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The language and diagramming of rejection and objection

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ABSTRACT: Understanding the language of rejections and objections is an important part of the analysis and practice of argument. In order to strengthen this understanding, we might turn to diagramming, as it has been shown to have the virtue of improving critical thinking skills. This paper discusses what reliable meaning can be taken from words and phrases related to rejections and objections, and then how to diagram them.

KEYWORDS: argument, argumentation, rejection, disagreement, objection, language, flag, indicator, diagramming, mapping

1. INTRODUCTION

An *argument* in the pragma-dialectical tradition is an attempt to eliminate disagreement between interlocutors (van Eemeren, Houtlosser, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2010, p. 2; Snoeck Henkemans, 1992, p. 18).

If (speaker) A says, "Dublin is the capital of the Irish Republic." and B says, "I agree.", the dialog starts with agreement and there is no cause for the presentation of reasons in favor of a standpoint or for replies to them. For an argument to take place, then, B must reject the averred proposition.¹ If A responds with something like "Well, you're an idiot then (for not agreeing with what I say).", she would indicate her unwillingness to attempt to eliminate the disagreement. An argument thus also requires that A, in some sense of the word, accepts B's disagreement.

"Rejection" is used here as a synonym for "disagreement" or perhaps better "non-agreement" with the standpoint. In analyzing the language of disagreement, I (attempt to) differentiate various forms of disagreement. "Objection" is reserved here for disagreement with A's reasons and reasoning.

The other main section of my discussion concerns the diagramming (or mapping) of rejections and objections in the course of a dialog. My interest here is mainly pedagogical: diagramming has been shown to have the virtue of improving critical thinking skills (Harrell, 2011; Harrell, 2008; Kirschner et al., 2003; Twardy, 2004; Van Gelder, 2001, 2003). However, diagramming is not extended to rejections and objections in most textbooks or in the literature on diagramming. (Appendix 1 surveys the coverage of objections in a number of textbooks, focusing on those that are most popular and those from authors working in the pragma-dialectic and

¹ In what follows, A and B are the speakers; A is female, B is male.

informal logic tradition.) On the assumption that more diagramming will continue to be beneficial, I attempt this extension.

A possible reason for the underdevelopment of diagramming is the difficulty involved. Dialectical reasoning involves two speakers, but diagrams traditionally do not demarcate who says what; they are concerned only with the propositions involved, placing them in various relationships to one another in a single diagram. For this reason, perhaps, in addition to diagramming we find separate tracking systems which interpret the utterances of speakers in terms of the moves made by their speakers and the level of their commitment to previously uttered propositions.

I shall say a few more words about this matter at the start of section 3, but I shall put this problem to one side and attempt simply to give a diagramming system for rejection and objection without explicit attention to tracking the speakers' commitment to the standpoint(s).

2. THE LANGUAGE OF REJECTION AND OBJECTION

2.1 Rejections and counter-standpoints

Speaker A asserts some standpoint. B's rejection of or disagreement with a standpoint, when taken seriously by A, is what begins the argumentation.

B rejects A's standpoint by failing to agree with the standpoint proffered by A. A's endorsement is for some reason not sufficient. The mildest form of rejection is doubt. B might express doubt by saying "It is?", "Really?", "I doubt it.", "I am not convinced." A request for reasons such as "Why do you think that?" also expresses doubt. Doubt means that B has another belief(s), unexpressed and perhaps even unconscious, which makes B unwilling to accept the standpoint merely on the authority of A, though A is not firm in holding this counter-standpoint. In this sense, doubt indicates that B holds one or more beliefs that are incompatible (directly or indirectly) with A's standpoint.

When, as is often the case, A has presented a standpoint along with a reason (before B speaks), expressions of doubt are unfortunately ambiguous between doubt of the standpoint and doubt of the reason. Compare:

A: Warren Buffett is very rich.

B: Are you sure?

A: Warren Buffett is very rich - he is on the *Forbes* list of wealthiest Americans.

B: Are you sure?

