Observer and participant perspectives in the analysis of argumentation

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1. Introduction: different perspectives on argumentative interactions

The municipality of Paris mails free of charge to every home a monthly information magazine titled *Paris le journal* [The Paris Diary]. This magazine is perhaps not of outstanding journalistic value, but it is well done and for a free service assumed by a political entity, it is surprisingly objective and informative.

The highlight of the January 1999 issue is the budget of the municipality for 1999, voted by the City Council on December 15, 1998. On the cover, readers are told in large and friendly letters that they will benefit from ‘une baisse historique de l’impôt [a historical tax reduction]’ (see Fig. 1).

On page 7, to which the cover refers, the readers are informed in more detail about this historical reduction:

"...le Conseil de Paris [...] a pris une décision historique: celle de baisser les impôts à Paris. Cette diminution sera de 1%.

[ [...] Paris City Council [...] took a historical decision, namely, to cut taxes at Paris. This reduction will amount to 1%. ]

At this point, a question may arise for the readers. What is so historical about a reduction of merely 1 per cent? The readers may recall the welcome address of Jean Tiberi, Mayor of Paris:

"C’est la première fois, depuis de nombreuses années, que les impôts relevant du budget de la Ville reculent en pourcentage; jusqu’à présent, ils augmentaient invariablement d’un an sur l’autre.

[ This is the first time after many years that the percentage of taxes attributed to the budget of the municipality decreases; up to now, they have invariably increased year after year. ] (Paris le Journal, January 1999 issue, p. 5)

The reduction, then, is historical because it is unique, or at least, has not occurred for a substantial number of years. But still, is this worth all the fuss?

Things become clearer a few paragraphs further in the article about the budget decision. Jean Tiberi is quoted as explaining why he suggested that the City Council adopt this reduction. One of his major reasons was this:

"Cette décision doit également être comprise comme une illustration de la politique préconisée par l’opposition républicaine au niveau national. Oui, il est
possible de baisser les impôts en France! Oui, les collectivités locales gérées par l’opposition républicaine peuvent donner l’exemple et compenser avec les moyens qui sont les leurs une fiscalité d’État qui se maintient à un niveau trop élevé.

[ This decision has to be understood, furthermore, as an illustration of the kind of politics which the republican opposition recommends for the national scale. Yes, it is possible in France to decrease taxes! Yes, the local authorities where the republican opposition is in charge can set an example and compensate, by the means they have at their disposal, for a taxation whose assessment is kept by the State at a level that is too high.]

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(Paris le journal, January 1999 issue, p. 7)
In this quotation, the actual topic of the article is introduced. Unlike what the national government claims, taxes can be cut; if the politicians are willing to do their best, they can spare the citizens further charges. The whole of the article to come plays on this theme: the national government, whose head is Prime Minister Lionel Jospin from the Socialist Party, does not seriously think about cutting taxes, and maybe will even raise them to pay the bill of a number of governmental programs they have themselves engaged in. On the other hand, the municipality of Paris, whose head is Mayor Jean Tiberi from the Rally for
the Republic – the opposition on the national scale –, does not only think about reducing taxes but actually does so. The further it goes, the more the article may well be read as a manifestation of an electoral "pre-campaign." In summer 1999, elections will be held in France, as in all countries belonging to the European Union, for the European Parliament.

In a sense, then, the article has to be considered as flawed if its contents are assumed to be a well-conducted argumentation. The characterization ‘historical,’ which is applied to the tax reduction, is revealed to be a catchword designed to make the readers pay attention to what is to come. The 1 per cent reduction is a good makeup to have them read the Mayor’s "pre-campaign" statement in favor of his party. Therefore, the article, if considered as an argumentation, is flawed for one more reason, which is that it comes along as an information yet quite clearly has the purpose of gathering votes.

Having elucidated that some dubious things happen, argumentatively speaking, in this article and that, therefore, we should be on our guards when reading it, I have analyzed the argumentative movement of the article. Have I, really? Fundamentally, I agree that this is a valid analysis of it. But for purposes of clarification as to what my point will be in this paper, I am going to take on me the role of an **advocatus diaboli** and am going to claim that it is not. In my **advocatus diaboli** role, I claim, instead, that what is done by this kind of approach to an argumentative movement, is the following: it is not analyzed but, rather, taken up and continued in order to argue against the argumentation it presents.

At first sight, this claim seems to be void, for this is about exactly what a scholar is supposed to do when analyzing argumentation. The scholar will not argue against the movement, probably, but nonetheless will take it up and see what it leads to, in order to be able to determine, for purposes of evaluation, how it is pieced together. However, the distinction is less trivial as soon as the following situation is considered. Imagine that I am with Jean Tiberi, Mayor of Paris, and he tells me that I will benefit from a historical tax reduction of 1 per cent. Most certainly, I will immediately ask him what is historical about a tiny 1 per cent reduction, in order to have him give me further information about this point that I feel unable to handle such as it stands. He may then answer that it is historical because it is the first time since a number of years that this happens. And upon my further questions – because I still feel somehow uncomfortable with this point – he points out that the municipality of Paris tries to counter-balance the increased charges the State government places on the citizens.

At this point, an argumentation scholar might analyze this dialogue as I have done above. He cuts me out of the interaction and centers on Jean Tiberi’s turns. But on the other hand, the dialogue might have developed completely differently if I had insisted on the exact explanation of what is historical about a 1 per cent tax reduction in Paris. I might have wanted to know how this reduction is balanced financially. It may be that the bill is paid by an increase of the citizen’s contribution to street-cleaning, or the like. From this, it should be
obvious that I, as a participant to the interaction, do the same thing, to a certain extent, as does the argumentation analyst. I review and evaluate what my interlocutor tells me; and at places in which my evaluation encounters problems of whatever kind, I consider what he tells me to be flawed in some way or other or at least in need of further clarification or examination.

The difference between myself and the analyst is, rather, that I am "in the dialogue" whereas the analyst is "after the dialogue." I participate in it, and my interventions do influence upon the further development of the dialogue. The analyst observes it post festum and, hence, "from the outside," as it were, and no effects of this for the dialogue are to be expected. When scholars analyze finished written argumentative texts, this difference of perspectives is no problem. However, it tends to be muddled up in the analysis of "oral texts," dialogues, as well. And in these cases, I claim, a lack of distinction may lead to questionable or erroneous reconstructions of what goes on in a dialogue, interactively speaking.

In this paper, I will propose, therefore, a way of distinguishing between the observer perspective and the participant perspective and I will point out which advantages can be gained for the reconstruction and evaluation of argumentative interactions if one distinguishes carefully between both of them.

2. Evaluative criteria from the observer perspective

By saying that the Paris Diary article about the 1999 budget is flawed because it pretends to be objective information and yet resembles an electoral campaign statement, I have appealed to norms that should be respected. These are norms such as: a text should not imitate a text genre it does not belong to, a magazine article should not mix up information and the political positions expressed in a politician's statements quoted in the article. Furthermore, I said that I was concerned about Mayor Tiberi's statement to the effect that cutting taxes would be possible although the national government acts otherwise. Again, this is because of norms I appeal to. For the statement occurs in the scope of explicitizing what is so historical about the 1999 tax reduction, yet I feel that it has not much to offer for doing so, and this is exactly why I have the impression that something is wrong with it.

