An age cohort analysis of religious voting in Canada.

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University of Windsor

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AN AGE COHORT ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS VOTING IN CANADA

by

David William Rees

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies through the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at The University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

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ABSTRACT
AN AGE COHORT ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS VOTING IN CANADA

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David William Rees

The relationship between religion and party preference has existed in Canada since the early twentieth Century. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the shifts in the alignment of the electorate with regard to a decline in the political relevance of religion. The method of analysis is that of age cohorts. The premise of cohort analysis is that persons entering the electorate develop distinct partisan ties (which are held throughout their lives) related to the political events surrounding their entry. It is then possible to determine the ways in which party support bases have changed over the past fifty years. For this purpose I have used data from the 1965, 1968 and 1974 national election studies. Selected social characteristics were amassed into a single data set in order to give a total sample size of 8051. In effect, I have aggregated the data for individuals from three surveys which were administered at different points in time.

In the first chapter there is a general review of the literature, a statement of the hypotheses and a definition of the concepts involved.

Party images, stemming from political events which "alienated" Catholics and the Conservative party, appear to be responsible for the development of religious based voting. Religious self-identification remains today the most important determinant of voting behaviour trans-
cending ethnicity, region and the strength of the id-
entification.

The most common explanation for the persistence of 
this relationship has been socialization. This is the 
process by which children "inherit" the partisanship of 
their parents. Since religion is an ascribed group, rel-
egious voting continues over generations regardless of 
the political relevancy of religion. My findings indicate, 
however, that irrespective of parental partisanship Cath-
olics have a strong preference for the Liberal party.

The strength of parties within cohorts may diverge 
from that of their parents simply because of differing 
rates of reproduction. This is expected to have strong 
implications for the party system as sixty percent of 
the youngest cohort, as opposed to forty percent of the 
oldest, are Catholic. The Liberal party can expect to 
benefit disproportionately from differential fertility.

Using correlation coefficients, an Index of Religious 
Partisanship and beta coefficients the cohorts do show 
an overall decline in the strength of religious voting. 
At the same time the third, more secular, parties have 
gained in strength. As younger people are less religious 
and have weaker partisan ties than older persons this was 
thought to be related to the decline in religious voting. 
Literature suggests, however, that these phenomenon can 
be better explained by the life cycle. As an alternative 
it was necessary to use levels of parental interest in 
religion and willingness to change vote in order to sup-
port the generational argument.

The secularization of society in the past decade was
indicated by declining church attendance and increased rates of inter-marriage. Utilizing regression analysis the predictive power of religion was seen to decline within the cohorts over this period. The net benefactor of secularization was expected to be the New Democratic Party.

The thesis concludes with a summation of the inter-relationships between the various factors considered and the possible implications of these for both the party support bases and strength.
para sa akin mahal, mehng
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Chapter One

The impact of religion on voting behaviour has been documented in Canada, the United States, and many European democracies. The most significant finding has been the degree to which the influence of religion varies from one nation to another. In Britain religion plays virtually no role in electoral behaviour whereas it is more strongly associated with party preference than any other demographic variable(s) in Canada.

How is it that religion and politics become so strongly associated? They can be related directly through interaction between the elites of the two institutional structures. Or, it may be related indirectly, through a value system imposed by the church which affects an individual's perception of governmental outputs. It might also be related to the extent to which society is segregated, that is, social interaction among members of the same faith may foster similar voting behaviour.

I am mainly concerned with the process of political change. Therefore, I am interested first in the mechanisms which perpetuate this religious cleavage in Canadian politics (i.e. socialization). Second, is there evidence of a breakdown of the religious cleavage? I will concentrate on the replacement of the electorate as well as the secularization of society as means by which religious voting is expected to be declining.

A decline in the relationship between religion
and politics will influence the nature of both the party system and the policies which they support. The two, voting behaviour and party policies, tend to be mutually reinforcing. Party changes must be amenable to societal changes. In Britain the rise of class voting, which has had major effects on their pattern of politics, was directly linked to the weakening of the Liberal party and signified the end to the religious voting cleavage in Britain. In Holland a very rapid decline in confessional party attachment in less than one decade has had extremely important consequences for the structure of both the party and political systems. Their political system is now characterized by many splinter parties rather than a few major parties. The experience of these two nations suggest that if physical changes in the party system do not correspond to societal changes then the existing parties must reassess their policy perspectives to accommodate the emerging cleavages among the electorate.

Social surveys permit us to identify the characteristics which distinguish supporters of one party from another and to assess party stability. Utilizing a number of studies over time allows us to identify movements of voters which can, empirically, be related to political and social events.

The purpose of this thesis is to identify what movement is taking place among the electorate, to relate these to political events, to assess party stability and the future direction of the Canadian political system.
II

The relationship between religion and party preference may exist for a number of reasons. Events which occurred in the early twentieth century are thought to have brought about an alignment of voters along religious lines. This connection between religious groups and parties, in the individual's mind, has been reinforced over time by a number of party images. First, the Liberals and Conservatives have been, historically, viewed as representatives of the two major religious and ethnic groups. Second, the selection of leaders, candidates and the elected members generally support these impressions. Third, the policy orientations of the two major parties, particularly in regard to education, has influenced and reinforced these perceptions.

The association between the religious variable and politics has also been characterized as spurious, that is, related by means of other social factors. First, religion is seen as a correlate of ethnic origin. It is argued that the social divisions within Canadian society are basically of a French-English nature. Second, an argument proposed in the United States is that religious voting is a by-product of the pattern of immigration. Third, recent analyses suggest that the continued existence of the relationship between religion and politics is the result of the socialization process and consequent "inheritance" of both religious denomination and party identification.
It is thought that the relationship between religion and voting behaviour is declining for two reasons. First, the political relevancy of religion, since the early 20th Century has obviously declined. There are few, if any, mentions of any issue during electoral campaigns which would reflect on religious differences. Second, the social importance of religion appears to be declining as society becomes more urbanized, secularized and "compartmentalized."

Religion and society are integrally linked. Many people are born in a denominational hospital, they receive an education in a confessional school or denominational university, they may work for an employer of the same religion or join a denominational trade union, they are likely to be involved in cultural or sports organizations with people of the same faith and almost always an individual's close friends belong to the same church.¹

In the past, churches exercised control over their members by dominating the social system as a whole² and, in many cases, members of the clergy held high offices in the political system.³ Therefore it is not surprising to find that religion, which is a significant social force, is associated with federal voting patterns in Canada even though, as Englemann and Schwartz point out, the areas in which it is most pertinent are under provincial jurisdiction.⁴

Canada is a pluralistic society in which there are demographic divisions among people. These
differences have their roots in distinctive cultural or linguistic backgrounds. The Dutch concept of social pillars (vertzuilling) has become analogous with social "columns" or "cleavages". This refers to the institutional structure of society as well as the segregation of social interaction. Within Canada the boundaries delineating religious-ethnic groups have been, historically, well drawn. Regenstreif states that

Canada is not unlike most of the other countries in the western world in that a considerable portion of its political history revolves around the existence of extensive religious cleavages. Engelmann and Schwartz argue that the religious cleavage which serves "...mainly as the basis for significant political cleavages" is a consequence of historical events which alienated the Catholics away from the Conservative party. These events include the Manitoba Schools Question, the handling of Louis Riel, and the conscription crisis during the First World War.

In 1890 the Manitoba government passed a bill designed to establish a single, nonsectarian public school system in that province. The Act "...evoked an immediate protest from the Roman Catholic minority". The federal Conservative government would not, at first, disallow the legislation. By the time they did decide to act they were not able to avoid the criticism of condoning the Manitoba Act.

Again it was a Conservative government which made the decision "...yielding to pressure from Protestant Ontario" not to commute the death sentence of
Louis Riel. When Riel was executed he became an instant martyr of Canada's "racial and religious minority."\(^{10}\)

In 1917 the Conservatives were once again in power. The election of that year was fought in the Maritimes and Western Canada over the issue of government administration during the war period. In Quebec it was fought over the issue of sending troops to a war that was considered British imperialist in nature. French-Canadians, primarily farming people at this time, valued their sons for their labour on the farm. Even though the Unionists proposed (and, indeed, later instituted) special considerations for farmer's sons, the election of the Unionists in 1917 did much to turn the French away from the Conservative party.

Party images are important as the parties provide the major link between society and government. Parties are, therefore, likely to reflect the societal cleavages which become politically relevant.\(^{11}\) For an association to exist between groups within society and a party it implies that the groups are connected by means of some collective experience and the parties by some consistent appeal to those groups.\(^{12}\) The willingness of the Conservative government to become involved in provincial affairs or issues directly pertaining to the religious groups was a major factor in the alienation of Catholic voters. On the other hand, the protection of provincial jurisdiction over the areas
allotted to them "...found their champion in Wilfred Laurier and the Liberal party" at a time when provincial rights and responsibilities were growing. According to Butler and Stokes it is the perception by an individual between "his" group and the perception that a party is positively valued by his group, that leads him to support it. The strong relationship between the protection of religious rights and provincial rights at the time was, therefore, instrumental in the development of religious voting.

While the historical context sheds light on the formation of the electoral behaviour of Canadians there are a number of alternative explanations for the continued existence of religious voting.

As I have just suggested one important aspect of party images relates to their historical background and policy orientation. The Liberal party is generally viewed as the party of federalism or provincial rights. The Conservative party is seen, by and large, as the party of centralism. Perhaps the most important area related to these images is education. Regenstreif states:

It is well known that, historically, Roman Catholics have felt discrimination in most of English speaking Canada, generally at the hands of Conservative provincial administrations especially in matters concerning education.

It may be the separate school system which helps to maintain religion as a salient cleavage in Canada.

Separate schools not only provide a focus for religious
cleavages but are also a part of the socialization process of children. McDonald argues that concern about separate schools could make Catholics support the Liberals whereas disapproval of the separate school system could make Protestants favour the Conservative party.  

The impact of the school issue on party images is reflected in Newfoundland. When this province joined Confederation in 1949 it was the Conservative party, not the Liberals, who supported parochial schools. Studies demonstrate that Conservative support in Newfoundland is largely Catholic and Liberal support mostly Protestant—a reversal of the national pattern.

Qualter suggests that the bond between religion and parties is enhanced by the candidates of the parties. That is, Catholics are more likely to be found in the Liberal party and Protestants in the Conservative party. Schwartz advances a similar argument in *Public Opinion* and *Canadian Identity*. She says

...the candidacy of correligionists provides a further impetus for supporting a particular party. Visibility of the success of Catholics in the Liberal party is another factor serving to tie the Catholics to it.

Lynn McDonald, however, could find little evidence to substantiate this claim in her study of the 1968 federal election in Ontario.

It has also been suggested that the election of a French-Canadian, Catholic leader intermittently with English-speaking, Protestant leaders has helped
the Liberal party attract and maintain Catholic support as the Conservatives have rarely had a Catholic leader. In particular, the leadership of Wilfred Laurier is accredited with originally attracting the French and Catholic support.

An argument which is put forward in the United States to explain the relationship between religion and voting behaviour is the pattern of immigration. The majority of post-World War Two immigrants tend to be Catholics, in both the United States and Canada. Pre-World War Two immigrants (in both nations) tended to be disproportionately Protestant. It is argued that immigrants take on the identification of the party in power when they arrive. For the post-World War Two immigrants this meant the Democratic party in the United States and the Liberal party in Canada. This identification is then manifested into votes when the immigrant takes out citizenship and/or when his children reach voting age. My limited exposure to post-1970 immigrants reveals that they perceive Canadian politics in terms of a single dimension—Trudeau.

Is the relationship between religion and party preference among immigrants spurious? Herberg argues that when the children of immigrants reach voting age a large number disassociate themselves from the ethnic subcommunity, primarily for linguistic reasons, and identify with their religious affiliation. It does not seem likely, either, that immigration has been
large enough to account for the magnitude of the relationship between religion and voting behaviour. Also, in Canada, we are faced with the dual problem of controlling for emigration as more people leave the country every year than enter.

It has often been claimed that religion is spuriously associated with party preference by means of ethnic origin. Alford states that the Progressive Conservatives are the party of the English and the Liberals the party of the French. However, Grace Anderson, in her study of Hamilton, argues that

Religious affiliation...is more closely associated with voting preference than is ethnicity. Religious affiliation and ethnicity cannot, therefore, be regarded as one and the same variable.

While the importance of the reinforcing relationship between religion and ethnicity cannot be underestimated, it is one which I would like to see dispelled. On the aggregate level it is known that Catholics disproportionately support the Liberal party yet this denomination is made up of a wide variety of ethnic groupings. On the other hand, Protestants are largely British in ancestry yet do not display homogeneity in their voting behaviour.

It has also been suggested that the Catholic behaviour can be attributed to their greater religiosity. In terms of church attendance or religious beliefs Catholics tend to be more religious than Protestants. A third aspect of religiosity is
'communalism'. Since family groups are basically endogamous this means that interaction among the family involves interaction among members of the same denomination. In this sense the family operates as a subunit of the larger religious group and the strength of religious beliefs within the family would be expected to affect the relationship with voting behaviour. In addition, the close friends of an individual will most often be of the same denomination and

...norms develop in the course of personal contact. Thus the relationship which grows between two friends and fosters their expectations of each other, turns them... into a tight and largely self-sufficient group with characteristics and norms of its own.30

The extent to which 'primary' groups (family and friends) form segregated communication networks, then; they facilitate the transmission of distinctive political norms.31 Meisel concurs in his study of Kingston that it was the political preference "...entertained by the mass of one's co-religionists which seems to be an effective signpost"32 in determining vote.

The authors of the American Voter argue that the 'successful' transmission of values and behaviour is a function of the effectiveness and insistence with which they are transmitted.33 Therefore, one's involvement in the religious community (both church involvement and primary group involvement) and religious voting are expected to be related.34
The first hypothesis I wish to investigate, therefore, is to what extent can other social characteristics account for the relationship between religion and voting behaviour? Specifically, I will consider ethnicity, religiosity, and region as alternative explanations. I will employ crosstabulations and Cramér's $V^{35}$ as a summary statistic to compare the effects of each social characteristic individually with religion and multiple regression$^{36}$ to assess the relative importance of them with religion on voting behaviour.

Another argument which purports to explain the spurious nature of religious voting is that it is a relationship based on tradition resulting from political socialization. This is a process whereby as a person grows up he is instilled with the norms and goals of the society primarily through the family group and later in life through institutional structures. Irvine suggests in his article "Explaining the Religious Basis of the Canadian Partisan Identity: Success on the Third Try," that both party identification and religion are inherited from parents "...without any necessarily felt connection between the two." While his data substantiate his claim that both tend to be inherited there are both methodological and substantive criticisms to be made of his article. However, socialization must be considered an important process by which the relationship between religion and party preference is maintained. The second
major hypothesis I wish to investigate, therefore, is to what extent can religious voting be attributed to inheritance?

The use of age cohorts to determine political change has become popular since Butler and Stoke's study of political change in Britain.\textsuperscript{40} They argue that any political movement is likely to be more evident among the younger voters who are "...more open to political appeals."\textsuperscript{41} Lijphart's data on the process of "depillarization" in Holland indicates that the generational differences were of primary importance in the movement towards secular parties.\textsuperscript{42} The premise of cohort analysis is, of course, that people develop their partisan ties at the point when they are first exposed to the political environment. These party preferences are thought to be held throughout the cohorts' lives. Therefore, by studying the support of the various parties at a single point in time one can extrapolate backwards in time (by establishing parameters around the cohorts) and determine in what ways party support has changed. This is an appropriate technique to use in the analysis of Canadian voting behaviour for two reasons. First, a bank of Canadian survey data does not exist—there are relatively few national surveys of voting behaviour. Second, there have been relatively few political events in recent decades linking religion to politics. Cohorts, which span more than fifty years of voting behaviour, should reflect this. My third major hypothesis, then, is to
what extent do age cohorts reflect a decline in the political saliency of religion? Of course, it will be important to distinguish between generational and life cycle effects.

There are many indications that there has been a societal decline in the importance of religion. Declining church attendance, greater secularization of society generally, and urbanization are all indicators of this. Yinger states that religion "...is more likely to be a conserver of old values than a creator of new ones." Nottingham also suggests that religious values do not change easily in response to changes involving "...secular conceptions of utility and convenience." Miller and Stouthard provide evidence that the process of urbanization is strongly related to the degree of involvement in the church. This was true even for the people who moved from one sized community to another—the norms of the new community were adopted. Regenstreif proposes that the process of urbanization in Canada has resulted in a decline in the group-based aspects of this cleavage. Lenski, however, argues just the opposite. He suggests that the process of urbanization leads to a "compartmentalized" or specialized role for religion. Therefore, religion has not become less relevant socially, only its role has changed from an associational one to a communal one. That is, the theological aspects of religion are lessened while the social ones are increased. Therefore, my last major hypothesis will deal with the extent of a social decline in the
importance of religion and, hence, voting and its relation to the process of urbanization.

The literature suggests the direction which this thesis should follow. First, what is the nature and extent of the relationship between religious affiliation and electoral behaviour? Can other social characteristics account equally for the relationship between religion and party? Secondly, what is the role of political socialization on maintaining the relationship over time? Third, if religion is less relevant politically can cohort analysis reveal a breakdown of religious voting? Finally, to what extent is a societal decline in the relevancy of religion related to religious voting and, in particular, what is the role of urbanization?

III

The data which is used is taken primarily from three national election studies in 1965, 1968 and 1974. In order to increase the number of cases, particularly for the age cohort analysis, the three studies were combined into one single data set. In effect, I have aggregated the data for individuals regarding their social characteristics and voting behaviour from three surveys which were administered at different points in time.

The variables with which I am working are not expected to have changed dramatically over this nine year period. At any rate, I am concerned with the demographic and social characteristics, as well as
their voting behaviour, at the time of election when they were surveyed.

