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Kashmir as a factor in India's relations with the superpowers in the 1950s.

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KASHMIR AS A FACTOR IN INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS IN THE 1950s

SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

BY

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the relative importance of Kashmir as a factor in India's relations with the United States, and the Soviet Union, in the 1950s.

The first chapter of the thesis examines the importance of Kashmir to India in the light of the 'symbolic' importance which it assumed to India's secularism, and its unity, after the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan, and India's achievement of independence in 1947. Kashmir's importance to India for strategic reasons is also examined. The chapter concludes with an examination of Kashmir as a factor in India's foreign relations.

Chapter two examines the factors conditioning India's relations with the superpowers. The attitudes of the superpowers on the Kashmir dispute and its impact on India's relations with both countries are examined. However, the chapter is essentially an attempt to show that nonalignment was the basic strategy of India's foreign policy, and not Kashmir. It is suggested that India's choice of nonalignment as a foreign policy stance was conditioned by attitudes to world affairs developed by Indian nationalist leaders in the pre-independence period, and was in particular, the result of their ambivalent attitudes towards both the United States and the Soviet Union.
in that period. The evolution of India's nonalignment in its relations with both superpowers in the first six years of independence is also examined.

Chapter three examines India's relations with the superpowers in the period 1954-59. In particular, the chapter attempts to determine the importance of Kashmir as a factor in shaping India's relations with both countries in the last half of the 1950s, relative to non-Kashmir factors.

Finally, chapter four concludes that Kashmir was only a secondary factor in India's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, and served only to reinforce trends developed primarily as a result of the non-Kashmir factors. It is suggested that the reasons for Kashmir's secondary importance as a factor in India's relations with the superpowers in the 1950s, despite its significance for India's basic national interests, stemmed from the thrust of India's diplomacy during the period, and the importance of nonalignment as an effective force in global politics in the 1950s.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................... 1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................. iii
INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1

CHAPTER

I  THE IMPORTANCE OF KASHMIR TO INDIA ........ 7
II  INDIA’S RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS TO 1954 .......... 32
III  INDIA’S RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS, 1954-59 ........... 80

CONCLUSION ................................. 145
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................. 151
INTRODUCTION

The fact that Kashmir, a state with a Muslim majority, should have cast its ties with India, has always seemed to the Indian leadership to be a refutation of the idea that Muslims and Hindus cannot live together in harmony, within the bounds of a single nation. Speaking before the Indian Constituent Assembly on March 14th 1948, the Indian Prime Minister said:

Kashmir is not a case of communal conflict ... this struggle in Kashmir, although it has brought great suffering to the people of Kashmir ... stands out as a sign of hope that there we see a certain cooperation, combination and coordination of certain elements, Hindu and Muslim and Sikh and others on an equal level.

Thus, Kashmir is to the Indian leaders an important symbol of India's unity in diversity, and its commitment to secularism. This, coupled with Pakistan's continuing dispute with India over the legitimacy of Kashmir's accession to India, has made Kashmir an important factor in any calculation of India's basic national interest, and accordingly, in India's

foreign relations. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine Kashmir as a factor in India's relations with the superpowers in the 1950s, with emphasis on the period 1954-59.

It must be acknowledged that Kashmir was only one factor among many in shaping India's attitude to the world, and particularly, the United States and the Soviet Union. Accordingly, such non-Kashmir factors as India's attitude to colonialism, the East/West conflict, and military pacts, as well as India's policy of nonalignment, and her desire for foreign economic assistance were all important factors in shaping India's attitude towards the superpowers. They are, therefore, also examined in attempting to assess the relative importance of Kashmir in shaping India's foreign relations. By considering all the important factors that conditioned India's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, it is hoped that the Kashmir factor in India's relations with both countries will be placed in better perspective.

The first chapter of the thesis examines the importance of Kashmir to India in the light of the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan. In this respect, the chapter examines Kashmir's symbolic importance
to India's unity, and its secularism, and, finally, its importance for strategic reasons to India. The chapter concludes that because of the importance of Kashmir to India for the above reasons, the attitudes of states to the Kashmir dispute has inevitably been a factor in India's relations with them.

Chapter two analyzes those factors that conditioned India's relations with the superpowers prior to 1954. In other words, it attempts to present the background against which India's relations with the superpowers were conducted in the 1950s, particularly in the period 1954-59. The chapter is divided into three sections; the first section examines Kashmir as a factor in Indo-American and Indo-Soviet relations in the period 1948-1953. In this section, India's growing disenchantment with the American position on Kashmir, and the impact of this on India's relations with the United States are examined. The section also shows that, in the same period, the Soviet Union adopted a neutral posture on the Kashmir issue, with the result that Kashmir did not become an irritant in Indo-Soviet relations as it did in the case of the United States.

Section two of the chapter examines India's policy of nonalignment and the reasons advanced by the Indian leader-
ship for the necessity of such a policy as a means of achieving India's foreign policy objectives in the 1950s. In particular, it looks at the way in which India's initial attitudes to both the United States and the Soviet Union were conditioned by its pre-independence conception of the two countries, and by its adoption at independence of a policy of nonalignment. Section three of the chapter looks at India's attitude to each of the superpowers in the first five years of independence. Here the thesis examines India's approach to the Cold War, as well as the different Indian and American approaches to the threat of international Communism, particularly in Asia. India's increasing role in world affairs, as exemplified by her role in the settlement of the Korean conflict and its impact on both superpowers are examined. Finally, the section looks at Indo-Soviet relations in the five years after independence. Fundamentally, the second and third sections serve to show that a variety of non-Kashmir factors were in fact the main determinants of India's relations with the superpowers during this period.

Chapter three examines India's relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union in the period 1954-59. The chapter indicates that this period, unlike the first five years of Indo-American relations, was characterized by
continuous friction between the two countries on a variety of world issues. The chapter indicates also that in this period there was a marked improvement in Indo-Soviet relations as compared to the early years after India's independence. This chapter, like chapter two, is divided into three sections; the first section deals with Kashmir as a factor in India's relations with both countries during this period. This section examines the continuous friction between the United States and India on the question of Kashmir. The declaration of Soviet support for India's stand on Kashmir, and its impact on Indo-Soviet relations are also examined.

Sections two and three of the chapter examine the non-Kashmir factors in Indo-American and Indo-Soviet relations respectively. Section two indicates that the period 1954-59 was characterized by friction between India and the United States over the issues that developed in the last half of the 1950s. Their different approaches to the Cold War continued to be a source of irritation between them, as were their differing outlooks on colonialism, the recognition of the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, problems in the Middle East and the issue of disarmament. The section shows that the political differences between the two countries were sharply expressed but that these disagreements related to
events in other countries, and did not directly prevent the development of their bilateral relations. Thus, for example, despite Indo-American disagreements over major international issues, India continued to obtain much economic assistance from the United States.

In contrast, the third section shows that relations between India and the Soviet Union steadily improved in the last half of the 1950s. The declaration of Soviet support for India's stand on Kashmir, the similarity of views between India and the Soviet Union on such issues as disarmament, colonialism and the Middle East, as well as Soviet economic and technical assistance to India were all important factors in cementing Indo-Soviet relations in the period.

The chapter, therefore, demonstrates that during the period 1954-59, Kashmir continued to be important to India's basic national interest, but was not in fact a critical factor in shaping India's relations with the superpowers. The chapter shows that Kashmir's impact was reflected in issues which the Indian leadership saw as having a bearing on India's foreign policy and its relations with the superpowers.

Thus, the thesis as a whole concludes that Kashmir was an important but not a primary factor in shaping India's relations with both superpowers in the 1950s.
CHAPTER I

THE IMPORTANCE OF KASHMIR TO INDIA

During the latter stages of the struggle for independence in the Indian subcontinent, two views emerged as to the identity of India. To the Indian National Congress, India was a national entity. To the Muslim League, there were two distinct communities within the subcontinent, the Muslims and the Hindus, so incompatible in their outlook as to be incapable of living within the bounds of a single nation. This dichotomy was reflected in the different meanings and interpretations of the two bodies to the partition of the country into India and Pakistan.

The Kashmir dispute is both a reflection and a symbol of these differences. Today the dispute is deeply embedded in the politics of the two countries and in the power rivalries of the great powers. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the importance of Kashmir to India. In so doing, the chapter will examine some of the basic issues involved in the dispute, to determine how important these issues are to Indian leaders and therefore to India. Finally, the chapter will examine briefly Kashmir as an important factor in India's foreign relations.
The Indian Independence Act of 1947 under which the former British subcontinent of India was partitioned into the independent states of India and Pakistan, provided that the Princely States which had formed a considerable proportion of the subcontinent could accede either to India or Pakistan or enter into agreements with either Dominion for the jurisdiction over Defense, Foreign Affairs and Communications while retaining complete autonomy on all other issues. Accession to India or Pakistan was to be complete when the Governor-General of India, representing the British Crown, signified his acceptance of the instruments of accession executed by the ruler of the state.

On the 15th of August 1947, the Maharajah of the Princely States of Jammu and Kashmir concluded an agreement with Pakistan authorizing the latter to operate Kashmir's posts and telegraph (formerly the responsibility of the undivided Government of India) and obligating Pakistan to supply food and other necessities. In this arrangement, defence and foreign affairs were not mentioned. Soon after Kashmir concluded this agreement with Pakistan, the latter cut off or delayed vital supplies of food and other commodities to Kashmir. Border raids and the infiltration of large numbers of tribesmen from the North-West Frontier Provinces began against
Kashmir and soon erupted into an invasion in late October. Unable to cope with the invasion, the Maharajah sought India's assistance. On the advice of Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor-General of India, the Government of India invited the Maharajah to sign the instruments of accession as the first step in securing India's help. This he did on October 27th 1947. The instrument, together with India's letter of acceptance from the Governor-General, completed Kashmir's accession to India.¹

The most controversial feature of the accession was the statement by Mountbatten in accepting the accession that:

> It is my Government's (India's) wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil is cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.²

Pakistan argued that Kashmir, being a Muslim majority area, should become part of her territory and that Mountbatten's stipulation had rendered the accession conditional upon the outcome of a plebiscite. In this connection, it should be noted that Mountbatten informed the Maharajah that

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¹ M. Brecher; *The Struggle for Kashmir*. (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1953), chapter 2.
this 'wish' was consistent with India's policy, that in the case of any state where the issue of accession had been subject to dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State.\(^3\)

Pakistan's assault on Western Kashmir persisted after the accession and finally resulted in the de facto partition of Kashmir. The cease-fire line that was drawn then, at the end of the fighting in 1948, and finally acknowledged as such by both parties in 1949, has constituted the de facto boundary line between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. India took the issue of Pakistan's invasion and occupation of part of Kashmir to the Security Council in 1948. The issue has remained there ever since.

The continuation of the Kashmir dispute over the last twenty years and the entrenched positions taken by both sides in the dispute inevitably raises the question of what it is that is so important about Kashmir that makes neither side to the dispute willing to give way or to compromise. The struggle for Kashmir is not fundamentally a struggle for territory, nor for economic resources. As one observer points out:

\(^3\) Ibid, p 38.
It is not a battle for territory that they are fighting, it is not strategic interest that is basically involved, although the strategic importance of Kashmir is not to be denied, no economic resources have allured them - it is a great war of ideology that is being waged in Kashmir.4

The conflicting ideologies at stake in Kashmir are the Indian conception of secularism as a fundamental tenet of statehood and the Pakistani belief in the need for two States in the subcontinent divided along religious lines because of the inherent incompatibility of Muslims and Hindus.

Thus, this ideological contest relates to the important question of the identity of the two countries, and Kashmir has come to be central to this conflict over identity. India finds its secular identity weakened without the example which a united Kashmir could provide of a predominantly Muslim state, living peacefully as an integral part of a nation which is predominantly Hindu. Pakistan (which was founded on the basis of the Muslim demand for a separate state) without Kashmir, is denied the claim of being the home and guardian of the Muslims of the subcontinent, and the ability to assert that the Muslims and the Hindus of the

subcontinent cannot live within the bounds of one nation. These points of view are held rather deeply and the continuing controversy has made them more entrenched than they were in the beginning.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir is situated in the extreme north of the Indian subcontinent. Covering an area of 84,471 square miles, it is the largest of the Indian states. It consists of three provinces: the Frontier district, Kashmir province and Jammu province, which includes Poonch and Cheneni. On the boundaries of Kashmir are Tibet in the north-east, Sinkiang in the north, the Soviet Republic of Turkestan and Afghanistan to the west and India and Pakistan in the south. Kashmir may be divided into three geographically demarcated areas: the Tibetan and Omi tracts in the north which includes the districts of Ladakh and Gilgit, the middle Happy Valley of Kashmir and the plainland of Jammu in the south. These three areas are separated by the snowbound outer Himalayan ranges. Thus, Kashmir's proximity to five countries greatly enhances its geopolitical significance. This geopolitical position is made even more important when it is realized that to the north-east of the state lies the Aksai Chin area which has been under China's occupation since 1957. This area is claimed by India as part of her territory. Given the fact of China's

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5 Ibid; p 81.
occupation of the Aksai Chin area, Kashmir assumes considerable political importance to India. However, before any analysis of the importance of Kashmir to India's security can be undertaken, the term security should be defined.

The ultimate purpose of security is the survival of the nation even though that which constitutes security is always changing. It is composed of military, economic, diplomatic and psychological factors with its definition being dependent on factors peculiar to a given nation. Wolfers defines security as: "... the protection of values previously acquired."\(^6\) Lippman argues that the nation is secure to the extent that it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war and is able if challenged to maintain them by victory in such a war.\(^7\) Such definitions of security point to the preservation of values and go beyond the maintenance of territorial integrity which was once considered the core of the concept. As one writer has recently pointed out:

National security must, if it is to have any contemporary relevance, include not only considerations of territorial integrity and political independence but also the survival of national identity and values.\(^8\)

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\(^7\) *Ibid*, p 150.

\(^8\) Roger F. Swanson; *Behind the Headlines*, Vol.XXIX, Nos.5-6, July 1970, p 9.
This broad definition of national security would seem to suggest that physical security is only a part of national security. A 1956 Brookings Institution study defines national interest as embracing:

... such matters as the need of a society to be free from external interference in the maintenance of its identity as an organized state - security from aggression; the desire of a national group to maintain its standard of well-being and cultural cohesion, and the efforts that an organized state, operating politically, makes to achieve the conditions both internally and internationally that will contribute to its security and well-being. 9

From the foregoing, security becomes the preservation of those core values that lie at the heart of the national fabric. This, however, raises the question of the nation or 'self' to be preserved. It would appear that the nation or self to be preserved would normally include territory and accompanying people, as well as those core values that have come to bind that people together. Physical changes in the state structure may often be viewed as threatening security. Thus, uncertainty may arise when new states are created, or when boundary lines change. This uncertainty may be a result

of the effect on the perception of 'self' which stems from the creation of the new state or in the redrawing of boundaries. This is essentially the question involved in the Kashmir dispute. That is to say, Indians perceive Kashmir as constituting an integral part of India and as affirming the Indian core value of secularism. Thus, Kashmir is important to India's security not only in the narrow geopolitical sense, but in the wider sense of preservation of the self and fundamental national values.

The creation of Pakistan was a result of fear on the part of the Muslims in India that their identity would be submerged within that of predominantly Hindu India. This fear led to the demand for self-determination on the part of the Muslims and had its expression in the two-nation theory propounded by the Muslim leaders towards the end of the struggle for independence. As the nation envisaged by the Muslim leaders was based primarily on religion, it ran counter to the secular ideal which the Congress leaders held up for India during the struggle for independence. As such, it was a threat to a core value on which the Indian union was to be founded, and, therefore, impinged directly on the symbolic importance of Kashmir to India. To demonstrate this importance in the light of what Indian leaders regard as the Indian 'self', as well as to place
it in perspective, it is necessary to look at the pre-
indpendence basis of communalism in the subcontinent, the
religious composition of Kashmir, and the response of the
Indian leaders to the two-nation theory when first pro-
pounded by the Muslim League prior to the granting of inde-
pendence.

Communalism is a pervasive force in Indian life. Its
economic base rests on the fact that the Hindu middle-class
registered spectacular growth during the early decades of
British rule, while the Muslims failed significantly during
the same period to develop any such class. This was partly an
accident of geography. The Moghuls, like most others who in-
vaded India, came through the land routes of the north. Con-
sequently, the north-west came under stronger Muslim influence
and domination than the rest of the subcontinent.\(^{10}\) The Bri-
tish, unlike others before them, came by sea and settled along
the eastern coast in particular. As a result, early centres
of British activity were generally far away from the areas of
dominant Muslim influence. The effect of this was that the
commercial and education opportunities opened up by the British
presence benefited largely Hindu people. Even in the heyday
of Moghul supremacy, the Muslims did not compete with the

\(^{10}\) J.B. DasGupta, *op.cit.*, p 8.
Hindus in non-military and minor professions or trades, with the result that the development of a sizeable Muslim middle-class was long delayed. This situation persisted in later generations, providing an economic base for communalism.\footnote{11}{J.B. DasGupta, \textit{op. cit.}, p 8.}

In addition to the economic factor, differences in customs between Muslims and Hindus have inhibited contact between the two communities. In their religious observance, Hindus use idols, whereas Muslims do not. To the Hindu, the cow is a sacred animal, to the Muslim, a source of meat. These differences have often been a source of conflict between the two communities and have impeded closer cooperation between them. Though they have had a common history, they have interpreted their history differently. To the majority of Hindus, the great heroes of the past were men like Shivaji, famous for his exploits against the Moghuls; whereas the Muslims worshipped those who were the most ardent champions of Islam.\footnote{12}{\textit{Ibid}, p 10.}

Many of the differences that strained relations between Hindus and Muslims were further aggravated as the struggle for independence unfolded, in the Indian subcontinent. From the outset, there was suspicion among the Muslims that the Indian National Congress was primarily defending and fostering Hindu cultural interest. This fear was based in part on the fact
that the Congress used Hindu values to appeal to and to develop the Indian nationalist spirit. This led many Muslims to view the largely Hindu-led nationalist movement as communal, thus furthering the alienation between the two communities as the struggle for independence progressed.

The British partition of Bengal in 1905 along communal lines gave no small encouragement to Muslim nationalism. The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 which gave the people of India enlarged participation in government, recognized the principle of separate communal representation. This gave added impetus to Muslim nationalism. The principle of separate representation was opposed by Congress. However, the All-India National Congress and the Muslim League met in Lucknow in 1916 to produce the famous Lucknow Pact. The Pact resulted in the two organizations asking for constitutional reforms and the Congress concurring with the League in the principle of separate electorates for the Muslims.