The norms about acceptable textual presentation and about acceptable argumentative movements to which I appeal are given, so to speak, "infra-communicatively." That is to say that they are treated as being beyond discussion and as governing the interaction. For this very reason I assume that the author of the Paris Diary article should respect them too. These norms, then, reflect the evaluator's vision of what is acceptable and what is not with respect to the point or action evaluated. However, it is not only the evaluator's vision of it; they very label 'norm' implies that the guideline in question is non-subjective and applies to a number of people. Norms may be thought of as either extrinsic or intrinsic. Extrinsic norms are those norms which are imposed
upon an activity and whose non-respect may cause (social) sanction but does not directly influence on the activity itself. Intrinsic norms are those norms which are co-substantial to an activity insofar as their non-respect makes it impossible for the actors to engage in, or to continue, the activity in question. Norms of politeness, for instance, are (largely) extrinsic. Note that shaking hands is less common in North America than it is in Europe. However, it is, despite possible problems of being fully accepted in a group of people, perfectly feasible to strike up a conversation in Europe without shaking hands after entering a room. The norm of shaking hands has no direct impact on the activity of, say, small talk. On the other hand, if a soccer player punches the ball forward using his hands, he does not respect a norm that is so fundamental to the game of soccer that allowing its non-respect would mean that the players are no longer playing the same game.

I have chosen deliberately an exemplification of extrinsic and intrinsic norms which recalls John R. Searle’s (1969: 34–37) distinction between regulative and constitutive rules. Since the pragmatic turn in argumentation theory, starting in 1958 by the pioneering work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and of Toulmin, scholars advocating normative approaches to arguing have opted for formulating norms as intrinsic rather than as extrinsic. Logical rules, for instance, have to be considered as extrinsic norms because 1) they presuppose closed semantic systems to which sequences of propositions are compared; and because 2) they do not model arguing as a goal-oriented activity but, rather, as a completed structure of relations between propositions. It is a precondition for a justified model of an intrinsic normativity of arguing to conceive of arguing as of a goal-oriented activity taking place in social contexts. This is the way chosen by one of the major approaches to argumentation theory, the Amsterdam School’s Pragmatic-Dialectics, which forms the normative core element of Normative Pragmatics, as developed by van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs (1993).

In Normative Pragmatics, arguing is assumed to be disagreement relevant. That is to say that argumentative sequences are likely to occur when disagreement seems to endanger further interaction. In instances of this kind of communication problems, arguing can serve as a mechanism for communicative repair (Jackson & Jacobs 1980; Jacobs & Jackson 1982; 1989; Jacobs 1989; Jackson 1995). Communication problems, then, are interpreted as conflicts between different opinions the interactors hold of how the interaction should continue. These conflicts of opinion can be resolved by one of the interactors assuming the role of the proponent and justifying, to the listener’s satisfaction, his standpoint with respect to the communication problem. Hence, the interaction has a goal it pursues (conflict resolution) because of which it brings about its intrinsic norms, the most important of which is to exclude any move that might prevent the interactors from getting to this goal and to further those kinds of moves which help them reach it. Moves are accounted for in Pragmatic-Dialectics, and hence in Normative Pragmatics, in terms of Speech act theory. Accordingly, the intrinsic norms of argumentative encounters, brought about by its goal-orientedness, portray the
proponent as performing assertive speech acts (putting forth a standpoint and advancing arguments for it) and the listener as performing commissive speech acts (doubting a standpoint and accepting or not the arguments advanced). Both of them may perform usage declarative speech acts, i.e., that kind of speech act by which the exact meaning of an expression is rendered in more detail. But any speech act other than the three types mentioned does not further conflict resolution and therefore is eliminated from a normative reconstruction of the argumentative features of the interaction.

The proponents of Normative Pragmatics are aware that this model relies on a number of presuppositions which are postulated rather than extracted from analyzed data. The most central presuppositions are that arguing can be captured by rendering the interactors’ moves as assertives and commissives, and that arguing is resolution-oriented. In order for this to be possible in real-life interaction, the argumentative encounter has to take place in a social and interpersonal environment that furthers this kind of arguing. For instance, the interactors must be willing to resolve the conflict of opinion that has occurred “on the merits,” which, in turn, is unlikely to happen if resolving conflicts is not, in their socio-cultural environment, a value for which people are ready to strive. In Normative Pragmatics, these preconditions are termed ‘higher-order conditions,’ meaning that these conditions have to apply in order to make it possible for the resolution procedure to be carried out. This, in turn, is the very reason why an analysis using the model of conflict resolution advocated by Normative Pragmatics may presuppose these conditions to hold (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs 1993: 24–89).

From the preceding, it is clear that a gap is manifest between the reconstruction at which Normative Pragmatics aims and the actual practice arguers perform. Nevertheless, the model for reconstruction is far from being worthless: it can serve as a heuristic tool in the identification of argumentative sequences and as an ideal in the pedagogy of argumentative debate. It has to be kept in mind, however, that thus the model represents an observer perspective analysis of processes of arguing. Although it displays intrinsic norms, the type of reconstruction it favors is not interested primarily in the interactors’ actual discourse-organizing moves. This is because it presupposes these norms and higher-order conditions to hold and does not pay much attention to whether or not they are indeed relevant to the interaction analyzed, and if so, how this can be retrieved in the given data.

Therefore, if one sets out to give a fuller picture of the communicative process of arguing, this kind of observer perspective analysis of argumentative encounters has to be complemented by a participant perspective analysis which pays close attention to the interactors’ discourse-organizing moves and points out to which norms they appeal and whether they check – and if so, how they check – whether these norms are respected.

3. Evaluative criteria from the participant perspective
Kenneth Lee Pike (1967: 37–42) has offered a distinction between ‘etic’ and ‘emic’ approaches to the analysis of social interaction, to which the distinction between the observer and the participant perspectives bears much resemblance. According to him, an emic approach aims at reconstructing how interactors make sense of others’ contributions within a specific system of social interaction. An etic approach is a theoretically elaborated vision of how interaction proceeds which does not, in the first place, take into account the specificities of a given system and which, by way of consequence, constitutes an initial approach to as yet not analyzed interactive systems, an approach that is to be revised and modified, if necessary, for the reconstruction of specific systems. Pike’s distinction is indeed acknowledged by Normative Pragmatics. Referring to Pike, van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs (1993: 50–52) distinguish between interpretive (emic) and analytic (etic) approaches and qualify Normative Pragmatics as more etic than emic on grounds of the following:

[...] an etic scheme of reference is designed to reflect a theoretically principled order of classification and to be capable of subsuming the emic system of any particular speech community. (ibid.: 51)

As I suggested in the introduction, it would seem more adequate to me not to subsume one type of reconstruction under the other, but rather to take them to be complementary. This is in line with research objectives I hold which are much less ambitious. Maybe some time in the future it will be possible to subsume the communicative phenomenology of any actual speech community under one systematic scheme. However, I don’t think so. Recent (and time and again not so recent) work in ethnology and intercultural studies has shown to what extent various cultures hold different visions of what fundamentals of communication look like. At the present state of the art as regards the process-centered analysis of authentic real-life argumentative interactions, I am dealing, rather, with the very phenomenology. Thus, I hold normative models – idealizing or not the process of arguing – to be a requisite of a consistent analysis, but I do not see any reason why they should be primary. This is just why I propose to integrate an etic and an emic reconstruction on a complementarity basis.