Those variables which are common to all three studies are: province; party identification; strength of party identification; vote; religion; church attendance; subjective social class; language; and age. In the case of the latter variable a corrective measure was used to equalize the values as the surveys were administered at different points in time. That is, persons born in 1930 were 35 years old at the time of the first survey and 44 years old in 1974. In the ensuing analysis age in 1974 is used as the base. Party identification or vote refers to the respondent's party preference at the time of interviewing.

A number of other variables which were present in either one or two of the surveys were also included in the data set. These are: parent's party identification; subjective religiosity; and a series of questions on religion. When presented the year(s) in which the data was collected will be shown.

The information from the three studies was stored on temporary file in an identical order and then merged together to give one large data set. The total sample size is 8051 unweighted and 9019 weighted. All tables in the analysis refer to the weighted sample size.

This study has also been augmented with data from a number of Gallup polls administered by the Canadian Institute for Public Opinion (CIPO). The total number of cases in each of these surveys are listed below.
IV

Religion has been defined, theoretically, as "...the formulation of conceptual, ritual and social symbols whereby a community or a society identifies itself in relation to a transcendent of supernatural order of reality." Denominations have been characterized as systems of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things which "...unite into a single moral community" called the Church.

Lenski defines religion, for sociological purposes as "...a system of beliefs about the nature of the force(s) ultimately shaping man's destiny, and the practices associated therewith, shared by members of a group." According to this definition religion has three distinct characteristics. First, it involves social interaction among separate groups of people. Second, religion is, for purposes of self-preservation, a system of worship and each denomination possesses its own symbols and rites to perpetuate this worship. Third, religion is a system of beliefs and values pertaining to forms of social interaction.

Self-identification in religious terms is an
accepted social norm. Herberg found in the United States that ninety-five percent of Americans were willing to place themselves in one of three categories, Protestant, Catholic or Jewish.\textsuperscript{51} In Canada one finds a much lower refusal rate on the religious affiliation question than on social class on surveys.\textsuperscript{52}

Within Canadian society there are two major religious groups—Roman Catholic and Protestant (United Church, Anglican, Presbyterian, Baptist and Lutheran)—which comprise ninety percent of the total population, roughly forty-five percent each.\textsuperscript{53} The population of interest is limited to these two groups hereafter referred to as denominations although Protestantism is not a denomination in the true sense. Herberg justifies the aggregation of several denominations under the title 'Protestant' on the basis of their attributes. He claims that taken together Protestants display the same social characteristics as Catholics and, hence, this makes for better comparisons.\textsuperscript{54} Second, members of the various Protestant denominations generally consider themselves as "Protestant". Third, Siegfried states that all Protestants co-operate fraternally and, if their actions are not mingled together, they are at least parallel. "And Catholicism, the common enemy, reminds them periodically of the need for united action if not for unity."\textsuperscript{55} Finally, there is the consideration of sample size which supports the aggregation of all Protestants.

The religious affiliation of the respondents was ascertained by a direct question asking for the "religious
preference" of the respondent. While there appears to be a strong social pressure to identify oneself as a Protestant or Catholic there is less pressure to conform to the "...social and theological tenets of the declared faith." 

This raises the question of the strength of attachment an individual has to his religion. The authors of the *American Voter* state

...the higher the identification of the individual with the group, the higher the probability that he will think and behave in ways which distinguish members of his group from non-members.

The term "religiosity" indicating the strength of association with religion is generally applied to the measurement which is most readily available (e.g. church attendance, subjective religiosity or group involvement). More detailed measurements have been developed but are rarely used.

Here religiosity will refer to the degree of attachment to one's religious denomination according to Lenski's definition of religion. That is, religiosity for my purposes is multi-dimensional. It refers to 1) an individual's strength of beliefs and values, 2) worship (associational) and 3) involvement in "primary" groups (family and friends) or one's social relationships with members of the same faith (communalism).

Religion as a system of beliefs and values is best measured by the usage of a number of questions on moral and/or ethical issues. Two CIPO surveys
asked respondents for their attitudes towards birth control and abortion. Another method of approaching the question of strength of beliefs is to ask people about their belief in God, how often they read the Bible or their belief in Heaven or hell. This aspect of religiousity, often referred to as "orthodoxy" has been found to be strongly related to voting behaviour. However, none of the three major election surveys included questions on this aspect of religion. As an alternative, therefore, I will use a question on the 1974 national election study asking respondents to give a subjective evaluation of their religiousity (very religious, fairly religious, or not very religious).

Religion as a system of worship can be measured by the rate of church attendance of the respondents. This question asks "About how often do you go to church? At least once a week, two or three times a month, once a month, a few times a year or less, never?" The responses have been dichotomized into Attenders (attends more than twice a month) and Non-Attenders (once a month or less). This question is available for all respondents on the merged data set.

Viewing religion as a system of social relationships is the most difficult to test. Lenski uses, for his measure, those people who married a person of the same faith and whose friends are of the same religion. Data of this nature is lacking in Canada and, as an alternative, a question on the 1968 national election study asking respondents for an indication of the
proportion of their friends who are of the same religion as well as activity in religious groups will be used.

Butler and Stokes have popularized the usage of generational or cohort analysis in recent years. They argue quite convincingly that generational differences are important factors in elections and particularly in the process of political change. Meisel adds, in his original study of Kingston, a note that "political generations may exercise some influence" on voting behaviour and particularly on religious voting behaviour.

A cohort has been defined as "...those persons who have been socialized in a similar fashion because of their exposure to the same prevailing events, as well as, those who "...experience the same event within the same time interval." For the political scientist the distinction between the two interpretations is important for constructing the time parameters around the cohorts.

The first definition implies that the important period during which "...the ideas, sentiments and values of members of the same cohort converge" is the period of socialization. The latter definition suggests that the "...distinctive composition and character reflecting the circumstances" of a cohort is formed when people enter the electorate. Because the events with which I am concerned are political, the second method of constructing cohorts will be used.

The ages of the respondents have been recorded
on the three national studies according to individual years. If the respondent refused to give his age the interviewer was to estimate it. There may, therefore, be some slight errors in the answers, not only because of interviewer estimation but also because of misreporting by the respondents. CIPO surveys simply ask the respondents to place themselves in a ten year age category. The benefit of the former method, over the latter, is that cohorts based on entry into the electorate during periods of important political events can be constructed. I have done so in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort Name</th>
<th>Entry into Electorate</th>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>Age(1974)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1918</td>
<td>18xx-1917</td>
<td>-1896</td>
<td>-78+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interwar</td>
<td>1918-1934</td>
<td>1897-1913</td>
<td>61-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War Two</td>
<td>1935-1947</td>
<td>1914-1926</td>
<td>48-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-WWII</td>
<td>1948-1957</td>
<td>1927-1936</td>
<td>38-47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The oldest cohort entered the electorate during the period of events which brought about the alignment of religious groups with political parties. These include the aforementioned Manitoba Schools Question, the handling of Louis Riel and the Conscription crisis of 1917. The inter-war cohort are those entering the electorate between the First and Second World Wars. Because of sample size, these two groups have been combined and are here-after referred to as the Pre-1935 generation.

The second cohort is composed of those entering the electorate during the Second World War era and the
boundaries have been selected because of the elections of 1935 and 1948.

The Post-World War Two cohort entered the electorate between 1948 and 1957 during which a two party system was dominant in Canada.

Those people coming of voting age between 1958 and 1967 are members of the Diefenbaker cohort. This includes the period during which the influence of Diefenbaker is expected to have affected traditional parties, the emergence of the third parties, and a Liberal minority government.

The youngest, or Trudeau, cohort includes all those who entered the electorate in 1968 or later. The ascendance of two new leaders to the Liberal and Conservative party provides the line of delineation between this and the Diefenbaker cohort.

Generational effects will be measured by comparing the degree of religious voting in each successive cohort entering the electorate to the older cohorts. Determining the effect of religion within each cohort requires summary measures of the strength of religious voting. It is also necessary to distinguish between generational and life cycle effects.

Party identification is the underlying psychological attachment of individuals to a political party. For the majority of the analysis I will, however, be using expected or recalled vote. The purpose of this is to approach, as directly as possible, the actual behaviour of the respondents. Regenstreif states "...voting is the most
obvious and manifest connecting link between the actions of a government and the preferences of the citizens...

The CIPO survey question asks, "If an election were held today, which Party's candidate do you think you would favour?" In the national election studies respondents are first asked if they voted and, if so, for which party.

In this thesis a four party analysis will be utilized. While the Liberal and Conservative parties are the main focus of religious voting, and the minor parties tend to introduce a regional bias into the analysis, a four party analysis is a more realistic representation of the political system. Also, it may be that the non-religious voters are moving towards the third parties and this is of primary interest.

Table one shows the actual party support in the various elections, the CIPO predictions and the three national election studies' postdictions.

All of the surveys tended to oversample Liberal supporters while undersampling those who intended or reported having voting Conservative. In particular, the 1965 and 1968 national surveys over-represented the Liberals considerably at the expense, mainly, of the third parties. It is, however, possible to proceed with some degree of confidence that the surveys have approximated the distribution of party support in the electorate.

Ethnicity is defined as the cultural ancestry of people who shared a common national origin, language,
Table 1.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>97.1*</td>
<td>1472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CIPO</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CIPO</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CIPO</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CIPO</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CIPO</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CIPO</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CIPO</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1943</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* slight discrepancies due to votes for other parties, independent candidates, etc.

KEY

Lib: Liberal  
PC: Progressive Conservative  
NDP: New Democratic Party  
SC: Social Crédit & Ralliement des Créditistes
religion or race, or a combination of these. Because Canada is a multi-cultural nation the number of sub-
groups would be too great for analysis. McRae argues
that since 1960 the pattern of institutional segment-
ation has moved away from "ethnicity" towards language.
Herberg also argues that language is synonymous with
culture in the American setting.

The measurement of this variable, therefore, will
be the language of the respondent. The sample question
usually asks "Which language did you learn as a child
and still speak today?" Using only those who answered
French or English effectively limits the analysis to
French-Canadians and Canadians of British ancestry or
the children of immigrants who have grown up in a
predominantly English-Canadian culture.

The purpose of this thesis is not to predict
future voting behaviour but to analyze shifts in the
social and political alignment of the electorate. The
format of this analysis will be structured so as to
concentrate on two dominant themes. First, what
explanations can be offered to account for the continued
existence of religious voting in Canada. Second, is
there evidence that a decline in religious voting is
taking place?

In chapter two I will consider the nature and
extent of the relationship between religion and electoral
behaviour. The historical relationship will be consid-
ered as the motivating force behind this phenomenon.
I will control for religiosity, ethnicity, and region in order to investigate the various dimensions of religious voting. Finally, I will employ multiple regression to assess the relative importance of all these variables on voting behaviour.

The third chapter will consider the process of socialization as an explanation for the continued existence of religious voting in Canada. I intend to consider the role of the family in socializing children, not only to partisanship, but also to religious orientations.

The cohort analysis, and the implications of replacement on political change, will be dealt with in chapter four. I will attempt to determine whether religion is a less important determinant of voting behaviour for the young than for the older members of the electorate. I will also consider whether weaker religious identification may be responsible for this. I will also discuss the weaker partisan attachments of the younger cohorts as a function of the declining political relevance of religion.

In the fifth chapter I will attempt to disentangle life cycle from generational effects in relation to religious voting. Both the strength of religiosity and partisan attachment are tied to the life cycle theory. Instead, then, I will consider the strength of parental interest in religion and willingness to change parties as alternative explanations of the generational argument. Finally, I will look at the social decline in the importance of religion and the implications of
this, which will not completely manifest themselves at the polls for thirty years hence.

In the sixth and final chapter, I will give a summation of the findings in this thesis, the evolving patterns, and what might be expected in the near future as the levels of party support.
FOOTNOTES


3. Queen, Chamber & Winston, p. 94.


7. Engelmann & Schwartz, p. 160


When a religious issue is injected into politics ... religious preference becomes highly relevant.


The individual supports a party because he perceives a positive bond between the party and his own class. But in this case the bond may be formed of nothing more than the individual's perception that the party is positively valued by his class.
15. I shall refer to religious voting as the members of the two major denominational groups (Catholics and Protestants) disproportionately supporting different political parties.


17. Engelmann & Schwartz, p. 45


22. McDonald, p. 140.


24. Lenski, p. 44.


29. Lenski, p. 18.


31. Lenski, p. 303


34. Lenski, p. 181, he states

The more involved an individual was in the Catholic subcommunity, the more likely he was to prefer the Democratic Party.


37. Regenstreif, p. 4.


40. Butler & Stokes, see specifically chapters 8 & 9.


42. Lijphart, see chapter X.


As more and more of our people move to the cities the traditional influences of religious affiliation and ethnic origin are likely to become less important in the face of the pressure of an increasingly complex technological society.

47. Lenski, p. 11.


50. Lenski, p. 331.

51. Herberg, p. 257.

52. The question on social class usually includes a second "probe" because of the high non-response rate. Conversely, there is usually less than a five percent refusal rate on the question regarding religion. This suggests that people do not generally think of themselves in class terms but they readily identify themselves in religious terms.

53. According to the 1971 Canada Census, Roman Catholics comprise 46.2% of the total population while the five Protestant denominations being used here account for 40.7%, a further 2.1% is made up of other Protestant denominations.


56. Qualter, p. 69.


58. See Yinger, also J.E. Faulkner and G.F. DeJong, "Religiousity in 5-D: An Empirical Analysis" in *Social Forces, Vol 45 no. 2* (Dec 1966) for a more detailed description of this measure. Briefly, Yinger proposes five dimensions of religion: belief, practice, experience, knowledge, and consequences. Faulkner and DeJong test C. Glock's five indicies of religiousity (C. Glock, "On the Study of Religious Commitment," *Religious Education* #42 (July-Aug 1962) pp. 98-110, which include: experimental (feeling, emotion); ritualistic (religious behaviour); ideological (beliefs); intellectual (knowledge); and consequential (effects of the secular world on the previous four).

59. See Lenski, p. 206, McDonald, p. 143.

60. Meisel, in Courtney, p. 160.


63. Ryder, p. 855.

64. A. Kornberg, J. Smith & D. Bromley, "Some Differences in the Political Socialization Patterns of Canadian and American Party Officials: A Preliminary Report," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol II no 1 (March 1969), the authors report finding that party identification occurs at a later point in life among Canadians as opposed to Americans. In Canada it occurs around the age of fourteen. They also state, however, that

...social events and conditions seemingly were more important agents of change in partisanship and levels of political interest than were personal experiences. (p. 86).

65. Ryder, p. 845.


67. These people are defined as those who do not base their party preference on religious grounds. Of course it is not possible to distinguish which individuals these are so it is necessary to use the group norm as an indicator.

68. McRae, p. 243.

69. Herberg, p. 13, he makes this statement in reference to immigrant's children.
Chapter Two

The Nature and Extent of the Relationship Between Religion and Partisanship.
All religions possess a number of common characteristics. First, they are all social phenomenon, that is, they all involve groups of men. Second, they are systems of belief which are accepted on the grounds of faith and not on empirical or logical demonstration. Third, all religions provide means by which men seek to cope with the basic problems of human existence.

Different denominational affiliation therefore provides the individual with the opportunity to associate with segregated groups and to hold differing beliefs about various forms of social interaction. It is difficult, however, to distinguish between these two aspects—social interaction and beliefs—as they tend to be mutually reinforcing.

Why is religious affiliation such an important determinant of voting behaviour in Canada? Canadian political history, like many countries in the western world, revolved around the existence of an extensive religious cleavage. History books often point to the important role of the churches, particularly the Catholic church, in the pre-Confederation and early years of Canada's nationhood. The social atmosphere of those times reflected an unbridgeable cleavage between the British and French Canadians. Historians attribute the role of the Catholic church to

...keep the French Canadians submissive, loyal, and calm. In return, the English government has left it almost free to exercise its authority just as it may please in the Catholic part of the colony...
The importance and magnitude of influence that the Catholic church had during these years cannot be fully appreciated today but is related in the texts of *The Race Question in Canada* by Andre Siegfried and Rioux and Martin's *French Canadian Society*. These books portray the extensive influence of the Catholic church in all aspects of (particularly French-) Canadian lives. It is apparent from these readings that the Catholic church fully expected to be involved in politics as indicated by one bishop's letter.

It is impossible to deny that politics and religion are closely allied and that the separation of church and state is an absurd and iminous doctrine.\(^3\)

On the other hand complete separation of religion and state amongst the Protestant clergy was the accepted norm rather than exception. Siegfried relates

It must be said, however, that the Protestant parsons and ministers do not as a rule take an active part in the elections...They rarely take up a position as a body on the side of either party.\(^4\)

In contrast Catholic priests and bishops would take sides in open pulpit and "...patronize one candidate, condemn another, give orders, issue prohibitions, and even go so far as to have recourse to the weapon of refusal of sacraments..."\(^5\) An indication of the power of the Catholic church over its members, which is difficult for a non-Catholic to understand and equally difficult for many Catholics to comprehend, is reported by Siegfried.
An elector who is at heart a Catholic and who is anxious to obey his bishop cannot say, "This is my own opinion and I must vote according to my conscience", and go against the order of his bishop without sinning grievously and rendering himself unworthy of the sacraments... The personal opinion of a voter is not his good conscience if not in conformity with the wishes and instructions set forth by the bishops in their pastoral.  

Why was the Catholic church so concerned with politics during the late 1800's? In particular they were afraid of the growth of liberalism, its social ramifications as well as a diminution of the power of the Church. One curé reportedly stated that liberalism resembled a "...serpent in the earthly paradise which creeps close to men in order to bring about the fall of the human race."  

The Catholic church strongly favoured the Conservative party during the early years of Confederation. They perceived the Liberals, or Rouges, as an anticlerical party which would destroy the position of authority the Church then enjoyed. This feeling ran so deep that Siegfried reports a curé stating, from the pulpit, that to vote for the Liberal party was to vote against himself, the bishop and even the Pope.  

