1981

Human life and the sexuate condition as disjunctive.

Paul E. Anthony. Zancanaro

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HUMAN LIFE AND THE SEXUATE CONDITION
AS DISJUNCTIVE

PAUL E. ANTHONY ZANGANARO

A Thesis Submitted to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies
Through the Department of Philosophy
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
The University of Windsor

WINDSOR, ONTARIO, CANADA
1981
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ABSTRACT

This presentation is a study of the sexuate condition as disjunctive according to the Spanish philosopher Julián Marías. The theme is examined within the context of Marías' philosophical anthropology.

My study is divided into three chapters. Chapter one, "Historical Need for a Theory of Human Life," attempts to show how the two events of the year of Marías' birth, 1914, acted as the primary circumstance that formed his life: the beginning of World War One and the publication of Meditations on Quixote, the first book by José Ortega y Gasset. The political occurrence ended the leading role of Europe in the world. The philosophical current that Ortega championed was part of the new effort to develop a theory that preserved the dignity of the person, the outstanding contribution to Western civilization by the Judeo-Christian religious tradition.

This tradition had fallen into disrepute in most intellectual circles. Efforts to ground the conviction of the dignity of the person in a philosophy had failed repeatedly. The new social sciences had not sufficed. Without a new philosophical foundation for this conviction nothing seemed to stand in the way of the budding totalitarian systems on the European horizon. Ortega believed he had discovered a philosophical method by which human life could be seen, that of "living reason." Mariás studied under Ortega at the University of Madrid, and later was to become Ortega's "active" disciple, extending his mentor's method to new topics.
The theme of my second chapter is seen in its title: "Metaphysical Anthropology." Marías gradually became convinced that the general attributes of human life discovered by Ortega's method were not sufficient to understand concrete life philosophically. The fact of marriage, for example, is not intelligible in the light of the general, or analytical, structure of life unveiled by the method of "living reason." It seemed to him that an intermediate area of human life, known vaguely from the time of Aristotle, was missing -- a zone between the analytical and the biographical structures. Marías eventually termed this intermediate area the empirical structure.

Human life, for Marías, is vectorial. We are installed corporeally in our world in many ways, among others the sexuate -- the form of installation that is the subject of my thesis. A detailed discussion of the sexuate condition shows that it is disjunctive, that is, that human life on earth is empirically given as man or woman. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to some of the implications of disjunctiveness -- as seen, for example, in the countenance, figure, reasoning and love of man and woman.

The third, and final, chapter is devoted to observations. With an examination of the historicity of human life as a context, my remarks center on the ontological and socio-political implications of Marías' choice of the word "disjunctive" -- as excluding equality -- to characterize not only the structure of the sexes but also their relationship.
INTRODUCTION

According to an Arab proverb: A man looks more like his times than he does his father.¹ As with most folk wisdom, there is more than a grain of truth in this saying. As I will attempt to show, Julián Marías is a child of his times, but in a way that does not preclude a complete absence of choice as implied in the proverb.

In the words of Marías: "There are two radical ingredients in human life that are not the object of choice. The first is circumstance; the second is vocation."² Although choice is constitutive of human living, a person does not choose everything. Marías, for instance, did not choose to be born a man, nor a Spaniard in the second decade of the twentieth century. As we shall see, one's sexuate condition and national origin are elements in what Marías calls his circumstance. Neither did Marías choose, he maintains, his vocation. For Marías a vocation is an inner voice that summons one to become himself; it is a calling to engage in a certain activity without which a given individual does not feel he is being the person he is. According to Marías, he felt his vocation to be that of a writer.³ Eventually we shall see how these two basic ingredients in Marías' life combine to enable him to make a contribution to the theory of sexuality in human life.

Choice enters indirectly into these givens. Although one does not choose his circumstance and vocation, he must choose whether or not to be faithful or unfaithful to them. This is a choice of what to do with the endowments given us.⁴ As we shall see, Julian
Marias chose both to become a writer whose central interest is philosophy and to remain in Spain despite personal inconveniences and, even, danger. These choices to follow his destiny are part and parcel of the background of Marias' philosophical contribution to the theory of human sexuality, for only within the context of his biography can we see how the problems and issues that faced him as a Spaniard and European elicited the response that is the subject of this presentation. In what follows I shall examine the circumstance into which Marias was born, historical and philosophical, and the bearing it had on his calling as philosopher-writer.

My first chapter, "Historical Need for a Theory of Human Life," attempts to show that the political occurrences of the year of Marias' birth (1911) ended the leading role of Europe in the world. These events also underlined the desperate need for the development of a philosophic theory of human life that preserved the dignity of the person, the outstanding contribution to Western civilization made by the Judeo-Christian religious tradition. This tradition had fallen into disrepute in most intellectual circles. Efforts to ground the conviction of the dignity of the person in a philosophy had failed. The new social sciences had not come to the rescue. Without a new philosophical foundation for this conviction nothing seemed to stand in the way of the budding totalitarian systems on the European horizon except the same brute force advocated by these movements. 5

Ortega believed he had discovered a philosophic method by
which human life could be seen, that of "living reason." In doing so Ortega was convinced that he, among others, was carrying on the effort of certain nineteenth century philosophers in their "return to metaphysics." It was this method that impressed the young Marias, as a student of Ortega in the University of Madrid. Marias chose Ortega as his mentor, making Ortega's philosophical position his own, including his teacher's philosophical preoccupation with his country.

The theme of my second chapter is seen in its title: "Metaphysical Anthropology." Marias gradually became convinced that the general attributes of human life provided by the metaphysics of Ortega were not sufficient to understand concrete life philosophically. The fact of marriage, for example, is not intelligible in the light of the general structure of life unveiled by the method of "living reason." It seemed to him that an intermediate area of human life, known vaguely from the time of Aristotle, was missing -- a zone between the general (analytic) and the concrete (biographic) structures. Since the area can be known by empirical observation instead of by analytical reflection, Marias eventually termed it "the empirical structure." After twenty years of investigation and preliminary publication, the result was Marias' major study in 1970 entitled Metaphysical Anthropology, "The Empirical Structure of Human Life." One of the more interesting distinctions made by Marias is that between human life everywhere and human life on earth in the form of "man."
All of human life is vectorial; that is, living is in a
dynamically forward manner represented best by the metaphor of an
arrow. We are installed corporeally in our world in many vectorial
ways. The form of installation that is the subject of my thesis is
the sexuate. Marías introduces a distinction between the sexuate and
the sexual to show the fundamental and ever-present nature of this
form of installation, and to emphasize that sexuality is only one
portion of the human life as sexuate. His contention is that human
life on earth is installed in its sexuate condition in a disjunctive
manner. That is, the sexuate condition is empirically found among
us as either male or female. After examining Marías' position in
detail, the remainder of my second chapter is devoted to some of
the implications of this disjunctiveness in the countenance, "figure,"
reasoning, "love, "temper" and "time" in the lives of man and woman.

The third, and final, chapter is devoted to observations.

With an examination of the historicity of human life as a context,
my remarks center on the ontological and socio-political implications
of Marías' choice of "disjunctive" to characterize not only the
structure of the sexes but also their relationship. Such a character-
ization seemingly precludes the usual one wherein the relationship
between man and woman is said to be one of "equality." Whether
Marías' substitution clarifies the relationship is the key issue in
my observations.
CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL NEED FOR A THEORY OF HUMAN LIFE

Historical Occurrences

Julian Marías was born on the seventeenth day of June in 1914 in the city of Valladolid in Old Castile. The year 1914 gave its name to the two events that shaped Marías' circumstance, yielding the range of possibilities from which he was to choose his life. They were the Great War, which has come to be called the First World War, and the Generation of 1914, whose concerns Marías eventually was to adopt as his own.

The world into which Marías opened his eyes was one in which Europe was still the leading power in the world. European ideas dominated the world even as much as did its technology and military might. If Europe could have been seen as the "prow" of the world, England, France and Germany had to be considered the "prow" of Europe. Spain had seen its day long since and was considered a technologically and militarily backward nation whose intellectual life was, at best, on the fringes of Europe. To many Europeans the old Spanish saying that "Africa begins at the Pyrenees" was true.

Within eleven days of Marías' birth the dominating role of Europe in the world would change forever. The assassin's bullets that killed Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife in Sarajevo, Serbia, killed an entire was of life. Age-old regional animosities and modern nationalism,
combined with advanced military technology, turned the armies of the most civilized countries on earth, albeit self-proclaimed, into slaughtering savages the likes of which Europeans had thought were a reality of a distant, barbarian past. A large percentage of the men born at the end of the nineteenth century in Europe's most progressive countries marched off voluntarily, or were conscripted, to the "great" war. What was anticipated to be a short skirmish dragged on for four years, during most of which time fighting was at a stalemate as the front moved back and forth over short distances and claimed an incredibly high toll in suffering and lives. When at last the armistice came, the terms imposed on the defeated were such that it fanned further the flames of nationalism, and it was just a matter of time until the war would be resumed in its second act.

It is surprising, at first, that Spain was not drawn into the war. It had agreed to enter into discussions with England and France should new circumstances arise to change the territorial status quo in the Mediterranean or along the African and European coasts of the Atlantic. Despite the fact that the declaration of war altered the situation, the Spanish government was not consulted and hastened to declare its neutrality. However, it was a precarious neutrality, even if it lasted because of peculiar internal Spanish conditions.

Although the liberal, anti-clerical and progressive Left was pro-Ally, while the reactionary and clerical Right were pro-German, these attitudes were less foreign oriented than domestic.
The pro-Ally group was not blind to the roles of England and France in the decline of Spain, but their anti-Prussian sentiments won out. For them England and France were defending the political system of liberalism, which was interpreted as seeing the individual as the true aim of the State, against the use of the individual as a mere tool for the State. As much as many liberals admired German philosophy and letters, including Marias' mentor, José Ortega y Gasset, they abhored Statism even more. "And for many the open advocacy of the Western cause implied a painful sacrifice of friendships and memories dear to them from student days beyond the Rhine."  

It had been only a short time since Spain was defeated disastrously by the technologically superior forces of the United States in the war of 1898, loosing Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guam and the Philippines to American control, directly or indirectly. Although the voice of the military strongly urged rearming to win back these possessions, the literary Generation of 1898 called for rebuilding the morale at home and giving attention to the unification of the "two Spains," the traditional Spain and the progresive Spain. Beginning in 1909 Spain became embroiled in a long, drawn out war with the natives in Spanish Morocco, in what today we would call guerrilla warfare. National pride to save the last of Spain's overseas possessions drew the military into the conflict, which proved costly in resources and lives. Obligatory military service had to be introduced in 1912, as a result of which the populace was anti-war by the time World War One commenced.
Despite Spain's neutrality the country suffered. What began as an economic bonanza through the sending of supplies to the Allies ended with German submarines sinking Spanish ships. Although the foreign capital helped pay most of Spain's debt, the war in Morocco went from bad to worse and consumed more and more of the profits. By far the worse situation at the end of the war was the fact that Spain's two political party system, Conservatives and Liberals, had been weakened not only by their own internal structure but also by the king's inadequate politics, which emphasized political personalities rather than respect for the Constitution. The army intervened more and more into the affairs of the country, finally usurping the powers of both the king and Cortes (Parliament) in order to keep labor unrest down and to stop the separatist movements that were threatening to fragment the country.

By 1919 Marías had moved with his family to Madrid, of which city he came to consider himself a native. There he was to receive all his education, entering the University of Madrid as a candidate for degrees in both the Faculty of Sciences and the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters. Although he had been drawn toward mathematics, physics and chemistry during his secondary years, his first in depth contact with philosophy and the "School of Madrid" impressed him to such an extent that he continued on in philosophy only. It was at this time that he made his first personal contact with a member of the Generation of 1914, his teacher, José Ortega y Gasset.
What is meant by the "Generation of 1914" is not entirely clear, since it has been used in a variety of ways: literary, political and historical. I shall use the phrase in the general way in which Robert Wohl employs it rather than in the historical, methodological manner in which it is utilized by both Ortega and Marias. This less restricted usage permits me, I believe, to point out more factors in Marias’ circumstance.

The idea of generation was gaining in popularity and winning enthusiasts around 1900. This led to a variety of usages, as can be traced in the dictionaries of the time. No longer was it confined to signifying either the relationship between fathers and their sons or contemporaneity, as it had been in the early years of the nineteenth century. By the second half of the nineteenth century it began to connote coevals, especially the dichotomy between the older and younger age groups. This carried over into the twentieth century. The Generation of 1914 became convinced that it was something separate and different from what had come before. This applied, of course, to all of Europe, but I shall concentrate on Spain, the immediate circumstance of Marias.

At the age of thirty José Ortega y Gasset was, by far, the leading intellectual in Spain of the Generation of 1914. Just beginning his political activity in 1914, it was also the year in which he published his first book, although he had been writing since his teens. The completion of the printing of Meditations on Quixote occurred, as pointed out by Marias, on July 21, a few days
before Europe was aflame. It was also, I might add, a little more
than a month after Marias' birth. Its publication was to have a
far-reaching effect on Marias for he would one day accept its
philosophy, and eventually come to be known as Ortega's foremost
disciple and commentator. 6

It is in *Meditations on Quixote* that Ortega expressed, for
the first time, the leitmotif of his thought: "I am I and my circum-
stance." 7 Since I shall comment on this statement at greater
length in a future section on the metaphysics of "my life," it will
suffice at this point to state that Ortega was expressing his con-
viction that each of us is so related to his world that both his
self and his surroundings are constitutive ingredients within his
life. Here I wish only to examine what he meant by circumstance.
It is seen to be "the mute things which are all around us." 8 It
had been in 1911 that Ortega first explicitly used the word. He
asked: "What are circumstances? Are they only these hundred people,
these fifty minutes, this little question? Every circumstance is
enclosed in a broader one. Why think that I am only surrounded by
ten metres of space? What about those beyond these ten? What a
serious oversight, what wretched stupidity it is to take into account
but a few circumstances when in reality everything surrounds us!" 9
Thus, circumstance consists of the totality of things that surround
me and with which I have to cope; it is irreducible to myself but
that without which I do not exist. It includes the external world
in the sense of things, events, and other people, as well as the in-
ternal world in the sense of soul, mind, psychological makeup.10

Ortega's circumstance, of course, is primarily Spain. "The individual cannot get his bearings in the universe," Ortega writes, "except through his race, because he is immersed in it like a drop of water in the passing cloud."11 "By race," Marias comments, "he understands an historical manner of interpreting reality, an original version of the human."12 It does not denote something solely biological, for both Ortega and Marias hold that nothing human is solely biological. The human is historicized biology.

In quoting Ortega on "I am I and my circumstance" his full statement has been omitted until this point. It reads: "I am I and my circumstance, and if I do not save it, I cannot save myself."13 By "saving" is meant "to look for the meaning of what surrounds us," to truly understand it and, hence, to make it our own.14 As Marias observed, this passage "...contains the philosophical reason why Ortega treats Spain thematically, and in addition the justification for patriotism in general."15

It is for this reason that Ortega treats Spain not only as a socio-political problem but as a philosophical one. From that time onward, to think for Ortega meant to assist Spain in its "rebirth," in the unification of the "two Spains" to which I alluded previously, and to help in its reunification with Europe. One day Marias will accept this task as his own.

The notion of the "two Spains" appears to have originated in the greater polarization between the "enlightened" and "plebeian"
factions, all Catholic, that began in the mid-eighteenth century. Previously, educated Spaniards had considered themselves to be on the same "level" as other Europeans, at the "height of the times."  

Over the following century and a half these "enlightened" Spaniards saw the reactionary forces treat every new foreign idea as dangerous and, increasingly, began to look upon Spain as hopelessly behind the times.  

This was the national circumstance into which Ortega was born on May 9, 1883.

The younger years of Ortega saw a marked improvement in the situation. The generation of his father counted among its members intellectuals who represented an idea of science and systematic knowledge that included rigor and clarity. Ortega used their idea to measure his own efforts. This generation was augmented by what has come to be called the Generation of 1898, named for the Spanish-American War of that year. Ortega was influenced both by this group, whose new way of regarding the national reality and intellectual themes marks the beginning of modern Spain, and an older group known as the Regenerationists, led by Joaquin Costa (1846-1911), who called for the modernization of the country.

It was with the Generation of 1898, however, that Ortega felt he belonged, although it is an error to list him formally with the group. He adhered to what they represented: the effort to bring Spain into the Europe of the twentieth century. This is why Ortega went to Germany in 1905-1907 for post-doctoral studies in philosophy, there to realize more fully how far Spain still was from living at
the level of the times.\textsuperscript{18}

Upon his return Ortega clashed with Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936), the most outstanding member of the Generation of 1898. Unamuno, nineteen years Ortega's senior, had lost his enthusiasm for bringing Spain into the modern, technological world; he feared that the people might lose their faith in immortality and God. Angered by Ortega's Germanophile leanings, Unamuno declared that if a nation could not produce both a Saint Teresa of Avila and a Kant, or both a Saint John of the Cross and a Descartes, he would prefer the saints.\textsuperscript{19} The so-called "Africanists" who sought to preserve traditional values were beginning to find in Unamuno their spokesperson for the saying that "Africa begins at the Pyrenees." Ortega, on the other hand, was seen as the leader of the "Europeanists." Clearly disillusioned with Unamuno's change of heart, Ortega realized that Unamuno had been, by far, the most important intellectual element in his youthful circumstance.\textsuperscript{20} He could not persuade Unamuno to opt for systematic thinking, with clarity and rigor, over personal, quasi-poetic and mystical reflections. The measure of Ortega's failure is seen in the 1913 publication of Unamuno's \textit{Tragic Sense of Life in Men and People}.\textsuperscript{21} According to Marias, it was this book that prompted Ortega to write his \textit{Meditations on Quixote}, perhaps sooner than he had planned, to counterbalance Unamuno's irrationalism. (Paradoxically, it will be Marias who will show -- I believe -- that Unamuno's major concern for personal immortality is compatible with Ortega's vital rationalism by synthesizing the two within his own development of Ortega's
theory of human life.)

The conviction of Ortega in 1911 that the future of Spain lay in Europe was to be his view for the rest of his life. The Spain "that could have been" had not come about precisely because Spain had isolated itself. Spain needed Europe to actualize its possibilities. However, it was a two-way street. "Europe, tired in France, exhausted in Germany, weak in England, will have a second youth under our land's powerful sun. Spain is a European possibility." That is, a new Europe, a unified Europe in which periodic civil wars have come to an end, is possible within a new political system that includes Spain. Ortega, and afterwards Marías, was convinced that to be a Spaniard one must be a European. The historical occurrences of both Spain and Europe are an inseparable part of the circumstance of Ortega's and Marías' lives, including their vocations as philosophers-writers. In stating this I simply repeat that of which they themselves were certain.

Philosophical Currents

The publication of Meditations on Quixote in 1914 marks the public declaration of independence by Ortega from the neo-Kantianism he had brought back from his post-doctoral studies in Germany. From that year dates his published efforts to contribute to "the return to metaphysics" and the philosophic "idea of life." Gradually his position of "ratiovitalism" drew attention and adherence from others, the group he influenced becoming known in some circles as the "School of Madrid." By the commencement of the academic year
1932-33, when Julián Marías first became his student, Ortega had quite a reputation. As a result of this contact, Ortega and Marías were to begin a relationship of teacher-student, mentor-disciple, friendship and collaboration that was to last until Ortega’s death on October 18, 1955.

To situate Ortega’s philosophical activity (and Marías’ later continuation of his mentor’s position) within the late nineteenth century’s “return to metaphysics” and search for the “idea of life” indicates the task Ortega set for himself: the transcendence of what he called “the modern theme.” It is “the theme of our times,” he was convinced, to accept what has been the contribution of modern philosophy and to go beyond it in order to meet the needs of our own day: the philosophic theory of human life. Indeed, “the intellectual life of present-day Europe depends on the tempo with which the idea of life is developed.” Although Ortega never explicitly states it, I am sure he connected this new task of philosophy with the need to assess the resurgence of political absolutism in its new twin forms of bolshevism and fascism. With the loss of influence of the Judeo-Christian belief in the dignity of the individual person, preserved in liberalism, and the failure of science to ground that belief Western civilization faced a rebirth of barbarism unless it could philosophically present its conviction to a world it still morally led.

That modern philosophy in the form of Cartesian idealism had been a positive contribution to our understanding of human life
Ortega had no doubt. He had said so many times, and repeated himself in the lectures that constituted the course that the young Marías first took from him in 1932. Since they were published posthumously, we can imagine the impact of the words on Marías' mind. In one lecture series Ortega presented his theory of human life, showing how he incorporated the insights of both realism and idealism.