By doing so, I am fundamentally in line with Pike’s reasons for distinguishing etic and emic standpoints for the analysis of social interaction and with his vision of how both kinds of perspectives can contribute to a fuller picture of the interactive processes.

Etic units and classifications [...] may be available before one begins the analysis of a further particular language or culture. Regardless of how much training one has however, emic units of language must be determined during the analysis of that language; they must be discovered, not predicted [...].

[...] Hence, etic data provide access into the system – the starting point of analysis. They give tentative results, tentative units. In the total analysis, the initial etic description gradually is refined, and is ultimately – in principle, but
probably never in practice – replaced by one which is totally emic. (Pike 1967: 37–39)

The major consequence of passing from a subsumptive to a complementary connection between the etic observer and the emic participant perspectives is that the guidelines or norms governing the interactive process of arguing must not be thought of as being applied from an outside observer’s theoretically elaborated normative framework. This is one kind of normative considerations that come into play for the analysis. Still, normative considerations of another kind must not be neglected. The arguers themselves more often than not appeal to normative criteria their argumentative interaction should conform to, and these criteria may or may not correspond to those applied to the interaction from the observer perspective. A participant perspective analysis, then, has to take seriously these appeals to argumentative norms the arguers make and has to aim at retrieving cues for how the arguers appealing to them display why they hold a norm to be respected or violated in a given interaction.

Let me illustrate this kind of participant perspective reconstruction with the help of the following example which is taken from an audiotaped corpus of pre-court mediations11 assembled by the Institut für deutsche Sprache (German Language Institute) at Mannheim, Germany.12 This particular mediation opposes Mrs Beck and Mrs Kraft. Either of them is in the autumn of her life and they have been living in the same neighborhood for a number of years. Mrs Beck has accused Mrs Kraft of having insulted her so massively that since then she has been suffering from cardiac difficulties. The mediation session opens with both the opponents’ versions of the issue. Mrs Beck the plaintiff’s consists mainly in a pouring rain of insults she quotes Mrs Kraft as having said to her. She sums it up, ‘des hot sie alles gsacht alles [she said all of this, everything].’ Thereupon Mrs Kraft the defendant claims, ‘nein des is nischt wahr [no, this is not true],’ and this denial causes Mrs Beck to protest against what she assumes Mrs Kraft to be heading for. ‘awer nit abstreite und misch als lügnerin denn sie is die lügnern [but no denying, an’ – me a liar? ‘cause she’s the liar].’ Mrs Kraft once again defends herself against this reproach. ‘isch lüg net. isch hab kein grund zur lüge [I’m not lying, I don’t have any reason for lying].’

At this point, both the discussants have formulated, albeit indirectly, a norm that should guide their attempts at finding a compromise. The mediation should proceed without the parties lying. On the surface of it, this is in line with the sincerity condition most argumentation scholars set up for goal-oriented efficient argumentation. As regards Mrs Beck and Mrs Kraft, however, the scholar is quite helpless if he adopts an observer perspective. Without having witnessed the several insults with which both the parties reproach each other, it is impossible for him to say whether or not the parties actually do lie, as the respective opponents claim they do. The norm of sincerity as appealed to by Mrs Kraft and Mrs Beck can be approached only from the participant perspective, and that means that the analysis has to work out what exactly the
participants make of it. As a case study, let me show this with the issue between Mrs Beck and Mrs Kraft.

4. Normative reconstruction of argumentative encounters from the participant perspective

Sincerity, or rather, refraining from lying, is a recurrent issue between the two women. The mediation takes relatively long, 45 minutes, and this is mainly because both parties treat refraining from lying as a fundamental norm for their discussion without whose respect there is no point in trying to get to a compromise that would be to satisfy both. The encounter I am about to analyze is far from what is generally called a resolution-oriented argumentation, and time and again one may ask oneself, as an analyzing observer, if what is going on in this mediation can legitimately be called an argumentation. But still, the importance the interactors give to the norm of sincerity – and to related preconditions of efficient dispute resolution, such as credibility and consistency – would seem to be indicative of the arguers’ resolution-mindedness. This is exactly why the norms to which they appeal have to be reconstructed from the participant perspective, although to the outside observer, it may seem that they are appealed to yet not respected.

Consider the following segment of the mediation, which is rather representative of how it proceeds ('B' is Mrs Beck, 'K' is Mrs Kraft, 'M' is the mediator).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>K</th>
<th>dass ich</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>ja was hot se'n gesacht</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td></td>
<td>that I</td>
<td></td>
<td>well, what did she say, then</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>&lt;<em>{2}waas</em>{2}&gt;</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>arsch lecke soll_{1}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>das is gelog/ das is ( \text{&quot;}\text{überhaupt})</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>und dass sich\text{&quot;}un dass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>that's a lie, that's not at and that I, that I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>nisch/ oh des hawwe sie sisch</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>isch blöd bin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>all... uh, that is all only in</td>
<td></td>
<td>am dumb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>alesoige/</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>un zu moi kinner bongert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>your imagi...</td>
<td></td>
<td>an' further, calling my children bas-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sincerity is at issue here and is negotiated as it has been a few times before and as it will be a considerable number of times later on. Mrs Kraft has conceded that she might have insulted Mrs Beck, but this would have been only because Mrs Beck had insulted her before. She quotes three insults, and Mrs Beck calls this a lie (01–07B/K); Mrs Kraft would have made up the whole story (04–05B). As a support for this claim, Mrs Beck advances two points: a) the neighbors should have heard what Mrs Kraft claims Mrs Beck said – which presumably they didn’t – (07–08B); and b) there would be a point in calling Mrs Kraft a liar, for she would reportedly have lied last year (10–11B). Mrs Kraft, on the other hand, affirms that there is absolutely no need for her to make it all up (11–12K); by way of consequence, this means that Mrs Beck is not telling the
truth. While the mediator is losing control of the mediation, Mrs Beck advances one more point to prove that she is sincere. The very fact that she has complained about the insults and is ready to engage a mediation or a lawsuit would be ample proof that she knows what she is talking about and that, hence, there would not be any reason for her not to be sincere (11–13B).

Quite obviously, this discussion is a dead end. For the women try to discuss about something which at the same time they take as a precondition for any serious discussion, namely, their sincerity. The reproach to the effect that the other would not respect the norm of sincerity, which either women addresses constantly to the other, is precisely what blocks any discussion. It is obvious that the kind of reproach found in Mrs Beck and Mrs Kraft’s discussion is an efficient rhetorical manoeuvre. It can be used strategically to block discussion about possibly questionable positions. This is exactly why one has to admit that the normative reconstruction from the participant perspective, as far as I have conducted it, has not really gone very much further. For it is not sufficient, given the possibly strategic use of language, to retrieve in a given interaction a norm to which the interactors appeal. In order to elaborate a justified interpretation as to which norms are actually relevant, it is necessary, moreover, to elucidate what the arguers make of these appeals. This is to say that the analysis has to work out whether or not, and if so, how arguers display what a norm to which they appeal, explicitly or not, means for them in a given case. The analysis has to show whether or not they give their interlocutors a "hint" as to how they would want it to be respected.

