An application of the "operational code" to Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago.

Kathleen A. Weekes

University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd

Recommended Citation

Weekes, Kathleen A., "An application of the "operational code" to Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago." (1974). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 975.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/975

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters' theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email (scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000 ext. 3208.
AN APPLICATION OF THE "OPERATIONAL CODE"

TO ERIC WILLIAMS, PRIME MINISTER

OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Windsor in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

by

Kathleen A. Weekes

University of Windsor
Faculty of Graduate Studies

1974
ERRATA

Page 7. from civilian to public life increased the prestige of the political actor.

8. Three distinct roles (status) can be identified in the career of Dr. Eric Williams (1) The intellectual and academic, (2) The Chief Minister of a colony, and (3) The Prime Minister of an independent state.

11. can only be settled through systematic investigations of individual and group beliefs and actions.

38. Furthermore, the utilization of primary source material has afforded the findings a measure of validity.

39. The History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago, 1962.

59. Perhaps the significance of the elevation from civilian to public life can best be summed up by the subject's statements.

80. As Chief Minister

101. From Columbus to Castro
ABSTRACT

In keeping with the general interest in the study of 'Political Man', this thesis is an attempt to analyse specific dimensions of a political actor's belief system in order to determine whether they undergo any change as the individual moves from one role position to another in society. The political actor examined in this study is Dr. Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. During a period of thirty-four years Dr. Williams occupied three distinct role positions: 1. Intellectual (1939 - 1956) 2. Chief Minister of a Crown-Colony (1956 - 1962) 3. Prime Minister of an Independent State (1962 - September 28, 1973).

The various dimensions of Dr. Williams' beliefs have been structured according to the guidelines outlined in the 'Operational Code' approach, as delineated through the question categories proposed by Alexander George. The 'Operational Code' is intended to examine two major areas of belief systems, (1) philosophical beliefs, dealing with 'the nature of politics and 2) instrumental beliefs dealing with means-ends capabilities.

The research methodology employed in this study is qualitative content analysis. From a selection of books and speeches written by Dr. Williams, the writer has analysed sentences and phrases which were considered as representative of 'answers'.
to the specific question categories of the 'Operational Code'.

While the findings illustrate that an overall change in the belief system did not occur concurrently with a change in role positions, there were discernable changes in certain dimensions of the belief system, in accordance with role change. Among the more significant changes in the beliefs were:
1) Changes in strategy advocating the pursuit of goals, and
2) Feelings of optimism and pessimism regarding the realization of one's objectives. It should be noted, however, that other dimensions of Williams' belief system, such as his views on the nature of political life and his belief in the mastery of historical development, remained consistent through all role positions held.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have helped me in the production of this thesis. To them all I would like to express my sincere thanks. In particular, I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Walter C. Soderlund for suggesting the topic. He was always most generous and patient in giving of his time and advice. This work has also benefitted a great deal from the counsel and frequent appraisals of Professor Richard Price. Special appreciation is extended to Dr. Larry Kulisek of the History Department, whose interest in the subject was most encouraging and stimulating. I am especially indebted to my father who undertook the difficult task of collecting all the speeches which were utilized in this study. I am indeed grateful to them all for assisting me in this endeavour.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................ iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................. v
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................... vii
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1

CHAPTER

I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................. 4
II. RESEARCH DESIGN ................................................................................. 30
III. THE SUBJECT:

  Dr. Eric E. Williams .................................................................................. 40

I BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

II ROLES

  (a) Intellectual 1939 - 1956
  (b) Chief Minister 1956 - 1962

IV. ERIC WILLIAMS

"Operational Code" .................................................................................. 101
Philoosophical Beliefs
Instrumental Beliefs

V. CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................... 127

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................... 133
VITA AUCTORIS .......................................................................................... 140
LIST OF TABLES

Page

Trends in Eric Williams' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs by Role..........................129
INTRODUCTION

Modern political studies of leaders have primarily emphasised an interdisciplinary approach, with sociological and psychological concepts and definitions being employed to explain political phenomena. Based on similar type of analysis, the project at hand examines the relationship between one's political role in society and one's belief system. This approach was suggested by Ole R. Holsti in the conclusion of his article, "The Operational Code Approach to the study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles" Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs".\(^1\) It is Holsti's contention that a change in political role can be associated with a change in the belief system of the political actor as measured by the Operational Code.\(^2\)

This study examines the political beliefs of Dr. Eric Williams, currently the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. For analytical purposes, political role is utilised as the independent variable and the belief system as the dependent variable. Assuming that the relevant variables role and belief


system are associated, one can hypothesise that a change in role would affect the belief system. Obvious analytical problems center on the degree of association between the two variables, and the degree to which changes in one leads to changes in the other. If it can be empirically established that the two variables are closely interrelated with role being the independent variable, then the rationale that one influences the other can be accepted.

Any attempt to establish the influence of one variable on another without strict controls, is to some degree speculative in nature. For example, we must consider the impact of other variables on the dependent variable. For instance, in the present case, changes in Dr. Williams' belief system may be influenced not only by role change, but by factors such as the occurrence of a significant event, or simply by maturation. While we cannot control for the influence of other variables, on consideration of the fact that Dr. Williams occupied three separate political roles during his political career, we can establish whether changes in his belief system occurred concurrently or shortly after these role changes. Conversely, we might discover that change occurred only in some portions of his belief system or that there was no change in his belief system. Findings of this kind would indicate rather convincingly, that a change in one variable (role), cannot be linked with a change in the other (belief system).
Justification for the selection of this research project stems from two considerations. First, it permits the researcher to work with a fruitful and novel technique, i.e. The Operational Code Approach, and second, the subject of the research Dr. Eric Williams, is an influential and controversial West Indian politician. Thus the study may shed some light on differences between the belief system of politicians in developed nation states as opposed to those in the developing world, and hopefully lend some greater understanding of the process of political development.
CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The sociological concept, "role", has been utilised by social scientists in their study of man and society. This interdisciplinary use of role-theory has emphasised that more than one definition or interpretation is applicable to the concept. Indeed, sociologists have indicated that because role is a multi-faceted concept, any attempt at a definition relies in part on a description of the context in which the term is being used.

In his work entitled Life In Society, Thomas Lasswell argues along similar lines. "It is often not clear whether the word role refers to society's expectations about a person's behaviour, to the way the person himself thought he should behave, or to the way he actually behaved". References to role, therefore, can be made according to three connotations. Daniel Levinson, in his contribution to Lasswell's study, explains that, "a role is an aspect of organizational physiology, it involves function, adaptation, process". According to Levinson:

A. Role may be defined as the structurally given demands (Norms, expectations taboos, responsibilities and the like) associated with a given social position. Role is in this sense, something outside the given individual.


4 Daniel J. Levinson, "Role, Personality, and Social Structure in the organizational setting," in Life in Society, p. 129.
B. Role may be defined as 'the member's orientation or conception of the part he is to play in the organization. It is so to say his inner definition of what someone in his social position is supposed to think and do about it.'

C. Role is commonly defined as the actions of the individual members—actions seen in terms of their relevance for the social structure (that is, seen in relation to the prevailing norms).\(^5\)

From the foregoing illustrations of role, it is clear that the interpretations are easier to advance as separate definitions than as a combined form. Nevertheless, social scientists have employed them both singularly and in concurrence. The use of a single term which conveys more than one meaning, has been severely criticised on the grounds that it creates ambiguity. In discussing the common usages of role, Levinson notes that: "the unitary all embracing conception of role assumes a close fit between societal prescription and individual adaptation".\(^6\) He contends that there is not an extremely high degree of congruence between all the facets of role, and questions the arguments of Sociologists, Linton and Newcomb on this subject. In essence, Levinson agrees that the three interpretations of role are to some extent isomorphic, however, he also believes that to regard these facets as a unitary concept, is too constricting for the analyst. His solution,

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 129
\(^6\)Ibid.
therefore, is to broaden the concept of role into "role theory", thus introducing additional terminology to pin down specific meanings.

Working with these safeguards in mind the concept of 'role', which is being employed in this study, will be further delineated. For the purpose of analysis, a general definition of role entails a combination of A and B. The main concern will be with the different social positions occupied by Dr. Williams, his adaptation to these positions, and the possible effects of such shifts on his belief system. It is necessary to note that individual action, as represented in Levinson's third definition, is not of central focus in this study and, therefore, has been excluded from the definition of "role".

The description in section (A), characterizes role as being determined by norms, responsibilities etc., which are associated with a social position. Thus role is seen as something outside the individual. This aspect of "role-theory" can also be referred to as social status; a concept closely interrelated with role yet bearing additional connotations which enhance its use. Status can be broadly defined as that element of role which is determined by society. In a similar reference, sociologist's, Broom and Selznick, define social status as a "position within a social system". 7 Status, therefore, is

directly linked with society and can be used here not only to provide a heading for what can be loosely described as prescribed or functional role, but to indicate the importance of the societal input on the role variable. The term role will be used here to describe both the status aspect of "role-theory" together with individual adaptation and attitude towards it. This, of course, is applicable only to general references concerning the independent variable. Specific references to status-role or individual adaptation to role will be expressed in appropriate terminology, according to the context of their use.

For most people, mention of the term status immediately conveys the notion of some form of hierarchy. It is believed that the closer one is to the top, the more prestigious one's status becomes. Prestige itself reinforces the hierarchical nature of status, and can sometimes make the goal of reaching the top more attractive to the individual than adamantly adherence to previously held beliefs and values. Perhaps this observation can be applied to the present case by assuming that the elevation from civilian to public life increased the prestige of political actor, thus forcing him to accommodate new values and attitudes. At this stage, however, such an assessment is purely speculative and indeed difficult to prove, seeing that changes might have occurred for other reasons. Although the power of
societal influences on the individual is subtle and varies extensively; it remains an important consideration in any attempt to outline the relationship between one's role and one's beliefs or actions.

Three distinct roles (status) can be identified in the career of Dr. Eric Williams: (1) The intellectual and academic, (2) The Chief Minister or a colony, and (3) The Prime Minister of an independent state. As a whole, the shift from one position to another is technically not difficult for each of these roles (status) has prescribed functions; moreover, role socialization cannot be restricted solely to those who already occupy a particular position. In most instances, there are patterns of societal and institutional pre-requisites associated with a specific status of which individuals are aware on assuming a position.

Another important aspect of 'role-theory', which is of special interest to this study, concerns the individual's perception and interpretation of his status. In this case extensive knowledge on individual perception is limited and perhaps better suited to psychological studies. However, one's perception of role in a strictly general sense, does require special attention. In some instances the individual bears most of the responsibility for the proper functioning of a system. Thus, certain judgements and decisions are made in the light
of what one perceives and believes to be the most correct and justifiable procedure.

During the process of adaptation to a new status, the prescribed norms and functions are internalized by the individual in accordance with his personality and beliefs. It is not uncommon therefore, to detect the individuality of beliefs and actions from one person to another in the execution of similar duties. Furthermore, it is here that one's attitudes, beliefs or actions may become clear indicators of the significance which one attaches to a position. Hence the assessment by James Rosenau that, "Every role allows some leeway for the individual interpretation and it is in this area of the role that personality and background variables are operative". Consequently, although the prescribed elements of role are static, if not completely rigid, personal values and judgements can sometimes implant new perspectives on existing norms and responsibilities.

The interplay between prescription and perception factors in role, creates ambiguity in terms of attributing an individual's actions or statements to role requirements or personal beliefs. In this regard, International Relations scholar, James Rosenau, has suggested that political leadership role requirements may be forceful enough to overwhelm the former perceptions of a political actor.

---

When political actors move from being candidates to office holders, etc., their perceptions of the world and its problems undergo a profound change and even a complete reversal. The change in role increases or lessens their responsibilities and thus alters their perspective on relevant objects in their environment, making these appear more or less salient, desirable and manageable.⁹

A notable point of interest here is that the type of status which one assumes bears directly upon one's perception. The assessment that the candidate's beliefs might undergo some changes once he has assumed office, seems justifiable in so far as the underlying principles of status are concerned. Apart from bearing distinctly outlined responsibilities, political office is also a highly prestigious position and particularly, for some, the incumbency might be the highest position within the state.

As a result, even though there might be tremendous scope for direct individual inputs into the status, one is always operating against a background of severe limitations. It is evident therefore, that in most instances, the position will shape the individual and not vice-versa. Reason for this lies in that fact that most societies are invariably controlled by abstruse phenomena such as political culture, nationalism, national interest, and other norms which play a major part in

⁹Ibid., p. 162.
determining how the individual will interpret and act in a political role. Thus, the debate continues regarding how much the individual contributes to the role (status). Arguments similar to those put forward by Daniel Levinson, can only be settled through systematic investigations or individual and group beliefs and actions.

Assuming that a measure of individual perception can become operative within the boundaries of societal guidelines and we consider perception to be one dimension of the belief system; then this analysis bears directly on the present hypothesis. Its validity, however, must be tested in terms of the particular role situations present in the career of Dr. Williams.

Regarding the dependent variable, belief system, a definition and explanation of the elements comprising the operational code is essential. Described as an ordered construct of an individual's philosophic and instrumental beliefs concerning politics, the code is designed for comprehensive studies of an individual or group. This novel approach to the study of the political elite was formulated by Nathan Leites during the early fifties. Recent interpretations and applications of the code seek to emphasise and improve the analytical
advantages of the Leites technique. Notable proponents of the Operational Code approach are, Alexander George, David McLellan and Ole R. Holsti. Some insight into these theorists' conceptions in the code, will be provided in the following section.

Focusing on the beliefs and doctrines of the Russian elite, Nathan Leites introduced the concept of the Operational Code in his work entitled *A Study of Bolshevism*. The "code" was formulated and employed as a method designed to reveal systematic and extensive analysis of the political rules adhered to by the Bolsheviks. In his introduction to the study, Dr. Leites describes the code as an outline of the elite "conceptions of political strategy". He also explains that its utility and relevance hinges on the assumption that through this type of research, a clear and beneficical cognizance of the relations between the Bolshevik party and foreign states might be gained.

The uniqueness of this analysis is emphasised by its departure from prevailing approaches to the study of elites. Dr. Leites has reasoned that knowledge of the Bolsheviks' spirit and doctrine might be obtained from analysis of the recorded writings of Lenin and Stalin. He has, therefore, refrained from employing biographical sketches and detailed

---

theories on political socialization in his study. Instead, an attempt is made to establish that behaviour is a function of beliefs which, in the case of the Bolsheviks, were nurtured by writings of prominent communist leaders.

Advancement of this theory is logical if only through consideration of the fact that the Bolsheviks themselves, constantly advocated Leninism and Stalinism as the foundation of their beliefs. While acknowledging this, Dr. Leites has further presumed that the precepts of the founding fathers of Bolshevism were both consciously and unconsciously assimilated into the Russian elite's beliefs about politics. Consequently, enthusiasm on account of "ideology" and political life style may lead to a strong relation between what he termed Bolshevik 'spirit' and their conceptions on political strategy, (that is the Operational Code). Undoubtedly, this argument may be applied to other elite groups.

The study of the Bolshevik Operational Code is a relevant avenue to the delineation of the Bolshevik spirit. This is not surprising, politics is central in the life of a Bolshevik leader. He does not participate in politics as in one activity of a multi-dimensional life, he lives to conduct politics. Feeling and thinking about politics expresses (though he may not know it) his major emotions, his central fantasies.\footnote{Ibid., p. 16}
In so far as the informative value of the code is concerned, knowledge of the subject's belief system may assist in explaining and predicting behaviour at decision-making levels.

Commenting on the potential use of the code in decision-making analysis, Dr. Leites cautioned that this method alone might be insufficient to provide relevant answers on certain issues. Thus, although he has asserted that the Bolshevik doctrine of political strategy influences to a significant extent Bolshevik decisions, this is not claimed as being empirically established in the study. Instead, he simply suggests that the impact of elite beliefs or doctrines on the decision-making process could be clearly demonstrated through a history of (Bolshevik) policies with reference to the Operational Code.\(^\text{12}\)

At this stage in the development of the approach, the analyst was chiefly concerned with identifying, wherever possible, conformity and continuity in the ideas and values which were expressed throughout the data. Emphasis was therefore placed on indicating that basic political conceptions or strategies were reiterated in different sources and formally sanctioned during the period 1903–1952. Hence, Dr. Leites' suggestion that the contemporary Politburo is more strongly

\(^{12}\text{Ibid., p. 16}\)
bound to its earlier system of operation than to its earlier conceptions of a communist society.\textsuperscript{13}

The Study of Bolshevism was conducted along the lines of illustrative, qualitative analysis and, as such, lacked the behavioural regularities and sophisticated designs found in later applications of the code. Choosing to advance his hypothesis against a background of extensive descriptive research, Dr. Leites indicated that the project's validity was essentially a result of his use of primary source data. In reference to its limitations, he has admitted that the study excludes certain important factors, such as the ideology behind the code, the influence of the code on Bolshevik policy; the extent to which we can predict Bolshevik behaviour through their beliefs and the degree of realism of beliefs about politics which comprises the code. However, the exclusion of these variables did not hamper the predicted usefulness of Dr. Leites' study. In fact, its major shortcoming was seen as the author's failure to delineate the fundamental guidelines which were germane to the formulation of his new technique. It is from this perspective that Professor George's study becomes important.

A proficient and most analytical sequel to Dr. Leites'\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 18
study has been presented by Alexander George in his article entitled "The Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the study of political leaders and decision-making". This analysis further advances the Operational Code as a useful technique for investigating political elites. Working with the innovative ideas forwarded in A Study of Bolshevism, Professor George has augmented the credibility of the Leites thesis by constructing a framework of analysis for the delineation of the code.

It is clear that, in essence, the basic characteristics of the Operational Code, as advanced by Dr. Leites, have remained unchanged in the George Study. Both authors emphasise the obvious importance of the individual contribution in government affairs, and they maintain that clearer insights into the beliefs, values and attitudes of the political elite, may be of some value to practitioners and students of foreign policy and comparative government studies.

Perhaps benefitting from the hindsight afforded by Dr. Leites' study, Professor George has been more explicit in forwarding his conception of the Operational Code:

The Operational Code refers to a set of beliefs about the fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics as these bear in turn to the problem of action. The actor's beliefs and premises serve as a prism that influences his perceptions and diagnosis of the flow of political events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations.  

This definition, in accordance with the main trust of the article, centers on two factors which are of major concern to the discipline, they are, (a) the fundamental sources of political decision-making and (b) leadership style.

