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Human selfhood in Heidegger's Being and time.

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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RÉCU
Human Selfhood in Heidegger's
Being and Time

A Thesis submitted to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies
Through the Department of Philosophy
in partial fulfilment of
Master of Arts
The University of Windsor

by

Adib Aburukin

Windsor, Ontario

1976
ABSTRACT

The subject matter of this thesis is the conception of human selfhood developed by Martin Heidegger in his work *Being and Time.*

The aim of the thesis is to demonstrate that Heidegger's conception of selfhood is a consistent and fruitful alternative to traditional philosophical conceptions of human selfhood.

Chapter one examines Heidegger's claim that the human self is neither 'substance' nor 'subject', and places this claim in the context of Heidegger's criticism of traditional Western Ontology.

Chapter two examines Heidegger's claim that the self is a possible way to be, and seeks to illustrate the meaning of that claim by reference to Heidegger's distinction between 'Authentic' and 'Inauthentic' ways of existence.

Chapter three examines Heidegger's claim that the self is not required as a principle of unity in the philosophical account of human reality, and the reasons that lie behind this claim.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis represents not only the results of Heidegger's thought, but also the results of the advice and encouragement of those who taught me. It is, therefore, a great pleasure for me to be able to take this opportunity to thank those who have given me so generously of their help in many ways.

Many of these teachers will, no doubt, disagree with some of the conclusions I have come to, but their teaching has been invaluable to me in helping to clarify and develop my ideas.

I wish to express my thanks and acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor R. C. Pinto, who has given me invaluable advice on many points of this thesis, and provided both the inspiration and direction of it.

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Adib Aburukin

University of Windsor, 1976
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INTRODUCTION

The Problem

When we consider the human self and its function, the problem that we are faced with is the nature of this self. Is the self a substance? If it is a substance, then what kind of substance is it -- material or mental? Is the self an entity existing by itself or does it relate to man's two substances -- mind and body -- and how does it relate to each or to both? These and many other questions can be raised whenever we think of or attempt to grasp the nature of the self and its function. In short we believe that the nature of the human self and its function is problematic. That which we are about to consider in our thesis is partially an attempt to deal with the problem of the nature of the human self by discussing the contrast between the traditional conception of the self and that of Heidegger.

In order to appreciate the problematic nature of the self, let us consider some unanswered questions which we believe each and every individual at some time is faced with.

When we speak of our self, attributing to it qualities such as thought, will, choice, freedom, and responsibility, we are faced with the question: what facts do we have to refer
to beyond any doubt? Is the self to which we attribute our qualities that which we call 'inner self-consciousness'; or is it a mere sum of accidental experiences and feelings? Is it possible for a man to find anything permanent or lasting about himself, of which he can say this is the 'self' which I am? Did anyone ever encounter the self as he encounters people or an entity? Where shall we locate this self, within man or outside him? To others, the individual's appearance is the self; as for the individual himself it all depends on that which he considers his 'self', and that which he considers 'not self'. Could it be that the qualities we mentioned above, and the thoughts, ideas, feelings and passions, together with whatever unites them, is what we mean by the self?

If we consider the concepts 'mine', 'yours', and 'ours', we are convinced that even in our most intimate moments of thought we are not always able to determine without doubt, which of these ideas we consider our own, and which of them are not ours. As I am sitting here and writing, the ideas that occur to me I consider mine; only when I think about our problem -- the self -- does it occur to me that I owe much of these ideas to books I have read and to others. Most of all we cannot find an adequate way to make the distinction between what we consider self and what is not self within us. That which I call 'myself' is by no means a constant something in me; for if it was, how could a physical or a psychological
change alter it and cause me to say, "I am not being myself".

The nature and function of the self becomes more problematic when the concept of 'self' is used in certain philosophical inquiries. This concept is used by many philosophers to explain and/or understand human beings as a totality or unity. Furthermore we assume that there is a legitimate philosophical interest in understanding human beings this way; otherwise, man will be a mere collection of accidental experiences.

For the Greek philosophers the 'self' (soul) is certainly not identical with the body in which it lives since our bodies do not deliberate alternatives and make decisions. Traditionally, only that which reflects and decides is the 'self'. When we speak of a person or human being, we must include in addition to the human body the concept of self; otherwise, the notion of person or human being loses its meaning. For each of us, it is one's self rather than one's body which is referred to by the first-person pronoun. The first-person pronoun refers only incidentally to one's body, but it refers primarily and essentially to the self in us. Traditionally it is argued that if this is not so, then it should be possible for one to regard any part of his body as the self.

The self, then, understood traditionally as that which we refer to by the "I" -- a non-physical something -- is the mental, psychic, or spiritual substance in us.

From the above considerations, it is obvious that the
nature and function of the self is a problem which is not solved, and that we are faced with it all the time. It is a question which we believe Heidegger attempted to answer.

Our thesis is primarily a contrast between Heidegger's conception of the human self with the traditional philosophical conception. The general and main subject of the thesis is Heidegger's new conception that "the self is not a substance nor is it a subject, as conceived by the tradition; rather the self is a possible way of Being". The traditional point of view is theoretical and abstract. It is theoretical in that it proceeds as though the self were a substance constantly there, having the attributes and qualities of a thing which is merely there. It is abstract in that it conceives of the self as a pure subject for whom the world is an object. This means that the traditional point of view conceives of the self in terms of thought directed towards man's acquirement of knowledge. In these terms the self is said to be the 'knower' and the world the 'known'. As a knower, the self in its thought is a 'pure subject', isolated from the world which it knows. This conception of the tradition is the result of its point of view concerning man's Being. It did not determine the meaning of man's Being, and therefore left the Being of the self indefinite. This point of view cannot be said to have been intentional; rather it is an implicit presupposition which prevented the tradition from inquiring into the meaning of man's Being and the Being of the self.
Our purpose in this thesis is to examine Heidegger's challenge of this traditional conception. In opposition to the traditional assumption that the self is a substance, Heidegger maintains that selfhood is a possible mode or way of Being -- existence. As such, the self is not a substance always present; rather it is a specific mode of existence, which each and every individual man is able to manifest through and by his own free choice.

Heidegger rejects the traditional conception that the self is a pure subject. He maintains that it is mainly because the traditional approach to the problem of the nature of the human self was guided by the idea of 'thought' as man's essence, that it arrived at the conclusion that the self is pure subject; the traditionalists did not realize that man is primarily an existing entity, in a world where entities such as objects and things also exist, as well as other people.

The thesis is divided into three main chapters, and each chapter is divided into sections -- in two chapters there are subsections. In the first chapter we shall discuss Heidegger's attempt to overcome the traditional conception of man's Being; the notion 'Dasein' to replace the concept man; his phenomenology as the only method to disclose man's Being as it is and as it shows itself; man's encountering the world -- entities and people in Heidegger's conception in opposition to the tradition; and finally his attempts to overcome the traditional conception of the human self -- as substance or subject.
In the second chapter we shall discuss Heidegger's conception of the self and its manifestation. The focal point is Heidegger's thesis that man's selfhood is 'a possible way of Being'; we shall discuss Heidegger's conception of the notions existence and possibility; the self as possibility will be shown as either authentic or inauthentic, either chosen or neglected; and finally we shall consider the manifestation of selfhood as anticipatory resoluteness.

In the third chapter, we shall examine how Heidegger's rejection of the self as it is conceived by the tradition affects the conception of man's unity. We shall show that, contrary to the traditional approach, we do not need the self as a principle of man's unity. The discussion will be focused on the way Heidegger conceives man's totality and the unity of this totality; we shall show that the phenomenon 'care' is man's structural whole and that selfhood is a constitutive item of this phenomenon; Heidegger's criticism of Kant's 'I think' will be discussed in relation to the concept of selfhood; and finally we will show the relation of selfhood to the phenomenon care.

The main and fundamental point which we hope to achieve in this thesis is to show that Heidegger's new conception of selfhood overcomes the problems which we were faced with as a consequence of the traditional conception. Selfhood is manifested when the individual decides to choose to be what he is and what he is able to be; it is not something given
to him. This is a new realization of the meaning of our existence; it is a new philosophical dimension which may give us a new understanding of our existence as human beings.
CHAPTER ONE

HEIDEGGER AND THE TRADITION

The purpose of this chapter is to contrast Heidegger's conception of man's Being with that of the tradition, and to show his critical objection to some of its assumptions, mainly that it conceived of man's Being as a substance and/or as a subject. We believe that if we are to understand Heidegger's thought concerning 'selfhood', it is most important to see it as the result of his profound misgivings concerning this tradition. Heidegger's main quest in his new conception of selfhood as a 'possible way of Being' is to overcome the conception that the self is a substance or a subject. Since substance and subject denote for him something constantly present -- a thing, -- the self, which is a mode or way of man's existence, cannot be thought of in these two terms.

1. Heidegger's Point of Departure

In his attempt to overcome the traditional philosophical conception of the human 'Self' as a 'Substance' and/or a 'Subject', Heidegger's disagreement and main criticism of it is that this traditional conception is based on a mis-
conception of the 'Being' of man. Moreover, this 'Being' was not determined; it was unexamined and was understood as an obvious or self-evident concept.¹

Heidegger begins his work Being and Time with this opening quotation from Plato's Sophistes:

'For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression "being". We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed'.²

Heidegger then asks "Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'being'?" His answer is, "Not at all," and hence he feels that we must re-examine this most crucial question, the meaning of 'Being'.³ Therefore, this is the main theme of Being and Time. But in order to re-examine the meaning of Being, Heidegger searches for the best possible way in which he can achieve his task.

As is the case in every philosophical inquiry, there is a need for a starting point, or a point of departure. For Heidegger, the only being (entity) uniquely qualified for this role is the one who raises the question of the meaning of 'Being'. And to inquire into the meaning of 'Being', we must inquire into the meaning of this 'being' -

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²Ibid., 19/1. Plato, Sophistes 224a.

³Ibid.
Insofar as Being constitutes what is asked about, and 'Being' means the Being of entities, then entities themselves turn out to be what is interrogated... Thus to work out the question of 'Being' adequately, we must make an entity -- the enquirer -- transparent in his own Being. ...this entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term "Dasein". ...Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. ...It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it.

Man -- each of us -- as the only being essentially having this characteristic, is himself the gate to approach the question of the meaning of Being. Man, as 'Dasein', is not like any other entity, but is the only entity who understands Being, in the sense that he is essentially related to Being: man, as Dasein, is related to Being by his very inquiry into the meaning of Being.

Now, if the question of 'Being' aims at discovering what we really mean when we say 'Being', then the point of departure must be an investigation or interrogation of man's Being. We must inquire, how does man of all the beings come to speak of Being at all? The inquiry must show the mode of the Being of man in which he can ask the question of the meaning of Being.

In order to be able to raise the question of the meaning of Being, man has to have some understanding of Being beforehand; otherwise man could not raise the question.

Ibid., 26-27/6-7, and 32/12.
Any inquiry presupposes a certain understanding of that which the question is about. This is why Dasein always has an understanding of Being, but at the same time stresses the fact that this understanding is not explicit; rather it is implicit. In his terminology, it is a pre-ontological understanding. This pre-ontological or implicit understanding is the reason man raises the question of Being, so that the understanding may become explicit.

Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological. Here "Being-ontological" is not yet tantamount to "developing an ontology". So if we should reserve the term "ontology" for the theoretical inquiry which is explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities, then what we have had in mind in speaking of Dasein's "Being-ontological" is to be designated as something "pre-ontological". It does not signify simply "being-ontical", however, but rather "being in such a way that one has an understanding of Being".5

Man's understanding, then, is by no means a fully developed knowledge or explicit understanding. It is merely a dim implicit understanding.

In Heidegger's view traditional ontology in its long history did not answer the 'Being question'. Rather it concealed this question by inquiring into the nature of all beings. It did not raise this question because it conceived of 'Being' as self-evident and clear, indefinable and therefore beyond formulation.

But 'The indefinability of Being', says Heidegger, 'does not eliminate the question of its meaning;
it demands that we look that question in the face.\(^6\)

It is clear that the question of the meaning of 'Being' is the main and central theme, and the final aim for Heidegger.

The purpose of the above discussion is to show that Heidegger's investigation of the Being of man and the modes of man's existence was his point of departure for revealing the concealed question of the meaning of Being. To determine whether or not Heidegger succeeded in achieving this goal is not our task, but we hope that this short account brings into focus Heidegger's motive behind the analysis of man's Being.

2. **Heidegger's Analysis of Dasein**

Before we can get to the main theme of our work, we feel that it is important to show in general terms Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. "Dasein" is the term designated by Heidegger to replace the traditional concept 'Human being' or 'man'. We think that this is done for a very important reason: the traditional concept 'man' meant for Heidegger a definite entity -- something 'thing-like' which had a fixed and constant nature. Furthermore, it is possible that since 'man' implied for Heidegger 'consciousness', and because consciousness is the attribute of man which in the ontology of the tradition set man apart from the rest of the world, then conceiving of man as conscious-

\(^6\)Ibid., 23/4.
ness was the first step in the traditional dichotomy of
'subject' and 'object'. The use of the expression "Dasein"
can therefore be viewed as an attempt to bridge this tradi-
tional dichotomy. It is our conviction that Heidegger's
conception of man as 'Dasein' served him as the first step
in his attempt to overcome the traditional misconception of
man's Being.

For example, in order to distinguish his analysis of
Dasein from anthropology, psychology, and biology, Heidegger
makes it clear that the aim of his analysis is to overcome
Descartes' conception:

Descartes, who is credited with providing the
point of departure for modern philosophical
inquiry by his discovery of the 'cogito sum'.
He investigates the 'cogitare' of the 'ego',
...On the other hand he leaves the 'sum'
completely undiscovered,...Our analytic raises
the ontological question of the Being of the
'sum'.7

The analysis of Dasein according to Heidegger is a
phenomenological interpretation. Influenced by Husserl's
phenomenology, objecting to the traditional ontology, and
deriving his concepts from the Greeks, Heidegger developed
his method of 'hermeneutic phenomenology'. The aim of this
method is to reveal and make explicit the meaning of man's
existence. The function of the method proceeds from an
analysis of man's everyday vague understanding of the mean-
ing of existence (which he calls "the preparatory fundamental
analysis of Dasein") to an existential interpretation or

7Ibid., 71-72/46.
'hermeneutic analysis'; it is only the primordial hermeneutic analysis which renders explicit our vague or pre-ontological understanding of the meaning of our existence. In other words, Heidegger's intention is to provide an original ontological investigation of man's existence. But we must keep in mind that his underlying intention is ontological and not anthropological; that is, the intention is to reveal the meaning of 'Being'. The analysis of man's existence must be understood as a means to an end. In this regard, Heidegger says:

With the question of the meaning of Being, our investigation comes up against the fundamental question of philosophy, this is one that must be treated phenomenologically... the term 'phenomenology' expresses a maxim which can be formulated as 'to the things themselves'! It is opposed to all free floating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking over any conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated; it is opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as problems often for generations at a time. ...the expression 'phenomenon' signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest. Accordingly the 'phenomena' are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light -- what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with--(entities).^8

Phenomenology is the science of phenomena; a phenomenon is that which shows itself in itself. But this showing must, according to Heidegger, be distinguished from the traditional notion of 'appearance'. Phenomenon

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...has proximally nothing at all to do with what is called appearance or still less a 'mere appearance'.

