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Jung and Whitehead: The living symbol.

Steven Robert Hanson
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JUNG AND WHITEHEAD: THE LIVING SYMBOL

by

Steven Robert Hanson

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research through the Department of Religious Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at The University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario Canada
1989
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ABSTRACT

Jung and Whitehead: The Living Symbol

By

Steven Robert Hanson

The living symbol, as the generative order of personality, can be understood as a process of recursive imaginative reversion. This thesis is derived from a comparative study of works by Alfred North Whitehead and Carl Jung. The kind of symbolic reference that I refer to as a process of recursive imaginative reversion is, I maintain, the vital pattern of symbolization that allows for the extension of any meaningful human order, and more particularly, for the development of personality.

The means by which the living symbol is constituted is what I refer to as an order of recursive imaginative reversion. This is the manner that experience is integrated, "in a final route of occasions," to comprise the living symbol and shape the becoming of an individual person. This process is an order by which imagination shapes and determines the concrete organization of physical and conceptual experience.

The recursive aspect of imaginative reversion refers to the effect that the imaginative exclusion of physical feeling has upon the process of imagination itself. The term reversion, in this case, pertains to the exclusion of
physical feelings in imaginative formulations. Recursive imaginative reversion is the process by which imaginative formulations have an indirect effect upon successive imaginative formulations as a result of excluding various aspects of physical feeling (while including others).

My approach, though indirectly based upon the phenomenological observations of psychic imagery as accounted for in Carl Jung's works, is an analytical method of theoretical extrapolation. Utilizing and developing concepts from within the context of Whiteheadian philosophy, I extrapolate from Whitehead's explication of "concrescence" to explain the form of symbolic reference that Jung describes as pertaining to the nature of the living symbol in the process of "individuation".

To adequately understand the nature of the living symbol it is necessary to distinguish between the general process of physio-conceptual appropriation and the symbolic process of apperception. The living symbol formulates and expresses the relationship between these processes. It constitutes a "regnant non-social nexus", an order of recursive imaginative reversion and, the generative order of personality.
DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my parents Robert and Elsie Hanson who have taught me the value of education and to my wife, Anne Hanson, who has taught me to value education selectively.
I would like to acknowledge the indebtedness I feel to Dr. Sean Kelly, Dr. Barry Whitney and Dr. Neil Holland. Dr. Kelly provided me with invaluable editorial assistance and numerous hours of supervisory and conversational input. The friendship I developed with Dr. Kelly during the writing of this thesis has been and will continue to be a formative influence on my life. I would also like to thank Dr. Whitney for originally introducing me to the thought of Alfred North Whitehead. Dr. Whitney admirably accomplished the formidable task of making Whitehead's language intelligible to me and furthermore, has for more than ten years now, shared with me his cultivated appreciation of process philosophy. I owe Dr. Neil Holland considerable thanks for both his formal participation on my committee and for his informal contributions in terms of assisting me in gaining some personal insight regarding the process of accomplishing this task.
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Introduction

My thesis is that the living symbol, as the generative order of personality, can be understood as a process of recursive imaginative reversion. This thesis is derived from a comparative study of works by Alfred North Whitehead and Carl Jung. The kind of symbolic reference that I refer to as a process of recursive imaginative reversion is, I maintain, the vital pattern of symbolization that allows for the extension of any meaningful human order, and more particularly, for the development of personality.

The living symbol is the instance of imagination that is the most inclusive and particular expression of the imaginative process itself. It is the meaningful formulation of an expression that unites disparate imaginings which makes possible a concrete personal order. It is like the silken thread upon which the jewels of the imagination are strung. Much like the thread makes a necklace out of jewels, the living symbol makes a personal order out of experience. In this case, however, the living symbol is of the same basic order as the imaginings which it unites. I refer to the living symbol as a "hybrid form of symbolic reference." Like the weft that unites the warp in the weaving of a cloth, it is the single piece of wool that weaves the strands of experience into the meaningful complex whole of personality.
The means by which the living symbol is constituted is what I refer to as an order of recursive imaginative reversion. This is the manner that experience is integrated, "in a final route of occasions," to comprise the living symbol and shape the becoming of an individual person. Although there are many complex processes involved in the becoming of a person, the living symbol constitutes the culminative and most significant organization of all these factors in each moment. This process is an order by which imagination shapes and determines the concrete organization of physical and conceptual experience. Formulative expressions of imagination always include specific aspects of physical experience and exclude other aspects. Moreover, every imaginative expression implicitly introduces conceptual purpose to the organization of physical experience. Physical experience, in other words, is presented to us, through imagination, in a manner that implicitly reflects a purposeful intention of conceptual selection. This conceptual selectivity involves the preclusion of some physical feelings and the inclusion of other physical feelings.

The recursive aspect of imaginative reversion refers to the effect that the imaginative exclusion of physical feeling has upon the process of imagination itself. The term reversion, in this case, pertains to the exclusion of physical feelings in imaginative formulations. Recursive
imaginative reversion is the process by which imaginative formulations have an indirect effect upon successive imaginative formulations as a result of excluding various aspects of physical feeling (while including others).

Because, as I shall explain, imaginative propositions entail including some formerly reverted aspects of physical feeling and reverting some formerly included aspects of physical feeling, imaginative propositions always express the integrated but relative cogency of two conceptual purposes implicit to the complex organization of physical feelings. Moreover, imaginatively reverted physical feelings constitute the most proximate possibilities for inclusion in successive imaginings.

I will provide an example of recursive imaginative reversion. The following description, however, is not an explication of what constitutes the living symbol. It is a more contained illustration of recursive imaginative reversion, which, in its most extensive operation, gives shape to the living symbol and recursively effects more contained instances of imagination (such as the one outlined below).

The marathon runner nearing the end of a race feels the agonizing pain of muscle exhaustion. At the same time there is an exhilarating experience associated with a rush of adrenalin, and the sight of the finish line. The implicit conceptual purpose associated with the experience
of pain is to relieve the muscles of the stress they are under. The implicit conceptual purpose associated with the exhilaration of an adrenalin infusion is the notion of crossing the finish line. These physical feelings may be associated with fantasies of collapsing and the joy of victory respectively.

Presuming the cogency of this second notion prevails, one might consider what went through this runner's mind. How did this runner continue to the finish line? We can assume that the runner attempted to exclude the physical feeling of pain from consciousness and focus upon the exhilarating physical feelings associated with adrenalin and the victorious crossing of the finish line. The prevailing notion of crossing the finish line involves an imaginative reversion of an aspect of physical feeling (pain) and the imaginative inclusion of another aspect of physical feeling (exhilaration).

The significance of this winning notion (in the context of the runner's life), is that it is meaningful to the extent that the completion of the race represents a personal victory in overcoming a physical disability. It can be understood, then, that the victory in itself is without meaningful significance, except to the extent that it represents the runner's physio-conceptual capacity to integrate the contrasting notions of surrendering to the limitations of pain and attaining victory. The integration
of these notions is attained by means of reverting some painful aspects of physical feeling. Moreover, the meaningful intensity of this experience is derived not through the complete imaginative exclusion of pain, but, rather through the understanding of victory in the context of overcoming pain. Ideally, in this moment of imaginative consideration, only to some extent is the physical feeling of pain reverted. As a moment that affords living meaning, it is an ideal harmony of contrast between the experience of pain and the feeling of exhilaration that affords both an understanding of context and significance. Without the pain the victory is a hollow one and without the exhilaration the pain is unmitigated. The recursive aspect of this reversion process is that it is the context of this meaningful experience that effects the next imaginative moment. The meaning experienced in this instance formulates the concrete possibilities for the imaginative consideration of yet another occasion of contrasting conceptual purposes. For example, the runner may further revert the physical feeling of pain to stand on a podium and receive an award.

It is not possible to provide a more comprehensive example of recursive imaginative reversion (as it pertains directly to the living symbol) without further analysis. Indeed, it may be impossible to circumscribe any specific example of the living symbol as this would involve describing a particular imaginative expression that provides
an order of meaning for one's entire existence. An exhaustive analysis of these infinite relations might not even be theoretically possible.

My approach, though indirectly based upon the phenomenological observations of psychic imagery as accounted for in Carl Jung's works, is an analytical method of theoretical extrapolation. I utilize relevant philosophical categories from the works of Alfred North Whitehead as heuristic tools for the hermeneutical discovery of a dynamic order in the character of the living symbol and the development of personhood. I delineate the concept of the living symbol within the context of Jungian psychology. Then, using concepts from within the context of Whiteheadian philosophy, I extrapolate from Whitehead's explication of micro-cosmic experience to explain the particular form of symbolic reference that Jung describes as pertaining to the nature of the living symbol.

Jung's model of individuation offers a theoretical framework to account for the phenomenological observations of this symbol's development. I shall demonstrate that, within this context, the living symbol is the culminative product of the complementary relationship between consciousness and the unconscious. It is the most integrated pattern of associated experience that the psyche, as a complex whole, manages to generate. The living symbol is an image of the Self, a complexio-oppositorum that includes
both the rational propositions of consciousness and the irrational feeling-toned contents of the unconscious. It is an a-rational proposition that constitutes a proposed relationship between the known contents of consciousness and the relatively unknown contents of the unconscious. This organization of psychic activity constitutes an overall attitude that is also a major factor of psychic agency in the further apperceptive appropriation of human experience.

It is also possible to derive an understanding of the living symbol from within the philosophical context of Whitehead's writings. In this context, the living symbol can be understood as a "hybrid subjective form of symbolic reference." This is a particular kind of symbolic reference that is distinguished by a quality of "appetition," a property of conceptualization that affords an initiative for the orginative appropriation of experience.

After reviewing Whitehead's general regard for the nature of religious concerns (a focus which Jung's works introduce as central to the development of a living symbol), I will concentrate on explicating Whitehead's theory of "concrescence", the process of physio-conceptual appropriation that gives rise to the development of symbolic reference. I will demonstrate that only an imaginative proposition may be properly considered a living symbol. An imaginative proposition, according to Whitehead, is a "hybrid occasion," a peculiar form of experience that
involves both the conceptual feeling of physical feelings and the physical feeling of conceptual feelings.

Following an explication of Whitehead's thought on the process by which experience is integrated (concretion), I will then proceed with an analysis of more obscure material in Whitehead's work. This entails determining the nature of a "hybrid occasion," which is a particular kind of experience germane to the nature of an imaginative proposition. I will then relate this kind of experience to Whitehead's understanding of how symbolic reference develops.

The living symbol is, I maintain, a hybrid form of symbolic reference that is recursively structured by micro-cosmic and macro-cosmic factors of agency, inter-subjective and intra-subjective propositions of consciousness, and archetypal and personal influences of the unconscious.

As Jung's work makes clear, the living symbol is a product of active and passive apperception. These are two distinct modes of symbolization by means of which experience is interwoven to afford living meaning. I shall examine the inter-subjective and intra-subjective factors of agency that constitute a hybrid occasion. It is the inter-subjective factors of agency between hybrid occasions, I contend, that constitutes the general character of passive apperception. Likewise, it is the micro-cosmic intra-subjective factors of agency that can account for active apperception in the
development of hybrid symbolic reference.

An investigation into the Jungian model of developing consciousness can enhance further one's understanding of apperception in terms of hybrid symbolic reference. Edward Edinger, a leading Jungian interpreter, provides a paradigm of developing consciousness. I contend that in the explication of this model Edinger does not distinguish adequately between the on-going psychic activity of image processing and the peculiar formulation of reference that characterizes the process of symbolization with respect to the living symbol. I maintain that to more adequately understand the nature of the living symbol it is necessary to distinguish between the general process of physio-conceptual appropriation and the symbolic process of apperception.

This distinction affords the opportunity to consider the relationship between the order of apperception that Edinger outlines and the order of physio-conceptual appropriation that Whitehead's work provides. With the new understanding of apperception which I delineate in terms of hybrid symbolic reference, it then becomes possible to recognize the dynamic order of a concrete relationship between the processes of physio-conceptual appropriation and apperception. This is a recursive relationship of imaginative reversion. Furthermore, inasmuch as Jung is correct in attributing meaning to the living symbol in terms
of promoting individuation, this process of recursive imaginative reversion can be understood as the generative order of personality.
Chapter One

JUNG: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTEXT

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the concept of the living symbol, and outline the psychological context to which it pertains. Within the theoretical framework of Jungian psychology the concept of the living symbol is the most significant factor to consider in order to gain an understanding of the role religious consciousness plays in the development of personality. I will present some of the general postulates that undergird Jung's model of "Analytical Psychology" and then describe the process of individuation wherein the development of the living symbol is of crucial relevance to the outcome of the entire process. The living symbol is in fact, as I shall explain, the guiding and mediating factor of apperceptive appropriation. I will explicate this final point in terms of Jung's discussion of apperception and the manner by which the living symbol transforms personality and determines the overall orientation of the psyche towards the integration of further experiences.

Experience and Psychic Images

Epistemological and metaphysical assumptions shaped Jung's approach to the study of religion, at the same time,
his study of religion inevitably led him to draw certain epistemological and metaphysical conclusions. With respect to the scientific-empirical validity of his research and the charge that speculative philosophical notions compromise the integrity of his research, Jung has said:

I have often been called a philosopher. I am an empiricist and adhere as such to the phenomenological standpoint. I trust that it does not conflict with the principles of scientific empiricism if one occasionally makes certain reflections which go beyond a mere accumulation and classification of experience. As a matter of fact I believe it is not ever possible without reflection because 'experience' is a process of assimilation without which there could be no understanding...¹

Note that Jung equates "experience" with the process of assimilation and understanding. We cannot, Jung claims, know a thing in itself as it exists apart from our experience of it. There can be no empirical knowledge that is not determined by the a priori structure of cognition.² That which is beyond the psychic realm is essentially unknown³ because the psychic structures may not be adequate


³ By 'essentially unknown' I would maintain that Jung does not mean that we cannot have any knowledge beyond that which is immediately present and 'faculty conditioned', but rather that all knowledge beyond direct psychic experience can only be derivatively and/or inferentially known.
to the nature of what is to be known.\(^4\) This is the most central epistemological assumption of Jung's works: psychic experience is the most direct and immediate form of experience. Jung writes:

It is an almost ridiculous prejudice to assume that existence can only be physical. As a matter of fact the only form of existence we know of immediately is psychic. We might well say on the contrary, that physical existence is merely an inference, since we know of matter only in so far as we perceive psychic images transmitted by the senses. We are surely making a great mistake when we forget this simple yet fundamental truth.\(^5\)

Jung does not deny the relative truth of either the 'realist' (esse in re) perspective or the 'idealist' (esse in intellectu) perspectives: "I would only like to unite these extreme opposites by an esse in anima, which is the psychological standpoint. We live immediately only in the world of images."\(^6\)

Although, for Jung, psychic imagery is the most fundamental category of experience, he refrains from asserting the metaphysical ultimacy of this claim: "I am quite conscious that I am moving in a world of images and that none of my reflections touches the essence of the


\(^5\) Jung, Psychology and Religion, p. 11

\(^6\) Jung, CW, vol. 11, p. 327, 328.
Unknowable...

Eschewing speculative claims about the nature of ultimate reality, Jung focuses on the phenomena of psychic images in their observed sequence, relations, and effects for the purposes of pragmatic consideration. As a pragmatist, Jung considers psychic imagery to be "real" because it has an effect. Jung's theorizing about the sequential processes, internal relations, and structure of psychic imagery constitute a significant effort to comprehend the nature of psychic agency. Yet by Jung's own admission, it is apparent that metaphysical and epistemological considerations cannot be divorced from a thoughtful analysis of his model.

What precisely does Jung mean when he speaks of psychic images, especially in terms of immediate experience? I would agree with James Hillman that, for Jung, images are the basic elements of psychic activity, the primary expression of mind and its energy. "We would expect," writes Jung,

7 Ibid., vol. 8, p. 361.
8 Ibid., vol. 8, p. 325.
9 These theoretical formulations of psychic agency of course cannot but presume, require and imply metaphysical percepts. This point demonstrates the importance of determining 'model fit' with more general metaphysical systems like Whitehead's especially in respect to epistemological concerns.
that all psychic activities would produce images of themselves and that this would be their essential nature without which they could no be called 'psychic' ...it should be clear that the psyche consists essentially of images. It is a series of images in the truest sense, not an accidental juxtaposition or sequence, but a structure that is throughout full of meaning and purpose; it is a 'picturing' of vital activities.\textsuperscript{11}

Images may function in two capacities: as signs, or as symbols. Images may be considered the psychic counterpart of the physiological sense functions (visual, aural, tactile, etc.).\textsuperscript{12} They reflect processes in the brain and therefore correspond to concrete referents. In other words, a psychic image that functions as a sign is semiotically interpreted as a merely causally conditioned fact, a symptom expressive of a condition rooted in the past and therefore indicating a condition of objective facticity.\textsuperscript{13} In a less restricted sense, a sign may be any image or conceptual derivative therefrom which serves to provide for recognition of a known factor in consciousness.

