Ch'En Tu-Hsiu, 1879-1942, and the origins of the Chinese Revolution.

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CH'EN TU-HSIU (1879-1942)
AND
THE ORIGINS OF
THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

by

Ping-ting Lam

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of History
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Windsor, Ontario, Canada
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To

Dr. Liang Hui Wang
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ABSTRACT

The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia had no immediate impact on China. The vast majority of China's intellectual leaders at that time were completely absorbed with Western liberal democratic political theories. Yet in the summer of 1919, almost overnight, a large proportion of the Chinese intelligentsia became bitterly disenchanted with such theories and swung abruptly toward Marxism. There is strong argument to support the contention that the basis for the eventual Communist triumph in 1949 was laid by the May Fourth Generation from 1919 on.

This thesis argues that the motive force of the still ongoing Chinese Revolution has been nationalism, rather than Communism. That is to say, the Communist victory in China cannot be understood in terms of the simplistic theory of a conspiracy emanating from without. On the contrary, Russian aid and support notwithstanding, the causes of the Chinese Communist success have been entirely indigenous.

The thesis contends that the May Fourth Generation was not originally attracted to Marxism on the basis of any profound understanding of Marxist theory. Rather, the leading intellectuals of the day, without any real grasp of Marxist theory, were profoundly impressed by the stand
taken by the Soviet Union in opposition to imperialism, colonialism, and secret treaties by great powers at the expense of small ones. The Soviet impression was strong particularly because the new Soviet stance precisely coincided with the shameful and humiliating treatment of China at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu is selected as the subject of this study because he was both highly influential in and representative of the May Fourth generation. It is felt that Ch'en represents the microcosm of what was occurring to the entire Chinese nation. By tracing and analyzing the significant changes in Ch'en's political thinking, and setting them in their correct historical context, it is possible to gain considerable insight into the failure of liberal democracy in China.
INTRODUCTION

The 1911 Revolution ended almost four thousand years of monarchy in China. China became a Republic, based on a fuzzy notion of western democracy. A central government was set up in Peking with Yuan Shih-k'ai its first prime minister. Yuan was very ambitious and wanted to restore the monarchical system. The leader of the revolution, Sun Yat-sen, broke with Yuan and established a KMT government in Canton. The country was in a state of chaos, and foreign aggression, especially from Japan, was an immediate threat.

From 1911 to 1919, despite foreign aggression, western liberal democracy was very popular in China. It was well accepted by the intellectual class. Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942) was the leading intellectual of that time. He was born in a lower middle class family in 1879, and had a fairly unpleasant childhood. Ch'en encountered many incidents in his childhood which made him equate China with corruption, injustice, and superstition. Ch'en decreed the hypocrisy of the scholar-official class, which monopolized money, fame, power, and property. Merchants, peasants, and landlords all aimed at entering this class via the Confucian civil service examination.

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Ch'en himself was no exception. He felt the pressure to pass the civil service examination in his childhood, and when he grew older, he witnessed the licentiousness of the examination candidates. Ch'en hated the civil service examination system. Through it, he felt the whole Chinese society was corrupted and hypnotized by Confucius' ancient ideology. Such was the origin of Ch'en's anti-traditionalism in his adult years.

On the other hand, a well-known scholar and journalist, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, also influenced Ch'en Tu-hsiu considerably in his early thought. However, Liang's ideas of moderate reform no longer attracted Ch'en after he went to Japan. Ch'en went to Japan four times. It was during his first day there that he became a radical revolutionary, and involved himself in revolutionary movements. However, Ch'en's thought was only anti-Manchu by then. Not until after the establishment of the Chinese Republic did he become western-oriented.

Ch'en's attraction to the west was not without reason. Previous to Ch'en's generation, the Chinese had blissfully assumed their cultural superiority for thousands of years. China was the centre of the orient and had a long and glorious history. All this was drastically changed for Ch'en's generation. This generation endured endless defeats and humiliations
at the hands of Japan and the western powers. Confucianism was of no avail against Western technology. It provided no effective solutions to China's social and political problems. The impotence of Confucianism rendered Ch'en's generation somewhat schizophrenic. The overwhelming technological and industrial Western superiority made Ch'en's generation feel that their own cultural heritage was inferior. They came to have the illusion that western ideology could profit China as it had profited the western people. Therefore, they began to look to the west, searching for a new ideology which the Chinese could rely on in order to regain national dignity.

This led to the establishment of the Youth magazine by Ch'en Tu-hsiu in 1915. In it Ch'en introduced western man's concept of life, which he felt was aggressive and independent. This was also the year that Japan pressed the Twenty-one Demands upon the Peking government. Through a series of articles, Ch'en did not seriously criticize Japan's aggressiveness, but blamed Chinese weaknesses, disorganization, low morale and immorality. At the same time, Ch'en clearly showed his admiration for Western Europe and North American liberal democratic institutions. In 1916, Youth magazine became New Youth magazine. Ch'en openly supported republican democracy and denied Confucianism. In 1917, Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei reorganized Peking University and made Ch'en Tu-hsiu the Dean of Letters. Ch'en allied with Hu Shih, another well
known scholar of his time, to announce that the vernacular Pai-hua (plain speech) would replace the classical language as the accepted language of publication. Ch'en condemned classical Chinese as hollow, difficult, and impractical, and praised Pai-hua as simple and expressive.

The next year, Ch'en began to write articles in Pai-hua; Hu Shih and many other scholars followed. This was the beginning of the literary revolution known as the New Culture movement. This movement had great significance for China and for Ch'en Tu-hsiu. It attracted not only the intellectual class, but all people in China. All kinds of newspapers, magazines, and periodicals were published. In them, new ideas were easily conveyed. In addition, various important works on philosophy, history, and economics were translated from western languages. People began to know more about the west. The young people particularly were amazed by western achievements in science and political institutions. In turn, they began to condemn their own culture. Their opinion of life and of China as a nation was changed. Ch'en's famous "manifesto", published in early 1919, divided China into two blocs, the conservative and

* "In order to support democracy, we have to reject Confucian propriety, etiquette, traditional ethics and politics; in order to support science, we have to reject the national essence of traditional Chinese culture and literature."
the revolutionary. A war went on between these two blocs, with each struggling to win over the other. This was the first time that Confucian China was faced a heavy challenge.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu initiated the New Culture movement, and the New Culture movement was an important cause of the May Fourth movement. The May Fourth movement was primarily a student movement which developed into a nationwide patriotic movement. The immediate cause of this movement was the unjust Shantung Resolution at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The Chinese were furious. Ch'en Tu-hsiu called the western Powers robbers, and the Peace Conference the give-and-take conference (China gave and the imperialists took). Once he had naively believed that justice would override despotism automatically; now the opposite seemed true. In order to preserve justice, Ch'en asserted that one must be politically strong and militarily powerful.

Ch'en's criticism was that China's failure on the Shantung question was mainly due to the lack of co-operation and communication between government and people. Ch'en seemed to feel that China deserved the Shantung insult, and should have learned a lesson from it.

Though Ch'en himself did not participate in the May Fourth incident, he gave his full support through his articles. He was later arrested by the Peking government for distributing pamphlets in Peking. He was in jail for almost three months.
He became more convinced than ever that the weak, corrupt, and bureaucratic Peking government was responsible for China's diplomatic failures and it must be replaced by a people-controlled government if China were to gain respect and support from the foreigners. Thereafter, Ch'en changed his political attitude. He no longer favoured western democracy. Actually, the most significant aspect of the May Fourth movement was that it brought to an end the popularity of western democracy in China. However, the intellectual class still looked up to the west, searching for a substitute. They found Marxism. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was one of the persons most responsible for the rise of Marxism in China. It is understandable that Ch'en took to Marxism. Marxism was also an ideology imported from the west. However, unlike liberal democracy, Marxism appealed only to the oppressed people. And China was oppressed by the west. In addition to this, after the May Fourth movement, the Chinese also saw a previously hidden dimension of western democracy and were disillusioned. Without losing any time, they immediately found that what Marxism promised was what China lacked. Therefore, it was speedily adopted in a most uncritical fashion.

Ch'en was the leading figure of his generation, and served as a useful bellweather. His political thought and behaviour best reflected the general attitude of the contemporary intellectual class towards China and the west.
Through Ch'en, one may observe the process of transformation undergone by the entire Chinese society. The process was painful, and in the course of it, old Confucianism was forever destroyed. It was replaced by the new Marxism ideology, which ultimately served as the basis for the success of the Communist revolution.
CHAPTER I

THE CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH OF
CH'EN TU-HSIU

Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Childhood

Despite the abuse heaped on Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942) by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Ch'en was undoubtedly one of the most influential people responsible for establishing Marxism in China. He was amongst the most prominent of the founding members of the CCP in 1920. Yet Ch'en Tu-hsiu had not been influenced by Marxism in his early studies. Before the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Ch'en's political philosophy was strongly anti-feudal and anti-traditional. In Ch'en's mind, all the old Chinese traditions, ethics, etiquette and politics were impractical and their destruction was long overdue. Ch'en believed that the only alternatives to these outdated practices were western technology and western democracy. After the May Fourth Movement, Ch'en was repelled by western liberal democracy and strongly attracted to Marxism which he came to see as the only political philosophy capable of saving China.

Why was Ch'en so disgusted with the old Chinese traditions and culture? The answer to that question is at least partially related to events in Ch'en's childhood. Ch'en's father died a few months after he was born; his eldest brother took on
the responsibility for Ch'en's early education. The two brothers were very close. The elder well understood Ch'en's lack of interest in Chinese classical literature and therefore never forced the study of it upon him.² Ch'en Tu-hsiu criticized the civil service examination:

... (it is) not merely vanity, but it is a dominating force affecting the people's life. Obtaining an academic degree is indispensable for entering the scholar official class; being a member of this class is indispensable for economic privileges; having economic privileges is indispensable for property owning....³

Ch'en also claimed that his mother was a typical traditional Chinese woman, who always hoped that her sons would honour their father and ancestors by succeeding in a civil service examination.⁴ Ch'en greatly respected his mother and readily admitted that his character was largely moulded by her.⁵ Although Ch'en Tu-hsiu did not indicate explicitly in his autobiography that he sat for the civil service examination solely because of his mother, he seems to imply that he did. The civil service examination was a traditional Chinese institution, the deficiencies of which were glaringly apparent. It is therefore not surprising that Ch'en should have been so critical of the examination system. However, filial piety was also a pillar of the Chinese tradition. Ironically Ch'en himself was undeniably a filial son.
Actually, what Ch'en Tu-hsiu most detested was the corrupt political system. He wrote two civil service examinations. In the first instance, he wrote the examination in an entirely frivolous manner, but nevertheless topped the list of Hsiu-t'sai degree graduates. This result convinced Ch'en more than ever before of the meaninglessness of the examination. On the second occasion, Ch'en went to Nanking for a higher Chu-jen degree. This time he was well-prepared but failed the examination. Ch'en's jaundiced view of the examination system was strengthened by the behaviour he observed on the part of other candidates while studying in the examination compound. The candidates were popularly respected as scholars and their identification as such entitled them to certain privileges. However, in Ch'en's view, the candidates did not merit the respect accorded them. They committed crimes such as shoplifting, smuggling, and trafficking in drugs because they were sure that the Imperial examination decree would protect them from any charge. Ch'en was also offended by the personal habits of the candidates in the compound. There were no sanitary facilities and the latrine was an open field. Some candidates deliberately relieved themselves more frequently than absolutely necessary, especially when young women were passing by.

Ch'en was most irritated when he encountered a naked obese man reading aloud his own composition. Upon reaching the
climax, the man shouted elatedly, "Right on! I will make it this time." Ch'en found the spectacle disgusting. These incidents began to typify the entire Chinese system in his mind; the so-called examination for the selection of the literary elite was merely an exhibition of human pulp. How much would the country and people have to suffer if destined to be governed by such creatures? Therefore, Ch'en Tu-hsiu began to feel the truth of what Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, a well known scholar and journalist of that time, had stated in *Current Affairs* (Shih-wu pao). Liang's political ideas were illustrated by a series of articles called "A General Discussion of Political Reform" in *Current Affairs*. In them, Liang stressed that in order to save China from foreign domination, the first step was to change the Chinese concept of life. To do this was to abolish the old Confucian civil service examination system and replace it by a new school system. Ch'en was heavily influenced by and decided to follow the western-oriented K'ang Yu-wei-Liang Ch'i-ch'ao school of thought, which promoted thoroughgoing social and political reform. He wrote:

After meditating for two hours, I determined my path for the coming years. I had come to the examination reluctantly. Yet to my surprise, the examination had benefited me.
It was, in particular, the sight of the obese man which caused the two hours of meditation. If Ch'en did not exaggerate, this incident does reflect a certain arbitrariness on Ch'en's part. In fact, the obese man had done nothing annoying to provoke such a harsh criticism. He was naked because the weather was hot; his shouting that he was sure to get the degree could be explained as normal expression of self-encouragement. No examinee wanted to fail; even Ch'en Tu-hsiu himself wanted to succeed in order to please his mother. Why should Ch'en have blamed the other man for his intensity?

Ch'en Tu-hsiu personally disapproved of the examination system. The strong repulsiveness he felt for the obese man might be attributed to the fact that he considered anything relating to the existing system as disreputable and intolerable. Ch'en did not misjudge the examination; the problem was that he generalized the whole thing and jumped to conclusions. Hasty judgement was not exclusively Ch'en's error; it was a flaw common to many of the young intellectuals of that time. It was partly this tendency which allowed Marxism to develop so rapidly in China.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Youth

In 1902, Ch'en Tu-hsiu went to Japan and studied in
the Kobun Institute. It was then that he became involved in the revolutionary movement. He joined a revolutionary overseas student organization, the Youth Society (Ching-nien hui). As Ch'en became increasingly politicized, his actions became increasingly impulsive. For example, upon learning of a Chinese student supervisor who had been harassing the students, he immediately went with two other revolutionary colleagues and cut off the supervisor's pig tail. Consequently, Ch'en was sent back home. On the one hand, this incident showed Ch'en's immaturity; on the other hand, it reflected the Chinese students' general hostility towards the Manchu government. The aim of the society was to build Chinese nationalism and to abolish the Manchu dynasty. The fact that its sole objective was a negative one indicates that this group of enthusiastic youth lacked a feasible revolutionary plan or ideology. Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his colleagues at that time were more correctly to be classified as anti-Manchu than as revolutionary. Their sole focus was to destroy the Manchu Empire and the question of what would succeed did not seem to occupy their thoughts.

In 1903, Ch'en Tu-hsiu established a Patriotic Society (Ai-kuo hui) in Anch'ing, Anhwei Province. He spoke in the opening ceremony, pointing out that China could not be saved without a well-organized military force because the problem of foreign invasion was becoming more and more critical. Apparently
Ch'en Tu-hsiu had, by this time, discerned more distinctly how the corruption of the Manchu Empire had facilitated the foreign invasions. He came to realize that the problem of Imperial China was a full-scale national problem. Ch'en was as radical as ever; his nationalism now extended not only to the Manchus but to all foreigners. If the imperial process were not reversed, the Chinese would be slaves not only of the Manchus but of the westerners as well.

In early 1900, Ch'en Tu-hsiu's leadership was generally recognized among the young intellectuals. More than two hundred Chinese students had joined the Patriotic Society. In the meantime, Ch'en had proposed to ally with other revolutionary groups, the Patriotic Study Society of Shanghai (Shanghai ai-kuo hsueh-shê) and revolutionaries of other provinces, in order to establish a National Covenant Society (Kuo-min tung-meng hui) and a southern China independence movement. However, this idea never got beyond the stage of theory.