Let me illustrate this second step of a normative reconstruction from the participant perspective by the following segment taken from the same mediation opposing Mrs Kraft to Mrs Beck. For some time now, the less-than-ideal discussion has been turning on the question as to who lies and who doesn’t. At the moment the transcript below starts, to increase her credibility, Mrs Beck has just pointed out that for 54 years she has been living in this neighborhood and has never had any quarrel with her neighbors.

| 01 | K ja weil sie nie/ niemand sisch | this is 'cause no one wants to have |
| 02 | B oh bei mir sitze jo/ K abgibt weil sie. weil sie mit | oh, it’s at my place that anything to do with you, just be- |
| 03 | B mit wem K jedem krach afange des sacht | gather... with cause, 'cause you start quarreling |
| 04 | B des sacht | whom that’s |
doch die ganz siedlung

hekschdend die fra kellergeischt

drivve die leut wo se

<ex-tremely>

vorher gewohnt hawwe die sache

<i>only Mrs Kellergeist who says so</i>

druchwa die leut wo se neighborhood says so down the

<i>ex-tremely</i>

lengthen

who?!

nobody!

street where you used to live, peo-

ple tell you: we’re happy we’ve got

gosh!

tell, rid of Mrs Beck it’s the peo-

tell me one single name ple down the street, you see I

is

don’t know their names the wom-

a lie

en the whole neighborhood says

the whole... you can’t tell me

so; anybody can go and check this

one single name in the neighbor-

whom-

I could as well tell you: the

ever you ask, just...

whole neighborhood doesn’t
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>K</th>
<th>net</th>
<th>like</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>genuaw wie die frau kellergeischt</td>
<td>just as did Mrs Kellergeist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>leide</td>
<td>you</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>hotbei de samaridderbund gesacht</td>
<td>the Workers’ Samaritans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>. der fall jetzt mit de frau beck</td>
<td>now this person Mrs Beck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>oh heere se mer uff</td>
<td>don’t even mention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>ah der indressiert misch doch</td>
<td>oh, that doesn’t matter to me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>ah misch kennt doch gar niemand</td>
<td>uh, nobody at all don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>mit der des krigge se gesacht</td>
<td>her that’s what they tell you,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>gar net also &lt;₅moment₅&gt;</td>
<td>at all; hold on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BK</td>
<td>von de samaridder</td>
<td>me at the Samaritans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>ja . weil se weil sie käns ja</td>
<td>o.k. – ’cause you, ’cause you don’t well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>ah wie kann’n die frau des wolle</td>
<td>oh how comes, this woman can like anybody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. the Workers’ Samaritans

5. moment
|   | K  | doch sich üwwerhaupe                  | niemand | wants to have to do anything |
|   | B  | h o b a ch gott lüge sie (...)      | once; oh God, how you're lying(...) |
|   | K  | abgewwe so is'es                     | at all  | but that's how it is       |
|   | M  | awwer äh Frau beck                  | uhm, Mrs Beck |
| 27| B  | <_sie sin vielleich verløge <_lourd>| how incredibly untruthful |
|   | K  | nein                               | you     |
|   | M  | fraubeck unfraukraft               | ain't it |
| 28| B  | denke sie an die geburt vun ihrm  | are; remind the birth of your child, |
|   | B  | kind wie se da geloge              | what lies you were making up then |
| 29| B  | des sin lauder so sache wo sie    | all of this is the kind of thing you're |
|   | M  | äh                                  | uhm     |
| 30| B  | offe losse sie hawwe kä <_lourd-zeuge> | not plain about you don't have |
|   | K  | so was hab isch <_lourd-er8>       | but this |
|   | M  | kind of <_lourd-frau beck8>        | Mrs Beck |
| 31| B  | sie känne mir nit sache was sie    | any witness, you can't tell me what |
|   | K  | awwer . <_garantiert niacht        | thing I for sure didn't |
| 32| B  | domit gemänt hawwe <_lourd>        | you meant to say |
|   | K  | gesacht<erg>                       | say     |
|   | M  | äh . Frau beck Beck                | uhm, Mrs Beck |
| 33| M  | jetzt . jetzt hot's jetzt mü/       | now, now there's, now we'd... at |
| 34| B  | sie redde sisch                     | you're   |
|   | M  | irgendwann müsse mer e              | wriggling |
In this segment, one of the participants, Mrs Beck, clarifies how she wants the norm of sincerity to be respected. Mrs Kraft claims that Mrs Beck’s point about her peaceful character is irrelevant (01–04K): since everybody avoids her because of her quarrelsome attitude she cannot possibly have any actual quarrel with her neighbors. It would be even the case that people in another part of the neighborhood, where Mrs Beck used to live before she moved to the place next to Mrs Kraft’s, are happy that she finally moved away (05–08K). In both cases, Mrs Beck wants Mrs Kraft to tell her whom she is talking about (03B, 06B). She concedes that, probably, another woman living in the neighborhood, Mrs Kellergeist, with whom Mrs Beck seems to be on rather bad terms, might slander her name (04–05B). However, she urges Mrs Kraft to tell her at least one name of a supposed calumniator (09B); and when her opponent replies that she does not know these people’s names (09–10K), Mrs Beck concludes, ‘dann is es geloge [then this is a lie]’ (10–11B). She goes on to elaborate on this conclusion and to say that this claim of Mrs Kraft’s has no justificatory potential as long as Mrs Kraft is not able or not prepared to give at least one witness’s name for evidence. For such as it stands the claim seems to be taken out of the blue, just as Mrs Beck too might have the – unjustified – idea to say that nobody in the neighborhood wants to have dealings with Mrs Kraft (12–16B).

Mrs Kraft’s claim—Mrs Beck’s call for evidence—lack of consistent evidence—Mrs Beck’s conclusion that her opponent is not sincere, – this discussion figure will reappear in the further dialogue in several slightly modified variants. I have quoted one instance above: Mrs Kraft points to the Mrs Kellergeist Mrs Beck just referred to, who would have said at a gathering of the Workers’ Samaritans that she would not want anybody even to mention Mrs Beck’s name (15–19K). While the mediator is once again losing control over the mediation (18–20M), Mrs Beck points out that the members of this association cannot possibly know her (19–24B). By doing so, she displays once again that she does not hold Mrs Kraft’s evidence for her claims to be consistent. And once again, she elaborates on this by appealing to a norm of decent (communicative) behavior: it is not suitable, she says, to call a person names or to slander a person’s reputation when one does not even know this person (24–27B). This elaboration is clearly at the service of the reiterated conclusion to Mrs Kraft’s lack of sincerity (27–28B): ‘ach gott lüge sie (…) sie sin vielleicht verlorge [oh God, how you’re lying (…) how incredibly untruthful you are].’ Mrs Beck even points to an instance in the past – the birth of Mrs Kraft’s child – when Mrs Kraft would reportedly have lied as well (28–29B).\footnote{15}

In the segment I have left out, the same discussion figure reappears, and at its
end Mrs Kraft sums it up by stating explicitly how she would want Mrs Kraft to respect the norm of sincerity. Mrs Kraft would be too vague in places in which Mrs Beck asks for further preciseness; she would fail to be clear as to who are the witnesses who back her report; and this is why, as far as Mrs Beck is concerned, Mrs Kraft’s statement has to be taken as inconsistent and, hence, untruthful; for every time Mrs Beck asks for further details Mrs Kraft would try to bypass the required, more precise account of her point (31–37B). Now, the mediator points out that at some moment the discussants have finally to get to determining whether or not the mediation has been successful, and he thereby interrupts the debate about sincerity (34–36M). Probably, if he had not done so, the meanwhile well known discussion figure would have been reiterated again and again.

