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Political Integration of the Overseas Chinese Communities in Burma, Cambodia and Thailand

Submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Windsor in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

by

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1973
ABSTRACT

This paper compares the positions of the overseas Chinese communities relative to the national political systems in Burma, Cambodia and Thailand. Using the comparative method and political integration theory, there has been an attempt to analyze the condition and processes involved in integrating a distinctive non-indigenous minority into the national political systems of three developing nations. There has also been an attempt to assess the relationship between political integration and assimilation in the process.

The focus of this research is on three factors influencing the political integration and assimilation of these three overseas Chinese communities: (1) structural factors contributing to the social and political stratification of the Chinese and dominant groups; (2) socialization agents that are commonly shared by the Chinese community; and (3) historical factors that influence the attitudes and behaviors of the two communities in their inter-ethnic relations.

Finally, in an attempt to throw more light on the particular processes in each of the three nations studied
and to the end of further developing political integration theory, four hypotheses were tested:

1. Cultural assimilation is not a necessary condition of political integration.

2. Highly competitive inter-ethnic contact has a disintegrating effect on political relationships.

3. Competitive inter-ethnic contact may have an integrating effect if two or more groups share a similar competitive experience with a single other group.

4. When the power structure of the Chinese community is the structure through which political relations with the national community take place, total integration will be blocked by the need of the Chinese structure to persist.

Working under a conceptual framework that assumes that political integration includes both integrative behavior and attitudinal integration, an effort has been made to determine the presence or absence of a 'sense of community' and co-operative behavior between the Chinese and national communities.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation and gratitude to Professor David Luxford for his criticisms of earlier drafts of this thesis and for being gracious in his tolerance of my many moments of obtuseness. I also wish to extend my deepest gratitude to Professors K. C. Loderlund and C. Massey for their most helpful comments on both the structure and substance of this writing. A special note of appreciation is also extended to Richard G. Price (University of Windsor) for his kind assistance in establishing the conceptual framework for this project; to P. H. Ho (University of Lethbridge) and W. J. Willmott (University of British Columbia) for sharing with me the benefits of their years of studying the overseas Chinese both inside and outside of Southeast Asia; to my wife Dawn and son Douglas for allowing me to bring home a pet project and then altering their lives so that its completion was possible.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The choice of this topic of research—the integration of the overseas Chinese in Burma, Cambodia and Thailand—arises in part from an interest in China and Chinese society; in part from an interest sparked by a concern with the role of minorities in the political systems of both the developed and developing worlds; in part from dissatisfaction with the present state of the theoretical development of political integration in political science. Having previously participated in projects studying the politics and sociology of oriental minorities in Canadian politics, my interest is amplified by the hope that this study of three countries in the developing world of Southeast Asia will aid in better understanding of the Canadian experience as well as that of the three subject cases. It is also hoped that this study will contribute to the body of available literature on political integration and offer a helpful comparative perspective to the dynamics and

mechanics of the integration process from the vantage of both the dominant and Chinese groups in each system. Secondly, it is hoped that some redefinition of the conceptual and operational models will enable more meaningful study of the integration process.

Conceptual Framework and Definitions:

Functionalists contend that one of the requisites (conditions that must be satisfied if the system is to persist) of the social system is to provide for the integration of interdependent units—roles and structures. Under the logic of the functional approach it does not seem possible to speak of the integration function of a given social system without also speaking of the relationship between integration and the other requisite functions (goal attainment, pattern maintenance, adaptation). The nature of the four social functions that led theorists to classify them as requisite must indicate a close relationship between them. Also, though there is little in the literature to suggest that the system must decide upon functional priorities from time to time, it is obvious that the

capabilities of a system must be the cause of considerable allocation of functional priorities. This is particularly the case in the emerging political system. The integration of diverse groups to a mode of cooperative behavior necessary for the persistence of a new nation-state, it is generally agreed, commands high priority in the process of political development. Such is the example of Southeast Asia where one of the most pressing problems is the unification of culturally diverse groups as well as non-indigenous minorities into a single, stable political system.

In a recent paper reviewing the literature on political integration, Arend Lijphart has noted that under the general rubric of theories of political integration fall such diverse theoretical perspectives as theories of nationalism and national unification, theories of regional integration at both the international and sub-national levels, theories of political development and nation-building, theories of political stability and theories of federalism. He has further noted that these theories differ, apart from basic substantive content, in two major respects: (1) they operate at different levels of analysis and (2) they differ in their treatment of integration as a variable. The first

of these differences needs no further comment. Of the second, we note that in theories of nationalism and regional integration it is dealt with as a dependent variable to be explained by means of a variety of background conditions and other independent variables; political development and stability theories treat integration as either an independent or intervening variable which will explain stability or development as the dependent variable; federation, as a particular form of integration, can be both dependent (when analyzing factors leading to the emergence or maintenance of the system) or independent (when consequences of federalism are the research focus). Lijphart also urges that we keep in mind that, among the different definitions of integration employed by different scholars, it is sometimes defined as a process and sometimes as a condition. Haas is an example of the former, Etzioni of the latter and Deutsch has employed both.

Though there seems to be little standard use of the term, there does seem to be considerable agreement on what

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is intuitively meant by integration. The lack of formal agreement largely reflects differences in scope and extent of formal political unity involved in the process as well as problems of precise operationalization. Karl Deutsch's definition, which by virtue of its de-emphasis on formally constituted constitutional structures, lies at one extreme, considers integration as a condition where "individuals or groups experience high levels of transactions with a positive covariance of rewards" which results in "the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its populations." At the other extreme is Etzioni's definition, which effectively equates an integrated political community with a sovereign state possessing "effective control over the use of the means of violence. . . a centre of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community . . . (and which is) the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware

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citizens. In attempts to avoid these definitional extremes we shall define political integration as the propensity for diverse groups to voluntarily co-operate through and positively identify with common sets of political institutions for the purpose of solving common problems. It is intended that our definition refer to a condition dependent upon the factors of a dynamic process which involves both co-operative behavior and congruence of identification or 'sense of community'.

Lijphart has observed that practically all theories of integration posit "a high degree of cultural homogeneity, and especially a homogenous political culture," as a necessary condition of political integration. Even those theories which apparently do not assign a key role to cultural homogeneity recognize the condition as crucial. The exact dimensions of the relationship between integration and cultural homogeneity are frequently left rather vague, however, which has caused a great deal of confusion with a sociological concept similar to integration—assimilation. Deutsch, for example, seems to have a great deal of difficulty keeping the two concepts distinct. He indicates that assimilation is of crucial importance to the process

7Amital Etzioni, Political Unification, p. 4.

8Arend Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration," p. 4.
(or condition) of integration but falls short of actually specifying where one ends and the other begins or exactly what the linkage is between the two. 9 Partially in his defence, it should be pointed out that this problem arises, in part, from the fact that there is little consensus over a standard definition or use of either concept in either discipline.

Hilton Gordon's excellent review of the sociological literature on assimilation indicates that in reality there may be little difference between the two concepts except in the level of analysis to which they apply. 10 He notes that assimilation has not necessarily been confined to simply an examination of culturally determined behavior patterns, but has been utilized to refer to cultural assimilation, structural assimilation, marital assimilation (intermarriage or amalgamation), the development of a sense of nationhood (as distinct from statehood) based exclusively on the host society or "identificational assimilation, attitude receptional assimilation (absence of prejudice), behavior receptional assimilation (absence of discrimination), and

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9 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and its Alternatives, pp. 16-30.

civic assimilation (absence of value and power conflict).\textsuperscript{11}

Clearly there is much in common between the two concepts both in definition and in operational application. The important difference, that Deutsch seems to have failed to clearly note (an error which he shares with distinguished company), is that assimilation is used with regard to whole social systems while integration is only a part of the same process in the political sub-system. Assimilation by definition must include political integration. Political integration, on the other hand does not require complete homogeneity of political culture (which is requisite for full cultural assimilation), but rather attitude congruence over system identification, as we shall see shortly. It is thus conceptually possible and, we shall attempt to prove in this work, empirically possible for political integration to take place prior to or without full assimilation in either the political sub-system or either of the social sub-systems. Etzioni correctly maintains that cultural homogeneity, though not to be disregarded, has been overblown in its importance for integration.\textsuperscript{12} in

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{12}Etzioni, Political Unification, p. 23.
part since all cultural values are not necessarily of political relevance.13

This is not to deny the fact that a strong linkage exists between assimilation and integration (possibly by virtue of some "spill-over effect") nor that cultural homogeneity for assimilation and political cultural homogeneity for integration may increase the probability of the condition emerging. The crucial question for the three nations under investigation might be: under what conditions are cultural cleavages transformed into political cleavages and how far-reaching, in terms of different social and political strata are these political cleavages? In many ways this is a reformulation of the approach of such pluralists as Lipset, Almond and Coser, who argue that the stability and integration of heterogeneous politics rest upon the presence

13 Ibid, p. 35.
of "cross-cutting" cleavages. This is particularly relevant to the emerging nations of Burma, Cambodia and Thailand where history and contemporary politics have often led to social class distinctions in terms of ethnicity.

An analysis of Chinese-dominant group relations based upon the guidelines of the work done by Leonard Binder, implying that an elite rather than a mass may be the key to the completion or even initiation of the integrative tasks in the nation-building process, can provide a useful perspective, at least as a point of departure. We are also aided by the distinction between "functional integration" and "moral integration" made by A. K. Basu. Basu's proposition is that individual or group involvement is more than a purely behavioral condition. Binder also points out that elites may be responsible to provide the means for integration that are, as far as possible, not inimical to traditional or parochial patterns of the dominant cultural group, when we consider Binder's note that people must


positively identify themselves as citizens of "the nation." Further, the whole process of demanding and initiating integration must be made with the capabilities of the system in mind. It seems obvious, for instance, that the integration of more people is accompanied by strict administrative imperatives as new structures are created and, perhaps, old structures discarded. This is a consideration that must be made not only at the final stage of integration—where behavior is accompanied by a 'sense of community'—but at the intermediate levels which may be 'identification' without behavior or cooperative behavior without identification.

Important to our model is the fact that political integration is not complete without both attitudinal integration ('sense of community' or 'common identification') and integrative behavior (shared transactions with some positive covariance of rewards). This becomes evident


18 Attitudinal integration is used here in the sense of what Basu has called moral integration which may be thought of in much the same manner as political cultural homogeneity where there is common identification toward political objects and symbols such as 'nation', 'state', 'flag', 'political cause', etc. This departs from Almond and Verba's definition in that attitudes may be integrated without regime loyalty or identification with the acts of a particular regime. Integrative behavior may be used more or less synonymously with what Basu calls 'functional integration', Drabick—'trade area'; and Weiner—'integrative behavior'. See,
in view of the fact that often the Chinese in each of these
countries control large portions of the local economy.
Transaction levels between them and the indigenous groups
may be high, however, those transactions may be simply a
fulfillment of, on one hand, the need to obtain goods on the
other, to have consumers of goods. These needs are more
basic than those necessary for a durable political relationship,
however stable the relationship may be at any given time. In
fact, the very stability of the relationship may have the
potential for creating resentments with a disintegrating
function for attitudinal integration.

On the other hand, the integration of attitudes is not
sufficient for the creation of a national community. While
the basic needs of groups and individuals may be fulfilled
by high levels of transaction locally, these same groups
and individuals may 'identify' with other communities with
which they have no means of communicating or with which
transaction levels remain low. An example might be the
same Chinese minority where often identification toward the
China mainland has remained high despite the fact that the

A. K. Basu, op. cit.; Lawrence Drabick, "The Identification
Component as a Factor in Community Location," *Dural
Sociology*, 30 (March, 1965), pp. 83-87; Myron Weiner,
"Political Integration and Political Development," *The Annuals
of the American Academy of Political Science*, 353 (March,
1965), pp. 52-64.
overseas Chinese have been in constant transactional contact with the members of economy in the host country, and have had relatively little contact with China.

In short, it is necessary that positive attitudes or identifications be accompanied by positive behavior (co-operative behavior) in order for a condition of integration to exist. In each of the political systems we shall study here, the national community has emerged, more or less, from a dominant ethnic community. More often than not, national identification involved the acceptance of certain values distinct to a dominant cultural grouping in the social system. Furthermore, the existence or lack of a second non-indigenous minority has had a significant effect on each of these systems. In both Burma and Cambodia, the colonial powers employed non-indigenous groups in administrative positions (Vietnamese in Cambodia; Indians in Burma). The predominance of this second minority, in both the politics and economy of these two countries, brought it into direct competition with the dominant indigenous group with an integrating effect for the Chinese, who were only of secondary competitive consideration. Partly because of the presence of a second minority, potential hostility between the Chinese and the dominant group did not materialize. In Thailand, the absence of such a minority may partially account for the high degree of economic competition between the Chinese and Thai which had a disintegrating effect on the inter-group relationship.
Methodology and Hypotheses

Guy Hunter has observed that ethnic relationships will be misleading if they are not considered in the context of the social, political and economic factors acting upon them because, he observes, "they arise in concrete, local, historical situations, and they can be altered by changing economic and political events."\textsuperscript{15} It is with this in mind that we shall undertake to examine the processes and conditions of integration between the Chinese and the national community in each of the three states under study.

The degree of racial diversity between Thailand, Burma and Cambodia varies, but each state is controlled by a particular ethnic majority. Each of these nations is dominantly Theravada Buddhist and has generally been exposed to similar cultural influences. For several reasons each has responded to the challenge of imperialist expansion from Europe in its own way and with distinct results. The Burmese reacted defensively, the Thai adapted and accepted change and were largely receptive to the west, the Cambodian monarchy accepted surrender to the French in order to maintain its domestic social position.

Out of such similarities and contrasts emerged the

\textsuperscript{15} Guy Hunter, \textit{South-East Asia—Race, Culture, and Nation}, (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); p. 10.
modern states of the mainland. A pitfall in our choice of these three states is one that inevitably arises when doing research on developing countries—the problem of data. Various difficulties are encountered in gaining access to data in each case and problems of data reliability, when obtained, must be taken into account in analysis. The data regarding the Chinese and the national society in Thailand is the most reliable and complete of the three cases under study. In each of the other two countries the data has been unevenly distributed. In Burma we have a relatively large amount of reliable data regarding the country as a whole, however data specifically dealing with the Chinese minority is slight. The result is that often it is necessary to make inferential statements which are more heuristic than empirically substantial. This problem in Burma has also necessitated the use of observer reports of limited reliability statistically. In Cambodia the reverse situation is apparent. We have the benefit of a couple of excellent studies of the Chinese community, however there is a paucity of aggregate data on the rest of the nation.

In the following study our focus will be upon the integration of the overseas Chinese in Burma, Cambodia and Thailand in the post-independence period (for Thailand, which did not formally have any colonial ties, this period coincides with the beginning of the second Phibun administration). Two major independent variable processes
or clusters will be examined for their effects on the integration process in each case: (1) structural cluster (factors contributing to structural differentiation between the Chinese and dominant groups in creating integrating or disintegrating cleavages) and (2) socialization agent cluster where we shall attempt to determine the extent to which formal and informal socialization agents are common to both communities. One important caution is in order when considering this second cluster. Common experiences shared by diverse groups may be interpreted differently by each group. For example, a news item read by a Burman and a Chinese in the same newspaper may have negatively reinforcing effects on one and positively reinforcing effects on the other. We have used this variable more for the sake of economy than of preference. It is recognized that survey techniques may be more reliable, however it is felt that the obstacles encountered by examining simply the sharing of agents such as the schools, social organizations and associations and media are not serious enough to warrant the exclusion of this set of factors.

In addition to the two independent variable clusters we shall look at the intervening variable of history. We shall attempt to introduce historical factors that are responsible for influencing actor attitudes and behavior in inter-ethnic relations. It is recognized that the historical experiences of societies often have continuing
effects on the socialization, social structures and policies of succeeding generations that may accelerate or impede integration and assimilation. In our summary examination of history we wish to identify the major factors that may intervene to change the relationship between our independent and dependent variables.

Because the question of who is or is not Chinese is not simply defined in any Southeast Asian country, few students of the overseas Chinese have found an entirely satisfactory solution. Coughlin and Donald Willmott have relied upon cultural criteria, Skinner has preferred the use of "self-identity" and William Willmott defines as Chinese any individual who supports or participates in some or all of the Chinese associations and organizations available to him. Because our major problem in this study is the utilization of data already available and not one of determining what individuals to include in a survey sample, we shall define Chinese as those either identifying themselves as Chinese or participating in the Chinese associations and organizations available to them.

Finally, in an attempt to throw more light on the particular processes in each of the three nations under study as well as to more rigorously define the relationships in the theoretical framework there will be a test of the following hypotheses:

(1) Cultural assimilation is not a necessary condition of political integration. Most of the studies of political integration in the sub-national system to date have dealt with the integration of indigenous groups. There have been few, if any, studies that have focused upon the integration of a non-indigenous minority to an indigenous political system. The proposition here is that, while total social assimilation must include both cultural assimilation and political integration by definition, each of these two are distinct factors of assimilation. Though some spill-over may be evident when assimilation takes place in social sub-systems other than the political system, thus aiding the process of integration in the political system, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of the process in the political system. For example, in Cambodia it is the Khmer Rouge that is in political rebellion against the national government (also Khmer). Both groups are culturally the same but ideologically different. The cleavage is political rather than cultural. The Chinese on the other hand are culturally different from the Khmer but in a much higher condition of political integration with the national
community than the indigenous rebels.

(2) Highly competitive interethnic contact has a disintegrating effect on political relationships. This is closely related to the "modernization process" in the developing state. Because of the disorienting nature of competitive contact (particularly in the economic sector) the individual or group will tend to orient toward particular rather than universal identification. As more and more individuals compete for scarce social and economic rewards the chances of success for any one actor becomes smaller and the "rule of the game" less well defined. This serves to increase the tensions of the competitive contact and thus the need for the individual to seek "relief" from this tension in the slower moving, better regulated world of his smaller reference group (in the case of the Chinese--the Chinese community). Conversely, as the competition levels decrease in that interethnic contact, so will ethnic identification decrease. This process will only take this pattern if the rate of competition within the ethnic community is less than that in society as a whole. If competition within the ethnic community is equal to that of the larger society other variables will become more important in affecting political integration. If competition in the larger society is less than in the ethnic community there will be a tendency to seek relief by total integration and assimilation. Thus, as traditional rules of competition
break down within the ethnic "reference group" of the Chinese community the individual will find it necessary to use some other reference source which will serve to cross-cut the ethnic cleavage. In the countries under study this process may be seen in action where urbanization is throwing Chinese and socially dominant groups into contact that is commercially and socially competitive in terms of status and business success. Governments, in attempts to reduce tensions for citizens, have tried to define the rules of this competition by restricting certain occupations and opportunities to certain individuals (in Thailand the Chinese in particular are restricted from a number of occupations; in Cambodia this restriction applies to non-citizens in general). In doing so there has been a tendency to reinforce the ethnic cleavage and translate it into a political cleavage with disintegrating consequences for the national system.

3) Competitive interethnic contact may have an integrating effect if two or more groups share a similar competitive experience with a single other group. This hypothesis is related to the one above. It does, however, focus on the presence of an 'intervening minority' in the integration of two other groups. Such is the case of both Burma and Cambodia where colonial administrations employed large numbers of non-indigenous persons in administration and encouraged them to develop secure positions in the national economy. In Cambodia this group was Vietnamese,
while in Burma it was Indian-Pacific. In both instances the Chinese and the numerically dominant indigenous groups were drawn from competition with each other and economic competition with this third force. The fact that both groups had a common cause in making social gains from the third minority was a positive influence in integrating the Chinese and the indigenous majority group.

(4) When the power structure of the Chinese community is the structure through which political relations with the national community take place, total integration will be blocked by the need of the Chinese structure to persist. When the communication structure between the two communities differs from the power structure of the Chinese community integration will be assisted because there is no threat to the persistence of the particular structures and roles of the Chinese community. We shall largely undertake to examine this final hypothesis in reference to Thailand and Cambodia.

In the first case the inter-community communication structure is almost identical to the intra-community power structure. In the latter case the two structures differ significantly. It is proposed that a threat to the continued persistence of a sub-system may have consequences that, if not disintegrating, are pattern maintaining. Following from this is the obvious proposition that pattern maintenance does not serve the needs of the integration function.
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL SETTING

The influence of history, particularly that of the colonial period (in Thailand the corresponding period runs from the end of Mongkut's reign--1868--to the beginning of the second Phibun administration) had a profound impact upon both the condition of integration at the time of 'independence' and upon the ensuing process in each nation. Despite the fact that Thailand experienced no formal colonial ties it is generally agreed that the destinies of the mainland states lay largely in the hands of the British and French and it is from the influences of these two colonial powers that these states embarked upon their entry into the modern world. Furthermore, the remark that "Chinese trade followed European flags"¹ is not altogether untrue.

BURMA

The Pre-colonial system

The pre-colonial history of Burma is largely marked by the struggle between three racial groups--the Burmans and Mons and the Burmans and Jhans. Though Burman rule did not

ascend until about the middle of the sixteenth century, which marks the beginning of the Burman state as we know it. Burman contact with Mon culture had an enormous impact on the nature of modern Burmese society.

Their substantial economic skills as hydraulic agriculturalists, craftsmen, shipbuilders, seamen, and traders were matched by their civilizing role as transmitters of Indian culture. Indian governmental practices and kingship symbols, Vishnu worship, Buddhism, and Sanskrit and Pali writing systems were all transmitted by the Mons to the Burman neighbors. 2

From the point of Burman ascendancy, the history of the nation is marked by a series of rebellions by both Mons and Shan until the rise of British colonial rule.

A study of classical Burma brings to focus a number of traditions of noteworthy variation from either Cambodian or Thai history. Early cultural assimilation was rather high due to the historical interactions of the Mon, Shan and Burman peoples. The Burman's owe much to the cultural and technical contributions of the Mon just as the Shan adopted much of their culture from the Burmans. In religion, Siva worship and Mahayana Buddhism (the type found in China), so prominent in early Cambodia, were in little evidence. Most importantly Burman political control centered in Upper Burma which depended upon the irrigated granary areas for food. There was no attempt to develop the rich delta lands of the

lower river, largely inhabited by Mons, so contact with the outside world was minimal. This lead to a xenophobic disdain for outside contacts—a spirit foreign to Thailand and Cambodia.

Though there is evidence of, at least partial, cultural assimilation among the indigenous peoples, there is almost a total lack of integration. The traditional administrative system rested upon the nyothayvis or hereditary township leaders. Prior to British occupation of Lower Burma these nyothayvis had been largely replaced by tawkhauvis or appointed officials controlling circles of villages much like the system in Thailand. The Upper Burmans retained the hereditary office until British annexation. The pattern in Lower Burma in fact aided the effective change to British control where the administrative structure was largely maintained while the "chef administrateur" was simply replaced. Where nyothayvis were a genuine part of the political authority structure colonialism had a markedly disruptive effect on the existing social fabric.

Burma is the only state of the three that has been extremely vulnerable to Chinese overland invasion throughout its history. In fact the first Burman contacts with the Chinese were mainly of a military nature. After the middle

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of the eighteenth century Burma-China relations remained generally peaceful and trade between them began to increase. Largely for the benefit of the upper classes of the Burman court trade goods arrived by overland caravan from Yunnan until the first half of the nineteenth century. Large scale Chinese immigration largely coincided with British ascendency in the South. As the cotton monopoly went from Chinese hands to the royal house, the overland route began to close. Chinese who had previously dealt only in Chinese goods were then forced to become general storekeepers. By the time the British were able to control the whole country the Chinese represented only about .54 percent of the national population (Indians about 3.3 percent).

The Colonial System

British colonial occupation of Burma was carried out in three successive stages: (1) the occupation of the lower Burma Tenasserim coast (1825); (2) the annexation of the lower Irrawaddy and Sittang Valleys (1852); and (3) the final occupation of Upper Burma and the final dissolution of the monarchy (1862). Following a short period of indirect administration through traditional leaders in Tenasserim,

5Ibid, p. 58

the Indianization of administration came in response to demands for formal court procedures under Indian law using professional legal council. In the Arakan district, where Indian capital, Bengali labor and direct British rule were introduced early, the society was treated almost exclusively as an economy. The end product was a general loss of status for Burmese leaders and headmen who were reduced to roles as tax collectors and low level salaried clerks. The issue of Indianization was a much greater blow to Burman elites than the mass as it was the leader class that stood to lose the most from Indian intrusion into the administration and the economy.

Professor Silverstein has observed that:

Prior to the third Anglo-Burmes War, the primary political interest of the British was to establish law and order. . . (and) sought to accomplish its purpose as inexpensively as possible. 7

This policy had a positive effect on the integration of the national system. The three parts of Burma were brought under a single authority for the first time in 1862; river traffic increased between Upper and Lower Burma; rail lines were completed and traffic began to increase; and the administration was centralized. 8

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8Cady, Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia, p. 98.
Chinese were allowed representation in the early British attempts to allow participation in the administration wherein the Yangon municipal council became two-thirds elected (the remaining third was still appointed by the British). The Chief Commissioner of Burma directed that the elected members should represent 'interests' rather than 'areas'. The elected membership was thus comprised of five Burmans, five Europeans, two Muslims, one Karen, two Hindus, two Chinese and one representative of the Chamber of Commerce. In 1897 the Lieutenant-Governor's legislative council was established seating native "non-officials." In 1920 these numbered thirteen of thirty and included ten Burmans, two Indians and one Chinese. The legislative assembly created by the 1937 Constitution gave 95 seats to the Burmese. The remainder of the 132 seats were reserved for Karens, Indians, Anglo-Indians, Europeans and Chinese. Because of Burman leader had to command over 71% (67 of 95 seats) of the Burmese majority to control the assembly a number of coalitions developed with the other representatives. Furnivall observes, however, that "there was no organic connection between the people and their


10 J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, pp. 71-72.

representatives. The colonial experience was providing only for an elite integration that was not penetrating to mass levels.

