May 15th, 9:00 AM - May 17th, 5:00 PM

Rhetoric and Reason in the Civil Science of Thomas Hobbes

William Mathie
Brock University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive

Part of the Philosophy Commons

https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA2/papersandcommentaries/76

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Abstract:
In successive versions of Hobbes's political teaching we see a changing account of the nature of rhetoric, or eloquence, and of the dangers it poses for political life. In his *Leviathan* Hobbes expresses a new confidence that the causes of political dissolution can in principle be entirely eradicated. I argue that Hobbes's new hope is based on his account of the problem of rhetoric and of the solution to that problem developed in *Leviathan*. I also examine two recent and important accounts of Hobbes's understanding of rhetoric by Quentin Skinner and David Johnston.

Political philosophy first comes to sight within Greek antiquity as the enterprise of men who must distinguish themselves from teachers of the art of rhetoric. That Socrates knew, and taught, how to make the worse argument prevail over the better was part of the original accusation against which he defended himself in the Platonic *Apology*. The distinguishing of political philosophy from rhetoric is often the critique of rhetoric—the distinguishing between dialectic and rhetoric—but it would be wrong to say that the philosophers simply condemned the teachers of rhetoric. Though Socrates speaks as if he devoted himself entirely to the questioning of political men, poets, and craftsmen, in many of the dialogues he talks with teachers of rhetoric and their pupils.1 One might also observe that when the philosophers deny the equation of *politike* or political science with the art of rhetoric by showing that the art is less powerful than its professors claim, one consequence of their critique of rhetoric is to reduce its magnitude as a proper object of public fear.2

In Plato's *Gorgias* the famous teacher of rhetoric who gives his name to the dialogue fatally contradicts himself when he cannot reconcile the bold claims Socrates has tempted him to make for his art with his awareness of its actual weakness in the face of public distrust. The explicit contradiction in which Socrates catches Gorgias is this: Gorgias had previously been at some pain to insist that the public ought not to blame teachers of rhetoric if their students misuse their art any more than they should blame boxing teachers if their pupils use what they have learned against their fathers, say. But now he has acknowledged that the teacher of rhetoric will always instruct his pupil in the just and unjust things if he happens not to know them upon arrival at the school of rhetoric, and he accepts Socrates' suggestion that one who knows what is just will be just. There would seem then to be no possibility that rhetoric could be used unjustly and so no reason to fear public distrust.

How has Gorgias been led to this debacle? Gorgias had argued that learners of his art—any who study it—will obtain the greatest good because they will be in a position to rule over the practitioners of all other arts. They will rule over the other craftsmen because they can produce persuasion in the minds of hearers in public assemblies and law courts. Gorgias and Socrates had also agreed that rhetoric produces belief but not knowledge about what is just and unjust in law courts and public assemblies and Socrates had even suggested a justification for rhetoric on this understanding: no one could teach so many about matters so great in so short a time (455a). But Socrates had then provoked Gorgias to go much further when he objected on behalf of the rhetorician's potential students that public deliberations are not generally restricted to questions of the just and unjust. More often the
assembly considers matters about which expert advice is available—whether and how the city should be fortified, for example. Gorgias had replied that it was the rhetorician not the experts who would lead the assembly to accept the advice of one or another expert. When Socrates declared himself amazed at the power of this art of rhetoric that enables one who does not know to prevail over those who do know by persuading others who are ignorant, Gorgias had suddenly reflected that the ignorant may hate those who boast of their ability to dupe them. And as we have seen, the concessions Gorgias makes to counter this threat reveal how incoherent is his understanding of the art he teaches.