The aim of this last move is to avoid the traditional distinction of appearance and mere appearance, of the thing and the 'thing in itself'. Phenomenology for Heidegger is, then, the description of phenomena, and it is interpretative or hermeneutic when it is applied to the phenomenon Dasein. It is possible to observe the influence upon Heidegger of Husserl's phenomenology, while acknowledging Heidegger's rejection of Husserl's first move, that is, the phenomenological reduction or the process of 'bracketing the natural standpoint'. Husserl would have us suspend our judgment concerning existence and inquire into the essence; that is to say, phenomenology is not concerned with existence. But in Heidegger's conception, existence is not to be suspended at all because for him, the problem of Being -- what it means 'to be' -- is the central problem of philosophy. In opposition to Husserl's bracketing, Heidegger's task is to examine 'the natural standpoint':

Our treatise does not subscribe to a 'standpoint' or represent any special 'direction'; for phenomenology is nothing of either sort nor can it become so as long as it understands itself.

To make the above point clear, we may add that in Husserl's philosophy, the main preoccupation is with the

9Tibid., 51/29.

10Tibid., p. 50/27.
knowledge of essences, and therefore, there is no interest in the individual existence, at least at the time of the philosophical investigation. But what Husserl is bracketing is that which Heidegger wants to analyse, and is the subject matter of the Dasein analysis.

Heidegger's method is to let the phenomenon show itself by itself, that is to let the facts speak for themselves. But if this is the task of Heidegger's phenomenology, then why should we inquire into the phenomenon? Why is there a need for hermeneutic interpretation? The point that Heidegger wants to argue is that, like scientific data, existence is a fact which speaks for itself, or shows itself by itself, but at the same time needs to be interpreted. Existence and its meaning, in Heidegger's view, are not separable; that which is implicit in existence is the fact, and to make it explicit, it must be interpreted.

At this point we may ask what is existence? To comprehend Heidegger's existential analysis of man's existence, we must grasp the basic significance of the notion of existence in his thought. We must keep in mind that man is distinguished from everything else in the world. Man is different from 'objects' and from 'things', because the latter are distinguished by the fact that for them, their Being is a matter of indifference. On the other hand, man's Being is an issue for him, and mineness is a fundamental characteristic of his existence.

To entities such as these [objects and things] their Being is 'a matter of indifference'; or
more precisely, they 'are' such that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite. Because Dasein has in each case [each and every man] mine-ness...one must always use a personal pro-noun when one addresses it: 'I am', 'you are'.

Heidegger introduces the notion of man's 'existence' in opposition to the traditional notion 'existentialia', particularly that of the scholastic philosophy, where 'existentialia' is opposed to 'essentia'. Man as an existing Being in Heidegger's view lacks a static nature (substance), by which all other entities are characterized. Entities such as 'book', 'table', 'cup' are what they are; they do not transcend their environment. They are static, constant, and their Being is a matter of indifference to them. On the other hand, man is an 'ecstatic' being. He is a possibility for himself, a possibility which he can grasp, develop or neglect. In a certain sense Heidegger is saying that man is what he makes of himself. Man's existence is a possibility. Man's Being is an unresolved problem, his existence is a constant attempt to resolve this problem, which no other entity is faced with. The concern that man has for his Being -- revealed in the fact that, 'his Being is an issue -- is a fundamental characteristic for him alone which other entities lack because they are what they are and no more. The notion 'existence', as a specific and fundamental characteristic of man alone, thus includes 'having to be', 'having

\[11\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 68/42.\]
concern about one's Being, and 'having an understanding' of 'Being' itself.

3. The Traditional Failure in Determining Man's Being

According to Heidegger, traditional philosophers conceived of man as substantial in nature. This substantialist conception was the basis for the traditional ontology from its early days; it held the view that man is substance or, what amounts to the same thing, a subject. It is this conception of man which led to Heidegger's criticism:

In the course of this history certain distinctive domains of Being have come into view and have served as the primary guide for subsequent problematics: the ego cogito of Descartes, the subject, the I, reason, spirit, person. But these all remain uninterrogated as to their Being. ...It is rather the case that the categorical content of the traditional ontology has been carried over to these entities with corresponding formalization and pure negative restriction, or its dialectic has been called in for the purpose of interpreting the substantiality of the subject ontologically.¹²

The above text is a clear indication that Heidegger is affected by profound misgivings about all the traditional approaches to man's Being, especially the conception of man as 'substance' and/or 'subject'. Heidegger's main motive is to overcome these traditional conceptions. His main quest, as we read him, is to show on the one hand that 'substance' and/or 'subject' are inappropriate concepts for the adequate apprehension of the Being of man, and, on the

¹² Ibid., p. 44/22.
other hand, that they are insufficient for the understanding of this Being. Concerning his aim to overcome the traditional ontology Heidegger says:

One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an "I" or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein. Ontologically every idea of a 'subject' -- unless refined by previous ontological determination of its basic character -- still posits the subjectum along with it, no matter how vigorous one's ontical protestation against the 'soul-substance' or the reification of consciousness. The Thinghood itself which such reification implies must have its onotological origin demonstrated if we are to be in a position to ask what we are to understand positively when we think of the unfified Being of the subject, the soul, the consciousness, the spirit, the person.\(^{13}\)

From the above text, we should be able to see that all the traditional concepts which denote the meaning of man's Being lack an ontological determination; otherwise they all will carry with them the implication of 'Thinghood'. Heidegger makes it clear that his task is not to accept these concepts at their face value, and as we can see, he is questioning their ontological foundation. Heidegger's questioning and criticism takes its starting point from that of Descartes', who, according to Heidegger, put philosophy on a new footing -- that of the 'cogito sum'. But in Heidegger's view what Descartes

\[^{13}\text{Ibid., p. 72/46.}\]
\[^{14}\text{Ibid., p. 46/24.}\]
The meaning of the Being of the 'ego' is what Descartes left unexamined and undetermined. Descartes' ego, Kant's 'subject', Hegel's 'spirit', and Husserl's 'consciousness', must be examined as to the meaning of their Being.

Now according to the well known substantialist theory of the 'self' articulated by Descartes, man was conceived as composed of two substances: the 'thinking' substance and the 'physical' substance, where the former has a primacy over the latter. But substance as Heidegger understood it -- that which 'remains constant', that which is 'static', that which 'does not change' -- cannot be the Being of man, when this Being is rightly understood, examined, and determined. The traditional concepts cited above were used to explain man's Being, but for Heidegger, none of these concepts captures the full meaning of man's existence. Whether we conceive the human self as a subject, as a substance or an object, in each case we are left with many unanswered questions about the meaning of the self.

The substantialist doctrine is based on the idea of 'substance', and substance meant for Heidegger that entity which is static, or in his terminology 'present-at-hand'. Every theory of the self, every doctrine of philosophy, which speaks of the self as a substance is for Heidegger a misconception of man's Being. But what does Heidegger exactly mean by the term 'present-at-hand'? In order to understand this term and its function, we must discuss Heidegger's concept 'ready-to-hand', and the relation of these two concepts to his conception of the world. For
Heidegger, man must be conceived as 'Being-in-the-world'. The phenomenon 'Being-in-the-world' is a unitary one; the world must be conceived as an essential structure of man. In Heidegger's thought we cannot conceive of man without the world and the world without man. Man and the world constitute one another. It is possible to conceive of man without entities 'ready-to-hand' (equipment), but never to conceive of man without the world. The way we speak of 'subject' and 'object' is the consequence of our relation to entities such as tools but not to the 'world'. Traditionally the relationship between man and the world is one of knowledge: man is conceived as the knower and the world as the known (subject and object).

The phenomenon of 'Being-in' has for the most part been represented exclusively by a single example—knowing the world. This has not only been the case in epistemology; for even practical behaviour has been understood as behaviour which is nontheoretical and 'atheoretical'.

Heidegger, on the other hand, does not think that we encounter the world through knowledge. Knowledge for him is one way to encounter 'the world, but it is not the primordial encounter; it is Heidegger's conception that it is a mistake of the traditional ontology to claim that our first encounter with the world is through knowledge.

If we take a close look at the way Heidegger's discussion of man began and how it proceeds, we should be able

\[\text{15Ibid.},\ p.\ 86/59.\]
to notice that the analysis began by the discussion of the world and the entities within the world. We know by now that Heidegger's thesis is that man's Being is different from that of any other entity. When the tradition spoke of man, its starting point was man himself. But here we find Heidegger shifting the starting point from man to the world, and in some sense he is saying: if we want to know man and in what way he is different from other entities, then we must ask ourselves what these entities are. Heidegger's analysis then begins with the discussion of entities which man uses -- tools or equipment; this in turn reveals the 'thing-entities' and finally man himself. In short, Heidegger's idea of man's encounter with the world is: from equipment to the thing-entities to man.

We now ask which entities shall be taken as our preliminary theme and established as the pre-phenomenal basis for our study. ...One may answer: 'things' (res). But with this obvious answer we have perhaps already missed the pre-phenomenal basis we are seeking. For addressing these entities as things, we have tacitly anticipated their ontological character.

This, then, is the error of the traditional ontological conception of man's encounter with the world as knowledge; in its emphasis on the known things traditional philosophy was mistaken and the primitive or pre-phenomenal basis was concealed from it.

Because knowing has been given this priority, our understanding of its ownmost kind of Being

16 Ibid., p. 96/68.
gets led astray. 17

The traditional philosophy was mistaken in its supposition that our basic relationship to the world is constituted by our knowing the world. Rather, for Heidegger:

The 'commercium' of the subject with a world does not get created for the first time by knowing, nor does it arise from some way in which the world acts upon the subject. Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world, thus Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be Interpreted beforehand. 18

If we reject the traditional conception that the relationship between man and the world is basically one of knowledge, then in what way does man relate to the world, and what is this basic state 'Being-in-th-world', which Heidegger thinks is the pre-phenomenal and primordial way? Heidegger's answer is:

The Being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be exhibited phenomenologically, if we take as our clue our everyday Being-in-the-world, which we also call our 'dealings' in the world and with entities within-the-world. Such dealings have already dispersed themselves into manifold ways of concern. This kind of dealing which is closest to us is...not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them into use; and this has its own kind of 'knowledge'. 19

Man, in his primordial or primitive encounter with the world, is not 'a subject related to an object'; rather, the primordial encounter occurs in man's 'use' and manipulation of the entities within the world. What Heidegger is arguing

17 Ibid., p. 86/59.
18 Ibid., p. 90/62.
19 Ibid., p. 95/66-67.
for here is the rejection of one of the fundamental propositions in traditional philosophy. His claim is that we use entities before knowing them as things. We encounter entities within the world first as a 'tool' or 'equipment'. Then and only then we develop or achieve knowledge of them as 'things': man's encounter with entities within the world as things 'present-at-hand' is posterior to their use as 'equipment', as something 'ready-to-hand'. Things 'present-at-hand' are characterized ontologically in the traditional conception in terms of 'substantiality', 'materiality', and 'extension'. Accordingly, our knowledge of an entity -- a thing 'present-at-hand' -- is by and through the application of the above categories to it. And since the traditional world is the totality or sum of things, then the world is known to us as a spatial, extended, and substantial world.

But for Heidegger, our first encounter with the world is not the theoretical; it is the practical or our use of it. Here we must keep in mind that we should not conceive that this distinction -- Heidegger's -- between things and equipment is a distinction between things we use and things we do not use. Rather, it is a distinction of 'knowing how' and 'knowing that', where the former is 'equipment' and the latter is a 'thing'. Heidegger wants to stress the priority of the 'how' of knowledge over the 'knowing that', which in his conception is a derivative of the 'how'. 'To know 'how' is man's encounter with the entities as 'ready-to-hand'; the knowing 'that' is the encounter with entities -- things -- as they are 'present-at-hand'.

Finally, if the 'knowing how' is prior to the 'knowing that', then Heidegger's claim is against the tradition and the way it conceived the world, for with this traditional conception man's Being was conceived as an entity having the character of a 'thing' present-at-hand. It is clear, we hope, that this argument is directed against the tradition in order to show that it misconceived the world and this misconception extended to man's self, which we shall discuss in the following chapters, for it is this misconception of the self as having the character present-at-hand which Heidegger wants to deny.

As we indicated before, Heidegger sees Descartes' substantialist doctrine of man as the basis for the misconception of man's Being and selfhood. In this regard Heidegger says:

Descartes distinguishes the 'ego cogito' from the 'res corporea'. This distinction will thereafter be determinative ontologically for the distinction between 'Nature' and 'spirit'. No matter with how many variations of content the opposition between 'Nature' and 'spirit' may get set up ontically, its ontological foundations, and indeed the poles of this opposition, remain unclarified; this unclarity has its proximate...roots in Descartes' distinction.20

Therefore, the blame falls on Descartes for misleading subsequent philosophers. And it is in opposition to the substantialist doctrine as Descartes allegedly understood it that Heidegger determined the idea of the 'essence' of man

as 'existence' and man's 'selfhood' as a 'way of existence'; and this idea seems to guide all his considerations. The interpretation of substance as 'res extensa' indicated to him, as we said, that it has the meaning something 'present-at-hand' -- a 'thing'. He says

...the real entity is what is suited for thus remaining constant..., so much so indeed that this is how the substantiality of such a substance gets characterized.\(^{21}\)

and he adds;

...on the basis of an idea of Being whose source has not been unveiled and which has not been demonstrated in its own right -- an idea in which Being is equated with constant present-at-hand.\(^{22}\)

The above conception of 'Being' as 'substance', which the traditional ontology understood as the essence of reality, did not limit itself to entities within the world; it conceived of man's Being in much the same way. In Heidegger's view, Descartes, the articulator of this conception, overlooked the fundamental difference between entities within the world and man:

The idea of Being as present-at-hand...keeps him \(\text{Descartes}\) from bringing Dasein's ways of behaving into view in a manner which is ontologically appropriate. \(...\)On the contrary, he takes the Being of 'Dasein'...in the very same way as he takes the Being of the \(\text{res extensa}\), -- namely, as substance.
\(...\)In his doctrine of the \(\text{res cogitans}\) and \(\text{res extensa}\), Descartes not only wants

\(^{21}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.} 125/92.\)

\(^{22}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.} 129/96.\)
to formulate the problem of the "I" and the world; he claims to have solved it in a radical manner.\textsuperscript{23}

For Heidegger then, the 'I', the 'ego', the 'subject', the 'spirit', and the 'person' -- man's selfhood -- all have the sense and meaning of 'present-at-hand'; man's self as presented to us by the tradition is presented as an entity whose character is that of the traditional substance -- a 'thing'. Its essence is permanence, constant, unchangeable. This presentation of the self is a misconception; it is misconceived because the tradition did not make the distinction between man's Being and that of a thing. Conceiving man's Being as a substance gives us the above picture.