In 1904, Ch'en Tu-hsiu set up the Anhwei Vernacular Daily (Anhwei su-hua pao), in which he used vernacular to propagate revolution among the common people. Besides using the paper to popularize anti-Manchu revolutionary ideas, Ch'en also exposed foreign penetrations, particularly the annexation of the mining area in Anhwei. In 1905, Ch'en Tu-hsiu started to organize revolutionary activities. He became the president of a secret
military organization, the Society of General Yueh Fei (Yueh-wang hui) in Wuhu of Anhwei province.\textsuperscript{24} Ch'en Tu-hsiu chose the namesake of the Society because the Chinese twelfth century national hero, Yüeh Fei, was renowned as a model of faithfulness and patriotism. When Ch'en organized the Society, the anti-foreign feeling of the Chinese people had reached a peak. Ch'en was confident that the legend of Yüeh Fei could be used effectively to arouse the morale of the people and that when this morale was combined with military force, it would transform China. However, after the success of the national revolution, military force was controlled and abused by the warlords. At the same time all the foreign powers still managed to maintain their privileges in China. The result of the development of military power was not at all as had been anticipated. Ch'en was disillusioned; thus gradually he began to seek ideological solutions from outside China. This new attitude towards the West engendered an inferiority complex in Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his generation.

In 1905, the Chinese Alliance Society (Chung-kuo tung-meng hui), organized by Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the 1911 revolution, was formally founded in Tokyo.\textsuperscript{25} Ch'en refused to join it on the ground that its revolutionary program was nothing more than narrow anti-Manchu racism. Nevertheless, Ch'en still acted as an independent revolutionary in his native Anhwei.\textsuperscript{26}
From 1906 to 1907, Ch'en Tu-hsiu made two trips to Japan and returned to China in 1909. What Ch'en saw and learned in Japan during these two years hastened his maturity. A few years later, Ch'en Tu-hsiu founded the New Youth magazine (Hsin Ch'ing-nien) and presented himself as a progressive and shrewd scholar. Japan's growing ambition towards China was quite obvious by the late 1910's. Ironically enough, it was in Japan that a great number of Chinese students developed into famous national revolutionary leaders.
CHAPTER I

Footnotes

1 Chih Yu-ju, Ch'en Tu-hsiu nien pu (The chronological table of Ch'en Tu-hsiu) (Hong Kong: Lung wen shu tien, 1974), pp. 28-29.

2 Thomas C. Kuo, Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942) and the Chinese Communist Movement (South Orange: Seton Hall University Press, 1975), p. 18.


4 Ibid., p. 32.

5 Ibid., p. 30.

6 Kuo, p. 20.

7 Ibid., p. 20.

8 Ch'en, p. 39.

9 Ibid., p. 38.

10 Ibid., p. 42.

11 Ibid., p. 43.

12 Kuo, p. 22.

13 Ch'en, p. 43.

14 Ibid., p. 42.

15 Chih, p. 7.

16 Ibid., p. 8.

17 Kuo, p. 29.

18 Chih, p. 24.

19 Ibid., p. 9.
20 Ibid., p. 9.
21 Ibid., p. 9.
22 Virtually all publications in China up to 1917 had been in the classical language which was unintelligible to the great majority of people.
23 Ibid., p. 12.
24 Kuo, p. 31.
25 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
26 Chih, p. 13.
27 Kuo, p. 34.
CHAPTER II

THE CHANGE OF SOCIAL THOUGHT IN CHINA BEFORE THE MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT

Social Thought In China Before The Middle Of The Nineteenth Century

China is a country with an extremely long recorded history. Numerous political and socio-economic changes have occurred over the four thousand years of China's recorded history. China's long history, vast territory, huge population, sophisticated philosophy, and rich cultural heritage all combine to make her the leading nation of the Orient.

China consists of a large and diverse populace. Chinese civilization originated in the Yellow River Valley. The Han people who populated this region had long viewed themselves as the real Chinese, while all others were seen as barbarians who had nothing to teach them.

Before the twentieth century, China had been conquered twice by the so-called "barbarians", namely, the Mongols (1260-1368) and the Manchus (1644-1911). The Mongolian empire ruled China ruthlessly for almost a century, eventually yielding to Chu Yuan-chang, who founded the Ming Dynasty. The Manchus, the second alien ethnic group to rule China, were reduced to total humiliation by the incursions of the western imperialists. They were finally overthrown by Sun Yat-sen, who established the
Republic of China in 1911. The Manchus, as had their predecessors, the Mongols, conducted themselves as conquerors and never treated the Hans equally; similarly, the Hans did not look upon the Manchus as their cultural equals. The resultant antagonism produced social unrest and disorder throughout the nineteenth century. The Chinese clung constantly to the notion that the expulsion of the Manchus would mean restoration of glory to China. Thus, when the power of the Manchus was declining towards the end of the nineteenth century, the most widely spread political slogan adopted by Sun Yat-sen was "to drive out the Manchu barbarians and return China to the Chinese".

The fact that the Chinese never altered their image of other tribes was mainly due to the fact that Manchu and Mongol cultures were less developed than that of the Hans. Ironically, after establishing their empire on the Chinese soil, the Manchus considered themselves to be superior, and made determined efforts to keep a distance between themselves and the Hans, without realizing that they were experiencing the gradual process of cultural assimilation by the Hans. Hence, it is then said that China was only superficially, not culturally, affected by the intrusion of the barbarians. Not until the outbreak of the Opium War (1840-1842) did the Chinese confidence in their own superiority begin to fade.
The Change of Attitude After
The Mid-Nineteenth Century

After the Opium War, the incapabilities and failures of the Manchu government were exposed to western societies. The curtain was raised for the opening scene of western imperialism in China. For half a century, a series of unequal treaties, including territorial concessions and war indemnities, illustrated the greedy lust of the Western Powers and the withdrawn and inept attitude of the Manchu empire. The Self-strengthening Movement (1861-1894), initiated by Tseng Kuo-fan and his colleagues, was a sign of the gradual Chinese loss of confidence in the continued viability of Chinese civilization. The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 led to the International Expedition which occupied Peking and grossly humiliated the Chinese. The Empress Dowager fled to Sian and the last vestige of Chinese pride fled with her. Thereafter the Chinese superiority complex rapidly became an inferiority complex and China became a symbol of corruption and weakness in the eyes of the westerners.

It was only after the International Expedition that the Chinese people began to feel threatened by western culture and society. In the past, the Mongols and Manchus only ruled China politically, achieving virtually no cultural penetration whatever. But now the westerners appeared politically, economically, and culturally superior. Many Chinese came to despise their own
culture and history. They asked themselves why China, with its rich cultural heritage and sophisticated civilization, could not withstand the invasion of western imperialists who were supposedly "foreign devils" with less than a thousand years of history? Quite irrespective of the strength of the westerners, China herself was in a state of military, economic, and political decline at the time. The seriousness of the situation forced many Chinese to abandon their cultural heritage and turn uncritically towards the West. Thus, towards the close of the nineteenth century, there developed in China a widespread tendency to disparage Chinese civilization while simultaneously idealizing all things western.

China's civilization had flourished for millenia, and had reached a much higher level than that of either the Mongols or Manchus. China was able to assimilate the latter. However, when China came into close contact with the western world, the term "assimilation" did not apply. It is important to note that Chinese and Western civilization had different origins, and each had its own unique characteristics. Theoretically, a meeting of these two civilizations on a footing of equality would have led to mutual benefit. Unfortunately, while the Chinese were hostile towards the westerners, many westerners also displayed a kind of master complex, which they never quite lost in the course of time. Their purpose in coming to the East was not to show the Chinese the essence of their culture but only to increase their own
material gain and prestige. Many westerners who sought their fortune in China at the end of the nineteenth century were little better than bandits. But the Chinese, though furious about the westerners' gunboat and land-grabbing policy, were amazed by their highly developed technology, which the Chinese lacked.

The Chinese viewed western technology as the essence of the intruding civilization, and began to feel inferior to it. Actually, technology was the only aspect of western civilization which China could not equal in the nineteenth century. She had not experienced an industrial revolution. The industrial revolution, which first occurred in Britain in the eighteenth century, had wrought drastic economic, social, and political changes in the Western world. While the West was modernizing, China still remained in an economically backward feudal age. To make matters worse, the Taiping Rebellion, the most devastating agrarian revolt in Manchu history, damaged China's national economy to an unamendable extent. Hence, in conditions of backwardness and turmoil, the corrupt government of China was unable to keep the western "barbarians" out.

However, if western imperialism had not invaded China, China's ineffectiveness could have remained unexposed and its national prestige preserved. Unfortunately, the growing economic prosperity of the West inevitably created a need for foreign markets as well as natural resources. In Asia, India was already
under the control of the British, Korea was the protectorate of China, and Japan, which was also modernizing, was not an easy target to penetrate. Only China, with its vast lands and population, seemed able to provide the required markets and raw materials. Thus, when Westerners proceeded East, China was destined to be the victim.

Of all the western Powers, Britain always made the fastest move for territorial and economic exploitation. Long before other powers had thought of taking advantage of China, Britain had already extracted from the Chinese huge sums of silver via the opium trade. It was the profit of the opium trade which fastened the Europeans' eyes on China. Following in Britain's footsteps, France, Germany, the United States, and others all rushed to China for territorial and economic benefits. Even Imperial Russia, whose relations with China had always consisted of border disputes, and whose domestic conditions were no better than China's, could still enjoy extensive privileges in China. And Japan, which had had territorial designs on its neighbours ever since the Meiji Restoration of 1868, determined to extract her share of the spoils.

Japan, like China, had kept herself aloof from the outside world for centuries. The United States gunboats had forced Japan to open trade relations. The Japanese, once they found themselves far behind the western world, immediately adopted the
western model of industrialization. The country was transformed into a great modern power within twenty years of the Meiji Restoration. In contrast, China, after suffering a great loss in the opium war, was still unaware of its perilous situation. There is a Chinese proverb, "To foresee the result is to make oneself well-equipped", which only half describes the Chinese sentiments of that time. The Chinese were aware of the insult from the foreigners, but not alarmed by it. The main obstacle to Chinese self-awareness was the traditional Chinese sense of national superiority.

The Manchu empire was doomed. Driving out the hated Manchus meant much more to the Chinese than the problem of Western domination at the moment. Hence, the national revolution led by Sun Yat-sen, after nine attempts, finally succeeded in 1911. Sadly enough, only the Manchus and the Monarchical system were driven out by Sun. What Sun could not chase out was the Chinese sense of national inferiority, a direct result of their repeated defeats at the hand of the foreigners. After the 1911 Revolution, China entered an era of even greater jeopardy.

Social Action In China After The Establishment Of The Republic

Before the 1911 Revolution, social thought in China mainly centred on narrow nationalism, i.e. the Manchu-Han problems. Freed from monarchical rule, it was generally hoped that
Republican China would achieve internal peace and stability. However, there was no consensus as to whether a presidential system or a cabinet system should be employed. The political parties were interested only in power. Foreign domination loomed large. The economic situation remained sordid and miserable, but no immediate plan had been employed to improve the condition. The issue which concerned the Chinese people most was Yüan Shih-k'ai's plan for the restoration of monarchical rule. Generally speaking, from 1912 to 1916, social thought in China was in a dilemma. The people bided their time to see the work of the Republic. On the other hand, the political parties were busy in either co-operating with or opposing Yüan Shih-k'ai. Their activity did not have much to do with the society. After the death of Yüan in 1916, and with one of his generals, Tuan Ch'i-jui, in power, Sun Yat-sen decided to overthrow Yuan's autocratic structure. This had an enormous impact on social thought in China. The years of chaos in fact provided the intellectuals with much food for thought, eventually leading to a literary revolution in 1916, known as the "New Culture Movement". This movement fundamentally altered traditional Chinese thought.¹

¹ The Origin Of The New Culture Movement

The New Culture Movement owed much to Yen Fu (1853-1921), a noted Chinese scholar and translator in the late Manchu
period. He studied for years in England, where he nurtured his interests in western philosophy, mathematics, history and economics. After returning home in 1879, Yen Fu decided to introduce to his countrymen what he had learned from the West. He then spent ten years in translating and summarizing the works of Thomas Henry Huxley, Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith, and others. He added considerable commentary of his own to the translations.¹

Yen Fu felt that the prosperity of western culture and society derived from the pursuit of truth in science, and the implementation of justice through democratic practice.² Yen Fu believed that these qualities were possessed by the Chinese too. However, the Chinese never realized they had such qualities and thus never came to make good use of them. According to Yen, this failure was due to the absence of the concept of "liberty" in Chinese culture.

Yen Fu asserted that the Chinese sages had a great fear of individual liberty. The concept never appeared in their writings and teachings. "In the West, people treasured this concept and so individual liberty was widely protected."³ In addition to this, Yen Fu found that westerners believed that human intellect and life were only improved through perpetual struggle and competition. Yen Fu argued that the notion of progress, which had contributed so much to the growth of western civilization, had never been acknowledged in China. Many of the Chinese were even
indifferent to the ups and downs of order and disorder, prosperity and decline. The Chinese were content with the status quo. Such a passive attitude stopped the Chinese people from progressing, and kept Chinese culture and society stagnant.  

Yen Fu's works invited the attention of the intellectuals of his time. He planted the seeds of western science and democracy in China. They blossomed with the dawn of the New Culture Movement.

**The New Culture Movement**

After the acceptance of the Japanese Twenty-one Demands, China's political situation worsened. Japan's ambitions in China appeared at least as important as the problem of warlordism at home. It was the pressures of foreign imperialism, and the frustration of failure and weakness, which combined to produce the New Culture Movement.

The origins of the New Culture Movement are found in the reorganization of Peking University by Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei (1876-1940), and in the advocacy of the vernacular language by Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Hu Shih (1891-1962).

Before 1917, Peking University was well known for its conservative tradition. The professors were judged not by their academic achievement, but by their official rank. Actually, most of the professors came from officialdom and maintained great privileges in and outside the University. The students looked
upon the university simply as the bridge to promotion in the public service. Furthermore, neither the professors nor the students respected the institution. Morals were tremendously low; gambling and consorting with prostitutes was common.7 

But in 1917, the year Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei took over the presidency, Peking University underwent a great change. 

As the president of the national university, Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei was quick to carry out his reform. In his inaugural address, he pointed out to the students their misconception of the nature of a university. He emphasized that the purpose of university education was not the realization of wealth or official promotion, but pursuit of learning. Later, Ts'ai proclaimed that all kinds of academic research on western civilization, including literature, economics, philosophy and others, would be conducted on a scientific basis in order to create a new civilization in China. Moreover, students were allowed to enjoy a certain degree of academic freedom, and they were expected to acquire knowledge in subjects other than their own specialty. More importantly, students were to enjoy free expression on divergent theories, such as the contradiction of idealism and materialism in philosophy, romanticism and realism in literature, 

Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei hired many well-known scholars, including conservatives, socialists, liberals, and monarchists who brought
their own points of view into the university. Under their leadership, various study and advisory groups were set up. Furthermore, students were allowed to take part in political activities as individuals. Both Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Hu Shih taught courses in the history of Chinese philosophy, while Ch'en Tu-hsiu was appointed Dean of the School of Letters. By then, Ch'en Tu-hsiu had already established the New Youth magazine in Shanghai, the most widely read and influential publication in China at that time. Through the magazine, Ch'en ardently propagated western science and democracy, and denounced feudal autocracy, feudal rites and morals, as well as Confucian ethics, which Ch'en Tu-hsiu saw as the instrument of feudalism. Ch'en's voice was heard, and its influence was immediate and powerful. Many intellectuals were soon writing tributes to, for example, Darwin, the scientific method, the experimental spirit, and liberty, equality and fraternity. New Youth magazine thus became the centre for intellectual, social, and later on, political discussion.