In the latter case, B's doubt might apply to the standpoint and so imply that either the reason or the inference are also doubtful, or it might apply to the premise and so imply doubt of the standpoint (in which case it would be an objection in addition — see the next subsection). In unusual cases, perhaps if B is a student of logic, B might disagree with the reason or the inference and yet agree with the standpoint; in most cases, however, B will only go to the trouble of questioning the premise if he also

doubts the standpoint and it is incumbent upon those trained in logic to articulate their unusual combination of attitudes.

The strongest form of rejection, dismissals such as "You've got to be kidding.", "Rubbish!", "No way!", "Bullshit!", or even abuse, such as the rhetorical question "Are you out of your tiny mind?", might suffer from this ambiguity too, but are more typically used concerning a standpoint, whether or not B agrees with the reason.

When clearly directed at a standpoint, dismissals, like doubts, indicate disagreement and indicate *that* B has a counter-standpoint. This is also true of less strong rejections which we can call "denials" of a standpoint, such as "I don't believe it.", "I don't think so.", "I think you're wrong.", or simply "No!".

A strong rejection (denial or dismissal) creates an expectation that an alternative standpoint or an objection (see the next section) will be articulated (and argued for). Indeed, B will often articulate his incompatible belief in the same breath as he indicates his disagreement. The incompatible belief is a counter-standpoint.

Violation of this expectation is the cause of the frustration expressed by Palin in The Argument Clinic (at 2m 18s):

Cleese:	Look, if I argue with you, I must take up a contrary position.
Palin:	But it isn't just saying "No, it isn't".
Cleese:	Yes, it is.

Palin expects that Cleese will either provide a counter-standpoint and give evidence for it, or will criticize Palin's argument. (In fact, in the sketch Palin has not yet given any reason for his standpoint and so an objection is impossible.) An expression of doubt, by contrast, invites A to give evidence in support of the standpoint, so that B can set aside whatever is worrying him.

Depending on the topic of the standpoint, dismissal or denial, but not doubt, might indicate not only that B holds a counter-standpoint, but implicitly articulate what the counter-standpoint is. If the standpoint is "Warren Buffett is not rich." then the stronger forms of rejection indicate that B thinks he is rich. (Though of course, the argument could then concern itself with just how rich Buffett is, and the standpoints would move from being contradictories to contraries.) If the standpoint is "Today is Tuesday.", on the other hand, dismissal or denial does not articulate a counter-standpoint, since it is not obvious what day of the week B thinks it is.

A counter-standpoint, in the terminology of pragma-dialectics, gives rise to a "mixed" argument: "the opponent does not merely cast doubt upon the argument, but adopts a standpoint of his own as well" (Snoeck Henkemans, 1992, p. 87 n. 14). Once a counter-standpoint is expressed, it becomes an object for discussion; A might ask for B's reasons for believing it, and B might offer them and perhaps think that a successful counter-argument will be a more effective rejection of A's original argument than criticizing it directly. (This issue — that B might support his own counter-standpoint or object to A's argument — returns in section 3.)

2.2 Objections

When A has given both a standpoint and a reason(s) for believing it, B can respond with an objection, which indicates the nature of B's criticism of what A has said. Objections typically indicate rejection of the standpoint but do not articulate a counter-standpoint.

B's words might indicate only the type of objection merely formally (that is, B says only what type of objection he holds). One way that B can state the nature of his objection (without or before providing the substantive objection) is by using the language of argumentation and logic.

"That inference is weak." or "That's not a valid argument." indicate dissatisfaction with the inference using language from logic. Less formal ways of stating that an inference is weak include "That doesn't follow.", "That's not much to go on." or "You'll need more than that to convince me."

Unfortunately, some of the vocabulary of logic used to state the forms of objection has entered into everyday English and lost its precision. "(Not) valid", for example, has come to be applied to propositions, and so can be ambiguous when A presents both a standpoint and a reason(s). At this time, "(not) valid" is applied to standpoints as much as if not more than to the inference.