From the observer perspective, the analysis is led to pointing out once again that this discussion is a dead end as far as cooperative conflict resolution is concerned. The very fact that the same discussion figure about Mrs Kraft’s sincerity is reiterated over and over again is sufficient for assuming that, in terms of resolution-orientedness, the discussion does not go any step further. However, from the participant perspective, the analysis is led to taking seriously Mrs Beck’s attempts at displaying her vision of how the norm of sincerity should be respected. As both women treat the norm of sincerity as a precondition for efficient mediation or conflict resolution (03–11B/K in the first transcript), there is indeed no point in discussing as long as they do not agree that both of them do respect this norm. The dead end is just because Mrs Beck gives a broad sketch as to how the norm in question should be respected and because, nonetheless, Mrs Kraft neither conforms her statements to this sketch nor engages in a (meta)discussion about the appropriateness of Mrs Beck’s vision of respecting the norm of sincerity.16

A normative pragmatic observer-perspective analysis leads to pointing out that Mrs Kraft and Mrs Beck’s discussion hardly conforms to standards of efficient resolution oriented discussion. Hence, it can be assumed that certain higher order conditions, such as the discussants’ resolution mindedness, do not obtain. A complementary normative reconstruction from the participant perspective, on the other hand, stresses the fact that a considerable number of phenomena, such as Mrs Beck’s attempts at displaying her vision of respecting the norm of sincerity, would indeed suggest that the participants are resolution-minded to a great extent. Such a participant-perspective reconstruction, then, has to speak to the fact that Mrs Beck and Mrs Kraft do not really go any further towards resolution despite their co-operativity. The cardinal question here is to know if there are cues that allow for determining whether or not the portions of the discussion which would suggest resolution-mindedness are used strategically. For if so, it is just them which are likely to block any actual resolution.

5. The analysis from both perspectives combined
In the interaction analyzed, there are indeed cues which allow for a justified interpretation of the linguistic material exchanged as not being used strategically. Despite the consequences her behavior has (it blocks any co-operative discussion to speak of), Mrs Beck does not seem to demand constantly her opponent’s sincerity for purposes of blocking intently any discussion. This is obvious from the end of the mediation (that I have not quoted): the mediator tells Mrs Beck that she does not act reasonably, and she is deeply surprised and shocked that one might qualify her behavior as unreasonable. But more importantly, if Mrs Beck used strategically the discussion figure regarding her opponent’s sincerity, it is hardly plausible that she would apply it unchanged over and over again without noticing that it does not have the desired effect and even weakens considerably her own position, up to having herself called unreasonable in the end.

What is to be learned from this for a normative reconstruction from the participant perspective is the following. Although both the opponents have agreed – relatively explicitly – that sincerity is a precondition for any serious discussion (see the first transcript), as far as either of them is concerned, they hold their respective opponent not to be sincere. That is, they agree in abstracto on a norm that should be respected, but they disagree in concreto that a given communicative behavior can consistently be seen as respecting it. In Pike’s terminology, they take an etic perspective on argumentative interactions, from which they determine context-independently how an interaction can get them to joint conflict resolution; and they take an emic perspective on this particular argumentative interaction to see whether or not it conforms to this picture. In my terminology, they are at the same time observers and participants to their interaction, checking continuously whether it proceeds as it would according to their vision of how it should do. In the mediation analyzed, Mrs Beck is clearly of the opinion that the actual discussion does not proceed as she would want it to.

It is no coincidence that I have chosen Kenneth Pike’s etic-vs-emic framework to account for where and why Mrs Beck feels that there is a gap between ‘ought’ and ‘is.’ This can be rendered on the grounds of the traditional structural concept of a semiotic triangle in which a linguistic expression refers via a mental concept to an object or a state of affairs in the world. Mrs Beck and Mrs Kraft’s different interpretations of the situation stem from the fact that one of them (Mrs Kraft) holds that to a certain referent – her communicative behavior –, a certain concept and the corresponding linguistic expression – sincerity – may be applied, whereas the other (Mrs Beck) does not. In other words, in the opinion of one of them the semiotic triangle is broken, in the other’s, it is not. Although their (etic) observer perspectives converge, their (emic) participant perspectives differ. Rather than a pragmatic incompatibility, the reason for this is a semantic divergence.

To illustrate this, let me reconsider, from the standpoint of structural semantics, Mrs Beck’s insisting that Mrs Kraft should say plainly who are the witnesses backing her point. In (09–13B), in the second transcript, Mrs Beck explicitly
states that Mrs Kraft’s failure to give the names of her supposed witnesses is sufficient for holding her point to be a lie. In other words, the concept (or signifié, as Saussure called it) to which corresponds the linguistic expression (Saussure’s significant) sincere has among the semantic units, or: semes, from which its signification is constructed at least a cluster of semes such as [+HONEST –BIASED +ACKNOWLEDGING FULLY +TRUTHFUL]. That is why, based on this cluster of semes, no (communicative) behavior that is partly constituted by withholding information or by transmitting distorted or incomplete portions of information can be qualified as sincere. By way of consequence, any behavior to which these semes do not apply may be said to violate the norm of sincerity, which Mrs Beck and Mrs Kraft have set up for their discussion. The reasons for the women’s diverging attitudes, then, are not to be found, in the first place, on the pragmatic level (which norms should be respected?); the women agree that they should be sincere. Their disagreement takes place on the semantic level. On the one hand, a given (communicative) behavior is held by one of them to correspond, on the basis of the aforementioned cluster of semes, to the signification of the linguistic expression sincere and, hence, to respect the norm in question. On the other hand, this very (communicative) behavior is held by the other woman not to do so and, hence, to violate the norm. The question as to whether or not Mrs Kraft’s statements have any justificatory potential as long as she does not give the names of her supposed witnesses, is a particularly plain example for this. Mrs Beck interprets Mrs Kraft’s behavior as withholding or distorting information; it then has to be qualified as insincere. However, Mrs Kraft does not think so; in the portion of the dialogue I have left out, she considers, upon Mrs Beck’s reiterated call for witnesses’ names, that she might give them to her after she herself will have known them, but she continues immediately by saying, ‘des spielt doch kä roll [that doesn’t matter in the end].’ Unlike Mrs Beck, Mrs Kraft is not of the opinion that giving these names is indispensable in order for her (communicative) behavior to "merit" the label sincere.

