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Response to my Commentator

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First of all, I would like to thank Professor Garssen for his insightful and useful comments. They have really given me a good chance to improve my work.

For example, I agree that it is a stipulation to say that the rhetorical effects of a performance are just a subset of its perlocutionary effects, namely, those which are beliefs and belief-like attitudes. The motivation for this stipulation is to deal with the rhetorical as contentful. But I think it would be a good idea to offer some additional rationale for this assumption.

Regarding the other clarifications demanded, I would like to say that, in my view, the key idea to distinguish speaker’s meaning from rhetorical meaning is not the possibility of “empirically discovering” the rhetorical intention of the speaker—i.e. her intention of producing a rhetorical effect—but the possibility of attributing such intention to the speaker by making sense of her performance as a means to satisfy it. Or in other words, by determining which other sort of belief may the speaker be aiming at inducing in her addressee which is not a belief about her communicative intention. Thus, I would not say that producing a rhetorical effect is the ultimate goal of the speaker; rather, I would say that it is the goal that makes sense of her speech act as a perlocutionary act—i.e. an act produced with the intention of “causing” some effect in the audience. Communicative achievements can be seen as even more important goals for the speaker, but the speaker’s communicative intentions would rather serve to make sense of her speech act as an illocutionary act.

In my view, an act of arguing, understood as an illocutionary act, amounts to an attempt at showing a target claim to be correct, whereas, as a perlocutionary act, it amounts to an attempt at inducing an indirect judgment—i.e. a judgment of the sort “c, since r.” That is why I think that argumentation can be seen either as a justificatory device (an attempt at justifying) or as a persuasive device (an attempt at inducing a belief). By arguing, we try to justify our claims and beliefs: argumentation is the way we turn our (true) claims and beliefs into proper knowledge—and, given a realist position about values, that includes, for example, knowledge about what is good or which are the best decisions to take. In being a justificatory device, argumentation would be a tool for knowledge, and in being a persuasive device, it would enable individuals’ interactions. I have argued for all this in Bermejo-Luque (2007 and 2009).

As a justificatory device, arguing mirrors reasoning, but the normative conditions for showing a target claim to be correct involve not only semantic, but also pragmatic constraints that, in my view, are alien to merely inferential processes (whose normative conditions are a matter of validity and truth/acceptability).

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Incidentally, there is also a normative dimension for argumentation as a persuasive device, namely, the one that has to do with the conditions for inducing beliefs by means of reasons, and not by other means as suggestion, coercion, seduction, etc. Additionally, we can also determine the value of a piece of argumentation as a rhetorical device, i.e. as a means to achieve a rhetorical effect.

My characterization of argumentation as a second order speech act complex is work in progress, but its guidelines are, on the one hand, that argumentation is composed of two acts of claiming that become the corresponding acts of adducing and concluding in virtue of a third implicit act of claiming a warrant. The idea that argumentation is a complex of reasons and conclusions is crucial for my account: as long as I aim at determining the normative conditions of argumentation by considering the normative conditions of such a speech act, it would not make sense to exclude the conclusion from the act of arguing; after all, adducing p may be felicitous of infelicitous depending on what do we adduce p for: p may be a good reason for q, but not for r.

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