Human rights in the Canada-China relationship: The impact of the Tiananmen Square massacre.

Paul Gecelovsky

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HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CANADA–
CHINA RELATIONSHIP: THE IMPACT
OF THE TIANANMEN SQUARE
MASSACRE

by
Paul Gecelovsky

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
through the Department of Political Science in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts at the
University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada
1993
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine human rights as a factor in Canada-China relations, especially in the context of the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989. Chapter One explores differing Canadian and Chinese perspectives on human rights and discusses the concept of "first priority rights" as a basis for formulating Canada’s human rights policies towards China and other countries. Chapter Two traces the development of Canada-China relations, especially from 1970 to 1989, and discusses the evolution of the theme of human rights in Canadian foreign policy. Chapter Three explores the specifics of the Canadian response to the Tiananmen Square massacre and the reasons why Canada responded to human rights violations in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in this instance when it had not previously done so. Chapter Four details the implementation of the Canadian measures as described in the preceding chapter, while Chapter Five attempts to account for the Canadian government's unwillingness to fully execute its stated plan of action directed against the Chinese government, especially in light of the Mulroney government's commitment to propagating human rights internationally. Finally, the last chapter, Chapter Six, summarizes the findings and sets out some prescriptions for Canada’s China policy.

This analysis demonstrates that, prior to the massacre,
the violation of human rights in China was a minor irritant in Canada-China relations, if it was a factor at all. The Canadian government only gradually developed an international human rights policy and at the same time it was preoccupied with fostering good relations with China for commercial and political/security reasons and thus did not allow human rights considerations to enter into the decision-making calculus. This study also shows that, with human rights becoming a prominent feature of Canadian foreign policy by 1989 and with the Tiananmen Square massacre generating widespread revulsion within and outside of Canada, the Canadian government felt obligated to take some serious action against the People's Republic of China.

The Canadian government's preoccupation with fostering better relations with China led it, however, to respond relatively weakly to the Tiananmen Square massacre, employing measures that were selective and limited and applied inconsistently. Outweighing the alienation of the Chinese that would have occurred had Canada responded harshly to the incident was the increased attractiveness of the PRC as a market and outlet for Canadian investment as a result of the economic reforms of the eighties. As well, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, China had become the most powerful communist state in the international system and, therefore, was regarded as increasingly important in political-security terms.
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Any inadequacies found herein are the exclusive responsibility of the author.
MAP OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

CHINA

SOURCE: IRBDC, December 1991
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine human rights as a factor in Canada-China relations, especially in the context of the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989. Its central focus is on how Canada's China policy was affected by the human rights violations perpetrated by the Chinese leadership on the Chinese citizenry in that month.

At the outset, it is important to establish the nature of the Canada-China relationship and the place of human rights in that relationship prior to Tiananmen Square. That is the purpose of Chapter Two which traces the development of Canada-China relations, especially from 1970 to 1989, and discusses the evolution of the theme of human rights in Canadian foreign policy. Chapter Three explores the specifics of the Canadian response to the Tiananmen massacre and the reasons why Canada responded to human rights violations in the People's Republic in this instance when it had not previously done so. Chapter Four details the implementation of the Canadian measures as described in the preceding chapter, while Chapter Five attempts to account for the Canadian government's unwillingness to fully execute its stated plan of action directed against the Chinese government, especially in light of the Mulroney government's commitment to propagating human rights internationally.
Finally, the last chapter, Chapter Six, summarizes the findings and sets out some prescriptions for Canada's China policy.

The primary reason for undertaking this study was the absence heretofore of a comprehensive analysis of the place of human rights in Canada-China relations and of the impact of Tiananmen on Canada-China ties. In the literature there are a number of works that deal with various aspects of Canada's relations with the People’s Republic of China. In the past, one of the most widely covered topics was the question of Canadian recognition of the People's Republic. The economic benefits accruing to Canada as a result of the recognition of China have also been a subject of study. Related to the recognition question, Professor Paul M. Evans at York University has conducted several studies analyzing parliament's influence and interest in Canada's relationship with China. Another area of enquiry has been the problems associated with attempting to effect change within China through the imposition of sanctions.

The issue of human rights in Canadian foreign policy has been one of the most widely debated topics in Canada. With respect to China, studies attempting to explain why the Tiananmen Square massacre occurred and what transpired during that period are readily available. Further, the PRC's nefarious history concerning human rights has been widely documented. In short, there are works dealing with
human rights violations in China, both in the past and in 1989, as well as literature concerning the various aspects of Canada's relations with the People's Republic. However, there is no work, prior to this one, that has evaluated systematically human rights as an issue in Canada-China relations both prior to and at the time of Tiananmen and attempted to explain the factors underlying the shaping of Canadian policy toward China in this domain.

At the outset, some clarification is needed regarding what is meant by the term "human rights". The basis for discussing "human rights" in the international realm is the International Bill of Human Rights which is comprised of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The International Bill encompasses a full range of civil, economic, political and social rights. Although both China and Canada consider this to be the foundation for all "human rights", each recognizes different "rights" as being preeminent.

In a move to clarify the Chinese position and to inform the international community what the present Chinese leaders believe the term "human rights" encompasses, in 1991, the government of China issued a white paper entitled Human Rights in China. In this 86-page document, the PRC emphasized economic and social rights over civil and
political ones. Included in "economic" rights are, inter
alia, the right to work, to free choice of employment, to
equal pay for equal work, to form and join trade unions, and
to rest and leisure.  "Social" rights guarantee that:

everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate
for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to
security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.  

In reality, the "human rights" question in China has a
simple answer: "there are no human rights per se; there are
only privileges granted by the state which the state can
also withhold or withdraw".  The Chinese Constitution
(1982) clearly asserts that every individual is entitled to
the rights outlined in the Constitution and that,
simultaneously, the individual must perform the duties
stipulated in the document. In exercising one's rights, an
individual cannot "infringe upon the interests of the state,
of society or of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms
and rights of other citizens".  

Given the fact that the Chinese constitution has
frequently been altered, in that country an individual's
rights and duties are in continual flux. As a result, the
Constitution is a "facade behind which rights that are pro-
offered on paper are readily withdrawn, modified or
ignored".  The revisions made to the Constitution are
often quite radical and are adopted to meet the changing needs of the Chinese leadership. Therefore, rights deemed important today can be, and often are, withdrawn at a future date without notice or recourse.

The social and economic rights actually delineated in the Chinese constitution are relatively concrete. For example, everyone is entitled to the right to eat and to work, rights that are tangible in comparison with such Western precepts as equality before the law or the right to political participation. However, with Chinese constitutions so mutable, rights rest on an insecure foundation, and when changes are made, they usually encompass the revocation of an entire set of rights, as in 1980 when Party Chairman Deng Xiaoping withdrew the right to criticize the government.17

By emphasizing the economic and social aspects of human rights, the Chinese leadership claims that it is being cognizant of the difficulties inherent in the drive to modernization—that there is a need for collective action within Chinese society if development is to occur. The welfare of the group is considered more important than the well-being of a single individual. An individual person's rights are considered "bourgeois" because the state provides the individual with what is necessary to live and be productive. Hence, any additional needs are merely for personal gratification at the expense of progress towards
modernization and of the collective.  

Also, the Chinese leaders feel that interference from foreign sources for human rights reasons flies in the face of international law. In their view, "the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, as a fundamental principle of international law, logically applies to matters of human rights". Any intrusion into the internal affairs of China by other states is not permissible since China is not guilty of practicing genocide or apartheid, the only two condition under which interference is allowed. 

Derived from the belief that state sovereignty prevails over human rights concerns is the notion that each state is a distinct and self-contained entity. Every state is accorded the opportunity to create its own set of human rights without interference from the outside. There are no international moral codes or legal influences that must be taken into account, and any external interference is regarded as an impediment to China's ability to determine its own future and thus a violation of the principle of self-determination. 

In short, the Chinese perception of human rights stresses social and economic rights that are concrete, yet mutable, collectively-based, subservient to state sovereignty and non-universal. 

By contrast, in Canada and the West in general, the
focus is upon civil and political rights. Civil rights include, inter alia, the freedom of association, conscience, expression, movement, religion, residence and thought; an individual’s right to life, free from arbitrary arrest, detention and killing, mistreatment, slavery, or torture; and equality before the law. Political rights may be understood as including the right to:

- take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; [and] to have access, on general terms of equality, to public services in his/her country.

Similar to the People’s Republic, Canada has enshrined the rights of its citizens in a document, the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Canada differs from the PRC in that its constitution is comparatively immutable. Changes to it cannot be made at the whim of the prime minister or leader as is the case in China.

In formulating civil and political rights, the issue of the individual necessarily occupies a prominent role. The civil and political rights outlined above are claims by the individual against the state. For example, an individual can protest against actions taken by the state without being penalized. Also, all qualified persons must be allowed to participate in the electoral process. Having secured the basic necessities of life, most Canadians concern themselves
with expanding their freedom in other areas, such as freedom of speech.

The issues of the particularism of rights and state sovereignty are closely related. If one accepts the notion that rights are particular to a state, as does China, then the sovereignty question is mute. If, on the other hand, one rejects this notion, as does Canada, then there is a legitimate basis for encroaching upon state sovereignty. In rejecting the view that all states are discrete and self-contained units, one accepts the view that there are similarities between and amongst states, a perspective that is supported by the "patent existence of supranational bodies and supranational value systems which are internationally endorsed".

Further, the particularist argument flies in the face of the recent progress that has been made at both the regional and international levels in devising a universally-accepted code of human rights. In the spring of 1993, representatives from 49 Asian countries, including China, met in Bangkok, Thailand, in an effort to draft their own definition of human rights. Although the Bangkok Declaration stressed the need for social order and was soft in avowing political rights, it, nevertheless, marked an improvement. It created a forum in which regional partners could air their views with each other, thereby commencing a dialogue that, in the absence of the conference, would not
have occurred. Later, in June 1993, states from the world over gathered in Vienna to participate in the UN World Conference on Human Rights. In total, 183 states took part. At the close of the meetings, the Vienna Declaration was issued, confirming the universality of human rights, extending rights to women, children and disabled persons, and pledging to create a UN High Commissioner on Human Rights.²⁸

Although progress towards an agreement on a universal set of human rights has occurred, it has been slow in coming. In order to facilitate negotiations, some rights should be decided upon which are "basic", "core" or "first priority" rights.²⁹ By adopting this approach of focusing on the "lowest common denominator" of rights, the international community would be assuring that all citizens possess the necessities for a productive existence.³⁰ The set of rights designated to be "basic" should include the "right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and protracted detention without trial, freedom from torture and other forms of cruel and inhumane treatment, freedom from extrajudicial execution, and freedom from the deliberate denial of the means of sustaining life, including the withholding of food and medical treatment".³¹ The list of rights presented are not culturally specific; rather, they are rights which are almost universally recognized as a legitimate basis for a productive human life. By creating a
list of "core" rights, a state's advancement towards fulfilling the delineated set can be tracked, whereas if there is no benchmark, then any movement, forward or backward, becomes difficult to establish. Once the "first priority" set of rights is attained, a state is likely to have created the environmental circumstances necessary to proceed to adopt a much wider range of civil, political, economic and social rights.

For the purposes of this thesis, the focus is on the limited set of "basic", "core" or "first priority" rights outlined above. The author does not believe that in adopting such an approach the essence of the argument is in any way compromised. Further, by narrowing the human rights focus, it is possible to concentrate on the central question—how Canada can help to pressure the Chinese government to decrease the number of Chinese who are arrested, imprisoned, tortured and executed in the People's Republic of China simply because they disapprove of government policies and demonstrate to show their displeasure.
CHAPTER TWO

HUMAN RIGHTS IN CANADA-CHINA RELATIONS PRIOR TO 1989

An understanding of the Canada-China relationship prior to the events of June 1989 is required if one is to grasp fully the changes in that relationship because of those events. Prior to 1989, the human rights situation in the People's Republic had little if any impact on Sino-Canadian relations. This chapter attempts to provide evidence of China's human rights abuses and Canada's failure to respond to the Chinese violations. Also, the reasons underlying Canada's failure to respond are outlined.

Historically, human rights violations in the Chinese People's Republic were flagrant and widespread. By whatever standards one employs, Party Chairman Mao Zedong's "abominable record" in human rights was indisputable. Even prior to the declaration of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Mao's use of murder as a political tool was well known. Following the Hundred Flowers campaign of 1956 in which Mao proclaimed freedom of speech for all, "two to three million counter-revolutionaries [were] executed, imprisoned or placed under control," and, later, in 1958, during the "anti-rightist" campaign, "700,000 were arrested, imprisoned or sentenced to do hard labour." It was also during this period that Mao decreed that five per cent of the people were 'class enemies' and 'reactionaries' and that
they, therefore, had to be deprived of their rights.\textsuperscript{35}

Notwithstanding the extent of the atrocities mentioned above, the worst of the Chinese leaders' excesses came in the period of the Cultural Revolution from 1966-76. Mao had envisioned this as the time in which the "spiritual transformation of the nation" would occur.\textsuperscript{36} However, in reality, the Cultural Revolution was "a disaster without precedent in five thousand years of Chinese culture" and a period in which an estimated 100 million lives were affected, with close to one million being lost.\textsuperscript{37}

With full knowledge of the heinous abuses inflicted on protestors in the past, some Chinese citizens still participated in demonstrations opposing the policies of the Chinese leadership. For example, in 1974, in Guangzhou, a trio of protestors, under the pseudonym Yi Li Zhe, in a wall poster charged that China had been transformed into "a lawless society not only because of the Cultural Revolution, but because of the political system itself".\textsuperscript{38} The protestors called on the government to legally guarantee democratic and individual rights. For their efforts, the members of the trio were arrested, subjected to an "education through labour" program and not fully "rehabilitated" (i.e. released from prison) until February 1979. The anti-government demonstrations of the Mao era climaxed on April 5, 1976 at Tiananmen Square when several hundred thousand people gathered to commemorate the death of
China's Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai. By honouring Zhou, the
mourners were implicitly supporting his and Deputy Premier
Deng Xiaoping's reform policies and, concurrently, attacking
the radical policies of the Gang of Four and Mao. The
police and public security forces were sent into the Square
where they "brutally suppressed" the demonstration.30

In March 1978, the first of the post-Mao anti-
government campaigns was launched when a few people began
pasting wall posters up at the Xidan crossing.30 The
content of the messages relayed by the 'dazibao' (wall
posters) generally fell within three categories: a
reappraisal of the role of Mao and the other leaders during
the Cultural Revolution and the 1976 Tiananmen Square
incident; personal complaints regarding the arbitrary use of
political persecution and miscarriages of justice; and calls
for democracy, justice and human rights. As the year wore
on, the number of posters increased to a point where Xidan
was no longer large enough and so some began to affix their
posters in Tiananmen Square and along Wang Fujian Street as
well. This outpouring of commentary from the masses was not
lost on Vice Premier Deng, who proclaimed on November 29,
1978 that the Xidan wall poster campaign was "a good thing
and could go on forever".31

Deng gave impetus to the wall poster campaign because
its presence aided him in his battle for control over the
Chinese leadership. The wall posters that criticized Mao
and the other leaders attacked the same contingent which had twice 'purged' Deng from their ranks; in other words, these were his rivals. Therefore, by opposing Deng's rivals, the wall posters were, in effect, giving Deng the apparent support of the Chinese people and he utilized this support to gain the upperhand in the Chinese leadership during the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee which was convened from December 18-22. Interestingly, the decisions arrived at by the party were "identical" to the concerns put forward in the wall posters.  

With control of the party leadership, Deng no longer needed the support of the Xidan Democracy Wall activists. As well, the wall poster writers began to get critical of Deng and his policies, advocating reforms beyond those Deng was willing to make. On March 16, 1979, Deng met with a group of high-ranking officials and told them that the Xidan Democracy Wall movement had "gone too far" and that henceforth all political debate was to uphold the 'Four Fundamental Principles' upon which Chinese Communist society was based. Following Deng's announcement, the prominent members of the democratic movement were arrested. One such individual was Wei Jingsheng, who had written an article entitled "The Fifth Modernization", charging that "without democracy, the Four Modernizations cannot be achieved". Another of his articles claimed that Deng had undergone a "metamorphosis" and was "no longer worthy of the people's
trust and support". For his writings, Wei was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment and an additional three years of deprivation of civil rights. The arrest of Wei for all intents and purposes ended the Xidan Democracy Wall movement.

In February 1980, the clampdown begun a year earlier was heightened when Deng proposed the abolition of the "Four Big Freedoms" that had been guaranteed in the 1975 and 1978 constitutions. The "Four Big Freedoms" included "speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates, and writing dazibao (wall posters)". A meeting in April 1980 of the Party Standing Committee upheld Deng's proposal and deleted the "Four Big Freedoms" from the constitution.

When Deng "opened" China to the West by way of his "Four Modernizations Plan", he did not foresee all the social implications of his actions. Deng's economic reforms resulted, by 1983, in a wealthier and more consumer-conscious Chinese society. Awash in Western influences, the populace of China was regarded by the Chinese leadership to be "spiritually polluted", so that in the fall 1983, the "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign was begun. In order to "eradicate [the] immoral influences caused by contacts with foreigners, especially Westerners", the movement "assailed bright clothing, foreign music and art, dancing, pornography, women curling their hair and, among other
things, persons raising goldfish'.' Also, during this period, the government instituted an "anti-crime drive" calling for sterner penalties for offenders to reduce crime and corruption. The conditions in China quickly degenerated. Provincial officials in all provinces were instructed to publicly execute a specific number of criminals as a deterrent for others; in total, 10,000 public executions were carried out throughout China in the fall of 1983. The "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign and the "anti-crime drive" began having an impact on foreign investors, who regarded the measures as detrimental to their investments because these actions attempted to "isolate China from the world". Due to the adverse investment climate caused by the introduction of the two programs, they were suddenly halted in early 1984. Although the "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign and the "anti-crime drive" were short-lived, they exposed Deng's "ruthlessness" and his "little regard for human rights".

In general, Deng attempted to silence dissent in China in ways similar to those used by Mao Zedong. In fact, there were "the same mass meetings to participate in, more public executions, the same intimidation,...and the same mass fear, arrests and alienation". Deng did, however, differentiate himself from Mao in the methods he used to control the Chinese masses in that he greatly expanded the practice of "education through labour". This is an administrative
system whereby dissidents, political and social undesirables and the unemployed are assigned to labour camps for a period of up to four years. Anybody can be assigned to labour camps against their will by someone of a higher authority. The length of sentences also varies because persons are regularly rearrested or reassigned.  

Turning to Canada's response to this human rights environment in China prior to Tiananmen, Canada acquiesced to the Chinese position that what occurred within the PRC was a domestic matter and not one to be discussed in bilateral or multilateral fora. One indication of Canada's acquiescence was the lack of parliamentary attention to human rights violations in China. In a study of Canada-China relations covering the period 1949-82, Professor Paul M. Evans and Daphne G. Taras found that "China's internal conditions" were addressed in the House of Commons on only 27 occasions. This corresponded to a mere 1.0 per cent of parliamentary discussion on China, with the country's domestic conditions ranking last among seven specific issues addressed by Canadian MPs. The other issues were trade (22.6 per cent of the total), Canada-China exchanges (7.7), recognition (7.2), China's external relations (6.6), Taiwan (6.4), and UN admission (3.4). Moreover, during the period in which China's most egregious abuses of human rights occurred, the Cultural Revolution, the House of Commons discussed the domestic situation in China a mere 7 times
(0.5 per cent of the discussion related to China). As well, between 1974 and 1982, there was no mention of China's internal conditions in Hansard, meaning that the Xidan Democracy Wall movement and the clampdown thereafter passed unnoticed or were at least not issues of enough importance to capture the attention of MPs. The lack of comment in the House of Commons concerning the internal conditions in China was indicative of an overall government inertia regarding human rights in China.

Proof of Canada's condonation of the persisting human rights abuses in the PRC can be found in several Canadian actions during the pre-1989 period. For example, in May 1968, China was at the height of the Cultural Revolution when Trudeau announced that Canada would proceed with recognizing the People's Republic, yet there was no mention of the atrocities committed by Mao at this time. In fact, Prime Minister Trudeau was to later praise the Chinese leaders for their efforts to "instill equality and greater social justice". Second, the Export Development Corporation (EDC) extended a $2 billion line-of-credit to China in 1979, further cementing Canada-China economic relations at a time when the Chinese leadership was in the midst of clamping down on the Xidan Democracy Wall movement. Third, unlike some countries guilty of violating human rights (eg. Poland, Afghanistan, Chile and Iran), China's human rights abuses were never mentioned in External's
annual reports. Finally, when Prime Minister Mulroney visited China in 1985 he did not mention the subject of human rights himself. Instead, he "delegated the thorny task to lower functionaries" and they were "coy on the human rights question", addressing it "not as a government concern, but as a concern to some Canadians". From the evidence presented, it seems that the Canadian government yielded to Chinese demands that the subject of human rights not be broached because this was a domestic concern of the People's Republic.

There are three principal explanations underlying the lack of importance attached by Canada to human rights considerations in Sino-Canadian relations prior to 1989. First, there was a lack of a credible base of information dealing with the domestic turmoil in China. Second, it was not until the late-seventies that Canadian policy-makers began to incorporate human rights issues into the Canadian foreign policy decision-making calculus. Finally, Canadians believed that they had an important, even a 'special relationship' with the Chinese which should not be disrupted by an undue preoccupation with moral issues. These explanations are examined in turn in the remainder of this chapter.

Lacking credible evidence regarding the extent of the population affected and the brutality of the measures inflicted upon the Chinese people by their government, there
was little that Canada or any country could do about the human rights situation in China. In its first report on China published in 1978, *Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China*, Amnesty International asserted that the shortage of dependable information on political imprisonment in China was due to, among other things, "the restriction of movement and the lack of free access to information". Amnesty's claim was backed up by the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights in the Carter Administration, Patricia Derian, who, in testimony to Congress, remarked:

> What we know documents serious human rights problems...[but] we do not know the full extent to which rights are denied [because] our normal sources of information—our diplomats, the media, government statements or reports, assessments of national, international or regional organizations, reports of individuals and nongovernmental organizations, are limited or nonexistent.