For the ontological concept of subject characterizes not the selfhood of the "I" qua Self, but the selfsameness and steadiness of something that is always present-at-hand. To define the "I" ontologically as "subject" means to regard it as something always present-at-hand. The Being of the "I" is understood as Reality of the res cogitans.\textsuperscript{24}

The self as conceived by the traditionalists (and without making any discrimination among their doctrines) must be understood as under the aegis of the substantialist theory, which Heidegger sees as the cause of the misunderstanding, and the misconception of man's selfhood. In order to arrive at an understanding of man's selfhood, it is Heidegger's claim that it is of most importance that we rid ourselves of the misconception and the substantialist doctrine which

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., pp. 130-31/98.

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p. 367/320.
advocates 'substance' or 'subject' as the meaning of self-

hood; for, as we have shown, these two concepts imply to

Heidegger that selfhood is a constant and static entity.

4. Who Is Man?

If Heidegger's break with the traditional ontology is
to be understood, then it is our task to show that his analy-
sis of the notion 'self' is not an examination of a 'subject'
or an 'ego' nor of 'consciousness', and that the question of
man's selfhood is a very different problem in Heidegger's
thought than it was for Descartes and the traditional

philosophy.

To make the above point clear, let us take one of
Heidegger's central questions: 'Who is Dasein?' Here he
wishes to show and point out that the answer to the 'Who'
is Dasein?' question was regarded as simple by the traditional
ontology. But Heidegger stresses that we must be on guard
not to be misled into underestimating our ignorance of its
problematic, just because Dasein is ourselves. Contrary to
the traditional ontology which assumed the response to this
question to be a simple one, Heidegger claims that we do not
know ourselves best and foremost:

It could be that the "who" of everyday
Dasein just is not the "I myself".25

The above text is a significant statement by Heidegger as an
answer to the question 'Who is Dasein?' In raising this

25 Ibid., p. 150/115.
question, Heidegger intends to achieve two goals: first, to show the mistake of the tradition, and second, to advance his own conception as an answer to this fundamental question. As to the first goal, the traditional mistake lies in its supposition that we already know who we are. The traditional answer to this question was in terms of "I", 'subject' and 'self'; the givenness of the "I", the 'subject' or the 'self' was evident and indubitable -- the 'self' was 'I' and nobody else. The tradition took this givenness and its indubitability to be its presupposition; therefore, it failed to raise the question of the being of the above concepts:

The question of the "who" answers itself in terms of the "I" itself, the 'subject', the 'Self'. The "who" is what maintains itself as something identical throughout changes in its experiences and ways of behaviour, and which relates itself to this changing multiplicity in so doing. Ontologically we understand it as something which is in each case already constantly present-at-hand, ... as the subjectum. 26

The traditional ontology then, by supposing that the answer to the 'who' question was simple, left undefined and indefinite the being of man. Substantiality was the ontological way to provide the answer. The conclusion in Heidegger's view, is as we can see, that all the traditional concepts basically retained the meaning of present-at-hand. Heidegger, while raising the question of the 'who', is raising the problem of selfhood anew. He is questioning the traditional assertion that the 'I', assumed in each case

26 Ibid., p. 150/114.
to be 'I myself', was ontologically obvious. He warns us that we should not be misled into supposing that the givenness of the 'I' guarantees us an unmistakeable ontological interpretation of the 'I', the 'subject' or the 'self'.

Traditionally then, the 'I', the 'ego', and the 'consciousness' were the obvious, given, and evident assumptions which most doctrines of the self took as their starting point. The self in one sense was conceived of as a necessity for man's understanding of himself. But there was a failure in bringing to light the ontological meaning of the self. The traditional ontology, taking as its starting point the givenness of the 'I', disregarded everything else that is given -- the world and other 'I's' or selves. As a result, the tradition secured for itself a starting point, but the 'I', the 'self' and the 'subject' were not interrogated ontologically -- the 'I' is a lonely 'I', and a worldless self.

The kind of 'giving' we have here is the mere, formal, reflective awareness of the "I"; and perhaps what it gives is indeed evident. ...Perhaps when Dasein addresses itself in the way which is closest to itself, it always says "I am this entity", ...Dasein is in each case mine, and this is its constitution; but what if this should be the very reason why, proximally and for the most part, Dasein is not itself?27

The traditional 'I' is presented as the selfhood of the everyday existence of man; that is to say, the expressions 'I', 'ego', 'self' and similar terms denoting 'self' were

27 Ibid., pp. 151/115-116.
taken as true expressions of man's selfhood. But, as we have noted, Heidegger questions this approach. The concept 'I' which meant the self is asserted by the tradition as man's true selfhood in his everyday existence -- when one said 'I', this meant that he was expressing ontologically his selfhood. But for Heidegger:

The word 'I' is to be understood only in the sense of a non-committal formal indicator, indicating something which may perhaps reveal itself as its 'opposite'... In that case, the 'not-I' is by no means tantamount to an entity which essentially lacks 'I-hood'..., but is rather a definite kind of Being which the 'I' itself possesses, such as having lost itself. 28

From the above text, we can note the traditional philosophy committed its greatest error at its starting point: it conceived that the 'who' of everyday Dasein was indicated by the word 'I' and meant man's selfhood. But Heidegger's interest lies in the kind of Being in which man maintains himself "proximally and for the most part". In other words, in order to grasp the ontological meaning of man's selfhood we must examine how man maintains himself in his everyday life. The everyday way of existence is the realm in which we can examine man as he is. We must as a first step recognize that the 'I' is not given as a separate entity from other 'I's' -- the community of 'I's' -- which man encounters in his everyday conduct. Rather for Heidegger the individual must be seen as one 'I' in relation to other 'I's':

In characterizing the encountering of Others, one is again still oriented by that Dasein which is in each case one's own. But even in this characterization does one not start by marking out and isolating the 'I' so that one must then seek some way of getting over to the Others from this isolated subject? To avoid this misunderstanding, we must notice in what sense we are talking about 'the Others'. By 'Others' we do not mean everyone else but me -- those over against whom the "I" stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part one does not distinguish oneself -- those among whom one is too.\textsuperscript{29}

Therefore, the 'who' of everyday Dasein is the 'I' which is not distinguished by authentic selfhood. This is Heidegger's criticism of the tradition when it is taken to mean the latter's failure to recognize that man in his everyday life is not a distinguishable selfhood; rather he is part of a whole community of 'I's' or, to put it harshly, he is not a true expression of himself.

Heidegger's argument so far is to stress the fact that the 'I' was first conceived by the tradition as an entity with the characteristic present-at-hand, isolated from the world and from other people. But as we have seen before, man must be conceived as 'Being-in-the-world', and now he must be conceived as 'Being-with'. It should be added, that the expressions 'Being-in' and 'Being-with' refer to existential structures of man, and are not to be understood as consequences of the fact that we are spatially 'in' or 'with'.

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., p. 154/118.
Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein's Being-alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be missing only in and for a Being-with.30

Heidegger rejects the concept 'I' as interpreted by the tradition to mean an 'isolated Being', a 'worldless subject', a differentiated 'Being' without the world and without community. For Heidegger, then, man must be understood as 'Being-in' and 'Being-with'. These two existentialia are fundamental to the understanding of man's existence. Since man's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, Heidegger dropped the term 'category' as used in the traditional philosophy (Aristotelian and Kantian), which in his conception 'category' is characteristic of Being for entities whose character is not that of man. Moreover, he uses instead the term 'existential' (the plural existentialia) to name the characteristics of human existence. As an existing Being man must differentiate himself, that is, he must recognize his selfhood. The differentiation and recognition of one's selfhood will be the topic of our next chapter. The foregoing is intended to reveal Heidegger's attempts to overcome the traditional approach, especially the substantialist doctrine of man's 'Being' and 'selfhood'.

In the introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger characterizes Dasein in this way:

30 Ibid., pp. 156-57/120.
'In its very Being, Being is an issue for it...
...its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has its Being to be, and has it as its own...\textsuperscript{31}'

And in his initial discussion of this theme in section '9' he says:

'These entities, in their Being, comport themselves towards their Being. As entities with such Being, they are delivered over to their own Being.\textsuperscript{32}"

If our reading of Heidegger is correct, he is saying in the above texts that man is basically concerned about his Being that is, about himself, and it is in virtue of this basic concern that man relates to 'Being', to the 'world' and to 'others'. Therefore, it is our task to show that all man's relations -- with the world and others -- are basically self-concerns.

In his discussion of the 'worldhood' of the world, Heidegger emphasizes the fact that man's encounter with the world originates and terminates in the understanding that it is 'for-the-sake' of Dasein. 'Entities within the world are basically encountered in the context of their involvement for the sake of man. Man encounters these entities basically in his concern with them. Man, as 'Being-in-the-world', has the character 'concern'. This characteristic means that man in his daily life is dispersed into definite ways of 'Being-in'. The ontological interpretation of these ways of 'Being-in' is 'concern', \textsuperscript{31}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 32-33/12.

\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 67/41-42.
which is an existential, and a possible way of man as Being-in-the-world:

- This term has been chosen not because Dasein happens to be proximally and to a large extent 'practical' and economic, but because the Being of Dasein itself is to be made visible as care. ...Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world...is essentially concern.33

For Heidegger, then, man's primordial encounter with the world is 'concern'. Entities within-the-world which man is concerned with can be ontologically understood in their total involvement for the sake of man. We tend to think that Heidegger's conception is: man's concern with the world is for the sake of himself. But man as Being-in-the-world is related not only to entities within the world; he is also related to other people, as another possible way of Being.

The Being possible which is essential for Dasein, pertains to the ways of its solicitude for Others and of its concern with the 'world' as we have characterized them; and in all these, and always, it pertains to Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, towards itself for the sake of itself.34

The above discussion is intended to show that Heidegger's conception of man in his everyday existence; in his encounters with the world -- entities and people -- is essentially based on the idea of 'concern'; man relates to other people in his solicitude for them. Man's concern and his

33Ibid., pp. 83-84/57.

34Ibid., p. 183/143.
solicitude is for the sake of his own Being and for the sake of himself. Heidegger's thesis as we understand him is that man basically is directed towards this self-concern, towards self-recognition, and the defining of himself. By self-concern, it should be stressed, we do not mean a degenerate or selfish attitude. What we want to say is that man's relation to the world and with others is basically for the sake of the individual himself as a possible existential way of Being.

To make the above point clear, we may discuss the existential "mineness". Early in Being and Time Heidegger calls attention to two fundamental characteristics of Dasein:

1. The 'essence' of this entity lies in its 'to be' -- existence, and
2. The Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine.35

The first of the above characteristics we discussed previously. The second -- 'mineness' -- is a basic existential by means of which man is distinguished from entities within the world. 'Mineness' is manifested by the fact that man alone is concerned for his Being -- his own existence. For all the other entities their Being is a matter of indifference to them. The 'mineness' characteristic is man's own concern to be in one or another mode of existence. If man did not

35 Ibid., p. 67/42.
have 'mineness' as a basic characteristic, then his Being or existence would not matter to him. We have seen that man's modes of Being are possibilities; now if he lacked the 'mineness' characteristic, then these possibilities would be a matter of indifference to him. Of all the possibilities of man's existence, 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' existence are fundamental. But they can be so only because of man's concern for his own existence in the first place.

As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity...are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness.36

'Minneness' then must be understood as man's concern for his existence. Each man is characterized by Heidegger as having this basic and fundamental concern for himself. This personal concern, as we shall see, will be the ground for the manifestation of selfhood. This personal concern is not only a recognition of man's possibilities, but is an appropriation through understanding of what it means 'to be', -- to exist in the first place as an individual.

A far-reaching implication of the idea of 'mineness' is -- if we understand Heidegger's claim to mean that there is no universal nature of man as a 'thing' -- that each man can direct himself towards his own possibilities, which are not static or 'present-at-hand', as conceived by the traditional ontology.

36 Ibid., p. 68/43.
In this chapter we have attempted to interpret some of Heidegger's basic concepts and to explain why he opposed the traditional philosophy. We have discussed his main criticism of traditional theories and his attempt to overcome their misconceptions -- the traditional notion that man's Being is that of a 'substance' and/or a 'subject'. Heidegger attempts to overcome these misconceptions because he wants to analyse the primordial modes of man's existence. His terminology presents one of the hurdles in understanding him, but we believe that this should not be held against him, because his thesis is meaningful and offers a new approach to the traditional problems. Having developed a clear understanding of Heidegger's conception in general, we can turn now to our main topic -- selfhood.
CHAPTER TWO

SELFHOOD AND ITS MANIFESTATION

1. The Problem

Man's selfhood and its manifestation is the topic of this chapter. Before we discuss Heidegger's notion of selfhood, we should give a short account of this notion in general and some of its problematic. In the previous chapter we said that Heidegger raised the question of the "who" of Dasein for two reasons: first, to show the traditional mistake of conceiving as obvious the knowledge of who we are; and second, to reveal that we do not know who we really are. Heidegger's thesis which we are concerned about is that selfhood is not a 'substance' nor is it a 'subject', as conceived by the tradition; rather, selfhood is a possible way of being 'existing'.

If we read Heidegger correctly, the problem of selfhood is to be understood in terms of his quest to find the best way of expressing his conviction that the notion of 'self' should escape the traditional characterization of 'substance' and 'subject'. For him this means that there must be a way to guard man's selfhood from being conceived as an entity present-at-hand. In other words we must conceive the self
not in terms of a static or constant entity. Any attempt to answer the question of the 'who' by a definite statement as to man's qualities, attributes, attitudes, feelings, and so on, which may be truly his, can hardly be taken as definitive and final. For example, what I consider myself to be today is not what I was yesterday in terms of the above statement, and not what I may be in the future. This means that man's 'Being' is not constant or static; rather, we must observe the transformation which man goes through in his daily life. But the question that is puzzling is whether or not there is some constant entity which underlies such transformations and changes. If we deny such a constant entity, then, we must be able to account for the fact that man is a unity, and that he has a self-constancy or stability, and that he is the same individual who has been known in the past and the same who will be in the future.