An image, taken as a symbol, is interpreted to have a meaning beyond its mere representative quality, beyond that which is known. A symbol has a prospective significance about which we are relatively unconscious and only partially

\textsuperscript{11} C. Jung, \textit{CW}, vol. 8, p. 325, 326.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 322.

able to formulate by way of analogy. Its referent is relatively unknown and can therefore be understood only in its similarities to and differences from something that is already known. A symbol is always suggestive and expresses an intentional relationship between the knower and something which exists but is not yet fully understood. A symbol reveals what is in the process of becoming.\textsuperscript{14}

It should be pointed out that images may function more or less effectively as both symbols and signs depending upon the context and the demands of consciousness. For Jung, a psychology based exclusively on the classification of signs or the interpretation of symbols is imbalanced and inadequate to human beings.\textsuperscript{15} Jung, moreover, indicates that

\begin{quote}
psychic processes stand in some sort of energy relation to the physiological substrate. In so far as they are objective events, they can hardly be interpreted as anything but energy processes....\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

In 1946 Jung elaborated upon this point:

\begin{quote}
The deeper 'layers' of the psyche lose their individual uniqueness as they retreat farther and farther into the darkness. 'Lower down', that is to say as they approach the autonomous functional systems, they become increasingly collective until they are universalized and extinguished in the body's materiality, i.e., in chemical substances. The body's carbon is
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., P. 64-65.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p.19.

\textsuperscript{16} Jung, \textit{CW}, Vol. 8, P. 233.
simply carbon. Hence at bottom the psyche is simply 'world'. In this sense I hold Kerenyi to be absolutely right when he says that in the symbol the world itself is speaking.\textsuperscript{17}

For Jung, therefore, the psyche "is a series of images... [and] not an accidental juxtaposition or sequence, but a structure that is throughout full of meaning and purpose..."\textsuperscript{18} These images function as both representational signs and as ontological symbols of organismic intentionality. Psychic images are the epistemic foundation of experience, a complex expression of relations wherein the psychic and the material find their common expression.

Archetypes and Complexes

Jung describes the "psychoid" structures of world-mind energy relations in terms of "archetypes." Archetypes are the foundations of all the relations between psychic processes. Jung documents recurring patterns of psychic imagery in myths, fairy tales, dreams and fantasies as evidence for the existence of cross-cultural and trans-historical motifs. These thematic parallels, Jung asserts, point to the structural components that comprise the a priori capacities of psychic activity. These archetypal structures are of a relatively limited number and represent the universal foundations (both formal and dynamic) of all personal

\textsuperscript{17} Jung, \textit{CW}, Vol. 9 Pt. 1, p. 173.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., vol. 8, p. 325,326.
expression. They represent the a priori capacity of the psyche for all cognitive, affective and conative expression. Jung refers to archetypes as "mental universals" or "categories of the imagination". As Jung explains, archetypes have an autonomous quality:

We are so used to the idea that psychic events are willful and arbitrary products...that we can hardly liberate ourselves from the view that the psyche and its contents are nothing but our own arbitrary invention or the more or less illusory product of assumption and judgement. The fact is that certain ideas exist almost everywhere and at all times and they can even spontaneously create themselves quite apart from migration and tradition. They are not made by the individual but rather happen—they even force themselves upon the individual's consciousness.

When an idea forces itself upon consciousness, it may or may not be recognized as an autonomous operation of the psyche. When such an occurrence takes place, it may be casually dismissed or rationalized as an expression of the ego. This is most often the case when we experience a clearly formulated idea. When an autonomous psychic content is experienced as an obscure and compelling idea, it is more likely to have the effect of an independent being.

The experience of an autonomous idea imposing upon

19 Ibid., p. 69.
20 Jung, CW, Vol. 9, Part 1, p. 43.
21 Jung, Psychology and Religion, p. 4.
22 Jung, CW, vol. 8, p.335.
consciousness may have the quality of another personality, or a psychic fragment that may conflict with and/or overwhelm one's conscious intentions. A common expression that designates the recognition of such an effect is, "I don't know what got into me." People used to posit "demon possession" and "evil spirits" to account for such compulsive and bizarre behaviour. Jung called these psychic fragments "autonomous complexes." The autonomous complex, writes Jung,

is the image of a certain psychic situation which is strongly accentuated emotionally and is, moreover, incompatible with the habitual attitude of consciousness. This image has a powerful inner coherence, it has its own wholeness and, in addition, a relatively high degree of autonomy, so that it is subject to the control of the conscious mind to only a limited extent and therefore behaves like an animated foreign body in the sphere of consciousness. The complex can usually be suppressed with an effort of will but not argued out of existence, and at the first suitable opportunity it reappears in all its original strength.  

All autonomous complexes have two aspects: an archetypal aspect and a personal aspect. The contents that typify the expressions of complexes, though infinitely variable in personal content, may be recognized as belonging to certain thematic categories characteristic of archetypal patterns of imaginative expression. Every autonomous complex has a constellation of psychic contents reflecting personal experience as well as an archetypal order of

23 Ibid., p. 96.
organization. In the course of human evolution, certain "engraved experiences" have shaped the psychic constitution\textsuperscript{24} in such a way that, collectively, the psychic formulation of experience is limited to a broad range of possibilities. This range of possibilities can be determined in terms of thematic categories, categories of collectively shared possibilities that, as I have said, Jung defines as archetypal.

The personal aspect of a complex is individually acquired and presents itself as a peculiar reaction pattern particular to the individual and his/her psychic situation. It receives its content (affective quality and cognitive images) through personal experiences. It contains emotionally charged associations made up of one's personal history and conditioned by affect-arousing situations (eg. traumas). Complexes are said to be the dominants of the personal unconscious.\textsuperscript{25}

According to Jung, however, this personal content is always grouped around "core ideas." Archetypes allow for the grouping of personal psychic contents by laws of association (similarity and contiguity).\textsuperscript{26} As we have seen, Jung claims that archetypes are as much psychic as non-

\textsuperscript{24} Jung, \textit{CW}, vol. 9, Part 1, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{25} Whitmont, \textit{The Symbolic Quest}, p. 65-69.
\textsuperscript{26} Whitmont, \textit{The Symbolic Quest}, p. 69.
psychic. They are, he maintains, of a "psychoid nature," involving "some sort of energy relation" between "the psychic processes" and "the physiological substrate." Recall also that Jung contends that such structures are "throughout full of meaning and purpose."

To sum up, Jung maintains that psychic experience is the most direct and only immediate form of experience. Psychic imagery is the most fundamental category of experience. Psychic images function both as signs and symbols. Signs are representative of known facts. Symbols hold a prospective significance and express intentional relations. Imagery itself is related to both the physical and psychic realms expressing some common energy relation. Archetypes are "psychoid" in nature, meaning that the patterns of imagery formed cannot be attributed totally to either mind or matter. Providing for the primordial immediacy all experience archetypes involve some kind of mutual relation between the psychic and the physical.

The psyche, Jung claims, is a dynamic system, a processive series of images with a meaningful and purposeful structure. Archetypes, as the fundamental categories of the imagination, determine the a priori capacities of the psyche. From the psychological perspective, Jung maintains,

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28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 326.
they are best described in terms of primordial images. As noted above, these images have a psychoid nature, which in their characteristically dynamic form of expression formulate the relatively autonomous operations of the psyche. In this capacity, primordial images provide the basis for the organization and arrangement of personal contents in the form of complexes. In other words, the personal aspect of a complex is formulated in terms of the specific content of psychic experience. The collective aspect of a complex is distinguishable in terms of the thematic organization of this content insofar as it reflects a general and common pattern of association shared by humankind.

The connecting link between psychic processes is a contingent one (dependent, I will argue, upon the formulation of reference). Jung writes about the manner in which complexes develop as autonomous factors of psychic operations:

The aetiology of their origin [i.e., psychic fragments or complexes] is frequently a so-called trauma, an emotional shock or some such thing, that splits off a bit of the psyche. Certainly one of the commonest causes is a moral conflict, which ultimately derives from the apparent impossibility of affirming the whole of one's nature. This impossibility presupposes a direct split, no matter whether the conscious mind is aware of it or not.30

30 Ibid., p. 98.
But a dissociation of the psyche is not necessarily a product of repression [a component of personality that is repressed due to its incompatibility with the contents of consciousness.] It may also be a product of psychic processes that were never themselves conscious. A complex may contain those psychic processes that represent relatively undeveloped psychic capacities, contents that are not yet conscious but are rather a product of one-sided personality development, neglected psychic processes which finally gain sufficient intensity to demand attention.\textsuperscript{31} Autonomous complexes are thus a normal part of development. Jung argues that onesidedness is in fact necessary for purposes of adaptation.

The process of adaptation requires a directed conscious function characterized by inner consistency and logical coherence. Because it is directed, everything unsuitable must be excluded in order to maintain the integrity of direction. The unsuitable elements are subjected to inhibition and thereby escape attention. Now experience shows that there is only one consciously directed function of adaptation. If for example I have a thinking orientation I cannot at the same time orient myself by feeling, because thinking and feeling are two quite different functions. In fact, I must carefully exclude feeling if I am to satisfy the logical laws of thinking, so that the thought processes will not be disturbed by feeling....

Moreover, Jung explains that Experience shows that the orientation is largely habitual; accordingly the other unsuitable functions, so far as they are

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid..
incompatible with the prevailing attitude, are relatively unconscious, and hence unused, untrained, and undifferentiated. Moreover, on the principle of co-existence they necessarily become associated with other contents of the unconscious.\(^{32}\)

Thus, autonomous complexes arise as a product of the development and differentiation of consciousness, which, by its nature, is a onesided development of the a priori psycho-physical system. Regarding autonomous complexes and psychic dissociation, Jung writes:

> This state is neither pathological nor in any way peculiar; it is on the contrary the original norm, whereas the psychic wholeness comprehended in the unity of consciousness is an ideal goal that has never yet been reached.\(^{33}\)

The Self and Unity Consciousness:

In contrast to recognizing the 'sequesterial' effects of autonomous complexes upon the conscious frame of reference, it is apparent that Jung also insists upon recognizing the implied unity of consciousness upon which these autonomous complexes impinge. The unity of consciousness, however, is one of a relative psychic wholeness comprehended as a partially realized ideal. This relative unity of consciousness, which Jung attributes to the ego, serves as the point of reference for the idealized comprehension of consciousness as a whole. The ego is the

\(^{32}\) Ibid., p. 35.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., p. 175.
centre of consciousness, the point of reference for consciousness as a whole and is developed through the conflict between the organism and its environment. And yet, as indicated, the psyche as a totality (as the Self) is a complex whole that remains contingently related in its various aspects, expressing always an anticipatory intention about coming to terms with the dynamic effects associated with the nature of consciousness. That is, consciousness in general and egoic consciousness in particular is subject to alteration by the experience of an autonomous complex. Egoic consciousness is only an aspect of the Self, and as such must either consciously accommodate itself to the effects of the total organism or be unconsciously compelled to do so through the potentially demoralizing power of the complexes.

It is theoretically necessary, Jung maintains, to postulate an organizing principle of the psyche in order to be able properly to speak of the dynamic operations of the psyche as a complex whole. Jung maintains that phenomenological observations of psychic imagery support the validity of this claim. Certain kinds of psychic images share common characteristics which, Jung asserts, represent the "Self."

The Self, according to Jung, is phenomenologically observed in images such as the mandala, quaternity expressions, and trinitarian notions as representing a comprehended unity of realized psychic wholeness. The Self
is an organismic concept of the total psychological individual. The deep structure of the images which the psyche produces of its own totality, Jung asserts, coincide with the deep structure of various images of God as found throughout many religious traditions.\textsuperscript{34} In fact, Jung contends, images of God and the Self are phenomenologically indistinguishable.\textsuperscript{35}

Jung's concept of the Self is postulated as a complexio oppositorum, a union of opposites wherein the conflicting tendencies of contingently related psychic operations are integrated as complementary relations within a complex whole. The Self is the self-regulating and ordering principle of the psyche. It represents the unity of the conscious and the unconscious, and, in its symbolic expression, represents the resolution of psychic conflict.

The Self, as the psyche in its totality, is always phenomenologically observed as a confluence of antinomial terms. It is "both ego and non-ego, subjective and objective, individual and collective. It is the 'uniting symbol' which epitomizes the total union of opposites."\textsuperscript{36}

Jung's concept of the Self is a "transcendental


\textsuperscript{35} Jung, \textit{CW}, vol. 11, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{36} Sean Kelley, \textit{Individuation and the Absolute: Hegel, Jung, and the Path Toward Complex Holism}, Manuscript pending publication with Paulist Press, p. 47.
postulate" which, "although justified empirically, does not allow of scientific proof."³⁷ Psychic images of the Self are phenomenologically observable in the process of individuation. The Self expresses the logos of psychic phenomena in the process of individuation. The image of the Self expresses the most comprehensive and integrated symbolic formulation of this emerging phenomenon as a complex whole. However, "as a complex whole, the Self is not to be conceived as a static entity, but...as process and becoming."³⁸

Autonomous complexes (characteristic aspects of the Self) impose upon the egoic framework of consciousness. This imposition can manifest itself as personality dissociation in the form of ideas, affects, and behaviours which are not subject to the control and will of the ego. Jung points out that a semiotic interpretation of these effects may be sufficient to resolve the nature of the personality conflict which arises between ego consciousness and the personal unconscious. In other words, an analysis of the effect and its precipitating cause in terms of relatively known or recollectable facts of personal experience may be sufficient to provide for an egoic interpretation of the dissociative effect. Understanding the effect as a sign representing an hitherto unaccounted

³⁷ Jung, CW, vol. 7 p. 405.

³⁸ Sean Kelly, The Path Toward Complex Holism p. 43.
for psychic fact can sometimes provide sufficient insight to integrate discordant factors of psychic operations. Hence egoic consciousness can itself adapt to the psychic situation.\(^{39}\)

Reductive analysis, however, may not be sufficient to reinstate healthy psychological development. While a causal analysis may afford a certain\(^{40}\) insight into the present psychic situation, such an insight will not necessarily bring about a resolution of the conflict. Nor is it always simply a matter of learning new coping skills to adapt to the psychic situation.

The nature of a psychic conflict occasionally calls for a fundamental alteration of the psychic orientation as a whole. A truly creative response is then required. In this case, the archetypal "core"\(^ {41}\) of the complex must be interpreted symbolically in terms of its intentional

\(^{39}\) This form of reductive analysis is typical of Freudian analysis and various other 'ego-oriented' therapies and is in itself adequate to problems relating to conflicts between the levels of the personal unconscious and egoic consciousness. It is also of course a necessary step in proceeding to seek any further depth of understanding about the psychic situation.

\(^{40}\) 'Regression' should be distinguished from 'retrogression'; the latter connotating a negative psychological development and the former implying a more ambiguous development which may, depending upon its denouement, take on a negative or positive character in respect to psychological development.

\(^{41}\) Whitmont, *The Symbolic Quest*, p. 65-69ff. The 'archetypal core' of an autonomous complex, as referred to by Whitmont, is the collective aspect of a complex.
relationship to egoic consciousness. Thus, not only must the personal aspect or 'shell'\textsuperscript{42} of the complex be interpreted to provide a reductive understanding of the conflict, but the collective, archetypal core of the complex must also be determined in order to derive the teleological meaning or intent of the dissociative effect. Jolande Jacobi explains:

If a complex embedded in the material of the personal unconscious seems to stand in inexorable conflict with consciousness, its nucleus once laid bare may prove to be a content of the collective unconscious. For example the individual is no longer confronted with his own mother, but with the archetype of the maternal, no longer with the unique personal problem created by his own mother as a concrete reality, but with the universally human, impersonal problem of everyman's dealings with the primordial maternal ground in himself. Anyone who has been through such a psychic experience knows what it is for a son to conceive the son-father problem no longer on the plane of individual guilt-- but as a problem of deliverance from the father, i.e., from a dominant principle of consciousness, that is no longer adequate for the son: a problem that concerns all men and has been disclosed in the myths and fairytales as the slaying of the reigning old king and the son's accession to the throne.\textsuperscript{43}

I consider the above passage to be very helpful in providing a concrete example of a psychological context for understanding how in Jungian thought the religious dimension

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 'Shell' is a term that Whitmont uses in referring to the personal aspect of an autonomous complex.

is regarded as germane to the overall psychic situation.

Seeing the archetypal dimension of one's personal conflict, one is no longer locked into the solipsistic world view of a purely reductive analysis. No longer need one view oneself as caught in the ruthless struggle between the demands of the personal unconscious and the ego. One's personal conflict is seen to have an objective significance, a trans-historical context and import.

