: "God's sovereignty through which salvation is offered to all, and man's free moral agency whereby the individual can accept or reject God's proffered grace."\textsuperscript{146} To those in the minority, divine sovereignty and human freedom are not incompatible. In fact, they argue that God, in a sovereign decision, determined to share power,
particularly the power of decision, with His creatures.

As we turn to the message and methods of the Evangelical evangelists, we will discover that this second approach is far more consistent with this vital facet of Evangelical life and identity.


3. I recognise that the use of "logic" will, perhaps, be problematic for both some philosophers and theologians. The philosopher will wonder, quite rightly, with what kind of precision I use a term from the language of philosophical discipline. I am not a philosopher, and I use the term "logic" as a layperson to the discipline of philosophy. I would accept the definition of logic provided by Irving M. Copi in Introduction to Logic. Copi defines logic as "the study of the methods and principles used to distinguish good (correct) from bad (incorrect) reasoning. ... [The logician's] question is always: does the conclusion reached follow from the premises used and assumed? If the premises provide adequate grounds for accepting the conclusion ... then the reasoning is correct. Otherwise, it is incorrect."

The theologian might wonder whether "logic" has any relevance to a discussion of God and/or His acts at all. The theologian might ask, "Is our understanding of God to be bound by the rules of logic, or does God, rather, transcend human logic?" Given that Evangelical theology wishes to stress "the rationality of faith" (Bloesch) and deems "the separation of revelation and reason" to be "a costly misadventure" (Henry), I would suggest that Evangelical thought is required to consider the demands of reason upon its thought.

See also pp. 64,65.


The Armenian tradition is so named as it refers to the thought of the Dutch theologian, Joseph Armenius, who led the theological movement of conflict with Calvinism, culminating in the Synod of Dort in 1618 and 1619.
5. In his book, Notes on the Doctrine of God, Henry includes a chapter entitled "Sovereign Father". In this chapter he simply assumes sovereignty to be understood by the reader, and so he neither defines nor outlines his own understanding of divine sovereignty here. Rather, this chapter focuses on the theme of God's parenthood. See Carl F. H. Henry, Notes on the Doctrine of God (Boston: W.A. Wild, Co., 1948)


18. Arthur Pink and his books pre-date the modern Evangelical movement. This is also true of Augustus Strong. However, both are not only relevant, but important to a
discussion of modern Evangelical theology because they have had a very strong influence on the movement.


22. Augustus Hopkins Strong, Systematic Theology, 287.


24. These questions will be dealt with in a fuller manner later.


I must say that I find Robinson's notion of justice as contained in this quote somewhat ironic. How God can choose particular humans to condemn to damnation without any reference to their character or use of freedom, and call this condemnation justice is simply beyond me.


31. J.I. Packer, Knowing God, 89.


33. J.I. Packer, Knowing God, 92, 93.

34. J.I. Packer, Knowing God, 90.
   One must therefore accept the sound of cats making love at 1:00 A.M.
42. Augustus Hopkins Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 779.


64. See Augustus Hopkins Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 637-639.


70. See Vinson Synan, "Theological Boundaries: The Armenian Tradition".


87. Arthur W. Pink, *The Sovereignty of God*, 88. This has already been aptly demonstrated; see also Arthur W. Pink, *The Sovereignty of God*, 21, 22.


90. Donald G. Bloesch, Essentials of Evangelical Theology, Volume One: God, Authority and Salvation, 40.

   It would seem to me that if God has foreordained such a state, it is unjust. Surely the soul could say to God, "I never had any real choice in the matter; you predestined my eternal destiny!"


93. J.I. Packer, Knowing God, 158.
   See also 153-163 for a description of the judgement of God upon sin; see also 164-175 for a discussion of the wrath of God against sin.

94. Donald G. Bloesch, Essentials of Evangelical Theology, Volume One: God, Authority and Salvation, 134.
   See also 652-660 for a discussion of physical and spiritual death as a penalty imposed against sin.

95. Carl Henry strongly affirms the doctrine that God is essentially just; He cannot be, therefore, unjust in any circumstance. See Carl F.H. Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, Vol. VI: God Who Stands and Stays, Part II, 86; 402-435.
   See also Augustus Hopkins Strong, Systematic Theology, 785, for Strong's discussion of divine justice vis-a-vis election.

96. See J.I. Packer, Knowing God, 157-159.

97. See J.I. Packer, Knowing God, 159.


100. Andrew K. Rule, "Providence and Preservation", 79.


112. All of the authors cited in the remainder of this chapter will be writing from an Evangelical perspective.


Though the Pentecostal and charismatic movements have previously been only "small players" in the Evangelical movement, my personal suspicion is that they are the fastest growing wing of the movement today by quite a significant amount. It will be interesting to see how a development of
serious Pentecostal theology will affect not only Pentecostal thought, but the thought of the rest of Evangelicalism as well. However, there really are not many serious Pentecostal theologians to have emerged thus far.

121. We will see that the problem of theodicy will also be the starting point for Anthony Campolo. It is not surprising that suffering is the issue leading these Evangelicals to question the majority view, for no other issue brings the power of God so much into question.


123. John Claypool, Tracks of a Fellow Struggler, 68.


125. Richard J. Foster, Celebration of Discipline, 32.

126. Richard J. Foster, Celebration of Discipline, 32.

127. Richard J. Foster, Celebration of Discipline, 32.


131. Anthony Campolo, The Power Delusion, 86, 87. It is important to notice that Campolo retains the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation: that in Jesus God became human. "While our liberal opponents doubt the deity of Christ, we have a tendency to doubt His humanity." (88) This means that because we see in Jesus One who voluntarily relinquished power, we can assume that God does the same: "He who has seen me has seen the Father" (John 14:9).


142. Augustus Hopkins Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 288. Strong also appeals to the Incarnation to substantiate this view. "It is an act of omnipotence when God humbles himself to the taking of human flesh in Jesus Christ." (288)
Chapter Three: EVANGELISTIC LITERATURE

STEWARDSHIP OF FREEDOM

It will be recalled from Chapter One that the heart of Evangelical self-identity is not a shared theology so much as it is a shared mission to "spread the Gospel to all the world". Certainly there is a theology, particularly a soteriology (with a corresponding anthropology) assumed and declared as this mission is fulfilled. Because of the nature of the Evangelical movement itself, it might well be argued that the message of the evangelist ought to be more formative to the Evangelical vision of God than is the message of the academic theologians. This is undoubtedly the case with respect to popular Evangelicalism.

A survey of the literature of Evangelical evangelism is consequently an important area of study with regard to the subject of God's sovereignty vis-a-vis human freedom in Evangelical thought. Whereas there is a conflict in academic Evangelical theology regarding the relationship between divine sovereignty and human freedom, that tension is notably absent in the literature of the Evangelical evangelists. The assumption of Evangelical evangelism is clear: humans are free to sin and free to accept the gift of salvation offered in Christ.

In this chapter I will briefly review and demonstrate the assumption of human freedom in the literature of the evangelist. This literature falls into two distinct
categories. The first category is the literature written with the intent of leading the reader to an experience of conversion. We might consider this category of evangelistic literature as containing the message of Evangelical evangelism. The second category is that literature in which the evangelist aims to instruct other Evangelicals in the art of persuasive evangelism. This category of evangelistic literature contains the methods of Evangelical evangelism. We shall see that assumed in both is a free humanity and a persuasive God rather than a determinative God.

It should be remembered that this chapter does not explore the thought of systematic theologians. The intent of these writers is not so much that their readers understand God as it is that they experience God. However, this literature represents a very powerful influence on the thought of the Evangelical movement as their mission is at the heart of Evangelicalism. It probably is also a better indication of popular Evangelical theology than are the writers cited in Chapter Two, and thus, perhaps, has a far greater impact on the thought and expectations of the large number of people identified with Evangelical Churches.

A: Implications in the Evangelists' Message

Regarding Human Freedom and Divine Persuasiveness

1. A Definition of Evangelical Evangelism

In 1974 Evangelical Christians from all parts of the world met in Lausanne, Switzerland, for an "International
Conference on World Evangelism. The delegates to this conference emerged with an Evangelical definition of evangelism that has very broad acceptance among Evangelicals:

To evangelize is to spread the good news that Jesus Christ died for our sins and was raised from the dead according to the Scriptures, and that as the reigning Lord he now offers the forgiveness of sins and the liberating gift of the Spirit to all who repent and believe. Our Christian presence in the world is indispensable to evangelism, and so is that kind of dialogue whose purpose is to listen sensitively in order to understand. But evangelism itself is the proclamation of the historical, biblical Christ as Saviour and Lord, with a view to persuading people to come to him personally and so be reconciled to God. In issuing the gospel invitation we have no liberty to conceal the cost of discipleship. Jesus still calls all who would follow him to deny themselves, take up their cross, and identify themselves with his new community. The results of evangelism include obedience to Christ, incorporation into his church and responsible service in the world. (emphasis added).

Already, in this Evangelical definition of the evangelist's mission are two important concepts. The role of the evangelist is to persuade and invite. The evangelist does not assume that those unconditionally elected to salvation will be saved, else such emphasis on human persuasion is senseless. Further, the personal and voluntary nature of the decision to be reconciled to God is clear. This definition contains a number of assumptions we will see made by the evangelists all of which point to a humanity with real freedom and a God that persuades rather than determines human events and decisions.