Citing the inability of traditional approaches to accommodate systematic empirical investigations of elite groups, Professor George commends the Study of Bolshevism as a breakthrough of considerable value. The current interest in behavioural methods along with the inventiveness of theorists have led to closer cooperation in the social sciences. With contemporary political analysis freely applying concepts from related disciplines, the scope for study and investigation of decision-makers has gradually widened. As a consequence, nominal descriptive speculation is discouraged and in its place empiricism of any credible form gains acceptance.

This trend is illustrated in Professor George's treatment of Dr. Leites' use of Psychoanalytical theory. While noting that Dr. Leites relied only "in part" on this method and that in effect its use was optional, he has endorsed this branch of psychology as a practice worth employing. He therefore asserts that: "for the behaviourally inclined political scientist, it can serve as a useful "bridge" or "link" to psychodynamic interpretations of unconscious dimensions of belief systems, and their role in behaviour under different conditions".15

15 Ibid., p. 169.
Thus, notwithstanding its difficulty, another channel for research is left open to build upon.

The reformulation of the Operational Code towards being more amenable to empirical or behaviouristic research has led to explicit and comprehensive accounts of certain decision-makers' motivations; the major examples being the McLellan and Holsti analyses of Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles. By indicating and correcting the major shortcomings of Dr. Leites' methodology, Alexander George has removed some of the obscurity and vagueness which seemed to surround that analysis: "Because Dr. Leites did not clarify sufficiently the order of hierarchy and interrelationships among various elements of the code, the usefulness of the technique was lost in detailed descriptive material". According to the George analysis, "the researcher is able to avoid such error by interpreting the code as a set of premises and beliefs about politics and not as a set of rules and recipes". Furthermore, elements of the code should not be viewed as absolute principles but should preferably be regarded as guidelines which bear directly on the political beliefs and behaviour of the elite.

Interest in the Operational Code is to a large extent

16 Ibid., p. 170
17 Ibid.
concentrated on its applicability to decision-making analyses. Mention has already been made of the theorists' speculation on the direct input of individual beliefs, perceptions, values, and attitudes in political decisions. It has been argued that: "leaders structure their decisions according to personal images and perceptions of the situation."\(^{18}\) Moreover, we can assume here that this demonstration of individuality is based on certain fundamental maxims which are held constant throughout the decision-making procedure. In other words, the fixed beliefs of the individual or group is a vital factor in determining how a particular situation will be perceived. The belief system itself has been described as being composed of, "a number of images of the past, present, and future which are accumulated, organized knowledge that the individual has about itself and world."\(^{19}\) Consequently, one's beliefs or convictions about politics should be considered as crucial variables in the decision-making process.

The importance of the Operational Code approach can be viewed with regard to the foregoing assessments. As a means of investigating political phenomena centered on elite studies, it may be linked with decision-making analysis. Commenting on


\(^{19}\)Ibid.
the operationalization of decision-makers' attitudes,
Alexander George states that "They engage in a 'definition
of the situation', that is, a cognitive structuring of the
situation that will clarify for them the nature of the problem
and relate it to previous experience, and make it
amenable to appropriate problem solving activities". In
this manner, the complexity of a problem is reduced to a
more manageable form. If the logic of this theory can be
accepted, then the relevance of delineating an Operational
Code becomes more apparent; for its concentration on systematic
analysis of personality factors enlightens a previously obscure
area in political analysis.

Another major concern to most theorists is the question
of rational decision-making. It is often noted that there can
be severe limitations which may impede the achievement of a
rational decision. Some of the limitations indicated in this
study were:

(1) Information about situations is usually
    incomplete.

(2) Knowledge of ends-means relationships is
genernally inadequately to predict reliably
    the course of action.

(3) It is difficult to formulate a single
criterion by means of which to choose
which alternative course of action is
best.21


21 Ibid., p. 171
Such limitations are imposed on all decision-makers and, in certain cases, they serve to emphasise simultaneously the precariousness and responsibility that accompanies leadership roles. Under these circumstances, political actors attempt to factor out and manipulate situations according to what might be familiarly termed their 'better judgement' which, in part, is based on prevailing beliefs.

Current decision-making studies have concentrated on analysing the final decisional outcome and the policy behind it in detail, while somewhat superficial attention is paid to the beliefs of the individual or group concerned. To some extent this seems justifiable especially in states governed by large bureaucracies. However, it is on consideration of the power of leaders, particularly in areas where high level crucial decisions are being made, and the realisation that a measure of individual opinion is not unknown to decision-making, that one can ascertain the relative importance of concepts such as the Operational Code.

The hypothesis that political actors determine the nature of decisions seems to be well founded. Although there are other extraneous factors involved in the decisional process, (for example, analysis of the situation and institutional procedures), Leadership usually stands out as one of the major determining
factors. Contemporary studies of political leaders' beliefs, their policies and decisions, can therefore assist in the larger and more pressing concern with observing world management in general. Accordingly, Alexander George has observed that through techniques such as the Operational Code we can update leadership studies and comparative political research. Moreover, he proposes a more systematic study of the problem of the relation of knowledge to action. The major question to be answered here is:

"How do political leaders in varying political cultures and institutional structures approach the task of making calculations, of deciding what objectives to select, how to deal with uncertainty and risk - that is, how to relate means and ends, and what styles of political calculation and strategies are developed for this purpose by different leaders?"22

For the purpose of an analytical framework, professor George proposed a construct based on Philosophical and Instrumental beliefs. Being primarily concerned with the individual's beliefs about the nature of politics and the ways and means towards achieving certain goals, he has designed a series of question categories in order to facilitate systematic research. Using the Leites study as a model, he has outlined these categories along with relevant commentary for future applications.

22Ibid., p. 171.
This method was employed by David McLellan and Ole R. Holsti who applied the Operational Code to Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles, respectively. Being chiefly concerned with the sources and content of these politicians' decision output, they advanced the code as an independent variable, which was indeed instrumental in providing explanations of political actions. Both scholars were optimistic about the code. One can comprehend and rationalize their enthusiasm in light of the ensuing clarity and distinction of personal characteristics derived from their findings. Thus, their overall acceptance of the code's utility regardless of some of its apparent dysfunctional qualities might be explained in light of the discipline's continuous need for theory, and their measured success.

David McLellan's study of Dean Acheson's beliefs, is based on the hypothesis that personality variables play a major role in policy formation and decision-making. Professor McLellan proposed this theory in an earlier analysis. He believes that personality variables, however complex, should be systematically analysed by the political scientist, and suggests that the George construct may be helpful in this area. He therefore addresses himself to some of the basic questions which

---

23See Robert C. Good and Roger Hilsman ed. Foreign Policy in Sixties (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins Press, 1965.)
were introduced in that study; for instance, Alexander George's query on: "the way in which the political culture has mediated between the statesman's personality and the possibilities which the situation affords him for judgement, decisions and action".24

According to the author, Dean Acheson's beliefs may be considered relevant to the more fundamental inquiry into American foreign policy during the Truman years. The initial assumption here is that Acheson's status as Secretary of State was undoubtedly one of the high points in his political career. Being a statesman of known renown and ample power within the administration, his personal feelings on the nature of politics and major issues, may serve as distinct parameters characteristic of his political style while in office.

Accordingly, Professor McLellan's study has revealed that the personality of this particular Secretary of State distinguishes his political style from others and, likewise, his policy preferences. For instance, he concluded that: "had Dean Acheson been willing to exploit America's European partners or take advantage of their vulnerability as John Foster Dulles did at the time of Suez, he might have pleased American people more".25 Thus, the author intimates that Secretary of State Acheson might have gained more popularity for the Truman administration, had

ров


25Ibid., p. 75.
his individualistic beliefs not compelled him to perform as he did. This, in effect, is a simple assumption that most political analysts are likely to forward from unscientific but astute observation and comparison of politicians' behaviour. However, today, such analyses are invariably subject to close scrutiny and ardent criticism, because they lack the formidable behavioural regularities through which credibility may be achieved. It is on consideration of such factors that theorists are inclined to realise and sanction techniques such as the Operational Code.

Because the Mclellan study simply outlines the degree of congruence between the political actor's Philosophical and Instrumental beliefs, its initial impact may be low-keyed. Nevertheless, there are discernable factors which indicate the applicability of the code. In the first case, Professor Mclellan has been able to identify and illustrate the distinctiveness of his subject's approach to foreign policy matters. Secondly, he has suggested a scheme based on the Operational Code, which might prove to be a beneficial source of reference in foreign policy research. Briefly his proposition states, if one assumes that continuous research on the political elite's belief system would, in time, enable the analyst to identify those traits of a nation's foreign policy which are consistent with a particular mind set and
and belief system of a leader, and those which are due to other forces, then accumulated studies of this nature might provide a valuable and unprecedented data source.

In effect, Professor McLellan has reiterated the most salient point in this study i.e., that the political elite is the cornerstone of governmental institutions and should, therefore be studied with the same measure of vigour and regularity as other variables. He has indeed voiced this conviction by philosophising that:

The world is presently at the mercy of leaders with beliefs about the universe, about the nature of politics, and about the motives of anyone who opposes them or their views, about how they mobilize support and impose their will upon their followers or upon their bureaucracies, and about how to calculate and control the risks involved in the pursuit of their goals - beliefs about which we know very little.

A similar application of the code was presented by Ole R. Holsti, on John Foster Dulles' belief system. Like the McLellan study, the subject (John Foster Dulles) had previously been investigated by the author. Nevertheless, it would seem that this new analytical perspective was regarded by both theorists as a means towards achieving further insight into the political values and attitudes of these statesmen.

\[26\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 75}\]

\[27\text{Ibid.}\]

\[28\text{Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images A Case Study". in International Politics and Foreign Policy, pp. 543-550.}\]
Ole Holsti describes the code as one of the several clusters of independent variables that explain policy making behaviour. Focusing on the relationship between behaviour and beliefs, he asserted that: "Our behaviour is largely shaped by the manner in which we perceive and interpret our physical and social environment."²⁹ His rationale, somewhat analogous to David Mclellan's emphasises that if a linkage exists between one's belief system and behaviour, then further observations of the individual or group's beliefs would facilitate increased comprehension of political behaviour. Indeed, the study of John Foster Dulles bore out the contention that beliefs and behaviour can be interrelated; for it was revealed that few inconsistencies existed between the verbal expressions and political behaviour of this statesman.

In addition to findings which demonstrated the utility of the code, professor Holsti has furnished hypotheses for future empirical analyses based on the concept. His suggestions are designed to guarantee the practicability of this method, and thus to reduce, as much as possible, existing ambiguities. "If the concept 'Operational Code' is to assume a central role among our tools of political inquiry, we should address ourselves not only to the effects of political beliefs on policy processes but also to their sources and the means by which they are sustained, modified or discarded."³⁰

²⁹Holsti, "The Operational Code, John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs", p. 123.
³⁰Ibid., p. 157.
Political Systems vary. In most of the published research on the Operational Code, elite personalities from leading states were investigated. If the concept is to be tested for its practicability or usefulness, it is hardly likely that research would remain limited to the study of major nation states. It is Professor Holsti's suggestion that we can accommodate similar analyses by posing the question, under what conditions do which ends justify which means? He also proposes that typologies of Operational Codes can be developed in order to allow generalizations about the relationship between beliefs and actions. Furthermore, if typologies are developed, we can compare the attitudes of politicians in varying political cultures. This comparison may also become effective in terms of the findings of the beliefs themselves. Perhaps one can question whether there is a relationship between optimism about long-range future and control of historical development, on the one hand, and risk taking on the other.\footnote{Ibid., p. 155.} Finally, he suggests that the code may be used as a dependent variable which can be influenced, controlled or modified by "Personal background experiences, role requirements, structural attributes of the international system."\footnote{Ibid.} Suffice it to say therefore, that what is required here is extensive research into the belief
systems of various leaders and elite groups. This, however, is a task which can only be accomplished when such variables are considered essential, and techniques similar to the Operational Code are perfected.

The preceding analysis bears directly upon the central proposition of the project at hand. In accordance with Professor Holst's suggestions, the study attempts to determine whether certain independent variables (in this case role), can influence the individual's belief system. What is primarily being tested here is the strength and sincerity of individual convictions. Basically, the researcher is attempting to discover whether the individual's beliefs are affected by changes in social status through which a greater deal of power and authority are attained.
CHAPTER II

RESEARCH DESIGN

Having considered the basic theoretical foundation it is now necessary to turn to the mechanics of the project. Three time periods are delineated in which Dr. Eric Williams occupied different positions in society. They are as follows:

1. 1939 - 1956, identified as the academic and intellectual period prior to his appointment as Chief Minister of Trinidad and Tobago.

2. 1956 - 1962, during this time he was Chief Minister of Trinidad and Tobago which was an Associated State of Great Britain.

3. 1962 - September 28, 1973, the period in which he assumed office as Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, (then an independent state) concluding with his first announcement of resignation on September 28, 1973.

These periods represent three role (status) situations occupied by the political actor, in which a transition from civilian life to the highly visible and prestigious positions of Chief Minister and Prime Minister occurs. It is evident that such transitions are accompanied by an exposure to social responsibilities which may pose a challenge to the individual's existing belief system.

The political actor's beliefs are the nucleus of this investigation. The set of beliefs is derived from answers to questions on the individual's political philosophy and his articulated instrumental capabilities. These questions are
presented primarily as essential categories comprising one's Operational Code.

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

1. What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realisation of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score: and in what respects the one and/or the other?

3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

4. How much 'control' or 'mastery' can one have over historical development? What is one's role in 'moving', and 'shaping' history in the desired direction?

5. What is the role of 'chance' in human affairs and in historical development?

INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

2. How are goals of political action pursued most effectively?

3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

4. What is the best 'timing' of action to advance one's interest?
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?\footnote{George, "The Operational Code", pp. 174-185.}

Probably the most pressing problem in this type of study involves data selection and analysis. The foregoing questions are essential implements for investigation of the data and, as such, it is important that their relevance and adequacy be discussed.

The overall conceptual framework i.e. (Philosophical and Instrumental beliefs) provides distinctive categories for the classification of an individual's belief system. One's philosophy about the nature of politics is analysed independently of means-ends beliefs. Thus, one dimension does not encroach on the realm of the other. The framework also leaves room for additional scales, for instance, in addition to philosophical and instrumental beliefs one might measure other beliefs not specified by Alexander George—(e.g. the moral dimensions of the individual's character). What is being emphasised here is the fact that the independence of the two categories eliminates whatever ambiguity there might be regarding what they represent.

However, in so far as the question categories are concerned, there appears to be some degree of redundancy or overlap. For example, both Philosophical Beliefs 2 and 3 are primarily
concerned with the individual's perception of the political future. They are distinct, however, only with regard to the degree of optimism or pessimism which might be discernable in question 2. The suggestion of overlap is more explicit between 3 and 4. Here the object of predictability of the future is closely associated to the general conception of how much 'control' or 'mastery' one has over historical development. In the case of Instrumental beliefs, the categories are somewhat independent, although similar observation can be made concerning 2, 3 and 4. Together, they all appear to be asking related aspects of one question i.e. How are goals of action pursued most effectively, in terms of calculating risks and timing action?

The question of exclusiveness of categories depends to a large extent on the type of research methodology applied. In this case, content analysis seems most appropriate. Although the technique is one which ideally requires mutually exclusive categories, it has been modified and made applicable to qualitative, descriptive analyses and, as such, it becomes congruent to the George construct. Justification for accepting this scheme of classification also stems from the rationalization that the categories, irregardless of discernable overlap, have been successfully applied in other studies. Furthermore, it
must be noted that the researcher's requirement of clarity has been filled by well-defined relevant, if not mutually exclusive categories. We must also realize that the sensitive nature of the investigation, i.e., its concentration on political man calls for explicit and descriptive units of analysis wherever possible.

At this stage, mention should also be made of the inherent limitations within the mechanics of the Operational Code. One is aware that successful application of the code depends on rigorous analysis of statements expressed by the political actor over time. In studies of this nature there can be certain misgivings about the accuracy of data analysis. The problem here is that the investigator cannot confidently assume that the subject's statements, while acting in official political capacity, necessarily reflects his personal views. Such concern is well founded because some political figures employ speech writers whose political beliefs would invariably be present in most speeches, thus posing a threat to the validity of the project. In so far as the subject of this analysis is concerned, to the writer's knowledge, Dr. Williams has written all his speeches. Moreover, it should be noted that the data collected for this study were all Dr. Williams' work.

\[2\] For example see studies:


Mclellan, "Dean Acheson's Operational Code," pp. 52-75
Another dilemma facing the researcher is that of perception, i.e., there may be conflict and misperception of values between that which the analyst perceives of the political actor and that which constitutes his actual views. This tendency is specifically relevant to the present case. Inasmuch as the role of the political actor during his incumbency is in part defined by institutional pre-requisites, we must realise that it is not uncommon under these circumstances for the individual's attitudes to assume some degree of flexibility. The researcher therefore, might inadvertently submit a misrepresentation of beliefs, hence weakening the validity of the proposition through the findings. A possible safeguard against this type of error calls for a careful and objective delineation of the beliefs on the part of the writer. In sum, it is evident that there are formidable contradictions facing the analyst. On the one hand the research demands an understanding of the politician's attitudes, on the other, objectivity is stressed. Resolution and avoidance of this conflict might be derived from epistemological reasoning.

As mentioned earlier, qualitative content analysis has been selected as the research methodology. In choosing the research method, certain factors were considered: (1) Its applicability to the hypothesis, (2) The economical benefits in terms of time and money, (3) The type of data to be processed. Examination of the political actor's writing within the framework of the question
categories can be systematised through inferential thematic units. This appeared to be less cumbersome and difficult than rigid quantification of symbols, words or themes, for although both methods are valid, the former procedure provides more leeway for a detailed, descriptive interpretation of the data.

The advantages of qualitative content analysis have been outlined by Richard Merritt in *Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics*. Citing Alexander George's explanation and defence of the methodology, he indicates that: "the content term in an inferential hypothesis or statement relationship may consist of the mere presence or absence of a given content characteristic or content syndrome within a designated body of communication."³

According to Merritt:

"What was advocated was a flexible technique at once responsive to the analyst's intellignece and insight and yet subject to the same methodological rigour as in the quantitative variety of content analysis ...... the careful formulation of hypotheses, selection and sampling of a set of communications, specification of content variables, strict adherence to analytical procedures."⁴

Thus the idea of understanding or at least identifying the attitudes of the political actor, appears to be an acceptable procedure in the research methodology. If we agree that a delineation of the three roles provides some insight into

⁴Ibid., p. 83.
inherent and expected attitudes on the part of the political actor then possible analytical misperception may be decreased or even eliminated. Attitude in this context refers to a specific manner of thinking, and not necessarily to behaviour.