The events leading up to the election of 1896, which, incidentally, happened to be the year that secret balloting was instituted, greatly changed the alignment of voters. The issue of the Manitoba Schools Act brought about vehement reaction by the Catholics who thought that their rights to separate schooling was being impinged upon. The matter was brought before the federal government for disallowance, however, the election of
1896 was called before it was dealt with, perhaps purposely, by the Conservatives. The appeal of Laurier to the electorate and his policies of provincial autonomy won great support at this time. Once elected he saw to it personally that the Schools Question was alleviated in Manitoba. In 1905, however, the Northwest Territories Schools Act brought the same issue before the politicians and it was Laurier who brought in the amendment to the British North America Act which states "...Nothing in any such Law shall prejudicially affect any Right or Privilege with respect to Denominational Schools" (section 93 (1)).

The Catholic church obviously had to reconcile itself with the Liberal party, accepting the fact that Laurier himself was a Catholic, and resigned themselves to abstention from direct involvement in politics. The Catholic laity saw the Liberal party as the defenders of provincialism and their rights to their own schooling which was, and still is, very important to them.

This suggests that either Catholics were able to break away from the influence of their clergy under protection of the secret ballot, or, the clergy did little to discourage their members from voting Liberal in 1896 in light of the Conservative's action. The only data available in recent years indicates that the Catholic clergy vote Conservative in accordance with their theological tenets although they do not actively or openly influence their members. What factors can account for the behaviour of Catholics then?
Religious affiliation can be related to voting behaviour in two ways. First, religious denominations can manifest themselves into cohesive groups at election time through the process of social interaction and reinforcing beliefs. In other words, social interaction with members of one's faith may provide an avenue through which an individual can relate to politics. This concept of reference groups is based on the theory that individuals have linkages to other individuals of which some characteristic is an indicator. Obviously a person belongs to more than one reference group. Depending on the political context of the country different reference groups can be expected to be of more or less importance. Meisel suggests that in Canada membership in a church enables the individual to be identified with certain groups in society which presumably share a similar outlook on the secular problems surrounding them.

He further suggests that the group aspect of religion help some people decide how to vote at election time. Butler and Stokes argue that an individual may support a party because he perceives a positive bond between his reference group and a political party. They also state that while some individuals form a positive bond with their own reference group others, alternatively, may develop a negative identification with the opposite reference group. It may be then that the social cleavage between French and English in Canada was accentuated when the school issue came before the electorate. This not only formed a positive bond between French-Catholics
and the Liberal party but also English-Catholics and, in addition, a negative bond between Protestants and the Liberal party. While the religious involvement of Protestants in politics was relatively small in comparison to that of the Catholics, they may well have developed a negative perception of Catholic involvement. This is consistent with Meisel's findings in Kingston where twenty-five percent of the Protestants cited anti-French or anti-Catholic reasons for voting Conservative. In this vein it may be, as McDonald suggests, that religious denominations in Canada are in effect interest groups and that they see different parties advancing their goals.

Alternatively, the relationship between religion and party preference may be based on the beliefs and values which the churches espouse, thereby affecting one's perception of events. In this respect religion may be very important because

Ultimate values, with their implications for conduct derive their meaning... from the kind of relationship the group believes to exist between its members and their deities or other objects of religious faith.

It may be then that the concepts of right and wrong obtained from the church will be applied to the policy outputs of the government. This may be true of the Schools Question. The Catholic church, which is basically conservative in its orientation, perceived the Conservative government pursuing liberal policies. However, this was more true in a social sense than a theological sense. In a predominantly Christian society the perceptions of right and wrong are likely to coincide
to a large degree among members of differing denominations. Different perceptions are more likely to be of
the nature which directly relate to the differing
practices or institutions of the denominations. Hence,
I feel that religion is more likely to be related to
politics through group-based aspects rather than a
function of differing beliefs or theological tenets.
The two are, though, highly reinforcing. Paradoxically,
it is worth noting, that the greater the segregation
of society along religious lines, the stronger the
feelings are expected to be yet accommodation takes
place at the elite level. It is when the elites lose
the support of the mass that conflict develops between
the people themselves.\footnote{21}

What is the nature of the relationship between
religion and politics and to what extent does it exist?
Table 2.1 indicates, as do most other studies\footnote{22} that
there is an overwhelming tendency on the part of
Catholics to support the Liberal party. The low amount
of support that Catholics afford the Conservatives is
likely a continuing reflection on that party's image
stemming from their past policies regarding the school
issue and conscription. Hence, this argument is a
cyclical one. The Conservative party cannot attract
Catholic support because of their past image and Catholics
will not support the Conservatives for the same reason.
The data also suggests that Catholics are more reluctant
than Protestants to support the New Democratic Party.
At the other political extreme, Catholics are more
Table 2.1


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>PCon</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<td>2881</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3404</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 654.0 \quad p < 0.001 \]

\[ V = 0.323 \]
willing than Protestants to support the Social Credit party but this is likely attributable to the regional orientation of the Socreds to Quebec.

Protestants do not appear to be influenced by their religious affiliation to the same degree as Catholics, since their behaviour lacks the homogeneity. There is a near even split between supporters of the Liberal and Conservative party, indicating no clear preference. They do, however, give a substantial amount of support to the NDP perhaps because of the conceptual link between Protestantism and progressive economic doctrines. Protestants give very little support to the Social Credit party, probably because of the aforementioned regional orientation of this party even though it is, or has been, a strong political force in two of the western provinces.

At this aggregate level of analysis it is clear that Catholics display very cohesive behaviour whereas the Protestants do not. There may be a number of reasons or alternative explanations for this.

First, the authors of the *American Voter* suggest that the proximity between a group and politics will vary according to the frequency with which the group has been seen to take a political position in the past. As evidenced earlier the Catholic clergy considered religion to be an integral part of an individual's total life and did not hesitate to become involved in politics. More importantly, issues directly pertaining
to the Catholic church became a political issue. Engelmann and Schwartz argue that the school question provides a continuing focus for religious differences.\(^{25}\) Schwartz further suggests that the separate school systems contribute to the saliency of religious divisions\(^{26}\) presumably through socialization. Protestants, on the other hand, have delineated in the past between religious and political behaviour. The political events which occurred did not directly affect them. It may well be then that Protestants don't identify with politics along religious lines whereas Catholics do.

This line of reasoning is all linked to the concept of party images. The Liberal party has an image of being 'federalist' oriented as opposed to the Conservative party which is generally viewed as being 'centralist' oriented. The Liberal party was seen, and is still considered, as more likely to protect the rights of the Catholic denomination. The Conservatives have a history of impinging on these rights. This would explain the Catholic electoral behaviour. Protestants, to whom religion does not appear to be a salient political dimension, may be equally attracted by a federalist and centralist policy orientation and, hence, the reasons for their voting behaviour.

II

A second explanation of the cohesive behaviour of Catholics is their general overall religiousness, in all senses of the term. Qualter states

Religion raises even more complicated questions
in that we live in a culture in which there are certain strong, but far from universal or binding pressures to make some formal declaration of adherence to some religious denomination. The pressures are less strong in requiring a person to behave in complete consistency with the social and theological tenets of the declared faith. A person's statement of religion therefore is only a very approximate indication of his actual religious beliefs or practices.  

How might one go about determining whether the electoral behaviour displayed by Catholics and Protestants is actually a function of religiosity and not simply religion? According to Lenski's definition of religion there are three attributes which contribute to the strength of confessional attachment. The first of these is the practice of worship. The most common and readily available indicator of overt religious behaviour is that of church attendance. Table 2.2 shows that there is a high correlation between religion and church attendance. Nearly three-quarters of the Catholics as compared to fewer than one-third of all Protestants are regular church attenders (defined as twice a month or more). Others have reported similar findings which support these results. Lenski reported that 70% of the Catholics and 33% of the Protestants indicated having attended church in the past week. Herberg states that 62% of the Catholics and 25% of the Protestants in his sample answered that they attend church every week. The higher attendance rates of Catholics would indicate that this aspect of religion is more important to them than it is for Protestants and, indeed, church attendance is almost a socialized norm for Catholics. Protestants, as children,
Table 2.2


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Church Attendance</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attender</td>
<td>Non-Attender</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\chi^2 = 1445.6 \quad p < 0.001
\]

\[
V = -0.431
\]
do not attend church, but, instead, attend Sunday School.

Can this aspect of religion account for the cohesive voting behaviour of Catholics? Obviously a group in which an individual participates can more easily exert pressures on him to conform to its norms and expectations as opposed to those who do not participate.\textsuperscript{30} Therefore, at the aggregate level, the Catholic church would appear to have a greater influence with regard to its members than do the Protestant churches in so far as the regular congregation of a majority of members fosters a common social and political outlook.

If, as I mentioned, church attendance is a socialized practice for Catholics then it cannot be considered an overall indicator of religiousity. On the other hand, it is an overt and observable behaviour and simply because most Catholics attend church does not invalidate its importance as one aspect of religiousity.\textsuperscript{31}

Therefore, church attendance may be considered an appropriate measure of one form of religiousity. One can fully expect, then, that the greater the degree of involvement in a group by an individual the greater its influence will be on him\textsuperscript{32} and that this would be reflected in the strength of the bond between the group and party preference. On the aggregate level this is seen to be true. Catholics, mostly church goers, tend to support a single party whereas Protestants, who are generally not church goers, are not as unified in their
political behaviour. The problem of "multicollinearity" therefore makes it difficult to disentangle cause and effect, or, possibly two causes. The correlation coefficients in table 2.3 do indicate that church attenders are more likely to vote in accordance with their religion. However, on closer inspection of the tables, church attendance does not account for the relationship between Catholics and the Liberal party. The fact that this measure does discriminate between the behaviour of Protestants, in relation to Conservative support, suggests that it is not a "bad" measure but that church attendance does, in fact, play a different role for Protestants than for Catholics.

The most interesting and, perhaps, significant finding in table 2.3 is that the New Democratic Party does substantially better among non-church goers of both denominations than it does among the attenders. It may be that the conservative tendencies (in relation to the NDP) among people are reinforced by weekly church attendance. An overall decline in the rates of church attendance will, therefore, be very important to the future of this party.

According to Lenski's definition of religion a second dimension of religiosity is the strength of religious beliefs. One indicator of this would be responses to questions on social and moral issues. Dealing with questions such as these can be difficult in surveys so often polls will only ask for a respondent's opinion on a single issue. The only available questions on moral issues were in recent Gallup polls and tapped attitudes
Table 2.3


**ATTENDERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1077</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 438.3 \quad p < 0.001 \]

\[ V = 0.368 \]

**NON-ATTENDERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 438.0 \quad p < 0.001 \]

\[ V = 0.239 \]
towards birth control and abortion. The data in table 2.4 and 2.5 indicate that no significant differences exist in the voting behaviour of those holding opposing views. The manner in which the questions were posed may have led some respondents to interpret the questions subjectively. That is, a Catholic may have inferred from "birth control" the rhythm method and from "abortion" when the mother's life is in danger. I don't believe that much emphasis can be put on this point as extensive media coverage has stressed various forms of birth control and abortion on demand. In regards to these two issues Catholics are nearly as "liberal" as Protestants and differences in attitudes on these social issues are not strongly linked to party preferences.

A second method of approaching this dimension of religiosity would be to ask questions directly related to religious activities and beliefs. An example of this is Herberg's study in which he used questions regarding the belief in God, or the Bible as God's work as a basis for determining that Catholics were more religious than Protestants.33 Lenski used a battery of questions dealing with belief in God, Jesus, and Heaven or what he calls religious "orthodoxy".34 Charles Glock developed five attributes of religiosity based on ideological, ritualistic, experiential, intellectual and consequential dimensions.35 Faulkner and DeJong tested Glock's scales on university students and found that the consequential dimension (based mainly on attitudinal questions towards religion) correlated the lowest with
### Table 2.4


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCON</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 14.9 \quad p < 0.05 \]

\[ V = 0.414 \]

### Table 2.5


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCON</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 17.3 \quad p < 0.05 \]

\[ V = 0.298 \]

### IMMORAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCON</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 33.3 \quad p < 0.05 \]

\[ V = 0.297 \]
the other four dimensions reflecting, in their opinion, a qualitatively different measure of religious involvement. The ideological dimension was "unmistakeably of pervasive importance." The ritualistic scale was ranked in the centre of the overall religiosity dimension and included questions on 1) time spent reading the Bible and other religious literature, 2) church attendance, 3) the possibility of developing a well rounded religious life away from the institutional church and 4) having a choice between a religious or civil marriage ceremony. Yinger proposed a similar five dimension scale of religiosity of which beliefs was a central element. Not having any such measures available I will use a question on the 1974 election study which asked respondents to give a subjective rating of their religiosity. 28.3% of the Catholics as compared to 8.9% of the Protestants considered themselves very religious while 16.5% versus 36.4% of the Catholics and Protestants respectively considered themselves not very religious.

Table 2.6 shows that the strength of subjective religiosity does differentiate between the voting behaviour of Catholics and Protestants. This is consistent with Lenski's findings that orthodoxy was a distinguishing characteristic. McDonald also reports finding that this dimension of religiosity differentiates strongly between the voting behaviour of Catholics and Protestants. It is apparent, then, that those individuals who consider themselves most religious
Table 2.6


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 43.0 \quad V = 0.391 \quad p < 0.01 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 114.9 \quad V = 0.362 \quad p < 0.001 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 42.5 \quad V = 0.321 \quad p < 0.01 \]
also tend to vote in accordance with their religious group moreso than do less religious persons. While this is an important finding it doesn't explain the strong relationship between religion and party preference which still exists for the least religious persons. Finally, it is of interest to once again point to the relationship between subjective religiosity and support for the NDP which, again, is stronger for the less attached within both denominations.

The third dimension of religiosity is that of involvement in the religious subcommunity. The appeal of the Liberal party to the Catholics may be related to the "inner cohesiveness" of the Catholic subcommunity so named by Lenski to refer to extended family and close friends of an individual. He states

The network of primary relations, which we have called the religious subcommunity, vastly increases the degree of interaction among group members. It greatly facilitates the indoctrination of the young in the norms and standards of the association, and contributes to their enforcement among adults.

Lenski, therefore, differentiates clearly between the associational aspects of religion (church attendance and beliefs) and the communal aspects, or social interaction with members of the same faith. He states that the church tends to be more responsive to the moral aspects of politics while the subcommunity responds more to issues of class and status. Both Lenski and Meisel argue that the pull of the subcommunity is stronger than the pull of the church.
While Lenski feels that the subcommunity is the important instrument for extending the influence of religion in the life of the community and communal aspects of religion tend to be mutually reinforcing for Catholics. "A high degree of involvement in the Catholic church was positively correlated with a high degree of involvement in kin groups." Lenski found that 60% of the Catholics who attend church regularly visit relatives at least once a week whereas Catholics who do not attend regularly were less likely to visit relatives (45%). On the other hand, an inverse relationship exists for Protestants. Of the church attenders, 43% visited relatives once a week while 51% of the non-attenders reported visiting relatives weekly. Lenski concludes that ties with the extended family among Protestants are generally much weaker than for Catholics—particularly for the church attenders. He feels that the role of the extended family is much greater among Catholics and that the sectarian tendencies among Protestants actually operate to weaken family and kin group ties. The extended family and subcommunity is the group around which Catholicism revolves, among Protestants it is the individual.

As previously mentioned, the subcommunity includes both the extended family and an individual's friends, both of which tend to be religiously homogenous. When this is the case these groups function as subunits of the religious denomination. It may be this aspect of
a Catholic's environment which leads them to support the Liberal party. Lenski found in the United States that the more involved an individual was in the Catholic subcommunity the more likely he was to prefer the Democratic party.49

The only appropriate measure of subcommunity involvement was a question on the 1968 data set referring to the proportion of friends which the respondent estimated were of the same religion. The answers were dichotomized into those having half or more of their friends of the same religion and those having less than half of their friends belonging to the same denomination. Nearly ninety percent of the Catholics as compared to slightly less than three-quarters of the Protestants fell into the first category, indicating the relative homogeneity of the Catholic subcommunity. The data in table 2.7 does not suggest that this measure of subcommunity involvement distinguishes between the behaviour of Catholics. While the correlation coefficients vary according to involvement in the subcommunity (V = 0.325) or not (V = 0.184) this is a function of the Protestant vote. Clearly, interaction by Protestants manifests itself at the polls in terms of a Conservative party preference. For Catholics it may be, as Siegfried points out50 that Catholics are surrounded by a close network of ecclesiastical influences which it is almost impossible to escape.

This may not be the most appropriate measure of subcommunity activity since the degree of interaction
Table 2.7


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 160.2 \quad p < 0.001 \]

\[ V = 0.325 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 11.5 \quad p = 0.009 \]

\[ V = 0.184 \]
with one's friends may vary and, second, it ignores the role of the family. Lenski reports that Catholics expressed a preference for relatives over friends.\(^{51}\)

Another method of measuring involvement in the religious subcommunity is by the level of activity in religious groups. McDonald found that this had the strongest association with voting in her study.\(^{52}\)

Again using 1968 data it is possible to test whether activity in a Church or Parish group influences voting behaviour. The correlation coefficients for religious voting are listed below.

Correlation Coefficients for Religion and Vote by Activity in a Church or Parish Group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>V</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Active</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly Active</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Active</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a Member</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>1599</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While there is some differentiation between activity in church groups even those who do not belong to a group (the vast majority) display a relatively high level of religious voting.