Does Gorgias’s defeat show the weakness of rhetoric? Socrates seems to have thought so for he subsequently describes it as a sham art that is unable to give any account of itself, an art that aims to flatter not improve those it addresses, an art that could only be of use in its forensic form and then only to make sure that we and our friends are punished for any acts of injustice we may have performed (463a-465e, 480b-d). On the other hand, we can hardly fail to notice that Socrates’ defeat of the great rhetorician was itself somehow rhetorical. The dilemma from which Gorgias could not extricate himself was on both sides a consequence of the rhetorician’s determination to persuade or at least assuage others as that concern is manipulated by the philosopher; Gorgias was even forced to give up any chance to escape public defeat by Socrates’s sly public offer to end the argument if Gorgias were the sort of person who would rather avoid refutation than arrive at the truth about what is at issue. Does Socrates’ at least partly rhetorical defeat of Gorgias show the strength or weakness of rhetoric? Or that it is neither as powerful as Gorgias claims, nor as insignificant as Socrates pretends? Or is what we see here, as in several other Platonic dialogues, the strength of a philosopher’s speech when it is aimed at a single interlocutor who is vulnerable to a kind of compulsion because he must care more, or differently, than Socrates how others see him and because Socrates knows this?3

But my subject is Thomas Hobbes and the significance of rhetoric for his civil or moral science. Recent scholarship has come to acknowledge that Hobbes did not simply condemn rhetoric and base his civil science on its contrary. Yet one might wonder whether this revised understanding does not still suffer from its assumption that Hobbes’s predecessors too starkly opposed dialectic as the way philosophers pursue truth to rhetoric by which sophists aim only to flatter.4 I have supposed that by recalling the ambiguous condemnation of rhetoric we find in classical political science and political philosophy, we are more likely to find in Hobbes’s understanding and practice of rhetoric the means to uncover his own intention as a political philosopher.

Recent and not so recent accounts of the significance of rhetoric for and within Hobbes’s political teaching have often pursued this question as if it might help us know what to make of the differences between the three, four, or five systematic statements of that teaching.5 It has been argued, for example, that changes in Hobbes’s teaching on the derivation of the subject’s obligation to obey the sovereign6, in his account of human nature as expressed in the state of nature7, and in his treatment of biblical religion8 all reflect in various ways a purpose Hobbes has in Leviathan that is somehow rhetorical. The claim that Hobbes should have had such a purpose must be reconciled, of course, with the fact that Hobbes has condemned rhetoric in every statement of his teaching. My intention here is to examine how Hobbes has variously understood the problem posed by rhetoric and eloquence in his Elements of Law, De Cive, and Leviathan and to consider how and how far we find a solution to that problem as Hobbes has come to understand it in the institutional prescriptions in Leviathan.

In his Elements of Law Hobbes examines and condemns rhetoric as a necessary and even sufficient condition of sedition. Sedition will occur, Hobbes says, whenever those who are discontented by reason of fear or ambition, believe themselves justified in disobeying the sovereign, and think they can remove their discontent through sedition find a suitable leader (2.8.1). The leaders needed according to Hobbes’s formula must combine a lack of
wisdom with much eloquence (2.8.12-13). If by wisdom we mean prudence, or the ability to conjecture what is likely from past experience, they show their lack of it when they forget that for every sedition that has won its leader honour, twenty have failed shamefully; yet Hobbes also refers us to a previous description (at 1.4.10) of prudence as "taking of signs from experience warily" where he had warned against failing to see how one's own case might differ from a previous "twenty." Sedition may find leaders among the "warily" prudent.

That leaders of sedition lack wisdom understood as the science of "what is right and wrong, and what is good and hurtful to the being and well-being of mankind" is evident, Hobbes says, from the very fact that they do not know what Hobbes has just shown—that none of the pretended justifications of sedition holds (2.8.13). They possess not science but opinion for they name right and wrong in accordance with their passions, or on the authority of others like Aristotle who have themselves named right and wrong according to their passions." They do not name right and wrong "according to their true and generally agreed-upon names..." (2.8.13). Now we might wonder how far the "true" and "generally agreed upon" meanings of words coincide and thereby lead to conclusions favouring the well being of mankind, or how far the perception of this equation depends upon Hobbes's own explication of the meanings of the names that have been commonly agreed upon, or something very like it. One could say that Hobbes condemns rhetoric here by presenting its power as unlimited. Though sedition requires the concurrence of discontent, belief in its rightfulness, hope of success, and eloquent leadership, eloquence, we now learn, can itself create the other requirements where they do not already exist (2.8.14). So Hobbes calls the eloquent, authors of sedition. And like Socrates, Hobbes is ready to deny that rhetoric itself is any kind of wisdom; it is rather, he says, "a habit gotten of putting together passionate words and applying them to the present passions of the hearer." On the other hand, one could also say that Hobbes furnishes an implicit justification for rhetoric in this same passage. What Hobbes takes to prove that the leaders of sedition must be eloquent are the requirements of demonstrating and teaching the truth—long deductions and close attention that are unpleasant to the hearer and impossible when the hearers are many. It may well be that the eloquent aim not at truth but at establishing a certain belief in their hearers and that they try to get this out of what those hearers' already believe or by stirring their passions, but what makes this necessary is not the fact that the eloquent aim at victory, not truth, but the impossibility Hobbes acknowledges of demonstrating and teaching the truth.