In 1928, Congress drafted a blue-print for the constitution of India with dominion status. This draft, however, made no mention of a separate electorate for the Muslim community. As a result, the Muslims were completely

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13 For example, the application of the Hindu concepts of non-violence by Mahatma Ghandi in the form of Satyagraha (soul force) or non-violent, non-cooperation during the 1930s and 1940s.

dissatisfied with the Congress draft and accused Congress of having completely overlooked the special position of the Muslim population. As a reaction to the Congress draft, the League met in Delhi in 1929 and proclaimed its own 'Fourteen Points' which, by contrast to the Congress draft, asked for separate electorates and special privileges for the Muslims in the executive. At this point, however, the Muslims had yet to raise their demand for a separate state; this was to come later.15

Congress, the League and the Princes participated in the elections of 1937 under the federal scheme embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935 which provided for almost complete autonomy in the provinces. In certain provinces, the League expected that it would be invited to form a coalition Government with the Congress. However, with the Congress having large majorities in the Legislatures, it had no need for an alliance with the League. League leaders in the United Provinces for example, were told that there would be no coalition and if they were to find places in the Ministry, the Muslim League would have to "cease to function as a separate group".16 Thus, in the Muslim view, the Congress was


16 Penderal Moon; Divide and Quit. (Berkeley: University of California, 1962), p 15.
not offering accommodation but absorption. This strengthened Muslim fears that the Congress was primarily a Hindu organization, unmindful of the rights of Muslims.

Between 1937 and 1940 there was no effective reconciliation between the Congress and the League, and at the 1940 Conference of the Muslim League in Lahore, the League passed its "Pakistan Resolution", demanding a separate state for the Muslims. Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, apparently admitted in private that this was only a tactical move designed to elicit the maximum possible concessions for the Muslims. However, the idea of Pakistan, once expressed, excited the masses and the demand for a separate Muslim state grew in intensity. The League was now placed in a position from which it would be difficult to withdraw.

As the 1940s unfolded, the gulf between the two communities widened with the result that subsequent efforts to work out a federal constitutional scheme satisfactory to both communities failed. Thus, the British Cabinet Mission of 1942, the Simla Conference of 1945 and the British Cabinet Mission of 1946 all struggled with the drafting of a federal constitution under which India would be granted dominion status but failed to produce a scheme acceptable to both communities.

\[17\text{ Ibid, p 21.}\]
Thus, economic, customary and political differences kept the two communities apart and stood in the way of mutual understanding and toleration. These differences were reflected in two distinct ways of life and two different spiritual outlooks and finally manifested themselves in two opposing conceptions of the future of the Indian subcontinent. With partition in 1947, Kashmir became the symbol of these different conceptions.

The Census Report of 1961 placed the population of Indian administered Kashmir at 3,560,976. The Muslims at this time constituted 68.30 percent, the Hindus accounted for 28.45 percent and the Buddhists constituted 1.36 percent, while the Sikhs formed 1.77 percent of the population. In Indian Kashmir, the Hindus predominate in three districts only: in the district of Udhampur, there were in 1961, 165,506 Hindus, 86,059 Muslims and 2,259 Sikhs. Jammu had 428,835 Hindus, 51,847 Muslims and 32,788 Sikhs. In Kathua, there were 177,666 Hindus, 27,605 Muslims and 32,188 Sikhs. In Ladakh, there were 47,708 Buddhists against 40,275 Muslims. These are the non-Muslim majority areas of Indian Kashmir. In the five remaining districts, the Muslims outnumbered the non-Muslims in 1961 in the following proportions: in Anntanog, out of a total population of 654,368, the Muslims numbered 624,373, the Hindus 23,978 and
the Sikhs 6,010 only. In Srinagar 580,538 Muslims lived with 53,167 Hindus and 6,459 Sikhs. Baramula's total population was 604,659 of which 588,389 were Muslims, 11,957 were Hindus and 4,244 Sikhs. In Qoda, Muslims accounted for 174,499 persons, the Hindus 92,797 only, whereas the Sikhs numbered 480 only. In the district of Poonch, 259,082 Muslims had 58,712 Hindus and 8,193 Sikhs as their neighbours.18

Thus, with Kashmir being a predominantly Muslim state, it had and has important implications for India's secularism. As a united integral part of India, it could serve as an affirmation of the fact that both the Hindus and the Muslims can live together in harmony, and as a denial of the necessity of creating two nations in the Indian subcontinent. To the Indian leaders, the subcontinent was one because of the consequences of a common history, common suffering and the successful intermingling of varied cultures and customs of diverse peoples. This belief in the unity of the subcontinent required for its realization commitment to the concept of a secular state.

To the Indian leaders, secularism was a pragmatic solution to India's religious, cultural and linguistic pluralism. The very fact that Pakistan should contest Kashmir on the ground of religion was to them a threat to one of the

core values on which the Indian Union was to be founded, and as such a threat to India's security.

The Muslims had no patience with the pre-1947 idea that India was a national entity. As Jinnah, often called the father of Pakistan, once remarked:

It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religious in the strict sense of the word, but in fact different social orders, and it is a dream that the Muslims and Hindus can evolve a common nationality and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone beyond the limit and is the cause of most of our hostilities and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither intermarry nor inter-dine and indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions.\(^\text{19}\)

These factors were the basis of the Muslim demand for a separate state - a state based on religion. To those favouring separation, Kashmir's accession to India was also important in strengthening the new country's claim to be the guardian of the Muslims. Such a view, however, runs contrary to India's secular ideal. In the eyes of the Indian leaders,

\(^{19}\) J. Korbel; op. cit., p 26.
Kashmir is in miniature another Pakistan, and if Kashmir can be successfully governed by India, then the ideal of secularism is vindicated.

Indian leaders did not agree to the partition of the subcontinent on the ground of irreconcilable religious differences even though they ultimately accepted partition. They accepted partition on the ground that it would avoid conflict and speed up the granting of independence. Moreover, with partition and the continuing dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the latter has assumed significant 'symbolic' importance to India's secularism. It is feared by Indian leaders that Kashmir has the potential for reopening many issues in the body politic of India - chief of these is that of theocracy versus secularism and the related question of the viability of India as a secular state. Not only would the introduction of such issues undermine India's external stability but that of the South Asian region as well.  

Thus, in response to the charge that acceptance of partition was acceptance of the two-nation theory, Mr. Nehru replied:

This is a surprising argument. At no time in India have we accepted the two-nation theory nor will we accept it. Why did we agree to partition? To avoid conflict, disorders and postponement of the achievement of freedom. We agreed to let the matter be

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settled by the elected representatives in the provincial assemblies concerned, although it would have been better if the issue had been decided by popular vote. What we accepted was the popular verdict as was expressed by the popular representatives and not the two-nation theory. If we accepted that theory, 40,000,000 Muslims would have become aliens in India. 21

Thus, partition to Indian leaders was a political expedient and did not mean that they accepted the view that Muslims and Hindus constituted two distinct nationalities. The very establishment of Pakistan on the basis of the concept of separate nationhood for Muslims and the continued emphasis on its Islamic character, as well as its insistence on self-determination for Kashmir, strengthens those elements in India which do not consider the secular concept of Indian nationalism viable in partitioned India. In this respect, it affects the sixty million Muslims in India and does little to allay communal tensions.

The threat which Pakistan poses to India's security by its stand on Kashmir is reinforced by the Indian interpretation of Pakistan's view of the history of the subcontinent. This is well brought out by Michael Brecher in his interview with Krishna Menon who, in reply to a question on Kashmir, said:

My belief is that the Pakistani leaders look upon Pakistan as the first instalment, thinking in terms of the English doctrine, take what you have and fight for more! They never seem to have accepted partition as final, as we did. Their main approach to the problem is that India was theirs; India was a Muslim country historically, the British had taken it from them, now the British had gone away, it should be handed over to them. 22

This view sees Pakistan in a hostile, almost imperialist light, as a threat to India's security of which Kashmir is only the first prize in the struggle. Thus, not only is the interpretation critical of Pakistani motives in Kashmir, but Indian memories of repeated invasions from the north-west have led in this case to the more alarmist interpretation of Pakistani goals.

Given the image of Kashmir in the perception of Indian leaders and the threat which Pakistan poses by its attitude on Kashmir, it is not difficult to see the importance of Kashmir to India. Yet, there is another aspect in which Kashmir is bound up with the Indian perception of what constitutes India. Unity came to India with the British, and the present Indian leadership has not known an India that was fragmented or Balkanized - though the threat of Balkanization is never lurking

far away in the background, given the many cultural, linguistic and other differences that characterize Indian life. Indian leaders have felt that if they gave way on Kashmir, there might well be demands for the precedent to be applied elsewhere. This feeling has persisted despite the fact that the Sikhs in the Punjab and the Nagas in Assam have sought and have achieved a degree of independent rule from the centre. However, the argument that Kashmir was necessary to the unity of India, and that any capitulation on that issue would provide the signal for an outbreak of communal rioting, which would be the prelude to the disintegration of the Indian secular state, has not been shared by all. J.P. Narayan has criticized the above view in an article entitled: "Our Great Opportunity in Kashmir" in which he observed:

Few things have been said in the cause of that controversy more silly than this one. The assumption behind the argument is that the states of India are held together by force and not by the sentiment of a common nationality. It is an assumption that makes a mockery of the Indian nation and a tyrant of the Indian state.23

However, there can be no doubt that in the eyes of Indian leaders Kashmir has become the symbol of Indian unity.24

24 Ibid, p 141.
Kashmir is also important to India's physical security and this relates to its exposure to Chinese penetration. From Sinkiang to Tibet, Kashmir is exposed to ever-increasing pressure. Its hilly and rugged borders are ideal for infiltration. As Korbel observed:

With all its economic misery and internal corrosion, its religious feuds and geographic proximity to Communist Sinkiang and Tibet, Kashmir offers an ideal battleground for subversive design.  

In the official Indian view, Kashmir occupies a very strategic position. This view was underlined by an Indian Government White Paper which declared:

Kashmir's northern frontiers, as you are aware, run in common with the U.S.S.R. and China, security of Kashmir which must depend on internal tranquility and an existence of stable government is vital to the security of India - especially since part of the southern boundary of Kashmir and India are common. Helping Kashmir is therefore an obligation of national interest to India.

This view was further reiterated by the late Prime Minister Nehru to the Constituent Assembly in the following words:

25 J. Korbel; op.cit., p 249.

26 Cited in A. Lamb, op.cit., p 145.
We were of course vitally interested in the decision the state would take regarding accession. Kashmir, because of her geographical position, with her frontier with the Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan is intimately connected with the security of India. 27

Geopolitically, Kashmir has a bearing on India's defense. Its rather rugged topography and its elevated location make it an admirable buffer between India and her neighbours in the West, North and North-East. The eastern section of Ladakh is extremely important in this respect, as it controls the routes leading into the Vale of Kashmir. It is very difficult to defend Kashmir without Ladakh.

Finally, it can be argued that because India finds its definition of itself complete only with the retention of Kashmir, the latter has become an important element in the Indian identity and in the demonstration of its secularism. Even if one finds the actual or real importance of Kashmir to India's secularism questionable, it does not deny the fact that Kashmir is held important in that respect by Indian leaders. Kashmir's strategic value to India cannot be denied, and India's retention of Kashmir against Pakistan's claims and against the many fissiporous tendencies found in Indian society has made it an important symbol of Indian unity.

The above factors clearly demonstrate the importance of Kashmir to India's basic national interest. This, coupled with the continuing dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has made the latter an important factor in India's foreign relations - both in the South Asian setting and beyond. The internationalization of the Kashmir issue with both superpowers lined up on opposite sides of the issue has added to the importance of Kashmir in India's foreign relations. India's view of partition is also important in this respect. Even though partition was accepted by the Indian leaders on the ground that it would expedite the achievement of freedom, Indian leaders seem to think that they can accept partition, and still not accept the two-nation theory which resulted in the division of the subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan. As Peter Lyon puts it:

Fundamentally, India sees herself as the primary legatee of undivided India, with Pakistan as a seceding state. Pakistan by contrast, regards herself as having equal status with India and claims that both of them are successor states to former British colonial rule.²⁸

As a result, Indian leaders who reluctantly accepted partition, and the division of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan, are not now inclined to capitulate on Kashmir in spite of what

Indians regard as Western pressure to resolve the Kashmir dispute in favour of Pakistan.

Thus, Kashmir's importance as a factor in India's foreign relations stems from the above factors. In the Indian perception, a favourable attitude on Kashmir not only adds support to the argument that it is the primary legatee of British India, but also indicates acceptance of the Indian secular ideal. On the contrary, an unfavourable attitude on India's stand on Kashmir, tends to lend support in Indian eyes to the idea that the division of Hindus and Muslims in the subcontinent is inevitable, and that the two communities cannot live together in harmony. In other words, it challenges the Indian definition of itself and the secular ideal. This has not only made Kashmir an important factor in India's foreign relations, but has made it the yardstick by which it judges its friends and enemies. In other words, support for its position on Kashmir has become one of the tests of friendship for India.
CHAPTER II

INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS TO 1954

Kashmir, an issue involving India's basic national interest, became an important factor in India's attitude towards the superpowers in the 1950s. India took the Kashmir issue to the Security Council in 1948 in the hope of finding international support for her case on Kashmir, and in the belief that the world body would assist in finding a settlement to the dispute. Indians were soon disappointed in these expectations, as the Security Council, and particularly the United States, adopted a position which Indians found unfavourable. How important this was in the development of India's attitude towards the superpowers will be examined in this chapter.

However, there were many other factors which conditioned India's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. These factors can best be analyzed within the framework of the strategy of nonalignment which India adopted at independence. Many of the values and attitudes that characterized India's approach to world affairs took shape in the pre-independence period when the leaders of the Indian National Congress started taking an active interest in world affairs.
Many of the attitudes developed in that period were important in India's choice of nonalignment as a foreign policy stance at independence. Thus, this chapter will also examine the background to India's relations with the superpowers, India's policy of nonalignment and finally, India's relations with the superpowers in the first six years of independence.

Kashmir in India's Relations with the Superpowers 1947-1954:

The Kashmir issue was first introduced before the Security Council in January 1948. India, in a complaint under Article 35, chapter 6 of the United Nations charter (dealing with the Pacific Settlements of disputes) requested that the Security Council ask the Government of Pakistan:

1) To prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil, from participating or assisting in the invasion of the Jammu and Kashmir state.

2) To call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in the Jammu and Kashmir state.

3) To deny the invaders (a) access to and use of territory for operations against Kashmir; (b) military and other supplies; (c) all other kinds of aid that might lead to prolong the present struggle.

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On January 15th 1948, Pakistan's Foreign Minister addressed Pakistan's reply to the Secretary General of the United Nations with the request that it be forwarded to the Security Council for appropriate action. In her reply, Pakistan denied the charges made by India in her complaint to the Security Council, and countered with charges of her own. Pakistan charged India with genocide against the Muslim population. India's objective, Pakistan held, was not only to kill the Muslims but to liquidate the State of Pakistan. In this scheme, Kashmir was only the culminating illustration of the hostility of India against Muslims and its ambition to rule over the subcontinent by naked force.\(^2\)

In presenting the Indian case, the Indian representative described the looting, rape, burning and murder that was carried out as the invaders swept down into Kashmir, and explained that this led the Indian Government to take military action. The Indian representative also pointed out that India had accepted the Maharajah's accession to India and, therefore, India was acting within her territory. Because of Kashmir's accession to India, the aid which the invaders received from Pakistan constituted an act of aggression against India. It appeared that India's primary objective in the Security Council

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debates was to narrow the scope of its argument, to pinpoint Pakistan's help of the tribal invasion of Kashmir, in the hope that once these facts were proved beyond doubt, the Security Council would censure Pakistan for its assistance to the invaders.³

Pakistan, in contrast to India, presented her case against the background of communal rioting in the subcontinent and the various events that led up to partition. In this respect it appeared that Pakistan's primary objective was to broaden the scope of the dispute and cast the Kashmir problem against the enlarged horizon of the Indo-Pakistani conflict and to prove that it was a systematic and carefully evolved scheme by India to reverse the trend of partition. Pakistan's presentation impressed the members of the Security Council who acquiesced in its approach by changing the title of the original complaint from "The Jammu and Kashmir Question" to "The Indo-Pakistan Question". This put the seal of U.N. approval on the Pakistani contention that Kashmir was only one aspect of the over-all relations between India and Pakistan.⁴

³ Ibid, p 126.
⁴ Ibid, p 128.
In the presentation of the Indian case, much emphasis was laid on the legality of Kashmir's accession to India and the Indian desire to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir provided certain conditions were fulfilled. The first step suggested in the Indian draft proposal was that the fighting be ended. This was to be followed by the withdrawal of the invaders and by the return of all those who had fled during the fighting. Next, in order to restore normal political life, the emergency administration which had been appointed by the Maharajah during the days of chaos was to be changed into a responsible ministry and prisoners were to be released. Then elections were to be held on the basis of adult franchise and a Kashmir Government was to be formed. Only then was the question of Kashmir's accession to be submitted to a plebiscite by the Kashmir Government "under the advice and observation of people appointed by the United Nations." However, this was opposed by the Government of Pakistan which felt that the plebiscite should be carried out by the United Nations, as she regarded the Government of Kashmir, led by Sheik Abdullah, as incapable of carrying out an impartial one.

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5 Ibid, p 129.

A positive reaction to the Indian draft proposal was forthcoming only from the Chinese Nationalist representative on the Security Council. On March 18th 1948, he moved a resolution calling on Pakistan to desist from giving further aid to the tribesmen and asking the interim Kashmir Government to add representatives of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to its Government and to set up a plebiscite machinery to be directed by an appointee of the United Nations Secretary-General. This resolution was acceptable to India with some reservations; Indians were disappointed that it did not receive support from other members of the Council.

On April 19th 1948, Belgium, Canada, China, Columbia, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted a revised resolution of the one put forward by Nationalist China on March 18th. This resolution was passed on April 21st 1948, with nine affirmative votes. The Soviet Union abstained. This resolution noted that both governments were agreed that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to either India or Pakistan should be decided through a plebiscite. The resolution also called on Pakistan to use its best endeavours to secure the withdrawal of its nationals from Kashmir. The resolution called on the Government of India to put

forward a plan in consultation with the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan which was set up in January for withdrawing its forces from Kashmir to a strength necessary for the maintenance of law and order. As a preparatory step to a plebiscite, the Government of India was asked to include all major political groups in the Council of Ministers of the State of Kashmir. India was also asked to accept a plebiscite administrator for the holding of a plebiscite, and to delegate powers to the latter for the same purpose.\(^8\)

This resolution had the full backing of the U.S. delegate who opined that the prior withdrawal of the Pakistani elements ought to satisfy India, whereas Pakistan should have no reason to complain in view of the arrangement for a plebiscite.\(^9\) India, however, rejected the resolution. In the Indian view, the resolution established parity between the aggressor and the victim of aggression. Indians also held that the resolution raised doubts about the validity of Kashmir's accession to India which was complete. Another objection raised by India was that the resolution was silent on the fact that it was essential for India to maintain her army in Kashmir not only for the maintenance of law and order but also for strategic reasons.\(^10\)

\(^8\) J.B. DasGupta; Jammu and Kashmir, p 134.