As well, the activities of the Chinese propaganda apparatus made it more difficult for foreign organizations and governments to collect accurate data on China. Fang Lizhi, astrophysicist, human rights activist and 1989 Nobel Peace Prize recipient, wrote that "about once each decade, the true face of history is thoroughly erased from the minds of Chinese society". In this manner, the Chinese Communist Party, through its policy of "Forgetting History", has been successful in keeping its "nefarious record of human rights violations...banned from memory and discussion inside China,...[and] largely overlooked by the rest of the
In a study of the number of persons placed under detention and sentenced in China in the period 1949-1984, Yuan-Li Wu found that of the 38,565 who were reported to have been arrested by the PRC news media, only 17,387 were sentenced. The fact that only 45 per cent of those arrested were sentenced is, by itself, disturbing, but the official figure for the number of Chinese arrested is grossly misleading given the information provided in the opening section of this chapter on China’s human rights abuses. Interestingly, during the Cultural Revolution, only 14,118 people were officially reported arrested and of those only 2,401 sentenced. The Chinese propaganda machinery was thus successful in covering up human rights abuses or at least in raising doubts in the West as to the number of Chinese affected and the harshness of their punishment.

The Canadian media’s biased coverage of the People’s Republic over the years immediately preceding Tiananmen was a further impediment to obtaining accurate information on China. In general, prior to Tiananmen Square, the Canadian print media portrayed China to its readership in an "almost exclusively positive" and "upbeat tone". Negative aspects of China were down-played while the positive aspects were stressed, causing the Canadian populace to have a distorted impression of China. "Once formed, such beliefs and images are tenaciously upheld, due to human tendency to
screen out contradicting information and to assimilate [only] information that supports one's perspective. The effect of this heavily positive reportage on the Canadian public and policy-makers was to make China, prior to June 1989, "a country of almost hypnotic allure".

Lacking a credible basis from which to draw information on China due to a paucity of reliable sources, to the efficient operations of the Chinese propaganda apparatus and to biased media coverage, the Canadian general public was not aware of the extent of the human rights abuses occurring in China. It is true that there were occasional stories in print, on radio or on television portraying the abuses of people, but these "prisoners were undefined hordes of people...[they] were nameless, faceless and anonymous". Thus, in essence, there were no groups in Canada pushing the Canadian leadership to call China to task for its treatment of its citizens. Conversely, there were those in both the Canadian business and farming communities who had very profitable relations with the PRC and would have actively opposed any government interference. The end result was that, prior to Tiananmen, the Canadian government was relatively quiescent on the question of human rights in China.

A second reason why China was exempted from criticism over its human rights record was that Canada only began to consider these issues in its foreign policy in the late
seventies. This development in Canadian policy was a result of, inter alia, US President Jimmy Carter making human rights a "central feature" of his Administration's foreign policy; the Third World becoming increasingly "impatient" with the continued oppression of the black majority in South Africa; and the growing awareness of the heinous human rights violations that were occurring throughout the world, most notably in Chile, Uganda and Kampuchea. These occurrences had an impact on Canadian foreign policy as evidenced by the difference in character of two statements made by Don Jamieson, then Secretary of State for External Affairs. In 1977, Mr. Jamieson stated that there were "no firm and fixed rules for raising and discussing what are essentially the domestic concerns of other states". The next year, however, he remarked that "Canada has moral and legal obligations to be involved in the promotion of human rights both at home and abroad".

This change in the orientation of Canada's foreign policy met with inter-party approval. Indeed, in 1978, Joe Clark, leader of the Conservative opposition, went farther than the government when he committed the Conservatives to not providing aid to governments which were gross violators of human rights. Later, in 1979, Mr. Clark delivered in part on his pledge when the Conservatives came to power, withholding aid from Vietnam due, inter alia, to the violation of human rights associated with the removal of the
"boat people". [73]

As the above statement and initiative by Joe Clark and the Conservatives demonstrates, one of the primary methods by which countries seek to effect change in other countries guilty of violating human rights is to decrease or, in extreme cases, to terminate aid. Jack Donnelly has noted that a state must import from other issue areas, such as aid or trade, any means by which it plans to retaliate against a violator of human rights. [74] Canadian foreign policy decision-makers have tended to use the aid lever rather than the trade lever as a means of expressing Canada's disapprobation of other states' behaviour with respect to human rights. Once again, attitudes towards the use of aid as a political instrument changed in the late seventies.

In March 1977, in answering a question as to whether Canada would link aid to human rights considerations as was being done in the US, Prime Minister Trudeau replied: "Until now we have not made it a condition of our assistance to starving people in the Third World that their government be above reproach. That is our general approach." [75] In 1978, however, Don Jamieson noted that:

Human rights considerations are,...a factor in determining aid levels and the orientation of programs....[0]n a few occasions when the human rights situation within a country has deteriorated to a stage where effective implementation of the aid program is made extremely difficult, Canadian assistance has been suspended or not renewed. [76]

This statement by Mr. Jamieson shows that the Canadian
government had adopted a more responsive, although still cautious, position by 1978.

The aid-human rights linkage was given further clarification in a 1984 document entitled Elements of Canada's Official Development Assistance Strategy. The following excerpt outlines the framework within which human rights considerations were to be considered when formulating policy:

Discerning the differentiation in the types and degrees of human rights violations and in the political and social milieux in which they arise, Canada has not developed a single, absolute normative standard against which to judge the human rights behaviour of other countries and to condition our political and economic relations with them. The approach has been to try and assimilate human rights considerations into the broader matrix of foreign policy and to determine the relative weight of human rights considerations in the light of overall objectives in particular circumstances.\(^\text{77}\)

The ad hoc, pragmatic approach subscribed to by the Trudeau government, as evidenced by the preceding quotation, resulted in inconsistent and punitive Canadian aid and human rights policies. Particularly revealing in this respect was the case of Indonesia.\(^\text{78}\) In 1964-65, Canada's food aid and all capital projects planned for Indonesia were terminated. The reason for this stoppage was Indonesia's assault on Malaysia. Indonesia was then led by Sukarno, an anti-Western dictator. Following the fall of Sukarno and the subsequent rise of Suharto and his pro-Western policies, Indonesia became more important to Canada. Thus, in 1979, a decision to concentrate more funds for development programs
in Indonesia was made. This decision was particularly troubling in an aid-human rights context because of the 1975 invasion of and continued repression of East Timor by Indonesia, causing the death of approximately one-third of the Timorese population through starvation and indiscriminate killings. An increase in aid in a period so replete with violations of human rights seemed in direct contradiction to Canadian policy as adumbrated by Mr. Jamieson in 1978. However, the policy could be reconciled with the 1984 policy pronouncement: apparently the "broader matrix of foreign policy" deemed the "relative weight" of human rights considerations to be substantially lower than those of an economic and political nature in the particular circumstances of Indonesia.

Other aid termination initiatives during the Trudeau period included Uganda and Chile in 1973, Cuba in 1978, Afghanistan in 1980, and El Salvador and Guatemala in 1981. These cases, including Indonesia, demonstrate several characteristics of Canadian aid and human rights policies prior to 1987. First, Canadian aid policy was punitive in nature. Where Canada reacted to human rights abuses it did so by terminating aid and not by trying to effect positive change within the offending state. Second, Canadian action lacked explicitness of purpose, in that human rights motivations for terminating aid were often not set out clearly. Third, there was a lack of consistency in Canadian
policy as exemplified by the Indonesian case where aid was terminated due to the actions perpetrated by one regime but not for similar offenses committed by a succeeding regime. Lastly, in all the cases cited in which bilateral aid was terminated the Canadian aid program was small and other Canadian interests were not damaged.  

In an attempt to illustrate the lack of consistency and resolve in Canada’s aid-human rights policy, Keenleyside and Serkasevich compared Canadian bilateral aid disbursements over the 1984-87 period with recipient states’ human rights rankings on a five-point scale, based on annual assessments of their records by Amnesty International. They found that approximately 70 per cent of Canadian bilateral aid was received by countries with serious to extreme human rights violations (i.e. that ranked from three to five on the scale). As well, extreme violators of human rights (category four and five countries) accounted for 48.5 per cent of total Canadian bilateral assistance. In their study, China was found to rank 16th as a Canadian aid recipient and had a human rights record which placed it as a category four violator, meaning that arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of people for their beliefs and for non-violent activities occurred on a "wide scale" and that "torture, extra-judicial killings and/or disappearances were a common part of life".

Thus, in the period up to 1987, China was clearly one
of those states that reflected the lack of focus in Canada's emerging new human rights policy. It was a serious violator of rights and yet at the same time an important recipient of Canadian aid, and at the same time a country with which Canada was carrying on a variety of other relations in an entirely normal atmosphere.

With the publication of three documents in 1986 and 1987, the Mulroney government outlined an expanded and more explicit aid-human rights policy linkage. One document, *Sharing Our Future*, succinctly set out the government's policy:

A basic principle of Canada's foreign policy is the promotion of human rights....As a starting point in Canada's development assistance policies, assessments of human rights policies and practices will be made concrete factors in decision-making on aid determination...[and] where it cannot be assured that Canadian assistance reaches the people for whom it is intended, government-to-government aid will be reduced or denied [or] channelled through our developmental partners at the grass-roots level.

Since the publication of the documents in 1986 and 1987, several initiatives have been taken to enhance the place of human rights in Canadian aid and foreign policy generally. A human rights unit has been created within CIDA; it is "responsible for ensuring that developmental assistance programs are consistent with Canada's overall policy concerns for human rights". Also, a training program in human rights has been implemented for CIDA and External Affairs personnel. Further, a manual for human
rights reporting has been developed by External for use at posts abroad in order to facilitate the preparation of annual reports of the human rights records of all states receiving Canadian aid.\(^7\)

Even though the Mulroney government attempted after 1986 to make human rights considerations a more prominent component within Canadian foreign policy, similar problems to those that confronted the Trudeau regime remained. Most prominent among these problems was what to do about a country that was a "systematic, gross and continuous" violator of human rights and also an important partner of Canada? Unfortunately, the Mulroney government responded in a comparable manner to the Trudeau government. In a follow-up to the Keenleyside-Serkasevich study referred to above, over the period 1988-91, Keenleyside found that there was "virtually no change" in the proportion of Canadian aid flowing to serious human rights abusers compared with the 1984-87 period, with 70.4 per cent of Canadian aid going to countries classified as category three to five violators and 43.2 per cent to extremely abusive states (category four and five abusers).\(^8\) In this latest period, China was found to have slipped to category five, i.e. it was one of the worst human rights violators, yet as a recipient of Canadian aid, it had climbed from 16th to third place.

In sum, a sizeable "rhetoric gap" remained in Canadian human rights policy after 1987; that is Canada’s verbal
declarations of concern were not backed up by consistent action. Thus, Canada's human rights policy, as expressed through its aid policy, continued to be marred by "hypocrisy", "inconsistency", and "the dubious selectivity of government in taking limited measures against some, but not all, states which it and the international community at large" had "acknowledged as serious offenders". Hampering efforts to bring human rights considerations to the forefront of Canadian policy was the "unwillingness" of Canada "to take action against countries with which it has substantial and growing commercial relations, even though the seriousness of their human rights abuses is recognized". China was certainly one of those countries with which Canada had "substantial and growing commercial relations" as the discussion below indicates. Therefore, Canadian criticism of the human rights situation in China remained muted even after human rights assumed a more prominent position in Canadian foreign policy after 1986.

A final reason why China's human rights record has not been an important component of Canada's China policy is that the Canada-China association has often been seen as an important, even a 'special relationship'. This 'special relationship' is viewed as having preceded even official recognition of the PRC. From the outset of Mao Zedong's tenure in 1949, Canada favoured recognition of the new government in Beijing. However, hampering Canada's ability
to proceed with recognition was, as John Holmes wrote, the "fact of American policy".\textsuperscript{74} American policy was based on the "fact" that the communist states were seeking to expand their influence by fomenting proletarian uprisings in non-communist states, and American policy-makers responded to the communist challenge by attempting to 'contain' communist states both in their geographic boundaries and in their international influence. The US policy of 'containment' as expressed through the Truman Doctrine was to hold sway with American policy-makers until the late sixties and it reappeared again in the eighties. The Canadian policy of liberal internationalism seemed to be at odds with this US policy in that Canada sought to bring all states into the world community, "to bind [them] by international organizations" so that "disputes could be settled amicably".\textsuperscript{75} In general, Canadian foreign policy decision-makers sought to bridge the ideological chasm separating Canada from China and, thereby, to bring about a more peaceful international environment, but they were halted by the overriding reality of American resistance to such an approach.

All was changed, however, on April 20 1968, when Pierre Trudeau assumed the office of Prime Minister of Canada. Prior to 1968, Canadian prime ministers had been long "skeptical of the bold stroke"\textsuperscript{76} of foreign policy, but "Mr. Trudeau knew exactly what he wanted to do with foreign
policy". With his ascendancy to office, Trudeau brought a new vision for Canada and, as important, the determination to implement it. What Trudeau wanted to do was change both the process and the content of Canadian foreign policy.

For Trudeau, Canadian foreign policy needed to be proactive, based on a rational calculation of the alternatives and determined according to the 'national interests' of Canada. He felt that for too long Canadian policy had been adversely affected by Canada's relationship with the US. Also, he believed that the only way to correct this was to reduce Canada's reliance on the US, thereby allowing Canada more leeway in its decision-making. Canada's China policy was to be one of the means used by Trudeau to "emancipate Canada from unnecessary American tutelage".

The new prime minister was quick to move to alter the content of Canadian foreign policy when on May 29, only a month after becoming Prime Minister, he made a major policy statement:

We shall be looking at our policy in relation to China in the context of a new interest in Pacific affairs generally. Because of past preoccupations with Atlantic and European affairs we have tended to overlook the reality that Canada is a Pacific country too. Canada has long advocated a positive approach to mainland China and its inclusion in the world community. We have an economic interest in trade with China--no doubt shared by others--and a political interest in preventing tension between China and its neighbours, but especially between China and the United States. Our aim will be to recognize the People's Republic of China government as soon as possible and to enable that government to occupy the seat of China in the U.N.,
taking into account that there is a separate government in Taiwan.**

Negotiations between Canada and China to establish formal relations commenced in Stockholm in February 1969. The negotiating process was drawn out and arduous. Complicating negotiations was Chinese intractability regarding the 'three constant principles'** on which formal relations could be established and the Canadian refusal to agree to all three. The Canadian officials could not accede to the Chinese condition that Taiwan be accepted as 'an inalienable part of Chinese territory'. The impasse in the negotiating process was overcome when the Canadian delegation devised the 'take note' formula so that in the announcement of mutual recognition, Canada took note of China's position regarding the status of Taiwan without endorsing or rejecting it.** Thus, in the end, on October 10, 1970, the Canadian and Chinese ambassadors in Stockholm signed the agreement normalizing relations between the two countries.

Following the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1970, Canada continued to foster the notion of a 'special relationship' with China. Of particular importance to Canada was the further development of the Canada-China trade relationship, and, as a means of increasing trade prospects, Canadian officials periodically journeyed to China. Another important factor in the Canada-China relationship was the evolution of an aid program for China. Finally, cultural,
academic and athletic exchanges increased the 'people-to-
people' linkages of ordinary citizens of both countries.
Each of these aspects of the bilateral relationship is
elaborated upon in the following paragraphs.

With respect to the trade relationship, economic
linkages between the two countries pre-dated the 1970
Canadian recognition of the PRC. Indeed, former Prime
Minister John Diefenbaker initiated wheat sales to China in
1960. Subsequently, Canadian exports rose from $4.3
million in 1959 to $125.5 million in 1961. In 1971,
Canadian exports to China totalled $204.1 million, with
grain comprising $190.7 million or 93.4 per cent of exports
(see Table 1 below). Exports increased by 26.7 per cent in
1972 to total $258.6 million, of which $227.3 million or
87.9 per cent was grain shipments.

In June 1971, in an effort to increase and diversify
Canadian exports to China, Jean Luc Pepin, Minister of
Industry, Trade and Commerce, led a group of business and
government representatives to the PRC in order to meet with
Chinese officials and to inform them of the wide range of
products that Canadian businesses were ready to sell to
China. The following year, in August 1972, the
Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp,
travelled to Beijing where he opened up a solo Canadian
Trade Fair. The fair was the largest one Canada had ever
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*In 1988, Statistics Canada altered its reporting format for exports. No longer was wheat reported as a separate category, it was subsumed in all inclusive cereals category.*
held outside of its own jurisdiction; it included 200 Canadian companies with over 500 representatives. In Canada, during this same time, the Chinese Foreign Minister opened the Chinese Trade Fair at the Canadian National Exhibition in Toronto.102

More important than either the Pepin or Sharp visits was the October 1973 visit to China by Trudeau. Trudeau was the first Canadian head of state to ever visit China. He had previously sojourned to China in 1949 and 1960 and during his 1960 visit he had met and befriended the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai.103 Trudeau's familiarity with China and its leaders was evident during his 1973 visit when he met with both Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong.104 The congenial spirit of the meetings and the amicable relations between the two countries led Zhou to sign a bilateral trade agreement, something that "as a rule" he never did.105 In addition, the two sides signed agreements and understandings in the areas of medicine, culture, sport, education, science and technology, consular matters and the re-unification of families.

By the time of Trudeau's visit, international competition for market share in the Chinese market had become extremely competitive due to the 'thaw' in relations between China and other Western states which had followed in the wake of the Canadian recognition, especially the improvement in Sino-American relations. Indeed, Canadian
excitement over the China market, by the late seventies, "had been dimmed by the belated realization that China trade required a great deal of hard work and more realistic expectations as to what could be achieved". For Canada, other more lucrative markets, most notably those of South Korea and the ASEAN member states, were being overlooked due to the inordinate amount of attention given to China. Also, after the deaths of Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Mao Zedong in 1976 a struggle ensued for the leadership of the PRC and it was not until 1979 that effective control was exercised by Deng Xiaoping.

Upon coming to power, Deng implemented a program of sweeping reforms that affected "virtually every aspect of political and economic life in the PRC" and that represented the "most decisive shift in Chinese society since the communist accession to power in 1949". The "Four Modernizations Plan" was announced at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978. In this Plan, the Chinese leaders sought to re-equip China's agricultural, defence, science, and technological industries with state-of-the-art techniques and manufactures.

In 1979, in response to the Chinese enunciation of the "Four Modernizations Plan," Canada, through the Export Development Corporation, extended a $2 billion line-of-credit to China. Up to that time this was the largest line-of-credit ever awarded to a foreign country and it was only
one of two extended by Canada in the eighties.  

China's 'Open Door' was pushed ajar a little farther in December 1984 when the "Four Modernizations Plan" was expanded. The Chinese Premier, Zhao Ziyang, wrote an article for an issue of The Atlantic magazine, asserting:

China is ready to develop trade with all countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, to import advanced technology and key equipment from abroad, to draw on foreign management experience, and to make use of foreign funds—all for the purpose of speeding up China's modernization.  

Later, China identified as priorities for its economic development the importation of advanced technologies for the energy, telecommunications and raw materials sectors; the importation of thermal, hydro and nuclear power generation equipment; enhancement of mining and mechanization capabilities; solutions for transportation difficulties; and the development of oil and natural gas reserves. All of the above priorities set for China's development were in market areas where Canadian businesses were capable of competing internationally.

As part of the reforms instituted by Deng, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Canada in January 1984. During his visit, Zhao became the first Communist leader to ever address Parliament. Following Zhao's visit to Canada a number of other high-level Chinese officials made calls, including Li Xiannian, the President of the PRC, who visited in 1985.

In the year following Li Xiannian's visit to Canada,
Prime Minister Mulroney travelled to China. In the course of his visit, he announced that Canada would be doubling CIDA’s bilateral aid contribution to China to $200 million between 1987 and 1992 and that Canada would be establishing a $350 million concessional financing line within the $2 billion line-of-credit for China that had been set up in 1979, as indicated earlier.\textsuperscript{113}

When Mulroney returned to Canada, the government decided that the time had come for Canada to fully review its relations with China. The volume and dollar value of transactions conducted by Canadian business with China had become overwhelming. For example, at a 1985 Marketplace sponsored by External Affairs, trade commissioners from the world over came to Canada for one month in order to inform Canadian businesses of the various economic opportunities that their markets held for Canadian businesses. During the month, the Chinese trade commissioners conducted over 1,000 interviews with potential Canadian investors, second only to the number for the US. In 1986, one observer noted that "the sheer volume of contracts being tendered and the number of Canadian firms interested in that market make it almost impossible for those in External Affairs in Ottawa responsible for China and those in the embassy in Beijing to cope with the press of requests for information."\textsuperscript{114}

The review process started after Mulroney’s return from China culminated in April 1987 with the announcement of the
"Canadian Strategy for China". This plan was to "ensure a focussed, co-ordinated and dynamic policy approach to Canada's relations with China". The new "strategy" was to build upon the recent achievements in the Canada-China relationship, including China being targeted as a "priority market" in the National Trade Strategy, the opening of a Consulate General in Shanghai and the expansion of the CIDA program in China.

Also included in the "Canadian Strategy for China" was the $350 million concessional financing line within the EDC's $2 billion line-of-credit for China that had been announced by Mulroney during his 1986 visit to China. The concessional line was required because the Chinese were reluctant to import from Canada goods other than grains and raw materials. Part of the Chinese reluctance was based on the inability of Canadian suppliers to provide goods of equal quality to those of the US, Western Europe and Japan at comparable prices. Also, Chinese officials continued to perceive of Canada as a "supplier of agricultural products" due to the dominant position of the Canadian Wheat Board and the Saskatchewan Potash Corporation within the Canada-China trade relationship.

The concessional line of financing did aid Canadian business in overcoming some of the obstacles impeding trade with the Chinese. Other sources of financing were, however, also used to expand Canadian exports to China. The $2
billion EDC line-of-credit was drawn down by $472.6 million
between 1985 and 1988 inclusive. An additional $22.15
million was provided to Canadian businesses under various
government programs including the Program For Export Market
Development ($5.4 million), the National Trade Strategy
($1.75 million) and the Industrial Cooperation Program of
CIDA ($15 million).

Joint-ventures also played a role in fostering the
Canada-China "special relationship". Northern Telecom
became involved in a joint-venture to produce digital
watches and the Nova Corporation in a variety of energy and
petrochemical projects. Numerous joint-venture hotels were
also launched. The attractiveness of the joint-venture
option became more apparent in 1988 when the Department of
External Affairs published a guide book for Canadian
business entitled Joint Ventures with the People’s Republic
of China: A Primer for Canadian Business.