Obviously, this issue is not, or not mainly, an issue about matters of fact. What is at stake is whether or not certain labels (signifiants, linguistic expressions) can be applied to a given referent (signifié, thing); here, whether or not Mrs Kraft’s (communicative) behavior corresponds to the signification of the label sincere. One may be tempted to treat this "struggle" about semantics, about labeling as irrelevant to the discussion proper because, structurally speaking, it is anterior to it or is on a meta-level on which the conditions for discussing are negotiated and hopefully agreed upon. However, these structural stages, or levels, of the discussion intermingle in the ongoing argumentative dialogue, for establishing Mrs Kraft’s sincerity or insincerity is a genuine part of the very issue the mediation session has gone to at this point, namely, to know whether or not Mrs Kraft lies when she claims that Mrs Beck has a quarrelsome character. For she must not lie since she has committed herself to the norm of sincerity. As a consequence for a reconstruction from the participant perspective, these intermingling functional stages, or levels, must not be separated from the sequential interactive context in which they occur.
Whether or not Mrs Kraft’s behavior (to claim that Mrs Beck has a quarrelsome character) “merits” the label sincere is indeed irrelevant, on a strict propositional or inferential basis, to resolving the issue about Mrs Beck’s claim that Mrs Kraft has insulted her so massively that she has been suffering from cardiac difficulties. However, it is not irrelevant on a communicative basis. For this very issue has led the arguers, once they have committed themselves to the norm of sincerity, to a closer examination as to whether or not the label sincere is justified in a given case. That is just why the sincerity issue is able to block any serious discussion to speak of about the insult issue which the mediation session is supposed to settle or to resolve. From the participants’ perspective, then, the issue about Mrs Kraft’s sincerity is not just a labeling affair. Instead, it is a genuine part of the very discussion about Mrs Kraft’s supposed insults. As far as the communicative process of arguing is concerned, this semantic struggle, therefore, is as important a part of the whole discussion as the arguments proper which are advanced for or against the standpoint taken by one or the other of the arguers.

By paying close attention both to the arguments about matters of fact and to the clarifying sequences which may lead to semantic struggles, an analyst can give a fuller picture of what happens in a discussion communicatively. From the observer perspective it can be accounted for how an argumentation is pieced together once it is completed. From the participant perspective it can be added how the “pieces” are introduced into the overall argumentative structure during the communicative process, and it can be checked whether or not the interactors display to their interlocutors that they hold a certain norm to be relevant, and it can determine whether or not the interactors check if it is indeed respected. An analyst can thereby point out how arguers “build up” interactively the completed argumentation and why, if applicable, they did not manage to get to conflict resolution.

6. Conclusions

In the present paper, I set out to put new life into Kenneth L. Pike’s distinction between an etic and an emic approach to social interaction. I advocated a joint etic – observer perspective – and emic –participant perspective – analysis of the communicative process of arguing. From the observer perspective, I assumed, in line with Normative Pragmatics, that arguing occurs when interactors face a communication problem (e.g., a conflict of opinion) and co-operate enough to try to solve it by way of advancing arguments for or against a problematic position. With such a concept, arguing is conceived of as a goal oriented activity and thereby equipped with a normativity inherent to this very activity. Such a theoretically elaborated model of arguing in conversation is a valuable heuristic tool for the identification of argumentative sequences in
dialogues; for the functional elements of a premise(s)–conclusion complex, which are traditionally assumed, are but very rarely plainly expressed in authentic real life dialogues.

From the participant perspective, I investigated methods and ways of accounting for whether or not the norms brought about by the assumption of co-operativity and resolution orientedness are indeed relevant in the piece of discourse analyzed. I presented a dialogue in which the interactors commit themselves relatively plainly to norms of efficient conflict resolution. Yet although they agree on guidelines for their attempt at resolving their problem, they, nevertheless, do not really get any step further towards conflict resolution. That is, the former seems to suggest that they are resolution-minded, and the latter would rather suggest that they are not. An exclusive observer perspective analysis could hardly go beyond the statement that despite their call for sincerity as a precondition of conflict resolution, the interactors do not act in such a way as to make conflict resolution likely to occur. A joint observer perspective and participant perspective analysis, on the other hand, yields the following result: The interactors appeal to norms that should guide their attempts at finding a solution to their problem, and they even agree on the kind of norms to be respected. However, they hold different opinions as to which communicative behavior can be qualified as respecting these norms. In other words, that the norm is agreed upon in abstracto does not mean that automatically the interaction can proceed without problems. For depending on either interactor’s vision of when a certain characterization (in the discussed example: sincere) is applicable to a referent (in the example: Mrs Kraft’s communicative behavior), a given referent may be held by one interactor to be of such a kind that it respects the agreed upon norm, whereas other interactors may be of a different opinion. (In the example, Mrs Kraft takes it to be sufficient for establishing her sincerity that she points to anonymous neighbors who witnessed situations in which Mrs Beck’s quarrelsome character was manifest; Mrs Beck, however, is of the opinion that Mrs Kraft has to state these supposed witnesses’ names).

Therefore, in a discussion, two kinds of argumentative movements are likely to occur. On the one hand, there is the discussion proper about a problematic position. According to a model of co-operative arguing, such as the one advocated by Normative Pragmatics, this kind of discussion is designed to allow for joint conflict resolution. As to this kind of argumentative movement, the arguers can be assumed to do roughly the same thing as an analyst, namely, to adopt an etic perspective and to observe, so to speak, their own interaction in order to know whether or not it gets them closer to this goal. On the other hand, this model is but an abstract scheme of how the interaction could proceed in view of effective resolution. The arguers cannot determine whether they come closer to conflict resolution unless they compare the ongoing interaction to the model. That is to say that the arguers, being participants to their interaction, adopt an emic standpoint as well and try to make sense of others’ contributions in terms of resolution-orientedness. It is at this point that gaps and divergences may occur. The arguers may hold different opinions as to
whether or not a contribution does indeed fulfill the argumentative function one interactor wants it to fulfill, or whether or not one or all of them are sufficiently resolution-minded.

The argumentative movement resulting from the arguers’ adopting an emic perspective, then, is largely about the bases on which the discussion proper about a position rests. From a strict structural viewpoint it can, therefore, be conceived of as being anterior to the discussion proper or as taking place on a meta-level. This is impossible, however, if the analyst sets out to reconstruct the communicative process of arguing as organized by the arguers themselves. For etic and emic argumentative movements intermingle in the course of discussion and influence upon each other. To give a fuller picture, in terms of communicative interaction, of what happens when people are discussing, I have proposed, therefore, to integrate both perspectives and to conceive of conversational arguing as proceeding genuinely by both kinds of argumentative movements.