\(^9\) Ibid, p 134.

\(^10\) Ibid, p 135.
Indian public opinion during this period was extremely bitter on the Kashmir issue and the way it was being dealt with in the Security Council. Much of the Indian anger was directed against the position taken by the Government of the United States. Indians were particularly incensed over the American view which seemed to be that while India's legal position was strong, the dispute had a religious or communal aspect denied by India. The United States also tended to question Indian claims concerning the size of Sheikh Abdullah's following in Kashmir. Thus, on February 26th 1948, the Indian representative to the United Nations declared in New Delhi:

Do not feel surprised if I tell you that the representative of the United States went so far as to demand that the conditions under which the plebiscite is to be held be such as would satisfy not merely the insurgents, not merely Pakistan, but also the tribesmen from the North West frontier. In other words, his argument was that the people who were invading Kashmir should be given the assurance by India that the conditions under which the plebiscite was going to be held after normal conditions had been restored would be such as the tribesmen would recognise as satisfactory.

In the Indian view, Kashmir became a part of India by virtue of the Instruments of Accession of October 1947. Therefore, both the tribesmen and Pakistan had no standing in the dispute. Thus, India found it difficult to understand the U.S. position and that of the Security Council as a whole. On March 15th 1948, in a speech before the Indian Parliament, Mr. Nehru referred to the "strange view that people in the Security Council have taken on this issue."\(^{14}\)

To most Indians, the American position on Kashmir and that taken by the Security Council as a whole, appeared to accept Pakistan's claim to have a hand in Kashmir's affairs. This conviction was strengthened when there was, in the Indian view, not enough change in the Security Council's attitude, even after the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan reported that Pakistani forces had been fighting in Kashmir since May 1948.\(^{15}\)

Indians also complained that despite what India regarded as numerous concessions in the efforts to have a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue, both the United States and the Security Council as a whole continually urged India to proceed with arrangements for a plebiscite without Pakistan first having abided by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolution of August 15th 1948.

\(^{14}\) Ibid, p 107.

\(^{15}\) Poplai and Talbot, \textit{op.cit.}, p 74.
The above resolution acknowledged the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir, and urged Pakistan to withdraw its forces first, along with Pakistani nationals not normally resident in Kashmir. The Indian withdrawal under this resolution was limited to the bulk of its forces only, and was to follow that of Pakistan. During the discussions between Prime Minister Nehru and the Commission, Mr. Nehru clearly indicated that in the event of Pakistan not accepting the resolution of August 15th 1948, "the Government of India's acceptance of it should be regarded as in no way binding upon India." This position was accepted by the Commission. In the Indian view, the Security Council and American opinion had tended to ignore the essential point that India's offer of a plebiscite was contingent upon the prior fulfillment of certain conditions which have never been met.

Indians also complained that Americans ignored the cruelty which resulted from the invasion of Kashmir, carried on with Pakistan's consent, if not its active help. Indians noted that America had been quick to move when Greece and other Cold War areas had been threatened by aggression and that she had been eager to condemn China for its "aggression" in Korea, while in the Kashmir case, the Americans avoided condemning Pakistan. Indians were angered that the

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16 Ibid, p 76.
17 Ibid, p 76.
18 Ibid, p 78.
American position was maintained despite the fact that the United Nations mediator in Kashmir, Sir Owen Dixon, asserted in his report that the movement of Pakistani forces in the state of Kashmir from May 1948 was contrary to and inconsistent with international law. In addition, American policy on Kashmir was widely interpreted in India as a reaction to India's refusal to align herself with the United States in the Cold War. 19

The American position on Kashmir was that the Kashmir dispute could not be settled by a straight-forward acceptance of India's complaint. First, there was widespread reaction of shock to the outbreak of communal rioting that spread across Pakistan and upper India after August 1947, as well as the invasion of Kashmir. All of this made the United States realize that the subcontinent after partition was very unsettled. Thus, in the eyes of most Americans, both parties had played their part in the tragic events that had unfolded in the subcontinent. 20 The American reaction, therefore, was that it would be unrealistic to try to solve the Kashmir dispute by adjudication of the legal points, namely the validity of the Maharajah's accession to India, and the allegation of Pakistani aggression that was advanced by India, but denied by Pakistan.

19 Ibid, p 78.
20 Ibid, p 80.
The agreement by Pakistan and India on the desirability of a plebiscite seemed the best basis as the starting point for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, as both parties seemed unable to agree to either the origins or the nature of the dispute. This position seemed justified when both India and Pakistan agreed to the resolutions passed by the U.N.C.I.P.* on August 13th 1948 and January 5th 1949, setting out conditions for a cease-fire, truce and plebiscite, and further reiterating that "the question of accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of free and impartial plebiscite."21

Thus, it was held by the Government of the United States that the question of Pakistan's aggression, as well as the validity of the Maharajah's accession to India were academic, as the commitment of both India and Pakistan to a plebiscite meant that this would be the method for determining the future disposition of the State. As a result, American support had been extended to the efforts of appointed United Nations mediators to elicit some measure of agreement from both parties on the conditions to be established for the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir.22

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22 Poplai and Talbot, op.cit., p 81.
From 1948 onwards, India found most of the proposals for demilitarization in Kashmir not acceptable to her. Indians have argued that the conditions set out in the UNCIP resolutions of August 13th 1948 and January 5th 1949, were never fulfilled. Pakistan, on the other hand, found most of the subsequent proposals for demilitarization, prior to a plebiscite, favourable to her position. As a result, the impression gained currency in the United States that India was stalling and unwilling to agree to the temporary concessions of sovereignty and military control necessary for an impartial plebiscite. This point was also emphasized by Sir Owen Dixon in reporting the failure of his mediatory efforts. He observed:

I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of any such character, as would in my opinion permit the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be impeded.23

The Indian interpretation of the resolutions of August 13th 1948 and January 5th 1949 was that Pakistan should take the first step - that of withdrawing its troops from territory

23 Ibid, p 82.
under its de facto control, before she would agree to any
detailed arrangements for conducting a plebiscite. This
seemed to most Americans to be a rather small point. In
the eyes of the American Government, it was held that the
steps towards a truce and plebiscite were interrelated, and
neither party was likely to take the first step unless it had
full assurance that all the remaining steps would follow automatically.24 The Indians maintained their position because in
their view, the aggressor and the aggrieved should not be
treated as equals.25

Indian opinion held that the positions taken by the
United States were a result of hostility towards India and not
the result of honest differences of opinion. Many politicians
in India, as well as important sections of the Indian press,
alleged that the Western powers were following a pro-Pakistan
policy with the purpose of protecting and promoting their
strategic interest in the area. The alleged American encourage-
ment of Sheik Abdullah in his 'Independent Kashmir' venture
seemed to confirm the fears of many Indians that the United
States was promoting its strategic interest in Kashmir by
adopting a pro-Pakistan posture on the Kashmir question.26

24 Ibid, p 82.


It has been suggested by L.K. Rosinger that American policy in Kashmir presumably arose in part from Kashmir's strategic location: close to the U.S.S.R., Afghanistan, Tibet, Sinkiang, India and Pakistan. The appointment of Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, an American, as plebiscite administrator seemed to affirm this in the minds of Indians. Whatever may have been the reasons behind America's policy in the Kashmir dispute, it was a severe irritant to good relations between India and the United States in the post-independence period.

In contrast to the clear-cut stand taken by the United States on the Kashmir issue in the United Nations, the Soviet attitude from the beginning, both in debate and in voting was rather non-committal. In 1948, when the Kashmir question was first discussed in the United Nations, the Soviet delegate objected to the change of the item from the situation in Jammu and Kashmir to the India-Pakistan question. He supported the Indian delegate's objection to that change in a brief speech but abstained in the voting. In the period 1948-50, Kashmir occupied much of the attention of the Security Council, but the Soviet delegate made few speeches and abstained from voting on all the resolutions.

27 L.K. Rosinger, op.cit., p 111. All commentators have not shared the view that the initial American interest in Kashmir had a strategic aspect. See J.Korbel, op.cit., p 269; also J.B. DasGupta, Indo-Pakistani Relations, op.cit., p 153.

In 1951, the Security Council dealt with the report of Sir Owen Dixon, and appointed Dr. Frank Graham as the new mediator between India and Pakistan. During that year, Kashmir dominated Security Council business for nearly three months, but the Soviet delegate again made few speeches and when he did so, it was merely to inquire why a citizen of the United States was appointed as a United Nations representative to mediate in Kashmir. 29

When Dr. Frank Graham submitted his report in November of 1951, the Security Council passed a resolution, maintaining that the fate of the state of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir, expressed through a free and impartial plebiscite, conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. In the whole debate, the Soviet representative did not participate once and, as usual, abstained in the voting.

From the outset, the Soviet press expressed the opinion that Anglo-American teams were surveying the territory of Pakistan-held Kashmir for building military bases against the Soviet Union and Communist China. 30 This opinion was reiterated by the Soviet representative in a speech before the Security Council in January 1952. In that speech, the Soviet delegate asked:

29 Ibid, p 51.

30 Ibid, p 52.
What is the reason why the plans put forward by the United States and the United Kingdom in connection with Kashmir have proved fruitless from the point of view of a settlement of the Kashmir question? . . . The purpose of these plans is interference by the United States and the United Kingdom in the internal affairs of Kashmir, the prolongation of the dispute between India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir and the conversion of Kashmir into a protectorate of the United States and the United Kingdom under the pretext of rendering assistance through the United Nations. 31

When the Security Council again discussed the Kashmir question in 1952 to consider the fourth Graham report, the Soviet delegate repeated the tone and content of the above quoted speech and severely criticized the British and American Governments for interfering in the Indo-Pakistan dispute and making its solution more difficult. However, the U.S.S.R. remained non-committal and abstained on all resolutions.

The lack of a positive stand on Kashmir by the U.S.S.R. on an issue involving armed conflict between two neighbours was mainly due to the U.S.S.R.'s hostile posture towards the successor governments to the British Raj in the immediate post-independence period, and Stalin's failure to perceive the emerging 'third world' and to evolve a positive policy towards it. Since Pakistan had not joined the Western bloc during

31 Ibid, p 53.
this period, she was not yet treated as an enemy bloc country; on the other hand, the cultivation of good relations with India and a positive pro-Indian stand on Kashmir was not yet an aspect of Soviet foreign policy.

Thus, with Soviet indifference on the Kashmir question in the early post-Independence period, Kashmir did not become a contentious factor in Indo-Soviet relations as it did in the case of Indo-American relations.

The Background to India's Relations with the Superpowers:

Kashmir, though an important factor in India's foreign relations after independence, does not in itself offer an adequate explanation of India's international outlook, as a whole range of attitudes and values conditioned India's international relations during the early 1950s. In examining India's relations with the superpowers in the early post-independence years, it is, therefore, necessary to look at the other factors influencing India's international outlook in order to place the Kashmir factor in proper perspective.

From the 1920s onwards, Indian nationalists started taking an active interest in world affairs, with the result that many of the attitudes developed by Indians in that period, were to characterize India's nonalignment, and her attitude to the superpowers in the post-independence period.
Notwithstanding the differences in circumstances surrounding the Indian and American independence movements, both countries experienced the fervour of nationalism and of democratic ideals. The same sentiments that brought liberty to eighteenth-century America inspired the Indian National Congress. The American Declaration of Independence had a profound impact on the leaders of the Congress. Indian nationalists cherished the American concepts of individual freedom, liberty, justice and respect for the rights of the individual and believed like Americans, that government should be carried on with the consent of the governed. Thus, nationalist Indians drew inspiration from American political precepts and from the American example of a successful struggle for independence.

However, despite these bonds and the Indian gratitude for the moral support generally accorded by Americans to the Indian struggle for independence, there were at the same time sources of Indian alienation from the United States. Thus, for example, while the role played by Woodrow Wilson at the Versailles Peace Conference encouraged nationalist Indians to hope that in future years, the United States would support energetically the struggle of colonial countries for self-determination, in the mid-twenties, Indian enthusiasm for

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33 Ibid, p 7.
the United States began to decline. This was in particular a result of the Monroe Doctrine as applied by the United States in the 1920s and 1930s; that is, the American tendency to interfere in the domestic affairs of Latin-American countries. To most Indians, this smacked of imperialism and amounted to a contradiction of the principles of self-determination. Indians were also concerned about racism in the United States.

Indian alienation from the United States was at this time reinforced by the growing popularity of the Leninist dictum that imperialism was the inevitable outcome of capitalism. On the basis of this, it followed, in the Indian view, that imperialism would emerge in the most successful capitalist country in the West. This harsh view of the United States was not shared by all Indians; many felt that America's overall policies, both towards the Philippines and China, represented an improvement over that of other colonial powers in Asia. Even those who were most critical of the United States during the 1920s and 1930s did not feel that imperialism was necessarily endemic to the United States; rather they felt that it was a particular characteristic of American Republicans.

34 T.A. Keenleyside (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation). The origins of Indian Foreign Policy - (A study of Nationalist Indian attitudes to foreign affairs) 1927-1939, p 257. Also see Bimal Prasad; The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy. (Calcutta: Bookland Printing Ltd., 1960), p 95.

35 T.A. Keenleyside, op. cit., p 263.

36 Ibid, p 263.
With the advent of the Democratic administration under Franklin Roosevelt, the nationalist Indian view of the United States did improve again. Roosevelt's "New Deal" even suggested to some Indians that capitalism in the United States was developing differently than in Europe. However, it was certain changes in American foreign policy that were responsible for reviving India's sympathy for the United States. Indians were pleased with the passing of the Philippines Independence Bill in March 1934, providing for the independence of the Philippines in ten years. Also, the new American policy towards Latin America obtained recognition in nationalist India. The statement by the American Secretary of State that the United States would never again intervene with armed forces in a Latin American country, as well as the American withdrawal from Haiti were all seen in India as evidence of the American intent to adhere to this declaration.

The second World War resulted in a heightened American interest in India and the desire to see a peaceful settlement of the question of Indian independence. Many Americans felt that the disturbing political situation in India and Britain's failure to associate the nationalist leaders with the war effort would seriously impede American operations in the eastern theatre of the war. Americans also felt that allowing them-

37 Ibid, p 265.

38 A. Guy Hope, op.cit., pp 8-9.
selves to be too closely associated with British policy would affect their standing among Asians and tarnish their avowedly anti-colonialist image. At this time, the United States was the only power among the Allies strongly advocating the anti-colonial aspects of the Atlantic Charter.\(^{39}\) Thus, throughout the second World War, America did bring some pressure to bear in favour of the granting of India's independence. Despite this, however, the Indian attitude towards the United States in the pre-independence period was rather ambivalent. This same ambivalence characterized much of India's attitude towards the Soviet Union in the pre-independence period.

The initial Indian nationalist reaction to the Soviet Union was one of suspicion. However, the Socialist experiment being carried on in the Soviet Union did have a profound impact on Indian intellectuals and nationalists of the younger generation, who were starting to assume leadership of the nationalist movement in the late 1920s. The similarity in the conditions existing in the two countries heightened the interest of Nehru in Soviet programs of social and economic reform. As Nehru observed:

Russia interests us because conditions there have not been dissimilar to conditions in India. Both are vast agricultural countries with only the beginnings of industrialization and both have to face poverty and illiteracy. If the Russians find a satisfactory solution for these, our work in India is made easier. 40

Much of the favourable attitude which Indian nationalists had of the U.S.S.R. in the 1920s and 1930 derived largely from the fact that at this time, the Soviet Union was the only European nation calling for an end to colonial rule in India. 41 This reinforced the belief of most Indians that the Soviet Union was anti-imperialist. Mr. Nehru emphasized the anti-imperialist nature of the Soviet Union to a student group in Calcutta in 1938:

And Russia, what of her? An outcast like us from nations and much slandered and often erring. But in spite of her many mistakes, she stands today as the greatest opponent of imperialism and her record with the nations of the east has been just and generous. 42

By way of contrast, most Indians believed that the power rivalries of Western European nations were the result of their imperialist ambitions. The depression of the late 1920s and 1930s resulted in increasing radicalism in the


41 Ibid, p 17.

42 Ibid, p 17.
Congress and seemed to Indians to confirm the Marxist thesis about the nature and fate of capitalist societies.\textsuperscript{43}

However, through the above period there was latent suspicion among Indian nationalists about the intentions of the Soviet Union. In 1929, when Russian troops crossed their border into Manchuria to enforce by arms their claim to the property of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Indian nationalist opinion was outraged. Likewise, the Soviet attack on Finland in 1939 further aroused Indian suspicion about the Soviet Union. Constant purges within the Soviet Union and the methods used to achieve change all helped to dampen Indian enthusiasm about the U.S.S.R. in the late 1930s. The collaboration of Indian Communists with the British war effort further reduced Indian nationalist sympathy for Communists and led Mr. Nehru to make a distinction between Indian Communists and their counterparts in the Soviet Union. On October 23rd 1945, in a speech he observed:

\begin{quote}
When Indians staked their all for the country's cause, the Communists were in the opposite camp, which cannot be forgotten. . . . We do not want to spoil relations with Russia, with whom we are looking forward for closer relations when India becomes independent.\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{43} T.A. Keenleyside, \textit{op.cit.}, p 263. See also B. B. Prasad, \textit{op.cit.}, p 120.

\textsuperscript{44} A. Stein, \textit{op.cit.}, p 22.
Thus, in the pre-independence period, the attitude of the Indian nationalists towards the Soviet Union was characterized by ambivalence, much the same as the attitude of the Indian nationalists towards the United States in the same period. This ambivalence towards both powers was carried over into the post-independence period and the Indian mixture of attraction and repulsion with respect to the great powers contributed to the country's decision to opt for a nonaligned stance in foreign policy on the attainment of independence.

In addition, however, to the above factors, the serious economic and political problems that India faced in the transitional period from colony to independent state tended to reduce possibilities in the field of foreign policy to two alternatives. On the one hand, she could have opted for a policy of active participation in world affairs combined with extensive military and economic support from foreign sources; on the other hand, she could have adopted a policy of active participation in world affairs without aligning herself with any major power group - in other words, she could have adopted an independent approach, playing one superpower off against the other, attracting aid from both and fore-stalling encroachment by either.45

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India opted for the second alternative - an alternative that was not without its advantages under the conditions then prevailing. As one commentator pointed out:

The political advantages of non-commitment - the power of the floating vote - are not inconsiderable under contemporary conditions. In addition, there is the prospect of an important channel of communications between major power blocs and the initiator of both the ideas and institutions of international compromise.\textsuperscript{46}

Such advantages as were to be gained from a strategy of non-alignment were in no way inconsistent with the aims and objectives of India's foreign policy in the 1950s.