The Chinese have also been affiliated with Canadian
businesses in Canada. For example, in 1989, the China
International Trade and Investment Company invested $94
million in the Celgar pulp mill in Castlegar B.C.127

As a result of both the Canadian government’s and
business’ efforts, by May 1989, over 30 Canadian companies
with approximately $240 million in capital were operating in
China128 and 40 Chinese companies were operating in
Canada in industries as diverse as fox-breeding, furniture,
petro-chemicals, pulp and paper, and coal.\textsuperscript{121}

Table 1 displays graphically the results of these numerous efforts to foster economic linkages between the two countries. By 1988, Canadian exports to China had climbed to $2.6 billion with China accounting for 2.4 per cent of Canada’s worldwide exports. It also ranked in that year as Canada’s fourth largest export market. Throughout the period 1960 to 1988, Canada regularly enjoyed a surplus in trade with the PRC, reaching a high of $1.6 billion in 1988. Moreover, over the years, Canadian exports to China steadily diversified, with the percentage of the total comprised of wheat dropping from 97.7 per cent in 1961 to 35.6 per cent in 1989. At the same time, Canadian imports from China steadily expanded over the years so that the balance in Canada’s favour which at one time exceeded a 10 to 1 ratio had altogether disappeared by 1989. In sum, an important commercial relationship gradually developed between the two states.

Another important aspect of the Canada-China relationship was the extension of Canadian bilateral assistance to China through CIDA starting in 1981.\textsuperscript{122} Cabinet’s decision to commence a bilateral aid program to China was influenced by China’s acceptance of assistance from multilateral sources. Throughout the seventies, Canada and China had conducted a large number of scientific and technology exchanges.\textsuperscript{123} The announcement by the Chinese
leadership of the adoption of the "Four Modernizations Plan" meant that China would require greater technology and knowledge transference than hitherto had been the case. For China to develop according to the "Plan", it required massive inflows of both technical knowledge and capital.

To further its rate of economic development, in 1978, China joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and asked to join the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The next year, China accepted $19 million of indirect aid from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in order to ease the financial difficulties caused by the inflow of Vietnamese refugees. Decisions by the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to commence programs in China meant that Canada was indirectly involved in providing assistance to the PRC before the initiation of its bilateral program. Canada began its direct involvement in providing assistance to China in 1979 when "the Canadian International Development Research Council (IDRC) concluded an agreement with the PRC to establish China's first bilateral development assistance program with a Western country since the Communist victory in 1949".  

From this modest beginning, Canadian bilateral aid disbursements to China soon grew to comprise one of the
largest bilateral aid components within CIDA. In 1981-82, Canadian disbursements of bilateral aid to China totalled a mere $4 million. Within four years, however, China became an important recipient of Canadian aid, receiving $8.37 million in 1984-85, ranking China sixth in Asia and 24th in the world as a recipient of Canadian bilateral aid. By 1988-89, China had jumped to fourth position in the region and sixth in the world, with bilateral disbursements totalling $38.91 million. Within less than a decade, Canada's aid program to China had evolved to become "one of the most valued instruments" in the Canada-China relationship.123

Also included in cultivating the "special relationship" were cultural, academic and athletic exchanges. There had, in fact, been an increasing number of these since the 1970 recognition, leading Joe Clark to state in 1989 that "exchanges with China of scientists, students, cultural groups and sporting teams have become common".124 Of note was the decision in 1976 by the Trudeau government to not allow Taiwanese athletes to represent China in the Montreal Olympics; Taiwanese athletes could participate only as representatives of Taiwan. The Canadian government effectively withstood pressure from the Ford Administration in the US, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Taiwanese government to allow athletes from Taiwan to participate as the representatives from China. The
ramifications of this act on Canada-China relations are difficult to ascertain. However, the Chinese government was "grateful" for Canada's support on the issue. This was a tangible signal to China by the Canadian government of its commitment to the PRC.

The practice of twinning Canadian and Chinese provinces and cities also played a role in further developing the Canada-China relationship. For example, the Canadian province of Ontario is twinned with Jiangsu; Alberta with Heilongjiang; Saskatchewan with Jilin; British Columbia with Shandong; and Manitoba with Liaoning. The Canadian city of Toronto is twinned with Chongqing; Calgary with Daqing; Saskatoon with Shijiazhuang; Victoria with Suzhou; and Regina with Jinan.

As an indication of the amicable state of their relations prior to June 1989, the Canadian government designated May 1989 as 'Friendship Month' between Canada and China. In accordance with the 'Friendship Month' designation, the Canadian Embassy in Beijing sought to create new, more diversified linkages between Canadian and Chinese businesses, and in this context the Embassy adopted the ironic theme 'Sharing Our Future'. It must have been distressing for Embassy officials, who had just completed 31 days of trying to forge new ties, to have to recognize that their work was in vain when the Tiananmen massacre disrupted the hitherto steady advance of cordial bilateral relations.
The closeness of relations between Canada and China prior to Tiananmen is evidenced by the comments of two noted China observers, Allen Abel and Earl Drake. When he was a correspondent for the Globe and Mail in Beijing, Allen Abel noted that Canadian officials were "hardpressed to find a single bone of contention lodged in the craw of Sino-Canadian relations". In an interview shortly after being named Canadian Ambassador to China, Earl Drake remarked that Canada's political relationship with China was "excellent" and that there were "no standing political problems" between the two and that Canada and China "share[d] general objectives".

Believing that Canada had an important and, indeed, a 'special relationship' with China, Canadians treated the Chinese as a 'special case'. Unlike the Soviet Union, China was "the acceptable face of communism—the mysterious Middle Kingdom embracing capitalism and trying to become like the West, the land of endless business opportunities, so completely different and more enlightened than the Evil Empire". Canadians also tended to be "optimistic" and "naive" about China. They allowed the developments in China to deceive them because they "want[ed] to be deceived". As well, into the late eighties, Canadians continued to bask in the glow of their accomplishment of easing China's entry into the international fold. Thus, "[f]or 20 years Canadians looked the other way" believing
that "through diplomatic recognition" they "had encouraged a slow process of liberalization in China". One observer cogently summed up the Canada-China relationship prior to June 1989 as follows:

...the Canadian government, media and many sections of the public had looked at China with rose-coloured glasses. China was the home of a wonderful culture, fascinating economic and political experiments and a booming economy...[so] no-one ever asked about how many people suffered during the cultural revolution or how many Chinese were in jail because they dared to be Christians or to advocate democracy.\textsuperscript{122}

The preceding analysis suggests that human rights considerations had little if any impact on Canada's relations with the PRC prior to the Tiananmen Square massacre. There was no domestic lobby seeking improvements in the human rights conditions within the PRC due to a lack of information detailing the extent of the population affected and the brutality of the measures inflicted upon the Chinese populace by the Chinese government. Although the Canadian government attempted to increase the importance of human rights issues in Canadian foreign policy, these efforts mostly remained in the realm of rhetoric, especially with respect to states where overriding importance was attached to economic considerations by the policy-makers and China was such a case. In regarding the Canada-China relationship as 'special', Canadians in general, including the government, misperceived the People's Republic, creating an illusion of China as progressing towards the twin goals
of 'freedom and democracy' when what Deng wanted was to increase the economic resources of the state while preserving an iron political fist.

The incidents of June 4, 1989 were particularly offensive to the Canadian government and people because their illusions of China were smashed. With every bullet fired the true face of the totalitarian regime of Deng Xiaoping was revealed and it scared Canadians. After June 4, 1989, there was, then, a feeling of betrayal because for so long Canadians had been fostering the "special relationship" and with this one act all the efforts of the past eighteen years were trivialized. Canadians in general displayed a "deeply-felt sense of horror and outrage" and, as one Canadian observer of China wrote, "the old love affair had ended".
CHAPTER THREE

CANADA’S REACTION TO THE TIANANMEN SQUARE MASSACRE

In the early morning hours of June 4, 1989, acting in his capacity as permanent vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, State President Yang Shangkun ordered the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to use "lethal force" to quell a major demonstration in Tiananmen Square. Thus began a campaign of terror waged against the citizens of Beijing and China in general, for the "counter-revolutionary rebellion" quickly spread throughout the country.

Chinese military forces raked the Square with machine-gun fire and also crushed demonstrators under the treads of PLA tanks, leaving the death toll at between 700 and 7,000 persons. The actual number probably will never be known because many of the massacred were either burned or transported out of the city and disposed of secretly.

This "restoration of order" was captured by the international mass media which happened to be in Beijing to cover Mikhail Gorbachev’s historic visit to China. Gorbachev’s visit was to mark the end of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Mass media coverage of the event meant that in millions of homes across the globe people witnessed the brutality of measures which some Chinese leaders utilized in order to retain their hold on power. Horror and revulsion
at the pictures in the press and on television led to immense public sympathy for the fighters for "freedom and democracy".

The public abhorrence of the atrocities committed in Tiananmen Square rendered a swift response by governments necessary, for people in many states cried out for the imposition of harsh retaliatory measures. Immediate action was required and the most favoured means through which protest could be manifested was the imposition of a range of sanctions.

The Chinese Ambassador in Ottawa, Zhang Wenpu, was summoned to the Department of External Affairs on June 4 by Joe Clark, then Secretary of State for External Affairs. Upon his arrival, Zhang Wenpu was met by Raymond Chretien, Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, who then lodged Canada's protest and condemnation concerning the use of force in quelling the demonstrations.

On June 5, in an emergency debate in Parliament on the crisis in China, Joe Clark outlined Canada's policy. The Canadian approach was to build upon two premises: the need to safeguard Canadian lives and the need to pressure the Chinese Government. Clark called upon the government in China "to urgently and immediately take steps to stop the aggressive and senseless killing by its armed forces". He indicated that Canada would make available humanitarian assistance or medical supplies as needed. Also, Canadians
in China, of whom there were approximately six hundred, were advised to leave Beijing. Clark then proceeded to set out the following bilateral initiatives that Canada was taking or had already taken:

- all events that were planned for the near future were cancelled;
- the signing of a series of memoranda of understanding regarding Canada's developmental assistance projects worth approximately $60 million was postponed;
- nuclear co-operation consultations due to begin the next week were suspended;
- all high level visits were delayed until a "more appropriate time";
- the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations was instructed to consult with other members and the Secretary-General regarding effective means by which moral suasion could be brought to bear upon the Chinese leadership;
- with regards to Chinese students and immigrants in Canada, student visas were extended until "calm returned to their homeland" and the Immigration Act pertaining to "removals to China" was suspended for a two month period; and
- the Canadian Armed Forces' modest program of defence relations with the People's Liberation Army was suspended as well as any export permits for military sales.

In addition, on the weekend of the incident, Clark considered recalling the Canadian Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, Earl Drake. However, Drake wanted to remain in Beijing until all Canadians who desired to leave had been airlifted to safety. Drake was subsequently recalled to Ottawa on June 13 after a complete review of Canada's relations with China was decided upon.
On June 30, in a broad-ranging statement, "China and Canada: The Months Ahead," the government made a further announcement regarding its reaction to the events in China earlier that month. This statement was a more precise and detailed outline than that of June 5 with respect to Canadian policies towards China in the aftermath of Tiananmen.

The June 30 statement set out "four basic parameters" which framed the accompanying policy initiatives. First, the nature of the relationship between China and Canada had been altered and Canada could not accept the "business as usual" stance of the Chinese Government. However, and this was the second point, Canada still valued its friendship with China and had not become and was not becoming "anti-China". Third, measures which tended towards isolating China were to be avoided. Fourth, Canada, in an attempt to maximize the effect of any measures employed, would strive to adopt a "coordinated approach of like-minded countries".141

In accordance with these "basic parameters", Canadian policy was to follow three broad criteria in order to "reflect the new reality in China". First, the links developed over the past decade were to be retained "to the extent possible". Second, "people-to-people exchanges" were to be the focus of any new initiatives. Lastly, "programs which benefitted or lent prestige to the current hardline
policies of the Chinese government, most particularly the
count this, state propaganda apparatus," were to be
"avoided".  

With respect to the "basic parameters" and the "broad
criteria", a series of further measures were adopted to
clarify Canada's position vis-à-vis China. At the "overall
political relationship" level, the June 30 statement
retained the ban on high-level contacts with the Chinese
government announced on June 5. In addition, it was
indicated that Canada would continue to pursue human rights
activities related to China in UN agencies, especially the
Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Human
Rights.

With respect to new initiatives, measures were imposed
on the development assistance front. Aid to three specific
projects was withdrawn because they failed the test of the
new criteria. The three projects, worth $11 million, included support for state auditor training, a lube oil
centre in the city of Lanzhou, and a training program for
urban traffic management. As well, four of the five aid
projects, worth $60 million, suspended on June 5, were to
remain suspended; only a project linking community colleges
was allowed to proceed. Canadian financing for the $13.2
billion Three Gorges hydroelectric project was also
suspended indefinitely.

Commercial actions were also included in the June 30
statement. Canada's trade representation in Beijing was to be "downgraded"; trade show funding was terminated for the balance of the year; and an examination into the slowing and possible stopping of the liberalization of the Co-ordinating Committee on Multinational Export Controls (COCOM) sanctions against China was undertaken.

Measures to assist the Chinese people in the face of the new repression were also announced. Canadian immigration capacity was to be improved through an increase in processing capabilities in both Beijing and Shanghai. "Priority" was to be given to students and people with family in Canada. Further, the visas of the Chinese students already in Canada were extended up to one year. In the cultural and communications field, Ottawa announced the advancement by ten months of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporations's plan for its Radio Canada International operations to commence Mandarin broadcasts into China.

In sum, the Canadian actions, when compared with past sanctioning activities against other countries, were fairly extensive, although many of the initiatives were symbolic in character and the overall effect on Canada-China relations was limited. In other words, Canada's response was middle level in character.

The remainder of this chapter seeks to explain the rationale behind the Mulroney government's imposition of the range of sanctions detailed above. It discusses the
factors that led Ottawa to take this initiative, why this action was selected over a fuller range of sanctions, including the full suspension of bilateral aid, or conversely a more limited response, entailing perhaps only the use of quiet diplomacy. In order to facilitate the analysis, a framework comprising three categories of variables--international, domestic and governmental--is utilized.

**International Influences**

The Chinese reaction to the measures announced by Western governments in the immediate aftermath of the tragedy was initially one of "surprise". The Chinese leaders regarded their actions as being "remarkably restrained by Chinese standards". Also, they felt that the matter was a domestic one and that their policies should not be the subject of international debate or censure. The Chinese policy was clearly outlined in a June press conference held by State Council Spokesperson Yuan Mu:

> Already there are people openly accusing us, saying we will not be given this and we will restrict that...and institute so-called sanctions against us. As far as that is concerned, I have been authorized by State Council leaders to explain two things before international opinion. First, we are not afraid. No matter whatever means, whatever accusations and whatever sanctions are levelled against us the Chinese government will never agree to any and people will never agree to any interference in our internal affairs. We are not soft spined. Even if this causes us some temporary difficulties, we will get by....Second, we hope that international opinion and foreign governments will take a long term view....If they take
a long term view they will see that it is not enough reason to take extreme measures to excite the feelings of the Chinese government and people.\textsuperscript{147}

The message to the international community from the Chinese leadership was clear: accept what was done as an internal matter and get back to 'business as usual'.

The Chinese position did not, however, meet with approval in the West. Indeed, there was a "constant exchange of cues between and among western states as they sought to co-ordinate their behaviour"\textsuperscript{148} in an attempt to have a greater impact on China. Alone, Canada could have no effect on China, but as part of a larger contingent it could be a useful participant in the application of pressure. Most important to Canada were the reactions of the US and Japan.\textsuperscript{149} The importance of the US to Canada is obvious, Japan, however, was important in that it occupied a "unique position to exert effective pressure" on China.\textsuperscript{150}

The Canadian response to the happenings in Tiananmen Square can be partly understood by an examination of the American response to the incident. On June 5, President George Bush stated that the "US cannot ignore the consequences [of the violent and bloody attack on the demonstrators] for our relationship with China".\textsuperscript{151} Further, Bushremarked that US policy was "a reasoned, careful action that takes into account both our long-term interests and recognition of a complex internal situation in
China. Bush then proceeded to outline American policy, stating that the government intended to:

1. suspend all government-to-government sales and commercial exports of weapons;
2. suspend all visits between senior US and Chinese military officials;
3. sympathetically review requests by Chinese students in the US to extend their stay; and
4. offer humanitarian and medical assistance, through the Red Cross, to those injured during the fighting.

The adoption of further sanctions by the US was not ruled out if the violence continued. On June 29, the US House of Representatives voted unanimously to enact Bush's "four steps." Although the House approved Bush's initial response, some House members felt that the president was being too lenient and so included in the legislation the suspension of "new trade and development funds and insurance for US private investment under the Overseas Private Investment Corporation," a body that supports US investments abroad by providing US investors with insurance. As well, the House debated additional sanctions which could be imposed, including, inter alia, revoking China's most-favoured nation status and restricting new Export-Import Bank loans. It also recommended that new loans to China through the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank be suspended. These additional measures introduced by the House, except for the proposal to terminate World Bank, IMF and ADB funding, did
not meet with Senate approval and so were never implemented.

The similarity between the American and Canadian reactions can, in part, be explained by the fact that Canadian and American governments consult regularly on a wide range of matters and it is inconceivable to think that the two sides did not discuss the Tiananmen incident. Canada would, therefore, have been aware of the initiatives planned in the House and also of the Senate and Bush Administration's reluctance to impose a wide range of strictures on the PRC. This is not to say that Canada acted in response to or in collusion with the US, but, rather, that Ottawa knew its initiatives would not be inconsistent with the US action. Thus, the US was not in any way a constraint on the Canadian decision.

Although not to the extent of the US, Japan is considered when formulating Canadian foreign policy. This is especially true when the target of the policy is a Pacific Rim country. In 1989, Japan was Canada's second most valued trading partner in the world with a larger market for Canada than the combined British, French and West German markets. The importance of Japan in regional affairs cannot be underestimated; it is the "lead bird" in the "flying-geese pattern of development" that characterizes the Pacific Rim.

The majority of Japan's senior political officials and businessmen, including Sousuke Uno, the Prime Minister, and
Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, the Foreign Minister, believed that the appropriate response to the "restoration of order" in Beijing was to mute any criticism. Thus, Uno's soft-pedalled response entailed abstract expressions of concern and regret. He stated that he was "seriously concerned" about developments in China, yet he made no movement towards initiating sanctions or even verbally condemning the Chinese leaders. In a press conference prior to the scheduled July 1989 "Group of Seven" summit in Paris, Hiroshi Mitsuzuka stated that "Japan would oppose any criticising of China by name at the summit...."¹³⁹

Japanese senior officials and businessmen believed that regional stability was more important than the preservation of "Japan's credentials as a member of the Western democratic club".¹⁴⁰ They further argued that Japan's 'legacy of the past,' that is, its wartime history of atrocities in China, made it "extremely dangerous" for Japan to criticize China without appearing hypocritical.

Also, the Chinese maintained a significant portfolio with both Japanese banks and investors. Their debt load held by Japanese banks totalled nearly US$27 billion and Japanese investments in 1988 were of the magnitude of US$500 million. Indeed, some Japanese investors even regarded the incident as a means by which they could obtain a larger share of the Chinese market. As the Western companies exited China, the Japanese firms prepared to step into the
breach. With respect to aid, Japan provided 45 per cent of China's total.  

Arguably, only Japan and the US had extensive enough relations with the PRC to be able to effect some change in its behaviour regarding human rights. Japan, instead of implementing meaningful restrictions on its relations with China, opted to resume business as usual with the PRC and this had a "particularly deleterious impact on other nations' efforts to exert constructive pressure on the Chinese government". The 'softness' of the Japanese response was important because it could be used by domestic groups in Canada which favoured a relatively more lenient approach as proof that a strict response was not necessary and, indeed, would be inconsistent with Canada's economic interests. American policy, on the other hand, furnished a benchmark for other Western countries. The US prohibition on high-level contacts and military sales thus "rippled through the sanctions policies of other [Western] countries," including Canada. In adopting a 'like-minded' approach to China with these other Western countries, Canada had a dual purpose: to have an impact on the PRC and not have its economic interests supplanted by other Western states.

Domestic Influences

In the aftermath of the events at Tiananmen Square, the Canadian government looked to sources knowledgeable in
Canada-China relations to help formulate Canada's response. On June 22, over 40 persons drawn from the business community, the Canadian-Chinese community, the academic community, and the government were assembled in Ottawa for a National Round Table. In what has been labelled "the most important airing of Canadian views on China after June 4," the representatives from the above-mentioned groups convened to "tell the Minister, and subsequently the Prime Minister and Cabinet, what to do about China."  

During the Round Table meeting, the strongest voice in favour of not punishing China came from the business community. It was reported by one participant in the Round Table meeting that the representatives from Canadian businesses spoke "with one voice" saying: "Let there be business with China as usual. Economically it is in our interest and in Canada's to maintain trade links and investment". This sentiment was repeated outside the Round Table talks by Marcel Dufour, President of Lavalin Industries, when he stated that "it is business as usual as far as we are concerned". Also, a Canadian business consultant specializing in Canada-China trade relations remarked that Canadian businesses had "done nasty business in the past" and would continue to "do nasty business in the future" because they could not "ignore 25 per cent of the world's population". The most visible signal to Canadian and Chinese leaders that Canadian businesses would
not ignore the world's largest domestic market rested in the fact that by June 20, most Canadian companies had resumed their operations in China.\footnote{167}

Opposing the viewpoint of Canadian businesses were the various Canadian-Chinese community organizations. As a whole, these groups pressed for the government "to stop considering actions and start taking stronger actions".\footnote{168} The response desired was an extension of the measures adopted on June 5 to signal to the Chinese leaders that Canada would not stand idly to the side and watch as several hundred innocent citizens were exterminated. A second concern of the Canadian-Chinese organizations was the safety of and assistance for the nearly 8,000 students and scholars who were in Canada at the time of the incident.\footnote{169}

The major contribution of these groups was the dissemination of knowledge to the general Canadian populace regarding the atrocities occurring in Beijing. These groups were non-violent in nature, and mostly limited their activities to organizing rallies and letter-writing campaigns. Large-scale rallies were held in all cities with a significant Chinese ethnic or student population, and these demonstrations assisted in galvanizing and focusing public opinion at large. For example, 30,000 people gathered in Grange Park near City Hall in Toronto to protest, listen to speeches and to march to the Chinese
diplomatic offices in an effort to register their indignation.