"That doesn't necessarily mean ..." and "Not necessarily" are in somewhat better shape. A logician hearing "not necessarily" would think that the inference is being criticized and the standpoint rejected.² However, "not necessarily." is sometimes used to mean "The standpoint is not necessarily true." even in the absence of reasons from A. B might use it to be polite, indicating with "not necessarily" that A's standpoint is true in some or many cases before pointing out the exceptions. For example:

- A: A mother would never hurt her children.
 B: That's not necessarily true. Sometimes ...

This use means that "not necessarily" can suffer the ambiguity noted in connection with doubt. For example:

- A: A mother would never hurt her children. After all, they're her own flesh and blood.
 B: Not necessarily.

Agreement with the reason(s) combined with disagreement with the standpoint indicate disagreement with the inference. Consider the following exchange:

² It's an interesting question what B's attitude towards the standpoint is when he says, "the inference does not necessarily follow". Is he expressing weak rejection, a doubt or something like doubt? This phrase is properly used when A has asserted a universal proposition. When B objects to this, he is suggesting that the proposition be made less universal. Does this mean he disagrees with the proposition or agrees with it?!

- A: Warren Buffett lives in a fairly regular house in Omaha, Nebraska. He isn't rich.
B: That's true, but he could still be rich.

B concedes the truth of the premise but expresses disagreement with the standpoint and so disagrees with the sufficiency of the premise.

Some indicator phrases are designed to work like this, admitting the premise but doubting the inference and so the standpoint: "Even so, ...", "And yet ...", "Yeah, but ...", and verbs and adverbs indicating concession, such as "I concede ... but ...", "I grant ... but ...", "Admittedly ... but ...".

B need not entirely concede the truth of A's premise; he might concede only that it is not definitive or only partially relevant to the standpoint, with a phrase such as "That is important to keep in mind, but ..." or "That's true sometimes, but ...". Consider the following example:³

- A: Large lectures are an efficient use of faculty. We should increase the number we offer and do away with some low-enrollment courses.
B: Efficiency is important, of course, and large lectures might be OK for some courses, but pedagogical concerns are more important ...

As another example, consider the following statement in response to improved national security being used to support warrantless wiretaps:

- B: But even though warrantless wiretaps contribute to the war on terror, they are not worth the invasion of privacy.

Here, B concedes that the practice has a beneficial consequence, but asserts that it is has a negative consequence, and that the two are of unequal value. A and B, as well as the analyst, must then decide if one of the two is strong enough to carry secure a standpoint, and which.

Practical arguments often involve speakers presenting competing reasons concerning an action, such as allowing students to use computers in class, or getting a dog:

- A: We should get a dog. A dog would be good company, and add to the security of the apartment.
B: No we shouldn't. A dog would add expense and need to be walked two or three times a day, which would take time.

I think one reason why recognizing objections and counter-standpoints is important for critical thinking is that they require us (as analysts or participants) to think

³ Based on an example from Nelson, 2011.

about the weight of competing reasons. These must be practiced alongside arguments involving definitive (all or nothing) considerations.

To indicate an objection to a reason, B might respond by saying "Your premise is false.". As noted already, just saying "That's false." (without using "premise" or another words such as "reason") is ambiguous as between premise and standpoint.

There are other phrases, not from the study of logic or argumentation, which can be used to indicate criticism of a premise, such as "You have your facts wrong." and "Actually, no.". As noted already concerning rejection, however, there is a risk of ambiguity with phrases which challenge the truth of a statement and so could be used as a challenge to either the standpoint (and thus to premise or inference) or to premise (and thus to the standpoint). The word "facts" in "You have your facts wrong.", or a word such as "evidence" or "data" might more strongly suggest the premise.

The broad use of the language of argument means that instructors face a tricky task, pedagogically: we want to educate our students in the precise use of logical terminology but then, in having them deal with real-world argumentation, must educate them in the imprecise use of that terminology in everyday argumentation.

Often, of course, the ambiguities are cleared up by whatever B says next or in the course of the dialog. But substantive propositions only help to eliminate ambiguity when speakers (ourselves or our students) have a firm grasp of the subject matter. The range of topics over which familiarity is widespread is decreasing, which means instructors must either use banal examples or educate students in topics that are not logic or critical thinking.