Another important consideration is that of coding reliability. For the purpose of this project, the writer is examining and interpreting all her material. This is unavoidable because of the nature of qualitative content analysis. In reference to the previously mentioned question categories, the possibility of coder bias or error exists. For instance, the researcher can mistakenly code material out of context. While presenting a formidable problem in terms of precision, its overall damage to the research is not critical, chiefly because of the aforementioned underpinnings of flexibility in researching the individual's belief system.

Achievement of reliability and validity in this case depends primarily on the adequacy of the data. An expert in the field has asserted that content validity is also sometimes referred to as face validity; the main trust of his rationalization is that findings should be plausible once they are based on reliable data. This relaxation of the strict measures of reliability required by quantitative analysis accommodates the

present study. Furthermore, the utilisation of primary source has afforded the findings a measure of validity. Reflecting on the Leites *Study of Bolshevism*, which was based on primary source data, one can realise the analytical usefulness of this type of material.

The present inquiry utilises the speeches and scholarly publications of Dr. Eric Williams to construct the philosophical and instrumental components of his Operational Code. Supportive material has been selected from Western Scholarship and noted commentators on West Indian politics. Altogether the articulated beliefs are derived from statements made over a period of thirty-four years. Unfortunately, the investigator does not possess a statistical breakdown of the quantity of published works. Thus periodization in terms of status, supported by amount of publications is impossible in this study. Suffice it to say a logical deduction would be that relatively fewer published works appeared in the first period (1939-1956), that in the second and third (1956-1962 and 1962-1973). Reasons for this are based on the fact that there was easier access to the publishing media in the latter periods. Moreover, it is obvious that as Head of State a major role requirement would be continuous communication with the public. Consequently, numerous publications expressing beliefs about politics during the latter period become more frequent and available.
Certain limitations connected to the research process revives the question of validity. In conducting the research, the analyst cannot attempt to examine all speeches made by the political actor:

(a) because it is time consuming and (b) more importantly, because of the lack of easy access to information. Ideally, an attempt should be made to standardise the data. For example, by selecting a random sample of major speeches from each year within the period, one ensures that the beliefs are representative of that particular period. Unfortunately, however, because the writer has not been able to gain easy access to a selective range data, the sample has been gathered according to the availability of speeches.

For the purpose of analysis the distribution of speeches and books for each period was as follows: For period one, sixteen speeches and two books were utilised books entitled, The Negro in the Caribbean 1942 and Capitalism and Slavery 1944. Period two, eleven speeches and one book The History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago. Period three, twenty five speeches and three books. British Historians and the West Indies 1964, Inward Hunger 1969, From Columbus to Castro 1969.
CHAPTER III
THE SUBJECT: Dr. ERIC E. WILLIAMS.

I. Biographical sketch
The following section provides a descriptive commentary on the political career of Dr. Eric Williams. An attempt has been made to outline Dr. Williams' career background in terms of prescribed role requirements, the political actor's convictions on his status and the political climate applicable to each time period. This approach seems practical for it sheds some light on the obscure points of the independent variable (i.e. the question of prescribed and perceived role functions), and it also provides a framework for biographical data. In illustrating the role variable for the three periods, stress will be placed on these factors and major events in Dr. Williams' career will be singled out for discussion.

This section is of major concern to the project due to the fact that the hypothesis is centered on changes in the role variable. Therefore, a delineation of each status would reveal a descriptive picture of all its elements, thus enabling us to observe the degree of change from one position to another. Each period in the career of Dr. Williams represents a new and improved social position. The pattern is one of upward mobility in which there are notable highlights of successes which outweigh the failures. One plausible rationalization which might be disproved later on but, nevertheless, is worth mentioning...
here states that: with a change in status being the embodiment of success one might expect either a positive or negative alteration in the individual's way of thinking. Thus reflecting on such conditions, it is hard to conceive of the individual's belief system as being impenetrable.

A similarly important factor is the political environment in which Dr. Williams' career developed and flourished. Information of this nature places the role in its situational framework, and furnishes background data on the politics of the Caribbean nation state in which this politician served as chief public official.

Born on September 25, 1911 Eric Williams has described himself, in his political autobiography, as a member of the coloured lower middle class. Dr. Williams, a Roman Catholic, grew up in the city of Port - of - Spain where he was constantly aware of the bitter struggle by the poorer classes to survive. Not belonging to a wealthy class himself, most of his early educational achievements were attained within a highly competitive field. In 1922, he won a government free education scholarship, and was educated at Queen's Royal college. In 1931, he won an Island Scholarship which enabled him to study at Oxford University between 1932 and 1939. There, he completed his B.A. degree with a double first in the honour school of modern history. Throughout his professional training he concentrated on colonial history. His doctoral dissertation was entitled, The Economic Aspect of the Abolition of the British
West Indian Slave Trade and Slavery.\textsuperscript{1} Certain aspects of this work were direct attacks on British Colonial policies. Such candour, at that time, was a novelty especially when it came from a colonial. Although there was a distinctive radical tendency in his scholarly pursuits, he never allowed himself to be caught-up in the radicalism of that period. As a colonial, he believed that his studies should be focused on problems within the British Empire, especially those which were related to his native environment. Being a diligent student, he proceeded to investigate these issues with the usual vigour and fastidiousness which reveals ambiguities and inconsistencies of prevailing theories. When, through these investigations, he developed an early reputation of being an anti-colonial, such an assessment was more appropriate for his academic pursuits than personal behaviour.

Throughout his political career Eric Williams has remained a consistent and dedicated scholar. Apart from numerous essays and short publications his major works are entitled: \textit{Britain and the West Indies: Historical and Contemporary Aspects of the Relationship Between Britain and the West Indies},\textsuperscript{2} \textit{British Historians and the West Indies},\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Capitalism and Slavery}.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1}Eric Williams, \textit{"The Economic Aspects of the Abolition of the West Indian Slave Trade and Slavery"} (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, 1938).
  \item \textsuperscript{2}Eric Williams, \textit{Britain and the West Indies: Historical and Contemporary Aspects of the Relationship Between Britain and the West Indies} (Fifth Noel Buxton Lecture of the University of Essex, London: Longmans, 1969).
  \item \textsuperscript{3}Eric Williams, \textit{British Historians and the West Indies} (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964).
  \item \textsuperscript{4}Eric Williams, \textit{Capitalism and Slavery} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944).
\end{itemize}
Education in the British West Indies, From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean, 1492 - 1969, History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago, Inward Hunger: The Education of a Prime Minister, and The Negro in the Caribbean. It should also be noted that at present, Dr. Williams is about to publish another book entitled - The Blackest Thing In Slavery Was Not The Black Man. He has travelled extensively throughout North and South America, Europe, Africa and South Asia. His academic honours are as follows: 1) appointment as pro-chancellor of the University of the West Indies, 2) Presentation of an Honorary Fellowship at St. Catherine’s College and later an Honorary Degree of Doctor of Civic Law, 3) bestowal of an Honorary Degree of Doctor of Laws at the University of New Brunswick and the Honorary Degree of Letters at the University of the West Indies.

---

5 Eric Williams, Education in the British West Indies (New York: University Place Book Shop, 1968).


7 Eric Williams, History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago (Port - of - Spain, Trinidad: P.N.M. Publishing Co., 1962).


11. Roles

(a) Intellectual (1939 - 1956)

Generally speaking, role as it applies to the intellectual and academic, can be defined as being creative and informative. Members of society usually rely on the creativity of such individuals, acknowledging that their primary function is to generate ideas and concepts, and transmit them to society. Most intellectuals are aware of what is required. Indeed, under certain circumstances, there may be bitter competition in the quest to discover sophisticated techniques and reveal unprecedented findings. It is a known factor that a considerable amount of time is spent sharpening and rethinking known techniques, and measuring the utility and disutility of new concepts. Consequently, it is not uncommon for intellectuals (especially students of philosophy) to be denounced as inhabitants of 'ivory towers' and individuals of great thinking but little action. Usually when an attempt is made to combine recently acquired knowledge with action, it might be met with reaction ranging from total acceptance to skeptical rejection. Most intellectuals are able to cope with negative reaction as long as they are given a chance to present their ideas. What they unanimously demand, however, is academic freedom.

As an intellectual and academic between 1940 - 1956, Eric Williams was subjected to both the criticism and praise which were in keeping with his role. This has been clearly indicated in his political autobiography, Inward Hunger, in which
the various experiences that ultimately led to a political career were recorded. Dr. Williams began his professional academic career in 1939 as a professor of History at Howard University in Washington. This occupation provided a stimulating environment and he believed that much could be accomplished. For him, the approaching decade promised revolutionary changes. Therefore, guided by a sound perceptual assessment and perhaps good intuition, he proceeded to teach history and politics from a modern day perspective. Indeed, there were several indicators of the forthcoming changes. Accordingly, he took stock of the world’s situation.

I was living with the New Deal and the appraisal of America’s resources just before it became the arsenal of democracy and intervention by the marines before the inauguration of the good neighbour policy. Garveyism had left its mark on the American Negro... The Third International with its collectivisation and five-year plans, its liquidation of kulaks and its purges, its world revolution ..., was beginning to agitate American conservatism ... Civil war in Spain and civil disobedience in India ... - the world was headed for World War II, American supremacy, and the emergence of the colonial peoples. 10

Such observations could easily be made by one who was determined to acquire an expertise in World History, having already developed practical knowledge of the problems facing the Underdeveloped World. In true academic style, and in keeping with the trend started earlier at Oxford, he indicated that his role was to teach and unearth as much as possible the history of Negroes in the Western World. He therefore proposed to

10 Williams, Inward Hunger, p. 58.
educate his students along the lines of the hypothesis that:
"problems of contemporary life are merely the climax of problems
which the distinctive ages of previous history have always had
to face".  

Dr. Williams' private academic pursuits were primarily
concentrated on West Indian topics. Between 1940 and 1944, he
explored the various caveats in the History of the Negro Slave
Trade and of course, in particular, reasons for the abolition
of slavery. The outcome of this research was two books entitled
The Negro in the Caribbean and Capitalism and Slavery. This
persistence in forwarding controversial viewpoints invariably
prompted comments and criticisms from concerned academics.
Nevertheless, as a whole, the books received favourable reviews
both from notable scholars and the very critical West Indian
press. It was not surprising, therefore, that by 1946-1947 Dr.
Williams was already recognized as a noteworthy commentator on
subjects such as the economic history of the Caribbean. Further-
more, as credit to these accomplishments, benefits were derived
in terms of increased travel and lecture tours which facilitated
more research.

Frequent tours of the Caribbean brought him face to face
with the realism of the problems he had discussed. Thus, his
eventual disenchantment with the life of an expatriate scholar
was a natural and expected reaction. He recalls turning down
an attractive offer from Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee,

\[11\] Williams, Inward Hunger, p. 60.
for what he believed to be a more worthwhile occupation.

I had already made my decision about my future. I would stick to the West Indies ... I would cultivate the West Indian garden from Cuba to French Guiana. And I had already made up my mind that, when the West Indian University came, as come it must, I would be prepared to play my part and leave Washington.\(^{12}\)

Thus assuming a somewhat vicarious attitude, he anticipated a personal involvement in Caribbean development.

Eventually, involvement was indirectly initiated through the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission. A joint venture of two powerful western states, the commission was organized for the purpose of augmenting social and economic co-operation in the Caribbean. As a concerned, highly qualified academic, Dr. Williams assumed that most of his research work would be of value to the commission, and offered his services. In 1944 he was appointed to the research department to bring West-Indian laws up to date. Meanwhile, he continued his personal writings and constantly revealed his beliefs and findings, much to the discomfort of the commission officials. Indeed, from the start it was hard to picture an existence of compatibility between Dr. Williams and the British and American administrative elite. In the first place, his writings attacked theories which these men had already assimilated as fact. Secondly, although he played by the rules and submitted all of his work for the perusal of the committee, he refused to be dictated to on what subjects he should pursue. In response to such suggestions, he

\(^{12}\) Ibid, p. 77.
emphatically declared that he would not become a colonial stooge. "I let Huggings know that, and thereafter I was always on the warpath to defend my academic freedom and constitutional rights."\(^{13}\)

We can realize, therefore, that the role of the intellectual, nurtured from earlier days at Oxford, remained constant both in terms of its prescribed functions and what the individual perceived it to be. For Dr. Williams, and likewise perhaps most of the academic community, these dimensions of role were more or less identical. That he refused to be dictated to on academic affairs was, therefore, not surprising. By 1946, after the commission had expanded to include the Netherlands and France he considered submitting his resignation. His major grievance was the organization's lack of innovative administrative methods. Furthermore, it was run by expatriates who had little interest in Caribbean Affairs. One can suggest here that his decision was motivated by the vision of a new role which, after 1944, had seemed closer to reality.

Returning home in 1944 on a research lecture tour, he was overwhelmed by the success of his speeches. Dubbed the Philosopher of West Indian Nationalism, his lectures on colonial history were well attended and received with open enthusiasm. This indicated the public's need for intellectual stimulation that he knew he could provide. Acceptance and praise from the 'masses' was countered by the hostility of vested interests. In the Caribbean, Dr. Williams was subjected to the discrimination which is inevitably

\(^{13}\)Ibid, p. 83.
levelled against all agitators and challengers of the establishment. Perhaps he was allowed to survive primarily because he constantly maintained that his 'role' was to teach history. This initial apoliticism led to further involvement with the Caribbean Commission. Because he was not prepared to assume a political identity, the next best alternative was to continue his research. The new situation, however, was different in many respects, for in 1948, when he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Caribbean Research Council of the Caribbean Commission, the job was to be executed from offices in Port - of - Spain, Trinidad. Thus, in effect, a part of Dr. Williams' self-perceived role had been fulfilled. Setting aside the initial disenchantment with Commission officials, he started research for conferences and special studies. As Head of the Research Secretariat he was exposed to important data concerning topics such as; trade statistics, industrial development, timbers, fisheries, housing, trade promotion, education and small-scale farming, all vital subjects to the Caribbean in general. In addition, he gained valuable first had experiences through his travels. Hence, work with the Commission proved to be extremely fruitful.

Admirers and critics alike have agreed that Dr. Williams always had a flair for organization and leadership. Moreover, he never remained idle for any period of time and seemed to thrive on his writings and intellectual debates. While employed
with the commission he initiated the Historical Society of Trinidad and Tobago. As president, he outlined the society's goals. They were, in essence, important dimensions of his scheme for the evolution of a revitalized West Indian society. Accordingly, his proposal was:

- to breakdown particularism in the Caribbean and to emphasize that the history of one part of the area is the history of all. To combat the danger of the Society becoming an ivory tower organization divorced from the West Indian people. Finally, to see West Indian history taught in schools at all levels.¹⁴

In spite of such high-sounding objectives, the association was a failure. As its creator sarcastically remarked, "the V.I.P.'s wished not to be reminded of the days of indenture."¹⁵ Turning to another outlet for his views, he began publishing a series of articles in the leading local newspaper Trinidad Guardian.

Eventually, this apparent indefatigable desire to spell out the ills of imperialism and to incite public interest towards a reformation of West Indian society was further propelled by two occurrences. First, some of his writings were challenged, and consequently stirred up lively debates. Secondly, the discord between himself and the Commission was revived. With continued friction the scenario finally ended in a complete severance of relations, and in its aftermath, Dr. Williams launched a new and eventful career.

The controversy arose over the hiring of a predominantly expatriate staff. Dr. Williams' dissent stemmed from his belief

¹⁴ Williams, Inward Hunger, p. 109.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 110.
that West Indian employees would be more appropriate, "They could work - unlike the expatriate who told me over his third gin and tonic at lunch time that the climate made it difficult for him to work after noon - and they shared West Indian aspirations." \(^{16}\)

In May 1954, having been put on probation for a year by Commission officials, he launched what was to be referred to as the 'nationalist backlash'. In a letter to Norman Manley of Jamaica, he expressed his feelings,

> I am determined once and for all to put a stop to this impertinent persecution (over his writings). They suspend the British Guiana constitution and now they wish to suspend me ... I may be out of a job in a year's time. There are elections here next year, and already I have been asked to come out and join the Independent Labour Party, and the suggestion has even been made that I should be chairman. I do not rule it out."\(^{17}\)

> It is evident from this statement that he would not be silenced. Furthermore, he now seemed prepared to abandon his nonpolitical role for a more positive weapon against colonial administrators (that is, active political leadership). However, the political role assumed in the following year was the result of a series of events, and not singularly limited to Dr. Williams' personal grievance; though this remained a major cause. His initial reaction was to continue writing and educating. "I am persecuted because of my writings, and I think therefore I ought to write some more."\(^{18}\) Thus issuing this challenge, he embarked on a road which was to end unexpectedly in political leadership.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., p. 109.

\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 112.

