An examination of the moralities of athletics and play.

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AN EXAMINATION OF THE MORALITIES OF ATHLETICS AND PLAY

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies through the Faculty of Physical and Health Education in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of Master of Physical Education at the University of Windsor

by

Terence John Roberts
B.P.H.E., University of Windsor, 1971.

Windsor, Ontario, Canada
1973
ABSTRACT

University of Windsor

ROBERTS, TERENCE JOHN

An Examination of the Morals of Athletics and Play

Masters in Physical Education, University of Windsor, 1973, pp. 233 (P. J. Galasso)

Athletics and play have been characterized definitionally, organizationally, psychologically, sociologically and historically, but as yet, little work has been devoted to an examination of these concepts and activities from a moral point of view. The problem is to examine the moralities of athletics and play.

Chapter I (Introduction) states the problem; defines the terms: "morality," "belief," "play," and "athletics;" elaborates on the definitions of athletics and play; states the methodology; and describes the organization of the remainder of the thesis.

Chapter II (Review of Literature) describes much of the literature related to the accepted definitions of play and athletics, and works dealing with the moralities of athletics and play, either explicitly or implicitly. The latter works are divided into five sections: works supporting character development; works supporting character development in principle only; works analyzing the structure of games as it relates to moral development;
works describing the negative aspects of sport in relation to morality; and other important works unable to be grouped in the preceding sections.

Chapter III. (An Examination of the Moralities of Athletics and Play) analyzes the beliefs about the nature of man, the beliefs about ideals worth pursuing for their own sake, the rules laying down what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, and the motives for either rule-following or rule-breaking in each of the activities of athletics and play.

Chapter IV (Implications and Recommendations for Future Examination) illustrates some of the implications arising out of the examination of the two moralities. As with many philosophical works, more questions are raised than are answered, and, as a result, chapter four points out a number of important problems in need of further examination.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

With sincere respect and gratitude, I acknowledge the inspiration and wise counsel of Dr. P. J. Galasso, Dean, Faculty of Physical and Health Education, who has served as major advisor and committee chairman of this thesis. Without his continued insight and personal support, the work would have been shallow and much less enjoyable.

For their considerable time, effort and involvement, even during their summer months, much appreciation is also extended to the other members of the committee: Dr. Richard J. Moriarty, Faculty of Physical and Health Education, and Dr. Stanley B. Cunningham, Department of Philosophy.

I dedicate this work to Mary, my friend and my love.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Athletics and play have been characterized definitionally, organizationally, psychologically, sociologically and historically, but, as yet, little work has been devoted to an examination of these concepts and activities from a moral point of view. Although many works have discussed the evils and benefits of athletics and play, much of the literature, to be subsequently reviewed, can be accused of "moralizing." As that term implies, they have been written to promote the moral benefits of one over the other, often at the expense of objectivity and clarity.

In the recent popular literature there has been an abundance of material devoted to the exposure of all that is bad and wrong, respectively, in the ends and means of athletics. These works, to be subsequently reviewed, have had a high degree of "shock value;" their irreverence for the "sporting world" has stirred all but the most steadfast out of the complacent "principles and objectives" belief that all is good and right in athletics.

The "principles" texts and the popular literature appear to be at odds and appear to be antithetical. One who attempts to read and understand both viewpoints may place himself in a quandary. Who is correct? Are they both correct?
Are they both incorrect? Is it even intelligible to speak of correctness or incorrectness in reference to this problem? Both viewpoints have been persuasive; that is their only similarity. Upon reading the literature in support of either of these standpoints, a realization develops that both sides have a definite opinion to put forth, and that they may be somewhat biased in the pictures that they paint. Neither approach assumes a position of disinterest.

This conflict over values could precipitate a healthy development however, if it is handled in a rational manner. This necessitates objective philosophical reflection and analysis rather than mere persuasion and acceptance. The fact that athletics and play are currently undergoing their respective moral criticism and adulation in the literature does not necessarily illustrate a heightened awareness or respect for moral inquiry. It may simply and unfortunately mean that a new set of moral ends and principles, perhaps just as inappropriate, are being hastily avowed and grasped as a result of marked disappointment with the old.

It seems that new values, espoused by those who have discredited the old, are being hastily accepted in place of the traditionally popular values of excellence and competition. Although it presently may appear difficult to discredit the newly expressed values of play - freedom, humanity and co-operation - one must remember that once excellence and competition were in high esteem and still
are in some circles. While at this transitory point of instability, one must be careful not to be unreflective and run like the rebounding lover to a seemingly comforting embrace with a new and different life-style. The new life, after initial enchantment, may prove to be as uncomfortably irritating as the one past. What is needed instead is a more rational, analytical, philosophical understanding; an awareness of the good and the bad, the right and the wrong, not only in what one wishes to discredit and cast aside, but also in that which one wishes to embrace.

It is true that we may be in a dilemma, not quite knowing what to accept, but before we again suffer the disappointing, and perhaps needless, results of trial and error, let us attempt to precipitate our moral prescriptions with philosophical understanding. Hopefully the present thesis will provide another small step in that direction.

A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The problem is to examine the moralities of athletics and play.

B. DEFINITION OF TERMS

Morality

A morality...contains

(1) beliefs about the nature of man;

(2) beliefs about ideals, about what is good or desirable as worthy of pursuit for its own sake;
(3) rules laying down what ought to be done and what ought not to be done; and
(4) motives that incline us to choose the right or the wrong course.¹

Belief

In Anthony Quinton's account of "Knowledge and Belief," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, he states:

Most philosophers who have in any way adverted to the nature of belief have assumed that belief is an inner state of mind directly accessible to introspection and distinct from, though causally related to, the believer's behaviour.²

Although Quinton's account of the inner nature of belief is useful, it is wise, for the present purposes, to avoid the notion of causality between belief and action, and all the intricate philosophical difficulties associated with it. Instead, it will simply be held that there seems to be a connection between belief and action such that belief can be used to help explain action. Jarvis states:

Many contemporary philosophers are concerned with the relation between thought and action, whether thought can be said to 'cause' action, or merely to give reasons for it....I certainly do not believe that thought 'causes' action, since causes are specific, whereas to any thought there would seem to correspond an infinite set of possible implementations in action....I would rather speak of people

¹Patrick H. Nowell-Smith, "Religion and Morality," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, VII, 150.

²Anthony Quinton, "Knowledge and Belief," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, IV, 351.
Play

Human play is understood as large muscle physical activity between or among two or more persons. It is engaged in for the purpose of attaining the fun and pleasure contained within the activity itself. It is a free activity, related to no external material or non-material interests, and although it can be completely engrossing, it is set apart somewhat from the other and (perhaps) more serious concerns of daily life. It occurs within the guidelines of rules, but yet it is still characterized by numerous opportunities for the occurrence of joviality, imagination, spontaneity and self-expression.

Athletics

Athletics is understood as that type of large muscle physical activity between two or more persons. Its purpose is the pursuit of victory. That purpose is accompanied by some or all of the complementary characteristics of: competition; highly codified rules; officials; a high level of organization reflected in the form of strict schedules and published won-lost records; governing bodies and special "disciplinary" sub-committees; a material interest in the outcome; prestige; honour; a spirit of dedication, sacrifice and intensity; preparedness; the pursuit of excellence.

ritual; and the presence of non-participating persons, some of whom are: men in the media, coaches, managers, trainers, statisticians, administrators, commissioners, cheer leaders, mascots and fans.

C. AN ELABORATION OF THE DEFINITIONS OF ATHLETICS AND PLAY

Athletics and play, as herein defined, are understood to be on two ends of the "sport" continuum; the one end is "play-sport," the other, "athletic-sport." The activity between the two extremes is characterized by a combination of both athletic and play qualities; the dominance of one or the other depends on the proximity of the activity to either of the extremes. Theoretically, that activity halfway between the two ends has equal proportions of athletic and play characteristics. Games, by virtue of their rules, are the structure of the various activities, and because every game can be participated in in either a play-like or an athletic-like manner, games pervade the entire length of the continuum.

The understanding of athletics, as it has been stated, appears to be more of an extensive list of characteristics rather than a concise and definitive understanding. Nevertheless, it does offer an understanding of the endeavour that the term refers to. The emphasis of the stated conception of athletics is placed on its purpose - the pursuit of victory. The other characteristics listed are
complements: they add to, or increase, the importance of victory. It is implicit in such an understanding, then, that as more of these complements are added, the emphasis on victory is heightened; as more are taken away, the emphasis on victory is lessened. Theoretically, however, the determination of whether the activity is athletics or not, does not depend on either the presence or absence of these complementary characteristics; if the overriding purpose of the activity is to win the contest, then it is athletics. It is only when that purpose is mitigated by other purposes, such as the fun and pleasure-seeking of play, that the activity is partially athletic-like and partially play-like.

This understanding of athletics and play and their relationship has a number of limitations. First of all, it is a conceptual or theoretical understanding and it is not very useful in the actual determination of whether a particular activity is either athletics or play by simply looking at it. Second, it could be criticized for not providing an understanding of what could be called "pure" athletics or play. If the overriding purpose of a little league baseball team is to pursue victory, then it is an athletic team. Yet it does not seem to have the same penchant for victory that characterizes a professional baseball team. The question is asked: "Compared to the little league activity, is the professional athletic team engaged
in "pure" athletics?" It is a question that cannot here be answered. It is inappropriate to think of athletics as pure or impure. Was the second world war a "pure" war in comparison to the war of 1812? It is true that it may have had more war-like qualities, and that more soldiers were killed, but the war of 1812 was still a war, and not an impure one. If a little league activity is characterized by an overriding concern for victory, then the activity is athletics. The difference between it and the professional team is that it does not have as many of the accompanying characteristics which complement that pursuit of victory.

Although the analysis is mainly placing its emphasis on the activities at the two ends of the continuum, it sometimes makes references and applications to activities which would be placed somewhere between the extremes.

D. THE USE OF SELECTED PHILOSOPHERS

Because of their appropriateness to the concepts and activities of athletics and play, the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill, and the "politico-moral" philosophy of Thomas Hobbes shall be used where appropriate in the analysis to provide more depth and insight. The analysis will also occur within the context of related, contemporary, philosophy of sport literature.

E. METHODOLOGY

The examination of the moralities of athletics and
play occurs in Chapter Three. Both of the moralities will be analyzed as they respectively relate to each of the four consecutive elements of morality, as outlined in the accepted definition of that term. Relationships and connections among the four elements of morality within each of the moralities of athletics and play are explicitly and implicitly dealt with. Hobbes, Mill, and contemporary sport philosophers will be referred to where they provide additional light and insight.

F. ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE THESIS

Chapter Two, the related literature, will illustrate and discuss literature related to the definitions of athletics and play and literature dealing with the moralities of athletics and play.

Chapter Three has been discussed in the methodology section of Chapter One.

Chapter Four, the implications and recommendations for future examination, suggests implications and questions still in need of answering in light of the analysis occurring in chapter three.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The review of literature occurs in three sections: A) works related to the definition of play; B) works related to the definition of athletics; and C) works related to the moralities of athletics and play. The magnitude of the literature precludes an exhaustive review; it is selective. Within each of the sections, works are generally related in chronological order.

A. WORKS RELATED TO THE DEFINITION OF PLAY

Much has been written on the various functions of play relating to education and development; little has been written of it as a concept. Regardless of their particular interest or concern, however, most authors do have within their works an implicit understanding or definition of the term "play." These have not been explicit definitional efforts, and, on that account, a distillation of the implied meanings is not made. The only works herein reviewed are those attempts to explicitly define or understand play as a concept.

Human play is understood as being large muscle physical activity between or among two or more persons.
It is engaged in for the purpose of attaining the fun and pleasure contained within the activity itself. It is a free activity, related to no external material or non-material interests, and, although it can be completely engrossing, it is set apart somewhat from the other and (perhaps) more serious concerns of daily life. It occurs within the guidelines of rules, but yet, it is still characterized by numerous opportunities for the occurrence of joviality, imagination, spontaneity and self-expression.

The above understanding of play is a combination of the definitions offered by Johan Huizinga in *Homo Ludens*,¹ and Sapora and Mitchell in *The Theory of Play and Recreation*.² Before they are discussed, it is necessary to focus on the classical, and traditional understandings of play.

Although, as it was just stated, there is no attempt made to distill implied definitions from writings, the traditional physiological and psychological works, if not through accurate perception, by their sheer number and repetition, have had, over time, a substantial influence on various understandings of play.

"Play,..." Giddens illustrates, in a work devoted


to a conceptual look at play and leisure, "...has been studied by two main groups of writers." 3 Giddens writes of how nineteenth century philosophers and theorists of education speculated about the nature and biological origins of play and their relation to the education process. Frequent comparisons were made between the play of man and animals. The second approach Giddens describes as more empirical; being stimulated by the speculative notions of the former group, the intent was to carry out psychological studies of child's play.

Huizinga viewed these speculative theories and empirical studies as "...only partial solutions to the problem." 4 He emphasizes that they overlap and that it "...would be perfectly possible to accept nearly all of the explanations without getting into any real confusion of thought..." 5 and, even more seriously, "...without coming much nearer to a real understanding of the play concept." 6 An illustration of the truth of both Giddens' and Huizinga's comments is found in the following lengthy.

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4 Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p. 2.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
but by no means complete, list of various explanations of play.

Schiller: The aimless expenditure of exuberant energy.

Guts Muths: The natural exercise and recreation of body and mind.

Froebel: The natural unfolding of the germinal leaves of childhood.

Lazarus: Play is activity which is in itself free, aimless, amusing, or diverting.

Hall: The motor habits and spirit of the past persisting in the present.

Groos: Instinctive practice, without serious intent, of activities that will later be essential to life.

Lee: Instinctive activity, looking toward an ideal.

Dewey: Activities not consciously performed for the sake of any result beyond themselves.

Gulick: What we do because we want to do it.

Stern: Play is voluntary, self-sufficient activity.

Patrick: Those human activities which are free and spontaneous and which are pursued for their own sake alone. Interest in them is self-sustaining, and they are not continued under any internal or external compulsion.

Rainwater: Play is a mode of behavior, either individual or collective, involving pleasurable activity of any kind, not undertaken for the sake of a reward beyond itself.
and performed during any age period of the individual.

Curti: Highly motivated activity which, as free from conflicts, is usually, though not always, pleasurable.

Pangburn: Activity carried on for its own sake.

Dulles: An instinctive form of self-expression and emotional escape valve.

Slavson: Play and recreation...are leisure-time activities...motivated by pleasure and serve as diversions from the more pressing and serious occupations of daily living.

Nash: Any act other than such survival activities as eating and sleeping which carries its own drive or any act in which an individual enters of his own volition, without feeling, in any way, outer compulsion.

Dictionary of Education: Any pleasurable activity carried on for its own sake, without reference to ulterior purpose or future satisfactions.

Mitchell: Play is self-expression for its own sake.

Huizinga: Play is more than a mere physiological phenomenon or a psychological reflex....It is a significant function - that is to say there is some sense to it. In play there is something "at play" which transcends the immediate needs of life and imparts meaning to the action.

Piaget: Play is a symbolical manifestation... it is a sensory-motor exercise, regulated and essentially social, and symbolic - especially with infants after the second year. 7

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Because it is unnecessary for the purposes of the present investigation to delve into why play happens, physiologically or psychologically, these classical, speculative and empirical works need no further attention. For additional surveys, summaries and critiques of the above and more contemporary scientifically-veined theories of play, however, refer to Ellis, Gilmore, Mitchell and Mason, and Vanderzwaag.

The accepted definition of play is dependent upon the letter and spirit of Johan Huizinga's understanding of the concept. After a comprehensive description of its characteristics, Huizinga more concisely establishes his well-known definition:

Summing up the formal characteristics of play, we might call it a free activity standing quite consciously outside "ordinary" life as being "not serious," but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly. It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner.


Although not contained in that definition, but yet integral to his and the present investigation's understanding, Huizinga earlier states that it is the "...fun-element that characterizes the essence of play." 13

Sapora and Mitchell, in The Theory of Play and Recreation, have also contributed to the understanding of play as it is accepted by the present thesis. Although they do not succinctly define the term, they do list quite a number of its characteristics, some of which have been incorporated. Sapora and Mitchell emphasize that play is activity, as contrasting with idleness; that it can be characterized by neuromuscular, sensory or mental activity; that its educational use depends on its power to interest and arouse; that it is the attitude of the participant that determines whether an activity is playful; and that the attitude is generally a satisfaction with the activity itself, as opposed to an interest in an external result. 14

Sapora and Mitchell go further to illustrate that to have play instead of work or drudgery there must be no serious consequences; defeat can mean no vital or enduring setback; there must be the opportunity of frequent success, especially in the acquisition of enjoyment; opportunities for imagination, spontaneity, and self-expression should be

13 Ibid., p. 3.

present; motives and desires should be able to be satisfied immediately; and finally, each game should be a sufficient whole—when it ends, it completely ends.\textsuperscript{15}

Several of these statements have been incorporated with most of Huizinga's understanding to form the accepted definition. Although it is satisfactory for present purposes, and needs no further defense or justification at this point, it is helpful to examine the literature which supports or opposes some or all of its characteristics.

Although Cailllois\textsuperscript{16} criticizes Huizinga's definition as being too general and not adequate for a more specific classification and differentiation of games, he nonetheless assumes an understanding of play similar to Huizinga's. Play, he lists, is free, separate and regulated. Forced participation immediately changes the nature of the game. It is separate in that it is "...circumscribed within boundaries of time and space that are precise and fixed in advance."\textsuperscript{17} Like Huizinga, he emphasizes that play is subject to its own conventions and temporarily suspends ordinary rules.\textsuperscript{18} All of these ideas are incorporated

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., pp. 124-125.


\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p. 46.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 46.
within the original Huizinga understanding previously delineated.

One measure of a definition's worth is the extent to which it, and very similar understandings, are used by other notable scholars within the particular field of investigation. Huizinga's has been used by many. Caillois is one. John W. Loy, Jr. is another. In his already famous article, "The Nature of Sport: A Definitional Effort," very likely the best and perhaps the only one of its kind, Loy admits his reliance on both Huizinga and Caillois for his understanding of play. He therefore elaborates the six qualities of play as being: free, separate, uncertain, unproductive, governed by rules and make-believe.

Paul Weiss, the prolific writer and recently turned sport philosopher, in his controversial book: Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry, supports the definition offered by Caillois over Huizinga's. As was stated, however, for the present purposes they are viewed with marked similarities. Although he subsequently and somewhat skeptically illustrates that Caillois' understanding of the terms: "free," "separate,"

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20 Ibid., pp. 57-58.

"uncertain," "unproductive," "make-believe" and "rules," do not always meet criticisms, he nonetheless points out that "...they do offer handy pegs on which to hang some crucial characterizations." 22

James Keating, in his past several articles, 23 devoted his linguistic analysis to the terms "sport" and "athletics," he has given the term "play" little specific attention. Although he has understood "sport" in a way similar to the present thesis' understanding of play, in one of his most recent articles, "Paradoxes in American Athletics," 24 he refers specifically to athletics and play. Instead of "sport," he now uses "play." In line with Huizinga's fun-element, Keating feels that "the primary purpose of the person who truly plays is to enjoy the activity itself, to maximize the pleasure of the moment. He may try hard to win, and if he does so, fine. If he loses, however, so what, as long as the activity itself was enjoyable." 25 Throughout the article he associates play with cavorting, laughing, shouting with glee, free-

22 Ibid., p. 134.

23 For a list of these articles, refer to bibliography.


25 Ibid., p. 18.
dom, spontaneity, a festive air, pure fun, and frolic.\textsuperscript{26} Indeed, such an understanding is supportive of Huizinga, Sapora and Mitchell and the present paper's accepted definition.

A. R. Beisser, in \textit{The Madness in Sports},\textsuperscript{27} interprets play as being "...sport or diversion, to amuse oneself, to frolic or gambol. To act in a way which is not to be taken seriously."\textsuperscript{28} He sharply contrasts play with seriousness and work and implies that it is unimportant. Because of the apparent presence of these "un-play-like" aspects in much American sport, most professional, amateur or little league activities are not properly play.\textsuperscript{29}

E. M. Bower's "Play's the Thing,"\textsuperscript{30} is yet another indication of the popularity of ideas similar or identical to Huizinga's. To play, Bower states, one must be able to "...step out of the real world and back again."\textsuperscript{31} In addition, he reasons that play "...cannot be prescribed,\

\textsuperscript{26}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 18-29.


\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 7.


\textsuperscript{31}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 21.
assigned, or done to order. It is voluntary. It is fun.\textsuperscript{32}

Play necessitates illusion and magical thinking, as well as enthusiasm and the following of rules.\textsuperscript{33}

A. Giddens' article, devoted to a further understanding of the concepts of play and leisure, is the final work reviewed which sustains the accepted definition of play. After stating that he has read many works devoted to play, he views all of its characteristics to be derivatives of several essential ones: non-instrumental, self-contained, non-productive, not serious and pleasureable.\textsuperscript{34}

Works supporting Huizinga and the accepted definition, whether implicitly or by explicit reference, are numerous. It is not fair to suggest that it is accepted universally, however; the understanding is not without its critics. Dissatisfaction with the definition, and others of its kind; focuses on the contention (and the philosophic method used to arrive at such a position) that play is opposite to, or set apart from, reality, seriousness, and importance. Fink; in "The Oasis of Happiness: Toward an Ontology of Play,"\textsuperscript{35} typifies that dissatisfaction.

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., pp. 22-24.

\textsuperscript{34}Giddens, "Notes on the Concepts of Play and Leisure," p. 74.

As long as we continue naively using the popular antithesis of "work-play," "frivolity-seriousness" and the like, we will never grasp the ontological meaning of play....

Jacques Ehrmann's "Homo Ludens Revisited," even more explicitly censures both Huizinga and Caillois for thinking of "...'reality,' the 'real,' as a given component of the problem, as a referent needing no discussion, as a matter of course, neutral and objective." Ehrmann cannot accept any attempt to contrast play with the "real" as it is called, without any initial investigation, understanding, or explanation of that "reality."

B. WORKS RELATED TO THE DEFINITION OF ATHLETICS

There is a shortage of material relating to a conceptual understanding of play; this dearth of conceptual works is even more acute in relation to athletics. There have been numerous works which investigate the benefits, drawbacks, values and objectives of athletics and these will be reviewed in the third section of the chapter. All

36 Ibid., p. 19.


38 Ibid., p. 33.

39 Ibid.
of these works, similar to those dealing with play, have within them implicit understandings of the concept "athletics," but because the implied meanings are not the result of explicit and sustained conceptual analysis, they will not be distilled.

The increased awareness of the different meanings of the terms: "play," "game," "sport," and "athletics" has been a relatively recent development. Prior to the differentiations among them, the terms were often used synonymously and inclusively. It is therefore understandable that only relatively contemporary articles are devoted to, or, are even relevant to a conceptual analysis of the term "athletics."

Athletics is understood as that type of large muscle physical activity between two or more persons. Its purpose is the pursuit of victory. That purpose is accompanied by some or all of the complementary characteristics of competition; highly codified rules; officials; a high level of organization reflected in the form of strict schedules and published won-lost records; governing bodies and special "disciplinary" subcommittees; a material interest in the outcome; prestige; honour; a spirit of dedication, sacrifice and intensity; preparedness; the pursuit of excellence; ritual; and the presence of non-participating persons, some of whom are: men in the media, coaches, managers, trainers, statisticians, administrators,
commissioners, cheerleaders, mascots and fans.

James Keating, in his several articles devoted to
the understanding that sport and athletics are two
radically different activities, with different aims, values
and methods, has provided the basis for the above under-
standing of athletics. Osterhoudt 40 emphasizes the im-
portance of Keating's work, illustrating that his linguistic
analysis "...represents the most important and prolific
contribution to this form of research." 41 In "Sportsmanship
As A Moral Category," which Osterhoudt refers to as "...the
most complete statement of his view,..." 42 Keating defines
athletics as:

...essentially a competitive activity,
which has for its end victory in the
contest and which is characterized
by a spirit of dedication, sacrifice
and intensity. 43

Keating emphasizes that it is the "...intention and
attitude of the participant,..." 44 rather than the structure
of the activity itself, which determines whether the activity

40 Robert G. Osterhoudt, "A Descriptive Analysis of
the Research Concerning the Philosophy of Physical Education
and Sport." (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Illinois, 1971).

41 Ibid., p. 191.

42 Ibid.

43 James Keating, "Sportsmanship As A Moral Category,"
Ethics, 85 (October, 1964), 28.

is athletics or play. There is a difference "...with regard to the attitude, preparation and purpose of the participants."\(^{45}\)

Unlike the person engaged in genuine play, the athlete's objective is not to maximize the pleasure of the moment. Like the political candidate and the opposing attorneys in a court case, the aim of the athlete is honorable victory in the contest. No doubt, when the tide of battle is running in his favour, he may experience extreme pleasure in the proceedings themselves, but this is merely incidental to the end of the contest.\(^{46}\)

Vanderzwaag, however, visualizes a problem associated with Keating's dependence on the attitudes and motives of the participants. He wonders if the motives to be examined should be those of the individual or those of the total group involved in the activity, or both. Would the motive be necessarily the same, he wonders, or "...could a sportsman exist in athletics; or, could an athlete be found in sport?"\(^{47}\) He suggests that the sportsman may find it very difficult to maintain his sporting attitudes while constantly under the influence of those who emphasize, above all other considerations, the value of winning. Similarly, Vanderzwaag suggests, athletes may become frustrated when they attempt to intensely pursue victory while participating

\(^{45}\)Keating, "Sportsmanship As A Moral Category," p. 28.


\(^{47}\)Vanderzwaag, Toward a Philosophy of Sport, pp. 68-69.
with those who emphasize the sporting values of gaiety and spontaneity. 48

Keating sharply contrasts sport (play) with athletics. He makes reference to no neutral or halfway zone where the activity could be characterized by both sport and athletic qualities. As Vanderzwaag illustrates, such a stance could lead to misplaced concreteness, and the inference "...that it is a simple matter of black vs. white or right vs. wrong. Under such simple thinking one could end up classifying each specific activity as being either sport or athletics. No room might be allowed for an intermediate or gray area." 49

Vanderzwaag's criticism is just. Keating in his strict dichotomization, allows for the inclusion of no activities in which both the attitude or the structure appear to be partially play-like, and partially athletic-like. The present thesis, instead of a strict dichotomy, places athletics and play at the two ends of a continuum, the area between them representing the gray area.

In addition to examining Keating, Vanderzwaag does present his own ideas on the concept of athletics. He views the activity as ritualized, structured, played and displayed all with the satisfaction of the paying spectator.

48 Ibid., p. 69.

49 Ibid., p. 68.
uppermost in mind. He also visualizes athletics as more structured and organized than sport, and writes that the teams are chosen with greater care; more attention is given to the enforcement of rules; equipment and facilities are standardized to a greater degree; there is more scientific analysis of skills, knowledge and strategy; and there is great emphasis on public relations. Most of these characteristics are compatible with those complementary characteristics listed in the accepted definition of athletics.