It is this context which fosters the development of religious consciousness. The psychic struggle is full of meaning because in the process of resolving such conflict a person gains an existential understanding of his/her particular significance in the cosmos. The psychological problem is one of reconciling psychic opposites, the collective elements and the personal elements, the conscious and the unconscious. The religious problem (the problem of "ultimate" meaning) thus corresponds to the psychological problem. The discovery of meaning is concurrent with the transformation and uniting of opposing psychic tendencies.

The reconciliation of psychic opposites is achieved in the discovery of meaning. The discovery of meaning is creatively fashioned through the mediation of a "living symbol" that constitutes the formulation of a religious proposition which, when apprehended in awareness, provides for religious consciousness. To further explain this notion the discussion must focus upon the psychodynamic factors
involved in the shaping of religious consciousness: the development of a religious proposition, and the transforming quality of a living symbol.

Religious Consciousness and the Living Symbol

Jung realized that religion is many different things to different people. He insisted that religion must be studied through an approach that takes individual differences into account. This, however, does not preclude the possibility of theoretical discussion about religion. Underlying various particular expressions of religion is a formal correspondence which may be termed the religious function. The individuation process in general is the modus operandi of this function. More particularly, I would maintain that individuation itself, as the concrete realization of unique personhood, is the sine qua non of the religious function. But like a mathematical function, the final product (an individual's religion) is dependent upon the values brought to the equation; i.e., the religious experience and the individual's attitude toward that experience.

Psychologically speaking, the religious function

44 The term 'religious function' as I use it here is not to be confused with Jung's use of the term 'function' to refer to one of the four functions of intuition, sensation, thinking and feeling. I refer to the 'religious function' as designating those psychic processes which in their combinative effect introduce religious consciousness to the psychic situation.
refers to the capacity of the psyche to respond to the cleavage of personality dissociation. Jung writes:

"Neurosis is an inner cleavage--the state of being at war with oneself.... Healing may be called a religious problem."\(^{45}\) He also claims that "...religions are systems of healing for psychic illness".\(^{46}\) He writes:

How does one come to terms in practice with the unconscious? This is the question posed by the philosophy of India, and particularly by Buddhism and Zen. Indirectly it is the fundamental question in the practice of all religions and philosophies. For the unconscious is not this thing or that; it is the Unknown as it immediately affects us.\(^{47}\)

Jung considered religion to be a natural expression of the human psyche. He came to understand the religious problem as one of "inner cleavage," a natural occurrence of psychic process becoming dissociated in the course of human development. The religious function designates the process by which this division is overcome.\(^{48}\) I have indicated, however, that the concrete expression of the religious function is not the same for everyone, and that it always serves the common purpose of uniting psychological opposition. Hans Shaer would appear to be in full agreement


\(^{46}\) Ibid., p. 344.

\(^{47}\) Jung, CW, vol. 8, p. 67, 68.

regarding this point.49 He writes:

The material in or through which a man
experiences the opposite is different in each
case and is probably related to the attitude
or function type of the individual. But
however various the forms may be, it is always
a matter of the individual realizing that the
opposite, the Other, exists and that he is
faced with the problem of uniting the
opposites.50

As I have suggested, it is possible to explicate further a
meta-psychological perspective on the nature of religion in
accordance with Jung's thought. Schaer claims that

Jung also thinks it possible to detect
psychological differences between introverts
and extraverts in their way of apprehending
God,...the psychological type is related to
the manner in which a man experiences
religion. We cannot go very far in our
conclusions as yet since Jung himself says
that our present knowledge of psychological
types is very imperfect.51

Jung does, however, proceed further than this with
his analysis. He writes that introversion and extraversion
are modalities of psychic functioning that determine

...the direction of psychic activity, that is,
it decides whether the conscious contents
refer to external objects or to the subject.
Therefore, it also decides whether the value
stressed lies outside or inside the
individual. This modality operates so
persistently that it builds up habitual
attitudes, that is types with recognizable

49 H. Shaer, Religion and the Cure of Souls, trans. by
R.F. Hull, (Princeton, New Jersey: Bollingen Foundation
1950), p. 213.

50 Ibid., p. 119.

51 Schaer, Cure of Souls, p. 79, 80.
traits.\textsuperscript{52}

Jung suggests that introversion and extraversion are centrally involved in the process of attributing the immediately experienced contents of psychic imagery to either the external or internal world of the perceiving subject. The perceiving subject, by attributing psychic contents to either the internal or external world, may determine whether the associated value of such contents should be attributed to the individual or to an Other. Further, Jung explains that the psychic operations of introversion and extraversion are self-perpetuating enough to shape attitudes.

Indeed Jung refers to this fact with respect to the conditions of religious experience:

...religious teaching as well as the \textit{consensus gentium} always and everywhere explains this condition as being due to a cause external to the individual....This is at least the general rule.\textsuperscript{53}

Jung is referring here to the experience of the \textquote{numinosum}. For "religion...is the term that designates the attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been altered by the experience of the numinosum."\textsuperscript{54} Jung maintains:

Religion as the Latin word denotes, is careful and scrupulous observation of what Rudolf Otto

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\textsuperscript{52} Jung \textit{CW}, vol. 8, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{53} Jung, \textit{Psychology and Religion}, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p.5.
aptly termed the 'numinosum', that is a
dynamic existence or effect not caused by an
arbitrary act of will. On the contrary it
seizes and controls the human subject, which
is always rather its victim than its
creator.  

Religiosity is

...[an]attitude of the human mind... a careful
consideration and observation of certain
dynamic factors, understood to be powers,
spirits, demons, gods, laws, ideas, ideals or
whatever name man has given to such factors as
he has found in his world powerful dangerous,
or helpful enough to be taken into careful
consideration, or grand, beautiful and
meaningful enough to be devoutly adored and
loved.  

Religion, then, is an attitudinal response of
considering and observing those factors which pertain to the
experience of the numinosum. The numinosum is a dynamic
effect that "seizes and controls the human subject" and is
"not caused by an arbitrary act of will."  

Other writers, however, make it clear that for Jung
religion was more than simply a passive attitude of
observing the effects of a numinous experience. Schaer, for
instance, suggests that religion plays an essential role in
maintaining psychic hygiene.

The objectification and projection of contents
which the ego cannot assimilate without grave
danger to itself is an absolute necessity for
the primitive soul and an act of psychic
hygiene, otherwise primitive man could not

55 Ibid., p. 4.
56 Ibid., p. 5.
57 Ibid., p. 4.
withstand the danger and would soon lose his ego... The psychological mechanism is the same as with civilized man. Just as the latter rids himself of certain psychic contents with the aid of confession, and on the other hand uses philosophy and religion in order to come to terms with his inner world, so primitive man uses magic.⁵⁸

Religious symbols produce a psychic cosmos preventing psychic chaos.⁵⁹ It is peculiar to the religious function of the psyche to bring the multiplicity of instinctual drives into a unified structure. Religion does not only acknowledge the things that consciousness fails to realize, but may also go further and bring about an inner unity and wholeness.⁶⁰ It is because of this organizing, consolidating operation of the psyche that Jung is able to claim that religious ceremonies and rituals operate in the service of the canalization and transformation of psychic energy. The canalization and transformation of psychic energy allows for directed psychic functioning and the development of cultural pursuits.⁶¹

Recall that Schaer suggests that the manner of apprehension involved in religion is related to psychological types. He writes:

The material in or through which a man

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⁵⁸ H. Shaer, Religion and the Cure of Souls, p. 213.
⁵⁹ Ibid., P. 128, 129.
⁶⁰ Marie-Louise Franz, C.G. Jung: His Myth in our Time p.89. See also Schaer, Cure of Souls p. 136.
⁶¹ Schaer, Cure of Souls, p. 102.
experiences the opposite [of the Other] is different in each case and is probably related to the attitude or function type of the individual. But however various the forms may be, it is always a matter of the individual realizing that the opposite, the Other, exists and that he is faced with the problem of uniting the opposites.  

Religion, as we have seen, is a "term that designates the attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been altered by the experience of the numinosum".  Jun...
takes place automatically.\textsuperscript{65}

It is clear, then, that Jung means that the religious point of view always expresses and formulates the essential combination of psychic factors or contents which guide and direct apperception, the means by which old psychic contents are related to new psychic contents.

Jung's notion of an attitude is, he explains, similar to Wundt's concept of apperception, except that apperception also includes the process of relating the already constellated contents to the new contents to be apperceived. An attitude pertains only to the subjective constellation of a content, whereas apperception pertains to the process of organizing psychic contents.\textsuperscript{66}

So it can be understood that Jung distinguishes the term 'attitude' from the term 'apperception' only insofar as he wishes to refer specifically to the subjective constellation of affective and cognitive factors involved in the apperception process. This of course is in keeping with his presentation of a psychological perspective (as opposed to a more general philosophical perspective). Further, it should be pointed out that Jung is not consistent in this regard. For instance, in discussing the nature of apperception, he writes:

\begin{quote}
Apperception is a psychic process by which a
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 414-416.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
new content is articulated, with similar, already existing contents in such a way that it becomes understood, apprehended, or clear.\textsuperscript{67}

Jung also distinguishes between active apperception and passive apperception.

The first is a process by which a subject of his own accord and from his own motives, consciously apprehends a new content with attention and assimilates it to other contents already constellated; the second is a process by which a new content forces itself upon consciousness either from without (through the senses) or from within (from the unconscious) and, as it were, compels attention and enforces apprehension. In the first case the activity lies with the ego; in the second with the self-enforcing new content.\textsuperscript{68}

Note that in the earlier passage about the nature of an attitude Jung maintains that the apperception processes associated with any given attitude take place "automatically" according to the selectivity principle of similarity and, further, he notes that "whether the point of reference is conscious or unconscious [it] does not effect the selectivity of the attitude." While Jung acknowledges that the subject does play an active role in apprehending new contents (i.e., it is not entirely "automatic"), passive apperception does involve a type of apprehension whereby the contents of the unconscious and/or the world autonomously impose their relatedness upon consciousness.

The distinction between active and passive

\textsuperscript{67} Jung, \textit{CW}, vol. 6, p. 412.

\textsuperscript{68} Jung, \textit{CW}, vol. 6, p. 412, 413.
apperception is an important one to consider. As I shall explain, the living symbol is constituted through the interaction of these activities.

Active apperception involves relating a new content to an old content through an act of conscious effort, and one might assume, with the conscientious concern appropriate to achieving the intended effect. Conscious intentions, purposes and understanding shape the nature of apperception such that the whole of internal relations between psychic contents is modified, at least in part, according to the aims of the subject.

Passive apperception is not an act of will but, rather, an autonomous process by which relatively distinct or independent contents are conjoined to the subjectively constellated contents of consciousness. An attitude constellated of relatively unconscious contents involves a decisive influence of perception upon shaping comprehension. Aside from conscious intentions, purposes and understanding, there is an autonomous process of imposed relations that modify the propositions of consciousness.

Jung claims that it is useful to distinguish between conscious and unconscious attitudes,

...because the presence of two attitudes is extremely frequent, one conscious and the other unconscious. This means that consciousness has a constellation of contents different from that of the unconscious, a
duality particularly evident in neurosis.\textsuperscript{69}

It might be asked, then, how these attitudes are related in shaping and expressing the essential attitude of the psyche as a whole? It is precisely the question of attitude that Jung maintains is central to the nature of religious consciousness. The propositions of religious consciousness, as I have suggested, formulate and express the attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been altered by the experience of the numinosum.

Schaer explains further what Jung means by the development of religious consciousness.

Psychic process can be experienced two ways—actively or passively. When a man experiences certain contents of his psyche passively only, they pass over him and influence him, but he is merely pushed about by them. A man who experiences them actively, however, is able to give them a certain direction; he is not simply pushed about in the psychic process, he actively intervenes in it and can for instance give it meaning...it is difficult to swim against the psychic current but within certain bounds a man’s activity can intervene decisively....in the last analysis religion consists...in adapting psychically—an active attitude....the basic principle is that the complete personality should engage in a living psychic encounter with the forces dwelling in the soul, or rather the forces we meet in our inward experi-ence.\textsuperscript{70}

Religious consciousness is an awareness of consciousness in the throes and vicissitudes of passive apperception. Further, it involves the formulation of

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., p. 415.

\textsuperscript{70} Shaer, \textit{Cure of Souls}, p. 99.
meaningful propositions that reflect the alterations imposed upon consciousness by the effect of experiencing the numinosum. Most importantly, religious consciousness constitutes an attitude with a conscious referent, the totality of the psyche (i.e., the Self) which it comprehends in its essential wholeness through apprehending the relationship between the active apperception of habitual consciousness and the passive apperception of the unconscious.

Of course, not all religious experience involves the conscious apprehension of the psychic totality. It is the theoretical point, however, that is of interest in this investigation. The assertion is that religious consciousness always involves some relatively comprehensive apprehension of the Self.

I would not, however, as Shaer does, describe religion as an active encounter, at least insofar as this might imply the predominance of active apperception. Religious consciousness is distinct from the habitual mode of consciousness in that it formulates an attitude constituted by a constellation of contents expressing the essential whole of the psyche. It is both the product of active and passive apperception processes and to the extent that religious consciousness might properly be said to have developed fully, religious consciousness allows each modality of psychic functioning, both passive and active
apperception, its appropriate expression in the formulation of the living symbol. Jung refers to the psychic process by which this symbol develops as the "transcendent function."

The living symbol, Jung explains, "is born of man's highest spiritual aspirations and must at the same time spring from the deepest roots of his being...."71 It is a uniting symbol that reconciles the opposition between the most primitive layers of the psyche and the most highly differentiated mental functions of consciousness. It is a symbol that is living only to the extent that it expresses the full parity of contrasting psychic tendencies and recognizes the right of all parts of the psyche to exist.72 The living symbol is formulated through the tension of opposites and transcends the disunion of these contrasts as a medial product of the mutual cogency in active and passive apperception.

From the activity of the unconscious there emerges a new content, constellated by thesis and anti-thesis in equal measure and standing in a compensatory relation to both. It [the living symbol] thus forms the middle ground on which the opposites can be united....The energy created by the tension of opposites therefore flows into the mediatory product and protects it from the conflict which breaks out again, for both the opposites are striving to get the new product on their side.73

It is this process which, according to Jung, accounts

71 Jung, CW, vol.6, p. 478.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p. 479.
for the overall process of psychic development. This process is the developmental matrix of the living symbol and the generative order of individuating personality. Jung calls this process the "transcendent function," the term "function"

...being here understood not as a basic function but as a complex function made up of other functions, and "transcendent" not as denoting a metaphysical quality but merely the fact that this function facilitates a transition from one attitude to another. The raw material shaped by thesis and anti-thesis, and in the shaping of which the opposites are united, is the living symbol.74

Jung continues,

If the mediatory product remains intact, it forms the raw material not of dissolution but of construction, in which thesis and anti-thesis play their part. In this way it becomes a new content that governs the whole attitude, putting an end to the division and forcing the energy of the opposites into a common channel....75

Hence, for Jung, the "raw material" shaped by the thesis and anti-thesis of active and passive apperception is the living symbol. Yet Jung also claims that it is "from the activity of the unconscious," when the activity of consciousness has been "neutralized," that the living symbol "forms the middle ground on which the opposites can be

74 Jung, CW, vol. 6, p. 478-480.
75 Ibid.
united."76 Jung maintains that the living symbol is born in the unconscious, "where all the differentiated functions have their common, archaic root."77

In my view, this part of Jung's explanation is reductionistic and not consistent with an understanding that the living symbol is born of the relationship between active and passive apperception. Jung refers to the living symbol as the "raw material of construction" because he does not distinguish between archetypal imagery and meaningful symbolic reference. The reader will also recall that Whitmont claims that Jung considered the archetypal structure of the psyche "throughout, full of meaning and purpose." This statement would suggest that Jung does not distinguish between the low-order image processing of psychic activity and the meaningful, more complex constructions of symbolic reference. Moreover, if Whitmont is mistaken in this interpretation, so too is another leading interpreter of Jung's works. Edward Edinger also puts forth similar notions that identify symbolic formulations of meaning with the unconscious formulations of psychic imagery. In the third chapter I will examine Edinger's model of developing consciousness and consider this question in detail.

With respect to the nature of the living symbol,

76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
there is also some ambiguity in Jung's writings regarding the relationship between image and meaning. The concept of the living symbol, as I have shown, can be understood in terms of the relationship between passive and active apperception. It is the product of the transcendent function, a complex operation that formulates and expresses the overall orientation of the psyche. The transcendent function is a uniting function that facilitates a transformation of consciousness. This process is the essential component in the process of individuation, and the living symbol is the concrete psychic content that comprises this generative order.

In the following chapter I will provide a Whiteheadian reading of Jung's concept of the living symbol. This entails an investigation into Whitehead's theory of how experience is appropriated, and also how this appropriation process is related to the development of symbolic reference. I will then describe the form of experiential appropriation that pertains specifically to the kind of symbolic reference that Jung demarcates with the concept of the living symbol.
Chapter Two

WHITEHEAD: THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT

This chapter is a Whiteheadian reading of Jung's concept of the living symbol. My intention is to demonstrate that the living symbol can be understood as a "hybrid subjective form of symbolic reference." This notion, it should be understood, is itself an interpretive understanding of Whitehead's work. It is derived from a broad overview of Whitehead's writings for the purpose of illuminating Jung's concept of the living symbol.

