The making of Canadian and Japanese policies in establishing diplomatic relations with China.

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THE MAKING OF CANADIAN AND JAPANESE POLICIES
IN ESTABLISHING
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA

by

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the degree
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1973
This thesis compares the various external and internal environmental factors affecting the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize the People’s Republic of China. The focus of the thesis is on explaining the different timing of the two countries' decisions to recognize the Peking Government. Using the comparative method and decision-making theory, there has been an attempt to compare the degree of change as well as the relative significance of the various factors affecting the two countries' decisions. The relative impact of the environmental factors, which has been derived from the degree of change and the relative significance of the factors, on the two countries' decisions is then compared. Finally, there has also been an attempt to compare the intensity of the positive or negative influence of the environmental factors prior to and during the two countries' decisions.

The external and internal environmental factors examined in this study are as follows:

External Environment

(1) Global System
(2) Regional System
(3) Relations with the United States
(4) Relations with Taiwan
(5) Relations with the U.S.S.R.
(6) China's Attitudes Towards Recognition

**Internal Environment**

(1) Public Opinion
(2) Economic Interest Groups
(3) Bureaucracy
(4) Opposition Elites
(5) Political Tradition: Values of Governing Elite

This study demonstrates that the output of the decision-making process was a compromise amongst all factors rather than the product of one or two dominant factors. However, the study also indicates that both the Canadian and Japanese decisions were affected more by the external environment than the internal environment. By comparison, the Japanese Government encountered a much higher degree of change in the environment than the Canadian Government at the time the two countries' respective decisions to recognize China were made. Japan, in other words, moved from a more negative predisposition towards recognition prior to its recognition of China than Canada, which was never very strongly opposed to recognition and, therefore, did not require much change in the environmental variables to move from a negative to positive attitude regarding recognition.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation first to Dr. D. Wurfel, my thesis director, for his concern and helpful guidance through various stages of progress of this thesis. Grateful acknowledgment is also made to Dr. T.A. Keenleyside for his constructive comments on the content and presentation of the thesis, and to Dr. N. Oguchi for his valuable suggestions on the content regarding the Japanese decision.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Canada announced in October, 1970, its establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as China). Canada was the third important Western power, after Britain and France, to establish diplomatic relations with China. Its move was significant in breaking the log-jam regarding the recognition of China, and its position to "take note" of China's claim to the territory of Taiwan without specifically endorsing that claim proved a workable formula and was subsequently adopted by some other nations which followed Canada's step of recognizing China. Italy followed Canada's example and announced its recognition a month later. More than thirty nations have recognized China during the three-year period since Canada's recognition. One of the most dramatic moves was Japan's recognition in September, 1972. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) recognized China a month after the Japanese recognition and Australia

Britain and France recognized China in 1950 and 1964 respectively.
recognized China in December, 1972, leaving the United States as the only major Western power without formal diplomatic relations with China.

The rush of nations to establish diplomatic relations with China has been largely attributed to China's softening attitude towards external relations after the turmoil of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution.2 The Chinese Government has since become much more diplomatically approachable. More significantly, China is no longer regarded as the "outlaw" of the international community. China's admission to the United Nations in 1971 indicated the acceptance of China by the world community. Finally, President Nixon's trip to China in February, 1972, apparently freed some of the U.S. allies to negotiate diplomatic relations with China. Indeed, some of the U.S. allies felt that they had been up-staged, or betrayed, by the U.S. overtures to China and that they therefore had to re-adjust their policies quickly to a new international environment. Thus some of the important obstacles inhibiting moves to recognize China were either removed or had subsided by the beginning of the 1970s.

2 For a more detailed discussion on the effect of the Cultural Revolution on China's foreign policy, see Chapter 4.
It is important also to note that there were positive factors motivating the rush to recognize China stemming from anticipated benefits of recognition. It was a common belief, for example, among Western observers that to recognize China and to get China involved in international affairs would promote world peace. This was a common theme in official statements of the Canadian and Japanese Governments when they announced their intentions to negotiate diplomatic relations with China. Another immediate concern of nations recognizing China appeared to be increasing their share of China's international trade. Canada sent its first trade mission to China in the fall of 1971, less than a year after its recognition of China, and held the largest Canadian trade fair abroad in Peking in August, 1972. Italy followed Canada's example and held a trade fair in Peking two months later. When Japan, West Germany and Australia established diplomatic relations with China, trade agreements were signed simultaneously. Apparently, international trade played some role in the decisions of many Western governments to establish diplomatic relations with China, but, the problem is to assess the weight of trade considerations amongst the many factors that