The modern age was formed around the basic assertion that our primary relationship with things is thinking them and, therefore, that things are originally what they are when we think of them. That is what has been called 'idealism,' and the whole modern period -- in its philosophy and in everything else -- has, in essence, been idealism.27

According to Ortega, this was an improvement on the thesis of realism, philosophically the first made in human history as well as the first proclaimed in our individual mental development. The thesis contends that everything that is, is by definition, as a thing is. The effect of realism was to consider human life a thing among things. Idealism had shown that the realist thesis, which affirms reality to be thing-like, implies still another thesis, namely, reality is a subject that thinks things. This new thesis is the "firm ground" upon which Western man has lived from the fifteenth century up to our own. "We [still] live in a world forged by idealism. The question is whether we can continue in that thesis, for everything makes one suspect that it is breaking apart and will go down."28 Even as realism must be recognized as a partial truth, because it does away with the uniqueness of the self, of human life,
so must idealism be seen for the partial truth it is because it
does away with the outside world. The idealist thesis practices a
conjuring trick, a sleight of hand, whereby every thing is magically
converted into thought. "This makes us recognize that idealism,
in trying to establish as a fact what there really is, commits the
same error as realism, although in another direction." For Ortega,

reality is not the existence of the wall alone, and
by itself -- as realism wished -- but neither is it
the existence of the wall in me as my thought, my
existence alone and for myself [as affirmed by ideal-
ism]. Reality is my coexistence with the thing. . . .
The truth is the pure coexistence of an 'I' with
things, of things there in front of the 'I.' . . .
Reality, then, is this interdependence and coexistence. 30

The above is the basis of Ortega's metaphysics, as we shall
see in more detail in the following section of this chapter. Under-
lining it is his epistemology of perspectivism, which he began to
formulate from 1913 in his university lectures. 31 His "doctrine
of the point of view" sought to avoid both the absolutism of
rationalism and the relativism of vitalism, which had come to be its
irrationalist opposite. It was the "theme of our time" to overcome
truth as absolutism, which is at the very root of the modern theme.
Since rationalism is anti-historical, it leaves no room for the dis-
covery of new truths. It produced relativism as its antithesis,
which has denied that truth is possible.

Neither rationalist absolutism, which keeps reason but
annihilates life [as historical], nor relativism, which
keeps life but dissolves reason, are possibilities.
The sensibility of the age that is now beginning is characterized by its rejection of this dilemma. We cannot adjust ourselves to either of its terms.

The sole thesis that is, in principle, false for Ortega is that which maintains it is the only true one, an absolutism. Relativists have been persuaded to believe that because we do not possess all the truth, we have no truth. "All knowledge is knowledge from a definite point of view." Truth is obtained by the gradual linking up of what I see with what my neighbor sees. Only God could see all perspectives simultaneously. Such perspectivism yields truths because reality itself is perspectival; reality itself is so constituted that it is possessed of perspectives.

In proposing his epistemology and metaphysics Ortega seems to have been trying to avoid, above all, identification with what had come to be called vitalism. Even though he eventually incorporated the word into the name he gave his own position, he prefixed it with the Latin term for "reason": ratio. In order to avoid identifying "ratiovitalism" with vitalism we must see what he accepted from the vitalists and what he rejected. Vitalism was one of the leading movements in the philosophical circumstance of the young Ortega. He was able to avoid it, at least in its form of historicism, because of a series of chance events while he was a student in Berlin in 1906, and because of his studies in the stronghold of neo-Kantianism at Marburg.

Up to the time Ortega left for Germany in 1905, supplied with a small Spanish government grant, he had little contact with
German thought. Nietzsche seems to have been the only German he had studied. His first place of post-doctoral study was the University of Leipzig, where he experienced his first desperate hand-to-hand combat with the Critique of Pure Reason. The following semester he went to Berlin where he spent most of his time in the library since no great figures of philosophy held any of the university chairs. Georg Simmel (1859-1918), probably Ortega's only teacher of philosophy in Berlin, was still to make a name for himself.

At the University of Marburg his teachers were Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) and Paul Natorp (1854-1924), the two master figures in neo-Kantianism. Contact with them was to leave a deep impression on him personally and on his philosophical formation. They assisted him in combating positivism, a threat to the very existence of philosophy. Above all, he received from them a desire for system and the conviction that he must transcend idealism. In rethinking Kantianism for himself, according to Marías, Ortega transcended it for a view of things themselves.

What did not happen in Berlin made itself felt in Ortega's life in 1929. At that time the posthumous works of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) appeared. Always interested in German philosophy, Ortega read them. It took four years of study before he knew Dilthey's position sufficiently well to declare that his previous ignorance of the philosopher has caused me to lose about ten years of my life -- ten years, in the first place, of intellectual development, but that, of course, means an equal loss in all other
dimensions of life." In an autobiographical preamble to an essay that Ortega wrote in 1933 entitled "A Chapter From the History of Ideas -- Wilhelm Dilthey and the Idea of Life," he tells us why he felt he had lost these years. It seems that had he been familiar with Dilthey's position it would have saved him "many perplexities and fruitless attempts" in developing his own idea of living reason.

Precisely why he never had the opportunity to study Dilthey takes us back to his student days in Berlin and, as he reveals, involves a matter of chance and of necessity. It was chance that Dilthey had ceased to lecture in the university and admitted only a few specially prepared students to the courses in his own home. It was also chance that his main work, albeit only in its first volume, on the Geisteswissenschaften, or "sciences of the spirit," was long out of print and always checked out when Ortega sought it in the library. What was not chance, but a matter of necessity, Ortega goes on, was that Dilthey's youthful intuition of "historical reason" was undeveloped. It seems to have been a necessary part of Dilthey's makeup to leave his ideas undeveloped. Only a personal contact with the philosopher would have been an assistance to Ortega.

When Ortega finally did become acquainted with Dilthey's work, he was struck by a strange and disconcerting parallelism between his ideas and the problems in his own writings. It is not that their ideas coincided; parallelism excludes precisely this. What Ortega saw was "exact correspondence." He saw that both he and Dilthey had set out to tackle the problem of how human
life -- as a developing reality -- knows realities that are likewise developing. However, they began at distinct starting points and, so, tackled the same problem on different levels. Dilthey had discovered "historical reason" while Ortega maintained he had discovered "living reason." This difference is why Ortega will assert that he avoided the irrationalism of vitalism, thus being able to formulate a theory of human life that is, at the same time, a metaphysics.

Positivism and Hegelian rationalism are what Dilthey had started out to avoid in his effort to formulate a "Critique of Historical Reason."\(^2\) What he ended up doing is denying the very possibility of philosophy as metaphysics and limiting philosophy to the history of itself. This was because, in the words of Ortega, "Dilthey was unable to free himself from the idea of vital irrationalism as contrasted with intellectual rationalism..."\(^3\) In the end, Dilthey had fallen into the trap of choosing the antithesis of rationalism, a trap which Ortega thought he had avoided because, unlike Dilthey, he did not maintain that "... life itself is irrational."\(^4\)

Even though Ortega's vital or living reason is, in its nature, historical reason, Ortega -- according to Marías -- avoided vitalism.

... Ortega is anything but a "vitalist" with a leaning toward irrationalism. He is speaking of a strict reason that is capable of apprehending the temporal reality of life... [For Ortega] vital reason and
living are "one and the same thing"; life itself is vital reason because "to live is to have no other remedy than to reason in the face of one's inexorable circumstance." 45

In this view life itself functions as reason, becoming the very organ of comprehension. There is no dichotomy between reason and life; reason is not all of life but an island in the sea of life, serving life. In this sense "reason is merely a form and function of life." The pure reason of the rationalists, including Kant, is obliged "to surrender its authority to vital reason" when it comes to apprehending human life. 47

It is no surprise, then, that Ortega negatively reacted to the irrationalism in the vitalism-like position of Unamuno. He had long considered the "Sage of Salamanca" to be the only hope whereby Spaniards could be brought to the systematic thinking evident in the best European science and philosophy. It was not the subject matter of philosophy, "this concrete man, this man of flesh and bone," that Ortega found unacceptable. 48 After all, he himself saw radical or fundamental reality in terms of the concrete: "I am I and my circumstance." Unamuno was correct in maintaining that "a man neither of here nor there, neither of this age nor of another, who has neither sex nor country, who is, in brief, merely an idea ... is a no-man." 49 That against which Ortega objected was Unamuno's method, or rather his lack of method. This led to Unamuno's assertion that "... philosophy lies closer to poetry than to science ... [that the] poet and philosopher are twin brothers, if not one and the same ... " 50
Although it would seem that Unamuno's contention that philosophy -- at bottom -- is a revelation of the inner biography of the philosopher was acceptable to Ortega, he could not accept Unamuno's preference for defining man as a feeling animal rather than as a reasoning one.

Moreover, for Ortega "... the only real vital problem, the problem that strikes at the very root of our being ...," is not that of the immortality of our soul."51 (Little did Ortega suspect that one day Marías would show -- at least to his own satisfaction -- the compatibility between Unamuno's contention and Ortega's metaphysical principles.) For Ortega, the real is not irrational as it is for Unamuno. Although Unamuno is asserting that human life, composed of head and heart as it is, is in continuous tension because each has its own "reason," he seems to have put greater emphasis on the heart. He seems to have declared that this is not only so in certain individuals, clearly himself, but in certain people as well. The Spaniards, for instance, are marked by their emphasis on the heart, and this can counterbalance the emphasis on the head by Europeans. Thus, Unamuno's "Africanist" attitude found a justification in the very constitution of life.

Such is the philosophical circumstance in which the young Marías found himself in the autumn of 1932. This is the "inexorable circumstance" in the face of which Marías was forced to reason in order to live academically, and the justification -- I maintain -- for my having included the portions on historical occurrences and philosophical currents as background for the topic of my presentation.
In 1932 both Ortega and Unamuno were members of the new Cortes (Parliament) of the recently proclaimed Second Republic, as well as teachers on the university level. They had both opposed the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera during the monarchy, and had worked for the fall of the king whom they believed had betrayed his oath to uphold the Constitution -- Unamuno from exile, in Hendaye on the Franco-Spanish border, and Ortega from Madrid. Both were soon to become disillusioned with the weaknesses of the Republic and the polarization it caused to the Left and the Right, leaving politics each in his own way to oppose the Nationalist revolt against the Republic.52

If many of the statements made by both Unamuno and Ortega exhibit a similarity with what came to be called existentialism and existential phenomenology, it is more than a coincidence. Unamuno felt Kierkegaard to be his brother and learned Danish in order to read him in the years before any translations were available.53 The young Marías had met Unamuno on various occasions over a period of fifteen days during the International Summer School of Santander in 1934 where Unamuno was lecturing. It was not until 1938, while in the army, that Marías began the in depth study of his thought that resulted eventually in his work entitled Miguel de Unamuno (1943).54 Marías' conclusion was that Unamuno cannot be considered a philosopher in the strict sense. His themes may have coincided with the basic ones in philosophy, especially those in existentialism, but his treatment is "pre-philosophic." Unamuno "felt" the problems but could neither state
them nor attempt to come to intellectual grips with them because of a lack of method. This method, Marías believes, is provided by Ortega's "living reason." (Marías later formulated the problems Unamuno felt and incorporated them into his theory of human life, as can be seen, especially, in the question, "What is to become of me?" in his *Metaphysical Anthropology*.)

The similarity between Ortega's philosophy of human life and existentialism is more complicated than space allows treatment. Hurt by the fact that Heidegger had been given recognition for certain ideas that he himself had already published, he -- nevertheless -- acknowledged the German as the philosopher to have examined human life in greatest depth. Marías has tried to show why Ortega's philosophy is not existentialism, how his mentor has transcended it, leaving behind any trace of irrationalism. At most, Ortega's ratiocinalism and existentialism share certain themes in common.

These philosophical currents, especially Ortega's efforts to transcend both rationalism and irrationalism, "reigned" -- to use Ortega's word -- in the academic society into which Marías entered in the early 1930's. In this sense they intellectually formed him, not without his choice to let them. In Ortega's words:

Who a man is or what he does begins not with the existence of the man or his actions, but to a large extent precedes that existence. Man is preformed in the society in which he begins to live. This preceding of oneself, this being before being, gives a character of inexorable continuity to the condi-

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tion of the man. No man begins to be a man, no man makes his debut into humanity, except that he continues the human that has already been existing. This continuation can be, indifferently, positive or negative, can consist in accepting the preexisting observances (vigencias) or in rejecting them; in both cases these observances are the historical a priori that is the epoch, that is the time into which he is born, acts on him and constitutes him. 57

This, I believe, is especially applicable to Marias. The efforts of Ortega to introduce into Spain systematic thinking that would not explain away human life, as did positivism, plus Unamuno's attempt to preserve the Spanish preoccupation with the ultimate destiny of the human person, pre-formed Marias' intellectual life as early as the year of his birth, 1914. When he matriculated into the University of Madrid, Marias met these seemingly contradictory attempts and accepted both, eventually synthesizing them within his theory of human life. 58

In the only explicitly biographical essay Marias has written thus far, he informs us that when he first entered the University of Madrid, he was equally interested in science and philosophy. 59 Accordingly, he decided to enroll in both the Faculty of Sciences and the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters. His attraction to the sciences had begun in secondary school, the Institute of Cardinal Cisneros, only one of three collegiates in the relatively small city of Madrid in the mid 1920's. Latin and geography, however, were his favorite subjects, the latter no doubt the source of his lifelong passion for traveling. 60
It was also during his collegiate years that he continued his studies in French, coming to speak it perfectly. Being the precocious child Marías seems to have been, he had learned French well enough at the age of seven to read his father's thick, illustrated catalogue of arms -- his father was a collector -- published by Manufacture Française d'Armes et Cyclas de Saint-Etienne. Having already learned to read Spanish spontaneously by the age of three or four, by constantly asking questions of his parents about the meaning of signs when he was taken out, young Julián spent his time leafing through the catalogue as well as illustrated magazines that showed photographs and drawings of the war in which Spain was officially neutral. Marías recalls vividly -- he says his memory is accurate and detailed, as long as it does not deal with numbers -- the pictures of the various uniforms of the combatants, the tanks, planes and submarines, the names of the battles and famous generals. Little did the young child, born only days before the war broke out, know that the scenes he viewed with wide-eyed curiosity were the end of la belle époque, and that one day he would experience them first-hand in the Spanish Civil War, the prologue to the second act of this world war.

The child's father, Julián Marías de Sistac (1870-1949) had come originally from Aragon to the city of Valladolid in the Province of Old Castile, where he met and married María Aguilar Pineda (1874-1938), herself transplanted from the southern region of Andalusia. By the time Julián, the youngest of three children, had
been born on June 17, 1914, his eldest brother, Pablo (1907-1910), had died, and his middle brother, Adolfo (1911-1930), was three. In 1919 his father accepted a position in Madrid. Marias grew to love the city, considering himself a native and always returning to it with pleasure from domestic and foreign trips.62

It was living in Madrid that facilitated Marias' matriculation into the university that bore its name. On many occasions Marias has sung the praises of its Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, always emphasizing that in intellectual rigor and research it had reached a level that it never attained before or since. "My debt to the faculty," he writes, "can never be paid except in one way: by being faithful to it, to that which it was for five years, and ought to have always been."63 The members of the faculty seem to have formed a galaxy of stars in their fields, many of them inspired by Ortega. Together Ortega and his collaborators formed what Marias calls the School of Madrid. By the end of his first year of studies, Marias became convinced that his true vocation was in philosophy. His teacher that first year was Xavier Zubiri (1898- ), himself once a student of Ortega, later studying philosophy and theology at Rome and Louvain and science and philosophy in Germany.64 It was during his second year that Marias first had Ortega as his professor, attending Ortega's lectures for every year thereafter of his university studies. While in secondary school Marias had read a few of Ortega's essays and felt as if a door had been opened for him. In the university he was immediately attracted to the man and his thought,
but it was to be many years before he considered Ortega to be his mentor, as well as his best friend. During those years he was also attracted to Unamuno, but felt that, for some reason, he could not penetrate his thought.

The years Marias spent in the university saw a growing politicization of Spain under the new Republic. It also saw a polarization as extremism of Left and Right brought civil chaos. Shortly after Marias graduated in 1936 the Spanish Civil War broke out. This interrupted his plans to begin doctoral studies, and soon he was drafted into the army of the Republic. He is sure he did not contribute to the death of anyone, his constant hope being that the war might soon end. He felt the war would not solve any of Spain’s problems. In the meantime Ortega had left the country and was recuperating from serious surgery in France. Unamuno had been placed under house arrest by the Nationalists at Franco’s order, and died on New Year’s Eve 1936. Marias read about it aboard a troop train loaded with volunteers of the International Brigade. A few years later, when he had some free time from his army duties, Marias threw himself into a study of Unamuno, determined to understand him once and for all. The result of that study eventually grew into his book on Unamuno, the conclusion being that the questions -- including whether man is immortal -- at which Unamuno hinted could only be asked and answered using the method of Ortega. In this Marias showed himself distinct from Ortega, perhaps even in contradiction with him. Ortega had maintained, in opposition to Unamuno, that man is mortal.
At the war's conclusion Marías found himself officially declared an enemy of the new State. Shortly after being mustered out, he was arrested on suspicion of having Republican sympathies. Had it not been for the assistance of his fiancée, Delores Franco Manera, who obtained sworn statements on his behalf, Marías would have remained in prison or been executed. While in prison he spent the time teaching illiterates, giving French lessons and delivering a series of lectures on geographical discoveries. Once released, Marías could not find a position teaching, and this for two reasons. Having been on the losing side, doors were closed to him, while his affiliation with Ortega was considered suspect by the Catholics and Thomists who came to control education in Spain. And, this despite the fact that Marías had always been -- and remains to this day -- a practicing Catholic in a nation characterized by nominal Catholics and anti-clericalism. Throughout his university and army days he had written for journals, and to this Marías turned to make a living (besides giving private classes or tutoring). Forbidden to publish in Spanish journals for many years, he wrote for the Spanish language press in Latin America. However, his books were approved by Francoist censors.

The first book by Marías was History of Philosophy, written at the suggestion of his fiancée and using the notes she had taken in the tutorial class Marías had presented at the request of some of his classmates to help them pass their examinations. It was brought out by the publishing house Ortega had founded, Revista de Occidente,
then headed by Ortega's sons who had stayed in Spain and fought on Franco's side. The last page of the first edition -- it had gone through thirty editions by 1978 -- was written in December of 1940, and the proofs were being corrected in January of the following year when word reached Marias of Bergson's death. Xavier Zubiri, his former professor, wrote the preface and it was dedicated to another former professor, Manuel Garcia Morente. A few months later the same Garcia Morente, now a Catholic priest, officiated at the wedding of Julian Marias and Dolores Franco Manera, a member of a distinguished Spanish-Cuban family active in the arts and sciences.

The book sold well. It was clear and spoke to the essentials. Even more importantly, it filled a real need for a manual in Spanish on the entire history of philosophy. Royalties from the book helped support the young Mariases, as they both struggled to earn a living by private teaching and further writing. In 1941 Marias returned to the University of Madrid for doctoral work, presenting a dissertation on the mid-nineteenth century French priest, Alphonse Gartry (1805-1872). It was rejected for political reasons, but finally accepted in 1951 (after it had already been published), by which time Marias had grown to be a writer of some fame. His Miguel de Unamuno (1943) had been awarded the prestigious Fastenrath Prize by the Royal Spanish Academy (1947), his Introduction to Philosophy (1947) had appeared, as well as his Generations: A Historical Method and numerous essays.

Perhaps most importantly of all, he had founded with Ortega
the Institute of Humanities in Madrid since, as Ortega put it, both of them had nothing to lose. By 1945 Ortega had returned to Spain from his self-imposed exile, having resided in neighboring Portugal since 1942. In 1944, and again in 1945, Marías and his wife had received permission to travel to Lisbon where they visited with Ortega, their former teacher. In the meantime Marías had been studying his class notes and re-reading Ortega, discovering for himself the validity of his teacher's thought. It was during this time, as Ortega himself was to comment, that Marías became Ortega's disciple. From 1945 they entered into long philosophical discussions the result of which was that Ortega began to talk of "their" philosophy. Although there are a number of admirers and scholars of Ortega who dispute (or resent) Marías' claim to be a sort of heir apparent of Ortega, two things are undeniable. The first is that there is seemingly no substantial difference between them, and the second is that Marías suffered as the result of official Spain's ostracism of his mentor, including the barrage of anti-Ortega articles that appeared shortly after Ortega's death in 1955.

Although there are -- to my mind -- at least three points of serious incompatibility between Marías and Ortega, it would take me far afield to detail them. Only mention can be made of the lack of emphasis by Marías, in his study of the structure of society, of binding observances or usages (vigencias), which Ortega contends are the core of society. Ortega's insistence, against Unamuno, that man is mortal is ignored by Marías when he introduces this issue at the
end of his study on *Metaphysical Anthropology*. This point, setting aside the basic issue of methodology, is the main difference between Ortega and Unamuno. Since Mariás makes no issue of it, I can only conclude that it sets Mariás himself off from Ortega.

There is no question that Mariás is a disciple of Ortega, his philosophical offspring. But, this intellectual filiation must be viewed as does Mariás — as not excluding innovation, indeed as requiring it. If Mariás can be viewed as a synthesis of Ortega and Unamuno, this synthesis is not simply an addition. If Mariás can be seen as the heir of Ortega, it is as an active heir, one who has carried Ortega's method into new areas (notably, the empirical structure of human life). In Mariás' words: "the relationship of a man's thought with that of his master might be reduced to this formula: inexplicable without it, irreducible to it."

The key word is "irreducible." Unlike biological filiation, in an intellectual genealogy it is the child who must recognize the parent. "Legitimate" filiation in intellectual matters must be innovative. Since the child is not the parent, he must go beyond the parent, must not simply repeat what has been said in the past. I am convinced that Mariás went beyond Ortega, especially in the area of philosophical anthropology and the disjunctive nature of the sexuate condition.