Traditionally this problem was known as the problem of 'personal identity' and it was the theme of a long historical debate about the criteria for 'self-identity'. Some theories insisted that at least for scientific purposes man's body provides us with the principle of unity, and as a consequence, the transformations of which we spoke are conceived in terms of materialistic changes. In other words, man's principal unity was conceived in the same way as for any other living organism. Others argued that we must account for the fact that in addition to being an organism, man is an active being; besides being acted upon by external
forces, he acts on his own. This activity was conceived of and described as a 'substance', a 'subject', a 'person', an 'ego', and a 'self'. But as we noticed in the previous chapter, Heidegger rejects all these descriptions because none of them captured the full meaning of man's Being. All the above concepts denoted the static nature which the traditional ontology accepted and Heidegger wanted to overcome.

In Heidegger's view, the traditional substantiality of the self is attributed to Descartes. Descartes conceived the 'ego' as a substance -- 'res cogitans', that is, a thinking substance. What is important here, however, is Descartes' characterization, in true scholastic fashion, of the 'ego' as a substantial entity. As we noticed in the first chapter, 'substance' meant for Heidegger an entity that does not have the characteristics of man. It is not an existing 'Being' in Heidegger's sense of 'existence'; rather, it has the characteristic of 'constantly present-at-hand', which Heidegger wants to get away from.

Having this in mind, we can turn now to Heidegger's conception of selfhood. But it is important to notice that the attempt to extract a specific explication from an aspect of Being and Time invariably involves some distortion. The reason for this distortion is that Being and Time develops its theme, not in terms of a series of arguments which one could examine in isolation from the work as a whole, but in terms of a serial interrelationship of a multiplicity of concepts which are interwoven by philosophical connections.
Despite this difficulty, it is possible to deal with Heidegger's conception of the human self. It should be noticed also that Heidegger's view concerning the self is not whether the self exists; rather, his main interest lies in the modes of existence of such a self.

Heidegger's conception of the human self is a movement from the pre-ontological to the ontological, from that which is closest to man, to that which, in an everyday sense, is the farthest. His interpretation of selfhood is a movement from the everyday or average notion of self -- 'they-self' -- to one's own selfhood. Through this movement we shall encounter the way the 'they-self' is modified so that man's individualization is achieved and the selfhood is manifested. At the same time we shall examine Heidegger's criticism of the tradition, especially the substantialist theory which conceived of the self as a substance or, what this amounts to, as a subject. Our aim is to show that for Heidegger, selfhood is 'a possible way of Being' -- existing.

This chapter on the manifestation of selfhood will be divided up as follows: Section Two 'The Essence of Man in Heidegger's thought'; i) Existence ii) Possibility iii) Authenticity and Inauthenticity as Possibilities of Existence; Section Three 'The Manifestation of Selfhood a. Individualization'; i) Anxiety ii) Anticipation b. The Appeal of Conscience and Resoluteness; i) Conscience ii) Being Guilty iii) Resoluteness iv) Anticipatory Resoluteness.
2. The Essence of Man in Heidegger's Thought

i) Existence

Dasein's selfhood has been defined formally as a way of existing, and therefore, not as an entity present-at-hand. For the most part I myself am not the "who" of Dasein; the they-self is its "who". Authentic Being-one's-self takes the definite form of an existential modification of the "they"; and this modification must be defined existentially.37

Selfhood is a 'way of existing'. This is Heidegger's formal definition. It is a way in which man exists. This conception of selfhood is clearly a rejection of the traditional view of selfhood as a substantial core which unified man's attributes. Moreover we know by now that such substance for Heidegger conveyed the notion of permanent essence or nature for man. The characteristics of permanent, constant, static and so on are truly characteristics of entities within-the-world which merely are; on the other hand man exists and existence is his essence.

The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly, these characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be; and no more than that. ... Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine. ... In each case, Dasein is its possibility, but not just as a property..., as something present-at-hand would. And

37 Ibid., p. 312/267.
because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. ...In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands. This is the formal meaning of Dasein's existential constitution.38

This move of Heidegger's thought in the above text has two goals: first, he wants to distinguish man's Being from that of entities within-the-world which merely are or are present-at-hand; and second, to reject the traditional conception of man's Being as a substance and to ground it in the possible modes of 'existence'. What distinguishes man from other entities is his 'existence'. Here we should keep in mind the distinction which Heidegger makes between his notion of 'existence' and the scholastic term 'existentia', for the latter meant for Heidegger something present-at-hand or merely there occurring within the world, and the former -- 'existence', as he conceived it -- is man's capability to be his own possibilities. This notion implies that man is not a completed entity, is not something static or constant, and his existence is not fixed; rather, it is permeated with possibilities to be chosen. Man's recognition and realization of his possibilities make him a special Being-in-the-world. In the above text, Heidegger's radical point is that 'existence is possibility'. It is not merely

38Ibid., pp. 67-69/42-43.
that existence has possibilities as in the traditional sense, i.e., a child has the possibility of becoming a grown human being. Heidegger interprets possibilities in a different way in explaining man's existence.

Heidegger's radical view must be understood further. If man's existence -- the existence of each individual man -- comprises his own possibilities, then we should not expect nor even conceive a general or universal set of potentialities or capacities for all men. Here we must be careful not to take this as meaning that Heidegger is implying there is no general or universal characterization of man in terms of his facticity -- that is, in terms of biological, psychological, values, morals and even behaviour. Rather, what Heidegger is denying is the notion of a 'constant human nature' whereby we can give a priori justification for man's choosing one end or goal over the other. Heidegger is denying that man in virtue of a 'constant nature' or outside causes will make his choices. For Heidegger, man in each case essentially is his own possibility, and this claim must mean that for each individual there are peculiar possibilities and that these possibilities may vary as much as the number of all human beings.

Dasein is not something present-at-hand which possesses its competence for something by way of an extra; it is primarily Being-possible. Dasein/in every case [each man] what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility.39

39Ibid., p. 183/143.
For Heidegger, the essence of man lies in his existence, and as we have seen in the above discussion, existence is possibility. Then it is important to understand Heidegger's conception of the notion 'existence', because as we shall see later, among the existential possibilities, two are very essential to our work; that is, the possibilities of 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity':

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence -- in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting. The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself.\textsuperscript{40}

For Heidegger then, man's essence is existence and existence is a possibility which only the particular individual decides to choose or not. This move is fundamental to Heidegger's conception of selfhood, and here we should note his objection to the traditional ontology, mainly that of Kant, who held the view that man's choice is always guided by his rationality which is universal, and because of this rational nature, man is able to make his choice between ends and goals. In Heidegger's view, as we can see from the above text, man's choices and decisions are always personal and peculiar to every man. Choices and decisions are fundamental to man's two basic modes of existence; authenticity and inauthenticity, which in turn constitute selfhood. The choice

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 33/12.
by man to be himself, the decision to exist by taking hold of existence, the choice of possibilities -- this is man's authentic way of existence. On the other hand, to make a decision not to choose to be himself and his own possibilities, rather to get himself into them not by choice, to grow up into them without making the decision to choose, to neglect his own existence -- this is man's inauthentic mode of existence. To exist authentically, then, is to make decisions and to choose one's own possibilities.

ii Possibility

For Heidegger, man is primarily Being-possible, and every individual is what he can be. This claim is a further support for the basic idea that only the individual himself decides his existence in his own way. The nature of the concept 'possibility' is clarified by Heidegger's argument that the 'Being-possible' has reference to or belongs to the way the individual relates to others, to the world, and to the possibility of Being or not Being his 'ownself'. Heidegger distinguishes between his notion of possibility and the traditional conception of possibility. The latter indicates that which is not yet, that which can be in some future time, that which is contingent. The traditional possibility is usually conceived and understood to have less importance than the actuality.

The Being-possible which Dasein is existentially in every case, is to be sharply distinguished both from empty logical possibility and from the contingency of something present-at-hand... it
signifies what is not yet actual and what is not at any time necessary. It characterizes the merely possible. Ontologically it is on a lower level than actuality and necessity. On the other hand, possibility as an existential is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically. 41

Heidegger's possibilities which are fundamental to the individual man belong to the different modes of man's existence: each man has his own possibilities for experience, for knowledge, for action, for moods, and for attitudes. As Being-in-the-world, the individual has the possibilities: concern for the entities within-the-world, solicitude for others, and potentiality-for-Being-one-self or for the recognition and realization of himself. Heidegger's insistence on the priority of his notion of possibility over that of the tradition must not be taken to mean that man is not an actual being. Rather as an actually existing entity man comprises all his existential possibilities, and therefore he chooses some possibilities and excludes others. Consequently, when the individual decides to choose one possibility he must abandon or neglect to choose others. Man's characteristic 'Being-possible' is fundamental to his understanding and conception of the 'world' and himself.

Heidegger's notion of 'possibility', then, if it is to be grasped, must be identified with existence. It should be sharply distinguished from the traditional possibility

41 Ibid., p. 183/143-144.
which meant contingency in opposition to actuality. The existential possibilities do not refer to the distant future; rather they are essentially the content of existence, and are always there for the individual to choose.

Here one may raise an objection to Heidegger's conception of possibility: how could a possibility be a choice when we observe that Heidegger, in his discussion of 'death', conceives of death as the ultimate possibility of the individual existence, the absolute impossibility of any existence at all.\textsuperscript{42} Heidegger sees death as a possibility. But one may ask -- apart from suicide -- can we choose and decide our own death? Can we make a decision whether to die or not?

We should note that one of man's characteristics is the projection of himself towards his possibilities. This projection is conceived by Heidegger as 'ahead-of-itself', which means that man is an essentially forward projecting being and projects himself towards various possibilities of his existence. Now man's actual death puts an end to this mode of existence; that is, death terminates man's projection towards possibilities and is therefore the termination of his existence. Since death limits man's possibilities, death is the impossibility of existence, for man no longer exists in the sense of Being-ahead-of-himself, and no longer projects himself towards his possibilities -- no longer 'Being-possible'. In a sense then, man reaches a position of

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., p. 294/250 and p. 327/262.
definitiveness. Ontologically on the other hand, in death man is neither completed objectively nor brought to fulfillment nor does he vanish; this is so because man's death is present to him from the very beginning of his existence. Therefore, ontologically death is a possibility; but since man is factual as well as possible, death is the "impossible possibility". The implications of death in Heidegger's thought are discussed further in the section on 'Anticipation'.

The above discussion is essential, because without a clear understanding of Heidegger's notion of possibility one cannot understand his conception of selfhood, which for him is a 'possible way of Being' -- existence. With this in mind, we turn now to our main topic, that is, Heidegger's conception of selfhood and its manifestation.

iii Authenticity and Inauthenticity as Possibilities of Existence

The purpose of our discussion of the notions 'existence' and 'possibility' was to come to grips with Heidegger's conception of selfhood as a possible way or mode of existence. Heidegger distinguished among the many possibilities of man's existence two fundamental possibilities which are essential characteristics for the understanding of selfhood. These two possibilities are the 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' way of existence:

Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and
inauthenticity possible. In each case Dasein exists in one or the other of these two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated. 43

Now in the first chapter we said that 'mineness' is the ground for the above two possible modes of existence. Since man is basically 'mineness' and since these two modes are possibilities for man to project himself towards, then man's decision to choose one of these two modes must be grounded in 'mineness'. By 'mineness' Heidegger seems to mean a unique personal characteristic for each and every man. Since the choice of possibilities -- in this case the choice of authenticity or inauthenticity -- is based or grounded in 'mineness', and the ability to make the decision to choose to be in one mode or another belongs to each and every individual, then 'mineness' must be the basis for individualization. Here we must be careful to note that we are not saying that 'mineness' is individualization; rather, our point is that, because of this characteristic, 'mineness', man is able to decide upon either mode of existence. What this amounts to, is that, the individual decision to make the choice is grounded in his characteristic 'mineness'.

To exist is a matter for each and every individual, and the way or mode one exists is a matter of choice and decision of each individual. It is 'I' or you who make the decision to choose, and it matters for me to exist in one mode or another; the choice is mine which way to exist. But

43 Ibid., p. 78/53.
the choices are connected with my possibilities, and my possibilities are my own and not anyone else's. Each man has his own possibilities, and he comports himself towards them. The individual can comport himself towards these possibilities -- to be his 'ownself' -- but it is also true that the individual can choose not to comport himself towards his own possibilities. Choosing one's 'ownself' or not is the most fundamental characteristic of 'existence' which is 'mineness'.

The authentic and inauthentic modes of existence discussed above as grounded in man's characteristic 'mineness' must now be interpreted in relation to selfhood. One of the main convictions of Heidegger's thought is that we cannot conceive or analyse man's Being and selfhood starting from a lonely and worldless 'I', or from a pure consciousness and subject. We cannot conceive man to exist alone without other people. Man should be conceived as 'Being-in-the-world' and as 'Being-with' others. We have stressed that for Heidegger man without the world is a misconception; so is the conception of man without others. We said that the traditional mistake was to conceive of man as a pure subject or consciousness and the world which includes others as an object.

Now in opposition to the traditional conception of man, Heidegger conceived him as 'Being-in-the-world' and 'Being-with' others. 'Being-with' is the mode of existence in which we encounter man in his everyday life, and if we are
to understand man's selfhood, our task is to analyse this mode. This is why we said previously that Heidegger rejects the traditional view that we know the 'who' of man. Rather for Heidegger, as we have seen, because we do not know the 'who', we should inquire into man's everyday mode of existence. For Heidegger man does not exist in isolation. If we are to understand and come to grips with the 'who' and man's selfhood, then we must view, the 'self' 'others' and the world, interrelated. If we accept Heidegger's conception, this will be a major shift in philosophy from isolated and separate concepts of knowledge to a unity. To view man as 'Being-with' others, is to shift weight from the knowledge of other minds to the implication of 'Being-with' others. The main and fundamental point to be noted here is that in this conception, the question of the 'I' as knower is shifted in Heidegger's thought to the question of the way in which man exists in relation to others. The traditional question of knowing the world and others becomes in Heidegger's thought a question of what it means to be in the world, and to be 'with-others'. Furthermore, in his new conception Heidegger bridges the gap between the traditional dichotomy of subject (knower) and object (known) and eliminates the separation between the 'I' and others.

In our discussion of the question of the 'who' we have shown Heidegger's analysis of the existential 'Being-with', and what he means by others. Man, in Heidegger's thought, is never to be understood without others;
So far as Dasein is at all, it has the Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being.\textsuperscript{44}

The characteristic Being-with is not revealed only in the actual encountering of others; it must be seen even if there are no others, and when one is alone. The 'aloneness' is a consequence and presupposes the absence of others. One's aloneness for Heidegger, is one's understanding of his existence as 'Being-with'.

In the final analysis we can understand Heidegger's thesis to mean that one of man's essential and fundamental characteristics is the existential 'Being-with', which must mean a context of mutual recognition in a community of people.

Only so far as one's own Dasein has the essential structure of Being-with, is it Dasein-with as encounterable for Others.\textsuperscript{45}

To answer the question of the 'who', we must inquire into the relation between people. We should indicate that the problem of the 'other mind' which puzzled and is still puzzling for philosophy, does not seem to be a problem for Heidegger. It is a philosophical problem only because the traditional inquiry started from the 'I', the 'ego', and the 'self' in isolation, and from this isolated self the tradition attempted the move to the 'Others' by inference. For Heidegger this is a mistake, and he argues against this misconception strongly attacking mainly Husserl's notion of 'Empathy'.