An examination of electoral participation further demonstrates that these moves to localize administration made little impression on the mass population. Tinker notes that early turnouts at the polls were low, but that there was an apparently steady increase in the salience of local politics. In the first rural elections in 1922 only 11 percent of the electorate voted and in 1925 only about 15 percent. In the municipalities the percentages went from 28 percent in 1921 to 44 percent in 1924. The difference between the urban and rural turnouts may be accounted for by the fact that urban voters were both closer to the central administration and more influenced by its outputs which dealt largely with the urban economy. In Rangoon, the Chinese were relatively well represented on the electoral rolls of 1931. Suffrage extended to about ten percent of the total population, to about five percent of the Indians, well over ninety percent of the Europeans and about seven percent of the Chinese.

12Ibid.


14Though these approximations are cautious and made on figures that are only roughly comparable at times, the variations should not be more than 2 percent for all groups
While it appears that the need to form coalitions was cross-cutting ethnic cleavages at elite levels, the effects were being countered in the economic sector of Burmese society. British recognition of existing ethnic cleavages in politics was compounded by a problem of occupations forming along ethnic lines. Karens, Chins and Kachins were being recruited into the British-Burma Army--Burmese were not. Indigenous groups were largely agricultural while the Indians and Chinese were largely involved in urban occupations (Chinese in commerce and trading; Indians as administrative clerical workers, absentee landlords, and coolie labor).

The presence of the Indian minority in Burma had important consequences for Burmese-Chinese relations. Because of the position of the Indians in colonial Burma, the Chinese did not enjoy the ascendancy in business that may be observed in Thailand. The Chinese were slightly over-represented in the employment statistics of 1931 (see appendix I) but not to the same degree as the Indian minority. The Chinese represented about 1.5 percent of the total persons employed


(they represented about 1.3 percent of the population by 1931) and the Indians 9.5 percent. A look at the relative positions of the Burmese, Chinese and Indians in public service industries and administration reveals that the Chinese were not proportionally over-represented while the Indians (comprising about 5.5 percent of the population) were over-represented by from six to nine times. It is apparent that the Burmese were under-represented in all occupational categories excepting agriculture and the professional classification (which also includes monks). A look at investment reveals that the Chinese had about 2.8 million pounds and the Indians about 101.77 million pounds invested in Burma by 1941. (also see appendix II). Further evidence suggests that the competition levels between the Burmese and Indians was high enough to result in disintegrating conflict and the transformation of ethnic hostilities into a political cleavage.

In short, Burmese security in their own economy and administration had to be accomplished at the expense of the Indians. For example, the Burma Planter's Association, representing large rubber interests in 1921 claimed to represent 40 estates—three Chinese, four Burmese, six Indian


17 Chakravarti, Indian Minority in Burma, pp. 94-95.
and twenty-six European. The Chinese only operated about half as many factories as the Burmans while the Indians operated almost the same number as the Burmans. (also see Appendix III).

Chinese social relations with the Burmans have been, until recently, relatively cordial. A traveller's account in 1900 reports a good deal of assimilation among metics.

The offspring of unions between Chinese men and Burmese women were thought to have a great future. The sons were brought up as Chinese; the daughters as Burmese. But the men were not suffered to wear the plaits of queue of the Chinese; they merely coiled their hair around the unshaven part.

The attitude of the Burmese toward the Chinese seems to have been one of limited kinship. In fact, the Burmese word for 'Chinese' is pauk pae which means next-of-kin. Chinese settlers generally intermarried freely and usually assimilated in about three generations of residence in the country.

This generally decreased in Burma, as it did in the other two countries, with the influx of more Chinese women in the 1920's. By 1931, however, the sex ratio among the Chinese was about

18 Ibid, pp. 92-93.

19 Ibid, p. 88.

20 Victor Purcell, Chinese in Southeast Asia, p. 61.


22 Ibid.
still low enough to encourage Chinese men to marry Burmese women, though the actual rate is unknown.

Chinese nationalism did not seem to attract the same kind or intensity of interest among the Chinese in Burma that it did in Thailand. Chinese generally came to regard Burma as their home, most spoke fluent Burmese, even the recent arrivals. The major point of Burmese-Chinese tension was the border issue with China. Part of China's post-war claims to "traditional" territory included some 75,000 square miles of Burmese territory bordering Yunnan. Furthermore, the large expanse of border was the cause of a good deal of illegal immigration of Chinese into Burma and a later problem of K.M.T. rebels staging raids against the communists from the Burma frontier.

Independence Period

The independence period in Burma has been dominated by two major political figures—U Nu and General Ne Win—and punctuated by a series of conflicts and uprisings between internal factions. A factor unique to the Burmese experience, significantly affecting the attitudes between

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23 Purcell, Chinese in Southeast Asia, p. 41.

Burhans and the Chinese minority as well as the direction of Burma's foreign policy, is the presence of Kuomintang troops in Northern Burma following the Communist victory in China.

Following the assassination of Burma's architect of independence, U Nyein Chan, the new Burmese government was headed by his old comrade U Nu. Efforts by Mu and the <s.AFPL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League) to lead the state were severely handicapped by the outbreak of nation-wide rebellion by communist break-away faction of the AFPL, the refusal of the P.V.C. (People's Volunteer Organization) to disband and Karen uprisings. Perhaps the single most important factor preventing a total collapse of the new government was the inability of these groups to coordinate either their objectives or efforts. In 1950 the tide began to turn in favor of the Nu government. Many members of the P.V.C. quietly surrendered in May of 1950, however the organization itself was not dissolved. During 1950 and 1951 the government also began to regain control of southern regions seized by K.N.U. and K.J.C.O. (Karen) insurgents. By June of 1951 the internal situation had stabilized to an extent where it was possible to hold, region by region, the first general elections of the new state. Also by this time American and


United Nations aid had begun to flow into the economy and the
International Farming Program in Burma (the IFPPL) began presenting welfare programs to the electorate in attempts to solve the economic problems left in the wake of colonialism, World War II and internal post-war insurrection.  

In 1952 Burma adopted a socio-economic plan known as Pyidawtha. By the end of the year new development corporations for rural, industrial and mineral resources were beginning to function and were soon followed by a full hierarchy of planning commissions. At the same time as the Karen armistice came a sharp drop in the price of rice while the nation's economic plan, based upon a hope of rice exports providing the necessary revenue to finance the industrialization program, faltered and failed. At the same time the Burmese government renounced American aid because of American involvement with KMT forces on the Burma-China frontier. The fact that defeated Kuomintang troops, from Yunnan province in China, had begun retreating into Burma in 1949 to regroup and conduct raids against the communists across the border was a constant threat to security and sovereignty.


in the early independence period. Burmese leaders feared that the communists would pursue the K.M.T. rebels into Burmese territory. By 1950 this threat prompted action on the part of the Burmese government. The Burmese army attacked K.M.T. strongholds in both 1950 and 1951 but this harassment seemed to serve only as an irritant rather than an obstacle to the plans of the K.M.T. leader, General Li Xi. During 1952 the K.M.T. forces were reinforced and armed from Formosa, their numbers rising to about 12,000 by the end of the year. There were also strong rumors of the presence of American instructors. After a decisive defeat at the hands of the communists in 1952, K.M.T. temper changed and it began to make territorial claims inside Burma. 30

These developments led the Burmese to renounce American aid and take the matter before the United Nations in April of 1953. Finally an agreement was reached and at the end of the year the Americans staged an "evacuation" of K.M.T. forces. Only 1,925 K.M.T. were evacuated, among which were "boys, Chans, and other non-belligerents; the arms tendered for surrender were made up of various museum pieces." 31 Evacuation was followed by a large Burmese offensive which ended in the capture of the K.M.T. headquarters in 1954 and a


31 Ibid.
further evacuation order. Many evaded the second order and there was rumor that reinforcements were actually flown in during the "evacuation."\textsuperscript{32} A further Burmese offensive was mounted in 1955 but even then many K.M.T. remained at large along the frontier controlling opium trade, manufacturing counterfeit currency and extorting revenue from local villages.\textsuperscript{33}

Burma's struggle with the K.M.T. on the Burma-China border coupled with a border dispute with the China mainland inherited from the British, leading to an official desire to accommodate Peking, is a major reason for Burma's being the first Southeast Asian state to recognize the People's Republic of China. The signing of a treaty between Burma and China in 1960 finally brought a formal end to the border dispute. Existing tensions between the two countries relaxed and improved relations were marked by extensive cultural and economic exchanges.

The relaxation of tension with China, which had begun in 1956, was not accompanied by a corresponding reduction of internal tension. Administrative inefficiency, political corruption and personal rivalries all contributed their share to the development of a split in the ruling U.P.F.L. Party.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{The Nation}, June 8, 1955. The report states that 600 fresh troops were smuggled in from Formosa.

\textsuperscript{33} Hugh Tinker, \textit{The Union of Burma}, p. 55.
in 1958.\textsuperscript{34} In the autumn of the same year U Nu announced his resignation and said that he had "requested" the commander-in-chief of the army, General Ne Win, take over the government and pacify the country so that a general election might be held in 1959.\textsuperscript{35} The promised election was finally held in 1960 and U Nu's faction of the NPP won an overwhelming victory, due largely to Nu's support of the Buddhist church and a general dislike for the preceding vigor of army rule over the country. Nu's government continued to have trouble with the Karen minority which, coupled with the rebellion of the Kachins and Shan's, helped set the stage for Ne Win's army coup of March 2, 1962.

The Ne Win government took a less sympathetic line toward minority groups in Burma and was not willing to grant concessions to favored minorities as was its predecessor.\textsuperscript{36} The constitution was suspended and a vigorous program of nationalization took place, particularly from 1963 through 1966, hitting resident foreigners hard. Like Nu, Ne Win generally maintained a policy of neutralism, but with a vigor


reminiscent of the xenophobic seclusion of the pre-colonial kings. Under military government strides were made toward solution of internal security problems, but at the expense of the economy as Ne Win had little capacity for economic planning. In 1967, in the wake of the cultural revolution, sino-Burmese relations took a turn for the worse and were marked by a bout of name-calling on both sides. Though tensions had relaxed somewhat by the turn of the decade, relations had not returned to their previous state of cordiality.

Official government policy toward the Chinese community throughout the U Nu regime was generally one of accommodation. The factionalism within the RPP and problems of insurgency throughout the country led the government to seek support from all possible quarters and thus toward a general policy of accommodation toward all ethnic minorities, both indigenous and non-indigenous.

Following the Ne Win take-over there was little change in this policy until about 1963-64 when the vigorous nationalization programs went into effect accompanied by a propaganda program that promoted Burmese nationalism. The group most hard hit by this program was the Indian minority,


toward which the full force of the nationalist sentiments were
directed. Though the pressures created by the government
policies seemed to have the effect of more sharply defining
the Chinese community by raising the ethnic consciousness of
both the Burmese and non-indigenous groups, we have no evidence
to indicate that there was such change in policy that might
be said to be directly aimed at the Chinese alone.

Summary

From our discussion of the major historical factors
influencing the assimilation and integration of the Chinese in
Burmā we may make several general observations. First we note
that Burmā was a highly pluralist society and poorly
integrated as a state. This is a condition that, all other
elements remaining equal, can make the national community
more receptive to the attempts of minorities to both integrate
and assimilate, particularly non-indigenous minorities that
have no historical claim to sovereignty or territory within
the national whole. Second, the presence of the large
Indo-Pakistani minority, from which the Burmans had to secure
themselves both economically and administratively, detracted
from potential disintegrative levels of competition that may
have developed between the Chinese and Burmans. Third, we
have seen that long contact between Burma and China has helped
to contribute to a small social distance between the Chinese
and Burmese who express a feeling of kinship with one another.
Finally, we have noted that the China border has long been a problem for Burmese governments. Both the fear of overland invasion from China (which had historical precedence) and illegal immigration of the Chinese by overland routes contributed to some degree of tension between the two groups. Further to this we have noted that the presence of a substantial force of K.M.T. rebels following the 1949 communist revolution in China was a further cause for uneasiness on the part of the Burmese officials about the Chinese minority in the country. Official Burmese apprehensions about the vulnerability of Burma to intervention from the China mainland may also be responsible for the apparent low profile of official policy toward the Chinese community in Burma, need to accommodate (or at least not unduly antagonize) Peking may have had direct bearing on official Burmese policies toward the overseas Chinese in the country.

Cambodia

The Pre-colonial System

Three major factors have been responsible for shaping the early history of Cambodia: (1) Cambodia's position as an important staging point on the old east-west route from China to India; (2) water-control problems involved with harnessing the Mekong River and a natural reservoir known as the Tonlé Sap (Great Lake); (3) the pressures of the Thai and Vietnamese at either flank.
Unlike the experience of Burma, the Chenla Khmer conquest of Funan, in the sixth and seventh centuries, was not marked by any extensive cultural interruption. Long contact with Funan had equipped the Khmers with a cultural orientation capable of providing continuity in the cultural and social patterns of the areas they were able to control. From the political confusion of the two centuries following the fall of Funan rose the Angkor empire which was perhaps the greatest period of Cambodian history, accounts of which come from early Chinese travellers.39

Like lower Burma, the feudal administration was composed of vassals appointed by royalty rather than an unbroken line of noble landholders, as was the case of Upper Burma. Cambodian royalty had the power to limit the influence of nobility because if titles were not renewed the Khmer system allowed for a gradual lowering of status to the rank of commoner within five generations.40 The assimilation of two religious traditions, the indigenous Nagaserpent and the imported Brahman, also contributed to the king's

39. A contemporary account of life in Angkor may be found in Chou Ta-kuan, Notes on the Customs of Cambodia, translated from the Paul Pelliot version by J. Gilman D'Arcy Paul, (Bangkok: 1967). Chou was a resident trader in Angkor at the height of the civilization.

control of his subjects by creating a 'god-king' cult. It is likely that Vishnu worship ceased before the thirteenth century and was replaced by Mahayana Buddhism which was in turn replaced by Theravada Buddhism in the fourteenth century. With these changes the god-king cult declined and with it the strong royal authority necessary to maintain the Mekong-oriented economy.

After the fall of Angkor in the fifteenth century, the history of Cambodia is one of successive territorial losses and struggles of varying success with the Thai and Vietnamese. Cambodian animosities were strongly directed toward rising Vietnamese power. The nineteenth century capture of a Cambodian monarch, royal family and ministers was the signal for a national uprising where Cambodians "set upon and killed all the Vietnamese they could lay their hands on." Thai aid was enlisted to restore order and the resulting struggle between the Thai and Vietnamese resulted in the installation of Cambodia as a buffer state until French ascendency some two decades later.

Both the Sung and Ming dynasties in China maintained embassies in Angkor and evidence suggests trade was carried

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41 Ibid., p. 469.

42 Reginald Lo May, The Culture of South-East Asia, (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1964), Chapter VII.

43 Tate, Making of South-East Asia, p. 471.
on, mainly for the benefit of the royal household. The decline of Ming China and the rise of Manchu power caused increasing numbers of Chinese to migrate to Vietnam and later to Cambodia. Between 1675 and 1691 the Cambodian ruler had to appeal to the Vietnamese for aid in controlling Chinese refugees. In return for their aid the Vietnamese assumed control of the territory involved largely limiting the mass influence of the Chinese in Cambodia until French ascendency. In 1855 French explorer Henry Mouhot reported a town of 10 thousand at Phnom-penh—almost all Chinese, but this was hardly representative of the rest of the country.

Prior to French colonial rule the Chinese were administered indirectly, as in Thailand, in a manner like the later French conscription system. In contrast to the French system, any Chinese born in Cambodia was considered a Cambodian if he adopted Khmer custom and dress. All Sino-Khmer were automatically Cambodian. In most matters of justice, evidence suggests the Chinese settled their own


disputes, indicating that early integration was low.\textsuperscript{46}

The Colonial System

French ascendancy in Cambodia in 1884 did not disrupt society, as did that of the British in Burma. The French move into Cambodia was made under the presumption that they were the heirs of Vietnamese suzerainty.

[The] principle activity in Cambodia, therefore, was directed toward the maintenance of law and order; only secondarily was it [France] interested in the development of natural and human resources.\textsuperscript{47}

The only important French investment in Cambodia was in rubber plantations which, along with processing plants, were manned by Vietnamese labor. The only significant break with Cambodian tradition came with the abolition of slavery. This policy was greatly disliked by Cambodian rulers, however, as slave service had traditionally constituted an important source of labor for royal projects and public works. A compromise was reached by permitting forced labor under a corvée system, from which foreigners were exempt.\textsuperscript{48}

The only census carried out in French-Cambodia was in


\textsuperscript{47} Kahin, \textit{Government and Politics of Southeast Asia}, p. 84.

\textsuperscript{48} Cady, \textit{Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia}, p. 113.
1921. It counted 91,200 Chinese (15,920 in the capital).\textsuperscript{49} Because of considerable error in this census, Willmott suggests that the "adjusted" Chinese population figure of 1921 would be more realistic at about 200,000 or about 3 percent of the total population.\textsuperscript{50} The Vietnamese represent a slightly higher percentage. In 1930, the Geneva Treaty stipulated unrestricted immigration to Indochina for the Chinese and Purcell estimates that there was a growth in the Chinese population of about 25 percent between 1921 and 1930.\textsuperscript{51}

Under the French, the Cambodian Monarchy was reduced to a symbol of nationhood and religion, behind which the French administration operated, manned by a small hierarchy of French residents and their staffs (mostly Vietnamese) strategically placed throughout the country. Though a centralized Cambodian bureaucracy was maintained, the French generally regarded Cambodians as being incapable of serving in administrative capacities\textsuperscript{52} and at the more important levels of government they preferred to utilize Vietnamese.


\textsuperscript{50}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{51}Victor Purcell, \textit{Chinese in Southeast Asia}, p. 178.

\textsuperscript{52}Kahin, \textit{Government and Politics of Southeast Asia}, p. 602.
(police, clerks, army, etc.) in the same fashion that the British employed Indians in Burma. Furthermore, the French did little to encourage Cambodians to train for administrative occupations. In 1927 the French set up a School of Administration but its Cambodian graduates were used only at the lowest levels of the administration.

Under French rule the Chinese in Cambodia were administered separately from the indigenous population through the **conrécration** system of indirect rule. The head of the **conrécration** was selected by the French résident from a list of three names elected by the **conrécration** itself. Every Chinese résident was required to be a member of a **conrécration** according to his place of birth and five such groupings were created (Teochiu, Cantonese, Hokkien, Hakka and Hainanese). For the French this system served the ends of taxation and control, while it functionally established states within the state and societies within the national society. The conrécration served to keep the Chinese ethnically and politically distinct from the Khmer and also to keep Chinese linguistic groups distinct from one another. Under this system neither assimilation nor political integration was possible at the mass level.

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53 For an imposibly detailed account of this system see J. D. Willmott, "Confréquences and Associations: The Political Structure of the Chinese Community in Phnom-pen, Cambodia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, **II** (June, 1969), pp. 282-301.
Under the French the Chinese were subject to taxation that the indigenous people were not. This tax was a boost to the French treasury thus giving the French an interest in maintaining the alien status of the Chinese. French policy, which was aimed at the broadest possible definition of 'Chinese', was in direct opposition to the position held by successive Khmer kings, but the latter had little power to turn the tables. The status of the Sino-Khmer was somewhat ambiguous under French rule, with the trend toward identifying them with the nationality of their fathers in order to include them in the Chinese community where they could be taxed.

Economically the Chinese were businessmen and contractors in Cambodia. During the pre-French and French periods no occupations were denied the Chinese by law. Their economic activities largely included timber and fishing concessions (armed by Vietnamese labor), import trading, rice milling, retail trade, and alcohol. Property restrictions kept the Chinese from owning rubber plantations or mining interests, but they were free to practice occupations such as teacher, printer, and innkeeper that were prohibited to other aliens. Generally they operated business interests that were both

54 Willmott, Chinese in Cambodia, p. 74.
55 Ibid, pp. 44-64.
56 Ibid, p. 46.
necessary and desirable to the economic life of the country but that were uninteresting to French entrepreneurs or the Khmer population.

Independence Period

Cambodia's transition from a colonial to independent state was a relatively smooth, but not uneventful, process. In accordance with an agreement signed with the French, Cambodia became "an autonomous kingdom within the French Union" on January 7, 1946. Full independence was not granted until late in 1953 when all of Cambodia was placed under Cambodian military command. The final transfer of sovereignty took place in February, 1954 removing all residual economic and technical services still in French hands to the Khmer government.

King Sihanouk and the members of his family completely dominated the internal politics prior to the granting of full independence. Four months after the constitution was promulgated in May, 1947, a constituent assembly was elected. Political factionalism emerged almost at once forcing Sihanouk to deal with a hostile National Assembly dominated by the Democratic Party. An extremely unstable administration resulted and in attempts to forestall complete chaos Sihanouk dissolved the National Assembly in 1949. Except for a nine month period, between September 1951 and

June 1953, King Sihanouk ruled Cambodia more or less directly until February 1955. In 1955 a national referendum of limited suffrage resulted in an overwhelming vote of confidence for the king. Shortly afterwards Sihanouk abdicated in favor of his father in order to build up a new political party, the People's Socialist Community (Sangkum Reastr Niyum). In the national elections of that same year the party won all of the seats in the national assembly. The XYZ continued in power until the coup in March of 1970. Despite the fact that Sihanouk's party remained in power, the administration was continually plagued by factional disputes, with the communists and between the "young intellectuals" and the "old guard." These disputes threatened the stability of the former king's government.

The first crisis came just after the 1958 elections which returned the S.R.N. by an overwhelming mandate. It involved the story of a plot to overthrow Sihanouk's neutral regime in favor of one which would form a military alliance with the Western powers. How much of the story is based on fact is unclear but it is certain that following its release Cambodia drifted into a closer relationship with the communist


59 Kahin, Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, pp. 627-629.

60 Ibid., p. 625.
bloc. Throughout the early sixties "les jeunes intellectuels" were the source of concern. Their complaint was that they lacked mobility in government beyond the National Assembly. JOhanouk's strategy to subdue this group was to put its members in the cabinet following the 1962 elections. By mid-1963 they had succeeded in nearly halving the national deficit.

As in Burma, Cambodia foreign policy was aimed at maintaining a neutralist position. Unlike Burma, the strategy was not one of seclusion but rather of attempting to continue relations with both blocs in the cold war. With the deterioration of Cambodian-American relations in the mid-sixties this was achieved only through continued cordial relations with the French government in the West. Foreign aid was extensively accepted from both communist and western donors. The most pressing concerns of foreign policy have been the uncomfortable problem of Vietnam and Thailand on Cambodia's borders and the need to maintain sovereignty in the face of the Vietnam conflict.

Official policy toward the Chinese in Cambodia throughout the independence period was generally cordial, though some tensions did develop in the sixties. In the next chapter we will see that the government moved to remove the structural restrictions placed upon the Chinese by the Concrération system, to broaden the definition of citizen to include all

métis Sino-Khmer and to move the Chinese under the direct jurisdiction of the government in the same manner as the rest of the national population. Legal restrictions were aimed generally at those persons who did not hold Cambodian citizenship (of all nationalities). Restrictions included the limiting of land leases, the need to possess a travel permit, and restriction from several occupations. Most prejudicial government policy was toward the Vietnamese minority in the country.

Summary

Several factors are apparent in the historical perspective that are of consequence to the processes of assimilation and integration in the independence period. Most importantly is the fact that the Khmer and Vietnamese were historical enemies. This conflict was amplified by the reliance of the French colonial administration upon Vietnamese staff in positions as police, clerks and lower officials. It was compounded again by the economic competition between Khmer and Vietnamese in the non-commercial sector of the economy (particularly agriculture).

It is also important that we note that the structure of the system under which the Chinese were administered, until independence, functioned to separate the Chinese and Khmer both socially and politically. There was, thus, little opportunity for social and political interaction that might
have led to a durable political cleavage between the two groups.

Like the case of Burma, we have seen that relations between the Chinese and the dominant ethnic group were generally cordial throughout the pre-independence period, a factor that may be largely responsible for peaceful relations between the two communities during the restructuring of both the Chinese and national communities following independence. It was generally felt that the Chinese provided economic services in the national society that were both necessary for the nation and unattractive to the members of the dominant society.

Thailand

The Pre-colonial System

The absence of direct foreign control in Thailand gives its history a distinctive quality. A similar pattern of development is evident however and what we shall refer to here as the pre-colonial arc dates from the beginning of the Thai kingdom to the beginning of the reign of Ram V in 1368.

Among the few facts that are known about the early Thai civilization is that the Thai entered their present territory from Yunnan province in China under Mongol pressures. The migration never assumed the proportions of a mass relocation but steadily increasing numbers brought the Thai into contact with Mon, Burmese and Khmer peoples, finally leading to a
transfer of power and the emergence of the early Thai city states. Non-Thai contact in this early period led to the introduction of Theravada Buddhism, Sukhodaya script and probably most of the other skills that the Lins had passed on to the Burmans before the Thai.

In the fifteenth century the Thai conquered the Cambodian capital of Angkor. Captured officials of the court brought with them a new Thai political order.

The paternal traditions of Thai royalty, as evidenced by Sukhothai and derived from a tribal past, where kingship was identified with prowess in battle, the preservation of old traditions, the role of supreme arbiter and the patronage of Buddhism, gave way to the new idea of absolutism. The Ayuthia king became 'The Lord of Life' with the attributes of a Brahmanic king-god. Under this new order emerged a new bureaucracy that moved toward administrative centralism in attempts to reduce the powers of provincial governors. At the same time family and tribal bonds were replaced by a new class structure which distinguished between an aristocracy of officials and a 'follower class' of peasants and merchants. Commoners were liable to military service, forced labor and taxation, from which foreign minorities (including Chinese) were exempt. Though the administrative change was patterned along the lines of the Khmer system of conferred patronage, it eventually evolved into a system resembling that of Upper Burma in

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62 Tate, Making of South-East Asia, p. 485.