The various measures of religiousity have not been able to fully account for the correlation between denomination and party preference. Of the three dimensions of religiousity subjective beliefs and membership in church groups differentiated the greatest between voting behaviour. These people may be better informed or simply relate religion more directly to politics as compared to those who only attend church. What is clear
is that simple identification with their religion is a stronger determinant of voting behaviour for Catholics than for Protestants and that the strength of the identification has relatively little influence for either denomination. Herberg states

For being a Protestant, a Catholic, or a Jew understood as the specific way, and increasingly perhaps the only way, of being an American and locating oneself in American society. It is something that does not in itself necessarily imply actual affiliation with a particular church, participation in religious activities, or even the affirmation of any definite creed or belief; it implies merely identification and social location.53

III

A third explanation of the voting behaviour in Canada, and is most often considered the dominant force, is ethnic background. Schwartz suggests that the importance of religion in Canadian voting behaviour is "...reinforced for the majority of Catholics by the possession of a common language and territory."54 Siegfried argues that English and Protestant are synonymous terms in Canada even though there are many English-Catholics (but few French-Protestants).55 Herberg suggests that the Catholic church is conceived as an over-all institution embracing and representing the major ethnic groups while Protestants are basically English in background.56 It is most important then to investigate these claims to determine whether religious voting is a function of ethnicity.

Ethnicity, or linguistic differences, is certainly the most visible cleavage within Canadian society.
The high correlation between ethnicity and religion is often pointed to as the "explanation" for religious based voting. In particular it is suggested that the overwhelming number of Liberals elected in French-Canadian constituencies creates a false statistical relationship between Catholics and Liberals. On the other hand, the Conservative party is often viewed as the party of the English which promotes predominantly British values. Alford states

Les deux races of Canada have shaped the identities of the political parties.57

Data, however, does not support this theory that the cleavage is an ethnic one, as seen in table 2.8. Not surprisingly a majority of French-speaking Canadians support the Liberal party. More importantly, however, is that English-Catholics are more likely than French-Catholics to vote for the Liberals. It is difficult to explain why this might be. There is no reason to believe that English Catholics would disapprove of the Conservative's stand on the schools question less than French Catholics is one suggestion. It might also be linked with factors concerning one's orientation toward life (as I will argue in the following chapter) or the size of the family itself (to be discussed in chapter four).

There cannot be any doubt that the high correlation between religion and ethnicity in Canada has a mutually reinforcing effect. The visibility of linguistic differences operates to compound the impression that
Table 2.8


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic-Religious Group</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>PCon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English-Catholic</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French-Catholic</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English-Protestant</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 739.2 \quad p < 0.001 \]
\[ \phi = 0.249 \]

*French-Protestants excluded due to low number of cases (14).
there is an ethnic voting cleavage. However, regardless of the French-Canadian vote, which one might argue successfully is based on a dimension other than religion there is still a denominational cleavage among the English-speaking Canadians. I feel there is, however, adequate justification for including French-speaking respondents in the following analysis.

IV

Compounding the problem of multicollinearity between religion and ethnicity is the regional structure of Canada and the grouping of a large portion of Catholics in Quebec. In addition to this Alford reports that the importance of the religious factor was greatest in the older provinces and least in the newer provinces. It is necessary, therefore, to ensure that the phenomenon being investigated is a national one and that differing patterns do not exist in the various regions. This is done in table 2.9. It shows that, although there is some variation, the same pattern is evident for all regions of Canada. The Catholic vote for the Liberal party is low in the regions in which the Liberal party tends to be organizationally weak. Likewise, the Protestant support for the Conservative party drops in those areas in which that party is generally weak. Overall, it is apparent that the strength of the minor parties is very important in determining the nature of religious voting in Canada. The Social Credit party appears to be successful in attracting Catholic voters in Quebec and Protestant voters in B.C. The NDP is
Table 2.9


**MARITIMES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 31.7 \quad p < 0.001 \]
\[ V = 0.240 \]

**QUEBEC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 22.3 \quad p < 0.001 \]
\[ V = 0.110 \]

**ONTARIO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1736</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 314.5 \quad p < 0.001 \]
\[ V = 0.360 \]

**PRAIRIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 35.0 \quad p < 0.001 \]
\[ V = 0.210 \]

**BRITISH COLUMBIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 15.7 \quad p = 0.001 \]
\[ V = 0.160 \]
relatively successful in attracting voters of both denominations in varying degrees in all regions of Canada. This suggests, and I will investigate this more thoroughly in chapter four, that the third or more secular parties are directly related to a decline in the strength of religious voting.

It is Ontario where the Liberals are able to attract most of the Catholic vote and not Quebec. Conversely it is in the Maritimes where the Conservative support is greatest among Protestants. Not coincidentally, in the latter case, the third party structure is the weakest. Only in the Prairie region, where the Liberal party is weak do the Conservatives attract anywhere near the number of voters, either Catholic or Protestant, that it does in the Maritimes.

On a provincial basis the results are very similar to the regional findings. Only in one case, Newfoundland, can a different pattern be found. In this province Catholics give more support to the Conservative party than they do to the Liberals as shown in table 2.10. This is likely related to the issue over education when Newfoundland entered Confederation in 1949. At that time the Conservatives, not the Liberals, supported the parochial school system. Regional groupings of the provinces, however, permit statistical analysis of the tables and generally reflect similar patterns.

While the regional variations are important to bear in mind I feel that it is possible to discuss a national voting pattern in relation to religion and party preference.
Table 2.10


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 0.32 \quad \text{not significant} \]

\[ V = 0.063 \]
LEAF 67 OMITTED IN PAGE NUMBERING.
Table 2.11


Dependent Variable = Liberal Party Vote/Conservative, NDP, Social Credit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>BETA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic/Protestant</td>
<td>0.232*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie/Other</td>
<td>-0.022**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec/Other</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English/French</td>
<td>-0.014**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritimes/Other</td>
<td>0.012**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attender/Non-Attender</td>
<td>0.006**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario/Other</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ N = 7184 \quad \quad R^2 = 0.064 \]

* significant at 0.001

** not significant
It is apparent that religious affiliation is the strongest predictor of a Liberal party vote. Using the 1974 data only the same regression was run including subjective religiosity. As seen in table 2.12 the importance of the independent variables change but subjective religiosity is not itself a predictor of Liberal party vote.
Table 2.12


Dependent Variable = Liberal Party Vote/Conservative NDP, Social Credit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>BETA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic/Protestant</td>
<td>0.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English/French</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairies/Other</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario/Other</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec/Other</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attender/Non-Attender</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritimes/Other</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Religious/Other</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1855  \[ R^2 = 0.074 \]

* significant at 0.001
** significant at 0.05
*** not significant


3. Siegfried, p. 42.

4. Siegfried, p. 121.

5. Siegfried, p. 44, members of the Rouge party were excommunicated and were not permitted the last rites.

6. Siegfried, p. 43.

7. Siegfried, p. 45.

8. Siegfried, p. 45, this resembles Italy today—the Catholic church has threatened to excommunicate those Catholics who run for the Communist party there. The Communists, despite the threats from the Vatican, obtain nearly 35% of the popular vote and is favoured to win the June 20, 1976 election.


11. B. Rosen, *Adolescence and Religion* (Cambridge: Schenckman, 1965), p. 47, the author adds Groups may also be thought of as either ascribed or achieved. In the former, membership is involuntary and is usually attributed to the individual at birth...Achieved membership in a group, on the other hand, is a product of the person's own effort (p. 48).


13. Meisel, in Courtney, p. 160


16. Meisel, in Courtney, p. 150, also see G. Lenski, *The Religious Factor* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1961), p. 65, Lenkis notes that Protestants were the most critical of others but were the least criticized group.


18. Butler & Stokes, p. 24, they state

All great realignments of party strength have involved values that the electorate attaches to the outputs of government, and the same may be said of the larger short-run fluctuations in party strength.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCON</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>$X^2$</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1173</td>
<td>$X^2 = 298.0$</td>
<td>$p &lt; 0.001$</td>
<td>$.333$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>68.8%</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>$X^2 = 166.6$</td>
<td>$p &lt; 0.001$</td>
<td>$.328$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>$X^2 = 215.6$</td>
<td>$p &lt; 0.001$</td>
<td>$.370$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


26. M. Schwartz, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967), p. 161. Apparently, however, it is attitudes towards separate schools rather than attendance at them which contributes to religious voting. As seen below, Catholics who attended a separate school are not that much more likely to vote Liberal than those who attended public school. (1968 data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attended Separate School</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cath</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prot</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 14.9 \]

\[ V = .151 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attended Public School</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cath</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prot</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 69.2 \]

\[ V = .233 \]


30. P. Kelvin, The Bases of Social Behaviour (Great Britain, Holt, Rinehard & Winston, 1970) p. 126, the author states:

The group in which the individual participates can exert pressures on him to conform to its norms and expectations; it can force him to comply with these norms as long as he remains a member, even if he does not agree with them privately.

31. Siegfried, p. 36, he states:

It is thus that in Montreal certain free-thinkers, free masons perhaps, are regularly dragged to mass. They do not listen, they do not respect the service, they may even bring books and read them ostentatiously. What does it matter? They are there and their presence is in itself an act of submission.

32. Lenski, p. 22.

33. Herberg, p. 220.
34. Lenski, p. 398, he asked specifically about belief in God, if God is like a loving Heavenly Father, if God responds to men's prayers, belief in life after death some will be punished, if Jesus was God's only Son and if God expects men to worship Him every week, if able.


37. Faulkner & DeJong, p. 250.


40. Herberg, p. 221.

41. Lenski, p. 301.

42. Lenski, p. 182.

43. Lenski, p. 182, Meisel, in Courtney, p. 156.

44. Lenski, p. 327.

45. Lenski, p. 248.

46. Lenski, p. 218.

47. Lenski, p. 348, I will be dealing with this in more detail in the following chapters.


49. Lenski, p. 181.

50. Siegfried, p. 35.

51. Lenski, p. 248, 66% of the active Catholics and 60% of the marginal Catholics expressed a preference for relatives over friends.

52. McDonald, p. 143.


55. Siegfried, p. 25.
56. Herberg, p. 35.

57. Alford, p. 258.


Chapter Three

Political Continuity
Through Generations
The development of religious voting is apparently attributed largely to historical events and the greater politicalization of Catholics. I have been able to substantiate that religion in recent elections is a more important determinant of an individual's voting behaviour than is ethnicity, religiosity or region.

Regenstreif suggests that while in some situations members of different denominations may perceive events in terms of their church association this is not always the case. Often religion is simply a reference group for the general population and while people may not consciously think of themselves in these terms their political behaviour can often be explained by it. Closely related to voting behaviour is the concept of party identification which refers to an individual's psychological attachment to a party. This is considered the means by which partisanship continues to exist along religious lines.

Political events which occur can have the effect of realigning the electorate along the social dimension in conflict. The political events directly related to religion, however, occurred more than fifty years ago. The explanation given for the continued existence of this cleavage is often that of political socialization. Because no other issues or events have occurred which would cause a further realignment of the electorate children take their political cues from their parents. To what extent, then, can religious voting be explained by the transmission of parental party identification to children? Three aspects of socialization must be
considered to answer this. First, is religion an unimportant dimension for those who do not take on the same partisanship as their parents? Second, are the rates of socialization the same for both Catholic and Protestant families? Finally, is the rate of transmission of partisanship uniform for supporters of all political parties? If the socialization concept is to be structurally sound then religion should not be an important dimension to those who formulate their own partisan identity and the rates of transmission should, intuitively, be the same for both religious denominations and for all parties.

The socialization of children to their parents partisanship, or "inheritance" can be approached statistically. Before doing so, however, I would like to investigate, empirically, differences between the upbringing of Catholic and Protestant children.

The process of socialization is one in which basic traits of personality are developed. Attitudes, beliefs, goals and behaviour are shaped foremost by the family yet often manifest themselves later in life in various institutional contexts. Of course these institutional and environmental surroundings--such as Sunday School or mass, school and friends--also contribute to socialization in the general sense. The entire process is one in which attitudes and much behaviour are learned. They are acquired by the individual as he reacts to various stimuli which impinge upon him. These stimuli are numerous and complex, acting upon the individual in the form of visceral drives and personality needs, and externally in the form of socio-environmental influences.
While other factors contribute to the process of socialization the family would appear to be the most important component. The function of the family, in a sociological sense, is the transmission of general norms of the culture to the young. The patterns of behaviour which are handed from parents to children, and therefore associated with an important source of authority, persist for a long period of time even in hostile environments.\(^4\)

Very important differences, however, do exist in the socialization of Protestants and Catholics. Lenski suggests that the behaviour of socio-religious groups are influenced by religious orientations.\(^5\) He states that every major religious group develops its own distinctive orientation towards all aspects of life, and that these orientations profoundly influence the daily actions of its adherents...\(^6\)

Lenski found that 62% of the Catholics in his sample as compared to 32% of the Protestants took an orthodox stand on a series of questions.\(^7\) McDonald found similar results in Ontario reporting that orthodoxy was as strongly related to voting behaviour as the social involvement indicies.\(^8\) These findings support McRae's argument that cleavages in society must be sufficiently intense and durable to give rise to distinctive outlooks or orientations towards society.\(^9\)

Therefore, I am arguing that differing life orientations of Catholics and Protestants, which are a function of their upbringing, may be responsible for the continuing political division. Regenstreif has argued that it is useful to see voting behaviour as being
conditioned by an individual's set of attitudes. These attitudes, in turn, are largely the product of the operation of such forces as family upbringing.10

It has already been noted11 that Catholics are more likely to prefer relatives over friends and are more involved in the extended family whereas Protestants have weaker ties not only with the extended family but also within the immediate family.12 Lenski provides some remarkable evidence on the differences in upbringing, or socialization, of Catholics and Protestants. Lenski first argues that the behaviour and attitudes of clergy represent more than personal likes and dislikes, they express the values and norms of the groups they lead. Eighty-one percent of the Catholic clergy stressed the importance of obedience over intellectual autonomy while only 40% of the white Protestant clergy did.13 These differences are, indeed, reflected in the laity. 48% of the Catholics in Lenski's sample as compared to 32% of the Protestants ranked obedience above intellectual autonomy for their children. When controlling for class the relationship persisted. Lenski concluded

These figures clearly indicate that the Catholic clergy are a major force promoting respect for authority in Detroit today. If Catholics are less often committed to intellectual autonomy than Protestants, this is not so much due to the influence of class as of the church.14

Not surprisingly, Lenski found that intellectual autonomy was negatively correlated with orthodoxy15. This is an important finding given the increasing amount and quality of education today and the relationship between orthodoxy
and party preference.

Lenski also asked in his survey whether a twelve year old should be allowed to decide for himself whether or not to attend church or Sunday School. 21% of the Protestants said yes he should whereas only 7% of the Catholics replied in the affirmative. 16 Finally, 38.2% of the Catholics and only 15.2% of the Protestants condoned the use of physical punishment for their children. On the other hand, 41% of the Catholics and 27% of the Protestants would use material rewards to express pleasure with their children. 17

As children are socialized their behaviour reflects not only their own needs and demands but must take into account the needs and demands of others. 18 This, apparently, is more so for Catholics than for Protestants. Protestant children are given more responsibility, are punished less and rewarded less materially than are Catholics. This confirms basic notions that Catholics are more family oriented whereas Protestants tend to be more individualistic and peer group oriented. 19 Lenski concludes of family life that

Given a traditionalistic orientation one would expect people to stress the importance of obedience. Given a rationalistic orientation one would expect people to stress the importance of a child's learning to think for himself. 20

Differences in the upbringing and orientation of children are, therefore, expected to manifest themselves in the political as well as social sphere.

Children, then, are subjected to the influence of their family which operates to affect the perception of
politics, party preference and general orientation toward life. The effect of socialization is to provide long term stability to the political and social system. Children adopt their parent's social identification such as religion, ethnicity and often social class. Therefore, the attitudes which are appropriate for the child's parents are no less appropriate for him. Given that the political relevancy of these social factors remain unchanged then the political preference of an individual's parents is also appropriate for him.

Many studies have shown that the political preference of very young children reflects that of their parents even before they become aware of the policies or leaders. Hence, a child inherits a political preference just as he inherits his church preference, for both are part of a general attitudinal structure that dictates what he "naturally" thinks.

Such inheritance is not, however, always the case. The major forces which operate against the inheritance of partisanship are: exposure to a different class environment, residence in a community in which the dominant sentiment runs against the parental choice, the experience of political events that work against the parental party, or contact with friends and co-workers predominantly identified with a different party.

William Irvine has attempted to explain the perpetuation of religious voting statistically by the use of a socialization model. He argues that religion is no longer the relevant political dimension it once was. It
persists because, and only because, of the process of socialization of the young to their parent's partisanship. Since religion is an ascribed group membership the correlation between religion and party preference continues without "any necessary felt connection between the two."^{25}

Irvine first dichotomized the voters into 'Liberal' and 'others'. He then divided the electorate into two groups— the inheritors and the bootstrappers. The inheritors are those people who identify with the Liberal party and remember at least one parent also having a Liberal party identification. In my analysis I will refer to these people as one-parent inheritors^{26} in order to distinguish between our results. The bootstrappers are those people who supposedly formulated their own party identification. They include Liberal identifiers whose parents were not or non-Liberal identifiers whose parents were. Again, I will refer to this group in my analysis as one-parent bootstrappers.^{27}

Using crosstabulation Irvine found that the relationship between religion and party identification was relatively high for inheritors but for bootstrappers it completely diminished. He then concludes that religion is a continuing cleavage for those who have the same party identification as their parents, which presumably, was originally based on political events. He infers from the data that inheritors, while voting along religious lines, do not consciously link politics and religion.

A number of methodological criticisms can be
made of Irvine's article. First is his construction of the two groups. Included in his inheritor category may be persons who are NDP supporters but whose parents were Conservatives (since these were aggregated into "others"). Or, there may be persons who are either Liberal or non-Liberal identifiers but whose parents did not agree on party identification. Third, bootstrappers included those who refused to answer or could not remember their parent's party identification. Indeed, it will be shown, the inclusion or exclusion of the missing data is critical to the outcome of the analysis. Fourth, Irvine made a critical assumption about the transmission of religious norms. He assumes that the religion of the respondent is the same as his parents'. It is known that family groups tend to be endogamous which means that interaction among members of a family is among members of the same faith. In short, the family group tends to function as a subunit of the larger and more inclusive religious group.\textsuperscript{28} However, important differences, as pointed out, between Catholic and Protestant asocialization exist.