Roger Caillois' "The Structure and Classification of Games," is the third and final work reviewed in this section. Caillois divides games into three major classifications - agon, alea, and mimicry. The first of these, agon, referred to by the use of such terms as: "struggle," "equality of chance," "antagonists," "confront," "victor," "triumph," and "winner," corresponds to the assumed conception of athletics. Although Caillois applies the "agon" classification to both muscular and cerebral contests, his description of the contest is applicable to athletics.

50 Ibid., p. 72.

51 Ibid., p. 73.

52 Caillois, "The Structure and Classification of Games," p. 46.
For each contestant the mainspring of the game is his desire to excel and win recognition for his ability in a given domain. Furthermore, the practice of agon presupposes concentration, appropriate training, assiduous effort, and the will to win. It implies discipline and perseverance. It makes the champion rely solely on his own resources, encourages him to make the best possible use of them and forces him to utilize them fairly and within fixed limits which, being the same for everyone, result in rendering the superiority of the winner indisputable.

Any review of literature endeavouring to survey the works relating to a conceptual or definitional analysis of athletics is destined to be brief. The dearth of material precludes that. The works of Keating, Vanderzwaag and Caillois, however, all well-known and influential, have been described, and shown to be supportive of the accepted definition of athletics.

C. LITERATURE RELATING TO THE MORALITIES OF ATHLETICS AND PLAY

There are few works which deal directly with the moralities of athletics and play; a great many deal with the topic tangentially and implicitly. Although numerous works are reviewed, their great numbers precluded an exhaustive report. To achieve some order through categorization, this section is divided into five parts: works supporting character development; works supporting character development in principle only; works investigating the structure of games and its relationship to morality; works

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53 Ibid., p. 47.
emphasizing the negative aspects of sport relating to morality; and other works dealing with sport and morality.

It must be understood that the above groupings are used as general guidelines rather than as strict and limiting regulations. Their purpose is to provide order; it is not to suggest a taxonomy for an extensive or rigorous classification of the literature. Some of the more lengthy, eclectic works could have been included in two or more of the categories. Where such a situation occurred, the work was included in the grouping which best represented its main thrust and import.

Works supporting character development

The claim for character development through play and sport is well known; its supporters are numerous; the literature sustaining it is vast. Many of the works supporting it were written before terminological distinctions, of a formal nature, were made among the concepts of "play," "games," "sport," and "athletics." Thus, they often either use one of the terms, particularly "sport," as inclusive of the others, or, they employ some or all of the terms as having approximately similar meanings. Such terminological "fuzziness" often makes it difficult to determine whether the author was referring to play or athletics as they are understood by contemporary distinctions.

Works are included in this particular subsection
of the review of literature precisely because they support the character-development claim. Many of these works do briefly mention that certain conditions must be present for the development of character to occur, which makes them eligible for inclusion in the immediately following section summarizing the works supporting the character development claim in principle only. Their emphasis however, focuses on a delineation and substantiation of the character development claim, and thus they have been more appropriately included in the present section.

Most of the literature supporting character development is only tangentially related to the present concern with the moralities of athletics and play. Their emphasis is on character development, which, technically speaking, is an end or product of morality. Very few works deal explicitly with an analysis of the nature of the morality which supposedly produces that character. They are nevertheless valuable, however, for implied in their claim for character development is a conception of the existing morality within the particular activity.

The character development claim has a long tradition. To give a dash of its historical past, it is worthwhile to note what surely must have been one of the first efforts to elucidate the worth of sport for the development of sound moral character. A description of the following article, written in 1859, has a twofold purpose: it illustrates the
long history of the claim; and, it remarkably represents all that the claim stands for, even by contemporary standards.

The clergyman who wrote "The Education of the Playground," reprinted in the Journal of Education for Upper Canada, had obviously become familiar with Thomas Hughes' classic: Tom Brown's Schooldays. The author actually dissects games of cricket and rugby, analyzes their components, and illustrates how each aspect develops a different moral quality. He even goes beyond the attention given this subject by Hughes, illustrating the development of such moral qualities and values as courage, firmness, calculation, self-reliance, unselfishness, responsibility, a sense of duty, pride, good temper, self-sacrifice, self-restraint, good humour, and Christian manliness. 55

Although the author of the article does not engage in any formal philosophical analysis of the morality, or the processes responsible for the development of these fine qualities, he does make a reasonable attempt to explain them in an anecdotal manner. Very few of the works following can boast of either a better representation of the character development claim, or a better explanation of the implied morality behind it.

54 "The Education of the Playground," The Journal of Education for Upper Canada, XII (September, 1859), 139-41.

55 Ibid., p. 55.
Charles Harold McCloy, in "Character Building Through Physical Education," 56 based on his understanding of how man learns, presents an involved, well-written approach to character-building through sport, emphasizing that it does not occur automatically, but needs to be a sought-after objective. 57 In Philosophical Basis for Physical Education, 58 McCloy emphasizes that adolescent athletic games and sports are complex and characterized by enough strong urges or emotions that they make "...excellent laboratories for training for democracy and other social learnings." 59 At a later point, McCloy, sounding similar to the clergyman in the foregoing article, suggests that some of these "social learnings" are: sacrificing one's own good for the good of the whole, individuality, loyalty, faithfulness, the ability to win without boasting and lose without sulking, courage, discipline, conscientiousness, initiative, co-operation, respect for law and a sense of duty. 60


57 Ibid., p. 41.


59 Ibid., p. 120.

60 Ibid., pp. 120-123.
In the ten-point list, devised by McCloy to illustrate these admirable qualities, he makes little mention of just how these traits are developed by athletics, but generally, simply states that they are acquired. This is perhaps an example of belief and opinion preceding reason and explanation. McCloy's presentation of the character claim is as well an example of what was previously uncritically referred to as terminological "fuzziness." One cannot be too sure whether he is speaking of "athletics," or "play." Although he constantly uses the term "athletics," one must realize that his understanding of the concept may be more in line with what the present thesis conceptualizes as "play," especially when he suggests that "athletics teaches how to use the spirit of competition for the benefit of both parties and not simply for the victory of one over the other. It is a contest without hostility, which is more akin to a co-operative adventure than to a battle."

Perhaps, in accordance with the present understandings, he is referring to play's ability to develop these attributes, not athletic's.

The Theory of Play, by Elmer D. Mitchell and Bernard S. Mason, although using the term "play," but often meaning "athletics" (according to the present definitions), suggests

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61 Ibid.

62 Ibid., p. 123.
that there is ample opportunity in the play situation for moral learning. "One can run the whole gamut of so-called character traits...." Mitchell and Mason forthrightly claim,... and find very few that do not represent possibly concomitant learnings in a week of play activity." 63 To support that claim, the authors proceed to list fifteen individual, and twelve social qualities similar to previous lists, which are possibly developed through the high jump, for instance. 64 They as well make brief, superficial mention of how these qualities are attained. Allen V. Sapora and Elmer D. Mitchell, in The Theory of Play and Recreation; treat the topic 65 in a fashion similar to Mitchell and Mason, and necessitate no further elaboration here.

In "New Objectives to Meet Modern Trends," 66 Charles D. Giauque suggests that it is time to develop some adequate measuring techniques to deter one from making unsupported claims in the area of character development. Nevertheless, he paradoxically states that "there is no better opportunity than through play..." 67 for the contact that makes possible

64 Ibid., p. 260.
67 Ibid., p. 73.
the learning of co-operation, sympathy, loyalty, courtesy, honesty, justice, charity, courage, initiative, perseverance and self-control.\textsuperscript{68} Again, like the others, Giauque, although mentioning that these attributes are not inherited, but acquired through repetition of their practice, makes no noteworthy statements beyond his beliefs in reference to the process of development, or to the morality present.

Jordan L. Larson, in "Athletics and Good Citizenship,"\textsuperscript{69} is very forceful in his claims, drawing relationships between the playing field, the battlefield and the employment of such traits as spirit, dedication, loyalty, self-confidence, leadership and good sportsmanship.\textsuperscript{70} It is an anecdotal article, which attempts to substantiate its claims by nostalgic references to the author's past. Once again, there is little presented, beyond sheer belief to explain the "why" and "how" of character development.

The character-development literature has been reviewed. Although the review has not been, nor need be exhaustive, it has established the meaning of the claim and the manner in which it has been espoused. The works are similar in the repetition of their claims, and alike

\textsuperscript{68}\textit{Ibid.}


\textsuperscript{70}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 258-259.
in their failure to investigate or explain beyond a simple anecdotal or superficial level the process of the development of character, which would yield a greater understanding of the nature of the existing morality. Due to their superficial and often opinionated nature, the foregoing works' credibility is suspect.

Works supporting character development in principle only

The works included in the present section also support the character development claim. Unlike the previous works, however, they do not support it categorically but emphasize that certain minimum conditions must exist for such a process to occur. Their understandings of the character development claim are similar to those previously expressed and need not be further explained. It is for their qualitative support that they are included in the present section; the review focuses on their expression of the conditions that must be present for moral development to occur.

Because of their emphasis, the works of this subsection of the literature offer more insight into the moralities of athletics and play. Although they do not engage in what could properly be termed an extensive philosophical investigation, because they do delve into practices in sport which either should or should not be present, they do provide a greater awareness of the implicit morality.
Luther Halsey Gulick, as cited by Ellen W. Gerber, urged that Christian character should be fostered in sport. He realized, however, that there was a need to rid sport of its malpractices if such a development were to occur, and devised the Clean Sport Roll. In it he spoke against dishonorable and ungentlemanly actions in sport; compared rule-breaking to stealing; and, more specifically, strongly criticized players for performing such immoral actions as stamping and kicking the floor in displeasure of other players and officials. In contrast to those who categorically supported the value of games and sports for the development of sound moral character, Gulick expresses a more realistic approach. His article, published in 1896, must have been one of the first to express the understanding that sport's malpractices do not likely contribute to the development of positive character.

J. B. Nash, a prolific writer, supports a similar stance in "The Role of Physical Education in Character Development." Nash, probably becoming more aware of the existing athletic situation with its increasing emphasis on external, and sometimes materialistic reward, felt:

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72Ibid.

As soon as the individual is interested merely in an award, rather than the challenge of the activity, character building possibilities become negligible. The above is yet another example of definitional difficulty. Nash does not equate character building with activities that are externally rewarded. By the present standards, then, would he associate it only with play? According to the accepted definitions, external material or non-material interests are often associated with athletic pursuits. If one were to hold Nash to his statement, then he could not associate the contemporary concept of athletics with character building.

In his later book, *Physical Education - Its Interpretations and Objectives and Its Relationship to Health, Education and Recreation*, Nash is more explicit and forceful in his criticisms. He retains the notion that character building can occur through games because there are rules to be adhered to and opportunities for one to achieve, but he also emphasizes the necessity of proper leadership. "A great deal of progress...," Nash emphasizes

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"...must still be made..." because "there are still sharp practices carried on by coaches under the tacit approval of school administrators and communities." That Nash is referring to the present conception of athletics, there can be no doubt, especially when he lists some of those "sharp practices" as: concealed spring football practices, the solicitation and subsidization of players, and the awarding of false grades to athletes. Nash believed that the potential for character development was present, but could not be pursued if athletics continued to exist as they did. The natural solution was to change athletics.

Divorced from publicity, community enthusiasm, the pride of school officials and the ambition of coaches, athletics could fulfill a real need.

Such changes, however, by today's standards, although they might aid in character building, would change the nature of athletics. It is safe to infer that Nash was supporting a move to make athletics more play-like, and that character building was more reasonably an end of play than it was of athletics.

Delbert Oberteuffer similarly saw the need for change in the sporting world. His article "Sportsmanship -

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77 Ibid., p. 254.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.
Whose Responsibility? implicitly expresses that need. The need was obviously strong enough to encourage him to write an extensive list of virtually every possible "do," and "don't" for all persons, even those remotely connected with the playing, the administering, the organizing and the watching of games. In Physical Education co-authored by Oberteuffer and C. Ulrich, several reasons are suggested for the lack of teaching of character in physical education. Although they admit that there are some "...who have a vague, general idea that participation in sport under a teacher of fine character will somehow favorably influence the young," reasons for most not holding that opinion are presented.

Others consider sports entirely too frivolous to have any serious bearing on character formation. Still others, noting the seriousness with which some sports are played, and the lengths to which some will go to win, form the opinion that within organized sport there is little hope for any educational or moral value of a serious sort.

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80 Delbert Oberteuffer, "Sportsmanship - Whose Responsibility?" JOHPHER, 19 (October, 1948), 543-545.

81 Ibid.


83 Ibid., p. 180.

84 Ibid.
This is yet another example of terminological "fuzziness." The terms "physical education," "sport," and "organized sport," are all used interchangeably, and apparently synonymously. That there may be different practices and values appropriately associated with each is not mentioned as a possible reason for the varied opinions of their worth for the building of character. Nonetheless, it is emphasized that within the activity there are "...countless opportunities for the expression of ethical and moral judgement, even for the expression of spiritual value." Since this is so, "...the most compelling obligation of modern physical education is to support and perpetuate those moral and ethical principles which are basic to society." Most of the works presented in this section either explicitly state or imply that the authors are discontented with much of what exists in the playing of games. Perhaps it is because what they were seeing was the development of what could be called, by present conceptions, "athletics" becoming more "athletic-like." They had finally and uncomfortably become aware of the many questionable practices associated with highly competitive sports, and understandably were not supportive of them. Oberteuffer, in "On Learning Values Through Sport," expresses this

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid., p. 190.

opinion when he writes:

...there is cause for alarm. No longer are all the games played on a high level of respectability. There has crept into the program elements of immorality and greed which bid fair to spoil the fun. And it will take more effort on the part of many people to stem the tide of anti-morality... which is presently engulfing sport...88

Oberteuffer wanted to believe that values could be learned through sport. Uncomfortably, however, he had the reality of the many "immoral" practices of athletics confronting him, which certainly were difficult to visualize as character building. The only recourse open to him, other than discontinuing his belief in character development, was to speak out against those negative qualities.

Many others held such a position... Charles C. Noble, in "The Moral and Spiritual Implications of School Athletics,"89 agrees that in athletics "...certain moral and spiritual implications can be seen quite clearly."90 But he admits that the over-emphasis on winning has detrimental effects and asserts that "...all the emphasis on fair play about which we talk so much in our American schools tends to be nullified by the shady practices condoned by otherwise honorable administrators."91 A. M. Coleman, in

88 Ibid., p. 24.


90 Ibid., p. 260.

91 Ibid., p. 261.
"Athletics - What of Them?"\(^{92}\) indicates the need for a well-run program for the development of character in athletics.\(^{93}\) Likewise, A. O. Duer, in "Instilling Sound Ethical Values in a Changing World,"\(^{94}\) suggests that if it is desirable to develop ethical character, which he most assuredly thinks is so, then there must be a re-emphasis on certain values of sport, specifically sportsmanship.\(^{95}\) The belief is maintained that athletics can develop character, but only if its nature is changed.

A number of authors express the opinion, explicitly, that involvement in athletics per se is neither good nor bad. What results depends on how the activity is carried out. Cowell and Schwehn, in \textit{Modern Principles and Methods in Secondary School Physical Education},\(^{96}\) strongly assert:

\begin{quote}
It is absurd to think that participation in sports per se develops sound character or that competition by itself is either good
\end{quote}


\(^{93}\)Ibid.


\(^{95}\)Ibid., p. 72.

or bad. An individual's behavior is determined by many factors such as heredity, environment, the activity in which he engages, and the kind of leadership and teaching to which he is exposed. 97

In The Philosophic Process in Physical Education, 98 E. C. Davis and D. M. Miller express a similar qualified support of character development. 99 Likewise, P. J. Arnold, with an extensive treatment of the topic in Education, Physical Education and Personality Development, 100 illustrates that athletic competition is "... in itself neither good nor bad, but from it, according to the manner in which it is handled, can stem beneficial or detrimental effects." 101

In the aptly titled "Character or Catharsis," 102 the now well-known sport philosopher James Keating sharply criticizes schools for provoking, sponsoring and financing anti-social attitudes while still referring to them as

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97 Ibid., p. 136.


99 Ibid., pp. 278-286.


101 Ibid., p. 118.

character building. Keating emphasizes that even if there are no serious social harms caused by these malpractices, they ruin the opportunity for positive good. He illustrates that one of the chief arguments supporting athletics has been its ability to provide excellent opportunities for the development of moral habits, social attitudes, and spiritual ideals. Although Keating believes that athletics can provide these opportunities, some of the current practices negate them.

K. W. Bookwalter and H. J. Vanderzwaag, in Foundations and Principles of Physical Education, go one step farther than Keating. They emphasize that if athletics, despite its potential for positive character development, is characterized by a number of questionable practices, then it will produce immoral habits. If players are taught to deceptively foul, to receive "illegal" grades and "under the table" considerations, and to intentionally injure opponents or evade rules and regulations in order to win, all under the name of loyalty, then Bookwalter and

103 Ibid., p. 300.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid., p. 303.
106 Ibid., pp. 300-303.
Vanderzwaag urge that character will be destroyed.\footnote{108} Richard Kraus, in Recreation and Leisure in Modern Society,\footnote{109} and Sherwyn M. Woods, in "The Violent World of the Athlete,"\footnote{110} as well suggest that athletics, as it exists, may lead to immoral and anti-social behaviour.

In summary, it is useful to list a number of traits which characterize many of the works mentioned in this section of the review. Essentially, all support the character development notion in principle. They are more realistic in their approach than those who support the claim categorically, however, often illustrating the need for change in the practices of the activity. Much of the writing appears to have occurred when athletics, as it is understood today with its emphasis on the pursuit of victory, was becoming so much more organized and institutionalized. Often the writings, by today's standards, are confusing due to the lack of definitional distinctions in the terminology. Time and again it is noticed that the author, using the words "play," and "sport," and referring to the values supposedly inappropriate to them, is actually

criticizing the practices of highly competitive athletics. In spite of these drawbacks, the works are generally useful in the overall understanding of the implicit morality that is present in both the type of activity they support and the one they write against.

Works investigating the structure of games and its relationship to morality

As has been previously stated, many works have been devoted to an understanding of play and games from sociological, psychological and anthropological standpoints. Their emphasis has been on the roles of play and games in the process of enculturation and the transmission of cultural values and traditions. Although they do delve into the structure of play and games, most do not provide more than a mere implicit understanding of the moralities of these activities. The following four works have been chosen because they do emphasize morality and its relationship to structure.

Jean Piaget, famous for his work in child development, wrote *The Moral Judgement of the Child*. The initial section of the volume provides an involved and enlightening account of the many intricate judgements and decisions associated with rule-abidance in a simple game of marbles. The game's complex system of rules, and their

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mastery, draws his respect.

Children's games constitute the most admirable social institutions. The game of marbles, for instance, as played by boys, contains an extremely complex system of rules, that is to say, a code of laws, a jurisprudence of its own. Only the psychologist, whose profession obliges him to become familiar with this instance of common law, and to get at the implicit morality underlying it, is in a position to estimate the extraordinary wealth of these rules by the difficulty he experiences in mastering their details.

If we wish to gain any understanding of child morality, it is obviously with the analysis of such facts as these that we must begin. All morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules.\textsuperscript{112}

Although it is hoped that not only the psychologist is in a position to understand the morality present, Piaget's enthusiasm for the importance of such an investigation provides reassurance that such an endeavour is indeed worthwhile.

John M. Roberts and Brian Sutton-Smith do not specifically deal with morality, but describe competitive sport in "Child Training and Game Involvement"\textsuperscript{113} in a manner that has implications for the understanding of the transmission of values.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., p. 1.

it is suggested that each game is a microcosmic social structure in which the polarities of winning and losing are variously represented. The individual in conflict is attracted to a model because he can find in it a codification of the emotional and cognitive aspects of his conflict, which is unavailable to him, at his level of maturity, in full-scale cultural participation.114

Similar to those who support the character development claim, Roberts and Sutton-Smith suggest that games offer a scaled-down process for learning the "...cognitive operations involved in competitive success."115 They do not suggest, however, whether these values are good or bad.

Sutton-Smith, Roberts and Kozelka, in "Game Involvement in Adults,"116 treat the subject in a similar but more detailed manner. In referring to the physical, intellectual and moral values traditionally presumed to be derived from competitive games, they illustrate:

Whether or not these traditional assumptions are well-founded, it is contended here that in achievement games there is learned a capacity to master the contingencies of winning and losing in interpersonal competition, and that the development of this capacity is fostered by the game-contained demands.117

114 Ibid., p. 183.
115 Ibid.
117 Ibid., p. 126.
They again emphasize that games offer a scaled-down version of societal competition in which the complex interpersonal events of winning and losing can be more easily assimilated.\textsuperscript{118}

Gunther Luschen, in "The Interdependence of Sport and Culture,"\textsuperscript{119} hypothesizes that "...the main functions of sport are pattern maintenance and integration."\textsuperscript{120} Luschen holds that values are transmitted through sport.

Since sport implies (as we saw) basic cultural values, it has the potential to pass these values on to its participants. We know from studies of the process of socialization that the exposure of children to competitive sport will cause these children to become achievement motivated; the earlier this exposure occurs, the more achievement motivated they become. And the child's moral judgement may, for instance, be influenced through games such as marbles.\textsuperscript{121}

Luschen is careful to point out, however, that competitive sport may as well be instrumental in the transmission of negative or dysfunctional values which possibly create conflicts both in society and within the system of sport itself.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{118}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{120}Ibid., p. 30.

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., pp. 30-31.

\textsuperscript{122}Ibid., pp. 31-32.
The four works by Piaget, Roberts, Sutton-Smith, Kozelka and Luschen offer support to the notion that the structure of games leads to the transmission of values or disvalues. Although they do lend credence to the possibility that character is developed, their approach is more analytical and disinterested than most of those who support the notion.

The four works do not take a stand on whether the values transmitted are either positive or negative ones; both can apparently be learned.

Works emphasizing the negative aspects of sport relating to morality

The second section of the literature review related works which supported the character-development claim in principle, but pushed for changing those aspects which had negative effects on the promotion of good character. Their approach and emphasis was decidedly more optimistic than the works to be presently reviewed. The following literature is characterized by marked negative attitudes to the notion that positive moral learning can be acquired through participation in sports and athletics as they exist today.

Like their opposites, who categorically support the notion of character-development, the following works are generally characterized by a strong and emphatic writing style. They appear to be attempting to persuade, to prove
a point, and because they deal only tangentially or implicitly with the moralities of athletics and play, one must also question their direct worth for the present investigation.

In a more scientific than philosophical investigation entitled: "Sportsmanship Attitudes of Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Grade Boys," R. A. McAfee found that sportsmanship attitudes decreased the longer boys participated in sports. In light of such findings he concludes:

Since the sportsmanship attitudes of the boys in this study became progressively lower from the sixth through the eighth grades, there seems to be a need to revise the methods used teaching sportsmanship.124

In "Money, Muscles – and Myths," Roger Kahn holds that claims for the development of sportsmanship and character are part of an effort to keep sports and athletics operating behind a curious moral facade. Parallel with this effort is an attempt to rid oneself of that nagging feeling of triviality that is often characteristic of those who devote their lives to sport. In big business, Kahn illustrates, all that is needed to justify a company's

123 Robert A. McAfee, "Sportsmanship Attitudes of Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Grade Boys," Research Quarterly, 26 (March, 1955), 120.

124 Ibid.

existence is emphasis on the fact that it grossed a couple of million dollars last year. He implies that sport businessmen could simply do the same, but illustrates that instead they look for more celestial justifications of their existence on earth. 126

Victory, sportsmanship and tradition all cloud the profit and loss ledger. Baseball is "The Game" and football is "the natural outgrowth of competitiveness at a time when young men are at their physical prime" and boxing is "the basic primal conflict." 127

Although Kahn may be right when he illustrates that sport and athletic businessmen feel the need to justify sports and therefore their own existence on earth, he may be "off target" when he illustrates that their emphasis on victory, sportsmanship and tradition which all cloud the financial purpose of the activity is a result of this uneasiness. Victory, sportsmanship and tradition not only cloud the profit and loss ledger, as Kahn puts it, but they exist because of it and precisely because they do camouflage it. Spectators pay to see and read about such noble attributes; they relate more to the values of sportsmanship, and the nostalgia of tradition than to the figures of profit and loss ledgers. Sports businessmen know this and thrive upon it. Their emphasis is not the result of uneasiness, but business.

126 Ibid., p. 10.

127 Ibid.
In a following article "Nice Guys Finish Last...," Kahn is more explicit in his description of the moral facade that envelops sport. He relates how cereal boxes and bubble gum cards helped to promote the understanding that all athletes got plenty of sleep, fresh air, exercise and sunshine and never drank or smoked. The picture of the athlete being a totally moral being was further portrayed in movies where all sport-heroes visited children's hospitals and were kind to dogs. Kahn contradicts himself however. He states that athletes fight hard, clean and morally and lose like gentlemen, but then illustrates that the athlete is taught to be a sportsman, and then told to win at any price. Be kind to children and spike the second baseman. Talk at a father-and-son banquet and butt the other fighter in the clutch. Keep your hands clean. Don't worry about your knees. Despite his contradiction, it can be assumed that Kahn is critical of the hypocritical morality present in athletics. He does emphasize, however, that the attack should focus on the image of the activity, not on the men who try to

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128 Roger Kahn, "Nice Guys Finish Last..." Nation, 185 (September 6, 1957), 108-110.

129 Ibid., p. 109.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid., p. 110.
fit it.  

George F. Kneller's *Existentialism and Education* presents existential arguments against the values of athletics. He does not feel the qualities of freedom, self-abandon and authenticity which are characteristic of play and beneficial to the development of character, are present in athletics. Kneller emphasizes that varsity sports which parade the ideals of "fighting for dear old Alma Mater," have little importance existentially because "...the hero of the day, who has scored the winning touchdown or knocked in the winning run may well be a completely unauthentic person." The values he supposedly holds, argues Kneller, are likely not his own but have been prefabricated for him. Kneller's existential stance is a popular one and is apparent in some of the literature following.

Although G. B. Kehr believes that sportsmanship should be stressed and taught, she sees a conflict of values present in sport which seriously hampers such

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132 Ibid.


134 Ibid., pp. 138-139.

135 Ibid., p. 139.

teaching. The basis of the conflict, she points out, is the different interpretations of rules and moral codes. As an instance of such conflict, she illustrates: "According to the rules of baseball, it is not necessarily illegal for a runner to charge into a catcher. However, this practice gives an advantage to the team or individual using it but it is contrary to our moral code."\textsuperscript{137} Kehr is correct when she emphasizes that "such conflicts make the teaching of sportsmanship extremely difficult."\textsuperscript{138} From the tone of her comments it would appear that she would prefer that there be no conflict between legal rules and moral codes; that it be a simple matter of black versus white. The conflict Kehr is criticizing is not one peculiar to sports, but characteristic of all moralities and legal codes. The decision as to what is right and wrong in particular instances is never a simple matter; teaching the moral code of sportsmanship is fraught with as many difficulties, conflicts and exceptions as the teaching of any other moral ideals.