63 Ibid, p. 497.
some respects where district administrators were able to build up considerable personal power and influence. There is no evidence, however, of the widespread opportunism (empire building) in Thailand that eventually became the case in Burma.64 These changes were effective in promoting partial integration through administrative centralism. Class cleavages were beginning to present themselves and were legitimized by the structure of the 'leader-follower' relationships.

Chinese trade in Thailand dates to the beginning of the kingdom with evidence indicating that Chinese artisans were encouraged to set up pottery production in Sukhothai. Chinese immigrants came almost exclusively from Fukien and Kwangtung provinces by sea and soon became counsellors to the kings and governors of Thailand.65 In the eighteenth century the son of a Chinese father ruled the country for a time and most hereditary nobility in modern Thailand can claim several Chinese ancestors.66 Victor Purcell quotes Bosny's 1834 estimate of the population of Thailand being about 5.9 million, including 1.6 million Thai, 1.5 million

64 Lahnin, Government and Politics of Southeast Asia, p. 7.
Chinese, 1 million Malays and 1 million Laos. Several other estimates agree that this was likely the case and that the Chinese in Bangkok at that time probably outnumbered the Thai by two to one.

Colonial presence on the mainland is of central importance to the rise of the Chinese position in Thailand. Late 17th century reaction against French missionaries caused a Thai closure to European trade that lasted about 150 years. About the same time conditions in Japan caused a decline in the Japanese trading community, leaving only the Chinese merchants, traders and artisans to take up the economic slack. The Chinese enjoyed privileges which were greater than those of the common Thai populace. The Thai monarchy farmed out most important concessions to the Chinese who enjoyed a great deal of autonomy in handling their affairs. Under the Thai system, resident alien nationalities were each given a quarter outside the city walls. Each quarter was governed by one of its residents upon whom was conferred a Thai noble title. Chinese settlers were thus almost self-governing. With the exception of local tensions of a particular nature, the Chinese

67 Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, p. 87.


enjoyed a position of relative freedom and privilege until the early part of the twentieth century. Their economic skills seemed to be appreciated by peasant and noble alike. 70

The Colonial System

The period in Thailand that corresponds to the colonial eras of Burma and Cambodia runs from the beginning of the reign of Rama V to the beginning of the second Phibun administration in 1943. The distinctive quality of Thailand's development during this period is the absence of formal colonial control and the fact that the monarchy itself became the architect of social and political change.

Because of the size and importance of the Chinese minority in Thailand, an examination of the social structure of this period and the position of the Chinese in society are necessarily a part of the same investigation. Two separate factors may describe the changes in the authority structure of Thailand during this period. The most far-reaching reforms were undertaken by Rama V between 1868 and 1910. Under his rule there was "a transformation of the kingship from a semidivine mystery to an exalted administrative presidency of the government," there was a "reorganization of the administration to strengthen the central government and

'rationalize' offices in terms of function" and there was a "beginning of legal reform and codification mainly aimed at making law and procedure understandable and acceptable to the west."71 The second factor was the ending of the monarchy and the creation of a constitutional monarchy following Phibun's first coup in 1932. The first of these served to replace the traditional departments by ministries grouped by function and to change the system of self-supporting officials to one of a salaried administration.

The change in attitude toward the Chinese in Thailand may be linked to several factors. The coming of western influence in the late 19th and early 20th centuries caused a decisive shift in the impact of the Chinese on the Thai economy. As foreign trade expanded, Thai administration began to treat the Chinese as common Thai citizens, a policy the Chinese did not find particularly complimentary. This created an erosion of relations that finally came to a head in the Bangkok general strike in the first decade of this century.72 The dispute was over the imposition of a tax on the Chinese like that on the indigenous population, a tax from which the Chinese had previously been exempt. This was seen as an erosion of Chinese autonomy that the Chinese leadership

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71 Kahin, Government and Politics of Southeast Asia, pp. 11-12.

72 Lois Mitchison, The Overseas Chinese, p. 25.
wished to halt. The attempt to make Chinese status equal to that of the Thai population was also seen by most Chinese as a real loss of social rank.

Changes in official Thai policy coincided with a rise in Chinese ethnic pride as a result of the success of the revolution in China. Chinese ethnic solidarity was furthered by a sudden change in the demographics of the Chinese community when Nationalist Chinese policy changed to allow wives and fiancées to join their men overseas. A sudden drop in the intermarriage of Chinese and Thai resulted and a more traditionally Chinese dimension was introduced into early childhood socialization with renewed emphasis on the Chinese family.

Coupled with the 1910 strike experience were stories of the "yellow peril," brought back by western educated Thai. In 1914 Sana VI published his pamphlet Jews of the East, picturing the Chinese as liars, cheats, robbers, and con artists ready to kill for money.73 The King also accused them of being aliens with foreign allegiance and unassimilable in their host countries. It was thus that the years of privileged status for the Chinese in Thailand ended.

The moral of the 1910 strike episode seemed to be that an increased indigenous ownership would increase Thai chances

of avoiding a repeat of the economic shut-down. A comparison of the Chinese position in the Thai economy and the reported national revenue sources from 1892 through 1938 shows a decline of Thai reliance on Chinese success in business, which corresponds to a similar decline in the national status of the Chinese as a group. In 1892 there were few other foreign interests in Thailand and the indigenous population contributed little to the national coffers (less than two percent) from the two direct taxes (land and capitation) which were imposed on it. The Chinese monopolies and license fees accounted for more than two-thirds of the government revenue at this time.\footnote{Data sources include James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand since 1850, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 185; Wendell Blanchard, et al., Thailand: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, (New Haven: Harf Press, 1958), Chapter 12; and Virginia Thompson, Thailand: The New Clan, (2nd edition; New York: Paragon, 1967), pp. 313-599.}

By 1926 government revenue had increased from about 15 million baht to over 100 million baht. While the Chinese were still represented in most of the same source classifications as in 1892, Chinese economic growth was not equal to that of the national rate due to an influx of new capital from European and Japanese sources over the intervening years. We can reasonably estimate that the Chinese accounted for no more than about 30 percent of the total government revenue at this time. Suspension of the gambling farms and a decline in the revenue from the opium monopoly accompanied by rising Thai
involvement in trading and commercial service cause a further decline by 1938 to a figure that could be safely estimated to be below 20 percent.

The Chinese were losing their grip on the Thai economy and coming into direct competition with other foreign interests as well as the Thai themselves in areas where Chinese had previously enjoyed monopolies. The importance of the Chinese to the royal treasury was rapidly diminishing and with it the status of the Chinese in the eyes of the Thai elite.

Following the 1932 coup, under the hypernationalistic Premiership of Phibun, government policies of Thai-ification were aimed directly at the Chinese minority. In 1938 the analogy of the Jews in Europe was revived and the suggestion was made by one minister that the Nazi solution might be applicable to Thailands. In the eight years of 1940, the Thai government levied a series of new taxes on the Chinese, excluded them from several occupations and, in 1935, legislated that all public and private industry employ at least 75 percent Thai labor. Furthermore, there was a general police crack-down on secret societies and political action groups organized against the Japanese, as well as police raids and closures of schools, printing presses, newspaper offices and association headquarters in the Chinese community.

76. Ibid, pp. 266-267.
After Pridi and the Free Thai leadership ousted the Phibun government, pressures against the Chinese relaxed somewhat. The respite was short lived however as serious Thai-Chinese clashes developed within sixty days of V-J Day. Chinese schools reopened in numbers surpassing those of the pre-war days and Chinese immigration boomed. The government began once again to regulate Chinese schools and animosity began to arise over the question of coolie strikes and hoarding and bribery of Chinese rice merchants which was seen as damaging to the economic recovery of the country. In late 1947, the coup staged by Phibun brought an end to all relaxation of repression against the Chinese and nationalistic policies equalled and surpassed the levels experienced by the Chinese in the years preceding the war.

Through the first four decades of this century, the Chinese community was bound by its economic associations and the more clandestine secret societies, the latter serving speech-group chauvinism to a much greater degree than the former. By the mid and late thirties the secret societies began to lose ground to a political cleavage between the Kuomintang Ch’u-pao-she and the Communists (the latter have never gained much prominence among the Chinese in Thailand). These groups integrated the activities of Chinese economic and social organizations for the first time with the specific aim of organizing the Chinese for aid in the China war effort.
against the Japanese. 77

Following the war the split between the Nationalists and Communists, who had cooperated in the war effort, resulted in a decline and even disappearance of several of the important organizations. To provide leadership for the Chinese community the Six Speech-group Association was formed to organize services previously provided by the Chamber of Commerce and the welfare organizations. There also ensued, until about 1948, a contest for organizational supremacy between the KMT and the Communists. The result was that the Chinese community never really regained the organization of the pre-war period and has remained, at least partially, divided over two-China politics and lesser factionalism.

The increased polarization of the Thai and Chinese communities marking this period of increasing Thai nationalism had the effect of increasing the actual assimilation of individual Chinese, while at the same time increasing the distinctiveness of the Chinese community. Skinner has noted that the real Chinese population (by our definition) increased by only about one million between 1910 and 1950. If we were to apply the national population growth rate to his estimate of the Chinese at the turn of the century alone, without considering the surge of immigration in the pre-war and post-war years, we would find that those persons of

77 Ibid, pp. 278-279.
Chinese blood must have more than doubled in number. The difference indicates that about one out of three persons of Chinese blood were assimilated into Thai society, that is, were no longer Chinese by definition.

It is felt here that political pressures mounted against the Chinese caused a clear necessity for a choice of ethnic identity based on status and success expectation. Though the channels of assimilation have remained largely open for the Chinese if they are willing to drop all vestiges of their 'Chineseness', the decision to do so is a personal or family matter and seems to be quite deliberate, depending upon perception of the greatest opportunity for success and status—as a member of the Chinese community or as a Thai. We further note that for those that have chosen to remain Chinese, these pressures have actually increased the solidarity and ethnic identification of that community. We can also link the repressive government policies to the direct confrontation of Thai and Chinese in the economic sector of the social system at a time when the Thai were attempting to secure themselves from Chinese domination of the economy.

Independence Period

Political instability in post-war Thailand resulted in a coup and a military dictatorship under Field-Marshall Phibun

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Longkram on November 9, 1947. Immediately following that coup, Nai Khuang Aphaiwong, leader of the Democrat Party, was drafted to form a caretaker government until elections could be held in 1948. Following the elections in January, 1948 he was able to form a government on the basis of an "unstable majority" in parliament. Less than two months after the formation of the government, Khuang was forced out by a second coup and Phibun succeeded him as Prime Minister.

The following period from 1948 to about the end of 1951 was one of extreme instability. It is apparent that a variety of groups were maneuvering for political advantage during this period. Also a thorn to the military regime was a new form of parliament providing for a bicameral assembly, the lower house elected by universal franchise. The members of the upper house were appointed by the king with counter-signature from the president of his Privy Council, whom he appointed with the counter-signature of the president of Parliament. For the first time the selection of parliament was completely free of direct military control. All of this was provided for by the constitution drafted by an act of the Khuang government and adopted in January of 1949. The new constitution lasted some three years, until 1951, when it was abolished in favor of the 1932 constitution.

76 Kahin, Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, p. 23.
80 Ibid, p. 25.
An apparent lack of stability, resulting from Phibun's lack of support among factions in the armed forces, was a political situation much different from the pro-war Phibun government. The triumvirate of General P'ao Ariyanon, director of Police, General Sarit Thanarat, commander of the First Army and Phibun ruled Thailand.

This 'Coup Group' government based its policy on a drive against communism both domestically and abroad. The drive culminated at the end of 1952 with widespread arrests of writers, intellectuals, young military officers and Chinese who were associated or suspected of being associated with leftist thought. Also under Phibun, Thailand became an enthusiastic member of NATO and, unlike Cambodia or Burma, became firmly aligned with the Western bloc in the cold war.

The trial of power in the 'Coup Group' made for an extremely unstable relationship with Phibun constantly finding it necessary to play one man against the other to maintain power. A dramatic turning point in Phibun's destiny with this relationship seems to have come in 1955 after a tour of Britain and the United States. Phibun's return ushered in a sudden change of policy with the registration of political parties, free discussion of politics and a decentralization of power.

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to local governments. The government immediately came under attack from a variety of parties and organizations. In the general election of 1957 the Phibun group won only a bare majority. Public expressions of dissatisfaction rose in intensity and finally became so strong that the experiment in democracy came to a bitter end.

In September, 1957, army General Sarit carried out a bloodless coup and took over the government. Phibun fled to Japan and Pao, the head of the Police, was allowed to go into exile. Parliament was dissolved immediately; the constitution was suspended, and Tharom Kittikachorn was named Prime Minister. Tharom had difficulty consolidating power and in October, 1958 Sarit staged another coup and established himself temporarily as a military dictator. An interim constitution was decreed in early 1959 and Sarit took over the office of Prime Minister until his death in 1963.

In 1963 Tharom again assumed the office of Prime Minister and by 1968 there seems to have been a gradual relaxation of the powerful grip of oligarchic rule of Thailand. In that year a new Thai constitution was promulgated and although parties were not localized by the constitution, as many as ten small parties formed in order to participate in the lower house elections of February 1969. Though a plurality was won

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by Thanon's United Peoples Party, some independents were elected. Though this relaxation of power may have been a welcome sight to some western observers, one author noted that there seemed no serious challenge to the existing system of patrimonial executive control from any political quarter. Following the second Phibun take-over until 1955, the official government policy toward the Chinese community was generally one of containment. There was an increase in the repression of the Chinese and seemed to be little willingness on the part of the government to either assimilate or integrate them. A dramatic turn took place in 1955 when Phibun suddenly, for no apparent reason, made an about-face and declared that the Chinese were once again assimilable. The large scale police raids were halted and official pressures toward the Chinese community were relaxed to some degree as some minor privileges were returned to the members of the Chinese community. They were once again subject to military service; they were thus more easily able to vote and there was some relaxation of regulations governing Chinese schools. It is important, however, to note that the Chinese were still largely regarded as second-class citizens and there seemed to be no effort to lift restrictions against the Chinese in a number of occupations.

Following the coup in 1957 by General Sarit, there was little change in the official policy, a condition that persisted until the end of the 1960's. There was no further attempt to relax regulations governing the Chinese and, as we shall see in Chapter IV, there was in fact some strengthening of regulations governing Chinese education. In short, it seems that there was little more accomplished by the Phibun 'reforms' than to return the relations of the Chinese and national communities to conditions that were present in the early 1930's.

Summary

Going into the independence period we observe that the process of assimilation of the Chinese and Thai societies was farther along than in either of the other two countries. This is largely due to the nature of the early relations between the two groups prior to the turn of the twentieth century. We have also noted that with a decline in the importance of the Chinese to the national treasury there came a rising tension between the two ethnic communities. The ethnic consciousness of each community rose to high levels, that do not seem to be apparent in either Burmese or Cambodian cases.

Because Thailand was not under colonial rule the government was able to administer the Chinese community in a direct manner. Official pressures were brought to bear by the Thai government to force the dissolution of the Chinese
community by full assimilation. Between 1932 and 1945 regulations made it extremely difficult to be ethnically Chinese in a highly nationalistic Thai society. It seems, however, that the full effect of these policies was to increase rather than decrease the solidarity of the Chinese community. It was during this period that the Chinese community structure began to develop its present form and solidarity. It is also likely that the form that this structure took was a function of Chinese adaptation to changes national policy and practice. Thus, going into the contemporary era we will see the rising importance of patron-client relationships, between the Chinese leaders and the Thai political elite, with the Chinese leadership acting in a 'broker' or 'diplomatic' role between the national and Chinese communities.
CHAPTER III

STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES ON PROCESSES OF ASSIMILATION AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Because one of the central questions in this investigation involves the creation, maintenance and cross-cutting of social and political cleavages between ethnic communities, it is necessary to examine the influences of social and political structures of action on the processes of assimilation and political integration. We desire to determine how the structure of the social and political systems make a difference in creating conditions amenable or not amenable to assimilation and integration. This chapter will focus on: (1) the way in which social and political stratification functions to create conditions reducing or promoting inter-community conflict; (2) the structures of social and political interaction in intra-Chinese community relationships (decision-making and communication structure); and (3) the sovereignty-dependency status of the Chinese community vis-a-vis the larger national system (i.e. the extent to which decisions in the Chinese community are subject to review by national authorities and the scope or range of decisions which are subject to the control of the community itself).

At the beginning of our examination of these three
factors in each of the three countries we shall also present a brief description of the demographics of the Chinese and national communities. Though important to our discussion of integration and assimilation, the demographic structure of the Chinese and national communities presents a set of contributing factors that should be considered apart from our description of the independent structural variable, yet demographic influences are crucial to some of the analytic considerations that must be made in explaining the relationship between the dependent and independent variables.

Burma

Demographic Structure

Before presenting a picture of the demography of the Chinese and Burmese communities, a few remarks are in order regarding the census data being used. A complete census of Burma has not been taken since 1931. An enumeration took place in 1941 but, excepting provisional totals by district, all the records of this count were destroyed during the Second World War. Since the war it has not been practical to take a full census due mainly to the fact that administration has not been effective over substantial portions of the country.

The first post-war census attempt was a "stage-census" or population sample conducted in two stages. The first,
undertaken in 1953, covered 248 cities and towns in Burma Proper and 14 towns in the Chin State. In 1954, the second stage was undertaken which covered about 15 percent of the total rural area of the country. Various economic and demographic surveys have been undertaken since the two-stage census but all are of a much more limited scope.

The 1931 census indicates that the total population of Burma was 14,667,146 of which 153,594 were Chinese. By 1953-54 the total population was about 20 million with about 350 thousand Chinese or 3.5 percent of the total population (see Appendix VII). In 1953-54 there were about twice as many Indians and Pakistanis as Chinese in the country, a situation that had almost reversed by the mid-sixties.

By the mid-fifties about 52 percent of the Chinese held Union citizenship, compared to about 54 percent of the Indian-Pakistani minority. By the early 1960's only 23 percent of the Indians were not citizens of Burma, while 30 percent of the Chinese fall into this category.


2 *Census of India, 1931*, (Rangoon: 1935), xi/1, p. 63.

See also p. 6 of part I pertaining to non-Chinese immigrants from China. Chinese are defined by language rather than blood in the Burma census.

3 Totals are based on estimates most agreeable to scholars of Burmese society. Citizenship is based on official immigration figures indicating residents holding foreign resident certificates at about the time of the 1953-54 census.
We note from an examination of the data in Appendix IV that by 1964-65 the Chinese non-citizens constituted the largest non-citizen group in the country. Appendix V indicates the percentage loss for each race group between 1961 and 1967, during the most vigorous nationalization policies of the Union government. It is interesting to note that between 1963-64 and 1965-66, when the Indian and Pakistani groups were leaving the country in substantial numbers, the Chinese community was actually growing. We see also that there was a significant increase in the female population of the Chinese community over this period indicating a slight upsurge of Chinese community identification and ethnic distinctiveness as government policy functioned to raise the sense of nationalism among the Burmans and more clearly mark the boundaries between ethnic communities.

The male-female ratio for the national population remained steady at about 1:1, while that of the Chinese community was similarly stable at about 1.6:1, promoting a relatively high intermarriage rate between the two groups. By the 1953-54 census sample we note that there was a

national trend toward an increase in the population percentage in the under-twenty age group, similar to that of the other two countries in this study. Appendix VI also shows that there were proportionately more Chinese in this age group than either the Indian or Burmese. The size of the under-twenty age group indicates a great deal of permanency in the Chinese community as immigrant populations are generally not characterized by large numbers of persons below working age.

Finally, we observe that about 34 percent of the national population was living in rural areas in 1953-54 and little change in this pattern had taken place by the 1960's. As geographic proximity has great influence as a condition intervening in patterns of ethnic interaction, the urban-rural distribution represented in Appendix VII is of central importance. It is apparent that non-indigenous minorities were proportionally over-represented in urban areas. The somewhat surprising statistic is that the urban-rural distribution of the Chinese as a group shows that they were almost evenly distributed (53 percent urban), offering no support for the notion that overseas Chinese in Burma were over-whelmingly urban.


outside the major population centres. The importance of the Indian minority is also evident when we consider that 54 percent of the Indo-Pakistani group may be classified as rural. It is also important that most of the rural Chinese were concentrated in the frontier Shan and Wa states and engaged in the non-indigenous occupations of petty tin and jade mining with only a few farmers among them. Most rural Indians, on the other hand, were in Lower Burma and engaged in farming, in direct competition with the Burmese.

Social and Political Stratification

An inquiry into the stratification of national society in Burma is an inquiry into the impact of Buddhist cultural values on the changing importance of material goals that must necessarily be the goal-focus of development. According to one source:

The cultural inhibition against acquisitiveness manifests itself in the attitude toward entrepreneurship, which traditionally is given a low status in the Burmese social structure. Traditionally, the class of traders (a-the) has been looked upon as socially inferior to the classes of those who serve the king (hin-shu-long), ordinary civil employees (a-shu-long), and even cultivators.

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the author further notes that:

... in modern Burma such professionals as lawyers, magistrates, civil servants, military officers and teachers are much more highly esteemed than business. These professions symbolize authority, power, and prestige... which... are not so conspicuously acquisitive and deviant from traditional norms.

Lucien Pye has been among others who have noted the salience of power status values in the stratification of the Burmese system, similar to that in both Cambodia and Thailand.

The trend to the mid-sixties, before nationalization of commerce and industry, was for the government to be a major employer in the high status occupations. Government employed 42.8 percent of the professionals while only 25.5 percent worked in private firms. Government also employed 47 percent of those in the managerial category, while those employed privately and those self-employed accounted for only 28.2 and 24.8 percent respectively.

In the non-status or lower status occupations the distribution between public and private shifts decisively to the private sector of the economy. The data shows that 75.3 percent of those in trade were self-employed, 10.5 percent of those in trade, occupations were employed by

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private firms, while government employed only 0.1 percent of the total (the remainder were unpaid family workers).\footnote{Lee H. H. Sunirun, *Census Data on the Labor Force and The Income Distribution in Burma*, (Rangoon: Department of Economics, Statistics and Commerce, University of Rangoon, 1958).}

Though exact figures for the post-independence period are lacking, we note that the Chinese were only slightly over-represented in the employment statistics of 1931 (they comprised 1.5 percent of the labor force but only 1.3 percent of the population total) and over-represented greatly only in mining, industry, transportation and trade (see Appendix I). In sharp contrast is the Indian minority which was grossly over-represented in every category except farming (where they were under-represented by only about 1 percent). Safe in the assumption that Burma's development did not take place at a rate capable of correcting this condition, we must observe that competition between the Burmese and Indians was high in both the high status positions and the lower status commercial occupations while the Chinese were significantly dispersed so as not to create such a degree of competitive contact.

The major status differentiation between the mass and elite is one of power. Those actors engaged in the legislative process, administration or judiciary, as well as those employed by the government in various capacities, are of a higher social status than those not. Though we have some evidence of

persons of Chinese blood in the military and occupying clerical positions in the administration, there is little to suggest that these individuals were Chinese by the definition used in this study. It is most likely that those listed as Chinese were culturally and socially Burmese (assimilated) in most respects. The Chinese continued to remain concentrated in commerce and industry and in relatively light competitive contact with the Burmese in sharp contrast with the Indian minority.

In the rural areas, somewhat removed from the central administration, the single most important position was that of village headman. Except in rare cases, there seemed to be no point of mobility beyond this position. We do have evidence from local newspaper reports that, where there were substantial numbers of Chinese, it was not uncommon that the village headman and his subordinates were Chinese. This is particularly the case in the frontier states of the north.

Of further significance to the focus of this study is the effect of government policy regarding naturalization and citizenship on the inter-ethnic stratification of the nation. Chapter II (sec. ii) of the 1947 Constitution of the Union of Burma grants citizenship if: (1) both parents belong or

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belonged to the indigenous races of the country; (2) at least one grandparent is indigenous and the individual is born in Burma; (3) both parents would have been citizens at the commencement of the constitution and the individual is born in the Union; and (4) the individual was born in any of the territories included under British law and has resided in the Union for not less than eight years in the ten years immediately preceding the constitution and signifies election of citizenship under the laws in force. Under the provisions of the Union Citizenship Act of 1940 and the Union Citizenship (Amendment) Act of 1994 are the usual qualifications for naturalization: attainment of 18 years of age; five years continuous residence in the country; proficiency in one of the national languages; good character; intention to settle in the country or serve the Government of the Union or one of the states. Further, the applicant was required to submit a statement of intention at least a year prior to filing papers and may not leave the country after being granted the naturalization certificate.

One point of contention between the Chinese and the local governments throughout Southeast Asia was the question


15 Ibid., p. 93.
of dual Chinese citizenship, at least until the late 1950's. Both the People's Republic of China and the Nationalist regime on Taiwan claimed overseas Chinese as citizens possessing rights and responsibilities of those countries regardless of whether or not they had taken up citizenship in the country of their residence. The Burmese government made an awkward legislative attempt to solve this problem in 1955 but the regulation proved impractical and the problem remained. Despite the problems involved the Burmese government continued to regard Chinese born within the Union as full Burmese citizens with full rights. This is supported by the case of U San Win vs. U Sin Ko. In this case the Parliamentary Elections Tribunal rejected a contention that a successful candidate should be unseated and disqualified because he had Chinese blood. According to the ruling it was held that the respondent could not be said to have acquired Chinese nationality because: (1) he had not registered as a foreigner with the Chinese embassy in Rangoon; (2) not obtained a Chinese passport.

The major distinction in non-indigenous ethnic relations with the national government, then, is one between nationals

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17 Aung Aung, Burma's Constitution, p. 94.

18 Ibid.
and foreigners. Since 1954, all foreigners residing in Burma have been required to register with immigration officials and obtain a foreign registration certificate at a cost of 50K (about 10 dollars). The distinction between citizens and non-citizens, however, did not really surface as a political cleavage until after 1960. The salience of this cleavage was highest during the vigorous nationalization programs undertaken by the Ne Win government in attempts to promote the "Burmesian road to socialism" from 1963-66.