I will begin by presenting an outline of Whitehead's thoughts on religion. This will give the reader a general orientation to Whitehead's views on the function of religion with respect to individual development. Unlike Jung, this was not one of Whitehead's primary concerns. In order to determine the nature of the religious concern that the concept of the living symbol entails, it is necessary to review Whitehead's theory of "concrescence." This is a theory regarding the appropriation of physical and conceptual experience.

I will show that Jung's concept of the living symbol corresponds to Whitehead's notion of an imaginative proposition. This is a culminating development of concrescent activity that Whitehead refers to as a "hybrid occasion." It is also a peculiar form of symbolic reference, I
maintain, that may be distinguished by a quality of "appetition." This is a quality of symbolic reference that generates a "conceptual initiative of origination." In other words, it promotes a novel form of integrated experience.

Upon determining that the living symbol is a manner of apprehending experience that corresponds to the character of a hybrid occasion, I will further consider the developmental processes involved in the expression of this kind of symbolic reference. I will demonstrate that hybrid forms of symbolic reference involve a perspectival formulation of the mutual efficacy and immediacy of relations between and within hybrid occasions. Moreover, while including some aspects of experience in formulations of reference, hybrid occasions secondarily exclude other aspects of experience. These secondarily excluded feelings, by reason of their partial inclusion in the developmental matrix of a hybrid occasion, however, constitute the most efficacious feelings for inclusion by successive hybrid occasions.

Whitehead on Religion:

Though Whitehead was not primarily interested in the psychology of religion, there is evidence that he considered religion an important factor in the shaping of personality
and the "becoming" of the individual. Whitehead writes:

   Your character is developed according to your faith. This is the primary religious truth from which no one can escape.1

"A religion on its doctrinal side," he claims, "can thus be defined as a system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended."2

   It is significant that Whitehead describes religion mostly in terms of individual experience (rather than in terms of its social forms, for instance). This makes his philosophical perspective amenable to a psychological reading. "In the long run," Whitehead maintains, "your character and your conduct of life depend upon your intimate convictions."3

   Life is an internal fact for its own sake, before it is an external fact relating itself to others. The conduct receives its final quality, on which its worth depends, from the internal life which is the self-realization of existence. Religion is the art and the theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things.4

"Accordingly," Whitehead maintains, "what should


2 Ibid., p. 472.


4 Ibid., p. 16.
emerge from religion is individual worth of character."\(^5\)

Note that Whitehead describes religion as being primarily a concern of the "inner life", of solitariness, and most importantly, I would suggest, a concern with the "self-realization of existence." Note too, however, that Whitehead maintains that the individual cannot be abstracted from society.

Social facts are of great importance to religion because there is no such thing as absolutely in-dependent existence. You cannot abstract society from man: most psychology is herd psychology. But all collective emotions leave untouched the awful ultimate fact which is the human being, consciously alone with itself for its own sake.\(^6\)

Though religion is ultimately a private affair, the social facts are central to the psychological make up of the religious concern. Whitehead claims that religious experience is to be accepted as a fact of immediate experience, constituting a direct intuition into the ultimate character of the universe. This intuition provides for the concurrence of three allied concepts in one moment of self-consciousness. Concepts whose separate relationships to fact and whose mutual relations to each other are only to be settled by such an insight. These concepts are: the value of the individual; the value of individuals for one another; the value of the objective

\(^{5}\) Ibid. p. 77.

\(^{6}\) Ibid., p. 16.
world which is a community necessary for the existence of individuals. 7

Religious experience is that beyond which there is no appeal. 8 Whitehead writes that this fundamental intuition is of such a nature that it contributes to our recognition that

...existence is more than a succession of bare facts. We live in a common world of mutual adjustment, of intelligible relations, of valuations, of zest after purposes, of joy and grief, of interest concentrated on self, of interest directed beyond self, of short-time and long-time failures or successes, of different layers of feeling, of life-weariness and of life-zest. There is a quality of life which lies always beyond the mere fact of life; and when we include the quality in the fact, there is still omitted the quality of the quality.... 9

Whitehead asserts that religious knowledge is an intuition concerning an always omitted quality about life. This is a notion that will become the central concern of this thesis. I will be describing the processes involved in this kind of intuition. In regard to the opportunity of realizing the ever expanding range of values excluded in living, Whitehead writes that religion is

the direct apprehension that...there remains the function of what is actual and passing, [and] that it contributes its quality as an

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8 Ibid., p.65.

9 Whitehead, Religion in the Making, p. 77.
immortal fact to the order which informs the world. 10

Although this passage explains only the most general character of religious intuition, Whitehead also makes it clear that the nature of religious knowledge has special standing in that it is different from the knowledge of other specialized interests of humankind:

The peculiar position of religion is that it stands between abstract metaphysics and the particular principles applying to only some among the experiences of life. The relevance of its concepts can only be distinctly discerned in moments of insight, and then, for many of us, only after suggestion from without. Hence religion bases itself primarily upon a small selection from the common experiences of the race. On this side religion ranges itself as one among other specialized interests of mankind whose truths are of limited validity. But on its other side, religion claims that its concepts, though derived primarily from special experiences, are yet of universal validity, to be applied by faith to the ordering of all experience. 11

Whitehead claims that the nature of religious knowledge is such that it is neither like the abstract general principles one might find in metaphysics for describing the world, nor like those principles which pertain to the description of more particular experiences. Religious knowledge, he suggests, is in some way unique in that it seems to express a medial position with respect to these other kinds of propositions. Note that Whitehead

10 Ibid., p. 77, 78.
11 A.N. Whitehead, An Anthology, p. 478, 479.
suggests that religious consciousness is of a somewhat specialized nature, having limited validity in its claims while also having a quality of universal validity. Whitehead claims, moreover, that religious ideas play a role in the ordering of all experience.

Whitehead suggests that it is particularly difficult to circumscribe the meaning of religious concepts. Religious concepts require "insight," and even then religious ideas are often only understandable upon gaining assistance "from without."

Whitehead also says, recall, that religion is the "force of belief," the art and theory of personal subjectivity in solitude, and that which has the effect of "cleansing the inward parts." As we have seen, Jung also considers religion to play a vital role in psychic hygiene. In my view, both Jung and Whitehead also agree that

the moment of religious consciousness starts from self-valuation, but it broadens into the concept of the world as a realm of adjusted values, mutually intensifying or mutually destructive. The intuition into the actual world gives a particular definite content to the bare notion of a principle determining the grading of values. It also exhibits emotions, purposes, and physical conditions, as subservient factors in the emergence of value.13

It is the living symbol, I will demonstrate, that is

12 Ibid., p. 57, 58.

the "particular content" given to the "the bare formative principle" of individual becoming. But it is not my purpose here to launch into a point by point comparison of Whitehead's general claims about religion with Jung's ideas on the same. Rather, I wish here to discuss Whitehead's ideas on the general nature of religion before focusing upon more specific concerns. With this immediate concern in mind, then, Whitehead writes:

In its solitariness the spirit asks, What, in the way of value, is the attainment of life? And it can find no such value till it has merged its individual claim with that of the objective universe....The spirit at once surrenders itself to this universal claim and appropriates it for itself. So far as it is dominated by religious experience, life is conditioned by this formative principle, equally individual and general, equally actual and beyond completed act, equally compelling recognition and permissive of disregard.  

Religious consciousness, according to Whitehead, involves the intuition of a formative principle for living. But as a product of religious intuition, this bare principle, discovered in the particular context of personal experience, has a specific and definite content. The content of religious intuition, one should note, is as equally compelling of recognition as it is permissive of disregard. It exhibits emotions, purposes and physical conditions, and all of these characteristics share a general orientation towards the attainment of value in accordance

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14 Ibid.
with the generally apprehended character of "rightness" inherent in the nature of all things.\textsuperscript{15}

Although Whitehead's generally expressed thoughts on the nature of religious intuition provide hints as to some correspondence with Jung's concept of the living symbol and the process of individuation, there is, on the surface at least, only a minimal resemblance between the writings of each author. This impression, however, is only superficial. A more in-depth and hermeneutical consideration of Whitehead's work will reveal significant parallels between these authors' ideas, and provide some valuable insights regarding the nature of the living symbol. I will begin this investigation by explaining Whitehead's theory of concrescence.

\textbf{Whitehead's Model of Concrescence}

Whitehead's view of the world is thoroughly relativistic and atomistic. The concept of an "actual entity" is the central concept in Whiteheadian metaphysics. Within this system, an actual entity, alternatively called an actual occasion, is Whitehead's most fundamental category of existence. It is conceived as an event of experience. Whitehead conceives of the world as composed of a vast number of microcosmic entities, "drops of experience"

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 60.
which are complex and interdependent.  

An actual occasion is a dipolar subjective unity which has both a mental and a physical pole. As the various dimensions of the internal relations (between the physical and mental aspects of an actual entity) attain satisfaction in the process of an occasion's becoming, it is constituted and constitutes itself as a "superject occasion" for succeeding actual entities. A superject occasion is an actual entity which is available to serve as the "initial datum" for the objectification and ingress of "eternal objects" by other succeeding actual occasions.

Considered in the abstract, eternal objects are pure potentials, the ideal primordial potentialities of all experiential unities. They are concretely real only insofar as they are both objectified in actual occasions and objectified as a real possibility for originative ingress by other actual entities. Eternal objects are the forms of


17 By the "various dimensions" I am referring to the various levels of complexification in prehensive activity which constitute the internal relations of an actual occasion. The nature of a prehension will be discussed presently.

18 The 'initial datum' is an actual occasion but the 'objective datum' is only that aspect of the actual entity which is objectified as an eternal object and relevant to the perspective of a prehending actual entity (Sherburne, KPR p. 219).

19 Ingression refers to the manner in which eternal objects are present to and participate in actual entities.
definiteness which, through their participation in the free and inclusive selection by an actual entity, shape the character of an occasion's particularity.\textsuperscript{20} Eternal objects account for the achievement of the attained interrelatedness of actual entities in a given order, and prescribe the opportunities of an emerging order. Eternal objects thus circumscribe the limits to the creative advance of reality.

Thus, in the present, as it arises from the past, the eternal objects of the initial datum might be said to impose limits upon the creative advance of the future. This is because the ingressed eternal objects of past occasions circumscribe the context of creativity. Creativity must conform to the inherent possibilities which define a context. It is also important to note, however, that actual occasions in the present selectively include or exclude eternal objects in their perspectival objectification of initial datum. Individual occasions play an important role in accentuating or minimizing the efficacy of experiential interrelatedness. The immediate relevance of superject occasions of experience to emerging occasions of experience, then, is one of a bi-lateral (co-determinative) nature. Not only must one consider the conformative imposition of past occasions on emerging occasions (the causal efficacy of the past) but one must also consider the teleological efficacy

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p.220, 221, 227.
that arises with the objectification of eternal objects in present occasions, (their propositional lure for the determination of experiential relatedness in the immediate future.)

Whitehead utilizes the term "prehension" to describe the operations by which an actual entity effects its own appropriation of experiential relationships within the larger process of concrescence. Every actual occasion or "throb of experience" includes the entire world within its scope,\textsuperscript{21} though not necessarily as part of its internal constitution. A negative prehension is the definite exclusion of an eternal object from positive contribution to the subject's own real internal constitution. A positive prehension is the definite inclusion of an eternal object (as one aspect of an actual occasion) as a positive contribution to the subject's own real internal constitution.\textsuperscript{22} In other words, positive prehensions involve the ingress of eternal objects while negative prehensions do not. Actual entities remain intimately related to the actual world through negative prehensions by virtue of the fact that the definite exclusion of eternal objects will have teleological implications, both for the

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 8.

\textsuperscript{22} Sherburne \textit{KPR} p. 9.
world and for the actual entity in question.23

In Whitehead's writings, however, it is a positive
prehension, defined as a "feeling", which is the means by
which the objectivity of data passes into the subjectivity
of an emerging actual entity in the process of becoming.24
Prehensions are "the concrete facts of relatedness."25
[These facts are the facts of metaphysical relatedness.]
Essentially, they are feelings that feel feelings. Every
actual entity is constituted by the unity of its
prehensions. Every prehension involves a subject (actual
entity) which is prehending, the datum which is being
prehended (both in its initial and various objectified
forms), the 'subjective form' of the prehending subject, and
the particular manner in which the object (another actual
entity) is being prehended.26 It is this tripartite
relationship which characterizes every concrescent event.

23 So far as the world is concerned, in this regard we
may speak of the opportunity for God to 'rescue' value from
the world by His/Her ability to comprehend the relative
merit of a decision to exclude a certain eternal object from
ingression. More relevant to this paper, however, is the
role the individual plays in accentuating the intensity of
subjective experience for the shaping of the internal
relations that constitute the living person. We are here
concerned with the individual 'rescuing' himself/herself
from among the fading occasions of the past by accentuating
value in the internal constitution(ing) of the self.

24 Sherburne, KPR, p. 8.

25 Ibid., p.235.

26 Ibid., p. 9.
There is a subject occasion (in the present), an object occasion (in the past) and the dynamics of their mutual relationship as characterized by an efficient and teleological determination of relevance for the emerging occasion. This last point shall be made clear in an explication of Whitehead's theory of concrescence.

This theory posits, as I have suggested, that experience is the fundamental category of existence. An actual entity is an occasion of experience that emerges as a unity of prehensions through either the positive valuation and inclusion or the negative valuation and exclusion of past occasions of experience. In other words, each actual entity represents a unified experiential perspective that uniquely emerges from the past. Whitehead's theory of concrescence essentially attempts to provide an account of the physio-conceptual processes of appropriation involved in this creative process both at a microcosmic level and a macrocosmic level.

In fact, the micro-cosmic world is, as Whitehead expounds it, at the level of prehensive activity for actual entities what the macrocosmic world is at the level of concrescent activity for God's prehension.27 Thus Whitehead

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27 With the exception that the world as the initial datum of God is entirely included in God's perspective.
refers to God as an actual entity. Yet this matter need not be a primary concern here; it serves, rather, as an heuristic device for understanding the relationship between the microcosmic and macrocosmic worlds in the context of the ever increasing combinative complexity that characterizes the physio-conceptual process of concrescence.

Whitehead maintains that all actual entities are constituted by two kinds of prehensions: physical and conceptual. Simple physical prehensions, as Whitehead refers to them, are "conformal feelings". These conformal feelings are the means by which the past is inherited by the present. One might say they constitute the energy relations of the world. In the vector relationship of feelings feeling feelings (the feelings of the emerging occasion feeling the feelings of the initial datum from a particular perspective) the cause is duplicated in the effect. Simple physical feelings are the first and most primitive level of concrescence. Physical feelings are characterized by a vague sense of causal efficacy, as these relations are the ones which convey the necessity to conform to other past occasions in the world. Simple physical feelings are an agency of efficient causation. Physical feelings provide for the repetition of the past and are the means of the

future's inheritance.

Whitehead makes many distinctions between different kinds of conceptual prehensions. Most simply, he distinguishes between reproductive conceptual feelings, simple comparative feelings, and complex comparative feelings. Reproductive conceptual feelings are those which arise as a reaction in the mental pole of an actual entity in response to simple physical feelings. Conceptual reproduction involves the initiation of conceptual valuation in reaction to a physical prehension. A conceptual feeling in this phase is derived impartially by a prehending subject from its analogous simple physical feeling.\(^{29}\)

Whitehead does not suggest that reproductive conceptual feelings are a direct representation or picture of simple physical feelings. Rather, they are a correlative reaction in the mental sphere which corresponds to the inchoate data of physical feeling. One might consider conceptual reproduction as a further adjustment which conforms to the effects of causal efficacy. It is, so to speak, an adjustment within the 'internal' relations of an actual entity.

Comparative conceptual feelings can be described in terms of the process of abstraction and its constitutive subordinate operations. In this context, Whitehead speaks of conceptual "transmutation" and conceptual "reversion,"

\(^{29}\) Ibid., p. 27.
each of which introduces an important element of originative initiative at the level of comparative conceptual feelings.

Transmutation is an initiative of integration\textsuperscript{30} whereby, through a process of abstraction, the prehending subject (actual occasion) ferrets out relevant datum from the inchoate representations of conceptual reproduction. By means of positive valuation and the inclusion of datum with common characteristics, a simple abstract relation is formulated. Concrete, unthematized experience is transformed into a relatively more abstract perspective called a "nexus". As I read Whitehead, a nexus can be understood as the prehension of identity. It is the abstraction of common relations from among a diversity of experiential data (which is unthematized at the level of comparative feelings). In other words, beginning at the level of comparative feelings, a diversity of inchoate but conceptually reproduced detail is excluded by negative valuation for the sake of focusing upon a pervading uniformity of detail deemed relevant by the subject for determining an abstract comparative relation. The process of transmutation refers to the definite inclusion of these positive prehensions in the constitution of the subject.