A third group, academics and China-watchers, was divided in its reaction to the events. A minority within the third category, some of whom had witnessed the massacre, had close Chinese friends whose fate was uncertain, or had taken part in the evacuation of Canadians from China, called for much stronger action. However, the majority recommended a measured response, and proposed:

that the Canadian government not withdraw its Ambassador, or in any way diminish the level of Canadian representation in China; that the Canadians should not impose economic sanctions on the PRC; that basic linkages with the PRC be maintained, especially scholarly exchanges which serve to benefit precisely those who are certain to be repressed after Tiananmen; that high-level government delegations be suspended, along with government-to-government consultations at the senior level; that no new developmental assistance programmes be initiated; that selected aid programmes be evaluated and possibly suspended; that the Government should re-evaluate its current and pending loans; that the Government should deliver a strong note of protest to PRC authorities, in Ottawa and in Beijing.

Mirroring the opinion of the majority, York University Professor, Paul M. Evans, further expressed his views in a June 13 column in the Globe and Mail where he advised Canada to be cautious in its recriminations of China and in the adoption of any retaliatory measures:

...whatever Canada's feelings of outrage, closing the door to contact with Chinese citizens and jumping beyond a cautious wait-and-see approach would be harmful to Canadian interests and the process of reform in China.
In addition to input from sources present at the Round Table meeting, Canadian foreign policy decision-makers needed to be cognizant of the desires of Canadians at large. Graphic depictions of the Chinese students being overrun by the NPA tanks and being mercilessly slaughtered in their tents solidified public opinion against the Chinese regime. Exacerbating the negative regard in which most Canadians held the Chinese leaders was the bravery of the Chinese students who stood up to the NPA forces. Of particular note was the action of one young man who blocked the path of an oncoming tank with his body. These images were not easily forgotten.

The media's role in fomenting a strong Canadian public reaction should not be underemphasized. Devoid of media coverage, the event probably would not have particularly exercised the Canadian public in the same way as earlier occurrences in China, and, prior to November 1991, East Timor had been ignored. However, on this occasion, the media conveyed the inhumanity of the event and the brutality of the measures employed was presented visually for viewers to interpret for themselves.

As a result of the instantaneous projection of the aforementioned images across the world, public opinion was quick to react and to call for government action. On a mass scale, public opinion was expressed in numerous ways, such as through letters to newspaper editors and to government
officials and through mass protests.\textsuperscript{172} Canadians vented their anger in the letters they wrote to both newspaper editors and government officials.\textsuperscript{173} Protests by Canadians reached unprecedented proportions as evidenced by the volume of letters received by External Affairs.\textsuperscript{175} Most often the writers simply condemned the acts of the Chinese leaders and did not outline any policy directives. However, when policy was considered, the letters called for a harsher response by the Canadian government. The preferred means to register disapproval was the imposition of economic sanctions.

Letters were mailed to the government and the media from every region and from every demographic category. The June 12, 1989 issue of the Ottawa Citizen included an entire page of letters from concerned Canadians in which they wrote of the "wanton brutality," the "brutal repression," and the "barbarian tactics" of the Chinese government's measures.\textsuperscript{176} Pearl Miller, a resident of Downsview, Ontario, wrote to the Toronto Star that "Canadian foreign policy is nothing short of hypocrisy. They go all out to condemn China's inhuman behaviour, but fall short of taking action for fear of losing the billion-dollar trade we have with them".\textsuperscript{177} Several hundred residents of Red Deer, Alberta, in a telegram to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, commented that they could not "stand in silence" and observe the "massacre of innocent
people" because to remain quiet would be an acceptance of the "oppressive acts of violence".\textsuperscript{19} Finally, a Grade 5 class in Markham, Ontario undertook a letter-writing campaign to Chinese Ambassador Zhang Wenpu asking him to explain the killings of unarmed students by the Chinese government.\textsuperscript{18}

A second means through which Canadians vented their displeasure was mass protest. As stated above, mass rallies and demonstrations were held in all Canadian cities with a sizeable Chinese population. However, not all demonstrators were Chinese citizens or of Chinese ethnicity. Most notable among the non-Chinese participants was John Polanyi, a Nobel Prize recipient and Professor at the University of Toronto. Canadians joined in the rallies to force their government to announce strict measures in reaction to the atrocities committed in China.

The indignation of the mass public was not, however, reflected to the same degree in the editorial columns of Canada's newspapers.\textsuperscript{19\textsuperscript{a}} Editorial opinion was relatively mute on the issue, with most papers usually only registering their repulsion in one editorial between June 5 and 12.\textsuperscript{19\textsuperscript{b}}

The most vociferous in its denunciation of the Chinese leaders and in calling for the imposition of sanctions was the Ottawa Citizen. In a June 6 editorial, it called on Canada to recall its Ambassador, to embargo all flights
between China and Canada, to terminate all technology transfers, to allow Chinese students to remain in Canada as long as necessary to ensure their safety, and to link deliveries of foreign aid to human rights performance. Later, on both June 14 and June 23, the paper repeated its demand to cease aid transfers. Joining the Ottawa Citizen in pressing for the imposition of sanctions was the Financial Post, which urged the government, in a June 6 editorial, to withdraw the Ambassador, to grant students refugee status, to review all EDC credits extended to China, to examine all possible multilateral channels that could force acquiescence and to recommend that China's application to re-enter the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade be halted.

Opposing the Ottawa Citizen and the Financial Post and supporting the government's measured response were the Toronto Star and the Vancouver Sun. Editorials in the Toronto Star credited the Canadian government with proceeding "cautiously" and with pursuing "exactly the right approach". Likewise, the Vancouver Sun was supportive of the government's initiatives, arguing that the government "responded with suitable rhetoric and a compassionate concern for Chinese citizens".

Overall, the primary effect of domestic influences was to compel the Canadian government to react. Societal opinion, as expressed through letters to the editor and to
External Affairs, through mass protests, and through editorial comment, pushed the issue of Tiananmen to the forefront of the concerns of the government. It served to "place the issue" on the policy-makers' desks and to "influence [their] perceptions of its urgency and importance". In other words, societal opinion helped to determine the policy-makers' agenda and the relative importance of the Tiananmen issue.

A second influence was that societal opinion assisted in establishing the limits of viable options for the policy-makers, the parameters within which they could act. In convening the Round Table, the policy-makers were seeking to "secure a more accurate estimate of what the domestic constituency [would] accept (or not accept)" thereby "determining in advance of taking a major policy risk" what lay "within, and what without, the range of domestically acceptable policy options". The participants in the Round Table thus defined the borders of the government's response. At the one extreme was the business community which pressed for 'business as usual' and at the other was the Canadian-Chinese community which called for the implementation of "severe sanctions". These two groups established the "range of politically workable choices" for the policy-makers. In short, the domestic factors helped to put the Beijing Massacre on the agenda of the policy-makers and to determine the parameters
of the Canadian response.

Governmental Influences

Finally, parliamentary, bureaucratic and executive reactions to the incident need to be studied in order to assess their impact on the process of policy formulation.

Most scholars take the view that parliament is ineffectual in regards to the formulation of actual policy. In his writings, Kim Richard Nossal has argued that the "control over formulation and implementation of foreign policy remains vested firmly in the hands of the political executive in cabinet".¹⁷¹ For his part, James Eayrs has noted that "if Parliament is to shape foreign policy, it must do so by influencing the decision-makers".¹⁷² However, parliament lacks the resources to engage in sufficiently sophisticated discussions of foreign policy as to be able to influence its content. Further, the "political executive has been unwilling to grant Parliament any decision-making role, and Canadian legislators have proved unwilling to demand any".¹⁷³ As a result, what parliament is useful for is simply consensus-building and the legitimization of a government's policy.

After Joe Clark's declaration on June 5 of the imposition of a range of sanctions, there was support from all parties in parliament for the government's action. Opposition leaders John Turner (Liberal) and Ed Broadbent (NDP) both seconded Clark's speech. Further, Andre Ouellet,
Liberal external affairs critic remarked that it was one of the toughest statements he had ever heard from a Canadian government. The multiparty support given Clark's speech was evidenced by the Members of Parliament giving it a standing ovation at its conclusion.

However, by mid-June, the consensus had dissipated. Bill Blaikie, the NDP external affairs critic, pushed for a stern Canadian policy:

> Canada should be more aggressive at the United Nations, especially the United Nations Security Council. Canada should force China to use its veto so that the 'move is on the heads of the Chinese, not on the heads of Canada....'  

Additionally, Howard McCurdy, the NDP human rights critic, questioned the government's response:

> Does the power and size of a nation provide for a contemptible government immunity from tangible expressions of international contempt? Should Canada and the international community be bullied into apparent acquiescence to infamy? I think not. I believe the Canadian people think not and I pray that the Canadian government will think not.

As usual, Parliament was divided along party lines: Conservative MPs supported the Mulroney government's position; NDP members demanded a policy change; and the Liberals were critical, but their criticism was muted. Parliament, in keeping with the remarks of Nossal and Eayrs, was uninfluential in the actual policy-making process. What parliament did do was to help put the Beijing massacre on the 'agenda' of policy-makers as evidenced by the holding of an emergency debate on China on June 5.
Also, during the June 5 emergency debate, various MPs outlined courses of action that Canada should follow and, in this way, parliament, like societal opinion, helped influence the 'parameters' within which Canadian policy would be made.  

A second governmental influence is the bureaucracy. Three civil servants of note participated in the decision-making process: Yves Fortier, Canada's Ambassador to the UN; Jean McCloskey, Assistant Deputy Minister, Asia and Pacific Branch, DEA; and Earl Drake, Canada's Ambassador to China.

In his presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT), Yves Fortier stated that he was not in favour of imposing sanctions on China. He informed the government of the inability of the UN to act as a means to condemn the Chinese measures. Likewise, Mr. Fortier warned of the ramifications for Canada if it attempted to isolate China through the imposition of sanctions.

Similarly, Jean McCloskey advised against the imposition of sanctions. She reminded Committee members of the failure of sanctions when they were imposed on China during the fifties and sixties. She also noted that this period of isolation resulted in serious human rights abuses in China.

Finally, Earl Drake, in his presentation to the SCEAIT, commented that the government "said the right things" and
that it "spoke out early, [it] spoke out clearly".203

Regarding sanctions, he believed that their imposition was the wrong approach because the Chinese economy was only marginally involved in the international market.204 To Drake, Canada should only suspend relations with the PRC in the area of visits because "visits could be misrepresented...to look as if [Canada was] endorsing the regime".205 He maintained that Canada had to be able to react quickly to reconnect its ties with China or it risked losing the many economic benefits gained from the Sino-Canadian friendship.

In sum, all three bureaucrats argued against the imposition of further sanctions. If alterations in policy were to be made, the coterie favoured a more lenient approach as the best course.

Since these observations preceded the June 30 announcement, they suggest the bureaucrats opposed as tough and extensive measures as were ultimately adopted. Further, their public reservations were probably made more vigorously in private. If the principal bureaucrats involved in this issue felt that even the initial measures went too far and were clearly opposed to additional initiatives, this suggests that policy in this instance was made largely at the executive rather than the bureaucratic level. However, the bureaucracy was probably influential in ensuring that the government did not go farther than it did in the June 30
announcement.

The ultimate decision-making body is the executive. Through the power of appointment, the position of the Prime Minister is the definitive policy-making post. The prime minister is empowered to select persons for key foreign policy decision-taking positions. With this power, the prime minister is able to name 'like-minded' individuals to Cabinet. In addition, the executive possess the 'crown prerogative' to negotiate and sign international agreements without reference to other institutions of government. The executive is thus the fundamental foreign policy decision-making unit and the prime minister is 'primus inter pares' within this group.

More specifically, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was instrumental in directing overall Canadian foreign policy; he set the "ultimate long-range goals of the state". Under his leadership, the government strove to include human rights considerations into the calculation of official development assistance. However, this 'linkage' between aid and human rights was tenuous and there were many instances where it was not made (eg. Chile, Argentina, East Timor, etc.). Mulroney's willingness to tie aid to human rights considerations was, in effect, dependent on the importance of any offending country to Canada, especially in economic terms.

During the decision-making period, Mulroney was
preoccupied by domestic matters and by the problems in South Africa. Domestically, the Meech Lake Accord was encountering great opposition. The accord only had a year before it expired and the opposition was fortifying its position in order to defeat the initiative. Mulroney was busily attempting to 'drum up' support so as to get the accord ratified and passed into law.

Internationally, Mulroney was immersed in the abolition of apartheid in South Africa. He had involved himself in the fight against the racist South African policy since the 1985 state of emergency declaration. It was in this area that the prime minister had "made his mark" by setting a novel course for Canadian foreign policy that entailed embracing an increasingly sanctionist approach.\textsuperscript{204}

On June 5, in reacting to the Chinese initiatives of the previous night, Mulroney remarked that he was "outraged" and "appalled" by the use of force against the demonstrators.\textsuperscript{205} After this initial reaction, the prime minister was to maintain a low profile until the July summit in Paris of the "Group of Seven". Although he kept behind the scenes, Mulroney was involved in the decision-making on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{206} However, the one who Mulroney entrusted with a leading role to outline the Canadian "strategies" and "tactics" in response to the Tiananmen Square massacre was Joe Clark, the Secretary of
State for External Affairs.\textsuperscript{207}

In May 1989, Joe Clark participated in two noteworthy conferences: the Summit conference of La Francophonie in Dakar and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meeting on the human dimension in Paris. In both fora, consistent with the governments enhanced focus on human rights since 1987, proclamations were put forth by Mr. Clark regarding Canada's quest to promote human rights internationally. At Dakar, the member states of La Francophonie accepted a Canadian initiative which committed members to "the respect of human rights as well as...respect for the right to development both within and outside our community".\textsuperscript{208}

In his opening speech to the CSCE, Clark remarked that Canada's "quest for the promotion of human rights had been and continued to be global". Further, he said, Canada's "particular interest in the human dimension [was] predicated on the conviction that human freedom, and the freer flow of people, information and ideas, do not threaten any well-founded ideology, government or social order. Instead they promote stability and security".\textsuperscript{209} 

Based on the above two pronouncements, it seemed clear that in future Canada would vociferously oppose any abuses of human rights. Any other course and Canada would be susceptible to charges of hypocrisy. Indeed, Clark's initial response to the massacre expressed the government's
abhorrence and outrage at the Chinese use of force to end the demonstrations. Mr. Clark commented that all Canadians reacted to the "indiscriminate and brutal fashion" in which the unarmed protestors were "gunned down and over-ran" by tanks with "a deeply-felt sense of horror and outrage".218

However, the "deeply-felt sense of horror and outrage" did not manifest itself in Canada's imposing stringent sanctions or even in responding to the Chinese actions in more than a symbolic manner. It is noteworthy that in three speeches given by Clark in the months following the Tiananmen massacre, Clark spoke of human rights and Canada's quest to extend basic human rights to all mankind, but on none of these occasions did he mention China or the Tiananmen Square massacre.211 Nevertheless, on all three occasions, he did discuss the problems afflicting South Africa.

In assessing the influence of the governmental factors on the final decision, it is apparent that both the executive and the bureaucracy had the greatest impact. It appears that initially both Clark and Mulroney favoured a stern response to the events in Beijing. They recognized the political need to respond to some degree in light of the domestic reaction in Canada and the actions of other states. As well, they, more than the bureaucrats, were responsible for the elevation of human rights in Canadian foreign policy
since 1987 and were mindful of the need to act consistently, at least in a rhetorical sense, with that new focus. Offsetting the wishes of Clark and Mulroney for a stringent response was the bureaucracy which favoured a more muted reaction. To the bureaucrats, Canada’s response needed to be tempered for they had been striving for nearly 20 years to improve Canada-China relations and did not wish to see any of their work destroyed because of what they believed to be a short-term difficulty. As well, officials from External were cognizant of the failure of past sanctions to alter China’s behaviour. Why outline a series of harsh, retaliatory measures when previous sanctioning activities had met with failure? To react in such a strict manner would seem to be a prescription for failure. Another reason for the bureaucrats’ reluctance was Japan’s readiness to step into the breach caused by an exodus of Canadian and other Western corporations. Thus, the bureaucrats probably had an impact on the measured character of the June 30 initiatives.

The development of Canada’s response in this instance seems to fit a pattern discerned by Cranford Pratt: "...where there have been significant policies motivated by human rights concerns, the impetus has in almost all cases come not from DEA but from the political leadership and from concerned public interest groups". In sum, influenced by an aroused public, Canadian decision-makers probably
initially felt "the intense anger that comes with betrayal by a friend" as a result of the actions of the Chinese government and, therefore, sought "to do harm to [the] wrong-doers". However, this initial impulse was tempered by the response of the international community, especially the muted reaction of Japan. The Canadian bureaucracy, in attempting to retain its linkages with the PRC, also stressed to its political masters the importance of a cautious Canadian response. Thus, in the end, as a result of the interaction of these and other factors examined in this chapter, Canada adopted a middle level response to the tragedy at Tiananmen.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CANADIAN SANCTIONS AGAINST CHINA

In registering its disapprobation of the Chinese action at Tiananmen, as developed in Chapter 3, Canada announced a series of concrete measures that then had to be implemented. Herein lay the problem. Did the government have the resolve to adhere to its intended actions? Some have claimed that Canada is often in the position of "piously condemning human rights abuses 'on Sundays' and then carrying on business as usual during the rest of the week". Was this to be such a case or would Canada assiduously set about implementing the measures announced? This chapter seeks to answer this question.

The period of the study is from July 1, 1989 to April 10, 1992. The analysis terminates on April 10, 1992 when Michael Wilson, Minister for Industry, Science and Technology and Minister for International Trade, led a trade mission to China, which for all intents and purposes signalled a return to normal relations and thereby ushered in a new phase of the Canada-China friendship.

Before analyzing the extent to which the Canadian government implemented each of the initiatives announced on June 5 and 30, 1989, a few words are needed with respect to the previously mentioned four 'basic parameters' and three 'criteria'—i.e. the overall framework in which the Canadian
government was to conduct its relations with China—for this subject is pertinent to the assessment of Canada's application of its sanctions. When each 'parameter' and 'criteria' is taken separately, one is struck by how sensible and straightforward they are. However, when the points are considered as a whole they are "fraught with difficulty," for there is the potential for behaviour that is encouraged under one point to affect adversely a second. For example, the 'parameter' for Canadian policy that business could not proceed 'as usual' led the government to curtail 'people-to-people' exchanges and to restrict the existing academic and cultural linkages, thereby undercutting the criteria related to preserving traditional links and people-to-people exchanges. On the other hand, the maintenance of some of the Canadian aid projects not subjected to sanction and the approval after June 30 of a number of projects for EDC financing, while perhaps justified under the criterion of preserving traditional links, could be considered as inconsistent with the first 'parameter' related to business as usual no longer being possible and the third criterion of avoiding programs that lent prestige to the hardline policies of the Chinese government. The Canadian government needed to indicate the importance of each point in relation to the other points. In other words, the four 'parameters' and three 'criteria' needed to be prioritized in order to serve as an effective
operational foundation for Canada's sanctions and to avoid apparent contradictions in its actions.

Turning to the Canadian government's implementation of the measures set out on June 5 and 30, three categories of action have been identified:

(i) supportive measures,

(ii) limited, and

(iii) significant sanctions.

Supportive measures are those actions taken that were initiatives designed to help the Chinese people at a moment of need in view of the heightened repression. Limited sanctions are those punitive actions taken that were bound to have limited impact due to the lack of depth in the Canada-China relationship in the functional areas subject to sanction. Included in this category as well are verbal sanctions, e.g. any Canadian actions taken at the United Nations to indict China for its human rights violations. Finally, classified under significant are those sanctions that were applied to prominent aspects of the Canada-China relationship, i.e. those related to aid and trade, where full implementation would certainly indicate Canadian displeasure regarding the Chinese action taken at Tiananmen and entail real costs for China and, indeed, Canada as well. Each of these categories of action is examined in turn in the sections that follow.
Supportive Measures

The supportive classification includes the cultural and immigration measures set out by Joe Clark on June 5 and 30. These are not sanctions because they entailed no termination of or reduction in the relationship; rather the goal of these measures was to show support for the Chinese people rather than their government at a time of need. Linkages of these types were to be sustained because, as the government put it, "the more contacts people from all walks of life in China can have with their Canadian and other friends, the less likely the success of the onslaught of the hardline propaganda machine".216

In an attempt to make a Western perspective on international news available to the Chinese in the wake of Tiananmen, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), through its Radio Canada International operations, advanced the commencement date for the broadcasting of Mandarin language programs into China by ten months. These programs commenced on June 20 with two ten-minute newscasts daily and, in October, the daily broadcasts were extended to two half-hour newscasts and a current affairs show. It is noteworthy that these programs survived the virtual halving of the CBC budget for RCI in 1990-1991 when the budget was decreased by $7 million from $20 to $13 million.217 The retention of the Chinese language programming is evidence of the Canadian government's desire to provide the Chinese
people with "straight news and information broadcasts" in order to strengthen "people-to-people linkages". 

In political terms, the cost borne by Canada of implementing the Mandarin language broadcasting project in China was minimal. The insignificance of the CBC measure is evidenced by the failure of the Chinese to react to its implementation, by, for example, jamming the CBC broadcasts. 

This measure thus did little to alter the Canada-China relationship.

With respect to immigration measures, it is important to understand the context in which they were taken. Following the incident at Tiananmen Square, the Chinese student population in Canada had voiced its disapproval of the Chinese government by organizing and participating in demonstrations against the Chinese leadership. It was soon learned that Chinese officials in Canada were photographing and compiling lists of all student demonstrators and that these photographs and lists were to be used against the students upon their return to China. In response to these claims, Joe Clark twice called in the Chinese Ambassador to warn him about Chinese officials harassing Chinese students in Canada.