The hardest hit members of the system by the nationalization efforts of the 1960's were the non-citizens. In 1963, for instance, it was announced that no foreign national would be allowed to register in vocational institutions and colleges without "special reason." This move effectively blocked an important channel of upward mobility in the national system to all non-citizens without the means to obtain higher education outside the country. Further to this, those foreigners wishing to leave the country faced tightened controls over the issuing of departure and re-entry visas.

In 1963, the government stated that these visas would only be issued to "able foreign nationals of long residence in Burma and where character is beyond question, especially those who have not seen their family and relatives for several years." In the same


year, provision was made by the Revolutionary Government to allow non-indigenous citizens of Burma to renounce their Union citizenship so that they could become nationals of their native country and at the same time a special government office was set up to expedite the emigration of these individuals—the Central Office for Foreigners Leaving Burma for Good. 21 Very few Chinese took advantage of the 'service', while Indians and Pakistanis comprised almost the complete total of the 6300 persons who did. By July, 1964, one report estimated the number of Indians and Pakistanis leaving Burma had reached 200 a day and that 200,000 would leave during the year. 22 The Working People's Daily (October 27, 1964) stated that between April 26, 1963 and October 21, 1964, 65,052 foreign nationals left Burma. This figure accounted for 55,509 Indians (85%), 7,099 Pakistanis (11%), 1,025 Chinese (1.5%) and 1,411 other nationalities (2.5%). Of this total some 14% percent were those who could not pay their fees and were deported.

The Chinese were obviously under-represented in these totals. We have already seen that at the time about 30 percent of the Chinese in Burma did not have Union citizenship, thus barred from working in nationalized businesses and industries. The most reasonable explanation that may be

21 The Nation, Rangoon, April 6, 1964.

found for the fact that most of the Chinese who did not hold citizenship chose to remain in the country may be that most of the non-citizens lived in the rural-frontier states removed from the main impact of the nationalization programs which were most evident in the more commercial regions of lower Burma. Because these individuals were not greatly affected they were not forced to flee the country because they had been deprived of their livelihood. Most of the Chinese of lower Burma, then, held Burmese citizenship and were thus not kept from employment.

Though no field studies have been undertaken to examine the structure of the Chinese community in Burma, we do have some evidence from diverse sources indicating that the Chinese community in Burma shares similarities with those in both Cambodia and Thailand. Unlike Cambodia, the Burmese Chinese community had separate economic structures in the Chinese Chambers of Commerce. The fact that there was more than one Chamber of Commerce indicates an authority structure somewhat less hierarchical than those of Thailand and Cambodia. Like Cambodia, it seems that inter-community communication takes place through the structures of the individual power blocs of the Chinese community rather than through a single community hierarchy. Accounts of inter-community relations carried in Burmese newspapers indicate that patron-client relations between the individual power blocs and the national elite have developed to a somewhat higher degree than is the
case in Cambodia, with the leadership of each Chinese power bloc providing for the needs of its particular constituency.

Like the Chinese community in Cambodia, that of Burma has almost complete jurisdiction over cultural concerns of the Chinese associations and organizations. The schools are almost without supervision and, until foreign language newspapers were banned in the late 1960's, there was virtually free communication within the Chinese community. Unlike Cambodia, where the powerful Chinese elite functions to provide some national representation for Chinese interests, there is no apparent group that transcends the Chinese community itself. Most, if not all, persons of Chinese blood that hold positions of any importance in the larger national system are fully assimilated as Burmese and thus have no contact with the internal structure of the Chinese community itself.

The elite of the Chinese community can be supposed to be characterized in the same manner as that of Thailand in most respects, ranking its power and influence from wealth and the connections it maintains with the Burmese national elite. Though no conclusive evidence exists in this last regard, an examination of the ownership of industries in Burma shows that as early as 1956 the industries owned jointly by Burmese and non-Burmese outnumbered those owned only by non-Burmese. By 1960 these joint concerns were almost double those owned only by non-Burmese entrepreneurs. We do note
however that these partnerships never reached the proportion
they did in Thailand, largely a function of the fact that the
Burmese had established themselves much more firmly in their
own commercial economy against non-indigenous enterprises
than the Thai had done.23

In summary, we observe that economic stratification
functioned to separate the Burmese and Chinese and thus reduce
the potential for conflict between the two groups to a much
greater degree than was true of the Burmese and Indians. The
Chinese were a part of the national elite of Burma. Furthermore,
the Chinese community itself was not highly integrated through
interlocking elites that were capable of making decisions
for the whole community. Rather it seems that the Chinese
community was composed of a number of separate power blocs
(Chamber of Commerce and guilds) through which the relations
of the Chinese and national communities took place. Through
a number of power hierarchies, patron-client relationships
were set up between the Chinese leadership and the national
elite. Finally, the Chinese community seems to have had
considerable control not only over its own cultural affairs,
but through the Chinese bloc leadership, there existed a good
deal of social control over both the politics and economics.

23 See Central Statistical and Economics Department,
Yangon, Tables 83, 30 and 47 respectively.
of the Chinese membership, at least until pressures of
nationalization in the "Burmese Road to Socialism" in the
mid-1960's.

Assimilation

As we noted in the introductory chapter, attitudinal
or cultural congruence is not adequate, by itself, to
create a condition of total assimilation. Without actual
interaction two communities could be culturally identical
yet to say that they are assimilated would be to abuse the
term. Inter-community interaction, then, through structures
allow such interaction to penetrate to mass levels of each
community is also important to the process of assimilation.

Structurally the Chinese and national communities
were kept relatively distinct throughout the independence
period in Burma. The degree of competition between the
Chinese and Burmese was minimal, in part because of the presence
of a more competitive and visible Indian minority and in
part due to a value difference between the Chinese and
Burmese that led them to pursue different occupations that
did not have transcultural status value. Lijphart's concept
of consociational democracies shows that (masu.) sub-cultures
may co-exist peacefully provided that they do not come into
contact with one another. 24 Such contact (i.e. economic

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competition) can frequently lead to conflict which in turn may lead to political disintegration.

It would seem that the low degree of common structural contact may be conducive to reducing competition that may in turn result in a political cleavage along ethnic lines. On the other hand, it would seem that this particular structural configuration does not create conditions that might be favorable to promoting a high degree of assimilation.

The inter-ethnic contacts necessary to promote transcultural uses of status are largely limited to the elite of the Chinese community which leads that community in both intra-community and inter-community affairs.

A comparison of the differences in the size of the non-citizen and citizen populations of the Chinese community in Burma indicates that between 1950 and 1960 the naturalization rate may have been as high as 7 percent annually. By 1960 the non-citizen population represented about 30 percent of the total Chinese community and by 1965 the Chinese non-citizen population was the largest such group in the country. By 1966 the Chinese non-citizen community outnumbered the Indians by about two to one and was larger than the Indian and Pakistani groups combined (see Appendix IV). This was a condition that was previously the reverse and corresponded with rising tensions between the Chinese and national communities. We have used the non-citizen population to roughly indicate the total ethnic community which, of course,
includes both citizens and non-citizens. The suggestion of these figures is that by the later sixties the Chinese had become the single largest non-indigenous minority in the country. This being the case, the Chinese were becoming more visible in Burmese society taking both Burmese and Chinese more conscious of their ethnic identities and increasing the ethnic-community identity of each. This may be a partial explanation for the height to which tensions rose between the Chinese and the national community during the Sino-Burmese disputes triggered by the Cultural Revolution in China in the late 1960's.

A further indication of the increasing solidarity of the Chinese community in the sixties and perhaps of a growing social distance between the Chinese and Burmese is the fact that most of the increase in the Chinese population was due to the immigration of females which would cause a decline in the rate of intermarriage between the two groups as well as retard the rate of Chinese assimilation through cultural amalgamation.

The geographical dispersion of the Chinese was also of consequence to the process of assimilation. It is reasonable to assume that most of the Chinese who had not taken on Burmese citizenship lived in the northern frontier states and were little affected by the nationalization programs as they were engaged in petty tin and jade mining and agriculture. This would mean that by the end of the
1960's only dependents of Chinese citizens were of non-citizen status in Lower Burma. It is also important that the Chinese community was almost equally divided between urban and rural areas. We have observed that most Chinese who were classified as rural reside in the Shan and Wa states on the frontier and were thus, somewhat removed from direct contact with the Burmese who populated the south. In the rural states the Chinese lived in communities that were dominantly, if not wholly, Chinese and their interaction with indigenous minorities was minimal. Thus, in contrast to Cambodia, assimilation was slower among the rural Chinese than among urban dwellers.

Integration

The relationship of structure to the creation of an identification with one or the other ethnic communities and to the promotion of co-operative behavior in Burma is significant. Chinese identification with the national community seems to have increased between independence and 1960, judging from the changes in the numbers of citizens among the Chinese during that period. We find this particularly valid as an indicator of identification as there was no particular instrumental reason (in the form of social or political sanctions) to cause a change of citizenship up until the nationalization programs of the Burmese government in the mid-sixties. It is of further importance that we note
that, following the government's nationalization programs, there were few Chinese who stepped forward to renounce their Burmese citizenship despite the fact that the government had made it easy to do so. Following nationalization there is no evidence to indicate that the identification of the Chinese with the national community declined substantially. What does seem to be indicated, however, is that there was an increase in the identification with the local ethnic community which slightly surpassed that of national identification.

In our discussion of assimilation, above, we have already noted the division of labor evident to some degree between the Chinese and Burmese (though we must also observe that at no time was it as great as in Thailand and Cambodia). The result of this was that there could be fairly high transaction levels between the two communities without any real signs of integrative behavior in the political system itself.

The presence of the Indo-Pakistani minority was also of major importance to the degree and nature of political integration between the Chinese and Burmese communities. Significantly, most of the economic competition during the formative years of the Burmese commercial class was against the Indians and Pakistanis who dominated both the Burmese and Chinese economically and politically. By the time the
Chinese had emerged as the largest non-indigenous minority community (mid-1960's) the Burmese were already relatively secure in their own economy and there was little opportunity for Burmese economic insecurity to be translated into a durable political cleavage between the two communities. In the next chapter we shall note that some tension did arise between the Chinese and Burmese after 1964 but that it never reached the level evident between the Indians and Burmese that was apparent in Chapter II. Not only was it necessary for the Burmese to secure themselves in their own economy after independence, but it was necessary for them to secure from the Indians the administration of the political system. Finally, the Indian community remained the single substantial symbol of a colonial past under British domination, freedom from which was obtained at no small price.

We have little evidence indicating any great deal of participation by ethnic Chinese in the national political elite and in most cases where we can determine persons of Chinese blood in the elite, it is evident that their assimilation was almost complete and that they were no longer Chinese by our definition. Though we have noted that there are several cases of Chinese village headmen in the frontier states, we must also observe that in the context of the national system this region is poorly integrated and that the national government has not had complete control
over the administration of the entire region at any time. Thus, there is likely little communication between the Chinese in these areas and the national government and as a result of their geographical isolation neither a high degree of integrative behavior nor identification with the national community is evident. This is likely due more to a lack of national political awareness than any other factor. Neither is the presence of a few village headmen that are ethnic Chinese an indicator of local assimilation or political integration. In most cases where we are able to find Chinese headmen the majority of the members of their villages are also Chinese.

Cambodia

Demographic Structure

Only two complete censuses have been taken in Cambodia—one in 1921 and the other in 1961. The 1921 count listed some two and a half million persons in the country, about 8.2 percent of which were Chinese. By the mid-fifties the total population was estimated to be about 4,300,000 with an annual growth rate of 2.5 percent. The 1961 census showed a total population of 5,740,100 and the annual growth rate


was about 2.2 percent, which would raise the population by the end of the sixties about six million. The Chinese population represented about 7.4 percent of the total by the second decade of our analysis.

The non-citizen proportion of the Chinese population is higher than in the other two systems. Following independence all sino-lemur became Cambodian citizens. By the end of the fifties about 15 percent of the Chinese had Cambodian nationality (the sino-lemur number in this group) and by the close of the sixties this proportion had approached one third.

There was no significant difference between the numbers of women and men in the national population according to the 1961 census. This is similarly the case among the Chinese. In Phnom-pen there were about 103 adult males for every 100 females, while the ratio in the smaller centres was 1.28:1. The effects of the male-female ratio on assimilation may be indicated to some degree by the fact that it is also in rural areas that sino-lemur intermarriage is more


28. Wittigott, The Chinese in Cambodia, p. 16, Table III.


Cambodia had one of the youngest populations in Southeast Asia with more than half of the total population under twenty years of age.\textsuperscript{32} This distribution is similar in the Chinese community where 54.5 percent of the total population is under 20 years of age.\textsuperscript{33} Like a similar observation made in the case of Burma, we note that the high percentage of young people in the Chinese population indicates a considerable permanency to that community.

Finally, the population of Cambodia is overwhelmingly rural with about 88 percent of the total population living outside the urban population concentrations and about 12 percent in the cities. In the Chinese population there were about 41 percent rural and 59 percent urban (almost 32 percent of the total lived in Phnom-penh).\textsuperscript{34}

\section*{Social and Political Stratification}

A major distinction between nobility and common-born runs throughout Khmer society. Though by 1967 titular rank carried on privilege officially, titles were still a source...
of prestige to members of title-holding families. Social stratification in Cambodia, as in most developing countries, was more apparent in the cities than rural areas, and except for the highest level of urban society, achieved rather than ascribed status apparently was due to the rising importance of occupational status, economic success and higher education among the populace.

Crucial to our examination of Chinese-Cambodian interaction is the importance of two general occupational classes—political and economic—by virtue of the fact that they remained more or less ethnically distinct throughout the first few years of independence with the Khmer occupying the roles of the first and the Chinese those of the second. The Vietnamese were evident in both sectors. Until recently no Khmer merchant class was in evidence and no participation in national politics was evident among most of the Chinese. This cleavage was apparently responsible for much of the intermarriage between the two groups. Chinese husbands were sought for Khmer women because a Chinese was thought of as a supreme breadwinner and his wealth could bring greater economic security to the bride's family. Chinese, on the other hand, sought greater political security and social status in the national community by taking a Khmer wife. This pattern was particularly noticeable among the Khmer

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nobility of high political but low economic status. The effect of this practice was the rise of a Sino-Khmer elite, active in the national community. The importance of this new national elite socially may be obtained from a change of intermarriage patterns in the latter sixties where Sino-Khmer marriage partners became the preferred mates of both Chinese and Khmer.

Willmott observed the merging of the Chinese and Khmer ethnic groups in the Sino-Khmer elite, where most prominent members of both the economic and the political elites are of this mixed parentage. Because of the cleavage between nobility and common-born members of society, as well as that between the Chinese and Khmer, the Sino-Khmer elite had the effect of cross-cutting both a social and cultural cleavage as well as that cleavage existing between the Chinese and Khmer in the economic and political sectors of the system.

Occupationally, as in Burma and Thailand, highest status is conferred upon positions of political importance. Sino-Khmer number preeminently among these occupations (high civil servants, deputies to the National Assembly, officers of the armed forces, managers of state agencies). In the middle strata are white collar workers, professional people, businessmen and teachers (the Chinese dominating in business

37 Ibid., p. 99-100.
while most white collar workers and clerical personnel are
Khmer with a very few Vietnamese remaining as part of the
colonial legacy). 38

The Sino-Khmer are a national elite, both politically
and economically, though definitionally Chinese by virtue of
the participation of its members in the organizations and
associations of the Chinese community. It is of further
importance that the Sino-Khmer elite has declined formal
political leadership within the Chinese community in preference
to the broader context of national politics.

Economic wealth of the Chinese does not necessarily
reside with the leadership of the Chinese community, as is
the case of Thailand and Burma. The wealthiest economic
class is the Sino-Khmer elite, while most other Chinese are
less powerful and less economically successful in contrast.
Thus, the most powerful leaders, those with economic and
mediating power over the Chinese community, do not themselves
formally participate in the leadership of the internal Chinese
political structure, yet they maintain social ties with the
community, donate funds for Chinese community projects and
special events and often send their children to Chinese
schools. It is a group that actually transcends the Chinese
community. The Sino-Khmer elite is in control of the means
of decision-making over the most important policy area of the
Chinese community—economic policy.

The political structure and the power elite of the Chinese community itself deals almost exclusively with the organization or activities within the Chinese associational structure; primarily with the organization of ritual and the establishment and maintenance of their own relative status within the voluntary Chinese associations. A web of interlocking officers exist to merge all associations into a single network emerging from four distinct power blocs among the leaders. It is further indicated that relations between these blocs and the more politically powerful Chinese elite does not proceed through the Chinese Hospital Board (which serves to integrate the four blocs for the internal community), but rather move directly from each bloc. Its position in both the economics and politics of the nation made the Chinese elite the single most important communication channel with the national decision-making process for the Chinese community.

Finally, it is important to look at the effects of government policies of naturalization and citizenship upon the stratification of the Chinese and national systems. As the concentration system eroded in the years following...


40 Ibid., p. 125.

41 Ibid.
independence, the legal definition of citizen changed considerably. According to article 22 of the nationality law promulgated November 30, 1954,

... anyone who can count at least one Cambodian parent is considered Cambodian, regardless of where he was born. Since the same law specifies that a Cambodian woman does not lose her nationality upon marrying an alien, this means that any métis is henceforth Cambodian. 42

The same article further stipulates that anyone born in Cambodia with at least one parent who was also born in Cambodia will be considered a citizen of the country. This act was not made retroactive and applied only to all children born after the thirteenth of November, 1954. The requirements of naturalization were made so broad and vague that, for all practical purposes, citizenship was possible only under the provisions of the nationality law of 1954. Willmott goes further to note that naturalization of the Chinese did take place, but only after the payment of a substantial sum, without which, the language requirements are very stringent. 43

Under the terms of a 1953 regulation only Cambodian citizens may own land or buildings and leases to alien tenants are limited to 99 years. The one prejudice in the law has been directly aimed at the Vietnamese minority. In

42 Willmott, The Chinese in Cambodia, p. 75.
43 Ibid, pp. 80-81.
1963, for instance, the National Congress voted to refuse naturalization to the Vietnamese on the principle that they were unassimilable as a minority group.⁴⁴

By the immigration law of 1956, the conditions of residence were the same for all immigrants, all having to carry identity cards which were renewable annually and all subject to the same fines and penalties. Article 26 of this regulation also restricted foreigners from eighteen professions.⁴⁵ Regardless of ethnic identity or origin, no Cambodian citizen was similarly restricted by law.

In 1958 the cohong was finally completely dissolved with the formal ending of the position of chañ in cohong. This meant that more Chinese could deal with the administration directly. By the early 1960's more Chinese were using the municipal and higher courts to settle disputes rather than having these disputes settled by religious structures within the Chinese community itself.⁴⁶ Willmott does observe, however, that those that were citizens were more likely to exercise this option that those that were not.

Further attention has been drawn to the manner in which citizenship functions to distinguish members of the Chinese

⁴⁴Hunson, Area Handbook for Cambodia, p. 295.


⁴⁶Willmott, The Political Structure of the Chinese Community in Cambodia, p. 60; p. 69.
community itself. In his elaborations on the rising importance of sports clubs as functional associations in the Chinese community, Willmott, observes:

A prospective member of a sports club must find a sponsor within the club, he must complete an application form that is reviewed by the executive, and finally he must go through a period of probation before being accepted as a full-fledged member. He is then eligible for election to the executive (provided he is of Cambodian nationality).\(^{47}\)

Attention is drawn to two facts: (1) that the new member may not become a member of the executive unless he is a Cambodian citizen and (2) that his membership itself is subject to approval by Chinese that are of Cambodian citizenship (the executive). Though I can find no evidence indicating government or national organization rules that require citizenship of the sports club executive such regulations may exist. The citizenship requirement may also be a function of Sino-Indian dominance in the sports clubs.

In summary we may make several observations. Conflict between the Chinese and Indian communities was reduced largely by three structural factors: (1) the presence of the Vietnamese helped to detract from some of the competition in economics and politics that might have evolved between the two groups; (2) the Chinese and Indian did not compete directly for status positions as major status values were different for each group and they largely confined their activities

\(^{47}\)Ibid, p. 72.
to areas where those values could be satisfied—the Chinese in economics seeking wealth and the Inner in politics seeking power; (3) conflict between the communities was reduced by the presence of a powerful Chinese-Inner elite operating at the national level but continuing to take part in the social affairs of the Chinese community itself. We further note that the communication structure of inter-community relations was different than the structure used for intra-Chinese-community politics. Furthermore we observe that the Chinese community structure was concerned largely with the cultural and associational concerns of that community while the most important decisions of the Chinese community—economic decisions—were the jurisdiction of the Chinese national elite transcending the cultural bonds of the Chinese community.

Assimilation

In reviewing the structural considerations in the process of maintaining the socio-cultural distinctiveness of the Chinese community we see that it was a highly organized community in Cambodia consisting of a system of interlocking officials and associations. These associations provided both cultural direction and welfare security for the members of the Chinese community, both of which were functions contributing to the maintenance of a distinct Chinese identity. Unique to the Cambodian situation was the presence of a powerful national elite of mixed Chinese and
Khumer blood which continued to hold social membership in the Chinese community. In each of the other two systems it seems that products of mixed marriages were more likely to be assimilated completely to the dominant culture and society. There is no evidence that the Khmer elite is active in promoting assimilation toward the dominant Khmer community, though it must be recognized that this elite group is somewhat more assimilated than the rest of the Chinese community.

Though we have noted some assimilation by intermarriage it does not seem to have reached any significant proportion. This statement is made in view of the fact that Khmer number among the 1 percent of the Chinese community that held Cambodian citizenship in 1560 and that all Khmer were Cambodian citizens.

Traditionally the Chinese and Khmer were occupants of separate classes that seemed to be roughly equal in status—Chinese economic class and Khmer political and agricultural class—in the national society. Until recently, there was little invasion of one class by the other and status determinants for each group remained more or less distinct. Colonial rule over Cambodia did much to contribute to a decline in the economic security of the Khmer political class (Khmer elite) by employing large numbers of Vietnamese in paid administrative positions and encouraging 'alien' development of the Cambodian economy (Vietnamese and Chinese
in commerce and Vietnamese in agriculture). This factor, more than any other was likely responsible for the number of marriages between economically secure Chinese and the Khmer nobility. Traditional antipathies between the Khmer and the Vietnamese played a role in preventing Khmer nobility from intermarrying freely with the latter group by creating a differential in the social distance between Khmer and Chinese and Khmer and Vietnamese. The Chinese-Khmer marriages were unions of convenience that brought political security and higher social status to the Chinese partner and greater economic security to the Khmer partner and her family. This pattern of intermarriage, and the motivations responsible for it, gave rise to the important Chinese-Khmer national elite.

The fact that under colonial rule most of the offspring were classified as Chinese is probably important in explaining why this mestizo group has continued to be socially Chinese.

The fact that the Chinese-Khmer elite continued to hold membership (but not leadership) in the Chinese community and that the Chinese community structure was organized explicitly for the purpose of administering the cultural and social affairs of that community (rather than purposes of political interaction with the national community) figure importantly into the process of assimilation. In the first instance it may be seen that 'to be Chinese' in a Khmer society was an acceptable social and cultural role held by some of the most important men in the country. There
was thus no social or political sanction brought to bear in order to speed up the process of Chinese assimilation. The contrary would seem to be the ease as the importance of the sino-Rinner elite would increase the ethnic pride and cultural consciousness of the Chinese community, if anything. Of the second point we simply note that because the community structure of the Chinese was not devoted to a broker role between the mass membership of the community and the national government, most of the resources of the Chinese community organizations were able to be directed to the maintenance of a distinct ethnic identity.

Integration

In historical perspective we have seen a differential in the national identification and integrative behavior possible through the structures of the Chinese and national communities. In Chapter II we note that until independence, the Chinese community in Cambodia was structurally defined by the concentration and neither integrated within itself nor integrated with the national community. Since that time, with the demise of the concentration system, we have seen some rather interesting patterns emerge. In the five or six years immediately following independence the Chinese community had already reorganized itself into an integrated body cross-cutting speech group lines.

Two major factors may be identified here as being major
contributors to the process of integration in Cambodia: (1) a broader definition of Cambodian citizenship; and (2) the erosion of the powers of the chefs de concentration, both by legislative broadening privileges for their charges and by the removal of Vietnamese administrators from any important office (particularly immigration).

We have observed that by 1960 only about 15 percent of the Chinese in Cambodia held citizenship and that this proportion had about doubled by the end of the 1960s. It has been obvious from our discussion that Cambodian citizenship was difficult for Chinese to obtain if they were born outside the country or were in the country before the end of 1954. The rising percentage of Chinese holding Cambodian citizenship after 1954 would indicate a general tendency for all Chinese who were able to take up Cambodian nationality.

We must caution, however, that this indicator of national identification is not as valid as it was in the case of Burma, for Cambodian law prohibited non-citizens from about 13 occupations which might give rise to some 'force of instrumental motivation to take up citizenship, as was the case in Thailand'. We note another indicator of national identification that is perhaps more valid, yet related to local status. In the regulations governing the sports associations in the Chinese community which were voluntary membership associations regulated by its membership, it was required that all members of the association executive be of
Cambodian nationality. If this simply reflects sino-liner domination of these clubs it is still a valid indication of Chinese identification with the national community, however more an indicator of elite identification than that of the Chinese mass.