The year 1951 was a sort of crossroads in Mariás' life. Not only had he received his doctorate but his extensive overseas foreign travels began. He accepted an invitation to speak at the University of San Marcos in Lima, Peru, and to lecture as Mary Calkins Visiting
Professor at Wellesley College, with side trips to Harvard and the University of California at Los Angeles. He was thirty-seven years of age, could barely speak English and was convinced from what he had been told that he would dislike the United States completely. Instead, it was -- in his words -- "love at first sight." Thus began an association with American institutions that has brought him back periodically ever since, especially to Yale, Indiana and Oklahoma. He began to feel himself expanding as a person from this contact with another culture, considering himself a bridge of understanding between the Spanish and American peoples, as manifested in his various essays.

The most lengthy stay by Márías in the United States was his first. His wife could not accompany him immediately, staying behind until the birth of their third son Javier (1951). Their first born, Julián (1945), had died at the age of three and a half, while Miguel (1947) and Fernando (1949) were still very young when they made the trip. A fifth son, Alvaro, was born in 1953. From every source it is said that Márías and his wife were extremely close: as friends and collaborators on teaching projects. Her death from cancer in December of 1977 was a shock from which, his close associates say, he has not recovered.

Julián and Dolores Márías lived through trying times. It was necessary for him to be gone over long periods to earn the living barred to him in his own country. Nevertheless, he refused to emigrate. He kept up an incredible pace of publications and lect-
tures, including the writing of movie reviews, a sort of "cinemato-
graphic anthropology," as he once put it. In 1956 he was awarded a
Rockefeller Foundation Grant as Visiting Professor at the University
of Puerto Rico and began a multi-volumed intellectual history of
Ortega, only one volume of which appeared in 1966 as José Ortega y
Gasset: Circumstance and Vocation. It was a work Mariás says he
felt Ortega expected him to write. Why it has not been completed
remains unexplained.

In 1964 Mariás was elected to the Royal Spanish Academy,
delivering his inaugural address the following June 20, 1965 on the
historical and social reality of linguistic usage. In 1970 his Meta-
physical Anthropology appeared, for which he was given the Gulben-
kian Essay Award in 1972 from the Academy of the Latin World in
Paris. The decade of the 70's was devoted by him to writing on
Spain, to contributing to his countrymen's consciousness of what was
to become of Spain after Franco's death. The first volume of a
series appeared in 1976 entitled La España real (The Real Spain);
it was followed by La devolución de España (Spain Given Back to It-
self) in 1977 and España en nuestras manos (Spain in Our Hands) in
1978. By that time Franco had died and King Juan Carlos was taking
steps to dismantle the dictatorship and to draft a new constitution.
The king asked Mariás to serve as a senator, one of forty the mon-
arch was permitted to appoint to the upper chamber of the freely-
elected constituent Cortes. Despite his dislike for politics,
Mariás accepted and worked to eradicate the more decentralist pass-
ages of the constitution, seeking to prevent a future fragmentation of the nation, one of the causes of the Spanish Civil War. Marías ended the decade (1979) with a series of essays entitled Problemas del cristianismo (Problems of Christianity), and began the next (1980) with his La mujer en el siglo xx (Woman in the Twentieth Century). Still as busy as usual, he has accepted his first official teaching position in Spain, the first occupant of the newly created Chair of Spanish Philosophy, at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia in Madrid. His inaugural address was presented on October 18, 1980, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the death of José Ortega y Gasset, for whom the chair is named.

Like his mentor, Marías has always considered Spain to be part of the legitimate field of his philosophizing because it is part of his circumstance. Despite isolated passages to the contrary, Ortega shunned speaking of the Spanish "temper" or character as if it were an essence to be isolated. This probably is related to his disgust with racism of any kind, including the nationalistic variety. This is why Marías does not believe in purely "national" philosophies. Ortega, likewise, avoided viewing Don Quixote and/or Sancho Panza as personifications of Spain, viewing these interpretations as narrow and misleading. Accordingly, remarks made by Ortega and Marías on anything distinctively Spanish must be carefully analyzed to avoid misunderstanding. With Ortega, Marías denied the geographic interpretation of history, viewing what people do to their geography as more important. In this they seem to differ slightly
with Unamuno, but a detailed examination would take us far afield.

The foregoing two sections have been an effort to show how Marias the philosopher, as well as the person, has been a child of both his times and his philosophic mentor. They are the immediate context of Marias' theory of human life as metaphysics, to which I now turn, and his theory of the empirical structure of human life, the subject of the next chapter.

**Metaphysics as Theory of Human Life**

The method of "living reason" proposed by Ortega, Marias is convinced, allows for the possibility of a "return to metaphysics." This return is not a "going back" to the traditional conception of metaphysics as ontology (or theory of being). Rather, it is an attempt to transcend both realism and idealism and construct a metaphysics on a reality as fundamental or radical as possible: "my life." The result is metaphysics as theory of human life, which exposes the structure of living.

As is well known, the term "metaphysics" is said to have originated from nothing more than the editorial placement of those works of Aristotle, that did not fit into other categories, after his writings on physics. Over the centuries what began as post-physica became, without qualification, transphysica -- something beyond the sensible world. In this way metaphysics came to be known as the science that searched for the reality or essence of a thing. This essence or being was thought to be something hidden within or standing apart from the thing itself.
Even a cursory survey of the history of metaphysics reveals what seems to have been a trait of the Western philosophical mind: cutting reality into separate parts, or analyzing. According to both Ortega and Marías, this is as true for the realists as it is for the idealists. As seen in my preceding section, realism cuts mind out of reality and retains only things, while idealism does the opposite. The increasing aversion toward this "science" culminated in "the gravest event in the history of metaphysics": Kant's Copernican Revolution. His revolution was based on the conviction that reality, or the "thing-in-itself," was inaccessible to experience. Nineteenth century philosophy, in varying degrees, accepted Kant's conclusion, even as it attempted to break out of the phenomenal world of experience. The scientific method was seen as accomplishing this by the positivist, whose anti-metaphysics is still influential in our own century. The "intuitive" method of the various irrationalisms, including vitalism, was also seen as freeing us from the confines of reasoning based on sense experience. (Unamuno can be considered within this tendency.)

From within the Kantian, anti-metaphysical nineteenth century came the first stirrings of what Marías terms the "return to metaphysics." During their day these movements were hardly noticeable or influential, but from our present vantage point we can see their significance. The "first seeds of the restoration of metaphysics" came from a group that had maintained an interest in traditional philosophical problems: theologians, especially those of the
Catholic religion. Catholic scholastics, above all the neo-Thomists, were exerting influence in their effort to utilize metaphysics as the "handmaiden" of theology as it had been during the high point of the middle ages. A second group, philosophers like Husserl, were turning to metaphysics as a means of regaining objectivity in knowing. Yet a third group was convinced that only metaphysics could account for certain realities irreducible to the sciences: human history, human existence, human life. Marías considers his mentor to be the twentieth century heir to this third group.

Following Ortega, Marías maintains that metaphysics is linked to human life in two inter-related ways: as subject matter and as internal necessity. That is, the very subject matter of metaphysics is human life, and human living requires the doing of metaphysics. I shall examine both of these aspects in detail, beginning with the issue of subject matter.

Throughout the "biography" of philosophy a slight shift in meaning of what it is to do metaphysics can be detected. Nevertheless, a resemblance between these various meanings emerges. It is that metaphysics is the "search for fundamental certitude about fundamental reality." The significant point, Marías asserts, is the double use of the adjective "fundamental" or "radical." (I shall use these terms interchangeably for the English equivalent of the Spanish radical.) Indeed, Marías' very conception of metaphysics will be seen to rest on the meaning he gives this term.

First of all, what is it to search for "fundamental" cer-
Knowledge, Marias implies, can be possessed in two ways: indifferently and as a matter of intrinsic necessity. What he calls "information," even if it is true or exact, is held -- at most -- out of curiosity. The name of the person who passed a certain building in a certain city on a certain day falls into this category. What he terms "certitude," on the other hand, is held because the person feels an internal need for the knowledge. Such knowledge is never given; it must be arrived at by the person who has and feels the need for it. Certitude is felt as being imperative in order to orient oneself, in order to live. (To anticipate my presentation, such knowledge is imperative precisely because, in the words of Ortega, life is not given to us "ready-made." Being born without a built-in plan, and nonetheless needing to choose what to do, we need the required knowledge to choose.)

Finally, what is the "fundamental" reality for which metaphysics is a search? It is reality as it presents itself to me, without my interpretation. Traditionally reality has been said to be "being," as a result of which metaphysics has come to be equated with ontology. Although the term "ontology" dates from the seventeenth century, the use of being in an interpretative manner stems from Parmenides and the Eleatics. The Greeks interpreted reality as being (onta, ens), whether it was material things or thoughts and ideas, unable to conceive of reality in any other manner. To make a long and rich history as short as possible, in time the distinction between "being" as ens and "reality" as esse was lost. In other
words, a dynamic and verb-like reality was transformed into a static
and thing-like being.

Along with Heidegger, Marías sees the foremost task of phil-
osphy in our time as the problem of being. But he asks: Are we
justified in identifying being and reality in the first place; is
ontology synonymous with metaphysics? His answer to both parts of
the question is no. Both idealism and realism have made this identi-
fication. Their conceptions of being may have differed but each
covered up reality with an interpretation. It is the task of our
time, Ortega and Marías maintain, to unveil reality as it fundamen-
tally is.

This fundamental or radical reality is "my life." It is
fundamental because all that is real appears in it, is rooted in it.
I am not "my life" as the idealists mistakenly concluded. Neither
is my circumstance or world "my life" as the realists seemed to have
affirmed. Both "I" and "my circumstance" are part and parcel of
"my life." Hence, Ortega's statement: "I am I and my circumstance."

To live is to have to do something with things that stand
around us, to decide what to do. We cannot just accept things as
they are: we must anticipate what they will be, how they will effect
us. If there is a "sameness" in things between what they are to-
day and what they will be tomorrow, then whatever allows for this
"sameness" can be referred to as "being." In this sense being refers,
as it did originally, to the "essence" of a thing. It gives us se-
curity in the face of a changing world. Because the world is so much
"larger" than any one of us, we need the extra edge that this security presents. Having something fixed enables us to keep ahead on certain matters and affords us extra time for other concerns. In this sense a person needs to know the "being" in things. In this way we know how things will "respond" to our wanting/need to live. Accordingly, being refers to human life. It is an interpretation of the role my circumstance has in life. This may be ontology but, as such, it is only part of a wider and more fundamental or basic study, the study of human life.

Only within the context of human living does being lose its character of absoluteness. It is seen to be specific -- this or that thing in my circumstance. This is why reality cannot be perceived from the perspective of being only. Reality must be seen, also, from other perspectives. Metaphysics, again, is more than ontology. I have need to know more than things in order to live. Since my life is not only the things that surround me but also I, myself, I have an equal need to know myself.

Metaphysics, according to Marías, does not so much have a method as it is a method. It is this method that yields an account of human life as can no other method. It is, of course, the method of "living reason" proposed by Ortega, to which passing reference has already been made at various times. It remains to examine in what this method consists.

The primary difficulty in formulating a method for metaphysics as the study of fundamental reality is that reality is con-
stitutively "inexact." That is, it is a dynamic, ongoing process that, if captured once and for all by the mind, is frozen into an artificial entity. Reality "appears" as an entity, as "such and such," traditionally apprehended by what is properly termed explanation, whereby the elements composing the "such and such" are taken apart. In other words, we reduce or analyze things. This suffices as long as our purpose is to handle things, either in the literal sense by our hands (technique), or by our minds (science). Certainly such has always been needed, for we must learn to handle the things that confront us in order to survive.

This is, however, not sufficient because reality is more than what it appears. In the words of Ortega, the patent (appearance) is not the latent (reality). Moreover, by analysis we dissolve the original thing into another thing, its principles. Even if the other thing is more important or basic, it is still another thing. The original thing escapes us. Again, there is no problem as long as our aim is to handle what confronts us. A problem does arise, however, when we feel we cannot surrender the reality that is presented to us, when it appears to be "unexchangeable, irreducible." To take a simple example, think about a color: the green of the tunic in El Greco's San Juan. The wavelength of all chromatic vibrations that produce it can be explained to me optically; also, the mixtures of chemical elements that are used on the palette to achieve it can be explained; and that is all excellent if what interests me is to "localize" that color, to place it with precision on a scale, to reproduce it;
all those explanations are valid for a blind man. But, if what matters is the color itself, as it does to the painter [as creator more than technician] or the one who contemplates, all that is worthless. The only thing to do is to open my eyes and see it. Then I have that color before me in its very-sameness, in its own irreducible reality as such a color. 85

It is precisely this kind of reality that human history, human existence, human life, is according to Marías. This irreducibility of human life came to be increasingly discovered during the latter half of the nineteenth century. As stated in the previous section (although neither Ortega nor Marías makes the connection explicit), I think this occurred as the traditional religious conviction in the dignity and uniqueness of the human person was fast eroding. Neither modern philosophy nor the newly forming social sciences could preserve this dignity. Those struck by the uniqueness of the human person began to look elsewhere: some to pre-modern philosophies, others to the possibility of a post-modern philosophy. Dilthey was one of the latter thinkers, and Ortega was caught up in the same movement. 86 By the time of Ortega the widespread disregard for the dignity of the individual, more "efficiently" executed with the assistance of modern scientific technology, underlined the absence of a theory of human life.

Because of the identification of the function of reason with its ability to analyze, to reduce one thing to another, irrationalism seemed the only alternative. If reason could not discover the uniqueness of life, then it must be discovered by another
means. This attitude prevailed in many quarters for most of the last century and, according to Marías, still does in "certain stragglers behind the times." 87

For a time it appeared as if the method of description would preserve what analysis could not. Without a doubt, to Marías, it is an improvement. It narrates rather than reduces the realities it confronts. But description, even phenomenological description, is not enough. "Its insufficiency is not derived from the fact that knowledge demands more but from the fact that it is not possible to live without going beyond description." 88 Although description gives what is there, it yields only unconnected notes or data, unconnected with our need to decide what to do. Life, not given ready-made, requires a decision, demands that we orient ourselves toward the total situation in which we find ourselves. In order to act, we are obliged to apprehend the totality in all its connections. This means that we must discover the "meaning" or intelligibility in our lives, in ourselves and in our circumstances.

The apprehension of reality in all its connectedness, in all its co-implicated relatedness, is precisely reason at work. It is not reason working as if it were independent of life but functioning within life for the sake of living. Living, as was seen, is the necessity of having to act with the things that surround us. Reason is, therefore, life manifesting itself to itself by apprehending the connectedness or meaning of reality, connections that are there in spite of us, apart from our ideas, in the situation in which we find
ourselves. As such, life is the concrete form of reason; reason is the effort of life to live. This effort of reasoning or thinking is not automatic. It "... supposes an essential, prior pause, that keeps human activity from being simple reaction and converts it into relation to other things, into initiative activity which issues from within myself." 89

This necessary co-implication of reasoning and living is what Ortega termed "living reason," "vital reason." Its double significance is as follows:

first of all, reason as that without which life is not possible; and second, reason as that which life is, that is, reason in its function of apprehending reality.90

Thus, metaphysics as method is life apprehending itself, reason in its concrete form of living, revealing the meaning of the totality of reality.

As a result, Marías maintains that the need for metaphysics arises out of living itself, is a basic need to which we -- each of us -- must be obedient. Metaphysics is far from being mere intellectual speculation. It is the knowledge we need in order to live. It is knowledge about human life, both the "I" as human person and the "circumstance" as the things that surround the "I." This "theory of human life is not a preparation or propaedeutics for metaphysics, nor even the foundation for metaphysics, but is clearly metaphysics itself, that is, the search for the fundamental certainty
about fundamental reality. As such, the theory studies both the analytical and empirical structures of human life, which will be examined in the first section of the following chapter.
CHAPTER II

METAPHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

In the previous chapter I have attempted to situate Marias' philosophy within its historical and philosophical contexts. I attempted to show that the two historical occurrences of the year of his birth, the First World War and *Meditations on Quixote* by José Ortega y Gasset, shaped his life and his vocation. Above all, these events served as the major factors in the Spanish and European circumstance into which Marias entered at birth.

The First World War started as a European conflict between age-old adversaries, what Ortega considered another civil war. Directly or indirectly, the entire world was soon affected. Modern technology had come to bind the rest of the world to Europe in such a tightly knit manner that Europe's problems became the problems of the entire world. On the blood-stained battlefields that drained the lives of many young people, the way of life of Europe itself was ending. It appeared as if the bombs that tore apart the young bodies were also tearing assunder the Judeo-Christian values upon which Europe had prided itself and which were, it seems, its moral justification for the colonization of the "pagan" world.

Powerful forces in Church and State had been able to forestall in Spain the rising tide of secularism that was engulfing Western Europe. In Spain the "religion" of nationalism had not made as much headway as in other parts of Europe. The Spaniard still
thought of himself in a two-fold manner that did not emphasize the
primacy of the nation-state: as belonging, at one and the same time,
to a part of Spain and to an international linguistic culture.
Marias was eventually to refer to this situation as Las Españas
(The Spains). The First World War was the beginning of Spain's
being thrust onto the stage of Europe, after having been center stage
centuries earlier and then being forced by other main actors to wait
in the wings.

Onto this historical stage Marías himself was thrust in 1914.
Like every other human, he had not chosen the world in which he came
to live, nor the time of his entrance, nor the country of his birth.
Life was fired at him, as at all others, point-blank. Like it or
not, he had to sink or swim -- as Ortega put it.¹ The young Marías
seemed to have had exceptionally affectionate and patient parents
who encouraged his studies. They made it possible for him to attend
one of the finest secondary schools in Spain, and to matriculate into
the University of Madrid despite the worldwide economic recession.
It was a critical moment in the history of both the university and
the nation. José Ortega y Gasset and his colleagues had succeeded
in raising the quality of scholarship in the Faculty of Philosophy
and Letters such that it was, in the words of Ortega, "at the level
of its times." That is, the Faculty in which Marías was studying
had professors who kept abreast of scholarship in the rest of Europe
and the world and, therefore, could enter into publication dialogue.
This was an incredible improvement over the state of affairs when
Ortega had been a student there from 1898 to 1904. From the year (1910) he won the Chair of Metaphysics Ortega had worked to make Spain a part of European scholarship, and through his prestigious journal, Revista de Occidente, had great influence on scholarship in the entire Spanish speaking world.²

The year (1931) that Marías began his university studies was the same year power passed from King Alfonso XIII to the Second Republic, without friction, bloodshed or a coup d'état. Ortega had been in the forefront of those who had opposed the monarchy because of the king's capitulation after the First World War to a military dictatorship, and his suspension of the constitutional liberties. From 1931 to 1933 Ortega was a delegate to the Cortes from the Province of León, afterwards leaving active politics forever in apparent disgust. "The presidency, the ministry of foreign affairs, the post of ambassador to Berlin -- all three were within his grasp."³ Instead he returned to full time teaching and writing. It was this world-wise "philosopher of the market place," that became Marías' teacher in the autumn of 1932. Ortega's personal influence on Marías came to be enormous, the most important in his personal and public life. Marías openly acknowledged his friendship with Ortega, as well as his admiration for Ortega's philosophy, at a time when it meant automatic exclusion from a teaching position in Francoist Spain. His refusal to emigrate and determination to speak out, as the censors permitted, for western, liberal democracy led to Marías' becoming the respected person he now is in Spain. In other words,
Marias did not sink in the turbulent waters that have been Spain and Europe during most of his life. On the contrary, he swam against the current and avoided the reefs of both fascism and communism to retain his conviction that the individual has the right to live part of his life free from state interference.

The philosophical context into which Marías was born was a Spain dominated by the figures of Miguel de Unamuno and José Ortega y Gasset. Nineteen years, and different conceptions of the role of reason in human life, separated the two thinkers. Marías came to be a disciple of the younger Ortega, to agree with his view that reason can and must be employed in the service of life, but was deeply influenced by the over-riding question that had become the obsession of Unamuno: What is to become of me (after death)? With Unamuno and Ortega, Marías battled both positivism which denied the uniqueness of human life, reducing the biographical to the biological, and traditional philosophies that looked to the past for ready-made solutions for contemporary problems. Following Ortega, Marías sought a new beginning for philosophy by grounding it in reality itself ("my life") rather than an interpretation of it such as "being." Ortega had set forth the outline of his position of human life as composed of "I and my circumstance" in his first book, Meditations on Quixote, published only weeks after Marías' birth. It was of this book that Marías was to say: "Ortega dives into the depths of Don Quixote and comes back to the surface with a rare pearl between his teeth: an interpretation of Spain which included, as a metaphysical
core, one of the most powerful and original philosophies of our time. 4

Following Ortega, Marias adopted the method of racionvitalism, which according to them once more placed reason within life, healing the rift between reason and life introduced by the rationalists. Marias, however, was not only a follower of Ortega. He was a collaborator. 5 Marias had rethought Ortega's philosophy for himself, becoming his former teacher's disciple long after he had been Ortega's student. 6 This has given Marias' works a maturity and independence that they might not have attained otherwise. It has also given him the ability to extend Ortega's principles into areas his mentor probably never even considered: the movies, travel books and, above all, the empirical structure of human life.