"Conceptual reversion" is a secondary origination of conceptual feelings whereby those "other" aspects of reproductive conceptual experience, having been excluded

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 101.
through transmutation, are taken into account as possibilities for future ingression (insofar as they have causal efficacy at the levels of simple physical feeling and conceptual reproduction to become relevant in their intensity and relation to the aim of the subject.) Note that the general relevance of reverted datum are to be found in the causal efficacy constitutive of simple physical feeling and conceptual reproduction. The particular relevance of the reverted datum is finally determined by the teleological aim of the subject.

For further clarification I would suggest that the development of conceptual reversion in terms of serially related occasions be considered. Let 'A' represent the first or antecedent occasion. Let 'B' represent an occasion in the immediate present. Let 'C' represent a succeeding occasion in the immediate future. Consider that 'B' (the immediate occasion) physically prehends ('A' the antecedent occasion) generating or inducing a conceptual reproduction of 'A' in the perspective of 'B.' As the past event is appropriated by 'B' and an infinitesimal passage of time occurs, a critical 'distance' is gained by 'B' beyond the antecedent event of 'A', allowing 'B' to emerge with a relatively abstract perspective about its relation to 'A'(there is an intense relation of identity between 'A' and 'B' followed by a fading intensity of less perceivable relations of identity and a perception of lingering
relations of identity (common relations). Hence transmutation has occurred and certain prehensions have been positively valuated and included as well as others having been negatively valuated and excluded from the appropriation process.

Though this perspective involves the exclusion of certain elements in `B' (that were included in `A') for the succeeding occasion `C,' these excluded elements (which are in contrast to the transmuted perspective of `B') may be physically prehended as presented in `B' because they were originally physically prehended and conceptually reproduced in `B'(and even perhaps transmuted by another contemporary occasion of `B' that transmutes a different perspective and which falls within the field of `C's' prehensive activity). It should be noted, however, that the succeeding occasion `C' need not necessarily deem these excluded elements of contrast relevant to its own perspective. But if these elements are included in the perspective of `C' (i.e., positively prehended) then conceptual reversion has taken place. If `C' excludes all the elements of contrast (those which are not included in the transmuted perspective of `B') from a positive prehension of `B', then `C' has simply further transmuted the same datum as `B.'

The important point here is that if `C' does in fact include contrasting elements of `B' in positive prehension, then the "initiative of origination" thereby introduced is
to be found partially in the causal efficacy of these elements themselves as presented by `B' (or `b' - a contemporary of `B') and partially in the inclination (i.e., subjective form) of `C' to include them as relevant to its aim. Thus, as an eternal object or 'potential' for ingresson by `C,' the factors constituting a particular initiative of origination have been realized by `B' to the extent that they are real potentials for `C.' The eternal object as an 'originative initiative' is diverse in that it is a potential lure forprehension in `C' and a concrete factor as already prehended in `B.' The eternal object is identical for both `B' and `C' in that the particularity of the content is the same. The locus for the initiative of origination cannot be assigned exclusively to `B' or `C.' As a concrete agency of efficient causation, the initiative of origination is to be found in `B.' As an ideal potential, an abstract agency of final causation is involved as a lure for feeling, as a teleological cause of origination assignable to `C.'

In other words, in `B' we find an efficient cause of concrescent origination in `C' (in simple physical feeling and conceptual reproduction) and in `C' we find a teleological or final cause for concrescent origination in `C' itself (at the level of comparative conceptual feelings.) Occasion `C' is not merely the result of efficient causal agency (as might be accounted for by
consideration of 'B' imposing upon 'C'). Rather, 'C' is also a product of its own prehensive valuation of the relevance of 'B' for inclusion in its own emergence. Thus 'C' is also constituted by its own teleological aim toward satisfaction.

Note that 'C,' in the concrescent activity of its becoming, makes available (for the first time in the concrescent chain of events) the presentation of a concrete embodiment of teleological efficacy for any succeeding occasion of appropriation. A succeeding occasion, 'D' for instance, may physically prehend (from a particular perspective) the teleological efficacy of conceptual prehension in the concrete embodiment of 'C.' Thus 'C' is prehended by 'D' as a proximate novelty, a partially realized ideal. (I.e., the reverted datum of 'B' which was impartially but concretely reproduced by an efficient causal reaction to the simple physical feeling of 'A,' is transmuted by the teleological agency of 'C,' and as such is presented as a

31 Whitehead also speaks of hybrid occasions as the prehension of God's lure towards value. He also expresses regret that he writes earlier of reversion when he later believed the notion of a 'hybrid' occasion to be a clearer expression of his point. I would suggest that it is fortunate that Whitehead expressed both formulations as for me the concept of reversion certainly makes it more clear how in the process of concrescence one might in any way prehend a conceptual relation, given that simple physical feelings are the only kind that are concrete. My understanding of reversion leads me to the claim that hybrid occasions involve the prehension of a physical effect (which may then entail further transmutation), an effect of teleological agency as generated by conceptual initiative i.e., appetition.
superject for physical ingress by 'D'). In other words, the physical datum of 'A' that was excluded as efficient cause (by the pre-emptive potency of teleological cause) from the constitution of comparative feelings in 'B' is transformed in 'C' into an effective cause of teleological agency in 'D.' The occasion 'D'prehends 'C' as a lure toward feeling, as a proposition at the level of complex comparative feelings.

The development of complex comparative feelings, which can otherwise be referred to as "propositions," is not entirely distinct from the conceptual phases of transmutation and conceptual reversion. The development of "complex propositions" presupposes the antecedent and continuing processes of transmutation and reversion. These conceptual processes occur not only at the level of simple comparative feelings but also in succeeding occasions at the level of complex comparative feelings. Complex comparative feelings are the result of a further compounding of experience.

Complex comparative propositions are about "conditioned but indeterminate matters of fact" as they are potentially related to a percipient.32 Propositions are indicative of the significance or relation of transmuted and/or reverted experience to the percipient. Complex propositions are the means of valuating partially ingressed

32 Whitehead, PR, p. 23.
eternal objects or sets of eternal objects (in their unity called a "complex eternal object") as to their relevance to the percipient — both in terms of efficient cause as a physical ingression (conformal relationship) and in terms of their potential or lure of feeling for contributing to the satisfaction of the percipient's subjective aim; i.e., as a teleological cause.

Propositions have their origin in the condition of the initiative generated by conceptual reversion. In accordance with the relative intensity of the novel element impinging as efficient cause upon the percipient (from among the excluded diversity of negative prehensions in a preceding occasion) and in accordance with its relevance to the percipient's subjective aim, a conceptual initiative is undertaken either to appropriate or ignore this element of experience in the succeeding occasion prehending it. The initiative of valuating reverted contrasting elements of experience for appropriation or exclusion at the level of simple comparative feelings is itself the seminal development of a proposition. At this level, one could, I suggest, speak of simple proposition as distinct from complex propositions. For a proposition, strictly speaking, is merely an originative initiative of conceptual determination (as opposed to physical determination). Propositional prehensions, and the freedom entailed with their capacity for conceptual determination provide a
criterion by which living (as opposed to non-living) occasions may be distinguished.

Complex propositions at the level of complex comparative feelings designate the threshold of consciousness. They express the development of "symbolic reference" whereby a perception of causal efficacy (prehending the conformity that the physical world imposes on a percipient) is combined with a comprehension of "presentational immediacy" (the conceptual relata of experience) to provide a clear apprehension in awareness of factors and their mutual relations in "Fact."^{33}

Symbolic reference, it must be understood, is a

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^{33} In discussing Whitehead's theory of perception Schmidt provides a good introduction to an understanding of the distinctions between Fact, factors, and factor relations. "Factors are elements of fact involved in relationships with Fact. Fact is an ultimate primitive including all diversification. It is the totality. It is not an entity of cogitation, since it has no individuality by its reference to anything other than itself. It contains all contrasts and cannot be contrasted with anything else. There is just one Fact. We might call it Factuality. Factuality is what there is, considered as one single whole, and this totality is inexhaustible, infinite. It contains all concepts as well as percepts, in the traditional way of speaking. Factuality cannot be exhausted by any definite class of factors...The term 'awareness' is used for consciousness of factors within fact. Consciousness is taken as a primitive term...According to our explication of Fact 'awareness is itself a factor within Fact. Awareness, then is our aspect of perception in which factors are discriminated and always seen in relation to other factors of Fact. Sometimes awareness focuses more on the factor than the relatedness and vice versa. Full awareness occurs when factors are clearly apprehended and their mutual relations are jointly apparent. (Paul F. Schmidt, Perception and Cosmology in Whitehead's Philosophy, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1967).
synthetic activity of two modes of direct perception. The experience of presentational immediacy and the experience of causal efficacy constitute these modes. As Whitehead claims, moreover, "the result of symbolic reference is what the actual world is for us".\textsuperscript{34} Through symbolic reference, the world is "that datum in our experience productive of feelings, emotions, satisfactions, and...the topic for conscious recognition."\textsuperscript{35}

The mode of presentational immediacy is akin to what is usually meant by the notion of sense perception. In this case, however, Whitehead is referring to perception of the relata demarcating the spatial extension of sensory data.\textsuperscript{36}

The mode of causal efficacy pertains to a perception of the extent to which the present conforms to the past. This mode of perception, in high grade organisms, involves determining the relevance of the immediate past to the present, and of the present to the future. In low-grade organisms, this simply entails on-going conformal feelings. This is a mode of apprehending the vitality of temporal succession.\textsuperscript{37}

Together, these two modes of direct perception


\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p.21ff.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 42ff.
provide for symbolic reference and the derivation of meaning through the formulation of propositions. There is a wide variety and infinite number of complex propositions. It is possible, however, to distinguish between two major categories of propositional feelings:

1) **perceptive propositional feelings**: result in a species of intellectual feelings termed 'conscious perceptions'. Perceptive propositional feelings may be 'authentic' or 'unauthentic'. Further authentic perceptive propositional feelings may be direct or indirect.

2) **imaginative propositional feelings**: result in the species of intellectual feelings termed 'intuitive judgments'.

This rather imposing nomenclature can be understood more clearly by means of an analysis of concrescent development in terms of conceptual reversion. Recall that conceptual reversion involves the initiative of prehending the contrasting elements of experience which are negatively prehended (by a preceding occasion) in the process of transmutation, yet which originally have been prehended physically and reproduced conceptually. These "proximate novelties" are potentially available for transmutation and/or further reversion by succeeding occasions which

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38 There is the possibility of a complex proposition developing to express an infinite variety of factors about Factuality.


40 Ibid., p. 52.
experience their causal efficacy and experience this initiative as a lure for feeling (as a teleological concern). All complex propositions can be understood in terms of prehending reverted datum - either by way of negative prehension or positive prehension.

An authentic perceptive proposition is one which involves the negative prehension of reverted datum and a positive prehension of transmuted datum. A direct authentic perceptive proposition is one which excludes reverted datum and does not conceptually revert the transmuted datum it prehends. A direct authentic perceptive proposition excludes the possibility of generating an originative initiative of appetition because it does not involve conceptual reversion. It simply relates two or more known nexuses to one another and/or the subject. Only a direct authentic perceptive proposition represents the factors of Fact as they are known (i.e., without error or the vagueness of contrasting elements of lesser awareness).

An indirect perceptive proposition develops through the transmutation of transmuted datum while also conceptually reverting this datum itself so as to exemplify an unfounded conceptual determination; i.e., an error. Whitehead seems to suggest that these propositions are concerned with wild imaginative fantasy that provides for little more than the accidental development of consciousness through random trial and error.
An unauthentic perceptive proposition is one that involves a succeeding occasion positively prehending and transmuting the reverted datum of an antecedent occasion to introduce a contrast in relation to the already transmuted datum of consciousness. Unauthentic perceptive propositions involve no conceptual reversion in the subject but only in the datum, and thus there is no further appetite.

Imaginative propositions are essentially unauthentic perceptive propositions which further provide for appetite by means of conceptual reversion in the prehending occasion. This initiative introduces the possibility for further integrative transmutation and reversion (introducing novelty, while affording integration) in successive occasions. Imaginative propositions transmute reverted datum to introduce elements of contrast to the transmuted datum of consciousness. They then take into account consciously that there are further elements of the contrast excluded by its own process of transmutation. This continuing process eventually generates a conscious initiative of origination (i.e., consciously directed creative effort) which is analogous to appetite by "the initiative of conceptual determination" at the level of simple comparative feelings.41

41 This summary of complex propositions is developed from Sherburne's, Whitehead's and Schmidt's work. However, I have re-interpreted some of these ideas (which seem very vague and inconsistent) in a manner that I believe is consistent with the compounding effect of lower level
It is only at the level of symbolic reference that complex imaginative propositions demonstrate an originative initiative (called appetition by Whitehead) which is characteristic of a "living occasion." Only at the level of symbolic reference does the prehension of an imaginative proposition provide an initiative of originative conceptual determination as a lure for feeling. Imaginative propositions, as distinct from perceptive propositions, provide not only for the prehension of efficient causal agency (as do perceptive propositions) but also for the prehension of teleological agency (as concretely embodied in the efficient cause of conceptual determination).

In other words, an imaginative proposition is, as in the example above (using serial occasions 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D'), the prehension of 'C' by the occasion 'D' such that 'D' prehends the factor of teleological agency in 'C' as the efficient cause in the becoming of 'D'. Hence imaginative propositions are hybrid occasions42 in relation to which perceptive propositions (and their logical relata of spatiotemporal factors of efficient causation and extension) are but stages in the prehensive emergence of experiential value.

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42 Whitehead, PR, p. 185,186.
The prehension of teleological efficacy, as in an imaginative proposition, provides an order of efficient causation, a personal order of serially related occasions in the form of a living symbol with teleological significance. The living symbol is thus the expression of an imaginative proposition in the concrescence of the human individual. It is in this sense that "...self-determination is always imaginative in its origin." "The deterministic efficient causation," he continues,

is the inflow of the actual world in its own proper character of its own feelings, with their own intensive strength, felt and re-enacted by the novel concrescent subject. But this re-enaction has a mere character of conformation to pattern. The subjective valuation is the work of novel conceptual feeling; and in proportion to its importance, acquired in complex processes of integration and reintegration, this autonomous conceptual element modifies the subjective forms throughout the whole range of feeling in that concrescence and thereby guides the integrations.

In so far as there is negligible autonomous energy, the subject merely receives the physical feelings, confirms their valuations according to the 'order' of that epoch, and transmits by reason of its own objective immortality. Its own flash of autonomous individual experience is negligible for the science which is tracing transmissions up to the conscious experience of a final observer. But as soon as individual experience is not negligible, the autonomy of the subject in the modification of its initial subjective aim must be taken into account. Each creative act is the universe incarnating itself as one, and there is nothing above it by way of final condition.43

43 Ibid., p. 245.
Hybrid Occasions:

In terms of Whitehead's writings, I have shown that it is possible to derive an understanding that a living symbol is an imaginative proposition. As Whitehead asserts, an imaginative proposition is also a hybrid occasion. I wish now to examine the nature of a hybrid occasion to determine more precisely what is entailed in this particular form of symbolic reference. More specifically, I seek to answer the question: What manner of prehensive activity is involved in the development of a hybrid occasion?

The answer to this question will afford an understanding of the physio-conceptual order of appropriation peculiar to the experiential matrix of hybrid (or "living") symbolic reference. This matrix is the most complex organization of concrescent activity. It is a concrete generative order, I maintain, of recursive imaginative reversion which determines the relationship between meaning and experience.

Whitehead claims that it is by means of hybrid occasions that conceptual feelings pass into the category of physical feelings.\(^{44}\) Hybrid occasions are those events of experience whereby initiatives of conceptual origination (i.e., appetition) are transformed into simple physical feeling and are conceptually reproduced. Simple comparative

\(^{44}\) Ibid., p. 246.
feelings, and finally complex comparative feelings, are subsequently derived from these.

Hybrid physical feelings, it is important to note, concretely objectify the same datum of conceptual feeling as an antecedent occasion, although in each occasion the subjective form, or manner of prehending the datum, may be different.\(^{45}\) Also, as Whitehead maintains, in a "'hybrid physical feeling' the actual entity forming the datum is objectified by one of its own conceptual feelings".\(^{46}\) Hence, it is apparent that hybrid occasions are experiences that are both reflexive to some extent (in re-presenting the conceptual datum of an antecedent occasion) and refractive to some extent (in that the conceptual datum is presented in a new subjective form: i.e., from a different perspective.) Moreover, this entails that hybrid physical feelings are the realized embodiment of proximate reverted feeling in an antecedent occasion, as every change in perspective is constituted by the appropriation of feelings excluded in alternative perspectives.