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., p. 163/125.

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., p. 157/121.
This phenomenon, which is none too happily designated as 'empathy'... is then supposed, as it were, to provide the first ontological bridge from one's own subject, which is given proximally as alone, to the other subject, which is proximally quite closed off. 46

Heidegger's argument is against the traditional philosophical mistake of taking as its starting point the knowledge of oneself then attempting to assert the knowledge of others by inference or empathy. The traditional assumption -- that we know our own selves before and prior to our knowledge of the others -- is a mistaken assumption. For Heidegger, our knowledge of our own selves presupposes our knowledge of others. 'Being-with-others' is the starting point for the inquiry into man's selfhood, and the notion of empathy does not solve the problem of the other mind:

'Empathy does not first constitute Being-with; only on the basis of Being-with does 'empathy' become possible;... 47

Now Heidegger maintains that man's realization of his unique individuality arises in the context of mutual relationships in a community of others. To find out who man is, we must inquire into the everyday mode of existence. As we have seen from the above discussion, it is on the basis of the inquiry into the existential 'Being-with' that we answer the question who is man. The existential 'Being-with' is conceived to be either authentic or inauthentic. These two modes of 'Being-with' are the basis which we should analyse

46 Ibid., p. 162/124.
in order to reveal man's understanding of his unique existence.

We are aware of Heidegger's method of analysis: for him, man's modes of existence should be seen in terms of both their ability to reveal and their ability to conceal man's understanding of himself. To exist authentically is such a mode in which man's unique selfhood is revealed; on the other hand to exist inauthentically is a mode in which man's unique selfhood is concealed. Therefore, in order to explain Heidegger's conception of man's selfhood and the way it is manifested, we should understand the inauthentic mode of existence in which the individual selfhood is covered up or concealed. Heidegger begins his analysis precisely with that mode which conceals the individual realization of his unique selfhood. The analysis of the inauthentic mode of existence, which Heidegger calls the 'they-self', will lead us to the contrasting mode of existence -- authentic -- in which selfhood is revealed. At this point we should turn to Heidegger's analysis of the inauthentic mode of existence -- 'they-self'.

The answer to the question, "who is man?" is the expression 'self' -- it is the self in its relationships with others. This self is the 'they-self'. It is the 'who' which meant for Heidegger an impersonal and neuter 'who'. This 'who' is neither this individual nor that one, it is neither me, nor you, it is no one in particular, and not all of us together. This 'who' is every individual in his everyday existence, existing in the inauthentic mode of 'Being-with'. 


It is the mode in which the genuine and unique possibility of selfhood is covered up and lost. To exist in this mode, that is the 'they-self', means to exist in the mode of 'Being-with' in such a way that the particular unique selfhood of each individual is reduced to that of an average and common man; it is to neglect the unique possibility of being authentically one's ownself. 'Being-with' as the inauthentic mode of existence, that is the 'they-self', is what Heidegger calls 'everydayness'; it is characterized by the existential 'fallenness'. For the greater part of their lives most men lose the authentic possibility to be themselves. Man is fallen away from himself, preoccupied and rootless. Man falls away from himself into the world where he is concerned and preoccupied with entities within the world. In his concern, man relates his possibilities to these entities and conceals his 'ownmost' possibilities -- to be his 'ownself'. The individual falling away from himself is 'fallenness' into the world of the public -- the world of the 'they'; it is the inauthentic way of Being-with-one-another, in which the individual loses himself.

This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of 'the Others', in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. ...We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back; we find 'shocking' what they find shocking. The "they", which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness.48

48Ibid., pp. 164/126-127.
'Publicness' is the main characteristic of the 'they' and this characteristic is revealed by 'distantiality', 'average-ness', and 'leveling down'. Man's values and behaviour in relation to others, the way he differs from them whether lagging behind them, wanting to catch up with them or being ahead of them and wanting to keep them in suppression, is 'distantiality'. Now 'Being-with-one-another' has the character of averageness; distantiality is grounded in averageness which points to the tendency of the 'they' to 'level-down' any distinctive thing of the individual man. Furthermore, in this mode of existence; the individual is 'disburdened' of his own existence by the fact that the 'they' 'accommodate' him with everything. In the final analysis publicness controls man's everyday existence.

By publicness, everything gets obscured, and what has been covered up get passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone.49

The everyday mode of existence is the one which man's selfhood is concealed, suppressed and regarded as an average. If the genuine selfhood is revealed, then it is covered up and leveled down by publicness, which is insensitive to any such genuineness. In this mode the individual is relieved of his responsibility, everything is ready made for him. The individual in this mode is not himself -- he is for the most part an average, one among many. In a sense his existence is based on mechanical habits, he follows the rules

49 Ibid., p. 165/127.
without being aware of what these rules mean, the public, established customs are his way of life, and he exists in the shadow of the public. Selfhood is not recognized either by the individual nor by others. He conforms to public demands and opinions, accepts the public criteria and standards without having first appropriated them, and most of all he neglects his own possibilities -- to be his ownself.

According to Heidegger, the 'they' which supplies the answer to the question of the 'who' of everyday mode of existence, is the nobody to whom the individual has already surrendered himself in his 'Being-among-one-another'. But the 'they' is an existential; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to man's existential constitution, that is, the 'condition' or 'state' in which the individual may find himself in the world and with other people.

The 'they-self', that is, the self of man's everyday existence is the one which Heidegger distinguishes from the authentic self -- that is, from the self which the individual takes hold of in his own way of existence. As 'they-self', the individual has been dispersed into the 'they', and must first find himself. This finding of one's self is the authentic Being-one's self, which is not to be understood as an exceptional condition detached from the 'they'; it is rather the individual's 'existential modification' of his everyday average existence in which his unique selfhood is manifested.

According to Heidegger, the 'they-self' is disclosed in terms of 'idle talk'. The 'they-self' sees everything
only in terms of 'curiosity', and it understands everything merely in terms of 'ambiguity'.

From the above discussion we can see that for the most part man's existence is characterized by the 'they-self' way of Being. It becomes clear that in this way of existence the individual is fallen in with the 'they' and that his genuine selfhood is not revealed yet. This fallenness into the 'they', and the individual's not being himself authentically is the individual's choice and decision not to be authentically himself. For Heidegger, man's fallenness away from himself into the 'they' is not necessary; man does not have to lose himself in everydayness, and to exist inauthentically. Nevertheless, in Heidegger's conception the possibility of an authentic existence, and for man to be his ownself remains there for him, the possibility which man's unique selfhood will be manifested. The manifestation of selfhood can be achieved only through an 'existentiell' modification of man's everydayness. This manifestation is the topic of our third section. The explanation of man's everyday existence, the inauthentic mode of Being, and 'they-self' brought to light Heidegger's conviction that the 'who' of everyday man is not 'I myself'. As we have seen from the above discussion the 'who' is the 'they-self', and in order to reveal man's unique selfhood in his authentic existence which existentially is only a modified way of man's everyday existence,

we should inquire into man's existentiell modification of the 'they-self', a modification which must be defined existentially.

3. The Manifestation of Selfhood

   a. Individualization

   The everyday mode of existence can be modified, this modification is achieved by the individual himself. In the everyday mode of existence, the individual is lost in the 'they', and, as we have seen, the individual in that mode is not himself. Man does not choose his possibilities and does not make decisions, because he is relieved of the burden of choosing and deciding by the 'they'. This mode can be changed, the process of everyday existence can be revised, but only if man brings himself back from his lostness in the 'they':

   when Dasein thus brings itself back from the "they", the they-self is modified in an existential manner so that it becomes authentic Being-one's-Self. This must be accomplished by making up for not choosing. ...But "making up" for not choosing signifies choosing to make this choice -- deciding for a potentiality-for-Being, and making this decision for one's own Self. In choosing to make this choice, Dasein makes possible, first and foremost, its authentic potentiality-for-Being.

   But because Dasein is lost in the "they", it must first find itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested.51

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51 Ibid., p. 313/268.
The 'they-self' then must be modified, this way of existence -- that is, the inauthentic -- should be revised, the individual can and should make the choice to be himself, he can reveal his unique selfhood and stand by it. The existential modification is to be achieved by the individual himself and not by the imposition of external forces. But in order for the modification to take place, the individual inauthentic mode of existence should be disclosed. This disclosure will bring about the realization of the individual's neglect of himself, of his possibilities, and of his responsibility to be his own potentiality-for-Being -- to be his ownself. The differentiation and modification of the 'they-self' is the topic of what follows. We shall examine Heidegger's discussion of man's individualization, which is achieved by the phenomena of anxiety and anticipation; man's realization of his neglect of his possibilities, and of his 'Being-guilty' which is brought about by the phenomenon conscience; man's resoluteness to be his ownself and to exist authentically; and 'anticipatory resoluteness' as man's authentic existence in which man's unique selfhood is manifested.

One of man's modes of existence as we have seen is his 'facticity' or 'thrownness' into the world; by 'thrownness' Heidegger means 'the facticity of being delivered over'. Man is not the creator of himself; rather, he is given to himself. 'Thrownness' is characterized by 'state-of-mind' or mood. Mood is a basic characteristic to man as 'Being-in-the-world'. It precedes man's thought and delivers him
over to the fact that he is in the world not by his own choice -- man is thrown in the world. It is in a sense an affective disposition, primordial and always there.

In having a mood Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as the entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being... as a naked 'that it is and has to be'.

i) Anxiety

One of man's moods, which makes him transparent to himself is the phenomenon 'anxiety'. As a mood anxiety is a revealing phenomenon which discloses man to himself as he is. Anxiety is always undetermined, in the sense that it does not originate from or depend upon any specific thing, and arises from 'nowhere':

Nothing which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions as that in the face of which anxiety is anxious... That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens, is nowhere.

In this mood the individual faces a total alienation; all that which concerned him up to now slips away, the things which he was preoccupied with become meaningless, people to whom he related become strangers. At this moment the individual is face to face with himself. Facing himself, the individual realizes that he has been neglecting his possibilities. This neglect and not choosing one's possibilities is the 'nothing' of anxiety. Recognizing this fact,

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52 Ibid., p. 173/134.
53 Ibid., p. 231/186.
the individual is overwhelmed with anxiety, he is by himself, he is not at-home in his environment. In a sense he is isolated momentarily from everything which preoccupied him up to that moment. Anxiety, then, individualizes man and creates a situation in which he is detached from everyday existence and is free to choose his own possibilities — to be authentically himself.

...for anxiety individualizes. This individualization brings Dasein back from its falling and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being. 54

The anxious individual recognizes the unique possibilities which are his, which he neglected in the 'they' mode of existence, and which he can choose.

Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being — that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for the authenticity of its being, and for...the authenticity as a possibility which it always is. 55

Anxiety, then, individualizes man by breaking up the contentment he finds in the 'they-self' mode of existence, isolates man from his daily concerns to become free for the choosing of his authentic possibilities. Anxiety is the experience which alienates and creates an estrangement in the 'they-self' mode of existence. As such, anxiety is the breakthrough into the 'they-self; and the revealing element

54 Ibid., p. 235/190-91.
55 Ibid., p. 232/188.
of the individual lostness in the everydayness, and the urgency to find oneself by choosing one's authentic possibilities.

ii) Anticipation

According to Heidegger, man is individualized by another phenomenon -- 'anticipation' -- which is the 'authentic Being-towards-death'. In our discussion of Heidegger's conception of possibility, we said that death is man's ultimate possibility, or the 'impossible possibility' of man's existence. This 'impossible possibility' is the extreme possibility of man's existence, in the sense that it has the characteristic of wholeness, which no other possibility has. In Heidegger's conception, the basic phenomenon which comprises man's fundamental modes of Being is defined as 'care'. Care is the structural unity of; 'existentiality', 'facticity', and 'fallenness'. Existentiality as the primary mode of man's existence is defined as 'potentiality-for-Being', in which man is 'ahead-of-himself' in his existence. As long as man exists, there is always that which is 'not yet'.

...if existence is definitive for Dasein's Being and if its essence is constituted in part by potentiality-for-Being, then, as long as Dasein exists, it must in each case, as such a potentiality, not yet be something. ...As long as Dasein is, there is in each case something still outstanding,...But to that which is thus outstanding, the 'end' itself belongs. The 'end' of Being-in-the-world is death. 56

56 Ibid., pp. 276-77/233-34.
Now if man is not whole as long as he is constantly projecting himself towards the 'not yet', then his wholeness is achieved only at his end -- death. But with death man is no longer exists, and he can never achieve his wholeness. For Heidegger, as we have seen, in death man is neither completed, fulfilled, nor does he vanish. Death in Heidegger's conception means 'Being-towards-the-end'. It is a possibility of existence, a mode of Being which man takes over as soon as he is or exists. The main question then is how man can achieve his wholeness by projecting himself towards this possibility -- by 'anticipating' his end?

Man's 'Being-towards-death' can be either authentic or inauthentic. The inauthentic 'Being-towards-death' is man's view of death as an event. Death is awaited or expected; man awaits his end in the sense of whether this possibility comes or not, whether it comes to him after all. Expecting his end, man views death from the points of 'when' it may occur, 'how' it may occur, and 'how and when' this possibility may be actualized.

Expecting is not just an occasional looking-away from the possible to its possible actualization, but is essentially a waiting for that actualization. ...By the very nature of expecting, the possible is drawn into the actual, arising out of the actual and returning to it. 57

The authentic Being-towards-death is man's comporting himself as a potentiality-for-Being towards his end as a possibility of Being; he does so by anticipating his end. By anticipating his death, man does not hasten it or actualize

57 Ibid., p. 306/262.
it; rather he understands it as a possibility. In anticipating death man understands it as a unique personal possibility, for he realizes that it is his own end which cannot be substituted or transferred;

No one can take the other's dying away from him. ...By its very essence, death is in every case [for each man] mine, in so far as it 'is' at all. And indeed death signifies a peculiar possibility-of-Being in which...one's own Dasein is an issue. In dying...mineness and existence are ontologically constitutive for death.58

Man's anticipation of death thus gives him the understanding of his personal uniqueness, it individualizes man. As a unique possibility, death belongs to man in an absolutely individual and personal manner. Thus when man realizes his individual responsibility towards his own death by anticipating it, then and only then does he realize his authentic existence. As authentic 'Being-towards-death', man faces this possibility by freeing himself in anticipation of it.