The subject of this chapter deals with one aspect of the empirical structure of human life: the sexuate condition as disjunctive. As the appropriate context of this theme, the entire structure of human life must be examined. It will be seen that life can be viewed on three levels, from the most concrete, that of individual biography, to the most abstract, those characteristics we all have as human persons. In analyzing our experience of ourselves as human we discover our structure: the various prerequisites for the existence of human life. Marias says he stumbled on a zone of human reality, as early as 1947, intermediate between the analytical and the biographical, a zone he later called the empirical structure. It was long after Ortega's death (1955) that Marias turned his attention
directly to the problem, the result being his major work entitled *Metaphysical Anthropology*. "The Empirical Structure of Human Life," published in 1970. In it he investigated the presuppositions in any biography, presuppositions not entirely accounted for in the analytical structure. He concluded that human life can appear under various empirical structures, only one of which is human life on earth. In examining the mode of human life on earth Marias discovered that corporeal structure was "installed" in various forms, the most basic of which is what he called the sexuate condition. That is, human life appears in the form of man or woman. "I am installed in my sex from head to toe, from biology to religion, and project myself from it toward all reality, which acquires its meaning in the function of my sex." 7

In order to avoid a purely biological interpretation of sex, Marias adopts the Spanish word sexuado to indicate the basic condition of "being one sex or another" even if not sexually developed or active. In this sense we are sexuated (the English word I have adopted from the English edition of *Metaphysical Anthropology*). We are sexuated in a disjunctive manner. That is, each one of us is either male or female. From this it follows that no one sexuate condition is intelligible without reference, in conceptual analysis as well as in everyday living, to the other. Each of us lives and becomes the particular person he or she is in view of the sexuate condition he or she is not. It is an examination of the sexuate condition as disjunctive in the context of human life that is the subject of this chapter, as well as of this thesis. It will be
followed by a chapter critiquing Marías' view of the disjunctive relationship.

Structure of Human Life: Analytical and Empirical

Before proceeding to examine the analytical and empirical structures, however, Marías' use of "structure" must be considered. Marías takes his definition of the term from Ortega, as found in Meditations on Quixote. For both, structure is elements plus order. Accordingly, it is more proper to say that reality is structure than to speak of the structure of reality. The elements in our circumstance and the ordering of them by us constitutes reality. But, insofar as we do speak of the structure of reality, it should be emphasized that its structure must be allowed to impose itself upon our thought and not be replaced by our constructions. The structures we discover in analyzing human life are those attributes without which life is not possible.

It is a necessary structure and therefore universal; it exists a priori with regard to each life, but is derived from the analysis of reality [as we live it] and is in no wise an aprioristic construction. (MA, 70)

This examination is a phenomenological one, at least in the sense that Marías uses the term — to designate the description resulting from making repeated circles, ever more narrow, around a thing until it is finally seen for what it is. This method is called by Marías, following Ortega, that of Jericho.

The attributes that compose the analytical structure of life
are listed by Marias as four: personality, dynamism, necessity and circumstantiality. The treatment is succinct, since *Metaphysical Anthropology* concentrates on the complementary empirical structure. However, there is no lengthy treatment by Marias of these analytical attributes in any other source, perhaps because Ortega had given such a presentation in *Man and People*, the main source I shall use to complement *Metaphysical Anthropology*.

The first attribute that is noticed in reflecting upon human life is that it is not a "what" but a "who." Human life is not a thing. In this sense it is not yet. It is a project or program, a reality to be realized. Moving a little closer in our second circle, it is seen that human life is also dynamic. That is, living is a reality that is on-going. This second attribute is, of course, implied in the first attribute (as each attribute will be seen to be implied in every other). This co-implication is an indication of the very way reality is constituted, each aspect as interconnected with the others.

Who we are is future-oriented. Each of us is identified with futurition. "[L]ife is an operation performed in a forward direction." (MA,33) The present is real enough but not all we are. A person is a reality that is not only real, because a person is not "there," can never be simply there or given. To be present is to be becoming or, more accurately, to be arriving. Our being is to keep on being, a condition of both constantly setting forth and arriving. (The fact that life is personal must not be misunderstood
to mean that I am a person. The "I" is not a person. "I" involves being a person, but more, namely, my circumstance.\textsuperscript{13}

The dynamic person each of us is is not ready-made. Yet, each of us must live his/her life. Hence, there is a necessity to human life. We must necessarily make our lives, formulate a program or project out of the repertory of possibilities and impossibilities offered us. This necessity involves the need to choose what to do. In other words, we are necessarily free in living.

To be, that is, to continue being ... \textsuperscript{14} [life] has always to be doing something, but what it has to do is not imposed on it or predetermined for it, it has to choose and decide for itself, untransferably, for itself and before itself, upon its own sole responsibility. ... This obligation to choose, and hence willy-nilly to be free, to be on its own account and at its own risk, proceeds from the fact that the circumstance is never one-sided; it always has several, often many sides. In other words, it invites us to different possibilities of acting, of being.

Thus, choice implies circumstantiality, the fact that in our lives we are surrounded by a multitude of realities that are not ourselves and with which we must act to live. Thus, our living is a co-living. It is within our circumstance that we are free, whether we want to be or not. To be free, in this context, means to lack a constitutive identity, to lack a nature or fixed substance, not to be assigned a certain role. As Ortega said: "Whether he be original or plagiarist, man is the novelist of himself."\textsuperscript{15} Furthermore: "Man is a substantial emigrant on a pilgrimage of being. ... Man in a word, has no nature; what he has is ... history."\textsuperscript{16} This is why it is neces-
sary to narrate the history of any thing, personal or collective, in order to comprehend it. 17

As is evident, the analytical theory of human life, although based on the experience each of us has in his/her own life, is abstract. Human life, however, occurs only in the concrete, as disjunctively "this" or "that" individual life. The study of such a life is biography. The question immediately arises, according to Marías, whether we can proceed directly from the analytical structure to biography in comprehending an individual person. This is what had long been thought, and what Marías had been doing until he stumbled on an intermediate zone of human life, what he will eventually term the empirical structure of human life.

According to Marías, his suspicion was aroused as a result of comparing the dictionary entries of three very different realities. The examples he gives are: pentagon, owl and Cervantes. As he observes, the dictionary gives a definition, in the strictest sense of presenting essential traits only, of the mental or ideal object that is a pentagon. Of the owl, a thing in the usual sense of a real object, it presents a description. Concerning Cervantes, a person, the dictionary tells a story, it narrates a personal history giving where and when he was born, where he traveled and lived, whom he married, what he wrote and, finally, where and when he died.

The concrete story of Cervantes presupposes the abstract theory of human life, presupposes certain attributes without which his life would be unintelligible. But, as Marías soon concluded,
this is not the whole truth. He became convinced that Cervantes' life presupposed another series of assumptions interposed between the analytical and the concrete. For example, it is reported that Cervantes lost either his arm or the use of it in the battle of Lepanto. Yet, the analytical theory makes no reference to arms. It also states that he married a woman named Catalina, wrote a book called Persiles and died in old age. However, no mention is made of sexuality, of man and woman, of writing and of growing old in the analytical theory, even if all this must be assumed as existing previous to Cervantes' concrete biography. 18

This intermediate zone of human reality, Mariás maintains, was first suspected by him in his book *Reason and Life*, "The Introduction to Philosophy" (1947). It was not until two years later that he discovered the problem, but did not see it with complete clarity, in his *Generations: A Historical Method*. Shortly thereafter he formulated the theme clearly, he says, in his essay on "Human Life and its Empirical Structure." 19 Since then, Mariás continues, it has constantly concerned him. In 1955 he examined the theme indirectly in *The Social Structure*. 20 Only with *Metaphysical Anthropology* (1970) did Mariás give his attention to it directly.

Although it is obvious that Mariás considers his theory of the empirical structure of human life a discovery, he observes that it was known in an incomplete sense in classical philosophy. Aristotle had written of the existence of a reality between "the essential" and "the accidental," namely, "one's own." This came to be known as
property (proprium) and included the fact that man is a biped, has the quality of risibility and is subject to the greying of his hair. "These determinations are not essential, of course, but neither are they simply accidental; they do not constitute his essence . . . but despite this they coincide with the limits of the species 'man'. All men and only men have these 'proprieties' (Topics, I,4)." (MA, 75) Porphyry (Isagoge, 5) transmits the concept to the medieval scholastics. "No sooner has this theory [of the ancients] been formulated than we see how far it is from the one I am expounding here," Marius contends. (MA, 75) While the properties of the classical philosophers were notes of things, his are attributes of human life, which is not a thing. Instead of being "just there," human reality is dramatically "taking place." Moreover, what I have called attributes must not be confused with notes or characteristics, for they are constitutive elements of a structure. As was pointed out earlier, a structure is not merely composed of elements; it is circumstantial elements plus order given by the person.

The empirical structure, unlike the analytical structure, is not a prerequisite of human life. However, it is a prerequisite of life as we experience it on our planet. Human life must have one empirical structure or another, but not precisely the one it does on earth. The necessary element of circumstantiality, essential to human life, implies an empirical structure. Which one it is, or in what it -- in fact -- consists is not necessary for all human life. An examination devoted solely to the study of empirical structure
would be anthropology, but when it is grounded or related to analytical structure, such a study becomes, what Marias calls, metaphysical anthropology.

**Vectorial Nature of Empirical Installation**

Given the nature of life as a dynamic and dramatic reality and thus future-oriented, Marias depicts life and the empirical structure of "man" as vectorially installed. That is, human life, understood as a union between a "who" and a "what," necessarily proceeds in a forward direction.

[I]f life is an operation which is made in a forward direction, this means that it has a "behindness," that this progressive movement is made from somewhere. This is what gives meaning to that "toward" in which life consists and which we call project. (MA, 81)

The metaphor Marias employs to illustrate this forward direction is the vector, symbolized by the arrow.

Human life is a vector, an arrow released from its harness and moving forward. The symbol of only the arrow is insufficient. The bow, arrow and target, together and as one unit more accurately represent human life. The bow designates where I have come from (my past), while the arrow and its target refer, respectively, to my (present) project and its (future) completion. The projecting of human life inexorably refers to the biographical nature of life, to the fact that life has a history. This means that I can only project myself

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from what I was already doing, from that in which I already was. We could say that no human project is "primary" or initial, or, in other words, that human life never starts off from zero. This is what I call installation. I cannot live in a forward direction except out of a previous manner of being -- previous in respect to each project and each thing I do -- in which I am "installed." (MA, 83)

Installation is both unitary and complex. Even as life is a unitary operation, so is the installation from which life is executed. Nevertheless, installation is multidimensional or exists in "forms." These forms can be divided into two categories. There are those that are so general that they tend to be confused with the human condition itself, with the analytical attributes of human life. Such forms are: corporeality, sensibility, and worldhood. The second category modifies and diversifies the more basic forms of the first category. Maria does not attempt to make a complete list of the forms in the second category, giving only those which have become relevant under our present circumstances. They are the following:

1) sexuate condition, or human life as sexually disjunctive -- male or female; 2) age, or the successive stages from which I make my life; 3) race, or "historicized biology" that serves as a "repertory of human living" (MA, 87); 4) caste, or the non-racial interaction of one group with another, each constituting itself with respect to the other; 5) social class, or social differentiation, which may or may not coincide with race or caste, serving as the basis for action; and 6) language, or the means by which we initially interpret the world, conferring a given tone on it. These forms of installation
enable us to see precisely how human life is circumstantialized, how a person is in his/her surroundings.

According to our individual or social perspectives, these different forms of installation take on a specific priority. Certain ones appear so fundamental that they become identified with the human condition itself while others that have a minimal relevancy seem non-existent. Because of perspective, life is always defined by a primary mode of installation, namely, that mode which appears closest to it in relation to all others. The projects of that life flow primarily from such a fundamental mode, and as it changes in intensity and direction so do the corresponding projections.

Within each life things are arranged in a rigorous and [yet] shifting perspective; they assume different functions or roles; they are arranged in a precise hierarchy whose principle is internal to [the biography of] that life and does not coincide [necessarily] with the hierarchy that external considerations would suppose. (MA, 92)

In the sphere of biography, intensity and direction become importance and significance (or meaning). We are carried along by the importance of things, in a direction determined by the meaning they have for me. In this sense, we must interpret things, determine what role they have or can have in our lives.

Each form of installation has its own direction and intensity, and together they constitute the way we are living. "The forms of installation are, therefore, inseparable from happening, without which they would lack meaning and reality." (MA, 89) In this manner
Maria is convinced he has avoided the misconception of installation as stagnant or immobile. Installation, it will be recalled, is the means by which and from which life is projected. It is now appropriate to present, in some detail, the first category of forms of installation, those basic forms of worldhood, sensibility and corporeality.

**Corporeality**

Human life takes place in a world, which is a restatement of Ortega's "I am I and my circumstance." World, therefore, is a necessary ingredient in the general or analytical theory of human life. In other words, to be human one must be in a world -- one world or another. In the specific or empirical theory of human life (or "man"), world is found in one of its possibilities, in the concrete form of "this" world -- what Maria calls "worldhood." 25

"This" world is neither a thing nor a sum total of things. It is "where" things are and "where" we are; it is the ambit "in" which both we and things stand. "[I]t is the boundary of my projects and interpretations." (MA, 97) All that stands in "this" world does so as being here, there or yonder. 26 At this point another basic form of installation has been brought in. I am here, rather than there, occupy this space rather than that, precisely because I am corporeal.

This means that, on the level of empirical structure, worldhood ["this" world] is inseparable from corporeality, and everything that can be said of the first includes
the second. But as, of course, corporeality is unthinkable without worldhood ["this" world], there exists between them a relationship of bilateral co-implication or complication, which systematically proceeds to link up with the other determinations of that structure. Worldhood ["this" world] has a "priority" at the level of analytical theory [that is, viewed from the perspective of the analytical theory], while corporeality has it at the level of empirical structure, for I insert myself corporeally into this world. (MA, 98)

As "man" I am bound to earth. I occupy a space and material things affect me. "I have sensibility and sensorial perception, a very specific form of succession, duration, temporality, and so on." (MA, 98) The third basic form of installation, thus, enters the discussion. Shortly, more will be said concerning it, but at this point it is necessary only to emphasize that all three basic forms are inter-related.

A further clarification of what constitutes "this" world is appropriate. "This" world as the stage for things being spatially situated is also the scene for their being either realized or potential. The real world is always being pursued by virtual worlds that are either just coming into being or are still mere possibilities. Thus, when we speak of "this" world qua "this" world we do not mean mere fact. Instead, it is everything around us, no matter what its nature or status. The world is everything with which we must make our lives. The factual aspect of "this" world is just that, a mere aspect or part: "this" world as circumstance also has as a part of it social and historical dimensions. Let us assume that we identify "this"
world with nature. It must be realized that such a conception of 
"this" world is the result of historical circumstance. "This" 
world as nature is an historical interpretation and not reality at 
all.

Reality can be lived in many different ways. It can be 
lived, for example, from the point of view of a physical scientist, 
a philosopher or an indigent. Identification of "this" world with 
nature is the scientist's interpretation. What is meant is that 
"this" world is lived mainly as possibility; because one perspective 
of "this" world has been chosen does not mean that other perspectives 
are not also possible. In this sense, "this" world is the basic 
mode of installation, all other forms of installation being subsumed 
under it. As such, corporeality -- embodiment -- is the primary 
mode of "this" world.

What are the implications of corporeality as the primary 
mode of being in "this" world, of "man's" way of existing in "this" 
world? This mode of existing includes, of course, localization. But, 
it also includes doing -- acting and, more importantly, living. Both 
being localized and living are recognized as corporeal, as possible 
within the context of corporeality. In fact, corporeal installation 
is so fundamental to our being and way of thinking that we attempt 
to condition everything by it, including God. What seems to be sig-
nificant about this habitual attempt at corporealizing everything 
is that
I do not recognize any manner of being located which is not corporeal, which is not conditioned by corporeality, which does not occur in the context of corporeality or "take form" within it. (MA, 108)

As part of the world bodies are things among things, separable and independent from each other. As a living body, however, "man's" body cannot be isolated from the rest of the world without dying through suffocation and starvation. Although "man" is corporeally installed in "this" world, it is more proper to say "he" is installed in "his" body. Being embodied goes far beyond merely "having" a body. It is not a case of mere ownership or possession, for "man" is not "man" without "his" body. That is, "having" a body is not secondary or consecutive to "man's" being "himself." Yet, "man" is not "his" body. Rather, "he" finds "himself" with "his" body; it is part of "his" circumstance to which "he" cannot be reduced.27 According to Marías, "the parallelism between worldhood ["this" world] and corporeality is strict." (MA, 124) If it is repugnant to say "I am my world;" it must be equally so to say "I am my body." "I am corporeal" in the same way "I am circumstantial."

The concrete mode of being located in "this" world for human life is being in it corporeally. All the attributes found in examining installation fit corporeally as one of its forms. Hence, all our projects start off from our bodily installation. Since our installation is vectorial,

... the body 'happens' as a whole, it is like a biological projectile which moves forward from birth to
death, throughout its life. That is, it moves in one direction and in conformity with a specific and historically foreseen trajectory. (MA, 130)

Each action we perform, as vectorial, has orientation and intensity. Our actions originate from our initial structural endowments augmented by technology which permits a certain degree of liberation from biological and physical servitude, to increase our biological freedom. Indeed, "man" does not seem particularly well-endowed. It appears as if "he" is marked by a series of limitations in relation to the other creatures that surround "him." "He" cannot fly, swim naturally, breath underwater, move rapidly, etc. Feeling these limitations as deprivations, "man" has used "his" imagination to outstrip those animals that "he" biologically envied. These limitations have served as a challenge to expand "his" nature and project "himself" vectorially with enormous intensity in all directions toward limitless horizons. 28

"Man" as the archer shooting "his" arrow-actions toward their targets poses a final consideration: the biographical use of the body and its personal significance. 29 The diverse ways in which "man" experiences "himself" in "his" body show that "he" is not reducible to corporeality. The various decisions that each man or woman must make as to the significance his/her corporeal condition is going to have for him/her is not primarily an individual decision but also historical and social. The conditions in one society and in one historical epoch that each must contend with vary, and are the
foundation upon which personal choices are made. The age of the person, a combination of biology (years) and biography (stage of life), is the framework in which such factors as bodily contact take on significance. We caress children more than talk with them.  

The same caresses bestowed by one adult on another adult of the opposite sex has a meaning quite different if bestowed by one adult upon another of the same sex. Each "man" expresses "himself" through "his" body but the same expression takes its meaning from biographical factors much more than biological actions. The essential "monastic confinement" of life within its corporeality explains the expressive character of the body: just as water oozes through the pores of an unglazed clay pot, so traces of intimacy ["man's" attempt at communication] ooze forth in the expressions of the body. ... [I]ntimacy oozes out of the body and, like all reality, it needs to be interpreted. Expression itself is the result of the interpretation that each person makes of himself. It is for this reason, and not on account of biological factors, that expression is so revelatory.  

By means of what Maries terms sensibility we pass through our bodies to reach out for things and other "men." Our bodies are transparent in this sense, and also transitive. My body sends me out to what is other than myself. Although the advances in technology have put us in contact with new realities, the fundamental ways by which "this" world is open to us are still the senses. Insofar as the body is a thing it is opaque, but as a living body "... it is a 'transparent' medium which inserts me into the world." (MA, 108)
Sensorial contact is interpretative: "human perception is interpretative and interpretation is perception." This does not mean that our sensorial perception of reality presents a construct of things, even if it conditions the structure of reality. As I mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, structure is elements (things) plus order (interpretation — in this case perception). The actualization of sensorial analysis, or interpretation,

depends on the reality which — also in fact — the physical world possesses. If there were not wave movements of a certain wave length, there would be no vision: but if there were no organs of sight, there would be no light. (MÁ, 110)

"Sensibility is made up of 'senses,' and these discover and show us [different] aspects of the world..." (MÁ, 110) The most basic senses are those of touch, sight and hearing, opening up to us three inseparable, but distinguishable, dimensions: "reality," "worldhood" ["this" world], and "significance." "Real" things are those that are tangible, that resist us, as in the instance of stubbing a toe against a rock.

Seeing is not so much a confirmation of those things we touch as it gives us the object's context. In this way, sight gives us "this" world: things and their ambit. Objects are transcended to bring in their context or field. Ingredients are linked by mutual relationships. Each thing appears with a halo or border of other, even though unobserved, realities. Furthermore, vision allows us to organize spatially what is perceived into here, there and yonder.
It is sight that also presents us with a sense of lacking things, as well as with the experience of seeing that we are not seeing, which is precisely what we mean by darkness. Our sense of lacking things enables us to realize the passage of time, both in the mode of distinguishing between day and night and in that of aging (sensing "our days are numbered," as the idiom goes).

Sound differs from sight because its apparatus is not as restricted. Sounds reach us from all sides and all at once. This simultaneity is the reason Marías maintains that it is primarily through sound that we discover the dimension of "this" world known as "living with." However, the key dimension with which hearing puts us in contact is significance or meaning. The voice is a personal sound, emanating from the corporeality of the other "man."

Thus, sounds have significance and reveal the meaning intrinsic to life. The fullness of co-living is realizable by "man" only through hearing (as seen -- if I may anticipate -- in the need of lovers to confirm their mutual love through the often-abused words: "I love you."). "The voice says what the face means, the face which is seen but can also be touched." (MA, 122)

Marías' concept of "living-with" has brought us to the consideration of the basic or radical characteristic of corporeality: sexuality. This co-living of the sexes is the most fundamental type of living-with, for Marías, as we shall presently see.

The Sexuate Condition as Disjunctive and its Implications

When speaking of "man" as an empirical structure of life, the
obvious is often overlooked: no one is only "man" or "human" or "person." Rather, I am a man or woman, male or female. At the end of the first chapter and the beginning of this chapter, I explained how for Marías, following Ortega, human life is fundamental or radical reality. I noted that human life as radical reality is empirically given as a structure called "man." This assertion must now be restated to include the fact that human life is first, and foremost, my life as man or woman. This primary differentiation, contrary to Freudian analysis, must not be understood simply in terms of sex.36 Clarifying this assertion is my main concern in this section.