Although still necessary to the creation of sedition, in De Cive Hobbes presents eloquence as just a little less formidable and he attends more to the disposition of those the eloquent must lead; he calls the leaders of sedition not "authors" but "artists" and says they must "turn their auditors out of fools into madmen (2.12.12)." And he describes them as disturbing the minds of their hearers so that they perceive things not as they are but "such as they in their minds, prepared before, had already conceived them." By accepting some one or other of the false doctrines that would justify their action, supporters of sedition show that they do not know what it is to be obliged "beyond that which seems good and right in their own eyes" and as a result can unite under some leader only because of the opinion they have of his virtue, or military skill, or likeness of humour to themselves (2.12.11). Instead of simply opposing wisdom to eloquence, Hobbes now distinguishes between a wise eloquence that explains things as they are by clearly and elegantly expressing the speaker's conception on the basis of true principles, and an unwise eloquence that appeals to the existing opinions of the hearers through a metaphorical use of words fitted to the passions. That the leaders of sedition are unwise in this latter sense is shown by the false doctrines they promote, for they must believe them in order to succeed in this. Finally, Hobbes suggests here that the folly of the people who are seduced by this eloquence reflects their wish to restore "the ancient government" which was a democracy.

Eloquence also enters into Hobbes's account of the relative inconveniences of the kinds of commonwealth in the
Elements of Law and in De Cive but its treatment in the two texts is very different. In his Elements, Hobbes compares only monarchy and aristocracy because every democracy is in fact an aristocracy governed by a few orators or, more rarely, a monarchy governed by one (2.2.5, 2.5.3). Eloquence enters into Hobbes's case against aristocracy in the Elements just to the extent that decisions there are sometimes made by large assemblies.13

In De Cive the nine paragraphs devoted to the inconveniences of the several kinds of commonwealth in his Elements become nineteen, the two kinds chiefly compared are democracy and monarchy, and the analysis of eloquence is much expanded. Here the argument for monarchy is the case against democracy, the case against democracy arises out of Hobbes's analysis of the case for it made by its champions, and the core of that analysis is the account of eloquence. Subjects are more likely to be oppressed to enrich favourites and advance the unworthy because the popular orators are numerous "and daily new ones growing" and the use they make of their power is even necessary if it is not to exceed that of the people too much (2.10.6). Innocent subjects are more likely to be condemned for here there are "as many Neros as there are orators who soothe the people" and "each one of them can do as much as the people" (2.10.7). Nor will the victims of Nero in a monarchy include those who "lead a private life."

But what of liberty? Partisans claim that it is greater in democracy. In his reply we arrive at the heart of Hobbes's critique of democracy and see the role of eloquence in it. Rightly defined, as being under such laws only as are necessary for peace, liberty is as great in a monarchy (2.10.8). What the partisans really mean by liberty and claim for democracy is the opportunity "to show their wisdom, knowledge, and eloquence" in public deliberation. Hobbes's reply to this claim is two-fold. Partly, he identifies the bad consequences of eloquence; in doing so he mostly develops and augments what he had argued in the Elements.14 So terrible are the consequences of public deliberations that provide a forum for eloquence that Hobbes compares the case for democracy that it gives an opportunity to the eloquent to the case for war that it gives an opportunity to the brave (2.10.9).