Later, in June 1990, it was discovered that the Chinese government had established five categories for students studying abroad. These ranged from category one which included "patriotic students who [would] be offered
continued study or jobs when they return[ed] home" to
category five which included students who would "not be
allowed to return to China before they abandon[ed] their
anti-government positions and commit[ted] concrete acts of
repentance".221

It was under these circumstances that Canada's June 30
statement allowed all Chinese students who wished to remain
in Canada to have their visas extended for one year.
Further, "priority" was to be given to students and their
families if they wished to file for permanent resident
status. "Priority" in this instance meant that the
Canadian government implemented "special humanitarian
measures"222 for all Chinese nationals in Canada because
of the brutality of the measures employed at Tiananmen
Square. In addition, the processing capacity of the
Beijing and Shanghai bureaux was to be "beefed up". This,
in fact, occurred when, in late June, the government
assigned an additional four visa processing officials to
Beijing (3) and Shanghai (1).223

The extension of student visas by the Canadian
government angered the Chinese government. In June 1989,
more than 8,000 Chinese were studying in Canada under
the various exchange programs.224 Tian Xiaogang, the
first secretary in the education office at the Chinese
Embassy in Ottawa, commented that "it is a very unhappy
thing for us to see the Canadian government granting special
status (to students and)....we do not like it, to be honest.

Exacerbating the Chinese anger was the fact that over the long term Canada's rate-of-return of Chinese students and professionals in exchange programs had been the lowest of any Western country. Only 50 per cent of CIDA program participants and only 10 per cent of Chinese students in Canada were returning to China. This led Earl Drake, then Canadian Ambassador to China, to warn Canadian officials that China might "terminate academic and professional exchanges" if a greater number of Chinese people in those programs did not return home.

By April 1990, 8,703 Chinese nationals had applied for permanent resident status in Canada and of these 7,666 were accepted and 509 rejected. An additional 2,374 had applied for refugee status. Whatever aggravation the extension of Chinese student visas and other immigration measures caused the Chinese government, it dissipated in September, 1990 with the termination of the special provisions.

While on the surface, Canada's immigration measures seemed sensitive to the plight of non-resident Chinese in Canada, the government's understanding is less apparent when the situation of the Chinese is placed in the broader context of immigration policy at this time. In January 1989, Bill C-55 came into effect which, in an attempt to
reduce the ever-increasing backlog of refugee claimants. Called for the Canadian government to empower the Immigration and Refugee Board to create special panels throughout the country whose sole purpose was to hear refugee claims. Following the creation of the regional panels, the approval rates for claimants of all nationalities steadily decreased. In 1989, 76 per cent of all claimants were given refugee status. In 1990, this figure dropped to 70 per cent, in 1991 to 69 per cent and in 1992 to 62 per cent.

For Chinese claimants, however, figures were significantly lower. In 1989, the approval rate for Chinese claimants was 61 per cent, 15 per cent below the overall rate. In 1990, this figure dropped to 43 per cent, 27 per cent lower than the overall rate and in 1991 and 1992 to 21 per cent, 48 and 41 per cent respectively below the figure for all nationalities. In total, for Chinese nationals the acceptance rate for refugees fell by 40 per cent between 1989 and 1992, with almost half of this decrease being experienced during a period (1989-1990) when Chinese nationals supposedly had "priority" in the immigration process. Thus, throughout this period, Chinese claimants consistently had a more difficult time than others in receiving refugee status, with the gap steadily widening between 1989 and 1991. John Fraser, the former chief of the China bureau for the Globe & Mail, in an editorial in
Saturday Night, wrote that the panels had "sketch[ed] a pattern of such consistent cultural incomprehension and smug ignorance that anyone with a tendency towards paranoia might think that there was a special animus against Chinese refugee claimants".

The 22 per cent decline in the approval rate for Chinese nationals between 1990 and 1991 can be explained in part by the Canadian government's abrogation of their special "humanitarian" refugee status effective September 19, 1990. After this date, for these people to attain refugee status, they had to proceed through the regular channels with no special considerations. The special status for Chinese citizens in Canada was not extended past the one year period even though some of those who returned home to China were subjected to performing "concrete acts of repentance" which usually included "reprogramming" at a state institution.

A second possible reason for the precipitous decline in 1991 was that the Immigration and Refugee Board was rumoured to have released to panel members a "style guide" outlining the method by which Chinese immigrants seeking refugee status should be turned down. It would appear that this publication set out an approach to Chinese refugee claimants that was in direct contrast to the prior policy of granting special status to Chinese claimants. Yet, the conditions in China had not changed so drastically that
Chinese nationals should have been disadvantaged in this way in their attempt to attain refugee status.

Two other aspects of the immigration measures deserve mention. First, incorporated into the "priority" conferred on Chinese nationals in Canada in 1989 was the arrangement that their families would be given preference in the immigration process. However, between June 1989 and September 1990, the period in which the policy was in effect, about 200 married Chinese students were foiled in their attempts to bring their spouses to Canada. In 1991, these students were informed that they would have to wait until 1994 to bring their spouses to Canada, a full five years after the Tiananmen Square massacre.  

Second, with respect to the assigning of additional immigration officers to Beijing and Shanghai, it must be noted that this move came after the staffs of the two bureaux had previously been decreased by more than half from 45 to less than 20.

In sum, Canada's response to the repression in China by way of immigration policy was at best not particularly supportive and at worst prejudiced against Chinese refugee claimants. Further, while a significant number of Chinese had their visas extended and/or were granted permanent resident status in the year following Tiananmen, special treatment of the Chinese was not extended beyond September, 1990 even though the human rights situation in China had not
significantly improved by that date.

Overall, the supportive measures had only a marginal impact on the Canada-China relationship.

**Limited Sanctions**

Included in this category are measures that entailed an attempt by Canada to criticize the Chinese leadership for its behaviour in a public forum and sanctions of marginal importance to the overall Canada-China relationship. There were five such measures: the continuation of human rights actions related to China in UN agencies; the 'enhancement' of the human rights monitoring capacity of the Beijing Embassy; the suspension of nuclear co-operation consultations; the suspension of the 'modest' program of defence relations; and the deferment of all 'high-level' contacts.

In the immediate aftermath of the massacre, some in the Canadian government believed that the UN would be an effective venue in which to lodge Canada's disapprobation of the Chinese action in keeping with the commitment made in the June 30 statement to take such action. In September 1989, Canada supported a resolution in the UN Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities calling for the UN Secretary-General to report on the human rights situation in China. It was only a subcommittee resolution; it marked a milestone, in that this was the first instance in which any UN body had
passed a resolution criticizing a Security Council member for human rights violations. Also, in March 1990, Canada co-sponsored a resolution before the UN Commission on Human Rights asking for "clemency towards persons deprived of their liberty as a result of the events in June 1989". This resolution was defeated 17 to 15 with 11 abstentions. Canada later reasserted its concern for human rights abuses in China in its national statement to the 1991 and 1992 sessions of the UN Commission on Human Rights.

It was soon realized, however, that the UN was incapable of effecting change in China vis-à-vis China's observance of international human rights codes. As Joe Clark stated, the Tiananmen Square massacre was considered by member states to be a Chinese domestic matter and, therefore, outside the purview of the Security Council. Affirming Mr. Clark's statement, in his testimony to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Yves Fortier, then Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that:

...the Charter of the UN,...,is extremely clear and the Charter of the UN does say, black on white, that the UN will not get involved in the internal politics of a nation unless international peace and security are in jeopardy.

When events such as those [at Tiananmen Square], which countries like Canada find objectionable, take place, the governments of those countries must act at the bilateral level,...,The outrage and condemnation of countries like Canada towards China must be expressed at the bilateral level.
The failure of the UN to be an effective agent for change within China should not detract from the fact that Canada at least supported the effort to indict China within this organization. Thus, the Canadian government in this instance did fully implement the measure that it had announced, even if the result of the action was only the international chastisement of the Chinese regime. China's international image was tarnished, but for China this was not a novel situation. Prior to Tiananmen Square, China had not been a paragon of virtue within the international community. It had, as indicated in Chapter Two, a history of human rights violations and was accustomed to admonishments by other states unilaterally and multilaterally. Also, during the fifties and sixties, China was treated as a pariah state by the West because of its Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology.

It is also noteworthy that the Chinese leadership felt that the West's and Canada's rebuke of China following the 'crackdown' would be short-lived. Deng Xiaoping stated: "Don't worry, after one year, these guys will come back."247 Canada's initiatives in the UN were admirable, but they clearly had no real impact on the Chinese government.

With regards to 'enhancing' the human rights capacity of the Beijing embassy, it seems that this initiative was already being implemented prior to Tiananmen as a result of
earlier policy statements. Hence, this was not really a new initiative, but one that could be used to give the impression that the Canadian government was doing more than it really was. In 1986, the Canadian government published a document, *Canada's International Relations*, which indicated that the Department of External Affairs would commence a training program for officers in the area of human rights.  

This 1986 statement was followed the next year by a report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *For Whose Benefit?* (the Winegard Report), which called on the Canadian government, through External Affairs, to prepare annual reports of the human rights records of all states that received Canadian aid. In its response to this report (*To Benefit a Better World*), the government agreed to do so and to facilitate the reporting procedure a human rights manual was developed by External for use by posts abroad.  

The above actions were thus in the process of being implemented when the Tiananmen Square massacre occurred so that the government's commitment to enhance the human rights monitoring capacity of the Beijing mission was not a June, 1989 decision, but part of an overall program launched two years earlier. Therefore, this measure cannot be regarded as being a declaration of Canadian displeasure in reaction to the events of June 4, 1989.
Turning to the third limited measure, on June 5, the Canadian government suspended the nuclear co-operation consultations scheduled for the following week. These talks were never rescheduled for a later date. Indeed, there is no evidence pointing to nuclear consultations occurring between Canada and China at any point since 1989.

Although this sanction was fully implemented, it was of little significance to the Canada-China relationship because there had never been any nuclear consultations held between the two parties prior to June 1989. There was thus no relationship in this field for the Canadian government to terminate. In short, this was merely a symbolic gesture.

Another sanction announced on June 5 was the suspension of the program of defence relations between the Canadian Armed Forces and the Chinese People's Liberation Army. This 'modest' program had consisted of a single visit to China in 1988 by the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff.

At the same time, the June 5 statement assured the Members of the House of Commons that Canada "would not grant export permits for military sales of any sort". This particular assurance by the Secretary of State for External Affairs was, however, short-lived. Weaponry totalling almost $1 million was exported from Canada to China in 1989 (see Table 2 below). This represented almost a threefold increase in Canadian arms exports to China from the preceding year. In the three-month period immediately
### Table 2

**Canadian Arms Exports to China**

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<td>January-June</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>415</td>
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<tr>
<td>July-September</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October-December</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>355</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>1305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Statistics Canada, *Exports By Country*, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, published annually). Category 93 "Arms' ammunition and parts thereof".

Following the massacre (i.e. July-September, 1989), Canadian arms exports increased by 241 per cent over the same period the preceding year. In the 1989 October-December period, exports increased over the previous year by 184 per cent. This is a particularly telling figure because it would have been in this period that the delivery of goods purchased in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square would have occurred and been recorded for the annual report. Finally, it is noteworthy that over the entire 1988-1991 period, arms exports to China progressively increased.

It is noteworthy that in May, 1991, the Canadian government decided to ease the general restrictions governing Canadian exports of light armoured vehicles and automatic rifles. Ottawa rationalized the change, in part,
by claiming that this type of weaponry was useless for distant combat and that Canada needed the business. In defending the changes by the government, John Crosbie told the House of Commons that these weapons "are necessary for armies, police forces and civil authorities to have if they are to be in a position to keep control of their own countries".\(^{293}\) Ironically, it is precisely this type of activity that the Chinese government claimed it was conducting in June 1989.

The behaviour of the Canadian government in this respect lends credence to the position of Ernie Regehr that "the Canadian government does not view military exports as an instrument to encourage greater recognition and respect for basic rights in the international community."\(^{294}\) In supplying China with any form of war materiel Canada could be regarded as supporting the Chinese regime's oppressive tactics. Yet, termination of this aspect of the Canada-China relationship would have been relatively painless to the Canadian economy and it would have been a tangible signal to the Chinese government that Canada did not condone the oppressive actions inflicted by China upon its citizenry. Further, the export of arms was an obvious violation of the criteria set out by the Canadian government to govern relations with China in that such action supported the hardline policies of the Chinese government and, in particular, the military.
Lastly, on June 30, it was announced that all 'high-level' contacts between Chinese and Canadian officials were to be deferred. This represented a continuation of the Canadian government's June 5 statement which had cancelled all 'high-level' visits until a 'more appropriate time'. In reality, this sanction had little impact since no 'high-level' visits were scheduled at that time and, in any event, the measure was repeatedly violated. In addition, the ban was later changed so that it "did not apply to any international conflicts that involve[d] China".236

Violations of this sanction, in fact, began only a few weeks after its announcement. In September, 1989 it was discovered that, in the preceding July, the month after the Tiananmen Square massacre, Joe Clark had met privately with his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, during a 19-country conference on Cambodia in Paris. It was reported that the minister used this opportunity to lodge personally the Canadian government's disapproval of the Chinese government's action at Tiananmen by "strongly" objecting to the methods employed to quell the demonstrations.237

In September, it also became known that officials of both countries' foreign ministries had met to "restore routine communications" that had been severed after the June 4 incident.237 The reopening of the normal lines of communications, in addition to Joe Clark's meeting with Qian Qichen, led Tang Fuquan, China's Consul-General in Toronto,
to state the following:

We [the Chinese] noted that the Canadian government has expressed its willingness to restore normal relations between our two countries. I already feel the atmosphere is becoming better.  

Despite the above developments, as late as May 1990, Joe Clark remarked in the House of Commons that the ban on 'high-level' visits was still in effect due to the continued repression of the Chinese people by their government.  

This was reaffirmed by External Affairs spokesperson Abbie Dann, who stated that "it's unacceptable to just change back to full-fledged relations...[when there is] evidence of systemic oppression on a very deliberate basis".

Despite the minister's statement, in June 1990, Monique Landry, then Minister for External Relations and International Development, met privately with an unnamed senior Chinese official at a meeting of the Asian Development Bank. Also, Chen Yaobang, China's Vice-Minister of Agriculture, travelled to Canada where he met with officials from both CIDA and the Department of Agriculture. In the same month, the Globe and Mail reported that a Chinese Minister and two Vice-Ministers had visited Canada since the massacre.

The following month, De Montigny Marchand, then Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, visited China in order to "take stock of [Canada's] relationship with China". He was, however, quick to point out that his visit "by no means signal[led] a return to a normal state of
affairs": it was simply a "working visit".\textsuperscript{295} While in China, Marchand met with Qian Qichen and Liu Huaqui, China's Minister and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively. Also in July, 1990, Howard Balloch travelled to Beijing in order to represent Canada at the events commemorating the twentieth anniversary of Canada-China diplomatic relations.\textsuperscript{295} It was at this time, with a large number of visits having taken place, that the Canadian government finally got around to clarifying the meaning of the term 'high-level'. It meant exchanges only at the "ministerial-level or higher,"\textsuperscript{295} a statement which disregarded the meetings of Clark and Landry with Chinese officials.

Later in 1990, the Health and Welfare Deputy Minister, Maggie Catley-Carson, and an all-parliamentary delegation travelled to China, while the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MoFERT) paid visits to Canada.\textsuperscript{295}

Ironically, in the midst of all this official-level activity, the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibetans, sojourned to Canada in October, 1990 to discuss the continuing human rights violations perpetrated by the Chinese in Tibet and the absence of a tangible Canadian reaction to the Chinese actions. While in Canada, the Dalai Lama met with Gerry Weir, the Secretary of State, and not Prime Minister Mulroney due to objections from the Chinese
government. The Canadian government further bowed to Chinese demands by calling the visit an "unofficial" one, since China would have regarded an "official" visit as an "unfriendly act".

In October, 1991, a year after the Dalai Lama's visit, Barbara McDougall, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, met with Qian Qichen at the UN, taking this opportunity to suggest that it was "about time to rebuild relations between the two countries". In the same month, Bill McKnight, the Minister of Agriculture, led a trade mission to China and met, inter alia, with the Chinese Ministers of Agriculture, Commerce and Foreign Trade and also the Vice-Premier, Tian Jiyuan. In November, 1991, Barbara McDougall met with Qian Qichen at the annual Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) ministerial meeting in Seoul, South Korea.

Finally, in April, 1992, Michael Wilson led a trade delegation of twenty Canadian business executives to China. The goal of the endeavour was to "support" the marketing efforts of Canadian business and "to expand existing trade ties with the market". By that time, any pretence that this particular sanction was still in place had ended and, indeed, overall Canada-China relations can be viewed as having been normalized by this date.

As the evidence suggests, the ban on 'high-level' visits was not consistently implemented. Almost from the
outset, the Canadian government backtracked from the June 30 declaration. The government twice narrowed the ban, first by eliminating from it any consultations with China in which China was needed to resolve a conflict and, second, by constricting the definition of 'high-level' contact to the ministerial level or higher. Even with these caveats, of the fifteen visits between July 1989 and April 1992, eight were in violation of the ban. Simply put, Canadian action failed to live up to the commitment made in June, 1989.

In sum, this category included measures that the Canadian government could implement with only a modicum of difficulty. These were not initiatives that would "make or break" the Canada-China relationship, but they were of a kind that would give an indication of the real desires of the Canadian government vis-a-vis China. That Canadian action failed to live up to the commitments made reflected Ottawa's interest in causing as little disruption in relations as possible and signalled to China that Canada was little bothered by the events of June 1989.

Significant Sanctions

Two categories of significant actions were set out, developmental and commercial sanctions.

First, on the developmental assistance front, the Canadian government suspended all activity associated with the Three Gorges Dam project, withdrew from three projects which had failed the test of the new criteria set out on
June 30. and postponed four of the five agreements that had been previously delayed on June 5.

The Canadian involvement in the Three Gorges Dam project had been controversial from the beginning. CIDA had contributed $13.2 million to the environmental engineering assessment of the scheme and had come under fire by environmental groups throughout the world which argued that the CIDA financed-assessment minimized the extent of environmental damage the dam would cause.274 Thus, prior to Tiananmen Square, an uncertain Chinese government placed a five-year moratorium on the project in order to gain a greater understanding of the environmental ramifications of the proposed scheme. China's suspension of the Three Gorges Dam project thus made the Canadian action of June 30 meaningless. The Canadian government's suspension of all activity associated with the Three Gorges project was never lifted, and CIDA terminated any plans for participation in the scheme on May 6, 1992.272

On June 30, Canada withdrew its support from three projects on the grounds that they failed the test of the new criteria related to preserving existing linkages, increasing people-to-people exchanges and avoiding any programs which benefitted or lent prestige to the military or state propaganda apparatus. The three projects involved support for state auditor training, a lube oil centre, and urban traffic management. The termination of the traffic
management program was understandable, since earlier the
Chinese authorities had utilized similar traffic monitoring
equipment provided by the British to observe the activities
of the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square.273 However,
the accountant training program and the lube oil centre were
not in any way aiding the Chinese authorities in quelling
the demonstrators or democracy. The halting of the
accountant program thus "baffled the Chinese", and the
citizens of Langzhou, the site of the lube oil centre, were
"crushed".274

In the above three cases, the projects were near
completion so that "the effect of the terminations was
marginal".275 In these instances, Canada tried to make
it appear that its reaction to the Tiananmen Square incident
had more substance than it did in reality; the measures
outlined above were really more symbolic than substantive.

The final measure instituted by Canada with respect to
developmental assistance was the further postponement on
June 30 of four of the five projects that had been on hold
since June 5. However, within one year all of these
projects were reinstated and thus this measure was no longer
in effect.276 As well, CIDA continued to approve new
development projects after June 1989. The details of some
of these have been publicly released. They have included
the Jiagedaqi Model Forest Fire Management project, aimed at
helping the Chinese to manage the forestry industry;277
a project designed to increase the participation of Chinese women in the economic development of China; and a project for transferring oil and gas technology to China. For these three projects CIDA contributed $10.5 million, $4.9 million and $26.5 million respectively.

Interestingly, in April 1990, a project aimed at improving the management of China's transportation sector received CIDA approval and financing. The amount of money that CIDA contributed and the exact nature of the project were not reported. This is curious for two reasons. First, for all of the other projects listed, their details and the nature of CIDA financing were reported. Second, the nature of this project and lack of information released about it suggests that it may have been the traffic management program, referred to above, that was terminated because it did not meet the new loan criteria set out by the Canadian government.

With all postponed projects being later re-instated, three projects being cancelled when they were near completion, and a project being terminated that had previously been put on hold by China, it is evident that the effect of the developmental assistance measures was minimal. It appears that Earl Drake spoke the truth when he stated that Canada simply "wanted to make a statement". The developmental assistance initiatives were a symbolic gesture of the Canadian government and had no real negative effect
on Canada-China relations.

Placing these modest aid sanctions in the context of Canada's emerging policy at this time of linking aid eligibility and levels of assistance to human rights performance casts additional light on the paucity of action taken against China. From 1987, the Mulroney government attempted to link the level of official development assistance (ODA) a state receives from Canada with a state's human rights record. Cabinet was to consider information on the human rights situations in all recipient states in its annual deliberations over the amount and channels of distribution of Canadian aid.\textsuperscript{280} Interestingly, just the month before Tiananmen, Prime Minister Mulroney was praised for his work on human rights at the Dakar summit of La Francophonie.\textsuperscript{281} Yet, just a week after the Tiananmen Square massacre, Monique Landry, Minister for External Relations and International Development, confirmed the belief already held by observers of Canada's aid-human rights policy that the government was not effectively implementing its new commitments. She was reported as saying in\textsuperscript{282} an interview that "human rights records were not being considered by Cabinet when the government decided on aid levels for the next year", a clear contravention of the policy outlined by the government in 1988.\textsuperscript{283} It can thus be surmised that there was some confusion in the Canadian government regarding its policy of linking aid and
human rights.

A fuller understanding of the reality of Canadian policy, as opposed to the rhetoric, can be obtained through an analysis of the changes in government-to-government assistance disbursed to China in the years following Tiananmen Square. If Canada really desired to register its disapprobation of China, a significant way to have done this would have been to reduce Canada's bilateral developmental assistance to China in keeping with the policy set out by the government in *Sharing Our Future* and *To Benefit A Better World* related to aid and human rights in general.