The soteriology of the evangelists is consistent with these assumptions. The evangelist begins with human need.
Billy Graham (undoubtedly the foremost modern Evangelical evangelist) describes this need. "... [T]he Creator made us for Himself; and we shall never find completeness and fulness apart from fellowship with Him."² That divine/human fellowship has been destroyed by sin, which ultimately, if not dealt with, results in the eternal damnation of the sinner.³ God, however, in His mercy provided Jesus Christ as a substitutionary atonement for that sin. This atonement is efficacious by an act of willing faith that personally appropriates the sacrifice.⁴ This act of faith not only enables the sinner to receive divine forgiveness, it also results in a "conversion": a changed life dedicated to righteousness flowing from a sincere love of God and a consequent-desire to obey God.⁵

We will now look at some of the elements of this soteriology in more detail, revealing the assumptions made by the evangelist regarding human freedom and divine persuasiveness.

2. The Personal Nature of the Evangelists' Message

One of the foundational features of the evangelists' message in Evangelicalism is the radically personal nature of the faith experience. This has already been seen in Chapter One as a number of thinkers have included in their conceptual unity a belief in the need for an individual, experiential and personal faith relationship between God and humans.

This personal nature of the gospel is again evident
as David Watson, a prominent British evangelist, describes his message:

It is a gospel that must be personally appropriated ... Until there has been a wholehearted personal response to the Gospel, so that we not only believe it, but also hold it fast, the gospel itself is in vain. 6

This personal nature of the gospel places the efficacy of the gospel on the response of the human recipient rather than on the initiating divine act of election as argued by the theologians in Chapter Two.

Addressing directly those who have not yet personally appropriated the gospel, Billy Graham informs them that there are four things they must do if they wish to be saved:

First, you must recognise what Christ did.

... Second, you must repent of your sins. ...

Third, you must receive Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord. ...

Forth, you must confess Christ publicly. ...

Notice the heavy emphasis on what humans must do to be saved. Unless the human responds, the gospel is in vain. The onus is placed on human choice, not divine decree.

James Kennedy, who has developed the most popular program for local Church evangelism in modern Evangelicalism, echoes the thought of Graham. Discussing "the message of evangelism", he also underlines its personal nature. "...

[I]t calls for a response ... [people] must say either Yes or No!" 8 The response that answers "Yes" contains three necessary elements. The first is repentance, "a change of mind, leading to a change of heart, resulting in a change of
direction." The second is belief. "... [T]he call to believe is a call to discipleship. It involves a clear commitment of the will to the person of Jesus Christ. The final response is to "receive" salvation. This means to consciously open our lives to the person of the Holy Spirit.

Graham describes the experience of conversion as consisting of three steps, "two of them active and one passive". They are (1) repentance; and (2) faith (which are active) and (3) "the new birth or regeneration" (which is passive). It is fascinating to note that what God does is the third rather than the first step in this process. In Graham's message, it is clear that God saves not by initiating human faith but by responding to human faith. Again, we see the onus on human freedom as opposed to divine fiat.


As we look even more specifically at how the Evangelical evangelists understand repentance and faith, the role of human choice becomes yet more clear. Repentance assumes that sin is a freely chosen event for which humans are directly responsible. Graham writes, "Repentance involves first of all an acknowledgement of our sin. When we repent we are saying that we recognize that we are sinners and that our sin involves us in personal guilt before God." We are personally guilty because we are personally responsible for our sinful choices. Graham writes, "We are
all sinners by choice.\textsuperscript{14} Again he writes, "Sin is not merely a negative thing, it is not just the absence of love for God. Sin is the working of a positive choice, the preference of self instead of God" (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{15} God can act against human sin by bringing "conviction of sin" to humans, but people can freely choose to resist this divine attempt at persuasion.\textsuperscript{16}

Bill Bright, founder and president of Campus Crusade for Christ, has written a widely distributed evangelistic booklet entitled "Have You Heard of the Four Spiritual Laws?" This presentation of the gospel makes a serious implication about the power of sin. Law number One is that "God loves you and has a wonderful plan for your life." But Bright then asks, "Why is it that that most people are no experiencing the abundant life? Because... [turning to law number Two] Man is sinful and separated from God. Therefore he cannot know and experience God's love and plan for his life."\textsuperscript{17} The implication implicit here is that humans have the power to thwart God's plan. God is not the determinative being who brings His plan to pass regardless of human decision or desire. God is dependent upon human response for His plan to come to fruition. A further implication is that God must therefore persuade humans to pursue the divine plan if He is to take any action in the matter at all. This evangelistic message is a radical break from the theological position held by a majority of Evangelical academics.

Graham also identifies repentance as an act of human
will rather than divine decree.

It is only when we come to the will that we find the very heart of repentance. There must be that determination to forsake sin - to change one's attitudes toward self, toward sin, and God; to change our feeling; to change one's will, disposition and purpose.\(^\text{18}\)

In this view of sin and repentance is a clear anthropology which includes freedom as an essential part of what it means to be human. Graham writes, "...[U]pon ... man God bestowed the most precious of all gifts - the gift of freedom. God gave to man freedom of choice."\(^\text{19}\) This freedom (and the corollary limitation on divine power) comes as the result of a sovereign decision on the part of God. He made us free out of choice rather than necessity:

God could have created us as human robots who would respond mechanically to His direction. Obviously, this would be a response over which man had no control. But instead, God created us in His image, and He desires that the creature worship the Creator as a response of love. This can be accomplished when "free will" is exercised. Love and obedience which are compelled do not satisfy. God wanted sons, not machines.\(^\text{20}\)

A clearer refutation of the Calvinistic doctrine of so many Evangelical theologians is difficult to imagine!

Furthermore, Graham guards against the assumption that God is working a pre-determined plan through human choices that seem to be free, but in reality have only one outcome. "Freedom is meaningless if there is only one path to follow. Freedom implies the right to choose, to select, to determine one's individual course of action."\(^\text{21}\)

According to Graham, human freedom is total:
Adam had total freedom - freedom to choose or to reject, freedom to obey God's commands or to go contrary to them, freedom to make himself happy or miserable. For it is not the mere possession of freedom that makes life satisfying - it is what we choose to do with our freedom that determines whether or not we shall find peace with ourselves and with God.22

The "terrible freedom" given to Adam and Eve, "whether to love God or rebel and build their world without Him" is also "what He gives us."23 If we so choose, we can live without reference to God or His commands. God will not manipulate, coerce, or force us to abandon our sin.

What then can God do? Graham answers, "[God] waits to offer individual salvation and peace to the ones who will come to His mercy. The same two paths that God set before Adam still lie before us. We are still free to choose."24 What the evangelists remind us is that we must choose some destiny. Because we are free, we must be responsible stewards of our God-given freedom. We will be held eternally accountable for what we do with our freedom. "... [W]hen we reach the age of accountability ... God looks on us as full-grown adults, making moral and spiritual choices for which we will be held accountable at the judgement."25

The academic Evangelical theologians have difficulty explaining why, when God exercises the power of determination over sinful human beings, He also justly holds them accountable for their sin. The evangelists have no such difficulty. They proclaim that humanity is free. Sin is the result of freedom gone astray, not the result of a mysterious
divine decree. God holds humans accountable for sin precisely because they are responsible for their abuse of freedom. By the same token, we shall now see that not only sin, but salvation as well, is a function of humans acting in freedom.

4. Salvation and Freedom in the Evangelists' Message

When we turn from the subject of sin to the subject of salvation, we see that the assumption of human freedom is just as clear in the evangelists' message on this second subject as it is on the first. The evangelist declares that God's response to human sin was to send Jesus Christ to die as a substitutionary sacrifice which atones for human guilt. This sacrifice, however, is only efficacious when it is accepted and applied by a personal and free decision of faith. Graham writes to the individual seeking salvation that

[b]elieving is your response to God's offer of mercy, love and forgiveness. God took the initiative and did everything that was needed to make the offer of salvation possible. ... But only by committing yourself to Him, surrendering to Him - are you saved.26

Salvation is, to the evangelist, just as personal and individual as is sin. Bill Bright's Fourth "spiritual law" says,

We must individually receive Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord; then we can know and experience God's love and plan for our lives. ... We receive Jesus Christ by faith as an act of the will. (emphasis added).27

Graham agrees that saving faith is a function of human will
freely choosing to believe. "Placing your faith in Christ means that you must make a choice. ... [Y]ou must choose to believe." 28

Graham uses the experience of Moses as an example of how such faith must be viewed as a "decision" or a "choice", and how that decision is made.