3. DIAGRAMMING REJECTION AND OBJECTION

3.1 Two types of argument tracking

In the pragma-dialectic tradition, an argument is an attempt to eliminate disagreement. This perspective on argument as process has the salutary effect of forcing us, whether as participants in our own arguments or as third-party observers or "analysts", to pay close attention to phrases by which a speaker indicates her attitude toward the substantive propositions of the dialog, especially in the "confrontation" and "conclusion" stages. That is, attention is paid to phrases which indicate whether or not (and with what confidence), the speakers agree or disagree with the standpoint (and the rest of the propositions employed). Tracking these attitudes can be done both descriptively (as in Edmondson, 1981) and normatively (as in van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans, 2002).

Theorists in pragma-dialectics also pay attention, separately, to the substantive propositions and their interrelations as these appear in what they call the "argumentation" stage.⁴ These are diagrammed in the manner familiar from the

⁴ The terms for the stages come from van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans, 2002. Chapter 5 of van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, looks just like an argument

informal logic and critical thinking traditions, using numbered propositions and arrows and perhaps a few other symbols such as braces or the plus-sign. That is, they track the argument in the sense of the product, the set of propositions, the standpoint (conclusion) and the reasons (premises).

Argumentation theorists thus employ two types of argument tracking and one might ask what the relationship between the two is. Tracking the commitments of the speakers is useful insofar as we want to make ourselves and our students better arguers in the sense of being more just towards our interlocutors by avoiding the use of fallacious and rhetorical ploys against them, such as shifting the burden of proof or imputing some unstated belief to them. Tracking the substantive propositions, on the other hand, is good because we might also learn from the speakers concerning the issue at hand.

If both types of tracking are valuable, we might attempt to devise a method for doing both at once, or discuss the prospects for reading the dialectical moves off the argument diagram.⁵ But this is beyond the scope of this paper. In what follows, I consider only diagramming propositions and their relationships, and in particular, rejections and objections.

No tradition pays much attention to objections. Many texts do not discuss objections at all and those that do often do so superficially. Coverage of diagramming rejections is practically non-existent. (Appendix 1 surveys the coverage of *objections* in representative textbooks; it doesn't bother with rejections.) As mentioned in the introduction, my concern here is pedagogical and there is evidence to suggest that diagramming improves critical thinking skills, and so I attempt to advance the state of the art.

3.2 Diagramming indicators of rejection and objection

Diagrams number substantive propositions and show relations between propositions by using the various arrows and symbols. The relationship of premise(s) to conclusion is usually represented by an arrow between them; this arrow represents what in English are the various premise-indicator and conclusion-indicator words. Numbers represent the substantive propositions while arrows represent the structure of the reasoning.⁶

There are various additions that might be used in order to diagram rejections and objections. I think we can get by, or certainly do a lot, with one addition, arrows

diagram from critical thinking texts, containing only reasons in favor of a standpoint. The same is true of Walton, 2006, chapter 4; Walton is in the informal logic tradition, but includes pragma-dialectic's rules for dialog.

⁵ We will see below that B's agreement with the truth of A's reason is not explicitly diagrammed.

⁶ Much attention has been given in the pragma-dialectical tradition to the distinction between dependent and independent premises and the indicator words which help distinguish them. See van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, chapter 7; Snoeck Henkemans, 1992, chapters 2, 3 and 4; van Eemeren et al., 1996, especially p. 18 n. 24; van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002; van Eemeren, Houtlosser, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2010; Snoeck Henkemans, 2010. My own take on this issue, along with a method for diagramming them, and objections to them, can be found in Woods, 2011.

with a dashed shaft. Where an arrow with a solid shaft is read as "is reason for accepting", a dashed arrow can be read, in general, as "is reason for not accepting", and has two specific forms depending on what it points at: if it points at a number representing a proposition (whether premise or standpoint), it means "is a reason not to accept as true"; if at an inference arrow, it means "is a reason not to accept as sufficient".⁷

As mentioned in section 2, rejection indicator words, whether in the form of doubt, denial or dismissal, indicate B's disagreement and that he has some contrary or contradictory standpoint, not yet expressed and perhaps not even conscious. An indication of rejection or formal rejection can be diagrammed with a dashed-arrow pointed at the number representing the standpoint; as there is no substantive counter-standpoint, the arrow does not point from any number, as in figure 1:




Figure 1: Disagreement with a standpoint without a substantive counter-standpoint.