For the exemplary analysis I presented, I chose one of the most delicate current issues in argumentation theory and analysis: Are theoretically elaborated intrinsic norms indeed relevant for the arguers, and if so, how can this be shown in the linguistic material exchanged? It has turned out that from the etic perspective (the arguers observe their own interaction to determine its extent of goal-directed efficiency), norms for co-operative arguing – in the example, the norm of sincerity – are relevant. Certain trans-situative and trans-individual standards of arguing are appealed to by arguers. However, dispute may arise about whether or not the interaction the arguers are having conforms to these standards. That is to say, the norms are relevant from an etic perspective, but whether they are indeed effective and respected may be subjected to negotiation from an emic perspective. That is the reason why norms of co-operative arguing (e.g., sincerity, soundness, consistency, credibility etc.) are seldom called into question in actual argumentative encounters. What is often called into question, however, is that a certain argumentative behavior does indeed conform to these norms. Therefore, what is at issue in the argumentative movement proceeding from an emic perspective are not so much matters of fact, i.e., the discussed position proper, as issues as to how to label "correctly" a certain referent (e.g., one interactor’s communicative behavior or a state of affairs about which one discusses). The etic observer perspective reconstruction is faced with the discussion proper about matters of fact, and typically it will end up with determining which arguments are advanced for or against which standpoint and how arguments "hang together," i.e., corroborate or weaken each other. The emic participant perspective reconstruction, on the other hand, is faced mainly with paying close attention to the semantic struggles, to the efforts of "correct" labeling taking place during the discussion. For these activities, as I have shown, are not just labeling. They represent a genuine part of the arguers’ discourse-organizing moves (and hence of a possible success of the resolution-oriented argumentative encounter). These labeling efforts are the major expression of the arguers’ co-operative attempts at negotiating, in
instances of doubt or disagreement, whether or not the norms they have themselves committed to are indeed respected, and if not, how they would want their interlocutors to respect them.

From the analysis I have presented and the conclusions I have drawn, it is clear that there is sort of an affinity between, on the one hand, the observer perspective and the reconstruction of the discussion proper and, on the other hand, between the participant perspective and the reconstruction of semantic struggles and the negotiation of labels. The observer perspective reconstruction, based on the assumption of a resolution-oriented argumentative procedure, is concerned primarily with what the arguers discuss, and it is an as yet indispensable way of identifying argumentative sequences. The participant perspective, based on the sequential succession of the arguers’ moves, is concerned mainly with how arguers discuss what they discuss, and it is similarly indispensable for suggesting why an agreement has or has not been reached in an argumentative encounter. It should be borne in mind, however, that this distinction is far from being as clear-cut as it might seem from my presentation. For in the analyzed mediation session, the institutional setting provides for determining relatively easily (from the observer perspective) what is the actual topic of the discussion. Moreover, Mrs Kraft and Mrs Beck’s discussion is such that the norms the arguers appeal to and the way in which they would want them to be respected can be extracted from the material (from the participant perspective) without major problems of interpretation.

In most argumentative encounters – especially in non-institutional ones –, this is different. Often neither the issue of the discussion nor the norms that should guide the discussion are expressed plainly. Whereas in such cases, the observer perspective reconstruction can rely on the assumption of a co-operative procedure and on the inherent normativity it brings about, the participant perspective reconstruction has to center on the interpretive processes performed by the interactors themselves. At this point, work remains to be done. With respect to norms and their relevance for conversational arguing, methods have to be looked for of determining when semantic struggles are engaged for strategic reasons. Furthermore, as systematic a repertoire as possible should be elaborated of the norms to which arguers do appeal, and this repertoire should show how arguers display to their interlocutors that they check whether or not the norms to which they have appealed – implicitly or not – are respected. The analysis I have presented is a starting point for the latter of these two lines of research.

Endnotes

1 The complete text is: ‘Budget 1999 A historical tax reduction for the Parisians; p. 7 General services: 19%; Burden of debt: 7%; Social services: 22%; Environment and local development + housing + ecological activities + transport: 35%; Culture, socializing, sports and events: 8%; Education: 9%
Expenses: Priorities confirmed anew’ N.B.: All translations in this paper are mine.

2Note that ‘republican’ implies no connotations of political couleur, such as in the name of the U.S. Republican Party. In France, the adjective républicain is roughly synonymous to ‘national’ (or ‘federal,’ depending on the type of administration of a country), meaning that what is characterized as républicain applies to the whole of the nation, not only to a local or regional authority. As opposed to the French adjective national, it mostly implies, in political discourse, that furthermore the one(s) using it claim(s) the democratic tradition going back to the French Revolution in 1789 and its fundamental revendications of Freedom, Equality, and Fraternity. As such, it is used indifferently by all French political parties.

3Citizens of federally organized countries may wonder why a comparison more or less on equal grounds is made between the State and one of its cities, albeit the capital city. Note however that after (at least) 300 years of centralism in France, the political and economic importance of the municipality of Paris is largely beyond that of any other local or territorial authority in France. Consider, for instance, that nearly a fifth of the French population lives in the Paris region; as regards culture and education, estimations run up to 80% of cultural life, 50% of research activities, and 30% of higher education being centralized in the Paris region.


5This way of putting it requires the assumption of a ‘preference for agreement’ of interaction, as put forth, e.g., by Jackson & Jacobs (1980). Scholars have been able to show that there is some problem involved in this assumption as long as the kind of interaction or of situation it is supposed to apply to is not specified; see, e.g., Bilmes (1993). It shall be obvious from this paper that although there is a point in this criticism, the preference-for-agreement assumption is, nonetheless, a valuable heuristics in the identification and reconstruction of argumentative sequences.

6The identification of arguing in colloquial speech is far from being as easy and clear-cut as a good deal of scholarly contributions tend to assume. The central elements of the traditional model of a premise(s)/conclusion complex, the starting points and the conclusion leapt to by an argumentative inference, are indeed expressed in a great many written argumentative texts. Still, it is very rare to find dialogues, for instance as recorded by discourse analytical transcripts, in which starting points or conclusions can be located more or less unambiguously. As to the problems the identification of arguing in dialogue involves, see, e.g., Spranz-Fogasy (1999).
The pedagogy of arguing is one of the aims pursued by Pragma-Dialectics; see van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1992 : 10–11).

Pike starts at a traditional structural viewpoint. That is why he speaks of theoretical etic systems applied from the outside, and (internal) emic systems which have to be ‘discovered’ by an analyst, as he has it. Throughout this paper it shall be clear that my point is less of a structural and more of a discourse analytical one. Accordingly, I am somewhat uneasy with the concept of (structural) systems of interaction. Obviously, in presenting Pike’s distinction I respect his terms.

Although it has been carried out with research objectives different from mine, the ethnological work done be Claude Lévi-Strauss (1967 [1949]; 1962) or Clifford Geertz (1973) offers ample insights as to this diversity. As far as arguing and rationality are concerned, consider that in Chinese the word meaning ‘wisdom; intelligence; knowledge’ – zhi – is often synonymous to the word ji, meaning ‘stratagem; cunning’ (and sometimes ‘ruse; trick’) (von Senger 1996 : 21). Furthermore, there is no direct equivalent of the adversative conjunction but in Chinese; the expressions used are ke shì and zhi shì, meaning literally, ‘it is possible/it may be that this is exact,’ and ‘only is it the case that.’ In other words, the adversion itself is not expressed at all; instead of establishing an adversative or confrontative relation between a preceding and a subsequent utterance, the opposite connection of utterances is smoothened, so to speak, and on the surface of it, the preceding utterance is not "attacked" but, rather, its communicative relevance is taken away (something like, "be that as it may, what counts is the following"). Although I certainly do not want to overstress this sort of linguistic metaphysics, it is worth mentioning that in other cultures the interactors’ communicative attitudes very often differ radically from what is common in our Western culture; and this seems to be the case not only because of different norms of politeness and facework.