Moses considered the claims and obligations of religion carefully. ... He knew how much was at stake and he arrived at his decision with the full use of his well-trained and superior mental faculties. 29

The role of human ability to decide, and the absence of any idea of a God acting behind the scenes determining the human decision and event of faith are clearly seen here. Faith is a human function, not a divine preordination. Being human, the decision of faith requires the active involvement of several human faculties. It requires knowledge regarding the object of faith. 30 It requires emotion (though Graham is clear that he does not mean "emotionalism", in which the emotions dominant the event, but rather a healthy involvement of emotion as one facet of the human person always involved in any decision). 31 Finally, "and most important of all", the decision of faith involves the will: "it is the will that makes the final and lasting decision." 32

The evangelists' message clearly rejects the notion that faith is the act of God predestining human individuals to unconditional election to salvation. Faith is a human function. If a person is condemned, it is not that they were consigned to wrath by divine decree, but because they
refused, in a free decision, to respond to God's offer of salvation.\textsuperscript{33} If a person does respond to Christ with faith, it is not as the result of a divine decision preceding that faith, but the result of a human process of choosing.

Clearly, the Evangelical evangelist believes, in marked contrast to the majority of Evangelical academic theologians, that humans are free beings and that God is not determining human acts and decisions.

Indeed, the Evangelical evangelists are clear that God will not act to determine this decision of faith. Billy Graham asserts that

\[\text{faith in Christ is voluntary. A person cannot be coerced, bribed or tricked into accepting Jesus. God will not force His way into your life. The Holy Spirit will do everything to disturb you, draw you, love you - but finally it is your personal decision.} \]

... [God] gives the Holy Spirit to draw you to the cross, but even after all of this it is your decision whether to accept God's free pardon or to continue in your lost condition. (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{34}

Leighton Ford, another North American evangelist prominent in Evangelicalism agrees. "[God's] love is relentless, but never coercing. ... Man is made with responsible freedom - allowed by God even to deny Him."\textsuperscript{35} Another Evangelical author of well-known evangelistic literature, Paul E. Little, adds his agreement:

Jesus Christ in all His power will come into our lives as we invite Him to take them over. He won't gate-crash or force His way in, but He is ready to respond to our invitation.\textsuperscript{36}

The whole tenor of the message of the Evangelical evangelists refutes the Calvinism so popular among academic
Evangelical theologians. The onus is placed upon human freedom rather than divine decree. God's grace enters the life of any individual by human invitation rather than by divine implementation. The Gospel is an invitation to be freed from the consequences of freely chosen sin, but only by a decision of freely chosen grace. God has done all that He will do in sending His Son; now it is up to humans to respond. Representatively of the Evangelical evangelists, Graham writes, "... the new birth is something that God does for man when man is willing to yield to God." 

If God has thus limited Himself by human freedom, how then does He bring people to Himself? If He cannot, in Leighton Ford's words, "coerce", He must be left only with the modus operandi of persuasion. He must lure humans toward the free choice of salvation. As we have seen human freedom explicitly and implicitly in the message of the evangelists, we will now see divine persuasion implicit in the methods employed by the evangelists in their mission.

B. Implications in the Evangelists' Methods

As we turn our attention from the literature by Evangelical evangelists written with the aim of converting the reader to give attention to the literature describing the activity of evangelism itself, we come to some broad implications about the way God works to influence human decisions. We might well ask the Calvinistic theologians if they have any reason to share their faith (an activity at the
foundation of Evangelical self-identity). After all, if God is going to predestine, initiate, and implement salvation Himself, why bother with any human effort? The evangelist has no such problem. Believing in human freedom and human responsibility, the evangelist sees this mission of proclamation as "... the only way God can make His appeal through us to the world."  

Leighton Ford sees the need for evangelism itself stemming from divine self-limitation.

In His sovereign self-limitation, God’s power is restrained by His own choice. God has committed to us the message of reconciliation... (2 Cor. 5:19). Jesus was born in a borrowed manger, he preached from a borrowed boat, he entered Jerusalem on a borrowed donkey, he ate the Last Supper in a borrowed room, he was buried in a borrowed tomb. Now he asks to borrow the lives of Christians to reach the rest of the world. If we do not speak, then he is dumb and silent.

Elsewhere, Ford discusses the evangelistic practise of "giving an invitation" (in which converts are invited to walk to the front of the building to publicly confess their new faith in Christ) at the conclusion of an evangelistic sermon. Ford maintains the legitimacy of this practise, arguing that a decision of faith is the primary goal of evangelistic preaching: "The only proper reason to give an invitation is that God calls people to decision. ... [T]he scriptural tradition is crisis preaching that calls for a decision."  

Not only does this statement imply human freedom to make such a decision, Ford’s view of evangelistic preaching itself carries the strong implication that God, as
a persuasive being, utilizes human persuasiveness to work out His divine purposes. Rather than electing individuals to salvation through divine fiat, God is seeking to persuade through human persons:

The only reason we have to ask people to commit their lives for time and eternity is that God is calling them. The Gospel message is both an announcement and a command: it tells what God has done and calls people to respond. ... God is making His appeal through us. 41

In an interview in Leadership journal, Oswald C.J. Hoffman (a well-known radio preacher) refers to God as "the Persuader" who works through his honest, but persuasive, proclamation of the Gospel. Throughout the interview, it is clear that his understanding of preaching is that God is speaking through the human voice, seeking to persuade and elicit a response of faith from the hearer. 42

Most reputable evangelistic writers within Evangelicalism deplore high pressure tactics and manipulative techniques for creating a faith decision. The reason for this is simple. A number of writers have clearly identified human coercion as being contradictory to the God behind the message who works through persuasion rather than coercion. Jerry Cook, for example, suggests that evangelism is most effective when it is tied to relationships of authentic care and concern. People are better motivated toward saving faith in Christ by love than they are by force because God Himself wins people by love and not by force. The evangelist generally needs, therefore, to exert "less pressure and more
loving". This approach, suggests Cook, more accurately reflects who God is and how He acts.43

A Christian psychologist, Jard DeVille, has written a book for Evangelical Christians who are not professional evangelists, but yet want to bear witness to their faith in their circle of friends.44 DeVille explores the psychology of religious decisions. Again, the assumption is that Evangelical Christians wishing to be evangelistic should be as persuasive as is humanly possible without becoming manipulative, because God, Himself, calls people to salvation persuasively, but not coercively.

A number of writers addressing evangelistic methodology recognize the possibility that their readers might attempt to force or trick others into a decision of faith. In unison they argue that to do so is to deny the nature of the faith decision and the God of love.45 Leighton Ford perhaps summarizes their concern best when he writes:

I try to get people into the Kingdom of God by arm-twisting and brain washing, then I am repudiating the love of God. His love is relentless, but never coercing. I am also denying what the Bible tells me about the nature of man. Man is made with responsible freedom — allowed by God even to deny Him.46

C. Summary of the Evangelistic Literature

The key-note played throughout the evangelistic literature of the Evangelical movement is human freedom and responsibility. The evangelists' eminent position in Evangelicalism is due to the assumption that God is calling and persuading people to
turn to and follow Him. The evangelist seeks to address the human need of personal guilt carried by humans that have freely chosen sin. The evangelist proclaims that humans can freely choose salvation. Indeed, the evangelist proclaims that people must choose salvation, for their destiny will be determined by the choices they make. The evangelist depends upon God to act and work through human agency, but this working is dependent upon the willing human agent. This dependence on human will and decision is labeled by the Evangelical evangelists as a sovereign divine self-limitation. God has willingly arranged things in such a way that He must perform His will in the world of freedom by means of persuasion. To coerce the decision of faith would be to deny the freedom and responsibility God has conferred upon humanity.

The Evangelical evangelist maintains that the most pressing issue for humans is the question of what we will do with our freedom. As stewards of freedom we will be called to account for how we have spent it. As stewards of freedom we will be held responsible for the sin we have so often freely chosen. As stewards of freedom we are offered the gift of salvation we can either accept or reject. As stewards of freedom we have the wonderful and terrible power of choice. In fact, as stewards of freedom, the only freedom we do not have is the freedom not to choose at all. The evangelist reminds us that we must act wisely and well with our stewardship of freedom.
NOTES


The statement defining evangelism which emerged from this conference is quoted or referred to more than any other definition of evangelism I have come across in my research. I suspect that this is the case largely because it is such an extensive yet concise definition. This might also be the case because it emerged out of a conference of many Evangelical evangelists, pastors and theologians, and so has a wide representation of thought inherent in it.

Though it is not of direct relevance to this thesis, there are elements to this definition that are perhaps even more interesting than the assumption of human freedom and divine persuasiveness I have pointed out. This definition clearly reveals an Evangelical commitment to the need for social involvement in the world (one of the issues that sharply divides the thought of Evangelicalism from that of Fundamentalism). Another interesting component of this definition is its affirmation of dialogue with the adherents of other faiths. An entire thesis could perhaps be written spelling out the many implications of this simple statement defining evangelism for many facets of Evangelical thought and practice.


3. See Billy Graham, Peace With God, 73.

4. See Billy Graham, Peace With God, 85-106.

5. See Billy Graham, Peace With God, 109.


The idea of "receiving" salvation is evident in the language of Evangelical evangelism in which a person is often referred to as having "received the Gospel", or more simply, having "received Christ". Synonymous with this concept, and equally evident in the dialect of Evangelical Christianity is
the reference to having "accepted Christ" into the heart or life.