Formal disagreement with a standpoint implies that something is wrong with the initial argument. But since we do not know (yet) what the supposed fault is, we can diagram no further.⁸

The device of an arrow not pointing *from* any number can also be used to represent indicators of objections to a premise or to an inference. If B implies disagreement with a standpoint by saying "your facts are wrong", we can diagram with *two* arrows, one against the premise and the other against the standpoint, and neither from a number. Formal objection to an inference would have the arrow point at the inference arrow and another at the standpoint. The reason for the two arrows in each case is that we should diagram whatever we can infer about B's position from what he says: criticism of A's premise or inference indicates disagreement of the standpoint.

The unusual case of (the logic student's) agreement with a standpoint but (formal) disagreement with a premise would be diagrammed as in figure 2, using only *one* arrow:

⁷ The *direction* of the arrow represents whether the statement pointed from (directly or indirectly) supports or criticizes the initial standpoint: the reasons for the initial standpoint go in one direction (downward), objections go in another (upward). The use of *two* distinguishing features (the type of shaft and the direction) comes into its own when there are supports for objections and objections to objections, and support for support for objections, and so on.

⁸ We might perhaps diagram *that* there will be an objection of some type by using an objection arrow with a split head, but in practice it is a good idea when diagramming not to add arrows (or any other symbol or number) that will have to be modified or removed at a later stage.




Figure 2: Objection to a premise without a substantive proposition.

3.3 Diagramming substantive rejection and objection

Where a counter-standpoint is articulated, that is, where a substantive proposition is presented as B's position, we would add a number to an arrow pointing at the original standpoint. Consider the following, in which a mixed response makes it clear that B is rejecting the standpoint:⁹

- A: Warren Buffett can't be very rich. He lives in Omaha, Nebraska.
 B: Even so, I think he is.

"Even so" grants the truth of the premise and "I think he is." is a counter-standpoint, which is clear from the fact that it makes no sense, grammatically, as an objection to the premise. The fact that B articulates a counter-standpoint and agrees with the premise means that B must think A's inference is weak, even though no objection to it is articulated. We diagram both rejection and formal objection as follows, with a numberless arrow pointing at the "supports" arrow, as in figure 3:¹⁰



Figure 3: Proposition (3) is a counter-standpoint; implied objection to the inference.

As an example of substantive objection, let us return to Argument Clinic. Palin tries to convince Cleese that he (Palin) has paid by noting that Cleese is arguing and claiming "If you are arguing, I must have paid.". Cleese replies, "Not necessarily; I could be arguing in my spare time.". In figure 4, this reply is

⁹ Some reasons are clearly expressions of a counter-standpoint, even when that standpoint is not articulated, because of the obviousness of what can be inferred from them. For example: A: I think Jack has been out of town for a while — he hasn't responded to my e-mails or texts. B: But I saw him just yesterday! Here, B's utterance will provoke the counter-standpoint that Jack *has* been in town recently.

¹⁰ Note that no way of positively indicating B's agreement ("even so") with the premise is diagrammed. This is a basic function of an argumentation-tracking schema. Perhaps we could use an upward-pointing, solid arrow, from no number?

represented by the upward arrow against the standpoint ("Not necessarily") and the number 4 and an arrow from it for "I could be arguing in my spare time."¹¹




Figure 4: Formal disagreement with a standpoint; proposition (4) is an objection to premise (1).

The following dialog articulates an objection after the counter-standpoint:

- A: Warren Buffett can't be rich. He lives in Omaha, Nebraska.
 B: I think he is. Maybe he has family in Omaha.