W. Kroll and K. H. Petersen, in a scientifically-orientated investigation entitled: "Study of Values Test and Collegiate Football Teams,"\textsuperscript{139} state that the attitudes

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., p. 93.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{139} W. Kroll and K. H. Petersen, "Study of Values Test and Collegiate Football Teams," \textit{Research Quarterly}, 36 (December, 1965), 441-447.
actually associated with the playing of football are quite different from the values that are usually ascribed to athletics. On the sportsmanship attitude questionnaire, the authors found that successful (winning) teams, particularly football teams, scored quite low.\(^\text{140}\)

Howard Slusher, in \textit{Man, Sport and Existence},\(^\text{141}\) presents extensive and, characteristic of his style, strongly worded arguments against the notion that sport develops character. Sport, he states, is not characterized by the qualities of warmth, love, personhood and care but rather teaches the child to be cold, impersonal, hard, objective, remote and tough.\(^\text{142}\) He emphasizes that sport is not ethical in the traditional sense and "...only the naive and/or ideal would even consider the transfer of Christian Ethics."\(^\text{143}\)

Certainly it appears that sport, itself, does not possess a moral structure. To confuse the element of "sportsmanship," for example as belonging to sport appears to be a stretch of the imagination. Whenever one's actions are "sporting," he is not necessarily reflecting the essence of sport. In reality he is acting as one would expect any civilized individual to behave. Perhaps our acute awareness of

\(^{140}\text{Ibid.}, p. 446.}\)

\(^{141}\text{Howard S. Slusher, Man, Sport and Existence: A Critical Analysis (Philadelphia: Lea and Febiger, 1967).}\)

\(^{142}\text{Ibid., p. 71.}\)

\(^{143}\text{Ibid., p. 219.}\)
this cultivated action in sport is but an indication that we really don't expect man to be human in the sport situation.\textsuperscript{144}

Slusser feels that in sport, actions are not chosen for their virtuousness, but usually for their pragmatic value, and therefore he emphasizes that "...sport is not the place to teach moral virtue."\textsuperscript{145} Later, he goes on to illustrate! "...the man of sport really does not need to develop his own ethical existence. The rulers of sport do this for him."\textsuperscript{146} He need not decide which actions are ultimately either right or wrong but simply act so that "...every personal decision must be interpreted in keeping with that which will be made by the official."\textsuperscript{147}

Slusser goes so far as to emphasize that behaving in a moral or virtuous manner in sport would be a disadvantage.

Darwinism has established the principle of survival of the fittest. But the 'fit' in sport are not those with qualities of concern, love, empathy, care, passion and respect for personhood. To survive in the world of sport man better not have these qualities. To be hard, to be tough, to be strong and to be rough - these are the qualities that pay dividends. Again,
the accent is in different kinds of strength or relative values. The truth of the matter is that the Bible would not have a chance against the likes of Darwin in a war or in sport. 148

Slusher strongly asserts that it is time the hypocrisy was eliminated from the world of sport.

Do we really expect him to practice the Ten Commandments in front of 60,000 people? I think not. We might like him to. But we don't expect him to. Yet overtly we give the impression that the morality of sport is identical to the morality of the choir. It seems that it is high time we either change the nature of sport (which is highly unlikely), or stop the hypocrisy and admit to ourselves the existing ethic. To condone, covertly, and to punish, overtly, is not my idea of authenticity. 149

B. C. Ogilvie and Thomas A. Tutko, as the title "Sport: If You Want to Build Character, Try Something Else" indicates, suggest the traditional claim that competition builds character is empirically unfounded.

We found no empirical support for the tradition that sport builds character. Indeed, there is evidence that athletic competition limits growth in some areas. It seems that the personality of the ideal athlete is not the result of any molding process, but comes out of the ruthless selection process that occurs at all levels of sport. Athletic competition has no more beneficial effects

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148 Ibid., p. 165.
149 Ibid., p. 167.
than intense endeavour in any other field. Horatio Alger success - in
sport or elsewhere - comes only to those who already are mentally fit, 
resilient and strong. 151

Although Ogilvie's and Tutko's findings are based on a
considerable number of subjects - 15,000 athletes - it must
be emphasized that they are not actually saying athletics
does not develop character, but that it does so no better
than any other intense pursuit.

Larry Merchant's ...And Every Day You Take Another
Bite 152 is a caustic and cynical attack on the notion that
football is striated with moral rectitude. He presents
example after example attempting to negate that claim. He
cites Georé Sauer, once a star end for the New York Jets
as saying:

Football's most obvious contradiction
is its failure to teach character, self-
discipline, and responsibility, which it
claims to do. There is little freedom.
The system moulds you into something
easy to manipulate. It is a sad thing to
see a forty-year-old man being checked
into bed at night. It is personally
embarrassing to realize you are a part
of this. After years of acting and being
treated like a seven-year-old, what else
can you be but an adolescent? 153

151 Ibid., p. 61.
152 Larry Merchant. "...And Every Day You Take
Another Bite" (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1971).
153 Ibid., p. 157.
In reference to those football players who do not express the character values of the sport, Merchant illustrates that it is simply because they have been conditioned to think so for most of their lives. He writes most cynically. A paraphrase will not do him justice.

...the football player mouths these abstractions because high school and college coaches like Allen have fed them to him like a circus animal trainer slipping biscuits to dancing bears. Run four hundred laps. Good boy. Here's a character biscuit. If we win the game you get a courage and pride biscuit. And if we go undefeated we bite from the biggest biscuit of them all, the team-desire biscuit. In this way players are made to train hard and viciously, which is what the game is about, and also made to feel that that makes them better citizens, which it doesn't. They are not mutually exclusive, but the notion that football-type character equals citizen-type character is Orwellian.\(^{154}\)

In reacting to a study carried out by Warren Johnson appearing in \textit{Psychology Today} which illustrates some relationships between aggression, rule-breaking and athletes, Merchant concludes "...that many pros would sell their souls to the devil for a lick of his fire."\(^{155}\) It is relatively safe to assume that Merchant does not support the character development claim!

Recently, there have been many books like Merchant's

\(^{154}\) Ibid., pp. 118-119.

\(^{155}\) Ibid., pp. 120-121.
written to expose the intricate and sometimes quite shocking internal workings of professional sport. Although most are purely anecdotal, they do reveal the implicit morality within professional athletics. It must be remembered, however, that they are popular literature, written to sell and make a profit at the newsstands. Upon reading them, one can quite easily gain the impression that some of the authors are not above overstating their case and writing for shock value. They need not be elaborated any further here. A relatively extensive list is included in the bibliography, however.

A professor of philosophy and once Canadian professional football player, John McMurtry, in "Kill 'Em: Crush 'Em: Eat 'Em Raw:" makes comparisons between his sport and war. He compares their practices, purposes, objectives and languages in a manner that implies: if character development is present, it must certainly be among the lesser objectives. He concludes:

Competitive, organized injuring is integral to our way of life, and football is simply one of the intelligible mirrors of the whole process; a sort of colorful morality play showing us how exciting and rewarding it is to Smash Thy Neighbor.

Duffy Doherty, ex-head football coach at Michigan


157 Ibid., p. 58.
State University, on a recent local television news broadcast said: "Let's not talk about coaches building character—that's misplaced. Character is built in the church and the home." Larry Merchant similarly illustrates that when a parent turned her son over to Bobby Dodd, the former football coach at Georgia Tech, hoping that he would develop some discipline in the boy, Dodd replied: "You give me a good boy, and I'll give you a good boy back." Such responses are indeed enlightening, for it is often coaches who are most emphatic in their claims for character development.

Tom Meschery, in "There Is a Disease in Sports Now...," attributes many of the changing values to the entry of big business into sports and the resultant over-emphasis on winning.

There was a time and it was not so long ago, when things such as honor and loyalty were virtues in sport, and not objects of ridicule. It was a time when athletes drew pleasure from the essence of competition, not just from their pay-checks. But, somehow, with the introduction of big business, the concept of sports in this country has changed.

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159 Merchant, ...And Every Day You Take Another Bite, p. 138.

160 Tom Meschery, "There Is a Disease in Sports Now...," Sports Illustrated, October, 1972, pp. 56-63.

161 Ibid., p. 56.
Meschery must strongly believe what he says is true for he cites these as the reasons for him quitting the National Basketball Association.

William A. Sadler has recently published a critical examination of American sport from an existential and counter-cultural standpoint. In "Competition Out of Bounds: Sport in American Life," he presents arguments against the values of competition.

Instead of expressing love for another person, competition involves an attempt to dominate the other. Though it may require the use of reason, the art of competition is not conducive to reasonableness that is open to questions about the meaning and value of one's own actions. Though fair play has been an important part of sports, care about winning often precludes consideration of justice; and it often breeds contempt for those who do not, or cannot, or care not, to win.

Sadler, like the other previously mentioned existentialists, Kneller and Slusher, is categorically opposed to all of the possible anti-social and unauthentic learning that is fostered in athletics as it exists today.

In an effort to compromise the two sides, those who strongly support the character development claim, and those who strongly oppose it, Jack scott, who formerly led

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163 Ibid., p. 130.
the attack against organized sport in The Athletic Revolution has taken a more middle-road position in "Sport and the Radical Ethic." He emphasizes that an incorporation of the best of both positions could be a reality.

Rather than denigrate the many accomplishments of those who have been guided by the values expressed in either the Lombardian ethic or the counter-culture ethic, the radical ethic attempts to build a system based on the achievements of these two systems while avoiding their abuses and excesses. The radical ethic, as a position of synthesis, acknowledges accomplishments and contributions of men like Knute Rockne and Vince Lombardi, but it does not accept them as representing the apotheosis of sport experience. The radical ethic in sport demands a commitment of excellence integrated with a desire to achieve that excellence by a process that will humanize rather than dehumanize man.

Although, by such a statement, Scott has aligned himself with those who support the character development claim in principle, it was deemed appropriate to relate his position at the present point because rather than theoretical or antithetical, it is synthetical. His stance provides a possible solution to the disagreement.


166 Ibid., p. 77.
That is the extent of the literature to be reviewed expressing the opinion that no positive moral benefit can be derived from athletic competition. The vastness of the literature precludes an exhaustive review, and although the review has been selective, it does adequately establish the spirit and thrust of the opposition to the traditional, moral and character development claims.

Other works dealing with sport and morality

The four works reviewed in this section of the related literature cannot be included under any of the previous sections. They are most valuable, however, not only as they are recent expressions, but also in the philosophical approach they take. Their style is more disinterested and their efforts are not devoted to persuasion, but rather to the enlightenment of a particular issue. In contrast with most of the literature thus far reviewed, they can be referred to as philosophical.

Any investigation dealing with the moralities of athletics and play would be incomplete without making reference to James Keating's several works emphasizing the differences in the purposes and behaviour appropriate to the activities. In most of his works, Keating convincingly advances the thesis that it is inappropriate to attempt an application of the values proper to sport (here understood as play) to the activity of athletics. In "Sportsmanship
as a Moral Category," he states:

In essence, sport is a kind of diversion which has for its direct and immediate end fun, pleasure and delight and which is dominated by a spirit of moderation and generosity. Athletics on the other hand, is essentially a competitive activity, which has for its end victory in the contest and which is characterized by a spirit of dedication, sacrifice and intensity. \(^{167}\)

The above is Keating's understanding of the separateness of the activities, and, as he states, they are radically different. He makes it most clear that any attempt to legislate the behaviour appropriate to one to the other, results in confusion.

The course of the confusion which vitiates most discussion on sportsmanship is the unwarranted assumption that sport and athletics are so similar in nature that a single code of conduct and similar participant attitudes are applicable to both. Failing to take cognizance of the basic differences between sport and athletics, a futile attempt is made to outline a single code of behaviour equally applicable to radically diverse activities. \(^{168}\)

In his other articles, Keating uses the same basic thesis to discuss problems related with winning. \(^{169}\)

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168 Ibid., p. 34.

and the professional-amateur conflict, and the concern with excellence, always delving into the conduct proper to both sport (play) and athletics. Keating's thesis may provide a solution to the conflict over the character development claim. Those who support the notion of character development are perhaps more closely aligned with Keating's understanding of sport. Those who ridicule the claim, pointing out that character development cannot result from an activity replete with so many questionable practices, may be looking at Keating's athletics. In other words, perhaps the desirable, social traits that are so often referred to, can be developed through Keating's sport, but not through Keating's athletics.

Robert G. Osterhoudt's "The Kantian Ethic as a Principle of Moral Conduct in Sport," is a landmark in the philosophy of sport. It is the first attempt to formally and directly apply a viable moral principle or ethical system to the morality of sport. The principle he applies is Kant's categorical imperative, which, loosely


phrased, means: to always act in a manner that your action can be universalized for all men. Osterhoudt emphasizes that the principle requires that one who has freely entered the sport situation be a strict adherent to the rules and regulations of the activity.¹⁷³ Not only must he abide by these rules, but he must obey them for their own sake.

The categorical imperative in its multiple formulations dictates that we abide by these laws for their own sake (for the sole sake of duty to them) and that we treat our fellow competitors with a sensitivity we ourselves would prefer; that is, to treat them as an end and not as a means to the gratification of our own desires and inclinations.¹⁷⁴

Osterhoudt views the value of this Kantian application in its ability to supply "...an order of ideal conduct increasingly uncommon in the playing of our amateur and professional sports."¹⁷⁵

T. J. Roberts, in "The Fiction of Morally Indifferent Acts in Sport,"¹⁷⁶ applies to games S. B. Cunningham's thesis¹⁷⁷ that all acts or actions performed

¹⁷³Ibid., pp. 121-122.
¹⁷⁴Ibid., p. 122.
¹⁷⁵Ibid., p. 123.
consciously or voluntarily by men are inescapably moral.\textsuperscript{178} He argues that even the most trivial and inconsequential actions in sport, if they are consciously deliberated upon and voluntary, are morally relevant.\textsuperscript{179} He concludes:

Voluntary, conscious and responsible activity seems to be prevalent in sport participation. Because sport is so goal or end orientated, it is characterized by actions which are performed from one's conception of reasons. This ability to give reasons for one's actions means that one has been influenced or convinced to perform such actions. To some degree one feels as though one should or ought to perform such actions. Since "should" and "ought" talk is vital to "moral" talk, I think the next progressive step to the statement that all actions in sport are morally relevant, is a quite natural one.\textsuperscript{180}

Roberts emphasizes that the importance of this conclusion is that "...it makes us more aware of the great breadth of the moral sphere. It leads us to realize that sport is full of morally relevant activity which...may lead some to become more morally aware of their actions...."\textsuperscript{181} Although the argument provides no guides for action, the author does substantiate that sport is not exempt from moral (as opposed to non-moral) consideration.

\textsuperscript{178}Ibid., p. 3.


\textsuperscript{180}Ibid., p. 45.

\textsuperscript{181}Ibid., p. 44.
Kathleen M. Pearson has recently written "Deception, Sportsmanship, and Ethics." Pearson attempts to construct a method by which actions in athletics can be determined to be either ethical or unethical. She wonders which acts of deception are appropriate and which are not. As her rule of thumb, Pearson holds that an unethical, deceptive act is one which is "...designed by a willing participant in an activity to deliberately interfere with the purpose of that activity...." She states that the purpose of the athletic activity is "...to test the skill of one individual,...against the skill of another individual,...in order to determine who is more skillful in a particular, well-defined activity." The well defined activity is a game which "...is no more (in terms of its careful definition) than its rules." By this well-reasoned argumentation, Pearson is able to state that all actions which run counter to the agreed-upon rules of the game are what she terms "definitionally deceptive," and run deliberately against the purpose of the activity, and are therefore unethical. She concludes with the following

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183 Ibid., p. 116.

184 Ibid.

185 Ibid.
A variety of elegant arguments can be produced to indict the deliberate foul. It violates the ludic spirit, it treats the process of playing as mere instrument in the pursuit of the win, and it reflects the view of one's competitor as both enemy and object rather than colleague in noble contest. All of these pleas, however, fall short of the ultimate and most damaging testimony: deliberate betrayal of the rules destroys the vital frame of argument which makes sport possible. The activity even may go on in the face of such fatal deception, but neither the logic of analysis nor the intuition of experience permit us to call whatever is left a game — for that is shattered. 186

Pearson's argument is a strong attack on those — and there are many — who either implicitly or explicitly condone deliberate rule-breaking in games.

Pearson's article concludes the sub-section, the section and the chapter. The review of the literature has been lengthy and due to the abundance of material it has not been exhaustive, but selective. The definitions of play and athletics have been placed in perspective and the focus of the entire thesis can now be seen more clearly in light of the works reviewed.

186 ibid., p. 118.
CHAPTER III

AN EXAMINATION OF THE MORALITIES OF ATHLETICS AND PLAY

A. INTRODUCTION

A morality is a complex system or composite of many interrelating beliefs, ideals, rules and motives usually reflected in action. Any attempt to provide more than a superficial understanding of the nature and consistency of those interdependencies is, in short, a humbling endeavour. Characteristic of any lesser attempts are the drawbacks of inappropriate generalizations, and oversimplifications and the problems of exceptions to the rule. Exceptions are abundant in all moralities; to suggest that such was not the case would be to over-simplify. Because the intent of the present investigation is to provide some semblance of the general natures of the two moralities, it would be imprudent for it to concentrate its efforts on those aspects of the moralities which point away from their general and yet essential characteristics. In keeping with that understanding, the following account places its entire emphasis on an elucidation of those elements - those beliefs, ideals, rules and motives - which are most apparent or most characteristic of the two moralities in question.
The use of Hobbes and Mill

It is appropriate at this point to explain and justify why particular emphasis is placed on the "politico-moral" philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill. Before that can occur, however, it is essential that a brief and concise summary of their respective philosophies be presented.

Thomas Hobbes, born at Malmesbury in 1588 and educated at Oxford, was first interested in classics and science, but is most renowned for his work in political philosophy. The first version of his thoughts was The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, privately circulated in 1640; the second was De Cive, published in 1642; and the third, the crowning achievement for which he is most famous, was Leviathan, published in 1651. So radical and influential were his claims that he sometimes feared reprisals by the House of Commons, and once even felt forced to flee to Paris where he stayed for eleven years.¹

In the editor's introduction to Leviathan, C. B. Macpherson writes that Hobbes was equally concerned with the analysis of power and "...the equal natural rights of man,..."² He tried "...to put the two things together to


²Ibid., p. 8.
get a theory of right and obligation, as well as a theory of power." Macpherson emphasizes that Hobbes' main concern, however, was peace, not the peace among nations, but the kind of peace essential for the avoidance of war among men within nations. Because of his earlier educational concentrations, Hobbes approached his task as a scientist might by constructing a model of man and society which formed the foundation of many of his later statements. Whether he was aware of it or not, Hobbes' model was basically a characterization of man living in a bourgeois, capitalistic market society, which naturally resulted in his postulates being shaded or biased in that direction. Because the bourgeois model he operated from was very competitive and very power-orientated, Hobbes' philosophy was similarly so.

Hobbes believed that men were moved to satisfy their appetites and avoid their aversions; the relative strength of these desires coupled with external influences, which either accelerated or decelerated the importance of them, established the order of priority in which they should be satisfied. Since it was apparent that the amount of power

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3 Ibid., p. 9.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., pp. 51-63.
6 Ibid., pp. 119-30.
a man had was a crucial element in the success one had in attaining the satisfaction of these appetites, Macpherson cites Hobbes as postulating that "every man must always seek to have some power,..." Macpherson summarizes Hobbes' understanding of power:

...the amount by which his faculties, riches, reputation, and friends exceeded those of other men. We have already been told that a man's power consists of his present means to obtain future apparent good. So Hobbes is saying that a man's present means to obtain future apparent good consists of the amount by which his faculties, riches, reputation, etc. exceed those of other men.  

Hobbes saw a necessary conflict arising out of man's desire for power "...because the power of one man resiseth and hindereth the effects of the power of another:..." Because Hobbes thought that one man's power always lessened another's, he postulated that generally in mankind there was "...a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death."  

That endless seeking of power was Hobbes' conception of man living in a natural state where there was no common force powerful enough to protect one from the inclinations of all other men seeking power. That condition Hobbes called war, and "[such a warre,...is of every man, against

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7 Ibid., p. 33.

8 Ibid., p. 34.


every man...where every man is Enemy to every man;...

It is logically pointed out by Hobbes that there are a number of necessary consequences of that kind of war and the natural inclinations of the men within it. The first is:

...that nothing can be unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues.12

In a similar manner, he emphasizes that in a war where

every one is governed by his own Reason: and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing, even to one anothers body.13

Hobbes realized, however, that civilized man would not wish to endure such an insecure life, and refers elaborately and now famously to the incommmodities of such a war.

In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters;

11 Ibid., pp. 185-186.

12 Ibid., p. 188.

13 Ibid., pp. 189-190.
no Society; and which is worse of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.\textsuperscript{14}

It was man's desire to have these "commodities," especially his life, which led him to form a society that was more peaceful and secure. Reason suggests to men, that there are several articles of peace on which they could come to agreement. Hobbes refers to them as the laws of nature; the first is:

That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre.\textsuperscript{15}

The second fundamental law of nature Hobbes puts forth is:

That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down his right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe.\textsuperscript{16}

From these and several other laws of nature, Hobbes constructs the commonwealth as headed by the monarch. There must be one who has more power than all of the others to enable the enforcement of the laying down of each man's natural rights characteristic of the condition of war, and

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 186.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 190.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
thus to ensure the protection of each, now vulnerable.

Hopefully the spirit and general nature of Hobbes' "politico-moral" philosophy has been established sufficiently for the purpose at hand. Although much of Hobbes' philosophy is concerned with the establishment of a well-ordered sovereign state with emphasis on contracts, covenants, rights and duties of the citizens to one another and the state, the present thesis concentrates its application on the hypothetical Hobbesian condition of war, and the condition which led to the formation of society.

Like Hobbes, John Stuart Mill was a British ethician, but of the nineteenth rather than of the seventeenth century. He made substantial "...contributions to theory of knowledge, psychology, and logic..." but it is his utilitarianism for which he is remembered most. Although expression of his utilitarianism is found in two works: "On the Logic of the Moral Sciences," the last part of the System of Logic, published in 1863, and Utilitarianism (1861), it is the latter of these on which the present investigation places its emphasis.

Mill's basic foundational assumption, on which his theory of morality was grounded, was that

...pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in

the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.\textsuperscript{18} His theory of morality is famously phrased in the following form.

...actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.\textsuperscript{19}

Mill's departure from Benthamism was in his realization that not only was the quantity of pleasure important, but also the quality, which led him to an illustration of the higher and lower pleasures.\textsuperscript{20}

Unlike an egoist's or an altruist's stance, Mill does not distinguish between the happiness of the agent and that of other men. He argues that:

...the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.\textsuperscript{21}


\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 11-16.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 22.
The actual purpose of the essay *Utilitarianism* appears to have been to defend the system against its attackers. A presentation of those arguments is here unnecessary. Hopefully a basic foundational understanding of the general nature of Mill's utilitarianism has been provided.

Now that Hobbes and Mill have been briefly summarized, it is easier to present how and why their philosophies are to be employed. An analogy is useful here. Suppose that you are walking along a street and you came across a house and a car. Suppose as well that someone approached and asked you to compare the house and the car by describing them. Regardless of your mechanical acumen, or your ability in carpentry, you would very likely be able to list many similarities and differences as to their purpose, size, shape, colour, and to a lesser degree even their structure. Unless you were educated in either mechanics or construction techniques, however, you would in all likelihood be unable to go much further with any degree of certainty. In attempting to analyze them in reference to materials used, intricate workings, structural and mechanical design you might logically be inclined to employ the knowledge of experts. The expertise of a structural engineer or a carpenter would be very useful in analyzing the structure of the house, while the knowledge of a mechanical engineer would assist you in a similar
analysis of the automobile. With such help you would be able to provide explanations beyond the mere external and superficial level that you could achieve prior to the experts' employment.

The analogy is apparent. Athletics and play are the house and the car; Hobbes and Mill, the experts. Prima facie athletics and play appear to be quite different sorts of activities. At first glance many similarities and differences can be made between them in reference to organization, administration, procedure and perhaps even purpose. A moral investigation, however, goes much further into the beliefs about the nature of man and his ideals, into rules and actions and into the motives that compel one to act in either a rule-following or a rule-breaking manner. Unless the investigator feels sufficiently competent to analyze and draw relationships among these elements that form the composite of a particular morality, experts must be called upon.

The question has been asked: "Why Hobbes and Mill?" Although the reply: "As opposed to whom?" would likely deter many from repeating such an inquiry again, it is not a sufficient justification of their use.

Athletics, in the introductory chapter, has been defined and understood as an activity which channels the pursuit of victory in what is most often a competitive atmosphere. It has been shown in the review of literature,
despite the dearth of material dealing with the concept of athletics, that such a conceptualization is by no means incongruent with scholars' understandings. In fact, they support it. In the immediately preceding pages of the present chapter, through a synopsis of his "politico-moral" philosophy, it was illustrated that Thomas Hobbes is most renowned for his analysis of power. His model of man and society was that of the rising bourgeois, capitalistic, market society functioning in England in the seventeenth century. It was a highly competitive society where "...the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another:..."22 As such, much of Hobbes writings dealt with devising means to constructively channel the competition and desire for power among men. Can the relationship be any closer? Athletics are highly competitive, where the victory of one necessitates the defeat of another, where, not symbolically, but actually, the power of one resists and hinders the power of another.

It may be objected that the paralleling of Hobbes' conception of power with athletic power rests upon an equivocal use of the term "power," but it does not. Hobbes states:

> The Power of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Original, or Instrumental.

22Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 35.
Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind: as extraordinary Strength, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence, Liberality, Nobility. Instrumentall are those Powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and Instruments to acquire more: as Riches, Reputation, Friends, and the secret working of God, which men call Good Luck. 23

The power of an athlete is his present means to obtain future victory. Although all of Hobbes' various types of power are not directly applicable to athletics, "strength," "form," "prudence," "reputation," and "good luck" most certainly are. All of these qualities make an athlete more powerful and more likely to succeed. An even tighter relationship between Hobbes and athletics can be made when one refers to his understanding of a man's value or worth.

The Value, or Worth of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power.... 24

A man's value in athletics is determined in exactly the same manner - not just similar, but identical! An athlete's price or worth is dependent upon his power or ability to bring about some future apparent good or goods; one of those goods is victory, another is the presence of many paying spectators. Even in some little league athletics

23 Ibid., p. 150.

24 Ibid., p. 151.
some boys are considered "worth" more than others; their
skills are greater; they have more power, more faculties
at their disposal to bring about the end of victory. In
professional athletics the relationship is even closer.
Gordie Howe's recent signing with the World Hockey Association for over a million dollars was a great coup for that fledgling league. Why? Because the eminence of the faculties of his body and mind - his skill as a great hockey player - coupled with his worldwide reputation and his numerous friends makes him a very powerful man; a man that the World Hockey Association is very wise to have on their side. The situation is the same for most professional athletes; they bargain for money with their power; as their power increases so does their worth to those who wish to purchase it. It is well known that the amount of money an athlete makes is, in most cases, directly proportional to his ability to overpower the opposition - or to his ability to attract paying customers - that is, proportional to his power.

The obviousness of these similarities, plus the knowledge that athletics is as well a capitalistic, competitive society made for many close and exciting relationships between the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and the morality of athletics.