12. See Billy Graham, Peace With God, 112.
13. Billy Graham, How To Be Born Again, 156.
17. Bill Bright, "Have You Heard of the Four Spiritual Laws?" (n.p.,n.d.)
See also Billy Graham, Peace With God, 121.
20. Billy Graham, How To Be Born Again, 68.
See also Billy Graham, "Steps To Peace With God"
(n.p.,n.d.).
This second reference is a "gospel tract", a booklet published for wide distribution as an evangelistic tool. In this booklet Graham echoes his words quoted from How To Be Born Again:

God created man in His own image and gave him abundant life. He did not make him as a robot to automatically love and obey Him, but gave him a will and freedom of choice. Man choose to disobey God and go his own willful way. Man still makes this choice today...

23. Billy Graham, How To Be Born Again, 68.
25. Billy Graham, How To Be Born Again, 156.
27. Bill Bright, "Have You Heard of the Four Spiritual Laws?".


32. See Billy Graham, *Peace With God*, 139.

33. Of course, this statement begs the question of the fate of those who have never heard the message of the evangelist, and thus have never had opportunity to respond. Obviously, those who have never heard the message of salvation have not freely chosen to reject it. How the Evangelical responds to this broader question would be an interesting subject for further research and clarification.

34. Billy Graham, *How To Be Born Again*, 162.


For many years Leighton Ford was one of the Associate Evangelists on the Billy Graham team. For the last several years, he has been active in his own individual evangelistic ministry.

36. Paul Little, "Who's Got the Answer?" (Chicago: Acorn Booklets, n.d.). This is another "Gospel tract" designed for wide distribution.

See also Paul E. Little, *How To Give Away your Faith* (Downers Grove, Ill.: Inter-Varsity Press, 1966), 60:

The Lord Jesus Christ is knocking at the door of our lives. He will not gate-crash or force His way in but will come in at our invitation.


44. See Jard De Ville, *The Psychology of Witnessing*
(Waco, Tx.: Word Books, 1980).


Chapter Four: A PROPOSED RESOLUTION TO THE DILEMMA

The previous two chapters reveal modern Evangelicalism as a movement on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the majority of the movement's academic, systematic theologians maintain a Calvinistic vision of God. This God is quite deterministic. He controls the universe; He predestines all human acts and decisions. This vision of God results in a corollary understanding of humans as bound by both the principle of sin and the decrees of God. In this view, the sovereignty of God leaves no room for real or meaningful human freedom.

On the other hand, the evangelists of the movement (who provide much of the movement's self-identity) argue instead for a free humanity. In their message, humans freely sin and thus need to accept the divine invitation to salvation. This invitation can only be accepted on the basis of a free decision of faith that involves the entire human being's faculties of choice. God works in this process, not by determining or unconditionally electing, but by using human agents of divine persuasiveness. God does not force, manipulate or coerce His way into a person's life. He simply calls, invites and lures humans into the wholeness and salvation labeled by the evangelist as a "new birth".

Who shall the Evangelical believe? Shall the Evangelical believe the majority of theologians and accept divine determinism and human bondage? Or shall the
Evangelical believe the evangelist who proclaims divine persuasiveness and human freedom? This is the dilemma.

It seems to me that Evangelicals are limited to only three choices as they respond to this dilemma. The first choice is simply to ignore it. This requires living with a divided mind. I fear that because in many respects this would be the easiest avenue to take (it requires no change), it might well be the avenue many Evangelicals select. It is the case that a number of Evangelical thinkers have acknowledged this as their position.¹

However, to ignore the dilemma, or even worse, to incorporate such a dilemma into the theological content of the Evangelical movement, can only be dangerous and detrimental to the life and vitality of Evangelicalism in the long run. To live with such a divided mind is to by necessity engage in a schizophrenic division between the cognitive content of religious faith and the actual practise of that faith. Such ambivalence must certainly leave the individual believer in a constant state of tension and frustration. It seems to me that the probable result is that individual Evangelicals will ignore either serious theological reflection or active evangelism, being unable to bring both together in a unified life of faith.² It is obvious that ignoring the problem is not, in my view, an adequate way to resolve the dilemma facing Evangelicals.

The second option open to Evangelicals in response to this dilemma is to refute the message and methods of the
evangelist. This option would clearly and unambiguously accept the verdict of the majority of academic Evangelical theologians that God predestines the acts and decisions of humans who, in this scenario, are not free. This option has the advantage over the first choice that it maintains theological integrity. However, this integrity is maintained at the cost of any meaningful understanding or practise of evangelism. This carries a further implication that the cost of this theological integrity is most likely the very life-blood of the Evangelical movement. Indeed, if Bloesch is correct in saying "To be evangelical means to be evangelistic," then to pursue this second option is, in effect, to cease to be Evangelical.

The third option is just the reverse of the second. Evangelicalism can reject the Calvinism found in the majority of its systematic theologians. Evangelicals can maintain both the message and the practice of evangelism by understanding God as a Being who persuades rather than determines and understanding humans as free. This is the choice that I, as one Evangelical, make. A minority of mainstream Evangelical theologians have also made this choice. I consider the message of the evangelists and of this theological minority to be correct. I would also suggest, however, that this line of thought needs to be carried further.

What follows are three reasons why I would urge other Evangelicals to make the same choice. I will then suggest
some avenues of theological inquiry that remain to be traveled by Evangelicals wishing to make this choice.

A. Three Reasons Why the Position of the Evangelists Ought to Prevail in Evangelical Thought

1. The Logical Incoherence of Calvinism

The first reason I would suggest that the message of the evangelists ought to prevail over the Calvinism of the majority of academic Evangelical theologians is that the position of this Calvinistic majority is itself internally logically incoherent. I am re-stating here an argument I have already made earlier. 4

The Calvinistic theologians want to maintain three propositions: (1) God predetermines human events and decisions; (2) God holds humans responsible and accountable for their decisions (and indeed, those who sin and/or reject the gift of salvation will experience condemnation); and (3) God is loving and just. These three propositions simply are not logically compatible taken all together. If Evangelical theology is serious about stressing "the rationality of faith," 5 one of these propositions must be denied.

We could argue, for example, that God will punish humans for events and decisions that have stemmed from divine freedom rather than human freedom, but to do so we must deny God's love or justice. It would simply be cruel and unfair to punish that over which people have no real control. But to deny either the love or the justice of God is to deny what
are arguably the most crucial elements of the Christian understanding of God. If we deny proposition (3), we are left with a God few of us would wish to worship. Few, if any, Christian thinkers would be willing to deny divine love and justice, so we must therefore find some other proposition to deny.

We could argue that a just God determines human events and decisions. Being just, this God cannot hold humans responsible and accountable for their choices and acts, for these flow from divine decree rather than from human freedom. In this event, to speak of salvation or condemnation is irrelevant. There is nothing to forgive just as there is nothing to condemn. There is no need for grace. There is no need for atonement. There is certainly no need for evangelism. There is no need for developing any understanding of morality or ethics, for these are questions taken out of the sphere of human activity or choice. We are simply acting out divine decisions over which we have no control and for which we have no responsibility. To deny human responsibility and accountability makes nonsense of much Christian thought, teaching, concern and tradition. This denial leaves us not only with moral chaos, but also with a small, petty God who clings to all the power of decision-making with tenacious insecurity. This again is a God few of us would be inclined to worship. Consequently, proposition (2) is also a tenet few of us would be willing to deny.
This leaves us only with one other choice: the choice of denying the proposition that God determines all human events and decisions. Certainly a just and loving God could (and would) hold us accountable for our choices and acts given that those choices and acts flow from real and legitimate human freedom.

It might be that Calvinistic thinkers would argue that this makes God "too small". I would reply that the only other options leave us with a God who is petty, tyrannical or insecure. I would then be arguing, in essence, that the God of Calvinism is too small. Indeed, it seems to me that a God daring enough to bring into being a creation full of freedom is anything but small! Such a God need not command my worship. His very Being elicits my worship and challenges me in the ethical realm to use my freedom well and with all the human maturity I can muster.

It might be that Calvinistic thinkers would argue that this position denies the Christian belief in divine sovereignty. I would argue that freedom is not in any way a denial of God's sovereignty, it is rather a product of God's sovereignty. God, Himself, is free to choose. But every choice logically limits future choices. The choice to create, for example, makes the choice to never have created impossible. To express this a little differently, in choosing to create God exercised a divine self-limitation on the potential choice to never have created. This does not limit divine sovereignty, it simply reveals God sovereignly
deciding and acting. The only way God could act without imposing some form of self-limitation on his future choices is for God not to act at all. This would not leave us with an active, sovereign God, but with a passive, fearful divinity. I would argue that God is sovereign, and in His sovereignty choose to create real beings—beings with the power of choice; beings with, in Billy Graham's words, "terrible freedom."  

Even if Evangelicals did not have the message of the evangelists refuting the Calvinistic theological majority, in the logical fallacy of this majority position there is adequate reason for the Evangelical to be dissatisfied with what the majority of Evangelical academic theologians are saying about divine determinism. Reason requires the Evangelical to refute a position that contains three logically incompatible propositions. Further thought makes it obvious that the proposition that must be denied if the entire Christian understanding of God is not to falter is the statement that God determines all human acts and decisions.

2. Evangelism and Evangelical Identity

The second reason why the message of the evangelists ought to prevail over the Calvinism of the majority of academic theologians in Evangelical thought is that evangelism and the message of the evangelist play such an important role in Evangelical self-identity.