In order to spread the new revolutionary ideas, Ch'en called for a literary revolution to replace feudal literature and the classical style of writing with the new literature and the vernacular. Ch'en asserted that literary Chinese, which emphasized style and form, had failed to reflect reality, whereas the vernacular, which was simple and expressive, could directly convey people's will and thought.
Ch'en was not alone in his campaign for the literary revolution; Hu Shih rendered his full support. In response to Ch'en, Hu wrote many poems in vernacular Chinese as an experiment and also asked the new intellectuals to create a new living literature in the vernacular. Under the strong influence of these two leaders, the literary revolution was soon supported by the students as well as the scholars. The university had become the centre of a nationwide "new culture movement" within a few years. 12

The New Culture Movement had indeed initiated a great change in Chinese society. People began to enjoy free thinking, and were encouraged to openly criticize the social and political establishment of their time. Access to western thought and literature led to a demand for a searching for truth.

Moved by this revolutionary new cultural movement, the Chinese people were looking forward to a change in society. When the news of China's failure at the Paris Peace Conference reached home in April 1919, the historical moment of catharsis had arrived and the May Fourth Movement exploded out of the New Culture Movement.
CHAPTER II

Footnotes


4. Ibid., p. 196.

5. Gasster, p. 22.

6. Ibid., p. 23.


8. Ibid., p. 50.

9. Ibid., p. 52.

10. Gasster, p. 34.


12. Ibid., p. 48.
CHAPTER III

A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF CH'EN TU-HSIU

The Thought Of Ch'en Tu-hsiu
Before The May Fourth Movement (1915-1919)

In the fall of 1915, Ch'en Tu-hsiu established Youth magazine, renamed New Youth magazine the following year, to express openly his approval of western culture and government and to denounce the obsolete Chinese tradition. Ch'en argued that the French Revolution had enabled Europe to develop socially and economically and to establish the principle of human rights. Ch'en approved the European social change which followed the French Revolution and believed China should follow that model.

Ch'en regarded the West as both progressive and liberal, whereas China remained confined in the bondage of tradition and was resistant to any reform.

China fell into severe economic chaos as the consequence of warlordism after the 1911 Revolution. The revolution had created a Chinese Republic. Yet the Republican ideology was practiced in name only. In reality, peoples' minds were still dominated by the values of monarchy. Ch'en Tu-hsiu believed that it was the legacy of Confucianism which held up the progress of China. The corruption and decadence of the old thought and tradition had to be eradicated before the Chinese people could
advance toward equality with the western nations. Ch'én at this stage undoubtedly considered himself a democrat.

The Thought Of Ch'én Tu-hsiu After The May Fourth Movement (1920-1932)

Ch'én's trust in western liberal democracy was destroyed by the Paris Peace Conference. He began to show his disappointment in the failure of the western powers to maintain international justice and equality. Such disappointment led him to question the basic value and quality of the western liberal democratic system. In the articles which he published in New Youth magazine during the summer of 1920, Ch'én switched his ardent devotion from liberal democracy to Marxism. He argued, following a Marxist approach, that only through class struggle could the working class obtain power; and it was only when power was in the hands of the working class that democracy could be attained. He stressed that in the capitalist society, so-called law and democracy merely served the interests of the bourgeoisie and facilitated their exploitation. One of the immediate steps, as he saw it then, to protect the Chinese people from foreign intervention and domestic exploitation was to establish through revolution a society ruled by the proletariat.

Ch'én insisted that Confucianism and warlordism were
the two vital flaws of the Chinese establishment. The inability of the Republican Party to withstand hardship had led to a hasty compromise with the monarchists. In accordance with democratic principles, the monarchists held seats in parliament and fully participated in the political system. Ch'en was thus convinced that Republicanism was unable to abolish the corruption of the old system, so it was unlikely to be the right choice to save China.

On the other hand, Ch'en Tu-hsiu believed that in the natural trend of social evolution, to which China was no exception, feudalism would lead to Republicanism which in turn would lead to socialism. In other words, Ch'en suggested that even though for the moment Republicanism was in power, socialism would eventually take its place in China. After 1920, Ch'en had begun to claim himself a Marxist.

Incongruity In The Political Thought Of Ch'en Tu-hsiu

The haphazardness of Ch'en Tu-hsiu's approval of liberal democracy on the one hand and the favouring of Marxism on the other reflected the fact that the Chinese were confronted with serious uncertainty and helplessness such as they had not encountered before. It was an extraordinary period of confusion brought about by the interaction of the western and oriental cultures. The
process was painful and the end result was frightful.

Both the Chinese and western cultures have long histories; and both are built on solid foundations. The collision of the two cultures in China inevitably generated a swirling emotion among the people. Under such forceful interaction, the people, in one way or another, began to lose their sense of direction and identity. They failed to react in their usual way, but drifted helplessly in the swirl. As a result, they could no longer perceive the cultural characteristics of the confusing era. They became emotionally lost and felt deeply uncertain about the future. They gradually became less progressive and adopted an attitude of acquiescence toward western culture. Not only did they abandon their own traditions, they also seemed totally oblivious to the implications of such acquiescence. There were two common results. Some survived the adaptation process and succeeded in regaining their Chinese identity; some, in contrast, having lost their identity, never regained it and wasted their lives as cultural outcasts vainly searching for direction. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was evidently among those sacrificed as a result of the severe cultural conflict of the May Fourth period.

China was the first country in Asia to adopt a democratic system after the collapse of the Manchu Empire. However, it was not very successful. Democracy operated best in the United States, because the Americans had a relatively short
history and heritage, and as a result, were able to concentrate on the development of the future without hindrance from the past. Nevertheless, the Americans had to go through a civil war before democracy was truthfully achieved. The road to democracy in China, on the other hand, was not as smooth as that in the United States. Democracy was alien to China, with its long history of feudalism and monarchy.

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, one of the main figures of the Hundred Days of Reform, explicitly argued that the Chinese people were yet to gain sufficient knowledge of democracy. Further, he anticipated a slow process of evolution in China. Before full democracy, a stage of warlordism and domestic turmoil was inevitable. Liang found support for his position in Chinese history. During each period of dynastic transition, China had to suffer a period of domestic disturbance. He argued that the country was able to survive the crisis and maintain her sovereignty in the past, because of a closed door policy and a self-contained social and economic system. On the other hand, given the modern system of international relations, the internal disturbance in China was no longer solely a domestic problem as the western powers were only too eager to take advantage of it. China was likely to be apportioned among them if the imminent problem was not handled properly. Liang's concern was indeed given substance by the subsequent history of the Chinese Republic.
In fact, Liang was not the only one who had foreseen such a problem; Sun Yat-sen also anticipated a similar outcome. Sun established a scheme to allow the practice of the Three People's Principles (San-min chü-i), i.e. Nationalism (Min-tzu), Democracy (Min-ch'üan), and People's Livehood (Min-sheng), to take place. ¹¹ According to Sun Yat-sen, the revolutionary process was schematized in three stages: (I) Military Dictatorship, a destructive yet inevitable period which emphasized nationalist revolution; (II) Political Tutelage, a period to educate the people to understand democracy; and (III) Constitutional Government, under which the nation is ruled by a government which practices liberal democracy and encourages social revolution. ¹² Sun considered the period of Political Tutelage of great significance, as it was at this stage that the people of China would be taught self-discipline. Only through such a process could democracy be established in the country. The regional warlords, oblivious to the consequence of their selfishness, bisected the country into a North-South division. Such a situation evidently deviated from the basic concept of achieving democracy through the practice of local autonomy as Sun suggested. ¹³ Notwithstanding this fact, Sun was confident and he pursued the unity of the country with perseverance. Sun showered high praise on republican democracy, not because the concept originated in the West, but simply because he believed that Republican democracy was the only way to restore national superiority.
On the other hand, Ch'en Tu-hsiu failed to realize that warlordism was an inevitable step towards the success of a new political system in China. To Ch'en, warlordism was unacceptable as it was a reflection of the imperfection of democracy, even though he remained a self-proclaimed democrat. In 1920, Ch'en published an article for the celebration of National Day. In it he expressed the following idea:

For any ideology that we believe in, and for whatever activity we are involved in, a critical evaluation is required to ensure that such an ideology or activity is valid and of value before it meets our support. Otherwise, it is nothing but mere blind faith and senseless conviction.14

In a 1917 article, Ch'en has also complained:

In the last few years, there were quite a number of people in China, who in one way or another, tried to establish and re-establish the concept of republicanism. It is, however, questionable how many of these people really have a clear understanding of what republicanism is, and how many of them actually have their mind stuffed with monarchism.15

The statement that Ch'en made, however, did not automatically prove that he was one of the rare few who really understood democracy. He was obsessed by the apparent success of the democratic political system in Western Europe. He was absolutely convinced that it represented China's only hope for
reconstruction. Obviously, his fantasy had no solid foundation. Not long after the Paris Peace Conference Ch'en began to realize that he was deceived by so-called western democracy, as the practice of it had failed to bring any advantage to China at the Conference. In Ch'en's depression, another rising western ideology, Marxism, captured his attention.

The intrinsic right or wrong of democracy is not the core issue here. It was Ch'en's failure to correctly perceive China's situation at that time that was responsible for his ideological incongruity. The European Powers had in fact shown a clear interest in China long before the fall of the Manchu Empire. China's success in her revolution would not in any way have altered the imperialistic interests of the West. Any anticipation of this kind would be nothing but a delusion. During the first year of the European war, China was left alone as the European Powers were too involved in their own conflict. It was only in 1917, when the United States had entered the war against Germany, that China was invited to join the alliance. China's declaration of war against Germany was indeed a miscalculation, for such a move provided the Japanese with an opportunity to take advantage in China (see Chapter V). The declaration was made by Prime Minister Tuan Ch'i-jui in the hope that such a movement would enable him to obtain loans and military supplies from Japan for the purpose of re-uniting China through the elimination of the warlords.
Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who was also in favour of Chinese involvement in the European war, perceived the whole issue from an entirely different perspective. He asserted that "not only would it be a great pleasure to have Chinese shed blood on the glorious European continent, but the experience and knowledge one might gain from such direct participation in western warfare would be enormous." Ch'en's argument was a vivid illustration of his inferiority complex towards western civilization. He was hoping that China would regain her reputation and western respect by involving herself in a basically European conflict. The attitude of the European Powers towards China was far from what Ch'en expected. It was a simple fact that no powers in the world would then have been willing to jeopardize their interests and their international relationship with others for the sake of helping a weak country like China. Hence, it was totally acceptable in the eyes of the western powers to give in to the Japanese demands at the Paris Peace Conference. Such a compromise was to their benefit in future international affairs, as Japan had shown herself to be a strong world power. The decadent situation in China provided a fabulous opportunity for exploitation by the western Powers. Under no circumstances could such a country attract the respect of the imperialistic powers.
Ch'en was humiliated by what was happening in China. He showed his serious disapproval of the Chinese people by accusing them of being individualistic and selfish, and lacking any sense of national unity. Ch'en's criticism was not fair as he overlooked the fact that the Chinese as a people have managed to survive a long history of more than four thousand years. While Chinese technology had in recent times lagged behind that of the Europeans, Chinese backwardness in this respect was attributable to many factors exogenous to China. What Ch'en portrayed was the corrupt part of Chinese culture, which he criticized as being a consequence of the numbing effect of Confucianism. While it might be true that Confucianism was not suitable in the May Fourth period, it was once the essence of the Chinese civilization. The ideas and concepts embedded in Confucian thoughts are too important to be discarded totally in the course of reconstructing Chinese society.

Before the turn of this century, the Chinese were not aware of the meaning of democracy. They were, however, able to differentiate a good emperor from a bad one. The Chinese have gone through a series of political revolutions before the 1911 Revolution. However, one may notice that revolution in the Chinese sense during those days was an alteration in leadership, but not a change in political system. The
long history of monarchism in the country is in fact a reflection of the peculiarity of the Chinese environment. A strong and powerful leader is always required under conditions of social, cultural, political and economic diversity. Such a leader was of extreme significance in the rural society of China. His ability in putting all the diversified factions under the control of a central government and in leading the country to further progress depended upon his integrity, appearance, and power. Confucianism was established in such circumstances to help maintain the socially necessary image of such a political figure.

By rejecting Confucianism, Ch'en Tu-hsiu was, to a great extent, tearing down the basic ideological fabric upon which the entire rural society of China had depended. In return, he was trying in vain to substitute for it a western democratic system. When he was trapped in an ideological vacuum, he inevitably turned to Marxism, as did many of the intellectuals of his time. Ch'en's dilemma in converting himself from a liberal to a Marxist was just a consequence of his rejection of his heritage.

There remains another reason why Marxism, of all the ideological thoughts of that time, won Ch'en Tu-hsiu's favour. Marxism was able to provide him with the kind of psychological satisfaction that he was lacking. This argument
can be substantiated by looking at the different ways that he defined despotism at different times.

Exactly a year before the May Fourth Movement, in an article published in the first issue of *Weekly Critics* (Mei chou p'ing lun), Ch'en defined despotism as "the disturbing of the freedom and equality of others by the use of one's authority."¹⁸ He further accused Germany of practicing despotism by invading the other countries of Europe. However, that invasion was checked by the Allies. To Ch'en, this proved that "justice is always superior to despotism", as he continued to argue in his paper that "despotism will lead nowhere in either international or domestic conflicts."¹⁹ In other words, he strongly proclaimed the significance of democracy and the concept of equality.

His attitude, however, underwent a complete change after the May Fourth Movement. Despotism became acceptable in his ideology. It was positively argued in his writing that "without despotism, there would be no meaningful political systems or nations."²⁰ Therefore, Ch'en concluded, despotism, nation, politics and law are just four different words for the same concept.²¹

From an historical perspective, it is not difficult to understand such a drastic change in Ch'en. It was an indication of his disappointment in the failure of the western Powers
to uphold justice and equality and to maintain a sense of fairness in international affairs. As a result of his disappointment, he turned to despotism, which seemed able to draw the attention and respect of the others by force and authority. Hence, Ch' en's drastic ideological shift in favour of Marxism was a natural process. Marxism is by nature a set of rather violent political dogmas, which favours a seizure of political power through revolution and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Such a formula, in the eyes of Ch' en, undoubtedly was the best means for the Chinese to achieve revenge for injustices suffered at the hands of western Powers. Ch' en believed that Marxist despotism would eventually make China a strong world power.

However, it might be interesting to go one step further and ask whether Ch' en himself was a true Marxist. The Marxist movement relies heavily upon the support of the masses. Ch' en, on the other hand, on several occasions denounced the significance of the mass movement. As an elitist intellectual, he himself refrained from any association with the proletariat. For example, in a letter replying to one of the readers of New Youth magazine, Ch' en claimed that "the emotion of the masses is basically one with no sense of direction. Hence, it is no surprise to observe that even a person as highly qualified as the scientist will eventually lose his logical thinking once
he is with the masses." To Ch'en, "there was always the
suppression of the majority by the minority in any revolution-
ary movement in history." Ch'en saw that the October Revolu-
tion in Russia was a movement originated by only a handful of
people. Therefore, there was no point in over-emphasizing the
importance of the masses in any political activity. According
to Ch'en's argument, even if there were, for example, one hundred
million people involved in the movement in China, the end result
would still be the suppression of the remaining three hundred
million Chinese by this revolutionary group, regardless of its
size. Obviously, such a perception was not Marxist. Ch'en's
reason for supporting Marxism was different from Lenin's.
According to Lenin, Marxism is the saviour of the suppressed,
but the destroyer of the capitalist class. To Ch'en, Marxism
was a means to restore dignity in China, and avenge the exploita-
tion by the western Powers. Lenin was able to adjust Marxist
ideology while it was applied to the Russian people; Ch'en tried
hard to have the Chinese people readjusted in order to adapt
them to this foreign political ideology. Hence, one may argue
that Ch'en was basically "anti-masses" and static in nature,
aiming to direct the masses for his own political interest.
On the other hand, Lenin was able to make use of Marxism to
benefit his people. The difference is of significant impor-
tance to the development of Ch'en's political power. Ch'en,
partly because of his inability to adjust the Marxist ideology
as Lenin had done, surrendered himself unconditionally to the Comintern immediately after the CCP was established, showing no regard for actual political conditions in China. His expulsion from the CCP in later years can be considered a consequence of his ideological obsession.