Sex, Marías recognizes, is an important part of human life. But, after all, sex is simply that: a part of life. It is included in life, but it is not the perspective from which we understand all of life. Briefly, life begins before sexual activity commences, and continues after sexual activity ceases. Based on this fact, and utilizing the existence of the two adjectives in Spanish, Marías makes the distinction between the sexual (sexual) and the sexuate (sexuado).37 The more fundamental of the two is the sexuate. Life always exhibits what Marías calls the sexuate condition or installation in which sexual activity can occur.

On the analytical level it was noted that life happens disjunctively: this or that life. A more specific or concrete type of disjunction occurs on the empirical level. It is the disjunction between the two sexuate installations: male or female. Care should be taken in noting that this disjunction does not imply division of the
sexes. "[D]isjunction neither divides nor separates; but the opposite: it links." (MA, 136) Furthermore,

[The disjunction between man or woman affects both man and woman, establishing a relationship of polarity between them. Each sex co-implicates the other, which is reflected in the biographical fact that each "co-implicates" the other. We shall say, then, that the sexuate condition is not a "quality" or "attribute" possessed by each man, [that is, "man,"] nor does it consist in the terms of the disjunction, but in the disjunction itself, seen alternately from each of its terms. (MA, 137)

As was said, the sexuate condition is previous to sexual activity. As such it permeates every aspect of life, including my understanding of reality.

All realities, even those most remote from sexuality — eating, comprehension of a mathematical theorem, contemplation of a landscape, a religious action, the experience of danger — have a masculine or feminine way of understanding them. (MA, 137)

Things do not appear in themselves. They appear in my life as having a certain function and significance depending on what I do, and are understood in this teleological context. What I do, of course, is structured by my sexuate state. What I do is done "out of" my condition, including my sexuate condition. The distinction between sexuate and sexual is not solely biological. It involves social dimensions. In fact, the sexuate condition is mainly social. For instance, when a child is born, it is assigned a masculine or feminine role, as well as given certain types of clothes and play things com-
sistent with this role. Every child is expected by its society to
live in a specific way, to engage in certain activities proper to
his or her role. Language and such external things such as dress and
activities are affected by the social interpretation of this disjunc-
tion. In some cultures even separate languages are developed for
men and women. In other cultures, like our own, the language does
not differ but, instead, what a man is "allowed" to say differs from
what a woman is "allowed" to say. The taboos surrounding language
also apply to such things as tone of voice, hand gesticulations, ways
of walking and so on. None of the prescribed activities of a role,
and in particular the above taboos, are wholly dependent upon the
biological presence of sex alone. That sex is not the sole criterion
is seen in the fact that many of the prescribed role activities have
been taught explicitly. Sexuality, in such instances, is seen as a
biological resource or datum that is interpreted socially and histor-
ically. Despite slight deviations, the role of the male and female
remains relatively constant in societies. In this sense men and women,
according to Marias, are absolute modalities of human life. Any
abnormalities that occur within these modalities are simply that,
abnormalities.

Even though the structure called "man" or "woman" is confirmed
as an absolute in the world, this does not imply that the disjunctive
structure is assumed as existing once and for all. Life is an un-
finished task; life is living. Hence, life can never be taken for
granted. On the empirical level this implies that being man or woman
means to go on being man or woman in relation to the opposite sex. Each sex co-implicates the other; it is directed toward the other. The sexuate condition is, thus, primarily biographical rather than biological. For the history of one life to be told or narrated, it must be done so in terms of the opposite sex. We need only recall the story of man in Genesis to understand this more fully: man became fully man with the creation of woman.

Most languages are inadequately equipped to illustrate the disjunctive nature of human life. For instance, in English the term "man" denotes people in general. When we say "man" we mean male and female, man and woman. Thus, when we say "man is rational" we mean men and women are rational. Because of this linguistic inadequacy, woman is often subsumed under man. She is given the role of the second sex. This is true of other languages, including Spanish. Certainly hombre is used for both varón (man) and mujer (woman), but the fact is that the word varón is not used very much; it is hardly colloquial and, far from being the normal way of referring to the masculine human person, it specifically accentuates the masculine quality. "The word 'hombre' means both the person in general and the masculine person..." (MA, 152)

In discussing the role of man and woman Marías re-emphasizes that the "vital" role of each is imposed through reference to the opposite sex. The seeming paradox is that these roles contradict, respectively, what each is in fact. As human, both man and woman are constitutively insecure, uncertain, ignorant and helpless because they

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have been born, as Ortega stressed, without a ready-made plan. Both
need to be what they are not in order to survive, both biologically
and biographically. Since a role is future-oriented, each sex strives
to be, in the eyes of the other sex, what he or she needs to be.

In particular, man strives to be what he is not: he is weak,
but exudes strength. According to Marias this seeming contradiction
is not man's attempt to pretend. Instead, an element of fiction or
imagination is a part of life; imagination lies at the bottom of all
human reality. Within imagination man feels what he desires one day
to become but what he never will become; he is not strong, but wants
to be strong. This is what man gives to woman in his relations with
her. This, Marias insists, is not a sort of paternalism.

Man is not primarily a protector, he is rather, vis à vis the woman, aggressive, predatory, challenging, possessive. He does not protect her; he offers her
strength, so that she can "resort" to his protection.

... A man does not feel paternal about a woman unless
there is some "filial" quality in her -- and to that
degree she ceases to function specifically as a woman
[becoming a child]. The man who needs to regard woman
as a "minor," an inferior, is precisely the man who
does not feel sure of his masculine condition. ... (MA, 156-57)

Paternalism upsets the balance between the sexes as does
polygamy. Within these relations it is impossible to communicate
person-to-person, as one sexuated person to the opposite sexuated
person. Lack of this communication prevents the ongoing growth and
development that is constitutive of living, the element of living-
with. Polygamy also destroys the polarity within all families and
societies, even though the element of the favorite spouse helps to minimize this. The enslavement or extreme dependence of woman is another cause of the deterioration of the relationship between the sexes. Given the co-implication between the sexes, any degradation of woman brings about a corresponding degradation of man. According to Marias, those societies which perpetuate such practices face the price of moral and intellectual ruin.

Marias contends that the ideal of the virile "figure," what man is obliged to be, is summed up best in the word "valor." In Spanish this word denotes worth, value, and, thus, valiance. By no small coincidence in most societies the tendency is to think of the man who is not valiant as having no worth or value. Hence, in man's face, Marias maintains, we expect to see an expression that denotes the seriousness or gravity that is indicative of one who is valiant. A man might exhibit an air of cheerfulness and joviality, but underneath resides a seriousness and strength that make him capable of assuming life's burdens, of "pre-tending" to have the strength to carry on life. Man knows that, at bottom, the reality of life is a burden. That is why he needs strength, that is why he must build an island of security which paradoxically is carried on his shoulders. That island is what we call civilization, science, culture, the State. (MA, 160)

In all respects, the feminine "figure" is expected to be "lighter," in the sense of less grave, than man. Marias seems to
imply that woman is less burdened by the weight of the world. She is once removed from the brute world. Biblically, woman's creation suggests her to be a second sex, derived from man. This does not, for Marias, suggest insufficiency. Man needs woman to be man even as woman needs man to be woman. Man, biblically speaking, is not suited to be alone, but neither is woman.

Man, Marias contends, desires to bear woman aloft. He puts her above the things of his life. By divorcing her from the gravity of his life he helps to place her in the realm of the beautiful. In this a system of balance is at work: man bears woman aloft from his gravity and woman, by her grace, softens the gravity of man.

Even as man is strong, so woman -- according to Marias -- is beautiful. It can easily be verified, of course, that all women are not beautiful, just as all men are not strong. Marias' point is this: because men and women are not actually strong and beautiful does not mean that the need for the sexes to attain these qualities is lessened. A woman may not be beautiful, but she should try to be so in order to be a woman. Or, better still,

[the woman who does not try to be beautiful does not function as a woman; she has withdrawn from her condition, has given up, has abdicated, has betrayed it -- according to circumstances. In the best of cases, we will say that she has sacrificed it. (MA, 163)]

Marias does not speak of beauty as exclusively physical beauty (even as he might have denied that strength is exclusively physical).

Rather, it is "personal" beauty emanating from the interior and ex-
panding through the face toward the future. Even as woman has her
kind of strength, man has his type of beauty, but the point is that
beauty is secondary in man as valor is secondary in woman.

While the masculine ideal of strength and security is
symbolized by valor, the feminine ideal of beauty is symbolized by
grace. Grace, etymologically speaking, is not only physical but that
which is gratis, agreeable. Grace is, nevertheless, unstable and
fleeting. Man responds to feminine grace with a sense of awe and
wonder:

We must not pass over the impression of "unreality"
produced in man by the spectacle of feminine beauty;
something surprising, astonishing, which it seems is
about to vanish into thin air. And that grace is
something winged, light, in contrast to the gravity
of the male; gracility means slenderness, slimness,
grace, and lightness all in one. (MA, 164)

Man's impression of woman is that she is ready at any moment
to flee, to escape him. Woman does not seem to be always present.
She is elusive. Yet, in her fugacity, she invites man to overpower
her. Woman provokes man, but she does so with modesty, intimacy and
concealment. Man is drawn to her, taken up by her; he is attracted by
woman's mystery.38

The elusiveness of woman is only one aspect of her. She may
flee, but she does so only for a time. After fleeing she wants and
needs stability. She wants to stay put, while man often wants to go
on. Man tends to be firmly rooted in the now, yet desires to go on
to the next horizon. He feels the drawing of the horizons much more
than woman. And this is why woman tempers his temptations to go on. Woman excites man to move, yet tempers him to stay. Early on in life she develops a sense of tranquility, helping to nourish a sense of gravity in man. Both tranquility and gravity represent a commitment to resignation: human limitations demand that aspirations be tempered by selectiveness and commitment. Woman is the impetus for this coming about:

Woman, by staying within herself, by electing — and that is why she is "elegant" — by waiting, by renouncing, begins, perhaps in her prime, to sketch out the gesture of resignation. (MA, 167)

Man and woman, as was pointed out, are the reciprocal structures of life. The empirical structure of life, of which man and woman are the manifestations, is both disjunctive and dynamic. Man and woman, therefore are not assumed modes of existence, that is, not socially conditioned responses. They are ways of living with and happening to each other. Life is not always sexual, but it is always sexuate. We live always with our face turned toward the other sex. Man realizes himself in woman and woman realizes herself in man. The "co-relation" of man and woman has many implications. Before proceeding to examine some of these implications, I would like to discuss one final aspect of the sexuate condition as disjunctive, namely, the kind of relationship it creates between man and woman.

The relationship of co-implication that exists between man and woman, according to Marias, is one of balance. First of all, it
must be realized that differences do not necessarily separate, as they do in the following example.

I can divide white and black balls into two different piles; this division separates the balls and makes them independent of each other; white balls on one side, black balls on the other, and no more: in the white balls there is no blackness or suggestion of blackness, in the black ones there is no element of whiteness. (MA, 136)

Differences can, on the contrary, link. This is precisely the case in disjunction, if the disjunction consists of the disjunctive terms. That is, the very reality of the terms consists of the disjunction.

The things denoted by the terms do not exist and, then, enter into a relationship that is disjunctive. Without the disjunction there would be no terms. The disjunctive relation of man and woman is such a relationship. What it is to be man consists in being related to woman, and vice-versa for woman.

Moreover, it is a dual and reciprocal relation. This means that if a human on earth is not a man, she is a woman, if not a woman, he is a man. This is not quite the same as saying that human life is disjunctive -- "this" or "that" -- because if life is not "this" life, it can be "that" or "that" or "that." What "that" life is can be an indefinite number of "that's," if not "this." On the other hand, "that" sexuate condition, if not man, must be woman (unless there is some abnormality present).

The disjunction between man or woman affects both man and woman by establishing what Marias calls a relationship of polarity.
In such a relationship each pole co-implicates the other, and when this is placed in the context of biography, Marias speaks of each sex "complicating" the life of the other. The sexuate condition is seen, alternatively, from each of its poles. "The sexuate condition is not even visible in an isolated life. We see it in each of us as it is referred to the opposite sex, which means that we see it 'from' each of us rather than 'in' ourselves [alone]." (MA, 137) Thus, there can be no "second sex." Each sex is a necessary "first" sex.

The relation between the two "first" sexes is, again, one of balance. What this does not entail, according to Marias, is equality. "To speak of 'equality' between men and women is one of the most dangerously stupid errors into which one could possibly fall." (MA, 158) What does constitute this balance is inequality and tension, yielding a dynamic balance... which keeps man and woman on the same level, precisely to make possible the strength and fullness of their encounter, their confrontation, their active polarity. (MA, 158)

What is balanced must be on the same plane or there is no balance. Poles out of balance cannot actively interact. This active interaction is precisely what is meant by being dynamic. Each pole must be active, which implies that both man and woman can be, should be, both passive and active in living toward or in view of each other.

Sexuate installation conditions all aspects and activities of being a human being on earth, including reasoning. Marias defines
reason as life grasping reality in its connectedness. Reason is making sense of the world by living in it. (It would not be strictly correct to say that reason is understanding the world in order to live it, because it is in living with the world that we apprehend fully the world's meaning.) Hence, reason is understanding the world from where I am presently in it, from my stance. I (as man or woman) always live my life from a time and a place. Reality, therefore, is relative to my life. My relation causes certain attributes to come forward and others to be excluded. Reality is uniquely circumstantial because I (as man or woman) stand centrally within it. This stance of mine is always sexuate: I (as man or woman) apprehend and interpret the world as man or woman. Hence, the disjunctiveness of human life implies, quite clearly, that men and women view reality from different perspectives. Because of this differentiation, reason is necessarily different for both disjunctive elements. "If reason is true reason," Marias says, "if it is to be the instrument of controlling, understanding and ruling reality, it must be different, for in fact it is confronted by different realities." (MA, 175) Furthermore,

[for men and women, things are arranged in different perspectives of interest, valuation, or importance, constituting different configurations of reality, different real worlds. Projects establish this articulation, based on the system of beliefs. These, which are the unexpressed basis of rational operations, their great assumptions, also differ. Reason is exercised in the places where it is needed, when action cannot flow spontaneously because there is not an effective belief to regulate conduct or because the conduct that was being employed]
has failed. (MA, 176-77)

Reason, then, is nothing but the way men and women live. But what of the contention -- by men, of course -- that woman is illogical? It stems from the fact that what interests man is not always the same as what interests woman. And, even if they are both interested in the same thing, man has his own way of being interested or "reason" for being interested, while woman has her own. What seems illogical to one sex, does so because that sex does not see the "reasons" of the opposite sex.

The mutual co-implication, and resulting attraction, between the sexes is seen when love is viewed from the perspective of the sexuate condition. Love, in this context, is quite different from the prevailing view that sees man's relation to woman as merely or mainly sexual. In the Freudian sense, for example, love has become synonymous with sexual activities. Because of the great influence of this interpretation the vast possibilities of relationships between men and women have been narrowed to sex. Human love, Marias contends, is very different. If love was only sexual, then it would dissipate once the desire for it had been satisfied.

It is worthwhile noting, again, Ortega's formula: "I am I and my circumstance." What this implies for any concept of love is that human life is inherently needy. Human life is not only in need of what it lacks, but also has a need for what it possesses. Love, in connection with Ortega's position, is needing what I al-
ready possess in order to live. Most importantly, these needs are biographical and personal and not solely sexual. For instance, on a biological level I need food to live. What kind of food I receive matters very little biologically. But I need a certain kind of food in a way that is quite different from my bodily needs. In other words, dislike of certain foods is a biographical matter and not a biological one. My need for another human is even more personal or biographical. A person is not something that is "there" now and always, but is someone who is "coming to be." Needing another person comes out of the dynamic story of my life as biographical. The reason why I love this person is because I am I, because of what I have become.

What Marias understands by the amorous condition can be understood only in this context. Men and women, installed in their respective sexes, live mutually — each projecting toward the other. Consequently, neither man nor woman can be defined — insofar as humans can be defined at all — without entailing the other. This mutual projection is more evident on the biological level, but is also present on the biographical level. The empirical structure of life as male or female implies a need of the one for the other. This mutual projection of man for woman and woman for man is more fundamental than any sexual need, for it involves their very biographies.

Therefore, far from taking as basic the abstract and undifferentiated need for one person for another, reality forces us to take the opposite path and to start off from the radical, inherent, and structural need
of one sex for the other in which human life consists. (MA, 182)

Love, as a phenomenon of biographical life, is not simply a concatenation of acts, but an installation: a state from which I live. One does, as is commonly said, "fall in" love. As if surprised, I find myself "in" love. And, this being installed "in" love affects all my actions thereafter.

The amorous condition is an abstract possibility for each man and for each woman when entering into any relationship. Consequently, there is an element, however slight, of expectation, of promise and fulfillment, with the accompanying risk of disillusionment and lack of fulfillment. But, again, this is only on the abstract level; concretely more is required. Some specific motive is necessary to actualize the amorous condition. Since motives operate with factors such as age, social and racial differences, ethical and legal norms, geography, biological kinship, etc., most man-woman encounters result in each scarcely noticing the other as sexuated. (Although not mentioned by Marias, a striking example of the biological eclipsing the biographical is incest. In this example, biological kinship is superceded by biological urge.)

But what of love itself? Love arises from both the analytical and empirical structures of life. Analytically speaking, a human needs "his" circumstance in order to be. A human lives "his" circumstance. Empirically, "man" is sexuately projected into the world. "Man" lives "his" life through the other sex. Each sex is fulfilled
biographically even more than biologically through the other. As human, love is a vector. My need is a vectorial need with varying degrees of intensity, importance and meaning. By loving a person I biographically direct myself toward him or her. To be in love means to love someone so that he or she forms my project. To be in love means to be together, to say literally "I am something with her [or him]." More directly one could say: because love is a projection — future-oriented — love is such that I cannot become myself without the other.

As a result, being in love involves a modification of my very reality: I am transformed, altered. Through love I become the man or woman I had to be. Lovers, as is often cited, love as a man or woman who were only partially so, but who are now fully so. It is this love which becomes the standard by which the lovers view and judge life. The implication is this: I am only myself with the person I love; not to have that person means denying my life as I know it. Not to have the person I love would mean that I would be different from who I am now.

That is why authentic love presents itself as unre-nounceable, and to this degree it is happiness. I mean that the lover, even the most unhappy of lovers, thinks that his love has been worth while; he would not accept its not existing, would not want the calm tranquility, and pleasure which he would enjoy without it. He prefers his love, with all its consequences, no matter how troublesome or painful they may be, to its lack of existence: he says "yes" to it unconditionally, because anything else would mean saying "no" to himself. (MA, 193-94)
I am called to be a certain person and thus to love a certain person. This calling is, in no uncertain terms, a vocation. For Marias and Ortega, vocation is an inner prompting colored by, but not created by, circumstance. It is, thus, pre-eminently personal; it can be spoken of only as "my" vocation. As life unfolds its structure, it shows me that my greatest task is to become the person I was meant to be. But I can choose to be faithful or unfaithful to my vocation. This is what happens in love. "Giving oneself over, freely and necessarily, to authentic being-in-love is the supreme form of acceptance of fate, and that is precisely what we call vocation." (MA, 195)

There is, of course, a corporeal aspect to love. Since "man" is a corporeal structure, and man and woman live bodily, they, therefore, fall in love bodily. Each man or each woman falls in love with the other man or other woman, then loves the body of that person because it belongs to the beloved. The apex of the corporeal state of love is the other's face. The face is minimally erogenous, but maximally erotic. The face reveals the person. Human countenance says who the person is by giving a synopsis of his or her biography and the direction toward which he or she is projected.

Love, among other installations, admits of degrees. Marias refers to this quality of degree as temper. We are always in one temper or another. For this reason temper does not present itself as another form of installation, but it exists as a feature or quality of all forms of installation as vectorial. Temper is a function of
empirical structure, of life itself. It cannot be reduced to mere elements like the psychological, biological or technological from which life is fashioned. Temper, then, is the way in which life's resources are articulated. Temper is my personal way of reacting to my installation. For instance, the way I speak is determined by my mood or temperament. Society conditions the modulations of the forms of installation. Each society regulates, especially, sexuate modulation: how man or woman will live as man or woman. The proclamation of the sex of a newborn child sets in motion a whole set of tempering factors: colors to be worn, games to be played, speech to be used, manner of walking, sitting, gesticulating, etc. Insofar as life occurs empirically as "man," then temper is the concrete definition of "man" in "this" world. "Temper," Marias says, "is an essential modulation of that in which one is when it is not merely, a question of localization or spatiality, but rather when one is living." (MA, 208)

The element of human time comes into play in any discussion of metaphysical anthropology, especially, when we consider human life as a projection in a forward direction. By my experience I know that life is limited: "my days are numbered." Birth and death are the boundaries of life. Human life occurs successively. The present assumes the past and the future. Human life, then, must be dealt with in terms of the reality that is past and that which is future. We project from the former to the latter, and we sense the future by means of imagination. This projective quality of life gives mean-
ing to human time. Time assumes a structural significance within a biography. It is different for each life, and different for each sex. This involves not only the statistically different longevity for man and woman, but what each sex is permitted or forbidden to do in relation to the other sex. Males do not live through young adulthood under the same conditions as those for women. To cease being able to reproduce does not occur at the same age level for each sex, even as the sexual urge is not felt as strongly for each sex at the same age level. To reach the age of "retirement" has different significance for each sex (although changing conditions are minimizing certain past differences).