3 See Chapter 2, pp. 34-47.
contributed to the individual decisions of states to recognize China.

The purpose of this thesis is to survey those factors which for over two decades inhibited Canada and Japan from recognizing China and those factors which ultimately led these two countries to opt for recognition. Canada and Japan have been chosen for this case study because it is felt that they offer meaningful bases for comparison. The two countries are strongly tied to the United States, both economically and militarily, making it interesting to compare the extent to which they have been inhibited by and been prepared to diverge from U.S. China policy. Relations with the Government of the Republic of China (hereafter referred to as Taiwan) was one of the stumbling-blocks in the two countries' approaches to China, making it interesting to compare how the two countries resolved this "Taiwan problem". Further, both nations are highly dependent on international trade for their economic prosperity. The lure of China's potential vast market must, therefore, have had enormous appeal to Canada and

\[\text{International trade constitutes about 30\% of Canada's GNP while it constitutes about 20\% of Japan's GNP.}\]
Japan, making it interesting to compare the weight of the trade factor in their respective policies towards recognition of China. Finally, the difference in political culture and institutions between Canada and Japan makes such a comparative study desirable as a way of examining the impact of internal environmental factors on foreign policy decision making.

There is a considerable amount of literature on both Sino-Canadian and Sino-Japanese relations. However, most of the literature either focuses on a single factor explanation or, while trying to explain the Canadian or Japanese approach to China by examining both external and internal environmental factors, lacks a rigorous systematic approach. Nor is there any attempt to use

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5 See, for example, Rupert Haley, *The Development of Canadian Policies Towards Communist China*, (M.A. Thesis), University of Calgary, 1968. Haley argues that the implications for Canadian-American relations of Canadian recognition was the single most important factor inhibiting Canada's move. See also Bruce Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy*, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972, especially pp. 75-76 and p. 116. Thordarson argues that the personal inclination of Trudeau to recognize China was largely responsible for Canada's decision to establish diplomatic relations with that country. Regarding Japan, see, for example, Chae-Jin Lee, "The Politics of Sino-Japanese Trade Relations, 1963-68", *Pacific Affairs*, (Summer 1969), pp. 129-144; see also George P. Jan, "Party Politics and Japan's Policy Toward Communist China", *Orbis*, (Winter 1971), pp. 973-991. Lee argues the importance of trade to Japan's China policy formulation, while Jan argues that intraparty politics among the LDP factions has largely shaped Japan's China policy.

6 The notable exception is an attempt to apply
a systematic framework to compare policies of other countries towards China. This lack of a systematic approach has in part contributed to the disagreement which exists among commentators on Canadian and Japanese relations about the relative significance of various factors in determining the relations of the two countries with China. In addition, the existing literature does not explain appropriately situations under which a specific determinant may have had either a positive or negative effect on recognition. For example, the fear of American intervention is considered by some writers as the chief obstacle which for many years inhibited the two countries' development of closer relations with China, while some writers

Cont'd


regard the shadow of the United States as having been a stimulation for a "forward looking" independent diplomacy towards China by both countries. It is not clear whether the U.S. factor had in reality a negative (or positive) effect, whether its effect varied at different points in time, or whether the U.S. factor was an obstacle (or a motivating force) only in the perception of the decision-makers. Clearly, then, a more rigorous and systematic consideration of the variables involved in the determination of the relations of these two states with China is desirable in an effort to establish the relative importance of the different factors for each state and to augment our understanding of the differences among these two states in their determination of the China policy.

In an attempt in this study to achieve a more analytical and objective consideration of the factors involved in determining Canada's and Japan's relations with China, the theoretical framework of Michael Brecher's model of foreign policy decision-making has been adopted.  