Note that I hold it to be no problem to substitute ‘social interaction’ any time Pike speaks, for obvious reasons, of ‘language’ and/or of ‘culture.’ The units and classifications to be applied change, but the relationship between the etic and the emic standpoint with respect to the object of analysis is essentially the same.

In Germany, parties engaged in a legal dispute can be summoned to a pre-court mediation session if the case is likely to be dismissed in court. This is because of, essentially, two reasons. 1) In most of the cases, pre-court mediation is engaged in "classical" conflicts between neighbors (insult, calumniation, minor theft, ...), and pre-court mediation then is designed to spare courts (constantly overburdened in Germany) the bureaucracy of legal proceedings which will very probably be dismissed anyways. 2) Since the complaining parties most often live next to each other, a mediation may settle the conflict to either party’s satisfaction when legal proceedings would possibly be interpreted exclusively in terms of winning and losing, thereby deteriorating
further the "micro-climate" in the neighborhood.

12 The transcript is #3001/02 at Institut für deutsche Sprache, Mannheim, Germany. The material has been published previously in Schröder (Hg.) (1997). The following reconstruction owes much to Arnulf Deppermann's (1997 : 310–326) analysis of the same piece of discourse in the scope of pointing to rhetorical techniques the interactors use in order to try to establish their own, or to undermine the opponent’s, credibility.

13 Transcription conventions have been reduced since the transcript does not serve, in the first place, the analysis of oral communication. Cells are numbered consecutively to the left. Underline indicates that the segment is stressed specially; dotted line indicates that it is lengthened. A period ‘.’ refers to a short pause up to 1 sec, a slash ‘/’ to an interrupted word or phrase. Material that is hardly understandable is put between parentheses or left out ‘(…)’ if not understandable at all. Further comments are numbered and given in a column to the right of the transcript; the comments refer to the material put between pointy braces. Simultaneous production or overlap of material has been respected in the transcript proper, but only very roughly in the English translation to the right. (In order to do so, the transcript text had to be stretched or shrinked in places; this does not, however, represent any para- or non-verbal data.)

14 The ‘Workers’ Samaritans,’ or Arbeitersamariterbund in German, were founded in 1888 as an organization for mutual help and assistance among craftsmen. Today, they are an independent welfare association engaged in life-saving services and disaster control but also in social services such as assistance and transport for the disabled, ambulance, etc.

15 This point about Mrs Kraft’s child is less incongruous than it might seem from the segments I have chosen for this presentation. Children’s education is indeed at stake. Mrs Beck is childless, and one of the issues on which turns the insult affair is that in the past, Mrs Kraft insinuated that a childless woman is socially inferior. Mrs Beck, in turn, claimed that Mrs Kraft is incapable of being a good mother to her child and of giving the child a good education. (Which insult was first seems to be a hen-and-egg question.)

16 This kind of meta-discussion about the very conditions that have to obtain if conflict resolution is to be achieved, i.e., a discussion about fundamentals of discussing, taking place, metaphorically speaking, on a higher level of discourse, is what an approach relying on Habermasian (1981) discourse theory would have to assume (see, e.g., Kopperschmidt 1980; 1989). Traditional epicheirematic reconstruction, e.g., according to Toulmin’s layout, would probably end up with assuming a sub-discussion about the applicability of the warrant to the given data/claim connection. (A ”dialogification” of Toulmin’s layout has been proposed, e.g., by James Freeman (1991).) These are valid reconstructions as far as the structure of a completed argumentation is concerned. However, in line with Normative Pragmatics I take this to be
insufficient for displaying the dynamics of the communicative process of arguing. Based on pragma-dialectical concepts (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992 : Part One; 1995 : 135–137), in Normative Pragmatics this kind of meta-, or sub-discussion is reconstructed as the arguers’ suspending the discussion for the time being and stepping back to the discussions ‘opening stage’; the opening stage is a stage of the discussion which is, structurally speaking, anterior to the argumentation proper and during which the arguers agree on norms and rules which shall govern the discussion to come. As compared to genuinely structural approaches, the assumption of a discontinuous opening stage to which the arguers may step back at every moment is a substantial improvement for the analysis of the process of arguing. Still, I would advocate, rather, giving up the distinction between a level, or stage, for the discussion of basic principles of discussing and a level, or stage, for the argumentative discussion proper. There are two reasons for this: firstly, in authentic real-life interactions, both levels very often cannot be delimited with absolute certainty, and secondly, when this is possible, they influence upon each other to such an extent as to make their separation for purposes of reconstruction alter seriously the characteristics of the analyzed piece of discourse.

By demanding continuously her opponent’s sincerity, Mrs Beck has built up sort of an "all-or-nothing position" because of which she loses much of her own credibility. Indeed, in terms of winning and losing – if they are applicable to a mediation session –, Mrs Beck loses the mediation. Its outcome is the minimal compromise the mediator headed for. Mrs Kraft apologizes for having insulted her neighbor; but none of the further claims Mrs Beck brought up during the mediation session is taken into consideration. Mrs Beck has even to experience sort of a "ceremonial degradation" for unreasonable communicative behavior which is carried out by the mediator (see Deppermann 1997 : 324–326).

One of the most popular interpretations of this semiotic triangle is the one offered by Charles Ogden and Ivor Richards (1923) in which a (linguistic) ‘form’ refers via a (conceptual) ‘meaning’ to a ‘thing’ in the world.

From a genuinely structural perspective, de Chanay (1993) has offered a similar account, based, as to its argumentation theoretical portion, on Jean-Claude Anscombre & Oswald Ducrot’s Theory of argumentation within the langue.

I prefer to speak of ‘kind’ rather than of ‘type,’ ‘level,’ or ‘stage,’ because the two kinds seem neither to be clearly separated in ongoing discussions nor to constitute well-defined types of an exhaustive typology.

The norms of co-operative, efficient arguing underlying the model of conflict resolution which is advocated by Normative Pragmatics are reformulated as a "dialectical decalogue" by the proponents of Pragma-Dialectics; see van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1992; 1995).

While in the mediation session I presented, this labeling seems not to have
Strategic objectives, it is indeed a powerful tool with which one can block discussion about a fact or action by denying it the label under which others want it to be discussed. This manoeuvre has been known since Hermagoras of Temnos’s classical *stasis* theory: a resource an advocate may use is to deny that the action the defendant is accused of would indeed be a crime. One of the most pervasive semantic struggles in our days has been the abortion debate in which labels range from ‘interruption of pregnancy’ to ‘murder.’ Obviously, here the label is all but innocent; for depending on which label one holds to be applicable to the fact, the way in which it is discussed – and probably the matters discussed as well – will be different.

References