Hybrid occasions are "impure" rather than "pure" prehensions. This means that they are propositions that function as a "lure" for feeling. Hybrid occasions involve the physical prehension of both physical and conceptual factors of agency in an immediately preceding occasion of

\(^{45}\) Ibid.

\(^{46}\) Ibid.
experience. Hybrid occasions, moreover, can more or less conform to the imaginative proposition which they immediately succeed and prehend. Hybrid occasions are both reflexive and refractive in the re-presentation of conceptual datum. They have their own distinctive subjective form and, consequently, objectify the conceptual datum of the antecedent occasion from a different perspective. This means that the objectification of initial datum is not identical to the initial datum. Rather initial datum is perspectivally represented in the prehensions of subsequent occasions, although it is always relatively more or less identical to the initial datum constituted by a preceding occasion.

The final concrescent achievement in the developmental matrix of a hybrid occasion is its development into a complex imaginative proposition of the most profound quality. A hybrid imaginative occasion is the most complex and extensively inclusive occasion in a localized route of historical occasions. As the prehension of an imaginative proposition it is (in its simple physical prehension and conceptual reproduction) the concrete embodiment of physical efficacy and conceptual origination. Hence, there is a primitive or primordial identity between any antecedent imaginative proposition and its successive prehending hybrid occasion. In the simple comparative feelings of this succeeding hybrid occasion, there arises, through the
processes of transmutation and reversion, a relationship of relative conformity encompassing certain contrasts and similarities between itself and an antecedent imaginative occasion. At the level of complex comparative feelings, perceptual propositions are involved in further developing a perspective which refractively reflects and presents these relata of complex agency in consciousness. In its fullest development as a complex imaginative proposition, a hybrid occasion is the determined satisfaction of complex physical purpose. This means that in a hybrid occasion, the compounding complexity of physical and conceptual prehensions (as both efficient and final cause respectively) are coordinated in such a manner as to be determinative of the peculiar character of subjective form in symbolic reference. The subjective form of symbolic reference refers here to the manner of prehensive activity which accounts for an occasion of experience with meaning. Complex physical purpose is subjective form acquiring a determinate, particular and concrete character of appetitious aversion and aversion. With respect to the formation of symbolic reference in a hybrid occasion, I suggest, complex physical purpose might be considered the manner in which meaning is formulated in experience.

A hybrid occasion is an imaginative proposition that is the final percipient route of compounding occasions which

determines a personal order of apperceptive appropriational activity. As an imaginative proposition of the highest order, it serves as both final cause and efficient cause in the organization of experience. As efficient cause it physically integrates, and as final cause it conceptually initiates, the proximate novelties of appetition and complex physical purpose. It is, itself, the physical prehension of an imaginative proposition, an impure prehension which includes the complex factors of both compound physical prehensions and conceptual prehensions. A hybrid imaginative occasion is a slice of experience with a fullness of meaning, a physio-conceptual product of appropriation that is itself derived from an imaginative proposition. It provides a concrete initiative for the origination of successive hybrid imaginative occasions.

An imaginative hybrid occasion is an occasion of the most complex order in the process of concrescence. It involves both the physical prehension of conceptual datum (the physical datum of transmutation in an antecedent occasion) and the conceptual prehension of reverted physical datum (the transmutation of datum reverted in an antecedent occasion). It is a relatively integrated imaginative appropriation of two perspectives. One perspectival aspect of this integration is the physical and conceptual prehension of transmuted datum in an antecedent occasion (by reason of efficient cause). Another perspectival aspect of
this integration is a product of its own conceptual initiative of origination (final cause), combined with the combined effect (efficient cause) of reverted, but prehended, simple physical feeling in an antecedent occasion (the transmutation of reverted datum).

The imaginative integration of these perspectival, aspects of experience, in the form of a proposition, I maintain, can be described as a process of recursive imaginative reversion (This process will be explained more thoroughly in the next chapter).

A hybrid occasion, I submit, is not only a relational expression of the physio-conceptual relationship of concrescent personhood, but is also a crucial determining factor in the centralized control of an emerging personal order of concrescent activity. In this way it both formulates and expresses a generative order of personality. A living symbol, as a hybrid occasion, constitutes the most advanced and significant development of symbolic reference. It generates a unique initiative of origination, an appetitious appropriation of novelty which exemplifies the exercise of human freedom limitedly conforming to the world in the appropriational becoming of individual persons.

Hybrid Occasions and God

Although Whitehead defines hybrid occasions primarily
as impure physical prehensions of both conceptual and physical feelings, he also makes it clear that an impure mental prehension is also an impure physical prehension and conversely, that an impure physical prehension is an impure mental prehension. Thus the term "impure" does not require the terms "mental" or "physical" except for the direction of attention in the discussion concerned.\(^\text{48}\)

It is precisely the "direction of attention" in prehending a hybrid occasion which constitutes an overall subjective perspective for the development and combinative integration of percepts in the making of symbolic reference and the development of hybrid occasions. Percepts arise in some conformity with the mutual relations of the world, but they cannot be finally integrated as a product of conceptual origination apart from a perspectival contribution by a prehending subject. The locus of subjectivity, itself an extended complexity of combinative agency (of efficient and final cause) provides a framework that is an essential factor of agency in the development of symbolic reference.

Although I will not engage in an extended discussion of Whitehead's cosmology in this writing, it is necessary to refer to some essential ideas regarding the Whiteheadian notion of God's nature and relation to the world (i.e., all physical order). According to Whitehead, in God lies the source of all novelty and order in the world. God both

\(^{48}\) Whitehead, *PR*, p. 33.
transcends the world and is immanent in the world. The conceptual aspect of God is God's primordial nature. This aspect of God is God's envisionment of the world in all its pure potential. The physical aspect of God is the world (and all other physical reality), God's consequent nature. This aspect of God is the means by which God experiences the realization of value.

"There are evidently two sub-species of hybrid feelings", Whitehead maintains: (i) those which feel the conceptual feelings of temporal actual entities, and (ii) those which feel the conceptual feelings of God.

The objectification of God in a temporal subject is effected by the hybrid feelings with God's conceptual feelings as data. Those of God's feelings which are positively prehended are those with some compatibility of contrast, or of identity, with physical feelings transmitted from the temporal world.... Apart from the intervention of God, there could be nothing new in the world, and no order in the world. The course of creation would be a dead level of ineffectiveness, with all balance and intensity progressively excluded by the cross currents of incompatibility.49

According to Whitehead, God continually intervenes in the world as a lure toward feeling the greatest possible realization of value. God's lure is prehended physically as a conceptual feeling. It is prehended in a hybrid occasion and affords "or a determination of the compatibility of reverted feeling with other transmuted datum. Prehending

49 Ibid., p. 247.
God's lure in a hybrid occasion entails prehending the relationship between pure potential (God's primordial nature) and real possibility, the reverted proximate novelty in the world (as partially realized in the consequent nature of God and objectified in the conceptual feelings of actual occasions in the world).

The physical prehension of God's conceptual feelings (in the prehension of a hybrid occasion) involves the prehension of God's primordial nature. The physical prehension of God's primordial nature is a contextual realization (ingression) of God's envisagement which circumscribes the structure of pure potential. The primordial character of God's conceptual feelings are experienced in the reverted datum of prehended simple physical feelings, proximate novelties that reveal a primordial order of contiguity and contextual relevance. God's lure (as so far made consequent in an antecedent occasion) may be excluded from appropriation according to the subjective aim of the prehending subject. Nevertheless, Whitehead's assertion is that divine agency is continually intervening in the world to present an opportunity to realize whatever aesthetic ideal of harmonious complementarity and intense contrast might be contextually available (in the consequent nature of God as the world).

Meaningful human experience requires that both "sub-species" of hybrid occasions are integrated as two aspects
of one hybrid experience. Imaginative hybrid occasions, if they are to serve their purpose in providing for intense contrasts and harmonious complementarities of feeling in symbolic reference, must involve feeling both the conceptual feelings of God and other actualities. I submit that all hybrid imaginative occasions relevant to meaningful human experience must involve these two aspects, to one extent or another.  

The conceptual feelings of God's primordial nature are derived from the subject\superject character of actual occasions in the world: i.e., God's consequent nature. God's primordial nature (pure potential) is concretely related to God's consequent nature (the world) as the interrelatedness and mutual conformity of all temporal occasions. This involves all the factors of complex agency in their particular complementarity of contrasts: as final cause and efficient cause, subject and object (superject), conscious and unconscious - each contributing to the creative advance of the universe. In this way, God's immanence in the world

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50 For let us not forget that the lure of God in a hybrid occasion constitutes God's intervention in the world. God's intervention in the world constitutes God's relation to the world and God's relation to the world constitutes the relation between God's primordial and consequent natures. God's consequent nature (the world) is concretely related to God's primordial nature (pure potential) as a relationship expressing all complex physical purposes in terms of real potential in a hybrid occasion. Hence God's dichotomous nature is an integral whole in the complex unity of all hybrid occasions and each hybrid occasion cannot be other than an expression of God's undivided but conceptually divisible nature.
is expressed as the subjective form of all concrescent activity. Moreover, God's transcendence of the world is expressed in the creative advance of the universe as the unfolding of God's primordial envisagement of the world, continually renewed through the realization of novelty and offered back to the world as the reverted datum of remaining and alternative possibilities.

Divine agency and the dichotomous character of God's nature is expressed in imaginative hybrid occasions as a particular localization of all the complex factors of agency (efficient cause and final cause, consciousness and the unconscious, and all subject\object (superject) relations) which together constitute the unfolding of God's primordial envisionment of the world, its consequent realization and continual renewal.

The primordial character of God as related to His/Her consequent nature of the world is a dynamic structure of ambiguous order, relatively organized and re-organizing, but always recursively and reversively appropriational. Let it not be forgotten that any notion of God is a symbolic construct and, as such, cannot do other than reflect the experiential dynamics which gave rise to it. From a philosophical and psychological point of view, an understanding of God and the world cannot be other than a comprehensive understanding of the experiential dynamics of symbolic reference.
"...When we take God into account..." Whitehead affirms, "...we can assert without any qualification...that all conceptual feelings are derived from physical feelings".\textsuperscript{51} Even God's conceptual feelings (his/her primordial nature) are derived from the world. In Whitehead's thoroughly relativistic system, the datum of God's conceptual feeling is found in the world. "...The objectification of God in a temporal subject is effected by the hybrid feelings with God's conceptual feelings as data,"\textsuperscript{52} our physical and conceptual prehensions of God's conceptual feelings can only be derived from the physical and conceptual order in the development of hybrid occasions from which the feelings of God are also derived.

Hence, one could suppose an identity between our own direct authentic perceptual propositions of order among hybrid occasions and God's conceptual feelings of order among hybrid occasions. God's primordial envisionment of order for the contiguity and complementarity of novelty in the world is interactively dependent upon the co-creative concrescent activity of particular actual entities. Likewise, the process of recursive imaginative reversion depends upon the discernment of proximate novelties that are contiguous and complementary to the intense contrasts of perceptual propositions in consciousness. God's conceptual

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 247.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 246,247.
feelings and the conceptual feelings of actual occasions in the world, I maintain, together constitute a hybrid determination of complex physical purpose, a relatively integrated unity of harmonious complementarity and intense contrast.

The extent to which there is some identity between the conceptual feelings of God and the conceptual feelings of actual entities (via direct authentic perceptual propositions) is relevant only to the establishment of a rational order that characterizes the limited concerns of this human epoch. Of much more general significance in the unfolding of God's primordial envisionment of the world and its consequent realization is the entertainment of both some contrast and identity of conceptual feelings. It is by means of this complex whole of harmonious unities and complementary contrasts (among conceptual feelings) that complex factors of agency generate the appetitious advance of all complex physical purpose. God's will to attain the maximum value that the combinative complexity of physical purpose will afford is realized in his/her consequent nature (the world) to whatever extent conceptual initiative develops in the constitutive matrix of hybrid origination.
Chapter Three

THE LIVING SYMBOL: IMAGINATIVE RECURSION AND GENERATIVE ORDER

I have examined the developmental matrix of the living symbol within both a psychological and a philosophical context. From a Jungian point of view, the living symbol is a psychic content that formulates an orientation toward new experience and expresses an attitude that determines the character of apperception. It is a symbol of the Self (or the total personality) that has both an archetypal quality and a personal quality. The archetypal quality is psychoid in nature, which means that it is constituted as an energy relation between mind and matter, a relation that affords humankind a collective capacity for the apperception of experience in terms of various categories of imagination. The personal quality of the image is shaped by the contents of life experiences. The living symbol is an image shaped by the apperceptive organization of both the conscious and unconscious psychic processes. As a dominant apperceptive bias, it guides and directs apperception and is thereby characteristic of the psyche as a whole.

According to Jung, the living symbol is the culminative product of both passive and active apperception. Passive apperception, recall, involves a type of
apprehension whereby contents of the unconscious and/or the world autonomously impose upon consciousness. Active apperception involves relating the emerging contents from the unconscious to the known contents of consciousness through an act of conscious effort and with a concern appropriate to achieving an intended effect.

In chapter two I discussed the concept of the living symbol in the philosophical context of Whitehead’s thought on the appropriation of experience. The living symbol is an imaginative proposition, a hybrid form of symbolic reference that is appetitious. It is a proposition that generates a conceptual initiative of origination with respect to furthering the process of human appropriation.

I now submit that passive apperception may be accounted for in terms of the inter-subjective relationship between hybrid occasions and active apperception in terms of the intra-subjective relations of hybrid occasions. As I will explain, there are both inter-subjective (macrocosmic) and intra-subjective (microcosmic) factors of agency involved in the developmental matrix of a hybrid occasion. Correlatively there arises in consciousness, both intersubjective and intra-subjective propositions about the contingent relations between these dimensions of experience. Hybrid symbolic reference and, therefore, the living symbol, can be understood in terms of a bilateral, co-determinate and recursive relationship between inter-
subjectivity and intra-subjectivity.

I propose in this chapter that the living symbol is an appropriational formulation and apperceptive expression of generative order in the development of unique personhood. Moreover, I maintain that this is a recursive process of imaginative reversion, a process whereby the causal efficacy and presentational immediacy of inter-subjectivity are related to the causal efficacy and presentational immediacy of intra-subjectivity within an imaginative proposition.

As I discussed earlier, imaginative propositions always involve the prehension of reverted data as well as the reversion of other data. It is by this means that they generate appetite. In hybrid forms of symbolic reference this always entails either a transmutation of inter-subjectivity and the reversion of intra-subjectivity, or, a transmutation of intra-subjectivity and the reversion of inter-subjectivity. This process is recursive because each form of imaginative proposition is an aspect of the living symbol that leads, by way of reversion, to the appetitious development of the other.

A consideration of Jorg Luis Nobo's explication of the relationship between inter-subjectivity and intra-subjectivity will afford an understanding of the recursive character of hybrid occasions. In my opinion, however, Nobo's perspective is reductionistic in regard to hybrid occasions. His account of the co-determinate relationship
between inter-subjectivity and intra-subjectivity does not acknowledge the bi-lateral character of co-determinate agency. The bi-lateral and recursive character of hybrid occasions is, I maintain, a key ingredient in the generative order of personhood, the development of consciousness and the experience of meaning.

I will also examine Edward Edinger's model of developing consciousness to expand upon this point. Edinger's model corresponds quite closely to Jung's writings. A critical evaluation of Edinger's ideas will afford an understanding of symbolic reference that will lend itself to an analysis of the relationship between the general processes of physio-conceptual appropriation and the more specialized processes of apperception. I describe this relationship as a dynamic order of recursive imaginative reversion.

Inter-Subjectivity, Intra-Subjectivity and Apperception

In Whitehead's Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity, Jorge Luis Nobo has recently, though incidentally, put forth an argument that affords a valuable insight regarding the living character of symbolic reference. Nobo suggests that all actual entities (including hybrid occasions, I insist) are the co-determinate products of
inter-subjective and intra-subjective factors of agency. Accordingly, Nobo maintains that it is necessary to distinguish the macro-cosmic inter-subjective process of "transition" from the microcosmic, intra-subjective process of "concrescence." Though I cannot (for reasons I will discuss presently) accept the claim that concrescence and transition may be so radically demarcated, I acknowledge the importance of recognizing the distinct formative influences of inter-subjective and intra-subjective agency.

Nobo's interpretation of Whiteheadian metaphysics claims, in contra-distinction to general scholarship in the area, that in order to understand Whitehead's vision of the extension and solidarity of creative advancement in the universe, it is necessary to distinguish between the creative processes of "transition" and "concrescence".¹ Nobo claims that LeClerc, Sherburne and other prominent Whiteheadian scholars have generally either ignored this distinction or claimed (as Sherburne does) that the processes of creative transition and concrescence are one and the same creative process viewed from different perspectives.² Sherburne equates the whole of an occasion's becoming with its process of self-realization.³ However,

² Ibid., p. 140.
³ Ibid.
Nobo points out that the whole of an occasion's becoming cannot be attributed to it's own self-making, as this would require the absurd postulation that a self which does not yet exist could create itself out of nothing.