In conclusion, it may be more appropriate to view Ch'en as a Nationalist, rather than as a Marxist or even a democrat. He was anxious to incorporate western civilization into China as a means of counteracting the cultural and political exploitation by the West. As a result, we was trapped in an ideological dilemma. He spent most of his life vainly attempting to solve this dilemma. After all, the era of the May Fourth Movement was in fact a many-faceted period of contradiction.
CHAPTER III

Footnotes

1 Chih yu-ju, Ch'en Tu-hsiu nien p'u (The chronological table of Ch'en Tu-hsiu) (Hong Kong: Lung wen shu tien, 1974), pp. 24-25.

2 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Fa lan si jen yu chin shih wen ming" (The French and the modern civilization), Tu-hsiu wen ts'un (Collected works of Ch'en Tu-hsiu) (Hong Kong: Yuen tung to shu kung ssu, 1965), Vol. I, i, pp. 11-15.

3 Ibid., p. 149.

4 Chih, p. 31.

5 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "T'an cheng chih" (A discussion on politics), Tu-hsiu wen ts'un, Vol. II, i, p. 554.

6 Ibid., p. 555.

7 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Kuo chin chi nien ti chia chih" (The value of the celebration of National Day), Tu-hsiu wen ts'un, Vol. II, i, p. 560.

8 Ibid., p. 561.

9 I-shan, Chung kuo chih tai shih (Modern history of China) (Hong Kong: Chan wing tai shu chu, n.d.), p. 305.

10 Ibid., p. 305.

11 Ibid., p. 297.

12 Ibid., p. 297.

13 Ibid., p. 299.

14 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Kuo chin chi nien ti chia chih", Tu-hsiu wen ts'un, p. 557.

15 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Chiu ssu hsiang yu kao ti wen ti" (The old thought and the form of state), Tu-hsiu wen ts'un, Vol. I, i, p. 148.

16 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Tui teh wai chiao" (Foreign policy on Germany), Hsin Ching Nien (New Youth: III/no. 1), p. 1.

18 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Mei chou p'in lun fa han chi" (The first issue of Weekly Critics), Tu-hsiu wen ts'un, Vol. II, i, p. 583.

19 Ibid., Vol. II, i, p. 583.

20 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Tan cheng chih", Tu-hsiu wen ts'un, p. 583.

21 Ibid., p. 543.

22 Pang Ming, "Wu ssu shi chi ti Li Ta-chao ho Ch'en Tu-hsiu" (Li Ta-chao and Ch'en Tu-hsiu during the May Fourth period), ed. by K.H. Chou, Wu ssu yun tung yen chiu lun chi (Collected essays on the study of the May Fourth Movement: Hong Kong: Chuan chui hsueh she, 1975), p. 193.

23 Ibid., p. 193.

24 Ibid., p. 193.
CHAPTER IV

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION
AND
ITS INFLUENCE ON REVOLUTIONARY CHINA

There were two revolutions in the first half of the present century which swelled the tide of communism to the point of overflow, and threatened to engulf all surrounding nations in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia. The first was the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, which gave birth to the first communist country in the world and exerted tremendous influence on the success of the second revolution, the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949.

The Russian Revolution Of 1917

Oppressed for ages under the autocratic rule of the Tsarist regime, the Russian people at the turn of the nineteenth century began to take direct action against Tsarism. In 1905, labour agitations, peasant revolts, and student disorder broke out in the country. At that time, Russia was suffering from her defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and the peace treaty had just been signed. Popular dissatisfaction increased. A general strike in October of the same year affected all Russia. Thereupon Tsar Nicholas II issued a manifesto promising the institution
of a Duma (national parliament). Thus between 1906 and 1911, a program of moderate social reforms was implemented. However, the Tsar’s despotic disposition soon came to show itself again. He first ignored, then dissolved, the Duma. This enhanced the revolutionary movement.¹ The outbreak of the European war had diverted Russia’s attention to foreign developments. But not for long. Military disasters accompanied by Tsarist inefficiency and corruption, brought internal discontent to a critical revolutionary stage. In March 1917, riots broke out in the Russian capital, Petrograd. The cry for “Bread!” was heard in every corner of the country. The army sent by the Tsar to suppress the people supported the popular cause. In such circumstances, Tsar Nicholas II found no alternative but to abdicate. Thus Tsarism came to an end, and Russian history entered into a new era.²

In the middle of March 1917, a provisional government was set up with the aim of establishing constitutionalism. The Russian people hoped that the new government would bring them food and peace. They shortly found, however, that their hopes were unfounded. Conditions were as bad as before. The rival political parties, such as the Mensheviks, and the Social Revolutionaries, began to criticize the government severely and demand an end to the war. Towards the end of July 1917, as dissension increased, the government resigned and was reorganized.
by A. Kerensky on a nonpartisan basis. Kerensky immediately ordered the arrest of V. Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik Party, who was in exile during the March Revolution and returned in April to organize a coup. The coup failed but Lenin was not arrested. Notwithstanding this fact, Bolshevik power was suppressed. In September, Kerensky had conflicts with the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces and his power was weakened. This provided Lenin another chance for a coup d'état. On November 7, the well-organized Bolsheviks seized all the public buildings and agencies, and arrested most of the ministers. Kerensky having lost support from the people, the provisional government was dissolved and the Bolsheviks took control of Russia.

Shortly after, Lenin concluded peace terms with Germany. The peace conditions were harsh and humiliating; Russia had to cede considerable lands and pay a large war indemnity plus allow the economic exploitation of Russia by Germany. However, Lenin decided to accept the terms in order to bring peace to Russia and thus enable the new government to consolidate its power at home. Hence, the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on March 1918. The Treaty in actuality had violated the Allied treaty of September 1914, under which any separate peace with Germany was forbidden. Apart from this, the Bolsheviks also repudiated the former Russian state debts.
causing immense loss to the Western Powers. In reaction, the Allies decided to withhold their recognition of the Soviet government and adopt a policy of intervention. However, the Allied intervention in Russia was half-hearted and the military assistance they gave to the anti-Bolshevik leaders was insufficient. After the conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the Allies, except Japan, announced the withdrawal of troops from Russia. Moreover, the civil war of Russia was practically over by the end of 1920. With the Japanese troops finally evacuated from Siberia in October 1922, the Bolshevik regime became secured. Thereafter, world politics was divided into two ideological blocs. Communism, which came to menace Western democracy, developed to the point where it controlled the fate of more than half the world's population.

**Marxism in China**

Though the external program of the Bolsheviks, which was to call for world revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, had created an immense threat to the capitalist system, it portrayed a completely different picture in China. The Chinese people, particularly the intellectuals, were enchanted by it. Actually, the term "socialism" had come to China some twenty years before the Bolshevik Revolution, but
little attention had been paid to it. After the 1911 Revolution, there appeared The Socialist Party which was claimed to be the first socialist party in China. In this party, only a small fraction of members were dedicated to the principle of socialism and later on participated in the Chinese socialist movement. The rest simply did not really understand what socialism was. In 1913, President Yüan Shih-k'ai dissolved the party, after which socialism remained unpopular among the Chinese. It was not until after the outbreak of the May Fourth Movement in 1919 that socialism, as well as Marxism, began to spread widely in China.

After the May Fourth Movement, the Chinese intellectuals were eager to find solutions for China's problems, and the New Culture movement reached an even higher stage. This led to the rapid increase of newspapers, magazines, and periodicals, and in them many western ideas and "isms", including Marxism, were introduced and discussed. Ch'en Tu-hsiu's New Youth magazine and Weekly Critics contributed significantly to the study of Marxism among the intellectuals and students. In March 1920, the Society for the Study of Marxist Theory (ma-k'o-ssu hsüeh-shuo yen-chiu-hui) was set up in Peking University by Li Ta-chao, a Japanese-educated intellectual who was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. Li was interested in Marxism even before the
May Fourth Movement. He believed that the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was the victory of the working class of the world and that the proletarian revolution was inevitable in the twentieth century. Under Li's leadership, the Society became the centre for students to study Marxism.

In April of the same year, the Comintern sent a representative, G. Voitinsky, to China to establish contact with the Chinese Marxists. Voitinsky first met Li in Peking and then Ch'en Tu-shiu in Shanghai. The following month "The Shanghai Communist Cell" (Shanghai kung ch'an chu yi hsiao chu) was established by Ch'en Tu-hsiu to introduce Communist theories and practices. Later on, similar organizations appeared in Peking, Wuhan, Changsha, Tsinan, and Kwangchow. In August, Ch'en established "The Chinese Socialist Youth Corps" in Shanghai which was a communist preparatory school for Chinese youth. And Ch'en's "Shanghai Communist Cell" became the temporary centre of the Chinese Communist Party before its first congress.

In the spring of 1921, the Comintern sent another representative, H. S. Maring, to China to help establish a central organization of the CCP. Eventually, in the summer of the same year, the first congress of the CCP was held in Shanghai; Ch'en Tu-hsiu was elected secretary-general and the Central Committee was set up. Thus the Chinese Communist Party was formally established. The constitution of the
party, which contained six articles, dealt with the organization of industrial unions, the publication of magazines and pamphlets for party workers, and collaboration with the Comintern. Thereafter, the CCP struggled to make Marxism the most influential political ideology in China.

The Bolshevik Impact In China

The triumph of Marxism in China owed much to the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The position of Russia was strikingly similar to that of China. China and Russia, with a common boundary of over four thousand miles, in frequent contact since the second half of the nineteenth century, were both large and backward as compared to the industrialized West, and were both undergoing the same violent transformation in the late nineteenth century. Even the situation of the last Tsar of Russia, Nicholas II, was in a way similar to that of the contemporary Chinese emperor, Kuang Hsu. Kuang Hsu was a good man but a weak emperor who never had any real political power. The power was in the hands of his aunt, the Empress Dowager (1831-1908), a woman who ruled China from behind the scenes from 1861 to her death. The Hundred Days Reform of 1898, led by K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, with the enthusiastic support of Kuang Hsu, was suppressed by her. However, the movement left Kuang Hsu the reputation of an enlightened
emperor. Nicholas II, behind whom stood the Tsarina Alexandra, was also a man of weak personality. His inconsistency on the issue of reforms simply increased the strength of the opposition and left the Tsar himself the reputation of an arbitrary despot.

The Russian Revolution of March 1917 was the natural consequence of the same kind of autocratic rule that had brought the downfall of the Manchu dynasty. Both countries were undergoing a transitional period after the success of the revolutions, and neither Kerensky nor Sun Yat-sen could acquire control. However, the Russians underwent a much shorter transitional period than did the Chinese. The success of the Bolshevik Revolution and the signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty with the Germans proved Lenin to be a very capable leader; he gave the Russians what they had demanded. Furthermore, his call for the world revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat had the remarkable effect of gaining full support from the oppressed people all over the world. Between the years of 1918 and 1919, revolutions occurred in Germany and Hungary; workers' strikes commenced in England, France, the United States, and Japan; and movements of national independence broke out in India and Korea. All these were directly influenced and encouraged by the Bolshevik Revolution. In China, the fruit of the 1911 Revolution was grabbed by Yuan Shih-k'ai, upon whose death
China fell into a state of chaos and regionalism. This is not to say that Sun Yat-sen was unable to fulfill his duty as a leader. Sun's greatness and his contribution to modern Chinese history are indisputable. But the Chinese people were impatient with Sun Yat-sen's version of Republican democracy. They wanted immediate results, which seemed impossible to obtain in a country like China. Apart from this, China was then suffering the humiliation of the Paris Peace Conference. The Chinese resented the injustice and hypocrisy of the Western Powers.

Soviet Russia presented a completely different appearance. How much the Russian people had to sacrifice for the new government's domestic policy the Chinese could not see; what they could see was the Soviet Union's uncompromising attitude towards the great powers. Russia finally had national prestige and recognition. In addition to this, the Bolshevik Revolution aroused the worldwide national liberation movement. The western world was shocked.

All these factors not only made the Chinese ashamed of their foreign policy, but also drew them to consider that probably Marxism was the only pillar which would make China stand tall in front of the westerners.

Actually, China had suffered humiliation and exploitation from Tsarist Russia during the nineteenth century, just as it had from other major powers. Russia's occupation of Chinese
territory after the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, its economic penetration of Manchuria through the East China and South Manchurian Railway, the division of North China between Russia and Japan under secret treaties before and during the First World War, had all inflamed the Chinese as much as had the actions of other imperialist nations. There should be no reason to expect China to regard Russia any differently from France, Britain, or Japan. It was the Bolshevik leaders who broke the ice between China and Soviet Russia. Because Soviet Russia was in the darkest moment of her existence, isolated and attacked by the Western powers and Japan, it needed whatever support it could muster. Therefore, on July 26, 1919, the Soviet government dispatched a declaration addressed to "the Chinese people and the governments of North and South China" through the Deputy Foreign Commissar, Leo Karakhan:

The government of workers and peasants has then (since October 1917) declared null and void all the secret treaties concluded with Japan, China and the ex-Allies, the treaties which were to enable the Russian government of the Czar and his Allies to enslave the people of the East and principally the people of China. . . . The Soviet government returns to the Chinese people without demanding any kind of compensation, the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all the mining concessions, forestry, gold mines and all the other things which were seized from them by the government of the Czars, that of Kerensky. . . . The Soviet government gives up the indemnities payable by China for the insurrection of Boxers in 1900. . . . If the Chinese people, following the
example of the Russian people, wish to become free and to avoid the fate reserved for them by the Allies at Versailles in their object of making China into a second Korea or another India, the Chinese people should understand that they have no other ally of brother in their struggle for liberty except the Russian peasants, and workmen and their Red Army. The Soviet government, therefore, offers to the Chinese people through the interposition of its government, to establish with us from now some official relations and to send some representatives to the front of our army.13

From this it is obvious that the Bolshevik leaders hoped their generosity would lead to the formalization of Sino-Soviet relations.

The Declaration reached China in late March 1920, after an eight-month delay caused by abnormal conditions in Siberia. Though the Peking government was skeptical of the sincerity of the Declaration, its publication provoked an immediate and enthusiastic response from the Chinese people, especially the intellectuals.14 This was due to the fact that after the 1911 Revolution, while the Western powers were still maintaining their special privileges in China, the Soviet Union's generous and liberal attitude towards China seemed genuine. In the light of the highhanded actions by the Western democracies at Versailles, the Declaration seemed even more appealing to the Chinese who felt that Soviet Russia, unlike the Great Powers and Japan, treated their country on the basis of justice and equality.
The early twentieth century was for the Chinese a time of confusion and instability, during which Western democracy attempted to supplant the old Chinese traditions and culture. The Western powers did not exemplify the virtues they espoused; the Bolsheviks emerged in striking contrast. Thus the rise of Marxism in China was entirely understandable.

**Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Role In The KMT-CCP Collaboration**

After the 1921 founding of the CCP in Shanghai, the Chinese Communists initiated strikes in the mining, railway and shipping industries. However, the party realized that by then the proletariat was not organized at all and the peasants were still imprisoned by feudal ideas. In order to strengthen the party and the Communist movement, the Central Committee decided to co-operate with Sun Yat-sen's KMT on the ground that the KMT, although not strong, was greater in number and appeal than the newly founded CCP, and that the KMT had an organization and Sun, its leader, was the symbol of the rising tide of Chinese nationalism.

In October 1921, Maring met Sun in Kweilin in the province of Kwangsi, and proposed the co-operation of the two parties. Sun replied that Communism could be practiced in Soviet Russia, but definitely not in China. In July of
the following year, the Second Congress of the CCP was held in Shanghai, during which a formal announcement was made that the CCP was to join the Comintern. Also the "First Manifesto of the CCP on the Current Situation" was passed, which included the declaration that one of the fundamental tasks of the party was to promote a democratic revolution by co-operating with the workers, peasants and petit-bourgeois in order to wipe out imperialism and feudalism. Apparently the CCP by then still aimed at establishing a "democratic united front" with the KMT. ¹⁶

After the Congress, Maring came again to China and criticized the United Front Policy as impractical and leftist in tendency. He argued that the Communists ought to join the KMT as individuals because Sun Yat-sen would not agree with the KMT-CCP co-operation. Maring explained that conditions in China by then were not yet suitable for a socialist revolution. There could be only a democratic and nationalist revolution in China in the foreseeable future. Since the KMT was the only powerful democratic and nationalist revolutionary political party, the Communists could make use of the nationalist organization to advance the Marxist cause. Moreover, the Communists could take over the leadership of the labouring masses from the KMT, and the KMT would be revolutionized by such a process. Maring insisted that the CCP must learn to respect the decision of the Comintern. ¹⁷ Ch'en Tu-hsiu disagreed with what Maring proposed. He contended that the KMT was a bourgeois party.
If the Communists were to join it, they would lose their identity. Furthermore, the convergence of the two parties would complicate the situation, harming the collaboration of the revolutionary forces. However, Ch'en said that he would assent to the decision if it was made unalterable by the Comintern. Finally, the Central Committee consented to the Communists joining the KMT subject to certain conditions. 18

On the KMT side, after breaking with Ch'en Ch'iung-ming, a warlord who once claimed to support the KMT in Canton, Sun Yat-sen began to realize that the warlords were after all untrustworthy and that the KMT should be reorganized and armed with a revolutionary theory. To accomplish this, assistance would be needed. Thus the KMT-CCP collaboration was not only demanded by the Comintern, but also appeared necessary to Sun. In the middle of August 1922, Sun arrived at Shanghai. A few days later, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao, and several other Communists officially became members of the KMT, with Sun performing the induction ceremony. At Ch'en's demand, the requirement of oath-taking by new members was eliminated. 19 Thus began the KMT-CCP collaboration which lasted until 1927.

While Sun was meeting the Communists in Shanghai, a Russian diplomat, A. Joffe, had arrived at Peking to negotiate with the Peking government for the resumption of diplomatic relations. When these negotiations failed, Joffe proceeded to Shanghai to offer Sun Soviet co-operation with the KMT in order
to achieve national unity and independence from the great powers. After long discussion and hard bargaining, a joint declaration was announced in January 1923. The declaration read, in part: "Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds and M. Joffe agrees that neither Communism nor the Soviet system is suitable for China, but Russia warmly sympathizes with China's aim of national independence and China can count on Russia's support." This section clearly shows that Sun denied the possibility of the CCP's leadership in China. That denial became the basis for the KMT split with the CCP in 1927. However, the immediate result of the Declaration was that Sun proceeded to reorganize the party in 1924 into a mass, nationwide political party with a democratic-centralist structure, and employed a Russian, M. Borodin, as political advisor. Borodin then played a dominant role in driving the KMT towards leftist policies after Sun's death.

Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925. Wang Ching-wei, one of Sun's intimates and his acknowledged successor, established a KMT Government in Canton. Wang was the head of the Left Wing of the KMT, and had a close relationship with Borodin who, after Sun's death, emerged as the most powerful and influential person in the party. Borodin's moving the entire party to the left inevitably invoked right wing dissent. In September 1925, a group of dissidents, commonly known as "the Old Comrades" of the KMT, left Canton and met at the
Western Hills in Peking. They formed the "Western Hills Group" and passed a resolution demanding the expulsion of the Communists from the KMT, the dismissal of Borodin, and the impeachment of Wang Ching-wei. Finally the "Western Hills Group" established another KMT headquarters in Shanghai in December 1925, and the split between the left and the right was complete.21 From Canton, Wang openly denounced the Western Hills Conference and held the Second National Congress of the KMT in Canton in January 1926.

The Second Congress was a total victory for the leftists. However, it also paved the way for the future victory of their hidden rival, Chiang K'ai-shek, a much more cautious person than the Western Hills Group. Chiang thought that at that point, coop-eration with the Communists was still indispensable for a Nationalist victory, whereas open opposition to them would prevent the KMT from ever coming to power. Therefore, when the Western Hills Group broke away, Chiang appeared to be an ally of Borodin. In return he was granted a supreme position in KMT military affairs for which he shared the chief responsibility of the regime with Wang Ching-wei.22

After the Second Congress, Borodin left Canton for Russia. His absence provided Chiang with an opportunity to make his first move against the CCP. The historically important incident through which Chiang gained full control of Canton occurred in March 1926. The Chung-shan, a gunboat under the
command of the Communist deputy chief of the Navy Bureau, was suddenly transferred from her proper station to the vicinity of the Whampoa Academy in Shanghai while Chiang was away at Canton. Interpreting this event as a plot against his life, Chiang ordered the gunboat seized and at the same time declared a state of martial law in Canton, disarmed the strikers who were the mainstay of the Communists, and arrested the Russian military advisors. Commander Li Chi-lung complained that it was Chiang himself who directed the gunboat to move but Chiang denied it. The truth is yet to be revealed. But there is no doubt that the Chung-shan gunboat incident was the turning point of the KMT-CCP collaboration. After the incident, with Wang Ching-wei retired from Canton to a country house, the power of the Communists and the leftists in the KMT began to decline.

His position consolidated, Chiang K'ai-shek decided to take immediate action against the warlords in the North. Leaving Canton in early July, the army for the "Northern Expedition" consisted of three main columns. One marched due north to the Wuhan cities (Wuchang, Hankow and Hankow), and captured Wuchang in early October. The progress of the two other columns was relatively slower. The column headed eastward to Fukien did not reach the capital city of Foochow until early December. The central column, led by Chiang K'ai-shek himself, moved in a north-easterly direction with Shanghai as its ultimate goal. It captured Nanchang in early November and Chiang decided to stop for the winter.
As Chiang was absent from Canton, Borodin, who had returned at the end of April, determined to take advantage of the situation by calling a joint session of the Central Committee and delegates from various KMT provincial organizations in Canton, proposing to move the government to Wuhan, and urging Wang Ching-wei to resume the Chairmanship. Despite Chiang's bitter opposition, and his demand that the government be moved to Nanchang, the now dominant left Wing and its Communist allies went ahead with its plans to transfer the capital to Hankow on New Year's Day, 1927.25

Chiang K'ai-shek arrived in Shanghai at the end of March 1927, and initiated a reign of terror. He co-operated with the secret societies to kill a great number of Communists. Following the Shanghai coup, similar actions occurred in Nanking and the provinces of Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangchow, Anhwei, Kwangsi and Szechuan. After the purges, Chiang established a Nationalist government of his own in Nanking.26

Now Wang Ching-wei, who had arrived in Wuhan in early April 1927, had to decide whether to join Chiang or to resist his drastic measures. At first Wang was determined to stay with the Wuhan government and declared that Chiang K'ai-shek was to be deprived of all his powers and arrested. However, after three months of observation, seeing that the Wuhan government was controlled by the Soviet-dominated Comintern, Wang finally
decided to arrest the Communists. Consequently the Communists were driven underground and most of them secretly left Wuhan for Shanghai and other cities. Thus the five year KMT-CCP collaboration came to an end.\textsuperscript{27}

Ch'en Tu-hsiu was neither an improvisor nor a whole-hearted supporter of KMT-CCP collaboration. From the very beginning, he favoured only the "democratic United Front" policy, but not the convergence of the two parties. He finally agreed to join the KMT as an individual simply because of his blind faith in the Comintern as well as the Bolshevik Party. As the leader of the CCP, Ch'en Tu-hsiu seemed to see Moscow as the Jerusalem of the world communist revolution, whose orders the CCP should learn to obey without question or complaint. Ch'en Tu-hsiu did not see that the Soviet-dominated Comintern's policy in China was based on a Russian model quite irrelevant to China.

Actually Ch'en could foresee, while the Comintern could not, the end result of the KMT-CCP collaboration, which was that the revolutionary forces would be curtailed. His apprehension finally proved true. However, Ch'en risked his own political career as well as the fate of the CCP for the sake of the Comintern, and it was ultimately because of this that he lost the leadership of the CCP after the split with the KMT in 1927.

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Ch'en Tu-hsiu's role in KMT-CCP collaboration was far less significant than were those of Maring and Borodin. It was Maring, not Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who forced the CCP members to join the KMT; and it was Borodin, again not Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who pushed the KMT left. Was the collaboration a power struggle between the CCP and the KMT? It would be more appropriate to understand it as the Comintern's intention to seize power from the KMT through the CCP.

Viewed from the CCP position, it was the Comintern which improvised the whole thing; from the KMT viewpoint, it was Sun Yat-sen who conducted the process. Sun considered that only he could lead the revolution, and the KMT was the only legitimate party to carry out the revolutionary programs. No other political party could be put on the same level as the KMT. However, while the Comintern assumed that the KMT would be revolutionized through the convergence of the two parties, Sun Yat-sen conversely held that any revolutionary element in China, albeit with different causes or principles, could and should be contained in the KMT, provided only that it support Sun's leadership. Hence, Sun and the Comintern each attempted to make use of the other.

This is not to say that Sun was not sincere in the collaboration. He showed his respect for the Communists by appointing Ch'en Tu-hsiu as one of the nine members of the KMT
Reorganization Committee. However, Ch'en was indifferent to the appointment. As the leader of the CCP, Ch'en did not want to get deeply involved with the internal politics of the KMT. If Sun had lived for a few more years, the split of the KMT and the CCP could have been less brutal. Sun's turn towards Russia and his decision to admit the Communists caused the split within the KMT. When Sun's death removed his unifying influence, the leftists aided with the Communists and fostered the growth of the Communist influence in the party.

After Sun's death, Ch'en anticipated the future difficulties of the Communists' existence in the KMT, and on more than one occasion suggested to Borodin that the CCP withdraw from the KMT and develop independently. Antagonism between Ch'en and Borodin grew wider and wider as Borodin continued to reject Ch'en's suggestions. Ch'en's feeling towards the CCP was just like a father's towards his son. He wanted the party to grow strong by itself without losing its identity and integration. Moreover, Ch'en thought that the CCP would benefit a great deal if it was put under the protection of the Comintern. Unfortunately, the Comintern thought otherwise. It treated the CCP more like a tool for the expansion of Soviet influence than anything else. When Ch'en finally came to realize the truth, the party was already out of his control.
After the collapse of the Wuhan government, Borodin claimed that the Comintern must not be blamed for the failure of the Chinese revolution, even though the CCP had from time to time carried out the Comintern's orders. The blame must be put upon the CCP leadership. Borodin asserted that the loss of the Comintern's prestige would affect its leadership of the world revolution. Therefore, with his leadership consequently removed by the Central Committee of the CCP in August 1927, Ch'en Tu-hsiu was labeled an "opportunist" and made responsible for the party's failure. Ch'en began as the father of the CCP and ended as Stalin's scapegoat.
CHAPTER IV
Footnotes


2 Ibid., p. 10.

3 Ibid., p. 11.


5 Ibid., p. 92.

6 Ibid., pp. 93-95.

7 Li Shu, Ma-k'o-ssu chu i yu chung-kuo ko ming (Marxism and the Chinese revolution) (Peking: Jen min chu pan she, 1963), pp. 76-81.

8 Li Ta-chao, Li Ta-chao hsüen chi (Selected works of Li Ta-chao) (Peking: Jen min chu pan she, 1962), p. 4.

9 Ibid., p. 7.

10 Thomas C. Kuo, Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942) And The Chinese Communist Movement (South Orange; Seton Hall University Press, 1975), p. 84.

11 Ibid., p. 88.

12 Hung Huan-ch'un, Wu ssu shih ch'i ti chung-kuo ko ming yun tung (The Chinese revolutionary movement during the May Fourth period) (Peking: San lien shu tien, 1956), pp. 31-32.

13 Wei, p. 16.

14 Ibid., p. 17.

15 Li Yun-han, Ta'ung ju kung tao ch'ing tang (From admitting the Communists to the purification of the party) (Taipei: Sheng wu yin shu kuan, 1966), Vol. I, p. 95.

16 Chang Kuo-t'ao, Wo ti hui i (My recollections) (Hong Kong: Ming pao yueh'kan, 1971), Vol. I, pp. 238-239.


24. McAleavy, p. 244.

25. Ibid., p. 247.


27. Ibid., p. 173.


CHAPTER V

THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE
AND
THE SHANTUNG RESOLUTION

China And Japan
During The First World War

When the European war broke out in the summer of 1914, China declared her neutrality which was recognized by the powers. It was clear that for some time the European powers would have too much on their hands at home to concern themselves with what was occurring in the East. As a result, China was left to face Japanese aggression alone.

What Japan aimed at was the Shantung peninsula. The Shantung peninsula reaches out into the East China Sea towards the southernmost promontory of Manchuria. Its location had always made it the target of the geopolitically conscious Japanese. However, Shantung's Tsingtao and Kiaochow Bay, together with railway and mineral rights in the hinterland, had been leased to Germany in 1898. The outbreak of the European war offered Japan the opportunity to replace Germany in Shantung. For their part, the Chinese feared Japan above all others. "Japan is going to take advantage of this war to get control in China", Yuan Shih-k'ai predicted.¹ Japan immediately joined with
England, which had a foothold in Shantung through the lease of the port of Weihaiwei. Japan issued an ultimatum to the German government. Germany was required to withdraw completely within one month, "without condition or compensation". Germany initially wanted to return the territory of Kiaochow directly to China, but this idea met the objection of both Japan and England. Finally Japan declared war against Germany at the end of August 1914.3

The Yuan government, which had already proclaimed its neutrality, attempted to limit the scope of hostilities, following the 1904 precedent in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese campaign, by denoting a certain area surrounding Kiaochow Bay as a battle-zone. However, after landing in Kiaochow, Japanese troops ignored China's declaration and moved into the neutral zone. Finally, Japanese troops occupied the whole stretch of the railway between Kiaochow and Tsinan, as well as the adjacent mining regions, and replaced Chinese personnel with Japanese.4

Her territory violated, the Yuan government demanded that the Japanese troops withdraw from the neutral zone. Japan not only disregarded China's demand but also declared that China had "insulted" Japan. On January 18, 1915, Japan presented China with the humiliating Twenty-one Demands.5

The Twenty-one Demands were divided into five groups. They included provisions that China should cede to Japan all
German rights in Shantung, and that China would undertake not
to grant leases of coastal harbours or islands to any other
country. The most far-reaching group of demands required that
the policing of important places in China should be a joint
Sino-Japanese responsibility: that Japan should supply the
Chinese army with weapons and advisors; that Japan should construct
railways in Central China south of the Yangtze; and that Japan
should have the first option of developing railways, mines and
harbours in the province of Fukien. Had China fulfilled all
these demands, its policies, economy, and militia would have
been under Japanese control, and thus China would have become
the protectorate of Japan. There is no doubt that the Japanese
themselves also realized that their demands were harsh. Understandably, the Japanese demanded absolute secrecy and an immediate
decision. At the same time, they also offered the president,
Yüan Shih-k'ài, support for his monarchical ambition, if he
agreed to the Demands.7

Despite the Japanese bullying, news about the Japanese
secret deal with Yüan Shih-k'ài leaked out a few days after the
presentation of the Demands. The Chinese public reacted in a
remarkable manner. Throughout the country, individuals and groups
protested vigorously against acceptance of the Demands. The
government and the press were inundated with telegrams, pamphlets,
and letters demanding resistance to Japanese aggression. Some
people even asked for immediate war with Japan. Many students in Japan came back home. And the refugee revolutionaries in Tokyo, New York, London and elsewhere stopped their activities and proclaimed that they would be willing to return to China to fight the Japanese if the government rejected the demands.\(^8\) Overnight, a sense of national solidarity emerged and provincial particularism seemed to have disappeared.