But Hobbes does something more here that he does not do elsewhere, at least explicitly. He tells us why the demand for an opportunity to display eloquence is made. He answers those who makes this demand. And he hints where one might have to look in order to overcome the dangers associated with eloquence. Those who argue against monarchy say that it deprives those who excel in "wisdom, knowledge, and eloquence" in the consideration of difficult and important issues of "the most delightful of all things" (2.10.9). They ask "what is a grievance if this be none?"

Hobbes answers with unusual vehemence:

I will tell you: to see his opinion, whom we scorn, preferred before ours; to have our wisdom undervalued before our own faces; by an uncertain trial of a little vain glory, to undergo most certain enmities (for this cannot be avoided, whether we have the better or the worse); to hate and to be hated, by reason of the disagreement of opinions; to lay open our secret councils and advices to all, to no purpose and without any benefit; to neglect the affairs of our own family: these, I say, are grievances.

Yet if there is here an answer to the eloquent that they can confirm if they reflect upon their experience in the manner Hobbes suggests, we must ask how effective that answer can be for those who need to be convinced. Hobbes acknowledges that the "desire of praise" that moves the eloquent or those who seem so to themselves is "bred in human nature." Will these weigh the imagined pains of failure in the assembly more heavily than the delight in success?15 One cost of participation we must pay regardless of success: the neglect of our own family's affairs. At the close of the present discussion Hobbes explains how it can be that men are led to mind the
public rather than their own private business (2.10.15). All that can explain this departure from what Hobbes here calls the natural inclination of every man is the chance to be reputed ingenious and wise and so "returning home to his friends, to his parents, to his wife and children, rejoice and triumph in the applause of his dexterous behaviour." What explains the departure from the natural inclination to prefer the private to the public is the anticipation of applause occasioned by a public performance but experienced on return to the private. And lest the private location of this enjoyment be supposed incidental or unimportant, Hobbes makes what looks like the same observation the basis for a parallel he derives through an interpretation of the actions of Coriolanus:

As of old, all the delight Marcus Coriolanus had in his warlike actions, was to see his praises so well pleasing to his mother.

If the kind of public performance through which Coriolanus sought praise was hardly eloquence, Hobbes himself has compared the danger to the commonwealth posed by the war-like and the orators. That said, it is hard to imagine a less tractable subject than the Roman general. Yet we are reminded that it was his concern to please his mother that finally overcame Coriolanus's intransigence. Might the elevation of domestic concerns and simultaneous denigration of the political inoculate against the still deadly threat of sedition posed by eloquence?

How are we to account for Hobbes's unprecedented claim in Leviathan that the commonwealth can be made immortal, that improved architecture can enable it to overcome all internal causes of dissolution? We have seen no reason to suppose that Hobbes had ever thought reason sufficient to establish a civil science that would have this result especially because of the threat posed by eloquence and the eloquent. In Leviathan eloquence all but disappears from Hobbes' thematic analysis of the causes of dissolution—he compares them to bodily diseases but names no disease that corresponds to eloquence. Hobbes mentions eloquence briefly in his brief comparison of kinds of commonwealth, but he deals with it at length and severely in a new chapter "Of Counsel." As ordinary readers and scholars have often observed, Hobbes's own teaching acquires a newly rhetorical form in Leviathan. And in its "Review and Conclusion" Hobbes has even declared that "reason and eloquence (though not perhaps in the natural yet in the moral) may stand very well together" and suggested that without powerful eloquence to procure "attention and consent" the effect of reason in human deliberations will be little. How might Hobbes's new willingness to combine eloquence and reason support his new hope? Elsewhere I have argued that the revised egalitarianism in Leviathan based on the passionate refusal of all to admit any other wiser than themselves could partly account for Hobbes's new hope especially as that hope is restated by one of the speakers in his Behemoth. That speaker thinks that the science of just and unjust might be taught more easily than rebellion now is despite its difficulty if based upon "principles evident to the meanest capacity." Here, however, I want to consider what more immediate grounds we might find for Hobbes's new hope in the revised account of the "Office of the Sovereign Representative" where he states it, and in his account of eloquence in "Of Counsel."