Death does not just 'belong' to one's own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim to it as an individual Dasein ...as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself. This individualizing is a way in which the 'there' is disclosed for existence. It makes manifest that all Being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all the Being-with Others, willfail us when our ownmost potentiality-for-Being is the issue. Dasein can be authentically itself only if it makes this possible for itself of its own accord.59

58Ibid., p. 284/240.
59Ibid., p. 308/263.
This possibility -- death, as the non-relational -- is the ground for individualization. The 'how' and 'when' of this possibility of Death cannot be actualized because it is indefinite. This means that in anticipation the individual is in state of tension -- anxious. As we have seen, anxiety individualizes man. Facing the indefiniteness of this possibility -- death, in anticipation man is anxious. Man is anxious because he has been individualized; anxiety discloses that death lays claim to him as a unique individual.

This realization frees man from his fallenness and lostness in the inauthentic 'they-self', he is free for accepting his responsibility by choosing to be his ownself, by accepting death as his ownmost possibility. By anticipation, man becomes free, and realizes that besides his facticity he should anticipate his unique possibility. This realization discloses to man that he is a finite being.

Our discussion so far has brought forth two possibilities of individualization, anxiety and anticipation. But man's realization of his individuality is not enough to make him choose to be authentically his ownself. For Heidegger the individualization is only 'the breakthrough' of the 'they' mode of existence. Man should choose on his own accord to be his ownself. The choosing of oneself is subsequent to man's resoluteness to be himself which is achieved by the call of conscience.
b. The Appeal of Conscience and Resoluteness

i) Conscience

For Heidegger, 'conscience' is a 'call' which summons man to the responsibility of being authentically his ownself. Not like 'idle talk' of everydayness, conscience speaks directly to man concerning his existence. It reveals to him his contentment in the 'they'way of existence -- man's fallenness and lostness into the inauthentic mode -- the 'they-self'. It appeals to man to find his ownself, to be responsible, and to be committed to himself authentically. As a phenomenon of man, conscience is distinguished by Heidegger from any external forces, it comes through man and speaks about man.

When anxiety and anticipation individualizes man, at this moment man is appealed to by the call of conscience. The call appeals to the individual to recognize his unique possibilities, to rescue himself from the they-self, and to be authentically that which he can. As a phenomenon, conscience is distinguished by Heidegger from the traditional conception of it. His main criticism is directed against these misconceptions:

1) Conceiving conscience as based primarily upon the moral categories of 'good' and 'evil' -- basically a moralistic distinction and not ontological, related to man's Being. Heidegger's conception of the call of conscience is not restricted to the individual's moral offences, rather it proceeds to the ontological interpretation of man's
'Being-guilty', which is his view is prior to any moral offence;

2) The tradition failed to see that the call of conscience is grounded in man's Being, that the call comes through man. They conceived it as an 'external' voice coming to man from some 'court of justice' (Kant) which makes the judgment whether man is guilty or not, and in which the idea of 'moral law' has its roots.

3) It conceived the call of conscience in relation to a restricted activity of man. Conscience was related to deeds which had been either actualized or intended, and which conscience either censured or approved of. The tradition did not realize that the call of conscience is prior to any activity that man may intend or do.

4) It conceived of the call of conscience to be critical, pointing to man's practical concerns, and failed to grasp that the call of conscience "summons man to existence, to his ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self". Furthermore the tradition failed to recognize the positive side of the call.

Heidegger's main dispute with the tradition, is that it failed to see the ontological meaning of this phenomenon. In this regard he says:

Such considerations are indisputably within their rights. We can, however, demand that in any interpretation of conscience 'one' should recognize in it the phenomenon in

60 Ibid., p. 340/294. (for full discussion of Heidegger's criticism of the traditional conception of conscience see Section 59 pp. 335-41/289-95.)
question as it is experienced in an everyday manner...we have merely tried to trace back conscience as a phenomenon of Dasein to the ontological constitution of that entity.61

In contrast with the tradition, Heidegger conceived the phenomenon conscience as a call coming through man himself -- the caller, the one who is called to, and the one who is called forth, as one and the same individual. The call of conscience proceeds from the individual himself; is directed to the individual and is heard by the individual. Therefore, conscience is not an external power or force; rather it is the individual himself who is lost in the 'they-self' way of existence, and who becomes individualized. The call is appealing to the 'they-self, which exists in such a way that the individual is not being his own self. As we have seen in the anxious mode and in anticipation, man feels not-at-home, he feels uncanny, this feeling 'not-at-home' or 'alienation' brings about the realization that the unique individuality is the one which does the calling in the phenomenon of conscience; the 'they-self' is called by the alienated individual to be authentically his ownself -- to exist authentically.

The call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to be its ownmost potentiality-for-its Self;...62

At this point it is helpful to recall that man's unique selfhood is a way of Being, different from the individual everyday existence, the inauthentic 'they-self'. But selfhood is

61Ibid., p. 324/279.

not something completely detached from the they-self; rather it is the 'existentiell' modification of the 'they-self'. The appeal of conscience then is to the individual which is lost in the 'they', and which neglected his own possibilities.

ii) Being Guilty

Now when the call of conscience is heard, the individual recognizes first his inauthentic way of existence and second that he should be his own self. This recognition gives him the urgency to make the decision to choose between these two ways of existence. The call of conscience therefore reveals to the individual both his neglect of his own possibilities and the urgency to choose the possibilities which he neglected. Furthermore, the call of conscience reveals to the individual that he is basically 'Being-guilty':

Though the call gives no information, it is not merely critical; it is positive, in that it discloses Dasein's most primordial potentiality-for-Being as "Being-guilty".63

The 'Being-guilty' as a primordial characteristic must be understood in terms of man's existential possibilities and choices. In the previous discussion of Heidegger's notion of possibility, we have seen that man is the one who makes the choices between his possibilities. Now in choosing one possibility, whichever it may be, one always leaves other possibilities unchosen, and by the very nature of 'choice' 

63 Ibid., p. 334/288.
nullity or the 'not', in its relation to the phenomenon -- 'the call of conscience', then, reveals to man his primordial guilt on one hand, and allows him to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic existence on the other. This distinction has a far-reaching consequence; the individual realizes that the inauthentic existence is a possibility that he is responsible for existing this way, and that he can make the distinction between these two possibilities of existence.

What is chosen is having-a-conscience as Being-free for one's ownmost being-guilty. "Understanding the appeal" means "wanting to have conscience." ...In understanding the call, Dasein lets its ownmost Self take action it itself...in terms of that potentiality-for-Being which it has chosen.65

Speaking metaphorically, if as Heidegger says, the phenomenon of conscience is a 'call', then there must be a hearer, to hear something one must listen, and must be wanting to hear. Man according to Heidegger has the characteristic of

64 Ibid., p. 331/285.
65 Ibid., p. 334/288.
'wanting to have conscience'. This 'wanting' is man's consent to hear the call, and in turn wanting to hear the call gives consent to 'Being-guilty'.

iii) Resoluteness

We are now in a position to understand Heidegger's existentiell modification of the 'they-self': anxiety and anticipation individualizes man and makes him feel 'not-at-home'; the call of conscience reveals man to himself, it makes him distinguish between authentic and inauthentic existence, and reveals to him his responsibility for himself, by revealing to him that he is basically guilty. Man now is transparent to himself, his responsibility is to choose his own possibilities and to be his ownself -- to be his unique selfhood -- he is 'resolute'.

The distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience -- this reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty in which one is ready for anxiety -- we call "resoluteness".66

Resoluteness, then, is the individual attestation of his authentic existence in which his selfhood -- the authentic way of Being -- is revealed by his own decision to be his ownself, and to rescue himself from the inauthentic way of existence. Resoluteness is the condition for man's authentic existence, it is the condition for the manifestation of

66 Ibid., p. 343/296-97.
selfhood, the existential modification of the 'they-self' is achieved, that is to say, the individual inauthentic everyday existence is modified by and through the individual himself.

It is important that we should not think of resoluteness as a habit or behaviour of man's practical faculty; it is an existential mode in which the individual listens to the call of conscience, willingly acknowledges and accepts his own existential or primordial guilt, and is called back from inauthenticity to his unique selfhood. It is important that we should not think of resoluteness as a justification of solipsism, as if the individual's authentic selfhood were self-enclosed. We have seen Heidegger's protestation against solipsism in the discussion of the phenomenon 'Being-with', man's authentic mode of existence can never be a solipsistic characteristic, for man in Heidegger's conception is fundamentally Being-in-the-world, and Being-with-others:

Resoluteness, as authentic Being-One's-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating "I". And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concerned Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others. 67

From the above text we should be able to note that resoluteness does not imply solipsism, because solipsism can never be an authentic way of existence as Heidegger conceives it.

67 Ibid., p. 344/298.
iv) **Anticipatory Resoluteness**

In resoluteness the individual accepts 'guilt' as an essential and primordial characteristic of his Being. Hence 'Being-guilty' is not an instantaneous or transient state but extends to the end of man's existence, and this 'Being-guilty' must be understood to mean being guilty all the time, since man should be free and responsible as long as he exists. On the other hand 'as long as one exists' encompasses the phenomenon 'anticipation' which is man's authentic Being-towards-death. Now resoluteness is the condition for authentic existence, and anticipation is man's authentic relation to his end -- death; therefore, resoluteness must have anticipation as an essential characteristic for it to be authentic.

...only as anticipating does resoluteness become a primordial Being towards Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Only when it 'qualifies' itself as Being-towards-death does resoluteness understand the 'can' of the potentiality for Being-guilty.68

The relation of resoluteness to anticipation must be seen from the point of view that anticipation is an authentic possibility which is included in authentic existence and which is what resolution is all about. As such, anticipation cannot be authentic without resoluteness, and resoluteness cannot be authentic unless it has anticipation as an

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68 Ibid., p. 354/306.
authentic possibility. We can see now that through anticipa-
tion resoluteness acquires its full authenticity. On the
other hand, anticipation become authentic potentiality-
towards-death through resoluteness.

Resoluteness does not just 'have' a con-
nection with anticipation, as with some-
thing other than itself. It harbours in
itself authentic Being-towards-death, as
the possible existentiell modality of its
own authenticity.69

As we have seen, the function of resoluteness is to
understand the call of conscience by listening to it, find-
ing and bringing back the individual who is lost in the
'they' mode of existence to his authentic possibility of his
potentiality-for-Being, his authentic self. Thus resolute-
ness is the condition for the manifestation of selfhood.
Anticipation on the other hand makes the potentiality-for-
Being oneself fully authentic by the disclosure of man's
utmost possibility -- death -- as his essential and funda-
mental authentic possibility and thus completes the con-
dition for man's authentic existence. Man becomes fully
authentic in anticipatory resoluteness which is the condi-
tion for the authentic mode of Being -- 'selfhood'.

Our investigation began with the statement that "the
self is not a substance and not a subject; rather it is a
possible way of Being-existing", and the analysis of man's
modes of existence revealed to us just that. We have shown

69 Ibid., p. 353/305.
Heidegger's view of the notion selfhood as a possible way of Being. His attempts to denote selfhood in terms of the individual's resoluteness to be authentically his ownself is in opposition to the traditional philosophical conception of the selfhood as that of substance or subject. But 'substance' meant to Heidegger an entity with the characteristic 'present-at-hand', and 'subject' an isolated worldless being. On the other hand, as we have seen, selfhood is a possible way of existence. It is manifested by man himself. Man is an entity but selfhood is a possibility which must be achieved by man's authentic existence.

We have seen that man's existence can be either authentic or inauthentic. In the inauthentic mode, the individual chooses not to be his ownself, rather exists in they-self world, while the former chooses to be his ownself, having the characteristic anticipatory resoluteness through which his selfhood is disclosed. Through the disclosure of selfhood or its manifestation, the individual becomes transparent to himself. This transparency is the individual's realization of his capacity to be his ownself, his 'potentiality-for-Being' his ownself. But the 'potentiality-for-Being' his ownself is a constitutive item of the phenomenon 'care'. Therefore, if we are to understand the individual in his transparency -- the manifestation of selfhood -- we must show the relation of selfhood to the phenomenon 'care'. This relation will be in part the topic of our next chapter,
dealing with Heidegger's conception of man's totality, of which selfhood is a constitutive item. The unity of this totality is man's unity.
CHAPTER THREE

SELPHOOD AND MAN'S UNITY

1. The Problem

Does Heidegger's rejection of the traditional conception of the self affect the idea of the unity of man's Being? The preceding two chapters have emphasized Heidegger's dispensing with the notion of self, as conceived by the traditional philosophy. And a question arises as a consequence: Is Heidegger able to maintain a comprehensible view of man's structural whole as a unity?

The question of man's unity is an important one in the traditional philosophy, and in Heidegger's thought. When we think of the 'whole' or 'totality' of man's Being, we search for a unity within the manifold and diverse phenomenon of man. In other words, when our concern is to comprehend man's totality, we should be able to discern the unity of this totality.

The question of man's unity is not imposed on our topic, the 'self'. Rather, because of the close relationship of man's unity to the notion of 'self', 'I', 'subject', and 'consciousness', in the traditional philosophy, it is most important to include the discussion of this question.
We should make it clear at this point, that our problem is not whether a man's history, taken as a whole, could be regarded as a single long event. Man's history and continuity is the problem of 'personal identity', that is, how we can know that any person is the same person at different times. We think that this is not the place to solve this problem. We only want to show that our problem differs substantially from the question of personal identity. We should note, however, that there is such a problem, and that it appears to be a serious one for those holding the view that man basically is mind or 'thinking substance'. Our concern here is whether, if we conceive man as basically having many modes of existence, then, how to account for his structural whole on one hand and for the unity of these modes on the other. We should also make it clear that our task is simply to show that in Heidegger's conception, man's structural whole is to be found in the phenomenon 'care', and that we do not need the 'self' as the principle of unity. In other words, our task is not to show how Heidegger solves the problem of man's unity, but to reveal his emphasis that man's unity is to be grounded in the care phenomenon, rather than in selfhood, for the simple reason that selfhood in his conception is a constitutive existential of the phenomenon care which is the structural whole of man's Being.

Now the question of man's unity was mentioned in the previous chapter. We did not elaborate on it or discuss it; we only said that there is a philosophical debate concerning
an adequate principle of unity. Does the unity of man consist in his body or his consciousness (mind)? Traditionally, at least from the substantialist's point of view, man was conceived as being composed of two substances, mind and body; while acknowledging the existence of both, they focused their attention more on the phenomenon 'consciousness', more on man's mental side than on his body. This conception is what we know as the dualistic theory of man's Being. The pattern of such a conception was set in the seventeenth century, especially in the philosophy of Descartes, and since then, philosophical dualism has operated in this framework.

Conceived as such, man is faced with the problem of the relation between his two substances. If mind and body are entirely different substances, how can they affect one another? In other words how can we represent man as a unity and not as diverse unrelated substances. This is only part of the problem; man's modes of existence too are manifold and diverse. If we do not see them as a unity, then we will have either the physiological modes or the mental. Yet no one is willing to deny the fact that man basically is a unity, because without this unity, or without the relationship between these modes, we would have instinctive activities on one hand, and/or pure thought on the other.