Nonalignment meant to Indians those policies and attitudes rejecting political and military commitment to either bloc in the Cold War, in favour of an independent judgment on issues as they arose. As such, nonalignment was not a substantive policy but a strategy which allowed Indian policymakers to determine policy on any given issue as they saw fit. Nonalignment was, in many ways, the offshoot of the strong nationalist feeling developed during the Indian independence struggle.\textsuperscript{47} The pursuit of an independent foreign policy provided a sense of national pride and satisfaction, and the

\textsuperscript{46} Robert Scalapino; "Neutralism". \textit{American Political Science Review}, Vol.48, 1954, p 55.

\textsuperscript{47} C.V. Crabb; \textit{The Elephants and the Grass}. (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1965), Chap.2.
feeling that the independence for which Indians fought was real; in this light, nonalignment was essentially foreign policy used as a continuation of the policy against colonial rule. The very purpose of the struggle against colonial rule was that of reclaiming national identity which had been submerged in that of the colonial power. As such, nonalignment was not only a strategy designed to maintain independence in foreign affairs, but also one to use in the struggle against colonialism in other lands. Both of these were important objectives of India's foreign policy in the 1950s.

Another reason for the adoption of a policy of nonalignment was that the Cold War was taking place primarily in Europe and Indian leaders felt there was no reason why it should be brought into Asia by India's joining either of the two camps. Prime Minister Nehru was also weary of European power politics and felt that blocs were inherently unstable and, thus, not in the interest of world peace. Moreover, Indians felt that they had no legacy of hatred towards either side in the Cold War; thus, by pursuing a strategy of nonalignment, Indians felt that they could remain outside of that conflict.


Closely related to the above objective was the Indian aim of providing a detente between the two superpowers. It was felt that by pursuing an independent policy and remaining outside of the two blocs in the Cold War, India could become an area of agreement between the two contending blocs. This, in the Indian view, would reduce tension and broaden the area of peace.

Perhaps the most important domestic factor in the choice of the strategy of nonalignment was India's underdevelopment and the urge towards economic development. Thus, the development of the Indian economy was another important objective of India's policy. It was felt that this necessitated keeping all avenues of trade and aid open. Accordingly, India needed to be in a position where she could accept aid from any source and yet not compromise her basic strategy in foreign affairs. Nonalignment could and did achieve this objective.51

These objectives of India's policy were significant factors shaping her relations with the superpowers from independence, and operated independent of the issue of Kashmir. India's nonalignment thus meant that, regardless of the attitude of the United States and Russia on Kashmir, the country's leaders were determined to tread a middle path between the superpowers.

51 For an analysis of India's foreign policy objectives in the 1950s, see J.C. Kundra; *India's Foreign Policy, 1947-1954*, pp 58-65.
In addition, however, a variety of factors in the early years of independence served to influence India's attitude towards the superpowers, and these are set out in the following two sections on Indo-American and Indo-Soviet relations.

**Indo-American Relations 1947-1954:**

Many of the differences in the Indian response to the Soviet threat compared to the American response were a result of circumstances in which India found herself in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Immediately after independence in 1947, India was primarily concerned with her pressing domestic problems. Independence brought with it the problems of integrating the Princely States into the Union, resettling millions of refugees as a result of partition and that of putting down Communist uprisings at home. Such domestic concerns gave Indian leaders little time to address themselves to the issues that were then unfolding in Europe, issues that were to become the chief preoccupation of America's foreign policy during the fifties.

After the second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union became the dominant powers on the international scene. This development resulted in the transformation of the American attitude towards the world. The difficulties experienced by the Allies in working out a post-war settlement
were reflected in the dismay with which Americans viewed developments in Eastern Europe. Developments in Europe convinced the American people and Government that the Soviet Union was then using the presence of the army in the occupied territories for purposes other than those agreed to at Yalta and Potsdam. The imposition of Soviet-run governments on Eastern Europe, Soviet refusal to establish a free and united Korea, and the stripping of Manchurian industry, all prompted a strong American response to Soviet policy after the second World War. 52

In the eyes of most Americans, the Soviet Union, with its ambitious secretive state system and Marxist ideology, presented a formidable threat to non-Soviet societies. 53 This American view was reinforced by the fact that by 1949, the Soviet Union had developed nuclear weapons of her own.

Most of the drama of the post-war Soviet threat was played out in Europe, with the result that most Indians felt remote from the area of crisis. By 1950, when the young Indian republic had overcome some of her overpowering problems and her leaders took note of what was happening in the West, the division of Europe into military camps had already taken shape. What Indians saw was the United States closely allied with the colonial powers of Western Europe. 54

52 Poplai and Talbot, op.cit., p 41.
53 Ibid, p 45.
54 Ibid, p 53.
Indians did not accept the American view of the nature of the Communist threat. There was little in India's experience to give specific content to the American picture of the Soviet leadership as insatiably aggressive and a threat to human freedom. Indians had been impressed with Soviet support of anti-colonialism, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia and Indo-China. On the other hand, Indians were irritated by the American financial and military support of her European allies, who in their roles as colonial powers were trying to crush nationalist resistance in colonial areas. This indirect and no doubt unintentional American support of declining European colonialism in Asia created suspicions in India about America's commitment to the principles of self-determination for colonial peoples.

Indians were particularly concerned as to how the American response to the Communist threat would affect developments in Asia. In the Indian view, the Americans, in their response to Communist expansion, completely misunderstood the nature of Communism's appeal in Asia. It was held by Indians that the force of Communism's appeal was not in terms of Soviet armed might, its atomic weapons and large army, but rather the appeal of Communist ideology as a means of ending colonialism

55 Ibid, p 53.
and promoting economic development through drastic land reform, collectivized agriculture and nationalized industry. Most Indians felt that the United States laid too much stress on the importance of military alliances and under-emphasized the social and economic pressures confronting the countries of the region. As a result, it was felt the American policy left the backdoor open to Communist subversion from within. As L.K. Rosinger has pointed out:

There is ample evidence to show that for most Asians, the main issue is not Moscow versus Washington, or Capitalism versus Communism, but rather nationalism, a real voice for the people in government and economic progress versus colonialism, despotic government and economic backwardness.

This Indian analysis greatly disturbed Americans who were inclined to argue that no one could tell the directions of Soviet policy without NATO, SEATO, ANZUS and the various alliances which Americans saw as necessary to contain the Soviet threat. The Indian argument was that pacts were counter-productive and would only provoke the country or countries sought to be contained and as such would only increase the chances of war by adding to the "fear psychosis"

56 Rosinger, op. cit., p 145.
57 Ibid, p 146. See also Poplai and Talbot, op. cit., p 53.
58 M.P. Barton; "India and the Cold War." Queen's Quarterly, Spring 1954, p 108.
that was then prevalent. As Mr. Nehru pointed out in 1953:

"... Large organizations have grown up for what is called mutual defense. ... It is open to any country to have such organizations. But if I may say with all respect to them, my own approach to this question is without creating any hostile alliance. I do not deny the necessity of any country or group of countries protecting themselves against possible danger. They may do so by all means. At the same time, again what a country should decide is whether its policy generally leads towards promoting a peace or war atmosphere. Sometimes I find very little difference - people talk of defense ... whether its defense or something else ... one country calls it defense and the other says that defense is aimed against it. The other country also talks about defense and takes some other measures. So they go on mounting armaments. 59.

Thus, the Indian approach sought to achieve security through avoiding pacts and presenting a pacific posture. This was at odds with the American approach which was peace through security.

Indians, conscious of the slender economic and military base of their country, sought to meet the challenge of a world split by the Cold War, by emphasizing mediation and conciliation

as a means of reducing international tension. The Indian leadership felt that by so doing, it could contribute towards world peace and bridge the chasm between the two camps. The effectiveness of such a policy demanded that India continue to promote her ties with the West and develop friendly relations with the countries of the Communist bloc, i.e. that she pursue a policy of nonalignment. Fundamental to the Indian approach was the belief that the existence of different economic and political systems need not necessarily lead to conflict. This was well summed up by Prime Minister Nehru when he observed in a speech before the Constituent Assembly:

> We must realize that there are different types of economic policy in the world today in different countries, and they are believed in by their people. Well, the only thing to do is to leave them to work out their own destiny. It may be that one of them justifies this policy, another justifies another. It may be that a third follows the middle course. We must proceed on the basis of leaving every country to shift in regards to their external affairs. Any effort to change the economic policy or to bring pressure to bear upon it leads to counter-pressure and continuous conflict. We have a type of philosophy which is a live and let live philosophy of life. We have no desire to convert any people to our view or thought.

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This dispassionate nonaligned Indian approach to the whole East-West conflict was a source of irritation in Indo-American relations as it ran counter to the image which the American leadership had of the world. India refused to participate in the Western bloc because she did not recognize the threat which the Western defense alliance was designed to combat. This did not mean that Indian leaders did not take precautions against external danger, in the event it should develop in the future, but her leaders remained convinced that there was no danger of attack from a Communist state. Her image of Communism was such that it did not affect her relations with Communist states. This was well brought out by Werner Levi, writing in "The Hindu" when he observed:

Leading Indian statesmen have shown full understanding of the Communist danger within India and utter repugnance to Communist political practices inside Russia and China. But their recognition of the nature of Communism does not consumately affect their relations with Communist countries or their interpretation of Communist international behaviour.

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62 Indians' dispassionate approach to the East/West conflict was also a source of irritation in Indo-Soviet relations. For a good statement of India's position, see J. Nehru, *op.cit.*, pp 210-222.

63 'p': Middle Ground Between America and Russia" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.32, No.2 (1953-54) pp 259-269.

This attitude differed from that taken by the United States which saw in international Communism a new form of imperialism and tyranny, tending towards world domination, trying to subvert democratic and non-democratic regimes whenever possible with the help of local Communists loyal to the Communist movement.

India's recognition of the Communist regime in China and the American refusal to do so, clearly indicated the different approaches which the two governments had towards international Communism. India recognized the new Communist government on December 30th 1949, whereas the United States rejected the Communist claim to sovereignty over China. The signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance of 1950 confirmed, in American eyes, the close links between the new regime and the U.S.S.R. What Americans regarded as Communist aggression against South Korea and China's role in prolonging the conflict kept American opinion highly antagonistic towards the Chinese regime, and thus American attitudes and politics diverged from those of India.65

In recognizing Communist China, India was recognizing the geopolitical realities on her northern borders - the fact that both China and the Soviet Union, the great powers of the Communist world stood on her northern gates. India did not

65 Poplai and Talbot, *op.cit.*, p 105.
anticipate any attack from the north, but in recognizing the new regime in China, the Indian leadership was taking into account this permanent feature of its geopolitical landscape. India's friendship with China had other roots as well, but geographical continuity strengthened India's decision to recognize China, and thus diverge from American policy.66

Perhaps the most important event in the evolution of India's nonalignment and her alienation from the United States was India's role in the Korean War issue. Before the "aggression" of 1950, India had little interest in Korea. The United States, on the other hand, had advocated a free and united Korea, under four-power trusteeship. The American expectation of 1945-46 that the formation of a united Korea would proceed rapidly was frustrated by the determination of the U.S.S.R. to have an entrenched Communist regime in the North. After failing in a negotiated settlement with the Russians, the United States placed the matter before the United Nations. United Nations attempts at settling the country's future on the basis of free elections and national unity failed.

North Korea launched an attack on South Korea on June 25th 1950. On the initiative of the United States, the Security Council was called into session. Both India and the United States supported the Council's resolution of June 25th, in which

the Council declared that North Korea's attack was a breach of peace and asked North Korea to cease hostilities immediately, and to withdraw its forces north of the 38th parallel. This resolution also directed a U.N. Commission on Korea to report on the implementation of the U.N. resolution, and called on U.N. members to render every assistance to the U.N. in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean forces. On the same day, at the request of the President of South Korea, President Truman arranged to give military supplies and help to South Korea under the U.S. Mutual Assistance Program. However, the advance of North Korea's troops was so rapid that the American Government ordered air and sea units to give the Korean troops cover and air support.

On June 27th, the Security Council passed a resolution sponsored by the United States, requesting that members of the U.N. furnish such assistance to the Republic of South Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security to the area. This resolution was supported by India with reservations. India was concerned about the implications of the use of force by the U.N., as none of the resolutions dealing with Korea had the support of the Soviet Union, or China. The Indian leadership felt that the increasing support against North Korea might lead to the outbreak of a major war. India emphasized the need for peace
through mediation and negotiation and urged the seating of Communist China in the U.N., on the grounds that no stable solution to the problem could be reached without China's support. In keeping with this policy, India reluctantly supported the armed intervention of the United Nations in Korea. The Indian position aroused a good deal of irritation in the United States and was regarded as unrealistic and ineffective. It was also criticized as undermining the action of the U.N. in Korea. As a result, India came to be regarded in the United States as neutral on the Communist side.

As the fighting continued, India warned the United States and the U.N. that the Indian Ambassador in Peking had been informed by the Chinese Government that the approach of the U.N. forces, composed mainly of American troops, towards the Yalu River was considered by China a threat to its security and would be opposed. The United States did not heed the Indian warning and Chinese 'volunteers' entered the war on the 5th of November. The danger of the war spreading suddenly became acute.

In 1951, the Government of the Soviet Union indicated that the Chinese were willing to seek a settlement. During the armistice negotiations, India and the United States took opposing stands on two issues: the scope and make-up of the
proposed political conference and conditions surrounding the repatriation of prisoners of war. The United States wanted the conference to be attended only by countries that had done the fighting; India, on the other hand, wanted a wider conference in which there would be greater representation of Asian states. In December 1952, India offered a plan for the settlement of the dispute which was accepted by the U.N. and finally accepted by the Chinese four months later.\footnote{67}

India’s aim in Korea was to keep the conflict localized and thus keep it from spreading. The United States, on the other hand, felt that by striking firmly against international Communism, it would curtail Communist expansion in other areas. This led to different Indian and American responses to the conflict, and different views of the means for bringing about a settlement. India’s role in bringing about a settlement of the conflict clearly indicated the effectiveness of the role which Indian leaders hoped for nonalignment in international affairs. As such, it confirmed the faith of Indian leaders in nonalignment. With the United States already suspicious of India’s nonalignment, India’s role in Korea was thus to act as a further irritant in Indo-American relations.

\footnote{67 For a discussion of India’s role in Korea and Indian differences with U.S. over policy in that dispute, see Poplai and Talbot, \textit{op.cit.}, pp 117-126 and K.P. Karunakaran, \textit{op.cit.}, pp 63-95.}
Despite the differences in the Indian and American approaches to international Communism and world peace, and American suspicion of India's nonalignment, hope persisted in the United States that India, because of her long association with the West and the common roots of the political institutions of both countries, would eventually join the Western bloc. India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth heightened this expectation. As The New York Times commented on the 29th of April 1949:

It is a historic step not only in the progress of the Commonwealth, but in setting the limit to Communist conquest and opening the prospect of a wider defense system than the Atlantic Pact.68

Perhaps the chief reason why Americans felt that India should and would join the Western bloc was the importance of India to American policy-makers after the Civil War in China ended in victory for the Communists. It was felt that the success of India's democratic experiment would have a great demonstrative effect on the countries of Asia and would serve as an example to follow. Thus, even though India adopted a nonaligned posture in international affairs and refused to join the Western bloc, the United States found that her interest lay in helping India even on those terms - because any undermining of India's political institutions, which were similar to those

68 Karunakaran, op. cit., p 238.
of the West, was likely to mean the loss of a decisive area to the other side. This was well brought out by Mr. V.G. Allen, a former American Ambassador to India, who in 1953 observed:

We attach the greatest importance to the effort which India is making to develop its economy and improve the lot of its people. If these efforts succeed, it will encourage the peoples throughout Asia and fortify faith in democratic methods everywhere. If they do not succeed, the very foundations of the Indian Republic and the Orient may be shaken. American interest, in one sentence, is that India, which has achieved full sovereign status shall retain that status completely and the faith which the vast majority of the Indian people have in democracy's ability to give them a better and fuller life be sustained and fortified.69

As a result, India benefited from much American aid. Under the United States Act for International Development of 1950, India received an allocation of $50 million in aid that year. In response to India's request, following the crop failure of 1950-51, the United States and India entered a loan agreement under which the United States provided $190 million to India for the purchase of two million tons of food grain.70

Thus, while the non-Kashmir factors in Indo-American relations in this period to 1954 largely led to increased friction and alienation between the two countries, there were at the same time positive elements in their relations.

69 Cited in Kundra, op.cit., pp 81-82.
Indo-Soviet Relations 1947-54:

On independence in 1947, India was given ready diplomatic recognition by the Soviet Union. However, Soviet friendship to the new Indian Government was short-lived. At this time, the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the problems of Eastern Europe, and so could give little attention to the newly independent state. The negative attitude of the Soviet Union towards India was also a result of the fact that the Soviet Union felt that the new Indian leadership was made up of members of the "national bourgeoisie" and so could not be trusted. 71

In many respects, India in the immediate post-independence period, remained oriented towards the West. The economic links established with Great Britain during the colonial period continued and were marked by a considerable flow of commerce between the two countries. India also elected to remain in the Commonwealth, which gave the impression that India had not really severed her links with Great Britain. More importantly, India dealt severely with the local Communists who were fomenting uprisings in Telengana and other areas. Thus, the initial Soviet reaction to India's nonalignment was that it was spurious, and a facade for Western imperialism in the area.

However, after 1950, with India's increasing role in international affairs, nonalignment could not long be ignored. India's mediating role in the Armistice discussions on Korea was recognized and praised by the U.S.S.R. and her desire along with that of the Soviet Union to have Communist China seated in the United Nations, which was inconsistent with the policy of the United States at the time, was appreciated by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was now beginning to accept India's nonalignment as real and not as a facade of Western imperialism as it was earlier regarded.

The world situation was changing and India's nonalignment was being followed by many of the new countries emerging from colonial rule. India, as the leader of the newly emergent nations, might be useful, Soviet leaders felt, in the promotion of a policy of peaceful coexistence outside of Europe. 72

India's refusal to condemn China's entry into the Korean War, her stand on French policy in Indo-China and her refusal to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty, all helped to change the image which the Soviet Union had of India at independence.