Though Hobbes has previously said that the sovereign ought to instruct his subjects so as to root out the false doctrines that justify sedition, in Leviathan he attaches much greater importance to that duty and gives a far longer and more complex account of the means and content of the public instruction required. That the public be instructed in the rights of the sovereign is essential because those rights cannot be maintained by any civil law or by punishing the disobedient, and it is the discovery by Hobbes of the "principles of reason" underlying those rights that makes it possible for the commonwealth, like a modern house, to last as long as the materials out of which it is constructed (2.30 [5], p. 220)]. But how are the public to be instructed in those rights? Always Hobbes says this must begin with the instruction of the young in the universities in the true civil science particularly as it refutes the false doctrines that justify sedition. In his Elements, he says the false opinions the young now
learn in the universities were first "insinuated" by the "eloquent sophistry" of Aristotle and others and argues that
the young will readily abandon false for true doctrine because their minds are "yet as white paper" (2.9.8). In De
Cive he thinks that those educated in the universities in accordance with his science of justice will instruct the
vulgar "cheerfully and powerfully" because they are convinced of the truth of what they profess (2.13.9).

Hobbes has not previously distinguished as he does now between what the young at the universities are to be
taught and what they subsequently teach. He makes that distinction when he replies to someone who might
object that even if Hobbes's "principles of reason" are right—because reasonable or because they can be
derived from scriptural authority—they are beyond the capacity of the common people. Hobbes's answer is that
it is the common people who are like "clean paper" ready to be written upon. What proves this is their
acquiescence in religious doctrines that are beyond or contrary to reason. As this proof might lead us to expect
what the people is to be taught by those educated at the universities in Hobbes's civil science is not that science,
nor anything derived from it, but a set of commandments modelled upon the Decalogue. If those teachers are to
teach these things "cheerfully and powerfully" this can no longer be because they are convinced of the truth of
what they teach. Could the difference between what they have learned and what they teach supply a motive?

In Leviathan Hobbes also teaches as he had not previously that it is an important and—as we shall see—very
difficult duty of the sovereign to choose able counsellors though it is no duty at all where the sovereign is not a
single person but an assembly because in the latter case "the persons counselling are members of the person
counselling (2.30 [25])." Previously Hobbes has written as if the relative inconveniences of the kinds of
commonwealth are matters of degree, sometimes as if the case for monarchy is only probable, not demonstrable
like so much of Hobbes's teaching. Yet here is an important duty that cannot even be attempted except in
monarchy. If the proper performance of this important duty partly explains Hobbes's new hope of preserving the
commonwealth, that hope must be confined to monarchy.

Before turning to Hobbes's account of the difficulty of choosing able counsellors we note that this question has
already been broached in the new chapter "Of Counsel." There we observe that most of the dangers formerly
associated with eloquence—and new dangers identified for the first time here—have become reasons why one
would be better advised by hearing one's counsellors "apart, [rather] than in an assembly" and the argument of
the chapter as a whole comes close to identifying the very idea of a sovereign assembly as a mistake that would
be avoided by properly distinguishing "counsel" from "command." The distinction Hobbes makes is this: one who
commands says "do this" advancing no reason other than his own will that it be done; one who counsels rather
claims that doing what is counselled will benefit the one counselled. From this it follows, Hobbes claims, that
no one can be obliged to do as counselled—there would be no counselling in this case—nor claim the right to
counsel anyone. It also follows that one who counsels must show the consequences of what he advises and tie
himself "to the rigour of true reasoning"—all who exhort reveal themselves as false counsellors because they
appear to the passions of those supposedly counselled. Yet exhortation is all that is possible for one who
addresses a multitude that cannot interrupt him to test his reasons. One could suppose that Hobbes means simply
to abolish all public deliberation by his definition of counsel, but this would ignore a quite different tendency of his
discussion. It follows also from "the nature of counsel" that one who asks for it
cannot in equity accuse or punish it: for to ask counsel of another, is to permit him to give such
counsel as he shall think best; and consequently, he that giveth counsel to his sovereign, (whether a
monarch, or an assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the same
be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the proposition in debate.
And in explaining why it is better to receive the advice of each counsellor privately, Hobbes says this is so that one will get the sense of each; in the assembly many are moved rather by their fear of displeasing the assembly, or those who have spoken, or of seeming duller than those who have applauded the speaker. If Hobbes’s definition of counsel denies that deliberation is possible in large assemblies, it may also point towards the modern account of representation. 28 Taken together with the kind of judicial interpretation associated with the definition of law as command as distinguished from counsel, we may even arrive at a plausible and, to us, quite familiar system of governance that averts the dangers of eloquence. 29