Now our main point is the idea that man is 'one' and has many modes of existence, and from the previous chapter we have seen that selfhood is one of these modes. The question is then, can we speak of such separate modes and
still conceive man to be a unified entity? And then, does this imply that we need to appeal to the notion self? We are accustomed to say: I think, I feel, I see, I taste, and so on, and we have no doubt that all these activities are done by some one, since we cannot conceive them to be done by themselves. These are all experiences which are undertaken by man himself. But do these experiences lead us to conclude that there is present in us something that cannot be made to fall within the experiences themselves? — something so different that it must stand alone over and above all our experiences? Should we accept the traditional claim that in addition to these experiences there is an 'I', 'consciousness', 'subject', or 'self'? This claim is based on the argument that 'an experience cannot experience itself', a thought cannot think itself, nor a sight see itself; moreover, they insist, knowledge without a knower is something incomprehensible.

The main point in the traditional argument is that consciousness is a very complex phenomenon, and yet man's knowledge may be said to have a certain unity. Why does not every experience stand absolutely by itself? Why does each experience stand in some way in relation to other experiences bringing about a structural whole or totality? Should not we assume some principle of unity?

Heidegger nowhere argues against the idea that we need a principle of unity, but he is very critical of the traditional assumption of 'the subject of experience' which
in his view is grounded on a misconception. This misconception persists, according to Heidegger, because the tradition left the Being of its subject of experience unexamined and undetermined ontologically.

Now such views of man's unity have been held by so many of the traditional philosophers, it would be beyond the scope of this thesis and indeed wearisome to attempt anything like an examination of all their opinions. In what is to follow, we will discuss Heidegger's criticism of one of these traditionalist's assumption, namely Kant's. For the purpose of our work it is sufficient that we have shown the problem in general. Since the question of man's unity is related to our topic, the self, we think that the above discussion is necessary for the understanding of the nature of our problem.

Finally, we should add that the idea that man is a unity received major consideration in Heidegger's thought. Not only that, but the notions of man's structural whole and unity seem to guide every step in his development of Being and Time. One of Heidegger's aims, as one can readily observe, is to show how we can conceive man in his totality, i.e., in all his modes of existence, and how we can view him as a unity in all these modes of existence.

But can Heidegger dispense with the notion of 'self' as substance and/or subject and still give us a comprehensible picture of man's unity? This is our main question. Furthermore, we may ask, why does the question of man's unity arise in his analysis of man's existence? The answer to the first
question in part) is the topic of this chapter. As to the second question we have seen that 'care', as the phenomenon which gives us the structural whole of man, is a many-structured one. Therefore our next step is to examine this phenomenon (Section 2). Our second step is to examine Heidegger's criticism of Kant's 'I think; Kant's criticism will lead us into the examination of the question of unity (Section 3).

2. Man's Totality -- Structural Whole -- 'Care'

Throughout the previous two chapters we spoke of and referred to the phenomenon 'care' as exemplifying the meaning of man's Being, since it encompasses all the fundamental structures of man's existence. The question that now arises is how can man take hold of an existence which seems so manifold and diverse in its possibilities? Care, as we have seen, is a many-structured phenomenon comprising 'existentiality', 'facticity', and 'falleness', which are open existential possibilities for man to choose. But how can we understand this existence as a structural whole? To answer this question, let us focus our attention towards the phenomenon care in order to see man in his structural whole.

In the discussion of Being-in-the-world, as the primordial structure of man Heidegger says:

Our first aim is to bring into relief phenomenally the unitary primordial structure of Dasein, in terms of which its possibilities and the ways for it 'to be' are ontologically determined. ...The fact that we foresaw this structural item which carries so much weight, arose from our aim of setting the analysis
of single items, from the outset, within the frame of a steady preliminary view of the structural whole, and of guarding against any disruption or fragmentation of the unitary phenomenon. ...But what more is there to point out in Being-in-the-world, beyond the essential relations of Being alongside the world (concern), Being-with (solicitude), and Being-one's-Self ("who")?

Here we see that Heidegger was concerned with man's totality from the beginning of his analysis. We see that one of his aims is to show the totality of man's existence, a totality whose unity he will show in a later analysis. In the previous chapters of Being and Time, Heidegger analyzed the constitutive items of man's existence, showing that man as Being-in-the-world, phenomenally is a manifold Being. The three main ways for him 'to be' were 'existentiality', 'facticity', and 'fallenness'. The three main ways which he relates to the world were 'Being-alongside', 'Being-with', and 'Being-one's-Self'. In Heidegger's view these ways or possibilities that man's existence is characterized by, must be understood as man's structural whole; they must be seen as man's totality. Heidegger's aim is to define this structural whole in an existential-ontological manner; that is, to grasp man's constitutive item in such a manner that these constitutive items are not elements which have been constructed, rather they should be revealed through man himself.

The fundamental ontological characteristic of this entity are existentiality, facticity and Being-fallen. These ...are

70Ibid., pp. 169/130-31.
not pieces belonging to something composite, but there is woven together in them a primordial context which makes up the totality of the structural whole which we are seeking. In the unity of those characteristics of Dasein's Being which we have mentioned, this Being becomes something which it is possible for us to grasp as such ontologically. 71

The phenomenon care according to Heidegger is an existential which harbours within itself man's total existential constitution; it is the existential in which all the fundamental characteristics of man are to be found. The formal existential definition of care is

The Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). This Being falls in the signification of the term "care". 72

As such we should be able to notice that the three most fundamentally characteristic modes of man's existence are included in this phenomenon, "care". But we may ask, how could we conceive one existential—care—to include in itself all the other existentials? In Heidegger's thought, as we observed before, man, as Being-in-the-world has 'care' as his ontological meaning, that is, man's Being is defined as care. What this amounts to is that the three fundamental constitutive modes of man's existence must be understood as modes of the phenomenon care.

Now because man as Being-in-the-world is conceived essentially in terms of care then we should be able to observe

71 Ibid., p. 235-36/191.

72 Ibid., p. 237/192.
that; the mode 'Being-alongside' entities within-the-world
is man's 'concern'; the mode 'Being-with-Others', which is
man's relation to other people is 'solicitude'; and the
third mode of man is Being-one's-Self. All the above modes
of existence are modes of the existential 'care'. We should
observe that care as an existential does not mean in
Heidegger's thought a mode detached from facticity and fallen-
ness; as man's structural whole, it embraces the unity of
these modes in which man's Being is disclosed and charac-
terized by Heidegger. Thus it is important to see that
'care' does not mean an isolated attitude of man towards
himself, because as Heidegger put it:

If one were to construct the expression 'care
for oneself',...following the analogy of
"concern" and "solicitude", this would be
tautology. "Care" cannot stand for some
special attitude towards the Self; for
the Self has already been characterized
ontologically by "Being-ahead-of-itself"...73

Now as we have seen from the previous discussions, man,
as Being-in-the-world is revealed through the existential
analysis. Man's 'facticity' is revealed through his 'state-
of-mind' or moods, in which his way of Being in the world is
manifested; his 'existentiality' is revealed through his
understanding, where man's authenticity is manifested; and
man's 'fallenness' is revealed through the 'they-self', where
his inauthenticity is manifested.

After raising the question of the structural whole of
man's three fundamental modes of existence, Heidegger inter-

73 Ibid., p. 237/193.
interpreted them in terms of the meaning of man's existence:
1) In this interpretation Heidegger's point of departure is the definition that man's Being "is an issue" which characterizes man's self-projective Being towards his ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This self-projective characteristic is termed by Heidegger as "Being-ahead-of-itself". Man characterized as that who projects before himself his own possibilities, and projection means that man always presses forward into possibilities -- his own. This implies that man understands that he has the potentiality 'to be'. Man has the capacity to project before himself the possibilities of his existence by being free to choose his ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This projective characteristic of man meant for Heidegger that man, understood ontologically, is always ahead of himself;

Dasein is always 'beyond itself'...not as a way of behaving towards other entities which it is not, but as Being towards the potentiality-for-Being which it is itself. This structure of Being, which belongs to the essential 'is an issue', we shall denote as Dasein's "Being-ahead-of-itself". 74

ii) To Being-in-the-world belong the characteristic 'facticity'. Facticity is the existential structure of man which means that he lives in a world, in some particular part and at some particular time for a limited period. Man's existence is the fact that he finds himself in his world, though he did not choose to be in a particular place in the world,

74 Ibid., p. 236/182.
and he did not bring himself into this world; in other words, man finds himself already thrown into a world not of his making. He finds himself in a world where there are entities ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, other people and himself which he encounters simultaneously, in his 'state-of-mind' -- mood.

The concept of "facticity" implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of these entities which it encounters within its own world.75

iii) This brings us to the third existential mode of man's existence -- 'fallennes'. As already noticed above, falleness is the mode in which man is occupied with his daily concerns, and because of his preoccupation, man neglects his potentiality for Being; he neglects that this Being 'is an issue' and lets his authentic possibilities bypass him -- he exists in the 'they-self' world:

'Falleness' into the 'world' means an absorption in Being-with-one-another insofar as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.76

Falleness, then, is man's falling- into-the-world and can be seen to include the following ideas; i) fallen man understands himself in terms of entities within-the-world as a substance having certain attributes, and ii) the world which man is falling is the world of the 'they-self'.

75Ibid., p. 82/56.

76Ibid., p. 220/175.
The above three fundamental existential modes of existence comprise the whole existential constitution of man's Being. They are the elements of man's structural whole -- totality. If we grasp the meaning of the phenomenon Being-in-the-world to convey man's totality, we should be able to see the following:

To Being-in-the-world belongs ahead-of-itself -- existentiality, Being-already-in -- facticity, and Being-alongside -- fallenness. As Being-in-the-world, man projects himself towards his possibilities, but is always bound to his 'facticity'; and since he is not an isolated entity, he relates to entities within-the-world and to other people authentically or inauthentically. The inauthentic relationship is his 'fallenness' into the world, while the authentic relationship is in anticipatory resoluteness.

But we already observed that the ontological meaning of man's Being is care, and we have seen that the above three existential modes of existence are man's structural whole. We can conclude from the above discussion that man's structural whole -- totality -- comprises the existential modes of the phenomenon care. Furthermore, we should be able to conclude that 'selfhood' as a possible mode of man's existence must be grounded in the phenomenon care.

As a result of the above discussion, care emerges as the phenomenon which comprises man's fundamental existential modes of Being -- the structural whole of his existence, his totality. If our point of departure is correct, that is, if the selfhood is a possible way or mode of Being -- exis-
tence, and if care is the phenomenon which comprises the totality of man's possible modes of existence, then, our natural conclusion is that the phenomenon care comprises within itself man's selfhood. Moreover, the ontological meaning of care as the structural whole will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, in order to establish the relationship of selfhood to care. The main point that should be clear from this section is that the phenomenon care is man's 'structural whole'. It is a unitary phenomenon which comprises within itself man's three fundamental modes of existence. Therefore, we should appeal to this phenomenon for man's unity.

3. Selfhood and Man's Structural Whole -- Care

a. Heidegger's Criticism of Kant's 'I think'

In what has been said so far, one question remains unanswered. Is selfhood the principle of man's unity? From what we have said, even though we have not established yet the relationship of selfhood to the phenomenon care ontologically, nevertheless, we hinted at the idea that selfhood as a mode of existence should be grounded in care. Therefore, the principle of man's unity is not selfhood. For Heidegger the 'principle of unity' is 'temporality', but we do not consider that the scope of our thesis permits us to go into the discussion of temporality. It will be sufficient to show in general terms Heidegger's conceptional temporality.
In Heidegger's thought man is primarily 'Being-in-Time'. We have already seen that the phenomenon care is the formal definition of man's Being as a structural whole, and the unity of care then, is man's unity. In the discussion of temporality, Heidegger reinterprets care in terms of temporality. In this reinterpretation the phenomenon care takes on the 'ecstases' or structures of temporality; it unifies past, present and future; the past as 'having-been' is man's facticity; the 'making-present' as 'already-in' is fallenness; and the 'Being-futural', 'ahead-of-itself' is existentiality.

The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality.77

and he adds:

Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in this way constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care.78

It is obvious that the above short discussion of temporality as the principle of unity does not do full justice to Heidegger's conception of this fundamental phenomenon, but by including this reference we simply want to show that Heidegger provides us with a solution to man's unity.79

Heidegger is very critical of the traditional conception of man's unity. For him the tradition conceived that man's unity is grounded in the 'I' or the 'self', where these two

77 Ibid., p. 375/327.

78 Ibid., p. 376/328.

79 For a full discussion of temporality see mainly section 65 pp. 370-80/323-31.
notions meant an 'absolute subject'. His main criticism is directed against Kant, who, according to Heidegger, failed to account for an ontological interpretation of the "I" -- the Being of the "I" he left undetermined.

Kant's categories -- 'simplicity', 'substantiality', and 'personality' -- are viewed by Heidegger to have been genuinely conceived as pre-phenomenological experiences, that is ontical. Now if man is ontically constituted by Being-in-the-world, and if the understanding of the Being of his selfhood belongs just as essentially to his Being, then Being-in-the-world should be interpreted ontologically. Therefore, Kant's categories should be able to serve as the ontological interpretation of man's selfhood. But as pre-phenomenological or ontical they do not reveal the ontological meaning of selfhood.

In Heidegger's view, Kant's conception of selfhood is grounded in a mistaken ontology. He understands Kant's "I" of the 'I think', as something present-at-hand, which he (Heidegger) took much pains to show as inappropriate for the explanation of man's Being. Heidegger is in agreement with Kant's argument concerning the phenomenality of the "I", and sees Kant's criticism of his predecessors concerning the substantiality of the "I" as a positive step for an appropriate ontological interpretation. But Heidegger is quick to attack Kant for not holding this position and for slipping back into the traditional ontology -- for Kant started the analysis of man's Being from an "I" -- absolute subject, rather than from 'I am' as 'Being-in-the-world', and 'Being-
with. Furthermore, Kant realized the inadequacy of the soul-substance, and the substantialist theory of selfhood, yet Kant failed to provide us with an ontological interpretation of the self. Heidegger quotes Kant's own words:

The 'I' is a bare consciousness, accompanying all concepts. In the 'I' 'nothing more is represented than the transcendental subject of thought'. 'Consciousness in itself (is) not so much a representation...as it is a form of representation in general'. (xvii) The 'I think' is 'the apperception, which clings to every experience and precedes it. (xviii) 80

Kant's formal conception of the "I", Heidegger argues, does not give us sufficient reason to conceive an "I" which gives unity to consciousness. The fact that man's consciousness is unified is not adequate reason for us to accept Kant's "I" as the subject which brought about this unification. What Heidegger is saying is that if we accept Kant's argument that the 'I think' must be able to accompany all man's representations, this does not give us the fact that an "I" is accompanying all our states of consciousness. Thus Kant's argument permits that every representation is one's own, but it does not guarantee that a 'subject', an "I" actually does accompany all one's representations.