The erosion of the power of the chefs to conciliation began as a direct result of the liberalization of the citizenship act, as we have seen above, combined with the removal of the Vietnamese administrators. The first factor had the effect of removing some of the chefs former charges from their jurisdiction and no longer allowed unqualified control over the remaining flock. With the gradual removal of the Vietnamese administrators came a breakdown in the particularistic relationships that had developed between the chefs and the Vietnamese, particularly with regard to immigration. With these relationships destroyed, it became possible for more Chinese to communicate directly with the new Amer administration, rather than through the person of the chef. This erosion of power was further followed by the formal placing of all Chinese under the jurisdiction of the Cambodian courts. Though many continued to appeal to the leadership of the Chinese community for dispute arbitration, many others began to remove to the Cambodian courts for adjudication of differences, indicating rising integration of the Chinese and national communities.

...mid the reorganization of both the Chinese and national
communities in the independence period exercised the Sino-Khmer national elite. This elite was a mobilizing force for both the Chinese and Khmer communities primarily at the national political level. We have seen that by the 1960's the Chinese community itself was highly integrated through a political structure of interlocking officers uniting most associations in the hospital board. Most relations between the various power blocs within the community took place through this hierarchical structure. On the other hand, relations between the various power blocs of the Chinese community and the powerful Sino-Khmer elite proceeded directly from each separate bloc. This is presented in evidence that the leadership of the Chinese community was concerned with "aspects of power that are therefore tangential to the most important question affecting the Chinese" (economic questions)."43

Most important of all, there is today a bloc composed of men who are at the same time both Chinese and Cambodian, and who are in positions of power over important aspects of the Chinese community life without themselves participating in the leadership of the associational structure. Today's most powerful leaders not only transcend the congregations; they transcend the Chinese community itself.

It is of further importance that we note that the political concerns of the Chinese leaders and the Sino-Khmer elite


45. Ibid., p. 126.
are different. The Chinese leaders are concerned only with the internal politics and socio-cultural affairs of the local Chinese community, while the Sino-Inner elite, thought participation in those affairs as members, hold a more universalistic interest in politics and socio-cultural affairs at the larger national level. The integration of the two communities is not seen as a threat to the positions of leadership in the Chinese community and more importantly, would do nothing to erode the elite position of the Sino-Inner cadre.

Similar to the situation we have already discussed in Burma, the presence of a second non-indigenous minority—the Vietnamese—had a powerful influence on the integration of the Chinese and Inner communities. Not only were the Vietnamese a symbol of French colonial rule and historical enemies, as we saw in Chapter II, but Vietnamese domination in administration meant that the independence movement as an attempt to secure itself politically from a foreign minority. Furthermore, the Vietnamese were extensively engaged in agricultural occupations in direct economic competition with the Inner community. As in Burma, both the Chinese and indigenous minority were administered as second class citizens relative to the position of the Vietnamese under the colonial administration. Competitive conflict thus did not develop between the Inner and Chinese communities to the degree it was apparent between both the Vietnamese and Inner in the
political system and to a lesser degree between the Chinese and Vietnamese in the commercial sector. Both the Chinese and Vietnamese, then, had a common focus in their competition with the Vietnamese which helped to develop a feeling of common purpose.

Thailand

Demographic Structure

Relative to the other two nations in our study, the census records of Thailand in the 'independence' period are reasonably complete. J. S. Caldwell has helpfully directed attention to the detailed analysis of the statistical deficiencies in the census provide by Sour-cois-Picot and Des Gupta and his colleagues, thus allowing us to insert various corrections for a more proper estimate of the various demographic components.50

The national population of Thailand was about 17.6 million in 1947, 26.2 million in 1960 and estimated at about 37 million in 1970. The Chinese represented between 10 and 12 percent of the total, increasing from about 2.1 million in 1947 to about 3.5 million by the later sixties. Throughout the period under investigation we find that the male-female

distribution in the national population remained relatively unchanged and even.\(^5\) In 1947, the male-female ratio in the Chinese population was more than 2:1 and had changed to about 1.5:1 by the sixties. As this calculation is done from data on the non-citizen portion of the Chinese community, it would be safe to suggest that in 1947 the average ratio of the total Chinese population was about 1.5:1 and by the sixties the distribution was about the same as that of the national community. More accurate estimates are not possible as most ethnic Chinese are not listed separately on the census.

The age distribution in Thailand is similar to that of the other two countries, with a high ratio of young people to the adult population. In the 1950's Blanchard, et al., report that the median was between 17 and 18 years—probably no actual change.\(^5\) The age distribution among the Chinese is similar to that of the national population.

Caldwell turns our attention to two important and interesting aspects of the urban-rural pattern in Thailand: "its relatively low level of urbanization and the treat

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extent of metropolitanization. He further observes that the proportion of the national population living in the urban areas is low, even in comparison with the other countries of Southeast Asia. The population distribution between the two decades, studied here, underwent little variation and in fact the changes in net migration in most areas was less than the equivalent of a single year's natural growth. Between 1947 and 1960, the ten largest towns in the country more than doubled their aggregate populations, but 37 percent of this increase occurred in Greater Bangkok where about 18.5 percent of the total population was urban and this urban area increased about one percent by the middle of the decade. Some of this population lives in the Bangkok area which is an almost perfect model of Jefferson's "private city" described in 1935. Bangkok is the primary urban area by such a large margin (100: 1) that it seems justifiable to base description of the social differentiations of urban Thailand on Bangkok which

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set the pattern for all other urban centres.

Finally, we observe that about 67 percent of the Chinese population held Thai citizenship in 1947. By 1960 this figure had increased to about 80.6 percent and jumped again to about 90 percent by the end of the decade.

Social and Political Stratification

Though Blanchard and his co-authors note that Thai rural society was basically classless, they observe that the urban area had a highly stratified class system (we have noted that about a third of Thailand's Chinese live in benschok). In urban Thailand status is determined on the basis of an individual's or family's position or rating in one or more of five basic categories: economic standing, political power and connections, education, outlook on life and family background. They further identify five urban classes: an aristocracy, composed largely of descendants of royalty and the old nobility; an elite, comprised of the top political, professional and business leaders (Thai); an upper-middle class, made up of merchants, small businessmen, and white-collar workers; a lower-middle class, made up mostly of craftsmen and skilled laborers.

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58 Ibid., pp. 400-405.
a lower class, made up of unskilled laborers, domestic servants, peddlers and the like. While recognizing these class distinctions, Jordan Jacobs contends Thailand is basically a two-class society (both in urban and rural areas) composed of "leaders and followers." The basic distinction between these two models of Thai stratification is their respective foci. The former model is most useful when dealing with occupational and economic stratification, while the latter is most applicable to political stratification of society. To better serve the ends of conceptual clarity I have attempted to roughly translate these two models in terms of each other in the following manner: (1) Leader class (in rank order, the elite, the aristocracy, Thai members of the upper-middle class); (2) Follower class (in rank order, Chinese members of upper-middle class, lower-middle class, lower class). It is cautioned that the reader understand that each of these models is very general and that these distinctions may not be formally true in all cases, however, sufficiently so to fulfill the needs of this research.

Nationally, about 82.4 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture, forestry, hunting or fishing. The remaining labor force does not exceed six percent in any one

55Ibid., p. 409.

category. Next to agriculture is commerce representing 5.7 percent of the labor force, service industries representing 4.8 percent, manufacturing representing 3.4 percent, transportation and communications representing 1.2 percent, while the remaining occupation categories represent less than two percent of the total. Furthermore, we note that government employs less than three percent of the total work force, while the private sector employs more than 97 percent. Most of those employed by government were in service industries (61 percent of the total government employed persons but only 4.3 percent of the work force total). It is also worth noting that government occupations are not necessarily the highest paying positions (in contrast to Burma) and in some instances government is one of the lowest paying employers.

The situation in Thailand is in sharp contrast to both the other two systems where the high status of government occupations is supported by the generally higher wages of those occupations. Though government positions are rewarded by a great deal of power and influence generally, they are not particularly secure from economic want. This is at least partial evidence of a failure of the traditional cultural

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62 Ibid., p. 190, Table 4-7.

63 Ibid., see also Blanchard, et al., pp. 283-285.
structure to adapt to the rising importance of non-traditional cultural values imposed by the pressures of modernization. The idea of conspicuous consumption in traditional Thai society was an alien value but in recent years conspicuous consumption has gained increasing importance to the Thai, particularly in the urban centres. This failure of system adaptation is, at least partially, an explanation for the high reliance on the patron-client relationships of Thai politics and particularly relevant to an explanation of the description of these relationships between the Chinese and Thai communities (representing economic security, on one hand, and political security, on the other).

Where Thai preference was for occupations of power and influence politically (government and the professions) as well as agriculture, we see a preference among the Chinese for occupations of commerce, finance, industry and crafts (see appendix L). An extensive search of available data has not turned up any reliable estimate (except in adjective form such as "such", "many", "most", etc.) of the urban-rural distribution of the Chinese in Thailand. From the data presented in a number of diverse sources the nearest approximation that is possible by this author is between 70 and 80 percent urban. Several authorities on Thailand have noted the dominant position of Bangkok as the urban center of the nation generally setting the tone's and being representative of most of the rest of urban Thailand. This
bein; the case, the information presented in Appendices II,
IV, and VI may be regarded a; generally representative of the
position of the Chinese in the rest of urban Thailand. Few
Chinese agriculturalists (some loggers and fishermen) may
be found in Thailand, however most rural communities have
a Chinese store that supports a Chinese family, similar to
rural Cambodia. In considering the statistical relevance
of the data presented in the tables of these three Appendices,
it must be considered that the Chinese represent about 45
percent of the total population of Bangkok where the sample
was taken.

In examination of the data in Appendix II shows that
the Chinese are vastly over-represented in the second an;
third status classes where they represent about 60 to 80
percent of the respective totals in these classes. We
further observe that few Chinese hold either high or low
government positions and that as a group they are under-
represented in both the high and low status positions.
Though this is the pattern of stratification in very general
terms (by occupation class) we note several important
exceptions upon closer examination of the various individual
occupations making up these classes. The Chinese have no
representation in the 'high-ranking government officials'
category but outnumber the ethnic Thai by more than two
to one in the second highest status occupation of 'large
business owners and managers.' Thus, we see a division
between economics and politics at the highest status level of the social system that compares with a similar division noted in Cambodia. The difference here is that this division is not cut by a group like the sino-burman elite in Cambodia, but rather corresponds with the ethnic line between the Chinese and Thai.

The highest status positions (professionals and high government officials) comprise the political elite, or in Jacob's terms "the leader class." This class "is a literate class of degree-holders who govern" in contrast to the "follower class" which is "composed of laborers (in essence of not formally true), who serve the governing class."\(^6\)

Evers and Silcock have shown that there is no reason to believe that mobility into the national elite has "declined sharply since 1932, despite continuing urbanization and bureaucratization."\(^6\) They have shown that more members are now being recruited from within bureaucratic ranks than from without, a position that runs a hard counter to those positioning a high degree of social mobility in Thai society. They further indicate that entry into the elite group is "determined largely by westernization (through education) and family ties in the civil service or business (indication a fairly high.


westernization prior to a formal western education). Entry may also be affected through the military which also satisfies the westernization and civil service criteria. From the data presented in appendices Li, I and II we note that no ethnic Chinese are members of this group at the criteria for entry make it unlikely they will become members in the near future without some substantial change in system recruitment patterns. In fact it seems that the Chinese have less chance of entry as the elite recruitment becomes more closed, by virtue of the fact that the Chinese have no past membership. This may help further explain the high reliance on patron-client relationships between the two ethnic communities, as anticipation of "integrative opportunities" in the Chinese community is low.

Within the Chinese community itself, status is mainly a function of wealth and sense of 'Chineseness'. Skinner has indicated that riches are essential for Chinese leaders, not simply because authority would decline without it, because by definition the leader had to have the necessary means by which to contribute to community causes commensurate with his position. We might add further to this by arguing that wealth is necessary in order for the Chinese leadership

66 Ibid, p. 90.

to have the economic capability with which to "purchase" political protection and benefits for the Chinese community from his Thai patron(s) who are able to supply such a "service". Because the Chinese are evidently economically secure, but without political security, while the Thai elite has political security without a "real" deal of economic security, the state is set for a positive covariance of rewards between the two elite groups, each having a resource desired by the other. The inverse relationship between Chineseness and the influence and prestige of Chinese leaders (both within and beyond the Chinese community) is a function of the ability of Chinese leaders to recognize this potential covariance of rewards and their ability to translate this potential into a reality for the Chinese community. This ability is obviously enhanced by an awareness of the transcultural uses of status (indicating a higher degree of assimilation and integration than the Chinese race).

Formal associations, rather than informal groups perform the functions of social control and welfare for the Chinese community. The organization of most importance is the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Skinner notes that the chamber has always aimed for proportional representation of the various speech groups and functions as the primary diplomatic an

protective agency (from the Thai government) for the entire community. 66 Of secondary importance is the T'ien-hua Hospital which also integrates the various speech groups at the community level. 70 These two organizations act as the 'spokesmen' for the Chinese community and their capacity to integrate the speech groups was only supplemented by the cross-speech group school boards in San-kol. It is through these organizations that Chinese interaction with the political representatives of the national community took place. They were the input for Chinese demands upon the Thai government and also for Thai government demands upon the Chinese community. In keeping with Skinner's proposed paradigm of Chinese leadership, 71 we note that of the seventy organizations classified as 'most-rightist', two are the most important all-community associations. 72

Skinner's study of leadership and power in the Chinese community shows that these all-community organizations were able to mobilize political support (in the form of protection) within the Thai elite in order to enhance their own security.

66. ibid.
70. ibid.
71. Skinner, "Paradigm for a Paradox."
and prestige. It has also been shown that Chinese leaders had to depend upon their wealth for influence, so that membership on boards of directors could be seen as a direct measure of their relative power. At the same time we note that the presence of the Thai leaders on these boards was a result of their positions in the national power structure, so that their board membership were a consequence and not a cause of their power positions in the Thai community.

Though it is recognized that there was an interlocking relationship between the Thai elite and the Chinese leadership, it seems to serve a pattern-maintaining rather than integrative function. The relationship is of instrumental convenience (integrative behavior) rather than an example of any real degree of full integration as it lacks a sense of comunity or single community identification.

Some suggestion of the instrumentality of such relationships may be drawn from the fact that it was unable to trace any single lineages between the blocs of interlocking Chinese-Thai and the various cliques within the Thai national elite. This suggests this reveals a confirmation of the notion that each Chinese bloc sought multiple alliances with rival groups of power in the Thai elite.


74 Ibid.
The effects of government policies of naturalization and citizenship have perhaps had more impact on the stratification of the Chinese and national communities in Thailand than in either of the other two countries in this study. Under Thai law, citizen-rights are balanced by citizen-duties including duties to respect the law, "even the country, pay taxes and "performing such other duties as are provided by law." In passing, we note that citizen rights may not be exercised against the government itself. Even a brief look at Thai politics reveals that constitutional considerations are of limited importance and that the acts of the various governmental agencies affect the various citizenship regulations more directly.

The original position of the government was to grant citizenship to anyone born in the country, a principle that was reaffirmed by the Nationality Act of June 1955 (1952). Section 7, giving citizenship to all persons born of a father who was a Thai subject, those with no lawful father but a Thai father, and all persons born within the kingdom. This act was rescinded by a new regulation in 1953 that

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75 Lamchar, op. cit., p. 160.

provided citizenship only for those born of a Thai father, illegitimate persons of a Thai mother and persons born of a Thai mother outside the kingdom. The latter part of this act provides citizenship for most persons of the 'Thai and Chinese blood'. Three years later the act was used to retroactively restore citizenship rights similar to those set out in the 1952 act and since 1956 the act has remained relatively unchanged. It has been subject to the influence of the day-to-day regulations of various ministries such as those laws relating to employment, military service and voting.

The naturalization of aliens is provided for in the same act (1956) which allows for naturalization if an individual has taken an uninterrupted residence of five years prior to application and complies with the current legal requirements prescribed by the ministerial regulation of the day. Further, the tentative and temporary requirements could be waived provided the applicant had "distinguished services to Thailand", or of value to the government service, or of naturalization parents. Such a waiver was at the discretion of the presiding officials of the ministry. Naturalization of the Chinese was not common; Councilin states that only 400 applications were granted.

77 *Ibid.*, p. 171

between 1947 and 1950. The "nationality act of 1950 set
forth limitations on the rights of citizens with alien
forebears, which gave the government justification to
strip both native-born citizens with 'alien' parents and
naturalized citizens of their citizenship.

Because there is no other large non-indigenous minority
in Thailand, it is obvious that these regulations were
'directly aimed at the Chinese community. The net effect was
to create three classes of citizens, each with different 'rights'
and each regulated by different regulations: (1) native-
born citizens of Thai parentage, (2) native born citizens
of alien parentage, and (3) naturalized aliens. These basic
distinctions and the regulations governing their enactment
are themselves subject to a great deal of specific regulation.

For example, under the election laws of 1951 and 1956,
native-born citizens had the right to vote without further
qualification while native-born citizens of alien parentage,
in the absence of having performed military service or served
the Thai government in some capacity for at least five years,
must have obtained a certificate of proficiency in the Thai
language equal to the sixth year of middle school (secondary
school), a qualification that few full-blooded Thai could meet.

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75 ibid., p. 176, Table II.
80 ibid., p. 178
Furthermore, fulfillment of the military service requirement was difficult for most Chinese born in Thailand, as well as those who had been naturalized as the 1936 Military Service Act contained specific provisions for retaining citizenship for duty by an "encouraged" (citizen) of citizens of alien parents. It was not until 1956 that the Military Service Act was amended to give equality to all Thai citizens regardless of their parentage.

Winner's extensive study of the Chinese leadership patterns in Thailand indicates a close relationship between citizenship and leadership prestige and influence in the Chinese community. The table reconstructed in appendix VIII shows that the trend as early as 1935 was toward more Chinese leaders holding Thai citizenship. Data indicate that the proportion of Thai citizens among Chinese leaders increased from 23 percent at the least influential level to 46 percent of the most influential leaders with citizenship. In correlating citizenship and prestige in the same table, we found that 51 percent of the leaders having the least prestige


Winner, Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community, p. 265. Winner indicates that the correlations are significant at the .025 level.
were Thai citizens, while only 18 percent of those with
the least prestige were Thai citizens. In 1952, the linkages
between citizenship and influence and prestige were obviously
not as significant as they were in the 1957 sample, when
leadership was heir-crested more readily to those leaders
with Thai citizenship. It is felt that the trend toward
leadership by leaders with Thai citizenship is a partial indication of the level of
assimilation of the Chinese community toward the Thai society.
However, there is no strong empirical reality behind this,
inter-ethnic and inter-class tensions of the two communities over the
time period.

By any of brief summary, there are several features
of the stratification of Thai society that function to create
a cleavage between the Chinese and Thai communities. The
obvious absence of a third important non-indigenous minority
in the commercial competition of the domestic economy is a
factor to consider in comparison with the other two countries
of this study. The Thai Chineses are caught in direct
economic competition, particularly in the urban areas where
a Thai commercial class was rapidly developing. Unlike either
of the other two countries, any tension that was likely to
arise from this competition were not directed by other non-
pronounced inter-ethnic tensions in the national community.
apart from the absence of another minority, the Chinese and 
dominant communities came into more direct competition in 
the commercial sector than in either of the other two cases.

We further note that a "patron-client" structure of patron-
client relations developed between the Chinese and Thai elites 
with an important covariance of reversion. The nature of this 
relationship had a great impact on the maintenance of a 
distinct Chinese community of some size in Thailand, even 
though individual Chinese continue to assimilate to Thai 
society at a fairly steady rate. This patron-client structure 
of inter-community relations allowed the Chinese leadership a 
large degree of social and political control over the members-
ship of their community. In addition we note that the Chinese 
community political hierarchy was the mechanism through which 
most important inter-community communications took place.

Assimilation

Structure has had an important role in maintaining the 
social and cultural distinctiveness of the Chinese in Thailand.
We saw the non-citizen portion of the Chinese community drop 
from about 33 percent to about six percent over the two 
decades under study. Immigrant values, thus had a 
reducing effect on the assimilation rate of the Chinese 
community. We may also regard the comparatively high 
proportion of citizens as an indication of the social 
permanence of the Chinese community which was asserting its
place in Thai society. However, as a contributing factor to assimilation, citizenship had a declining value for the community as a whole. Thai law effectively put a ceiling on its ultimate effect by establishing that persons of Chinese parentage were second-class citizens. The net contribution of these legal restrictions caused a rather unique assimilation differential. At some point after citizenship was attained (either by native-birth or by naturalization, which was not frequent) it became necessary for each Chinese individual to make a choice between ethnic identity as Chinese (allied with the Chinese community structure) or ethnic identity as a Thai, based upon influences other than the legal loyalties of citizenship.

We have seen that it was possible for Chinese aligning with the Chinese community (as was the case of the Chinese leadership) to be socially and culturally more Thai than Chinese. That is, many of their attitudes and orientations toward Thai social objects were stronger than those toward Chinese community society. The major influence upon the nature of this ethnic choice seems to have been a lack of transcultural status determinants for the two communities. The Thai have shown a preference for occupations of a governmental and professional nature, in contrast to a distinct Chinese preference for occupations with a more commercial flavor. This correlates with the high value the Thai place on power and authority as a status determinant and
the place of wealth as a status determinant for the Chinese community.

We have also noted that mobility into the political elite declined nationally during the independence period and that mobility opportunities for the Chinese in this sector of society were non-existent. The effects of low Chinese mobility into government occupations may be obtained from the study done by Joonsanoo-Punyovana.35 Here it is observed that there is a distinct division between those Chinese who were government employed and those who were not, within the same education level. The government employees were consistently more assimilated to Thai society than those who were not, preferring to send their children to Thai schools, have Thai friends, marry Thai women, sharing a lower tendency to consider various occupations as being the exclusive domain of a particular ethnic group. This is perhaps a novel example of institutional socialization, which was lacking in both a real and anticipatory sense among most of the members of the Chinese community.

Because of local restrictions against the Chinese in various occupations, it became necessary for Chinese aspiring

to be upwardly mobile in the national community to invest themselves of all Chinese social trappings and become fully assimilated into the Thai social and cultural patterns, thus becoming Thai.

The assimilation rate of the Chinese in Thailand took place at a rate only slightly lower than the growth rate of the Chinese population (statistically). The Chinese community itself only grew about 0.7 million over the twenty years under study, while statistics indicate that over three million persons of Chinese blood just have been born. We can find no evidence that the persons of Chinese blood who assimilated to Thai society maintained relations with the Chinese community that were any different than those between the Chinese and other Thai.

Competition between the Chinese and Thai in the economy did much to both advance individual Chinese assimilation and retard that of the community. With a rapidly evolving commercial class in Thai society (a partial consequence of the assimilated persons of Chinese-economic background), over the two decades of this study competition even intensified to some degree. The intensity of the competition had the effect of socializing Chinese in common competition with Thai, to some degree, to the values and expected behaviors of Thai society in order to decrease the effects ethnicity might have upon success in that competition (this is particularly the case of the Chinese
leaders). For those not socializing, the Chinese leadership was present to act on their behalf through its patron-client relationship with the Thai political elite.

The associational structure of the Chinese community had a negative effect on the assimilation of its members into Thai society. The associational hierarchy of the Chinese community effectively served to preserve the ethnicity of the Chinese by channeling much of the interaction of the members of the community through the structure for inter-community relations. It is also important that the Chinese community structure in Thailand assumed the responsibility for social control as well as welfare, thus limiting the necessity of the mass membership of the Chinese community to adopt the behavior and attitudes necessary to deal with the social control mechanisms of the national community. This ethnic distinctiveness was preserved by the patron-client interaction of the Thai and Chinese elites which also limited the ultimate political interaction that could take place between the two communities, as we shall later see. The two elites functioned to preserve the Chinese community as a distinct ethnic unit in order to maintain the patron-client system. Logically, if the Chinese community were allowed to disappear into the larger national society, not only could the Thai patrons lose a distinct and preferred client bloc, but the Chinese leadership would simply become Thai clientele, losing both prestige and status enjoyed as
leaders of the Chinese community.

Integration

Structural considerations are centrally important to the creation of a national identification among the Thai Chinese community leadership and to the ability of the mass communities to behaviorally integrate. In Chapter II we saw that the organization and solidarity of the Chinese community emerged at its peak during a period when Chinese-Thai competition in the economy was high and Thai reliance on Chinese business skills for national revenue and development was in decline. Because the Chinese community had established a firm foothold on the Thai economy it was necessary for the developing Thai commercial community to secure gains directly from the Chinese. The degree of competition and resulting conflict was largely responsible for transforming the ethnic cleavage existing between the two groups into a durable political cleavage that continues to exist into the independence period.

The resulting division between the Thai and Chinese communities necessitated the functional response of each community in an adaptive manner. Structural reorganization of inter-community relations caused a rise in the importance of patron-client political relationships. James Scott states that these relationships are a special case of "patrician (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status..."
(patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron." It is clear from this definition that implicit to the model are elements of both classic 'role theory' and 'exchange theory'. The relationship demands reciprocity in which each contracting partner provides a service that is valuable for the other (covariance of rewards), which we have described as an important aspect of interactive behavior. It is also important that there must also be a power imbalance between the patron and client (but not so great as to permit a relationship based on mere power), a condition that is not conducive to a 'true' sense of community identification. It is also characteristic of the relationship that the client's choice of patron affiliation, rather than various other alternatives, is neither a purely coerced decision nor the result of unrestricted choice in any instance. Nor is it uncommon for a client to have more than one patron, or for a patron to have a myriad of clients. The structure of this relationship, simply conceptualized in Chinese-Thai politics puts the Chinese leadership in a 'dual role as both client of the Thai elite, with which it has affiliated, and as a patron to the other members of the Chinese community.

we have seen in this chapter that the Chinese community structure is hierarchic, similar to that of Cambodia. Unlike Cambodia, this structure is concerned with both intra- and inter-community affairs. It is through this structure that most communication with the national community must proceed.