But what of the eloquent and the ambitious whose ambition leads them to seek out ways of displaying eloquence? Does Hobbes's hope of an immortal commonwealth imply their transformation? Might Hobbes have thought that there was a possible satisfaction for human beings of this kind consistent with the peace of the commonwealth in the prospect of being selected by the sovereign as able counsellors? The new duty of choosing counsellors follows upon a warning to the sovereign against buying off ambitious subjects as at best postponing and augmenting the danger they pose. 30 Who are the most able counsellors? Not those who can benefit from "public troubles." Nor the rich and noble as such:

unless we shall think there needs no method in the study of the politics, (as there does in the study of geometry,) but only to be lookers on; which is not so. For the politics is the harder study of the two (2.30 [25]).

In fact so difficult is the knowledge that the most able counsellor should have that it is unlikely to belong to any sovereign who is looking for a counsellor who has it—if the sovereign was so wise he would not need a counsellor. The sovereign can only be guided by external signs of that wisdom. 31 Might the highest ambition not find some satisfaction in the secret recognition of such superiority?

As the creator of a civil science intended to be the basis of a peaceful and commodious society and free of all uncertainties, Hobbes seeks to revise and perfect the tradition of political philosophy. He at once condemns his inadequate predecessors and accepts the legitimacy of their enterprise. To be sure, the success of what Hobbes attempts depends on more than the substitution of true for false civil science—the divines and the common lawyers must also be defeated. And there is above all the threat to civil order constituted by eloquence that has been our subject here. Hobbes's hope for an immortal commonwealth depends in large measure upon the connection he makes between eloquence as a threat to civil peace and the failings of his predecessors. The false doctrines that justify sedition were first "insinuated" by the "eloquent sophistry" of Aristotle and others. If the first political philosophers were eloquent then, were they like subsequent leaders of sedition also unwise? Was it not their claim, in fact and as Hobbes understands it, that wisdom is the best or only title to rule? But it is precisely Hobbes's claim that Aristotle established politics on a fatally insecure basis by making men "by nature, some more worthy to command, meaning the wiser sort, (such as he thought himself to be for his philosophy;) others to serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not philosophers as he)..." (Leviathan 1.15 [21], p.96). This is the wrong foundation for political science not only because few will accept it but because it identifies ruling with the claim to be wise, and being ruled with the acknowledgement that one is not. If eloquence is pretending to be wise in matters of governance then one can link eloquence to the Aristotelian mistake. In the Preface to De Cive Hobbes goes so far as to treat the Socratic turn from natural to civil philosophy as the fatal step responsible for all subsequent civil strife, to imagine "a golden age" without political philosophy and all that has followed from it. In condemning rhetoric, or eloquence, Hobbes associates it with long speeches and the avoidance of interruption. In Leviathan something like the Socratic distinction between dialectic and rhetoric becomes the distinction between counsel and exhortation. If Hobbes does not repeat his lament for a golden age without
political philosophy, this may be because he hopes to have created a world in which philosophy no longer leads to the dangers of eloquence. The question remains how far the civil science through which this world is to be created has itself a rhetorical character.