With the subject of human time I have come full circle. In attempting to illustrate Marías' conviction that metaphysics is the theoretical result of a felt need to know what reality is through living, it is seen that this need is felt differently by each person. It is, in this sense, a personal need. Humans, however, are not given on earth simply as persons. They appear as male or female, biographically as well as biologically. Their relation is disjunctive, that is, mutually co-implicative. The relationship is one of balance rather than equality. The sexuate installation is the most radical or fundamental form of installation since it is from this source that each of us, as this man or this woman, experiences, interprets and responds to the world, including other persons.
CHAPTER III

OBSERVATIONS

All the points in this thesis concerning which observations might be made fall into one of two categories: those dealing with events in the history of philosophy and those involving issues in the systematic consideration of philosophy.

Foremost among the first category is Ortega's and Marias' judgment that the primary task of twentieth century philosophy is the formulation of a theory of human life. An observation on this judgment would require an examination of what is entailed in "philosophical anthropology," an area also known in the twentieth century as "philosophy of man," "philosophy of mind," and "rational psychology." It would also entail an examination of the rise of the behavioral science of psychology, as well as a contrasting of the methodology of philosophy with that of psychology. Such an examination would indicate, I believe, a shift in questions about the "nature" of human life to those about the "actions" of humans. It would reveal the extent to which this shift left any basic questions unanswered, thus indicating why Ortega might conclude -- as he did -- that despite the emergence of psychology human life was still not accounted for by theory.

A more complex example of an issue in the history of philosophy is the relation of Ortega's and Marias' philosophy of "living reason" to the movement collectively -- some would say, erroneously -- called
existentialism. As mentioned in the first chapter, Ortega is often listed among the existentialists, despite the fact that he had pointed out, on a number of occasions, how he differs from them. For example, William Barrett, in *Irrational Man*, includes him in the group, and adds a statement that surely would have offended Ortega, as it must Marías: "All the basic premises of Ortega's thought derive from modern German philosophy."¹ Both Ortega and Marías would object to the very title of the book, maintaining that Barrett failed to make a distinction between irrational and non-rational.

A detailed investigation into Ortega's and Marías' sources would have to be undertaken to determine the relation between their philosophy and existentialism, especially their relation to Heidegger. It very well may have been the case, as Franz Niedermayer writes, that "... it was a high point, even the high point in the life of Ortega when, on 5 August 1951, in Darmstadt's town hall, he met Martin Heidegger, crossed lances with him, and held his own."² It is the opinion of John W. Dixon, Jr. that

... too many careless readers have considered Ortega to be a provincial variant of Heidegger. Ortega paid generous tribute to Heidegger on several occasions but he himself was aware that the temporal priority in stating common themes was usually his and that he was engaged in a very different enterprise. Despite the coincidences of themes, the differences are so crucial as to create a picture of two men occupying the same piece of ground while facing in opposite directions.³

The conclusion of such an examination might very well be, as proposed by Robert O'Connor, that Ortega and Marías both "... be-
long to the post-Husserlian tradition of existential phenomenology, together with Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. [And, that]
(or the historical record, Ortega was probably the first phenomenologist to take the existential turn. . . . 4 Dixon maintains that the contemporary philosopher closest to Ortega is Merleau-Ponty.

"Allowing for considerable difference in personality and intellectual style, their positions are so close that only Ortega's basic metaphysical insight enabled him to go beyond what Merleau-Ponty achieved." 5

The category dealing with systematic philosophy has more issues of possible observation. These include: 1) the nature of metaphysics; 2) the difference between the analytical and empirical structures; 3) the description of installation as forward-going: vectorial installation and the historicity of human life; 4) the relation of corporeality to human life; 5) the relation of the sexuate to the sexual; and 6) the nature of the sexuate condition as disjunctive, as precluding the equality of man and woman. My attention will be devoted to three of the issues listed above: installation, sexuate and sexual, and disjunction. But before proceeding to my extended observations on these, I shall point out certain aspects concerning the other issues stated above: metaphysics, structure, and corporeality.

In Ortega's and Marias' efforts to meet the philosophical needs of our times, they propose as a new starting point for philosophy the reality of human life, maintaining this reality is more fundamental than being. An examination of this contention would
have to include their assertion that human life, unlike being, is not an interpretation of reality. Ortega and, following him, Marias have maintained that not only has their metaphysics preserved the uniqueness of human consciousness introduced by modern rationalism, but that it has also restored the world omitted by modern idealism. In doing so, Ortega criticized traditional philosophy, although Conrad R. Dietz contends that Ortega's "... analysis shows in actual practice he does rely on the senses and does assume the validity of the first principles, revealing thereby that his verbal attacks against Aristotle and traditional philosophy are contradicted by his own procedure."6

An examination of Marias' contention that he uncovered an intermediate zone between the general or analytical structure of human life and concrete biography would involve an examination of whether the traditional notion of "property" as "proper accident" adequately deals with the same reality. Does the Aristotelian definition of "man" as "rational animal," for example, imply all the forms of installation which Marias maintains can only be known through direct experience or empirical observation? Marias himself contends "man is an animal who has human life."7 If so, it would be impossible for Marias to speak of human life as having possible empirical variations, only one of which is manifested on earth. Consequently, if there is intelligent life elsewhere, it would not be possible to refer to it as human but under a different empirical structure. It would be simply intelligent life of a kind different than human.
This is, in fact, what the astronomer Carl Sagan maintains, without of course discussing the philosophical implication. If he had, it would be that of a positivist, a position quite opposed to that of Marias. Sagan states the following:

Extraterrestrial intelligence would be elegant, complex, internally consistent and utterly alien. Extraterrestials would, of course, wish to make a message sent to us as comprehensible as possible. But how could they? ... We believe there is a common language that all technical civilizations, no matter how different, must have. That common language is science and mathematics.

Lest talk about extraterrestrial life seem out of place in a philosophy thesis, I hasten to mention that Marias brings the theme up in Metaphysical Anthropology. On more than one occasion in the book he states that "man" is only one possible variant of human life, the structure empirically given on earth. Indeed, Marias spoke of the theme, he informs us, thirteen years before writing Metaphysical Anthropology. He wrote:

If man, when he arrives on another planet, finds no life or finds only "biological" life -- plants, animals -- he will undoubtedly feel disappointed; apparently, he desired or hoped to find men. But if he finds men he will also feel cheated, and will think that he hardly needed to travel so far to find them. What does he anticipate and hope for, then? For me there is no doubt: "life" -- biographical life, personal life, of course -- but with a different empirical structure. That is, what we call "human life" -- because we have no intuition of any other kind -- but not "man." (MA, 78)

Marias' interest as a philosopher in this theme is not an isolated
one. Professional philosophers are beginning to turn their attention to extraterrestrial intelligence, invading an area still dominated by science fiction writers.\(^9\)

A critical observation on Marías' notion of corporeality would include a comparison with what other contemporary philosophers, more well-known than he, have contributed to the theme. He himself makes passing reference, something he seldom does, to one other: Marcel. "... Gabriel Marcel," he writes, "has seen this very clearly -- 'being embodied' goes far beyond merely 'having,' beyond ownership or possession of the body, for I am not I without my body, and having it is not secondary or consecutive." (MA, 12\(b\))^10

In presenting observations on this theme, special attention must be devoted to Marías' view of the relation of body, an empirical structure, to human life itself understood as analytical structure. In his *Metaphysical Anthropology* Marías informs us:

In principle, human life is conceivable in a disembodied form. (On condition that this does not mean a merely negative concept; I mean, we would need to think positively of another form of reality as "homologous" to corporeality.)... In other words, if human life were not corporeal (or if in some way it should cease to be so), it would not by that token cease to be circumstantial or world-like; the "other-world" is also a world. Were we to imagine angelic life, for example, it would be neither corporeal nor "human," but it would be personal. It would also be "circumstantial," but certainly not "local," and therefore would have another structure of worldhood, an entirely different one. The "glorious body" which designates another mode of corporeality would correspond to the worldhood of the "other-world." (MA, 97–98)
I have quoted at length because this is the key passage in any critique of Marias' position. This passage must be reconciled with what Marias had written eighteen years earlier (1952): "Corporeality is essential to human life, but not exactly this form of corporeality."  

Corporeality is the way in which human life is installed in its world. This installation is what Marias calls vectorial, thus emphasizing the forwardness and historicity of human life. This is the issue to which I now turn my attention.

Vectorial Installation and the Historicity of Human Life

An observation on the vectorial installation and the historicity of human life involves a consideration of the very constitution of human reality according to Ortega and Marias. The most striking statement of Ortega on human reality is found in his early (1941) essay on "History as a System."

Man is what happened to him, what he has done. Other things might have happened to him or have been done by him, but what did in fact happen to him and was done by him, this constitutes a relentless trajectory of experiences that he carries on his back as a vagabond his bundle of all he possesses. Man is a substantial emigrant on a pilgrimage of being. . . . Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is . . . history. Expressed differently: what nature is to things, history, res gestae, is to man. . . . Man . . . finds that he has no nature other than what he has himself done [made].

It is upon this that Marias built years later (1970). Although "man is the animal who has a human life" (MA, 133), "man" is not an animal
in the sense of having "his" reality "given." (MA, 104) It is precisely this "given," this "fixed being," that is called nature.

"If we can speak of human nature, we would have to say that it has expanded, vectorially, with enormous intensity and in all directions; that it is a nature in expansion..." (MA, 132) Thus, "man's" nature is an open one; by means of technology it can be stretched and transform "his" world. (MA, 104) The point is that "man" is not only a nature. "... [N]othing human is merely natural..." (MA, 165) To be human is also to be socio-historical. "Man is 'in' time, the substance of life." (MA, 213) This is equivalent to saying that history is the substance of life, the obverse of what Ortega had said when he called life the substance of history.13

The verb form Marias employs in designating the reality of human life is "estar" rather than "ser," although both are forms of the Spanish verb for "to be."14 According to Marias, "estar," besides its meaning of "mere states or passing conditions and non-radical feelings, in contrast to the inherentness and permanency denoted by the verb ser... refers necessarily to reality." (MA, 80) Marias maintains that "estar" means inclusion, be it passing and unessential or permanent and essential. Moreover, coming from the same Latin verb "stare" as does "circumstance," "estar" refers inexorably to the circumstantiality of life, showing it as the ambit or place where I am.

The absence of estar in other languages has hindered the understanding of this situation in general. Let
us take an example: If I say in French je suis vivant, there are two possible and probable translations, both inadequate: either "I am a living being" or "I am alive"; either a determination of the being, or a state. It is not primarily a question of this, but of the meaning of the dynamic and at the same time "stable" reality of the verb estar with the true gerundive, which must never be confused with the present participle: I am living [estoy viviendo]. (MA, 81)

In "History as a System" Ortega had said: "Life is a gerundive, not a participle: a faciendum not a factum." This María built upon, observing the uniqueness of the Spanish form of estar to capture the dynamic, forward-going character of living. As an active happening life is lived toward the future: "I am future-oriented" (MA, 90), an echo of Ortega's observation that "... life is in its very essence futurism."³¹³

María, in his effort to apprehend the uniqueness of human life, correctly attempts to preserve the dynamism that each of us experiences in our actual living. Both he and his mentor, like the majority of philosophers in this century, reject the notion of "nature" as expressing this dynamism. This, I contend, is a misinterpretation, as I shall explain in the following paragraphs.

The dynamism of human living is, at one and the same time, a "continuing-to-be" and a "moving-forward." In "continuing-to-be" human life is not merely "just-there-continually" but is actively renewing and generating itself. What is done becomes an intrinsic part of what is there, but neither in the sense of an external residue that builds up in layers as a rock increases in size, nor in
the sense of a quantitative growing and nurturing from the inside as in biological life. Human living as biographical is qualitative growth. Given the "kind" or quality of life present initially (essence), human life takes on a further quality -- a moral quality -- by its own actions. Since these actions are temporal, time or historicity is part and parcel of the very structure of human living.

In attempting to express this historicity of human living, Marias, among others, is left almost speechless. Nouns do not apprehend what is given in experience. The "going-on" of living is frozen or "set" by nouns. Verbs come closer to capturing this reality, but even this is insufficient. Our last resort, as Marias recognizes, is to point in the direction of reality. It is in this manner that metaphor enters the picture. We use a reality about which we already know something to point toward another reality about which we know less. Hence, Marias' use of the vector, a metaphorical description of human living as vectorial installation, as a self-propelling arrow seeking a target of its own choosing by coming out of the past so as to build up the momentum needed to reach a future goal. This metaphor points to both the dynamism and historicity of human living.

Granted the interpretation that was seemingly given the notion of "nature" throughout most of the history of philosophy, that of a static and stable thing, it is understandable that Marias, following Ortega, felt obliged to discard it. In its place they substituted the notion of "history." Almost as an afterthought
Marias adds: it is not that a person has no nature; it is that he/she is more than a nature. Unfortunately, this "more than" was left undeveloped. If developed I am sure Marias would have related it to the dynamic interaction between the biological-biographical dimensions that compose human living according to his view. From this he might have seen that the original notion of "nature" was as the birthplace (natus) of actions, actions that as offspring do not have a separate life of their own but constitute part of the reality from which they came. Not only do operations (actions) follow being (nature), but through operations we know what being is. There is, thus, an intrinsic and necessary connection between them; together they constitute human living. It was not necessary for Marias and Ortega to discard the notion of "nature" in favor of a metaphor for "nature" since "nature" originally was a metaphor to describe human life and, by an anthropomorphization of non-human life, everything else. It is a matter, I think, of recalling this rather than of seeking a substitute metaphor.

Installation occurs on earth in one of two forms: as male or female. This distinction raises the issue of the realtionship of the sexes and how fundamental being sexed is to being a human being in the world, the issue to which I now turn.

**Sexual and Sexuate**

Marias maintains that "(f)or a good many years now I have been using a linguistic distinction of the Spanish language which I find
exceedingly useful: the two adjectives sexual and sexuado ('sexuate').

(MA, 133-13h) For him "sexual" refers to a kind of an activity
founded on a condition of human life in general, the "sexuate,"
which "affects all of life, at all times and in all its dimensions."
(MA, 13h) (The phrase "of human life in general" seems to refer to
all forms of human life. Consequently, it seems corporeality,
without which the sexuate condition seems unintelligible, is essential
to all forms of human life.)

Consultation of the definitive dictionary of the Spanish
language, compiled by the Royal Spanish Academy, shows the following.
"Sexual" ("sexual") is defined as "pertaining or relative to sex"
("perteneciente o relativo al sexo"), while "sexuate" ("sexuado")
is defined as an adjective, used in biology, "said of a plant or an
animal that has sexual organs well developed and able to function"
("dicese de la planta o del animal que tiene organos sexuales bien
desarrollados y aptos para funcionar"). The implication is that a
baby is not sexuated. However, for Marías, the sexuate condition
underlies the sexual, so that it is present from the beginning, long
before the sexual organs are sufficiently developed to function.

Marías is clearly introducing a new meaning for "sexuado," one that
is the direct opposite of the recognized one. It is interesting
to note, I think, that the translation of the word "sexuado" by
James Parsons in "The Corporeal Structure of Human Life" is as
"sexed" rather than as "sexuate." I have opted for the translation
of sexuado as "sexuate" following the English translation of Metaphy-
sical Anthropology.

The admiration Marias had for Freud has previously been mentioned, as has his criticism that this "genius" erred by mistaking the part ("sexual") for the whole (the "sexuate" condition). Marias' critique seems to imply that Freud fell into the error of understanding many non-sexual activities as sexual because of his lack of distinction, grounded as it was on his naturalism. This seems valid to me, but I think Marias himself might have fallen into the same class of error when he interprets all human activity as "sexuate." Marias seems to have failed to distinguish between an act, such as solving a mathematical problem, performed by one who is "sexed," male or female, and an act performed in a "sexed" or "sexuated" manner.

Undeniably, the solution of a mathematical problem, unless done by a calculator, is accomplished by one who is male or female. However, this fact may be so minimally important that to stress it runs the risk of implying sexist intentions. It is a difference that is unimportant, unless one is trying, for example, to connect levels of mathematical competency not only with the age of a person but also with the sex of the person.

Man and Woman as Disjunctive

In presenting my observation on Marias' notion of the sexuate condition as disjunctive five aspects will be examined: 1) the meaning of disjunction (as either/or); 2) the historical context of the sexuate condition (as "historicized biology"); 3) the distinguishing
traits of the disjunctive terms (man as valiant and woman as beautiful); 4) disjunction as facilitating love (through completing the humanity of man or woman); and 5) disjunction as a balance (precluding equality). I shall consider each aspect, repeating some of the exposition presented earlier and conclude by presenting a statement on the overall contribution by Marias to this theme.

The idea of "disjunction" was forced upon Marias, he contends, as long ago as his book on Reason and Life, "The Introduction to Philosophy" (1947). The occasion was his attempt to understand the relationship between "human life" and "my life." At that time he realized that traditional theories would not facilitate his understanding of this relation. On the one hand, the relation is not an instance of seeking a principle by which a species (human life) is individuated into particulars (my life). On the other hand, the relation is not understood by appealing to a nominalist-type position in which the abstract notion of a species (human life), extrinsic to the unique reality of the single individuals, is arrived at by an enumeration of empirical individuals (my life). The point, for Marias, is that human life cannot even be thought of except as concrete and circumstantial, in disjunction, as this life or this other life; that is, the life of each one. It is not a mere individuation, but rather that human life exists disjunctively, in a circumstantial disjunction which belongs intrinsically to the "consistency" of that life. Hence human lives are "unique," irreplaceable, cannot be substituted for, are intrinsically singular; in short, irreducible. . . (MA, 136)
As such, each human life essentially is either this one or this one or this one, etc.

However, in transferring the notion of disjunction to the sexuate condition from the relation of human life and my life, it becomes "stricter," according to Marías.

The reason is that while life is plural and indefinite ("Life" is this life or this life or this life ...). Disjunction is dual and reciprocal: man is male or female. This means that if "man" is not male, she is a woman, if not a woman, a male, while if life is not this life, we cannot be sure which life it is. (MA, 136-37)

The duality and reciprocity establish a polarity such that it affects both man and woman. Each term of the disjunction implies the other; the terms co-imply each other. Woman cannot be understood without man entering into the concept and vice versa.

I agree, for the most part, with these observations. In attempting to understand an individual human and appreciate that individual's irreplaceability, I agree that we realize that the individual is no other individual. I agree, furthermore, with what I think the disjunctive condition of human life implies, namely, that in knowing who one person is, we must focus on not only who the individual is but also who the individual is not (namely, any other individual). Thus, in distinguishing one individual from another we realize more fully that one individual cannot biographically live (become human) without another individual, that living is essentially co-living.
However, I fail to see how disjunction becomes "stricter" when transferred from the issue of individuality to the sexuate condition. The either/or nature of disjunction reveals as much about "the other" individual whether we are focusing on "this" individual's uniqueness (individuality) or sexuate condition. In each case the notion of disjunction applied to human living indicates that no person is an only person. In the case of individuality, disjunction reveals that I am "my" self, that "my" self and "other" selves compose humanity, that "my" self is not the only self that exists. In the case of the sexuate condition, disjunction manifests that I am a-man-and-not-a-woman, that being a man is not being a woman, that "manness" is not the only sexuate condition that exists. Even as I, the individual self, cannot be understood except through understanding another self (since I exist in contrast with another self), so I, the man, cannot be understood except through understanding another sexuate condition, the woman (since I exist in contrast with another sexuate condition). (And, of course, vice versa if the self who is writing this critique were a-woman-and-not-a-man.) Again, in each case what is revealed about the other (self or sexuate condition) is the same: that the-other-life-is-not-this-one-who-I-am and that the-other-sexuate-condition-is-not-the-one-who-I-am. I am convinced, contrary to Marias, that the application of the notion of disjunction is no more strict in one case than in the other.

Concerning the use of the word "disjunction" by Marias I have serious reservations. The either/or nature of disjunction
clearly illustrates, I agree, the existence of sexuality as biologi-
cally either male or female, of the sexuate condition as biographi-
cally either man or woman. However, sexuality and sexuateness is
not only disjunctive; it is also conditional, even as Marias says.
Either/or propositions can be reduced to if/then propositions. "I
am either a man or a woman" can be reduced to "If I am not a man,
then I am a woman." In both disjunctive and conditional proposi-
tions there is a disjoining, a separation and division, that can be
avoided, I believe, by the use of the word "correlation." The co-
implication of male and female, of man and woman, that Marias em-
phasizes as key to his view is better expressed by "correlation."
Not only does "correlation" involve a distinction or separation of
the terms but also a joining or unification of these same terms. It
is a case of distinguishing in order to unite. The mutual relation,
the reciprocal inter-relation, the standing together by confronting
each other, that Marias so accurately describes as the condition of
human living is more adequately conveyed, I am convinced, by corra-
lation. In a correlation the two terms are related to each other such
that one implies the other, so that neither can exist or make sense
without the other -- exactly what Marias is attempting to convey.