I have replicated Irvine's analysis utilizing two distinct groups. First are the "one-parent" inheritors and "one-parent" bootstrappers which were outlined above. In order to study the process of socialization more critically I have also constructed the "conformers" and "non-conformers". Conformers are those who remember both parents as having the same party preference and they, too, identify with that party. The non-conformers are those persons who identify with one of the four major parties
and remember both parents supporting a different party. For example, those respondents whose parents were both Conservative and they, too, identify with the Conservative party are conformers. Those persons with Conservative parents but they identify with one of the three other major parties are non-conformers. Persons whose parents disagreed on partisanship, or for whom data was missing for one or both parents, are eliminated from this analysis. I have, therefore, isolated those politically homogenous families in which political transmission is expected to be higher and deviation more difficult. I am, then, being as strict as possible in my operationalization of party transmission (i.e. socialization) with regards to the conformer group.

Irvine's findings and my replicated ones are presented in table 3.1. The data for the replicated findings are taken from the 1965 and 1974 national surveys as the 1968 sample did not include a question on parental partisanship. The table includes the results for both the one-parent inheritor and conformer groups. The phi coefficients are presented for Irvine's results and Cramer's V for the replicated ones as I am working with a four party system and not a dichotomy as Irvine chose.

In all cases the correlation for religious voting is higher among the inheritor and conformer groups. My findings indicate, however, that the one-parent bootstrappers and the non-conformers show a relatively strong degree of association between religion and voting. Irvine's elimination of the missing data is, apparently, very
Table 3.1


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Irvine Merged Data Set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \rho )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sample</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inheritors</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootstrappers</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformers</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Conformers</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
important in explaining the diminution of the coefficient within that group. While society is composed of people who don't remember their parent's party attachment or won't disclose their own, it is best to use data from only those respondents who have answered all questions in order to draw unbiased inferences. This is not to say that the elimination of the missing data invalidate Irvine's findings. The differences in the magnitude of the correlation for the two groups requires further analysis.

Irvine's findings led him to conclude that he had found the source of the continuing religious cleavage among the Canadian electorate whereas I only found a difference in magnitude. If one assumes that the entire electorate was once aligned along religious lines then the high correlation between the inheritor group and party preference is not surprising. One cannot assume automatically, though, that religion is not a salient cleavage for the inheritors based only on this information.

Inspection of table 3.2 shows that the decline in the coefficient for the bootstrappers is mainly a function of the increased Protestant support for the Liberal party rather than for the Conservative party. While not as strong as the inheritor group, Catholic support for the Liberal party among bootstrappers is found. The major difference is to be found in the support for the two major parties and the third parties. The inheritor group affords the third parties a total of
Table 3.2

Party Identification by Religion Controlling for Inheritance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 376.4 \]  \( p < 0.001 \)
\[ V = 0.553 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>PCon</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 262.0 \]  \( p < 0.001 \)
\[ V = 0.191 \]
3.1% of their support whereas bootstrappers offer 36.1% to the minor parties. Obviously the fact that the minor parties were non-existent for the majority of the parents of the present members of the electorate obscure the true relationship. If the two major parties alone are used in the analysis, the proportion of Catholics voting Liberal is 87.6% for inheritors and 83.7% for bootstrappers—hardly a substantial difference.

This suggests that inheritance of partisanship may not be the main determinant explaining the perpetuation of religious voting. What Irvine fails to do is identify the relative strength of the two groups, to identify common characteristics of inheritors or to suggest why transmission of parental identification takes place among this group and not the bootstrappers.

There are two avenues which should, intuitively, be followed. The first is that of religion. Are there differences in the rate of transmission between families which are more interested in religion? Second, what is the effect of parental partisanship and agreement on partisanship on inheritance?

I. Religion and inheritance

There is a slightly stronger tendency for Catholics to conform to their parent's party identification (71.7%) than for Protestants (64.6%). This may, or may not, be a reflection of different family structures. As seen in table 3.3 there is equally high probability that a respondent will have the same religion as his parents.
Table 3.3


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parent's Religion</th>
<th>Respondent's Religion</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1065</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 1858.5 \quad p < 0.001 \]

\[ \phi = 0.928 \]
Roughly four percent of each denomination change, usually as a result of inter-marriage. However, if the various Protestant denominations are broken down, quite different results in regards to religious homogeneity emerge, as seen in table 3.4. Clearly, then, the high inter-marriage rate of Protestants as compared to the high intra-marriage rate of Catholics is likely to have differing effects on the transmission of religious and political norms to the young. The authors of the *American Voter* state that group salience depends on the clarity with which a standard is transmitted and the insistence that accompanies it. This is supported by the greater religiosity of Catholics found in the previous chapter for the more that people have internalized the norms of their religious group the more their actions reinforce similar tendencies in other members of the family. This would be further supported by the following data taken from the 1968 national survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Level</th>
<th>Catholic (%)</th>
<th>Protestant (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Interested</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly Interested</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Interested</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 425.1, \ p < 0.001, \ \nu = .423\]

More than three-quarters of the Catholic respondent's parents were very interested in religion whereas the Protestant distribution is nearly equal for all three
Table 3.4

Proportion of Marriages Within Denomination--Source: Canada Year Book, 1972.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>% of Marriages Within Denomination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Church</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
categories. If, as Nottingham argues,

instruction in religious values forms a large part of the explicit or implicit training of children... and that this instruction takes place at a time when the personal values of the individuals are being formed, guarantees at least some degree of consistency between individual values and religious values.34

then the effect is going to be greater among Catholics. Unfortunately it is not possible to test for parental interest in religion against inheritance. Conformers are, however, more likely to be church attenders (58%) than are non-conformers (45.7%). While the differences are not too strong it is in direction expected.

II. Partisanship and inheritance

What effect does partisanship have on inheritance? Conformers are overwhelmingly Liberal supporters (60.1%) as compared to Conservative identifiers (34.5%) or the few NDP or Sacred identifiers (5.3% total). Is it possible to ascertain more clearly the identity of conformers and non-conformers? Table 3.5 indicates that non-conformers are most likely to be persons who had Conservative parents and who now vote for the Liberal party. Fully 28.2% of the non-conformers are such people.35 Overall 37.1% of the non-conformers are Liberal party identifiers. This would suggest a general movement towards the Liberal party indicating that the high correlation between Catholic conformers and the Liberal party may, in part, be a spurious one. This will be considered in more detail later.

Parental agreement on partisanship is considered to be an important factor in the transmission of party
Table 3.5

(total percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parent’s Party Identification</th>
<th>Non-Conformers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCon</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37.1% 24.9% 28.1% 9.9% 100%

N = 526
identification and, hence, led to my distinguishing between one-parent inheritors and conformers. Yet in society not all parents agree on partisanship. The importance of parental agreement, in relation to inheritance is seen below.

Correlation Coefficients for Religious Voting

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
V & N = \\
\hline
Parents Agree on Partisanship & 0.384 & 1647 \\
Parents Disagree on Partisanship & 0.274 & 220 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

This suggests that the transmission of political norms based on a religious dimension is greater among families which agree on partisanship. However, almost all parents agree on partisanship. More importantly table 3.6 shows that those whose parents agreed on partisanship are more likely to be inheritors whereas those whose parents disagreed tend to be bootstrappers.

I have found that there are both religious and political characteristics of the family which Irvine failed to take into account in his model. Religious voting cannot be explained by a simple dichotomy for it is a complex function of many attributes of family structure. I have constructed a model of inheritance as seen in figure 3.1. It indicates the proportion of inheritors and bootstrappers for each combination of partisan family. Among families in which the parents agreed on Liberal partisanship 95% of the Catholics as compared to 73% of the Protestants are inheritors. 79% of the Protestants and only 39% of the Catholics with
Table 3.6


| Parental Agreement on Partisanship | One-Parent Inheritance |   |  
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|---|---|
|                                   | Inheritor | Bootstrapper | % | N  |
| Parent's Agree                    | 67.3      | 32.7         | 100 | 1871 |
| Parent's Disagree                 | 28.1      | 71.9         | 100 | 270 |

$x^2 = 152.7$  \hspace{1cm}  p < 0.001

$\phi = 0.269$
Figure 3.1

Patterns of Inheritance.

**ROMAN CATHOLIC**

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{PCon/PCon} &\quad (18\%) \\
\text{PCon/Lib} &\quad 11 \\
\text{Lib/Lib} \quad (\text{Parents}) &\quad 71 \\
\text{PCon} &\quad (39.1\%) \\
\text{Lib} &\quad (60.9) \\
\text{PCon} &\quad (19.6\%) \\
\text{Lib} &\quad (80.4) \\
\text{PCon} &\quad (5.3\%) \\
\text{Lib} &\quad (94.7) \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[n = 765\]

**PROTESTANTS**

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{PCon/PCon} &\quad (55\%) \\
\text{PCon/Lib} &\quad 11 \\
\text{Lib/Lib} \quad (\text{Parents}) &\quad 34 \\
\text{PCon} &\quad (79.7\%) \\
\text{Lib} &\quad (20.9) \\
\text{PCon} &\quad (45.3\%) \\
\text{Lib} &\quad (54.7) \\
\text{PCon} &\quad (27.1\%) \\
\text{Lib} &\quad (72.9) \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[n = 789\]

**KEY:**
- One-parent inheritors
- One-parent bootstrappers
parents who agreed on Conservative identification can be classified as inheritors. Among the families of mixed partisanship one would expect to find a near even split between the respondents. This is clearly not the case for Catholics. Protestants approach the expected norm although there is a slight preference for the Liberal party. Over 80% of the Catholics, however, support the Liberals.

Inheritance of parental partisanship obviously is an important component to the perpetuation of religious voting in Canada. Protestants, however, approach the socialization norm while evidence presented here suggest that the Liberal party is still preferred by most Catholics, regardless of parental partisanship. This would suggest that there are forces external to the family which operate to draw Catholics towards that party. Or, there may be forces inherent within Catholic families, regardless of parental partisanship, which attract Catholics to the Liberal party. Lenski found the same phenomenon in Detroit. Regardless of whether the respondent's father was Republican, Democrat or Independent the correlation between religion and party preference persisted. This was true even when Lenski controlled for class. He concluded that

religion is something more than an accidental correlate of party affiliation...These data strongly suggest that religious affiliation is an important factor influencing the party affiliation of present-day Americans.37

Therefore to explain the behaviour of the non-conformers or one-parent bootstrappers it is necessary to refer to
those conditions earlier mentioned which bring about a break in the pattern of inheritance: exposure to a different class environment; residence in a community in which the dominant sentiment runs against the parental choice; the experience of political events that work against the parental party; or contact with friends and co-workers predominantly identified with a different party. To suggest which of these is the predominant force behind non-conformity in Canada would be purely speculative. It may well be a number or a combination of these factors at work.

The findings in figure 3.1 suggest that for Catholics religion is a stronger determinant of voting behaviour than is inheritance. The role of socialization and partisan inheritance cannot be underestimated however for it is a major factor contributing to life orientations and the continuing stability of politics. This fact is borne out by regression analysis (table 3.7) and shows that Liberal parents are a stronger determinant of Liberal party vote than is religion. On the other hand, if religion were not still an important correlate of voting behaviour then the extent of non-conformity (roughly one-third of all voters) would quickly bring about a rapid decline in the degree of religious voting.

In this chapter I have considered the electorate as a whole in my analysis. In the following chapter I will consider peer group or cohort socialization as a component of political change. That is, by considering the entire electorate I am spanning a period of more than
Table 3.7


Dependent Variable = Liberal Party Vote/Conservative, NDP, Social Credit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>BETA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father Liberal/PCon, NDP, SC</td>
<td>0.261*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic/Protestant</td>
<td>0.116**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English/French</td>
<td>0.084***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario/Other</td>
<td>0.080+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec/Other</td>
<td>0.054+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairies/Other</td>
<td>-0.045+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritimes/Other</td>
<td>0.043+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attender/Non-Attender</td>
<td>0.019+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1073  \quad R^2 = 0.149

* significant at 0.001  
** significant at 0.01  
*** significant at 0.05  
+ not significant
one hundred years (i.e. since the parents of the oldest members of the electorate are included). I now want to break the electorate into cohorts in order to determine the extent of religious voting and whether its importance is diminishing.
FOOTNOTES


5. Lenski, p. 291.


7. Lenski, p. 57, see footnote 34 chapter two for the questions Lenski used. Lenski feels that the differences between Catholics and Protestants reflects on the social heritage of the two denominations. "Protestantism came into being in large measure as a sectarian revolt against the massive institutionization of medieval Catholicism." (p. 312).


11. See footnote 51, chapter two.

12. Lenski, p. 218, also see chapter two.


14. Lenski, p. 301, this was also true for those with a Catholic education. 68% of those having attended a separate school reported favouring relatives over friends as compared to 63% of those Catholics with a public school education.

15. Lenski, p. 225, again this was more true of those with a Catholic education. 68% were doctrinally orthodox if they had attended a separate school as compared to 56% of the Catholics who attended public schools.

16. Lenski, p. 234.


19. Lenski argues that Protestantism weakens and undermines the extended and immediate family. This results in a different attitude towards work, greater mobility in the economic system and, generally, a more rational outlook on life. (p. 357).

20. Lenski, p. 358, on the aggregate level this is seen to be true. Apparently, Catholics tend to vote Liberal, as did their parents, whereas Protestant children are not as strongly tied to family tradition. This is dealt with in more detail later in the chapter.


26. In my analysis I used only those who identified with one of the four major parties. If the respondent identified with the Liberal party and one parent also identified with the Liberal party then he was classed as a one-parent inheritor. This does not, however, take into account those persons who are vote switchers and, therefore, may be classed incorrectly.

27. Any combination in which the respondent did not identify with the same party as one parent he was classified as a one-parent bootstrapper.


29. Unfortunately it was not possible to test this directly since all missing data was excluded from my data set.

31. Indeed, growing inter-marriage rates are one source of a diminishing correlation between religion and voting behaviour which I will consider in chapter five.


33. Lenski, p. 18.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's Identification</th>
<th>Respondent's Identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCon</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brodie argues that the differences in rates of inheritance between parties might be attributed to: youth radicalism in the 1960's; life cycle theory; consistency of parental vote; and the stronger identification of Conservatives with the candidate rather than party or leader.

36. Lenski, p. 141.

37. Lenski, p. 142.
Chapter Four

Political Change

Through Generations
Evidence from the previous chapter suggests that inheritance of parental partisanship cannot account in full for the persistence of religious voting since the early twentieth century. The fact that nearly four of every ten voters is a "bootstrapper" indicates that the strength of religious voting would decline drastically if, as Irvine suggests, there is no relationship between bootstrapper's religious affiliation and party preference. Indeed, I found that the bootstrappers display a pattern of partisan attachment not too dissimilar from the inheritors. In particular, Catholics, regardless of parental partisanship, strongly prefer the Liberal party. It was this evidence which suggested that forces other than the family were operating to socialize Catholics and, hence, was responsible for their Liberal partisanship. Butler and Stokes state that

> The plasticity which renders the young open to so deep an impress from their parents, also renders them more open to influences from other quarters than they will be later, when set in their adult ways. Many of these influences are lodged in a wider social milieu of school or work.\(^1\)

Therefore, it may be an aspect of the broader social environment which is responsible for the Catholic's preference for the Liberal party.

A relationship between a party and a group in society can only exist if, first, individuals have a common experience of which the social characteristic is an indicator and, second, if the parties have a consistent
appeal to those groups of persons. When a religious issue becomes a political one it would be expected that religious affiliation would become highly relevant politically. Likewise, if religious issues were not politically relevant then one wouldn't expect to find religious affiliation to be an important determinant of voting behaviour. In other words, given the opportunity to vote in accordance to religious issues, denominational loyalties will become more apparent in voting behaviour. This suggests that party images and voting behaviour of individuals tend to mutually reinforcing. Schwartz argues that Canada doesn't have class based voting because we don't have class based parties. Others might argue that class based parties will not develop until the society has developed along that dimension. This raises the question as to which comes first, voter alignment or the issue dimension the parties take. As mentioned, the two are mutually reinforcing but rely, in part, on the ability of the parties to exploit emerging cleavages within society. In a brokerage system of politics it is difficult for parties to maintain electoral support and to take a consistent, ideological stand on social issues. Consequently the voter alignment tends to be tied more directly to historical party images. It is for this reason I feel that the future of religious voting depends heavily on the fortunes of the 'third' and more secular parties. As for the Liberal and Conservative parties their ability to appeal to both Catholics and Protestants is more likely to come about when
the issues along a different dimension are seen as more important than religious loyalties? The question to be considered, then, is how salient is religious affiliation for politics in Canada?

The successful transmission of group political norms is one factor which contributes to the proximity of the group to politics. In addition, however, the political salience of the group depends upon a heightening of awareness of a particular group membership at the time when the individual is most oriented to the political world. As the authors of the *American Voter* put it

...as proximity between the group and the world of politics increases, the political distinctiveness of the group will increase. Or, at the individual level, as perception of politics becomes clearer, the susceptibility of the individual member to group influences in political affairs increases.

A specific group membership, then, can be a relevant political dimension only to the extent that the individual perceives a bond between the group and a party at the time when he is most oriented to politics. This is generally at the time when one enters the electorate and votes for the first time. During this period party preference is most directly influenced by the actual events which create political issues, the leaders of the parties, and the state of the party organizations themselves which offer to cope with the issues. The frame of reference which determines how people react to these issues, leaders and parties is molded by the people with
whom the individual associates daily. While this may be the members of one's family, the political preference of people entering the electorate is susceptible to the pressures of one's peer group. Their political identification will then reflect the particular circumstances (social and political) surrounding the peer group or, on a broader scale, all those entering the electorate during distinct periods of political events, leaders and party organization.