A similar case can be made for the use of John Stuart Mill, although the relationships between his utili-
tarianism and the morality of play cannot be so tightly
drawn. Play is engaged in for the fun and pleasure within
the activity itself; it is a free activity offering its
participants many opportunities for the expression of
joviality, imagination and spontaneity. The end of pleasure
is not an exclusive goal; it can be achieved theoretically
by all men simultaneously and thereby necessitates no com-
petition for its possession.

John Stuart Mill felt that "...pleasure and freed-
from pain are the only things desirable as ends;..."
and that actions are judged right as they tend to produce
happiness and wrong as they tend to produce the reverse
of happiness which is pain. Although one must be care-
ful not to equivocate between Mill's understandings of the
terms "pleasure," "pain," and "happiness," and the meanings
of those terms in the play sphere, some relationships can
be drawn. It can be shown, for instance, that in play,
actions and dispositions are right and good as they tend
to increase the pleasure of the activity, and wrong and
bad as they tend to decrease that pleasure. The present
investigation does not apply Mill's conceptions of the
qualities of pleasure, and the higher and lower pleasures;
nor does it concern itself with happiness, mainly because

\[25\] Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 10.

\[26\] Ibid.
happiness is a life-long goal and a kind of composite of many consistent pleasures while the play sphere is viewed as being set apart somewhat from the other and (perhaps) more serious concerns of daily life. Although it is likely that the pleasures found in play may certainly contribute to one's overall happiness, the present concern is more directly related to pleasure than it is to happiness. Although it is true that by using only Mill's guides to action and the utilitarian principle of pleasure in general, one gives short shrift to the very characteristics of Mill which distinguished him from other utilitarians - the quality of pleasure - it must be realized that the present concern is much less extensive than the questions to which Mill addressed his attention. That is to say, the applications made here are simple, basic and do not utilize most of Mill's concerns. Nevertheless, the application does appear appropriate. If play's purpose is the pursuit of pleasure, and implicitly, the avoidance of pain or displeasure, then it seems very useful to rely to some extent on the man who supplied us with the official manifesto of the morality of promoting pleasures and avoiding pains.

B. BELIEFS ABOUT THE NATURE OF MAN

Introduction

The definition of morality illustrates that beliefs
about the nature of man represent an important element in the composite of beliefs, ideals, rules and motives that make up the total of any morality. How a man sees himself, what he believes himself to be and what he thinks his essential nature is has no small influence on what he considers to be good and bad, right and wrong, and therefore, on how he acts. It is true that investigations of moralities must focus on action and behaviour. It should be remembered, however, as it was stated in the accepted definition of belief, that there is a relationship between belief and action; an understanding of beliefs then, is useful to an understanding of actions and the morality in which they occur.

Beliefs about the nature of man form the foundations of a morality; they set the tone or spirit of the composite. One's final justification for any action or disposition, if he is pressed to provide such a defense, often is dependent upon what he believes to be the ultimate and essential qualities that make man what he is. He may emphasize that a certain action is either right or wrong, or that a certain end is either good or bad as it tends to be either consistent or inconsistent with what he believes to be the elements of man's nature. He often uses his beliefs to justify his actions and dispositions.

An investigation into a morality must naturally place its emphasis on those persons who are involved in
that morality. Such a necessity may appear to be obvious, but it has not been so understood. When looking at a morality one must be careful not to let his own beliefs form the foundation on which the morality is supposedly based. The investigator must always remember that he is to analyze the participants' beliefs, not his own. Such a shortcoming is particularly characteristic of many of those works which attempt to legislate the type of behaviour appropriate to athletics. The article: "The Education of the Playground," written by a clergyman in 1859 (previously discussed), describes the kind of behaviour which that clergyman believes is appropriate to the games of cricket and rugby. Such an account is certainly justifiable so long as it is made clear that the written characterization of the games is based not necessarily on what is the case, but instead, on the author's notions of what should be the case. The present investigation is not particularly concerned with observers' beliefs, but rather, attempts to concentrate on those of the participants - not on what someone outside the two moralities emphasizes should be the case, but more on what those intimately involved believe is the case.

Although athletes and players likely involve themselves in several different moralities, characterized by

diverse beliefs and values, the present examination concerns itself with only those beliefs and values related to their involvement in either the morality of athletics or play.

It must be remembered that there is a connection between belief and action. Although it is debatable and yet undecided in philosophical circles whether all action, here understood as conscious and voluntary, is caused by or based on belief, there is little doubt that consistent, conscious and voluntary actions are connected to belief. Beliefs, then, normally can be inferred from one's actions. Athletic beliefs can be inferred from athletic actions; play beliefs from play actions. They are not bare inferences, however, ones that cannot be substantiated by various works and expressions of athletic or play beliefs, but rather, inferences that are substantiated not only through the literature but are supportable as well through an argument based on a general and total understanding of the consistency of each of the moralities of athletics and play.

A charge of circularity may be made against such a use of inference to investigate belief. A critic may state that if the investigator justifies the existence of particular beliefs through the use of action, it would be circular to later justify action on the basis of belief. Such a criticism confuses the morality under scrutiny with the
investigation itself. It is incumbent upon moral agents to justify actions and beliefs; it is not incumbent upon one who is simply looking at a morality to justify any actions or beliefs within it. The circularity that such a criticism imputes may be a characteristic of the morality, but not of the investigation. A moral agent generally has beliefs; if they are strong enough those beliefs probably move him to action; he very likely justifies some or all of those actions (if he considers them to be right), on the basis of his beliefs. If he were to then turn around and also justify his beliefs on the basis of his actions, he could very well be involved in a circularity. Whether such circularities exist within the moralities, however, in no way indicates circularity in the investigation. The investigation infers beliefs from actions, not to justify them, but simply to illustrate and explain them, always working on the assumption that consistent conscious and voluntary action is somewhat reflective of belief. When it comes time to explain actions, however, the investigation does not need to infer them from belief (if that could even be accomplished); it will simply look at them, for, unlike belief, they are available for everyone to see. Then an explanation can be made, or implied, of how such actions are justified, not by the investigation, but by the beliefs of the moral agents who involve themselves in the particular morality in question.
The discussion of the beliefs about the nature of man in each of the moralities of athletics and play is necessarily restricted to the general rule and excludes from the presentation many of the possible exceptions. There may be athletes, for instance, who do not act according to their alleged beliefs. Although all of their actions may be similar to their fellow athletes, and they compete intensely, for one reason or another, it might be the case that they loathe competition and think it a despicable human endeavour. It must be assumed for the purpose of avoiding a myriad of side-stepping, hair-splitting exceptions, that those who consistently compete in athletics, for instance, hold that competition is valuable, or at least do not repudiate competition. Although there may be a substantial number of such inconsistent persons in any morality, it must nevertheless be agreed that the general nature of a morality is best revealed through an understanding of that which is most often the case.

**Athletic beliefs about the nature of man**

It is reasonable to suggest that athletes believe athletes to be competitive beings. There is ample justification for one holding that belief in the athletic morality. An athlete must compete to make the team; he must compete with even his teammates for certain positions, and, of course, he must compete with the opposition for
victory. Professional athletes, in addition to these, also compete for the prize and the financial remuneration that accompanies success. A belief in man's competitiveness is not only consistent with and complimentary to the ultimate purpose of athletics, but it is perhaps a belief that logically cannot be avoided. The purpose of athletics is to pursue victory in the contest. All athletes, by definition, pursue that end. Victory, however, by its nature, is an exclusive or limited end; two cannot emerge victorious from a contest unless they are on the same team. It can be attained simultaneously by relatively few athletes; it must be competed for.

It would be strange to even think of victory as the result of something other than competition or conflict. James Keating defines competition as:

...an attempt, according to agreed-upon rules, to get or to keep any valuable thing either to the exclusion of others or in greater measure than others.28

Most economic, political or courtship competitive situations, Keating emphasized, are engaged in out of necessity rather than by design. Athletics, in contrast, is freely engaged in making it one of the purest forms of competition.29 Athletes most certainly do attempt to get

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29 Ibid.
and to keep a valuable "thing" to the exclusion of others; that "thing" is victory. The relationship is even more direct in football and to a lesser degree in hockey, basketball and soccer, where actual territory is held, attacked, defended, possessed and excluded from others' desires and efforts to gain control of it.

To be extremely competitive in athletics is a valuable asset. One of the most complimentary statements one athlete can give to another is to emphasize he has "a lot of drive." Often athletes are applauded for their great "will to win," their "desire," their "spirit" and their "aggressiveness" - terms which all refer to one's competitiveness. It is not rare to hear or read of relationships expressed between the values of competitiveness and upstanding character. Merchant illustrates:

George Allen, ... once said of a rookie, "He almost regurgitated at half time, and it took Gatorade and smelling salts to revive him. He showed me he's got character."30

Merchant goes on to state cynically that "character, courage and similar goodies are shorthand for relentless aggressiveness, for being a tough competitor."31

An athlete's competitiveness brings him success.


31 Ibid., p. 119.
Often athletes wish they had more of it - they may envy those who do, especially their opposition. In this vein, Keating cites Frank Beard, 1969's top-money winner in golf.

The No. 1 guys have to be almost totally self-centered. They have to possess an incredible burning for success. They have to ignore their friends and their enemies and sometimes their families, and they have to concentrate entirely upon winning, upon being No. 1. There's no other way to get to the top. ... There are many days I wish I had their singleness of purpose. But I don't ... If I tried it, I'd fail. I couldn't survive that constant intensity, that constant burning. I admire - hell, I envy their ability to burn and burn and burn.32

On the other hand, perhaps the strongest criticism an athlete can receive is that he is not competitive enough. Any show of timidity or apprehension by an athlete may result in him being thought of as "gutless." Coaches attempting to bring their team to a fever pitch may deride them for "not wanting to win enough," not having enough "spirit," or "pride," or enough "killer instinct!" With that constant emphasis the athlete is likely to soon believe that competitiveness is the key to victory and all that is good in his activity.

To assume that athletes do not believe in competitiveness, to think that it is not considered to be an essential and valuable element of man's nature in the athletic activity is incongruous. Suppose that an athlete did not believe that

competitiveness was good, and, acting according to that belief, he no longer competed. Such an understanding is nonsensical because if he no longer competed he could no longer pursue victory and by definition he would not be an athlete. But athletes do compete, do value competition and envy its abundance in their opponents. Again, assuming that consistent action is grounded in or partially explainable by belief, it is reasonable to think that in athletics man's nature is believed to be competitive.

Athletes pursue victory: they must compete against others; they must defeat others to attain their ends. In such a situation there is no one to ultimately depend upon other than themselves. Although it may be an uncomfortable awareness or perhaps a challenging one, the athlete must be cognizant of the fact that he is ultimately alone in his pursuit; normally no one else will help him attain his goals. Most are even trying to stop him from reaching success. The athlete must work for his own interests because it is reasonably certain that few others will intentionally help; athletes know athletes are self-interested. Slusher helps to explain why:

Darwinism has established the principle of survival of the fittest. But the "fit" in sport are not those with the qualities of concern, love, empathy, care, passion and respect for personhood. To survive in the world of sport man better not have these qualities. To be hard, to be strong and to be rough - these are the qualities that pay dividends....The Bible would not have a
chance against the likes of Darwin in a war or in sport.\textsuperscript{33}

The athletic situation demands that athletes always choose their own interests over the interests of others. If they do not, they may be surpassed by others who do. Self-interest is the natural result of competition for an exclusive end, and even though, as Slusher illustrates, athletes may sometimes suffer guilt feelings, their methods cannot be avoided.

The "other's" body is thought of as a thing and is often manoeuvred for the achievement of personal satisfaction. It is not unusual for players to sense this feeling in themselves and others and feel "guilty" about being selfish. Yet when one gets down to cases, sport is much like survival. In life co-operation may provide for quality but in survival man wants just to exist.\textsuperscript{34}

Slusher's poignant use of the terms "survival," and "existence," although strong, are not inappropriate descriptions of the condition in athletics. To express survival and existence as goals implies that there is a very basic struggle - not a struggle for the complements of life, but for life itself. George Allen, head coach of the Washington Redskins, illustrates that indeed life and death do depend on victory and defeat: "The winner..."


\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 39.
is the only individual who is truly alive. I've said
this to our ball club: 'every time you win, you're re-
born; when you lose, you die a little.'³⁵ Although Allen's
statement might very well be true in varying degrees for
all athletic situations, Keating emphasizes there are
even more complications for many professional athletes.

Victories, superior performances, and
high ratings are essential to financial
success in professional athletics. Too
frequent defeat will result in forced
unemployment. It is easy, therefore,
for a professional athlete to view his
competitors with a jaundiced eye; to
see them as men who seek to deprive
him of his livelihood.³⁶

The athlete is well aware that many of his opponents, if
left unchecked, can and usually will cause him serious
harm. It is understandable that such an environment would
foster the recognition that if one is to be successful, if
he is to attain victory and survive against the efforts of
those ambitious men who seek to destroy him, he must act
in a manner which further's only his own interests.

All athletes must fear defeat to a certain degree.
If it comes, it is instigated through the abilities and
efforts of one's opponents. To an extent, then,
athletes must live in fear of the other, depending on the

³⁵ George Allen with Joe Marshall, "A Hundred Percent
is Not Enough," Sports Illustrated, July 9, 1973, p. 76.

³⁶ James Keating, "Sportsmanship as a Moral Category."
Ethics, 85 (October, 1964), 32.
other's power. Thomas Hobbes emphasizes that among citizens "the cause of mutual fear consists partly in the natural equality of men, partly in their mutual will of hurting; whence it comes to pass, that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to ourselves the least security."³⁷ Victory is an exclusive end and as Hobbes illustrates:

...the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is the strongest must be decided by the sword.³⁸

Weiss implies the same, and offers a description of the accompanying insecurity.

The dazzling triumphs possible in sport and sometimes its material rewards, are hard to duplicate. But none of these prevent the athlete from being haunted by a sense that he will be proved to be incompetent, not really first-rate, even if he had shown himself to be the opposite just a short while before. Despite this apprehension he continues to participate, persistently and sometimes with fervor.³⁹

Although it is more likely that athletes fervently compete because of their apprehension rather than "despite" it.

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³⁸Ibid., p. 115.

Weiss is correct when he suggests that even the most victorious are not immune from the fear of pending defeat, and thus pain. It does not matter how successful one has been in the past, nor how many victories he has realized; even the consistent victor is well aware that many are intense with the hope of defeating him. Hobbes illustrates that the struggle is never-ending.

...it is perpetual in its own nature; because in regard of the equality of those that strive, it cannot be ended by victory. For in this state the conqueror is subject to so much danger, as it were, to be accounted a miracle, if any, even the most strong, should close up his life with many years and old age.40

To increase that life-span, all athletes, even the most successful, must always operate to deter the success of others and in the same motion promote only the success of themselves.

But team games, it is sometimes argued, offer a good example of the reverse. As has been reviewed, some literature states that playing on a team offers athletes many opportunities for the development and expression of co-operation and self-sacrifice. Slusher disagrees.

Traditionally togetherness has been conceived in sport literature, as a derivative of team-work. This proposition, as naive as it may sound, purports that the sport situation encourages the individual to regulate himself to the good of the team. Naive? Yes! Because all the norms of our competitive world discourage such altruism. Why should

40 Hobbes, De Cive, p. 118.
As Slusher implies, whatever one does for the good of the team, one also does for the good of the self. The good of the team usually means the good of the self. Because guards in basketball, for instance, consistently pass, set up plays and make assists, they are often-moralistically referred to as "self-sacrificing team players." The reference is made as if such a player is going beyond the call of duty, above what is required of him, and as though he had a real choice in the matter. Certainly such a man is a great team player, but he is not necessarily hallowed with moral rectitude because of it. If he is a professional, making good passes, setting up plays, and assisting on baskets is the man's job — those skills are precisely what he is being paid to perform. If he could not, or would not carry out those requirements adequately, then he soon would be displaced by someone who could. Each instance of a guard's "team-work," as it is called, benefits him in two ways: it helps the team, and it demonstrates to those who are paying for his power that he is performing his job well and is worth the price; he is more powerful because of those actions; his worth increases.

41 Slusher, Man, Sport and Existence: A Critical Analysis, pp. 72-73.
The actions of offensive linemen in football provide another example. A quarterback's ability to function is related to his line's strength in blocking; he depends on the linemen for enough protection to complete the "play." To think, however, that linemen savagely block opponents away from their quarterback out of concern for the "other," or, out of self-sacrifice, is to misunderstand the nature of team athletics. It is inappropriate to even think of the athlete who supposedly operates for "the good of the team," as being concerned for the interests of the "other." It is still self-interest because, ideally, the team is the "self." The total "team self" is a composite of all the individual "selves" that are on it. There are no "others" on one's own team; the "other" is the composite of individual "others" that make up the opposing team.

In athletics man acts in a competitive, self-interested manner. Assuming that consistent conscious action is explainable by belief, it can be inferred that athletes believe themselves, and others like themselves, to be competitive and self-interested. The explanation and typification of these two characteristic beliefs has been brief and provides only a skeletal understanding of the nature of man in athletics. It is not meant to be a total understanding of all that a man perhaps is believed to be; he is probably many other "things" as well. He may, for instance, be believed to be extremely aggressive
or perhaps work-dominated. These characteristics, however, although apparent in many athletes, are not found in all; there are too many exceptions to categorically emphasize that they are part of man's essential nature in athletics. Only those beliefs that appear to be essential and universal have been elucidated. On the other hand, athletes likely believe that man is a sentient and rational being as well. Beliefs such as those, however, although undoubtedly true, are not peculiar to athletes, but characteristic of man universally, and have been deleted from the presentation because they add no additional insight into the particulars of the athletic morality. Beliefs in man's competitiveness and his self-interest appear to be the only distinguishing, peculiar and yet universal beliefs about man's nature in the morality of athletics.

Play beliefs about the nature of man

A player's actions are much different from the athlete's; he is neither competitive nor self-interested in the athletic sense. A negative approach, although partially useful in providing a juxtapositional understanding of play in contrast with athletics, does not wholly explain what play is in itself. The emphasis must be not on what play is not, but rather on what it is.

By definition, play is engaged in for the fun and pleasure contained within the activity itself. By definition, as well then, player's pursue pleasure, and therefore
can be considered to be pleasure-seeking or hedonistic. It is only a short jump to the statement that players believe that man is a pleasure-seeking or hedonistic being, at least in the play situation.

It may be argued quite strongly that few players are cognizant of such a belief. It must be agreed that it would be rare to hear a player express: "I believe that man in play is a hedonistic being." Players, why even people in general, do not speak in that manner. That is not evidence against the claim that players generally hold such a belief, however. It is quite common to hear persons respond to the question: "Why do you play?" with "I play for fun," or "I play for the pleasure," or, "I find the game is enjoyable or pleasureable." He would then have to agree that while he was playing he was a man seeking pleasure, or, a hedonist. It is true that players may not often express such a belief, but there is no reason for him to do so.

A second possible criticism is: to say players believe man to be a pleasure-seeking being is to say nothing, for all men seek pleasure to a certain degree. It could be argued that athletes pursue pleasure through victory and that it is simply a matter of different ends bringing pleasure to different persons. The truth of such an argument cannot be seriously doubted; if victory did not result in immense pleasure it is doubtful that the athlete would
continue to fervently pursue it. Without wishing to open Pandora's box on the polemical topic of the various types, quantities, qualities and intensities of pleasure, it is nevertheless here suggested that in comparison to athletics, the pleasure sought in play and the way it is pursued is still quite different. Perhaps it is because the pursuit is more direct; there does not appear to be any important intermediate goals, such as victory in athletics, the attainment of which results in pleasure. Athletes pursue victory; victory gives them pleasure. Players pursue pleasure; the pursuit gives them pleasure. It may be true that all persons ultimately pursue pleasure, but in play where all actions are devoted to that end, the pursuit is more direct than eventual.

The approach that players take in regard to preparation for play is based on an additional belief which not only "bears out" the belief in the "pleasure-seekingness" of man, but also acts as its corollary. It is usually held that in play man should have a leisurely, carefree attitude. This does not mean that the player should not try hard once he is playing, but rather, that the results should not be so important to him that he must prepare intensely for the activity. There is no need for such work. Pleasure is an inclusive goal; it can be obtained by all; the attainment of it by one or several does not limit its ability to be attained by still more people. There is no
need for competition and no intense preparation. The attitude is simply to play. Keating emphasizes the inappropriateness of associating dedication with sport (here called play).

If sport is that which diverts and makes mirth, how can one call for dedication, sacrifice and suffering? Is it not meaningless to speak of dedicating oneself to an activity which is by definition, a diversion, a pastime?42

It is not only meaningless as Keating points out; it can be argued that a player dedicated to good performances in play may even be looked down upon or not often "played with." One who repeatedly practices, who is intensely concerned with his performance and who cannot bear losing is not considered by many to be a valuable play partner or "playmate." He robs the game of much of its mirth and joviality; he adds an ingredient of "real seriousness" which many would like to play without. Some golfers can be characterized by this description. Be reminded of the occasional golfer, who, because he practices at the range after work, consistently scores better than the other three members of his foursome. Yet, he is often unhappy. Whenever he makes a bad shot he grimaces and he curses; he kicks the divot and throws his club. The others are sometimes secretly amused at his unpleasant antics, but are

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quite aware that they dare not express it. Their carefree and jovial attitude is curtailed, especially when it is his turn to shoot. They tell him to relax, calm down, take it easy, and not take the game so seriously, but it is to no avail. If it is a serious enough situation the three players may eventually change their golf day and find an additional fourth. Such a serious, unrelentlessly and athletic-like attitude is inappropriate to the play activity. Although it is the serious person who will eventually be successful in athletics, the above players are not pursuing success in their golf, simply pleasure.

The player believes himself and others like himself to be socially dependent or socially oriented in play. Players must depend on others to help maximize the pleasure of the game. The competitiveness and self-interest of the athlete does not increase the sum of pleasure, but detracts from its sum. Such attitudes are inappropriate to play. Co-operation and self-sacrifice are qualities thought to be more valuable; possessors of these usually make good playmates. Although Keating is referring to sportsmanship, his statements are indicative of the co-operative, socially oriented conception he has of play.

...generosity and magnanimity are essential ingredients in the conduct and attitude properly described as sportsmanlike. They establish and maintain the unique social bond; they guarantee that the purpose of sport—the immediate pleasure of the participants—
will not be sacrificed to other more selfish ends.43

Players know that if their playmate plays selfishly, some of the potential pleasure will not be realized. A player's self-interested actions probably will result not only in the decreased pleasure of the playmate, but, because of the effects of such actions, his own as well. One depends on the other.

A true player does appear to have concern for the other's well-being. In golf he tries to soothe the pain of a poor stroke; he praises and applauds a good shot and constantly gives encouragement to those friends who appear to benefit from it. In tennis, if he is well-skilled enough, he plays according to his playmate's ability; if the other cannot return his serves, he will serve them so that he can; if the other's backhand is poor, he will keep the ball on his forehand side. He does not sacrifice his own pleasure performing these actions however; he still attempts to enjoy the activity as much as he can.

Such a concern for the pleasure of the self and the other reminds one of J. A. Brunton's article "Egoism and Morality," which describes the differences among a rationalist's, an altruist's, and an egoist's understandings and reactions to another's pain in comparison to his own.

...the 'rationalist' will say, the mere fact that it is my pain is irrelevant.

If it is in all respects like someone else's pain it is my duty to give it just so much attention and alleviation as I would give to his and no more. No! The Altruist will say; just because my pain is (a) no more acute than my neighbour's pain and yet (b) so much more hard for me to bear than his pain, I, as a moral agent, must try to transcend my immediate feelings, and help my neighbour despite myself. The Egoist will take a third view. Whilst admitting that his neighbour's pain is, for his neighbour, as acute as his own, he, the Egoist, will argue that nevertheless the mere location of the pain in another person is a highly relevant factor and sufficient reason for him to adopt a planned policy of avoiding pains for himself. 44

Athletes are clearly the third of these; they must always choose the avoidance of their own pain over helping others to avoid theirs. Players, however, are generally neither egoists nor altruists, but rather the third, rationalists. Keating illustrates that all actions in play should operate from the following maxim.

Always conduct yourself in such a manner that you will increase rather than detract from the pleasure to be found in the activity, both your own and that of your fellow participants. 45

Keating's maxim, from which his understanding of sportsmanship is derived, has close connections with Mill's utilitarianism, and with the Golden Rule.


As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. "To do as you would be done by," and "to love your neighbour as yourself," constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.\(^{46}\)

The above quotations by Brunton, Keating, Mill, and even Jesus help to point out more clearly the "unique social bond" which exists in the play morality. The nature of the activity demands that one be co-operative, a moral rationalist, and in general and awkwardly phrased, a socially oriented person.

When one goes out to play he anticipates a friendly sociable atmosphere. He usually plays with friends who mutually value their relationship. One does not want to spoil that festive air with actions that are inappropriate. He depends on the same attitude from his playmates – a sociable one. He believes he is concerned with their well-being; he believes he has a sociable attitude; he believes that in play, he, and others like himself, are socially oriented.

Although the description has been brief, player's beliefs about the nature of man in play indicate pleasure-seeking and social orientation. It is a skeletal sketch. As Keating points out, however,

Our concern is not with those virtues

\(^{46}\) Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 22.
which might be found in the sportsman. Nor is it with those virtues which often accompany the sportsman. Our concern is rather with those moral habits or qualities which are essential, which characterize the participant as a sportsman.\textsuperscript{47}

Seeking pleasure and being socially oriented or dependent on the other, appear to be the only qualities which fulfill such a requirement. It is difficult to think of others that specifically characterize the nature of man in play and which cannot be included within the two qualities already mentioned. It is the belief in pleasure-seeking or hedonism, along with the belief in man's social orientation that provide the basis and the justification of most of the morally relevant actions in the play morality.

C. BELIEFS ABOUT IDEALS, ABOUT WHAT IS GOOD OR DESIRABLE AS WORTHY OF PURSUIT FOR ITS OWN SAKE

Introduction

It is thought that every activity, artistic or scientific, in fact every deliberate action or pursuit, has for its object the attainment of some good... Since modes of action involving the practiced hand and the instructed brain are numerous, the number of these ends are proportionately large. For instance, the end of medical science is health; of military science, victory; of economic science, wealth... - in all these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to those of the subordinate skills, for it is the former that provide the motive for pursuing the latter.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{47} Keating, "Sportsmanship as a Moral Category," p. 29

Aristotle subsequently illustrates that knowledge of the good is advantageous in the conducting of our lives, for we have a better chance of achieving the good, once we know what it is.\textsuperscript{49}

Unlike Aristotle's emphasis on the sole good, toward which all other goods in all activities aim, the present section concentrates on those ends considered to be good in the moralities of athletics and play. "It is thought that every activity, artistic or scientific, in fact every deliberate action or pursuit, has for its object the attainment of some good."\textsuperscript{50} Athletics and play are no different; they too have as their objects the attainment of some good or goods, some "thing," or "things," toward which all actions aim. Goods are objects pursued for their own sake; they are not valued as they tend to lead to other desirable objects beyond themselves; to attain them absolutely is to be absolutely successful.