Realizing that it was impossible to resist the Japanese demands, but that the popular feeling was too strong to suppress, the cabinet and presidential advisors were unable to come to a decision. The Japanese were impatient with the hesitant attitude of the Peking government. In May 1915, the Japanese dispatched an ultimatum to the Chinese, warning that the Japanese government would take any steps it might believe necessary if no satisfactory reply was received in two days.\(^9\) After receiving the ultimatum, Yuan Shih-k'ai immediately called for a meeting and shortly after declared that except for those demands relating to the policy and military co-operation and the railways in Central China, which were reserved for further consideration, all other demands were to be accepted. Yuan's rationale for accepting the demands was that China was not yet strong enough to fight Japan.\(^10\) Such an explanation served not to appease the public but to expose Yuan's hope that the Japanese would support his personal political ambitions. Yuan Shih-k'ai died in 1916, after failing in his bid to become emperor. His
selfishness gained him everlasting notoriety as a modern Chinese traitor.

The acceptance of the Twenty-one Demands constituted the ultimate Chinese humiliation. The American government tried to involve Britain, France and Russia in a joint remonstrance against Japan, but all of these countries refused to co-operate. In the end, the American government alone sent identical notes to both the Peking and the Japanese government, declaring that it would not recognize any agreements made between them which might hamper American rights and the Open Door Policy in China, or Chinese sovereignty. However, Japan ignored the notes, and thereafter the augmented Japanese influence upset the balance of power among the great powers in China.

In November 1915, Britain, Russia, and France invited China to join the Allies. The Yüan government was in favour of this action because it felt that if China went to war with Germany, the German possessions in Shantung could thereby be recovered directly by the Chinese. However, Yüan Shih-k' ai's agreement was rejected by the Japanese, who foiled every chance for China to improve her international position during the war. Japan did not allow China to have a voice at the peace table until she secured her own position in China as well as in the Far East generally. At the same time, Japan also realized that the Twenty-one Demands had aroused the disapproval of
Britain and the United States. Therefore in 1916, Japan began to make secret deals with the Western powers with regard to the possible ultimate disposal of the former German holdings in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{12}

In early 1917, the Japanese government asked the British, the French, the Russian, and the Italian governments for formal pledges of support for Japan's claim to the former German rights in Shantung and in the Pacific Islands north of the Equator. The Russians and Italians gave their support without condition; the British extracted a promise that Japan would in return support its claims with regard to the Pacific Islands south of the Equator; and the French secured a Japanese commitment to persuade China to break off diplomatic relations with Germany.\textsuperscript{13}

The only country with which Japan had problems was the United States. Therefore in November 1917, Japan sent Viscount Ishii on a special mission to Washington to talk to the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing. Ishii expressed to Lansing that it was the intention of Japan neither to invade China, nor to put China under its control. Simply because of territorial propinquity which created special relations between countries, Japan's policy towards China was just like that of the United States toward Mexico and Latin America. Ishii maintained that Japan's foreign policy towards China
had always been the same, but it was misunderstood by the American people. In order to clarify this misunderstanding, which he claimed had been created by the German government for the purpose of alienation, Ishii suggested a joint announcement by the governments of the United States and Japan. Finally, an agreement was confirmed by an exchange of notes between Lansing and Ishii:

... In order to silence mischievous reports ... a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our governments with regard to China is advisable. The governments of Japan and the United States recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous. The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired...

The Government of Japan and the United States deny that they have any intention to infringe in any way on the independence or territorial integrity of China....

The term "special interests" was the key thing in the notes. It meant two different things to the United States and Japan. To the United States, "special interests" meant merely a close or strong general interest in the welfare of China, not a particular or vested proprietorship or paramount interest. To Japan, "special interests" meant vested interests or proprietorship, something tangible. After the signing of the
Lansing-Ishii Agreement, Japan made an effort to impress the Chinese people that the Japanese interpretation of the Agreement was the correct one. Thus, Japan had tied the United States unwittingly to recognition of Japan's special and close relations, political as well as economic, with China. And Japan by then considered China its protectorate.

Early in 1917, when the United States declared war on Germany, China was again invited to join the action. Eventually, China broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, and declared war on it and Austria in August of the same year. After the completion of the November 1917 agreement, Japan felt secure in her position in the Far East, and was no longer so adamantly opposed to China's entry into the war. Instead, Japan urged China to join the Allies because she desired Chinese support for her move against German economic interests in Russia and Siberia.

China was at that time in a state of anarchy. After the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai, vice-president Li Yüan-hung became president. However, real political power was not in the hands of Li but of Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui. Tuan was a warlord who had no patience with parliament. He wanted to unite the country through military force, but the financial situation of the Peking government was very poor. Therefore, when the Japanese government offered Tuan financial help and guaranteed that Japan
would not invade China while she was at war with Germany, Tuan accepted the offer without hesitation. This resulted in the huge Nishihara loans, amounting to about 200,000,000 Japanese yen. Under the influence of these loans, the Tuan government leaned more and more upon Japan, and Tuan Ch'i-jui became the dedicated servant of Japanese imperialism. Most disheartening of all, the Tuan government on September 1918, had negotiated a secret loan (it was one of the Nishihara loans) from Japan for the construction of the Tsinan-Shunteh and Kaomi-Huschow railroad in Shantung province. The whole property and income of the two railroads was mortgaged for the repayment of the loan. At the same time, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Baron Goto Shimpei, proposed to China a seven-point arrangement concerning the question of Shantung, in which Japanese troops stationed along the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railroad were to be concentrated at Tsingtao, with a detachment at Tsinan. A police force with the Japanese as the chief officers and trainers would guard the railroad and when the status of the railroad was established, it should be worked jointly by the Japanese and the Chinese. To these proposals, the Chinese Minister to Tokyo, Chang Tsung-hsiang, replied in an exchange of notes, "I beg to acquaint you in reply that the Chinese government gladly agrees (hsin-\textit{jan} \textit{t'ung-i})." This exchange of notes seriously prejudiced China's claim to Shantung at the Versailles Peace
Conference, since they provided Japan with a legal basis for her claims to Shantung and the related railroads.

The first world war did not benefit China at all. By the end of the war, China was internally torn to pieces by the warlords and externally exploited by Japan.

The Paris Peace Conference And The Shantung Resolution

The First World War ended in Allied Victory. A peace conference was held in Paris in January 1919. Thirty-two countries attended the Conference. Five great powers, Britain, France, the United States, and Japan, each with two delegates, formed the Council of Ten. It was the three big men, George Eugene Benjamin Clemenceau, the Premier of France; Lloyd George, the Prime Minister of Britain; and Woodrow Wilson, the president of the United States, who behind closed doors made decisions on all important world problems, particularly on the territorial ones. Japan and Italy played an active part in the deliberations affecting their respective interests. The remaining twenty-seven countries - China not excepted - could do no more than accept the decisions made by the big powers.21

Woodrow Wilson proposed his "Fourteen Points" as the basis of the Peace Conference. They called for the destruction of secret diplomacy, self-determination of peoples, and the
establishment of the League of Nations. All these principles made the Chinese people believe that through the Peace Conference, the concessions Germany had held in China since 1918 would be restored to China, and the Sino-Japanese treaties and agreements concluded under duress during the war would be readjusted.\textsuperscript{22} Therefore, the Chinese delegates presented to the Peace Conference three desideratas: (1) Restoration to China of the leased territory of Kiaochow, the railway in Shantung, and all other rights; (2) Renunciation of spheres of influence or interest; withdrawal of foreign troops and police; withdrawal of foreign post offices and agencies for wireless and telegraphic communications; abolition of consular jurisdiction; relinquishment of leased territories; restoration to China of foreign concessions and settlements, and, tariff autonomy; (3) Abrogation of the Twenty-one Demands.\textsuperscript{23} The Council of Ten replied that the Peace Conference was not to be responsible for the second and the third desiderata; only the Shantung question could be brought up for discussion.

The Council of Ten on January 27, 1919, heard the Shantung question. During the meeting, Baron Makino, delegate of Japan, claimed unconditional Japanese control of the leased territory of Kiaochow and the railways and other rights possessed by Germany in Shantung province. Baron Makino argued that Japan had taken these places during the war, and that Germany could
not be allowed to re-occupy them. Because of Japan's contribution to the Allied victory, it was just and fair for Japan to retain the German concessions. Later on, Makino stated that Japan was in actual possession of the leased territory and that she must first of all obtain from Germany the right of free disposal before she could carry out the promise to eventually restore it to China. Actually, as Makino pointed out, the matter had been the subject of an exchange of notes between China and Japan, and agreements had already been reached with regard to the railways. The Chinese delegates argued that the agreements were made in consequence of the "Twenty-one Demands"; the Chinese government had agreed only under the pressure of an ultimatum. Therefore the agreement should only be regarded as provisional, temporary, and subject to review by the Conference. On the other side, all treaties and conventions concluded between Germany and China were abrogated once China declared war on Germany. Even if such were not the case, Germany had no right to transfer the territory to another country, because of the express provision against transfer in the lease itself.

The Shantung question was not taken up until mid-April. At a meeting of the Council of Five, Robert Lansing proposed that Germany be made to renounce all rights, titles, and privileges in and over territory outside her European frontiers. The Japanese
objected that, according to previous commitment, the leased territory of Kiaochow could not be included in such a disposal. Finally Japan threatened to leave the Peace Conference if its demands on Shantung were not sanctioned by the Council. To make the matter worse, the British and French spokesmen then stated that they were bound by wartime pledges to support Japanese claims. Thus at the end of April 1919, faced with the withdrawal of the Italian delegation from the Conference, the French and the British insistence on the sanctity of their engagements, and President Wilson's fears for the future of the League of Nations, the Council transferred the leased territory to Japan on the basis of a vague promise on Japan's part to hand it back to China eventually. At the same time, Japan was allowed to retain the economic rights pertaining to railways and mines.27

The Chinese delegation received the news with great surprise. They immediately telegraphed home for instructions. The Peking government, fearing serious Japanese measures against China, agreed to sign the treaty. But the news provoked immediate and widespread public indignation in China. Student organizations and social groups from all over China telegraphed the Chinese delegation in Paris, demanding that they refuse to sign the treaty. The delegates therefore made an attempt to insert into the Shantung question a clear statement that Kiaochow
was to be returned to China eventually. Their request was rejected. Later on, the Chinese delegates made three proposals asking that China be permitted to sign the treaty subject to a reservation on the Shantung question, and that China have the right to ask for reconsideration of the Shantung clause after the signing of the treaty. All three proposals were turned down by Clemenceau. Upon Clemenceau's insistence that no reservation of any kind be admitted either in the text of the treaty or separately before signing the treaty, the Chinese attempted a final compromise. They proposed a further modification of the wording, so that China could still ask for reconsideration of the Shantung question after signing the treaty. This was also rejected. Finally, the Chinese delegates refused to sign the treaty of Versailles at the end of June 1919. The Shantung question remained unsolved.

China's Losses And Gains At The Paris Peace Conference

In terms of foreign diplomacy, China was a complete failure at the Paris Peace Conference. It is an undeniable fact that the Peace Conference favoured Japan and was unjust towards China. Wellington Y.K. Koo, one of the Chinese delegates to the Conference, pointed out that China was treated as a third class country at the Conference. China asked for five representa-
tives but was only granted two. Actually, China was classed as a "belligerent power with special interests" on a level with Greece, Poland, Portugal and some others. She could attend the sessions at which questions concerning her were discussed only when formal permission by the Council of Four was granted, whereas Japan was classed as a "belligerent power with general interests", on a level with Britain, France, Italy, and the United States. Japan could attend all the sessions and commissions. Therefore, Japan had the advantage of hearing the inside discussions as one of the great powers and of judging the general temper of the conference. As all final decisions made by the five great powers had to be unanimous, Japan had an added bargaining position that China did not possess.

When the Council of Ten met at the end of January 1919, and decided to bring up the Shantung question, Japan, Britain, France, and Italy wanted to exclude China from representation. Only at the insistence of President Wilson and Robert Lansing, were the Chinese plenipotentiaries invited to participate. The Shantung problem was a problem between China and the foreign powers, and the Chinese delegates were almost entirely excluded from the discussion of it. Both Japan's contempt towards China and the total lack of concern for fundamental justice on the part of the three European powers were completely exposed.
Of the five great powers, only the United States was sympathetic to China. In the beginning, the Chinese really believed that Wilson's Fourteen Points would be accepted by the Allies as the basis for the post-war settlement. Probably Wilson thought so too. Not until the opening of the Peace Conference did both the Chinese people and Wilson awaken from their dreams. Wilson's idea of the League of Nations was only popular outside the United States. It was already strongly opposed by the Senate of the United States, especially by the Republicans. The former president, T. Roosevelt, openly declared that Wilson, and his program, did not represent Americans. Therefore, every single move by Wilson in Paris was attacked and criticized at home. Although Wilson had once sailed home to explain his position to the people, the Americans' hostility towards him remained unchanged. 33

In addition to his problem with his own people, Wilson encountered many difficulties at the Peace Conference itself in his defense of the "League of Nations". He struggled with each of the great powers in turn. The struggle with the Japanese was shorter than the others, but at the same time sharper. The earlier struggle with Italy served to weaken Wilson's position in the later contest with the Japanese. It was sparked by Italy's insistence upon claiming the city of Fiume, which had been assigned to the Yugoslavs by the Allies' secret Treaty of London in 1915.
Italy's concern was to assure any rivalry on the part of the new Yugoslav State. Wilson issued a manifesto on Fiume rejecting Italy's claims, and the Italian delegation left the Conference in protest. This resulted in the practical paralysis of the Conference.

The Fiume problem was actually similar to the Shantung problem. Japan was alarmed that the Conference might disappoint her too on her claim to Shantung. In fact, the American press reported a statement emanating from the Japanese that if Wilson was to issue a manifesto on Shantung like the one on Fiume, Japan would also leave the Conference. There is no doubt that Wilson's policy on Italy weakened his stance in the Japanese crisis which came right after Fiume.