Nobo argues that the subjective form of an occasion is birthed as a unified, conformal, and objectified relation of subjective forms from the world of the settled past. This relation of conformal subjectivity constitutes an occasion's initial subjective aim. Concrescence begins with the datum of these conformal feelings (simple physical feelings and conceptual reproduction) already constitutive of its autonomous subjective form.

Nobo maintains, furthermore, that the process of creative supersession in the universe is a two stage process of macro-cosmic transition and microcosmic concrescence. The term "concrescence," he suggests, should be restricted, as Whitehead intended (Nobo claims), to refer only to the teleological, intra-subjective, final causes of agency in an actual occasion's making of itself. By contrast, the term "transition" should be taken to refer to the intra-subjective (togetherness), conformal, and efficient causes of an actual occasion's making.

Nobo's distinction between transition and concrescence emphasizes the different roles of efficient and final cause in the constitutive matrix of an occasion. He emphasizes the receptive aspect of the appropriational
process in the development of an occasion and points out that Whitehead distinguishes each actual occasion as a "recipient" and "patient" as well as an "agent" in the process of creative advance in the world.\(^4\) Nobo claims that transition is "the process whereby the subject has its double character of recipient and patient, whereas concrescence is the process whereby the subject has its character of agent."\(^5\)

Nobo explains that as "patient," an actual occasion is subject to the objectified feelings of subjective forms and valuations which are not of its own choosing, but which are a given for its own constitution.\(^6\) Nobo strongly emphasizes the distinction between concrescence and transition in an effort to provide evidence for his central thesis. This thesis is that the creative advancement of the world, in Whitehead's system, presupposes a scheme of metaphysical solidarity and extension.\(^7\) Nobo's analysis does not take the complex character of hybrid occasions into account. He provides a straightforward explication of the relationship between inter-subjectivity and intra-subjectivity for the least complex form of actual entity. He does not acknowledge that actual occasions involve

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 142.

\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 208.
various complexities of prehensive activity. Hybrid occasions are the most complex among these and, in fact, as I have explained, encompass the lower, less complex forms of prehensive activity within their developmental matrix.

The co-determinate order between inter-subjectivity and intra-subjectivity is, I assert, compounded in hybrid occasions and other complex actual entities. This fact is obvious when one considers a hybrid occasion from a developmental point of view (as I discussed earlier). Each level of development and prehensive activity involves both inter-subjective and intra-subjective factors of agency in its formation. Each generic form of agency is a co-determinate factor as Nobo suggests. Furthermore, however, in hybrid occasions these factors of agency are compounded, and thereby confounded in such a manner that they could be more properly described as bilateral and recursive factors of co-determinate agency.

The least complex actual entities may be purely co-determinate in the order that Nobo suggests, but complex actual entities are certainly co-determined in a bi-lateral and recursive manner. It is reductionistic to conceive of complex actual entities, and more particularly hybrid occasions, in terms of a simple serial order of macro-cosmic transition giving rise to isolated micro-cosmic concrescence which only upon its completion gives rise to macro-cosmic effect. Rather, the macro-cosmic order of transition
(inter-subjectivity) is bi-laterally and recursively related to the micro-cosmic order of concrescence (intra-subjectivity). To divorce one from the other is to deny the relative and interdependent cogency of either with respect to the other.

The solidarity and togetherness of an atomistic cosmos could only be sustained through the novelty of complexification. My reading of Whitehead is that there is only one source of novelty in the world that may account for the extension (both temporal and spatial) of the cosmos: apperception (conceptual initiatives of origination). The conceptual transmutation of reverted datum and the reversion of transmuted datum are the only mechanisms of apperception. Hence the protensity and extensity of the cosmos is formulated and expressed through the complexification of these operations. The extension of spatio-temporal relations is a function of the physio-conceptual complexification of conceptually initiated origination and physical ingression. As I have explained, only hybrid occasions involve both the conceptual prehensions of physical datum and the physical prehensions of conceptual datum. Only hybrid occasions, therefore, can account for the extensive continuity of the cosmos.

Nobo's argument for an eternal, transcendent ground of relatedness among pure potentials is, I believe, a fundamental error of misplaced concreteness in understanding
Whitehead's notion of the relationship between God's primordial nature and God's consequent nature. This misunderstanding also implies a similar confusion regarding the nature of hybrid occasions, because it is these complex actual entities which formulate and express the concrete immanence of God in the world.

The protracted and extensive relatedness of actual entities as more or less contiguous and more or less complementary to one another is determined not by an eternal transcendent ground of solidarity and extensivity (as Nobo posits) but rather, solely by the concrete order of prehensive activity among hybrid occasions as realized and emerging in the world.

While Nobo correctly ascertains that there is a co-determinate relationship between inter-subjective and intra-subjective factors of agency in the emergence of an actual entity, he does not give due consideration to the bi-lateral and recursive relationship between these generic factors. As a result he does not recognize that the ontological relationship between the actual and the possible is an appetitious order of hybrid prehensive activity.

There is no transcendent ontological order of pure potential per se (i.e., a transcendent ground of spatial temporal extension). This is merely an abstraction from a concrete order of real potential, the data perspectivally reverted in the orders of comparative and complex
prehension, yet always physically prehended and conceptually reproduced at the level of simple feelings. The only ontological order of primordial possibilities is constituted in the relationship between the reverted data of relatively simple physical and conceptual feelings and the transmuted data of more complex feelings.

I understand this relationship (between the reverted data of relatively simple physio-conceptual feelings and more complex physio-conceptual feelings) to be a hybrid form of symbolic reference which would correspond to the Whiteheadian notion of a regnant "non-social nexus". 8 This is a complex order of prehensive activity characteristic of a living order and derived primarily from intense physical feelings. 9 It is also an order of prehensive activity which serves as the immediate environment for an analogous determination of a "personal order," an order of prehensive

8 Whitehead defines and discusses the nature of a non-social nexus and distinguishes this concept from the concept of a personal order (See Whitehead, PR, p. 105, 106). Although these ideas will be discussed presently, it is important to note that Whitehead discusses the relation between a "non-social nexus" and a "personal order" in only poetic terms. He speaks of the "interstices of the brain" as the "empty space" wherein the reactions to the physical intensity of feeling is so modified so as to allow for the originate conceptual reactions that characterize "living" occasions. Sherburn also takes up this discussion of the relationship between a non-social nexus and a personal order (See D.W. Sherburne, Southern Journal of Philosophy, "Whitehead's Physiological Psychology", Winter 1969). My proposal is that the relationship between the non-social nexus and the personal order is a non-social regnant nexus constituted by a living symbol.

9 Whitehead, PR, p. 105.
activity that Sherburne identifies with the conscious ego.\footnote{Donald Sherburne, \textit{Southern Journal of Philosophy, "Whitehead's Physiological Psychology"} Winter, 1969. p.403ff.} However, for reasons to be made clear presently, I would identify this personal order more properly with a recursive order of imaginative reversion, a dynamic relationship between imaginative propositions. I would agree, nevertheless, that this order might not be consciously differentiated from the ego. Again, this point will be clarified in later discussion when I reconsider the Jungian model of developing consciousness.

I have claimed that the spatio-temporal relations of the cosmos can be accounted for only in terms of the concrete inter-relatedness of hybrid occasions and not, as Nobo contends, by an eternal transcendent ground of pure primordial possibilities. I have maintained further that Nobo's analysis of inter-subjective and intra-subjective co-determinacy is reductionistic because it does not account for the bi-lateral and recursive relationship between these factors of agency in the confounding and compounding development of complex actual entities.

The point of this discussion is to indicate that both inter-subjective and intra-subjective factors of agency are bilaterally and recursively related so as to constitute a non-social nexus and a derived, but analogous, personal order ofprehensire activity. I have yet to explain the
relationship between the reverted datum of a non-social nexus and the transmuted datum of a personal order. This relationship, however, is best explained in terms of the relationship between the general process of physio-conceptual appropriation and the apperceptive processes involved in the development of consciousness.

Edward Edinger's psychological model for the development of consciousness closely corresponds to Jung's writings with respect to explicating the psychological effects of passive and active apperception in the development of a living symbol. A critical analysis of Edinger's work will afford a clearer understanding of a non-social nexus (in terms of psychoid imagery) and its contingent relationship to consciousness. The non-social nexus and the personal order are bi-laterally and recursively formulated and expressed in a hybrid form of symbolic reference (which is a subjective form of the living symbol).

The Development of Consciousness

Edward Edinger points out that there are at least three phases in the incremental development of consciousness and the apprehension of living meaning. The first phase corresponds to a psychological state of "ego-self identity," the second phase to "ego-self alienation," and the third
phase to a state of "individuated consciousness."\(^{11}\) He asserts that there are three corresponding relations between the ego and the symbol:

1. The ego may be identified with the symbol. In this case the symbolic image will be lived out concretely. Ego and archetypal psyche will be one.

2. The ego may be alienated from the symbol. Although the symbolic life cannot be destroyed, in this case it will function in a degraded fashion outside consciousness. The symbol will be reduced to a sign. Its mysterious urgencies will be understood only in terms of elementary, abstract factors.

3. The third possibility is the one to be desired. In this instance the ego, while clearly separated from the archetypal psyche, is open and receptive to the effects of symbolic imagery. A kind of conscious dialogue between the ego and emerging symbols becomes possible. The symbol is then able to perform its proper function as releaser and transformer of psychic energy with full participation of conscious understanding.\(^{12}\)

Edinger describes the first pattern of relationship between the ego and the symbol as one which corresponds to the state of ego-self identity, wherein "the ego and the archetypal psyche will be one" (undifferentiated in consciousness). He describes this relation between the ego and the symbol as a "concretistic fallacy," as a primitive relation and as one in which the individual is unable to distinguish symbols of the archetypal psyche from concrete, external reality. For examples of this fallacy he cites


\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 110.
animistic beliefs, hallucinations, the delusions of psychotics and superstitions of all kinds. The relationship between ego and symbol in this case, Edinger claims, constitutes a fallacy of concretism because the symbolic character of psychic imagery is mistakenly understood to refer literally to concrete facts in the external world rather than to the psychic life of the inner world.\(^{13}\)

In the second case (which corresponds to the stage of ego-self alienation) Edinger explains that "the significance of the symbol is missed by misunderstanding it as a sign for some other known content."\(^{14}\) Edinger claims that this is a "reductive fallacy." It is based on the rationalistic attitude that the "real" meaning can be found behind symbols, thereby reducing symbolic imagery to known factors (i.e., reducing symbols to signs). This entails a "depreciation of the unconscious" and the "power" of its symbolic images to transform personality.\(^{15}\)

According to Edinger, only the third form of relationship between ego and archetype\(^{16}\) can provide for a sense of "living meaning." This kind of meaning does not

\(^{13}\) Ibid.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.

\(^{15}\) Ibid. p. 13.

\(^{16}\) Edinger does not distinguish between the symbol and the archetype, a problem which I will indirectly address presently in terms of distinguishing between image and reference.
primarily provide for abstract knowledge, but rather refers to a psychological state which can affirm life. It is "laden with affect and relates us organically to life as a whole."¹⁷ This relationship between the ego and the symbol, according to Edinger, corresponds to the state of individuated consciousness.

Edinger asserts that "symbols are spontaneous products of the archetypal psyche"¹⁸ which "one cannot manufacture." He claims that symbols "can only be discovered."¹⁹ When these symbols are experienced unconsciously, they are experienced only as wishes or impulses toward external action. "The image behind the urgency is not seen. No purely psychological meaning is discerned behind the motivating force of the symbolic image which has one in its grip."²⁰ Every instinctive compulsion, according to Edinger, has an image that lies imbedded in it. Hidden meaning is revealed through the perception of this image as a symbolic and transforming acculturation of psychic energy. Perceiving this "hidden meaning" leads to a transformation from the level of animal instinct to the spiritual level of human meaning.²¹

¹⁷ Ibid., p.108.
¹⁸ Ibid.
¹⁹ Ibid.
²⁰ Ibid. p. 113.
²¹ Ibid., p.114.
Edinger maintains that only to the extent that one is unaware of the symbolic dimension of existence does one experience the vicissitudes of life as meaningless symptoms. "Symptoms," he writes, are

disturbing states of mind which we are unable to control and which are essentially meaningless - that is, contain no value or significance. Symptoms, in fact, are degraded symbols, ... intolerable precisely because they are meaningless. Almost any difficulty can be borne if we can discern its meaning. It is meaningfulness which is the greatest threat to humanity.²²

Meaning is experienced as living only through the dialectical interaction and recognition of ego-self identity and ego-self alienation. The meaning of living can be unconsciously acted out in terms of the dialectical consequences of ego-self identity and ego-self alienation and/or it can be actively imagined in reflective consciousness.²³

Edinger argues that the threefold process of developing consciousness is an archetypal expression of the Self. The trinity archetype symbolizes a threefold process of temporal development.²⁴ "All events in time naturally fall into a threefold pattern. Every event has a beginning, a middle and an end."²⁵ Quoting H.G. Baynes, Edinger

²² Ibid., p. 117.

²³ Ibid., p. 40-42, See also p. 116 where Edinger describes the resolution of psychic conflict by seeking meaning through active imagination.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 182.

²⁵ Ibid. p. 183.
writes:

The number three is specifically associated with the creative process....Every function of energy in nature has, indeed, the form of a pair of opposites, united by a third factor, their product.  

Edinger points out that in Jung's writings there is some ambiguity concerning the symbolic significance of three-fold images, particularly with respect to their relationship to quaternal images. For instance, Jung describes the Christian Trinity as an incomplete representation of the deity (which, it will be recalled, is indistinguishable from the Self). The Self is more usually thought by Jung to be most adequately represented by quaternity images. Yet, Edinger quotes some of Jung's discussion on the Trinity and points out that nowhere is there the implication that this notion does not "adequately and completely" symbolize the developmental process of the Self in time.  

He further suggests that the "three-fold rhythm" of the developmental process of the Self deserves greater attention, and that three-fold and four-fold kinds of symbolization are different archetypal aspects of the psyche. Edinger postulates that triunal and quaternal symbolism is related in the following manner:

The quaternity image expresses the totality of the psyche in its structural, static or


27 Edinger, Ego and Archetype, p. 183.
eternal sense, whereas the trinity image expresses the totality of psychological experience in its dynamic, developmental, temporal aspect. 28

The thesis of this writing would suggest that quaternal imagery represents the totality of the appropriation process while threefold imagery represents tri-partite subjective forms of apperception i.e., various combinations of prehensive activity that are involved in the expression of the living symbol. Although this point has not yet been clearly established, it may be kept in mind that neither symbol pertains to a static expression of the Self. Rather, I maintain, that quaternal imagery is symptomatic of a growing awareness of reverted physical feeling, and, the seminal differentiation in consciousness of the recursive effect of imaginative reversion. In other words, quaternal imagery, as distinct from triunal imagery, is the latest development of symbolic reference in an antecedent hybrid occasion and the earliest development in a successive occasion. This is because it reflects the recursive effect of imaginative reversion and the most minimal apprehension of the proximate possibilities that reverted physical feelings entail. Admittedly, however, this is a speculative view of the relation between tri-partite and quaternal forms of symbolic reference. It is also a theme which I would think is of considerable importance, yet one that can be

28 Ibid.
addressed only as a tangential implication of this thesis.

I am only concerned with demonstrating that the living symbol formulates and expresses a process of apperceptive appropriation which may be described as a recursive order of imaginative reversion generative of personhood. To proceed in this regard it is necessary to consider critically Edinger's model of developing consciousness.

Edinger's model is a paradigm for understanding the symbolic process that provides for living meaning. In fact, "the ultimate goal of Jungian psychotherapy", Edinger claims, "is to make the symbolic process conscious."29 Edinger does not, however, acknowledge explicitly that the three-fold process of development which he proposes is also an outline of the apperceptive structure involved in the development of symbolic reference.

Edinger identifies the symbolization capacity of the psyche with the imaging power of the archetypes. He implies that the unconscious is the exclusive domain for the formulation of symbols and that living meaning is an epistemological discovery of the symbolic qualities inherent to the psychoid images of archetypes.

Note, however, that Edinger does not take into account that a symbol is distinguished from a sign, not by certain characteristics of the image itself, but by a

29 Ibid., p. 113.
quality of reference associated with the image. Symbolic thinking (as distinct from signific thinking) is a means by which the novel experience of relatively unconscious awareness is related to the ordinary experience of conscious awareness. Signific thinking, recall, is a means of relating factors of conscious awareness to other factors of consciousness.