Goods, ends, ideals, or objects considered worthy of pursuit for their own sake are understood in either quantitative or qualitative terminology. Although money is usually valued for the objects of one's desire that it can purchase, it is probably considered by some to be an end in itself. It is a quantitative good; there is only

\textsuperscript{49}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{50}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 25.
so much of it to go around, as is painfully known by many. The possession of it by one, limits its possession by others; the wealth of one means the poverty of another. Characteristic of all quantitativ goods, wealth can be a reality for relatively few persons.

In contrast, qualitative goods cannot be understood in terms of quantity, finity, or exclusive possession. Honesty, if it was considered to be an end in itself, would be a qualitative good. It has no amount and it cannot be measured by quantitative means. Although its attainment is limited not by its own nature, but by the nature of those who are supposedly attempting to acquire it, the attainment of it by one can in no way limit its ability to be attained by others. Theoretically, everyone can be honest; if they desire it, it can be held by all men simultaneously.

Some moralities are characterized by quantitative goods, while others have as their objects of pursuit qualitative ends. Such a distinction is important because the methods used to attain ends are partially predetermined by the nature of those goods. If a limited end is desired enough by enough men, it will be competed for, which is probably the most fair way of determining who shall have it. Qualitative goods, however, are limitless and in contrast do not necessitate competition. On the contrary, the attainment of them by one, through example, may even
lead others to possess these goods as well. The ramifications of this distinction between quantitative and qualitative goods will be exceedingly important throughout the entire thesis.

Athletic beliefs about ideals, about what is good or desirable as worthy of pursuit for its own sake

The athlete has been typified as believing fellow athletes to be competitive and self-interested by nature. To engage in athletics he must compete for victory; he must be concerned with virtually only his own interests. But just what is it that he is pursuing? What is it that he deems worthy of pursuing for its own sake—worthy of that intense effort? Is there only one such end? Several? Many? Are there some goals, which although appearing to be pursued for their own sake, are actually simply means to other higher goods? The answers to questions such as these will provide an understanding of the "good" or the "goods," considered to be so in the athletic morality.

By definition, the pursuit of victory is the essence of athletics. It is not bold to claim that athletes consider victory to be at least one of their objects of pursuit; that is why they compete and are self-interested. The related literature reviewed earlier made it very clear that victory was the most important end of athletics. It is unnecessary at this point to list more than a few of the numerous statements made by athletes which emphatically
point to their need for victory. James Keating, in his several works analyzing athletics and sport (play), does this excellently and should be referred to if that type of substantiation is required. After citing several athletes and coaches expressing their addiction to victory, Keating emphasizes that "...the most uncompromising statement of this position has been attributed to the late Jim Tatum,... 'I don't think winning is the most important thing. I think it is the only thing.' \(^51\) In a recent Canadian television broadcast, entitled: "It's Winning That Counts," several players and the coach of a Metropolitan Toronto Hockey League team (perhaps the highest calibre of pee wee hockey in Canada) emphasized the importance of winning.

After all of the players had verbalized that the goal of the season was to win this tournament and that championship, with absolutely no mention of any other goals, the coach, not surprisingly, gave the most poignant expression of all. Emphatically he stated: "Our objective is to win everything...everything that can be won, we want to win it." \(^52\) Throughout the total broadcast, which focused on the team's practices, games and the intensity

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\(^51\) Keating, "Winning in Sport and Athletics," p. 203.

\(^52\) Curly Davis, "It's Winning That Counts," CBC-TV, Tuesday, September 19, 1972.
with which victory was pursued, there was never an indication that victory was not their overriding objective. Although it is true that all athletes pursue victory by definition, there is ample evidence and content to sustain the truth of that understanding.

In addition to illustrating the athlete's dominant concern for victory, Keating provides supplemental evidence by a linguistic analysis of the term "athletics" in relation to the "prize."

This element is the prize, the crown of victory, the raison d'être of athletics. Etymologically, the various English forms of the word "athlete" are derived from the Greek verb athlein - to contend for a prize, or the nouns, athlos - contest, or athlon - prize awarded for the successful completion of the contest. An oblique insight into the nature of athletics is obtained when we realize that the word "agony" comes from the Greek agonía - a contest or a struggle for victory in the games.53

Weiss points out that "victory is what is normally signalized at the close of a game."54 Victory means the game is over. Athletes do not stop contesting when they are tired, when they have figured that they have done the best they are going to do, or when they have enjoyed the activity enough for one day; they stop only when victory and defeat have been declared. Although there are some

53Keating, "Winning in Sport and Athletics," p. 204.
54Weiss, Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry, p. 175.
games, football for instance, that can end in a tie score, most are played until one is victorious, and recently, there has even been talk of making professional football that way as well. To be victorious is not only an end as it is a sought after state of existence, but victory is the structural end of the contest as well; one that the contest is always moving towards. Even the structure of the game naturally tends to promote the athlete's belief that victory is a good or an end worth pursuing for its own sake.

There is little doubt that victory is pursued and considered valuable by athletes. It is unclear, however, whether it is thought of only as end in itself, valuable for its own sake, or whether it is also considered to be so for the benefits or other goods which tend to accompany or result from it. Prestige, self-fulfillment, success and financial reward are perhaps the most common qualities or states of existence that are associated with victory. Are these ends in themselves?

The concept of prestige and its role in the morality of athletics is complicated and difficult to discuss with exactly the correct amount of emphasis to thereby ensure that its importance neither be under nor over-stressed. What is prestige's relationship with victory? Is prestige an end in itself? If it is, does that necessarily imply that victory is merely a means? These questions, intricate
and interrelating as they are, necessitate responses if the role of prestige is to be properly understood.

Without victory, or at least the athlete's individual success, there can be no prestige. One's prestige is usually directly proportional with his ability in attaining victory and avoiding defeat. Each win, if it is against a worthy opponent, increases one's prestige; numerous successes result in great prestige, not only among spectators, but within the athletic community as well. In athletics there are few ways to attain prestige other than through victory, or individual success.

Since fame, acclaim or prestige results from victory, does that necessarily imply that prestige is an end above and beyond victory - an end worthy of pursuit for its own sake? That is such a difficult question, but yet an important one necessitating consideration. The problem, of course, is complicated by the fact that in athletics, just as in all moralities, there are agents who value prestige more than others, and it would be simplistic to attempt to suggest a categorical response. In any morality it is difficult to pursue prestige directly; it must be earned; it must be given to one by others who recognize he has attained ends or ideals considered worthy of pursuit for their own sake. If it is discovered that an individual, previously considered prestigious, has not actually attained those valued ends, he may be regarded as
a fraud or charlatan. Although observers and outsiders may be duped by "prestige-pursuing" performances such as grandstanding, and making plays appear more difficult than they are, those within the morality are not so easily fooled and view those responsible for such actions with disrespect. Unless he resorts to these inappropriate methods, there is little the athlete can do to gain prestige other than to pursue victory. One could even go so far as to suggest that the athlete has little control over the matter; whether he desires prestige or not (if that is likely), if he wins or is successful, he is going to have it; if he loses, he is not.

The question remains, however, whether prestige is valued as an end in itself. Despite the fact that prestige necessarily accompanies victory, irrespective of one's desires, prestige could still be believed by some to be an object worthy of pursuit for its own sake. There are arguments which suggest that it is an end; there are others to suggest that it is not.

The thought that athletes pursue prestige for its own sake is an uncomfortable one for many. It is regarded as too common, too terrestrial and almost vulgar. Surely such great men have ends beyond the mere hand-shaking, back-slapping and adulation of their admiring fans. Surely they live, train, practice and compete as intensely as they do for more than such demeaning, debasing goals.
Although such an argument may be guilty of attempting to once again place external standards of right and good on the morality of athletics, it is not without merit. It must be admitted that many athletes probably bask in popularity, publicity and the adulation of their fans. But one would think that after initial enchantment much of the everyday publicity, hand-shaking, autograph-signing and the accompanying inability to have personal privacy would prove to be quite troublesome. It appears that many "stars" endure these daily rituals out of duty and necessity rather than out of design or desire.

At times, an excess of such prestige can prove detrimental to the athlete's pursuits. Hank Aaron, in his present effort to surpass Babe Ruth's lifetime homerun total, is experiencing some of the problems associated with fame. His actions do not reflect one who values prestige for its own sake.

Hounded by newsmen and autograph seekers wherever he goes, he has taken to holing up in his hotel room on road trips. At home, he avoids the crowds by parking his car in the stadium tunnel instead of the player's parking lot.55

At the present time it is likely that Aaron views the prestige that is engulfing him as more destructive, or, at least more distracting than it is desirable.

On the other hand, several other characteristics

of Aaron's behavior in the past several months do indicate that he is pursuing prestige and values it for its own sake. Perhaps it is a different kind of prestige. He was upset when Bowie Kuhn, the commissioner of baseball, did not officially congratulate him on his seven hundredth home-run. Baseball's Hall of Fame similarly aroused his anger by refusing to shelve several Aaron artifacts or mementos that might preserve his legend for all time. Finally, although he has repeatedly stated that he does not want people to forget Babe Ruth, he has just as strongly emphasized that he wants them to remember Hank Aaron too.  

Perhaps there are two kinds of prestige: one immediate, and one long-range. The drawbacks of the immediate day-to-day kind of prestige have been presented and make it questionable whether prestige, in this sense, is valued for its own sake. One would rather have it over its reverse, of course, precisely because if one has it, it means that he has been or is being victorious. It is symbolic of victory, and most athletes will endure any amount of hand-shaking and autograph-signing as long as they continue winning.

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57 P. J. Galasso, Ph.D., private discussion, Dean, Faculty of Physical and Health Education, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada, August 7, 1973.
The durable long-range kind of prestige is quite different; it carries with it no disagreeable aspects. There are probably few athletes, in fact, few persons in general in this world, who would not like to be remembered for some outstanding achievement. Few athletes make or break records; fewer still establish records that go unbroken for many years. Such an accomplishment is the epitome, the pinnacle, the paragon of the athletic endeavour. Man's quest for immorality is no less apparent in the athletic morality than in any other. To have one's name in a record book for all time, to be admitted to the Hall of Fame, to be recognized as one of the premier athletes in the sport's history are the dreams of most athletes. Immorality, most certainly, is not common, not terrestrial, nor vulgar. It is reasonable to suggest that athletes do believe long-range durable prestige to be an end worthy of pursuit for its own sake.

A final question remains. If the long-range durable kind of prestige is believed to be a good valued for itself, and since it can be attained only through victory, does that mean that victory is not an end in itself, but rather, merely a means? Although that may appear to be the case, it might be more consistent with experience to view both victory and long-range prestige as ends in themselves, but separated by time.\footnote{\textit{ibid.}} Victory is the immediate goal; day-to-
day it is sought after; all efforts are repeatedly directed towards its attainment. Durable prestige, however, can usually be accomplished only after many years of dedication and peerless performance. It is apparent that the great majority of athletes will never attain it; they must recognize that fact, and yet, irrespective of that realistic belief, they continue to fervently pursue victory in the contest. It must again be emphasized that the focus here is on beliefs, more specifically, athletes' beliefs about ideals, goods or ends worthy of pursuit for their own sake. It could logically and quite simply be argued that victory in the contest is the means to the attainment of durable prestige, and thus not an end in itself. Such an understanding, although reasonable enough and logically persuasive, may not be completely and accurately descriptive of what is actually believed. Victory and winning are considered to be and are upheld as the ends worthy of pursuit; they do not appear to be believed to be means even though logically they may very well be. But again, verity is not requisite to belief.

Some persons suggest that athletes pursue what they pursue for the goal of self-fulfillment.

Is it sufficient to say that man seeks gain? One does not come to "lose." But this demands an explanation of "gain." Is winning sufficient or is its relationship to self-fulfillment that which claims its importance? 59

59 Slusher, Man, Sport and Existence, p. 55.
Self-fulfillment, as it is thought to be an end worthy of pursuit for its own sake, has been gaining in popularity in recent years; it likely has been espoused as the end of virtually all of man's various pursuits. Indicative of the rising concern for humanity and individuality, self-fulfillment has a magnetic existential ring about it which attracts and pulls one to the realization that the fulfillment of the self is surely one of the more important goals a man could have in any activity.

But what does it mean? Would you know what a man was pursuing if he were to say: "I am pursuing self-fulfillment as an end in itself"? Just what would one see if he were to study another who was allegedly pursuing self-fulfillment? These questions may appear odd, but only because they point to the misuse of the term in question. Can pursuing the goal of self-fulfillment mean anything more than seeking those ends which one thinks one would be happy to acquire? Achieving self-fulfillment similarly means nothing more than bringing that pursuit to successful completion. To say to another that you are pursuing self-fulfillment tells him nothing more than the fact that there are a number of ends, ideals or objects that you are pursuing, but have not yet got.

Howard Slusher, an existentialist, asks the question whether winning is sufficient in itself or is its importance based on its relationship to self-fulfillment. 60

60 Ibid.
Such a query appears to be an example of asking the wrong question. Understanding self-fulfillment as above, it is possible to paraphrase Slusher’s question nonsensically: "Is winning a sufficient object of one's pursuit, or is its relationship to the pursuit of pursuing those ends which one would be happy to acquire but has not yet got, that which claims its importance?" The acquisition of victory, for those who desire it, brings self-fulfillment. One does not simply pursue self-fulfillment. One pursues specific ends he desires and when he achieves them, perhaps then he is self-fulfilled. Indeed, self-fulfillment is an end of athletics, but it is too general; all activities engaged in by man have such an end.

Some similarly tout that success is considered by athletes to be an end worth pursuing for its own sake. It is similar to self-fulfillment, however, in that it is too general and provides no specific information about what is actually sought. Athletes pursue success. Most certainly they do, but so do all men. The term "success" simply illustrates having achieved those goals that are considered worthy of pursuit. An investigation into those ends, such as victory, the attainment of which means success, will cast more light on the morality of athletics than will the generality of success in itself.

Prestige has been discussed as a necessary accompaniment to victory in athletics that may or may not be pursued
for its own sake. Professional athletics has another similar "element" in financial reward. Traditionally, money has not been considered to be an end in itself but rather as a means of obtaining future apparent goods. In the same light, then, money, as it means the purchasing ability of dollars and cents, cannot properly be considered to be an end worthy of pursuit for its own sake in athletics. This is not to suggest that money, as it means dollars, is not fervently sought after in professional athletics, because the athlete, like anyone else, would prefer to have a nice home, a car and in general a secure financial situation for both himself and his family. These considerations, however, not only treat money as a means, making it irrelevant to the present emphasis, but they lead the discussion away from the focus on the nuclear internal workings of the morality of athletics itself. To value money for what it can bring one is an example of how the morality of athletics is connected with other moralities and the total society in which it exists. Indeed, there are many important ramifications of this concern for the purchasing power of money, and are most worthy of investigation, but nevertheless, they must remain delimited from the present emphasis.

Financial reward, money and wealth, however, are not only thought of in terms of their purchasing power, as simply means. They are also valued symbolically; as such,
they take on the appearance of ends in themselves. The terms of Connie Hawkins' contract, related to his salary, when he was finally admitted to the N. B. A. with the Phoenix Suns, is an example of such symbolic thinking. The original verbal agreement was to have his salary start at $50,000 and increase by $15,000 annually. Later, however, David Litman, Hawkins' lawyer, relates what happened while he was on the phone finalizing the agreement with the owner of the team.

"While I was talking," says David, "Connie wrote me a note saying he wanted sixty thousand dollars the first year instead of fifty thousand dollars. I think sixty thousand dollars was a magic figure to him: it conveyed a certain status he wanted very much. I told Dick we'd take only a five thousand dollar raise the second year, so the total would be almost the same." Money was symbolic to Hawkins, symbolic of the fact that after many tortuous years of rising from the ghetto, and struggling to gain entry into the National Basketball Association, he had finally made it. Even though the total amount of money did not change, sixty thousand dollars was an even greater symbol than fifty thousand. Hawkins' reactions to his newly-found wealth were hardly those of a man pursuing money for its own sake, however. Uppermost


62Ibid., p. 338.
in his mind were his thoughts that he had finally entered the National Basketball Association, and his fears that he might not "make it" in the big league. Although the money was important for what it symbolized, what it did represent was most important.

Although Hawkins' case may be unique, there are other factors which lend credence to the notion that money is thought of symbolically. In most professional athletics, there is a direct and proportional relationship between one's power and the amount of money he is paid. So close is the relationship that spectators often measure a man's worth or ability to bring about victory by the size of his salary. In golf, the relationship is most explicit. Throughout the duration of the professional tour, the public is kept informed of who has the greatest total of cash prizes. Money is the measure of success; the top man is the "top-money-winner," he has finished at or near the top of the tournaments more than any other man. In those sports which have the draft, previously publicly unknown rookies are ranked according to the size of the contract they are able to negotiate. Money is the prize; the prize means victory. Wherever the prize exists in athletics and whatever it may be, whether money or trophies, the same kind of symbolism exists.

The problem of financial reward, of course, is complicated by the fact that money is not only a symbol but a
very valuable means of attaining other things as well. As it is a symbol, however, it cannot be considered above or beyond or even apart from what it symbolizes. One does not normally pursue symbols for their own sake, because if they are attained falsely, they mean little; they are empty symbols. The Toronto Maple Leafs would not feel very victorious if they went out and literally stole the Stanley Cup from the Montreal Canadiens. Ordinarily, prizes are not valued in themselves, but as soon as money becomes the prize, so many complications are involved.

To be cautious here is wise. Although it would be comforting to propose definitive, categorical answers to the problems associated with financial reward as it is both a means and a symbolic end simultaneously, such a response is not in the making. As often happens in philosophical investigations, more problems have been raised here than have been answered. To synopsize, it is not certain whether victory loses its end-in-itself nature in relation to financial reward. The only way it can is if it is considered a means to money which is in turn a means to other material goods which are outside of the morality of athletics and thus is excluded from the present focus. On the other hand, if financial reward is viewed symbolically, victory continues to be an end in itself. Both understandings can be convincingly argued and substantiated by experience, which suggests, in all likelihood, that both
beliefs are held by athletes. One thing does remain certain however: victory, although it is often thought of as the good in athletics, is not a "pure" end in itself, that is, unalloyed by other very important and related ends and means.

Achieving excellence is another popularly expressed possible good of athletics. Like financial reward, however, its consideration as an end is complicated by the different ways in which the term can be understood. There are at least three separate understandings of excellence possible in athletics, two as it is an end in itself, and the third as it is a means to another end.

The first type can be referred to as "self-excellence." Under this conception a man does not reach excellence when his abilities and faculties are that much greater than those of other men, but rather, simply when he has performed or developed to the best of his own abilities; other men are not thought of or referred to. It is a striving to use all of one's ability, skill, effort and intensity to produce the best attempt possible. When one has done that, and it may not happen very often in an athlete's life, he has achieved an excellence for himself; he has done his absolute best. Is this the type of excellence that is sought after in athletics? Is it considered worthy of pursuit for its own sake? Although it is certain that athletes always want to perform at the highest level possible to themselves, this
understanding implies that a competitor can achieve excellence without ever being victorious or ever even being better than at least one other opponent. It is doubtful that even an athlete who consistently performed at his peak, but yet never won a contest, would be considered by himself or by any others to be an "excellent" athlete. He might be thought of as devoted, dedicated, "game" for anything, Quixote-like and perhaps even masochistic, but never excellent.

To be satisfied with a self-excellence unrelated to victory runs counter to the purposes of the athletic activity. Victory, not "doing one's very best," is the measure of success. Most athletes cannot afford, either financially or psychologically, to think of excellence in such a manner; it is too disheartening. When an athlete loses a contest, even though he perhaps did perform his very best, he has got to think that he did not; he has to hope that increased training, dedication, sacrifice and intensity is going to make him even better to enable him to have any chance at victory the next time. He has to operate with that hope. If there are athletes who consider self-excellence, apart from victory, as an end worthy of pursuit for its own sake, it is likely that they entertain no hope, and have come to the uncomfortable realization that consistent or ultimate victory, for them, will never be a reality. No doubt there is satisfaction to be gained
from playing one's very best, but such a goal is sub-
ordinate to playing one's very best and winning simultane-
ously. Keating emphasizes the same point.

It is true that a gallant effort helps
to cushion the blow of failure or defeat;
that the man who has given his all has
nothing of which to be ashamed. But all
this is a negative sort of thing. It is
all very well to learn how to salvage
something from defeat and to accept
adversity with fortitude, but this is
a far cry from the position that the
essential thing is to have fought well.63

One possible exception to such an understanding
is when an athlete is competing "over his head," as is
often the case at many track meets. When one does not
have a "prayer" of attaining victory and knows it, pur-
suing the goal of self-excellence is perhaps the only end
realistically available to him. One may be quite satisfied
that in the particular event he had bettered his previous
best time. It is likely, however, that even the athlete
considers victory in the event to be a much higher end,
and surely a more pleasing one.

A second and more plausible theory is that athletes
consider excellence to be a relative quality integrally
related to victory. One is excellent in relation to others.
Excellence is exhibited through victory. Victory means
that one has beaten the other, which usually means that on
that particular occasion he was better than the other.

Consistent victory means that one is better than most on most occasions, which means he is excellent. To say, then, as is often said, that athletes consider excellence, as it is presently being understood, to be an end worth pursuing for its own sake, a good in other words, is to say nothing more than athletes pursue consistent victory over everyone else. That is most assuredly the case. Victory and excellence are not two different ends, but merely two words expressing the same end.

The third and most likely manner in which excellence is thought of in athletics is as it is a means rather than an end in itself. One's excellence leads him to victory; he becomes excellent, and then, because of it, becomes victorious. The athlete sees around him many others who desire victory as much or nearly as much as he does. The only way to possibly ensure his success over theirs is to become better than they, and, even better, to become better than most; he must become excellent. Such an understanding is not to value excellence for itself, but for what it can bring - victory.

Victory, prestige, self-fulfillment, success, financial reward and excellence are all commonly held to be ends considered, by athletes, to be worthy of pursuit for their own sake. It may be possible and perhaps even likely that some athletes pursue one or all of these qualities or states of existence as ends in themselves. Victory, however, appears
to be the most important. All others can be seen to be either the means to, or the necessary accompaniment of the attainment of victory; without victory they cannot exist.

Play beliefs about ideals, about what is good or desirable as worthy of pursuit for its own sake.

The ends and ideals of the player are much different from those of the athlete. What the participant in play believes to be worthy of pursuit for its own sake is not related to such things as victory, excellence, prestige or financial reward. Although it may be deceiving, play's ideals seem much simpler to understand than athletic's. It is an activity less complicated by the external variables impinging upon athletics. As all was seen to center around the end of victory in athletics, play similarly has an object of pursuit from which all play behaviour can basically be understood.

First and foremost, the player is a man seeking pleasure. Although it can be stated that this claim is presently true by definition only, that particular understanding of play, as it was delineated in the definition section of the introductory chapter, has been supported by substantial writings reviewed in the related literature chapter. As the present section progresses into the investigation of the ideals of play, especially the end of pleasure, the reasonableness of that emphasis will hope-
fully become more apparent.

When one attempts to investigate the morality of play, he is immediately placed in the disadvantageous position of being faced with a decided dearth of literature dealing with the topic. In contrast to athletics, play has little dramatic value, nor does it make good copy for newspapers and magazines desiring to increase their circulation. The attitudes, ideals and behaviour proper to play are not talked about nor popularly written of. James Keating, of course, is an exception. He is most explicit concerning the importance of pleasure to sport (here understood as play).

In essence sport is a kind of diversion which has for its direct and immediate end fun, pleasure and delight and which is dominated by a spirit of moderation and generosity.64

The problem is with substantiation. With very little literature written on the topic, how could one attempt to justify to others that, indeed, it is the attainment of pleasure that is the ideal, the object, and the very purpose of play? If one were discussing the problem with another in disagreement with such a claim, he could ask of the unbeliever: "All right, if you don't think that the object is pleasure, what do you think it is?" If the

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disbeliever then proceeded to list various other possible ends of play, the investigator, if sufficiently skilled, could attempt to illustrate how each of those suggested ends was either inappropriate to the nature and purpose of play, or, he could illustrate that in the final analysis, some were related to the concept of pleasure. Although such a method is not foolproof, it is reasonable. Appealing to reason, just that process of elimination will presently occur. As other possible ends are discussed, the truth and importance of the claim for pleasure will become more apparent.

What are other ends that could conceivably be considered by players to be ends of play worthy of pursuit for their own sake? Some view play as directed towards the same ends as athletics and thus hold that victory and excellence are important. Others emphasize that the pursuit of friendship or comradeship is the end that players seek. The desire to be fit is one of the more common factors said to motivate one to play, while still others hold that it is a need for leisure and relaxation. Victory, excellence, friendship, fitness, leisure and relaxation - it is difficult to suggest any other possible reasonable ends sought after through play. If there are others, they are uncommon ones. A discussion of these possible beliefs, as they either consistently or inconsistently relate to play, will be sufficient for the present purposes.
Is victory important to those who play? Yes it is! Is it considered to be an end worthy of pursuit for its own sake? No, it is not! The apparent contradiction can be avoided by simply looking at the pursuit of victory in play as a means rather than as an end in itself. Although one's observations of play, and the intensity with which it is often engaged in, may give the impression that the participants are deeply concerned with who wins, such a concern is more apparent than actual. Victory is pursued for the pleasure that the pursuit brings, rather than for the end itself. A critic immediately could respond that a similar situation exists in athletics. If he did so, he would be wrong! It is not the pursuit but more the end of victory that is so very important in athletics, borne out through observing the solemn remorse that usually accompanies one's defeat.

As was delineated in the accepted definition, play can be completely engrossing. It is this sometimes very intense characteristic which lends credence to the notion that victory is an end of importance in play. But, as Keating points out, it is simply a disguise, for it is "its simulated competitive atmosphere" which "...camouflages what is at bottom a highly co-operative venture." Keating continues to eloquently describe the relationship in play between the pursuit of victory and pleasure.

65 Ibid., p. 30.
Our insistence that sport seeks diversion, recreation, amusement does not imply that the sportsman is by nature a listless competitor....It is common practice for him, once the game is underway, to make a determined effort to win....He "fights" gallantly to win because experience has taught him that a determined effort to overcome the obstacles which his particular sport has constructed, adds immeasurably to the enjoyment of the game. He would be cheating himself and robbing the other participants of intense pleasure if his efforts were only half-hearted.66

When one reads such an understanding of play he may immediately be reminded of those persons who wrote similarly of athletics. Those, as it was illustrated in the related literature, who emphasized that it was the effort of athletics that was important and not the end of victory, were perhaps relating to the present conception of play. That in part may explain some of the confusion and disagreement over the values and methods considered appropriate to athletics.

If victory as an end was very important in play, then, the reaction to defeat would be much different. It is true that if players had a choice, in most cases most would naturally prefer to have victory over defeat, but nonetheless, defeat does not carry with it any serious or even disagreeable results. The game is played and enjoyed; the score may or may not be kept; regardless of who wins or loses, the measure of the game's success is

66 Ibid.
the pleasure that has been derived. Further insight into
the unimportance of victory as an end in itself in play
can be gained by an inquiry into the limited role that
excellence assumes.