\(^{18}\)Ibid., p. 113.
My second weapon was an adult education campaign if I could no longer stay in my administrative headquarters at Kent House in order to earn my daily bread, I would make the Trinidad Public Library my intellectual headquarters. If imperialism attacked from Kent House, nationalism would counter-attack from the Public Library. The Caribbean Commission was determined to do nothing to promote the cause of West Indian Nationalism and the education of the West Indian people; then I would dedicate myself to the education of the West Indian people and the cause of West Indian Nationalism and, by transmitting to them the fruits of the education I had received at their expense, I would repay their investment in me.19

Reflecting on the facts presented so far, certain observations can be made. I have implied that the subject's escalation to power followed no definite pattern or design. Through his commitment to intellectualism he gradually became a public figure which was, for the most part, non partisan and only academically political. Yet one cannot dismiss the contention that, as an officer of the Caribbean Commission and former lecturer on modern history; he must have held some views on the political situation in Trinidad and Tobago, and possible methods of resolving persisting problems. As would be expected, Dr. Williams' overnight transformation from individual nationalist, to leader of a nationalist movement, has been a point of discussion by political analysts. The obvious question asked is, was it by accident or design? In most cases they resolutely agree that a combination of both prevailed, thus hinting on the astute, expedient dimensions of his character. According to Ivar Oxaal:

There can be little doubt that Williams' discussions of the historical origins of the slaves, the nature of the slave regime and economy, and the consequences of slavery, were important themes in stimulating the mass notoriety which projected him into politics. The degree to which this was a calculated political manoeuvre ... is-impossible

19 Ibid, p. 113
to say. My personal guess is that initial statements by Williams on this subject were not made with any particular political end in view, but once their political potency had been revealed he used them in a very shrewd manner as rallying symbols.20

Selwyn Ryan in his study entitled Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago, appears to be more skeptical and Dr. Williams' early motivations:

He had cast himself in the role of the providential messiah who had been preparing himself in the wilderness of the Commission so that he might with greater effectiveness 'set his people free'. His main strategy was to get the masses to regard his personal struggle as their struggle - the struggle of the qualified black West Indian for recognition and advancement.21

This analyst concedes, however, that in 1955 Dr. Williams was not deliberately scheming to enter politics. "It is certain that had it not been for his dismissal from the Commission, Williams would not have entered active political life, much as he might have nursed secret ambitions to follow in the footsteps of Manley and Munoz Marin."22

Mass public reaction in the political environment was another contributory factor to Dr. Williams' success. In 1948, the political system of Trinidad and Tobago was depressingly stagnant. The implementation of universal suffrage that year did little to dispel the apathy and apoliticalism of the populace. Furthermore, the society remained culturally and ethnically differentiated under the constraints of colonialism and class distinctions. The


22Ibid.
intensity of this dilemma was clearly revealed in the 1950 elections. Here, a member of the coloured middle class (Dr. Patrick Solomon), led the Caribbean Socialist Party to defeat. Although it was aligned to a large labour organization (The Seaman and Waterfront Workers), the party gained little support from the lower classes. This, argues Oxaal, "indicated the precarious political popularity of the educated professional man."\textsuperscript{23} It was, however, in the same political climate that Eric Williams, a man of similar qualifications, within a period of eight years, became educator of the people, resigned from the Caribbean Commission, organized mass support and founded a multiracial nationalist party.

In the early fifties, Dr. Williams' role was clearly that of educator first and nationalist leader second. By the mid-fifties, however, the two factors were on par with each other. During this period the basic role requirements of a budding political leader, in such a difficult society, were all conspicuously reflected in Dr. Williams' style.

For instance, he became the champion of a historicoal debate by denouncing Aristotlean principles, especially those on slavery as an institution. He continued his academic publishings and lectures on issues ranging from Slavery and Trade Unionism to the formation of the West Indian Federation. More importantly he worked towards institutionalizing the nationalist movement both through the 'middle class', People's Education Movement,

\textsuperscript{23}Oxaal, \textit{Black Intellectuals Come to Power}, p. 98.
(P.E.M.) and the "grass roots" University of Woodford Square. The P.E.M., an offspring of the Teachers Economic and Cultural Association, (T.E.C.A.) can be described as a stepping stone or platform organization for the launching of a national political party, the People's National Movement (P.N.M.). The T.E.C.A. was formed to provide organized representation for teachers of denominational schools (primarily Roman Catholic). However, some observers suggest that Dr. Williams and leaders of this organization used its offices to "plot the strategy for the formation of the P.M.M."

With increased interest from middle class individuals, the P.E.M. gained prominence within the society.

The scholarship of Eric Williams had always attracted a dedicated middle class following. Commenting on the Political Education Group, an earlier movement, W.J. Alexander noted that "it was not a group of intellectuals or for intellectuals though it was stimulated by a certain intellectualism. It was a heterogeneous group whose members were shocked with concern by their vivid realization of the social and political evils of the time." Eventually, in this manner, a leadership contingent was formed.

Still, the more pressing and indeed difficult problem concerning the mobilization of mass public support was yet to be conquered. The critical spark needed to ignite favourable public response came from speeches delivered at the University

24 Ibid., p. 103.

of Woodford Square. On June 21, 1955 in the wake of dismissal by the Caribbean Commission, the oratorical skills of Dr. Williams turned a predominantly black lower class audience into a somewhat hysterical mob which sanctioned his leadership. "Here was not a dry recitation of services rendered but a lively, executive suite drama in which the hero, in announcing his decision to stay in Trinidad and continue the struggle, invited his audience to participate in writing the final scenes. It was epic theatre in the flesh." 26 Apart from the emotionalism, there was a serious and more subtle underlying factor; for it was the first time these people were treated as a sophisticated audience. More than anything else this moral upliftment sealed the bonds between the poignant leader and his following.

Altogether, the period represents uncertain but formative years of Dr. Williams' political career. As an intellectual he had led a civilian life which was not restrained by the rigid rules or privileges of political leadership. At all times he sought to pursue academic freedom in an independent manner. Apart from adherence to academic and basic societal norms, most of his personal discipline was self-determined. Thus he has been criticized for being egocentric and megalomaniacal. Also, by not being another colonial stereotype, he was marked as a radical opponent of all colonial governments. Since psychoanalysis of Eric Williams' behaviour is beyond the scope of this study, suffice it to say that: as a controversial

26 Oxaal, Black Intellectuals Come to Power, p. 111.
individualist with an independent expressive style and a
tenacious determination to fight things to the end, he symbolized
different things to different people.

The transition to de facto if not de jure political
leadership was furnished with all the trappings of power and
influence. Between 1954 and 1955, there was evidence that the
stage was set for a strong political movement which would be
responsive to the people's needs. That Dr. Williams gained
control of the popular front, after June 21, 1955, came as no
surprise. In fact, the unofficial mandate of popular followings
was not unheard of in the West Indies. In Trinidad names like
Butler and Cipriani had previously stirred up mass support which
led to both social and economic change. Furthermore, the occur-
rence of certain events in both the internal and external environ-
ment complemented the nationalists bid for power. In January 1955,
the Trinidad Guardian published a letter from Anglican Canon
J. D. Ramkeesoon which commended Dr. Williams' article on India's
Republic Day. The Canon inferred that by stressing the common
heritage of Indians and Negroes in the Caribbean, Dr. Williams
had performed a valuable service to Trinidad. Recognition from
the echelons of Indian society was welcomed by the Negro nationalist
leader whose pronouncements on racial unity could hardly penetrate
the barriers of ethnicity and religion in East Indian communities.
Such variance within the society was further emphasized by the
fact that the P.E.M. was an urban based Negro organization, thus
precipitating the estrangement of country districts which was
predominantly Hindu and Muslim. Favourable words from the Canon
were effective even if they only barely penetrated the consciousness of the Indian community.

The international arena reflected an equally promising picture. In January, Norman W. Manley's, People's National Party of Jamaica was successful in that country's national elections. For the P.N.M. which was similarly designed (nationalists, coloured middle class) the victory signified a turn in the tide of West Indian politics. From Britain there were growing signs that, although undecided on the question of West Indian independence, administrators considered the validity of nationalists' claims. In February 1955, Princess Margaret visited the island, thus demonstrating that the bonds of goodwill persisted, in spite of rising anti-colonial sentiments. Finally, and perhaps most significantly for the Nationalists, Winston Churchill resigned as British Prime Minister; bringing to a close an eventful era in British Politics.\(^{27}\) Against this background the future assumed a new and positive direction.

The fundamental aim of the P.N.M. was to convince the people of its capabilities and viability as a political party. From the moment Dr. Williams made his political intentions clear, an extensive campaign moved into high gear. A people's manifesto was drawn up which outlined the country's most pressing problems along with tentative solutions. Candidates for the approaching elections were chosen mainly from the professional class. However, an unconvincing attempt was made to gain racial solidarity through the selection of candidates from various ethnic

\(^{27}\)See Oxaal, *Black Intellectuals Come to Power*, p. 107.
backgrounds. Success in this venture was limited, for the East Indian community, with some justification, claimed to be under-represented.  

Because the charisma of Eric Williams intensified the spirit of the movement, his continuous communication with the people became crucial for the party. Colleagues were aware of the fact that "The Doc", as he was affectionately termed by his followers, had established an interpersonal relationship with thousands of followers through his sympathetic acknowledgement and comprehension of their everyday struggle to survive. As a result, most constituencies' platforms were usually enhanced by Dr. Williams' presence. In addition, opposition attempts to cast aspersions on his character disastrously backfired:

"The press, the Catholic hierarchy, big business, the old government and Legislature and reportedly American agents all came out in opposition to the P.N.M. But the movement could not be stopped. By singling out Williams for persecution, slander, and threats, the opposition had merely served to enhance the growing tendency to hero worship him."  

With the victory of the P.N.M. on September 24, 1956, came de jure role change. Perhaps the significance of the elevation from civilian to public life can best be summed up the subject's

28 The East Indian community comprised approximately 36% of the total population while the Negro community made up 43%. Statistics for the P.N.M. candidates in the 1956 elections were as follows: Negroes 15, Chinese creole 1, Indian 6 (3 Muslim, 2 Hindus, 1 Presbyterian), European 1, Spanish creole 1. See Ryan, Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago, p. 161.

29 Ibid., p. 162.
personal experience. On the evening of the election day, while involved in attempting to pacify an enraged crowd, which protested the illegal vote soliciting of a Roman Catholic priest, he was approached by police security officials. Their duty was to protect the future Head of State. He recalls his immediate feelings as follows:

I knew that we had won the elections when an unknown man came up to me. He flashed a police badge and said to me, 'I am a security officer. I must ask you to leave the scene immediately and not risk your personal safety.' It was then that I was conscious of being followed by a security car. I went to my car at once and drove away, understanding that the future Chief Minister was under police protection.  

(b) Chief Minister (1956 - 1962)*

In 1956, as Chief Minister of Trinidad and Tobago and leader of a rapidly growing nationalist party, Eric Williams was officially considered as one of the most important individuals in the crown colony. His incumbency as chief public official was retained throughout the sixties and carried into the seventies. In effect, role differentiation between period two and three is chiefly based on power and legality. The Chief Minister of a crown colony has less commanding authority in decision-making than the Prime Minister of an independent state. Even in cases where an overwhelming majority support the Chief Minister's views, they remain subjected to the approval of Colonial Administrators. In this case, apart from the Legislative Council;

---

30 Eric Williams, Inward Hunger.

*For most of this period Dr. Williams was also officially Premier of the Trinidad and Tobago Unit of the West Indies Federation. The writer has used the term Chief Minister in keeping with Dr. Williams initial status on entering office.
officials such as the Chief Secretary of the colonies and the Governor General must be consulted, and they participate in all decision making. A popular view concerning the status of Chief Minister is that he is head of other commissioned ministers selected by the populace to perform governmental duties sanctioned by the Crown. As members of the Executive Council, they work in conjunction with the colonial office in formulating and executing policies.

Within such a narrow framework there is limited room for nationalist sentiments beyond low priority domestic matters, seeing that major policy directives are always subject to the Colonial Government's sanction. One should not assume, however, that the Chief Minister is totally powerless, for articulate leaders may use their influence as representatives of the people to force the sanction of special policies. Generally speaking, the Chief Minister is primarily the spokesman of the people, being chief co-ordinator of their demands and having a somewhat free hand in minor domestic policy. Insofar as major policies are concerned, for example, international treaty agreements and trade policies, the final word is left up to the Colonial Government even though the negotiations may be initiated by the Chief Minister and his Government. It should be noted, however, that like all other bureaucratic systems there may be a certain degree of flexibility in the colonial administration. Furthermore, when a colony has outlived its usefulness, it inevitably becomes a burdensome liability on the government in question. This awkward situation eventually facilitates the ascendency of
self-determination principles as espoused by indigenous leaders.

As leader of a nationalist party and Chief Minister between 1956 - 1962, Eric Williams was resolved to reformulate the existing political system along the lines of self-determination. His first act was to create a cabinet and call for constitutional reform. Although this cabinet was not legal in the eyes of the British Government, having acknowledged overall nationalistic demands for a self-determination especially along the lines of a Federal West Indies, it was willing to comply.

The obligations and duties of a Chief Minister vary according to the type of administrative structure designed by the government. In this case the political actor held the portfolios of Finance, Planning and Development and Tobago Affairs. He described the new government's main task as follows:

"We immediately set about changing the constitution. The first step was for the ministers to meet privately before Executive Council so that we could present a united front. I was normally the spokesman for the ministers in the Executive Council." 31

Formal duties performed by Dr. Williams during this period were: 1) He presented the budget, taxation and expenditure, (this was the outcome of the new Ministry of Finance under the revised constitution), 2) He worked towards providing free secondary education. When this was proposed and initiated, its financing was relegated to his office. 3) He was also in charge of immigration until the Ministry of Home Affairs was developed

31 Ibid., p. 168.
in 1960. In addition, Dr. Williams was involved in the re-
organization of the public service and as Head of State was
subject to official visits aboard.

The first P.N.M. administration, its problems and political
blunders, has been subjected to detailed descriptive and critical
analyses. West Indian political commentators are drawn to the
subject for different reasons. For instance, they contend that
with the exception of a few, the cabinet was comprised of a clan
of inexperienced politicians. These were middle class profession-
als who introduced to the colonial society a sophisticated new
political style not unlike the large metropolitan governments
of the Western Hemisphere. Added to this is their usual interest
in two crucial affairs. These were the protracted issues of West
Indian Federation and the Chaguaramas naval base question.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, analysts discuss the
emergence of a rival nationalist party, The Democratic Labour
Party (D.L.P.). This party's failure to maintain its initial
popularity and potentiality as a thriving opposition to the P.N.M.,
is said to have further enhanced and dominance of Dr. Williams'
administration.

Between 1956 - 1962, Eric Williams conveyed the image of
a conspicuously unabashed folk-leader. With a somewhat quixotic
style, he took all major issues to the people at the University
of Woodford Square. At this symbolic meeting place, he explained
that his role was to deliver what he promised them throughout
the elections (that is a more prosperous and morally satisfying
way of life). In this manner, considerable support was won and
eager followers pledged their loyalty to the Nationalists cause. Nevertheless, total victory for the P.N.M. and its dynamic leader, in the consolidation of power, proved to be much more difficult than it originally appeared.

First, consider the question of a Federated West Indies.* In explaining the background of this issue, Dr. Williams noted that most discussions revealed two main factors. In the first place, "Federation was superimposed on reluctant communities. It was a British scheme designed to promote British goals and achieve British ends in the Caribbean."

Secondly, there was the "paucity and inadequacy of West Indian public opinion." Consequently, in 1958 with the inauguration of the Federal Parliament, its principal task was to create a more positive identity for the people in addition to viable self-sufficient government. Unfortunately, however, from the very beginning the

---

32 Ibid., p. 173

33 Ibid.

*Since 1947 attempts had been made to create a Federal union of the islands of the West Indies and Guyana. Differences among the various units hampered progress in this area until January 3, 1958 when the territories, encouraged by the British Government, finally agreed to the terms of federation. The federation consisted of twelve units: Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Christopher together with Nevis and Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago, British Guiana (renamed Guyana) British Honduras (renamed Belize). There were two Houses in the Federal Legislative, a senate comprising 19 members and a House of Representatives comprising 45 members. The West Indies Federation existed for a short period (1958 - 1962). Constant disagreements led to the withdrawal of larger units Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Further attempts to federate the smaller territories also failed.
West Indian state was besieged with problems. First of all, it was impossible to create a united society out of small fragmented societies, without long range educational and cultural adjustments. Yet this is what some officials ambitiously aimed at. Then there were the leadership conflicts, and disputes with the colonial administration over economic assistance. What might appear to the outsider as a minuscule problem, i.e., the selection of a Federal capital site for islands separated by a distance of 1,025 sea miles (Port - of - Spain to Kingston), turned out to be a major issue. Consequently, intensification of irreconcilable differences led to the dissolution of the Federated State.

For Dr. Williams and the P.N.M. the idea of an independent West Indian nation was in keeping with their fundamental principles on anti-colonialism. Thus he stated Trinidad and Tobago's position: "We stood for a strong independent Federation with the usual powers over the constituent units."\textsuperscript{34} The demand was for full national independence, nationhood and organization of the economy in the national interest. When the formulative plans for federation began to show signs of a growing struggle, Dr. Williams outlined his country's position, which was to be of major significance within the region as well as domestically.

1) He argued that the British proposed constitution should be amended and Dominion status introduced within five years from its inception.

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 175.
2) He attempted, in the name of Trinidad and Tobago in general and the Indian minority in particular, to repudiate the allegations against the Indian population made in the report of the Federal capital site Commission. (That it was a risk to place the site in Trinidad because the Indian minority was opposed to Federation.)

3) He stated at a public rally that the P.N.M. would not scramble for seats in the Federal Parliament. "I made my own position crystal clear. I was not a candidate for the position of Prime Minister. Manley was present ... He told me later that he was surprised that I made my mind so early and even more surprised that I made my decision public."

Showing disregard for the persuasive arguments against his assertions, he resolutely adhered to the first and third points of his statement. Where the other West Indian governments were concerned, the major point of departure was his views on the British proposed constitution. There seemed to be a general consensus among West Indian leaders to refrain from overt antagonisms against the colonial government for fear of economic reprisals. In addition to this they opposed Dr. Williams' attempt to conduct the foreign affairs of Trinidad and Tobago without the sanction of the Federal government. Needless to say, above all, they must have been perturbed by his impetuous announcement that he had no desire to join in the leadership struggle. These and other issues, not mentioned here, were all premature signs of the final debacle.

Contrary to the political actor's second assertion, the domestic front was not as calm and unified as he indicated. With the formation of a Trinidad unit of the federal Democratic Labour Party (D.L.P.), a viable local opposition to the P.N.M. took

---

35 Ibid., p. 174
An integral sector of this party was derived from the People's Democratic Party (P.D.P.), headed by a prominent East Indian leader Bhadase Sagan Maraj. Thus the D.L.P. came to be nationally recognized as the East Indian counter to a predominantly 'creole' P.N.M. This assessment was largely confirmed through the results of the 1958 Federal elections. Then, the new party won six of the ten seats allocated to Trinidad and the Chief Minister's West Indian Federal Labour Party, also a unit of a Federal party, suffered an embarrassing defeat. The obvious question to be asked here is; was this outcome proof of the East Indian community's opposition to federation, or was amalgamation a deliberate attempt to attack the bastions of the P.N.M.?

Observers do not rule out either suggestion, but there is a tendency to accept the second speculation. Reason for this stems from the immediate reaction of the East Indian community in the wake of election victory. Emphasizing that the elections had been fought and won on the government taxation policy (which was said to be biased against East Indians), and the Chaguaramas issue, the P.N.M. government was called upon to resign. Albert Gomes, former head of the government, saw the victory as "a welcome Thermidorean reaction, a successful rally of decent people against a dictatorship of hooligans". 