We have surveyed the concepts considered by
Evangelicals to unify the Evangelical movement in Chapter One, and it is notable that not one writer identified Calvinism in general or divine determinism in particular as being one of those convictions that bind Evangelicalism together. Writer after writer, however, identified the soteriology proclaimed by the evangelists and the mission of the evangelist as being essential to what it means to be Evangelical. I would argue, therefore, that to believe in human freedom and divine persuasiveness ought, by reason and logic, to also be integral to being Evangelical.

Surveying the message of the evangelist, we have seen that Evangelical soteriology is personal. It deals with personal sin that by its nature is freely chosen by the human sinner. It deals with personal faith that is a free decision of the human believer. In the personal, experiential gospel that Evangelicals perceive as part of their essential self-identity there is a strong assumption of human freedom.

Further, in the urgency of the evangelistic mission there is the strong implication that God's modus operandi in the world is persuasion rather than determination or coercion. If it is the case that God has fore-ordained and unconditionally elected those who are to be saved, Evangelicals are wasting millions of dollars and much time and energy seeking to "win the lost to Christ". If Evangelicals really believe in divine determinism the way that most Evangelical theologians define it, evangelism would not play such a large role in what it means to be
Evangelical. But Evangelicals do believe in and practise evangelism - it is a hallmark of what it means to be Evangelical.

I would argue that the Evangelical soteriology is a de facto statement of human freedom. I would further argue that the Evangelical commitment to and emphasis upon the practise of evangelism is a de facto statement of divine persuasiveness as opposed to divine determinism. The problem is that in many cases these de facto statements have not been included, and have even been denied, in the doctrinal formulations of Evangelicalism. To look at the same issue from the opposite angle, I would argue that a view of divine determinism and the corollary view of a very limited human freedom are de facto denials of the message and practise of Evangelical evangelism. Given that a commitment to the message and practise of evangelism is essential to what it means to be Evangelical, I would conclude that a view of divine determinism and the corollary restricted human freedom are, in fact, a denial of Evangelicalism itself.

To be sure, the many Evangelicals who are committed Calvinists would strongly disagree with these assertions. My response is simply that they have decided to live with a divided mind on the subject, appealing to such notions as divine mystery and inscrutability to explain their inability to bring their doctrine and their practise together in a unified vision of God and what it means to believe in and follow Him. If Calvinistic Evangelicals wish to maintain
divine determinism and evangelism, then it seems to me that the onus is on them to demonstrate how the two can be reasonably defended as logically compatible—a demonstration that has not yet been made. It seems to me that if Calvinistic Evangelicals are unable to rationally defend both poles of their position, then they should refute either their Calvinism or their Evangelicalism.

Whereas Calvinism is not one of the few features of Evangelical self-identity, and whereas evangelism's message and practice are, it would seem to me that Evangelical thought should begin with the assumptions of human freedom and divine persuasiveness found in evangelism. To let go of these assumptions is ultimately to lose what it means to be Evangelical.

3. Pastoral Relevance

The third reason I would argue that the message of the evangelists ought to prevail over Calvinism in Evangelical thought is that divine persuasiveness and human freedom are concepts that are more pastorally helpful than are the concepts of divine determinism and human bondage.

Right at the outset of this argument I acknowledge that it cannot stand on its own. The reason I make this my third argument rather than my first is that I recognize that a belief might be convenient to pastoral concerns or practice, but not necessarily true. At the same time, however, it must also be the case that what we experience as
having power to work positively in people's lives must be given serious consideration. If human experience does not form part of our theological reflection, the entire discipline of theology runs the risk of becoming utterly irrelevant.

Richard Foster has demonstrated (as we have already seen) that the concept of divine determinism creates a barrier to the spiritual discipline of prayer. If the events of the universe are already set for eternity without the possibility of change, why pray? It would seem to me that as it is seen in both Scripture and Christian experience, the discipline of prayer is the discipline by which God and humans are able to communicate with one another in order to cooperate in our co-labour in the world. That we sense a need for this human/divine communication, and that God (apparently) sanctions such a discipline, would seem to suggest that we and the world can potentially move in a variety of directions depending upon how humans and God respond to each other.

To turn this argument around, I would suggest that anyone who prays believes that their human act makes a difference, or else they would disregard the discipline entirely. It is difficult, if not impossible, to teach that our human prayers have a direct impact upon God's response to the world while at the same time teaching that God's response to the world is predetermined and foreordained. In this case, God does not make a response at all to our prayer, for
neither He nor our situation is changed by it. There is no adequate reason to pray to a determinative God.

A God who works through persuasion and who leaves room for creaturely freedom is, by contrast, far more religiously accessible. Prayer to such a God makes sense. Indeed, if free humans are working with a free God in the world, prayer is necessary. We must have some avenue by which we can discern where and how God is luring us to act and decide. The message of the evangelists is, in this matter of prayer, obviously far more pastorally applicable than is the message of modern, Evangelical Calvinistic theology.

In another pastoral issue, Anthony Campolo and John Claypool have also demonstrated that a belief in divine determination creates a serious problem for Evangelicals wrestling with the challenge of suffering. In a world where there is such misery, the conviction that it is all part of an unalterable, foreordained plan of God is not much comfort. It is, at times, difficult enough to worship and pray to God from the environment of such suffering. To worship and pray to a God that has actually caused it is for many impossible. An understanding of a persuasive God and a free humanity, however, can provide us with at least a good starting point for an Evangelical theodicy that does provide comfort as well as reason to worship and pray (see "Appendix: Toward an Evangelical Theodicy").

The many activities of clergy and Church that call
upon people to deal decisively with their lives are irrelevant if their lives are already predetermined. Were I, as one pastor, convinced that the decisions elicited by my preaching were preordained and had nothing to do with either my persuasiveness or the hearers' faculties of choice, I would not work nearly so hard as I do to preach intelligently, persuasively and well. What would be the point of such work? The outcome would depend not upon my preaching, nor upon the hearers' listening, but upon a divine decision already made before I step into the pulpit and the listener settles into the pew.

Were I, as one pastor, persuaded that the outcome of the personal counseling I do with parishioners is already determined, I would not work so hard to be a wise and good counselor. I would not endure the frustration of giving advice that is at times painful for the counselee to hear and difficult to implement. If the outcome of each counseling session is already predetermined, why work at it? If an individual's life events and choices are already determined by God, why spend such time and emotional energy encouraging them to make good, constructive life decisions? This demanding ministry only makes sense if underlying the pastor's counsel is a God persuading people into spiritual and emotional health and wholeness.

Many Evangelical pastors maintain a doctrine of divine determinism and human bondage and nevertheless work very hard. They work hard at preaching, counselling,
evangelism, prayer, teaching, meeting the needs of the community, providing ecclesiastical leadership as they set congregational goals— and a host of other pastoral activites that seem to require and imply free decisions on the part of those who receive such ministry. I do not mean to discredit the hard work of these pastors. I do mean to suggest that their hard work belies their theology. My hope is that they will continue to work hard, and that they will be encouraged and motivated in their work by the knowledge that God is working through them: persuading, calling and inviting through their effort.

As one pastor, were I to believe that my life work is merely mechanical— God acting on me and thus, acting on others— my life would be characterized by hopelessness, exhaustion and despair. This is so because I would feel that my life, and my response to God's call, are without any meaning beyond that meaning given to a pawn on a chess board. The conviction that God is not acting upon me, but working through me, leads to a different view. This conviction leaves me with human dignity and worth, and a strong sense of responsibility.

A view of humans as free and God as persuasive gives meaning and relevance to much of my pastoral work. Even more importantly, this view gives me meaning, challenge and fulfillment as a human being. The benefits of a pastorally relevant view of God are to be shared not only by pastors,
but by all people who receive their ministry.

B. Three Directions Evangelical Theology Needs to Take

If Evangelicalism is going to be successful in incorporating the theology of the evangelist into its systematic theology, there are three directions those Evangelicals arguing for a persuasive God and a free humanity are going to have to take.

1. The Need for a New Systematic Theology

In the first place, this vision of God is going to have to be incorporated into a much larger systematic theology. As was seen in the first chapter, one of the weaknesses of Evangelical thought has been that, due to the particular history of the Evangelical movement, its theology has been shaped "into the the form of haphazardly related doctrines." The evangelist is concerned with freedom as it relates to evangelism. The pastor is concerned with freedom as it relates to prayer, theodicy and other specific pastoral issues. What is needed is a large, systematic approach to the issue that examines how this vision of God touches upon a number of Christian doctrines.

Considering the Evangelical's deep committment to Biblicism, for example, questions as to how divine persuasiveness and human freedom affect the way Evangelicals understand the process of revelation must be addressed. The doctrine of divine persuasiveness needs to be corelated with
an understanding of the Incarnation. Anthropological questions such as the origin and nature of sin need to be answered. It would seem to me that an underlying conviction of divine persuasiveness and human freedom open some interesting windows on all anthropological questions. How does divine persuasiveness relate to the issue of eschatology? What does human freedom imply about the flow of history toward some ultimate victory of God? How does divine persuasiveness change our understanding of the Church and how it is to be governed? Is, for example, a congregational form of Church government more consistent with who God is and how He works than are hierarchial structures of Church government? How do divine persuasiveness and human freedom affect our worship and our celebration of such powerful religious symbols as baptism and communion? How does this understanding of God instruct us with reference to such events as miracles or divine healing? What exactly does prayer to a God who is persuasive rather than determinative accomplish?