With Stalin's death, there was a shift in Soviet policy towards India which was part of a larger shift in Soviet policy. 73 Soviet initiatives towards India were based on a need to gain contact with the Third World and the necessity of breaking out

72 Harish Kapur; "The Problem," Seminar No.73, September 1965, p 12.
73 Stein, op.cit., p 29.
of diplomatic isolation. Equally important was the Soviet need to counter the Western defense alliance system around the southern perimeter of the Communist world. In pursu-
ance of this policy, the Soviet Union decided to take advan-
tage of the strong feelings of anti-Western imperialism and anti-colonialism among the leaders of the new states and at-
tempt to develop closer relations with them.

The first major statement indicating that the Soviet Union was becoming more appreciative of India’s nonalignment was made in an address by Premier Malenkov to the Supreme Soviet in August 1953 when he declared:

In the efforts of peace-loving countries directed towards ending the Korean War, India made a sig-
nificant contribution. Our rela-
tions with India are becoming stronger and our cultural ties are growing. We hope that in future, relations between India and the U.S.S.R. will grow stronger and develop in a spirit of friendly cooperation.

With this changed Soviet image of India, the latter came to be the centre of Soviet policy in the region. After 1954, Pakistan was in the Western bloc and India was becoming increasingly alienated from American diplomacy. Under these cir-

74 Ibid, p 30.
76 Cited by A. Stein, op.cit., p 37.
cumstances, the Soviet Union moved towards the establishment of closer relations with India.\textsuperscript{77}

One aspect of the new Soviet attitude towards India was to offer to India in 1952 to increase Indo-Soviet trade. In the same year, a Russian trade union sent India a relief shipment of wheat, rice, condensed milk and 25,000 rupees during a severe famine. With the new Soviet interest in the development of closer relations with India, both Soviet aid to India and Indo-Soviet trade increased.\textsuperscript{78}

The Indian response to Soviet initiatives was rather cautious. Because of latent Indian sympathy for the often maligned Soviets, India was willing to give the benefit of the doubt to the U.S.S.R. Indian leaders believed that both sides were responsible for the Cold War and welcomed any change in Soviet policy. Malenkov, the Soviet Prime Minister, had called for a lessening of international tension, but it remained for the Soviets to demonstrate their desire for peaceful coexistence. The signing of the Korean armistice agreement in 1957 was regarded by India as a step in the right direction.\textsuperscript{79}

Thus, by the early 1950s, India's attitude towards the Soviet Union had become one of cautious optimism, while the more active role which India played in international affairs after 1950 by its mediatory role in Korea, and its opposition


\textsuperscript{78} A. Stein, \textit{op.cit.}, p 31.

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Ibid}, p 48.
to American policies dispelled Soviet fears that India's nonalignment was only a facade for United States policies in the region.

From the foregoing, it is clear that much of the ambivalence which characterized India's attitude to the Soviet Union and the United States in the pre-independence period was also evident in the first six years after independence. This was, in part, an inevitable consequence of the Indian decision to adopt a policy of nonalignment; but it was also a result, particularly in the case of relations with the United States, of India's seeing many of the international issues of the period up to 1954 differently from the superpowers.

Finally, during the post-independence period to 1954, Kashmir was only one of a number of irritants in Indo-American relations. Differences over the Cold War, military alliances and America's policy in Asia were major factors in shaping relations between the two countries. However, most of the irritants in Indo-American relations were over world issues and were not directly concerned with their bilateral relations. Kashmir was perhaps the most severe irritant in their bilateral relations. The effect of the American stand on Kashmir was probably to heighten Indian suspicions of American policies, thus causing her to give greater vigour to her policy of non-alignment. 80

In contrast to Indo-American relations in this period, Kashmir was not a factor in Indo-Soviet relations - because of the indifferent Soviet attitude on Kashmir. Thus, Soviet attitude on Kashmir did not contribute to India's ambivalence towards the U.S.S.R. in the post-independence period, nor stand in the way of gradually improving relations towards the end of the period considered in this chapter.
CHAPTER III

INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS 1954-1959

This chapter will examine Kashmir's role in determining India's relations with the superpowers in the period 1954-59. In this period, such issues as the 1954 military aid agreement between the United States and Pakistan, the declaration of Soviet support for India on Kashmir in 1955 and the attitudes of the two superpowers in the United Nations Security Council debates of 1957 were all important in affecting India's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union.

As indicated in Chapter II, such non-Kashmir factors as the Indian attitude on colonialism, the Cold War, military pacts, foreign aid and the policy of nonalignment, were all important in shaping India's attitude towards the superpowers in the first five years of India's independence. These factors continued to be no less important in India's relations with the superpowers in the last half of the 1950s. Therefore, in analyzing the importance of Kashmir as a significant variable in India's relations with the superpowers in the period 1954-59, the above-mentioned factors will also be taken into consideration. The chapter is divided into three sections, the first of which deals with Kashmir in India's relations with
the superpowers and the remaining two, the non-Kashmir factors in Indo-American and Indo-Soviet relations respectively during the above mentioned period.

Kashmir in India's Relations with the Superpowers, 1954-59:

The signing of a military agreement between the United States and Pakistan was by far the most important event in Indo-American relations in 1954. In this section, an attempt will be made to analyze the impact of the military agreement on India's policy in Kashmir and its impact on India's relations with the superpowers.

Relations between India and Pakistan after independence were far from cordial and Pakistan's belligerence towards India was only contained by its military weakness vis-a-vis India. It was only after the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in London in 1953 that meaningful talks were carried on between India and Pakistan on Kashmir and other issues that divided them. It was reported unofficially in December of 1953 that a measure of agreement had been reached in the talks on everything except the identity of the plebiscite administrator and the disposition of troops during the plebiscite.¹ Indians were, therefore, upset by the announcement at this time of

¹ James W. Spain; "Military Assistance to Pakistan." American Political Science Review, September 1954, p 742.
the American-Pakistan military agreement, which they felt could only alter the context in which the Kashmir talks were going on. This was clear from a statement by Mr. Nehru before the military agreement was announced, when he pointed out that "the whole context of the agreement on Kashmir will change if military aid comes to Pakistan."  

The strong Indian reaction to the military agreement was partly a result of the fact that Indian leaders felt the American stand on Kashmir was anything but neutral, and that the American press was biased in its criticism of Indian policy on Kashmir; the military agreement confirmed both views. Of greater significance, however, was the effect of the agreement on Indian attitudes to a Kashmir settlement. Indians now feared that demilitarization of Kashmir, which was an aspect of the agreement being negotiated with Pakistan, would present insuperable problems, as the Pakistani troops would have a greater fighting potential because of American military aid, and could make a fatal strike at Indian positions in Kashmir.

Thus, to the Indian leadership, the military aid agreement between Pakistan and the United States made the

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3 Ibid, p 274.

Kashmir dispute more difficult to solve. Negotiations between India and Pakistan on Kashmir broke down as a result of the agreement. Thus, India's opposition to the military pact, which was inevitable in any event since it conflicted with her own basic approach to international affairs, was heightened because of its implications with respect to Kashmir. As a consequence, Indo-American relations took a sharp turn for the worse.5

By 1955, Pakistan was firmly tied to the United States through her membership in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. Thus, on its southern frontier, the Soviet Union was now encircled by countries in military alliance with the United States. Kashmir, as the one area to the south where it seemed possible to interrupt this hostile military encirclement, now assumed greater importance to the Soviet Union. In the north-west of the state in the region of Gilgit (part of Pakistani occupied Kashmir) an airfield had been maintained for some time; improvements were now made to it by the Americans after their military agreement with Pakistan. The Gilgit airfield, though not a major one, did have the potential for serving medium-range bombers. This heightened the importance of Kashmir strategically to the Soviet Union, as the Soviets could not tolerate the presence of a strong, hostile

5 M.S. Rajan, _op.cit._, p 263.
power in Gilgit and its surroundings, nor perhaps in central Kashmir, from where long-range bombers could harass Soviet Central Asian territories. As indicated by Dr. Sinha, a former member of the Indian Parliament and a former Communist:

Military considerations forced them, the Soviets, to join hands with India on the Kashmir question and proclaim Gilgit a part of India. She declared that Pakistan had no right to occupy Gilgit or to allow the Americans to build an anti-Soviet base there. Thus, Kashmir became an important aspect of Moscow's concern over the strategic implications of the American presence in Pakistan.

As a result of these strategic considerations, India's case in Kashmir received a tremendous fillip from the encouraging statements of Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev during their visit to India in the closing months of 1955. This was a departure from the neutral posture which the Soviet Union had adopted on Kashmir during the Security Council debates in the period 1948-52. Addressing a Srinagar gathering on December 10th 1955, Mr. Khrushchev announced:

7 Ibid, p 148.
The people of Jammu and Kashmir want to work for the well-being of their beloved country, the Republic of India. The people of Kashmir do not want to become toys in the hands of the imperialist powers. But this is exactly what some powers are trying to do under the pretext of supporting Pakistan with regard to the Kashmir question. It made us very sad when imperialist powers succeeded in bringing about the division of India into two parts - India and Pakistan. . . The question of Kashmir as one of the states of the Republic of India has already been decided by the people of Kashmir.8

Some time earlier, Mr. Bulganin, in a reply to an address of welcome at Srinagar airport, referred to Kashmir as "the northern part of India" and its inhabitants as part of the Indian people.9

On the return of the Soviet delegation to Moscow, Mr. Bulganin reported to the Supreme Soviet on his tour of India. In his report he observed:

As to the Kashmir problem, it has been provoked by countries which are pursuing definite military and political aims in that area. . . on the pretext of supporting Pakistan on this matter of Kashmir, certain countries sought to entrench themselves in this part of India, in order to threaten and exert pressures on areas in the vicinity of Kashmir.

8 J.B. DasGupta; op.cit., p 222.
9 Ibid, p 222.
An attempt was made to sever Kashmir artificially and convert it into a foreign military base. The people of Kashmir are emphatically opposed to this imperialist policy. The Kashmir issue has already been solved by the people of Kashmir themselves; they regard themselves as an integral part of the Republic of India and are desirous of working within the fraternity of Indian peoples - for the upholding of a new and independent India and for the peace and security of nations. 10

The declaration of Soviet support on the Kashmir issue was very much appreciated in India- especially in the context of Kashmir's importance to India's secularism, its national identity and security. To most Indians, Soviet support on Kashmir demonstrated that India had a friend on whom it could rely for support. As one observer of the Indian scene pointed out:

Soviet support on Kashmir ... provided the basis for a surprisingly strong and durable Indian belief in the permanence and inflexibility of Soviet support. 11

Thus, just as the United States' lack of sympathy for the Indian position on Kashmir led in this period to a deterioration in their bilateral relations, so did the U.S.S.R.'s sympathy to the Indian position lead to a further improvement in their relations.

10 Cited in V.K. Naik, op.cit., p 56.
The support India received from the Soviet Union produced counteractions on the part of the Western powers. When the Foreign Ministers of the Council of SEATO held their second annual meeting in Karachi from March 6-8, 1956, they expressed the need for an early settlement of the Kashmir dispute, either through the United Nations or by direct negotiations. Mr. Nehru interpreted the reference to Kashmir in the SEATO Council as implying support of that military alliance to Pakistan in its dispute with India.\(^{12}\)

Members of the Baghdad Pact also expressed their concern over a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The communiqué issued at the end of the second annual meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact nations from April 16-19, 1956, mentioned the specific problems causing tension in the area as Palestine and Kashmir. It said both problems had been discussed thoroughly and in a spirit of mutual comprehension.\(^{13}\) These developments heightened Indian fears that Pakistan was using its membership of American dominated alliances, to which India was opposed, as a means of getting support on Kashmir.

On March 8th 1956, Mr. Nehru stated in the Indian Parliament that talk of a plebiscite in Kashmir was beside the point, and that the holding of such a plebiscite could not be considered until Pakistan had withdrawn her forces

\(^{12}\) DasGupta, op.cit., p 224.

\(^{13}\) Ibid, p 224.
from the state in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 1948. In the same speech, the Indian Prime Minister underlined the fact that Pakistan had been the aggressor in Kashmir, and emphasized the legality of the state's accession to India. However, the points most stressed in the speech were that American military aid to Pakistan, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact were retarding the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. ¹⁴

However, it is not clear whether the above reasons advanced by the Indian Prime Minister for the lack of progress towards a settlement of the Kashmir dispute were genuine or only an excuse for India to continue the process of integrating Kashmir into the Indian Union; for by 1956, it was becoming increasingly apparent that India was determined to hold Kashmir. Thus the Indian Government's determination to maintain its position in Kashmir was evident during the debates on the Hungarian crisis of 1956, in the way in which India opposed the use of the United Nations as an instrument for conducting fair and impartial elections. On November 9th 1956, India voted with the Soviet Union against a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and the subsequent holding of elections

under United Nations auspices. Explaining the Indian position, Mr. Krishna Menon told the General Assembly: "We cannot subscribe to the idea that any sovereign state can agree to elections under the U.N. organization." One week later the Indian Prime Minister told the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs that the holding of elections in Hungary under the United Nations might have created a bad precedent. He obviously had the Kashmir dispute in mind. Commenting on India's voting during the Hungarian crisis, Michael Brecher has observed:

India's vote had little to do with the question under discussion. On the contrary, as was revealed later, India opposed the proposal to send U.N. observers and the call for U.N. controlled elections in Hungary because of the precedent it would create for Kashmir.

It must be remembered that one week after the U.N. debate on Hungary, Pakistan requested the Security Council to reopen the Kashmir question. It is likely that the Indian Government knew that this development would occur, and was mindful of the implications of setting a precedent of Indian support of U.N. controlled elections. Further, Soviet support on Kashmir was not as certain as the statements of

Soviet leaders during their visit to India in November and December of 1955 might have suggested. In March 1956, Anastas Mikoyan, then first Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, said in a speech at Karachi that the future of Kashmir was indefinite and ultimately would be determined by the people of the state. Thus, in the view of A.C. Noorani, an Indian writer, Mikoyan provided a clear opening for a volte face should it become necessary in the Soviet interest.  

This could not have been lost on the Indian leaders. Since Soviet support on Kashmir was uncertain, Indian leaders most likely felt that they should proceed with caution on the Hungarian issue in order to increase the prospect of Soviet support on Kashmir, and in particular, the exercise of a Soviet veto should the Security Council consider passing a resolution with regards to holding U.N. administered elections in Kashmir.

India’s attitude on Hungary, which was apparently adopted with Kashmir in mind, could not but further strain its relations with the United States, while improving its relationship with the U.S.S.R. Similarly, India’s attitude to the unification of Korea in 1958 was a result of the fear that U.N. administered elections in Korea would have set a precedent for the Kashmir dispute. With the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from Korea in October 1958, India believed that

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17 Brines, *op.cit.*, p 150.
there should no longer be any objection to the supervision of elections by a mutually agreed authority for the unification of the country. This position was at odds with that taken by the Government of the United States. The position of the United States was that any such elections should take place under the supervision of the United Nations. The Government of India found reason in the argument of the North Korean Government that, while it would be willing to participate in internationally supervised elections, it would be difficult for them to accept a U.N. supervised election, as the U.N. involved itself in the war.\textsuperscript{18} It is apparent, however, that the real Indian concern was that the holding of elections under U.N. supervision might have established a precedent that could have been applied to the Kashmir dispute, and the Indian leadership was anxious to avoid such a situation.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, once again its preoccupation with Kashmir led India into a foreign policy stance which ran counter to U.S. interest, but which corresponded with those of the U.S.S.R.

In December 1956, Pakistan requested the Security Council to convene an early meeting on Kashmir, claiming that India had repudiated its pledge of having a plebiscite in


Kashmir to determine the future of the State, and had integrated Kashmir into the Indian union in violation of its international commitment assumed under the two United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of August 13th 1948, and January 5th 1949. Under these resolutions, India and Pakistan had agreed to a cease-fire and truce. However, the resolutions further stipulated that:

The question of accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.\(^{20}\)

This section of the two resolutions remained to be fulfilled. The Pakistani representative also explained that no prospect of a bilateral agreement was in sight and that, therefore, there was the need for an early meeting. He recommended that a U.N. force be introduced in Kashmir, and asked that the Council deny the legitimacy of the Constitution of Kashmir, under which Kashmir had been made an integral state of the Indian union.\(^{21}\)

Mr. Menon, India's representative, reemphasized India's position and the legality of Kashmir's accession to India. He also demanded that Pakistan withdraw from that part of Kashmir which she had illegally occupied, and pointed


out that India stood by its commitments under the two UNCIP resolutions in the light of its understanding of them. Mr. Menon also pointed out that in the light of Pakistan's failure to withdraw its forces from Kashmir and in view of subsequent developments, India could not forever regard the resolutions of August 13th 1948 and January 5th 1949 as applicable or binding. 22

At first, the Security Council passed a declaratory resolution on January 24th, sponsored by Australia, Columbia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States. This resolution stated that the decision of the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, and any steps that India might take in pursuance of its decision did not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the principles enunciated in earlier resolutions. Before the vote was taken, Mr. Menon objected strongly to the resolution, observing that the Council was in effect telling India what she could have in her Constitution. 23 The Soviet delegate, Mr. Sobolev, also objected to the resolution. He charged that because of Kashmir's strategic importance, outside powers were holding up a settlement of the dispute. He referred to the decision of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, ratifying the State's accession to India,

22 Ibid, 764th Meeting (January 24, 1957).
and pointed out that Kashmir was an integral part of India. The Soviet delegate also pointed out that the draft resolution did not take into account the fact that the dispute had been settled by the people of Kashmir.\textsuperscript{24} The resolution was adopted by ten votes to 0 with the abstention of the Soviet Union.