Brecher categorizes the inputs of foreign policy decision-making into external and internal environments (or "operational" environments as he calls them).\textsuperscript{11} By operational environment he means the setting in which foreign policy decisions are taken. Setting, according to Brecher, refers to the set of potentially relevant factors and conditions which may affect a state's external behavior.\textsuperscript{12} In other words, variables included in the environment are inputs to foreign policy decision-making. In the external environment Brecher includes such variables as the global system, subordinate system, subordinate other system, bilateral system and dominant bilateral system. In the internal environment, he includes the impact of such variables as a country's military capability, economic capability, political structure, interest groups and competing elites on the determination of a country's foreign policy.\textsuperscript{13} The following is a brief explanation of the manner in which Brecher's variables have been applied in this study:

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 81. \\
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 80.
External Environment

1. Global System: Brecher defines the global system as constituting the total web of relationships among all actors (states, blocs, organizations) within the international system. This study focuses on the impact of the international system on the external behavior of Canada and Japan, and specifically on its impact on the two countries' decisions to recognize China.

2. Regional System: In Brecher's model, this includes the "subordinate system" and the subordinate other system". Brecher defines a "subordinate system" as a group of contiguous states (at least three) within a geographic region; a "subordinate other system" is defined as a group of non-contiguous states within a geographic region or sharing membership in an alliance. Since both Canada and Japan are geographically Pacific powers this study compares the relative impact of non-Communist countries in the Far East, on the determination of their China policies. Because of the closeness of Japan to these countries, Southeast Asia can be regarded

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14 Ibid., p. 82.
15 Ibid., p. 83.
as the "subordinate system" of Japan. By contrast, since the Southeast Asian states are geographically remote from Canada, they can only be regarded as a "subordinate other system" of Canada. Canada's "subordinate system" is its sole neighbour in the South which is treated under the following variable, as the "dominant bilateral system" affecting Canadian policy. Japan's "subordinate other systems" (such as the European states) and Canada's "subordinate other systems" apart from the Pacific are excluded from this study because they were irrelevant to or had only a marginal impact on Japan's decision to recognize China.

3. Relations with the United States (or the "dominant bilateral system" in Brecher's model): Brecher refers in this variable to the total pattern of interactions between any state and a super power or preeminent actor in the global system.16 The U.S. is the dominant power which has a general impact on the foreign policies of Canada and Japan. The relative impact of the U.S. influence on Canadian and Japanese policies towards China is, therefore, compared under this heading.

4. Relations with Taiwan (or the "bilateral system" in Brecher's model): Brecher refers in this variable to the total pattern of interactions between any two states, except

16 Ibid.
for relations involving super powers or preeminent powers within the global system. The way Brecher defines this variable is too broad and by no means clear. When bilateral relations with more than two states are equally significant, this variable may overlap with the variable described as "regional system". Since Taiwan is the only state besides the two super powers which has had an important effect on Canadian and Japanese policies towards China, this study treats this variable as strictly Canadian and Japanese relations with Taiwan, excluding any other states.

5. Relations with the U.S.S.R.: Brecher includes under the "dominant bilateral system" relations with either the United States or the Soviet Union but not both and, at the same time, excludes relations involving either of the super powers under the "bilateral system" variable. Since relations with the U.S. is defined as the "dominant bilateral system" in this study but there cannot be super powers considered under this variable, there is, thus, no adequate place for relations with the Soviet Union in Brecher's model. This study, therefore, treats Canadian and Japanese relations with the U.S.S.R. as a separate variable.

17 Ibid.
6. **China's Attitude Towards Recognition**: There is no adequate place in Brecher's model for considering the impact of the policies of the country which is directly affected by the decision concerned on that decision, i.e. in this case, the impact of Chinese policies on the determination of Canadian and Japanese policies regarding the recognition of China. Although this variable may be included in the bilateral system, Brecher has not made explicit the distinction between relations with the target country toward which the decision is aimed and relations with other countries which may have a direct or indirect influence on the ultimate policy decision. This study, however, makes a point of examining the attitudes of the Chinese Government towards Canadian and Japanese recognition as a specific input variable.

**Internal Environment**

On the whole, Brecher's categorization of variables in the internal environment is much too broad to be meaningful and, in some cases, the variables are not relevant to the issue of recognition. For example, Brecher includes "military capability" under the internal variables and defines this as the ability of a state to wage war or to deter other states from attacking.  