This has helped to consolidate the positions of the leaders of the Chinese community by giving them control of the distribution of political favors from the national elite, through their patron-client contacts. The net effect of this structure of inter-community relations is to create a concern on the part of both the Thai and Chinese elites to maintain the pattern of low integration of the Chinese race. It is contrary to the rational interests of the Thai elite to permit either full assimilation or mass integration of the Chinese because either or both of these conditions would cause the loss of a favored clientele by eroding the power-status imbalance on which the persistence of the system depends. On the part of the Chinese elite, a similar sentiment is shared. With the full integration of the Chinese community would come an end to the leadership positions of that community, thus the Chinese leadership would lose its Chinese clientele and thus its status.

This relationship between the Chinese and Thai elites clearly provides for a positive covariance of rewards. For the Thai elite the Chinese leaders can provide greater
greater economic security. The Thai patron, on the other hand, can provide political security for the Chinese. This is a valuable resource for members of the Chinese community constantly facing local discrimination. It is also a resource that may be "distributed" by the Chinese recipients, to the Chinese community members who have alienated with them. Chinese leadership also has substantial means with which to impose sanctions upon its client-base by withholding its distribution of political security provided by its Thai patrons. In short, it is necessary to restrict higher levels of integration to the elite memberships of each community in service of the interests of those elites. It also seems apparent that the promotion of institutional conflict between the Thai and Chinese communities helps maintain rather than change this pattern.

Summary

Several contrasts and similarities arise across these three countries from our discussion of structure. Perhaps most important among these is the effect of structure on conflict, reduction or conflict acceleration. We have noted that in the cases of both Burma and Cambodia the structure of the national system acts to reduce conflict between the dominant and Chinese groups. In Burma this was due both to the presence of a large Indian minority and to the geographical and occupational dispersion of the Chinese.
In Cambodia it was seen that conflict reduction between the two groups was due largely to the presence of a larger Vietnamese minority and the factors surrounding their inter-ethnic relations with the Minos and to the rise of a powerful Minos-Miao elite that continued to be socially Chinese but occupied important roles in the national system. In passing, we note that the rise of the Minos-Miao elite was partly due to Vietnamese presence also. In Thailand, we have noted that the structure of the national system has not effectively functioned to reduce conflict between the Chinese and the members of the national community. We have seen, in fact, that at times conflict is actually promoted by the structure of the system.

We have also observed variance in the role of the elites of the Chinese and national communities in promoting or retarding assimilation and integration. In the case of Java, the elite of the Chinese community is not monolithic in the same sense that it is in Thailand and Cambodia. There is no evidence to suggest that there is any centralization of decision-making for the national Chinese community (or even a large portion of the national Chinese community). The Chinese community structure in Java may be best thought of as a number of Chinese communities, though this may not be formally true. On the other hand, within each bloc of the Chinese community it would seem that the structure is hierarchical with the leadership concerned with both intra-
and inter-communal affairs. Unlike some of the Chinese community in Thailand, certain Chinese community in Cambodia seems to be relatively integrated into a fairly hierarchic national community with the leadership also concerned with both intra- and inter-communal matters. In Cambodia, the Chinese community is highly integrated in a hierarchic but the leadership of the community hierarchy is concerned only with the internal affairs of the Chinese community itself. In inter-communal matters, the Chinese community in Cambodia does not seem to be highly integrated as political relations with the national elite proceed directly through each separate power bloc of the community rather than through the hierarchical structure of the whole community.

The full range of the effects of this hierarchical structure may only be completely investigated by another study more restricted in scope, but we see one important difference between the two cases. In Cambodia, we saw where the Chinese community elite has been traditional for inter-communal and intra-communal communication and political action, it seems that there has evolved such greater reliance on patron-client relations between the Chinese and national elites. This is not to say that patron-client politics are not evident in Cambodia. What does seem to be the case is that in the former two cases these types of relations have taken on a community wide dimension or are of consequence for the whole community, while in the latter
case patron-client relations seem to be conducted on a much more limited scale. This may be partially a consequence of the ability of the Chinese leadership to mobilize prior control over segments of the Chinese community in matters of importance to the national elite. This gives the Chinese leadership both more power of distribution and social control than is the case in many other societies. In addition, there is a tradition of full assimilation or integration of the local level of the Chinese community in threatening to their status and authority, as an elite.
CHAPTER IV

AGENTS OF SOCIALIZATION

It is recognized here that it would be desirable to investigate the socialization processes of both the Chinese and dominant communities of each nation under study. Such an investigation is prohibited, not simply by the high cost and time involved in collecting behavioral data in each of these countries, but also by the low probability of obtaining official permission to do such work in Burma, if not also Cambodia. A lack of attention to considerations of process by others in each of these countries also hampers any attempt at such a discussion, apart from embarking on a field study. We have, thus, turned to one empirical alternative open to us in determining the socialization differential between the Chinese and national communities in each nation. In this chapter we shall concentrate our attention on agents rather than processes of socialization.

The basic assumption here is that if various groups and individuals of a political community are subject to the same socialization agents, they are to some degree subject to the same process. It is recognized that the presence of common agents, used by individuals in common, has a high impact on the tendency and behavioral capability of groups to assimilate and integrate. To restate our assumption we
might say that when agents of socialization are mutually exclusive, integration and assimilation (particularly the latter) are not taking place. This is particularly so in the case of voluntary associations and organizations.

There will be no extensive attempt to examine the socialization agents used solely by members of the dominant groups. Our main areas of focus will be those areas where socialization agents commonly influence both the Chinese and dominant groups and, to a lesser degree, where the Chinese come under the influence of unique agents of socialization.

For convenience we have made several distinctions between agents of major impact in the socialization process, besides the family. The first of these is education and schools. Education is important to most Chinese in South-east Asia and has been, from time to time, suspect of being a tool of subversion of various alien Chinese regimes. Here we shall look at the degree to which Chinese children attend Chinese separate schools rather than national schools. Also, where data permits, we shall look at the political orientations of these schools. Secondly, we shall examine the mass media and communications as agents of socialization. In question is the degree to which members of the Chinese community obtain, or are able to obtain, information from Chinese media. Of primary importance here is the degree to
which Chinese becomes the media of communication for the Chinese community as well as the degree to which Chinese and dominant groups are influenced by common media. We shall also attempt to determine the effects of various formal and voluntary associations both exclusive to the Chinese community (reinforcing the distinct values and orientations of the community) and common to both Chinese and dominant groups. Finally, some attempt will be made to discuss the political and economic experiences of the Chinese in each country, as they relate to the national system. Foreign policy toward China, national policies with regard to the Chinese minorities, political corruption are all of significance in molding the loyalties, orientations, levels of interaction and attitudes toward the national community.

Burma
Education and Schools

The insurgency in Burma that accompanied and followed independence had devastating effects on the development of the national school system until about 1952. Rebels destroyed and looted more than one half of all the school buildings and headmasters often seemed to be high priority targets in the guerrilla "war of liberation." 1

The state goal was free education for all young citizens of the Union. Primary schools, for students 6 to 10 years of age, were to carry through the fourth grade (standard); middle schools, for children 10-13, would carry through the seventh grade; high schools were for those from 13 to 15 years old and would carry through to the ninth grade. Mission schools and the private Indian and Chinese schools were recognized by the state and were required to register with the Ministry of Education. Control over private schools was minimal, though they were subject to inspections and expected to follow the directives of the Ministry.

In 1952 there were 3,335 primary, 72 middle and 108 high schools in the Union that were government operated. At the same time there were 7 primary, 5 middle and 10 high schools privately operated by missions, Indians and Chinese. By 1955 there were 8,951 primary, 405 middle and 220 high schools that were government run in contrast to about 295 Chinese schools (11 percent in the Rangoon area). Between 1952 and 1963, Chinese schools had increased by about 10

\[\text{Ibid.}\]


percent to 259 with a total student population of 39,000. 5
By this time about 23 percent were in the Rangoon area, the rest spread throughout the Union. The 59 schools in the Rangoon area had a combined enrollment of about 16,500 (42 percent of the total national Chinese school enrollment). 6
The two largest of these were operated by western mission societies: the Chinese Methodist High School, with about 3,700 students and the Catholic Anglo-Chinese School, with 2,100 enrolled. Both taught courses in Chinese, Burmese and English. 7

As we observed in the last chapter, more than fifty percent of the total Chinese population of Burma was under twenty years of age. While this was the case, only 8 to 10 percent of the total Chinese population was attending Chinese schools (about one child in five). This figure is somewhat exaggerated if we take into account the fact that only about 13 percent of the Chinese schools in the Union were engaged in secondary education, making it necessary for most Chinese children to attend secondary institutions outside the Chinese community (Chinese secondary schools enrolled about 7,000 students in 1962--about 1 in 10 of the school-age children). Like both Thailand and Cambodia,

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
Burma had no Chinese universities or technical schools and regulations in the 1960's made travel outside the Union difficult if not impossible for most Chinese students. My estimates indicate that about 55 to 60 percent of the eligible Chinese attended Chinese primary schools and about 10 to 12 percent of those eligible attended Chinese secondary schools.

Both public and private education in Burma have been the objects of sharp political controversy and attention throughout the independence period. It has been suggested that in 1951 about 90 percent of the Chinese schools were Peking oriented, a figure which declined to about 70 percent by 1953. Murray states that by 1962 only the two mission-operated schools could claim political neutrality. By 1962 only 74 schools were at odds with the Peking line, a decline of 11 from 1959. About 56 percent of the students enrolled in Chinese schools were attending Peking oriented institutions, which constituted about 70 percent of the schools in the country. It is also important that the right-wing institutions were prominent in Northern Burma where a substantial number of K.M.T. rebels continued to roam, while the left-wing institutions were predominant in lower Burma.

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9 Murray, "Chinese Education in Southeast Asia," p. 79.

10 ibid.
where the national government was the first non-communist regime to recognize Peking.

The Chinese schools in Burma were controlled largely by two organizations. The right-wing institutions were administered by the Burma Overseas Chinese Cultural and Education Advancement Association. The left-wing institutions were supervised by the much better organized and financed Burma Overseas Chinese Teacher’s Union. Each of these organizations has to some degree been an instrument of one side or the other in the two-Chinas conflict, yet there is little evidence that the Chinese schools in Burma ever became as politically involved as their counterparts in Thailand.

We do not have the necessary data to give an exact indication of the number of Chinese students attending universities and technical schools. From the occupational distributions already examined in the last chapter, we can estimate that they were represented about proportionally to their numbers in the total national population. The universities and technical schools in the country have been highly political throughout the independence period. The Chinese students generally have not been indicated by Burmese officials as an independent source of concern so

11 Ibid.

it may not be presumptuous to assume that those Chinese reaching university were almost totally assimilated and politically indistinct from their Burmese peers.

Chinese schools in Burma did not attract much official attention until during the cultural revolution in China, just prior to the Sino-Burmese split of 1967. In June of that year, however, Chinese students of Burmese nationality showed up in two Rangoon junior high and primary schools (public schools) with Mao badges in place of their identity pins and refused to remove them. They were taken to an army base where they barricaded themselves and refused to leave when their parents came to take them home. Several of the leaders of the demonstration were "accused by students who escaped of having flown in from China after Red Guard training." During the following week rioting, sparked by similar pro-Maoist demonstrations, spread throughout the capital injuring and killing several Chinese. Though several authors indicate that the 'Burmese' represented in those riots were representative of the national popular sentiment, it is probably more correct that a good number of the anti-Chinese demonstrators were Burmans of Indian

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descent who lived close to the Chinese quarter in the capital city.\textsuperscript{15}

As an indicator of assimilation, this discussion shows that the Chinese community maintained a considerable degree of cultural distinctiveness, yet it is important that as many as 40 percent of the Chinese school-age children attended Burmese government primary schools where they were largely removed from reminders of their Chinese heritage. It is also important that the education of ethnic minorities (the Chinese in particular) was never a political issue of great importance in Burma.

Mass Media and Communications

Newspapers in Burma were relatively unrestricted up to the military regime of 1962. In 1950 there were three Burmese language newspapers published in the country with a total circulation of about nine thousand, two Chinese publications with a circulation of about 1,500 and one English newspaper with a circulation of about 3,500.\textsuperscript{16} By 1960 the number of Burmese papers had swelled to 14 with a circulation of about 41 thousand, the Chinese papers totalled 4 with a circulation of just under six thousand.

\textsuperscript{15}Badgley, "Burma's China," p. 754.

there were six Indian papers with about five thousand readers and three English papers with just under ten thousand readers. In 1963, the Revolutionary Council set up a News agency which took over all private wire news service as a means of controlling the outflow of news not in accord with the government line. By 1967 most foreign language papers were disallowed as were English language papers owned by foreigners and there were only about ten papers being published in the Union with a combined readership of about 69 thousand. From the figures represented above, it is obvious that even when the press was unrestricted the Chinese papers had a small circulation relative to the size of the Chinese population (about 75 persons for each paper circulated).

Most movies were seen by audiences in the capital city and in lower Burma. Though there were a number of Chinese films numbering among those shown in the country, they did not exceed about 16 percent of the total shown. Far more numerous were films in the English language (as much as 40 percent) and Indian films (as much as 25 percent). The acceptance of Chinese films was probably as much a reflection of the friendly relations between Burma and

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17 Ibid.

mainland China as a reflection of local demand in the Chinese community. It is noted that as relations between the two countries began to sour, the number of cultural exchanges (including motion pictures) declined accordingly.

National communication was a major problem in Burma. The system was pluralistic and the government did not control large portions of the country. As well, most of the national communications system was destroyed during the war and recovery was slow. Burmese was the national language, but was supplemented by English in many quarters, a practice that was gradually dying out during the latter sixties. Most Chinese in Burma, it is noted, spoke Burmese fluently; many of them were multilingual.

Social, Political and Economic Organizations and Experiences

Little research has been done into the social and political patterns of associations in modern Burma, much less has been done in the area of Chinese associations. We have already mentioned the two major associations overseeing the Chinese schools, but judging from the participation of Chinese in the separate school system, it was likely that these two organizations did not have extensive membership. The Overseas Chinese Association attracted some membership from younger members of the Chinese community and had long been oriented toward the mainland politics and working in conjunction with the Burmese Communist Party. There is no
reason to believe that this organization has not survived the military regime, but there is little or no data available as it was driven to take a low profile when the B.C.P. (Burmese Communist Party) went underground following the military take-over. 19

Though the B.C.P. is in rebellion against the regime in Burma its membership is fiercely patriotic and sees the current regime as a problem to be solved by revolutionary means. Thus, Chinese co-operation with this group is a legitimate indicator of political integration of the Chinese with a dissident segment of the indigenous political community. The B.C.P. was dominated by indigenous membership, but co-operation with Chinese seems to be common, if not extensive.

Unlike Cambodia, the Chinese in Burma formed separate Chambers of Commerce, which were the most powerful organizations speaking for the community. The 1951 election asserted to the importance of the Chambers as its support was a contributing factor to the AFPFL victory. 20 Special explanations about policy were also given to this group during the nationalization of business in 1964, apart from those given to other merchants and businessmen affected by

19 See John H. Badgley, "Themes and Schisms in Burmese Communist Literature," Asia, 22 (Summer, 1971), pp. 72-86.

the policies (no evidence appears to indicate that the Indians were similarly treated). 21

The most significant political experience for the Chinese in Burma was the removal of Indians from administrative posts following independence. During colonial rule the Indians in Burma had generally enjoyed a preferred position over both the Burmese and Chinese, a fact that drew upon them the bulk of anti-colonial sentiment following independence. Relations between Burmese and Chinese, like those of the Khmer and Chinese in Cambodia, were generally cordial under colonial rule and continued so even under the pressures of economic nationalism in the mid-sixties.

The nature of international relations had also had some impact on the relations between Burmese and Chinese, as we have already noted. Not only did the Burmese recognize the Peking regime and maintain relatively cordial relations until 1967, but many of the rebel groups also were oriented toward the China mainland. The Burmese Communist Party, Shan rebels and some of the Karen rebels received both moral and material support from the Peking Communists. The presence of K.M.T. troops in the frontier region seems to have been almost as much an embarrassment to the Chinese of Burma (as a group) as to the Burmese government itself. K.M.T. 'bandits' were as much a threat to Chinese personal security in the frontier states as they were to members of

indigenous groups. Evidence suggests that little or no
support for the K.M.T. came from Chinese in Burma. In fact
more support for this group came from Shan and Kachin
insurgents (who were also enlisting support from Peking). 22

The Cultural Revolution in China had a significant
degree of support from the Chinese community in Burma, most
of which came from the Chinese youth in the schools and
universities. These young Chinese were joined by young
Burmese intellectuals in their enthusiasm for the 'Revolution'
during its height in China. 23 The rift between Peking and
Burma was marked by increased tension between the Burmese
and Chinese domestically. 24

Finally, the 1964 nationalization of the two branches
of the P.R.C. (People's Republic of China) state-owned bank--
the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications--removed an
important negative influence on Chinese integration. These
banks had been of great political and economic importance to
the local Chinese community since 1949. Through them the
Chinese Embassy was able to apply considerable economic


pressure on Chinese businessmen by lending money on easy terms to those who were P.R.C. supporters and refusing loans to non-supporters. Three conditions had to be met to secure such loans: (1) send their children to pro-Peking schools; (2) fly the P.R.C. flag during specified holidays; and (3) employ pro-P.R.C. employees. We might expect that the removal of this influence would have a noticeable impact upon importance of Chinese schools to the Chinese community and it is unfortunate that with nationalist policies came a virtual end to field research in Burma by western scholars, contributing to an unfortunate data gap. The influence of the two bans may be one means of explaining the seeming paradox between the number of children attending separate schools and the low acceptance of the Chinese press.

Assimilation

In Chapter 1 we pointed out that cultural homogeneity was but one aspect of assimilation in any total sense. We also noted that total assimilation would, by definition include political integration. We shall here discuss the socialization agents in view of their contribution or lack of contribution to creating a condition of positive attitude and behavior congruence between ethnic minorities in all social sub-systems.

In the last chapter we noted that over half of the Chinese population of Burma was under twenty years of age. It is of importance to the process of assimilation that only about one in five of these young people came under the socialization of the Chinese separate school system throughout their school years. Unlike Thailand, there was no legal reason why these children should have attended government schools so we may assume that it was largely a matter of choice. We have further noted that the Chinese school system in Burma was poorly developed and that there were few secondary schools. No legislation seemed in evidence to impede such development had it been desired by the Chinese community. Both of these may be noted as indicators of the assimilation of the Chinese to Burmese society.

It is also important that the socialization of young people to Chinese values was greater in the earlier years of education. We have shown that about 60 percent of the Chinese, at some time, attended Chinese primary schools, while only about 12 percent of those eligible attended Chinese secondary schools. It is important to note that those that halted their education after primary school (which had a sixty percent probability of being Chinese) would have been less assimilated by adulthood than those that did not. It is also probable that most of those that fell into this category were Chinese by our definition, though we have no data to indicate the extent to which this was the case.
The Chinese press in Burma did not enjoy as high a circulation as it did in either Cambodia or Thailand. Statistically there was about one paper circulated for every 75 persons in the Chinese community. If we look only at those Chinese living in Lower Burma where the newspapers are published (and we must assume most widely circulated) this figure drops to about 45 or 50 persons per newspaper, still far below the circulation rates in the other two countries. Burmese seems to have been generally used as the vehicle for commercial and social contacts between the Burmese and Chinese and many Chinese spoke Burmese among themselves (often this was the case on the occasion of a meeting between Chinese from different language groups in the Chinese community). Chinese films did not exceed sixteen percent of the total films shown and a good number of these films were enjoyed by both Chinese and Burmese audiences as they were a part of the cultural exchanges between the People's Republic of China and the Burmese government. We do note, however, that as relations between China and Burma began to sour in the late sixties the number of films from China dropped drastically.

National communication was a major problem generally in Burma. The national system was pluralistic and the government was not in control of large portions of the country. The effects of this poor national communication, particularly in the frontier states where almost half of the
Chinese lived, was to retard the process of assimilation and, similarly, that of integration with the national community.

The Chinese in Burma seem to have been about equally divided (by region) between pro-Peking sentiments and pro-Taipei politics, the former in Lower Burma and the latter in the frontier states where a number of Nationalist rebel troops continued to reside. Until the mid-sixties the Burmese national government was generally pro-Peking as was the Burmese Communist Party. The result of this pattern was that Chinese in Lower Burma were able to align their politics to both the national community and to the B.C.P. which was patriotic to Burma but at odds with the national government. In the frontier areas the local political alignments of indigenous insurgents fluctuated from week to week, generally seeking aid for their independence battles where they could find it. We have mentioned that many of the Chinese in this area were likely more parochial than aware of the national community (a result of poor contact with the central authority), however, those that were actively political were generally pro-Taiwan and not aligned with local indigenous groups to any great extent. Unlike the situation in Cambodia, it seems that rural Chinese in Burma assimilated at a much slower rate than did their urban counterparts.

The only general observation that may be made is that the Chinese in Burma seemed to be a group in social transition.
They maintained a fairly high degree of social and cultural distinctiveness, yet as a group (particularly in the south) they were not awkward in a Burmese social setting, most speaking the language well and patronizing Burmese media. A partial indication of Chinese assimilation may be obtained from an anecdote recounted by Hugh Tinker. In January and February of 1955 an impressive cultural mission was sent to Burma by the People's Republic of China. The mission presented a rich display of Chinese opera, dancing and orchestral music in Rangoon and played nightly to audiences of over two thousand, most of whom were members of the Chinese community of that city. The troupe combined both classical and proletarian pieces in their performance which were exclusively Chinese, to the intense pride and satisfaction of their audiences. And yet, the only two items which stirred the crowded Chinese audience to a loud standing ovation and rousing demand for an encore were a rather feeble Burmese dance and a Burmese song, hastily learned by the troupe as a compliment to their hosts.

Integration

From the discussion of socialization, above, we may observe an interesting difference in Burma from the other two countries both in the creation of a sense of

26Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma, p. 189.
community and in the part that socialization agents played in both promoting and retarding co-operative behavior.

A large portion of both the Chinese and national populations were under-twenty years of age and came under the influence of the post-war education boom in the country. There was a large number of Chinese children attending government schools and we have seen that the political sentiments of many Chinese and Burmese youth were alike, both largely left-wing. It is important too that the young Chinese, because of their pro-Peking sentiments, were able to enter into a problem-solving relationship of co-operation with both the legitimate forces of the nation or one of the major groups working at odds with the national regime—the Burmese Communist Party.

It is also important that there were separate Chinese and Burmese Chambers of Commerce and labor organizations, which kept the dispute mediation structures of each community distinct (i.e. the Chinese did not share in the mediation of disputes between two Burmese organization members, neither did Burmese share in the mediation of disputes between two Chinese members of an organization), which meant that all common dispute mediation was in matters of dispute between ethnic communities and easily translated into a political cleavage between the two groups. On the other hand, we have seen that the Chinese community was, on occasion a significant consideration in national politics and a group that experienced
a fairly high degree of political mobilization through the Chinese leadership. We have noted that the Chinese Chambers of Commerce contributed to the A.F.P.P.L. victory in 1951 and that even during nationalization in 1964 the Chinese business community was given separate explanation of government policy and purpose from the rest of the national business community. It may be further observed that the Ne Win regime sought endorsement (which it received) from various members of the Chinese business community for its socialist programs of nationalization and, as well, the support and co-operation of various Chinese business associations was received by the Burmese government during the height of the nationalization program.

Until 1964, the two branches of the P.N.C.'s state owned bank had a negative effect on political integration. This was accomplished by setting forth qualification which had to be met in order for Chinese community members to secure bank loans. We might expect that the removal of this influence had a positive effect; however, no evidence is available to indicate the degree to which the politics of the Chinese altered after 1964.

A final partial indicator of Chinese political integration is the common attitudes of the Chinese and Burmese in international politics (particularly with regard to the two Chinas question). In southern Burma, which was
under the control of the central government for the most part, the Chinese community was generally pro-Peking in keeping with the foreign policy of the national government (we must also regard the effects of the Chinese banks in causing this however), while in the north, which is a region that is poorly integrated with the nation generally, the Chinese tended to hold the right-wing politics of Nationalist China, partially as a result of the fact that many of the residents were refugees at one time or another from the 1949 communist revolution in China.

Cambodia
Education and Schools

French colonial interests did not include the presence of an educated Cambodian elite which might demand reform policies or even independence. The result was a severe retardation of education development in Cambodia. Prior to independence, education was left primarily to the Buddhist wat and community sponsored schools which only provided about three years of primary instruction. After independence, at least in theory, compulsory education existed through the sixth grade, but because of poor facilities and overcrowding, many children still did not progress beyond the third grade. 27

In its over-all organization, the public school system was patterned after the French model. It consisted of two three year periods of primary schooling followed by four years in the collège and three years in the lycée.

Education in Cambodia officially pursued two objectives: (1) developing skills urgently needed for economic growth and social development and (2) imparting information congenial to the political order. A 1957 regulation stipulated that no Cambodian citizen could attend a school in a foreign country. The rule was aimed primarily at keeping Cambodians away from French schools where students had tended to fall under the influence of the French Communist Party. There was no regulation restricting Chinese from attending Cambodian government schools or Khmer from attending Chinese private schools. There was an increase in the number of private schools following independence, yet more and more Chinese were attending government institutions, particularly in search of secondary education (there was only one Chinese secondary school in the country during the 1950's and by the end of the sixties none) despite the fact that there was no restriction upon the development of a separate secondary school system.

In 1948 there were 160 Chinese schools operating in Cambodia, by 1958--179, and by 1965--over 200. Only about

28 Ibid., p. 658.

half the Chinese children of school age attended Chinese schools in Phnom-Penh, the remainder are estimated to have attended government schools as almost all Chinese children went to some school.\textsuperscript{30} Cambodian government regulations, unlike those of Thailand, did not stipulate that instructors be citizens, nor that they speak Khmer, only that they be suitably qualified in their field. In addition to legally defining maximum class sizes, the only regulations were that 10 to 15 hours of Khmer cultural content be taught each week and that textbooks be approved, but only for material relating to Cambodia.\textsuperscript{31} The main point of contention between the government and the Chinese community was the limit on class size, as the pressure for places in both Chinese and government schools was heavy.\textsuperscript{32} This conflict was more a question of economics than politics. The Chinese schools were run as profitable businesses and Khmer as well as Chinese attended them. Limits to class size was a limit to the income of the school itself.