Kornberg suggests that the elections of 1911, 1935, 1958, and 1968, leaders such as Diefenbaker and Trudeau, and issues such as the schools question and the conscription crisis have "...probably induced substantial numbers of Canadians to change their party identities..." One might expect that political events and issues to have a greater influence on those people just entering the electorate for their party attachments are less well developed and, hence, they are more open to new political appeals. Butler and Stokes state that

If strong forces move the country towards one of the parties we can expect these forces to be most clearly evident in the behaviour of the youngest voters, on whom the weight of prior loyalties sits most lightly.

Periods of political events then form political generations which are distinct in their behaviour at the polls. Every cohort has its own ideas, sentiments and values which converge, and their actions become "quasi-organized." As each cohort enters the electorate and is exposed to political issues and events, it carries the impression
of this first encounter through life. Kornberg suggests that social events and conditions are more important agents of political change than are personal experiences. Indications of generational importance is offered by Lenski who found that the differences in party support proved to be the greatest among the oldest respondents and least among the young. In Holland differences in age groups have been attributed to the various social, economic and political conditions under which the groups have been socialized. Irvine reports similar findings in that those aspects of religious life which contribute to group mobilization are more effective among the older. The focus of this paper, then, shifts slightly to examining not the persistence of the religious cleavage but the potential for political change, of which cohort differences may be an important element.

To review, briefly, the cohorts were constructed on the basis of periods of distinguishable political events or leaders and delineated by the elections of 1935, 1948, 1958, and 1968. Those entering the electorate before 1935 are members of the "pre-1935" cohort during which time the political events thought to have caused the alignment of voters along religious lines occurred. Those entering between 1935 and 1947 belong to the "World War Two" cohort aptly named for the period of economic growth prior to the Second World War and for the war itself. Third, those turning twenty-one between 1948 and 1957 are members of the "post-World War Two" cohort and reflect a period of industrialism
and a strong two party dominance of politics. Between 1958 and 1967 persons coming of voting age are named the "Diefenbaker" cohort because of the personal effect that this man had on federal politics for this period. Finally, the "youth" or "Trudeau" cohort are those entering the electorate between 1968 and 1974.

Before entering into the cohort analysis it must be noted that political change is related to age in a number of ways. The concept of political generations inners that the distinctiveness of each group is determined by their responsiveness to the forces which dominate politics when they enter the electorate. These impressions are thought to be carried through life. However, other factors may influence the pattern or partisanship within each cohort. These may be irregular birth and mortality rates or the influence of the "life-cycle" effect. The former will be dealt with in the ensuing section while the latter will be discussed within the context of the cohort analysis itself.

The party composition of those in a cohort entering the electorate may diverge from that of their parent simply because of differing rates of reproduction in the various segments of the electorate. To illustrate the effect of differential fertility rates on party support we begin with a simple example of fifty Catholic couples and fifty Protestant couples, all undeviating from the "traditional" party preference of their religious group such that:
According to 1961 Canada Census data the fertility rates of Catholics and Protestants over fifteen years of age is 3.5 and 2.4 respectively.\(^{23}\) This is somewhat higher than the fertility rates which Lenski quotes for roughly the same time period in the United States (Catholics 2.7 and Protestants 1.9).\(^{24}\) Lenski also points out that the gap between Catholics and Protestants was widening.\(^{25}\) Using the Canadian fertility rates the following number of new voters would enter the electorate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total party %</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given an inheritance rate of 70% the overall effect on party strength among the new voters would be such:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>122*</td>
<td>53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total party %</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* rounded down
** rounded up

Therefore the differential fertility rates operate in a manner which would increase the Liberal party strength
by roughly seven percent in one generation, assuming equal inheritance rates for both denominations and that nothing will occur to upset this pattern. If we take into consideration the differing proportions of "successful" transmission rates by party and religion, as in chapter three, the effect is even greater.

Inheritance rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic-Liberal</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant-Conservative</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Party %</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The direct effect of fertility coupled with differential inheritance rates is staggering. While the model is overly simplified this demonstration would indicate that the Liberal party can expect, on the basis of fertility alone, to enjoy an increasing proportion of the popular vote over a long period of time.

Of course fertility rates are directly related to differing family sizes. Data from a CIPO survey in June 1975 indicates that 56.1% of the Protestant families consist of three or fewer persons while 57.8% of the Catholics have families of more than three persons.26 Butler and Stokes suggest that

...beliefs as to family size tend in an interesting
way to be tied to a wider pattern of values and beliefs, of which political allegiance and aspirations of social mobility are also party.27

Indeed, family size is very strongly related to the strength of religious voting in Canada as the following correlation coefficients indicate.

Correlation Coefficients for Religion and Party Preference Controlling for Size of Family.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Family (# of persons)</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.426</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6+</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While many of the above categories have few cases if they are grouped into three or fewer/four or more members in a family the results are very similar. Of those in smaller families the correlation between religion and party preference is \( V = 0.299 \) (\( N = 371 \)) while the coefficient rises to \( V = 0.407 \) among the larger families (\( N = 371 \)). Whether or not the results are linear the implications are clear. Members of larger families tend to vote more along religious lines than do members of smaller families. These findings cannot be attributable to the larger family size of Catholics and smaller size of Protestant families alone (mean family sizes are 3.7 and 3.2 respectively). Lenski argues that the children of larger families are likely to be at a disadvantage in the competition for good jobs. This is because the addition of one extra
child in a family greatly reduces the chances for any of the children to get a college education. If this is true, then one might expect to find those with higher education and occupations taking their political cues from these sources while members of larger families will be more influenced by the family itself, lacking other social cues.

The significance of differing fertility rates for political change is seen in table 4.1. Due to differential rates of child birth and, perhaps to a lesser extent immigration, the proportion of Catholics in the electorate has risen from 40% in the eldest cohort to nearly 60% in the youngest cohort. This means, in absolute terms, that if the Liberal party can maintain support from 70% of the Catholics in each cohort (regardless of inheritance of partisanship), their support will increasingly grow. Figure 4.1 demonstrates this point adequately.

Figure 4.1 Effects of Fertility Rates on Party Strength
Table 4.1


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trudeau</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diefenbaker</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-WWII</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1935</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 116.2 \quad \text{p < 0.001} \]

\[ V = 0.122 \]
Simply because of the increased proportion of Catholics in each cohort the Liberal party will enjoy a direct increase in support of the magnitude \((b-a)\). Everything else being equal the Conservative party, by virtue of the decreasing proportion of Protestants, will lose an equivalent amount of support.\(^30\) In terms of political change, then, the concept and reality of differential birth rates is a very important one.

Differential mortality rates may, however, also contribute to the process of political change particularly if the strength of one party is heavily concentrated in the older cohort.\(^31\) Butler and Stokes state that

\[\ldots\text{if the oldest age-cohort favour one of the parties more strongly than the accumulated effects of the selective mortality would lead one to expect, then that party stands to suffer unequal losses due to current deaths.}\]

On the other hand, Butler and Stokes also point out that mortality is likely to change the party balance less rapidly than the entry of new cohorts because of the speed of the process.\(^32\) It takes longer for the effects of a cohort leaving the electorate to be felt than for the impact of a large set of new voters entering at once. The fact that there is no discernable difference in the life span of Catholics and Protestants suggests that mortality may not be as important a factor for political change in Canada as is the birth rate.

Does the religious composition of party supporters vary according to political generations and, if so, in what direction and magnitude? Among the oldest cohort
one would expect to find the largest divergence between Catholics and Protestants in terms of their voting behaviour. Religious voting should decline in the World War Two cohort as the political importance of religion declined and the rise of the CCP party might account for a decline as well. In the post-World War Two cohort, religious voting may increase because of the strong two party system during this period. Religious voting is expected to decline even further in the Diefenbaker cohort because of the personal appeal of this leader. I expect to find a large number of Catholics entering the electorate to have been drawn towards the Conservative party for this reason. In the Trudeau cohort the opposite pattern is expected to exist with Protestants being attracted towards the Liberal party. In addition, during this latter period the reduction of the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen could mean an increase of Liberal support within this bloc of new voters.

The correlation coefficients in table 4.2 indicate an overall decline in the strength of religious voting with an upswing in the youngest cohort. The pre-1935 cohort has the strongest degree of religious voting as expected. These are the people who entered the electorate when religious issues are thought to have been most relevant. The magnitude of the correlation between religion and party preference then decreases within each successive cohort until the last. Why might this be?

In a four party analysis it would be somewhat misleading simply to compare the correlation coefficients.
Table 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Liberal (Lib)</th>
<th>PCong (PCon)</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\[ x^2 = 40.7 \quad p < 0.001 \]
\[ V = 0.326 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Liberal (Lib)</th>
<th>PCong (PCon)</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\[ x^2 = 53.3 \quad p < 0.001 \]
\[ V = 0.216 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Liberal (Lib)</th>
<th>PCong (PCon)</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\[ x^2 = 132.6 \quad p < 0.001 \]
\[ V = 0.312 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Liberal (Lib)</th>
<th>PCong (PCon)</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>918</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\[ x^2 = 183.9 \quad p < 0.001 \]
\[ V = 0.331 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Liberal (Lib)</th>
<th>PCong (PCon)</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\[ x^2 = 295.9 \quad p < 0.001 \]
\[ V = 0.417 \]
To be more accurate it is necessary to look at the strength of the Catholic-Liberal, Protestant-Conservative vote as well as the strength of the third parties. Among the Catholics, Liberal support has declined more than fifteen percent. A similar decline has taken place in regards to the Protestant support of the Conservative party. This would indicate that the bonds which link the religious denomination to the "traditional" party, while still present for the Catholics, are consistently declining. What is affecting the value of the correlation coefficients, then, is the fact that younger Catholics have no more tendency than their elders to support the Conservative party. Protestants, on the other hand, are generally affording the Liberal party more support.

Just by observing the data in table 4.2 it suggests a general movement of the young towards the Liberal party. It is necessary then to isolate, as best as possible, religious voting from cohort influence. The extent to which the religious denomination is above the cohort mean for the "traditional" party is taken as one indicator of religious voting among each cohort. Graph 4.1 reveals that the tendency for Catholics to disproportionately support the Liberal party has declined markedly. Protestants, though, in all age cohorts, are over-represented in terms of Conservative support. As noted earlier this is a function of the lack of Catholic support for the Conservative party. In order to account for the discrepancy caused by this interaction effect of
Graph 4.1

Proportion of each denomination voting for the "traditional" party above the cohort mean.
the two denominations on both major parties, a measure was computed which would take into account both Catholic and Protestant support for both the Liberals and Conservatives. This involved adding the support for the two "traditional" parties for each religious denomination and subtracting the proportion of each denomination's support which went to the "opposing" party. The results are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Index of Religious Partisanship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trudeau</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diefenbaker</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-World War Two</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War Two</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1935</td>
<td></td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This measure of religious partisanship indicates that there has been a substantial and consistent decline in the amount of religious voting in Canada across cohorts. There is a small upturn by the Trudeau cohort, though. This might be accounted for by the fact that the separate school issue was raised in Ontario in 1972.

What may be occurring, of course, is that the third parties, which are more secular in orientation, appeal more to the younger voters to whom religion is not politically salient. Table 4.3 shows that the increase in support for third parties among the younger members of the electorate corresponds directly with a decrease in major party support. The future of the third parties then apparently plays an important role in the direction of religious voting. As mentioned earlier it is mainly
Table 4.3


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>MAJOR (Lib &amp; PCon)</th>
<th>MINOR (NDP &amp; SC)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trudeau</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diefenbaker</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-WWII</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1935</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 17.5 \quad p < 0.002 \]

\[ V = 0.049 \]
the Catholics who are giving the third parties more support whereas for Protestants the Liberal party is the recipient of their support, not the minor parties. The overall effect is to keep the Liberal party strength relatively stable while the Conservative party declines at a rate roughly equivalent to the increase in third party support.

Could this mean that the third parties have drawn the secularized support from the younger cohorts and the relationship between religion and the two major parties has remained the same? Using only the two major parties graph 4.2 shows that the two denominations have declined in their tendency to give disproportionate support to the "traditional" party, again with the exception of the youngest cohort which takes a slight upturn. This is supported by the Index of Religious Partisanship which shows a similar pattern.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>IRP Range (0 - 200)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trudeau</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diefenbaker</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-World War Two</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War Two</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1935</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is possible to conclude, therefore, that religious voting is declining within the two major parties, which are aligned on a religious dimension.

There is, however, still a relatively strong association between religion and party preference among the younger cohorts, especially Catholics. It may be that the relationship is dissipating slowly because no
GRAPH 4.7

Proportion of each denomination voting for the "traditional" party above the cohort mean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>Catholic N</th>
<th>Protestant N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-WWII</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-WWII</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disenfranchised</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truculent</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
other major events have occurred which would radically change the alignment of voters. If this is the case then those for whom religion is not as politically salient should display a weaker attachment to these parties. Table 4.4 indicates that the stronger partisan attachment is, the stronger the tendency to vote according to one's religious denomination. As seen in graph 4.3 younger voters are not as strongly attached to a political party. Therefore, it might be inferred that while younger cohorts display a tendency to vote along religious lines their attachment is not as strong as for older people. Unfortunately, literature suggests that there is a general increase in the degree of partisan attachment as a result of the life cycle effect which negates this argument. Butler and Stokes state

There is evidence that what determines the strength and unchangeability of partisan ties is not so much the voter's age in years as the duration of his attachment to one party. Younger voters tend to be more plastic because their party preferences tend to be more recent.36

Therefore, as with many attitudes, the longer they are held, the stronger they become.37 Distinguishing more clearly between the life cycle and generational effects will be dealt with in the next chapter.

Respondents were asked in 1968 to rate between 0 and 100 their feelings towards Catholics and Protestants. One measure, of religious attitudes, would be the mean score of one's own religious group minus the mean score of the other religious group. The difference in the strength of religious attitudes can be seen in
Table 4.4


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>VERY STRONG</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>PCon</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$X^2 = 282.5$</td>
<td>$p &lt; 0.001$</td>
<td>$V = 0.405$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| FAIRLY STRONG |            |            |            |            |     |     |
| Catholic      | 70.3       | 15.1       | 8.0        | 6.6        | 100 | 1238|
| Protestant    | 39.2       | 42.8       | 15.2       | 2.8        | 100 | 1577|
| $X^2 = 355.6$ | $p < 0.001$ | $V = 0.354$ |            |            |     |     |

| NOT VERY STRONG |            |            |            |            |     |     |
| Catholic       | 64.0       | 16.8       | 12.4       | 6.8        | 100 | 345 |
| Protestant     | 46.1       | 41.2       | 10.8       | 1.9        | 100 | 576 |
| $X^2 = 64.6$   | $p < 0.001$ | $V = 0.274$ |            |            |     |     |
GRAPH 4.3

PROPORTION OF EACH COHORT HOLDING A VERY STRONG PARLIAMENT ATTACHMENT

PERCENT

50

25

PRE-1935 (1840)  LWWII (1876)  POST-LWWII (1563)  DEFEATER (1341)  TRUDEAU (SAL)

CONSORT
Protestants, from oldest to youngest, tend to rank the two denominations closer and closer together whereas there is a curvilinear relationship present for Catholics. It would be difficult to argue that these patterns are the result of a life cycle effect. However, they do correlate roughly with the voting pattern found earlier. Irvine, using the same data, collapsed the 100 point scale into ten categories. He then considered those who gave the two denominations a rating within three 'points' of one another insensitive to religious differences. Using this measure he found that there was an increasing tendency, across generations, to be less sensitive to the two religious denominations. He states

> Both in a social and in a psychological sense, therefore, we seem justified in concluding that there is a decline in the exclusiveness of religious community in Canada.

Irvine's measure, however, meant that there could be a variance of thirty percent between an individual's attitudes towards Catholics and Protestants and he would be considered insensitive to religious differences. I broke the attitude scale into ten categories as Irvine did but made a more stringent requirement that attitudes had to equal one another to be considered insensitive.

As seen in graph 4.5 the proportion of persons giving equal ratings to both denominations has increased across generations but with a very slight decline in the Diefenbaker cohort. The number of cases in the youngest cohort is much too small to draw any inferences from.
Graph 4.4

Percent difference between thermometer score for one's own religion minus score for other

Catholic
(Mean score for Catholics minus mean score for Protestants)

Protestant
(Mean score for Protestants minus mean score for Catholics)

PRE-WWII | WWII | POST-WWII | DEFENSE | TRUCE

Catholic N: (234) | (291) | (262) | (302) | (241)
Protestant N: (340) | (339) | (265) | (251) | (22)
Graph 4.5  Proportion giving equal rating to both denominations

Percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-1935</th>
<th>WWII</th>
<th>Post-WWII</th>
<th>Evensen-Jones</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protestant N*</td>
<td>(274)</td>
<td>(262)</td>
<td>(302)</td>
<td>(261)</td>
<td>(261)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic N*</td>
<td>(340)</td>
<td>(261)</td>
<td>(251)</td>
<td>(251)</td>
<td>(251)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cohort
The pattern is, however, identical for both Protestants and Catholics suggesting that the decline in the exclusiveness of religious community may have slowed down. On the other hand, it may be that positive attitudes towards one's own religious group strengthen over time and attitudes towards the other religious group strengthen negatively.

Younger people tend to be less religious than are older people, as indicated in table 4.5. Gallup polls conducted in 1973 show that younger persons are less likely to believe that religion can answer all or most of today's problems or that religion is a relevant part of their lives. While this reflects an approach to life it may more likely be the result of the life cycle effect. This is probably also true of the pattern in graph 4.6 in which the younger cohorts do not consider themselves as (very) religious to the same extent as do older persons.