On February 15th 1957, another draft resolution was formally submitted to the Council by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States. The purpose of this resolution was, in part, to have the Council voice its concern over the lack of progress towards a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, and to emphasize the importance attached to demilitarization of the State prior to the holding of a plebiscite. The draft resolution also took note of and extended its support to Pakistan's proposal for a temporary U.N. force in connection with the demilitarization of Kashmir. The main, substantive proposal of the resolution was that the Council's President, Gunnar Jarring of Sweden, should visit the subcontinent and formulate proposals for a settlement, taking into account the previous resolutions of the Council and the UNCIP, in order to bring about a settlement. He was to report back to the Council no later than April 15th 1957.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ibid}, 765th Meeting (January 24, 1957), pp 15-17.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid}, 12th Session, 768th Meeting (February 15, 1957).
This resolution was opposed by the Soviet delegate, who intervened in favour of India by moving three amendments to the draft resolution, eliminating references to the holding of a plebiscite, to the introduction of a U.N. force, and to the time limit of April 15th 1957 for Mr. Jarring's report. Mr. Sobolev ruled out a plebiscite, as one of the parties (India) had rejected it, and ruled out the sending of a U.N. force, on the grounds the suggestion was inconsistent with the U.N. charter. The Soviet amendments were rejected and the resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union, its first veto on Kashmir. 26

Following the rejection of the four-power resolution, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted another resolution which recalled the resolution of the Security Council of January 24th, and asked the President of the Council to explore the possibilities of a settlement, having regard to the previous resolutions of the Council and the UNCIP. He was asked to visit the subcontinent and report back to the Council by April 15th. Notable omissions from that resolution were any references to resolutions other than that of January 24th 1957. The resolution was carried on February 21st by ten votes to 0. The Soviet Union abstained. 27

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After visiting the subcontinent, Mr. Jarring submitted his report to the Security Council on April 29th. The Council took up the Jarring report in the autumn of 1957. In his report, Mr. Jarring said that he was aware of the grave problems that might arise as a result of a plebiscite, and therefore, offered a number of suggestions aimed at mitigating these difficulties. These suggestions were unacceptable to India and Pakistan. As a result, on November 16th 1957, the representatives of Australia, Columbia, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted a draft resolution to the Council. Following the threat of a Soviet veto, Sweden moved a number of amendments on November 27th which the sponsors of the resolution accepted on December 2nd. The amendments were accepted by ten votes to 0 with the abstention of the Soviet Union. The amended draft was accepted by an identical vote.

The resolution recalled the previous resolutions of the Council and the UNCIP and underlined the importance of the demilitarization of the State. The operative part of the resolution requested India and Pakistan to refrain from doing anything which might aggravate the situation, and appealed to their respective peoples to create a favourable atmosphere for further negotiations. The resolution also requested the

29 Ibid, p 256.
U.N. representative for India and Pakistan (Dr. Frank Graham) to make recommendations to the parties for further action with a view to making progress towards the implementation of the UNCIP resolutions and towards a peaceful settlement. Dr. Graham was asked to visit the subcontinent for these purposes and to report back to the Council on his efforts as soon as possible.

During his visit to the subcontinent, Dr. Graham held a number of meetings with the two Governments in the first two months of 1958 and submitted his report to the Council on the 28th of March 1958. The report was rejected by the Indian Government. 30

The position of the United States and other Western powers in the consideration of the above resolutions was very much resented in India. The nature of the resentment was reflected in a speech delivered by Mr. Nehru at a mass meeting held in Madras on January 31st 1957. The Indian Prime Minister declared with reference to the resolution which dispatched Mr. Jarring to the subcontinent:

The resolution was pushed through and hustled through in the Security Council without even trying to understand what the position was. The resolution which the Security Council passed was drafted and was in existence even before it took the trouble

of hearing our representative. This was the most casual way of dealing with an important question. There has been a great fuss made about Jammu and Kashmir framing its constitution and its accession to India... The Pakistan constitution has incorporated that part of Jammu and Kashmir in their state. Nobody shouted about it... The Security Council did not move when this fact was mentioned in the Security Council, it did not apparently create any impression. It is quite possible that it is due to all these military alliances that these resolutions are passed in regard to Kashmir. What pains me is that countries which are friends of ours should have considered this difficult question in this casual way.31

It was obvious that Mr. Nehru was concerned with the genuineness of American friendship to India when it could be so 'casual' on such an important issue as Kashmir.

By contrast, India welcomed Soviet support on Kashmir and in particular the Soviet attacks on American policy with regards to Kashmir, as summed up in the following statement by the Soviet delegate in the Security Council on November 5th:

It would be hard to disagree with the statement of Mr. Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, on March 11th, in which he said that certain powers which do not like his country's independent foreign policy, are seeking to exert pressures without and within to induce India to change it.

Soviet delegation, for its part, shares the concern caused in peace-loving circles in Asia and throughout the world by the policy of organizing politico-military blocs, and establishing military bases on foreign soil. The fact that Pakistan has allowed itself to be drawn into the Western orbit... has left its mark on the Pakistan's Government's policy with regard to the Kashmir problem as well. As a result of Pakistan's policy which has found support among that country's partners in SEATO, the situation in the Kashmir area continues to be strained.32

However, the Indian leadership must have been worried by the Soviet abstention on the declaratory resolution of January 24th 1957, in which the Council stated that steps taken by India to integrate Kashmir within the Indian Union did not constitute a disposition of the State. Similarly, the Soviet Union abstained on the resolution of February 21st which asked the President of the Council to proceed to the subcontinent and explore the possibilities of a settlement. India's uncertainty about the Soviet attitude was understandable in view of the fact that Soviet leaders had already clearly stated that Kashmir was an integral part of India. It was widely felt in India that the Soviet abstention from voting was a reply to India's belated condemnation of Soviet intervention in Hungary.

Thus, it was felt that the Soviet abstention was largely disciplinary.\textsuperscript{33}

The debates in the United Nations and the positions taken by the superpowers indicated their respective positions on the important issue of Kashmir, positions which were taken in the light of their understanding of the international roles of both India and Pakistan. However, the Soviet Union, by its continuing support on Kashmir, had demonstrated that it was prepared to support India on a matter that was vital to its national identity and security. In that respect, it met an important test of friendship insofar as India was concerned, and this was bound to augur well for their future relations. In contrast, the United States, by its continuing opposition to India's position on Kashmir, and its support of Pakistan, both militarily and otherwise, was bound to fail to garner a similar stock of goodwill in India despite the vast sums of aid which the United States provided to India and their mutual distrust of international Communism.

\textsuperscript{33} K. Gupta, \textit{op. cit.}, p 36.
Indo-American Relations, 1954-59:

In 1954, Washington became increasingly concerned with what it regarded as the threat posed by international Communism in Asia, as a result of the outcome of the Korean War, and the success of the Viet Minh in their struggle against the French in Indo-China. As a consequence, the United States entered into the military agreement with Pakistan discussed in the previous section. In the eyes of the American leadership, such an agreement with Pakistan was necessary to strengthen nations on the periphery of the Soviet Union. It was, in other words, necessary to fill the power vacuum in the region against the threat of international Communism. India, pursuing a policy of nonalignment, was more concerned with the consequences of the aid, not merely in the context of Indo-Pakistani relations, but more important, with its significance for the trend of international relations in Asia.

Even before the agreement was announced on February 24th 1954, news of the proposed agreement had provoked a reaction from the Indian leadership. Mr. Nehru, speaking at the 1954 Kalyani session of the Congress, observed that the proposed aid to Pakistan:
is not merely a question of a rich and powerful country aiding an underdeveloped country, but something which goes to the root of the problem of peace, as well as the freedom of many countries in Asia. These countries, including India, have only recently attained independence. They will only retain it so long as they are worthy of it and are capable of defending it. The moment they rely on others to do so, they have already lost part of that independence and the rest may also slip away later. For the countries of Asia which have suffered so long and so terribly under foreign domination this is no small matter. In the long perspective of history, this means a reversal of that process of liberation for which we have all struggled in Asia for generations past and which at last yielded results. This is not a question of motives but certain steps which inevitably lead to others.\textsuperscript{34}

Another argument invoked by Mr. Nehru against American military aid to Pakistan was that the aid would be a break in the Asian peace area and would lessen the chances of peace. The Indian Prime Minister said the countries in the Asian region were looking to a 'no war' area in Asia and hoped that Pakistan would belong to that area. The Indian Prime Minister also pointed out that if military aid came to Pakistan, the Cold War would be brought to the subcontinent. Mr. Nehru suggested that in the event of a shooting war, India would be

\textsuperscript{34} Cited in M.S. Rajan; \textit{op.cit.}, p 430.
affected, as well as Burma, Afghanistan and other countries of South East Asia and the Middle East. 35

Thus, to the Indian leadership, the proposed military aid agreement between Pakistan and the United States not only constituted a reversal of the trend towards freedom and independence for which Asian people were fighting, but threatened to bring the Cold War to the Indian subcontinent. In this respect, the proposed military agreement was against India's policy of nonalignment and the desire of the Indian leadership to isolate the Indian subcontinent from the Cold War. Accordingly, Indians were very much exercised over the proposed agreement. Commenting on India's attitude to the proposed agreement and its likely impact on Indo-American relations, the Delhi Correspondent of The New York Times reported:

Nothing in the realm of foreign affairs has so exercised India since she became independent as . . . the extension of United States military aid to Pakistan. . . . There is no doubt whatsoever that if the Karachi arms deal goes through, the United States will have forfeited its position in India whatever that may be and whatever it may be worth. 36


Indian leaders were not impressed with the American contention that these arms would not be used against India by a hostile Pakistan. In fact this fear persisted throughout the 1950s as Mr. Nehru declared in Hyderabad in January 1957:

... leaders of Pakistan have openly stated that military, including atomic weapons received from the United States, would be used against India. I do not understand with what intentions these arms are being sent to Pakistan... The U.S. Government have assured India that military aid being sent to Pakistan would not be used against India. We do not doubt the genuineness of the assurance of the U.S. Government. We have respect for the United States which is a great country. We have friendship with them. But I am going to check whether the military aid sent to Pakistan is at any time being used against India or not.37

Indeed, there were many prominent Americans who questioned the wisdom of the proposed military aid to Pakistan, because of the fear it raised in India of Pakistani aggression. When the agreement was finally announced on the 25th of February, 1954, President Eisenhower assured the Indian Prime Minister that military aid, under the terms of the aid agreement, could not be used against India, and suggested that in the event India requested military aid, her request would be given a sympathetic hearing. Commenting on the presidential offer,

37 K. Gupta; op.cit., p 11.
Mr. Nehru remarked:

The President has done less than justice to us and to himself. If we object to aid being given to Pakistan, we would be hypocrites and unprincipled opportunists if we accepted aid ourselves. 38

Thus, while the U.S. military aid to Pakistan had certain implications for Kashmir, the strong Indian reaction was possibly due much more to the affront which this decision involved to the fundamental tenets of Indian foreign policy.

The Indian leadership, fearful of the military consequences for India of the strong measures which the United States was taking against "international Communism" in the region, sought to balance this by fostering good relations with China. 39 India entered into an agreement with Peking on April 29th 1954, defining her relations with Tibet and China in terms of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Through the Five Principles, Mr. Nehru hoped to bind China to international obligations and responsibilities from which it would be difficult to withdraw and thus to enhance the security of India's northern border. Similarly, India was giving substance to her policy of nonalignment.

The Indian leadership had hoped that, because of India's policy of nonalignment, and its relations with both China and the United States, that it could promote some

38 M.S. Rajan; op.cit., p 272.
39 J.B. DasGupta; op.cit., p 273.
understanding between the two countries in the hope of normalizing their relations. India's interest in trying to bring the United States and China together was motivated not only by her interest in reinforcing her relations with China, but by her broad interest in the peace and security of Asia. In this respect, the Indian leadership had hoped that the Geneva Conference on Indo-China would produce an agreement that would bring peace to South-East Asia, and thus minimize the potential for conflict between China and the United States.

The Indian leadership was pleased with the results of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, and saw the Geneva Agreement as a means of bringing peace to South-East Asia. The Indian leadership had hoped that the Geneva Agreement would prevent Communist China from interfering in the affairs of the countries of the region and that China, by her acceptance of the agreement, as well as her acceptance of Panch Sheel would become more responsible and restrained in her conduct. However, while India believed that the implementation of the settlement would ensure peace in South-East Asia, the United States thought otherwise, and in fact organized SEATO in order to meet the presumed Chinese Communist threat to South-East Asia; India was thoroughly opposed to the project.

40 M.S. Rajan; op.cit., p 291.
41 Ton-that-Tien; op.cit., p 131.
42 M.S. Rajan; op.cit., p 292.
Not only were the majority of the signatories of the Manila Pact non-Asian, but Article (4) of the Pact extended protection to some countries that were neither participants to the negotiations nor parties to the Pact. India not only refused the invitation to attend the Manila Conference, but expressed her opposition to the Pact, which she said was destroying the basis of the Geneva Agreement. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on September 29th 1954, Mr. Nehru said that India's attendance at the Manila Conference would have meant the surrendering of India's policy of nonalignment and would also have affected India's position as Chairman of the three Commissions on Indo-China. Mr. Nehru went on to point out that SEATO came into the 'area of peace' in the Asian region and had adversely affected the climate of peace brought about by the Geneva Agreement. Thus, in the same way as its military pact with Pakistan, the U.S. espousal of SEATO conflicted with a basic tenet of Indian foreign policy and, thus, further affected adversely Indo-American relations in a much more fundamental way than the essentially regional issue of Kashmir.

43 Ton-that-Tien; op.cit., p 318.

44 J. Nehru; op.cit., pp 86-93. Commenting on the usefulness of the new organization, Mr. Chester Bowles, former U.S. Ambassador to India wrote: "to rely on the alliance of these nations (South Korea, Formosa, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand) with less than a population of 15 percent of free Asia would be like trying to hold Europe with NATO consisting of Spain, Portugal and Greece with the rest of Europe sitting on the sidelines." Ambassador's Report, p 386.
Political differences between India and the United States continued to dominate their relations during this period. Towards the end of 1955, while the Soviet leaders were visiting India, a meeting was taking place between the American Secretary of State Dulles and the Portuguese Foreign Minister. It was rumoured that during the course of the meeting, Dulles referred to Goa as a Portuguese 'province' and stated that the United States might consider the defence of Goa as part of her NATO obligation.\footnote{M.S. Rajan; \textit{op.cit.}, p 280.} Even though Dulles clarified his position a few days later, the damage had already been done. Both the Indian and American press were quick to comment. \textit{The New York Times} opined: "Of all the blunders and failures of the Dulles regime, our debacle in India may be remembered as the dreariest."\footnote{The \textit{New York Times}, December 10th 1955.}

The issue of Goa was an important one to Indians, as Mr. Nehru pointed out at a political conference in Uttar Pradesh on August 21st 1955:

\begin{quote}
Opposed as we are to colonialism everywhere, it is impossible for us to tolerate the continuance of colonial rule in a small part of India. It is not that we covet Goa... That little bit of territory makes no difference to this great country. But, even a small enclave under colonial rule does make a difference and it is a constant reproach to the self-respect and national interest of India.\footnote{Cited by Norman A. Palmer; "India's Outlook on Foreign Affairs." \textit{Current History}, Vol.30, 1956, No.174, p 71.}
\end{quote}
To the Indian leadership, the issue of colonialism in Asia was the most important issue of the period. In the Indian Council of States in 1954, the Indian Prime Minister had declared:

We talk of the crisis of our time and many people do it in different ways. Probably in the United States of America the crisis of our time is supposed to be Communism versus anti-Communism... may be to some extent. Well the crisis of our time in Asia is colonialism versus anti-colonialism. 48

Against this background, it was almost inevitable that the Indian Government should protest Dulles' alleged statement, especially when the Soviet leaders had recently made clear their support for India's position on Goa. The Government of India sent a strong protest to the United States Government, charging that the Dulles statement was at variance with the facts and that it completely disregarded and wounded the deep and strongly held views and sentiments of the people and Government of India. The protest added that the Dulles statement accorded by implication United States approval to the maintenance of the present colonial status of Goa and appeared to be a reversal of the proclaimed United States policy regarding colonialism. 49

49 M.S. Rajan; op.cit., p 282.
The attitude displayed by Dulles over Goa confirmed the fear of many Indians that the United States was not genuinely committed to the ending of colonialism. As M.S. Rajan pointed out: "By this action, the U.S. Secretary of State succeeded in compelling the Asian and African peoples to alter their faith and belief in America's traditional policy and attitudes to colonial questions." 50

It is quite possible that Mr. Dulles was merely reacting to the great reception accorded the Soviet leaders in India and their propagandistic statements from Indian soil. He thought that by so doing, and by raising doubts about America's position over Goa, he could indirectly express displeasure over India's having provided a hospitable forum for Soviet attacks against the West. 51 Whether that interpretation is correct or not, the apparent American position on Goa could not but have enraged Indian sensibilities on so delicate a colonial issue.

Thus, the United States' apparent support for Portuguese control of Goa was an additional irritant in Indo-American relations. Moreover, it was capable of provoking an even more intense reaction in India than American espousal of the Pakistani position in Kashmir. India, after all, for some time was prepared to see the fate of Kashmir, an issue between

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50 Ibid, p 283.

two Asian states, settled by a plebiscite; some Indians could, therefore, accept the American position as due to a genuine difference of opinion or to a misunderstanding of the issues involved. However, mistaken U.S. policy in Kashmir, at least it did not involve the inflammatory issue of Western colonialism. Goa was a different matter, for it was a clear-cut case of European colonial rule on which, in the Indian view, there could be no compromise. Thus, the American position on Goa seemed to conflict with another fundamental Indian foreign policy tenet - anti-colonialism - and as a consequence it further affected Indo-American relations.

The American announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine on January 5th 1957, that is, of providing military and economic assistance to those Middle East countries which desired it, introduced a new source of friction in Indo-American relations. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, Mr. Nehru criticized the basic implications of the Eisenhower doctrine; he declared:

I have no doubt that a great deal in President Eisenhower's proposals, more specifically the part dealing with economic help, is of importance and value. But there is an approach that troubles me, and that is the idea of thinking that areas in Asia, for instance West Asia, are vacuums which have to be filled by somebody stepping in from the outside. That I feel is a dangerous approach . . .
what is the test of this vacuum idea? It seems to me to really lead to the conclusion that where circumstances compel an imperialist power to withdraw, necessarily you must presume that it creates a vacuum. If so, how is that vacuum to be filled? Surely if somebody else comes in, it is a repetition of the old story, perhaps in a different form. It can only be filled by the people of that country, growing and developing themselves economically, politically and otherwise.52

It was obvious that to the Indian Prime Minister, the Eisenhower Doctrine smacked of colonialism all over again. In the view of the Indian Government, the unrest in the Middle East at this time was a result of an upsurge of Arab nationalism in the region, in response to the Baghdad Pact and the enunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. While reiterating his criticism of the Eisenhower Doctrine in Parliament on August 19th 1958, Mr. Nehru said in part, that the Eisenhower Doctrine "does not recognize the effect of Arab nationalism which has become such a dominant force."53

In August 1958, Communist China began heavy shelling of the two off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, part of the territory claimed by the Formosan Government under Chiang-Kai-Shek. In January 1955, following a similar raid from the


mainland on the two islands, the United States Congress had passed a resolution authorizing the U.S. President "to employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing Formosa and the Pescadores." In terms of Quemoy and Matsu, the resolution left to the discretion of the President whether or not an attack on these islands should be regarded as a threat to Formosa. However, the Government of Chiang Kai-Shek had interpreted the resolution as encouragement to reinforce its garrisons on Quemoy and Matsu, which the K.M.T. forces had used as bases for raids against the mainland in early 1958.