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18 Ibid.
other words, Brecher uses this variable as a means of measurement of a state's power and, hence, capability to further its interests in particular situation. Defined in this way, this variable is not readily applicable to a study examining the various determinants of a specific policy (as opposed to the means available to implement a specific policy decision) and, thus, this variable in the manner in which it is defined by Brecher is omitted from the study. Like the variable relating to "military capability", Brecher uses "economic capability" as a measurement of a state's economic power and, hence, this variable is also omitted from the study.

However, the military posture of Canada and Japan may have had a specific effect on their choices of policies towards China (regardless of their military power to back up their policy decisions). For instance, since both Canada and Japan are highly dependent on U.S. military protection, the military posture of the two countries is closely related to the variable regarding relations with the United States. In addition, the two countries' concern with the Chinese nuclear threat was resulted from the emergence of China as a nuclear power in the global system. The relative impact of the above two elements on the two countries' policies of recognition is,
thus, compared respectively under the headings of "relations with the U.S." and the "global system". The discussion of Canadian or Japanese military capability per se is, on the other hand, omitted in this study.

The rest of the three internal environmental variables in Brecher's model, namely, the "political structure", the "interest groups", and the "competing elites" are also too broad for any meaningful comparative study. Brecher uses the variable in "political structure" in his model under which he includes the political institutions and constitutional matrix in which authoritative decisions are made. On the other hand, Brecher adopts the classification of interest groups suggested by Gabriel Almond, which is a broad one and includes all groups which can conceivably be considered as interest groups (including public opinion and the press) within the internal sector of the environment. However, some

19 Ibid., p. 84.
21 Michael Brecher, et. al., op. cit., p. 85.
institutions or interest groups may not be relevant to the issue of recognition and, hence, using these definitions, the above two variables are too broad to be meaningful. Finally, Brecher employs the variable of "competing elites" which he defines as those elites which vie for authority to make political decisions in the system.\footnote{22}{Ibid.} Brecher seems to include the impact of opposition parties as well as the competing political factions within the ruling parties under this category. However, since the nature of the impact of opposition parties on the two countries' China policies may be completely different from the nature of the impact of the competing elites within the ruling parties, it seems desirable to separate the two into two different variables.

Clearly, then, the internal environmental variables in Brecher's model are not appropriate for the purpose of this case study. Accordingly, variables in the internal environment for examination in this study are adapted in the following manner.

7. Public Opinion: This study only compares the impact of those interest groups within the internal operational environment which expressed concern about
recognizing China. Thus, this variable focuses on comparing the impact of public opinion and the press on the Canadian and Japanese decisions regarding recognition.

8. Economic Interest Groups: For the purpose of this study, the economic variable is considered in terms of the impact of the two countries’ economies (specifically their trading relations with China) on their respective policies regarding recognition. The relative impact of the two countries’ economic interest groups on the decisions to recognize China is compared. In this way, light may be cast on the eagerness of the two countries to establish closer relations with China for economic reasons.

9. Bureaucracy: Instead of comparing the impact of all formal institutions on recognition which is too broad to be meaningful, this study focuses on comparing the impact of the bureaucracies on Canadian and Japanese policies of recognition.

10. Opposition Elites: This variable focuses on comparing the impact of party system and the impact of opposition party attitudes on Canadian and Japanese China policies.

11. Political Tradition: Values of Governing Elites: Brecher treats "political tradition" as a component of the
psychological environment which has significant impact on the elite images of the external and internal environments. This study compares the attitudes of the ruling elites, including attitudes of the competing elites within the ruling parties, which to a large extent are affected by political traditions of the two countries, towards the issue of recognition.

In his model Brecher adopts the technique of content analysis—quantitative examination of the speeches, interviews, press conference and writings of those persons defined as the decision-makers. The technique assumes that decision-makers usually act according to their articulated views, which is not necessarily the case. In addition, the technique cannot deal adequately with unarticulated views or concealed views of the decision-makers. In fact, public expression of elite perceptions in many cases reveals only "declaratory" policy, not necessarily the real policy of decision-makers. Decision-makers may create "noise" intentionally or unintentionally as excuses.

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23 Ibid., p. 86.

24 The following criticism is not directed at the technique of content analysis per se, but rather at the use of the technique in Brecher's model.