The 36 Canon Farquhar speaking for former P.N.M. supporters noted that,

---

36 Ryan, Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago, p. 188.
"he hoped the defeat would have a sobering effect on fanatical nationalists whose minds had begun to lose touch with reality."\textsuperscript{37} Predictively, what occurred next was a protracted verbal war culminating in a brusque speech from Dr. Williams.

In essence, the speech was an attempt to account for the P.N.M.'s defeat. The fact that the party had increased its total votes from the previous election was little consolation in the face of unquestionable defeat. Dr. Williams' bewilderment over the solidarity of the East Indian community ran parallel to his disappointment in the P.N.M.'s failure to rouse an equally overwhelming response. It must be remembered that he perceived himself as being open and honest with the people; therefore, their overt lack of interest, coming at a time when self-determination was close at hand, symbolized to him the depth of apathy and ignorance. The fault, however, lay not with the people but with the party mechanism. Little attention had been paid to rural areas. It was common knowledge, since the 1956 election, that the East Indian sector was suspicious and apprehensive toward the 'new messiah' and his mass Negro following. Yet, since no cohesive opposition evolved, the organization remained content with its urban support.

Dr. Williams' reaction was cold and deliberate, he condemned the Indians for their anti-federalism and stated that the P.N.M. should be prepared to eliminate the racial tension which

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., p. 189
increased rapidly.

"As the party responsible for the initiation of an attempt to bring sanity, political morality, decency and self-respect to this country, it is our duty to warn the electorate and the people of this country of the situation which threatens to engulf the progress that has been achieved." 38

Selwyn Ryan has advanced sound criticisms of this political manoeuver by the Chief Minister. He contends that there was an ulterior motive behind Dr. Williams' chastising rhetoric. "It was a clever attempt to rouse the Negro population from their apathy and lethargy. They were fighting among themselves and threatening to vote irresponsibly while the Indian community was mobilizing all its energies to capture power." 39 Assuming that the P.N.M. sought to upbraid its voting public, Ryan argues that the Chief Minister demonstrated poor form and signs of tactlessness by performing the task himself. "It would have been more prudent for an address of the sort to have been given by another official of the Party. It was one thing to be a psephologist in an academic treatise designed for a limited audience, but quite another to make that type of appeal in the public squares." 40 However, this was the type of politicizing traditionally practiced by the P.N.M. Reasons for this shall be outlined later on.

38 Ryan, Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago, p. 192. citing P.N.M. - Weekly, April 21, 1958.

39 Ryan, Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago, p. 193.

40 Ibid., p. 193.
Turning to another major issue during this period (the Chaguaramas naval base dispute), one finds evidence of mounting success for the P.N.M. and its leaders, both with the population and foreign governments involved in the affair. During the early months of 1960, the Trinidad government intensified its demand for land which had been leased to the Americans by the British in 1941. The urgency of this demand was triggered by the fact that Trinidad had been finally chosen to house the Federal Capital. Trinidad nationalists' irredentist claim was a novelty for the Caribbean, and the ensuing struggle became one of the interesting highlights in the history of West Indian Federation.

Throughout the struggle, Dr. Williams used nationalism as a weapon. Accordingly, the masses supported his actions, but he could not escape the criticism of Federal Government officials and the D.L.P. During the controversy various undercurrents emerged to the surface. It was widely known among Federal Government official circles that the Trinidad and Tobago Government intended to open negotiations with the British and Americans. Already angered over Dr. Williams' refusal to allow Federal authorities more leverage in his country's foreign policy (for example on trade procedures), they offered little support to his new venture. In fact, they upheld a prior arrangement which was the American proposal to leave matters as they were for another ten years. Dr. Williams had been enraged by this proposal. "The Federal Government, he insisted, was nothing but a stooge of the Colonial office. Instead of carving out a role for itself that
would give it dignity, it had simply joined the State Department and the Colonial office in harassing the Trinidad government. 41

While the rift between Federal authorities and the Trinidad and Tobago government widened, a new campaign was launched by the political leader and his 'nationalists'. As early as November 1958, there were growing signs of the P.N.M.'s plan to bid for full scale independence for Trinidad and Tobago. It had been evident that their recommendations for the integration of Caribbean lands along the lines of uncompromising independence, were subordinated to those of other units. Unlike Trinidad which already held the potential for a progressive economy, some of the other islands still depended heavily on British aid. For example, Dr. Williams' strong demands for British economic aid could not be supported at that time by Norman Manley, who was in the process of negotiations with the British on his country's behalf. Apart from this, where caution and tolerance were obviously the watchwords of West Indians leaders in their dealings with great powers, arrogance and determination more appropriately described Eric Williams' attitude. Hence the rift became more apparent.

Although his actions were severely criticized on the home front by opposition groups, they ceased to be politically dangerous after the April 22, 1960 famous 'March in the rain.' Furthermore, once the State Department decided to open negotiations with the Nationalists, there were clear indications that

a settlement would be arranged signifying the end of a classic conflict.

At this juncture it is necessary to note briefly the events leading to the American 'capitulation'. During the early months of 1960, the State Department was adamant in its refusal to consider Dr. Williams' proposal. Reasons for this were obvious. The United States (U.S.), deeply involved in the Cold War and anxious to tighten its grip in the Western Hemisphere, was in no position to open negotiations for the release of a naval base. Such a move, they argued, could be interpreted as political vulnerability and constitute a threat to other bases. Moreover, U.S. officials were aware of the formidable opposition which attacked the Nationalists at both the regional and domestic levels. Finally, it was difficult to ignore the socialist innuendos in nationalist propaganda. From all appearances, Dr. Williams' ideology had traditionally been of an orthodox democratic nature which was in keeping with U.S. principles. Nevertheless, one of his chief party lieutenants was known Trotskyite, C.L.R. James. Also Mrs. Janet Jagan, wife of British Guiana's Marxist Chief Minister, along with Trinidad Marxist Lennox Pierre, were among the major participants in his march for Chaguaramas. As a consequence, the Americans adopted a wait and see attitude.

The historic march was planned at a P.N.M. convention. Having tried all other channels and failed, the party decided on public protest with the U.S. consulate as its target. Most commentators have acknowledged Dr. Williams' skillful use of
symbolism to emphasize his demands as another brilliant showing of his political mettle. "Williams was determined to show the D.L.P., the Colonial office and the State Department - and indeed of the West Indies - that he was not a lonely embittered agitator who had gone too far out on a shaky limb to satisfy a personal pathological grudge against imagined 'devils'." \(^{42}\) Indeed, one writer has noted that: "the mass daytime meeting called at the University of Woodford Square, the burning of The Seven Deadly Sins of Colonialism (including the U.S. - U.K. bases agreement) and even the selection of Marxist speakers were all performed for the shock value."\(^{43}\)

The success of the demonstration, however, was due only in part, to its leaders. Observers estimated that between fifteen to thirty-five thousand people participated and openly approved the Nationalists' cause. As an elated Dr. Williams commented: "A demonstration such as this is not only a political leap forward, it is also a spiritual purification."\(^{44}\) According to Selwyn Ryan, "Trinidad had at last done something 'revolutionary', and had matured under his stimulation."\(^{45}\) Hence he received another popular mandate which undoubtedly complemented the one of 1955. With renewed confidence Dr. Williams noted, "When Chaguaramas is returned, if the Federal government is still interested in using it for the capital, they can come in and we will sit down with them and bargain about it."\(^{46}\)

\(^{42}\) Ibid., p. 215.
\(^{43}\) Oxaal, Black Intellectuals Come to Power, p. 133.
\(^{44}\) Ryan, Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago, p. 216.
\(^{45}\) Ibid.
\(^{46}\) Ibid.
Such statements, invariably triggered the wrath of opposition forces. Here was a leader whose confidence and invincibility were imperious. The traditionally skeptical Trinidad Guardian was outraged. Along with a pictorial comparison of Dr. Williams and Adolf Hitler, "he was accused of caudilloism, of paranoia, of being so desperate for an election issue that he was ready to destroy the West Indies in the process... His is the dilemma of every loud-mouthed demagogue during this period of history."  

A more subdued, yet rational, criticism was expressed by the new leader of the D.L.P., Dr. Ruwanath Capildeo. Also an academic with impeccable credentials, Dr. Capildeo had arrived on the political scene in March 1960. While he argued that the P.N.M. was putting party before country, he agreed that U.S. bases were indeed inimical to underdeveloped societies. His reply on the question of independence was more of a precautionary warning than blatant condemnation of Dr. Williams' aspirations. He asserted quite perceptively: "when you press for independence and remove the foreign technical expert, you invite his brother to come in - the foreign technical expert and you have simply changed one colonialism for a stronger one." At this stage

\footnote{Ibid., p. 217.}

\footnote{Dr. Capildeo argued, like many others, that too much land and resources were tied up in Bases agreement. Social problems were also considered, for instance according to Gordon K. Lewis, Americanization of a colonial society produced a degrading phenomenon. "a roughly hewn combination of British snobbery and American vulgarity." See Gordon K. Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies (New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1969), p. 212.}

\footnote{Ryan, Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago, p. 216.
however, with nationalistic sentiments on the rise, Dr. Capildeo's judicious assessment seemed almost blasphemous to the P.N.M. supporters. Yet it was undoubtedly a factor worth considering. It should be noted that the power of opposition forces was limited. The sole vehicle, which held power to affect public opinion (the D.L.P.), showed signs of conflict within leadership ranks. Unlike the P.N.M., internal weaknesses were not easily controlled; moreover, it was hampered by a formidable opponent which had already gained popular support. As a result, instead of waging a successful opposition onslaught, the D.L.P. was coerced into coming to terms with Dr. Williams' government.

Insofar as the region was concerned, Federal officials remained opposed to Dr. Williams' policies. Therefore, they did not hesitate to remind him, in his state of euphoria, that others had tried revolutionary tactics and had failed. Cipriani, Adams, Manley and the rest had all experienced limited successes in their nationalistic endeavours. Norman Manley implicitly inferred that Dr. Williams was not the first West Indian Nationalist and that the tide was already in favour of a West Indies nation. On the question of independence he stated: "there is no problem about Independence - except the working out of the sort of Federation we want when we get Independence. I do not think there is any point in fixing a date for independence until we have settled the future of the Federation which was our business." 50

50 Ibid., p. 217.
To say that Dr. Williams ignored these criticisms would probably be a misjudgement of his later actions. As an astute politician he was aware that the image projected in April 1960, was too radical for foreign observers and, therefore, was politically dangerous. Consequently, in May 1960, he openly denounced communist states by declaring that Trinidad regarded itself as 'west of the Iron Curtain'. Ivar Oxaal recalls that this speech was partially responsible for the State Department's reversal of its policy. Moreover, rumours to the effect that Dr. Williams was severing ties with his old friend C.L.R. James were confirmed. Oxaal was told by a United States official that it was after this speech that he regarded the issue as negotiable: "The San Fernando speech marked Williams' break with James. It is part of Williams' political style to telegraph his punches. After that speech we knew we could do business with him."  

Regarding the question of Independence, it was not so much Eric Williams' arrogance as the British preparedness to negotiate that led to fruitful discussions. The British Government had already been prepared for an independent West Indies. On his visit to Trinidad in late 1960, the Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod was most responsive to the Nationalists' demand for self-determination. Thus it became evident that compromises would be made by both sides. Although the Federation was on the verge of collapse, nationalistic sentiments prevailed.


52 Ibid.
Sensing Britain's willingness to transfer its power and authority, West Indian leaders continued to negotiate for a favourable settlement of their grievances.

Between November 28 and December 9, 1960, representatives from the Caribbean, Britain and the United States worked on a settlement for the Chaguaramas issue. Delegates met in Tobago and Dr. Williams remarked that the conference was Trinidad's first real venture in external affairs. In his final address he stated:

We have substituted, Sir, and Agreement made by us for an Agreement made for us, and the recognition by the U.S.A. as well as by the U.K. of our new status, in fact, even before we have achieved it in law, enhances our dignity and fortifies us as we approach the road to national independence - this Agreement will be carried out not merely in the letter but also in that spirit of friendliness and recognition of mutual need which has actuated us all in this room.\(^53\)

On February 10, 1961, the West Indies flag along with the flag of Trinidad and Tobago were raised at Chaguaramas. This eventually proved to be the single clause of the settlement, to which all sides conceded. Once the excitement over the success of the Tobago conference had subsided, charges and counter-charges were issued by both sides. As Dr. Williams prepared to take the Agreement to the Legislative Council, American officials claimed that he had misinterpreted certain clauses. The main issue concerned remuneration arrangements. Here the U.S. argued that, while they had been indeed willing to supply aid for local projects, no commitment was made to stand the total cost of these

\(^{53}\) Williams, *Inward Hunger*, p. 239.
projects. In a memorandum dated 24 October 1961, the U.S. mission noted:

While the United States delegation strongly recommended United States participation on a grant basis in projects relating to the port, road, Cocorite reclamation, railroad and University College, at no point did the United States agree to provide the entire costs of these projects. 54

Final acquiescence from the State Department came after the Cuban missile crisis. Dr. Williams has intimated that the crisis was instrumental in the procurement of an agreement:

"I was in London at the time, and I made it clear in a press conference that the Chaguaramas question was a domestic issue which I did not wish to get embroiled in extraneous considerations. Shortly after, President Kennedy sent a special emissary to me to make an offer of fifty one million of our currency. I accepted." 55

P.N.M. government officials have always maintained that the Chaguaramas agreement was signed in the national interest of the people of Trinidad and Tobago. Contrary to this assertion, is the strong opposition contention that the deal was a 'sell out'. Part of this claim was due to the fact that the Americans were allowed to retain their facilities at Chaguaramas until 1977, pending a review of the contract in 1968. Furthermore, some individuals condemned Dr. Williams' increasing devotion to the U.S. By attempting to stage a brilliant showing for the people of Trinidad and Tobago and the West Indies, they argued, he had engaged in a foreign policy manoeuvre which was strongly biased

54 Ibid., p. 241.
55 Ibid., p. 244.
in favour of the United States government. “What would the leaders of the West Indies tell Ghana, India and the rest of the Afro-Asian neutralist bloc? Why should West Indian delegates agree to tie the hands of the future West Indian Government which might have different views on foreign policy?”

Inasmuch as earlier nationalistic sentiments were distinctively anti-colonial and anti-American, such criticisms seemed justifiable. Yet the immediate political consequences were not as damaging as critics predicted. By 1968 the Americans had voluntarily left Chaguaramas, retaining only the Missile Tracking Station and a new navigational station. As was expected, relations remained the same with Afro-Asian states, and the country moved on to independence without the other West Indian islands. Nevertheless, we should not hasten to dismiss opposition arguments seeing that they hinted at a more fundamental but obscure consequence. In his analysis of the situation, Lloyd Best, Sociologist and ardent critic of the Williams administration, refers to the inexpediency of a political union with the U.S.:

By taking the line of least resistance, and bowing to American power, the P.N.M. committed Trinidad to accepting an ‘external definition of the national purpose’ and make any further acceleration of the decolonization process impossible. The aim of the Agreement had been to trade submissiveness to imperial militarism for metropolitan economic assistance and more generally to maintain metropolitan confidence. By the same stroke, however, protection was offered to the plantation economy and to the metropolitan investors who controlled it.

---

56 Ryan, Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago, p. 230.

57 Ryan, Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago, p. 343, citing ‘Chaguaramas to Slavery’, New World Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1965, p. 44.
It is customary to regard the status of Chief Minister as an initial step towards the more prestigious position of Prime Minister. Needless to say, the assumption of such a responsible government position bore certain profound implications for Dr. Williams. Encountering for the first time the pitfalls of arduous government problems, he realized that the implementation of nationalistic aspirations required more than a popular mandate. Generally speaking, politicians are usually aware of limitations of power and authority before entering office. Yet, sometimes their earlier preoccupation with the quest for and attainment of popular support, creates a false sense of security which can be tragically shattered by the burdensome realities of governing a state. When, as in this case, the society is paralysed by imminent dangers of racial conflicts, economic underdevelopment, reality may become overbearing; thus precipitating disastrous consequences for a politician. To the enterprising leader, however, this situation may be a challenge.

As Chief Minister, Dr. Williams was constantly aware of the country's most persistent problems. Because he was in a position to know all the facts and held manipulative power, the society expected (in some cases demanded) firm and judicious action in the eradication of major discrepancies. Now, continuously in the public eye as self-proclaimed spokesman of the party and the country, he endeavoured to be straightforward and trustworthy in executing the major tasks of government.
The change to Prime Minister intensified the urgency of pressing problems. It is customary that, prior to a change in role, politicians seeking higher status would have made numerous promises to the electorate at different stages in their campaign. In this case, each change occurred in the aftermath of an election and the subject was forced to come to terms, not only with the requirements and limitations of his role, but with the fact that in the face of more pressing demands, some promises could not be kept. Probably the most conventional reaction to this predicament is an attempt to modify one's promises or philosophy, either by diverting public attention to new issues and crises or by extending the fulfillment of the promise over a period of time, in which case its impact is lost. Regardless of what is done, however, one can anticipate hostile accusations from disgruntled sectors of the populace. Therefore, leaders are well advised to refrain from inflamed denouncements of such elements, in order to preclude the possibility of a politically dangerous power struggle.

All government and administrative leaders face this predicament in one way or another; however, the pressure is more intense at the upper levels of the hierarchy. This conclusion bears directly on the dimensions of leadership role and political power considered in this study. The foregoing discussions

*September 28, 1973 marks the date of Dr. Williams' announcement of his decision to retire from public service. At the request of P.N.M. members he has consented to remain Head of State until his term of office ends in 1976.*
illustrated a pattern of increasing individual responsibility running parallel to increasing demands from the public. After 1962 the intensity of these demands was heightened. With foreign opponents out of the picture, the society assumed a more introspective posture. Consequently, self-criticism led to new ideas and a reinterpretation of traditional values which forcefully challenged the old. For Eric Williams, the intellectual and folk-leader, opponents had been easily identified and accused. The Caribbean Commission, the Gomes Government even British Colonialism had been attacked for their disregard and betrayal of the West Indian people. During his term as Chief Minister, Colonialism was the major enemy and he engaged in battles against western powers, like the U.S. and Britain, spurred on by the tremendous public support. Victories such as the 1956 election, the United States agreement over Chaguaramas and the British decision to grant independence forced most P.N.M. opponents into a defensive position.