It seems likely that as people grow older and become more established in life their attention turns more towards family life and involvement in more community and religious associations. While the life cycle explanation might be appropriate for an individual's religious orientations what of his political orientations? In the 1968 national election study the respondents were asked to state how religious their ideal political party would be. As seen in graph 4.7 the proportion of those wanting a very religious party is generally declining, though the few number of cases in the Trudeau cohort
Table 4.5 A

"Do you think that religion can answer all or most of today's problems - or is it largely old fashioned and out of date?" (CIPO, July 1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELIGION STILL RELEVANT SOCIALLY?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES        NO        %     N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL       50.7       49.3    100 487</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE GROUPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-29 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 + years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 95.1 \quad p < 0.01 \]
\[ V = 0.445 \]

Table 4.5 B

"Is organized religion a relevant part of your life at the present time or not?" (CIPO, July 1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELIGION STILL RELEVANT PERSONALLY?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES        NO        %     N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL       50.0       50.0    100 727</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE GROUPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-29 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 + years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 38.2 \quad p < 0.01 \]
\[ V = 0.231 \]
GRAPH 4.6

Proportion of each cohort who consider themselves very religious.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1935</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-WWII</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GRAPH 4.7

Proportion of each cohort wanting a very religious ideal party

PERCENT

Catholic

Total Sample

Protestant

PRE-WWII
POST-WWII
DEFEATER
PROSERVO

Catholic N = (257) (284) (260) (297) (241)
Protestant N = (376) (354) (265) (250) (22)

Cohort
must be kept in mind. The pattern is amazingly consistent for both Protestants and Catholics, with the former generally wanting a less religious ideal party than the latter. The slight increase in the Diefenbaker cohort wanting a very religious party is difficult to explain. It could be the result of their socialization during the 1950's in which there was a "religious revival."

Because of this irregularity, for whatever reason, the life cycle argument is not appropriate for these findings. The desire for a very religious ideal party does not increase consistently with age but appears to be likely a cohort or generational effect.

The data presented in this chapter suggest that religious voting is weakening. While religiousity and strength of partisanship were thought to be explanations for decrease, life cycle effects appear to be more important. In the following chapter I will consider the relationships between these two variables and age more closely. Finally, I was able to determine the political salience of religion was linked to age by means of the desire to have a very religious ideal party.

As in previous chapters regression has been used to determine the relative strength of religion as a predictor of Liberal/not-Liberal voting behaviour. In all cases religion was the strongest predictor among age cohorts except for the Trudeau generation in which residence in Quebec/other was slightly stronger. The partial R's and unstandardized Beta coefficients are presented for religion in table 4.6. It suggests that while
Table 4.6


Dependent Variable = Liberal Party Vote/PCon, NDP & SC

Values for the Independent Variable Catholic/Protestant are presented here only.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>Partial R</th>
<th>Unstandardized beta</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trudeau</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.070 *</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diefenbaker</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.106 **</td>
<td>1318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-WWII</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.259 ***</td>
<td>1544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>0.241 ***</td>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1935</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.366 ***</td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* not significant
** significant at 0.01
*** significant at 0.001
religion is still the most important determinant of voting behaviour it is rapidly loosing its ability, among younger cohorts to predict voting behaviour.
FOOTNOTES


5. Schwartz, p. 162.


...the position the public takes on issues is invariably the result, not the fore-runner, of party pronouncements and campaigning, or of the party identification of individuals.

7. Schwartz, p. 162.


While the successful transmission of a group standard in a particular situation may increase the members sense of proximity, we would propose that the effect of any particular standard, once received, will vary according to the individuals generalized, pre-existing sense of proximity between group and politics. Thus proximity has an important time depth, based on the frequency with which the group has been seen to take a political position in the past.


10. Irish & Prothro, p. 264.

11. It seems almost too obvious that one cannot vote for a party if it is not in existence or does not run candidates in many ridings.


15. N.B. Ryder, "The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change," American Sociological Review (Dec 1965), p. 855, Ryder uses the term to refer to "semi-organized" or "cohesive".


25. Lenski, p. 240, Lenski found that the gap between the fertility rate of Catholics and Protestants was increasing between the two denominations at the following rate (although both were increasing absolutely),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26. Interestingly enough, family size among Catholics varies according to political preference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATHOLICS</th>
<th>family size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1,2,3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


29. Census data indicates that the proportion of Catholics in Canada has risen from 45.7% in 1961 to 46.2% in 1971. In relation to age, Roman Catholics account for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>under 15</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-44</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures are lower than shown in Table 4.1 since I have eliminated other denominations and the non-religious from my data.

30. The total net increase in Liberal support would be: (Liberal increase among Catholics - Liberal decrease among Protestants), the change in Conservative support would equal (Conservative decrease among Protestants - Conservative increase among Catholics).


32. Butler & Stokes, p. 137.


34. Butler & Stokes, p. 137.

35. Butler & Stokes state that "The displacement of the Liberals as the Conservatives' main opponent is one of the keys to the displacement of religion by class as the main grounds of party support in the recent past" (p. 104), A. Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968) argues that the loss in support for the "Big Five" parties was mainly the result of the growth of minor parties in Holland. These parties, he adds, are characterized by their youth and general appeal to the young and secular minded. See chapter X, pp. 6-8.


38. Irvine, p. 8, while Irvine used different cohorts he found that the proportion giving equal ratings to Catholics and Protestants were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort (entry into electorate)</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-1920</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1934</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-1944</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-1956</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-1968</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
39. The question asked "How religious would your ideal political party be?", the answer provided for a range of one (high) through seven (low). The responses were recoded, combining the first two categories (very religious), the middle three (fairly religious) and the last two (not religious).

40. W. Herberg, Protestant-Catholic-Jew (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1960), see particularly Chapter IV, "The Contemporary Upswing in Religion" where Herberg points to indicators of increased religious involvement during the late 1950's.

41. It is necessary to use unstandardized betas in this case as the distributions of the variables may vary from cohort to cohort (eg. the proportion of Catholics is one documented difference). As the standardized betas are based on the standard deviations, which will vary from cohort to cohort, this would lead to misleading inferences.
Chapter Five

The Political Impact of
Social Change.
In the preceding chapter I have shown that the strength of the relationship between religion and voting decreases by cohort reflecting a diminution of the political salience of religion. This would also suggest that as replacement of the electorate occurs the strength of religious voting will decline. It was difficult, however, to determine that the reasons for this decline were generational rather than life cycle motivated.

The process of political change is not always a rapid one. The differences between the cohorts in the strength of religious voting, while expected, were by no means large. Religion is still an important political dimension for the youngest cohort. This could possibly be accounted for by the fact that no other social dimension strong enough has risen to replace the religious pattern.

Both the party and electoral systems in Canada operate against a rapid exploitation of emerging cleavages within society. With two major brokerage parties people may, however, vote for the same party but for very different reasons. Or, the parties may change their focus of appeal over time such that the reasons the Liberal party, for instance, continues to enjoy a large portion of the Catholic vote is related to very different reasons than the incentive which originally attracted Catholics to that party. It is also possible that the role of religion is changing within society. Throughout the analysis in the previous chapter religion was considered to be a constant. Over the past ten years, however, its importance and role has changed considerably.
In this chapter I intend first to determine whether support can be found for the generational theory of cohort differences in voting behaviour. Second, if the younger cohorts reflect, in a more general way, societal changes the most then there should also be an overall decline in the social importance of religion and religious voting within the cohorts between 1965 and 1974.

Younger people are less religious and tend to be weakly identified with a party. It was difficult to discern between generational or life cycle influences though.

Because religion is an ascribed group membership one possible way to control for life cycle effects is to use parental interest in religion as an indicator of the strength of religious upbringing. Parents who are less interested in religion are less likely to a) practice themselves (i.e. attend church, belong to religious groups, or hold religious beliefs) and b) to see that their children attend church or Sunday school, or, that religious beliefs are an integral part of the family’s life. Graph 5.1 shows the proportion of respondents whose parents were both very interested and not very interested in religion. The proportion of those having parents who were very interested in religion declines steadily until the Diefenbaker cohort at which point it rises slightly. For those whose parents were not very interested in religion the line increases constantly until the Trudeau cohort where it tails off. In general, younger people have fewer parents who are
GRAPH S.1

Proportion of each cohort whose parents are very interested or not very interested in religion

Percent

50

25

N: 747 736 595 631 581

Cohort
very interested in religion and more that are not very interested. This is undoubtedly going to reflect on the upbringing of children. While there are relatively few cases in the youngest cohort (since in 1968 there was only one year of the Trudeau cohort in the electorate) the pattern could be explained by the fact that those in the Trudeau and Diefenbaker cohorts are children of those in the World War Two and Pre-1935 cohorts respectively. Therefore, while the strength of one's own religious beliefs may increase in accordance to the life cycle the residual of religious interest lags approximately thirty years in its effect on politics and, hence, a cyclical but generally decreasing influence by religion on voting behaviour may be expected over a long period of time. This is substantiated by the correlation coefficients for religious voting according to parental interest in religion.

Correlation between Party Preference and Religion Controlling for Parental Interest in Religion
(1968 National Election Study)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Level</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Parents Both) Very Interested</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>1048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Fairly Interested</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Not Very Interested</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since there has been a general decline of parental interest in religion (graph 5.1) it might be inferred that this is one dimension along which religious voting will decline.

The role of the family, therefore, in relation to
to religious upbringing is thought to be an important
element for electoral behaviour. Moreover, while I
have suggested that religion is less important to
younger people there are also indications that religious
orientations of all people are changing. Certainly any
number of indicators would suggest that society over
the past one hundred years has become more secular in
its outlook. The vast increase in scientific knowledge
in the past twenty-five years has had important conse-
quences for religion since the latter

...rest(s) upon faith—upon an asset to the
supraempirical. Consequently, all those other
elements of values, aspirations, and goals which
it undergirds, rest, like religion itself, upon
an unstable base. In secularized societies, the
instability of religion, and of the values derived
from it, become apparent to a degree that would
have been though impossible in older, traditional
societies.2

Is it possible to test for the secularization of
attitudes? In 1968 respondents were asked to rate, on
a one hundred point scale, their feelings towards
Catholics, Protestants and Atheists. According to life
cycle theory attitudes (either positive or negative)
become stronger as one grows older. Generational theory
would hold that the cohorts will maintain attitudes
throughout their lives to the same degree. Graph 5.2
shows that attitudes towards the two major denominational
groups have remained roughly the same across all age
cohorts (no appreciable differences exist for Protestants
and Catholics in this regard). The mean scores of
attitudes towards atheists, however, increases continuously
GRAPH 5.1

Mean thermometer scores of each cohort towards Catholics, Protestants, and Atheists.

- Like Catholics
- Like Protestants
- Like Atheists (total)
- Protestants' Like Atheists
- Catholics' Like Atheists

Cohort

PRE-1935: 741
1936: 736
1937: 593
1938: 261
1939: 58
from the oldest to the youngest cohort members. Also, it is important to note that the proportion of Catholics and Protestants giving equal ratings to atheists are virtually identical for all cohorts. This suggests an acceptance among younger people, cutting across religious lines, of non-religious individuals. In a more general sense, this also suggests greater social acceptance as well. Professor Bibby states that those who never attend church are generally more accepting of social diviants—communists, atheists, homosexuals and ex-convicts—than are church-goers. In so far as church attendance is declining (discussed later) liberal attitudes would conceptually appear to be linked with a decline in the social importance of religion.

In the previous chapter it was shown that younger voters have weaker partisan attachments. Literature suggests, however, that this is related to the length of time the party identification has been held. In order to distinguish between generational and life cycle effects I would, therefore, like to consider whether younger people are more willing to change their vote.

Glenn argues in a paper on aging and conservatism that younger people whose...

...formative experience occurred in a more rapidly changing society may have been socialized to a greater attitudinal flexibility, to a more flexible commitment to values and beliefs than older cohorts.

If, as I argued earlier, younger people do not perceive the bond between politics and religion then one would expect their attachment to parties on this dimension to
be weaker. Since the two major parties have not changed their focus of appeal substantially since the early 1900's younger people are expected to be more volatile in their voting behaviour.

In the 1974 survey respondents were asked which party they had voted for in the 1972 national election. While there may be some recall error it will not be as great as in a normal four year period between elections. This is an appropriate measure as most of the members of the youngest cohort were eligible to vote in 1972. Hence, the propensity of younger voters to change their vote, relative to the other cohorts, can be studied without a great loss in the number of cases (only two years, or those between 18 and 19 in 1974 will be excluded). Graph 5.3 reveals that younger people, in general, did change parties in greater proportions than the older members of the electorate. It is also evident that Protestants were more likely than Catholics to change but the disparity lessened among the younger cohorts. Within the Trudeau cohort Catholics and Protestants had the identical tendency to change. Overall the religious differences have shown a trend to converge at the higher level of vote changing. Also plotted on graph 5.3 is the proportion of each cohort voting for a different party in 1974 (federally) than they supported provincially. Only the four major parties were used in this computation so if one were to consider those persons could not vote for a given party in one of the elections (i.e. Conservatives in Quebec or NDP in some Maritime ridings) the proportion would rise substantially. This
GRAPH 5.3

A. Proportion of each cohort voting for different parties provincially and federally.
B. Proportion of each cohort voting for different parties in the 1972 and 1974 federal elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-WWII</th>
<th>Post-WWII</th>
<th>DEPRESSION</th>
<th>PROSPERITY</th>
<th>POSTWAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CATHOLIC</td>
<td>(106)</td>
<td>(153)</td>
<td>(145)</td>
<td>(145)</td>
<td>(114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTESTANT</td>
<td>(152)</td>
<td>(172)</td>
<td>(144)</td>
<td>(141)</td>
<td>(144)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cohort
measure shows a consistent increase in the proportion of each cohort changing parties except in the youngest cohort where the line dips slightly.

It is possible that these patterns could be attributable to the fact that older persons have well developed partisan ties and, when younger, were also more prone to change parties. To some extent the pattern of federal/provincial vote change refutes this hypothesis as this measure deals with two different political systems. In the 1974 election survey though, respondents were asked whether they had always voted for the same party or not. It would be expected that relatively few in the youngest cohort will have voted for another party simply because they have never had the opportunity to do so (although most were eligible. in 1972 voter turnout among the youngest members of the electorate tends to be very low). It would also be expected, given this line of reasoning, that the proportion of people having voted for a different party will increase with age, since they have had more opportunities to change their vote. The evidence in graph 5.4 contradicts this however. While the expectation for the youngest cohort holds true the data does not conform to the latter hypothesis. There is a small, but noticeable, increase among the younger cohorts to have changed their vote. This pattern is remarkably similar for both Catholics and Protestants although the latter group has always been more likely to change.

So far the cohort analysis has focused on the
GRAPH 5.4

Proportion of each cohort having voted for another party in their lifetime

CONJCT
political relevance of religion. If the cohorts do reflect, in a more general way, societal changes then this suggests that religion itself is declining in societal importance. In order to test for this one must determine the social importance of religion over time and then compare the degree of religious voting over time as well.

In 1962 the CIPO Gallup poll asked respondents whether they thought the influence of religion was increasing, decreasing or staying about the same. Table 5.1 reveals that a plurality of both Catholics and Protestants thought that it was losing influence. This finding is further supported by weekly attendance rates which, admittedly, is a measure of associational involvement only. This is not, however, insignificant particularly keeping in mind the negative relationship between church attendance and support for the NDP party (Chapter Two). Table 5.2 shows that the proportion of individuals attending church weekly has dropped nearly thirty percent in less than thirty years. To further substantiate this decline, respondents were asked in 1970 whether they were attending church more frequently, less frequently, or about the same as five years previous. Twenty-nine percent said that they were attending less frequently while only 6% said more frequently. These figures are relatively constant for both Catholics and Protestants. Asked why they were attending more frequently the six percent gave reasons associated to family life (trying to set an example) or "because of my wife."
Table 5.1
Attitude Towards the Influence of Religion Socially by Denomination--CIPO 1962.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Increasing</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Decreasing</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
X^2 = 0.69 \quad \text{not significant}
\]

\[
V = 0.018
\]

Table 5.2
Proportion of Respondents Attending Church in the Last Seven Days--CIPO (some N's not given)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
N = \quad 2000 \quad - \quad - \quad 1006 \quad 2000
\]
Those who stated that they were attending less frequently offered non- or lost-interest reasons (40%), health or small children explanations (25%), or just "can't say" (27%). Professor Bibby attributes the loss of interest in religion to "increasing disbelief" and the Churches' inflexibility. He found that 72% of the respondents had attended church or synagogue services weekly while growing up but only 32% now attended regularly. The CBC programme "Man Alive", which helped fund the study, cited increasing awareness of hypocrisy and disenchantment with what religious organizations were doing as major reasons for the decline in attendance.

The associational involvement of individuals has undoubtedly lessened since the end of the Second World War. Herberg, Lenski as well as Engelmann and Schwartz argue that

...the pervasiveness of the Catholic church shows signs of weakening. Greater participation of the laity, loosening Church control over education, evidence of self-criticism, and even the emergence of an anti-clericalism dormant since the decline of Le Parti Rouge, suggest a weakening of Church influence over all facets of life.

Widespread dissention within the Catholic church began in 1968 after a decade of massive changes in social attitudes towards many moral issues central to the Church's teachings. Sparking the dissent was Pope Paul VI's proclamation that the Catholic Church condemned all methods of contraception as against God's natural law. A vocal minority of priests and laity states that they simply could not accept this without qualification. This,
in effect, called into question the rights of freedom versus authority in Catholicism with the Pope's right to speak as teacher for the Church the central issue. A recent survey of American Catholics indicates that only 37% fully accept the doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope. Birth control was the symbol of inerrancy of the church and "If previous Popes have been wrong on this question, they could have been wrong on everything else. And where would the church be then?"

Changes were, however, being made in the Catholic church. In 1968 changes were made in the rites of consecration for the Mass, the first such changes in 1300 years. At the same time translations into various languages was permitted. Even the restriction on Catholics to eat fish on Fridays was lifted. These structural changes came easier than theological changes. Social attitudes toward divorce, remarriage, birth control and abortion brought into question the power of the Catholic church to restrict liberty. Recently in Windsor a cartoon on abortion provoked a negative reply from a Priest at Assumption Church who reminded readers that for Roman Catholics "abortion is tantamount to murder." A Catholic replied that "the day has long since passed when the clergy should assume to speak on behalf of all Roman Catholics..." and added that censorship should be limited to the confines of the rectory. This is one illustration that Catholics, perhaps still a minority, are less docile than before and are questioning the Church's teachings. Social values are moving
outside the churches and thoughts and values are being derived more from secular sources.\textsuperscript{22}

A similar questioning of teachings was taking place within the various Protestant denominations at the same time, only much more subtly. It would appear that the loss of interest in religion among Protestants was not tied to specific issues but more to the liberalization and secularization of society in general.