The territorial claims to Shantung constituted only one part of the Japanese position at Paris. Warned by Fiume and with the Shantung question temporarily in abeyance, the Japanese purposely stressed their demand for "racial equality". In the League of Nations Commission in April 1919, Baron Makino made a strong speech endorsing "the principle of the equality of Nations and the just treatment of their nationals", which principle he argued should be laid down as the fundamental basis of future relations in the world organization. The Chinese delegates, though suspicious of the Japanese in every other way, were in full sympathy with the spirit of the proposed amendments.
ment. The Japanese anticipated that Wilson would find it painful to accept the demand, since the United States had very strict regulations on immigration, and the Japanese and Chinese had found the regulations especially harsh towards them. If the "racial equality" amendment was to be passed, the Japanese would take it as a basis for future negotiations with the United States. However, the amendment would be unacceptable to the Senate of the United States, and the domestic attack on Wilson's "League of Nations" would be increased. The result of the demand for "racial equality" was twofold. Wilson was embarrassed and the Chinese delegates had no choice but to support it. Eventually Wilson rejected the amendment, as was expected by the Japanese. The failure of the demand served to harden the determination in forcing Japanese territorial claims in the Councils. From Wilson's point of view, the only way to preserve Japanese membership in the League of Nations was to satisfy Japan's Shantung demands. Thus China's interests had to be sacrificed.

In the light of his final capitulation to the Japanese, Wilson must be adjudged strong in theory but weak in practice. He failed in the struggle with the great powers which made the Peace Conference a give-and-take conference. Despite his sympathy for China, Wilson gave her no aid beyond moral support. All the Western powers - the United States not excepted - were overwhelmingly preoccupied with Europe and in particular with
Germany. Britain did not consider China capable of threatening the British position in Asia or acting as a counter to Japanese power. France had no respect for China, and naturally would not have wanted to antagonize Japan by defending her. Furthermore, both Britain and France were committed to Japan by a wartime agreement on Shantung, and the United States, preoccupied with the League of Nations question, also considered China's interests of minor importance.

Actually, Wilson was condemned by his own countrymen. His Shantung settlement was interpreted as a sacrifice of China's fundamental interests in favour of Japanese expansionism. Wilson himself felt that the long term importance of the League of Nations justified the short term difficulties. Wilson even believed that China would be more fairly treated in the League of Nations. Wilson was indeed an idealist. Compared to statesmen like Lloyd George, Clemenceau, or Makino, he appeared naive and less resourceful.

Quite apart from Japan's contempt and the Western powers' inconsiderate manner towards China, China was partly responsible for its own failure at the Conference. The Twenty-one Demands were signed under pressure of an ultimatum, but there was no such excuse for the secret agreement of 1918. That agreement provided Japan with a powerful legal argument for Shantung, whereas China's argument was strong only on politi-
cal and moral grounds. Also, China's internal dissension rendered her voice at the peace table ineffective. When Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui was about to declare war on Germany in 1917, the KMT-dominated parliament feared that the decision might strengthen the leadership of Tuan and his colleagues. President Li Yuan-hung thus courageously dismissed Tuan. Facing the possibility of a military move against Peking by Tuan, Li dissolved Parliament. However, Tuan himself succeeded in entering Peking and reorganized the cabinet, excluding the Southern provinces from membership. The Southern provinces established a separate government of opposition in Canton with Sun Yat-sen as the leader.39

The widening split of North and South not only reduced China's international reputation to an even greater degree, but also put the Chinese delegates in Paris in a peculiarly embarrassing position. The chief delegate represented the North, but the second-in-command represented the South, constantly reminding the western Powers of China's lack of unity.

From the national viewpoint, the Peace Conference was a complete loss to China. But the Conference had taught China that sympathy and friendship were not enough to guarantee the victory of a just cause, and that reliance upon the support of other countries was unwise and unsafe. A country must undergo self-strengthening before it struggles for equality with the great powers. After the Conference, there was a significant
change in Chinese foreign policy. China began to take the initiative in external affairs. Another genuine advantage gained by China in Paris was the worldwide publicity for the injustice done to China. The Allies' lack of good faith became known everywhere. The true face of Western liberal democracy was completely revealed. The last and the most important result of the Conference was the outburst of the May Fourth Movement, a genuine watershed in modern Chinese history. Subsequently in less than half a century, China emerged as one of the most influential world powers, and obtained the full respect which was denied her at Paris in 1919.
CHAPTER V

Footnotes


6 McAlleavy, p. 217.

7 Levi, p. 140.

8 Tseng, p. 163.

9 Ibid., p. 164.

10 Fu, p. 272.

11 Tseng, p. 164.

12 Fu, p. 281.


14 Fu, p. 283.

15 MacNair, p. 833.

16 Ibid., p. 836.

17 Ibid., p. 839.

18 Fu, p. 306.

88
19 Tseng, p. 168.
20 Fu, p. 309.
22 Tseng, p. 172.
23 Wen, p. 99.
24 Temperley, p. 377.
26 Temperley, p. 378.
27 King, p. 25.
28 Wen, pp. 99-100.
29 King, pp. 29-30.
30 Wellington Y.K. Koo, "Pa-li ho hui ti hui yi" (Recollec-
tion of the Paris Peace Conference), Biographical Literature,
VI/6 (December 1966), 6.
32 King, p. 5.
35 Fifield, p. 256.
36 Baker, p. 237.
37 King, Ts'ung pa-li ho hui tao kuo lien, p. 19.
38 Baker, p. 224.
39 Fifield, pp. 73-74.
CHAPTER VI

THE MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT
OF 1919

The May Fourth Incident

When the disheartening news of the failure of the Chinese delegation to solve the Shantung problem at the Paris Peace Conference reached China at the end of April 1919, the Chinese public was furious. University and college students were the first to react, planning a mass demonstration on May 7. This particular day was later designated as "National Humiliation Day", after the Twenty-one Demands of 1915. The students also sent telegraphs to various public organizations and the mass media, calling on all people to hold protest meetings on May 7 in protest against foreign aggression.1

When news from Paris indicated that the Chinese delegation might sign the Treaty without a satisfactory resolution of the Shantung question, the students in Peking changed their original plan. On May 3, more than one thousand student representatives from the various Peking educational institutions attended an informal meeting in the assembly hall of the Third School of the University of Peking. It was unanimously agreed at the meeting that a mass demonstration was to be held the next day, May 4, instead of May 7.2
Early in the morning of May 4, some students tore up their bed sheets and wrote slogans on them in their own blood. Slogans such as "China is Chinese China", "Return our Shantung", "Abolish the Twenty-one Demands", "Externally, struggle for sovereignty; internally, throw out the traitors", and "Refuse to sign the Peace Treaty", among others, were shouted out loudly.3

In the afternoon, some five thousand students from thirteen tertiary institutions in Peking demonstrated at the Heavenly Peace Square (Tien-an men) and distributed a leaflet entitled the "Manifesto of All the Students of Peking". It stated:

Japan's demand for the possession of Tsingtao and other rights in Shantung is now going to be acceded to in the Paris Peace Conference. Her diplomacy has secured a great victory; and ours has led to a great failure. The loss of Shantung means the destruction of the integrity of China's territory. Once the integrity of her territory is destroyed, China will soon be annihilated. Accordingly, we students today are making a demonstration march to the Allied legations, asking the Allies to support justice. We earnestly hope that all agricultural, industrial, commercial, and other groups of the whole nation will rise and hold citizens' meetings to strive to secure our sovereignty in foreign affairs and to get rid of the traitors at home. This is the last chance for China in her life and death struggle. Today we swear two solemn oaths with all our fellow countrymen: (1) China's territory may be conquered, but it cannot be given away; (2) the Chinese people may be massacred, but they will not surrender. Our country is about to be annihilated. Up, brethren!4
This manifesto was drafted by Lo Chia-lun, who was a founding editor of the New Tide Monthly (Hsin-ch'ao yüeh k'ān) and a student leader in the new literature and new thought movements. It typified the spirit of the young intellectuals of that time.

After the meeting, the students marched from the Heavenly Peace Square to the Legation Quarter. Besides distributing leaflets to the spectators on the streets, the students carried placards inscribed with patriotic slogans, demanding the punishment of Ts'ao Ju-lin(a), Lu Tsung-yu(b), and Chang Tsung-hsian(c), the three government officials who supposedly had betrayed the country.5

When the students arrived at the Legation Quarter, they were refused entry by the Legation Quarter police. Finally, the students were allowed to send representatives to talk with the Legation ministers, but none could be found. At the same time, the Chinese police and troops intervened and forced the students back. The students then marched to Ts'ao Ju-lin's residence.6

Ly Tsung-yu and Chang Tsung-hsiang happened to be there, holding

(a) A principal negotiator of the treaties relating to the Twenty-one Demands and the Nishihara Loans.

(b) Chinese Minister to Japan at the time of the Twenty-one Demands and currently president of the Sino-Japanese Exchange Bank, which handled the Nishihara Loans.

(c) Chinese minister to Tokyo on leave in Peking.
a secret meeting with the Japanese. The students broke through the door and beat Lu unconscious. They set fire to the house when they found that Ts'ao had escaped. One student was shot to death. 7

When, on May 5, the students heard that the Peking government intended to lay serious charges against the arrested students, they burned with indignation and refused to attend classes. 8 On the following day, May 6, the Student Union of the Middle Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning in Peking (Pei-ching chung-teng i-sheng hsüeh-hsiao hsüeh-sheng lien-ho-hui) was established. The purpose of the union was "to facilitate the performance of students' duties and to promote the welfare of the nation". 9 In order to realize this purpose, the students immediately organized speakers' groups, distributed leaflets, and telegraphed to the press and all the academic institutions to ask for public support. 10 The Student Union of Peking was the first permanent student organization of secondary and tertiary educational institutions on a citywide basis in China. It was also the first time in Chinese history that male and female students had grouped together for political activities. 11 The news of student demonstrations in Peking enveloped the country overnight. Students in Tiensin reacted with immediate support, holding a meeting of protest against the Peking government; then students in Wuhan, Nanking, Hangchow, Shanghai, Amoy, Kwangchow, 93
and elsewhere followed suit. Student unions were established in many major cities to direct local activities. On June 16, the Student Union of the Republic of China was founded by more than thirty student representatives from important provinces and cities, meeting in Shanghai. Thereafter, this union became the headquarters of the student movement throughout the nation.

Before June 3, demonstrations and strikes were mainly carried out by students and intellectuals. However, on June 5, a great number of Chinese urban workers went on strike, marking a new stage in the development of the May Fourth Movement. In Shanghai, approximately 70,000 urban workers went on strike, while many merchants closed their shops in support of the striking students. Meanwhile, similar actions occurred in Nanking, Hangchow, Tiensin, Wuhan, Amoy, Shantung, and other major cities. From June 5 to June 6, strikes and demonstrations by students, workers and merchants broke out one after the other all over China. Provincial councils, educational associations, labour organizations, chambers of commerce and other organizations set up National Self-Determination Organizations (Kuo-min chih-chueh hui) of their own to boycott Japanese goods. In Shanghai, a permanent association of merchant and labour organizations, the press, and the student union was erected. It became known as the Federation of All Organizations of China (Chung-kuo ko-chieh lien-ho-hui) and proclaimed that the strikes would not stop until
Shantung was returned. On June 10, the Peking government succumbed to the students' pressure and dismissed Ts'ao Ju-lin, Chang Tsung-hsiang, and Lu Tsung-yu. However, the movement did not stop after the dismissal of the "traitors" because the Shantung Resolution was still unsettled.

Moreover, Chinese students abroad in Japan and Europe were also aroused by the May Fourth incident. A few hundred students in Japan staged a demonstration despite the intervention of the Japanese armed police. Students in Europe sent representatives to the minister for the purpose of presenting their demands on the Shantung Resolution. Students in Paris warned the Chinese delegates that they would be treated as traitors if they signed the treaty. Under these circumstances, the delegates declared that they would refuse to sign even if the Peking government insisted. On June 28, when the news of China's refusal to sign the Peace Treaty with Germany reached Peking, the mass protest which began with the May Fourth demonstration came to an end.

The Significance Of The May Fourth Movement And Its Influence On The New Culture Movement

The May Fourth Movement is one of the most important events in modern Chinese history. It was first initiated by
the students and intellectuals, but soon joined by the merchants, industrialists, petit bourgeoisie, and urban workers. It led to various kinds of other social movements, e.g. the labour movement, peasant movement, and woman's suffrage movement (including professional opportunities for women, free marriage, and anti-feudalism).\textsuperscript{18}

The May Fourth Movement did not occur accidentally. After the 1911 Revolution, the corrupt government, the arbitrary warlords, the growing foreign imperialism, the deteriorating social economy, and the changing attitude of the intellectuals towards Chinese culture and traditions combined in a revolutionary explosion.\textsuperscript{19} The Paris Peace Conference, however, only ignited the fuse. Without the Peace Conference, the revolution would have been sparked by something else.

The May Fourth Movement began as a student movement, something not without precedent in Chinese history. But the student movement of 1919 had momentous consequences. Never before had student power had such a great effect. The conservative and bureaucratic Peking government was shaken.\textsuperscript{20}

There were two other significant results of the May Fourth Movement. Externally, the western powers began to change their attitude from contempt to serious concern towards the Chinese and the Shantung Resolution as well.* Internally,

* All the Shantung privileges were returned to China under a Sino-Japanese Pact which was signed during the Washington Conference in 1923.
the movement brought about the awakening of the whole nation. It was the first time that the Chinese had realized the importance of national independence and individual human rights. The Chinese populace began to recognize that the warlords would not save the country. On the contrary, they constituted the main obstacle to China's domestic unity and national independence. Therefore, the responsibility to rebuild the country belonged to the whole nation. The movement indeed hastened the unification of China by drawing people together in thought and action. Also, the increased consciousness of the Chinese intellectuals made them recognize that the establishment of the Republic could not be complete by merely transplanting the laws and political institutions of the West without other changes. What the intellectuals asked for was the uprooting of the traditional Chinese culture and its replacement by a new western culture. Never before had Chinese culture and civilization met such a challenge, initiated not by the westerners but by a group of its own people, a group which claimed to be westernized but in fact was raised and nourished on Chinese culture. This was the most dramatic and tragic feature of the May Fourth Movement.

Despite the political accomplishments of the May Fourth Movement, its most outstanding aspect was its combination with the New Culture Movement.
The New Culture Movement broke out two years before the May Fourth Movement and was already popular among the intellectuals. With the burning effect of the May Fourth Movement upon the people, the New Culture Movement reached its peak. The striking concepts and ideas brought by the movement, such as new thought, anti-traditionalism, and literary reform were carried to every corner of the country, and the New Culture Movement became one of the main ingredients in the May Fourth Movement. various kinds of magazines, newspapers, and periodicals rapidly emerged.

The purpose of the New Culture Movement was to modernize Chinese thought and behaviour, and it succeeded in that purpose. With the wide use of the vernacular, the content of short stories, novels, essays, and dramas were greatly enriched and improved. The practical vernacular language made literature more easily accessible and it thus became relevant to life and society. Literary studies developed in abundance.

However, the emphasis of the New Culture Movement on western science and democracy ironically proved sufficient. The term "democracy" had been widely discussed among the intellectuals, but no plan for the democratic transformation of China was ever formulated; neither could the advocacy of democracy influence contemporary warlord politics. "Science" too did not develop significantly during the May Fourth period. On the one hand, democracy and science did not have roots in Chinese
society; on the other, Chinese traditional culture was denied. There was a philosophical and cultural vacuum. Especially after the May Fourth Movement, the public attitude towards politics was radical. Western doctrines, such as individualism, socialism, Marxism, and anarchism caught the attention of the Chinese intellectuals of that time. 25

After the May Fourth Movement, Marxism was broadly discussed in Ch'en Tu-shiu's New Youth magazine, which was the most influential magazine of that time. Many other periodicals established by radical intellectuals were also devoted to Marxism and the Bolshevik Revolution. Some radicals in Shanghai even put their beliefs into practice by going to work with the factory workers, and fighting for their welfare. 26 This was part of the reason why Marxism, of all the western doctrines, won out in China. The May Fourth Movement led to the downfall of one ideology, western liberal democracy, and the triumph of another, Marxism.