Eventually, however, as the population settled down to the business of self-determination and it became evident that certain projected goals could not be immediately fulfilled, its antagonism was directed against those in power. Hence, rival forces once more attempted to stimulate public opinion, this time with more success. Now that the P.N.M. had achieved its goal of creating a politically conscious public, it was faced
with the realization that such a society was fully equipped to identify shortcomings just as well as successes. For the most part, a rise in the political consciousness of a people might be profitable to those who engineered that change; however, in some cases such knowledge may also serve as a protective force against domination by any group, thus producing a more cautious electorate. Although it has survived as the most progressive nationalist party in Trinidad and Tobago, the P.N.M. has not escaped injury from the ambivalent disposition of the public. As commentary on the period at hand will show, public sentiment ranged from strong support and admiration during the sixties, to cynicism and disenchantment in the early seventies. Reasons for this shift are numerous. Some claim that it may be attributed to the administration's inability to exercise skill in handling novel and volatile situations. Others contend that the overly expectant society, unable to rationalize the slow pace of development coupled with a prevailing colonial atmosphere, moved backward into an unproductive apathy which demonstrated their dissatisfaction. More importantly, however, problems were compounded by increasing uncertainty and suspicion over the Prime Minister's true intentions. When the administration's problems were placed against the background of promises made in the fifties, one found difficulty in disassociating Dr. Williams from its failures. Therefore, by the early seventies the 'Nationalists' hero of the fifties was subjected to harsh criticisms and repudiation by large sections of the society.
Contrary to some arguments, the role of Prime Minister is perhaps more restricting and confining within all its outward appearances of flexibility. In the first place, the prescribed norms for a Head of State are clearly defined. While a considerable measure of respect and power is afforded the leader by both the domestic and international society, they expect in return, adherence and consistency in relation to the rules of the game. British Historian F.W.G. Beney has outlined the official duties of a Prime Minister along with the limitations of his powers.

According to this author the Prime Minister is:

1) The working Head of State.
2) The Head of the Cabinet.
3) The choice of the electorate as the nation's representative at international summit conferences.
4) The Minister whom the electorate regards as the person responsible for the well-being of the country.
5) The Minister with the power to request a dissolution of Parliament, to appoint and dismiss Cabinet Ministers, to dispense an enormous amount of patronage.
6) The most influential and powerful man in the country, who is for a period of time almost a benevolent dictator.

His powers are limited by:

1) The nature of the modern party, which is a coalition of many pressure groups, making it necessary for him to try to perpetrate all these factions, and thus to govern by means of continual compromise.
2) The need to remember that the leader of the Opposition is an alternative Prime Minister.
3) The mass media by which he builds up an image of himself as an infallible and omniscient statesman are equally capable of destroying his image.
His powers depend on:

a) His authority over the electorate.
b) Party discipline.
c) His control over the Cabinet.
d) His widespread patronage.\(^{58}\)

Taking professor Beney's guidelines into account, we realize that individual interpretation and application of the Prime Ministers' role may be constrained not only by the prescribed role requirements but by strong domestic opposition contingents. Thus the individual is placed in the precarious position of attempting to govern effectively, maintain power, and follow the basic rules of authority, while refraining from dishonest and surreptitious activity. For the subject of this analysis, the problem was heightened by the nature of society. Being primarily of colonial extraction, there was an inbred pervasive attitude of dependence and willingness to be led which was countered only by an acute sense of injury. It was easy, therefore, for the small state to develop an overconfidence in the patriarchal image of the Prime Minister, completely assured that progress was forthcoming. However, if failure was perceived it was equally easy for such confidence to rapidly dissipate into distrust.

Between 1962 and 1973, the P.N.M. government focused on domestic issues. Its primary task was nation building. Among some of its major efforts were, the introduction of Five year

Development Plans, revised legislation for the reorganization of the public service, the Industrial Stabilization Act and an attempt at Direct Democracy through close contact with the people. In 1969, the Prime Minister published his autobiography. Here he listed these ventures as some of the party's major successes. He was particularly pleased with public response to the government's experiments with Direct Democracy. In 1963 the Prime Minister's 'Meet the People Tours' had been an initial step toward this type of government.

Most of the proposed Legislative bills were issued to members of the public for their scrutiny and approval. Similar methods were also applied to the party and by 1966 (its tenth anniversary), the organization had revised its constitution, established new Party Headquarters and redefined its philosophy. According to a committee report presented to the P.N.M. General Council by A.N.R. Robinson, the main dimensions of the Party's Philosophy were as follows:

"The Party is for independence and democracy. Our concept of democracy is based upon the rule of law, human rights and human dignity ... We reject the dogmatism of state enterprise, and we reject the dogmatism of private initiative ... We are interracial. We are for integrity and discipline."

As a whole, ten years of P.N.M. government had produced significant changes:

"New industries, farms where there were none before, respectable flats replacing disgraceful shanties, hospital beds and health clinics, new roads, new schools in which education is free." 60

These were stimulating times for Dr. Williams and his colleagues. In the 1966 elections, sixty-six percent of the voting population turned out and the P.N.M. received its third mandate.

At this juncture, it is necessary to touch briefly on the more significant problems and challenges of Dr. Williams' administration. First of all, setbacks were encountered in attempts to reconstruct the Public Service. Secondly, the racial problem though dormant still persisted. Finally in the early seventies there emerged new nationalist movements dedicated to remedying the ills of society and the removal of the Prime Minister. One can suggest that a decline in public support exemplified by the revolutionary demonstrations of 1970 and the poor voter turnout in 1971 (thirty-three percent of the people went to the polls), resignations of leading public officials, widespread rumour and clandestine conspiratorial activity, all contributed to Dr. Williams decision to resign in 1973.

The governing powers of any administration are enhanced by efficient expertise within the bureaucracy. In a Parliamentary system where close interaction between Government Ministers and Civil Service officials is required, areas of responsibility should be clearly outlined, thus guarding against duplication.

60 Ibid., p. 324
of authority and unnecessary friction. For Trinidad and Tobago in the decade of the sixties, reorganization of the Civil Service was a necessary step in the decolonization process. Although the government successfully dispensed with expatriate officials, the rudiments of colonial heritage, nurtured by years of indoctrination, remained unaffected. Hence, Dr. Williams' suggestion that: "the failure of the P.N.M. to make much headway with bureaucratic reform has been due to its inability to come to grips with the persistence of colonial attitudes and institutions in the society at large."\(^{61}\) Moreover, the problem was deepened by "the smallness of the society and the consequent absence of privacy and anonymity which intensified jealousies and rivalries ... Such conditions eventually led to the personalization of the service."\(^{62}\) Instability in the Civil Service was further compounded by personalism within the Cabinet itself. It is widely known that the Prime Minister monopolized decision-making. His total control over crucial matters alienated some of his colleagues. The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that the new administration evolved along similar lines to the colonial government. Such an occurrence was paradoxical. Here was a Nationalist party bent on decolonization, institutionalizing colonial divide and rule tactics through its centrist attitudes and narrow scope of communication. Efficiency, therefore, became irrelevant as

\(^{61}\) Ryan, Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago, p. 349.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., p. 350.
public officials spruced up their personal images. Lack of concern and dependence on others caused the situation to develop into a malignancy which could hardly be controlled by the administrative skills of Dr. Williams.

One of the major clauses in the P.N.M. charter advocated its commitment to the establishment of a harmonious multi-racial community. Indeed in 1962, most of the dissenting public had crossed party lines and de-emphasized ethnic considerations to align themselves with the Nationalists' pursuit of independence. In return, Dr. Williams made a non-partisan bid in an attempt to bridge the chasm. In fact, during the early sixties there seemed to be an easing of strained relations between the Indian and Negro communities. Since, however, there was never any open sense of animosity or rancour between the two communities, there was no overt movement towards amicable race relations. What existed was an implicit disregard for each others' customs and values, a condition inimical to the crystallization of a unified society.

Two hypotheses have been advanced to explain Dr. Williams' perception of the Indian - Negro relationship before 1962. In some respects, they are also of significance to the period at hand.

1. It may be that he deliberately ignored the composite nature of the society on the grounds that the anti-colonial struggle and the social revolution had to be given priority. It may also be that he believed that he had a responsibility to emancipate the Negro, to stimulate his pride, dignity and feeling of independence.
2. There is evidence that the Negroes took it for granted that the Indians had assimilated into the society, and that the common experiences which they shared with Negroes on the plantation predisposed them to follow a national movement dedicated to an overthrow of the plantation system. 63

While direct inroads were made by the Government over issues such as equal opportunities in employment, government representation, civil liberties and the recognition of religious rites and customs, the Indian population maintained that overt discriminatory practices restrained their social mobility. Some government policies were viewed as being beneficial only to the Negro population. Already frustrated by the D.L.P.'s failure to provide adequate partisan protection, the Indian community settled for passive co-existence in which religion and culture provided more cohesive bonds than active political involvement.

For many years, the goal of multi-racialism had been no more than an expressed desire. After 1956 overt attempts were made to create a bond of mutual friendship and trust among all groups. The Prime Minister established close contact with Hindu and Moslem leaders, and during his 'Meet the people tours', members of the rural East Indian community actively participated in both the cultural and political events. In the final analysis, however, a pseudo-participatory mood prevailed. Whether it was a lack of concern or a misperception of the mood of this particular ethnic group, the fact remains that Dr. Williams' continuous

63 Ibid., p. 376.
pronouncements on existing inter-racial unity could not make his wish a reality. A good illustration of this point is to be found in the limited Indian response to the new-nationalists' movement of 1970. As one commentator noted, "The Indians do not define themselves as blacks and do not share the anxieties and frustrations that people of African descent feel about their cultural identity." 64 Thus, although similarly deprived of economic benefits, they refrained from demanding change when this meant the removal of one African based hierarchy for the replacement of another. The lack of a common identity prevented unity over a common cause almost as if in mockery to the national motto 'together we Aspire, together we Achieve'. Still, the smallness of the society demands some kind of unity or common identity between the two major ethnic groups especially if a more egalitarian, people oriented society is to evolve.

Race and Nationalism were key considerations in the public protests of February 1970. To a large extent this crisis signified a turning point in Dr. Williams' political career. Open espousals of 'Black Power' principles and denouncements of the P.N.M. government as being an archaic institution governed by Afro-Saxons, made a decisive impact on public opinion. For the first time, Dr. Williams' methods were subject to widespread criticism which gained popular support. Indeed, many government supporters became skeptical on realizing the validity of the

64 Ibid., p. 379
new opposition's inferences. As a whole, the overall political and social climate which antedate the conflict showed signs of its inevitability. Persistent economic problems such as a rise in the cost of living, increased taxes and unemployment, all contributed to creating mass public sympathy with the movement. However, the causes of upheavals and political violence in this society ran deeper and were more sensitive. Since 1956, the dream of the 'creole' masses, fostered by Dr. Williams, was to gain increased status and dignity within the society. After more than a decade, there still existed a preponderance of colonial values and attitudes. In spite of the fact that whites had withdrawn from politics, they retained a great deal of influence (primarily economic) within the society. Their control of the life blood of social existence coupled with isolationism and manifest racial prejudices, were factors that most concerned West Indians were forced to live with but refused to accept as a permanent state of affairs. As far as the radical elements were concerned, Eric Williams had been given a mandate to right the wrongs. He had failed, and it was incumbent upon them to bring these situations to the attention of the public.

Revolutionary activity in the external environment was a major contributory factor to the genesis of local revolutionary movements. As an open polity, Trinidad and Tobago society was exposed to a wide range of political propaganda. In the new revolutionary fervour, a rash of small dissenting groups of
varying ideological persuasions emerged almost overnight. Comprised mainly of students, Trade Unionists, Military personnel and the numerous unemployed, these groups ranged from confirmed Marxist, Leninist, Trotskyites to disciples of Stokley Carmichael, Malcolm X, the Black Panther Movement and other influential leftist organizations of the era. They lacked a common ideology and there was continued friction among them. Nevertheless, unified by common goals and common dislikes, they engineered and actuated the most successful mass demonstration of dissent since Eric Williams' 'March for Chaguaramas' a decade earlier.

Leaders of the movement regarded its success as a reflection of the population's open condemnation of the Prime Minister's government. The people's revolutionized cognizance, they argued, discarded the myth of unity and progress which had blinded them from reality. Full realization of their plight led to demands for both economic and political power. According to Trade Unionist George Weeks, "Our struggle for economic liberation must mean one thing, "Black Power", when we advise the Government to acquire British Petroleum holdings, what we are actually advocating is the transfer of power, white power, into the hands of the black people, Africans and Indians." To a large extent this interpretation of 'Black Power' was overshadowed by the racial overtones of the actual demonstration. Its symbolic

---

acts, performed with the intent to arouse public interest, were primarily directed against the white middle and upper class sectors of the society. Some observers have noted that the movement lost its impetus as a result of extremism and prolonged acts of aggression against the white minority. Others have claimed, however, that police repression and foreign interference brought about its downfall.

During the course of the demonstration, most leaders clearly indicated, in public speeches and periodical publications, that they were bringing to a close, an era of political adventurism and oppression. Their proposed methods of approaching the public, though extremely radical, bore surprising resemblances to Eric Williams' tactics. Whether this was a deliberate attempt to demonstrate what should have been done in the sixties, or simply the use of a convenient, already established, platform is debatable. Yet their programmes of mass public education, the renaming of the University of Woodford Square as 'The People's Parliament', and in particular, staged demonstrations outside foreign banks and embassies were reminiscent of P.N.M. activity in the early sixties. However, it is clear that the 'New Nationalists' movement is by no means an extension of the old.

Focusing on the Prime Minister as the individual most responsible for the society's stagnation, chief protagonists discussed reasons for his failures. The National Joint Action Committee, a student based organization suggests that Dr.
Williams' rise to power bore implicit contradictions:

The image of the Messiah blinded people to the obvious contradictions in the man who spoke the language of the grass roots with an Oxford accent, who boasted pride in his blackness but measured himself by white standards. So even after the betrayal over Chaguaramas, when he made us feel that at last we were going to deal with the white Imperialists and sold out the people's struggle for some aid, the charisma did not die. It is only in recent years the illusion of 1956 has really been broken for most African people. 66

Other criticisms pointed to the Prime Minister's failure to relinquish his hold on political power in the face of mounting pressures. Opposition forces denounce his impetuous disposition as a scare tactic employed to promote self-aggrandizement, and they further denounce his ministers for allowing themselves to be so easily manipulated. The whole administration, they argue, is underlined by power politics and corruption. These and other inferences bring into focus the subject of Dr. Williams' relationship with the party, as this relates to interaction with the public.

The distinguished, yet condescending image which has been projected by Dr. Williams is common to most nationalist leaders. For the Caribbean, however, his interpretation and execution of his role as Head of State, introduced a new style of nationalist politics which was a strange blend of traditional and modern techniques. This novelty stemmed from two factors. a) The party and how it developed and b) The personality of the political actor.

66"Conventional Politics or Revolution?", National Joint Action Committee Pamphlet (Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: The Vanguard printers, n.d.), p. 25.
Analysts usually describe the political systems of small developing states as being prone to infestation and decay through graft and corruption. Determined to overcome and avoid this stigma by eradicating its source, Dr. Williams promptly denounced corruption after receiving the first mandate and proceeded to cultivate the image of an incorruptible leader. With the deciated support of party members an attempt was made to create what most individuals consider impossible: that is, an honest political party. As might be expected, their efforts led to the type of criticism which they sought to escape.

Because of the intimate, personal nature of the recruitment process and the small size of the community, Dr. Williams found himself presiding over a party and a society with much of the character of a Gemeinschaft community in which the bureaucratic regulations, stress on merit over personal connections as a basis for status and rewards and other structural concomittants of a large-scale, industrialized society were at a relatively low stage development.67

With the party progressing along these lines, the onus of maintaining credibility, shifted completely to the shoulders of the political leader. Consequently, the party's success was, for the most part, based on its political leader's image of honesty and straightforwardness with the people. Notwithstanding the fact that as a charismatic personality Dr. Williams was able to maintain a popular front, such conditions were not ideal for the proper functioning of a democratic political party. While it is true that the monolithic party structure survived throughout the

67 Oxaal, Black Intellectuals Come to Power, p. 144.
sixties and popular mandates were renewed, it must be remembered that no strong opposition intervened to disrupt the harmony between the people and their leader. Once a stable situation prevailed, party members willingly surrendered their independence.

Commentators and party members alike have asserted that dissention within the ranks of the P.N.M. was continuously suppressed by the shrewdness of its political leader. According to David Nelson, a former party member: "Fear of the personal consequences of open disagreement with, or efforts to control, the political leader is today the only neutralizer of the poison which is slowly eating into the P.N.M. system." 68 This, in effect, was the heritage of a party which had centered its aspirations around the genius of one individual only to discover later that it was difficult, if not impossible to widen its scope. Ivar Oxaal has commented on the early signs of problems within the party. "Associated with this general atmosphere of enthusiasm and satisfaction within the party, however, were strong tendencies toward oligarchy verging on an autocratic leadership style ... The P.E.G. was formed primarily with the intention of advancing his career in politics, its raison d'etre was Williams' own mass appeal." 69 Centralization of authority in the hands of the party leader fostered individualistic attitudes among its members. Furthermore a genuine


69 Oxaal, Black Intellectuals Come to Power, p. 138.
democratic atmosphere was lacking. Because he adopted the attitude of being incorruptible and condemned the socializing side of politics, in an attempt to avoid the personal informal customs of small communities: "his posture gave credence to the image of being lonely, isolated and dictatorial."\(^{70}\)

It must be noted, however, that an entirely opposite view has been taken by other analysts. Adrian Espinet and Jaques Farmer have categorized the Williams administration as one of interdependence between the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.

The very scope of his omnipotence calls for enormous resources of energy and ability, and there can be no doubt that Williams brings them abundantly to the task. As a Prime Minister, he has varied the dubious formula of *primum inter pares* to a far more certain (though not always clear) one of the first among unequals — a patent fact which has led some observers to the view that every Member of the Cabinet is Williams' personal creation ... the evidence for a counter dependence of Williams on certain of his 'men' is as much there as the evidence for their dependence on him.\(^{71}\)

Reflecting on the official duties of the Prime Minister as proposed by professor Benemy, (pg. 85) certain observations about Dr. Williams' position can be made. It is evident that he lived up to expectations insofar as the performance of official duties was concerned. Party discipline and his control over both the electorate and Cabinet served to enhance his status while demonstrating his power as Head of State. Furthermore, he personally attempted to revitalize the political system by being pragmatic, expedient and efficient. What was lacking, however, was a viable opposition force to serve as a check on


\(^{71}\) Ryan, *Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago*, p. 434. Citing 'Tapia' article November 15, 1969.
the administration's power and provide a visible alternative to the people.