Willmott has stated that Chinese schools in Cambodia provided little political leadership, as both the economic


\textsuperscript{31}Willmott, The Political Structure of the Chinese Community in Cambodia, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{32}Murray, \textit{op cit.}, p. 83.
and social status of teachers was low in the Chinese community (wealth-conscious Chinese referred to them as "wooden idols").\textsuperscript{33} We also observe that Chinese education has achieved some status through Prince Sihanouk himself who placed one of his own sons in Phnom-penh's Duan Hua School, the largest Chinese school in the city in 1961.\textsuperscript{34} The Chinese themselves, however, attested that the standard of education in Chinese schools was low.\textsuperscript{35} A familiar pattern of education in Chinese families was to send children to a Chinese school for from three to six years and then transfer them to a government school (a pattern common to both the 'full-blood Chinese' and the Sino-Khmer).

The most significant socialization away from the values of the Cambodian leadership came, not from the Chinese schools, but from the government schools themselves. The leftist intellectuals—commonly referred to as the Khmer Rouge—drew support mainly from the ranks of pro-Communist French-educated teachers and their student followings.\textsuperscript{36} It appears that the events of the Cultural Revolution in China aroused a good deal of enthusiasm in the Khmer Rouge.

\textsuperscript{33}Willmott, The Political Structure of the Chinese Community in Cambodia, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{34}Murray, "Chinese Education in Southeast Asia," p. 83.

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{36}Michael Taifer, "Rebellion or Subversion in Cambodia?", Current History, 56 (February, 1969), pp. 89-91.
which also drew some sympathetic support from Chinese students (similar to Burma).

Mass Media and Communications

Khmer was spoken by over 90 percent of the country’s population and most members of the ethnic minorities were either bilingual or multilingual. Though French was the language in intellectual and professional circles (a pattern that was changing to Khmer by the late sixties), Khmer was the language of commercial transactions. Some Teochiu Chinese, however, was used by both Chinese and Khmer in commerce.

From independence to the mid-sixties, newspaper circulation tripled, television was introduced and radio was found in almost every home. No official censorship was evident through most of the period under study, however every publication, whether or not printed in the country, had to be licensed by the Ministry of Information and the Ministry was able to withdraw a license at will with no chance of appeal. The total circulation of government publications by the sixties was about 78 thousand. The Agence Khmère de Presse was the official press bulletin and a news source for most other publications in the country.

Up to 1967, when all private newspapers were permanently banned, there were 13 daily newspapers published in four

37 Munson, Area Handbook for Cambodia, p. 197.
languages: Khmer, Chinese, Vietnamese and French.\textsuperscript{38} All were printed in the capital for national distribution. There were about 27 thousand subscribers to the Khmer papers, 25 thousand to the Chinese papers and about six thousand each to the Vietnamese and French publications in 1967.\textsuperscript{39} Willmott reports that there was little acceptance of the one pro-Nationalist Chinese newspaper printed in the country by 1963.\textsuperscript{40}

In 1957 there were about 20,000 radio receivers in the country and about 400,000 by 1967 putting radio into almost every home in the country.\textsuperscript{41} Television was limited to close circuit programming in the capital and neither radio nor television programming offered regular programming in the Chinese language, though radio was widely listened to by members of the Chinese community. Furthermore, about 25 percent of all radio programming consisted of Siamese political speeches. Of the 400 feature films shown in the country in 1950, about 13 percent were Chinese with American and French productions representing 41 and 36 percent respectively (American westerns are very popular with Cambodian audiences which total about 3 million per year.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{40} Willmott, The Political Structure of the Chinese Community in Cambodia, p.177.

in some 40 theatres). 42

Social, Political and Economic Organizations and Experiences

In the last Chapter we noted the emergence of the Sino-Khmer elite in Cambodia, also observing that they were Chinese by the definition offered at the outset of this study. It was further obtained that they were seldom, if ever, office holders in the associations of the Chinese community. Though, as members of the Sino-Khmer elite, they do not participate in the formal politics of the Chinese community, Willmott observes that some of these individuals had held leadership positions in the Chinese community prior to their entry into the national elite. 43

It would seem from this that one criteria of elite membership is that local Chinese politics be rejected in favor of activity in the national arena.

Willmott has identified four power blocs in the associational structure of the Chinese community merging in the Board of the Chinese Hospital when decisions affecting the whole community are to be made (i.e. preparations for the visit of a Chinese dignitary or Chinese holiday).


Though this board was the ultimate structure for intra-community decisions and communication, it was not involved with communications of an inter-community nature. Relations between various blocs and the powerful Sino-Khmer political and economic elite proceed directly from each bloc, rather than through the power structure of the whole community.

Willmott has ordered the Chinese associations in Cambodia into three basic types important to our discussion of socialization agents. The first type he calls “traditionist associations,” which include the clan and locality associations, the cemetery committees of each speech group, the opera societies and other performing groups. The memberships of these associations were not generally large as they consisted primarily of older Chinese and appealed to loyalties salient in China thirty years past. Few youths were interested in activities sponsored by these associations. There was also much less concern for this type of association among the older generations of Cambodia-born Chinese than among the immigrant community. The leaders of these associations generally came from the immigrant population and were not particularly wealthy. The second type of association is the “modernist.” These include the Chinese Hospital, the important sports associations and the schools. There was little overlapping

44 The bulk of this discussion comes from Willmott’s, The Political Structure of the Chinese Community, pp. 115-124.
membership between these and the traditionist associations. Thirdly he notes the "traditionist-modernist" associations which focus both upon ritual aspects and the more universalistic concerns of the community. Most prominent among these was the Mutual Aid Society, but speech-group associations were also included. Membership was much higher in the last two types than the first and almost all Chinese youth aspired to be or were members of the sports clubs which regularly competed with other Chinese and Khmer sports clubs. It is observed that the pro-K.M.T. organizations had a separate association structure from the rest of the community but was not well supported and had a very low membership.

With the exception of the pro-K.M.T. associations, none of these organizations seemed to be particularly involved with "Chinese" politics. Most were oriented toward the mainland (except the traditionist associations which were virtually apolitical) but were not actively engaged in spreading the gospel of the communists. Neither were these organizations particularly involved in national issues. Involvement in national politics seemed to be left up to the individual, as most associations were concerned only with matters of ritual and the immediate purposes of the association.

As in most Southeast Asian countries, the most important economic organization in Cambodia is the Chamber
of Commerce. Willmott reports that, as of 1963, a Sino-Khmer was head of the Chamber.\footnote{Willmott, The Chinese in Cambodia, p. 99.} It is significant as an indicator of Chinese integration, that no Chinese Chamber of Commerce has ever been organized, which is in contrast to both Burma and Thailand. The Chamber in Cambodia acted as a quasi-governmental agency in that every business firm in the country was required to be a member. It undertakes some administrative aspects of control, such as issuing permits and setting standards.\footnote{Willmott, The Political Structure of the Chinese Community, p. 44 and p. 110.} In both Burma and Thailand, there is no evidence of such "universal" purpose to the Chinese Chamber(s) of Commerce which have been primary agents in separating the Chinese and national communities.

Foreign policy of the Cambodian government has generally been congruent with the orientations of the Chinese community throughout the independence period. This is particularly so with regard to the recognition of the People's Republic of China. The majority of the Cambodian Chinese favored Peking and enthusiastically received officials visiting from the mainland. The Cambodian Chinese have also been urged by the mainland government to become loyal citizens of the country, to intermarry and to
learn the language. Furthermore, when there have been relatively tense periods (particularly in the later sixties) in the relations between Cambodia and China, most of the warnings issued to China about interference in Cambodian politics have referred to communist support of indigenous student leftists and insurgent Vietnamese, rather than local Chinese.

In short, the agents of socialization in Cambodia seemed to offer, in David Apter's words, "acceleration of integrational opportunities" at a level concerned with more universalistic orientations than those of the Chinese community itself. Integration of the two communities seemed to remain relatively higher than the level of assimilation. This is largely because of the activity of the associations of the Chinese community that continued to maintain the socio-cultural distinctiveness of that community.

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Assimilation

Agents of socialization seemed to play a significant role in maintaining the ethnic distinctiveness of the Chinese community in social and cultural affairs. We have noted that, as in Burma, slightly less than half of the Chinese children attended Chinese separate schools. However, a familiar pattern among the Chinese was to send their children to a Chinese school for from three to six years, then transfer them to government institutions. The effect was not unlike that of a similar situation in Burma, promoting an early identification with Chinese society and the Chinese community which was later modified by a government education. In view of the fact that assimilation in rural Cambodia seemed to take place more quickly than in the urban centres, it seems paradoxical that more than half of all the Chinese schools were located in rural Cambodia, however this statistic is likely due to the fact that rural schools were smaller and the populations they served were more dispersed. We also observed that the Chinese schools in Cambodia achieved a status not evident in either of the other two countries as the national elite (Sino-Khmer) sent most of their children to Chinese schools and Prince Sihanouk himself placed one of his sons in a Chinese school in Phnom Penh.

It is also important that there was fairly high acceptance of the Chinese press (about 1 newspaper for every
20 persons). The effects of the Chinese press were offset somewhat by the fact that most homes and small shops had radio receivers which received programs almost exclusively in Khmer. Throughout the period under study we note that there was a fairly high interest maintained in Chinese films which constituted about 13 percent of all films shown in the country in 1950 (later figures were not available).

None of the Chinese associations were particularly involved with either "Chinese" or national politics (with the exception of the K.M.T. organizations). Most organizations were oriented toward the mainland but seemed to be more concerned with internal community affairs than those of international politics. Almost all Chinese associations performed some socialization function that was distinctively Chinese, either formally or informally.

In short, the Chinese community socialization agents seemed to be countering most assimilation agents of the national community. The Chinese community was maintaining a cultural and social distinctiveness that seemed to be more marked than in either of the other two countries studied. To a large degree this is a combined influence of structure, as discussed in the last chapter, working against assimilative socialization.
Integration

It is of major importance to the process of integration, whereby socialization agents must promote a sense of community identity as well as integrative behavior, that the political concerns of the Chinese leaders and the Sino-Khmer elite were different. The Chinese leaders were concerned mainly with the internal politics and socio-cultural affairs of the local Chinese community, while the Sino-Khmer elite, though participants in the Chinese community, were more universalistic in their interests.

It is also important that, in contrast to Burma and Thailand, there was no separate Chinese Chamber of Commerce. The single national Chamber brings all businessmen in the national community together in a common body where standards are controlled and disputes between them mediated. In Cambodia the Chinese and Khmer participated in the mediation of disputes between members of one ethnic community as well as between members of different communities. Membership cross-cut ethnic boundaries and helped reduce the probability that a dispute between members of different ethnic groups might be translated into a political issue along ethnic lines.

The foreign policy of the national government throughout the independence period was generally congruent with the attitudes of the Chinese community, particularly with regard to recognition of the P.R.C. Even when relations between
Cambodia and China were tense there seemed to be less suspicion of subversion directed at the Chinese community than at the Vietnamese and local Khmer insurgents. This is not to say that no tension existed between the national government and the Chinese community. Roger Smith has noted the fluctuating position of Sihanouk toward both China and the local Chinese community.\textsuperscript{50}

The high degree of integration of the Chinese community itself and the socialization functions that were performed by the associations of that community worked to promote a fairly high degree of identification with that community among the Chinese membership. We may posit that the policies of the national government, the position of the important Sino-Khmer elite, and the interaction of Khmer and Chinese in both social and political organizations created a national identification among the Chinese that about equalled that of the identification with the Chinese community itself.

\begin{flushleft}
Thailand

Education and Schools

Compulsory education has existed in Thailand since
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before the 1932 coup and has been generally enforced since 1935. Up until 1960 education was basically organized into four compulsory grades and eight secondary grades. In 1960 the government decided to extend the number of compulsory years from four to seven throughout the state. In contrast to the two colonial systems, the government of Thailand began to control and restrict Chinese schools as early as 1918. By 1948 there were 430 Chinese schools with a total enrollment of about 175 thousand. The post-war boom was caused in part by a surge of Chinese nationalism and in part by a relaxation of official Thai control over the Chinese community. A decline in the early fifties was chiefly caused by increased Thai government pressure against Chinese schools. By 1951, the number had declined to 244 and by 1963 it stood at 158 (non of which were above the primary level). After 1958 there were about 63,000 students enrolled in Chinese schools and by 1961 this number had once again increased to about 71,700.


54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.
Though about 50 percent of the total Chinese population in Thailand was under 20 years of age, only about 8.5 percent of the total population was attending Chinese schools in 1949. By 1960 this figure had dropped to about 2.1 percent of the total and in 1961 it rose slightly to about 2.9 percent. It is obvious that most Chinese children were attending government schools (by law they were limited to 4 years primary education in Chinese schools) and the Chinese schools themselves had curriculum standards that were more Thai than Chinese. By law, of a 30 hour weekly curriculum, only ten were to be taught in Chinese, and if government subsidy were sought, only six were permitted. It was also required that the principal of the school be of parents who both held Thai citizenship. By 1961, over 2,100 of the 3,400 teachers were Thai citizens.

In contrast to the other two countries under discussion, Chinese schools in Thailand were probably positive agents of assimilation to the core-culture of the national system because of the extensive national regulations regarding curriculum content. The Chinese schools were more aligned toward the politics of Nationalist than mainland China throughout this period, though political involvement was kept at a minimum so as not to attract undue attention from government authorities.

56 Ibid. p. 72.
57 Ibid. p. 75.
Mass Media and Communications

Literacy in Thailand was high in comparison to other Southeast Asian countries and there was a relatively high circulation of the printed media. By 1966 there were 19 dailies in Thailand, all but one published in the capital. All but four Chinese and two English newspapers were printed in Thai. The total circulation of the Thai language newspapers in 1967 was just under half a million copies per day, while the Chinese papers had a circulation of just over one hundred thousand (in reality 200,000 copies per day as they printed both morning and evening editions). Chinese newspaper circulation made about one paper available to every fifteen persons in the Chinese community, about the same as in Cambodia. The press was tightly controlled by the Press Act of 1941 and more importantly by the Anti-Communist Act of 1952, thus most papers tended to hold a right-wing or neutral stance and usually abstained from comment on Thai national politics.

Unlike either Burma or Cambodia, where there were national press agencies, foreign representatives were found in the capital from most major news sources around the world.


59 Ibid., p. 287.

60 Ibid., pp. 287-288
Coverage of international news by the Thai press, however, is scanty at best. The two major Chinese papers, on the other hand, are noted to have standards of international coverage almost equal to those of the better metropolitan dailies in the United States.

In 1966 there were about 3.5 million radio receivers in the country (1 set for about every 8 persons) and some 160 radio stations. Broadcasts were made in most of the languages spoken in the country (including Chinese) and some were tailored for foreign audiences. Most of the stations were controlled as instruments of the Army, the Prime Minister and the various ministries, directly or indirectly. Radio broadcasts carried a large number of commercials for operating revenue and reached virtually all parts of the kingdom. There were no Chinese radio stations, but Chinese rebroadcasts, in 1966, could be heard in Bangkok and Thon Buri through the facilities of the Thai Rediffusion Company which was a commercial concern owned jointly by members of the Thai elite and private Chinese businessmen. Broadcasts were in Mandarin and four major dialects and it is estimated that about 89 percent of the Chinese in these areas listened to these broadcasts regularly.61 There were few commercials and revenue came from the rent of receiving

61 Ibid.
sets to subscribers for about 30 baht per month (about 2 dollars). 62

Though there was a striking post-war growth of the local motion picture industry in Thailand, as in the other two countries, there was never the proportion of Chinese films imported for local viewing as was the case in the other instances. Only about two percent of the total films were in Chinese and it is further significant that all of these films originated in Hong Kong or Taiwan rather than the China mainland, as was the case in Burma and Cambodia. More than half of the motion pictures shown in Thailand annually came from the United States (like Cambodians the Thai are enthusiastic about American westerns). It is of some importance that, when voice dubbing is not used (which is often) subtitles are inserted with Thai at the bottom and Chinese on the side of the picture, obviously indicating high Chinese patronage of films also attended by most Thai audiences.

Social, Political and Economic Organizations and Experiences

The organization of the most importance to the Chinese community in Thailand was the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. 63

62 Ibid.

Skinner notes that the Chamber has always aimed for proportional representation of the various speech groups and functions as the primary diplomatic and protective agency (from the Thai government) for the entire community. 64 Of secondary importance is the T'ien-hua Hospital which also integrates the various speech groups at the community level. 65 These two organizations acted as the 'spokesmen' for the Chinese community and their capacity to integrate the speech groups was only supplemented by the cross-speech group school boards in Bangkok. It is through these organizations that Chinese interaction with the political representatives of the national community took place. It is significant that of the seven organizations classified as 'most-rightist,' two are the most important all community associations (the Chamber of Commerce and the Hospital Association). 66

Politically, the Chinese community was slightly split between pro-Peking and pro-Taiwan sentiments. The communist influences are not strong and are most apparent among the Chinese labor unions and among some of the younger members of the community. It has been stated that the Thai Communist Party (which is not large due to the anti-communist

64 \textit{Ibid.}

65 \textit{Ibid.}

laws of the national government) is "known to consist principally of local Chinese." 67 The Thai Communist Party was not a particularly significant part of Thai politics and does not seem to have been really important to the politics of the Chinese community.

The official Thai position toward the Chinese community has made ethnic identification a political decision and consequently a political cleavage for those involved. Whether the government position was pro-assimilationist or anti-assimilationist was of little importance to the nature of Chinese-Thai relations. In both cases a "frontier" (taking on a Thai nation-business partner) was too costly for Chinese business as an representative of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce explained. "If a merchant knows officials of the Ministry of Economic Affairs well, he gets a number of import permits relatively easily. . . . If he is not personally acquainted with the officials at all, there is no chance whatsoever of his getting a permit." 68 It has also been observed that Chinese business ties with the Thai elite also offered greater security from police interrogation (a common threat to Chinese by the police was that they would be reported as communists if they did not pay).


extortion or arrest. By way of illustration:

When the two Chinese directors of the Union Bank were brought before the police in April 1954 to explain foreign exchange irregularities, Leader Chou with the backing of General Sarit Thanarat and other key officials came through unscathed, while Leader Liu, with no cemented business ties in the inner circles of the new Thai elite, was badly burned. It was even possible for a Chinese gold-shop proprietor, wanted by the Thai police for smuggling, to open a new branch in January 1955 once he had made business connections with two prominent Thai officials, both of whom attended the opening ceremonies.

As many as 60 percent of the top one hundred Chinese leaders of any considerable influence were formally involved in business cooperation with the Thai elite, if informal ties were considered the percentage jumps to 82 percent; all of the top ten leaders had such patron-client ties.

Of secondary importance to the Chinese community is the fact that Thailand, unlike the other two systems, had never established relations with the People's Republic of China. Diplomatic ties were always with the regime on Taiwan. Unlike either of the other two countries, the Chinese community was oriented toward the nationalist regime, perhaps

60 Ibid.

70 Ibid, p. 304

a function of the harsh penalties under the Thai government's Anti-Communist Act. Open K.M.T.-sympathies have generally been tolerated (at times encouraged) by the Thai government, while pro-Peking organizations have been driven underground and, at best, are aligned with Pridi's exiled Free Thai Movement operating from the China mainland.

Assimilation

With regard to Chinese education in Thailand, Skinner has posited that the accelerating effect toward complete assimilation which was given by a Thai schooling or the retardation coming from a Chinese education did not change significantly up to 1970. We have noted, however, that over the period of study the proportion of the Chinese population attending Chinese schools moved from about 8.5 percent in 1949 to under 3 percent by the 1960's. This was a change from about 14 percent of the school-age Chinese to about 4 percent. This is by far the lowest of the three nations studied.

The effects of a Thai education on members of the Chinese community were substantial. Though Skinner's observation may be true, in the face of the facts gathered by the Punyodana study, it simply indicates the continuing importance of a Thai education, an importance at a community

level that is amplified by a greater number of Chinese attending Thai schools. The study shows that those Chinese with a higher (post primary) level of education, which was necessarily Thai, had a more tolerant attitude toward the value of such an education, even though both the educated and poorly educated Chinese had large numbers of close relatives attending Thai schools. The study also shows that the more highly educated group tended to have a greater percentage of Thai friends, there was a greater tendency to speak Thai than Chinese in the home, fewer practiced ancestor worship and they seemed to have no distinct preference between Thai and Chinese marriage partners (the more poorly educated group tends to favor Chinese marriage partners). In short, Thai education seems to have helped narrow the social distance between the two groups. We may assume this that among those of Chinese blood, most individuals that may be classified as Chinese were not educated beyond the primary level. This of course would not be the case of the Chinese leaders whose position depended upon a somewhat higher level of assimilation than the mass.

We have noted that media circulation in the Chinese community in Thailand was about the same as that in Cambodia. In Thailand, there was about one newspaper for every 15 persons in the Chinese community. In contrast to each of the other two countries we have noted that about 80 percent
of the members of the Chinese community in the Bangkok area received radio programming in a Chinese language, through the services of the Rediffusion company. Though Chinese language information distribution was high, we note that there was a low percentage of films in Chinese indicating a relatively low cultural distribution through the media (this is of course only accounting for manifest functions of each of these medium and not latent functions).

In short, we may note that there is a great deal of socialization toward the values of the Thai community among the members of the Chinese community. Most Chinese have at least some Thai education and are influenced by some Thai media. Still we note a number of influences that maintain the ethnic distinctiveness of the Chinese community among which the use of Chinese language newspapers and radio number importantly.

Integration

We observe that in Thailand there is little socialization toward a national community identity or integrative behavior in the Chinese community. We have noted that the Chinese community structure is highly organized and centralized, similar to that of Cambodia. We find, however, that the Chinese community structure looks after most functions of the social and political control of its membership. There is little common use of dispute mediation institutions between
the two communities, similar to the case in Burma. The appearance of Chinese community members in a Thai court is a result of inter-community dispute mediation; however, most of the disputes between members of the Chinese community itself are settled within the community. The effect of this is to politically separate the Chinese and national communities and create conditions conducive to the creation of political cleavages to almost all contacts between the two groups. Also, unlike the situation in Cambodia, the Thai and Chinese communities do not share a common political or economic elite to help soften the intensity of inter-community conflicts.

By simple membership in the Chinese community the Chinese are socialized to the rules of patron-client relations. The most important organizations for the Chinese community is the Chamber of Commerce which functions as the primary diplomatic and protective agency for the entire Chinese community. It is through this organization and some of the important lesser organizations in the community that most inter-ethnic communications take place. Most Chinese learn early that patron contacts are important to their success and livelihood. The members of the Chinese elite seek such contacts among the Thai elite while those Chinese of less wealth and prestige rationally must attempt to seek a patron within the Chinese community itself, among those
Chinese who have Thai patrons. The effect is to ultimately limit the level of mass integration between the Chinese and national communities.

We have also noted above that of the seven community organizations that might be classified as 'most-rightist,' two are the most important all-community associations. Unlike either of the other two countries, Thailand had never established relations with Peking. This fact seems to be reflected in the pro-Taipei stance of most of the Chinese community. It seems that through the community associations the Chinese leadership is able to largely control the political orientations of the Chinese community and it would seem only logical that those leaders most acceptable to the Thai elite would be pro-Taipei. These apparent sentiments toward the nationalist regime are further reinforced by the fact that there are harsh penalties under the Anti-Communist Act of the Thai national government. Open K.M.T. sympathies have been tolerated by the Thai government while there is no opportunity for open communist activity. Thus, the congruence between the international relations of the national government and the sentiments of the Chinese community as a whole seem to be similar to those we have observed in both of the other systems in this study.

Though we have observed that there was a fairly high level of assimilation of the Chinese community to Thai society, we have also noted that the Chinese continue to
identify with the Chinese community and the society that is represented by that community. This may be more a political identification than a socio-cultural identity brought about because of the benefits that the Chinese community and its leadership can provide for the membership benefits such as political protection and representation in national politics and economics that could not be found readily in the national community. We may thus posit a fairly high degree of community identification among the Chinese, an identification that seems much stronger than any identification with the national community.

Summary

We have observed that in Thailand the agents of socialization were active in raising the level of assimilation of the Chinese community to Thai society, while at the same time imposing an optimum level of integration by inculcating the rules of patron-client inter-community relations upon the mass membership of the Chinese community. This in turn was responsible for maintaining a high level of identification with the Chinese community, through the leadership of that community, at the mass level.

In Burma and Cambodia it is recognized that the socialization agents, particularly the schools, were responsible for establishing an early identification with the Chinese community and with Chinese social and cultural
patterns. This was later offset somewhat by a pattern where many Chinese attended government schools following their primary education. The effect was to raise the ethnic consciousness of the Chinese at an early age, followed by socialization that would function to establish some degree of national consciousness and identity with the national community.

In all three cases it seems that the ultimate effects of socialization upon the processes of integration and assimilation were modified greatly by the structural influences discussed in the last chapter. In passing we observe that in both Burma and Thailand the mass membership of the Chinese community is largely composed of persons who have little post-primary education. The leadership, on the other hand, seems to have generally been educated beyond the level of the mass community because of the requirements of that position. This creates a mass dependence upon the skills of the leaders of the Chinese community to deal with inter-community affairs and thus, consolidating the position of the leader group. In the case of Cambodia a similar situation did not seem to exist. Even the highly educated and more universalistic Sino-Khmer elite is part of the Chinese community and there is no real reason why the intra-community leadership need to be significantly more universalistic in its outlook or more skilled in dealing with the national community than a large portion of the mass
community. In Cambodia the Chinese community must depend upon the skills of an elite that does not lead the Chinese membership in intra-community affairs—(the Sino-Khmer elite). Thus the position of the Chinese community leadership in Cambodia is not consolidated to the degree that it is in the other two cases by a wide mass-elite assimilation and integration differential brought about by an elite that possesses special leadership skills for both the ethnic community's internal politics and for dealing with inter-community political affairs.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

In an attempt to summarize the condition of assimilation and integration in each case and to more clearly represent a comparative relationship between the two processes we shall here, for the moment, further conceptually divide the concept of assimilation into two parts: (1) cultural assimilation and (2) structural assimilation (interaction through and sharing of common social structures). This distinction will be helpful in comparing assimilation with the two factors of political integration that we outlined in Chapter II: (1) attitudinal integration (sense of community or identification) and (2) integrative behavior (co-operative interaction).