"I think he is." is an articulated counter-standpoint, represented by the number 3 and its arrow. The second sentence of B's is best construed as a criticism of the inference, and diagrammed by 4 and an arrow pointing at the inference. The whole is diagrammed as in figure 5:



Figure 5: Proposition (3) is a substantive counter-standpoint; proposition (4) is a substantive objection to the inference

In this example, B's response is classified as an objection because it can be interpreted as an objection to the initial argument and would make no sense as a reason to think that Buffett is rich. (The "maybe" indicates that it is directed against the inference or an implicit connecting premise or warrant, as it is a general rather than a particular proposition about Buffett.)

In the following example, the premise is challenged:

- A: Moving prisoners from Guantanamo to mainland U.S.A. puts American citizens at risk. They must remain at Guantanamo.
 B: No, they should be moved! The prisons they would be held in are super-max facilities that are completely secure. Indeed, the

¹¹ The arrow points at a number rather than at the inference arrow because "If you are arguing, I must have paid." articulates the inference between the specific premise "You are arguing." and the conclusion "I paid.". The inference can then be criticized by criticizing this premise.

shoe-bomber and one of the 9/11 plotters are already securely incarcerated in U.S. prisons.

Here, B begins with "No", which indicates rejection and immediately articulates his counter-standpoint. What follows this, however, is clearly contrary to the truth of A's premise, that Americans will be put at risk, rather than support for the counter-standpoint.

3.4 Dual-purpose propositions

Could B's second sentence (about super-max facilities and their current occupants) also be interpreted as support for B's counter-standpoint? Perhaps not, because it would support the counter-standpoint only negatively, by removing a worry, as though A's initial reason were presented as an objection to B's standpoint.

Some cases, however, are indeed ambiguous; that is, the same reason(s) functions both as support for a counter-standpoint and as a criticism of the initial argument. For example:

- A: Warren Buffett can't be very rich. He lives in Omaha, Nebraska.
 B: I think he is. He was towards the top of the *Forbes 500* list.

This reason provides support for the counter-standpoint. This supporting function can be diagrammed as in figure 6:




Figure 6: Proposition (3) is a counter-standpoint; proposition (4) offers substantive support for (3).

But the proposition which provides support for the counter-standpoint also serves as an objection to the original argument, and this role should be indicated in the diagram as well, in this case as an objection to the inference. See figure 7.



Figure 7: As figure 6, with proposition (4) also serving as an objection to the initial inference.

Similarly, consider an example in which speakers merely pile on competing considerations. Here is the discussion about getting a dog, again:

- A: We should get a dog. A dog would be good company, and add to the security of the apartment.
 B: No we shouldn't. A dog would be expensive.

In this scenario, B's reason can be interpreted as support for his claim that they (A and B) should not get a dog. This is so because they immediately follow an expressed counter-standpoint. We would diagram as in figure 8:¹²




Figure 8: Proposition (4) is a counter-standpoint; (5) supports (4).

Without the presence of an articulated counter-standpoint, however, B's reason would be construed as an objection to A's argument (and specifically, the inference): that being good company and making the apartment more secure are insufficient support for A's standpoint. We would diagram as in figure 9:

¹² Proposition 4 could be expressed as ~ 1 . I ignore in this example the difference between descriptive claims and practical claims. For the split-tail arrow as a means of diagramming "piling-on reasons" arguments, see Woods, 2011.



Figure 9: Proposition (4), which is Figure 8's proposition (5), is an objection to the initial inference.

In this diagram, the reason (here 4, which is the same proposition as 5 in the previous diagram) pushes back against the force of 2 and 3, rejecting 1. This proposition can be offered in support of the counter-standpoint or as a criticism of A's argument. This suggests that in the previous diagram we ought also to draw an objection-arrow from 5 to the shaft of the arrow from 1 and 2 to 3.

B might even do both explicitly in one breath:

- A: We should get a dog. A dog would be good company, and add to the security of the apartment.
- B: No we shouldn't. A dog would be expensive. You seem to have overlooked this.

In some cases, then, B's response can serve a dual function and this dual function can be diagrammed. (This goes for both speakers: the reasons A has already given in support of her standpoint can also function as rebuttals to B's argument.) These examples (both with single function and dual function) show again (as was stated at the end of section 2) that analysts must depend to some extent on their knowledge of the topic under discussion and cannot solely rely on indicator words and phrases.