### TABLE 3

**CIDA BILATERAL AID DISBURSEMENTS TO CHINA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>World</th>
<th>Aid Rant:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>256.68</td>
<td>671.36</td>
<td>7.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>305.97</td>
<td>716.07</td>
<td>12.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>275.58</td>
<td>678.30</td>
<td>9.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>8.37</td>
<td>337.04</td>
<td>874.64</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>15.46</td>
<td>355.46</td>
<td>816.22</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>27.04</td>
<td>354.05</td>
<td>924.79</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>35.30</td>
<td>438.18</td>
<td>1133.04</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>38.91</td>
<td>463.16</td>
<td>1259.92</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>35.20</td>
<td>391.71</td>
<td>1708.42</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>63.85</td>
<td>379.81</td>
<td>1090.35</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** CIDA, *Annual Reports*, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, published annually).
The Canadian bilateral aid program began operating in China in 1980. In 1989-90, the year of Tiananmen, China continued to ascend through the rankings of Canadian aid recipients even though it experienced a slight decrease in the level of disbursements (see Table 3 above). Canadian disapproval of the Chinese crackdown did not seem to affect Canada's overall willingness to give China aid despite the limited actions discussed earlier. Even more noteworthy is the fact that in the year after Tiananmen Square, China trailed only Bangladesh (at $117.24 million) amongst worldwide recipients of Canadian bilateral aid. It must be realized that decisions regarding aid disbursements are made at least a year before projects are implemented; that is to say the 1990-91 disbursements probably largely reflected Canadian government decisions taken in 1989. With this in mind, the decline experienced by China in 1989-90 was probably little related to the massacre whereas the significant increase in 1990-91 was permitted despite the government's knowledge of the repression in June, 1989. Fully aware of what transpired at Tiananmen Square, Ottawa, nevertheless, allowed China to receive almost double the amount of aid in 1990-91 that it received in 1989-90.

Table 4 displays the annual percentage increases
of ODA for China, Asia and the World over the most recent six years for which the data are available. It is noteworthy that China's proportion has been growing at a faster rate than either that of Asia as a whole or of Canadian aid worldwide. Also, in 1989-90, the decrease in aid disbursements suffered by China was less than that of the Asian region generally. In fact, of the three Asian states that received more bilateral aid than China in that year, two of them, Bangladesh and Pakistan, experienced decreases greater than that of China (12.3 per cent and 42.5 per cent respectively) while the third, Indonesia, recorded a 2.6 per cent increase. However, in the following year, China more than made up for the loss suffered in 1989-90 by recording an increase of 81.4 per cent while Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia weathered decreases of 6.5 per cent, 25.4 per cent and 20.2 per cent respectively.

The growing importance of China in the Canadian aid program is further illustrated by Table 5 which shows how it has increasingly received a larger proportion of the Asian and world aid totals. In 1985-86, China comprised 4.4 per cent of the bilateral Canadian aid program in Asia. This increased to 16.8 per cent in 1990-91. Similarly, China made up 1.9 per cent of Canada's world total in 1985-86 while this
### TABLE 4

**ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN CANADIAN ODA TO CHINA, ASIA AND THE WORLD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Changes</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>(6.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>(.4)</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>(9.5)</td>
<td>(15.4)</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>(3.0)</td>
<td>(36.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Change</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** CIDA, *Annual Reports.* (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, published annually).

### TABLE 5

**CHINA’S PERCENTAGE OF AID DISBURSEMENTS TO ASIA AND THE WORLD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** CIDA, *Annual Reports.* (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, published annually).
increased to 5.9 per cent by 1990-91.

In sum, Canada’s aid program in China was not detrimentally affected by the Tiananmen Square massacre. In fact, aid disbursements to the PRC increased after that event and China gained significantly in relative importance as a recipient of Canadian aid.

By reducing bilateral aid to China, the Canadian government could have relayed to the Chinese leadership its displeasure at the severity of the measures employed to quell the demonstrations in the spring of 1989. A reduction in Canadian disbursements would have been a tangible and visible signal of Canadian disapproval of the Chinese leaders’ tactics. However, as it was, the signal given to the Chinese was that this important foundation of the Canada-China relationship would not be materially affected.

Along with developmental assistance, the other major area where sanctions were applied was the commercial field. On June 30, all Canadian government funding for Canadian participation in PRC-hosted trade shows and exhibitions was terminated for the remainder of 1989. Second, Canada announced that it would examine the likelihood of halting the process of streamlining and liberalization of the COCOM export controls as applied to China. Third, Canada’s trade representation in Beijing was to be ‘downgraded’. Lastly, the new criteria set out on June 30 were to be applied to any new projects considered for financing under the EDC’s $2
billion line-of-credit for China.

The halting of government financing for Canadian participation in China-sponsored trade shows and exhibitions was essentially a meaningless gesture. The importance of trade shows and exhibitions is in creating new business linkages, and after a relationship has formed between a company and a foreign government the importance of trade shows and exhibitions is minimal. Therefore, Canadian companies which had been operating in China were not affected by the measure. With respect to companies wanting to form new business relationships with the Chinese, they were not forbidden to participate in the various business fora organized by the Chinese; the only effect of the sanction was that they had to pay the full price for participation.

Further, the limited duration of this sanction, six months, further reduced its importance. Within ten months of the massacre, the Canadian government had resumed funding for Canadian participation in trade shows and exhibitions. In short, this was clearly a symbolic measure.

The second Canadian initiative in the economic realm was to examine the possibility of slowing the process of COCOM reforms, as they applied to China. COCOM was created as a means by which the Western states could control the flow of critical technologies and equipment to the
socialist and communist states of the world, especially China and the USSR. In the early eighties, as a result of increased American-Soviet tension, COCOM restrictions on technology transfers to China were "substantially reduced" due to China's increased importance within the 'strategic triangle'. Interestingly, the relaxing of American-Soviet tensions in the late-eighties led to even further reductions of the COCOM restraints vis-a-vis China.

Not only were COCOM restrictions relaxed in the pre-Tiananmen period, but they had never been burdensome for China in any event. They were easily circumvented by importing advanced technology through a non-COCOM member that was not subject to similar constraints. China often found Brazil and South Korea to be willing third parties in these transactions. Corporations also participated in this circumvention by not fully implementing the COCOM restrictions and allowing sensitive goods to be obtained by China.

Even if COCOM restrictions had been assiduously implemented, sensitive technologies and goods unknowingly could be exported to restricted states by way of dual or multi-purpose goods. For example, a skull furnace could be exported to China with the agreement that it would be used to produce artificial limbs, a legitimate end product of such a furnace. Upon its construction in China, the skull furnace could, however, be used to produce many other
things, such as missile, aircraft and nuclear weapons components. In such a situation, an exporter would not have contravened any COCOM regulations. Nevertheless, China would still have increased its arms-producing capability.

In sum, by the late-eighties, COCOM's inability to stem the flow of critical technologies and goods to China and elsewhere had rendered it obsolete. Further, any Canadian protestations about further relaxing COCOM restrictions as they applied to China were muted by the general concern among COCOM-member states to liberalize and streamline the restraints. There is thus no evidence of Canada's having actually taken any action related to this measure.

The third economic measure related to "downgrading" Canada's trade representation at the Beijing mission. Although a specific meaning for the term 'downgraded' was never given, it is assumed in this paper that 'downgraded' meant that the mission was lowered in size and in terms of the rank of its staff. On October 7, 1989, the Globe & Mail reported that the Beijing Embassy had been "downgraded" by reducing the number of trade officers from nine to six "partly to indicate official displeasure and partly because of reduced opportunities". The rank of the mission in trade terms was also "downgraded" in 1989 through the removal of the highest ranking trade officer who held the position of Minister, a level second only to that of
Ambassador.

It is interesting to note, however, that the three trade officers who were "cut" from the Beijing embassy in 1989 as a result of the turmoil were transferred to the Hong Kong mission. In this way, they were able to retain their contacts in China while not technically being in the Beijing mission.

By November 1990, the Beijing mission was largely restored to its pre-June 1989 status. Two of the three trade positions cut from the embassy had been reinstated, bringing the total to eight, one short of the pre-June 1989 total. By the same time, the position of Minister (trade) had also been re-established. Therefore, either official displeasure had dissipated by the autumn of 1990 and/or economic opportunities not apparent when the trade staff was cut in 1989 began reappearing in China. Regardless of the rationale underlying the restoration of the rank of the embassy trade staff and of its numbers to close to pre-Tiananmen figures, it is obvious that the application of this sanction was short-lived.

The last economic measure to be examined is the application of the criteria set out on June 30 to any new project considered under the $2 billion EDC line-of-credit. Three points need to be considered: the rapidity with which the loan program was restarted; the types of projects funded by the loans, specifically the telecommunications projects;
and the size of the loan program after Tiananmen Square.

First, the Canadian government lost little time in commencing loans to China after Tiananmen Square. On August 2, 1989, it was reported that Cabinet had approved an EDC loan of $100 million for Northern Telecom Canada Limited (NTCL) to supply telecommunications equipment to China. Later, in September 1989, it was discovered that a loan of $130 million had been extended in July to a seven-corporation conglomerate for the purpose of equipping the Gehe Yan Dam and hydro-electric station.

Departing from convention, EAITC did not issue a press release to inform the public of the July loan to China. This raised suspicions in the Canadian news media that a cover-up had occurred. One writer, in the Calgary Herald, asserted that the non-publication of the press release was a "conscious decision" of the Mulroney government to "keep it quiet". There were even insinuations that the Prime Minister's Office had orchestrated the whole event.

Opponents of the Mulroney government wasted no time in condemning the government for extending these two sizeable loans to China so soon after the massacre. Howard McCurdy, the colourful NDP human rights critic, waxed eloquently: "It's clearly a victory for hypocrisy over principle. It's like marrying the widow before the husband's body has been interred." And, Liberal MP, Marlene Catterall, warned that by extending these loans to China, Canada had
undermined the G7 "Declaration on China" that it had signed in July 1989 at the Summit of the Arch.  

The rapidity with which Canada restarted loaning funds to China was not lost on Tang Fuquan, the Chinese Consul-General in Toronto, who stated: "I regard the decision made by the Canadian government for those two loans as correct. It shows its (Canada's) good feelings towards the Chinese people." By extending the loans to China so quickly after Tiananmen Square, the Canadian government led the Chinese government to deduce that all was normal and that the two could return to 'business as usual' regardless of the June 30 statement.

In addition to not waiting some time before ratifying loans to China, the types of projects that the EDC was financing became a contentious issue. When each of the loans outlined in Table 6 was approved, save the $130 million loan in July 1989, the corresponding News Release issued to give the details of the project included a statement explaining that the loan had been reviewed and that it fully complied with the guidelines announced by the Canadian government on June 30. It is difficult to discern how Canada, by providing the Chinese government with funds to construct chemical plants, hydroelectric facilities and pulp and paper mills, was focusing on "people-to-people" linkages, as provided in the guidelines. Also, it appears
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NEWS RELEASE NUMBER</th>
<th>LOAN AMOUNT (in millions $)</th>
<th>RECIPIENT</th>
<th>PROJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/06/89</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>109.00</td>
<td>Northern Telecom Canada Limited (HTCL)</td>
<td>telecommunications equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/89</td>
<td>no News Release was issued</td>
<td>139.00</td>
<td>7 firm conglomerate led by ASEA Brown and the Ntl Group</td>
<td>hydro-electric dam operating equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/12/89</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>28.30</td>
<td>Fluor Daniel Canada</td>
<td>ethylene oxide plant support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/02/90</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.98 (US$0.82)</td>
<td>SNC Services Ltd.</td>
<td>chemical plant construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/03/90</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>SPAR Aerospace Ltd.</td>
<td>satellite earth station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/05/90</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>11.52 (US$9.80)</td>
<td>Klockner Stadler Hurter Ltd.</td>
<td>carbon disulfide plant design and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/06/90</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>37.50</td>
<td>Canadian Industrial Consortium Inc.</td>
<td>pulp and paper mill construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/08/90</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>10.75 (US$9.40)</td>
<td>HTCL</td>
<td>telecommunications equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/08/90</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>24.60 (US$21.50)</td>
<td>HTCL</td>
<td>telecommunications equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/08/90</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>Whiting Equipment Canada</td>
<td>computer-operated furnace system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186</td>
<td>37.90</td>
<td>Fuller-F.L. Swidith Canada Ltd.</td>
<td>cement plant equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/09/90</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>7.06 (US$6.10)</td>
<td>Harris Farinon Canada Inc. (Farinon)</td>
<td>digital radio microwave systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/10/90</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>6.15 (US$5.30)</td>
<td>Fujima International Inc.</td>
<td>automotive stamping dies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/01/91</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>Thyssen Canada Ltd.</td>
<td>water treatment plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/01/91</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>Farinon and Newbridge Networks Corp.</td>
<td>telecommunications equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.55 (US$3.74)</td>
<td>Fenco Lavalin Corp.</td>
<td>activated carbon plant construction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>NEWS RELEASE NUMBER</td>
<td>LOAN AMOUNT (in millions C$)</td>
<td>RECIPIENT</td>
<td>PROJECT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16.12</td>
<td>Chedrics International Company Ltd.</td>
<td>supply fertilizer and chemical plants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/03/91</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5.79 (US$5.08)</td>
<td>Rymac Ltd., Beloit Canada Ltd., Chedrics, and Fisher Controls Co.</td>
<td>pulp and paper equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>67</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>BC% Industrial Controls Ltd. and Dresser Pump Canada Ltd.</td>
<td>water treatment plant equipment and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.55 (US$2.20)</td>
<td>Eagle Precision Technologies Inc.</td>
<td>muffler machinery, tooling and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
<td>38.68 (US$31.70)</td>
<td>SPAR</td>
<td>telecommunications equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.32 (US$4.60)</td>
<td>SR Telecom Inc.</td>
<td>radio system equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>17.24 (US$14.90)</td>
<td>NTCL, Farimex, E.F. Johnson Canada Inc., Electrohome Ltd., and Newbridge</td>
<td>telecommunications equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/05/91</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>48.53 (US$42.20)</td>
<td>NTCL</td>
<td>telecommunications equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/06/91</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3.55 (US$3.10)</td>
<td>Dresser and SGP-VA Inc.</td>
<td>water treatment plant equipment and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>141</td>
<td>0.69 (US$0.60)</td>
<td>Lambah Tool &amp; Mold Inc.</td>
<td>mold design and fabrication equipment and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>142</td>
<td>5.72 (US$5.00)</td>
<td>Joe Ng Engineering Ltd.</td>
<td>coal gasification plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/08/92</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>33.35 (US$28.08)</td>
<td>SPAR</td>
<td>telecommunications equipment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"US$ financing was converted to C$ according to the monthly exchange rate as reported in the Canadian Economic Observer, July-December 1990, January-June 1991 and January 1992."
that some of these projects may well have been of benefit to the hardline policies of the Chinese regime and thus inconsistent with the June 30 announcement in this respect as well. For example, the EDC's $100 million loan to China for NTCL's telecommunications equipment was criticized by some as benefitting the hardline policies of the Chinese regime. Andy Leung, executive director of the Chinese-Canadian National Council, remarked that the loan would help the Chinese leadership in creating a "more efficient government operation", in that the proposed project aided the Chinese government in tracking down those who had participated in the demonstrations.  

Joe Clark responded to these claims by downplaying the possibility that this equipment could be used for such a nefarious purpose.  However, the Chinese government, in the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen, had set-up telephone "hot lines" so that people could report the whereabouts of demonstrators. It was reported that some had even turned in relatives and friends, fearing reprisals by the state if they were caught harbouring fugitives. Reports of this nature led a Canadian journalist to write that it "may be Canadian technology that helps the regime reach out and arrest someone". 

It is noteworthy that the EDC provided more funds to the Chinese government for purchases of Canadian telecommunications equipment than for any other type of
good. In the 1989-92 period, the EDC provided China with $295.4 million worth of financing specifically for telecommunications purchases (see Table 6). This represented 49 per cent of the total loans extended to China.

With a more advanced communications system, the Chinese government would be more capable of putting down any so-called rebellions in all regions of the state. First, news of any rebellious activity would be received in a shorter time period and, hence, momentum could be restrained through quick government action. Second, better communications would enable the Chinese leadership to have more control over the military because they could be in continuous contact with each other should a situation arise. Thus, not only might the telecommunications projects financed by the EDC be used, in Joe Clark's parlance, to "enhance the ability of the Chinese populace to communicate amongst themselves, and with the outside world", but they might also be used to continue the subjugation of the Chinese people.

The size of the EDC loan program in China is the final point that needs to be examined. In the three years prior to the Tiananmen Square massacre, the EDC extended loans to China worth $472.6 million. Over a similar period after the massacre, loans for 28 projects totalling $569.3 million were provided to China through the EDC (see Table
6). This represented an increase of 20.5 per cent. Also, on November 21, 1991, the EDC extended to October, 1993 a $175 million concessional line-of-credit to China. This concessional line replaced the $350 million line-of-credit which had expired on October 1, 1990. In sum, it is apparent that the June 1989 measure related to EDC loans had no meaningful dampening effect on expanding Canada-China relations in this domain.

As with the developmental assistance program, a fuller understanding of Canadian economic policy regarding China and of the pusillanimous effect of the commercial sanctions can be grasped through an analysis of their trade relationship. In 1984, with Canada recording a trade deficit with Japan, China became the only significant market in the Asia-Pacific region with which Canada had a trade surplus. Canada recorded its largest trade surplus ($1.6 billion) with China in 1988 (see Table 7). Over the 1985-91 period, the average increase in Canadian exports amounted to 16.5 per cent per annum and for imports 29.2 per cent. The decrease in exports experienced in 1989 was due to the drought that plagued the prairies in that year, which decreased grain exports to China by $1.3 billion—from $1.7 billion in 1988 to $4 billion in 1989—and was not due to the Tiananmen Square massacre. Moreover, Canadian exports rose again in 1990 and 1991. It is also noteworthy that there was never a break in the upward spiral of
### TABLE 7

**CANADIAN TRADE WITH CHINA, 1985-1991**

(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>% changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1 278 323</td>
<td>403 475</td>
<td>874 848</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1 118 969</td>
<td>566 083</td>
<td>552 886</td>
<td>(12.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1 432 079</td>
<td>770 901</td>
<td>661 178</td>
<td>27.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2 599 707</td>
<td>955 919</td>
<td>1 643 788</td>
<td>81.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1 120 017</td>
<td>1 182 291</td>
<td>(62 274)</td>
<td>(56.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1 650 855</td>
<td>1 394 368</td>
<td>256 487</td>
<td>47.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1 844 093</td>
<td>1 852 114</td>
<td>(8 021)</td>
<td>11.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Canadian imports from China, which more than quadrupled between 1985 and 1991.

As evidenced by the figures in Table 7, Canadian business in general was minimally affected by the alleged crackdown in economic relations with China. As Tang Fuquan, the Chinese Consul-General in Toronto, remarked, the continuing trade between Canada and China attested to the "improving climate" between the two countries.\(^\text{303}\)

The preceding evidence suggests that the Canadian government did not apply the economic sanctions in a consistent or full-hearted manner. The blood of Tiananmen Square had not yet completely dried before the Mulroney government approved a $100 million loan which could conceivably aid the Chinese government in its post-massacre roundup of government proclaimed-rebels, and that action signalled the government's intent to continue to pursue the
commercial relationship vigorously by all available means.

In sum, looking collectively at all the measures announced by Canada, the purported rejection of China's demand for 'business as usual' by the Canadian government in the post-Tiananmen Square period is not supported by the Mulroney government's actions during this time. The evidence suggests that Canada was reluctant to do anything more meaningful in reacting to the crackdown than verbally condemn the Chinese action. Specifically, the massacre had little effect on the aid and trade interests of the Canadian government, the two major aspects of the Canada-China relationship where effective sanctions were possible. The cessation of government funding for trade shows and exhibitions for six months was of little significance to Canadian businesses at large, since they were not precluded from attending trade shows and exhibitions. On the other hand, the major sources of government financing for Canadian businesses were not interrupted in that EDC and CIDA funds kept flowing unhindered. Had Canada meaningfully restrained activity in the aid and trade areas, it would have been a tangible signal of Canada's displeasure at the leaders in Beijing, but Canada was unwilling to communicate such a signal.

Where the sanctions were fully implemented, the action taken was essentially meaningless because these areas were marginal in the overall Canada-China relationship (for
example, nuclear consultations). Interestingly, even in some areas where the relationship was of little importance, Canada was still hesitant to enact any punitive measures, as in the case of defence relations where the almost non-existent official contacts were halted, but the export of arms was allowed to continue at an increased rate.

To a degree, credit needs to be given in the area of student visas. Canada did withstand Chinese pressure to force the return of visa students. However, the Canadian immigration system failed in processing refugee claims and in allowing more students' families to emigrate to Canada as was promised. In toto, the implementation of the measures set out by the Canadian government was selective, limited and inconsistent.
CHAPTER FIVE

EXPLANATIONS FOR CANADA'S LIMITED APPLICATION
OF SANCTIONS AGAINST CHINA

The failure of Canada to fully implement the measures outlined in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre can be explained in the same manner as the decision to act at all was examined in Chapter Three, that is through an examination of the pertinent international, domestic and governmental influences.

International Influences

Many states failed to implement assiduously their sanctions against China and this was a factor which doubtlessly influenced Canadian behaviour. The Bush Administration covertly sent Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Adviser, and Lawrence Eagleburger, the Deputy Secretary of State, to Beijing in July 1989 and, in December 1989, the pair openly returned to Beijing to brief the Chinese leadership on the outcome of the Bush-Gorbachev summit meeting. Further undermining the US sanctions placed on China was the shipment of four Boeing jets, valued at $150 million, in July 1989. These planes were delivered to China even though their navigational systems were included in the US list of sanctioned military equipment. This was followed in October by the return of Chinese military officers to the US to continue work on a $502 million project to "upgrade" Chinese F-8 fighter
aircraft. Thus, by the end of 1989, the US had violated its sanctions dealing with the suspension of visits and the export of weapons.

Notwithstanding the above, in the spring of 1990, China still faced "the most significant sanction" available to US policy-makers: the renewal or revocation of its Most-Favoured-Nation trading status. China had been granted MFN status by the US in 1980 and has had it renewed unconditionally every year since. President Bush "vigorously opposed" all efforts by Congress to revoke or to attach human rights conditions to the renewal of China's MFN status. In short, the Bush Administration adopted an "accommodating stance" in its relations with the PRC on this and other issues.