Excellence, like victory, is generally not an
object of pursuit in play. The end of victory is not im-
portant, so one need not be excellent to attain it.
There is no intense preparation for a match, no intense
training and no rigorous post-game critical analysis of
what one did or did not do. It is not because preparation,
for instance, is considered not to be useful that it is
conspicuously absent, but simply because, for one reason
or another, players never seem to get around to it. There
can be no doubt that those great numbers of occasional
golfers, who consistently shoot in the nineties or low
one hundred's, could benefit their game immensely by a
weekly trip to the driving range. But the attitude is:
"why practice when you can play?" Practice and prepara-
tion, over and again, are simply not very satisfying.
Athletes are also aware of that, but they have less choice
in the matter. Many golfers may go to the driving range
several times at the beginning of each season, probably
more out of fear and anticipation than out of desire.
But as soon as the weather gets better and the time is
available, the choice is to play. Each time such a golfer
goes out for a round, however, he likely promises himself
several times that this week for sure he is going to the
driving range to straighten out that slice. But invariably
the next round arrives with no practice and still a very
pronounced slice.

Having a "good game" is not something pursued through
preparation but simply through intensely trying once the
game has begun. It simply either happens, or it simply
does not; if it does result it is the added "icing." The
golf player anticipates every round wondering if today will
be the day for the "good game," and yet, invariably, after
several holes, it becomes increasingly apparent that it
will not. But the pleasure derived from the game is lessened
to a very minor extent, if at all. If the pleasure was
diminished substantially, then most occasional golfers are
either incredibly and naively hopeful, or else extremely
masochistic!

What other ends are likely to be considered as
worthy ends to pursue through play? One quite commonly
mentioned is friendship or comradeship. People who play
usually play with either the same person or with a
regular group of persons. Play with a stranger is rare;
in athletics it is common. Such a fact has led some to
the notion that friendship is introduced and promoted
through play. Friendship may be increased or enhanced
in play, but it is doubtful that play is responsible for
the actual introduction of friendship. One usually makes
friends with another first; it then is discovered that they have a common interest in a particular game; they play. Their play, depending on how playfully they play, may tend to either strengthen or weaken that friendship.

Friendship does not seem to be a sought after end of play. If it is, it is most assuredly implicitly felt rather than explicitly expressed. It would be unusual, for instance, to hear one state: "Today Bill and I are going to play paddleball to promote our friendship." Such a promotion may indeed result but it is not a goal which one expresses or even consciously pursues. However, friendship is implicit in the quite different remark: "Today Bill and I are going to enjoy a game of paddleball together." Two persons engaging in a common pleasureable pursuit implies that friendship is present; in reverse, friendship implies that pleasure is present. Friendship may result from play, but whether it does or does not is not the focus here. It must be remembered that the present emphasis is on beliefs about ideals worthy of pursuit for their own sake. It would be unrealistic to consider friendship to be one of those believed-in ideals.

It is even more appropriate to view friendship, to some degree, as an almost necessary a priori element to play. Usually, one does not wish to play with another whom he dislikes, and although such situations do occur, the attitude and methods of the individual likely are not
playful. Perhaps one does not mind "losing" to a friend, but he does not appreciate losing to one he dislikes. The a priori element of friendship or comradeship helps to structure some of the methods used in the attainment of pleasure. Friendship exists prior to play. Being "friendly" in play helps to make the activity more pleasurable as will become more apparent in the consideration of the rules and motives associated with the activity.

Fitness is another end considered by many to be a good worthy of pursuit for its own sake in play. Persons like the businessman, who, in reference to their daily luncheon or after-work tennis match, express the notion that it "tones up the muscles," or "keeps him fit," are quite common, especially in recent years. Despite the limited amount of "fitness" which likely accrues from the activity, such a belief commonly is held, or at least commonly is expressed by many persons.

People dominated by the work-ethic must always find utilitarian justifications for their leisure activity. Just playing for the pleasure of the activity is inconsistent with the goods and values which they hold dear in their work. It is questionable, however, whether one who is playing for fitness is actually playing. Fitness is an end which falls outside of the play sphere; to pursue it, means to engage in play as a means, not as an end in itself. But as Giddens illustrates:
The majority of interpretations seem to stress one fundamental characteristic of play, as differentiated from any other sort of behaviour, namely, that play is activity which is by and large non-instrumental in character. That is, play is not linked psychologically to purposes which are external to the activity and which would dictate its character. 67

The question must be asked: "Is one who plays for fitness actually playing?" The response is negative. If one feels obligated to become more fit, or more relaxed so that he can perform better on the job, or at home, then he is not playing, but engaging in an activity that might more accurately be termed "work."

It was stated that many persons express utilitarian justifications and rationales for their playing. Does that necessarily imply that their activity must be delimited from the investigation? Not necessarily, because even though the number of those who emphasize they play for fitness is great, it is unlikely that most actually do. Assuredly, there are many who staunchly hold that belief and act according to dictates which complement it. The others must be viewed, lightheartedly, as preposterous impostors or frauds operating in a deceptive world. Even though they feel the need to justify their actions as promoting certain functional results, they secretly know by their paunch and by their labouring when climbing stairs

that they really are becoming no more fit. They know very well they are getting no significant results, yet they cling to the same rationalizations. The point is, of course, that they probably secretly know they play for fun, but yet feel somewhat guilty. As it is commonly heard in reference to jogging, calisthenics or fitness exercises, which are known to be good for conditioning, the impostors reveal themselves by expressing: "that's too much like work!" They don't want to give up their play; they enjoy it and the companionship that is often missing in the more functional activities. They continue to deceptively justify their play to themselves and others as utilitarian. Some occasional golfers are prime examples of such frauds. Many justify their weekly game by rationalizing that there is a good deal of walking and lots of stretching for the "old tired muscles," and then they secretly chuckle to themselves.

A final possibility is that people who play believe that leisure and relaxation are the goods worthy of pursuit. That may be true, but surely pleasure is implicit in those goals. Are not one's relaxing and leisure pursuits commonly understood to be activities that one considers enjoyable, fun and pleasureable? Pleasure, ideally at any rate, is implicit in leisure; to pursue leisure is to pursue pleasure. As such, leisure and relaxation, as ends, are similar or identical to the end of pleasure.
Pleasure, victory, excellence, friendship, fitness, leisure and relaxation have all been considered by some to be the good which players aim towards. Some are appropriate to play, some are not. Those that are can be seen to be in close relationship with the end of pleasure, reaffirming the notion that in play it is the good of pleasure towards which all things aim.

D. RULES LAYING DOWN WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE AND WHAT OUGHT NOT TO BE DONE

Introduction

So far we have considered only the structure of moral systems; we must also consider their content. As to content, morality is either wholly or almost wholly concerned with relations between men, and how they ought to behave toward each other, with what general rules governing relations between man and man a society ought to adopt. 68

Beliefs and ideals are crucial to the understanding of a morality because they establish the foundation and point to the goods which are sought after; but yet, they do not provide an understanding of the real content. When one thinks of morality one thinks of actions and whether they are right or wrong; one imagines a whole system of restricting rules guiding behaviour, telling one what may or may not be done. Although beliefs about man's nature and his ideals form the foundation, establish the structure.

68 Nowell-Smith, "Religion and Morality," p. 150.
set the "spirit" and provide the rationale for rules and the legislation of right and wrong actions, it is these latter elements that are the stuff of a morality.

Rules are fabricated to guide man's actions so he does not become "overzealous" in his pursuits of those things which he desires. Within a system or composite of rules, then, there is an implicit agreement as to the appropriateness of some actions and the inappropriateness of others, as defined by either the majority of the agents within that morality, or by their representatives, or by another sort of authoritarian legislator. Before an investigator can understand which acts should or should not be performed in a morality, thereby gaining knowledge of its rules, it would be beneficial for him to know what are actions and what are not actions from a moral point of view. For a particular human movement to be considered an action it must have at least two qualities: voluntariness and conscious deliberation.

Moral investigation is concerned with looking at behaviour which is or is not in accordance with rules. Individuals can be culpable or inculpable for their rule-breaking behaviour. One of the factors relevant to a determination of culpability is whether the performance is voluntary or not. If one's arm is involuntarily forced into the air by another, voluntariness is not operative and the movement is not an action. The individual, whose
arm is raised, is not culpable for that movement. Voluntariness is necessary, but not sufficient. John Wilson, in *Introduction to Moral Education*, explains: "if an action is to fall within the moral sphere,... it must be rational: and this implies that it must be done for a reason (not just the result of a cause)." 69 A. I. Melson, in "Action," distinguishes between actions and mere bodily movements. 70 He contrasts the activity of an infant (who does not know the rules of chess) with that of a chess player. Both perform the identical movement of changing the position of the knight in the properly accepted style. Because the child was unaware of the rules of the game, its movement is not considered to be an action (in the context of the game), but merely a bodily movement; it was just by chance that it moved the piece in the accepted manner. The chess player's movement is an action, however. Depending on his ability, the movement was performed from either a rational or an irrational conception of the rules and an awareness of the appropriateness of such a play; he had reasons, and thus, it is an action. Unconsciously drumming one's fingers on a desk in the library does not imply the same degree of culpability as does that same


action performed consciously and deliberately to irritate another. The first is unconscious and merely a movement; the second is done for a reason and is an action.

Actions in a particular morality are governed, restricted and occur within the context of three types of rules: the laws of the total society, country, state, or province in which the morality exists, the written rules and regulations of the activity in which the morality exists (e.g., written game rules), and the unwritten rules or implicit understandings within the morality itself. Naturally the present investigation ignores the first of these and concentrates its efforts on the written rules and unwritten implicit understandings of the two activities of athletics and play, and the moralities within them. Although written rules and regulations may be more closely aligned to legal considerations as opposed to moral ones, because the two have considerable overlap in relation to duty, obligation and the rights of others, they both have importance to the present investigation.

Each athletic sport and game has an official book which explicitly lays down the rules and regulations according to which each particular instance of the activity should proceed. No man, whether athlete, coach, referee or even commissioner can circumvent a written rule's authority; it is the last word. All arguments over rules, over whether a certain action is legal or illegal must
end once the authority of the rule-book has been consulted. Although some may question the appropriateness of certain rules and move to have them repealed, while they still exist, their legality cannot be questioned.

The situation is not the same in play. There are neither rule-books, nor written laws. Although when playing tennis, the game may run approximately according to the actual rule-book regulations of the game, it does so not because rules indicate that it must, but simply because the regulations provide a structure in which to play. The rules are not looked upon as authoritarian but as instruments or tools designed to help make the game more enjoyable. Actual rule-book regulations may be waived or new rules may be added if the players mutually agree that such a change is desirable. There are numerous examples of such behaviour. It is rare, for instance, to see tennis "players" strictly abiding by the service line rule; bowlers often go over the foul line; golfers always seem to play "winter rules" and "touch down" in sand traps. If a rule is inappropriate in play, if the players question its usefulness or restrictiveness, there is no respect for its ultimate legality; it simply is changed or omitted right then and there, and the game goes on.

The two moralities' treatments or understandings of written rules are different. The two preceding para-
graphs furnish a general description of each of the respective interpretations or conceptions of the written rules, and provide a foundation from which to operate. Although the two understandings are different, each is consistent with the purpose, beliefs, and ideals of the total activity within which it operates.

The written rules of athletics

As has been stated repeatedly, the purpose of athletics is to pursue victory; victory is the end that is sought after most. It is an exclusive end; the attainment of it by one limits its ability to be attained by another; it demands that its pursuers be competitive and self-interested. Competition and self-interest, however, if uncontrolled and allowed to dominate a society, would produce a situation similar to Hobbes' condition of war. In such a state, where every man is enemy to every man, where every man has a right to all things, there is no security and the life of man would be "...solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." 71

It is perhaps difficult to visualize how athletic life could be solitary, nasty, brutish and short in a "real" sense. There are many parallels, however. Hobbes does not state that such a condition of war of every man against every man ever existed historically. He does not try to develop the notion that commonwealth or sovereignty

71Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 186.
historically developed out of such a natural condition: 
"...there had never been any time wherein particular men 
were in a condition of warre one against another;..." 72
Hobbes' thinking is more hypothetical. He writes, from 
his observations of civil war, that the natural condition 
of war would be the result if there were no common power 
for all men to fear. 

...it may be perceived what manner of life 
there would be, where there were no common 
Power to feare; by the manner of life, 
which men that have formerly lived under 
a peacefull government, use to degenerate 
into, in a civill warre.73

He uses the possibility of that condition of war, and the 
calamities therein, as a justification of commonwealth or 
sovereignty, not as a point in the evolution of such a 
government.

Neither is the claim here made that the rules and 
regulations associated with athletic competition evolved 
out of a desire among athletes to make athletic life more 
secure. Such a situation never existed - it is well known. 
It is simple hypothetical thinking. If there were no restric-
tions limiting the extent to which competition and 
self-interest could travel, and if victory over the oppo-
tion was still the main goal of all athletes, then a situa-
tion similar to Hobbes' condition of war would be apparent.

72 Ibid., p. 187.
73 Ibid.
Indeed such a situation never has existed, nor is it likely that it ever will. But still the hypothesis is not unfruitful. An understanding of it provides many exciting insights into why the rules and regulations exist, why there are some particular rules instead of others and why they are enforced and respected to the degree that they are.

It is...neither absurd nor reprehensible, neither against the dictates of true reason, for a man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows....Therefore the first foundation of natural right is this, that every man as much as in him lies endeavour to protect his life and members.74

This Hobbes says is as natural of man as it is of a stone to move downward.75 It would be in vain, Hobbes says, to have a right to the end of self-preservation if one did not have a right to the means of its attainment.76 From this reasoning he concludes that man has the right to use all the means available to him to gain this end, which, in short, indicates that all men have a right to all things.77

But it was the least benefit for men thus to have a common right to all things. For the effects of this right are the same.

74 Hobbes, Man and Citizen, p. 115.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid., p. 116.

77 Ibid.
almost, as if there had been no right at all. For although any man might say of every thing, this is mine, yet could he not enjoy it, by reason of his neighbour, who having equal right and equal power, would pretend the same thing to be his. 78

As was previously stated, however, such a condition is insecure; one in which survival and happiness is brief. Man comes to know that the times in between his fighting and defending are more pleasant, more secure and not so much subject to the incommunities of war. When not fighting "the time remaining is termed PEACE." 79 This realization of the benefits of peace is what Hobbes terms the first and fundamental law of nature: "...that peace is to be sought after, where it may be found; and where not, there to provide ourselves for helps of war." 80 But if this be the case, Hobbes reasons, a derivative of that law is "...that the right of all men to all things ought not to be retained: but that some certain rights ought to be transferred or relinquished." 81 Hobbes then proceeds to describe the nature of contracts and covenants, what makes them valid and invalid and the obligations which accompany them. 82 Covenants, however, are simply not enough. There

78Ibid., p. 117.
79Ibid., p. 118.
80Ibid., p. 123.
81Ibid.
82Ibid., pp. 123-152.
must be someone with enough power to enforce them.

...there be somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting: which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe,...The only way to erect such a Common Power,...is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men,...and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their judgements, to his judgement...as if every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition: that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.\textsuperscript{83}

The result is a sovereign power ruling the common good - the Commonwealth. But it must be remembered, however, that "we do not...by nature seek society for its own sake, but that we may receive some honour or profit from it."\textsuperscript{84} "All society...is either for gain, or for glory; that is, not so much for love of our fellows, as for the love of ourselves."\textsuperscript{85} Hobbes further emphasizes "...that the original of all great and lasting societies consisted not in the mutual good will man had towards each other, but in the mutual fear they had of each other."\textsuperscript{86}

That men form society for self-interested reasons is essential to understand. In that society he retains

\textsuperscript{83}\textit{Hobbes, Leviathan,} pp. 226-27.

\textsuperscript{84}\textit{Hobbes, Man and Citizen,} p. 111.

\textsuperscript{85}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 112-13.

\textsuperscript{86}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 113.
many of the egoistic characteristics that he had in the hypothetical state of nature. He pursues peace so long as he is able; when he is not able, he reverts to war. Everything he does, he either does directly (through war) or indirectly through covenants of peace for his own self-preservation or self-interest.

Athletic activities characterized by unrestrained competition and self-interest would be chaotic, likely meaningless. With no agreed-upon rules anyone would have the right to do anything in his power, short of breaking the laws of the land, to gain victory. And as Hobbes indicates, in such a condition nothing would be unjust, and there would be no notions of right and wrong, no justice and injustice. If such were the case, there would be no game.

The athlete in a sense, also gives up certain rights. It sounds odd to say that he gives up certain rights, however. It is better said that he gives up certain methods of attempting to gain victory. Better yet is to say that he agrees to limit his methods of gaining victory to certain commonly accepted ones. He agrees to relinquish some of his powers to a common authority, a common power which can protect his need for self-preservation.

That common power is the set of rules which govern

87 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 188.
the game. He agrees to abide by the dictates of that common authority, but, as Hobbes says of the citizen, the athlete does so on one condition; that his opponents will do exactly the same. In essence, the athletes form a commonwealth in the literal meaning of that term. They agree to seek victory only by the rules; they agree to play the game.

A Publique Minister, is he, that by the Soveraign, (whether a Monarch, or an Assembly,) is employed in any affaires, with Authority to represent in that employment, the person of the Commonwealth. 88

Publique Ministers are also all those, that have Authority from the Soveraign, to procure the Execution of Judgements given; to publish the Soveraign Commands; to suppress Tumults; to apprehend, and imprison Malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the Peace. 89

Athletics too has its public ministers who represent the commonwealth: execute judgements; explain the rules; suppress riots and fights; detect and punish rule-breakers; and perform other acts that keep the peace and ensure a fairly played game. In a competitive self-interested environment, officials are essential to guarantee that the covenants made to compete according to the rules of the game are kept. Words are not enough. The temptations of opportunism are too great. What is needed is an authority powerful

88 Ibid., p. 289.
89 Ibid., p. 293.
enough to guarantee that the contracts will not be broken, an authority powerful enough to instill fear of punishment in any possible transgressors. Athletic officials represent that power.

The understanding of the role of officials in the athletic activity gives a great many insights into the morality itself. First of all, officials make judgements. Umpires decide balls and strikes, outs and safes; linesmen decide off-sides; referees in hockey and basketball decide almost everything. Why is this so? Why do officials make these types of decision? Is it because the athletes cannot see? Is it because no one else knows the rules? Although the officials do know the rules and do make these decisions, it is unreasonable to think that they are there because these duties cannot be handled by the athletes or coaches. Practically anyone could make the decision or know the rules. The problem, however, is that it is feared that the athletes would not make the proper and honest decision. The problem is with interpretation and application of the rules. Officials are there because of mistrust. One athlete or team cannot trust another athlete or team to make the correct and honest decision. It is not that athletes are not in the position to see, nor is it that they are not knowledgeable of the rules; it is not that they are unable to make the correct call; it is that they are able, yet, will not. The mistrust is well-founded, however, and that is the interesting part. If there were
no officials, athletics would likely return to the hypothetical state of nature where the domination of unrestrained competition and self-interest would once again be the rule. In such a condition, as Hobbes points out, covenants not to defend oneself and covenants to accuse oneself are void. In a crucial close play at home plate, the catcher would not accuse himself of missing the tag and thereby suffer immeasurably; the runner would not accuse himself of being out. Self-interest and fear of elimination (death) are just too great to expect disinterested judgement.

It is understandable in such a situation of self-interest, competition and mistrust that sometimes even officials are mistrusted. On occasion it does appear that officials make bi-partisan decisions; rumours of officials being "on the take" increase the impact of those appearances. Whether such bi-partisanship is real or imagined is not the question; the important reality to be aware of is that the fear and the mistrust are existent. One must be constantly guaranteed that he is being treated in a manner that will not put him at a disadvantage. He agreed to play by the rules on one condition: that his opponents do the same. The realization or even the possibility that his opponents are receiving deferential treatment within those rules arouses numerous and understandable fears in his mind; his reservation is at stake.

\[90\text{Ibid. p. 199.}\]
The officials' other major role in athletics is the detection and punishment of rule-breakers. Similarly, athletes do not, nor can be expected to carry out this function disinterestedly either. Rule-breaking in athletics, however, is a complex affair and although the meting out of appropriate punishments, as defined by the rule-book, is straightforward, the actual detection is sometimes difficult. Rules can be broken consciously and deliberately, or unconsciously and indeliberately; they can be broken openly and blatantly, or covertly and deceptively; they can be broken with or without the punishment in mind, and perhaps through several combinations of these. Although most rule-breakings are punishable, and, if detected, punished, the emphasis here is on behaviour for which there is no exculpatory excuse. Unconsciousness, indeliberateness, and involuntariness, although not always, often provide the basis for such excuses.

One could immediately suggest, from his impression of athletics, that such a delimitation eliminates from consideration a great majority of the rule-breakings in athletics; a great number of rules appear to be broken unconsciously. He may be correct, but it is unlikely. The only type of rule-breaking that such a delimitation eliminates, for certain, is that kind from which there is no advantage to be gained. Usually basketball players would be foolish to step deliberately on the boundary line while in possession of the ball; hockey players would
be the same for consciously going off-side. There is nothing to gain from such behaviour and usually something to lose; one does not usually consciously act against his own interests, especially in athletics. What is questionable, however, is whether many of those rules broken, where one has something to gain from their transgression, are broken unconsciously or consciously. Although many of them appear to be indeliberate, and likely are so, it is also probable that a great many are not. One can gain insight into them through a consideration of punishments.

Some hockey players are known by their opponents to have an uncanny ability to elbow deceptively and effectively in corner scrambles. At just the right moment the elbow always seems to come up and place the opponent at a decided disadvantage. The action is so quick and so "second-nature-like" that observers think it is a reflex or unconscious movement. No matter how deceptive the elbower is, however, he is going to be detected performing such actions a great number of times, especially if it occurs near the puck. Referees, too, are aware of certain player's reputations; they look for such behaviour. Each time the player is caught he is given a two-minute penalty; that happens repeatedly. If the elbowing was unconscious, he soon becomes conscious of it in the penalty box. That is one of the functions of punishment: to make people more conscious of actions that
they should be conscious of. Even the fact that a particular individual gets away with elbowing a substantial number of times without being detected could imply that it is performed consciously. Assuming that the referee can see, the only way in which elbowing can go unnoticed, is, if it is done when either the official is not looking or when somebody is obstructing his view. If the movement were unconscious, these precautions would not be taken into account; they would be performed more openly and as a result a great many more would be detected and punished.

Some may then ask: "Well if he acts consciously, and knows there is a penalty for it, why does he persist?" The obvious response is that he considers it worth it. The hurt he causes the opponent, coupled with the fact that there is a fairly good chance it might go undetected, makes it, over time, a worthwhile action. That is yet another important consideration characteristic of the athletic morality.

Certain kinds of open, conscious and deliberate rule-breaking are accepted and justified in athletics. This is not to express a "should;" it is simply a statement of fact. Although many people outside of the athletic morality believe that all conscious types of rule-breaking within it are immoral, it is apparent that great numbers of the actual participants do not. It is understandable, and logically consistent with the total morality.
that the breaking of certain rules is justifiable to the athletes within it. Hobbes illustrates why.

...before the names of just, and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant;... 91

There are numerous examples in athletics where the situation arises that it is considered more worthwhile to break the rule and suffer the penalty than it is to suffer the consequences of abiding by the rule. When the punishment is not equal to the gain of transgression, it is understandable that men transgress. Basketball players intentionally foul opponents freezing the ball; they foul players on breakaway layups that look to be a sure thing; hockey players hold their opponents to stop a breakaway; pass defenders may resort to interference on a potential touchdown pass. These rule-breakings, even though intentional, are not considered by those within the athletic morality to be morally reprehensible. They are thought of as strategically smart plays, as "good" penalties.

That which is gained or adverted by such transgressions is worth more to one's self-preservation than the punishment is worth against it. Even those who suffer from the holding, the interference or the deliberate fouling, although perhaps angered because their efforts are thwarted,

understand and accept such fouls as part of the game. In a similar situation they know they would do the same and feel justified in doing so. They gladly accept the benefit of the stipulated penalty, and the game goes on.

Penalties and punishments, of course, are very important to rule-following and rule-breaking. Fear of the punishment stops much illegal behaviour; when the punishment is not feared, the action will continue. Although it might sound excessive, if deliberate fouling in basketball, for instance, was punishable by immediate forfeiture of the game, and such a penalty was strictly enforced, then the occurrence of such a foul would undoubtedly be rare. As long as the punishment does not fit the crime and is less than the gain from transgression, then "strategic" deliberate rule-breaking will continue to be justified by those within the morality as "smart" playing.

Conscious, deliberate, but covert rule-breaking presents another unique situation. Covert rule-breakings necessarily are deceptive because the advantage to be gained through them could not be realized if the transgression was detected. The potential gains and losses from this type of rule-breaking compared to the last is similar to comparing a "big money" poker game to its penny ante brother; the stakes are much higher, but so is the pot. The advantages to be gained are so much greater, but so
are the potential punishments. Deliberately feigning an injury in football to gain an additional dearly-needed time-out, if undetected, may turn a sure loss into victory, but if discovered may result in automatic forfeiture of the contest plus additional sanctions. Deceptive, covert, and illegal use of funds by universities for the solicitation of top football athletes, conceivably could turn an unknown, unranked, mediocre team into a national power and result in their participation in a financially lucrative post-season bowl game. Detection, however, could result in very serious sanctions causing painful financial difficulties. The stakes are much higher in this type of transgression and so is the tension, fear and mistrust which surrounds it.

The athlete has agreed to play by the rules and give up certain methods of pursuing victory on the condition that his opponents will do the same, expecting the officials to guarantee that the game and all the relevant conditions surrounding it will be the epitome of fairness and equal opportunity. The attainment of victory is difficult enough under equal conditions; unbearable under unequal ones. But the system is imperfect. It has methods to keep open rule-breaking under control, but covert rule-breaking is often undetectable and thus difficult to punish, deter, or provide compensation for harm done. Athletes, coaches and managers know the problem and fear it.
Rumours fly. Suspicion and mistrust increase. One fears what another may be doing behind his back; he worries over the secret advantages that may be deceptively gained by his opponents. The few cases of covert rule-breaking that are uncovered stoke the fears and apprehensions; life in athletics may appear nasty and brutal – at least insecure. The authority and power of the rules are only partially able to guarantee peace and security, only partially able to deter the condition of war. When one is not able to pursue self-preservation through peace he is justified in using the helps of war. Whether it is actual knowledge or merely the suspicion that opponents are gaining secret disadvantages, it is fear that leads one to counter-measuring, compensative, deceptive rule-breaking. The article, "A Case of Volunteer – or Else," focused on the deceptive and illegal use of pre-spring training programs in NCAA football, illustrating the fear and mistrust of what others are doing.

"Most coaches today shun such combat drills as tools from the Dark Ages. Some would like to do away with all pre-spring programs, but fear that if they did they would be giving an edge to a rival." 92

Such actions appear to be more defensive than offensive; one must take precautions; one must not take the chance of being defeated through illegal deception; survival and

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self-preservation are at stake.