The questions that need to be raised seem endless. This is the case because our understanding of God, Himself, inevitably must influence profoundly the way we think about the many issues that surround our belief in God. Evangelicals have for too long lived with an inconsistent theology, and added to that inconsistency a lifestyle of faith that is not always compatible with theological convictions. This situation can only be redressed when there is a systematic
theology in place that coincides with Evangelical life as well as being internally coherent to itself.

This process of systematizing our thought might itself require some change in the Evangelical community. The reason that the Calvinistic theologians have won the day is that those involved in evangelism have been so busy evangelizing that in many cases they have been unwilling to invest the time and energy into serious theological reflection. While I respect the tendency to emphasize the practice of evangelism, I would suggest that the evangelist is weakened when there is no seriously defined theology for the evangelist's converts to believe and be taught.

For too long the Pentecostal and charismatic proponents of human free-will have been suspicious of the intellectual content of systematic theology. They have wanted to retain "the simple gospel". I would suggest that the issues that face all Evangelicals today must leave us with an awareness that life, humanity and God are not always simple issues. It might take some serious and concentrated thought to rediscover what "the simple gospel" actually is! As one Evangelical more in the mainstream of Evangelicalism, I would welcome some serious theological insight from the Pentecostal, charismatic and "holiness" wing of Evangelicalism that has never lost a belief in divine persuasiveness and human freedom, but has also, unfortunately, never given us a serious, thoughtful and systematic exposition of their doctrine.
In any event, as long as those Evangelicals whose commitments lead them to accept divine persuasion and human freedom resist engaging in the study and writing of serious systematic theology, those Evangelicals wishing to have and study a systematic theology will turn to Calvinist thinkers. There simply are no other alternatives. It is my opinion that the Evangelical movement is ready and waiting for a number of people to begin writing and promoting this new systematic theology. I would suggest that this new direction contains the seed for a powerful renewal within the Evangelical movement.

2. The Preservation of Divine Sovereignty

I find myself in agreement with Donald Bloesch that, "If there is anything that characterizes the evangelical ... it is the stress upon the sovereignty of God."\(^10\) As the new Evangelical theology is defined, it must be clarified that what is involved is not a rejection of divine sovereignty, but rather a re-definition of divine sovereignty.

There are other theological movements (process thought notable among them) that define God as persuasive rather than determinative. Process thinkers view human freedom and divine persuasiveness as metaphysical necessities.\(^11\) Evangelicals will reject this view. Evangelicals will retain a vision of God as having the capacity to maintain all-power in the universe. They will also argue, however, that in the act of creation, a sovereign
God imposed a self-limitation on divine power by creating free beings. This understanding of sovereign self-limitation on the part of God is described consistently by the few Evangelicals defending divine persuasiveness. It seems likely to me that unless this divine self-limitation continues to be clearly underlined this vision of God will be rejected by the majority of Evangelicals who will not, and should not, deny divine sovereignty.

3. The Development of a Biblical Argument for Divine Persuasiveness and Human Freedom

It should be recalled from the first chapter that one of the unifying concepts tying the Evangelical movement together is a common commitment to the Bible as the ultimate authority for matters of Christian faith and practice. Because of enduring Evangelical commitment to Biblicism, part of the theological defense of divine persuasiveness and human freedom will have to be the development of Biblical arguments in favour of this position.

A survey of what has been written by the minority of mainstream Evangelical theologians that do promote human freedom and divine persuasiveness and the writings of the evangelists indicates that they are as proficient in "proof-texting" their view as are the Calvinists. I would nevertheless suggest that there remains the task of developing an academically responsible biblical argument for this view. Just as the doctrine itself has not been brought
into a systematic framework, the biblical arguments in its
defense are a hodge-podge collection of passages taken from
the Bible. (It must be added that this is largely true of
both sides in this debate.)

To adequately perform this task, an Evangelical view
of the Bible itself must be clarified. Then, using the best
hermeneutical principles and tools available to the
Evangelical, a serious, systematic study of Scripture
exploring this entire issue needs to be undertaken. Without
having performed this task,¹² I suspect that what will emerge
is a realization that the Biblical revelation is probably
larger than any single view of God. Nevertheless, I am
convinced that a biblical argument can be made for the vision
of God I have suggested the Evangelical assume. I am further
convinced that this biblical argument will be just as
compelling as the argument made by the Calvinist majority of
Evangelical systematic theologians today.

C. Conclusion

In the pages of this thesis I have described a
religious movement on the horns of a dilemma. The
foundational principles and practices of modern
Evangelicalism are in conflict with the movement's professed
systematic theology. I have suggested the beginning of an
alternative theology. I have provided arguments why I
believe this alternative to be viable. I have suggested some
avenues that need to be traveled as Evangelicalism moves into
the future, addressing this crucial issue.

This is a beginning, not an ending. I, like a few other mainstream Evangelicals, have exposed a need and proposed a solution. Now the hard work of implementing that solution must begin. I hope that I will have the opportunity to be involved in the process of re-defining Evangelical systematic theology so that we can come to a theology that is in harmony with our evangelism and spiritual life.
NOTES

1. We have already seen, for example, that J.I. Packer and J. Norval Geldenhuys accept the logical incoherence of a commitment to evangelism and a belief in divine determinism. They claim a willingness to live with such a "mystery" (Geldenhuys) or "antinomy" (Packer). (See pp. 60-62.)

2. My experience as a pastor would verify this probable result. I have encountered many people in the Churches I have served who have shied away from serious theological reflection because it all seems too puzzling to contemplate. In particular, people (in my experience) will shy away from a discussion of pre-destination, asserting that they "recognise its truth" but find it too confusing to try to understand. Perhaps it is too confusing to understand because it is not true! Perhaps the confusion of these laypersons who have not studied theology poses the challenge of logic to the theologians in an indirect way.


5. See p. 17.

6. See pp. 88,89.


8. See pp. 67-70; 65,66.


12. Such a task would require a thesis in itself!
Appendix: TOWARD AN EVANGELICAL THEODICY

One of the most challenging issues to confront all Christian thinkers is the problem of theodicy. How can a loving Being with ample power to be described as "God" be reconciled with the pervasiveness of suffering, evil, misery, and cruelty in the world? The problem is made evident in three statements: (1) God is all loving; (2) God is all powerful; and (3) suffering exists. These three simple statements cry out for some explanation or reconciliation. I would suggest that a vision of a God who is persuasive rather than determinative (and the consequent doctrine of human freedom) provides the Evangelical with a good starting point for solving the problem of theodicy.

Theodicy poses a critical set of theological questions to the Christian. What is God like? What can God do? Why, if God has power, does He not always use it to alleviate suffering? How do prayer and miracles fit into our understanding of God? There are many more such theological questions. But at the heart of the theodicy issue are some very basic experiential questions for the believer. Can I love and worship God given that there is so much pain and suffering He obviously has not alleviated? Is God, in fact, a being of love and grace — how can these terms describing God's relationship to humans accompany the human experience of a world that is often anything but loving and
gracious? Does God really care about me and my pain — or am I part of an unfolding plan over which I have no control and in which I have no real significance? The question of theodicy is much more than theological speculation. To provide an adequate theodicy is to respond to the cry of pain: "Why, Lord?"

As I utilize the concept of divine persuasiveness to point toward an answer to these questions, I am responding to an important existential quest in my own life. For this reason, what I consider to be the start of an Evangelical theodicy will be prefaced by a very personal report of how I have arrived at my conclusions.

A. A Personal Search for Meaning in Suffering

This entire thesis really began on Labour Day, 1982. My wife and I were expecting our second child, due any time the coming week. The guest room had been converted to a nursery. The crib was in place, the diapers washed — all was ready. Then the baby stopped moving in the womb. Within hours it was determined that for some unknown reason, life in the womb had simply ceased. (It later became evident that the umbilical cord was too short, and that as the baby entered the birth canal, the tension on the cord was too much for it to bear).

No one who has never experienced a stillbirth can begin to understand the agony of losing a fully developed, flawless baby that one never heard cry in the night, never
caressed, and never had the opportunity to know. Only those who have been through such an experience know how the normal agony of labour (for mother and father) is intensified by the certainty that there will be no baby's cry at the end, only an aching sense of loss.

At the time I had six years of pastoral experience comforting others in their bereavement. I could not comfort myself. I heard the responses one so often hears. "God has a plan we cannot see." "This will make you a stronger person and a more compassionate pastor." "She's better off in heaven." Like Job I wished to complain, "I have heard many such things; miserable comforters are you all! ... How then will you comfort me with empty nothings?" (Job 16:2; 21:34, RSV).

Religious faith became more of a bane than a help. How could God permit such a thing? Did He not hear our many prayers for a healthy child? Did He not know that we were on His side? How could God expect that I would pray to Him again? God and I were engaged in an intense lovers' quarrel. I felt betrayed.