Generally speaking, however, one might suggest that Dr. Williams' interpretation of his political status stemmed from earlier experiences as an intellectual. Gordon Lewis has argued that the P.N.M. varied from other West Indian movements because the political leader's outlook was not only shaped by British training common to most West Indian scholars of his time, it was also severely influenced by his American experience. This assisted him: "to absorb the American qualities of dynamic energy and rapid movement, of the urge to get things done, so much opposed to the traditional caution of the British national outlook."72

The foregoing description of Eric Williams' academic and political careers is essentially an abstract of situations and experiences which this writer considers relevant to each status. It is assumed that by placing status in its situational context, individual characteristics as well as political ethos are more clearly perceived and comprehended. The present case characterizes the political actor as a charismatic and pragmatic leader, who attempts to perfect an 'independent' leadership style.

Delineation of each status has indicated that there is more evidence of direct individual input into the role variable.

in the first and second periods than in the third. As Prime Minister, the subject appears to be less adventurous than in previous years and more disciplined towards structural processes. For instance, one detects a more subdued manner, in his dealings with foreign states and local corporations, than previously existed. Consequently in comparing his belief system over the three periods, a major point of interest will be evidence of variance between the first and third periods.
CHAPTER IV

ERIC WILLIAMS' "OPERATIONAL CODE"

Philosophical Beliefs.

Before presenting the description of the belief system, it is necessary to cite briefly some of the problems of research which were encountered in the study.

First, insofar as the utility of Dr. Williams' textual publications is concerned, the analyst has encountered problems resulting from their predominantly historical content. Books such as Capitalism and Slavery, The Negro in the Caribbean, Inward Hunger, From Columbus to Castro, History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago, and British Historians and the West Indies, while containing some relevant information, were not rich with philosophical and instrumental beliefs. The historical material itself is not especially useful, primarily because it focused on the origins and nature of Colonialism and Slavery in the West Indies. Writing from an academic viewpoint, Dr. Williams tried to be as objective as possible in the presentation of his theories perhaps because he expected adverse criticism from scholars who were aware of his emotional attachment to the topic. For instance, in the preface of Capitalism and Slavery he stated:

The book is not an essay in ideas or interpretations. It is strictly an economic study of the role of Negro Slavery and the slave trade in providing the capital which financed the Industrial Revolution in England and of mature industrial capitalism in destroying the slave system.¹

The resulting work is largely a chronology of historical data and assessments which in large measure do not relate to the question categories of the Operational Code. Thus while more might have been hoped from the data examined, nevertheless, the author believes that she has sufficient material to trace the development of Eric Williams' operational code over three distinct role positions.

For the purpose of clarity, we shall present a description and comparison, where possible, of each Philosophical and Instrumental Belief for the three role periods, (that is 1939 - 1956 Intellectual, 1956 - 1962 Chief Minister, 1962 - 1973 Prime Minister). The beliefs will be presented in the same order as the question categories, ranging from 1 through 5 for both philosophical and instrumental beliefs.

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS:

No. 1. What is the 'essential' nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?

This category is perhaps most essential and informative to the entire Operational Code. According to Alexander George,

A political actor's belief system about the nature of politics is shaped particularly by his orientation to other political actors. Most important of these are one's opponents. The way in which they are perceived the characteristics the political actor attributes to his opponents - exercises a subtle influence on many other philosophical and instrumental beliefs in his operational code.²

For Eric Williams, writing in 1942, the political universe was based on conflict. His references to conflict were made in the context of the relationship between colonial governments and their subjects. He asserted that slavery was an immoral life situation which was the direct result of the economic needs of western capitalists. Thus, two types of conflicts emerged, first conflict among the capitalists illustrated by this statement extracted from *The Negro in the Caribbean*:

> All the European wars between 1660 and 1815 were fought for the possessions of these valuable islands and for the privilege of supplying the 'tons' of labour needed by sugar plantations.³

Second, conflict between caribbean negroes and western capitalists. From the same work he stated, "With the transporation of the Negro from Africa to the Caribbean the germ of political revolt was transplanted to the New World."⁴ Thus, using slavery as a base, he has voiced his convictions on the 'selfishness and inhumanity of mankind'.

He also appears to be convinced that the actions of colonial governments are determined primarily by economic considerations.

If the Negro slave eventually became at various times in the nineteenth century, a free man, the reason is to be found not only in the belated recognition of morality and Christian precepts but also in the fact that slavery, as an economic institution had ceased to be profitable.⁵

⁴ Ibid., p. 83.
⁵ Ibid., p. 16.
While he commended the humanitarian efforts of men like Bartolome de Las Casas and Thomas Clarkson, he pointed out that their values had not been widely accepted by those in power. To Williams moral law is most important and should not, therefore, be constantly subordinated to mundane economic considerations. His belief that it is economic factors and not moral sentiments which influence the policies of colonial governments fosters a considerable degree of distrust and ill-feeling in Williams towards his opponents. Thus, "the political and moral ideas of the age are to be examined in the very closest relation to the economic development."\(^6\)

In the second period as Chief Minister, (1956 - 1962) the emphasis in Williams' thinking shifts to different types of issues; however, his sentiments regarding conflict were very similar to those of the earlier period. For instance, during the late fifties his views on the preponderance of conflict in the political universe, remained for the most part unchanged. In 1959, there was evidence of his acknowledgements of the need to promote harmony in the light of attempts by world powers to foster a more harmonious relationship. He noted then that an adroit West Indian leader ..."looking at the history of the past with its isolation (deliberate) of one territory from its neighbours, looking to the history of the future, consciously seeks, with equal deliberation, to break down that isolation and to foster closer association."\(^7\)

\(^6\)Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, (1944), p. 211.

\(^7\)Williams, *Inward Hunger*, p. 270, citing his article printed in the *Nation* on November 20, 1959.
Nevertheless this reference to peaceful and harmonious existence was followed up by two statements which expressed his former belief. In 1960, he defined independence as it relates to interaction among states as follows:

Independence means first and foremost external relations, foreign policy. The broad outlines are already clear. The world is divided into two camps; the hot war will follow the cold.8

In the same vein he stated that, because conflict has been the norm rather than the exception in the Caribbean, independence must be strong.

Independence means the right the inalienable and indestructible right as in India, as in Ghana, to determine our own alignment in the international power struggle, even to the point of avoiding any attachment whatsoever.9

In a new dimension of our consideration of the nature of politics, insofar as opponents were concerned new enemies emerged. For example, opposition parties came to be regarded as reactionaries. His constant criticism of colonialism maintained its original form and he referred to the opposition as 'moral anarchists' and 'enemies of democracy'. He denounced it on the basis that, "it seeks to divide our inter-racial community and to substitute a new colonialism based on the aristocracy of the skin."10 The struggle for power is the major concern of the opposition, this insatiable greed is reactionary:

---


The challenger calls himself the D.L.P., but goes under many aliases and has no fixed abode. He stands for nothing in particular, he poses as the champion of Labour and the small farmer but worships at the shrine of Massa (colonialism and reaction).\(^{11}\)

Further, within his own party, Williams tends to view opposition in terms of conflict. On enemies within the party he noted that disloyalty stemmed from the influence of the Old World. Here he condemns the former governments which had been loyal to colonial powers.

Disloyalty to the P.N.M. is largely an importation from the Old World which we defeated in 1956. That Old World bequeathed to us the individualism, chicanery and downright inanity of its politics.\(^{12}\)

During the third period, when Eric Williams was Prime Minister, we are able to detect little change in his fundamental conceptions of the nature of politics. Political life was based on conflict between the haves and the have-nots. "The fight is shaping up between the developed countries of the world and developing or under-developed. People are involved as well as leaders."\(^{13}\) This trend of thought is characteristic of the entire period. In 1966 he noted that conflict and instability are the norms rather than the exception: "The 1966 General Elections came at a time of increasing instability and confusion in the larger world of which we are inescapably a part."\(^{14}\) The Caribbean

---


\(^{12}\) Eric Williams, Responsibilities of the Party Member, Fifth Annual Convention, September 30, 1960 (Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: P.N.M. Publishing Co., 1960), p. 3.


region was not exempted from manifestations of conflict. In 1969, he asserted that harmonious relations among Caribbean territories were hampered by extreme diversity. "Constitutional diversity is matched by an appalling degree of economic fragmentation totally absurd for so small an area." 15

No. 2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?

The effects of a change in role seems to be more apparent in Dr. Williams' "answers" to this question. As an intellectual with limited influence and no real political power, his statements were inclined towards pessimism. Writing in 1942 he strongly condemned foreign control of natural resources in the Caribbean. In keeping with his beliefs on independence and democracy for all peoples he viewed the new economic system, which followed the abolition of slavery, as being reactionary. "The old order is being imperceptibly restored. American corporations are increasing in number, size and influence." 16 As a whole, he condemns the West Indian governments' economic policies as being inimical to progress.

The despotism of 'King Sugar' in the islands is perpetuating another unhealthy feature of the slavery regime - a fatal dependence on monoculture a fatal concentration on a single crop. 17


While he does not foresee the alleviation of these problems in the immediate future, he does believe that in the long run a more equitable solution is possible.

The Negro must be given a more equitable share of the wealth he produces. The sugar industry and the land that goes with it can no longer continue to be the monopoly of a few absentee companies.\(^{18}\)

In January, 1956, we detect a change in Williams' pessimism at the very close of the first period, seven months before he became Chief Minister. Despite his views on conflict within the region he was quite optimistic about the proposed West Indian Federation. He believed that economic, social and political development would follow political unity. Such optimism is evident in his attempts to gain public support:

Think of that Ladies and Gentlemen, the richest lands in the West Indies still lying idle a monument to Colonial Office neglect. Only Federation can utilize those lands. Federation is a simple matter of common sense.\(^{19}\)

Speaking a few years after becoming Chief Minister in 1960, he perceived a new freedom stemming from the transfer of power from the European to the West Indian. "A new world is opening up before us. It is ours to make what we can of it. This freedom is what divides us irrevocably from the past."\(^{20}\) This optimistic trend is naturally maintained during his years of service as Prime Minister. As Head of State, Dr. Williams seems to be

\(^{18}\)Ibid., p. 45


\(^{20}\)Williams, Perspectives for the West Indies, 1960, p. 10.
more confident and optimistic in predicting both long-run and short-run success of policies which were based on his judgement. In 1970 he stated that "political independence is the highway to the achievement of economic independence, popular participation in the economy and cultural autonomy." It is necessary to note that, for the most part, one expects this type of optimistic declaration from a popular Head of State. By the same token, evidence of pessimism in his resignation speech might be expected given the circumstances in which it was presented. The resignation speech was delivered at the Fifteenth Annual Convention of P.N.M. and the decision to resign came as a surprise to party members. Having given no prior indication of his intentions, the Prime Minister openly admitted that his disillusionment with the party, government and existing political, social and economic conditions were the primary cause of his resignation. Thus by September 1973 his views on the achievement of Caribbean unity, for which he held such high expectations in 1956, were extremely pessimistic. He seemed to be saying that, in the long-run, the absence of loyalty and unity leads to disintegration.

It is now clear beyond any possibility of doubt that Caribbean integration will not be achieved in the foreseeable future and that the reality is continued Caribbean disunity and even perhaps the reaffirmation of colonialism. 22

Further in the same speech he stated:

Like it or not, we have to recognize that they are not all Israel which are of Israel. The situation is particularly depressing in the light of three major international economic problems that face the Caribbean today. (1) The Multinational Corporation, (2) Tourism, (3) Caribbean association with the European Economic Community. 23

No. 3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

Dr. Williams' principal answer to this question would probably be that the individual cannot always be sure of the direction of the future. While limitation in predicting the future may be good or bad, however, it is logical that those who do have some control over the present might be able to foresee the future.

In the first period, resigned to his limited power, his views on the future seem to transmit the pessimism evident in belief No. 2.

With humanity at the crossroads, there are, for the Caribbean as for the rest of the world, for the Negro as for the rest of mankind, only two alternatives, greater freedom or greater tyranny. 24

On becoming Chief Minister, despite the fact that the element

---


23 Ibid., p. 4.

of uncertainty continued to exist, he envisioned greater freedom in the long-run and thus expressed his views quite forcefully: "Our population will not be stopped on its march. We go forward. That is not in doubt anymore. The point is what we are going forward to." 25

Similar sentiments were expressed in period three. In The Chaguaramas Declaration, he asserted that revolutionary change can be expected.

Revolutionary change is not only demanded in the Caribbean today; it is also, in view of our past history an historical imperative necessary to confer real and meaningful power, self-discipline and self-determination upon those who have been historically dispossessed. 26

No. 4. How much 'control' or 'mastery' can one have over historical development? What is one's role in 'moving' and 'shaping' history in the desired direction?

Throughout his academic and political career, one of Dr. Williams' basic contention was that with dynamic political movements major goals can be achieved. His uncertainty about the predictability of the future was therefore countered by definite views on one's role in 'shaping' history. To him one of the major necessities for political success is a dynamic movement. The dynamic leader or movement hold the keys to success.

25 Williams, Perspectives for the West Indies, (1960), p. 10.

While there was not much to be seen in the islands in the way of concrete organization, it is unquestionable that the Garvey Movement in the United States exercised an extraordinary stimulating effect upon Negro race consciousness, among the poorer classes of the British West Indies.\(^{27}\)

Leadership therefore should be dynamic and forceful in voicing the demands of oppressed peoples,

What Juan Gualberto Gomez was to Cuba, Jose Celso Barbosa was to Puerto Rico, an eminent coloured middle class leader, voicing the aspirations not of his race but of his compatriots of all races in a period of transition and adjustment.\(^ {28}\)

He also stated that, Democratic measures are crucial and necessary for the survival of the state and the progress of the masses. "Any solution of the internal problem would be meaningless which continues to ignore the extension of full democratic privileges to the Negro."\(^ {29}\) He agrees with the philosophy that, the price of liberty is eternal vigilance and asserts that,

Only the extension of democratic rights and constitutions by which the masses can increasingly control their own destiny, promises to improve peacefully, conditions in the Caribbean.\(^ {30}\)

In 1955, being optimistic about the success of the party, he declared that he and his colleagues have the power to act for the benefits of the people. Generally speaking his statement implied that those who control or determine the destiny of a state should be guided by moral principles and should transmit

---


\(^{28}\) Ibid., p. 87.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., p. 99.

these principles to the people.

We believe that we can help (in the social and moral upliftment) and that the way to this is by the organization of a party such as I have described - a democratic party of men and women of honesty and incorruptibility etc. ... dedicated to its service appealing to the intelligence rather than the emotions of the electorate whose political education it places in the forefront of its activities.  

During the second period there was a deepening of the same philosophy.

We of the P.N.M. are the voice of the West Indian Independence. We are the writers of the New West Indian history. We are the future arbiters of our own destiny. We and we set out to be a living protest against colonialism and all its works, a living symbol of our announcement to the world that, notwithstanding our slave past, we too want a place in the sun, we too belong to the new political aspirations of the 20th century.  

The people are most important in shaping history. They should be psychologically as well as spiritually prepared for such participation.

The state of mind of our people must be taken into consideration. It is our right and our duty to ensure that as we seek to establish the material foundation of our society, we define our spiritual attitude, we reject outworn ideas, and we substitute new ones suited to our time and place.

In discussing leadership, his views were basically an extension of those postulated in the earlier period. For him, the leader must be extremely active and constantly aware of problems which face the people. The leaders of developing states should view


their people's problems as part of the larger world problem.

Speaking on the role of the leader Dr. Williams noted that:

He promotes and encourages all forms and manifestations of culture which, he consciously seeks to integrate into one harmonious whole; to weave into an orderly pattern the disparate strands of culture which constitute the West Indian.\(^{34}\)

In this period Democracy was again upheld as being the ultimate goal.

We of the P.N.M. cannot be neutral in that struggle (Latin America). We are for democracy and against dictatorship. Trinidad soil will not be used to uphold dictatorship and sabotage democracy, more than that, we shall give no asylum to the henchmen of the dictators.\(^{35}\)

Finally, in the third period, his belief in the mastery over historical development crystalizes as follows: A relevant ideology must arise from the specific historical experience of a people under specific conditions.

The future way forward for the peoples of the Caribbean must be one which would impel them to start making their own history, to be the subjects rather than the objects of history, to stop being the playthings of other people. In this respect, the Caribbean has so far been the 'outsider' in the New World.\(^{36}\)

No. 5. What is the role of 'chance' in human affairs and in historical development.

Although most of Dr. Williams' writings are based on the history of the Caribbean, the researcher has not found evidence to determine what his convictions are on the role of chance. It should be noted however, that his strong emphasis on leadership and the role of the leader suggest that to him chance is not essential to the Caribbean leader.

\(^{34}\) Williams, Inward Hunger (1960), p. 270.
\(^{35}\) Williams, Perspectives for the West Indies (1960), p. 15.
INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS:

The instrumental beliefs have been classified as the individual's means-ends-conceptions concerning political action. In essence, this section of the Operational Code is of crucial importance to decision-making studies and questions related to the rationality or irrationality of a leader's decisions. To some extent, the instrumental beliefs are essentially an extension of one's philosophical beliefs on the nature of politics. In this respect, they can assist in illustrating the intensity and strength of the individual's political ethos. Like the foregoing philosophical beliefs, Dr. Williams' statements made on means-ends analysis reveal minor but not fundamental change between 1939 and 1973.

INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS:

No. 1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

Answers to this question are based on Dr. Williams' conviction that a dynamic political movement underlined by principles of democracy is an essential feature in the development of a crown-colony or a nation-state. Williams reiterates time and again the need for political leadership communicating with the mass. In keeping with this belief, he has implied that in selecting goals or objectives for political action, the following factors are of prime importance. First, that Government officials should be prepared to be honest and loyal to the people. Morality should

not be subordinated to political expediency. Attempts should be made to avoid destructive mistakes. A high degree of party discipline may prove a valuable weapon against the enemy.