By "accommodating" China, the US probably "precipitated or facilitated a bandwagon effect among like-minded" Western states. Its actions in June, 1989 had encouraged other states to apply sanctions. With the US easing its restrictions on the People's Republic, other Western countries including Canada were encouraged to follow suit so as not to be supplanted in the China market.

From the outset, Japan's reluctance to impose sanctions on China had adversely affected the willingness of other Western countries, including Canada, to take initiatives. During the G-7 meetings in France in 1989, Japan contested the imposition of sanctions and at the G-7 meetings the next
year, it was able to get the group's sanctions removed. In fact, Japan sent a delegation to China in September 1989 to discuss trade and investment opportunities even though this contravened the 1989 G-7 declaration.

At times since June, 1989 Japan has played the role of "apologist" for China's continuing human rights violations. For example, even though there was evidence of continuing human rights violations in China, the Japanese representative at the 1991 session of the UN Commission on Human Rights defended the record of China, stating that "The worst is over and there are some encouraging signs [of] improvement."

Apart from Japan, by the summer of 1990, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and South Korea had all either normalized relations with China or were in the process of doing so. Warnings of being replaced by others if, indeed, relations were terminated had been issued by the Chinese and it seems that all feared a loss of economic opportunity if they did not quickly restore full relations with China.

Some have contended that the imposition of tough sanctions against China was possible because China had been rendered unimportant as an ally of the West as a consequence of the decline of the Soviet Union and, thus, the collapse of the 'strategic triangle' linking the Soviet Union, China and the US. No longer would China be needed in order to keep the Soviets in check. This was not, however, the
prevailing view in most of the capitals of the world where China's importance in the international system was not seen as greatly diminished by the decline of the USSR.318 China was, after all, the largest remaining communist state and so it was sought as an ally by the other remaining communist countries. Also, China continued to occupy its seat on the UN Security Council and, accordingly, still possessed its veto power within the UNSC. In addition, China retained its nuclear arsenal which consisted of between 246 and 288 warheads with 465 megatons of force. In megatonnage, the Chinese nuclear force was surpassed only by those of the US and USSR which had 15,000 megatons each.317 Further, China was prominent as an international arms dealer, earning US$11 billion between 1980 and 1987.319 In the 1980-83 period, China provided 84 per cent of total arms exported to the Middle East and South Asia and in the 1984-87 period, this increased to 94 per cent. The majority of these sales were to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was also a major recipient of Chinese arms. Further complicating matters, prior to China's 1992 accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its decision in the same year to adhere to the stipulations of the Missile Technology Control Regime, it was not reluctant to sell nuclear weaponry to others, as evidenced by its sale of nuclear submarines to Pakistan in 1990317 and its aid to Algeria so that
Algeria could assemble a nuclear weapons capability.  

China's retention of its international status regardless of the fall of the Soviet Union was also evidenced by the necessity of its participation in the successful resolution of two major events in 1990.  

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided China with an opportunity to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate within the international system. The Chinese leadership agreed to terminate arms sales to Iraq and to not veto the UN resolution condemning the Iraqi invasion. The Western states were willing to normalize relations with China in part as an exchange for Chinese cooperation in castigating Iraq.  

A second event which required Chinese cooperation if it were to be resolved was the Cambodian situation, and China could not be forced into isolation in the interest of settling this issue. That was the underlying rationale for Clark's talks with Qian Qichen in July 1989 in Paris; Clark was playing the role of 'honest broker'. The result of China's involvement in the negotiations was that by September, 1990, it had "pushed" the Khmer Rouge into accepting a tentative peace plan for Cambodia.  

Thus, the action of Canada and other states in the implementation of sanctions against China after the Tiananmen Square massacre was constrained by China's international importance. Other international events took
precedence such as the Cambodian situation and the Gulf crisis. Further, after the summer of 1990, with China's return to the international community by way of the American renewal of China's MFN status, by the termination of the G-7 sanctions and the normalization of relations with Japan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and South Korea, any sanctions still imposed by Canada would have had minimal effect. Under these circumstances, Canada, holding to its internationalist past, sought to retain its linkages with China because change could be more easily effected from within. Discussing in general the place of human rights in foreign policy, Matthews and Pratt have written that, "As international peace and security are certainly important, states may have to play down human rights". China after Tiananmen was clearly a case in point.

**Domestic Influences**

After the government responded to a degree to the demands Canadians placed upon it to punish China, public pressure waned significantly. As the media focused on other events, Canadians quickly became involved in other issues of importance and their displeasure over the Chinese action quickly dissipated. B.M. Frolic, a professor at York University, wrote of the "evaporation" of Canadian public concern about Tiananmen: "Now in late August 1989 the Beijing massacre, like a faintly glowing ember, is barely visible on the Canadian horizon. The front pages and
television screens are occupied with other fare...." He further noted that even the Canadian government's contravention of its June 30 policy by its approval of a $100 million loan to Northern Telecom Canada Limited to aid China in developing its telecommunications technology met with "minimal" public criticism.³²³

If the Canadian public was only briefly preoccupied with the events of Tiananmen Square, the Canadian business community was distracted for an even briefer period. By the end of June, most companies had resumed their operations in China.³²⁴ Canadian corporate opinion of the Chinese market was also little affected by the massacre. Robert Norris, Vice-President of Merchandising for The Bay, stated that his company had made a "commitment" to conduct business in China and it would continue to do so.³²⁵ One executive even praised the efforts of the Chinese government to help his company through those troubled times Stephen Freed of Freed and Freed International Ltd. noted:

The government [of China] is assisting in getting shipments out by flying goods in where necessary and running night shifts in some factories...We are very happy with the effort they have put in...no one wants to insult them, get on the wrong side of them. They are the next boom market and everyone wants a piece of them.³²⁶

As a result of these corporate attitudes, Chinese officials in Ottawa were "heartened" by the prospect of the continuation of smooth commercial relations.³²⁸

Conversely, the Canadian-Chinese community continued to
press the government to implement the measures announced and to add to the list of initiatives. Prior to Tiananmen, Canadian-Chinese had not been an active participant in the debate on Canadian foreign policy since the Canadian recognition of the PRC in 1970. The 1989 massacre was, however, a catalyst for coalescing the community into a powerful political body. One China observer noted that "the events of 1989 marked a major step in the political maturation of Canada's Chinese community, a community that until Tiananmen had been relatively quiescent politically on the Canadian scene". Nevertheless, although it was an active and vocal proponent of more governmental sanctions, the Canadian-Chinese community was not successful in achieving this goal. Its desire that the government 'live up' to its rhetoric was offset by the interests of the Canadian business community in better relations between Canada and China and by the absence of continued pressure from the Canadian public for tough sanctions.

**Governmental Influences**

After the Second World War, Canadian policy-makers constructed Canada's international role around the principle of functional internationalism. It was believed that Canada's fate was inexorably linked to that of the international system at large and that Canada needed to utilize whatever resources it could to ensure the maintenance of global peace and security. Policy-makers
perceived Canada as being a mediator between the East and West power blocs. Traditionally, Canada had differed from the American 'containment' viewpoint in that Canada had attempted to 'bridge the gap' between communist and capitalist countries.

The Canadian recognition of China in 1970 was regarded as just such a 'bridge'. By bringing China out of isolation and into the international system, Canada was attempting, inter alia, to make China "a more responsible world citizen". Once China was a member of the international community "it would be more amenable to Western influence" which could result in China "softening" its "militant communist posture" and in speeding up its detachment from the Soviet orbit. Canada has thus had a history of seeking to 'build bridges' to China. In the process of constructing these 'bridges', Canada has down played some of the atrocities committed by the Chinese government on its people. Tiananmen Square was not the first instance of a brutal crackdown by the Chinese leadership. "China has been a notorious human rights abuser for many years in terms of imprisonment, arbitrary detention, summary execution and so forth--many of them public--[and Canada had] not raised objections beforehand." Thus, the Canadian government's perception of the prerequisites for advancing the cause of global peace and security acted as a restraint on the vigorous
implementation of the June 1989 sanctions.

The failure of past sanctioning exercises directed against China to fulfill their goals was another influence on the limited application of the Canadian measures set out in June 1989. Canadian decision-makers were aware that the period in the fifties and sixties when the West sanctioned China corresponded to the time in which the Chinese government perpetrated its most heinous human rights abuses.33A

A third consideration was one which has influenced Canada's relations with a number of states. Ottawa has generally refrained from acting against countries which have perpetrated serious human rights abuses if it has "substantial and growing commercial relations" with the violating countries.33B Such was the case with Canada-China relations. The Mulroney government had invested a significant amount of time and money in trying to create better Canada-China economic ties. As previously indicated, in 1987, Prime Minister Mulroney announced the "Canadian Strategy for China" which built upon the recent initiatives of the Canadian government: China was targeted as a "priority market" in the National Trade Strategy; a consulate was opened in Shanghai; CIDA's China program was expanded; and a $350 million concessional financing line was established within the EDC's $2 billion line-of-credit for China. The 1987 measures were further enhanced in 1989 with
the publication of the Canadian trade strategy for the next century, entitled *Going Global*. This new trade strategy included a plan for the Pacific (including China) that was to complement the 1988 Free Trade Agreement that Canada had signed with the US. With China thus enjoying an important place in Canada's trade policy, Ottawa was not prepared to assiduously apply economic sanctions against it.

Fourthly, it is noteworthy that the Canadian government has always been reluctant to impose strictures on Canadian businesses operating in other states. For example, in sanctioning South Africa, Ottawa imposed a 'code of conduct' on Canadian firms operating in South Africa that was optional and not mandatory. Kim Richard Nossal has set out the rationale: "Making it illegal to perform an act in another jurisdiction where such an act was legal would be to embrace something long anathema to Canadian policy-makers of all persuasions—extraterritoriality." Canadian policy-makers have been particularly sensitive to US intervention in Canada's economic relationship with the PRC. In the late fifties, some Canadian corporations, such as Ford and Chrysler, abruptly terminated trade negotiations with the PRC apparently because warnings had been conveyed by their US-parent companies that the US government might impose the Trading-With-The-Enemy Act if US goods were transported to China via Canada. Thus, for Canada to have imposed strictures on Canadian corporate activity in
China would have been to bestow legitimacy upon US "extra-territorial" measures vis-a-vis Canada. This concern was a constraint on the nature of the economic measures the Canadian government was prepared to take against China.

Notwithstanding the above, economic considerations need not have impeded the implementation of the specific commercial measures outlined by Canada in June, 1989 except for the influence of one final factor. The magnitude of Canada's trade with China needs, after all, to be put into the perspective of Canada's overall trade. In 1989, Canada-

### TABLE 8

**CHINA'S PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CANADIAN TRADE**  
(in millions $C$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Two-Way Trade</th>
<th>% of Total Canadian Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>598.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1020.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1432.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1570.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1662.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1664.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2244.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>3551.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2297.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3045.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3696.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

China two-way trade totalled $2.3 billion. This was no paltry sum; however, it represented only 1.2 per cent of the entire Canadian trade program. As a percentage of the whole, Canada-China trade has never represented a significant percentage of total Canadian trade (see Table 8). Therefore, if Canada had fully implemented the sanctions, the "damage" to the Canadian economy would not have been too great.

However, overshadowing China's relative unimportance to the Canadian economy was the fact that if Canada had fully implemented the measures in this instance, pressure, domestic and international, would have been put on the Canadian government to treat other human rights violators in a similar manner. Consistency in the application of Canada's human rights policy would have been called for and this would have been very costly to the Canadian economy because some 115 states in the international community were (and are) human rights violators. Prime Minister Mulroney acknowledged such concerns when, in October 1991 in a House of Commons debate, he remarked that a linkage of human rights with trade would mean "Canada would cease to exist on a commercial basis".

In sum, as with international and domestic influences, several political and economic concerns of the bureaucracy and the executive encouraged Canada to soft pedal the application of sanctions against China.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to assess the impact of the Tiananmen Square massacre on Canada-China relations in the context of Canada's emerging human rights policy. It has demonstrated that, prior to the massacre, the violation of human rights in China was a minor irritant in Canada-China relations, if it was a factor at all. The Canadian government had only been gradually developing an international human rights policy and, concurrently, it had been preoccupied with fostering good relations with China for commercial and political/security reasons and thus did not allow human rights considerations to enter into the decision-making calculus. This study has also shown that with human rights becoming a prominent feature of Canadian foreign policy by 1989 and with the Tiananmen Square massacre generating widespread revulsion within and outside of Canada, the Canadian government felt obligated to take some serious action against the People's Republic of China.

The Canadian government's preoccupation with fostering better relations with China led it, however, to respond relatively weakly to the Tiananmen Square massacre, employing measures that were selective and limited and applied inconsistently. In addition to the alienation of the Chinese that would have occurred had Canada responded
harshly to the incident, Ottawa had to consider the increased attractiveness of the PRC as a market and outlet for Canadian investment as a result of the economic reforms of the eighties. As well, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, China had become the most powerful communist state in the international system and, therefore, was regarded as increasingly important in political-security terms.

If the case of China is any indication, it seems likely that the Canadian government's evolving human rights policy will continue to be adhered to only where it does not adversely affect other aspects of Canada's relations with particular states.

Looking at Canadian policy since April, 1992, it is noteworthy that the government has continued to express its concern for the advancement of human rights. At the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June 1993, Canada regarded the meeting as a "chance to build a 'worldwide culture of human rights'" that would be "a stronger bulwark against abuses, more effective than any law or sanction".

At the same time, however, Canada has also sought to improve its relations with China. In March, 1993, Joe Clark travelled to China and met with Li Peng, Qian Qichen and several vice premiers, and, in May, Zhu Rongji, China's "principal" vice premier, paid an "official visit" to Canada, thereby formally ending the sanction on 'high-level'
visits. As well, EDC funds have continued to flow to China as evidenced by the signing of $151.8 million worth of contracts in the year since Michael Wilson visited.\textsuperscript{340}

Meanwhile, the situation in the People's Republic has not improved; rather, it has deteriorated even further. Assessing the post-Tiananmen situation, the New York-based International League for Human Rights commented that "human rights, far from improving, have continued the downward slide", and Amnesty International remarked that the "abuses themselves have never stopped".\textsuperscript{341} In preparing for the Eleventh Asian Games in the fall of 1990, Chinese officials launched an 'anti-crime drive' to ensure that the games proceeded undisturbed. During this period, 350,000 criminal cases were "cracked", including 62,000 'major' ones. Amnesty International reported that over 500 executions took place at this time.\textsuperscript{342}

Those who were sent to prison were subjected to conditions of overcrowding, malnutrition, infection from disease, an absence of medical treatment and isolation in very small cells.\textsuperscript{343} In addition, prisoners were often tortured by applying a 50,000-volt cattle prod to their thighs, by forcing them to work 14-hour days with high production quotas, and by affixing to their legs weights of up to 9 kilograms and then confining them to cells measuring one by two metres.\textsuperscript{344} In 1992, Amnesty International
reported that torture in Chinese prisons had become
"endemic" and that prisoners were suffering abuses "far more
severe" than a decade earlier.\textsuperscript{345}

It must be noted that the Chinese leaders have pledged
to use measures similar to those applied prior to the
Eleventh Asian Games, should Beijing be awarded the 2000
Olympics. In the Beijing Olympic committee's official bid
to the International Olympic Committee, the Chinese leaders
pledged that "[n]either now nor in the future will there
emerge in Beijing organizations opposing Beijing's bid and
the hosting of the 2000 Olympiad". Also included in the
Chinese bid was a "letter of guarantee" which stated that in
1998 China would commence a comprehensive program of
surveillance to safeguard "against any possible hazard to
the games". "Important suspects," the government said,
would be "put under surveillance and control".\textsuperscript{346}

In short, the human rights situation in China has not
improved. The Chinese government has not become more
tolerant of dissent, has not relaxed its search for
dissidents, and is still handing out stern sentences to
"counter-revolutionaries".

Under these circumstances, and with the outcome of its
reaction to Tiananmen as a guide, what is needed now is for
Canada to rethink its China policy. The Tiananmen Square
incident impressed upon Canadian decision-makers the
relative lack of influence that they have over change within
China. Confronted with this reality, Canadian policy needs to become more creative and dynamic. The present challenge is not a new one. In fact, it was recognized by the Trudeau government in the seventies, as evidenced by the following passage in the "Pacific" chapter of *Foreign Policy for Canadians*:

For Canada, the problem of the future will be to define constructive policies and interrelationships realistically tied to individual national capacities...[and] the real challenges and opportunities...are to be found in the search for imaginative solutions.²₄⁷

"Imaginative solutions" are in dire need if Canada is to help in the task of creating a more humane Chinese state by decreasing the number of its human rights violations and the brutality of the measures perpetrated by the government.²₄₈

First, when addressing human rights considerations, it must be remembered that China is but a part of Canada's overall international human rights policy, and for such a policy to be valid, Canada needs to develop universal and consistent standards for evaluating human rights in all countries. Granted, some goals are more important in the international realm than are human rights considerations, especially promoting international peace and security. However, concerns of this type do not excuse a state from not reacting to human rights abuses. What is necessary is for Canada to outline a policy regarding human rights that
will be adhered to consistently. If a policy is consistently abided by, then states will know beforehand what the Canadian reaction will be to any offences that they commit. In the Winegard Report, the Committee members cautioned the Canadian government in this regard: "The worst thing would be for the government to adopt stricter human rights policies in theory, but then allow them to be implemented in an ad hoc, inconsistent or lax manner." This is precisely what the Canadian government did in the case of China and the Tiananmen Square massacre; Canada announced a set of measures that it left largely unimplemented.

The Mulroney government should have outlined a more limited range of sanctions that, when fully implemented, would have provided evidence to the Chinese leadership of Canada's disapproval regarding the Tiananmen Square massacre. Further, by completely implementing a more limited range of measures, the Canadian government would not have been open to charges of inconsistency. Operating in the above context, the government should not, for example, have placed a moratorium on official contacts with Chinese officials, knowing that such a measure could not be fully implemented without dire consequences for Canada-China relations. On the other hand, the shipment of arms to China should have been terminated altogether, for they aided the Chinese government in its efforts to stifle opposition and
were a minimal component of overall Canada-China relations where action could be taken with impunity. If such an approach had been adopted—that is if the measures announced had been limited, but fully implemented—it could have become a foundation for formulating future Canadian action in similar instances. However, rather than narrowing its initiatives to those it was really prepared to implement, the government outlined a lengthy 'wish list' of sanctions that proved to be a paper tiger and provided little guidance for future action.

In order to increase the validity of Canada’s overall human rights policy, universal and consistent standards need to be developed. As indicated in Chapter One, the government should define a set of "first priority" rights "without which it is impossible for any individual to live a life of dignity and worth". Other states would then know what Canada perceives to be the fundamental necessities of life. At the same time, any attempt by a state to deprive its citizens of these rights should result automatically in a reaction from the Canadian government so that all states know what to expect from Canada when "core rights" are violated.

To implement a fully effective human rights policy, the reaction of the Canadian government to any violation of "first priority rights" needs to be quick and harsh. The exact government reaction cannot, however, be formulated in
advance due to the differing nature of Canada's relations with each state. However, as a general guide, bilateral aid should be rechannelled through NGOs at the grassroots level in order to benefit principally those who have been deprived of their rights, and funding for large-scale projects which aid or lend prestige to the offending government should be terminated. In short, states need to feel the repercussions of their human rights abuses in an economic sense.

Returning specifically to China, a second approach that Canada should adopt in an effort to improve its observance of human rights is the development of relations with local leaders throughout China, especially the leaders in the coastal centres (Guangdong, Shanghai, Fujian, Jiangsu). It is these areas which are currently, and will continue to be, the engines of growth in the Chinese economy. Senior officials there tend to be more reform-oriented and they are, therefore, challenging the Beijing leaders' monopoly over the policy-making process.

Furthermore, the persons in power in these regions are younger than the gerontocratic leaders in Beijing and will be in line to assume control of the People's Republic after the deaths of the current party elite.

The changes introduced at the 14th Party Congress in October, 1992 augur well for the future of reform in China. A number of reformers were promoted to the Central Committee, the Politburo and its Standing Committee.
Further, the Party adopted "market-socialism" as its official policy, and the Central Advisory Commission, an organizational base of China's 'hardliners', was abolished. Additional leadership changes at the National People's Congress in March 1993 augmented the trend towards economic reform in China. What is necessary now is that Canada establish linkages with these new figures in order to encourage an extension of the economic reforms to the political domain.

There are at present in Canada several institutions which could aid in forming closer ties between Canadians and reform-minded Chinese. Indeed, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD) was created specifically "to work closely with governments, public institutions and NGOs in developing countries, to help establish and strengthen institutions, programs and activities that promote internationally recognized human rights". Although not a government agency, the Canada-China Trade Council could also play a useful role in further developing ties between the Canadian business community and the Chinese leaders in the southern regions.

Third, Canadian policy-makers should increase Canada's relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan. By encouraging reform within these two territories, Canada can indirectly pressure China to change also. Taiwan and Hong Kong are playing a more important role in the PRC due to the increasing
interconnectedness of their three economies. The formation of a "Greater China" as a result of this interdependence could enable Canada to have greater influence in Chinese affairs than was previously possible. Even Yang Shangkun, the Chinese President, has recognized the fact that China can no longer return to isolation: "I don't think it is possible to seal off China now because the world has changed". Canada must utilize China's recognition of this reality to induce change.

Fourth, the inability (or unwillingness) of Canada to effect change within China after Tiananmen Square by unilateral means demonstrated that if China is to become more humane in the governance of its people, then joint international pressure is needed. Therefore, Canada should participate in any multilateral fora aimed at creating an international consensus regarding human rights. The World Conference on Human Rights held in June 1993 in Vienna was a positive step in this direction, even though the Chinese delegation sought to tone down any declaration. Most important was the fact that the Chinese participated in the process when previously they probably would not have, claiming that any discussion of human rights in such a forum was an intrusion into the internal affairs of China. The simple act of participating in the formulation of an international declaration thus reflected a new tacit recognition on the part of the Chinese that human rights
considerations do not fall solely within the confines of a state.