Some historians assert that the May Fourth Movement was solely a patriotic movement, with no real connection to the New Culture Movement and its leaders. 27 This view fails to perceive the hidden effect which the New Culture Movement had upon the May Fourth Movement. It is the New Culture Movement which brought the Chinese new glimpses of the western way of life. The Chinese began to doubt and deny their own culture.
Their dissatisfaction with their own culture led to their search for a new Chinese identity. This was the most basic motive force of the May Fourth Movement. On the other hand, the leaders of the New Culture Movement, represented by Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his colleagues, did not cause the May Fourth Movement, but their contribution towards the New Culture Movement was undeniable. They were the symbols and models of the generation. It was not them in person, but their renovating philosophy, which came to be the dominating force of the May Fourth Movement, and in return the May Fourth Movement was the catalyst of the New Culture Movement. The two movements were not only related to, but also facilitated each other.
CHAPTER VI

Footnotes

1 Chung-kuo hsien tai li shih shih chien hsuen pien (Selected historical events in modern Chinese history) (Hong Kong: Chih lien chu pan she, 1976), pp. 41-42.

2 Ibid., p. 42.

3 Wu ssu yun tung hui i lu (Reminiscences of the May Fourth Movement) (Peking: Chung hua shu chu, 1959), p. 35.


6 Chou, pp. 109-111.

7 Chung-kuo hsien tai li shih shih chien hsuen pien, pp. 44-45.

8 Ibid., p. 45.

9 Chou, p. 122.

10 Chung-kuo hsien tai li shih shih hsuen pien, p. 45.

11 Chou, p. 123.

12 Chung-kuo hsien tai li shih shih chien hsuen pien, p. 47.

13 Ibid., p. 47.


15 Chung-kuo hsien tai li shih shih chien hsuen pien, p. 49.

16 Pao, p. 114.

17 Chou, p. 166.


20 Pao, p. 117.


22 Ibid., p. 152.

23 Chou, p. 288.

24 Li, p. 153.


26 Chung-kuo hsien tai ko ming yun tung shih, p. 127.

27 Chou, p. 2.
CHAPTER VII

EPILOGUE

The Fall of Ch'en Tu-hsiu

In August 1927, the Central Committee of the CCP held a special meeting and discharged Ch'en Tu-hsiu from the leadership. The new leadership of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, a Russian-educated radical, began to accelerate the policy of armed insurrections. Thereafter the Communist movement changed from the great urban movements of 1924-1927 to the peasant uprisings of 1927-1934. The first uprising under this leftist policy, which ended in failure, had already taken place in Nanchang before the August meeting. The Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan, and the Canton Commune also failed. Ch'en Tu-hsiu participated in none of these uprisings. He sharply disagreed with Ch'u Ch'iu-pai's strategy of armed insurrections. He wrote a letter to the Central Committee's standing Committee on November 27, stating that the party's immediate task should be to lead the workers and the peasants in a struggle for economic gains rather than to mobilize peasant uprisings. Ch'en noted that since the KMT government's position was still stable, the Communist Party had not yet been able to win the masses' support in order to seize political power. Ch'en Tu-hsiu also suggested that the CCP should keep in touch with the left-

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wing of the KMT and other social democratic organizations so as to detect rivals and eliminate enemies. However, the Central Committee ignored Ch'en's suggestions and labeled him an "opportunist".

In July 1929, the East China Railway in Manchuria provoked serious conflicts between the Nationalist government of China and the Soviet government. This Railway was built in 1896 and had been controlled by Tsarist Russia. After the Bolshevik Revolution despite its repeated declarations that it would renounce all concessions in China, the Soviet government did not give up its privileges in respect to the East China Railway. The Railway always remained under Soviet control. However, in July 1929, the Soviet-dominated railway administration was forcibly seized by the Chinese authorities. The result was friction between the Russian forces in Siberia and the Chinese troops in Manchuria.

The CCP-supported Soviet Russia, and planned to organize Chinese volunteers to help Russia to fight against the Nationalist government of China. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was strongly opposed. He immediately wrote a letter to the Central Committee, stating that the Chinese masses and petty bourgeoisie would not like the idea of supporting Soviet Russia. The best solution for the party was to denounce the KMT government for suppressing China's progressive policy. The Central Committee rejected Ch'en's
suggestion and argued that the policy of proclaiming support for Soviet Russia was perfectly consistent with Chinese revolution, and the Chinese masses should understand that.\(^{10}\) Ch'en's apprehension was due to his ignorance of the situation and his lack of confidence in the CCP's leadership. His ideas ignored Ch'en Tu-hsiu was accused as a "liquidationist" and expelled from the party four months after the ideological dispute.\(^{11}\) From then on, the relationship between Ch'en and the CCP was never restored and Ch'en Tu-hsiu began to occupy himself with a different phase of the Chinese revolution.

**Ch'en Tu-hsiu And The Proletariat**

*(Wu-Ch' an Chieh Chi)*

In 1930, Ch'en Tu-hsiu organized a group, "The Proletariat", under the banner of the leftist opposition faction of the CCP, and he himself became the secretary-general.\(^{12}\) The purpose of this group was mainly to attack the Stalinist-dominated Comintern. Ch'en Tu-hsiu charged that under Stalin's "opportunist" leadership, the revolutionary line of the Comintern shifted solely toward supporting the Soviet Union. The actual conditions of the Chinese revolution were ignored and even denied. Ch'en continued to point out that the CCP could not tell the difference between principle and tactics. Its blind submission to the Comintern contributed to the failure of the Chinese revo-
lution. He also charged that the CCP leaders used the name of revolution to eliminate opposition within the party, and that was the reason for his expulsion.

After Ch'en's expulsion, Trotsky, who had become the leader of the International Leftist Opposition after his expulsion from the Soviet Communist Party in 1927, had openly supported Ch'en Tu-hsiu and recommended that Ch'en join hands with the other leftist opposition groups, "Our Word" (Wo-men ti hua), "The October Society" (Shih-yüeh she), and "The Fighting Society" (Ch' an-tou she). In 1930, the four factions acted together and set up an anti-Soviet program. Ch'en Tu-hsiu claimed that the Chinese revolution was in a preparatory period for the revolutionary high tide to come. During this period, it was necessary to call for a National Assembly. But the anti-Soviet program did not turn out well. The Leftist Opposition Party was so disorganized that it achieved nothing. With the National government's arrest of Ch'en Tu-hsiu for treason in 1932, his political career had come to an end.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu's arrest was immediately known throughout the country. Many of the intellectuals, particularly the well-known scholars, demanded a fair trial. Finally, Ch'en pleaded guilty to endangering the Chinese Republic and was sentenced to thirteen years imprisonment. During his imprisonment, Ch'en worked on studies of Chinese language, and began to
write his autobiography. However, Ch'en did not serve his full term in prison; he was released in 1937 when the KMT and the CCP agreed to unite against the Japanese invasion. The release of political prisoners was part of the agreement. 18

The Change Of Ch'en Tu-hsien's Political Thought In His Last Years

At the end of 1937, Ch'en Tu-hsien began to give lectures advocating total mobilization to resist Japan and he participated in no more political activities. 19 Once the CCP tried to offer Ch'en readmission to the party on the condition that he admit his past mistakes in participating in the Trotskyite Opposition. Ch'en turned down the offer and claimed that he no longer wanted to represent anyone but himself. 20 Thereafter, Ch'en ignored the attack of the communists and continued giving lectures and writing articles on the Sino-Japanese war. Ch'en asserted that the war was not only inevitable but also necessary. He believed that China was awakened and was aware of her crucial situation, and that she must win the war. Only by winning the war could China achieve domestic unity and freedom from the imperial bondage forced upon her since the middle of the nineteenth century. 21 Ch'en's goal had always been to see China modernized and freed from foreign invasion and imperialism. His urge to accelerate the process of modernization caused his
inconsistency toward western ideology. He was more a nationalist than anything else.

One last important aspect of Ch'en's last years is that his views on democracy and the Communist regime had been altered to a certain extent. Ch'en felt that democracy must be the goal of either a capitalist or a Communist country; a country would become totalitarian if the idea of democracy were suppressed. Without democracy, centralized authority, i.e. bureaucratic centralism, would gradually develop in the party. Ch'en began to see that western democracy was not the only product of the bourgeoisie. The term democracy itself indeed implied certain good qualities, such as freedom of speech and press for parties other than the one in power, freedom of thought and religion, and freedom to strike. All these were basic human rights. Ch'en saw that democracy was a necessary tool in order for each class to develop class power. He felt that the main task of the proletariat was to re-establish "democratic centralism". Ch'en asserted that proletarian democracy, which the Bolshevik government claimed to pursue, in fact was no different from bourgeois democracy in capitalist society, which the Bolsheviks attacked. Both democracies claimed to aim at basic human rights and freedoms, but in both systems the principle of democracy was violated. Ch'en thought that the problem was even more critical with the Communists as centralized power was more inclined to fall into the hands of a ruling minority.
It appears that by this time Ch'en had taken one step forward in understanding the term "democracy". His prime concern was human freedom and dignity. Ch'en saw that true democracy was in no way to be achieved in a Communist State, namely Soviet Russia, and turned to support bourgeois democracy through which he felt a better, albeit still imperfect democracy could be achieved. This reveals that Ch'en Tu-hsiu had mellowed. He no longer blindly admired western ideologies. He seemed to have learned the essence of both Marxism and liberal democracy.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu's political thought in his later years was no longer influential because of his long absence from practical politics. Nonetheless, since he was the leading figure in the May Fourth period, the period which opened a new chapter in modern Chinese history, the value of Ch'en Tu-hsiu as an influential historical figure can never be denied. The time period between the rise and fall of Ch'en Tu-hsiu was after all coincident with the May Fourth generation which under the pressure of history, sought a new and strong western model(s) for China.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu was a man of principle who never yielded. He had the distinctive character of the traditional Chinese intellectual. In Chinese terms he was a "lofty bone", that is to say an uncompromising character. A person with this inflexible nature is born a tragic figure, particularly when he is incapable of conciliation and refuses to grant concessions. Had
he not participated in politics, he could have become a brilliant scholar or philosopher. However, Ch'en chose badly and was doomed to fail. Ch'en's life history typifies the Chinese saying, "an unarmed scholar repaired his country with his armed faith".
CHAPTER VII

Footnotes

1 Thomas C. Kuo, Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942) And The Chinese Communist Movement (South Orange: Seton Hall University Press, 1975), p. 176.


3 Kuo, p. 176.

4 Ibid., p. 183.

5 Huang Wei-han, Chung-kuo kung ch' an tang chih fa ch' an ch'i ch'i mo lo (The development and fall of the Chinese Communist Party) (Nanking: Hsueh shu yen chiu she, 1935), p. 141.

6 Kuo, p. 187.


8 Kuo, p. 195.

9 Ibid., p. 195.

10 Ibid., p. 196.

11 Chih Yu-ju, Ch'en Tu-hsiu nien p'u (The chronological table of Ch'en Tu-hsiu) (Hong Kong: Lung wen shu tien, 1974), p. 53.

12 Kuo, p. 207.

13 Ibid., p. 205.

14 Ibid., pp. 232-233.

15 Chung-kuo kung ch' an tang fa ch'i jen chih fun lieh shih-liao (Historical essays on the split of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party) (Hong Kong: Lung wen shu tien, 1968), pp. 87-88.

16 Huang, p. 79.
17 Chih, p. 59.
18 Ibid., p. 61.
19 Kuo, p. 227.
20 Ibid., p. 231.
21 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, K'ang jih chan cheng chih i i (The significance of the anti-Japanese war) (Shanghai: Ya tung to shu kuan, 1937), p. 6.
22 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ch'en Tu-hsiu lun kung jen chuan cheng chi wen chu cheng chih chu wen ti (Ch'en Tu-hsiu's discussion on the dictatorship of the proletariat and democratic politics) (Hong Kong: Lung wen shu tien, 1964), Part II, pp. 17-19.
23 Kuo, p. 208.
24 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ch'en Tu-hsiu lun kung jen chuan cheng chi wen chu cheng chih chu wen ti, Part II, p. 5.
CONCLUSION

Ch'en Tu-hsiu died thirty-seven years ago, and the Chinese Communists have become the legitimate government of China. Despite the CCP's denunciation of Ch'en, he remains one of the most outstanding figures of the May Fourth era, and one of those most responsible for introducing Marxism into China.

This paper has tried to show that Ch'en played a leading role in an era which forms an important watershed in the modern history of China. Given Ch'en's family and social background, and the education he received, he could have become a very brilliant scholar. However, Ch'en was not satisfied to develop only his intellect and exercise it in a vacuum. He detested and denied his old heritage and strove to bring a new government and social order to China. Thus, he became a radical revolutionary.

When he found that the new Chinese Republic had not fulfilled its promise, he realized that simply changing the form of government would not improve the welfare of the people. Only a fundamental change in the Chinese people's concept of life, and an awakening of China as a country and as a nation could transform China into a modern state, able to resist foreign aggression.
Therefore, oblivious to the tremendous pressure put upon him, Ch'en openly criticized Confucianism and demanded its overthrow. Ch'en generated sufficient backlash that he was forced to resign as Dean of Letters at Peking University; on the other hand, Confucianism, which had dominated and guided the Chinese people's lives for two thousand years, was also mortally wounded. Ch'en initiated this great anti-traditionalist movement, and for one historical moment, China was left ideologically blank. To replace Confucianism, Ch'en Tu-hsiu first chose liberal democracy and then Marxism.

Ch'en epitomized the schizophrenia of the May Fourth generation. Proud of being Chinese, Ch'en was fiercely nationalistic. But he was disgusted and humiliated by China's successive military defeats and by her rampant corruption. In Ch'en's youth, China was only an informal colony of the European powers. After the 1911 revolution, externally China remained the same, and internally the new China was under the control of warlords, who cared only for the pursuit of personal powers. Thus Ch'en came to be more convinced that Chinese culture was thoroughly decadent. He reasoned that a strong and effective ideology should be borrowed from where it had already succeeded. Ch'en admired western culture because it appeared to be strong and forceful. Therefore, Ch'en
called upon the Chinese nation to adapt Western science and democracy to its own needs.

However, what Ch'en saw was only the fruit of the western culture. He had not examined the process of its growth. Neither had he distinguished the basic cultural differences between East and West.

After the May Fourth movement, the practice of the western powers was found seriously deficient in comparison to the theory they claimed to espouse. Ch'en and an entire generation were rapidly drawn to Marxism. It appeared to Ch'en that Marxism would benefit the Chinese in two ways. It would threaten the western world, as Soviet Russia had done after the Bolshevik Revolution; and it would also offer solutions for the social and political problems in China. Again, Ch'en was enchanted by Marxism but lacked a perfect knowledge of it. This led to his inconsistency before and during the KMT-CCP collaboration, which was the major factor in his downfall. The collaboration also provided negative influence on the early Communist development in China. Ch'en's shifting attitude was, in fact, fatal to his political career. Nevertheless, with Confucianism brutally destroyed, and western democracy abruptly discredited, Marxism became the only viable political alternative in China.

The strengths or weaknesses are not the subject of this paper. However, as the Communist Revolution succeeded
less than thirty years after the CCP was established, one must assume that Marxism have met the needs of the Chinese people. In the study of Marxism in China, we should regard the development of Ch'en Tu-hsiu as a microcosm of development in Chinese society as a whole.
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