Stressing the vital role which the party must play in political development, he emphasises its obligation to educate the people. Toward the end of the first period he stressed this point: "The very foundation of the party is that it must be dedicated to the satisfaction of the principal need of today—the political education of the people". 38

The principal objective of the new party must therefore be at all times the dissemination of knowledge and of facts among the people to enable them to draw their own conclusions. Whatever conclusions the party itself draws can then be tested by the people themselves. 39

Discipline weeds out enemies and can provide a protective force against them. The three directions for discipline are as follows:

1) Refusal by the party's executives to admit anyone who, in its opinion, is not likely to abide by its decisions or whose past record is regarded as compromising to the party's reputation for honesty and ideals.

2) The expulsion of any member whose conduct has been contrary to the interest of the party or to its programme policy or principles.

3) A clear prohibition by the party of any indulgence by its candidates in personal abuse and in election campaigns. 40

In warning against destructive mistakes he also advocated the avoidance of unnecessary extremism against colonialists. In

---

39 Ibid., p. 13.
40 Ibid., p. 17.
1942 he noted that,

If Haiti is a standing example of how the Negro can be driven to desperation, it is also the standing example of how a successful political revolution can be frustrated in some of its potentialities for progress by conservative economic practices.41

Referring to policies concerning colonialism, he stated:

Problems of hemisphere defence are mutual, not unilateral, and the islands need defence not only against Hitler but also against starvation and excruciating poverty.42

This statement implied that a compromise should be reached between the great powers and crown colonies. Insofar as regional politics was concerned he suggested closer unity among the peoples of the Caribbean as the first step towards conquering regional problems.

Burdened by the same curse, sugar, the dynamics of the different areas are the same, and it is time to pay more heed to the fundamental identities than to the incidental differences.43

As the country approached independence in the second period he maintained the view that the leader or party should be loyal and honest in dealing with the public. In 1960 he outlined his personal intentions as follows:

a) I am participating in no deals whatsoever.

b) I shall take every step that I consider necessary to make rackets and intrigues public.

There is one and only one political loyalty I have - the loyalty to the P.N.M., and through the P.N.M. to the people of the West Indies, and to humanity in general.

There is one and only one political method I know of - the education of the people.44

42 Ibid., p. 107-108.
43 Ibid., p. 104.
By the same token, he would argue that political goals must be based on the loyalty of the people to their party.

You are a traitor to your party if you seek to use the P.N.M. for your personal gain. Party democracy means the fullest opportunity for expression of your views on the policy when it is to be considered, and on implementation and details of that policy, which, once a decision is arrived at by the majority vote, must be supported and carried out by all.\(^{45}\)

Political expediency might not always be immoral. Speaking in 1960 he supported this view.

This is neither rhetoric nor political expediency, though even if it were either or both, there is nothing for me or for you to be ashamed of. What is important is that our perspectives of interracial solidarity be translated into practical terms.\(^{46}\)

With the prospects of Caribbean unity considerably lessened after the dissolution of the West Indian Federation Dr. Williams assumed a new attitude on this subject. It can be said that his expressions displayed relief rather than disappointment in the failure.

I consider the breakdown of Federation an absolute blessing in disguise. We can get away from all this wrangling, all these difficulties we have had with people who were talking the metropolitan language of Colonialism of 1876.\(^{47}\)

Perhaps in keeping with his main contention that freedom and democracy should be the principle guidelines of Caribbean society, he was prepared to concentrate less on attempting to foster a Caribbean unity which might not develop along these lines.

\(^{45}\) Williams, Responsibilities of the Party Member, (1960), p. 2.

\(^{46}\) Williams, Perspectives for the West Indies, (1960), p. 17.

The general ideas projected in period one have remained unchanged in period three. This abiding belief in the utility of political communication and political parties, and an emphasis on morality in public affairs were frequently reiterated. Caution and deliberate attempts to avoid serious mistakes are still considered significant when selecting political goals or objectives. It is also important that panic should be controlled in a small society. In assessing the Communist threat posed by the Afro-Asian, Latin-American People's solidarity Conference held in Havana he stated:

The situation calls for sober men and sober measures. We have kept watch on our local subversive elements known or suspected to be tainted with Castroist influence without impairing our democratic institutions and practices.

As Prime Minister of an independent state he urged that the new society place greater emphasis on self-reliance and personal and group initiative. While he maintained a cautious attitude in dealing with foreign powers, he was prepared to act in the better interest of the state even if his methods could be misconstrued as being extremist or radical.

Expediency is most important in economic matters and it supercedes ideology. We must not await the word of the big power in order to advance our interest. Some have opposed our new relations on the ground that Cuba is a Communist country. But if that did not prevent President Nixon from initiating new arrangements with Communist China, why should it prevent us from bringing Cuba into a regional trade arrangement?

48 Williams, Review of the Political Scene, (1966), p. 5.
No. 2. How are the goals of action pursued more effectively?

In answering this question Dr. Williams, like many other political leaders, would suggest that one should strive to be rational and realistic. More specifically, he reasserts the general premise that people support government when they have been educated in the ways of democracy, and when they believe that government is acting in their best interest. Because public support is indispensable for the effective pursuit of goals, there must be confidence and strength within the party in order to gain widespread support.

In period one as an intellectual, he explained the purpose of political education as follows:

By political education we mean that every step taken by the party must be a step calculated not only to do something in the interest of the people but rather designed to get the people to do things for themselves and to think for themselves.\footnote{Political education is a democratic technique enhanced by the party's overall demonstration of honesty and morality.}

The party is of the opinion that every legislator, every minister, every councillor ... must be required by law to divulge annually all sources of his income. It must convince the people that public office is not sought for personal gain.\footnote{Williams, The Case for Party Politics in Trinidad and Tobago, (1955) p. 12.}

\footnote{Ibid., p. 13.}
Subsequently as Chief Minister and leader of a popular party he maintained the conviction that "great ideas must be placed before the people and great efforts demanded of them".\(^{53}\)

Here, the main question was how does one rationalize conflict to the people. To this end he has placed West Indian struggles within the framework of international conflicts. His basic intention was to demonstrate that in keeping with views expressed in Philosophical Belief 1, conflict is universal and that firm measures and self confidence are justifiable.

We must negotiate ourselves. You can't have a British Ambassador in Caracas negotiating for a fisherman in Cedros. He knows nothing about it at all and if we need self-government, we must learn to negotiate it ourselves.\(^{54}\)

In resisting military imperialism we are not alone. We are not the only country with an American Base ... Our former colonial colleagues (India, Ceylon and Venezuela) now emerged into the full flavour of independence will stand with us.\(^{55}\)

In accordance with earlier views on political opponents (Philosophical Belief 1), he is extremely firm in discussing methods of dealing with enemies. Party members are advised to "attack the enemy everywhere, top, bottom and in the middle ... attack every pernicious Guardian story or editorial."\(^{56}\) The party should make


the most of a situation in which the enemy is defeated.

We have so solidified the confidence reposed in us by the mass movement that we have survived motions of no confidence ad infinitum, parrot cries of resign, and the monotonous malevolence of the Guardian. And thus it is that we are here tonight, in Party Convention with the enemy in disorderly rout vainly trying to reform its ranks for election purposes only. 57

Having defeated the enemy, continued unity is important in limiting threats to security. Again here, his methods coincide with his views on party discipline.

As Political Leader of the Party, I say categorically that no sky-larking can be tolerated, no sabotage, no backsliding, no disharmony, no dishonesty, no intrigue. What I gave you as an appeal at our Fourth Convention last March, I give you as an order at this Fifth Convention.

CLOSE RANKS. 58

In period three (1962 - 1973) the beliefs are essentially the same as the earlier periods. For instance, Williams maintained that a rational outlook was the oasis of stability when he stated "Let us all keep cool heads and look rationally at our position in a troubled and disordered world." 59 There are, however, indications of a changed attitude in approaching certain problems. First of all the researcher has not found evidence of explicit or overt instructions on how to deal with public enemies during the seventies. This absence of direct instruction varies from the first and second periods. As Prime Minister he approached

---

57bid., p. 2.
58bid.,
social upheavals more from a factual point of view than an emotional one. Also in 1973 he urged that the executive be given more privacy.

I believe that in seeking to avoid the abuse of power by the executive we should not fall into the equally dangerous error of reducing the effectiveness of the executive ... Two of my own greatest blunders as Prime Minister involved the grant of permission for the publication for public comment of two major pieces of Legislation before Cabinet scrutiny ... and they would never have received the endorsement of the Cabinet. 60

Thus the inclination towards direct democracy and popular participation, which were characteristic of the first and second periods have been cast aside in favour of improved cabinet-executive relations and extended breathing space for those in power.

No. 3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

As stated in the research design (Chapter II) instrumental beliefs 2, 3 and 4 are closely interrelated. In keeping with the main points cited in Instrumental beliefs I and II, the central answer to this question would be that, if the party and the public are working towards the same goals, and the choice of alternatives is made in the most democratic way possible, then concern over the risks of political action would only apply to one's dealing with opponents. In other words mutual interests and understanding creates unity over political conflict at least insofar as Eric

60 Williams, P.N.M. Fifteenth Annual Convention, (1973) p. 21.
Williams is concerned. In dealing with enemies the most plausible approach, according to Williams, would be to emphasize the strength and potential of the enemy and thus maximize internal unity and limit threats.

There is some modification of Dr. Williams' tactics in approaching the enemy in period three. In period one where uncertainty still existed over his obtaining power he rationalized party activity (which was severely criticized in various powerful circles namely, the Roman Catholic hierarchy, the press and Government officials), as being too well entrenched to be intimidated.

We shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this university (Woodford Square) were closed, then our colleges in the various parts of Trinidad and Tobago would carry on the struggle for the right to think and express our views. 61

Thus by constantly referring to the party's strength in the face of pressure from the opposition, one is able to buy additional time for further action. In confronting such foreign opponents as the Colonial office, again the strength of public opinion is emphasized.

We too have many divisions ... those invincible divisions that parliamentary democracy gives to us massed in their thousands in the University of Woodford Square etc. It is the force of public opinion that counts and P.N.M. not the colonial office has public opinion behind it. 62


Dr. Williams' reply to suggestions made in 1969 on breaking the British tradition and turning the State into a republic suggests a more moderate outlook towards matters concerning a long time enemy i.e., the British Government. Here he seems to be more restrained and less inclined to perpetuate confrontation with the enemy while acknowledging that the idea of a republican government is preferable, he opts for one more similar to the Indian political system than to a Latin American State.

But we should be careful not to excite apprehensions which are not necessary and not to create enemies where there is no need to create them. My own personal feeling is that the minimum break with our tradition should be encouraged.63

This change in 1970 might be attributed to the fact that he considered the British Government to be less of an enemy once independence had been achieved.

No. 4. What is the best timing of action to advance one's interests?

From the data examined specific answers to this question were few. It might be suggested, however, that in keeping with inferences drawn concerning calculation and control of risks, Dr. Williams would perhaps approach this problem as follows. The best timing of action to advance one's interest would be whenever the opportunity presents itself. Using popular philosophical expressions he stated in 1963 that politics was the continuation of education by other means. Later on he adopted the posture that "Politics

is the art of the possible. New circumstances constantly arise posing new challenges demanding new emphasis requiring adjustment." Furthermore because change occurs constantly in every political system the future remains uncertain, yet the system is flexible enough to absorb most changes.

A set of guiding principles on which national life is based is not a fixed guide, valid forever. These principles must themselves evolve in accordance with changes in objective circumstances and with changes in the people's consciousness and perception.\(^{65}\)

No. 5. **What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?**

In order to build a vibrant political system, self-government must be first obtained. This general premise advocated by Dr. Williams throughout the three periods is the key to understanding his position. First, he emphasizes the necessity of achieving real political power. He suggests that people can be aggressive over matters of their defence.\(^{66}\) Hence power is vital in the struggle against colonialists. While marshalling public support in a bid for political power, he does not ignore the benefits of negotiations with the same enemy.

Finally, from some of the statements made in answers to other questions it is evident that he seeks to unify his party not only by indicating and emphasizing its strength but also by inferring that if such strength is not maintained, dissolution becomes highly probable.


\(^{65}\)Ibid., p. 15.

\(^{66}\)Williams, From Slavery to Chaguaramas, (1959) p. 37.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

Generally speaking, the major hypothesis of this study was that the beliefs (values and attitudes) of political leaders are susceptible to change and that this change may be precipitated by a change in role requirements. In order to test this hypothesis the beliefs of Dr. Eric Williams were organized and analysed by employing the operational code approach to political leadership. From an analytical perspective the belief categories of the code have yielded valuable information on individual 'conceptions of politics and political strategy'.

Before discussing changes in the subject's belief system certain observations can be made concerning the usefulness and applicability of the question categories comprising the operational code. As these findings illustrate, some questions have only been partially answered. This may be attributed to the fact that there is some overlap in the question categories (i.e., the categories are not always mutually exclusive).

Unlike most of the other studies utilizing the operational code, which dealt with political actors of leading nation states, this paper focuses on the political beliefs of an individual who, as Head of a developing state is subject to a different set of external demands and a society with a population at a different level of political maturity. Thus the degree to which the operational code of Dr. Williams differs from other
leaders stated (e.g., John Foster, Dulles and Dean Acheson) may be a result of the different political environment in which he functions. Until more research is done on leaders of developing countries, we simply cannot answer this question.

In spite of these conceptual and idiosyncratic limitations, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that some change in Dr. Williams' beliefs did occur with changes in role. The fundamental question here is, how significant and formidable was this change? Some might argue that from all outward appearances the researcher has described a developmental sequence of beliefs with beliefs manifest of the intellectual role reiterated in a more sophisticated and rhetorical manner later on. This assessment is not too far from the mark with regard to a number of beliefs. However, although the manifestations of change are partial some do appear significant and related to a change in role.

The contents of Table 1 summarizes Dr. Williams' beliefs in general as well as changes in those beliefs which seem to be associated with corresponding changes in role (between 1939 and 1973).

The development of most beliefs from the role of the intellectual to Chief Minister and later Prime Minister, indicates a change in the expressive style of Dr. Williams. This might be attributed to intellectual maturity, however, it might also be the result of maturity reinforced by power and influence which have been transmitted in accordance with leadership roles. It
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrumental Beliefs</th>
<th>Philosophical Beliefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Optimism</td>
<td>1. Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Optimism</td>
<td>2. Optimism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Non-Predictable</td>
<td>3. Optimism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Control of Historical Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Non-Predictable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Chief Minister</th>
<th>Intellectual Period I</th>
<th>Period II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
is evident that changes in political attitudes occurred only in some categories of the belief system, or in some dimensions, of the "operational code". In summarizing these findings the writer will begin by discussing the areas in which no change occurred and then turn to those beliefs in which change was detected.

Focusing on the philosophical beliefs first, it might be noted that throughout the three role positions as Intellectual, Chief Minister and Prime Minister, Dr. Williams' statements indicated that he considers the political universe to be essentially one of conflict. Although as Chief Minister Dr. Williams acknowledged the efforts of world powers to create a more harmonious relationship among all states, his fundamental sentiments regarding conflict remain essentially unchanged.

Similar evidence of belief consistency in relation to role is discernable in Dr. Williams' view concerning an individual's control or mastery over historical development. As an academic and a politician he seemed firmly convinced that when a dynamic leader has the support of a majority of the people along with party solidarity, he holds ample power to control the direction of history.

Insofar as the subjects' means-ends capabilities were concerned there was no change in his beliefs regarding the best approach for the selection of goals or objectives for political action. During the three periods Dr. Williams reasserted the view that the political elite, through dedication and constant communication with the people, should strive to discover and
comprehend the needs of the society.

On the question of the utility and role of different means to achieve ends we also detect a consistent trend. In this case stress was placed on methods which were related to other beliefs. For Williams' dynamic leadership, party solidarity and public support were some of the vehicles through which major goals could be achieved.

Second, indications of change in instrumental beliefs are manifested in Dr. Williams' statements on the calculation and control of the risks of political action. As illustrated in Table 1, during the first period, when he was an intellectual, Eric Williams went to considerable length to explain the unavoidability of adventurous action in dealing with both domestic and foreign opponents. On becoming Prime Minister, however, he assumed a more moderate posture on the practicality of constantly pursuing the enemy, especially in the case of the British Government.

Substantial change was also evident in Dr. Williams' beliefs concerning the best strategy for the pursuit of goals of action. Statements expressed in the first and second periods suggested that, in terms of strategy, at least, he was convinced that people should participate as much as possible in decision-making; hence his emphasis on constant elite-mass communication. As Prime Minister, however, Dr. Williams openly advocated a revision of this policy in favour of more executive freedom.

Turning to changes in Dr. Williams' philosophical beliefs we find that the subject's views on the predictability of the
future do indeed vary with his role. As an intellectual he believed that the destiny of the West Indies was unpredictable. On becoming Chief Minister and later Prime Minister, he made more definite statements on the future of the Caribbean. Thus, this shift to a more active and powerful political role is associated with a reversal of his earlier sentiments.

Eric Williams' views on the prospects for the eventual realization of fundamental values and aspirations likewise vary with role. During the first period, in addition to his belief that the future was unpredictable, he harboured extremely pessimistic views on the realization of his fundamental values. These views do not change until the very end of the period around 1955-1956. As his role changed the tone and manner of his expressions became increasingly optimistic. This optimistic trend continued throughout the second period (1956-1962) and into a major portion of the third period. By September 28, 1973 (at the time of his resignation) we once more detect evidence of increasing pessimism. One can surmise from these sentiments that Dr. Williams' beliefs were directly related to his self-perceived role and confidence. By 1973, after seventeen (17) years as Head of State, and with the benefit of hindsight to re-examine experiences, goals and objectives, it seems likely that a leader might be pessimistic and disillusioned over his failures.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:


Ryan, Selwyn D. *Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago: A Study of decolonization in a multiracial society*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972.

**Articles:**


Period I. 1939 - September 1956

A. Books


B. Speeches

*The Development of Negro Education from 1865 to the Present.* 1946. Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: Trinidad Public Library, n.p., 1946.


A. Books

History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago. Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: P.N.M. Publishing Co. Ltd., 1962.

B. Speeches


Message to the Youth of The Nation. August 30, 1962. Issued by Public Relations Division, Office of the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, 1962.


A. Books


B. Speeches


VITA AUCTORIS

FAMILY: Kathleen Weekes, daughter of Mr. Albert Weekes.

EDUCATION: Primary and Secondary education received in Trinidad and Tobago, West Indies.

Received a Bachelor of Arts Degree from Lakehead University, Thunderbay, Ontario, in 1972.

Admitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Windsor, 1972 - 73, for a Master of Arts Degree.