In Heidegger's view all that we can deduce from Kant's argument is that the "I" is a thinking subject:

In Kant's sense we must take "I" as saying "I think". Kant tries to establish the

80 Ibid., p. 366/319. (I have retained the two Roman numerals which are references to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason) see text p. 496.
Nevertheless, Kant is given credit for the correct phenomenal interpretation of the "I" in 'I think' when he rejected the 'substantial' meaning of the "I" and that the "I" must be understood as 'I think'. But Kant's conception of the "I" as a 'subject of experience' prevented him from providing an appropriate ontological interpretation of the self, for in Heidegger's view he left the ontological meaning of the subject undetermined:

For the ontological concept of the subject characterizes not the selfhood of the "I" qua self, but the selfsameness and steadiness of something that is always present-at-hand. To define the "I" ontologically as "subject" means to regard it as something always present-at-hand. The Being of the "I" is understood as the Reality of the res cogitans. (xix)

Now we are well aware of the fact that any conception of man's Being as something constantly present is for Heidegger an inappropriate ontology. Kant's main failure is that he did not exploit his own insight -- that the "I" remains related to its representations and would be nothing without them. But for Kant the "I" is pure thought while the representations are the 'empirical' or phenomenal, and their relationship is the fact that the "I" must accompany

\[81\] Ibid., p. 367/319.

\[82\] Ibid., p. 367/320. (The Roman numeral refers to Heidegger's note on pp. 496-97, where he explains the relationship of Kant's 'I think' to that Descartes' thinking substance)
these representations at all times. Nevertheless, Kant failed to show the ontological meaning of 'I think', the 'representations', and their relationship.

For Heidegger, in order to conceive of the self as not a bare consciousness, pure thought, or subject of experience, we must assert that whenever there is 'I think', it should be understood ontologically as 'I think something' as a fundamental characteristic of the self. Kant, not only failed to assert this at his point of departure in his interpretation of the self, but he also left the 'something' indefinite. What is obvious for Heidegger is that Kant understood the Being of the self, the representation and their relationship as something constantly present-at-hand.

The most important point of Heidegger's criticism of Kant is that the latter left the 'something' undetermined; whereas for Heidegger the 'something' in 'I think something' is the entity-within-the-world, which implies that the 'world' containing this 'something' is already there. But as we have seen, this phenomenon 'world' is a constitutive of the unitary structure 'Being-in-the-world' as the ontological meaning of 'I am'. Failing to provide this ontological interpretation of the self, Kant presents us with an isolated worldless subject:

...as a consequence the "I" was again forced back to an isolated subject, accompanying representations in a way which is ontologically quite indefinite.83

83 Ibid., p. 368/321.
This ontological indefiniteness, which Heidegger's main quest is to overcome, is the reason why Kant is so strongly criticised by Heidegger. The self as conceived by the tradition, including Kant, was not determined as to its ontological meaning. Now we have shown that Kant's categories, substantially, simplicity, and personality, do not reveal to us ontologically the meaning of selfhood. And as we have seen from Chapter Two, since the self is a possible way of Being, we cannot appeal to the self for man's unity, but to the phenomenon care. Now our final task is to show the relationship of selfhood and care.

b. Selfhood and Man's 'Structural Whole' -- Care

Thus far we have encountered our two main points of this chapter; i) man's 'structural whole', 'totality', as the phenomenon care; and ii) Heidegger's criticism of Kant's 'I think'. Now we shall establish the ontological meaning of the relationship between selfhood and care. That which we shall prove is that selfhood is a constitutive structure of the phenomenon care. By showing that, we will establish the final point in our work, that is, the fact that selfhood is a possible mode of man's Being -- care -- will be the proof, that selfhood cannot and must not be conceived as the principle of man's unity.

Ontologically, Dasein is in principle different from everything that is present-at-hand or Real. Its 'subsistence' is not based on the substantiality of a substance but on the 'self-subsistence' of the existing Self, whose Being has been conceived
as care. The phenomenon of the Self -- a phenomenon which is included in care -- needs to be defined existentially in a way which is primordial and authentic, in contrast to our preparatory exhibition of the inauthentic they-self. Along with this, we must establish what possible ontological questions are to be directed towards the 'Self', if indeed it is neither substance nor subject.

Man's existence is not based on the substantiality of substance -- a 'thing', rather for Heidegger on the 'self-subsistence' of the existing self, of which we have shown the manifestation in the previous chapter, as the result of the 'existentiell' modification. There we have shown the process of this manifestation step by step. We said that the phenomena, 'anxiety' and 'anticipation'; individualize man; the call of conscience summons man back to himself out of the they-self world, and reveals that fundamentally his Being has the characteristic 'Being-guilty'; and finally, the individual's decision to be himself -- resoluteness. Furthermore, we have shown the combining of the two phenomena, resoluteness and anticipation, to yield 'anticipatory resoluteness' which is the authentic mode of existence and through which the selfhood is manifested.

In the above text Heidegger says that selfhood must be grounded in the phenomenon care, which we indicated all along in this chapter. Our task now is exactly to affirm Heidegger's claim. Our argument is as follows: If antici-

84 Ibid., p. 351/303.
patory resoluteness, the authentic existence, is the manifestation of selfhood, and if anticipatory resoluteness is one of man's modes of existence, while care is man's 'structural whole' -- that is, the phenomenon which comprises within itself all the modes of man's existence -- then our conclusion should be that selfhood as a possible mode of existence is a constitutive item of care.

Now Heidegger's thesis is that authentically existing, the individual's 'I'-hood or 'selfhood' is expressed in terms of the phenomenon 'Being-in-the-world'. But as we have seen from our discussion of the inauthentic mode of existence -- the 'they-self' -- when we attempted to answer the 'who' question, man interprets and understands himself in terms of the entities with which he is concerned. This interpretation and understanding of oneself is what we came to know as 'falling'. Falling as an existential mode of man's Being is the fact that man flees or hides in the face of himself, and exists in the 'they' world.

What expresses itself in the 'I' is the Self which, proximally and for the most part, I am not authentically. When one is absorbed in the everyday multiplicity and the rapid succession...of that with which one is concerned, the self of the self-forgetful "I am concerned" shows itself as something simple which is constantly selfsame but indefinite and empty.\footnote{Ibid., p. 368/322.}
It is simple because it is undetermined ontologically; it is selfsame because it conceives itself in terms of the entities it encounters within the world; it is indefinite because it is not itself, but is the average one, each and everyone, the they-self; it is empty because its fundamental characteristics are 'idle talk', curiosity, and ambiguity; it is like an 'echo' repeating everything and having nothing of its own.

The ontological understanding of selfhood which we achieved in the second chapter, that is, as a 'possible way of existence', is to be guarded against any attempt to interpret it or understand it in terms of "I" -- substance or subject. The authentic self must be understood only in terms of man's authentic potentiality-for-Being. We must reject the conception that the self is the basis of care, or that it is the basis for man's unity. Furthermore, we should reject the conception that the self is constantly present-at-hand. In Heidegger's thought, selfhood

...As to be discerned existentially only in one's authentic potentiality-for-Being-one's-Self -- that is to say, in the authenticity of Dasein's Being as care. In terms of care the constancy of the Self, as the supposed persistence of the subjectum, gets clarified. 86

But if the expression 'I-hood' or 'selfhood' is an essential characteristic of man, and its ontological meaning is revealed in authentic existence or in inauthentic existence, then it follows that the constancy of the self could be either

86Ibid., p. 369/322.
authentic or inauthentic. 

The inauthentic constancy of the self is man's possibility of his failure to stand by himself -- that is, his existence as the they-self. But if we conceive selfhood as a substance or a subject, then we tend to understand its constancy as an attribute of these two concepts, and to believe that it is constantly present. On the other hand, if we conceive of it as a mode of existence, then we should be able to understand its constancy in terms of existence itself.

The authentic constancy of the self, then, is the possibility of man's mode of existence in which he stands by himself -- that is to say, man's resolution to be his ownself.

The constancy of the self, in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness, is the authentic counter-possibility to the non-Self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling. Existentially, "self-constancy" signifies nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness. The ontological structure of such resoluteness reveals the existentiality of the Self's Selfhood. 87

Selfhood and its constancy then, must be understood in terms of man's possible modes of existence. But all the possible modes of existence, as we have seen, are constitutive items of man's structural whole -- the phenomenon care. This phenomenon -- care -- which is disclosed as the authenticity of man's Being encompasses selfhood within its structural

87 Ibid., p. 369/322-23.
whole. Man's authentic existence, the manifestation of his selfhood, is achieved in his primordial individualization as an anticipatory resoluteness -- in Heidegger's own words "in the authenticity of Dasein's Being as care". 88

According to Heidegger, when we conceive of man's selfhood in this way -- as a resolute existence -- then and only then are we capable of disclosing the phenomenality of the "I". The meaning of the phenomenality of the "I" as we have seen, is the ontological meaning of man's authentic potentiality-for-Being-one's Self -- that is, anticipatory resoluteness. This ontological understanding allows us to interpret Kant's categories -- substantiality, simplicity, and personality -- as essential characteristics of selfhood.

Finally, we are in a position to conclude that man's selfhood as a 'possible mode of Being' is grounded in the phenomenon care -- man's 'structural whole'. Our discussion in this chapter guided us to affirm this claim by Heidegger. The problem was to show that man's unity is not to be grounded in selfhood. Ontologically understood, selfhood is a 'possible mode of man's Being', and man's Being is disclosed ontologically in terms of care -- man's structural whole; therefore, selfhood as a constitutive item of this phenomenon cannot be the ground or the principle of man's unity. We have, then, provided the answer to our basic question -- does Heidegger's rejection of the traditional conception of the self affect the idea of the unity of man's Being?

88 Ibid., p. 368/322.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The aim of this work in the first place was to show that in Heidegger's thought the human self is not a substance nor is it a subject, as conceived by the tradition; rather the self is a way of Being.

This conception of the notion 'self' in Heidegger was elaborated and viewed from the vantage point between Heidegger's conception and the basic traditional views of the self. It manifested itself in a triple direction: as an attempt to overcome the tradition, as a possibility of choice, and as in relation to man's unity.

Our efforts were occasioned and guided by the specific conviction that Heidegger's work represented a contribution to the present need of philosophy and the deepening of our understanding of ourselves as we really are. It must be acknowledged that Heidegger's main quest in Being and Time, is not the self, rather the Being as such, and the Being of man in relation to it.

It was shown that Heidegger's philosophical method is phenomenology. He maintained that the phenomenon should be conceived first as it is and only then interpreted ontologically, that is, in terms of its Being.
It was shown that for Heidegger the only way to understand "Being" is by conceiving man's Being. In his overcoming the traditional conception, his main rejection was that of the categories of substance and subject. It was shown that Being and Time began with the everyday modes of man's Being-existence, in order to demonstrate their derivative character in relation to the authentic modes.

Authentic and inauthentic modes of existence were shown as possibilities which man chooses, and according to this choice his existence was rendered either authentic or inauthentic. The main point that we stressed is that in Heidegger's thought man's essence is existence, and this existence is determined by man's own choice.

In contrast with the tradition, which thought of man's essence as that of substance or a subject constantly there, Heidegger's new conception is that man basically is what he can be. This is not to say that Heidegger is denying the fact that man is an entity with physiological and psychological qualities. Nowhere does Heidegger make such a claim. What Heidegger wants us to understand is simply that man basically exists, and that his existence is permeated with possibilities for him to choose.

Our focal point was man's modes of existence which denoted man either authentic or inauthentic; the analysis of the former revealed 'selfhood' as an individual who is existing authentically -- taking over his existence by choosing to be himself; the analysis of the latter revealed the 'they-
self' as an individual who is existing — not — inauthentically — letting his existence be determined for him by his own choice.

It was shown the main characteristics of each of those two modes of existence; the inauthentic mode — the 'they-self' — we said has 'fallenness' as its main characteristic when the individual existence is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity and where nothing can be genuinely the individual's own. On the other hand it was shown that the authentic mode of existence — selfhood, is just the opposite of 'they-self'. It is the mode which is characterized by anticipatory resoluteness, where the individual is genuinely his ownself.

We also showed that selfhood as a possible mode of existence is a constitutive item of the phenomenon care — which was shown as the existential structural whole of man's existence. We inquired into the question whether selfhood could be seen as the principle of man's unity, and have shown that in Heidegger's thought selfhood is not this principle. We hinted at the idea that temporality is the principle, but we refrained from going into the examination of Heidegger's analysis of temporality because such a task is beyond the scope of this thesis.

If we are to sum up our thesis in one sentence, we can say that if Heidegger's notion of existence is understood correctly, then 'selfhood is that way which existence is disclosed to the individual through and by his ownself'.
No attempt has been made throughout the whole thesis to criticize Heidegger or to try to show any deficiency or faults in his conception of the human selfhood. The aim of our thesis was not to criticize Heidegger's new conception but to gather and to bring to light that which is scattered throughout his work, *Being and Time*. This does not mean that Heidegger's new conception is beyond any criticism, for philosophy is said to be a search for the truth, and any philosophical problem is an openended question never to be finalized. As long as there are people with the quest to search, the question of selfhood is openended. We are convinced that our thesis is not a final answer to the problem of the human self. What is clear for us at this point is that Heidegger's new conception of selfhood opens our eyes to the fact that the self is not a given thing which is always there much the same as a thing; rather he wants us to think of selfhood as an achievement manifested only when we are being truly what we are capable of being. Neither is the selfhood something brought from outside ourselves, for if this were true, then it would be possible that man could never achieve or manifest his selfhood.

One last thing that we explained, which is very important, is that selfhood is a condition for authentic community in Heidegger's thought. We showed that for Heidegger 'authentic-Being-with-others' presupposes authentic existence -- selfhood.

Selfhood in the final analysis is the specific way or
mode which man exists in the world. This specific way is realized and manifested only when the individual chooses to be that which he is, and what he can be in the first place. As long as the individual is preoccupied with idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, the realization and manifestation of selfhood is not possible. We have seen that the manifestation of selfhood is not an alienation or estrangement of the individual; rather it is constituted by the way the individual interrelates with the world -- entities and other people.

Understood this way, the implication is that man is by no means merely the product of heredity as some biologist and psychologist wants us to believe, nor simply the product of his environment. Man's freedom to choose his possibilities, his ability to make decisions -- to decide for himself through and by himself -- is the responsibility that he can and should choose and decide his way of existence. Selfhood in its new meaning is a requirement, it is a condition that should be met if we hope to have a society composed of responsible individuals.

One final word, we believe that Heidegger's conception of selfhood is a genuine insight into what it means to be a human being, to be oneself, and to be in a relationship with other people and the world--to realize the meaning of our existence.
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