James Keating often cites athletes' and coaches' alleged pronouncements of the importance of victory. Here he cites Woody Hayes, head football coach of Ohio State.

Woody Hayes of Ohio State recently rivaled the late Jim Tatum's unfortunate pronouncement: "I don't think victory is the most important thing. I think it is the only thing." After a thrilling 10-7 loss to Michigan, Hayes went Tatum one better in the area of moral license. He is quoted as saying: "We'd rather have an immoral win than a moral defeat."93

Keating goes on to criticize that a man of Hayes' stature and reputation should not make, what Keating understands to be such an "irresponsible statement."94 Whether statements like Tatum's or Hayes' are unfortunate and irresponsible is not the question here; the fact to be aware of is that they are statements made by moral agents in the morality of athletics which express the existing code.

The immorality of Hayes' statement is questionable. When he illustrates that he would rather have an immoral win than a moral defeat, one has to wonder to whose standards of morality he is referring. If he is relating to "society's" standards, his pronouncement is not all that shocking. He could possibly simply be suggesting that some of the methods he employs to gain victory may be looked down upon by society generally, and perhaps do not parallel

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94 Ibid.
the standards of right and wrong that often are placed externally on athletics. That is not surprising, because one who is familiar with the internal workings of athletics already knows that what is considered to be good and bad, right and wrong, in that morality, are quite different from other moralities, and from what can be referred to as the "overall societal morality."

On the other hand, if he is making an internal statement, then indeed, it is unfortunate. If he is saying: "Within the morality of athletics, with its own peculiar notions of good and bad, right and wrong, I would rather do what is evil and wrong and gain victory than do what is right and suffer defeat," then Hayes is guilty of making an immoral statement by the standards of the morality within which he is a moral agent. To be judged by the standards of one's own morality as moral or immoral seems to be of greater moment than to be judged so by external standards. To go against the societal moral code is one thing; to go against one's own agreed-upon standards of morality by the same action seems to make it more reprehensible. Hayes, however, may not be immoral by athletic standards.

Even though Keating goes a long way in dispelling the appropriateness of the external standards often placed on athletics (sportsmanship for instance), he still may not have gone far enough. He states:
Since the goal of the athlete is honorable victory in the contest, the code of the athlete demands that nothing be done before, during, or after the contest to cheapen or otherwise detract from an honorable victory. 95

Is Keating saying that this is the way it is in the morality of athletics, or is he suggesting that this is the way it should be? Does the code of the athlete demand honourable victory, or should it demand honourable victory? Would Hayes agree with Keating? Is honourable victory the actual end of the athlete, or is it plain and simple victory itself? Hayes' statement, Tatum's statement, and the numerous open and covert deliberate rule-breakings which appear to occur as a matter of course, all suggest that the latter is a strong possibility. An understanding of a morality, as has been stated repeatedly, necessitates a knowledge of what is considered to be right by the agents within it, not of what observers prescribe should be right.

One seeks to survive in athletics. He sees many around him who would like to deprive him of that survival. Although he might wish to abide completely by the rules, he fears that others will not do the same. Fear of punishment deters rule-breakings. If punishments are not feared, then rules will be broken. One can attempt to impress upon a rule-breaker over and again that his actions are wrong, but as long as the situation exists where he cannot be guaranteed of fair play, he will continue to justify his

95 Ibid., p. 25.
actions as defensively self-preservation. One agrees to peace because of the benefits it provides for self-preservation; if the peaceful situation no longer guarantees those benefits, then one might as well revert to the methods of war. In that condition the pronouncements of good and evil or right and wrong have much less influence.

The unwritten rules of play

Written rules have limited authority in play; they are not respected as rules but as tools; the approach is teleological.

Teleologists, ... regard moral rules as rules for producing what is good (health, happiness, knowledge, beauty) and avoiding what is bad (disease, misery, ignorance, ugliness); they are to be judged empirically on the basis of their tendency to promote what is good and prevent what is bad. We are under no obligation to keep promises because "a promise is a promise" if it would clearly be more beneficial to break it. 96

In play, the good toward which all things aim is the pleasure and fun of the activity itself. Written rules derive their importance from that pleasure principle; if a particular rule adds to the pleasure of the match then it should be upheld; if it detracts, it should be deleted. Play often occurs outside of the rules which usually structure the action within a "real" game. Racquet game rules repeatedly are disregarded. Two go out to play tennis; one stands at one end of the court, the other at the other end and they

96 Nowell-Smith, "Religion and Morality," p. 150.
hit the ball back and forth. No one serves. No one keeps score. The only rule apparently in effect is that one must try to keep the ball moving, any way possible, somewhere in the vicinity of the court. The game they play is radically different from the actual game of tennis as defined by the rules, although it might be difficult to convince the players that that afternoon they were not playing tennis.

To play strictly according to the written rules, for them, not only would be unenjoyable but virtually impossible. To begin with, neither is even sure of the rules. In addition, whenever they attempt to play according to the written rules they often never get beyond the service. A game or even a total set won by virtually all double faults is not uncommon. That kind of game, even though it is played according to the rules, appears to be less like tennis than simply volleying. Rather than "tennis" it might more appropriately be termed: "Serve. Serve. Walk to net. Walk back. Serve. Serve. Walk to net."

Such a game is not enjoyable. They would much rather attempt just to volley back and forth. Where there are no written rules, no written rules can be broken, and thus, a consideration of that topic, for this type of play, would be irrelevant.

As skill increases, however, play is apt to occur more closely in accordance with the written rules. Yet,
even here play does not have the same respect for the authority of those rules as does athletics, ideally. One may be able to fulfill the requirements of the regulations, yet, often one wishes not to. Before a match, players can often be seen to be establishing the rules they are to play by. If one does not want the service line requirement, then the other is quite satisfied with having it deleted. Often such a deletion goes without saying. It is omitted because it is restricting; it is a rule which tends to detract from the total pleasure of the activity and therefore is not considered obliging.

In play, just as there is no need to abide by rules that are displeasurable, there is no particular need to break rules that have been agreed upon either. When one agrees upon rules in play he more or less is saying: "These are the rules that we want to play by; we have chosen them because they are the ones which we think are going to result in the greatest amount of pleasure for us." If it is discovered upon playing that the pleasure is not as great as it could be, then a discussion takes place, and the rules may again be changed, even in mid-stream of the game. In the "play-game" of tennis, there are few rules that one can deliberately break, at least to gain an advantage. It is certainly not beneficial to deliberately double-fault or hit the ball out of bounds; one simply does not do those things. The "play-game" of
"pick-up" basketball is a better example; in that activity there are rules which one can break to gain an advantage. Often a game of "three on three," played for fun, is quite a bit rougher than an athletic basketball game. Although that may seem paradoxical, unsportsman-like and perhaps inconsistent with most observers' understanding of play, it is not. Strict interpretation of body contact rules are restricting and are implicitly disregarded. The attitude of "no harm — no foul" is taken, and the term "harm" is loosely interpreted — only the most obvious of fouls are called. The players either do not have the ability, or they do not desire to play any other way; a game interrupted by numerous foul calls would be restricting, staccato-like, and unenjoyable.

Although when they do, they act inappropriately, there often appears to be one or some in a "pick-up" situation who either foul deliberately or seem to make no effort whatsoever to avoid crushing another player on a lay-up or a scramble under the boards. That such a person violates the agreed-upon rules is obvious, but what is more important and what makes his behaviour so inappropriate to play is that he makes no conscious attempt to avoid violation. Although it may sound strong, his actions can be considered as immoral; not only do they not increase the pleasure, but they detract from it. If the situation becomes serious enough he may be sanctioned by the anger of
the others; if he still consciously and blatantly fouls, either the game will cease or on the next occasion he may be omitted from the play group.

The morality of adult play, in particular, does not call for a strict enforcement of rules. Keating eloquently describes the attitude.

The code governing pure sport is substantially different from a legalistic code in which lawyers and law courts are seen as a natural and healthy complement of the system. In fact, it is in direct comparison with such a system that the essence of sportsmanship can best be understood. In itself, sportsmanship is a spirit, an attitude, a manner or mode of interpreting an otherwise purely legal code. Its purpose is to protect and cultivate the festive mood proper to an activity whose primary purpose is pleasant diversion, amusement, joy. The sportsman adopts a cavalier attitude toward his personal rights under the code; he prefers to be magnanimous and self-sacrificing if, by such conduct, he contributes to the enjoyment of the game. The sportsman is not in search of legal justice; he prefers to be generous whenever generosity will contribute to the fun of the occasion. Never in search of ways to evade the rules, the sportsman acts only from unquestionable moral right. 97

Such a player does expect the same cavalier attitude from his playmates, however. Detrimental to the fun spirit which envelops a "pick-up" game is one who niggles; he calls every foul no matter how insignificant or incidental; he interprets every rule to the letter and misses no opportunity to get his legal deserts. He upsets the game

and ruins its continuity. Such a player is often regarded as a worthless playmate.

There are no officials in play to ensure that rules are abided by or that fairness, justice and punishment properly occur. What little legal control there is is handled internally. Players, unlike athletes, have the responsibility of seeing the play, knowing the rule and making the decision. Although all that is required is that one be fair in his judgements, when there is doubt, the decision usually favours the other side. Keating shows its difference from athletics.

The sportsman invariably gives his opponent the benefit of the doubt. Whenever he is not sure, he plays his opponent's shot as good even though he may suspect that it was out. The athlete, however, takes a different approach. Every bit as opposed to cheating as the sportsman, the athlete demands no compelling proof of error. If a shot seems to be out, even though he is not certain, the athlete calls it that way. He is satisfied that his opponent will do the same. He asks no quarter and gives none. As a result of this attitude and by comparison with the sportsman, the athlete will tend toward a legal interpretation of the rules.90

It is apparent that in play, unwritten rules provide more guides for action than do written ones. The regulations of the game, as delineated in rule-books, have no special authority; their value corresponds to their ability to aid in the promotion of pleasure. There

90 Ibid., p. 33.
are a number of unwritten rules, however, alluded to in the past several pages, which are considered important within the morality of play. Keating feels that there is one rule in particular from which all the others are derived.

All the prescriptions which make up the code of sportsmanship are derived from this single, basic, practical maxim: Always conduct yourself in such a manner that you will increase rather than detract from the pleasure to be found in the activity, both your own and that of your fellow participants.99

Keating's statement is obviously utilitarian and the connections to Mill need no further elaboration.

Some of the implicit derivatives of that pleasure principle are: always try to play according to the rules you have agreed upon; do not be legalistic in the interpretation of the rules; be absolutely fair in your interpretations of the play (i.e.: whether the ball is in or out of the court); play according to your playmates' strengths rather than his weaknesses if it is more enjoyable for him that way; and, be friendly. All of these unwritten rules, if followed, increase the pleasure to be derived from play. To act contrary to these "understandings" is to act inappropriately; in terms of the standards of right and wrong within the morality of play, it is to act immorally.

Although no explicit sustained effort has been made in the present section to relate play's orientation to the rules with reference to each of the beliefs about the nature of man and his ideals in play, they are implicit in the understanding of the rules. The rules are justified as they complement and supplement man's pleasure-seeking-ness and his social orientation in play, hence once again illustrating the morality's consistency.

The unwritten rules of athletics

It is more difficult to draw out an implicit moral code from a morality than it is to see the written rules and regulations. Such "understandings" are often beneath the surface, unwritten and unspoken, but yet influential. The written rules relate only to the game, and illustrate athletes' competitiveness, and self-interest-attitudes which necessarily puts them in opposition to all other athletes. That is understandable and understood as part of the game; it is necessary that athletes' goals and interests conflict. The implicit code, however, although still related to the actual playing of the game, appears to have wider-reaching importance and implication; it connects itself more to "real" life concerns. Made by athletes for athletes, the code can still be related to self-preservation, not in the sense of winning and losing, but of simply being able to continue competing. The unwritten rules, in
contrast to the explicit ones, illustrate a unity of athletes, an understanding that athletics is their livelihood and that there are certain things one must not do to jeopardize another's existence in that occupation. Unlike the situation surrounding many written rules of the game, where rule-breaking is often viewed as justifiable, the transgression of the unwritten code is not regarded complacently: those athletes who break it are stigmatized as immoral, socially ostracized and often subject to severe physical retributive punishments.

Although many of these rules are specific to each athletic sport, there are several which can be thought of in general terms as characteristic of all athletics. Even in the most physical of sports, where almost any form of brutal body contact appears to be tolerated, there are certain types of contact that are understood as implicitly forbidden. In hockey it is spearing; in football it is spearing a downed opponent with the helmet, "piling-on," and face-guard pulling; in baseball it is "bean-ball" throwing; in basketball it is "submarining" beneath the boards, and in boxing it is butting. One must not do these things. All of these "understandings" protect athletes from serious physical harm; an injury resulting from one of these actions conceivably could cause the cessation of one's athletic career. Persons known to have committed such actions repeatedly go beyond
the limits of acceptable behaviour; they are thought of as immoral. Not only are they punished by whatever sanctions the rule-book regulations delineate, but they also may suffer retributive justice from the athletes themselves. The attitude is that such a rule-breaker seriously threatens the livelihood of other athletes and either must be made to stop or at least suffer a similar punishment. One does not go to authorities to alleviate such a problem; largely it is handled internally. He who breaks this understood moral code better be aware and keep alert—punishment is on its way. Brock Yates, in an appropriately titled essay: "The Hit Men," points out that the task of enforcing this moral code may be left to a few athletes called "enforcers." Writing in a style that reminds one of the professional "hit" men, the enforcers or policemen in the underworld morality, Yates describes these few athletes as:

...the meanest players of all. Call them fighters, enforcers, policemen, brawlers or whatever, they occupy an exclusive niche in professional sport. Their job is to protect their teammates and carry the threat of serious harm to their opposition.

That kind of enforcement is apparent in hockey especially. John Ferguson of the Montreal Canadiens was the best known


101 Ibid., p. 145.
and perhaps most feared of all "policemen."

Skating with chopped, heavy strides, he roamed the ice like an avenging angel, chin high, his stick more a weapon than a tool, seeking combat. 102

Men like Ferguson perform a useful function however. Analogous to the professional killers and the fear of contracts in the underworld, the "enforcers" of the sporting underworld represent the fear of punishment that the law is unable to provide. Even if one knows he can spear in hockey without drawing the attention of the officials he is aware that he will not escape retribution from the other team’s "hit man." Unlike some punishments within the written rules, the punishment here is feared.

The second implicit rule to be considered here, although increasingly important as athletic situations become more organized and structured, operates in various degrees at all levels. The understanding is that athletes should not become too close or too friendly with the authorities, as represented by the coach, the manager, or the management in general. Most athletic teams have coaches whose responsibilities focus around ensuring that the team plays its best, and hopefully wins more contests than most other teams. He is the man in charge, the authority, the boss, the one who gives the orders and

102 Ibid.
directs the athletes and because of that, often is looked upon by the team members with a kind of employer-employee detachment. Whether through experience, intuition, belief or superstition, coaches feel that there are certain "things" in relation to team discipline, training methods, attitudes and effort that produce winning teams and certain others which produce losers. He naturally wishes to promote the former and avoid the latter. Although athletes want to win just as badly as the coach, they often question the usefulness and relevance of some of their coach's methods, and stress that is not whether they get to bed on time, or arrive at practice ten minutes late, or whether they are highly enthusiastic during practices that is important, but rather, how they perform during the game on the field. Whether the methods of the coach are useful or not is not the question here; what is important is that the difference of opinion often results in the athlete doing or not doing something that he was or was not "supposed" to do. Little leaguers come to practices late; pee wee baseball players fool around in the dugout; high school basketball players do not do their "jumping jacks;" college football players fail to run their laps; professional hockey players abuse their curfews and miss bed checks.

Regardless of the level, however, if an athlete is doing or not doing what he is or is not "supposed" to
do, and is getting away with it without harming his performance in the contest, it is likely that he would prefer to keep it that way by keeping it as quiet as possible. People who are close to authority, however, always are suspected to be informers; their closeness arouses fears in others, especially those who feel they have something to hide.

The mistrust of athletes close to authority is intensified in professional athletics because of the involvement of money, security and the fact that the activity is a livelihood. More demands unrelated to the actual participation in the game are placed on the athletes at this level, and it is understandable, because of the maturity of the participants, that there be more disagreement over the relevancy of these "unrelated" demands. Teams are owned by men who naturally wish to make the organization a financial asset. Because they realize that keeping out of the "red" is wholly dependent upon the paying public they attempt to parcel the game in the most attractive package possible. Curt Flood, in *The Way It Is*, sardonically describes the promotional attitude of these businessmen in baseball — the great American Game.

These dedicated men are custodians of a great tradition, the slightest neglect of which would plunge the entire United States into degradation.

There gravest concern is the Good of the Game. With this in mind, they maintain constant vigil over the Integrity
of the Game — its competitive honesty and fairness. And they cultivate the Image of the Game, having realized long ago that what the public perceives, or thinks it perceives, need not always correspond to reality. If reality becomes an inconvenience, it can be camouflaged. 103

The picture is painted that all athletes are fine American boys, who, with upstanding character, courage, and discipline, have reached the ultimate of the American dream; they are on a professional team! In order that this promotional caricature not be disclosed, athletes must try to act in a manner that befits their moral cloak. Anyone who does not, even though he plays well on the field, is thought to be hurting the image, and thus the gate receipts. Flood describes what athletes are supposed to say when in public.

"I'll sweep out the club house to stay here," he says. "I love the game and owe everything to baseball. I am thankful to this grand organization for giving me my big chance. I'm in love with this town and its wonderful fans. Even though I had kind of a slow start, I think I'm getting it altogether now. I expect to have a big year."

A player courts trouble if his public pronouncements stray too far from that familiar vein. 104

All of this simply illustrates that athletes are often required to behave in a manner that they do not support

104 Ibid., p. 35.
necessarily. Some resent the intrusion into their personal lives, into activities which are not related directly to his performance in the contest. Consistently breaking these requirements, however, could result in serious consequences and perhaps even the cessation of one's career. They understandably do not wish to be found out, and mistrust anyone close to the coach or management who may be informants. Such mistrust and suspicion is depicted in Foul!, the story of Connie Hawkins.

With paranoia sweeping the club, some players suspected Art was a "Valachi." Connie made up the term. It applied to players who spy on their teammates and give information to management. Most pro teams have someone they suspect. Often it is the trainer, or a white substitute or marginal starter trying to protect his position by ingratiating himself with his bosses....

The information passed on usually concerns black players dating white women, the names and gripes of discontented athletes, and the identity of players who complain about the coach. 105

Known informers suffer the social ostracism that naturally comes with mistrust. They cannot be confided in, nor can they be asked to participate in activities that do not represent the "proper" image for fear of managerial reprisals. Little can be done in the form of direct punishment, however; that would be taken to the authorities as well. Although he is regarded as a betrayer of the brotherhood, the informer and even the

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105 Wolf, Foul!, pp. 255-56.
suspected informer must be tolerated, but avoided.

Athletes want fair treatment. They want to have a fair chance at making the team at tryouts, and becoming a starter during the season. Anyone who is close to the coach may be suspected of trying to acquire a position by means other than through sheer performance and ability. Ability should be the determining factor, not whether one can get the coach to like him. Those who use the latter method are breaking the implicit moral code, and are disrespected.

Only two of the implicit rules or understandings operating in athletics have been discussed; it is not suggested here that they are the only ones. The illustration of them was to provide a general understanding that there are two distinct codes in athletics: one related to the playing of the game, the other related to wider-reaching concerns outside of the actual functioning of the game, but similar in that the following or breaking of them is connected to one's self-preservation. Although many of the written rules are broken often by the athletes, giving observers the impression that athletics is a highly immoral affair, there is an additional underlying code, strictly enforced, composed of rights and wrongs formulated and respected by the athletes themselves. It is much more difficult and intricate, but an understanding of the morality of athletics is incomplete without an investigation
of that implicit, underlying, action-guiding moral code. Previously, allusions to and pronouncements of athletics' immorality have been based solely on an understanding of rule-breaking as it relates to the written rule-book regulations of the game, without a recognition of the importance of the implicit morality as well. Although no claims to completeness can here be made, hopefully it has been established that the morality should not be understood through only the external standards of written rules, but through a conception of the internalized maxims as well.

E. MOTIVES THAT INCLINE ATHLETES AND PLAYERS TO CHOOSE THE RIGHT OR THE WRONG COURSE

Patrick H. Nowell-Smith, in conjunction with his definition of morality, describes three kinds of motives that lead individuals to follow the moral rules of their society.

1. Enlightened self-interest: We obey moral rules, even when it is irksome or inconvenient to do so, because we know that we shall suffer if we do not...

2. Respect for rules: We are creatures of habit and have been trained to obey the rules of our society from our earliest years. Almost all men have a conscience and, however this has come about (a difficult and controversial question), they sometimes obey the rules for no reason other than the fact that they are the rules...

3. "Other-regarding" motives: Under
Unfortunately, Nowell-Smith makes no reference to those motives or dispositions that lead men to choose the wrong course and violate the moral rules of their society. In keeping with this understanding, however, one could argue that opposites of rule-following motives lead to rule-breaking. Some are: self-interest, hatred, antipathy, malevolence, and a disrespect for the rights of others. Although ignorance, foolhardiness and haste often result in broken moral rules, because of their lack of intent, they cannot properly be understood as motives. One is not inclined because of his ignorance to break a rule; he may break it because he is ignorant, but his ignorance is not the motive that leads him to action.

The previous section has dealt with the rules of each of the moralities of athletics and play - rules that supposedly establish the behaviour which the participants consider appropriate to their activity. Within all moralities, however, there are persons who consistently abide by those rules, and persons who consistently do not. The focus of the present section is on some of the general kinds of motives that possibly lead one to be either a rule-follower or a rule-breaker in each of the two moralities.

Motives in athletics

Man's nature in athletics is believed to be competitive and self-interested. He is striving for victory, an end which by its very nature is held at the exclusion of others. In that light, of Nowell-Smith's three types of motives which lead one to follow rules, only the first two, enlightened self-interest and deontological respect for the rules, have any place in athletics.

To obey rules out of a concern for others, out of love or benevolence or sympathy is incongruent with the athletic situation. Athletes generally are self-interested and as Slusher has indicated, they would be more effective by not having a concern for others. Although some athletic actions, to be discussed, may appear to be the result of other-regarding motives, on a closer analysis, they can be better understood as self-interested as well.

As Nowell-Smith indicates, enlightened self-interest as a motive often entails a recognition of the fact that:

society enforces its code of rules by such sanctions as disapproval, social ostracism, retaliation, and the penalties of the law; and it is partly fear of such penalties that leads us to obey the rules. But it is not only fear. Most men are intelligent enough to see the advantages that they will gain in the long run by fulfilling their moral obligation.108

107 Slusher, Man, Sport and Existence, p. 165.

It is surely true that such a motive and understanding is operative in the morality of athletics. The fears of social ostracism, retaliations and certain prescribed penalties in the written game regulations have been shown to be significant deterrents against rule-breaking in many athletic situations.

Informers and persons considered to be too close to the authority figures are socially ostracized. Athletes who commit one of the physically injurious, implicitly understood taboos, like "spearing" in hockey, or "submarining" in basketball very likely will suffer a similar physically brutal retaliation. Third, depending on the situation, many rules are not broken because the ensuing penalty would make the action foolhardy and not in the athlete's best interests. It is usually considered imprudent to trip an opponent in hockey or to foul your man in basketball when there is no immediate threat of them scoring. Enlightened self-interest operates from a knowledge and a weighing of the punishment and the recognition that it is more prudent to follow the rule than to suffer the consequence.

It must be realized as well, however, that implicit in such a motive is the understanding that if it is not in one's best interests to obey the rule, then one has reason to break it. If there is more to lose by following the rule than by breaking the rule and enduring the penalty, then under the operation of the enlightened self-interest
motive, it is understandable that the rule is broken sometimes. Such motivation, clearly, is apparent more in the athletic morality than in most others; in most moralities, activities or societies, the fear of punishment from the law and social sanctions is serious enough to provide a sufficient deterrent for most potential rule-transgressors. There are probably relatively few situations in these, if reflected upon, where the gain from breaking the law minus the punishment suffered, is greater in the long run than the benefit of abiding by the rule. Often the situation is not the same in athletics. There are numerous occasions where it is more profitable to break the rule and suffer the penalty than it is to abide by the rule and let the opposition score. Athletic penalties do not carry with them the same kind of "real world seriousness" that can be associated with the death penalties and the imprisonments of other moralities; punishments are not feared as much. Where there is no fear of punishment, the same enlightened self-interest that motivates one to abide by rules in certain situations, can also lead one to transgress certain rules in other circumstances. It all depends on realizing which of the actions is best for one's own interests.

The second motive for rule-following in athletics is deontological: "rules are rules and they should be obeyed." While there are some in athletics who operate
from teleological enlightened self-interest, always considering the ends resulting from either rule-following or rule-breaking, there are surely others who obey the rules simply because they exist. Nowell-Smith points out the deontological fundamental regard for rules as rules.

Moral rules are not rules for achieving ideal ends, dependent for their validity on their success or failure in bringing about these ends, but are worthy of obedience in their own right. 109

Obligation and duty play an important role in this kind of respect for rules. One is obliged; it is one's duty to obey those rules simply because they are the rules. Little or no deliberation is required; one simply obeys.

By applying Nowell-Smith's statement to athletics, it can be said that athletes "...are creatures of habit and have been trained to obey the rules of their game from their earliest years." In basketball, athletes try to avoid contact while attempting to get the ball; football athletes, when making a tackle, immediately move their hands to another position if they initially make contact with the facemask; in hockey, when checking another into the boards, the "checker" takes one hand off his stick to avoid cross-checking. Two points are debatable here: are the movements conscious ones; and, is there a conscious reflection of the rules? Because of the skill, timing, speed and power that necessarily is involved in a well-performed check into the

109 Ibid., p. 150.
boards, it is likely that the actual performance of the check is reflected upon consciously, and therefore is an action. That the rule governing cross-checking is deliberated upon consciously, while executing that action is not so apparent. It is unlikely that the athlete thinks: "It's in my best interests to take my hand off the stick." Nor is it probable that he thinks: "If I don't take my hand off the stick, I'll get a two minute penalty and I fear that." If he thinks about the rule at all, it is likely a very simple, "I can't do that because there's a rule saying I can't and so I won't." If he were asked why he obeyed or had to obey that particular rule, he would very likely respond: "...because the rulebook says so."

Such an understanding of rule-following opens the door to several important and difficult questions relating to consciousness and action. There appears to be a fine line between a deontological respect for rules and what could be considered as simply blind and unconscious obedience. By definition, however, action necessitates consciousness. Even if it ever so briefly flashes through the athlete's mind that he may not do that and takes his hand off the stick because of it, he can be described as operating from a deontological regard for rules. If he simply does it, however, with no reflection, his movement is unconscious, performed through habit, and is not an
action. Of course, it would be difficult to determine which of the two the action was, but the problems arising are not of principle itself, but of its application.