Each of the elements of assimilation and integration is ranked here according to a five point scale to which numerical values have been assigned as follows: high (5); medium-high (4); medium (3); medium-low (2); low (1). There is no pretense to assume that these rankings are attempts at quantification. They are simply subjective scores assigned by the author in order to provide a means by which we might compare and aggregate the observations of the preceding chapters. The resulting sum of the two rating values in each category provides us with a crude means of comparing the relative condition of each of these processes in each national setting, as represented by Table I on the following page. We have
recognized that there is a differential in the assimilation and integration between the mass and elite levels of the Chinese community in the cases of both Thailand and Burma.

**TABLE I**

Comparative Assimilation and Political Integration Ratings for Burma, Cambodia and Thailand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>ASSIMILATION</th>
<th>POLITICAL INTEGRATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>medium-low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>medium-low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

that does not seem to exist to the same degree in Cambodia. The tables represented here do not deal specifically with this differential, but rather, with the condition of the mass community. Table II, below, gives a further representation of the aggregate totals in each category (assimilation and political integration) for each of the three countries. In this table we have used numerical representations based upon the 'averages' of the assessments made under each heading in Table I. We have already assigned subjective values to the various ratings (low ranks 1, medium-low ranks 2 etc.).
TABLE II
Comparative Summary of Assimilation and Political Integration Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>Political Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chinese in Burma seemed to take on some Burmese cultural patterns, speaking the language, using Burmese cultural mediums (newspaper, films, etc.) and generally adapting to Burmese modes of dress and living. We have seen, however, that a good deal of distinctly Chinese culture was maintained in the Chinese community through education and association membership and that there was actually little overlapping of social structures between the two communities (in Chapter III we noted separate guilds, Chambers of Commerce and trade organizations).

The Chinese community in Cambodia has continued to maintain a relatively high degree of cultural distinctiveness through extensive membership in community associations that are almost wholly devoted to maintaining a distinctive Chinese culture. On the other hand, there is some overlapping of structure between the two communities as they come into contact through the nationally organized
sports clubs and share a common Chamber of Commerce. It is for this reason that we have rated structural assimilation medium-low.

In Thailand the Chinese community, though culturally distinct as it must be by definition, has adopted many of the Thai cultural patterns. Most Chinese in Thailand speak the language and adopt the dress patterns of the Thai and many children attend Thai schools at some point. Community assimilation may be ranked high relative to the others in this study, a fact that has also been noted by Chinese from other more traditional Chinese communities in Singapore and Hong Kong visiting Thailand. Structural assimilation has taken on much the same pattern as in Cambodia. Though there are separate Chambers of Commerce, most guilds and unions have both Chinese and Thai members by law. As well, the law dictates that businesses must employ a quota of Thai personnel. Structurally then, we have assigned a medium-low rating because of the Chinese community structure which we have seen in Chapters III and IV works to counteract this structural configuration by maintaining a distinct set of Chinese organizations and associations (like the Chinese Chamber of Commerce).

In Burma the Chinese, through identification with community organizations, seem to identify with the Chinese community first and the Burmese nation second while the importance of the Chinese community to the political process
of Burma seems to indicate a good deal of integration
and between the two communities at the behavioral level. In
Cambodia, by virtue of the position of the Sino-Khmer elite
in large, it seems that the Chinese identify culturally with
the Chinese community but politically with the Cambodian
tonation with about equal intensity. Interaction through the
Sino-Khmer elite and shared political interaction through
the Chamber of Commerce would justify our rating
integrative behavior as high. In Thailand Chinese community
identification is about the same as it is in Burma, both
as a result of historical factors and as a result of the
particular patron-client structure of inter-community
relations. Because the Chinese elite looks after most of
the interaction between the two communities through patron-
client relationships with the Thai elite we have also rated
integrative behavior of the Chinese mass population as
medium-low. We do recognize that the nature of the system
in Thailand has resulted in a substantial difference between
mass and elite attitudes and behaviors in the Chinese community
of a degree not detected in either of the other two countries.

Each of these configurations is represented in Table I
above. In attempts to present an aggregate picture of the
relationship between assimilation and integration in Table
II we note that there is little direct relationship between
the level of assimilation and of political integration. In
two cases, Burma and Cambodia we see that the level of
political integration exceeds the overall level of
assimilation, while the case of Thailand is the reverse. It is obvious then, that other factors intervene between the two conditions and their processes in order to create conditions whereby assimilation may be conducive to greater integration.

With regard to the first hypothesis presented in Chapter I that 'cultural assimilation is not a necessary condition of political integration' we have fairly conclusive support, at least at the mass level of the Chinese community. Several other factors have also presented themselves throughout the course of this study, however, that must qualify the hypothesis.

In each of the cases studied we note a mass-elite differential in both level of assimilation and level of integration. Our evidence is most clear in the cases of Thailand and Cambodia. In Thailand the Chinese elite is more highly assimilated to the dominant Thai society and, through its capacity as broker between the Thai and Chinese communities, exhibits a higher level of political integration than the mass membership of the Chinese community. In Cambodia a somewhat different pattern emerges with the Sino-Khmer elite occupying roles as both national elite and mass members of the Chinese community (by virtue of their having declined leadership of the Chinese community for national politics and economics). The Sino-Khmer elite is more highly assimilated than the rest of the Chinese community
including the leadership of that community and is of course, by definition as a national elite, politically integrated with the national community.

The integration pattern that we have observed in Cambodia is reminiscent somewhat of a federal system of government (without the defining legal structure) with political roles being non-transferable between local and national politics. It seems that in order to occupy a role as a national 'gladiator' the individual must abandon all or most such activity in the local community setting. This being the case, the entry of members of the Chinese community into national politics does not threaten the intra-community security of the leadership of the community.

In Thailand, we may consider that the leaders of the Chinese community are also marginal members of the national elite through the patron-client contacts that they maintain with the 'official' Thai elite. At the same time the Chinese leaders are, by definition, elites of the Chinese community itself. Entry of the mass membership of the Chinese community into integrative contacts with the national elite clearly threaten the leadership positions of the Chinese elite as it would reduce the absolute value of the rewards and sanctions that the Chinese elite would be capable of distributing to the membership of their ethnic group. In the case of Thailand, we may note that the conditions that have contributed to the greater assimilation
of the Chinese elite have at the same time contributed to placing limitations upon the level of political integration possible for the rest of the Chinese community.

In none of the three cases studied are we able to identify any clear, direct relationship between level of assimilation and the level of political integration. In the last Chapter we noted that in the case of Thailand the level of assimilation for the Chinese community as a whole seems to be somewhat higher than the level of integration between the Chinese and Thai communities. We also observed that in the cases of both Burma and Cambodia, inter-community political integration seems to be at a higher level than the assimilation of the Chinese communities to the core society.

One assumption of the theoretical position of a deterministic relationship between assimilation and integration seems to be that if people are brought together and mixed they will lose not only their sense of separation but also their sense of insecurity, which will be replaced by a sense of membership in a more universalistic community. Arend Lijphart points out that this may not be the case as ethnic groups may become conscious of their own identity and then anxious to retain it. He suggests that when people are thrown together with people of other groups and other languages their sense of identity is challenged which creates an even greater sense of insecurity. Lijphart proposes that the mass of the people should be separated from one another.
as far as possible in order that they retain both their identity and sense of security. Secondly, he suggests that the elites of the various groups that must co-operate should be able to transfer from one group to another, should have a sense of security, should have a more cosmopolitan outlook on life and should presumably be able to adapt to the different culture patterns of the groups with whom they have to deal. He distinguishes sharply between elites that mix and the masses that remain separate.¹

It seems that the implicit statement of Lijphart's position is that, like the case of Thailand, the burden rests with community elites to limit the degree of political integration that may take place at the mass-level. Though he gives little indication of the explanation behind such a process, we have made several interesting, albeit heuristic observations, in the proceeding three chapters of this discussion with regard to the instrumentality of such a process taking place between ethnic communities. We also note that such a process is pattern maintaining rather than adaptive and integrative (both of which would involve some pattern change).

We also note in Lijphart's position that he is speaking of elites that are particular in jurisdiction and may not be classified as national elites in the stricter sense that the term implies. In the case of Thailand and to a lesser degree Burma, we note that Chinese elites seem to be able to mingle with national elites, however we also have no evidence that the national elite, particularly in Thailand, is able to similarly transfer from one group to another as do their Chinese counterparts. In the case of Cambodia we see that because of similarities in the social identification of the Chinese and national (Sino-Khmer) elite the transfer is made much more easily; however, most inter-community contact takes place because of the transferability of the national, rather than the Chinese, elite.

We have only the case of Thailand where we are able to fully observe processes relating to the second of our hypotheses that 'highly competitive interethnic contact has a disintegrating effect on political relationships'. In this case we have seen that, in both the historical context and continuing to the post-independence period, competition was high between the Chinese and Thai in the economic sector of the national society. In each of the other two countries we have observed the presence of a second non-indigenous minority in this competition between ethnic groups which may best be discussed with the next hypothesis.
specifically relating to such a condition.

We note clearly that as the Thai attempted to secure the national economy from the Chinese after the turn of the twentieth century that Chinese solidarity and intra-community organization began to increase significantly (see Chapter II). We also noted during a brief period in the immediate post-war era, as Chinese community power became fragmented between the communists and nationalists, that the intra-community solidarity of the Chinese community necessarily began to decrease. However, no data was found to indicate the degree of defection from the Chinese to the national community.

We do have fairly extensive evidence to indicate that 'the rules of the game' for members of the Chinese community are much more clearly defined within that community and by identification with that community by virtue of the relationships established by the Chinese elite with the national political elite, than are the 'rules' of such relationships that might be necessary between the Chinese mass membership and the national elite. It seems that both the national elite and the Chinese leadership in Thailand have institutionalized the 'rules' of inter-community political relationships such that most or all such relationships are best conducted through the representation provided by the Chinese leaders rather than on an individual basis. This has functioned to maintain
the legitimacy of the Chinese leadership for the mass membership of the Chinese community. The position of the Chinese leadership vis-a-vis the national community has thus functioned to maintain intra-community solidarity and identification. It is only through this leader group that the members of the Chinese community have political recourse for solution of problems arising out of Chinese activity (mostly economic) in the national society.

We have also seen that competition for contracts, licences, etc., between the Thai and Chinese has been a major factor in maintaining the patron-client relationship between the Thai and Chinese elites. Though perhaps this competition has not formally had a disintegrative effect on the political relationship, it has acted to effectively limit the ultimate level of integration that was possible at the level of the Chinese mass. Because political contacts are necessary in order to obtain the competitive edge in gaining such contracts, etc., and because the Chinese elite monopolizes such contacts, the competition between the two ethnic groups serves to maintain the current level of integration between the two communities.

With regard to our third hypothesis that 'competitive interethnic contact may have an integrating effect if two or more groups share a similar competitive experience with a single other group' we seem to have a good deal of support. In the case of Burma we have observed that there was a
large Indo-Pakistani minority from which the Burmese found it necessary to secure themselves politically following independence while the Chinese, holding a much less visible position in the economy of the nation than the Indians, never seemed to be a threat to the Burmese either politically or economically. For both the Burmese and Chinese political and economic gains were to be made at a cost to the Indian minority. Furthermore, Indian dominance in administration under British rule was enough to arouse a common feeling of animosity toward the Indians by both the Burmese and Chinese.

In Cambodia a similar situation existed. The Vietnamese were both historical enemies of the Khmer and dominant in the French colonial administration. Furthermore, the Khmer and Chinese were occupationally and culturally separated in society—the Chinese were largely involved in the commercial sector of the economy while the Khmer were largely agrarian and political role occupants. The Vietnamese were engaged in all three of these occupation categories and in common competition with both the Chinese and Khmer who were in turn not competitively engaged with one another, as there was little Khmer activity in commerce and little Chinese activity in politics or agriculture. When the Chinese finally did become engaged in national politics (the Sino-Khmer) they were not threatening to Khmer also competing in that area, as most Khmer actors in national politics were of noble birth and their social status could not be eroded by the lower
status Sino-Khmer group. We also note that few, if any, full blood Chinese entered into competition with the full blood Khmer of the national system.

In both of these cases the presence of a second minority with which both the Chinese and dominant social group were in common competition seemed to draw the two groups together in a sense of common cause. It is felt here that the third group was an important factor in the development—or failure to develop in the case of Thailand—of a sense of community between the two groups.

We have already discussed some of the factors evident in support of our final hypothesis in the first hypothesis examined above. It was stated that 'when the power structure of the Chinese community is the structure through which political relations with the national community take place total integration will be blocked by the need of the Chinese structure to persist'. Implicit to this is the fact that when the community structure is used for inter-community relations a significant aspect of the persistence of that structure or system depends upon the continued reliance of its membership on the function of inter-community communication.

In each of the three nations studied we have observed a different communication pattern between the Chinese and national communities. Thailand and Cambodia lie at two extremes with Burma somewhere in between. In Thailand the patron-client structure of inter-community relationships takes place through the elite of the Chinese community.
structure. The same group of leaders are thus concerned with both intra-community affairs and inter-community relations. Not only is there a power hierarchy within the Chinese community but most communications with the national community must proceed through this hierarchy. In Cambodia we saw that the Chinese community structure resembles that of Thailand closely. It is fairly well integrated and hierarchically structured. We also noted, however, that relations between the Chinese community and the national elite do not proceed through this structure but rather proceed directly from each individual power bloc of the community. In Burma we have seen that the Chinese community itself is not particularly well integrated. There does not seem to be any particular central decision-making unit for the major part of the Chinese community in Burma such as in the other Chinese communities. Similar to Cambodia, it seems that most inter-community relations take place from each individual faction or power bloc in the Chinese community. It would seem that the notion of 'spill-over' is not operative to any significant degree in any of these cases. On the contrary, it would seem that perhaps a high degree of integration may only take place over particular issues in order to increase the security of the members of the Chinese community. In the Cambodian case we note that the Chinese community structure is only concerned with cultural issues, however the community is
not integrated over issues that might have a more universal appeal as these inter-community concerns are left to the various bloc structures and not to the full community authority. In Thailand the community seems to be structurally integrated with regard to both intra-community and inter-community affairs. In this case, and to a lesser degree the case of Burma, there seems to be a limiting effect on the integration process resulting from the use of a common structure for both inter- and inter-community communications.

We further noted that in the two cases where a common structure for internal and external political communications was utilized, Burma and Thailand, there seemed to be a much greater gap between the mass and elite of the Chinese community. Also in each case, there seems to be little opportunity for narrowing this gap because of the nature of the socialization process that defines the Chinese community socially. In both cases the Chinese community mass is made up of a less well educated and more politically parochial group of individuals than might characterize the leaders of the community. It would also appear that a lack of upward mobility within the Chinese communities in these cases is demonstrated by the fact that most persons of Chinese blood that acquire more education and a more universalistic political orientation relinquish their Chinese identity for that of the dominant society. In short,
the mass membership of the Chinese communities are trapped by their own political and social structure to a degree that does not seem to be apparent in the Cambodian case.

It is obvious from this study that many questions remain to be answered by more reliable data and more sophisticated research tools than we have had at our command here. It would seem that an examination of the integration of the Chinese in each of these countries would provide a fertile testing ground for the investigation of such concepts as 'spill-over', 'consociational democracy', and further test by the use of attitudinal surveys of the relationship between community identification and interethnic contact would provide a further understanding of this process we call political integration. We must also recognize the fact that this study has concentrated upon core societies and that there are individuals that are in transition both in degree of assimilation and degree of integration. These individuals themselves would provide a great deal of information about the integration process in each of these systems were it undertaken to research them with the methods necessary to provide both the quality and quantity of data needed to describe and explain their positions relative to the total process.
APPENDIX I

BURMA:

Labor Force Participants by Occupation and Ethnic Group (%), 1931:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous Races</th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>All Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Occupations</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Forces</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and other Liberal Arts</td>
<td>91.9*</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Buddhist monks are probably included in this figure, according to the source, accounting for the high percentage.

### Estimate of Foreign Investments in Burma, 1940.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Corporations</td>
<td>£47,200,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>2,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Chettyar</td>
<td>56,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and municipal obligations</td>
<td>45,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban real estate</td>
<td>3,250,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indian Industry</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£155,250,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX III

**Factories in Burma 1939–40.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owners</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Engineering</th>
<th>Sawmills</th>
<th>Rice Mills</th>
<th>Vegetable oil mills</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burman</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The above factories include only those in which power is used and in which 20 or more persons are employed.

APPENDIX IV


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INDIAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>104,490</td>
<td>94,369</td>
<td>91,892</td>
<td>80,235</td>
<td>54,584</td>
<td>49,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>72,881</td>
<td>62,038</td>
<td>62,097</td>
<td>53,437</td>
<td>35,997</td>
<td>32,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>31,609</td>
<td>32,331</td>
<td>29,795</td>
<td>26,798</td>
<td>18,587</td>
<td>16,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKISTANI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25,367</td>
<td>25,339</td>
<td>22,475</td>
<td>20,577</td>
<td>16,092</td>
<td>14,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>23,465</td>
<td>23,340</td>
<td>20,464</td>
<td>18,188</td>
<td>14,416</td>
<td>12,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1,902</td>
<td>2,039</td>
<td>2,011</td>
<td>2,389</td>
<td>1,676</td>
<td>1,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINESE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>81,194</td>
<td>79,878</td>
<td>79,722</td>
<td>80,723</td>
<td>80,057</td>
<td>79,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>51,333</td>
<td>48,962</td>
<td>48,352</td>
<td>48,813</td>
<td>46,975</td>
<td>47,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>30,861</td>
<td>30,916</td>
<td>31,370</td>
<td>31,910</td>
<td>33,082</td>
<td>31,894</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX V

**Burma:**

#### Loss in Foreign Residents by Race and Sex, 1962-67

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>+9.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>+1.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>+1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>+15.8</td>
<td>+1.2</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
<td>+1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>+3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The plus sign in the chart indicates an actual growth rather than loss in the foreign resident category.

## APPENDIX VI

### Population of Burma By Age Group and Race, 1953-54.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Grouping</th>
<th>Total Pop.</th>
<th>Burmese</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>under 10</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-12</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>20 and under</strong></td>
<td><strong>47.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>47.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>42.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>51.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 45</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 and over</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All ages</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX VII

Urban and Rural Population of Burma by Race, 1953-54.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Group</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burmese</td>
<td>2,364,840</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>14,401,876</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous races</td>
<td>252,250</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,655,388</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians and Pakistanis</td>
<td>283,281</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>331,078</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>189,187</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>165,539</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeans and others</td>
<td>63,062</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical and Economics Department Statistical Yearbook, 1961, (Rangoon: 1963), Table V.
APPENDIX VIII

Thailand:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Birth</th>
<th>135 Leaders 1952</th>
<th>171 Leaders 1955</th>
<th>120 Influential Leaders 1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ciudad</th>
<th>135 Leaders 1952</th>
<th>171 Leaders 1955</th>
<th>120 Influential Leaders 1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thai</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese only</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX IX

**Occupational Stratification, Thai and Chinese Groups.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation class</th>
<th>Male Chinese</th>
<th>Male Thai</th>
<th>Female Chinese</th>
<th>Female Thai</th>
<th>Total Chinese</th>
<th>Total Thai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. High-ranking gov't officials</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,080</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Large business owners, mgs.</td>
<td>2,890</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>4,390</td>
<td>1,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Highest-status professionals</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>1,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. High-ranking office staff</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,790</td>
<td>8,430</td>
<td>1,540</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>5,330</td>
<td>10,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mid-high status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lower-ranking gov't officials</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18,220</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Smaller business owners, mgs.</td>
<td>54,900</td>
<td>8,980</td>
<td>28,560</td>
<td>25,500</td>
<td>83,460</td>
<td>34,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Lesser &amp; semi-professionals</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>4,040</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>2,870</td>
<td>7,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Government clerks</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16,290</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,840</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Business clerks</td>
<td>5,070</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>5,380</td>
<td>2,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. High-status industrial staff</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>62,720</td>
<td>50,170</td>
<td>29,420</td>
<td>33,040</td>
<td>92,140</td>
<td>83,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mid-low status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Carpenters &amp; furniture makers</td>
<td>7,230</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7,310</td>
<td>1,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Repairmen, machinists, etc.</td>
<td>4,050</td>
<td>2,880</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4,080</td>
<td>2,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Auto, bus, &amp; truck drivers</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>4,330</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>4,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Metal workers (base metals)</td>
<td>3,060</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3,170</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Miscellaneous technicians</td>
<td>3,620</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>5,430</td>
<td>2,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Tailors &amp; dressmakers</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2,130</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>3,980</td>
<td>2,620</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX IX cont'd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation class</th>
<th>Male Chinese</th>
<th>Male Thai</th>
<th>Female Chinese</th>
<th>Female Thai</th>
<th>Total Chinese</th>
<th>Total Thai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mid-low status cont'd</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Jewelers, gold-, silversmiths</td>
<td>2,880</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>3,360</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Miscellaneous craftsmen</td>
<td>2,170</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Cooks, bakers, food processors</td>
<td>1,720</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>2,610</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Market sellers (install)</td>
<td>4,390</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>4,790</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Weavers &amp; dyers</td>
<td>2,420</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6,070</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>8,490</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Hairdressers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Shoemakers</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,880</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Hotel &amp; restaurant employees</td>
<td>3,210</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>3,630</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Workers in building trades</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male Chinese</th>
<th>Male Thai</th>
<th>Female Chinese</th>
<th>Female Thai</th>
<th>Total Chinese</th>
<th>Total Thai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40,760</td>
<td>11,800</td>
<td>13,660</td>
<td>9,160</td>
<td>54,420</td>
<td>20,960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lowest status</th>
<th>Male Chinese</th>
<th>Male Thai</th>
<th>Female Chinese</th>
<th>Female Thai</th>
<th>Total Chinese</th>
<th>Total Thai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26. Farmers &amp; fishermen</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2,120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Market gardeners</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>1,720</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>2,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Actors</td>
<td>1,830</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Sailors &amp; ships' crews</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Low-status domestic &amp; service</td>
<td>2,830</td>
<td>5,110</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>7,390</td>
<td>4,320</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Barbers</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Hawkers, petty market sellers</td>
<td>1,880</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Unskilled laborers</td>
<td>30,200</td>
<td>20,240</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>7,370</td>
<td>34,100</td>
<td>27,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male Chinese</th>
<th>Male Thai</th>
<th>Female Chinese</th>
<th>Female Thai</th>
<th>Total Chinese</th>
<th>Total Thai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>39,530</td>
<td>29,130</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>18,970</td>
<td>46,230</td>
<td>48,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Summary of APPENDIX IX

**Estimated occupied population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations of:</th>
<th>Male only</th>
<th>Both sexes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Thai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest status</td>
<td>3,790</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-high status</td>
<td>62,720</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-low status</td>
<td>40,760</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest status</td>
<td>32,530</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>146,800</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The data on which this table is based are the 1947 census statistics, "Occupational Classification by Nationality, Phra Nakhon" (supplied by the Central Statistical Office in Bangkok), and the amphoe registration figures for Krungthep municipality as of December 31, 1952 (supplied by the Krungthep Municipal Office).

## APPENDIX X

### Thailand:

**Ethnic Occupational Specialization by Major Categories.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation Category</th>
<th>Chinese No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Thai No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>43,630</td>
<td>26.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions</td>
<td>3,160</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>8,760</td>
<td>5.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and finance</td>
<td>100,720</td>
<td>50.84</td>
<td>41,260</td>
<td>25.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and artisan</td>
<td>38,450</td>
<td>19.41</td>
<td>9,880</td>
<td>6.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic and service</td>
<td>19,310</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>24,540</td>
<td>15.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>6,710</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled labor</td>
<td>34,100</td>
<td>17.21</td>
<td>27,600</td>
<td>17.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>198,120</td>
<td>100.01</td>
<td>162,380</td>
<td>99.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX XI

Thailand:

Occupational Classes, Arranged According to Ethnic-group Dominance.

Occupational classes in which Chinese nationals are a majority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weavers &amp; dyers</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoemakers</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel &amp; restaurant employees</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewelers; gold-, silversmiths</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenters &amp; furniture makers</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market sellers</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal workers (base metals)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in building trade</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbers</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous craftsmen</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business owners &amp; mgrs.</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sailors &amp; ships' crews</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous technicians</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethnic Chinese are a clear majority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business clerks</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailors &amp; dressmakers</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairmen, machinists, etc.</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled laborers</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational classes in which ethnic Chinese &amp; Thai are about equally represented</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks, bakers, food processors</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market gardeners</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Thai are a clear majority</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-ranking office staff</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-status industrial staff</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesser &amp; semi-professionals</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-status domestic &amp; service</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto, bus, &amp; truck drivers</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest-status professionals</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hairdressers</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers &amp; fishermen</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government clerks</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table is based entirely on Appendix IX; the ethnic ratios are computed from the absolute figures given there. When the total of one sex in a given category is less than 100 (as occurs several times for females and once for males), the ratio between Chinese and Thai would be next to meaningless and unreliable; such cases are indicated by a dash on the table.

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Cambodia


Thailand


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