Lastly, Canada should increase pressure on the PRC to improve its human rights records in bilateral meetings of officials of the two countries. As one China watcher has asserted, Canadian policy-makers need to "discuss the matter [of human rights] regularly and thoroughly with the Chinese at the highest levels possible". What is needed is for Canadian officials to instill in the Chinese the degree of importance that Canada accords human rights concerns. It is acknowledged that by pressing the Chinese some animosity will be created as has been the case in the past. Nevertheless, the Chinese leaders must come to "understand that how they treat their people has global consequence and hence is of legitimate universal concern".

Canadian policy-makers should capitalize on the progress made at the World Conference on Human Rights by initiating discussions with the Chinese in the hopes of coming to an agreement regarding some of the so-called "soft" human rights issues, such as the condition of Chinese prisons, the opening up of Chinese courtrooms to the public, and the freedom of movement of individuals across international borders. If they are taken at their word, the Chinese appear to be willing at least to discuss the issue of human rights, for in a 1991 statement, the government noted that "China is in favor of strengthening international
cooperation in the realm of human rights on the basis of understanding and seeking a common ground while reserving differences. Even if the two sides cannot come to a complete agreement on human rights issues in bilateral talks, a narrowing of the differences in viewpoints would mark an improvement and serve as a basis for future talks. At a minimum, Canadian participants would have a better understanding of the Chinese position regarding human rights.

A full implementation of the above proposals may not be tenable in the short-term. What may be required is an incremental adoption of the ideas presented, but the objective should be to set out a path for the future so that a more human rights-oriented Canada-China policy results. A time frame must also be adopted in order to be able to assess progress towards the ultimate goal. Too often, sound policy initiatives are not fully implemented because they are void of time constraints; procrastination is a characteristic of governments as well as individuals.

In sum, what is needed to rectify the current situation vis-a-vis Canada's China policy is for a new path to be forged. To retain the present approach would be misguided because there is no clear direction to policy. Currently, the pronouncements of the Canadian government concerning human rights cannot be effectively implemented because of ambiguity. How, for instance, can "human rights" be guarded
(or, for that matter, violated) if it has not even been determined what is meant by the phrase "human rights"? The result is lip service and posturing by the government in its human rights policy.

The goal of this thesis was to determine the relative importance of human rights in Canada-China relations, especially in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre. The evidence presented indicates that Canada was exercised over the situation in China in June, 1989 and initially responded with what appeared to be some vigour. However, human rights concerns were soon reduced to a level commensurate with the pre-Tiananmen period, thereby lending credence to the oft-cited charge that the Canadian government is guilty of condemning China 'on Sunday' and then carrying on business with little change 'on Monday'.
NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1. The Tiananmen Square massacre is a misnomer because the majority of those killed were not killed in the square, but rather in the surrounding roadways. Also, the Tiananmen Square massacre cannot be limited to June 4, 1989, since many of the participants were captured and punished after that date. It is also worth noting that the Chinese government claims that Tiananmen was a bloodless affair: "During the whole operation not a single person was killed." See China. The Truth About the Beijing Turmoil, (Beijing: Beijing Publishing House, 1989), p.5.


6. For a discussion of sanctions, their goals and efficacy, see the works of Margaret Doxey and James Lindsay, as well as Paul M. Evans, *Sanctions Against the People's Republic of China*, (Toronto: Department of Political Science, York University, 1983) and Peter Van Ness, *Analysing the Impact of International Sanctions on China*, Working Paper 1989/4 (Canberra: Department of International relations, Australian National University, December 1989).


10. Canada is a signatory of all three documents which comprise the International Bill of Human Rights and also of the 1985 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. With respect to the International Bill of Human Rights, these documents were signed by the Taiwan government when it held the China seat in the UN. However, when Mao Zedong and the Communists took the seat, they nullified all previously signed agreements. Thus, China is not a signatory to any of the aforementioned UN human rights codes, except the 1985 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. This convention was signed by China in December 1986, but never ratified. For a discussion of the International Bill of Rights, see Paul Williams, ed., The International Bill of Human Rights, (Glen Allen, Ca.: Entwhistle Books, 1981).

11. China has stated that it supports the International Bill of Human Rights, but believes that historical, social, economic and cultural differences circumscribe the UN-defined rights. See China, Information Office of the State Council, Human Rights in China, (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 1991) p.112.


13. Ibid., p.10.


16. Copper, Michael, & Wu, p.95. Also, see Kent, pp.7-8.
17. For more on this, see the section in Chapter Two dealing with Deng's abolition of the "Four Big Freedoms" following the suppression of the Xidan Democracy Movement.


20. Ibid., p.15.


23. Alterations to most articles in the Canadian Constitution require the support of at least two-thirds of the provinces, representing at least 50 per cent of the population. Unanimity is required to amend some articles.

24. The advancement of a particularistic view of human rights is not limited to only China or the Chinese. In Canada, there are some who espouse a similar belief. For example, see M. Lakshman Marasinghe, Commentary, Tenth Anniversary Symposium at the University of Windsor, vol. 10.; pp.451-3.

25. In the Canadian address to the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June 1993, the Canadian representative remarked that "human rights principles are universal--they reflect the 'natural' aspirations of all human beings". See Statement, 93/48, June 16, 1993, p.2.


27. Time, June 14, 1993, pp.56-59.


CHAPTER TWO

32. Copper, Michael, & Wu, p.90.


34. As quoted in Cohen, p.456-7.

35. Copper, Michael & Wu, p.24. and Cohen, p.456. Based on an estimate of the population in 1949, Mao's statement meant that over 25 million Chinese were to be interned. In 1993, with a population of 1.2 billion, Mao's 5 per cent corresponds to 60 million people being imprisoned.

36. Vohra, p.79.


39. Goldman, p.119

40. This section on the Xidan Democracy Wall movement is based on information found in the following: Brodsgaard, pp.762-74; Goldman, pp.118-26; James C.F.Wang Contemporary Chinese Politics, 2nd. ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1985), pp.203-6; and, John Fraser, The Chinese: Portrait of a People. (Toronto: Totem, 1980).

41. Fraser, The Chinese, p.242 and Brodsgaard, p.761.

42. Wang, p.204.

43. Brodsgaard, p.770. The "Four Fundamental Principles" were guidelines for each citizen to "uphold the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought".
44. As quoted in Brodsgaard, p.767. The "Four Modernizations Plan" was announced by Deng Xiaoping at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978. Deng sought to modernize China's agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defence.

45. As quoted in Brodsgaard, p.771.

46. Brodsgaard, p.772; Wang, p.206; and, Goldman, p.126.

47. Brodsgaard, p.772.

48. Copper, Michael, & Wu, p.29.

49. Vohra, p.130.

50. Ibid., p.130.

51. Copper, Michael, & Wu, p.27.

52. Ibid., p.92.

53. Ibid., pp.94-5.

54. The material from this section is derived from Evans & Taras, "Looking (Far) East," pp.66-100.

55. From a transcript of a television interview with Pierre E. Trudeau conducted by Tom Gould (CTV) and Ron Collister (CBC) on October 16, 1973 as quoted in Harbron, p.23.


59. Statement of Patricia M. Derian to House Committee on Foreign Affairs, as quoted in Cohen, p.452.


61. Ibid., p.274. Interestingly, this technique was used after the Tiananmen Square massacre causing, the "official" version to be deemed the "Big Lie".
62. Yuan-Li Wu et. al., p.298. Yuan-Li acknowledges the inaccuracy of his data set: "...the picture our data present is only the visible portion of a massive iceberg. There is no way of telling precisely what is the size of the submerged portion of the iceberg".


67. Tiananmen Square marked a coalescing of the Canadian-Chinese community into an interest group which actively participates in the debate on Canada's China policy.

68. Cohen, p.475.


71. As quoted in Keenleyside and Taylor, p.1

72. Ibid., p.4


75. Nolan, p.381.

76. As quoted in Keenleyside, "Aiding Rights".


78. Keenleyside, "Aiding Rights".

79. Ibid.

country's absolute bilateral aid figure a three year average was
used in order to reduce the disparities caused by extraordinary
occurrences in a single year. Also, a five-point scale was
adopted to gauge human rights abuses whereby a ranking of three
or higher meant that the state was a "serious human rights
abuser". See pp.144-151.

81. Ibid., p.160.

82. Ibid., p.151.

83. see DEA. Canada's International Relations: Response of the
Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee
of the Senate and the House of Commons, (Ottawa: Supply and
Services Canada, 1986), pp.23-9; Canadian International
Development Assistance: To Benefit A Better World. Response of
the Government of Canada to the Report of the Standing Committee
on External Affairs and International Trade, (Ottawa: Supply and
Services Canada, 1987), pp.49-56; and CIDA, Sharing Our Future:
Canadian International Development Assistance, (Ottawa: Supply
and Services Canada, 1987), pp.31-2.

84. Sharing Our Future, p.31.

85. Julian Payne as quoted in Keenleyside, "Aiding Rights".

86. Canada's International Relations, p.72.

87. For a more detailed discussion of the preparation of the
manuals, see the Third Report of the Standing Committee on Human
Rights and the Status of Disabled Persons, Human Rights
Considerations and Coherence in Canada's Foreign Policy, (Ottawa,
June 1990).


90. Ibid., p.24.

91. Holmes, p.215.

92. Stephen Beecroft, "Canadian Policy Towards China, 1949-1957:
The Recognition Problem," in Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and

93. James Eayrs, "The Foreign Policy of Canada," in Foreign
Policies in a World of Change, Joseph E. Black & Kenneth W.
& Frolic, eds., Reluctant Adversaries, for a fuller discussion on
the problems associated with Canadian recognition of the PRC.
94. As quoted in Harbron, p.2.

95. Prior to entering political life, Trudeau had commented that Canada had freedom over only 30 per cent of its foreign policy because the remaining 70 per cent was predetermined by the US. See Thomas S. Axworthy, "'To Stand Not So High Perhaps but Always Alone': The Foreign Policy of Pierre Elliott Trudeau," in Towards A Just Society: The Trudeau Years, Thomas S. Axworthy & Pierre Elliott Trudeau, eds., (Markham: Penguin, 1990), pp.12-48.


98. The 'three constant principles' were:

1. A government seeking relations with China must recognize the central People's Government as the sole and lawful government of the Chinese people;
2. A government which wishes to have relations with China must recognize that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and in accordance with this principle must sever all kinds of relationships with the 'Chiang Kai-shek gang'; and
3. A government seeking relations with China must give support to the restoration of the rightful place and legitimate rights in the United Nations of the PRC and no longer give any backing to so-called representatives of Chiang Kai-shek in any organ of this international body.

99. Harbron, p.14; The development of the 'takes note' phrase, or the 'Canadian formula', eased China's entry into the international community. Within 18 months of the Canadian initiative, nine other countries had established formal relations with the PRC.

100. For a detailed discussion of the commencement of wheat sales to China, see Patrick Kyba, "Alvin Hamilton and Sino-Canadian Relations," in Reluctant Adversaries, pp.168-86.


103. After his 1949 visit to China, Trudeau had committed himself to support Canadian recognition of China in the pages of Cite Libre. Later, after his 1960 visit, Trudeau co-authored with Jacques Hebert a book about their travels in China entitled Two Innocents in Red China, (Toronto, 1968).
104. Zhou Enlai during an official banquet even went as far as calling Trudeau his "old friend". See Harbron, p.2.


106. Ibid., p.196.


114. Muirhead, p.12.

115. Hervouet.

116. Ibid., and Paltiel, p.44.

117. Saywell, p.412.

118. Evans and Zweig, p.19.

119. Paltiel, p.45; Maclean's, April 24, 1989, p.30.

120. Ottawa Citizen, June 6 and 7, 1989.

121. Maclean's, April 24, 1989, p.30.

122. The data in this section are largely drawn from Frolic, "Canada and the PRC" and O' Brien, "CIDA's China Program".
123. The science and technology exchanges were still constrained by Canada's membership in the Coordinating Committee (COCOM). COCOM was a corollary of NATO. COCOM and later CHICOM (China Committee) were created in order to ensure that strategic materials and knowledge was not transferred from the Western bloc to the Eastern bloc. CHICOM was created in 1952 as a result of Chinese intervention in the Korean War. CHICOM's complete embargo list totalled more than 500 items and applied to China, Korea and, later, North Vietnam. Due to a difference between the US and British regarding the extent to which COCOM and CHICOM sanction lists should differ, CHICOM was re-integrated into COCOM in 1958. For a more complete treatment of COCOM and CHICOM operations, see Paul M. Evans, Sanctions.


125. Ibid., p.199.


128. This is not a complete list. For fuller details see CIDA, "China Country Program Review," Appendix B, p.19 as cited in O'Brien, "CIDA's China Program," p.12.


133. Confidential correspondence with the author.


135. Confidential correspondence with the author.
CHAPTER 3


137. Ibid., p.10.

138. Statement, 89/28, p.3.


140. Statement, 89/28, p.2-5.


142. Ibid., p.3.


144. Herein the term sanctions encompasses more than just economic measures. It includes various types of sanctions, symbolic and material, positive as well as negative. See Van Ness, Analysing.

145. Confidential correspondence with the author.

146. Ibid.


149. For information outlining the reactions of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States and of the Asian Development Bank, the European Economic Community, the Group of Seven, the International Labour Organization, the United Nations and the World Bank, see International League for Human Rights, Business As Usual...? The International Response to Human Rights Violations in China, (New York: International League for Human Rights, May 29, 1991).


152. Ibid., p.10.

153. Ibid., p.10.


155. In late 1989, Congress passed legislation ending Export-Import Bank financing and insurance operations with the PRC and prohibiting American satellites from being launched by Chinese vehicles. However, both of the restrictions could be waived by the President if in so doing he was serving the "national interest".


164. Ibid., p.4.


170. Ibid., p.5.

171. Ibid., p.5.

173. In order to assess public opinion, five newspapers were examined between mid-May and mid-July, 1989. The papers included the *Globe and Mail*, the *Toronto Star*, the *Ottawa Citizen*, the *Financial Post*, and the *Vancouver Sun*.


180. See note 38 for the papers whose editorials were examined.

181. Surprisingly, the *Globe and Mail* was silent on Canada's policy vis-a-vis China. The editorials were primarily descriptive in nature and offered no position regarding sanctions. It was not until July 22 that the *Globe and Mail* expressed a position on sanctions and, then, it supported the range of sanctions compiled by the 67 countries at the Summit of the Arch.


186. Ibid., p.130.

187. Ibid., p.131.

188. Ibid., p.133.


190. Stairs, p, 131.


193. Ibid., p.232.


197. During the 4 3/4 hour debate on the evening of June 5, 1989, 37 MPs voiced their concerns and gave advice as to the 'correct' Canadian response to the massacre. See *Hansard*, June 5, 1989, pp. 2591-2636.


199. Ibid., June 20, 1989, 8:23.

200. Ibid., 8:11.

201. Ibid., 8:15.

202. Ibid., 8:22.


204. Ibid., p.169.


211. see Statement, 89/21, August 7, 1989: 89/41, September 18, 1989; and 89/45, September 26, 1989.


CHAPTER 4


218. Ironically, a Canadian transmitter in Sackville, New Brunswick was used by Chinese authorities through their Radio Beijing operations to spread Chinese propaganda in North America. An agreement had been signed by RCI and Radio Beijing in April, 1989 allowing Radio Beijing two hours of access daily to the transmitter for broadcasts to Latin and North America RCI was given equal access to Chinese facilities in Xian. Editorial freedom was guaranteed in the agreement. See Globe & Mail, July 1, 1989.

219. Voice of America broadcasts were jammed in the immediate aftermath of the massacre and continued to be occasionally jammed into 1991.


222. In Canada there are three possible humanitarian categories in the refugee determination process: convention refugees; members of designated classes; and special humanitarian measures. For more information, see Employment and Immigration Canada, Canada's Immigration Law, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1993), especially pp. 15-16.


228. Bill C-55 reformed the refugee determination process. It replaced an 8-stage process which took years to determine a persons’s refugee claim with a 3-stage process that completes the procedure in months. Actual processing of claimants under this new method commenced in May, 1989. For more information, see Canada's Immigration Law.

229. Problems in the determination process were evident almost immediately after the panels were created. In March 1990, in the case of Ken Yung Yhap, Justice Jerome found that the "policy directives and criteria for officers conducting the humanitarian and compassionate reviews were too narrow and restricted their discretion". He called for new guidelines to be prepared to remedy the situation. For more information, see Minister of Employment and Immigration, News Release, 90-04, March 20, 1990. Especially Backgrounder #1 and #2.


231. Ibid.

232. These statistics were obtained from the Immigration and Refugee Board, News Release, February 12, 1993.


234. Ibid.

235. Ibid. Interestingly, this trend continued in the first quarter of 1993. In that period, the approval rate for all seeking refugee status was 54.1 per cent, while for Chinese the figure totalled 15.3 per cent. See IRB, News Release, May 28, 1993.


237. Information provided by Guan Qingyong, a graduate student at the University of Windsor as cited in Elizabeth Ng, "Canada and the Tiananmen Square Massacre: A Case Study in Canadian Foreign Policy Decision-Making," (unpublished M.A. research paper), p.18.
238. Fraser, "The Last Refuge," p.20. The existence of the "style
guide" is in question. Government officials denied that it
indeed existed whereas some others knowledgeable in such matters
told the author that they believed that such a "guide" was used.
Rumours surrounding its existence seem to stem from the fact that
in 1991 IRB panel members from various cities in Canada released
judgements in cases which used very similar language in denying
the claims. Confidential correspondence with the author.


240. Globe and Mail, June 23, 1989. In the immediate aftermath of
Tiananmen Square, the Chinese government altered the emigration
process so that anyone who sought to leave China had to first
report to his/her neighbour police station in order to secure the
proper documents. Thus, the assigning of additional officers to
China was in any event not an effective measure.

241. From correspondence with EAITC, as cited in Ng, p.20 and
Business As Usual, pp.62-63.


244. From correspondence with EAITC as cited in Ng, p. 20.
Later, at the 1993 session of the UN Commission on Human Rights,
an American-introduced draft resolution registering concern over
China's human rights abuses was stopped due to Asian and African
resistance. The US measure was not even voted on. See Globe and
Mail, March 11, 1993.


246. Standing Committee on External Affairs and International

247. Globe & Mail, June 2, 1990. This was reported in the
aforementioned edition of the Globe & Mail, but it was said by
Deng Xiaoping a year earlier.

248. Canada's International Relations, p.72.

249. For a more detailed discussion, see Human Rights
Considerations and Coherence in Canada's Foreign Policy.

250. Statement, 89/28, p.s.

251. A 1990 External Affairs report listed a sale to China,
totalling $6,395, of "electronic equipment specially designed for
military use", External Affairs and International Trade Canada,
Export of Military Goods From Canada; First Annual Report 1990,
p.20. Later, External Affairs claimed that a mistake had been
made and that no military goods of this type were shipped to
China during the period of the report.
252. Over the period 1985 to 1988, military goods sold to China included five Challenger aircraft, two of which were custom-fitted with search radar and navigation systems, tactical switchboard systems, and tactical air navigation systems (TACAN). Information provided by Project Ploughshares.

253. As quoted in Ernie Regher, "Besides, We Need the Business," This Magazine, August 1991, p.7.


258. Ibid.


263. Information provide by EAITC.

264. From correspondence with EAITC as cited in Ng, p. 17.

265. Ibid., p.17.


268. During his visit, McKnight did relay the Canadian government's concerns regarding continuing human rights violations in China. Vice-Premier Tian Jiyuan reprimanded the Agriculture Minister for his intervention stating that China's human rights violations "was not something that Canada should be interested in---that [Tiananmen Square] was a domestic action and like other countries, they would do what is necessary to maintain stability". Toronto Star, October 26, 1991. Three Canadian Members of Parliament who visited China in January, 1992 also offended the Chinese government and ended up being deported. The MPs had travelled to China on a fact-finding mission to investigate the human rights violations perpetrated by the state. In attempting
to fulfill their mission, they met with relatives of jailed dissidents from Tiananmen Square, thus incurring the ire of the Chinese leadership.

269. Information provided to the author by EAITC.


274. Ibid.

275. Keenleyside, "Aiding Rights".


277. Manon Tessier, Canadian International Relations Chronicle, April-June 1990, p.27.

278. Manon Tessier, Canadian International Relations Chronicle, July-September 1990, p.27.


284. see Paul M. Evans, Sanctions.


293. Ibid.


295. Interestingly, this practice was discontinued after August 4, 1992 and replaced by phrases akin to the following: "the project preserves existing links established by the exporter in the past...people-to-people exchanges...equipment and services to be exported are clearly directed towards civilian domestic needs". Ottawa thereby preserved the pretence that the loans approved were consistent with its guidelines.


301. Information provided to the author by EAITC.


CHAPTER FIVE


305. Business As Usual, p.38.

306. Ibid.

307. In December 1989, American policy-makers announced that they were planning for a "slight relaxation" in sanctions against China. See, Paltiel, p.55.

308. Business As Usual, p.40.


310. Ibid., p.36.


312. Business as Usual, p.57. and Ng, p.32. In July, 1989, the G-7 members--US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain and Canada--agreed to a range of sanctions to be imposed on China. The G-7 "Declaration on China" included: the suspension of bilateral ministerial and high-level contacts; the suspension of arms-trading; the termination of any new World Bank loans; the extension of Chinese student visas. See Group of Seven, Summit of the Arch, July 1989.

313. Paltiel, p.55.


315. Ibid., p.30.


322. Matthews and Pratt, p.299.


324. Ibid., p.6.


327. Ibid.


330. Ibid., p.7.


332. Ibid., p.191.


340. For contract amounts, see News Releases, 92/161, 93/37, 93/38, 93/49, 93/50, 93/51, 93/53, 93/54, 93/92, 93/103. For exchange rates, see Canadian Economic Observer, July 1993.

341. As quoted in Maclean's, June 17, 1991.


349. For Whose Benefit?, p.25.

350. Keenleyside, "Aiding Rights". See, inter alia, Kent, pp.2-6 and Gillies, pp.7-9. These rights are outlined in Chapter One, p.9.


353. It has been forecast, using IMF methods, that the total output of the economy of "Greater China" will exceed that of the US in less than a decade. Using new statistical methods based on purchasing-power parity, China is now regarded as the third largest global economy behind the US and Japan. See *Time*, May 31, 1993, p.28.

354. As quoted in Drinan, Kuo & Kuo, p.40.

355. Confidential interview with the author.


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Information provided by EAITS.

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