The decline of the social importance of religion is reflected by a weakening of barriers between religious communities. One indicator is the inter-denominational marriage rate. Siegfried wrote in 1905 that

\begin{quote}
The Church wishes to keep its boundaries intact and well defined. She would prefer to lose a single individual member altogether rather than sanction the admission of a Protestant upon any terms into a Catholic family. Otherwise the result might be the formation of dubious groups, half Catholic, half Protestant, likely to tend towards free thought and to be lost entirely to Rome.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

Herberg presents statistics for the United States on inter-marriage rates in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.\textsuperscript{24} These are presented below:

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Catholics marrying Catholics & Protestants marrying Protestants \\
\hline
1870 & 95.35\% & 99.11\% \\
1900 & 85.78 & 90.86 \\
1930 & 82.05 & 78.19 \\
1940 & 83.71 & 79.72 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

These figures indicate that cross-religious marriages were almost non-existent in the 19th Century. While the rates of inter-marriage increased somewhat until 1940 it
occurred faster among Protestants. Inter-marriage rates in Canada, which were first reported in 1944, coincide rather closely with the above figures for 1940. The rates of Protestant inter-marriage, however, are listed by separate denomination which has the effect of lowering the intra-marriage rates. Table 5.3 shows that the intra-marriage rate between 1945 and 1959 averaged close to 71%. Between 1960 and 1972, however, this rate dropped almost one percent per year and, in 1972, stood at less than 62%. Conversely, 38% of all marriages in Canada in 1972 involved people of different religious backgrounds. The implications of this are twofold. First, at the societal level, this indicates a greater acceptance for members of differing faiths into family groups which are basically endogamous.\textsuperscript{25} It is also important to note that while marriages between two Catholics are more fertile than all other marriages, marriages between Catholics and Protestants closely approximate the fertility rate of those families in which both spouses are Protestant.\textsuperscript{26} This would indicate, in the long run, a decrease in the rate of growth of Liberal support due to fertility and a decline in the degree of religious voting as family sizes generally decrease. Second, the most important impact of a mixed marriage will be on the children who will enter the electorate some twenty to thirty years hence. Inter-religious marriages can be expected to weaken the role of religion within the family and, as earlier seen, this has a significant impact on the degree of religious voting among the children.
Table 5.3

Proportion of Marriages Within Denomination in Canada--
Canada Year Book 1946-1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Intra-Marriage Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>71.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It was thought that the rate of inter-marriages might be a function of increased rates of inter-Protestant marriages along. However, figures for Catholic marriages (based on bride's denomination which tends to be higher than for the groom's) indicates that this is not the case. In 1944, 89.2% of the Catholic brides married Catholics and this figure drops slightly to 87.9% in 1960 and substantially to 78% in 1972 hence displaying the same pattern as in the society generally (albeit the absolute values are different).

A societal decline in the importance of religion (or secularization) would be expected to manifest itself in the voting behaviour of the cohorts over time. In the absence of panel data this is a difficult item to measure. Bibby as well as the CIPO data presented above have substantiated that there has been a decline in the strength of confessional attachment over the years. But what of religious voting? I have decided to use multiple regression analysis in order to assess the relative importance of religion as a determinant of vote for each of the cohorts in the three elections for which I have data.

As seen below the predictive power of religion has decreased substantially for all members of the electorate between 1965 and 1974. This is consistent with the social decline theory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Sample</td>
<td>0.226*</td>
<td>0.208*</td>
<td>0.102*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3807</td>
<td>2767</td>
<td>2445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at 0.001

The above results could, however, be a function of replacement alone—even though it seems highly unlikely. Therefore it is necessary to determine whether the predictive power of religion has diminished within the cohorts over the nine year period. The unstandardized betas for religion are shown in table 5.4. One would expect to find the strongest beta in the oldest cohort at the earliest point in time and the weakest beta in the youngest cohort at the most recent point in time. This is in fact the case with beta = 0.386 for those in the Pre-1935 cohort in 1965 and beta = 0.016 for the youngest cohort in 1974. Across time the patterns within the various cohorts are not completely consistent but do reflect a general, if sometimes slight, decline.

The youngest cohort cannot be analyzed because of the few number of cases in 1968. The Diefenbaker and Post-World War Two cohorts show an increase in the predictive power of religion between 1965 and 1968 but it then declines in 1974. Among the two oldest cohorts—the World War Two and Pre-1935 generations—secularization of society has had the greatest impact on voting.
Table 5.4


Dependent Variable = Liberal Party Vote/PCon, NDP & SC

Values for the Independent Variable Catholic/Protestant are presented here only.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pre-1935</th>
<th>WWII</th>
<th>Post-WWII</th>
<th>Diefenbr</th>
<th>Trudeau</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.171*</td>
<td>0.030*+</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.199**+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0.150*</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.016+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* beta for Religion not strongest
** N under 100
+ not significant, all others significant at least to 0.05 level
Within the World War Two cohort there is a decline between 1965 and 1968 which then levels off. In the oldest cohort, those thought to be the most consistent voters and strongly attached to a party, the decline in the predictive power of religion is both consistent and large.

The empirical interpretation of the data in table 5.4 is that the social decline in the importance of religion which occurred in the late 1960's apparently reduced the political importance of religion for all members of the electorate.

In this chapter I have attempted to show that the social decline in the importance of religion in the past decade has had some influence on the strength of religious voting within the cohorts. The strength of religious voting seems likely to continue to decline for the following reasons.

First, within the limits of the data I was able to find support for the generational as opposed to the life cycle theory. Therefore, as replacement of the electorate occurs the strength of the association between religious affiliation and party preference will decrease.

Second, the level of societal importance of religion will continue to decline in so far as parental interest in religion has declined. This is expected to affect the religious upbringing (or lack of it) among the children today and voters in ten to twenty years.

Third, the barriers between religious denominations
have been breaking down. Increasing rates of inter-marriage suggest a growing acceptance of members of differing religions within family groups. This is likely to have two effects. First, parental interest in religion is likely to continue to decline and, hence, so is the degree of religious importance and religious voting among their children in twenty to thirty years. Second, fertility rates are expected to decline as a result of inter-marriage between Catholics and Protestants which will result in smaller families and a further decline in the strength of religious voting.

Finally, voters will become increasingly volatile if the two major parties continue to appeal to the electorate along traditional, religious dimensions.

The secularization of society is likely related to the process of urbanization. It is Lenski's thesis that urbanization is integrally linked to a compartmentalized view of life. He argues that within cities religion becomes a

...highly specialized formal association and ceases to be a nucleus around which a variety of social relationships is organized, as in the typical agrarian community. 27

If this is true then one might expect class based voting to increase in importance as society undergoes urbanization and industrialization. Alford hypothesizes that

More "secularized" persons exhibit more class voting and class voting is higher in urban areas. If further changes toward urbanization and secularization can be predicted... then possibly class voting in Canada will rise. 28
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to deal with the topic of class voting. However, if those forces which are related to urbanization are responsible for the decline of religious voting then it might also indicate an increase in the degree of class based voting.\textsuperscript{29}
FOOTNOTES

1. An example of this would be the correlation between father's interest in religion and the respondent's rate of church attendance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's Interest</th>
<th>Attender</th>
<th>Non-Attender</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>1430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 362.6 \quad p < 0.001 \quad \chi^2 = 0.379 \]


5. Only the four major parties were used in this computation. If an individual voted for the Liberal party in 1972 but one of the three other major parties in 1974 he was a "switcher". Anyone voting for a party other than the major four, or not voting at all, was eliminated from this analysis.

6. See P. Converse & R. Niemi, "Non-Voting Among Young Adults in the United States," in W. Crotty, D. Freeman, & D. Gatlin, Political Parties and Political Behaviour 2nd edition (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1971). They state that newly eligible voters go to the polls at a rate which is nearly 30% below the turnout rate for older voters. They break this down further by stating that 20% of the non-voters were under 30 years of age and 50% under 45 (p. 743).

7. The figures for Protestants and Catholics are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attend Church</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>more often</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less often</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>about the same</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>can't say</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N not given (CIPO 1970)

8. Data from the 1968 national election survey indicate that the respondent's mothers, for all age cohorts, were more interested in religion than were fathers. There was, on average, a ten to fifteen percent difference.
9. The total adds to 101% because of some multiple responses.


15. "Catholic Freedom v. Authority," Father Greeley estimated that no more than 1 million of the 35 million church going Catholics in the United States could be considered rebels. He states, though, that

The pastoral problem for the bishops, however, is that the dissenters influence a great many concerned, educated laymen who take their faith seriously as a commitment rather than as a social club held together by ritual, dogma and Friday-night bingo. Their numbers are likely to grow. (p. 54).


19. See "A Church Divided," the article quotes Greeley, "Once it became legitimate to eat meat on Friday, one could doubt the authority of the Pope, practice birth control, leave the priesthood and get married or indeed do anything else one wanted to."

20. "A Church Divided," p. 42, the article states that the divorce rate among American Catholics is approaching that of non-Catholics.
21. These latter two are reflected, to some degree, by cohort attitudes.

**Abortion (CIPO, Sept. 1974)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Wrong</th>
<th>Not Wrong</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-19</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>76.3%</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>64.6%</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>61.8%</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 6.5 \quad p = 0.264 \quad V = 0.081 \]

**Birth Control (CIPO, June 1975)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>Wrong</th>
<th>Not Wrong</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trudeau</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>96.9%</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diefenbaker</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>92.1%</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-WWII</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>84.3%</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1935</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 49.5 \quad p < 0.001 \quad V = 0.231 \]


25. This is true at the elite level as well. Many priests refused to marry a Catholic and Protestant at the alter. The ceremony was conducted, instead, in the chapel. This is rarely the case any longer.


27. Lenski, p. 11.

29. Dichotomizing the data on social class I found the following pattern for the strength of class voting for the three election surveys:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(V)</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2940</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>813</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By using an Alford type index which measures the difference between working class and upper class support for the NDP as an indicator of class based voting similar results are found:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class Voting Index</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter Six

Summation and Conclusions.
Detailed analysis of the relationship between religious affiliation and voting behaviour in Canada is sadly lacking. Although Meisel first wrote of the relationship twenty years ago there are, to date, only a few published and a handful of unpublished articles which deal specifically with the topic.

Most authors when referring to Canadian voting behaviour have been all too willing to attribute the continued existence of religious voting to the process of socialization. Not until very recently, however, has anyone taken the trouble to establish whether this was statistically true. Because most political scientists pointed to socialization as the mechanism by which religious voting persisted it was assumed to be a static phenomenon. I have attempted to develop a theory that through replacement the social bases of voting and overall party support are changing over time.

**Summation**

Party images, stemming from the early twentieth century, appear to be responsible for the development and, possibly, the continuance of religious based voting. Political events which occurred, such as the Manitoba Schools Question, the execution of Louis Riel, and the Conscription crisis of 1917, provided the incentive for Catholics to withdraw their support from the Conservatives and vote for the Liberals instead. This “alienation” of voters is reflected in the voting behaviour of the members of the oldest cohort who
entered the electorate during this period of events.
I did not attempt to determine which factors were responsible for the persistence of this relationship.
There are two important considerations to be made though.
First, those persons who were exposed to these political events are still members of the electorate and, hence, contribute to the strength of the association. Second, no other events have occurred which would bring about a realignment of voters along a different dimension—even though religion is not as politically relevant today.

My findings indicate that religious self-identification is a more important determinant of voting behaviour than is ethnicity, region or the strength of the identification. In the case of the latter, subjective religiosity had the greatest influence of the three dimensions of religiosity (i.e.: church attendance, beliefs, communalism) on voting behaviour. This would warrant more attention in future surveys and statistical analysis of religious voting.

At the aggregate level religion appears to be more important for Catholics than for Protestants at election time. Roman Catholics display substantial homogeneity in their party preference whereas Protestants do not. That is, Catholics have a strong preference for the Liberal party but Protestants do not display a preference for a single party. Yet on all measures of religiosity, the more religious Protestants tend to be Conservative supporters thereby
implying the salience of religion for them as well. The New Democratic Party receives most of their support from the less religious members of both faiths. This is probably due to its development after the divisive issues occurred and because of its class and secular appeal.

Differences in Protestant and Catholic socialization was thought to influence the pattern of partisanship among children. Protestants, according to Lenski, tend to be "rationally" oriented, that is, to raise their children to think for themselves. And yet seventy percent of Protestants whose parents were both Liberal or Conservative took on the same partisanship. Catholics, who are "traditionally" oriented, raise their children to respect authority but they tend to prefer the Liberal party regardless of parental partisanship. While Protestants conform to the socialization model, Catholic behaviour calls into question the importance of socialization as the only mechanism contributing to the persistence of religious voting from generation to generation.

Differential fertility rates may be important as a contributor to long term political change. As seen, Catholics comprise forty percent of the oldest cohort and sixty percent of the youngest. Given the strong relationship between Catholics and the Liberal party the net impact, over the next fifty years as replacement occurs, will be the continued strengthening of the Liberal party.

At the same time the process of replacement is likely
to bring about a decline in the strength of religious voting as well as an increase in the strength of third party support. Younger Catholics are more likely to vote for the NDP than are older Catholics and less likely to support the Liberals. Younger Protestants are more likely to vote Liberal than are older Protestants and less likely to prefer the Conservatives. The net result is increased proportions of NDP and Social Credit support, decreasing proportions of Conservative support and the Liberal party strength remaining stable. The social bases of party support is, however, distinct, from the overall party strength. Even though younger Catholics are giving less support to the Liberal party than their elders the fact that there are fifty percent more (i.e. sixty percent as opposed to forty percent) means that the Liberal party will still enjoy increasing strength.

The secularization of society during the past decade is likely to continue to influence the strength of religious voting. As seen in Chapter two, those who were non-attenders or less religious (subjectively) are more likely to support the NDP than were religious persons. Second, as parental interest in religion has declined over the past decade so is the probability of the strength of religious voting among their children in twenty to thirty years. Social barriers between the two religious groups are breaking down as well. This was indicated by the rate of inter-marriage. Inter-marriages will likely further reduce the level of
interest in religion within the family, which will again be manifested at the polls in another generation's time. Also, the fertility rates of inter-married couples is lower thereby suggesting an overall, long-term decrease in the average family size. While this will take a long period of time to have any political impact it will, nevertheless, reduce the strength of religious voting.

Conclusions

I have been able to identify four major sources of political change or continuity. First, based on past rates of inheritance religious voting is expected to continue to be the major political cleavage. Second, fertility rates suggest that the Liberal party will increase in support over time. Third, in so far as there is a further political decline in the importance of religion (exclusive of its social relevance) this is likely to result in a diminution of religious based voting and increased support for the third parties. Finally, the social decline in the importance of religion during the past decade will likely reduce the strength of religious voting since there is an increasing number of families in which the parents are not very interested in religion, or, are of two different religion, or, are smaller in size.

The impact of these various factors appear to be offsetting. Inheritance suggests the continuing importance of religious voting while the political decline
decline in the relevance of religion is likely to bring about a further decline in religious voting. Differential fertility rates imply increased Liberal support while the NDP is expected to benefit from a social decline in the importance of religion.

Here it is important to distinguish between religious voting *per se* and the ability of religion to predict voting behaviour. That is, it seems likely that the majority of Catholics—regardless of the strength of their identification, parental partisanship or even age—will continue to support the Liberal party. At the same time the ability of religion to distinguish between party supporters is declining. This is likely due to a number of factors. First, younger Catholics are no more likely than older Catholics to support the Conservatives but an increasing number do support the NDP. Second, the secularization of society operates against Protestant support for the Conservative party and encourages increased NDP support. The final result being that religion has little differentiating power among the youngest cohort even though the support for the various parties is highly skewed.

Stated briefly, the net impact of all factors are likely to be: increased Liberal support (long term from higher Catholic fertility and shorter term from Protestant replacement); increased support for the third parties (from replacement); decreasing amounts of support for the Conservative party (from replacement.
and secularization), a further decrease in the predictive power of religion on voting behaviour (from replacement, inter-marriage, declining parental interest in religion, and smaller families).

The factors which influence the voting behaviour of individuals are many and varied—particularly with the brokerage party system which exists in Canada. I have isolated but one social characteristic in order to assess the nature of its relationship with party preference and to analyze the changes in its importance in relation to the political system.

As I pointed out in the introduction the purpose of this thesis was not to predict the future voting behaviour of Canadians—such a feat would be impossible without knowledge of the critical issues, events or leaders. Rather, my intent was to analyze the shifts in party support, both their support bases and strength. In this respect I feel the major findings are twofold. First, religion continues to be an important political dimension and will continue to have major implications for the political system. Second, both the cohort analysis and the secularization of society have supported the theory that religion has been losing its political relevance and religious voting—over generations and time—has been declining.
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VITA AUCTORIS

The author was born on July 29, 1952 in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan. Both elementary and secondary schooling were completed in North Vancouver, British Columbia. In 1970 he enrolled at the University of British Columbia in Arts and consequently majored in Political Science. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree in May, 1974. In July of that year the author received a Canada Council grant enabling him to attend the International Social Science Council’s Third European Summer School in Comparative Research held in Amsterdam. In the following academic year (1974-1975) he was involved in the Task Oriented Teacher Education programme at the University of British Columbia. Teacher certification was attained in September 1975. In the same month the author entered the Faculty of Graduate Studies at the University of Windsor. While working towards his Master of Arts degree in Political Science he was a teaching assistant for an undergraduate course in statistics. Graduation is expected in the Autumn of 1976.