Notes

1. In the Republic the account of justice and its defence is and remains importantly a dialogue between Socrates and a teacher of rhetoric, Thrasymachos. What links Socrates and Thrasymachos is the weight both attribute to the logoi.

2. That speech is less powerful than the teachers of rhetoric think is suggested even in the first bantering between Socrates and the young men who point to their strength and number in order to compel him to join them in conversation at the home of Cephalos. When Socrates suggests he might be able to persuade them to release him, they reply that his arguments against their plan could succeed only if they agreed to listen to them (327c). The equation of political science and rhetoric is denied, for example, by Aristotle at Nicomachean Ethics 1181a12-15. On the limits of the sophists' power see the Republic 492e-493d.

3. The most extreme instance is that of Meletus as he is examined before the jury whose votes he seeks though even, or especially here, we perceive the ambiguous power of the philosopher's speech. Socrates can compel Meletus to answer his questions so as to contradict himself but in the course of doing so Socrates may incidentally persuade the jury that the charge that he makes the weaker argument prevail is true.

4. In his review of Quentin Skinner's, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, Brian Vickers questions whether Skinner may not have "undervalued" Hobbes's "Greek sources" but goes on to say uncritically that Hobbes took up "the old quarrel between philosophy and rhetoric." Times Literary Supplement August 16, 1996.

5. See, for example, Mathie, "Reason and Rhetoric in Hobbes's Leviathan," Interpretation (May & Sept. 1986) pp. 281-282; David Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. xviii-xix; the review by Mathie of Johnston's book at Interpretation (17.1), especially pp. 146-147; and Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp.334-356. Or consider the importance attached to Hobbes's continuing reconsideration of Aristotle's Art of Rhetoric in Leo Strauss's account of The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963). Here as in my earlier essay I have mostly confined my discussion to the Elements of Law, De Cive in its English translation commonly attributed to Hobbes (but see Skinner at xvi), and the English Leviathan. Variations between the last work and Hobbes's subsequent Latin version are of larger importance for Skinner because his investigation primarily focuses upon Hobbes's employment of specific rhetorical devices recognized in classical treatises on rhetoric and within sixteenth century treatments of those devices. As Curley has shown in his valuable edition of Leviathan that indicates where and how the Latin version departs from the English these differences are also of great importance for any adequate treatment of Hobbes's handling of the "politico-theological problem." I believe this makes those differences crucial for any final understanding of the "rhetoric of Leviathan" though I have largely excluded their consideration from this essay.
6. Clifford Orwin has argued against David Gauthier [*The Logic of Leviathan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969)] and others that the "authorization" theory of obligation in *Leviathan* does not at all alter the extent or nature of sovereign authority or the obligation of subjects or its generation ("On the Sovereign Authorization," *Political Theory* (v3, number 1). The change is rather what Hannah Pitkin is happy to call a rhetorical improvement on the previous version (ibid, p. 47). On the other hand, it would be misleading—though perhaps correct—to say that the change is merely rhetorical for it may mark a major step towards the privatized morality of liberal democracy.

7. F.S. McNeilly [*The Anatomy of Leviathan* (London: Macmillan, 1968)] has argued that we may extrapolate from *Elements of Law* and *De Cive* through *Leviathan* to a perfected statement of Hobbes's teaching that would rest on an entirely formal account of human nature. I have tried to refute this interpretation in "Reason and Rhetoric in Hobbes's *Leviathan*," pp. 292-295.

8. David Johnston has argued that Hobbes has arrived at a rhetorical conception of his enterprise because he sees the need and chance to transform the culture of Christianity that stands in the way of obtaining a rational society and politics. *The Rhetoric of Leviathan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

9. In the passage that immediately follows the earlier account of "wary" prudence to which he refers, Hobbes says that to have heard a sentence given in like cases a thousand times is not enough "to conclude that the sentence is just..."(1.4.11). To reach this conclusion it is "necessary... to trace and find out, by many experiences, what men do mean by calling things just and unjust.