As the need to understand became more and more urgent, I began to study what some Christians outside of Evangelicalism are saying about theodicy. I discovered in John Hick an solution to the problem of suffering that hinges upon human freedom. According to Hick, the opportunities for growth ("soul-making") in this world are worth the agony. God has not caused the specific case of suffering encountered
at any given time, but rather, has presented us with a world of freedom. This freedom leaves us with great possibilities for both good and evil.¹

I read process theodicies by writers such as Charles Hartshorne, David Griffin and Barry Whitney. They argued that the metaphysical structure of the universe demands that God be persuasive. They argued a radical freedom for all of creation. They argued that God and suffering co-exist for the simple reason that, given the metaphysical structure of the universe, God cannot prevent suffering.² This is not, as it might seem at first reading, a radical denial that God is God. Hartshorne clarifies the position:

[God's] power is absolutely maximal, the greatest possible power is still one power among many others. ... God can do everything that a God can do, everything that could be done by "a being with no possible superior."³

Though I could not, as an Evangelical, accept the epistemological foundations of either John Hick or the process theists, I nevertheless found their thought to be very helpful. If it were true that God, in a free world, did not prevent suffering because He could not, this would carry me a long way toward answering the theological questions raised by my suffering. But even more importantly, if these people were right, my complaint against God was unjust. The difficulty lay not in God's response to my life, but in my expectations of what God could and would do.

But were divine persuasiveness and creaturely freedom consistent with Evangelical theology? Was it possible to
find the same solution to the problem of suffering from with the epistemological framework of Evangelicalism? I discovered that a very few credible, mainstream Evangelicals were bothered by the same questions that bothered me, and pointing toward the same solution. As I read a number of different types of Evangelical literature with these questions so much in the forefront of my thinking, I became increasingly aware that there is a great dissonance between what the systematic theologians and what the evangelists are saying about God and humans. In this observation this thesis was born.

I have made the argument that divine persuasiveness and human freedom are not only possible doctrines within Evangelicalism - I have argued that these concepts are, in fact, more intrinsic to Evangelicalism than are divine determinism and human bondage. I have emerged from this very personal search with some answers that would enable me to rebuild my relationship with God. The existential and the theological have come together (as they always should) into a unified vision of God.

What follows is a description of a possible Evangelical starting point for dealing with theodicy in a manner that is consistent with the theology I have suggested. This beginning of a theodicy also, hopefully, will speak to the experiential needs of suffering people. This theodicy assumes human freedom and divine persuasiveness. It assumes further, that the evangelistic invitation of grace and
salvation offered by God is the most crucial free-choice that human individuals will make. Thus it is a distinctly "Evangelical" theodicy.

B. Living in a World of Choices: Beginning an Evangelical Theodicy

Theodicy begins with the three irreconcilable statements I have already made. (1) God is all-powerful. (2) God is all loving and good. (3) Evil and suffering exist. The problem is clear. If God is all loving, surely He must want to bring an end to the suffering and misery His creation so often experiences. If God is all-powerful, surely He must be able to do so. Yet, evil and suffering exist.

It could, perhaps, be argued that evil and suffering are, in fact, illusions. Those events which seem to be evil might be God's mysterious way of working out His good and perfect plan. I was told when my daughter died, for example, that this was God's way of making me a better, stronger person. I was also told that God was, perhaps, preventing some future evil worse than my present bereavement. This funeral parlour theology, though apparently prevalent in popular religious life, is simply not tenable. If God is, indeed, all-powerful and can do anything, then certainly He can prevent great evils by the employment of good rather than the employment of lesser evils. A further difficulty lies in the sheer immorality of this position. This understanding of evil assumes that God uses people and their suffering in a
mechanical kind of manner in order to implement His own agenda. People, in this view, are treated as objects of divine manipulation rather than persons who engage in meaningful relationships with God. Certainly we would deem any individual guilty of such crass manipulation and de-personalization as evil. This denies the premise that God operates within the context of a holy and perfect character.

We are left, then, with a denial of either the premise that God is all-powerful, or the premise that God is all loving and good. In the main body of this thesis I have argued that God is not all-powerful if we understand omnipotence to mean that God can do anything He wants. God is not limited intransitively, but He has imposed a self-limitation on the use of His power in order that He may enjoy relationships of real love with His creatures. This assumption has profound implications for the problem of suffering.

When we discuss the evil and suffering in the world, it is necessary to recognise two distinct categories of suffering. We might describe moral evil: that suffering that comes as the result of immoral behaviour on the part of persons. Moral evil is evident in such events as war, urban crime, the lie that ruins another's reputation, or the simple negligence of the drunk driver who really didn't mean to harm anybody. We might also describe physical evil: that suffering that comes as a result of the fact that the laws of nature can at times be cruel in their effects. Into this
category fall such events as stillbirths, famine, the suffering inflicted by predatory animals, earthquakes, fierce storms, and all other sorts of "natural disaster".

It is clear that these two types of evil are very different in their origin. Let us see how we can apply the principle of divine persuasiveness and human freedom to each of these categories.

Moral evil clearly is the product of human act and decision. If the systematic theologians of Evangelicalism are correct, this still does not reduce divine responsibility for these events. These theologians have informed us that God does control even the evil acts and choices of humans, and if He wills to do so, can actually prevent the evil.5 In this event, God must take ultimate responsibility for the evil and suffering inflicted by one human upon another.

But if the evangelists are (as I have argued) correct in saying that God has given humans the "terrible gift" of freedom, this situation is quite different. In this event, moral evil is simply the result of human freedom misused. God does not wish these abuses of freedom, but the only way in which He could possibly prevent them is to remove the gift of freedom, itself. To do so reduces us from the status of real persons to the status of machines acting at the impulse of God.

This is an issue closely related to Evangelical soteriology. Were God to have removed human freedom before it ever was abused, we would have lost forever the
possibility of the real, personal relationship of love with God that is at the heart of Evangelical religion. Were God to have removed the gift of freedom at any time after the first abuse of that freedom, forgiveness would be an impossibility given Evangelical soteriology. Evangelicals maintain that salvation is given on the basis of a free decision to love God and accept His gospel. Thus, for God to remove freedom after any instance of sin would be for God to deprive the sinner of any means toward salvation. It would seem clear that in either event the Evangelical cannot argue that God would deprive humans of freedom.

Confering freedom upon humans, however, carries the immense risk that this freedom is going to be abused. The inevitable result of this abuse of freedom is that people (and other creatures!) are going to suffer. Because God engages in meaningful and loving relationships with suffering creatures, this implies that God Himself will suffer at the hands of free persons. This is seen nowhere more clearly than at the cross of Christ.

Does this freedom imply that God's hands are bound: that there is nothing God can do? Certainly not! God calls persuasively. While giving humans the gift of freedom, God constantly invites, urges and lures us to use our freedom wisely and well. He even uses (not causes!) the suffering we cause one another to spur us on toward a better use of our freedom. But, He does not coerce us to accept His invitations. We can, and often do, reject the positive
choices God places before us in favour of negative and destructive choices. It is in these abuses of freedom that moral evil is to be found.

Moral evil is thus to be understood in this Evangelical theology as the result of humans misusing their God-given gift of freedom. God will not coerce good choices, for that would create unreal beings with an unreal love for Him. Given the sinful past, for God to limit our freedom now would be to deprive us of the very gift of salvation. We cannot blame God for moral evil - it lies within the scope of human responsibility.

But what of physical evil? While the correlation between human freedom and moral evil is fairly obvious, couldn't God at least prevent the multitude of natural disasters that bring suffering upon creation? Certainly, human freedom cannot be held directly accountable for such events.

I would argue that physical evil is related to human freedom in two ways. Firstly, physical evil insures human freedom, particularly the freedom to choose to love God for the sake of that love itself. Secondly, the reality of physical evil represents a constant reminder to humans that while we have freedom to choose, we have no freedom not to choose. The time in which we must decide whether or not we will accept God's invitation to salvation is limited. Let us look at each of these thoughts more closely.

Recalling that the evangelist presents us with a free
choice to accept God's love, we must ask ourselves how the absence of physical evil would affect that choice. Were the world a place of instant justice in which the good never got sick and the evil were constantly unhealthy, true freedom could not exist. Were the world a place of instant justice in which the kind became wealthy and the mean became impoverished, true freedom could not exist. In such a world where good things always happened to good people and bad things always happened to bad people, who could say that they chose good for good's sake? More to the point, who could say that they had chosen God for His own sake? Certainly we would have to say that we had chosen health and prosperity. Such a world would present us with no possibility to freely choose to love God for His own sake.

God has given us a world, however, in which He has refused to stack the deck in His own favour. In this world, it is equally possible to hate God as it is to love Him. One must choose to love God here. The choice is not destined for us by either the decree of God or by the moral order of the universe. This world demands a free choice of faith. In this world, faith is utterly essential to choosing God and good. But faith is not impossible. God's persuasive invitation contains much of the goodness and graciousness of the world that we so often miss when we focus on the suffering. Freedom and faith come together in this world to provide the hope that we can, indeed, use our freedom well. But we never lose the essential freedom that makes us real
people. We are free to grow. We are free to morally and spiritually stagnate. We are even free to regress. This world challenges us to choose well and leaves us with the freedom to choose poorly.