Apart from these difficulties, and despite those numerous athletes who deliberately break rules, it is here assumed that there are still a great many who operate from a respect of the authority of many of the regulations in athletics.

Very often respect for rules is enhanced or even created by respect for the author of the rules: we think it right to obey a rule, even though we do not see the point of obeying it, because it emanates from a source that we recognize as authoritative, worthy of our esteem, and competent to exact our obedience. 110

The source or "author" of rules in athletics, of course, is the rule-book. The rule-book demands that a multitude of rules be observed; abiding by them comes to be almost second nature; one does not ask why a rule is there or to what end it leads; it is simply there, part of the game, and must be adhered to.

By proposing an application of Kant's categorical imperative to sport (athletics and play), Osterhoudt implicitly supports a deontological respect for rules. 111

110 Ibid., p. 151.

"The categorical imperative,..." Osterhoudt illustrates, "...dictates that we abide by these laws for their own sake (for the sole sake of duty to them)..."112 Osterhoudt's approach, however, is a normative one: he hopes that the Kantian application will encourage "...an order of ideal conduct increasingly uncommon in the playing of our amateur and professional sports."113 He hopes that conduct will be improved; too many rules are being broken too often. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of rule-following in athletics; the games would not be recognizable if there was not. It is a characteristic of rule-breaking that it is more noticeable than rule-following. In fact, it could even be argued that it is more obvious precisely because it does not happen as often as rule-following: the unusual always catches the eye. Speeding cars are more unusual than non-speeding ones: they are also more noticeable, unless it is one's own, of course. Similarly, it is easy not to be aware that rule-following is occurring when one basketball player consciously avoids fouling another on a lay-up. A deliberate foul in such a situation, however, immediately draws an observer's attention. Although it in no way reduces the effect of Osterhoudt's arguments, there is reason to believe that a considerable

112 Ibid., p. 122.

113 Ibid., p. 123.
amount of deontological rule-following already is present in athletics. Osterhoudt simply wants more.

Howard Slusher describes the attitude which surrounds rule-following in sport (athletics) in a manner that supports the notion that a deontological approach is present. Several of his statements imply that understanding.

For the average man, sport provides an opportunity to escape the risk of freedom. He enters into sport perceiving a system of rules, regulations and orders. To play the game is to regulate oneself to the rules.\[114\]

...the man of sport can look toward objective and rational order. He can determine the "norms" and make his own decision within the context of an "absolute" system....In sport the immediate must comply with the rules.\[115\]

It must be pointed out that rules in sport are more than guides for decision. They actually direct the way of doing things, if not the choice of doing. The participant is usually suppressed by a God-like official, who rather than provide an image of the "loving father" becomes a dogmatic legislator (the umpire is always right). In a manner of speaking, every personal decision must be interpreted in keeping with that which will be made by the official. Likewise the man of sport really does not need to develop his own ethical existence. The rulers of sport do this for him.\[116\]

\[114\] Slusher, Man, Sport and Existence, p. 149.

\[115\] Ibid., pp. 157-58.

\[116\] Ibid., p. 158.
Although Slusher goes on to argue that such an attitude towards rules, existentially, is not authentic and that persons often "fit in" to the sport morality without reflection on the values implicit in their actions, his statements do suggest that a deontological approach to rules does exist in athletics. A lack of reflection may not result, necessarily, from a deontological respect for rules, but, because the rules, the morality and the game itself all exist prior to the athlete's involvement, it is a distinct possibility. More will be said regarding this matter in the final chapter.

**Motives in play**

In the last section it was shown that rules, generally, are regarded quite differently in play. The deontological approach or motivation for rule-following is much less apparent. As it was explained, if a rule is considered too restrictive, or not complementary to the pursuit of pleasure in play, then it is either discarded, disregarded, deleted or replaced by a more appropriate regulation. Although children's play, where there appears to be more of an authoritarian enforcement of the rules as they are the rules, may be an exception, in adult play there is a casual, cavalier attitude. Rules are not considered to be authoritarian as in athletics, but are looked upon as tools to be manipulated to provide the best structure possible for the attainment of pleasure and the occurrence
of fun. Although once the rules have been established in unsupervised children's play, they are absolutely enforced, there is a similarity to adult play in that there is no authority outside of themselves which imposes the rules upon them. In addition, even though children often squabble, bicker and even fight over what rules shall be employed, it is nevertheless partially a result of a concern over which rules will make the best game—the one that is the most fun.

The approach in play, adult play in particular, is teleological. Rules are followed for the results they bring. Enlightened self-interest and other-regarding motives operate in play. Although Kant and Osterhoudt would very likely discredit self-interested motives, it would be overly idealistic to suggest that players act solely out of duty and other-regarding motives. Players play to enjoy themselves. Even if they do wish others to enjoy themselves too, they are concerned with their own pleasure and naturally wish to accentuate it as much as possible. They realize, however, that play is a cooperative endeavour; a "good" playmate always makes a game more fun.

There are few written rules in play which players have reason to break, at least in an ideal situation. It is in relation to those implicit, unwritten understandings that enlightened self-interest probably operates. Nowell-
Smith illustrates that "we obey moral rules, even when it is irksome or inconvenient to do so, because we know that we shall suffer if we do not." 117 For instance, in pick-up basketball, it is understood that one should not niggle over, or legalistically interpret the rules. Often obvious fouls go uncalled and even though one may wish to call a foul, he refuses to do so because of the negative results that would follow. One knows if he calls too many fouls he will be sanctioned by the displeasure of his playmates; he knows he may establish a precedent for an increased amount of insignificant foul calling. Both of these would result in a decrease in pleasure for the agent; he knows it; he wants to avoid that; he follows the implicit rule of "no harm - no foul" out of enlightened self-interest.

Self-interest is not the only motivating force for rule-following in play. The player was seen to be a socially-oriented being; friendship is often characteristic of the play situation. A concern for others' interests also motivates players to perform the actions they do in play. Mill emphasizes that a society cannot exist any other way:

Now society between human beings, except in the relation of master and slave, is manifestly impossible on any other footing than that the interests of all are to be consulted. Society between equals can

only exist on the understanding that the interests of all are to be regarded equally. 118

A player, because he has the choice, does not continue to involve himself in an activity in which his interests and pleasures are disregarded by the other player or players. Since seeking pleasure is one's reason for playing, there is little reason to continue if it is not being actualized. One hopes that one's own interests will be satisfied through play; it is natural then to view one's playmates as having the same need. Although it may not be found so much in children's play, it is a unique and complex combination of concern for oneself and a concern for others that characterizes adult play. A statement from Mill's Utilitarianism helps to explain it.

They are...familiar with the fact of co-operating with others and proposing to themselves a collective, not an individual, interest as the aim (at least for the time being) of their actions. So long as they are co-operating, their ends are identified with those of others; there is at least a temporary feeling that the interests of others are their own interests. Not only does all strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others, it also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with their good, or at least with an even greater degree of practical consideration for it....Consequently, the smallest germs of the feeling are laid hold of and nourished by the contagion of sympathy.... 119

118 Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 40.
119 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
The play form of golf is a particularly good illustration of the applicability of Mill's statement. There are few games which offer so many opportunities for the feeling and expression of sympathy. All golfers know the frustration of a "wicked" slice, the agony of a fairway duff, and the utter torture of a two-foot "in-and-out" putt. They know how the occurrence of any one of these, never mind all three as often happens, may have detrimental effects on the rest of the game. Whenever one of the golfers suffers from any of these unfortunate shots, at least one of the others seems to sincerely sympathize with him. He groans and sighs and sadly shakes his head with a pained, morose expression on his face. He may suggest that there's a lip on the cup, or blame the condition of the course, all with the hope of alleviating the other's displeasure. And, as Mill suggests, the sympathetic feeling is contagious. Soon the situation is reversed, and the sympathizer becomes the victim of yet another natural disaster represented in perhaps, the weather, the wind or the heat as expressed by another playmate in true sympathy. Others join in and soon it is four mutually concerned players co-operating and pitting their combined efforts to overcome the perils of the course, the elements and fate. So long as they continue to co-operate in such a manner, as Mill points out, they will have the feeling that all their ends are the same, that
their own interests are the same as their playmates. So long as they continue to do that, the game will be immensely enjoyable.

Keating would agree that other-regarding motives are operative in play for he holds that generosity and magnanimity are essential ingredients because they establish and maintain the unique social bond within it. 120 Although he refers to both sport (play) and athletics, Osterhoudt, in Kantian terminology, urges an increased concern for others' interests in the activities, emphasizing the importance of treating competitors as one would himself like to be treated: as ends in themselves rather than as means to the gratification of self-interest. 121 Although treating others as oneself would like to be treated can result from either self-interested or other-regarding motives, it is certain that both Kant and Osterhoudt are referring to the latter. By their understanding, self-interested motives are not properly moral.

The motives for rule-following and rule-breaking in athletics and play are consistent with the respective purposes, beliefs, ideals and rules of each of the

120 Keating, "Sportsmanship as a Moral Category," p. 29.

activities. A competitive, self-interested athlete pursuing victory, success and the accompaniments of prestige and financial reward, is not likely to operate from other-regarding motives, especially when it could be detrimental to his own pursuit. Self-interest and deontological respect or duty for the rules are his motives for rule-abidance; self-interest alone for his transgressions. A player is just as consistent. In his pleasure-seeking, socially-oriented activity, the adult in particular has no overwhelming respect for rules as rules; rules are tools, valued teleologically as they tend to help in the realization of fun. He wants to enjoy the activity but he wants his playmate-friend to do the same. It is this unique union of interests in play that leads the player to operate from a blend of both self-interested and other-regarding motives. He is a rationalist; there is little difference between his own pleasure and the pleasure of his partners; by promoting both he guarantees that the activity will be enjoyable to all, and that there will be more games in the future.
CHAPTER IV

IMPLIEDATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE EXAMINATION

The foregoing examination of the moralities of athletics and play, although lengthy, has left much unsaid. Often it is general, and lacks the detail and colour of an absolutely comprehensive understanding, if that even is possible. Despite these drawbacks, however, the thesis hopefully has accomplished its goal: that of providing a general understanding of the essential features of the internal workings of the moralities of athletics and play. Although the intricacies of the two moralities precluded a complete and absolute understanding, it is hoped that the preceding endeavour can be considered to be a step towards a more comprehensive conception of the moral nature of athletics and play.

A. IMPLICATIONS

From the examination of the two moralities arise a number of important implications which point out, hopefully, both the benefits of such an examination and suggest problems in need of further investigation.

The moralities are radically different

The most obvious implication or conclusion, perhaps, is that the two moralities are radically different. Although
the two activities have been contrasted from other stand-
points, the preceding examination has presented their
difference from a moral point of view through the use of
moral language. According to Nowell-Smith's understanding
of the elements of a morality, athletics and play differ
on every count. They are characterized by different be-
liefs about the nature of man, and, his ideals; the under-
standing, function and enforcement of rules is different;
and the motives for rule-following and rule-breaking are
of different kinds. One of their few similarities, however,
is their consistency. In athletics, it appears to be the
pursuit of victory that structures much of the activity
and behaviour within it; in play it is the pursuit of
pleasure. The radical differences between athletics and
play and their internal respective consistency lead to
further important implications.

The character-development claim

The problem was illustrated and instantiated in
the related literature chapter. Many have claimed that
character and moral values are learned through sport
(athletics and play); recently many have argued quite
strongly that such a claim is ludicrous. In light of the
foregoing analysis and illustration of the differences
between the moralities of athletics and play, it appears
to be no longer reasonable to claim, categorically, that
upstanding character, and all its sub-traits, are developed
equally in both. It has been argued that sport (athletics and play), either categorically or in principle, is responsible for the development of such character traits as: co-operativeness, competitiveness, loyalty, honesty, self-sacrifice, respect for rules and authority, self-control, dedication, sportsmanship, a concern for others, initiative, ability to handle adversity, integrity, promptness, good-will, charity and benevolence. Almost every trait that has ever been considered good has been claimed at one time or another. Even if one sees fit to ignore the problems associated with the teaching and learning of morality and the often raised difficulties related to the transfer of training, he is still confronted with the fact that some of the above character-traits are not characteristic of the two moralities. Some, perhaps, are appropriate to athletics, some to play, but certainly not all to both. It is incongruous to suggest that athletes, while engaged in their pursuit, are learning to be co-operative with the "other," self-sacrificial, sportsmanlike (in the traditional sense), other-regarding, charitable and benevolent. Their activity is competitive and self-interested. Not only does their activity not positively reinforce the above sociable traits, but it supports their opposites. As it has been suggested by Slusher, one had better not have these traits in athletics.\(^1\) To expect these attitudes

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of the athlete is similar to asking a leopard to change its spots.²

If one is going to claim that character is developed in athletics, he would sound more reasonable if he were to suggest traits that are at least consistent with and relevant to the morality within the activity. It is conceivable to suggest that competitiveness, loyalty, dedication, initiative and an ability to handle adversity are positively reinforced in athletics. All of these traits are beneficial at one time or another. Assuming that only those traits that are positively reinforced will be developed, it is more reasonable to suggest that some of the traits helpful in the pursuit of victory might be acquired.

Although co-operation, self-sacrifice, sportsmanship, a concern for others, goodwill, charity and benevolence are not consistent with the athletic morality, they may be more appropriate to the play situation. If one is regarded by the others to be a "good" playmate it is likely that he has some or all of these character traits. This is not to argue that these traits are learned in play, but simply to suggest that if any learning of this sort does occur, it is more reasonable to assume that it would be related to dispositions which are appropriate and valuable to the activity in question - ones that are reinforced.

It might be fruitful to approach the investigation of the two moralities through a conceptual analysis of each of these suggested character traits or dispositions and of how they, either positively or negatively, are related to the activities of athletics and play. What does co-operation mean in athletics? In play? What is the place of loyalty in each? Self-sacrifice? An analysis such as that for every possible disposition would provide some of the detail of a more complete understanding.

**Deontology and teleology**

A second implication goes more deeply into the notion of moral development in athletics and play. It relates to the function of the rules, and the presence or absence of a deontological respect for the rules. Insight into these questions or concepts will shed more light on the problem of moral development in the two activities and suggest some possible differences.

In athletics, the written rules, and perhaps even most of the unwritten ones, exist prior to any involvement by the athlete; he has no voice in their making; whether he thinks them right or wrong is irrelevant. If he wants to compete, they are the rules, and he must abide by them. Even though he tacitly agrees to compete according to their dictates, his free choice is limited somewhat. The rules are not his own; they are made and enforced by something
or someone else; in a sense, they are forced upon him. A certain kind of personal involvement, or consciousness, or self-identification with the rules is missing. The rules are obeyed because they are the rules. The authority of the rule-book goes unquestioned; it is simply obeyed. The attitude is deontological.

In play the situation is not the same. Rules do not exist, necessarily, prior to involvement. They have no separate, independent existence. They become actual only after they have been invented, discussed and agreed-upon by those playing. The only authority the rules have is bestowed upon them by the participants. The players are more able to relate them to themselves; more conscious, personal involvement and self-identification are present.

The player, unlike the athlete, is able, if not required, to involve himself in a decision-making process. He and his playmates are able to ask: "Are these the rules that we wish to play by?" The utility, the rightness and wrongness of rules can be taken into account. In this process many morally relevant questions can be considered. Is the rule fair? To what end does it lead? Which types of action are right under the rules; which types are wrong? Does it take advantage of the weaknesses of one and not the other? Why should that rule be incorporated instead of this one which might be better? What makes all of these questions even more morally relevant is that their answers.
depend, to a certain degree, on consensus and agreement among the participants. In a sense it is a consciousness and a discussion and a legislation of the good, the bad, the right and the wrong in their activity.

It is understandable why the problem of rule-breaking is apparent more in athletics than in play. Apart from the fact that one has more to gain from breaking the written rules in athletics, and more to lose by breaking them in play, it is reasonable to assume that persons who have helped to formulate rules may be more apt to abide by them, than those who have had the rules forced upon them. One who has a knowledge of the teleological value of a rule appears to have an additional reason to obey it than the one who simply respects it deontologically - as it is a rule to be obeyed. From that formulation, the player, unlike the athlete, is able to gain important moral insights into the appropriateness and function of the rules.

Moral education, as opposed to moral training, implies a certain consciousness. It implies ability to reasonably consider ends and means and to make decisions of conduct based on those considerations. One who always conducts himself out of deontological respect for the rules may not act, but simply behave. Although Osterhoudt may be correct when he suggests that an application of Kant’s categorical imperative to sport (athletics and play)
would provide an ideal order of conduct in these activities that has been conspicuously absent in recent years, one must question whether that is simply all that is needed. Deontology seems to imply training while teleology seems to imply education. If it can be assumed that participation in sport (athletics and play) can lead to some moral learning that might be transferable to the "real" world, which is most desirable, deontological respect or teleological understanding? Both? A proper response to this question necessitates additional understanding of the consciousness involved in both deontological and teleological attitudes in relation to the concepts of education, training, and moral learning and the always-present problem of transfer.

The role of officials

There are usually officials in athletics; there are usually none in play. Not only is there a lack of involvement in athletics in the formulation of rules, there is a related absence of a type of morally relevant decision-making connected with the application of the written rules. Officials decide what is right and wrong conduct; in play, the participants are responsible for these decisions. George B. Leonard in his exciting book

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Education and Ecstasy, describes the athletic situation and the possible results.

Baseball...characterizes much that has passed away. Its rigid rules, its fixed angles and distances, shape players to repetitive, stereotyped behaviour. The complete reliance on officials to enforce rules and decide close plays removes the players from all personal decisions, and encourages them, in fact, to get away with whatever they can.4

It is generally agreed that "...a person's morality is primarily a measure of his ability to make moral judgements, and to arrive at decisions on the basis of moral principles."5 Leonard's criticisms point out that much of that decision-making process is absent in athletics. Athletes are not required to judge the "plays:" it is assumed, and perhaps quite legitimately, considering the ends they pursue, that they are unable to make these types of decisions objectively and honestly. The officials take much of the burden and dilemma of moral decision-making away from the athlete. With it they perhaps take much of the possible moral learning.

Leonard proposes that a different type of game, a play game of frisbee, dependent on the players' abilities to make morally relevant decisions, would be more valuable.


Two players stand about fifteen yards apart. When the thrower launches the disk, the receiver makes an all-out effort to reach it. If he cannot get close enough to touch the disk — i.e., if it is entirely out of his range — he takes a point. If, on the other hand, the throw turns out to have been within his range but he failed (through misjudgement or insufficient effort) to reach it, the receiver gives a point to the thrower. If the receiver manages to touch the disk and then drops it, he gives the thrower two points. In each case the receiver makes the decision. There is no appeal, no intervening referee, no out-of-bounds sanctuary. Thus the receiver is making frequent statements about his own ultimate capabilities. He is practicing moral judgement....There are no external standards, no statistical comparisons — only the absolute of individual ability, desire and honesty.6

Where there are no officials the participants make all the decisions. Imagine yourself playing a game of paddle-ball against an outside wall of a brick building. You have just hit a good shot but it has landed on or near the line just in front of you. Whether it was in or out is your decision to make since you are closer. Some very quick thoughts might be likely to flash through your mind. "Was it in or out?" "Did the other player see it hit?" "I could call it in, but what will he think?" "It was almost in." "It was such a great shot!" Conscience grabs. "Oh, I wish it was in, but I guess it wasn't." "Damn!"

"I'll call it out."

In athletics, such consciousness is missing: one

is relieved of such considerations. The player cannot look to anyone else for the decisions; he must look within himself. Such responsibility entails an understanding of right and wrong, and the involvement of conscience.

Again, if it can be assumed that some kind of moral learning can occur in sport (athletics and play), it is reasonable to suggest that conscious moral decision-making would be important to it. To investigate this problem adequately as well necessitates a greater understanding of consciousness, moral education, the function of rules, the role of officials and the types of decisions that are or are not made by the agents within the moralities of athletics and play.

The question of external control

Do persons outside of the morality of athletics have a right to attempt to prescribe the type of behaviour appropriate to the athletic activity? It is true that many persons do not agree with much that occurs within athletics, but does that mean they have any right to attempt to change it? Before one even considers possible changes, if he is not an agent within that morality, he should seriously question his right to do so.

The athletic morality is a morality. Apart from the actual written rules there is an implicit unwritten code made for athletes by athletes that also legislates
right and wrong conduct. Those within the morality have a system of beliefs about the nature of man and his ideals; they have rules, explicit and implicit; they have punishments, explicit and implicit; and, of course, they have motives for either rule-following or rule-breaking. Athletes have an understanding of what is right and wrong, good and bad in their morality; as in any other morality, if detected, they are punished for their wrong actions. Although it may be radically different from other moralities, or the "overall societal morality," it is still a morality tacitly agreed upon by those agents within it. Would attempting to change it from without be much different from attempting to prescribe the moral conduct of a closely-knit ethnic group, for instance? It is questionable whether any group has a right to determine what another group of responsible persons shall consider to be right and wrong, good and bad. Perhaps the only way that right can be gained is if it is determined that the morality in question has serious detrimental effects on others outside of its internal workings. If it does not, then it seems that the agents within the morality should be left to determine their own moral prescriptions. Does athletics, with its own peculiar notions of right and wrong, cause serious harm to society? An answer to that question necessitates a weighing of both its positive and negative effects. Are children, who emulate the actions
of the athletes, seriously retarded in their moral development? Do coaches who emulate the strategy and methods of professional coaches negatively influence their young players? If so, are these negative aspects of athletics more important than the possible good it supplies as it is a major source of entertainment and income for millions of people? Are not the qualities of competitiveness, self-interest, dedication, and the ability to handle pressure and adversity beneficial to existence in the capitalistic morality of North America? Should they be? Are co-operation, self-sacrifice and charity more appropriate? Before one can have the right to legislate the morality of others it must be determined that their morality causes serious harm to still others. That consideration opens the door to many intricate but vital questions that need investigation prior to any legislation. It necessitates consideration of the goods and bads, rights and wrongs and their effects not only in what exists, but also in what is suggested to be better. That has yet to be accomplished.

Suggestions for change in athletics

If it were ever decided that athletics should be changed, it would be likely that rule-breaking would be one of the central concerns. In the light of the foregoing analysis of the morality of athletics, some suggestions can be made which might deter or lessen the rule-breaking that presently occurs.
Assuming that the competitive atmosphere and the pursuit of the exclusive end of victory were not changed, there are at least two logical methods that could be implemented to ensure greater rule-following. As Hobbes has pointed out, where there is more to be gained from breaking a rule and suffering the punishment than there is to be gained from simply following the rule, it is understandable that the rule is broken. Where there is no fear of punishment, punishment cannot act as a deterrent. Many such situations arise in athletics and need not be reiterated here. A way to solve that problem would be to increase the punishment so that all rule-breaking would be unprofitable. If deliberate fouling in basketball is undesirable, then establish a punishment that makes such an action foolhardy. Although such a change might result in "better" conduct, it might hamper freedom of choice. It would be relatively simple to establish punishments that were so severe that no one would ever act contrary to the rules. Although there might never be an immoral action in such a situation one could question whether there would be any moral ones either. The possibility of increased punishment to deter rule-breaking necessitates a greater understanding of rule-following, rule-breaking, the role of punishments and the concepts of choice and consciousness as they all relate to athletics.

A second method of increasing rule-following might
be to give athletes more control in the formulation of the rules by which they are to compete. This would raise consciousness, personal involvement and self-identification. There appears to be more reason to follow a rule that one has helped initiate and implement than one that is simply there and imposed externally. As was earlier explained, this would involve an implementation of teleological discussion and understanding, instead of deontological obedience. Such a method as this would also radically change the nature of athletics and might result in the de-standardization of rules which would be very confusing to athletes and spectators alike. Again, it is a question of which is most important.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE EXAMINATION

Although many of the recommendations for future research have been discussed in the preceding pages, it is perhaps helpful to list them and others in concise form.

1. A very general recommendation is to carry the analysis further including more detail and applying general concepts to more particulars.

2. The present investigation has dealt with the activities play and athletics without regarding the different variations within them. There is child's play, adult play, girl's play, boy's play, and individual and
group play. There are likely various levels of athletics described, perhaps inadequately, by the terms: "little league" athletics, "amateur" athletics, "international" athletics, "professional" athletics, and individual, dual and team athletics. Although all of these levels are variations within either play or athletics, it is likely that a more detailed philosophical investigation could illustrate morally relevant differences between and among them.

3. More light could be shed on the character-development claim through an intense conceptual analysis of the possible dispositions appropriate to the moralities of athletics and play.

4. Still further insights could be gained into the questions of character-development through an investigation of moral training, moral education, transfer of training, "transfer of education," deontology, and teleology.

5. A useful analogy might be made between the concepts of law and morality in society and the functions of the written laws and the implicit moral code within athletics.

6. Although investigations into moralities must limit its concerns, to a degree, to behaviour that is conscious and voluntary, there are some types of unconscious performance that are its concern as well - those
movements which should be performed consciously, but are not. For instance, one should not drive his car down the street without a certain amount of conscious deliberation and attention. Whether he does or does not is a morally relevant consideration. Perhaps there are similar movements in athletics, such as elbowing in the corners in hockey, which appear to be performed unconsciously, but yet should not be.

7. Many outsiders consider much of what goes on in athletics to be immoral and are intent on making major adjustments. Does anyone have a right to prescribe the morality of others? In what circumstances can that right be gained? Is the morality of athletics harmful in other ways? What changes can be made which eliminate the bad and wrong but still ensure the right and the good? These questions are the most important of any, but, as well, by far, the most difficult to adequately discuss. They necessitate a complete understanding of the athletic morality, a comprehensive conception of the society in which it exists and a detailed knowledge of their inter-relationship.

8. If changes are to be made in athletics, more insight is needed into the concepts of rules, law, moral codes, rule-following, rule-breaking, action, consciousness and punishment.
C. THE APPROPRIATENESS OF MORAL INQUIRY

The major implication of the present thesis is that it points out that moral language can be used quite fruitfully in the investigation and understanding of the activities of athletics and play. All of the major moral concepts or terms can provide useful and revealing insights. An understanding of the meaning and role of good, bad, right, wrong, motive, punishment, voluntary, conscious, action, freedom, choice, law, morality, conscience, deontology and teleology within athletics and play will enable a more accurate conception of the activities. All of these concepts can be usefully and unequivocally applied.

The use of Thomas Hobbes' "politico-moral" philosophy and John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism, although brief and not indicative of the detail of their works, has hopefully shown that the works of philosophers can be used appropriately to gain insights into athletics and play that may have, otherwise, never been gained.

The boldest and most exciting possible implication of all is that perhaps an understanding of the moralities of athletics and play could lead to a greater understanding of morality in general. As moralities, athletics and play have a certain quality of separateness or distinctiveness that other moralities might not have. They are relatively concise, concentrated and more in-
dependent of many of the intervening complications of a
more overall or general morality. The moral concepts
appear to be more easily exposed and perhaps their meanings
and relationships are understood more easily as they
operate within the athletic and play situation. In light
of the explicitness of moral concepts within them, is it
not an exciting possibility that knowledge of the moralities
of athletics and play could perhaps complement or
even supplement knowledge of moralities in society and a
more universal understanding of the moral nature of man?
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