In the eyes of the Indian Government, the crisis in the Far East appeared likely to lead to a major conflict. The Government of India accepted the sovereignty of the Communist Government of China over Formosa, and did not approve the policy of the American Government of giving military support to Taiwan. India also believed that the off-shore islands should go to the mainland, since otherwise they would prove a constant source of insecurity to China. In this context, the Indian leadership regarded Mr. Dulles' statement of September 1958, that "the United States will force the issue if necessary to prevent the Chinese from seizing Quemoy,"56

56 Ibid, p 16.
as rather disturbing. Accordingly, the Indian Government was rather dismayed over the American position on this issue, although no major conflict erupted as a result of the shelling. In short, the brinkmanship which the U.S. practised with respect to this issue conflicted with the basic Indian approach to international affairs. Alienation was once again the inevitable result of this basic incompatibility of the two countries in their approach to international affairs in the 1950s.

One other issue on which Indian leaders did not see eye to eye with the United States was that of disarmament. Throughout the 1950s, India continued to be critical of the United States on this issue. India's position was that nuclear testing should be stopped as the first step towards general disarmament. Mr. Nehru was critical of the fact that in the U.N. Disarmament Sub-committee, sitting in London in March 1957, the United States and other Western powers rejected India's offer to appear before the sub-committee in support of a memorandum she had submitted calling for the cessation of nuclear tests. In May, October and November, Mr. Nehru made specific appeals to the great powers for the suspension of nuclear tests. 57

57 J. Nehru; *op.cit.*, pp 199-201.
The United States position on disarmament was that the cessation of nuclear tests should be linked with an agreement on the limitation of weapons production and with the reduction of other elements of armed strength. The Americans also felt that a measure of assurance against a surprise attack was required as a pre-condition to the cessation of nuclear testing.\textsuperscript{58} Thus, on this issue India and the United States had divergent views about the priority to be given to the suspension of nuclear testing in the general process towards disarmament.

Despite the differences in policy between India and the United States, indications are that from 1956, both countries were beginning once again to explore the common bonds that existed between them. R.L. Park has argued that the differences between India and the United States submerged the basic goodwill and friendship that had always existed between them as a result of a common way of political life, greatly reinforced and expanded by increasing commercial and cultural intercourse.\textsuperscript{59} The renewed exploration of this basic goodwill and understanding between India and the United States was facilitated by certain developments between 1956 and 1958.

\textsuperscript{58} K. Gupta; \textit{op. cit.}, p 18.

In 1958, India discovered that China had built a road in the Aksai Chin which ran deep inside Indian-claimed territory. Chinese answers to Indian protest notes confirmed more and more that the presence of Chinese troops on what India considered to be Indian territory was not accidental, but a planned assertion of Chinese territorial claims. India was now faced with the prospect of a real and growing border dispute with China, which threatened to extend beyond the exchange of diplomatic notes and to lead to armed conflict. India could no longer consider China a friendly neighbour.

In 1957, India experienced an acute shortage of foreign exchange which threatened to ruin the prospect of the fulfillment of India's second five-year plan. The prospect was alarming not only because of the new threat which was developing on India's northern borders, but also because of its wider effects. India, as Paul Barreau has said, had "the hot breath of Communist China blowing down her neck" as she felt she was in a race of competitive existence with another form of economic organization.

To counterbalance the Chinese threat, India could not rely solely on its own strength nor could it count on the support of the Soviet Union which was formally allied

60 Ton-that-Tien; op.cit., p 322.

with China and did not wish to aggravate its existing differences with the Chinese leadership. Neither could the Soviet Union provide aid on the scale required by India. Thus, India was forced to look to the West for increased economic support as a buttress against a now-threatening China.  

The Suez crisis of 1956 in which India and the United States adopted similar positions opened the way for an Indo-American rapprochement. India was pleased with the stand taken by the United States on the Suez crisis and both the Indian and American delegations worked together to bring about a settlement of the dispute. The importance of this to Indo-American relations was summed up by M.S. Rajan who observed: "In the United Nations General Assembly, the Indian and American delegations worked in such perfect union over that issue that there was even talk of a 'New Delhi-Washington axis' having emerged." America's increasing understanding of India's policies made the shift smoother. This understanding was evident in several ways, especially in Mr. Nehru's visit to Washington in 1956 and the Dulles visit to India the same year.

Dulles, on his visit to India in March 1956, emphasized the points of agreement between India and the United States. He also complimented India on its contribution

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62 Ton-that-Tien; op.cit., p 323.
63 M.S. Rajan; op.cit., p 296.
to world peace and asserted that there were no matters of dispute and controversy between India and the United States, and renewed an invitation to Mr. Nehru to visit President Eisenhower. After his visit to the United States in 1956, Mr. Nehru observed that the policy of the United States towards "neutralist nations like India is not as rigid as I thought and is indeed a flexible policy adapting itself to circumstances."  

There was also a growing realization in the United States that its policy on Pakistan was adversely affecting its relations with India. As Mr. Sulzberger of The New York Times pointed out: "American policy of arming Pakistan tends indirectly to weaken disastrously the Indian economy. It has also provoked another neighbouring land - Afghanistan - to make an unhealthy weapons deal with the U.S.S.R." This view was also shared by the influential columnist Walter Lippman, who observed: "As a result of our arming Pakistan, we have incurred the distrust of both of Pakistan's neighbours - India and Afghanistan ... the damage done to the American position by the Pakistan entanglement alone is enormously greater than what can be done to repair the damage by more economic aid."  

64 Tung-that-Tien; op. cit., p 323.  


67 Ibid, April 15th 1957.
India's acute shortage of foreign exchange in 1957, as a result of her need to import large quantities of capital goods and industrial raw materials, led to criticisms of India's foreign policy. Mr. Asoka Mehta, a noted Indian publicist and later India's Finance Minister, criticized India's foreign policy and urged that it be placed more in line with her economic planning. Writing in The Statesman, he said:

I have no quarrel with the broad outlines of our foreign policy, but I am not sure whether in its working out we have not piled up difficulties for our economic plans and policies.68

After commenting on the needs of the Indian economy, he asked:

If the U.S.A. is the sole provider of the key supplies, without which the tempo of the plan cannot be maintained, is it worthwhile to stick to the righteous idios and usages and the unsmiling visage as the unalterable accompaniment of our foreign policy?69

This realization of the need for greater foreign aid resulted in the Indian Finance Minister paying visits to the United States in 1957 and 1958 to solicit aid. In 1957, loans totalling a sum of $175 million were extended by the American Government to India. In 1956, the first PL 480 agreement between India and the United States was entered into.

Under this agreement, surplus U.S. agricultural commodities were to be shipped to India with the provision that the sale proceeds be used as loans for financing development projects. By 1959, some $600 million worth of aid had been committed to India under PL 480 in the form of wheat, cotton and rice, among other commodities. The United States also made aid available to India under the International Cooperation Administration. Under the I.C.A. program of 1957, India received some $65 million in aid. Between 1954 and 1959, the President's Asian Development Fund extended $20 million of aid to India, the Development Loan Fund $175 million, and the American Export-Import Bank $150 million. In addition, there was an estimated $80 million worth of assistance from Private American organizations during this period.70 From 1954-59, eighty percent of India's foreign aid came from the United States.

After 1957, the flow of private American investment to India surpassed that of Britain. To encourage the trend towards greater private foreign investment, India enacted laws that would act as a greater incentive to private investment. One of these laws protected the foreign investor from the danger of double taxation - taxation in India and in his own country. During 1959, many joint Indo-U.S.

70 W. Malenbaum; East and West in India's Development. This provides a good analysis of aid India received from both blocs in the 1950s.
ventures involving technical as well as financial collaboration were announced for the manufacture of aluminium, synthetic rubber, paper chemicals, tires and automobiles. This was a notable break with the past, as formerly most U.S. private investment in India was concentrated in the oil industry.

Throughout most of this period, United States exports to India increased. This was due largely to the food shortage India experienced in the period, with the result that year after year, more and more grain was imported from the United States. This resulted in United States exports to India exceeding those of the United Kingdom, which traditionally had been India's largest trading partner.

Thus, while the political differences between India and the United States were sharply expressed during the period under consideration, both the growing volume of Indo-U.S. trade and the growing American emphasis on economic aid to India helped to preserve some balance in Indian attitudes towards the United States. President Eisenhower's visit to India towards the end of 1959 and the warm reception he received while there was further evidence of the new Indian attitude towards the United States. 71

71 Ton-that-Tien; op.cit., p 325.
In the context in which this section has attempted to analyze Indo-American relations in the last half of the 1950s, the question inevitably arises as to how important was Kashmir in shaping India's relations with the United States. In the period 1954-59, Kashmir was not a critical factor in Indo-American relations, rather its impact was reflected in the Indian attitude to specific issues which Indians saw as having a bearing on the Kashmir dispute.

The 1954 military aid agreement between the United States and Pakistan was, for example seen in this light. It was feared in India that such aid would be used by Pakistan to strengthen its hand in Kashmir. The agreement heightened India's determination to hold on to Kashmir, as was reflected in the acceleration of the process of integrating Kashmir into the Indian Union. It appears that, because of the military aid agreement between the United States and Pakistan, the Indian Government was no longer prepared to trust the holding of a plebiscite to countries whose bona fides on Kashmir was distrusted.\footnote{Michael Brecher; The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p 181. Also see Frank Moraes; Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography. (New York: The Macmillan Press, 1957), p 397. Moraes notes that Indians also feared that the holding of a plebiscite would exacerbate communal tension and would have great consequences for India's internal stability. There could be a strengthening of communal forces, increasing distrust of the Muslim minority and a challenge to the foundation of Indian life.}
The Kashmir issue, and in particular India's apparent repudiation by the mid-1950s of the idea of holding a plebiscite to determine the future of Kashmir, was apparent in India's opposition to the United States resolution which called for holding of U.N. administered elections in Hungary, and in the opposition to the United States position that there should be U.N. administered elections in Korea for the unification of that country. In both instances, the Indian leadership was apparently fearful that U.N. administered elections would set precedents for her own dispute in Kashmir and was, therefore, anxious to avoid the creation of such precedents.

In addition to the above effects of Kashmir on Indo-American relations, the American position in the debates in the Security Council in 1957 also affected Indo-American relations. The U.S. position provoked a considerable reaction from the Indian Prime Minister who expressed doubts about the genuineness of American friendship to India. It was feared that the various resolutions sponsored by the United States and other Western Governments on behalf of Pakistan were an attempt to embarrass the Indian Government. Yet, by this time, it was becoming clear that the Kashmir issue was stalemated and that much of Mr. Nehru's outrage over the position of the Western bloc, and particularly the United States, on Kashmir in the Security Council debates of 1957, must have
been for reasons of domestic politicking. It is worth noting that 1957 was an election year in India and it was viewed as desirable to head off criticism of the Government over Kashmir by tough criticism of those countries which did not support India on Kashmir. Again, it must be remembered that although Mr. Nehru had almost unlimited freedom in the formulation of India's foreign policy towards the superpowers, he had less flexibility in handling India's potentially explosive relationship with Pakistan.\textsuperscript{73} He was, therefore, strongly reactive to foreign criticism, particularly American criticism of India's stand on Kashmir. Thus, the effects of the 1957 Security Council debates on Indo-American relations may have been more verbal than substantive.

Within the context in which the analysis of Indo-American relations has been attempted, the question remains as to what impact the non-Kashmir factors had in shaping Indo-American relations in the last half of the 1950s, and their relative importance vis-à-vis the Kashmir factors. By 1954, it was apparent that the different approaches which India and the United States had adopted to the threat of international Communism, particularly in Asia, as well as India's policy of nonalignment, had already created serious differences in policy between the two countries.

\textsuperscript{73} A. Stein; \textit{op.cit.}, p 74.
America's increasing concern with the problems of the Cold War and the threat of Communist penetration in Asia, resulted in the United States entering into a military aid agreement with Pakistan and the formation of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. These developments conflicted sharply with India's desire to isolate the subcontinent and Asia from the Cold War and resulted in a sharp deterioration in the state of Indo-American relations. These developments heightened Mr. Nehru's doubts about the motivation of American policy in Asia. The Indian Prime Minister's increasing preoccupation with the problems of the Cold War in this period stemmed largely from America's policy in Asia, and the threat to peace which it posed in the Asian region.

It would appear that the negative trend in Indo-American relations developed as a result of the above factors which reflected fundamental differences in approach to the basic international issues of the day. This trend was reinforced by other political differences examined above, such as those over Goa, the Eisenhower Doctrine, Quemoy and Matsu and disarmament.

Thus, with the non-Kashmir factors dominating Indo-American relations in the period 1954-59, the American position on Kashmir had the effect of reinforcing the negative trend in Indo-American relations, relations that would have been negative
in any event, because of the wide policy differences over many other basic issues. At the same time it is interesting to note that the differences over Kashmir were not sufficiently important to prevent the gradual improvement in bilateral relations between India and the United States which became apparent towards the end of the period under study.

Indo-Soviet Relations 1954-59:

The period 1954-59 was characterized by improving relations between India and the Soviet Union. With the change in Soviet foreign policy after the death of Stalin, there were efforts towards befriending India. As indicated above, this was reflected in the more positive support which the U.S.S.R. gave India on Kashmir in the 1957 U.N. Security Council debates compared to the early 1950s, but there were earlier signs of improved relations between the two countries. The 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China afforded the Indian leadership a chance to put Soviet professions of goodwill to the test. India was not formally represented at that Conference, but Krishna Menon played an important role behind the scenes. He let it be known that India would regard Soviet efforts to obtain a settlement of the Indo-China question as an endorsement of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.74 The

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increasing rapport between India and the Soviet Union grew in part from India's satisfaction with the results of that Conference.

Mr. Nehru's proposed visit in July 1955 to the Soviet Union was seen as further confirmation of the trend towards better relations between India and the Soviet Union. As the Indian daily, The Hindustan Times opined, Mr. Nehru's proposed visit will allow the Indian Prime Minister "... to determine how far India can trust the Russian leader's profession of goodwill ... and how far it is in India's interest to seek Russian collaboration in the execution of her development plans."75

Mr. Nehru visited the Soviet Union in July 1955 and was warmly received there. Commenting on the success of the visit, K.P.S. Menon, then India's Ambassador to the Soviet Union remarked:

It would be wrong to attribute the success of the visit merely to the efficiency of the Communist party machine. The reasons lie deeper. India has a quaint appeal to Russia... To them, steeped in the philosophy of materialism, Mahatma Ghandi was a holy puzzle. Jawaharlal Nehru was easier to understand. What they admired in him was not that he had merely won India's independence but that he was determined to protect it against all blandishments.76

76 K.P.S. Menon; The Flying Troika. (London: Oxford
The Indian Prime Minister's visit to the Soviet Union was, thus, the occasion for the acceptance of Panch Sheel as the basis for relations between the two countries.

On the return visit of Prime Minister Bulganin and Khrushchev to India in November and December of 1955, the Soviet leaders made a deep impression on the Indian people with respect to the sincerity of the Soviet Union in the pursuit of world peace and in its appreciation of India's non-alignment. The Soviet attitude with respect to Indian non-alignment was appreciated in India, especially in the light of the tendency at that time in some American circles to characterize India's nonalignment as immoral, and in the light of the United States' policy of extending its military pacts to Asia. As K.P.S. Menon wrote:

Above all, the people of India see in the Soviet Union a friend, a friend who, to all appearances demands nothing from them except friendship. In this respect, the Soviet Union seems different from the United States. The U.S.A. too is a friend but a rather jealous friend, almost a possessive lover who is out to grapple India to his heart with hoops of steel. But India is not ready to lend herself to this steely embrace.  


78 K.P.S. Menon; op.cit., p 131.
At the twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU, Mr. Khrushchev declared that peaceful coexistence with other political systems was a cardinal objective of Soviet policy and removed certain ideological impediments in the way of this goal. Mr. Khrushchev observed that war was not inevitable, that violence was not essential for the transformation of society and that there could be different ways to Socialism. In the same speech, Mr. Khrushchev described India as a great power. He said: "The great republic of India has made a big contribution to the strengthening of peace in Asia."\(^7^9\)

These developments were welcomed in India. The Indian Prime Minister, in commenting on Mr. Khrushchev's speech said:

It is an important matter not only for the U.S.S.R. but for all countries at large in the world to understand these great changes that are taking place. These changes are taking the U.S.S.R. more and more towards one kind of normalcy which is to be welcomed in every way.\(^8^0\)

Continuing his appraisal of the new developments in the U.S.S.R., Mr. Nehru observed:


\(^8^0\) *Lok Sabha Debates,* Vol.12, No.27, March 20th, 1956. Cited by A. Stein; *op.cit.*, p 83.
The new line both in political thinking and practical policy appears to be based on a more realistic appreciation of the present world situation and represents a significant process of adaptation and adjustment. According to our principles, we do not welcome interference of others in our country. But any important development in any country which appears to be a step towards the creation of the conditions favourable to the pursuit of a policy of peaceful coexistence is important to us as well as others.\textsuperscript{81}

In April 1956, the Cominform was dissolved by the Soviet Union and this too was appreciated by India, as it indicated the Soviet Union would not be vigorously pursuing the overthrow of bourgeois governments.

Indo-Soviet friendship was tested during the Hungarian revolt of November 1956, immediately in the wake of the invasion of Suez by the Anglo-French armies in October. While India was quick to condemn the Suez invasion as "naked aggression", the Indian leadership took several weeks before it expressed criticism of the Soviet invasion of Hungary. The Indian reaction was slow because the nature of the revolt was not immediately recognized in India. It has also suggested that the Indian leadership felt that to have criticized the Soviet Union would not have furthered the interest of world peace, and that to have done so would have

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid! p 83.
been of little use as it would not have deflected the Soviet leaders from their chosen course.\textsuperscript{82} This position, however, seemed at variance with India's nonalignment which was supposed to allow her the moral freedom to take a position on issues as she saw fit. More important, it seemed at odds with the Indian aim of trying to foster the liberalizing trend in the Soviet Union, which was highlighted by the 20th Party congress and Soviet acceptance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

However, Mr. Nehru did speak out against Soviet intervention, but certainly not with the vehemence he showed in the case of Suez. Speaking at a UNESCO Conference meeting in New Delhi on November 5th, he said: "We see today in Egypt as well as Hungary both human dignity and freedom outraged and the voice of modern arms used to suppress peoples and gain political objectives."\textsuperscript{83} In response to the criticism that his Government's reaction was slow and tepid, the Indian Prime Minister replied that the situation was obscure and that he did not have the facts. Even though India did not have an Ambassador in Hungary at the time, K.P.S. Menon, then Indian

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Ibid}; p 87. For a defense of India's initial reaction to the Hungarian crisis, see Sujit Mansingh; "India and the Hungarian Revolution". \textit{India Quarterly}, 1965, pp 50-61.