10. In the *Elements of Law* Hobbes had begun his account of seditious eloquence by citing what the Roman historian Sallust had said of Cataline as the greatest "author" of sedition, that he combined little wisdom with much eloquence and, as we have seen, Hobbes's own analysis had maintained the distinction between wisdom and eloquence made by Sallust. In *De Cive* Hobbes continues to note that "Sallust separates wisdom from eloquence" but he himself immediately replaces this with a distinction between two kinds of eloquence.

11. Like Gorgias Hobbes seems to assume that one could not have the true understanding of justice without acting justly.

12. In both accounts Hobbes compares the eloquence of the leaders of sedition and the folly of the people whom they persuade to the witch Medea and the daughters of king Pelias who are persuaded by her to butcher their father in order to restore him to his youth; in *De Cive* Hobbes adds that what the common people desire thereby is "to renew the ancient government"... (2.12.13) According to both the *Elements of Law* and *De Cive* the ancient government is democracy (*Elements of Law* 2.2.1,6; *De Cive* 2.7.5)

13. The abuse of power arising out of the passions of those who exercise it is far more likely where every man delivers his opinion in long uninterrupted speeches designed to inflame the passions of his auditors (2.5.4). Laws are likely to vary more than changed circumstances warrant because each whose mind changes will try to change the opinions of other members of the assembly (2.5.7). And here civil war becomes probable when powerful opposing factions emerge because men seek the honour of having their advice prevail or of having the policies of their successful opponents fail (2.5.8).

14. The argument that abuses of power to the cost of individuals are more likely when decisions are made by
large assemblies, because it must be the business of the successful orator to stir up the passions of his auditors, becomes a reason "why a great assembly is not so fit for consultation...(2.10.11)." The need for secrecy and expert competence in public deliberations are added to the considerations set out in the Elements and the inconvenience arising out of unnecessary changes in the laws is connected to an exact account of how assemblies generate factions.

15. The question resembles one that could be asked of Hobbes's refutation of the fool "who has said in his heart there is no justice" at Leviathan 2.15.

16. Hobbes observes this in the course of making his final argument against democracy, that even democracy prefers smaller committees for the consideration of matters of great consequence.


19. The claim is also made in the preceding chapter where Hobbes reviews the causes of dissolution but the major difference between this and the parallel discussions in Elements of Law and De Cive is the omission of all mention of eloquence.

20. One paragraph of the nine that outline the sovereign's duties in the Elements of Law and of the seventeen in De Cive are replaced by ten of the thirty in Leviathan.

21. That rebellion can be averted only when the people understand their duty to obey as a natural obligation is barely suggested in De Cive (2.13.9) but stated far more emphatically at Leviathan 2.30 [4], p. 220.

22. More difficult are the powerful who object to whatever might restrict their appetites, and the learned who object to being found wrong (2.30 [6], p. 221.).

23. To see that true doctrine can be taught to the people Hobbes says we must consider how the false doctrines "contrary to the peace of mankind" have been "instilled into the people." What he shows us in fact is that most of mankind are diverted from the deep meditation needed for the understanding of natural justice by the demands of their trade or by their devotion to sensual pleasures. They therefore get their notions of duty from the pulpit or from acquaintances whose readiness to talk of them makes them seem wiser than themselves in these matters. In turn "the divines, and such others as make show of learning" get their notions at the university, or schools of law, or from books favoured there (2.30 [14], p. 225).


25. See for example the "Author's Preface to the Reader" in De Cive [par. 8].

26. The distinction is also the basis of Hobbes's definition of law as this will be developed in Ch. 26.
27. The freedom for counsellors Hobbes obtains by his definition of counsel resembles that recommended by Diodotus at Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 3.43.


30. In the parallel section of *De Cive* though not here Hobbes admits that as "it so happens sometimes, that ... we must stroke a horse by reason of his too much fierceness, so a stiff-necked subject must be flattered for fear of his power" (2.13.12).

31. As for those who claim the privilege of giving counsel as a right attached to a title or estate, Hobbes observes that when forced to compete for this as a favour of the sovereign... "they must needs by degrees let [their privileges] go, and have at last no further honour, than adhereth naturally to their abilities (2.30 [25])."