My second major point in regard to the disjunctive nature
of the sexuate condition concerns the historical context of the sexu-
ate condition. It is in connection with this point that Marias in-
cluded, in my estimation, one of his most fruitful concepts,
which, "historical biology." He employs it initially when speak-
ing of race. His point is that race as we confront it in our lives is not merely, or even mainly, biological. More than denoting skin color, it points to the history of those who have this biological trait. We confront our own race and those of others more biographically. As Marias correctly points out, biography builds on biology; biography is how one utilizes his/her biology and how one is treated because of his/her biology. "For man nothing is merely physical or even biological, but also historical and social," (MA, 101) Marias perceptively writes. With this I fully agree. As I understand life, it is above all biography: what I do with my biological endowments, or lack thereof, and how others treat me because of these same givens, or lack thereof. Any country in which there is racism, either based on color or ethnic traits (this latter form is prevalent in countries where all are members of the same biological race), manifests a situation in which a person's race is treated primarily as what role that race plays, or is forced to play, in the present and recent past. The aspect of race cannot be separated, in other words, from its historicosocial veneer-like role.

When transferred to the consideration of the sexuate condition, this concept is especially useful. It enables us to see more clearly that "man" and "woman" are roles assigned by society, partly but not wholly along biological lines. It makes manifest that, as technology increasingly liberates us from the determinism of the biological, the historicosocial role we are forced, often literally, to assume would be less intrinsically connected to the
biological. "... [B]eing a 'man' or a 'woman' is not only a biological matter, but a personal and a social one, and ... these identifications are not even 'social constants,' but mean different things in each society." (MA, 101) Although being a man is always such in reference to being a woman, and vice versa, the changing historico-social factors do not dictate the particulars of either, once and for all. What does seem to remain a relative constant, to Marias, is that the roles complement each other in one way or another, even when the activities -- I might add in my agreement with him -- are identical.

Reference to roles brings me to the third aspect of the sexuate condition that I wish to examine: the distinguishing traits of man and woman. It is in this area that Marias' words and treatment will probably be subjected to more intense criticism as he seems to be underlining and justifying the age-old biographic role of the sexes as based more exclusively on biological factors. What must not be forgotten, to avoid unwarranted criticism, is that Marias explicitly states that

virility [or masculinity] is neither a biological nor simply a "natural" quality, but a historico-social one. That is, not only does the significance of the general term "man" vary from one society to another, but also the significance of the words "man and woman." (MA, 154)

The same applies to the term "femininity." As I explained in the previous chapter, the distinguishing characteristic of man is valor (gravity) and that of woman is beauty (grace). Each has the
other characteristic, Marías maintains, but it is not primary.
Moreover, these characteristics are not merely, or mainly, physical
(even if erroneously thought so by the uncritical mind, Marías --
I am certain -- would add).

Although I agree with much of what Marías says, I have reser-
vations concerning some of his comments and, above all, disagree
with his strategy for expounding the distinguishing traits. What I
agree with is that "virility" and "femininity," like "man" and "woman,"
are historico-social. Those statements concerning which I have
reservations are his comments on the complementary relations of man
and woman. Despite what appears to be Marías' conviction that each
sexuate condition meaningfully lives only directing itself to the
other, some of his statements still indicate a greater emphasis on
woman living in relation to man than of man living in relation to
woman. His treatment is, to this degree, one-sided; in this I agree
with Professor Maryellen MacGuigan.20 The relative one-sidedness
comes through in statements such as: "There is nothing needier or
more uncertain than a woman alone -- so much so, that her temptation
is to flee from herself, from her condition as woman." (MA, 166-67)
There is no effort to show the complementary effect of man's fleeing
from his condition as man, except for having previously stated: "We
would have to ask ourselves rather seriously how many things would be
important to men if they lived by themselves." (MA, 159)

To the slight degree that Marías tends to be one-sided, I
believe it is due to his strategy of presenting the distinguishing
traits of man and woman. He does not ground these traits with sufficient clarity in human life as "constituent insecurity." (MA, 154)

In speaking of the human condition as insecurity, neediness, ignorance, indecision and helplessness, Marias does not clearly develop his two key chapters on "The Virile Figure of Human Life" and "The Figure of Woman" in Metaphysical Anthropology. If for every statement Marias made on one of the sexes, he had made a complementary one on the other, his treatment would be less open to misinterpretation.

For example, it is not sufficiently clear, even if implicit, that both man and woman, according to Marias, must face up to the insecurity of the human condition, must acknowledge life's burdens. Both must try to minimize life's uncertainties. This means both must be strong or valiant, in ways their society permits (or even forbids, if they are courageous). Valor requires employment of strength of body (muscles), mind (intelligence) and spirit (stamina). It is as necessary for woman as it is for man. Societies, especially pre-technological ones, limited the expression of valor along lines largely biological and favorable to man. Accordingly, I disagree with Marias' contention that valor is man's primary characteristic. It is, I would maintain, the primary trait of all humans.

Nevertheless, I tend to agree that man's valor shows up -- or at least, has shown up in the past -- in "gravity," in a face that is serious as if to defy the threats of the human condition. On the other hand, woman's strength is manifest in her face as "grace," a quality that defies, by its orderly action, the chaos of human
reality. Which is to say that I disagree with Marias in saying the distinguishing trait of woman is beauty -- if beauty is seen as distinct from strength. As I indicated, man's strength or valor in confronting life's uncertainties manifests itself as gravity, which means taking the situation seriously, by being "on guard" for anything. Woman's strength manifests itself in grace, which entails taking the situation seriously by defying the chaos and making the most out of what is given, by rearranging it and augmenting it. This permits her to confront reality by discovering/creating order in the form of beauty so that life can be lived "gracefully." In other words, the distinguishing trait of both sexes in their respective sexuate conditions is valor/beauty, or simply valor manifesting itself as gravity and grace. The other side of the coin of beauty is valor, not as a separate trait belonging to a complementary sexuate condition but to both sexes. Beauty is as much a person's effort to live life as is valor; beauty involves as much an effort to show oneself as defying chaos by orderly living by one sex as the other. The social role forced on woman of being physically attractive has been due to their lack of civil status independently of man. As civil rights are extended to women, beautiful appearance and personality will be seen, I am sure, as the responsibility of both sexes -- in attracting one to the other and in making a chaotic world more bearable.

The penultimate aspect of the sexuate condition I wish to examine is that of how the disjunctive (correlative) nature of this
condition facilitates love. Any treatment of love, as was seen in the previous chapter, must be grounded in the intuition that "I am I am my circumstance." This indicates that I have need of what is not myself in order to live my life fully. This includes not only my need for things but also for other people. However, this need is not merely for any other person, persons interchangeable with each other. I who am this person live my life in the fullest sense only through relating to a particular other person, whom I come to know as unique and irreplaceable. In this manner we both discover more fully who we are and become more fully our respective selves. We realize ourselves more fully through co-living, a living with that includes the adopting of a single project toward whose realiza-
tion each of us cooperatively works.

The above is a summary of what I understand Marías to be saying about a loving relationship. It is a position with which I agree. I also concur with Marías when he becomes less abstract by reminding us that human life is given in two disjunctive (correla-
tive) forms, each human but complementarily so, such that both man and woman must form a person-to-person (loving) relationship with one of the opposite sexuate condition in order to come to be man or woman more fully. There is no other way for one individual, man or woman, to know who he or she is except through knowing who a member of the opposite sexuate condition is. It is as if to be a complete human being each of us has to experience, through collaborative living with, the humanity of the form of the sexuate condition which
is contrary to our own. Such a loving relationship of man and woman, woman and man, is so fundamental that all others can be understood only in its context, including a loving sexual relationship.

My observation on Marias' position is that he presents it in a misleading manner, perhaps because it is so compactly given. Most of the time he writes as if this loving relationship between persons of opposite sexuate conditions involves overt sexual relations. Because of this, it is easy to misinterpret him as implying that without a lovingly sexual relation neither man nor woman can develop his/her humanity. What I take him to mean, however, is that without a loving relationship between the sexuate conditions each misses knowing what the other half of humanity is and can be. I would contend that the misleading character of his presentation would have been avoided by calling such a loving relationship friendship. Such a friendship can exist within other relationships: father-daughter, mother-son, brother-sister, peers, etc. It is heterosexual in the sexuate rather than the sexual sense. Love, in this context, is to wish and do well to the other, as if the other were part of the self. As such, love completes the form of sexuate installation that each of us is.

The last aspect of the sexuate condition as disjunctive that I shall examine is disjunction (correlation) as balance. Marias' key passage in this regard is the following.

To speak of "equality" between men and women is one of the most dangerously stupid errors into which one could possibly fall. What can be, and should be,
between the sexes is balance, a dynamic balance made up of inequality and tension, which keeps man and woman on the same level, precisely to make possible the strength and fullness of their encounter, their confrontation, their active polarity. (MA, 158)

I shall first examine what Marias means by a relation of balance and, thus, discuss whether it precludes equality. The use of the word "balance" brings to mind a type of scale with two holding pans: one for the material to be weighed and the other for the weights. Each side must be on the same level -- precisely Marias' words -- to achieve a balance. What is in each pan cannot be the same, but each must weigh the same. When this reality is used as a metaphor for the relation between the sexuate conditions, it points to the fact that the sexuate conditions are different conditions, but that each is the same insofar as each is one, and only one, of the two sexuate conditions of human life on earth. Each sexuate condition is unequal to the other in the sense of each being a different condition. Each condition is equal to the other in the sense of each being a human condition, of each having the same requisite traits that are present wherever human life is found. Thus, I would maintain that Marias' conception of the relationship between the sexuate conditions as a balance is preceptively correct, but that it includes both inequality and equality.

I can understand Marias' rather forceful statement against equality. He is reacting against the socio-political attempt at unisex leveling. It is unfortunate that he did not elaborate his context, for the implication is that it is solely a metaphysical con-
text. He emphasized in his metaphysical anthropology, time and again, that men and women are human, but in two profoundly different senses. For example; "Not only is the masculine face different from the feminine one, but they are faces in different senses -- as in general the two modes of corporeality differ..." (MA, 151) Thus, each is human, and in this sense equally so. But each is differently human, hence in this sense unequally so. Each is equally needful of the other in order to become fully human.

To say that men and women are unequally related in a metaphysical context, as does Marías, is misleading. In what way, we can ask, are realities unequal? In two ways, I think: as independent realities and as realities of different kinds. As independent, each and every reality is metaphysically unequal. Each reality is irreducible to the other. This, I am certain, is not what Marías was attempting to point out, for it seems too obvious. Turning to the second way in which realities are metaphysically unequal, we find that it involves a reference to what has been traditionally called essences. Realities of different kinds (essences) are, by that fact, unequal. However different the respective sexuate conditions of man and woman are said to be, they are still two forms of the same kind of reality, namely, human life (on earth). Each form participates in the same essence of humanity, I am tempted to say. More accurately, each sexuate condition manifests upon analysis the requisite traits without which there is no human life. In this sense, they are metaphysically equal. Hence, my criticism that the metaphysical
conception of man and woman as a balance of unequal terms does not preclude the balance from being also one of equal terms. On the contrary, it requires that the balance be conceived of as one in which the terms are related both as unequals and equals.

The problem that Marias reveals by his remark (against the relation of the sexes being spoken of as one of equality) is a problem in the socio-political context, not in the context of metaphysics. As I mentioned, Marias is reacting to the socio-political leveling of the sexes. This leveling involves two factors, if I correctly have drawn out the implications in Marias' remarks. One is the tendency to play down or ignore the sexuate condition. This minimizes the differences of the sexes to a degree that men and women are not interacting as men and women, but as non-sexuated beings, which means that they are not interacting as humans. They, therefore, miss opportunities to develop their humanity, which is the equivalent of harming themselves. The other leveling factor is more evident as a greater number of women enter the professions from which they were previously excluded. They are entering a "man's world," usually on man's terms. They are forced to act in the ways men acted to get ahead. This prevents them from bringing to the professions their own ways of doing things, resulting in an impoverishment of the professions. Men lose an opportunity to enrich the professions with the perspective of the opposite sexuate condition, and women lose even more: the chance to be themselves at work as well as off work.

I would contend, however, that it is misleading on the
part of Marías merely to emphasize that the sexuate balance is one of inequality. When speaking of the socio-political world, we are including the issue of civil rights. Unless the sexuate balance is spoken of as one of equality as well, we run the risk of perpetuating the uneven treatment afforded the two sexes in the past. But, at this point, a shift of the meanings of "inequality" and "equality" has occurred. The metaphysical usage of the terms was, as such, value-free. The socio-political usage is an evaluative one. In stating that men and women are unequally balanced we are saying they are of "unequal worth." If the omission by Marías of a reference to equality in balance in the metaphysical context can be said to be misleading, it is even more so in the socio-political context. It is misleading in both contexts because Marías does not hold what he misleads us to conclude. For him, both man and woman are human (and all his qualifications based on empirical structure do not alter this given). As such each must be afforded human treatment in the socio-political context: even if the relation of the sexuate condition is seen as disjunctive rather than as correlative, the use of equality alone to characterize it is misleading. The very "tension" that Marías correctly sees as part of the balance would be impossible unless there were both equality and inequality. Tension occurs when there are terms that are both alike (equal) and different (unequal). It is on this basis that I ground my observation of Marías. His conception of the relation between the sexuate conditions as one of unequal balance does not preclude equality. On
the contrary, it requires it.

My overall estimation of Marias' contribution to the understanding of the sexuate condition as disjunctive is that it is exceedingly perceptive and exceptionally well-grounded in the metaphysics of human living. Even with all my many reservations, especially concerning his lack of a clear distinction between love as friendship and a loving sexual relationship, I maintain that the frame of reference Marias develops is most promising for future philosophical discussion. Above all, this is so because he views man and woman as needing each other to become human. It very well may be, as Marias writes, that "not many men have a middlingly adequate idea of what [who] a woman is . . . [Because] (men) do many things with women but rarely think of them." (MA, 178) Women probably know men more adequately since they have had to live in a male-dominated and male-oriented world. However, each must do more than know the other. It is not so much thinking about the opposite sexuate condition that yields that knowledge required by man and woman to learn who they are and, therefore, to become themselves. Ultimately, it is a matter of living-together, of each installed in his/her own sex projecting toward the other, and together toward their dual personal project. Only in this manner, Marias rightly contends, will the two sexuate forms of humanity become mutually transparent. It is this foundation that, I believe, can act as a springboard for further philosophizing on this long neglected theme: human life and the sexuate condition.
NOTES

Introduction

1Quoted in José Ortega y Gasset, "Prólogo a 'Introducción a las ciencias del espíritu'" por Wilhelm Dilthey, Obras Completas (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1961), VII, 61.

2Julián Marías, "Contemporary Philosophy and Atheism," Philosophy as Dramatic Theory (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971), 105. Translated by James Parsons. In this sense these givens are our destiny.


5Ortega considered force to be the last resort of civilized men, an expectional act, undertaken after discussion had been exhausted. His concern was that the new barbarism of fascism was utilizing it as the first resort, the usual policy. See, José Ortega y Gasset, Man and People (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963), 321-325. Translated by W.R. Trask.

Chapter I: Historical Need for a Theory of Human Life

1As is the custom in Spain, his surname is taken from both his parents. Accordingly, his full legal name is Julián Marías Aguilera. Marías is his father's name, coming from his paternal grandfather, while Aguilera is his mother's name coming from his maternal grandfather. However, he has always used his father's name only in his professional life as a writer. In this he is more European than Spanish. I have followed the practice of referring to him only by the one surname.

2Marías uses the metaphor "prow" when speaking of the role of the United States in the post-Second World War era, emphasizing thereby the fact that, even as a ship's prow reaches a new point first, the United States is in the forefront of the rest of the world. By and large, where the United States is now, the rest of the world will soon be. The same, I think, can be said of the Europe of the pre-First World War era. See: Julián Marías, "The Prow," America in the Fifties and Sixties: Julián Marías on the United States (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1972), 110-114. Translated by Blanche De Puy and Harold C. Raley.
Salvador de Madariaga, Spain, A Modern History (New York: Fredrick Praeger, 1958), 312. I have relied on this source for what follows concerning the events in Spain during the twentieth century. Madariaga was one of the members of the "League for Spanish Political Education" that Ortega had founded in 1914, in his first contribution to Spanish political life. Later, Madariaga served as Ambassador to the United States and France under the Second Republic prior to the Civil War. Born on July 23, 1866 in La Coruña, Spain, he became literary critic for the London Times and in 1928 took a position at Oxford University as Professor of Spanish. In 1936 he was elected to the Real Academia Española. He died in Switzerland in December, 1978.

Ibid., 312-313. Even the royal family was divided. King Alfonso XIII's wife, being British, favored one side, while his mother, being Austrian, felt loyal to the other. The result was that Alfonso was obliged to forbid discussion of the war at his table, successfully concealing his true sentiments throughout the war.

5. The difference is one of "idea" versus "theory." Wohl accepts the phrase's usage among most writers living in early twentieth century Europe, that of an "idea" to convey the consciousness that united them and the unique national experiences that separated them. Ortega and Mariás both have a more precise notion as part of their "theory" of generation as a historical method to understand the change in "binding-observances" (vigencias). For Mariás' contribution to the theory, see: Julián Mariás, Generations, A Historical Method (University: University of Alabama Press, 1967). Translated by Harold C. Raley. For Wohl's position, see: Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1911 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). Helpful reviews are to be found by Noel Annan in The New York Review of Books, XXVII, April 3, 1980, 11; and by Paul Fiazza in The Chronicle of Higher Education, Books and Arts, October 12, 1979, 10.

6. José Ortega y Gasset, Meditations on Quixote (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963). Translated by Evelyn Rugg and Diego Marin, with a "Prologue for American Readers" and an "Introduction" and "Notes" by Julián Mariás. The notes were chosen by Mariás as the most essential from his complete commentary to the Spanish edition of Ortega's Meditaciones del Quijote (Madrid: Ediciones de la Universidad de Puerto Rico de Revista de Occidente, 1957).

7. Ibid., 45. "In 1932 Ortega writes: I am myself and my circumstance. This expression which appeared in my first book and which condenses all my philosophic thought . . . ." Quoted by Mariás in Ibid., 168, n. 4.

8. Ibid., 41. As Mariás pointed out, Ortega's idea of circum-
stance as a condition of human life originated independently and previous to the stimuli from Uexkull's biological and Husserl's intentional usages, as seen in Ortega's 1910 essay on "Adán en el Paraíso" (Adam in Paradise). Seen in Julián Mariás, José Ortega y Gasset, Circumstance and Vocation (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), 362-365. On page 362, Mariás states that Uexkull's influence is not the source of Ortega's idea of circumstance, but "a lateral stimulus which confirms the original intuition and completes its later conceptual development."

9 Quoted by Mariás: Ortega y Gasset, Meditations on Quixote, 169, n. 5; italics in original.

10 Mariás, José Ortega y Gasset, 361.

11 Ortega y Gasset, Meditations on Quixote, 103.

12 Ibid., 19. Although the theme of race in Ortega and Mariás is too complex to do justice in a few lines of explanation, something must be said to avoid misunderstanding.

First of all, it must be remembered that Ortega's and Mariás' notion of "my life" as including both me and my circumstance, seen more fully in the last section of this chapter, enabled them to examine philosophically a range of realities that would not be considered proper material for philosophizing by other philosophers. This range includes the ethnic group to which one belongs, a group that does not necessarily coincide with one's nationality. Such a group has a biological basis insofar as it involves general traits, somewhat like family resemblances, that become more pronounced through marriage within the group. More importantly, the group has a repertory, with slight variation, of doing and not doing things that become pronounced from repetition over a long period of time. Among these "doings" are to be found activities from speaking a given language (or a given language in a specific manner), worshipping, greeting, to marriage customs. Both the biological "substructure" and the biographical "superstructure" have been constructed over the ages. Each has penetrated the other so that no aspect is solely biological. What results is "historicized biology." Race, as skin color, hair texture, etc., is only one aspect of this biology. Ortega never referred to the white race in contradistinction to the black race, for example. He did refer to the Spanish "race," meaning a more or less identifiable group. (It is only in "racist" nations that there is the danger of misunderstanding Ortega to mean skin color or the stereotype Spaniard of the "mañana" variety.) Mariás is more specific in his reference to race. He lists race as one of the various modes of installation. As will be seen in passing in the next chapter, Mariás does not consider race as "exclusively ethnic." The point is, I think, that race is not exclusively biological.

Secondly, the passages by Ortega in his first book, Meditations on Quixote, that contrast Germanic and Mediterranean cultures
must be read carefully so as to avoid a "racist" interpretation. (After all, he was so disgusted with Nazism that he neither permitted a translation of his Revolt of the Masses to be published in Germany nor accepted the appointment as Spanish ambassador to that nation, a country to which he felt the closest after his native Spain.) Also, it must not be forgotten that the Latin to which he refers already has Germanic blood: in Spain the Visigothic and in Italy the Ostrogothic. Ortega's disgust with the low level of Spanish scholarship, both in philosophy and science, in comparison with what he found in Germany is still very much evident in Meditations on Quixote, even ten years after his return. The superficiality of which he seemingly accuses the Spaniards has a faint echo of Unamuno's effort to understand the Spaniard by delving so deeply into the Spanish character that he hit the rock bottom of humanity. Others had failed to ground their observations of the Spanish in what it is to be human and remained nationalist ideologues. Unamuno, and afterward Ortega and Marías, placed their remarks within the context of the human condition itself and could be read by people all over the world who saw a bit of their own humanity in the Spanish variety of humankind.