It is perhaps because of confusions resulting from the dual function of some propositions that most texts refrain from dealing with counter-propositions at the same time as the initial proposition. It is less confusing and makes for less dense diagrams to deal with one standpoint at a time and repeat the reasons in each diagram (in one as objections, in the other as reasons for the counter-standpoint) as necessary.¹³

4. SUMMARY

Let me conclude by attempting to summarize the various claims made in the course of the paper.

The second section of the paper discussed the words and phrases that can be used to express rejection and objection, and the extent to which they were reliable indicators. The following points were made:

¹³ Snoeck Henkemans in chapter 4 of her 1992 diagrams A's reasons (both initial reasons and reasons offered in response to B's objections) without including B's objections.

- Doubt, denial and dismissal are three ways of rejecting a proffered standpoint without necessarily articulating it. A rejection is a contradictory stance, and wherever the options concerning the standpoint are limited to contradictories, the content of the counter-standpoint can be known without it being stated explicitly.
- In response to a standpoint along with a reason, indicators of disagreement with a proposition are ambiguous between the standpoint and the reason.
- Rejections indicate counter-standpoints, but doubt does so very weakly; only with denials or dismissals is there an expectation that B should advance the conversation by giving an objection or support for a counter-standpoint.
- Objections also serve the function of rejecting a standpoint.
- Some of the language of objection from logic has been degraded in everyday English and is ambiguous between mere rejection and objection. This creates a pedagogical difficulty in that we must train students both in the precise use of this language and in its imprecise use, which is potentially confusing for students.
- A mixed response can help specify the precise nature of B's response.
- We can distinguish between formal and substantive rejection and objection, or to put in another way, between indicating and articulating rejection or objection. Indicator words and phrases are sometimes all that people say.

The third section of the paper proceeds from a claim about the value of argument diagramming and assumes that this value extends to diagramming rejections and objections. In discussing how this might be done, the following points were made:

- There are two types of argument tracking: tracking the speakers' commitments to the standpoint(s) and tracking the propositions. This paper does not attempt to integrate these.
- The device of an arrow pointing from no number can be used to diagram rejection and objection that is indicated but not articulated, that is, to diagram indicator words.
- Some substantive propositions can be categorized and diagrammed as objections alone, or as support alone, and some will have a dual purpose. Knowledge of the topic under discussion is essential in order to discriminate.
- When a proposition both supports a counter-standpoint and functions as an objection to the initial argument, the diagram should reflect this dual function.
- In the practice of diagramming is it advisable to diagram all of the relationships between propositions.

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APPENDIX - Coverage of diagramming of objections in selected textbooks

- Austhink.com—against premise and against the inference in the form of a connecting premise
- Boss, *Think*, (2e 2012)—none
- Copi & Cohen, *Introduction To Logic* (8e 1990)—none
- Epstein, *Critical Thinking* (3e 2002)—against premise and against the conclusion
- Fogelin, *Understanding Arguments* (3e 1987)—none
- Howard-Snyder, *The Power Of Logic* (4e 2009)—none
- Kelley, *The Art of Reasoning* (3e 1998)—against premise and against the inference in the form of a connecting premise
- Johnson, *Fundamentals of Reasoning* (4e 2002)—none
- Johnson & Blair, *Logical Self-Defense* (1994)—none (mentioned in passing)
- Moore & Parker, *Critical Thinking* (6e 2001)—none (one example containing a consideration against the conclusion, diagrammed with hash-arrow)
- Morrow & Weston, *A Workbook For Arguments*, (2011)—none
- Thomas, *Practical Reasoning In Natural Language* (3e 1986)—against truth of premise, against inference
- Toulmin, Rieke & Janik, *An Introduction to Reasoning*—against inference
- Salmon, *Introduction To Logic & Critical Thinking* (5e 2007)—none
- Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, *Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation* (2002)—none
- Walton, *Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation* (2006)—none
- Yanal, *Basic Logic* (1988)—none