Images should only be considered symbols in conjunction with the process of reference associated with them. Although it is certainly possible to consider the phenomenological character of images apart from the process of reference that determines their function, it must be recognized that this is reductionistic. One might, as Edinger does, identify the symbolization process with the unconscious processes of imagery production, and, therefore, conclude that symbols are simply images; but in my view this is a reductive assumption. It leads to the erroneous conclusion that all psychic images have the same complexity of organization as those images which constitute the meaningful propositions of symbolic reference.

Symbolization involves both image and reference. I am in agreement with Whitehead that there are various possible relations between an image and a subject.30

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30 Though Whitehead is also guilty of the same reductionistic claim as Edinger. He actually claims that there are various possible relations between a symbol and a subject.
Indeed, it is the manner of apprehending these various possible relations which determines whether an image functions a symbol or a sign. I submit that it is when an image is apprehended as standing in a propositional relationship to consciousness it may be understood to take on symbolic significance.

In the narrowest sense of the term, Whitehead claims that "...symbolic reference is the active synthetic element contributed by the nature of the perciptent."31 This point is made to emphasize that there is no necessary relationship of order between an image and its meaning. There is no necessary relationship of order determining whether components of experience elicit consciousness, or whether elements of consciousness elicit various components of experience.32 The living symbol, I submit, is an image that expresses this dynamic contingency, while, at the same time, being a formulation of reference that mediates and establishes a determinate order of physio-conceptual appropriation.

My point is that symbolic thinking, and the corresponding increases in consciousness that accompany it, can be understood in terms of the development of imaginative propositions. The awareness of living meaning, in the stage of individuated consciousness, can be understood as an

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32 Ibid.
awareness of an imaginative proposition pertaining to the potential relationship(s) between relatively unconscious imagery and relatively known factors of consciousness.

I read Edinger's model of developing consciousness as a threefold categorization of psychological symptoms that accompany the formulation of symbolic reference with respect to the development of imaginative propositions. From this perspective it is a model of apperception whereby living meaning is constituted through the development of symbolic reference.

Yet the process of symbolic reference cannot, as I have shown, by itself account for the experience of living meaning. The living symbol by which living meaning is expressed is living precisely because it relates us organically to life as a whole. The living symbol is not merely a proposition about the contingent possibilities of intra-subjective reference. This would involve only an aesthetic appreciation of purely imagined possibilities, with regard neither for the consideration of their relevance to life as a whole nor for their integral relationship to one another in terms of their actualization.

The pure succession of propositional relata corresponds to what Whitehead refers to as the mode of presentational immediacy. As I have explained, this mode of apprehension is only one aspect of symbolic reference. Jung also recognized that the intra-subjective propositions of
consciousness require both a concrete context for an understanding of their relationship to the world and an integrative initiative on behalf of the subject. Regarding his own experience of the individuation process, Jung writes about his developing consciousness of the living symbol:

There were things in the images which concerned not only myself but many others also....I myself had to...try to plant the results of my experience in the soil of reality; otherwise they would have remained subjective assumptions without validity.\(^{33}\)

He also explains that in observing the developing fantasies that emerge from the unconscious it is important neither to place undue emphasis upon their aesthetic value, nor surrender a grasp on reality for an illusory gain in artistic pleasure.

If I had taken these fantasies of the unconscious as art, they would have carried no more conviction than visual perceptions, as if I were watching a movie. I would have felt no moral obligation towards them. The anima might then have easily seduced me into believing that I was a misunderstood artist, and that my so-called artistic nature gave me the right to neglect reality. If I had followed her voice she would have in all probability have said to me one day, "Do you imagine the nonsense you've engaged in is really art? Not a bit." Thus the insinuations of the unconscious, can utterly destroy a man.\(^{34}\)

I cite these passages to illustrate that in the

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\(^{34}\) Ibid., p. 211.
development of the living symbol there is an aesthetic dimension, and more particularly, a luring quality which corresponds to Whitehead's notion of a hybrid occasion. There is also, however, an ethical dimension with respect to determining the relevance of intra-subjective propositions to the world.

It is also a mistake, Jung explains, to think that merely understanding these relations to the world is sufficient.

It is equally a grave mistake to think that it is enough to gain some understanding of the images and that knowledge can here make a halt. Insight into them must be converted into an ethical obligation. Not to do so is to fall prey to the power principle, and this produces dangerous effects which are destructive not only to others but even to the knower. The images of the unconscious place a great responsibility upon a man. Failure to understand them, or shirking of ethical responsibility deprives him of his wholeness and imposes a painful fragmentariness on his life.\footnote{Ibid., p. 218.}

Jung claims that an ethical obligation arises in the apprehension of relatively unconscious imagery. I read this consistently with Whitehead to mean that morality is derived from the aesthetic dimension of experience.\footnote{Whitehead, PR, p. 255, 317,} I assert that the moral concern is derived from the aesthetic experience of presentational immediacy (though I would also maintain that the aesthetic sense is recursively related to the
ethical sense). I therefore understand the determination of an ethical obligation to be a proposition about the relevance and causal efficacy of intra-subjective propositions with respect to inter-subjective propositions. I am here discussing the imaginative consideration of causal efficacy, whereby the proximate real possibilities of concrete physical feeling are experienced as having a graded relevance of intensity within a larger experiential matrix of aesthetic appropriation.

As I explained by example in the introduction to this thesis, there is not only a cogency of contrasting physical feelings in imagination, but also an aesthetic ideal to be achieved in the integration of propositional feelings. The concrete integration of physical feeling and thereby the concrete realization of conceptual purpose (i.e., living meaning), cannot be achieved apart from a harmonious unity of a contrasting intensity between physical feelings. This requires a concrete imaginative initiative, a counter-active inclusion of formerly reverted physical feeling and the reversion of formerly included physical feeling. This amounts to an imaginative ethical undertaking and a personal sense of moral obligation.

The presentational immediacy and causal efficacy which I describe above, insofar as it pertains to the apperceptive development of the living symbol, can be described in terms of an experiential matrix of hybrid
symbolic reference. This is an order of relationship between a process of physio-conceptual appropriation and a personal order of apperception. I have referred to the dynamic order which formulates and expresses this relationship as a process of recursive imaginative reversion.

I will first outline the order of physio-conceptual appropriation that I suggest pertains specifically to hybrid occasions and the apperceptive structure of the living symbol. My proposal is that various combinations of prehensive activity within a hybrid order of physio-conceptual appropriation can account for the developmental pattern of apperception that is characteristic of the living symbol. As I suggested earlier, all lower orders of physio-conceptual appropriation below apperception culminate in the development of a non-social nexus. Apperception, however, culminates in a regnant nexus constituting a personal order. The personal order of the regnant nexus is, of course, derived from the lower order of the non-social nexus, but it is a distinct, more complex order of hybrid symbolic reference.

The essential argument of this thesis can thus be expanded to the claim that the living symbol, as a process of recursive imaginative reversion and the generative order of personhood, formulates (in terms of physio-conceptual appropriation) and expresses (in terms of apperception) the relationship between the non-social nexus and the regnant
nexus. These combinations ofprehensiv activity comprise the micro-cosmic experiential matrix of macro-cosmic apperception. By means of a process of recursive imaginative reversion, the living symbol comprises an order of apperceptive appropriation that organically relates the subject to the whole complex order of life.

Conclusion

I have argued that the generative order of the dynamic relationship between the non-social nexus of physio-conceptual appropriation and the regnant nexus of an apperceived personal order is a generative process of recursive imaginative reversion and the characteristic structure of the living symbol. I have shown that the living symbol is a hybrid form of symbolic reference, and that this is an order of apperception that can be distinguished by its complexity of organization from other kinds of experience. It must, however, be recognized that the regnant nexus of an apperceived personal order is derived from the non-social nexus of a hybrid occasion's developmental matrix. I submit that this personal order, which is represented in the living symbol, is derived by means of a process of recursive imaginative reversion.

As I see it, the hybrid form of symbolic reference, which constitutes the regnant nexus of a personal order, is a tripartite formulation of prehensive activity within a
non-social nexus of quaternion prehension. The living symbol, I maintain, is a tri-partite formulation of symbolic reference. It is an apperceptive order within a larger order of physio-conceptual appropriation. This is a three-fold expression of a four-fold formulation of experience. It is a tri-partite "remainder" of quaternion prehension, the final product of reversion and the appetitious initiative of recursion. The living symbol is the undivided whole which is divisible through differentiation. It is three-fold in its structure (giving expression to two modes of causal efficacy and one mode of presentational immediacy) and fourfold in its function (formulated by and further formulating two modes of causal efficacy and two modes of presentational immediacy). The apperceptive structure of the living symbol always involves an imaginative and recursive reversion of physical feeling and, it is this recursive process of reversion which distinguishes a symbol from a psychoid image (i.e., an aspect of the personal order, from a correlative aspect of the non-social nexus). The living symbol is a tri-partite structure (as a symbol) that gives expression to a fourfold function (a psychoid image). The living symbol constitutes the concrete relation between the non-social nexus of psychoid imagery and the regnant nexus of a personal order (constituted by symbols that are relatively less living).

I have shown the complexification process involved in
the order of physio-conceptual appropriation, and, more particularly in the development of a hybrid occasion (This is described in the previous chapter). I submit that it can be understood, then, that the prehensive activity of this most complex form of experience can be expected to include four kinds of prehensive activity. These include: 1) the physical prehension of reverted datum which pertains to the causal efficacy of simple physical and conceptually reproduced datum; 2) the physical prehension of transmuted datum which pertains to the causal efficacy of complex physical feeling, or physical feeling organized by conceptual purpose; 3) the conceptual prehension of reverted datum which pertains to the presentational immediacy of simple physical and conceptually reproduced datum; and 4) the conceptual prehension of transmuted datum which pertains to the presentational immediacy of complex physical feeling.

The integration of all these kinds of prehension, I maintain, allows for the experience of living meaning. Living meaning may otherwise be understood as the final satisfaction of "complex physical purpose." Most succinctly stated, this is the integration of complex physical feeling and conceptual purpose.

The realization of complex physical purpose, by means of the living symbol, I assert, is by a recursive process of imaginative reversion.

I submit that the non-social nexus of physio-
conceptual appropriation is constituted by the secondarily reverted physical feelings of imaginative propositions. This includes both the physical prehensions of reverted datum (simple physical and conceptually reproduced physical feelings) and the physical prehensions of transmuted datum (complex physical feelings). This would be consistent with Whitehead's description of a non-social nexus which he describes as characterized by an intensity of physical feelings that are indirectly derived from the body of the human organism. Note that as a product of secondary reversion, the non-social nexus implicates an involvement of conceptual prehensions (both positive and negative), but is primarily relevant as the residuum of repressed physical feelings. Hence it is a quaternion matrix of the most concrete and proximate potentialities of transformation i.e., the repressed physical feelings are the manifested agency of latent factors of appetition.

The reader will recall that every imaginative proposition not only involves the prehension of reverted datum, but also involves some further reversion of datum. It is this secondary initiative of imaginative reversion that provides for appetition. This is the characteristic feature of an imaginative proposition by which it can be distinguished from a perceptual proposition.

The quaternion matrix of a hybrid occasion is, as I have argued throughout this paper, the culminative
development of the living symbol. Within this complex whole there is a non-social nexus now describeable as the primary repression of imaginative reversion. This is a non-social nexus of physical prehensions (considered in terms of its primary relevance). It is constituted by the physical prehensions of transmuted datum as secondarily reverted through the imaginative propositions of ego-self identity and the physical prehensions of reverted datum as secondarily reverted through the imaginative propositions of ego-self alienation.

The symbolic formulations of ego-self identity and ego-self alienation are the two forms of tri-partite prehensive activity that constitute the recursive structure of hybrid symbolic reference and imaginative reversion. Ego-self identity involves the imaginative reversion of the fourth prehensive activity that ego-self alienation includes. Alternately, ego-self alienation involves the imaginative reversion of the fourth prehensive activity that ego-self identity includes. They are thus functionally related to one another in a recursive manner.

Both these developmental stages of symbolic reference involve all four kinds of prehensive activity. In the

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37 I would contend that this form of repression is not to be confused with the more usual understanding of psychological repression though I expect it is related. I refer here to a generic form of repression which I mean to be associated more closely with the archetypal limitations on the development of human capacities rather than with the personal limitations for coping with emotional trauma.
formulation of reference, however, ego-self identity further involves reverting, to some extent, the physical prehension of transmuted datum and ego-self alienation involves reverting, to some extent, the physical prehension of formerly reverted datum.

Note that the datum of secondary reversion is, in each case, the datum complementary to the other. The reverted physical prehensions of transmuted datum, in the case of ego-self identity, is positively prehended in ego-self alienation. Likewise, the physically prehended reverted datum which is secondarily reverted in the case of ego-self alienation is positively prehended in ego-self identity. It is the recursive complementarity of this imaginatively reverted data, that, in the conceptual prehension of transmuted datum, constitutes a regnant nexus of personal order, and, in the conceptual prehension of reverted datum constitutes a generative order of recursive imaginative reversion.

To explain further, ego-self identity and ego-self alienation are symptomatic expressions of tri-partite prehensive activity in a personal order of apperceptive appropriation. Ego-self identity is an order of tri-partite prehensive activity with respect to the development of passive apperceptive reference to inter-subjectivity. Ego-self alienation is an order of tri-partite prehensive activity with respect the development of active apperceptive
reference to intra-subjectivity. Both of these forms of symbolic reference take place within the quaternion matrix of a hybrid occasion.

I refer to ego-self identity in terms of a proposition about inter-subjective reference because the infusion of novelty that most characterizes its integration is the conformal datum of passive apperception, the prehension of simple physical and conceptually reproduced feelings. This is a formulation of reference in regard to the psychoid imagery that is the archetypal aspect of a complex.

I refer to ego-self alienation in terms of a proposition about intra-subjective reference because the infusion of novelty that characterizes its integration is the non-conformal datum of active apperception, the prehension of complex physical feeling (as reflecting the purpose of transmutation: i.e., it is the physical prehension of transmuted datum).

Passive apperception can be understood in terms of the presentational immediacy and causal efficacy of inter-subjective reference. This involves the physical ingression of formerly repressed simple physical feeling: the conformal feelings that entail inter-subjective awareness.

Active apperception can be understood in terms of the presentational immediacy and causal efficacy of intra-subjective awareness. This involves the ingression of formerly repressed complex physical feeling: the relatively
non-conformal feelings that reflect a contingent organization of conceptual purpose.

The living symbol always involves some primal repression of complex physical feeling. Hybrid symbolic reference always excludes a differentiated integration of some aspect of complex physical purpose in the apperceptive integration of consciousness. This is because the appropriational activity of complex physical feeling is to some extent always secondarily reverted in the apperceptive formulation of hybrid symbolic reference. The presentational immediacy of relata in consciousness is shaped by the causal efficacy of quaternion prehension, but the apperceptive integration of this appropriational activity involves reverting aspects of complex physical feeling and also, therefore, the prehension of conceptual purpose as entailed in its organization.

Hence, with respect to the appropriational process of concrescence, the apperceptive process of symbolic reference is a process of imaginative reversion. This is a process of conceptually including previously excluded physical feeling while excluding previously included complex physical feeling. This is a process of integrating complex physical feeling with conceptual purpose and the manner by which appetition generates the satisfaction of complex physical purpose. Through the conceptual prehension of included complex physical feeling (the transmutation that entails its
exclusion), the physical prehension of previously excluded complex physical feeling (the physical prehension of previously reverted datum) and the conceptual prehension of this reverted datum, a hybrid subjective form of symbolic reference is constituted.

The appropriational formulation of the living symbol is a four-fold matrix of prehensive activity. However, its expression in terms of symbolic reference is a three-fold apperceptive integration of tri-partite prehensive activity. The regnant nexus of a personal order is recursively related to a non-social nexus of secondarily reverted physical feeling.

The apperceptive integration of hybrid appropriation can only ever exclude its own present immediacy and causal efficacy in the formulation of symbolic reference. Only the past is presented in its efficacy. Accordingly the most complex organization of physical feeling and the conceptual purpose derivative therefrom is reverted from reference in the latest stage of a hybrid occasion's development. It is clear, then, that it is this reverted datum that has the most proximate and real recursive potential for originative ingression by a successive hybrid occasion.

Moreover, it can be understood that imaginative propositions (i.e., hybrid occasions), in order to be distinguished from perceptual propositions as appetitious, must be defined in terms of their recursive relationship to
reverted datum. With respect to hybrid subjective forms of symbolic reference, this means that the living symbol, too, should be described in terms of an order of recursive imaginative reversion.

The living symbol has meaning for a person insofar as it constitutes a dynamic order of recursive imaginative reversion, a personal order of symbolic reference that determines the causal efficacy and presentational immediacy of a relationship between apperception and appropriation. The conceptual prehension of a particular recursive order of imaginative reversion constitutes a regnant nexus of a personal order. Yet this integration too, is subject to imaginative reversion, thereby, recursively generating the further development of personhood.
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Secondary Sources


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