13 Ibid., 45.
14 Ibid., 45, 46.
15 Marías, Ortega y Gasset, 362; italics in original.
16 The use of "level" and "height of the times" is seen in Ortega when speaking of Spain and Europe with their differing developments in modern times, as well as with the needs put on philosophy by historical events. See, José Ortega y Gasset, The Modern Theme (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), translated by James Cleugh.

17 As a result of the French Revolution, in the words of Marías: "They [the reactionary faction] reasoned more or less in this way: the French have guillotined their king and queen; therefore modern science is an error and we must stick to fifth hand Scholastic manuals. The Committee of Public Safety is criminal; therefore the Inquisition is admirable. The Jacobins attack religion; therefore theocracy is the only admirable system. Marat and Robespierre are execrable, therefore Galileo, Newton, Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz must be eliminated by every possible means. The Convention established the Terror; therefore we must insist on unrestricted absolutism. Voltaire has contributed to the development of the revolutionary spirit; therefore the torments and tortures he attacked are admirable and should be applied without scruple. This is no caricature. A simple perusal of the Gaceta de Madrid from 1815 to 1820 or after 1823 gives us hundreds of examples of such inferences, both in theory and in the most effective practice." Marías, José Ortega y Gasset, 24.
18. Ibid., 106. I have not employed the dating of generations found in Marías since our purposes are different. I wish to present an intelligible background for Marías' philosophizing about human life and, therefore, my treatment is general. In his study of Ortega, Marías' aim is to show the changes in prevailing attitudes (vigen-
cias) so he utilizes the concept of the generation as his method. Accordingly, he gives the date of Ortega's father's generation as 1856, that of the Generation of 1898 as 1871, and Ortega's own generation as 1886.

Ortega was never the unqualified Germanophile he was later made out to be. See, Wohl, op. cit., 129.

19. Marías, José Ortega y Gasset, 132. For Marías' complete treatment of Unamuno, see: Julián Marías, Miguel de Unamuno (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). Translated by Frances M. López-
Morillas.


21. Marías also became interested in this theme of "could have been." See: Julián Marías, La España posible en tiempo de Carlos III, Obras (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1955), VII. See, also: Wohl, op. cit., 123.

22. Marías, José Ortega y Gasset, 212.

23. Julián Marías, "A Chapter from the History of Ideas --
Wilhelm Dilthey and the Idea of Life," Concord and Liberty (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), 137. Translated by Helene Weyl, it was originally published by Ortega in 1933-34.

24. For Ortega's early critique of fascism, see: José Ortega y Gasset, Invertebrate Spain (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), especially Chapter XI, "On Fascism." Translated by Mildred Adams. Also see his first chapter, published before the outbreak of the Second World

25. José Ortega y Gasset, Some Lessons in Metaphysics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969). Translated by Mildred Adams. Unlike Descartes, for Ortega life -- not just mind -- is evident; it is knowing itself, being fully aware of itself. Ibid., 53. "I and
circumstance both form parts of my life."  Ibid., 77.

27 Ibid., 80-81.

28 Ibid., 130.

29 Ibid., 146; See: 152.

30 Ibid., 147, 155.

31 Ortega, The Modern Theme, 92, note.

32 Ibid., 35. On various occasions Ortega expressed his conviction that we were entering a new epoch, and needed a philosophy to meet its needs. What is different from the birth of other ages, he held, is that we are in full command of a clear historical sense of what is occurring. See: Ortega, "Chapter" in Concord and Liberty, 133.

33 Ortega, The Modern Theme, 90.

34 Ibid., 91. See: Antón Donoso, "Truth as Perspectival and Man as History: The Thought of José Ortega y Gasset," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 43 (1969), 139-147. José Ferrater Mora gives the name of perspectivism to the stage in the development of Ortega's philosophy intermediate (1914-1923) between the "objectivism" of his early neo-Kantianism years (1902-1913) and his final "rationalism." At this point in my study of Ortega I tend to think that he retained perspectivism as his epistemology thereafter. See: José Ferrater Mora, Ortega y Gasset (New Haven: Yale University Press, rev. ed., 1963). First published in 1957 by Bowes and Bowes of London as part of their Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought.

35 Quoted in Marias, José Ortega y Gasset, 190.

36 The other school of Kantianism in Germany at the time was Baden, a center for the problems of history, culture and values with Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915), the historian of philosophy, and Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), important in the theory of the natural and historical sciences. See: Ibid., 193-201.

37 José Ortega y Gasset, "Preface for Germans," Phenomenology and Art (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), 52-53. Translated by Philip W. Silver. The "preface" never appeared in Germany for the events in Munich by the Nazis so disgusted Ortega that he forbade the publication there of his Revolt of the Masses.

38 Marias, José Ortega y Gasset, 199-200.

124
Ortega, "Chapter," *Concord and Liberty*, 136-137.

Originally it was published in installments during the months of November and December 1933 and January 1934, in the internationally renowned journal Ortega had founded, *Revista de Occidente*, the occasion being the centenary of Dilthey (1833-1911).

Ortega, "Chapter," *Concord and Liberty*, 141.


Ortega, "Chapter," *Concord and Liberty*, 164.

Quoted by Ortega in *Ibid.*, 164, n. 28.


Unamuno, *op. cit.*, 1.


As early as 1939 a thesis written on "The Concept of the Tragic of Soren Kierkegaard and Miguel de Unamuno" by Richard Whitely Norton at the University of Illinois. See also: Jesus-Antonio Collado, *Kierkegaard y Unamuno* (Madrid: Gredos, 1962).


See: Julián Marías, "The Presence and Absence of Existential-


Ortega, Obras, VII, 61.


Marías has not published his memoirs and, from what has been told me by Professor Antón Donoso who interviewed him extensively on the relation of his writing to his life, Marías has no plans for doing so. There are, however, a number of autobiographical statements embedded in Marías' many essays and prefaces. These I have used to construct the brief biography I am presenting.
Among Marías' works is a series of what have been called "books on countries." Hardly the usual travel books, Marías' reflections on the cultures he visited can be seen to be grounded in his philosophical anthropology. There are collections of essays devoted to the United States, as noted in the previous footnote, Latin America, India, Israel, and Catalonia and Andalusia, two regions of his native Spain. Only the essays on the United States have been translated into English.

His teacher was from Cognac, and Marías refers to his own French accent as having the "aroma" of the region. Professor Alain Guy, the Hispanist from the University of Toulouse, testifies to Marías' fluency in French, as well as his friendship toward France. See: Alain Guy, Les philosophes espagnols d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, "Epoques et auteurs" (Toulouse: Privat, 1950), 331.

See: Arthur Goodfriend, "The Cognoscenti Abroad -- V: Julián Marías' Madrid," Saturday Review, 52 (June 11, 1969), 39-41. This is a fascinating account of Madrid through the eyes of Marías, who served as Goodfriend's guide. It shows Marías' love of the city, his outgoing attitude and his participation in the Spanish discussion group called the tertulia.


Besides Ortega and Zubiri, other philosophy professors who had a personal influence on Marías were Manuel García Morente (1886-1942) and José Gaos (1900-1969). Ortega had been the teacher of García Morente, while Ortega and Morente had taught Zubiri. The three were the teachers of Gaos. Gaos was Rector of the University of Madrid at the time of the Civil War and had to escape from the country at the victory of Franco, going to Mexico in whose National University he taught. He became the force in the spread of Ortega's philosophy in Mexico. See: Patrick Romanell, Chapter 5, "Perspectivism and Existentialism in Mexico," Making of the Mexican Mind (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), 111-185. García Morente, to whom Marías dedicated his first book, History of Philosophy, had been the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters when Marías was a student. He later became a priest and officiated at his marriage to Dolores Franco Manera. These figures are members of the "School of Madrid," the name Marías gives to the group that Ortega inspired. For a brief summary of their position, see: Marías, History of Philosophy, 452-468. Marías devotes essays to Morente and Zubiri in his collection Filosofía española actual (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, quinta edición, 1973). For a study of Zubiri see: José Ferrater Mora, "The Philosophy of Xavier Zubiri" in George Kline, ed., European Philosophy Today (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), 15-29.


72. In addition to a history of philosophy, Marías maintains there is a biography of philosophy. It is called such by him be-
cause it partakes of the lives of those who engage in philosophizing. It focuses on what philosophy has meant from the Greeks to contemporary philosophers. See: Marías, *Biografía de la filosofía*. Obras (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1962) II. An English translation by Harold C. Raley will appear shortly through the University of Alabama Press. It will include essays not in the original. For access to the English translation in manuscript I wish to express my thanks to Professor Raley.


74 A. Robert Caponigri of the University of Notre Dame has translated the word as "fundamental," while Professor Harold C. Raley of the University of Houston has translated it as "radical," considering it a technical term.


76 Marías gives 1646 rather than 1792 as the date. That is, he thinks the term was introduced earlier than Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and those utilizing his philosophy.


78 I am aware of the Thomist translation of both as "being."

79 Raley, *op. cit.*, 172.

80 See the fourth structural law in Ortega, *Man and People*, 80. It deals with the fact that things as perceived are perceived in a "pragmatic field," that is, as beneficial or harmful to us.

81 This is anthropology in the philosophical rather than scientific sense. It studies "man" or the human person, an ingredient in human life. See: Marías, *Metaphysical Anthropology*, "The Empirical Structure of Human Life" (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971), 53. Translated by Frances López-Morillas.


83 See: Ortega, *Man and People*, 65. The use of "appearance" and "reality" is my own. I do not mean to imply that Ortega holds these two aspects to be separable. For him both are given but not simultaneously known, and each is "real."
It seems to me that both Dilthey and Ortega had a desire to integrate reason into life. In this they resemble the neo-Thomists who did so by utilizing the Aristotelian notion of soul as having various functions connected with life, including reason. The Cartesians, on the other hand, had separated reason from life.

Chapter II: Metaphysical Anthropology


2. Founded in 1923, it opened up to the entire Spanish reading world, through articles and translations, the latest in continental philosophy decades before the English reading world had access to translations. "Through its pages Ortega's personality and philosophic perspective influenced thousands in Latin America during the thirteen years of its publication. An entire generation of Latin intellectuals saw the events of the world as thought through him." Antón Donoso, "The Influence of José Ortega y Gasset in Latin America," Filosofía, "Añais do VIII Congresso Interamericano de Filosofia," (São Paulo: Instituto Brasileiro de Filosofia, 1974), III, 45.


4. Julián Marías, "Prologue for American Readers" in José Ortega y Gasset, Meditations on Quixote (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963), 10. Ortega had objected to Unamuno's over emphasis on Don Quixote the person while ignoring Don Quixote the book that acted as the context or circumstance for the tragicomic character.

Julián Marías, José Ortega y Gasset: Circumstance and Vo-

6 Ibid., 10

7 Julián Marias, Metaphysical Anthropology (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1970), 87. Since this work will quoted a number of times in this chapter, hereafter the pagination will be given in the body of the work, preceded by "MA." References other than quotes will be in footnotes.

8 Ibid., 11.

9 Marias, Metaphysical Anthropology, 11.

10 Marias, "The Dramatic Structure of Philosophical Theory," Philosophy as Dramatic Theory, 51.

11 For Marias' use of the term "phenomenology," see the following pages in Metaphysical Anthropology: 28, 32, 100, 256.

12 Ibid., 59. It is used by Ortega in What is Philosophy? (New York: W.W. Norton, 1960), 30.

13 Marias, Metaphysical Anthropology, 50.


16 Ibid., 216-217.

17 Ibid., 214.

18 To anticipate a possible objection that could act as a stumbling block to following Marias on this point, such attributes as sexuality, having limbs, growing old, etc. can be said to be implied in the analytical structure. This Marias would agree to; however, he would insist that the implication -- really, co-implication -- is not known analytically (by analyzing the essential traits of life). They can be known only empirically, by actually observing them (after which their connection to the analytical is evident). Someone from another "world" would not know of these empirical attributes solely from the analytical ones. 
The first two books have been referred to already. The last essay appeared in English translation in the previously referred to collection: Philosophy as Dramatic Theory.

Julián Mariás, *La estructura social*, Obras (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1961) VI, 167-180. It has been translated by Professor Harold C. Raley and is scheduled to be published by the University of Alabama Press. I wish to express my appreciation for having been able to consult it in manuscript form.

I have used the word "man" in quotes when referring to both man and woman. I agree with Marias that the linguistic identification of the male with human life on earth in most languages is "obviously taking too much for granted." (MA, 152) Since it, equally, would be taking too much for granted to identify human life on earth with human life according to Marias' theory, I cannot use the word human in place of man. Marias contends that it is a possibility that human life exists, in a different empirical form, no doubt, elsewhere than on earth. Thus, I have retained the word man for human life on earth, but have put it in quotation marks.

This is Marias' re-expression of Ortega's "I am I and my circumstance."

Since only sexuate installation will be examined in any detail in this presentation, in the next section, a few words may be appropriate on the other forms of installation. Marias says very little about them in Metaphysical Anthropology. Although a chapter is devoted to language, only the context for discussing age is presented in the chapter on human life. There is virtually nothing given on race, caste and class.

Marias' consideration of language is situated within Ortega's notion of "utterance," or the need to communicate; as constitutive of human life. Indeed, "biographical life is possible only through utterance. . . ." (MA, 231) As such only utterance is a prerequisite for human life, language -- the speaking in tongues -- being a part of the empirical structure. It is, in this context, that language is said by Marias to be our fundamental interpretation of the world. For Marias, to live vectorially is to live temporally. This is a prerequisite of all life. "Man's" life is lived also through the cycles of "this" world. "Man" is aware of temporality on earth in the form of knowing "his" days are numbered, giving rise to ages in life: child, puberty, young-person, mature adult, and old person. Whatever the last age is, it is that beyond which there is no age. This treatment of human life is the context for Marias' consideration of the concept of generation, seen in his book, Generations, A Historical Method.

No treatment of race, caste and class are presented. Marias'
few words on each, however, are revealing of the outline of what an extended consideration would have included. The key aspect about his notion of race is that it cannot be viewed solely in biological terms, since to be human is to be more than biological. Furthermore, the historicity of human life on earth transforms biological race into "historicized biology." In other words, historical occurrences, social interpretations and usages permeate the human race. Marías' notions of class and caste both contain the aspect of being a "plurality." That is, one's class or caste is lived in view of all others. The notion of social class underlies Marías' study of social structure, especially as involving usages or "binding observ-
vances" (vigencias), as seen in La estructura social.

24. This is an abbreviated presentation. An example is the perspective that has identified the form of race with the human condition and sees all other modes racially.

25. Since I have found the expression "worldhood" too technical for this brief presentation, unless quoting, I have used "this world" instead. It seems to contrast more clearly with "world" (used to refer to any world).

26. The experiential presentation of things to us in this manner is what is called by Ortega the second structural law of the world. See: Ortega, Man and People, 66-67.

27. Marías rejects both the tendency to "thingify" "man's" body and its opposite view that "man" is an intelligence served by its organs such that "he" has a body. For Marías, "man" is not an intelligence. Rather, "he" is intelligent, which -- as he understands -- is a very different thing.

28. Marías, Metaphysical Anthropology, 132. See: Marías, "The Corporeal Structure of Human Life," Philosophy as Dramatic Theory, 165-183. This is the essay, published originally in 1952, to which Marías refers, at the beginning of the chapter on "Corporeal Installation" in Metaphysical Anthropology (123), as his earlier detailed consideration of the same theme. Here I wanted to point out the following: "... [I]f it can be said at all that man has a nature, it cannot be said that he is a nature, nor that he is simply natural." (169)

29. This is an earlier variation by Marías of his previously stated symbol for the vector as a metaphor of human life (as an arrow, then as the bow, arrow and target). In 1952 he wrote: "Almost twenty years ago I observed that the traditional symbol of knowledge, the arrow that hits the target, is incorrect. More exact would be the archer and the target, for here the archer is present twice -- first, where he is; and, secondly, in the target, to the degree that
it is a target for him." Marias, "The Corporeal Structure of Human Life," Philosophy as Dramatic Theory, 174. Twenty years earlier would have been 1932, the second year of Marias' studies at the University of Madrid, the first year he had Ortega as a professor. If he is referring to a published observation, he gives no source.

Perhaps -- even if a bit exaggerated -- it is the case that a child is the product of the carese, that the reality we call "child" is conditioned by the frequency and character of the caresses bestowed upon it. This parenthetical observation is seen in Marias, "The Corporeal Structure of Human Life," Philosophy as Dramatic Theory, 185.

Ibid., 186-187, italics in original.

Technology is [also] the intermediary that adapts [this new] reality to the human scale so we can understand and live with it. Ibid., 172.

Marias adopted the position of Alphonse Gratry (1805-1872), the French theologian-philosopher, on sensation. It seems to be a variety of the Aristotelian-Scholastic concept of sense powers as "rooted" in the soul along with the "intellectual" powers, in contrast with the rationalist notion of sensation as mechanical and non-human.

Marias, "The Corporeal Structure of Human Life," Philosophy as Dramatic Theory, 171. This seems to be an application of Ortega's fourth structural law, that things are perceived in "pragmatic fields," that is, as beneficial or harmful. See: Ortega, Man and People, 80.

This linking appears to be an application of Ortega's second structural law, that things appear to us in a context or field. See: Ortega, Man and People, 66-67. The organizing seems to be identical to Ortega's third structural law, Ibid., 75.

Although Marias disassociates himself from Freud because of the latter's naturalism, he does maintain that it was an "extraordinary discovery, indubitably a stroke of genius," on the part of Freud to place sex in the center of anthropology. Freud's concomitant error was to give a solely "sexual" interpretation of sex, omitting the "sexuate," and thus mistaking the part for the whole. This also reduced to data, that is, to a given, the dramatic and "arriving" reality of the person. See: Marias, Metaphysical Anthropology, 139. Also, Marias, "Psychiatry from the Point of View of Philosophy," Philosophy as Dramatic Theory, 111-163. Although not specifically devoted to Freud this article is an appropriate context for Marias' statements on him.
I have opted to follow Frances López-Morillas in the use of "sexuate" for sexual, as seen in her translation of Metaphysical Anthropology, even though there is no such English word in the dictionary, rather than James Parsons who translated it as "sexed" as seen in his translation of "The Corporeal Structure of Human Life" in Philosophy as Dramatic Theory.

There is no corresponding treatment by Marías of woman's response to masculine valor, to man's strength. Any mention of man's mystery to woman is also omitted. This is a point I shall examine in my section on observations.

It seems to me that Marías developed the implications for love in Ortega's position more fully than did Ortega himself. See: José Ortega y Gasset, On Love, Aspects of a Single Theme (New York: World Publishing Co., 1957).

Chapter III: Observations


Robert O'Connor, "Ortega's Reformulation of Husserlian Phenomenology," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 40 (1979), 59. Note the following: "It is my strong impression that most of those commentators on modern thought who must find affiliations and classifications tend to link Ortega with Heidegger. Although I am not aware of any influence of either man on the other, the contemporary philosopher closest to Ortega is Merleau-Ponty. Allowing for considerable difference in personality and intellectual style, their positions are so close that only Ortega's basic metaphysical insight enabled him to go beyond what Merleau-Ponty achieved."

Dixon, op. cit., 299, n. 7.

See: Conrad R. Dietz, "Ortega's Attempt to Restore the World," Laval Theologique et Philosophique, 26 (1970), 115. It was Marías who wrote: "All 'realistic' literature... makes the world into a vast repertory of 'data' or 'given' things, which 'are there' and can be listed, catalogued, and described. The realists -- I said many years ago -- are those who betray reality... with things." Marías, Metaphysical Anthropology (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971), 103, ellipsis in original.

Julían Marías, Metaphysical Anthropology, 133. References in this chapter hereafter will be given in the body as (MA).


See: James L. Christian, ed., Extraterrestrial Intelligence, The First Encounter (Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books, 1976). Of the fifteen contributors to this collection, seven are professional philosophers -- including Wilfrid Desan, well-known for his studies on Sartre.

Marías writes: "...according to Maritain, only those Catholics are Thomists who are sufficiently intelligent to be such; this is a statement in which Gabriel Marcel has found a self-evident example of venial fanaticism." Marías, "The Presence and Absence of Existentialism in Spain," loc. cit., 160.


José Ortega y Gasset, History as a System and Other Essays Toward a Philosophy of History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1962), 216-217, italics and first ellipses are in the original.

See: Fabiola Franco, "Ser and Estar in the Light of Modern Linguistics," Ph.D. dissertation for the University of Minnesota, directed by Professor A.N. Zaharias. I do not know its date except that it is recent (1979-1980). I did not consult this work since I lack the necessary background in linguistics. I refer to it merely to illustrate the in depth consideration that must be involved in making a critique of Marías' preference for estar over ser.

According to Caponigri: "Spanish distinguishes, in general and informally, two modes of being by its verbs, 'ser' and 'estar,' whereas English only uses one verb, 'to be.' When it means existence, 'ser' indicates a kind of essential existence; generally speaking, it is used to indicate what a thing is. 'Estar' is used to indicate, in general, how a thing is, what condition it is in."


Diccionario de la lengua española, Decimovena edición (Madrid: Real Academia Española, 1970), 1200, column A.


Marías, Reason and Life, 198.

See: Maryellen MacGuigan, "Is Woman a Question?", International Philosophical Quarterly, 13 (1973), 50h. MacGuigan deals with José Ortega y Gasset, Karl Stern, F.J.J. Bultendijk, as well as Marías. Of the four only Marías -- according to MacGuigan -- accurately locates the problem in human life and not peculiarly in woman.
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