The only choice we cannot make is not to choose. In its own way, the physical evil of this world presents us with the same challenge as does the evangelist. Whether we die in war or in sickness; as the victim of crime or the victim of famine, we will all surely die. The physical evil of the world reminds us that there is ultimately an equality in death. Death stands before each one of us with a granite inevitability, forcing us to ultimately choose where we will spend our eternity. The biblical dichotomy of heaven and hell is a manifestation of this freedom to choose. If salvation is universal, then we do not have the free choice to hate God. We can only be said to have that choice if a real possibility exists that we can choose an eternity without Him.

Moral evil and physical evil come together to underline the message of the evangelist. The reality of moral evil demonstrates to us the gap between what we are and what we should be. We can choose either to ignore this or to respond to the God who calls and invites us in Jesus Christ. We can choose to accept by faith the atoning death of Jesus to bridge the gap between what we are and what we should be. If we make this choice, we find in the consequent relationship with God the fulfillment of our human nature.
But we have the freedom not to enter that relationship if we so choose.

God does not force us into a relationship with Him, for that would deny any virtue in the relationship. He will not force our hand. He will not stack the deck in His favour. Physical evil preserves our freedom to make real faith choices. God simply gives us life as an opportunity to choose and death as a reminder that we must choose some destiny.

Theodicy, then, merges with the persuasive message of the evangelist. Moral evil is the direct result of human freedom. This is why we need salvation: we have abused the freedom God has given us. Physical evil presents us with a world that gives us the completely free choice to reject or accept God's gift of grace, while simultaneously reminding us that such a choice must be made in the time that we have. I am convinced that this understanding of evil and suffering is not only consistent with the new Evangelical systematic theology I am proposing, it is also consistent with the Evangelical psyche in its stress on evangelistic freedom and responsibility.

Certainly there is need for much more discussion and consideration. There are many outstanding questions. My purpose here has not been to describe a complete Evangelical theodicy, but rather to demonstrate that an Evangelical understanding of divine persuasiveness and human freedom can be very constructively applied to an Evangelical response to
the questions raised by suffering and evil.

C. One Important Question

One question remains, however, that requires an answer. Does this theodicy help? After five years of thought, study, discussion, prayer and writing about theodicy, do I feel any better about the death of my daughter beyond that healing that time, alone, effects?

Were I given the option of trading all of the insight I have gleaned through this process of reflection in exchange for the daughter I lost, I would not hesitate one second. I would choose my child, alive and healthy. We must not fall into the temptation of believing that understanding our suffering will lessen its hurt. The question "Why, Lord?" is seldom a theological inquiry. It is an expression of pain.

While not lessening the pain, however, an adequate understanding of theodicy such as I have proposed has had one very beneficial effect on my experience. It has removed naive and false expectations of what God can and will do to prevent future suffering. Eliminating from our thought those false expectations of God frees us to expect what God can do. Evangelicals and process theists can come to an unusual agreement\(^9\) as to what a persuasive God does for sufferers. A.N. Whitehead has described God as "the great companion - the fellow-sufferer who understands.\(^{10}\) Anthony Campolo agrees that what God offers is "... the empathy of love, the concern of love, the fellowship of love, the sharing of love."
... He weeps with those who weeps and suffers with those who suffer.

It is this understanding of God that I believe will be truly helpful to the Evangelical encountering suffering. The conviction that God will, in His power and majesty, protect us from all suffering and evil adds immense disappointment and doubt to the agony already caused by the suffering itself. While other Evangelicals maintain God's infinite ability to work, I would maintain another infinite ability. I would underline to Evangelicals God's infinite ability to suffer. I would emphasize God's infinite ability to agonize with creation. The apostle Paul bears witness to this ability.

We know that the whole creation has been groaning as in the pains of childbirth right up to the present time. Not only so, but we ourselves, ... groan inwardly... In the same way, the Spirit helps us in our weakness. ... [The Spirit himself intercedes for us with groans that words cannot express. (Ro. 8:22,23,26, NIV)

The ultimate test, for me, of the relevance of this theodicy, is to ask how it applies to my existential needs with respect to my daughter's stillbirth. This theodicy informs me that it is pointless to look for some hidden purpose of God in the event. God has, without question, used the suffering in my life for constructive ends. But it is not a punishment, a test, or a severe stimulus to growth, for that would reduce my relationship with God to mere mechanics. The suffering I have experienced is the result of the fact that I live in a free universe: a universe in which God has
refused to stack the deck in His own favour. As a free human in relationship to a persuasive God, I must, nevertheless, listen closely to what I can learn about my living from the experience of suffering. I suffer because, apparently, God deems freedom worth the cost of suffering. I do not enjoy suffering. I do not desire suffering. But in the final analysis, I acknowledge that I would far rather suffer with freedom than be merely a comfortable robot.
NOTES


There is a great deal of promise in a dialogue between Process thought and Evangelical thought, in my opinion. The differences between the two cannot be ignored. It is, for example, questionable whether Process theists will agree with Evangelicals that the Bible should be viewed as the final authority on all matters of Christian faith and practice. Likewise, it is questionable whether Evangelicals will accept the metaphysics of A.N. Whitehead. These differences will mean that the two movements will never become one.

There is room, nevertheless, for comparison and discussion that could be quite fruitful for both movements. Both, for example, share a commitment to strip the veneer of Aristotelian thought away from much of Western Christian theology. This Neo-Platonism, of course, is largely due to the strong influence of Augustine on both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism.

I hope that I have argued effectively in this thesis that a vision of God as persuasive should be viewed as intrinsic to Evangelical commitments. This would be a view to be shared by Process thinkers. The Evangelical thinkers discussing divine persuasiveness also observe that God is immutable in character and in purpose, but is also changeable in His relation to the world (see Richard Foster's chapter on prayer in *Celebration of Discipline*, for example). They could benefit, therefore, from a reading of process thought on God as processive.

Unfortunately, whatever conversation has taken place between Evangelical and process thinkers (and there has not been much!) has tended to be characterized by spiritual and/or intellectual arrogance (see for example Carl Henry's article, "A Critique of Process Theology"; I have not found a process critique of modern Evangelical theology). Is it not possible that two schools of Christian thought can agree to disagree, and then learn from their points of agreement? I would say that this is not only possible, but desirable.
I would hope that at some point Evangelicals and Process theists would come into an intentional dialogue to learn from and with one another. Perhaps it is not impossible to synthesize process metaphysics into Evangelical theology. Perhaps Evangelicals need to be challenged by process thinkers with regard to their understanding of freedom vis-a-vis sub-human creatures. Perhaps Evangelicals, who share with Process theists a very personal vision of God, can also share with process thinkers the personal nature of the faith experience. From my perspective, one of the most important concepts Evangelicals can share with process thinkers is the need, message and power of evangelism.

It is my hope that at some point in the future I will be able to extensively study and write about the common ground shared by Evangelicals and process theists.


4. See pp. 68-73.

5. See pp. 50-52.

6. See p 16. It will be recalled that one of the features that distinguishes Evangelical thought from Neo-Orthodoxy is an Evangelical rejection of universal salvation.

7. I am not here implying what I understand "hell" to mean -this might best be left for another study which would carefully examine Evangelical convictions regarding the reality and nature of hell.

Personally, I would accept the fairly traditional definition of hell as the complete and total absence of God. Because I consider God to be the foundation and sustenance of all existence, I therefore consider hell to the the absence of any existence at all.

Whether or not many other Evangelicals would agree with this view remains for further study. I suspect there would be considerable disagreement between Evangelicals regarding the nature of hell, though I doubt that many Evangelicals would wish to entirely deny the concept of hell.

8. Without listing all the possible questions to be asked, I would identify the most pressing questions to me, personally, as relating to prayer and miracles. What does this all imply about what we can expect as to prayer? Are such events as divine healings possible, or do we inevitably
expose ourselves to disappointment and disillusionment if we expect such things. I believe in miracles and I believe in healing. I do think that much work needs be done, though, to answer the question why some are healed, for example, and some are not.

As is the case elsewhere, I am inclined to turn my attention to the issue of evangelism. It seems to me that the solution to this problem might lie in understanding the kerygmatic content of miracles: what they proclaim about God. If such things as healings are declarations of God's reality and presence, with the alleviation of suffering as a beneficial by-product, then there are at least some possible directions Evangelicals can take in responding to this question.

9. Though I have pointed out some similarities between Evangelicalism and process thought, such close echoing of one another is uncommon in the writings of the two movements.

For other Christian interpretations of the divine ability to suffer see W. McWilliams, The Passion of God: Divine Suffering in Contemporary Protestant Theology (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1985).


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VITA AUCTORIS

1954
Born in Hampton, Virginia

1973
Completed High School at North Albion Collegiate Institute, Toronto, Ontario.

1977
Received Bachelor of Theology Degree majoring in Pastoral Studies from the Ontario Bible College, Toronto, Ontario.

1978
Ordained into the Christian Ministry by the Baptist Convention at Ontario and Quebec.

1979
Received Bachelor of Arts Degree, General Program, from the University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario.

1977-1981
Pastor of the Bricker Street Baptist Church, Port Elgin, Ontario

1981
Pastor of the Olivet Baptist Church, Windsor Ontario.