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Ibid}; p 89.
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, observed that a member of the Indian Embassy did manage to get several well-written detailed reports out of Hungary via the Austrian border.\textsuperscript{84} Thus, the Indian leadership must have been aware of the 'broad facts' of the situation.

In the crucial debates on the Hungarian question in the United Nations General Assembly, the Indian delegate, Mr. Krishna Menon, registered a negative vote on the resolution condemning the Soviet action and calling for the holding of an election in Hungary under U.N. supervision. The Indian vote in the General Assembly provoked considerable reaction at home. J.P. Narayan, the Indian Socialist, remarked: "I am concerned over our foreign policy. We are following a double standard... one standard of measurement for Egypt and another for Hungary. That is why I am opposing it."\textsuperscript{85} Much of this criticism was echoed abroad, and forced the Indian Government to take a firmer stand. As a result, Mr. Nehru reacted with a call for the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.\textsuperscript{86}

The Soviet Union was pleased with India's initial reaction to the Hungarian crisis. However, the Soviet Union became annoyed when India later called for the entry of U.N.

\textsuperscript{84} K.P.S. Menon; \textit{op.cit.}, pp 163-180.

\textsuperscript{85} A. Stein; \textit{op.cit.}, p 90.

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Ibid}; p 93.
observers into Hungary, and for self-determination for the Hungarian people. Thereafter, the Soviet leaders were not reluctant to drop hints in private that India also had a number of problems, including Kashmir. 87

During the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union emerged as a potential source of aid to India. In 1954, the Soviet Union set up a steel mill at Bhilai in central India. The cost of the steel mill was estimated at $275 million, of which the U.S.S.R. agreed to finance $132 million on credit at 2½ per cent. In 1955, India also received agricultural machinery from the Soviet Union in the form of a gift. The Soviets also extended loans to purchase equipment from the U.S.S.R. for diamond mining and oil prospecting. There was also Soviet assistance for India's shipping. During their tour of India in 1955, the Soviet leaders promised assistance for India's development plans. "On our part," said Bulganin, "we are prepared to share our experiences in the construction of industrial enterprises, electric power stations, hydro-electric projects and the utilization of atomic power for peaceful purposes." 88 In 1956, a Soviet delegation visited India to help set up a drug factory in Bombay for the manufacture of antibiotics, vitamins and basic chemicals.

87 Ibid; p 92.
88 W. Malenbaum; op. cit., p 37.
The U.S.S.R. made an offer of a $20 million loan to cover the foreign exchange costs involved in the project and to supply the needed technical assistance.

During the period 1957-59, three important agreements were signed with India, making provisions for:

1) A heavy machine building plant
2) A coal mining plant
3) An optical and ophthalmic glass factory
4) A thermal power station
5) Enterprises in the Korba coal fields, for heating 2.5 million tons of coal per year. By 1959, the U.S.S.R. had advanced credit to India totalling $280 million. 89

As a result of these programs and other efforts, India's trade with the Soviet Union expanded significantly, although by 1957, this trade accounted for less than 4 percent of India's total trade. There has been a net import surplus from the U.S.S.R. since 1955, as opposed to the negative balance which tended to prevail in earlier years. In general, India's trade with the Soviet Union after 1955 featured the export of agricultural products, including tea, coffee, ores and consumer goods. In return, India imported Soviet machinery - which increased after 1956 due to India's rising needs for machinery, tractors, equipment and cement. 90

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89 Ibid; p 40. Also see K. Gupta; op.cit., p 48.

90 W. Malenbaum; op.cit., p 39.
From 1957 to the end of the period under study, relations between India and the Soviet Union continued to be good. On the 12th of February 1957, the Soviet Foreign Minister made a major speech on foreign policy, calling for peaceful coexistence in the Middle East and suggesting a six-point plan for peace in the area:

1) Peaceful settlement of controversial issues
2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of the Middle East
3) Renunciation of any attempt to involve these countries in military blocs
4) Liquidation of foreign military bases on their territories
5) Denial of military aid to these countries
6) The provision of economic aid without conditions.\footnote{K. Gupta; \textit{op. cit.}, p 37.}

In making these proposals to bring peace and to keep the Western powers out of the Middle East, the Soviet Union's main concern was to keep American forces from coming close to her oil fields in the Caucasians. India was more concerned with accretion of the military strength of Pakistan as an indirect result of American involvement in the Middle East,\footnote{\textit{Ibid}; p 37.} due to Pakistan's membership in the Baghdad
Pact. Despite different reasons for wanting to keep the Cold War out of the Middle East, both countries appreciated each other's stand on the issue. India, however, supported the Soviet proposals for other reasons also. Direct Western involvement would have brought the Cold War to the area and this was against her policy of nonalignment. Further, the Indian Government supported the six-point plan which the Soviet Union was advocating vis-a-vis the Middle East, while American policy conflicted with these objectives in many respects.

In 1958, during the disturbances in the Middle East, the Soviet Union once more took the initiative in calling for a meeting of the major powers, as well as the leading nonaligned nations, to discuss proposals for improving the situation in the Middle East, as well as for easing world tension generally. The Soviets proposed that such outstanding issues as the easing of tension in Europe, suspension of nuclear tests, renunciation of hydrogen and atomic weapons and the Middle East be discussed. India was favourable to the proposal but the Western powers were not and the plan was dropped.\(^{93}\)

On the question of disarmament, India and the Soviet Union adopted similar positions, and the Soviet Union was eager to see India take part in talks on this issue. The

\(^{93}\) Ibid; p 42.
urgency with which India viewed the problem of disarmament was reflected in two resolutions passed by the two houses of the Indian Parliament in May 1957, calling on the Great Powers to cease nuclear testing. Further, in October 1957, when Mr. Nehru was on an official visit to Japan, the Indian Prime Minister and the Japanese Premier, Mr. Kishi, appealed to the Great Powers to stop further nuclear tests. On November 28th, Mr. Nehru made a personal appeal to the United States and the Soviet Union to stop nuclear tests as the first step towards disarmament.

The Soviet Premier, Marshal Bulganin, in his reply to Mr. Nehru's appeal, said in part:

Mr. Prime Minister . . . in common with you, our Government regards the instant suspension of nuclear tests as the first and extremely important step towards solving the disarmament problem in general . . . the Soviet government, in submitting its disarmament proposals to the current session of the General Assembly advocated as a start, the conclusion of an agreement on the suspension of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, if only for two to three years.

On March 31st 1958, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. published a decree unilaterally discontinuing all atomic and hydrogen weapons tests and appealing to other

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94 Ibid; p 44.
95 Ibid; p 45.
96 J. Nehru; op. cit., pp 201-203.
97 K. Gupta; op. cit., p 44.
states to discontinue such testing for all time. The U.S.S.R. reserved the right to resume testing, however, should other powers not follow its example. Mr. Nehru was unhappy when Soviet nuclear tests were resumed in October 1958 due to there being no agreement on a permanent test ban. However, in general the similarity in the Indian and Soviet positions on disarmament brought them closer together during this period. This desire to ease world tension was shared by Mr. Nehru who hoped that India's policy of non-alignment would make India an area of agreement between the superpowers and so bridge the gap between the two of them.

However, the execution of former Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy in June 1958, and the pressure which the Soviet Union was putting on the independent policies of Yugoslavia were opposed by India. Mr. Nehru expressed concern over the deterioration of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and wondered whether the pressure which the Soviet Union was exerting on Yugoslavia was consistent with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to which the Soviet Union, as well as India had subscribed. Nevertheless, despite these minor irritations in Indo-Soviet relations, the bonds between the two countries continued to be strong.99

98 Ibid; p 45.
It was, to Indians, a mark of the Soviet Union's friendly attitude to India that the U.S.S.R. refused to take sides in India's border quarrel with China. The Soviet Union maintained a silence during the initial stages of the border confrontation, which came out into the open with the Tibetan revolt in March 1959 and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India. This confrontation was intensified following the first Sino-Indian armed clash at Lonju along the McMahon Line on August 25th 1959, and the publicity in the Indian press about the Chinese road construction through the Aksai Chin plateau.

The first inkling of the Soviet position was revealed in a statement in Tass on September 9th, which expressed the hope that "India and China will settle the misunderstanding that has arisen about their long borders." 100 When Mr. Khrushchev went to Peking in September, he attempted to exercise some mediatory influence. Early in September, the Chinese Premier had sent a telegram to Mr. Nehru lauding the principles of coexistence and describing the present differences between India and China as only an episode in the age-long story of friendship. 101 Apparently Mr. Khrushchev was trying to exercise his mediatory influence in view of

101 A. Stein; India and the Soviet Union, pp 102-103.
the Chinese overture to India. A serious clash in the western sector of the border on October 21st, resulted in a rapid deterioration of the situation. Mr. Khrushchev, on October 31st, said before the Supreme Soviet that Russia "very much regrets the incidents on the Indo-Chinese border. We would be happy if there were no more incidents . . . and the existing frontier disputes were settled by friendly negotiations."\textsuperscript{102} The Soviet position was heartening to the Indian leadership. Krishna Menon noted that it was the first time the Soviet Union had talked of a peaceful settlement in a dispute between a Communist and a non-Communist country.\textsuperscript{103}

Thus, towards the end of the period under study, the Soviet Union and India, apart from their unity of outlook on various world issues, shared a similar interest in the containment of China with whom both share long and undefined borders. India's confidence in her relations with the Soviet Union was reflected in a speech of November 27th 1959, by the Indian Prime Minister in the Lok Sabha, when he deliberately contrasted the peace-loving posture of the Soviet Union with the war-like mood of China. Mr. Nehru said: "I do not think any country in the world is more anxious for peace than the Soviet Union. But I doubt if there is any country which cares less for peace than China."\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{102} K. Gupta; \textit{op.cit.}, p 57.
\textsuperscript{103} A. Stein; \textit{India and the Soviet Union}, p 117.
\textsuperscript{104} K. Gupta; "India's Relations with the Soviet Union," p 237.
In concluding this section on Indo-Soviet relations in the period 1954-59, the question arises as to what impact Kashmir had in shaping relations between the two countries. Kashmir did not become a factor in Indo-Soviet relations until 1955 when the Soviet leaders, while on a visit to India, declared their support for India on Kashmir. India's relations with the Soviet Union had been moulded in the two years preceding 1955, when the mutuality of support on burning issues in Asia (a factor highly conditioned by American behaviour in the region) took on the mutuality of interest. In this respect, the American military aid agreement with Pakistan in 1954 was significant. As a result of that agreement, the Soviet Union was moved to protect its vital interest on its southern frontier by declaring its support for India on Kashmir.

This change in Soviet policy on Kashmir had a number of consequences for India. It strengthened India's position against Pakistan, thus making it possible for the Indian leadership to resist effectively undue Western pressure to resolve the Kashmir dispute in a way which it viewed as detrimental to its interest. Another consequence of the declaration of Soviet support for India on Kashmir was that it made it possible for the Indian Government to achieve its long

105 Ross N. Berkes; "India and the Communist World" in Current History, Vol.36, March 1959, No.211, p 146.
desired balance in relations between the West and the Eastern blocs. Thus, the declaration of Soviet support for India on Kashmir was an important factor in cementing Indo-Soviet relations. 106

With Soviet acceptance of Panch Sheel in 1955, and its support of India's position on Goa, as well as its economic and technical assistance to India, the bonds between the two countries grew. Indo-Soviet relations were further strengthened by the interest both countries found in the containment of China with whom both shared long and undefined borders.

Thus, Kashmir was an important factor in the development of friendly relations between India and the Soviet Union. Equally important in the development of Indo-Soviet relations was their unity of outlook on various world issues, and the mutuality of interest developed as a result of American and Chinese policies in the South Asian region.

In conclusion, it can be argued that during the period 1954-59, India received much aid and encouragement in social and economic development from both the United States and the Soviet Union. However, in the eyes of most Indians, on the more important local problems of national integration, the promotion of secularism and non-discrimination among religions, the United States did not give any moral or political support. It was felt that, on the contrary, the United States, by providing arms to Pakistan, as well as supporting that country's position on Kashmir, strengthened Pakistan's resolve to get all of Kashmir. In contrast, the Soviet Union supported India's national integration and its secularism by its support of India's position on Kashmir.\textsuperscript{107}

Thus, on local problems, the foundations were stronger for Indo-Soviet than Indo-American relations. On the wider plane of international issues which by and large were more central to Indian foreign policy during this period, Kashmir was of some, but considerably less influence in shaping India's attitude towards the superpowers. In this broader sphere as well, however, there were more similarities of outlook between India and the U.S.S.R. than India and the U.S. Thus, on both the local and the international planes, India's relations generally appeared to be closer with the U.S.S.R. than the

U.S.A. However, since it was on the international plane that differences and similarities with the superpowers touched at the very roots of India's foreign policy posture in this period, Kashmir was not the dominant but only a reinforcing factor in shaping India's relations with the superpowers.
CONCLUSION

Kashmir, as the preceding chapters have shown, because of its symbolic importance to India's unity and its secularism, and because of its strategic location, was a factor in India's relations with the superpowers in the 1950s, and particularly in the period 1954-59. We have also argued, however, that India's attitude towards both the United States and the Soviet Union was determined by many factors, and that Kashmir was only one factor among others in shaping India's relations with both countries in the post-independence period.

The thesis has indicated that at independence, India chose not to get involved in the Cold War, and adopted an independent approach to world affairs. This was in accord with the many attitudes to international relations which characterized India's outlook in the pre-independence period, including doubts which nationalist Indians had about the motivations of Soviet and American policies in that period. Thus, nonalignment was the basic source of India's foreign policy. The thesis has indicated that nonalignment was a source of irritation in India's relations with the United States in the 1950s, and particularly in the first six years of India's independence. The doubts which Indians had about the motivations of American policy in this period were further heightened
by American policy on Kashmir in the Security Council debates in the early years of independence. Thus, Indo-American differences on Kashmir reinforced those sources of alienation in their relations which stemmed from basic differences in their approaches to the international issues of the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Because of the United States position on Kashmir in the Security Council debates of 1957, Kashmir continued to be a source of irritation in India's relations with the United States and reinforced the negative trend in Indo-American relations which developed primarily as a result of differences in policy over the problems of the Cold War, and American policy in Asia. However, throughout the 1950s, American economic aid to India continued so that some balance was maintained in their relations.

The thesis has also indicated that America's policy in Asia, particularly its military relations with Pakistan, and its concern with creating military alliances in the Asian region to counter the threat of Communist penetration, conflicted sharply with the basic tenets of India's foreign policy. India's disaffection with the United States was also shared by the Soviet Union. This was an important factor in the development of closer Indo-Soviet relations and no doubt influenced the declaration of Soviet support for India on
Kashmir. This support for India on Kashmir was an important bond in the development of close relations between the two countries, and served to reinforce the trend towards better Indo-Soviet relations which developed as a result of their unity of outlook on various world issues and by Soviet technical and economic assistance to India.

In short, the thesis has shown that Kashmir was not a critical factor in India's relations with the superpowers in the 1950s. Accordingly, it served only to reinforce trends in India's relations with both countries which developed as a result of the greater weight and importance of the non-Kashmir factors discussed in the thesis. Given the importance of Kashmir to India's unity, and its secularism, it is somewhat paradoxical that Kashmir, which is important in any calculation of India's basic national interests, was not a primary factor in shaping India's relations with the superpowers in the 1950s. The reasons for this are that, due to her active role in such international events as the armistice negotiations in Korea, the Geneva Conference on Indo-China in 1954, the Suez crisis and the subsequent peace-keeping operations in the Middle East, India's nonalignment was transformed from a mere verbal assertion into a practical global position. As a result, India's nonalignment gained increasing recognition from the superpowers as a serious foreign policy stance, and both
superpowers started to seek India's support on international issues.

India's increasing role in international affairs in the mid-1950s was also reinforced by her influence in the 'third world' and her active role in the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations. This active international role was also in part strengthened by the proclivity of Nehru for this type of world role for India. Nehru's long-standing interest in world affairs, and his conviction that India had an important contribution to make towards the maintenance of world peace helped to emphasize the international focus of India's diplomacy in the 1950s. Moreover, India's active world role and the vigorous promotion of nonalignment had certain domestic advantages in the early years of independence. It was a way of building India's sense of national pride and prestige. Such feelings were important stimuli in the ongoing task of social and economic reconstruction at home. The above factors led the Indian leadership to place more importance on the international rather than the regional aspects of India's foreign relations in the 1950s. Thus, Kashmir as a 'regional' issue was only a secondary reinforcing factor in India's relations with the superpowers compared to the broader international issues.
In addition, after 1954, United States policy in Asia of attempting to counter Communist penetration by a system of pacts and alliances led to increasing concern on the part of the Indian leadership that the Cold War would be brought to the region because of United States policy and the threat to peace which that policy represented. As a result, the Indian leadership vigorously promoted India's nonalignment in the hope that India would become an area of agreement between the superpowers, and thereby reduce the potential for conflict between them. Thus, the Indian preoccupation with the Cold War and its spread into South Asia, where it became a direct threat to India, inevitably led the Indian leadership to focus its attention on the Cold War and world issues rather than Kashmir.

Thus, the thrust of India's foreign policy during the 1950s and particularly in the period 1954-59 was towards the conflicts of the superpowers. As a result, the Indian leadership was more concerned with problems that were dominant in the global international system than in the South Asian subordinate system. Accordingly, the Kashmir dispute, a regional problem between India and Pakistan, exercised only a secondary influence in India's relations with the superpowers in the 1950s and particularly in the period 1954-59.
Thus, Kashmir was only a reinforcer of policy trends which resulted from other factors. In the case of Indo-Soviet relations, Soviet support for India on Kashmir reinforced the positive trend in their relations. In the case of Indo-American relations, however, the American stand on Kashmir had the opposite effect - it reinforced the negative trend in their relations.

However, Kashmir was an important factor in India's foreign policy, and became of increasing importance towards the end of the period under study. With the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations after 1958, because of the dispute over their Himalayan borders, the geopolitical importance of Kashmir to India's security became more evident. Although the 1960s fall beyond the scope of this thesis, it is safe to assume that Kashmir continued to be an important symbol of India's secularism and that Kashmir's importance to India for security reasons increased throughout that decade, and became a primary factor in India's foreign relations. The Indian fear of Sino-Pakistan collusion on Kashmir, the Sino-Indian War of 1962, and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, coupled with the decline in the significance of nonalignment as an effective force in global politics all contributed to an increasingly regional emphasis in Indian foreign policy in the 1960s. Then, as opposed to the previous 'Global' decade of Indian policy, Kashmir inevitably came to assume considerably greater importance.
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