25 Ibid., p. 89.

26 The term "noise" is borrowed from its usage in communications theory. In contrast to "signal", "noise" confuses the process of information communication and, thus, reduces the accuracy of the information.
for inaction or hesitation of action towards foreign policy issues. The findings may be confused because of the inadequacy of the technique of content analysis to distinguish the "noise" from the real motivations of the decision-makers. For the above reasons, this thesis does not adopt the technique of content analysis nor any rigorous quantitative research design. It is the author's contention that a qualitative analysis is more helpful for the purpose of piercing some of the less explicit attitudes among decision-makers which may have had an effect on the decisions of the respective countries to recognize China.

This study attempts to compare the relative "significance" of the environmental variables. It also examines the "change" in the environmental variables when Canada and Japan were making their decisions to recognize China. The concept of "change" is borrowed from James Rosenau's model for comparing the effect of "change" in environmental variables on the course of decision-making. For the purpose of this study, the relative "change" in each environmental variable is ranked from "high" to "low" and

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then weighted accordingly. Similarly, the relative "significance" of each variable in the environment is ranked from "highly significant" to "negligible" and then weighted accordingly.

However, change in the external environment has an impact on the choice of decisions only if the changes which take place are perceived as significant by the decision-makers. For example, if a specific variable in the environment is perceived as "highly significant" by the decision-makers a "low change" of that variable may affect significantly the course of decision-making; conversely, if a specific variable in the environment is perceived as of "negligible significance" even a very "high change" of that variable may not affect significantly the course of decision-making. Thus the sum of the weighted "significance"

28 The degree of "change" of the variables is weighted as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High</th>
<th>1 = 20</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 = 15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 = 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>5 = 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 The relative "significance" of the variables is weighted as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly significant</th>
<th>1 = 20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 = 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 = 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>5 = 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and weighted "change" of each environmental variable determines the degree of "impact" of each variable on the course of decision-making.  

Finally, the nature of the impact of the environmental variables (i.e. whether each one had a stimulating or inhibiting effect on recognition) before and during the two countries' decisions to recognize China is compared. For instance, the impact of a variable might have been negative (or neutral) before and become positive during the decision. The overall negative effect of the environmental variables is what deterred the two countries from recognizing China prior to their respective decisions in 1968 and 1971. The change in the nature of the variables, especially from an overall negative effect to a positive one is what determined the ultimate decisions to recognize China.

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For example, if a variable has been weighted both as "highly significant" and having a very high degree of "change" it can reach its maximum weight of 40 and, hence, has the highest "impact" on the course of decision-making. Accordingly, the relative "impact" of the variables is ranked as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High</th>
<th>1 = 40</th>
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<td>2 = 35</td>
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<td>3 = 30</td>
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<td>5 = 20</td>
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<td>6 = 15</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7 = 10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 = 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>9 = 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To state explicitly, the independent variables in this study are the external and internal environments while the dependent variable is the timing of diplomatic recognition. There are two dimensions regarding the concept of timing in this study. The first dimension, which is the primary focus of this study, is the three year lag between the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China. The second dimension, which is of secondary concern in this study, is the length of time which it took the two countries to establish diplomatic relations with China after their respective announcements of their intention to recognize that régime.

Since there was a three year lag between the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China, the Japanese Government must have encountered greater obstacles and, hence, the change in the environmental variables must have had a greater "impact" in affecting the ultimate Japanese decision to recognize China in 1971 than the Canadian decision in 1968.

In addition, since Canadian governments before 1968 hesitated to recognize China, we can hypothesize that the environmental variables must have been on balance negative for Canadian governments before 1968 and on balance.
positive in 1968. Similarly, we can hypothesize that the environmental variables must have been on balance negative for Japanese governments before 1971 and on balance positive in 1971.

Hypotheses for each environmental variable follow the same pattern; hypotheses for the variable relating to the "global system" only are, therefore, stated as an example:

\[ H_1 \]: The impact of the "global system" was more important in affecting Japanese than Canadian recognition.

\[ H_2 \]: The "global system" was a negative factor for Canadian governments before 1968 and became a positive factor in 1968.

\[ H_3 \]: The "global system" was a negative factor for Japanese governments before 1971 and became a positive factor in 1971.

Brecher has made a distinction between the environment and the "elite images" of the environment, but he does not include in his model any means to separate these two different phenomena. An initial attempt of this study has been made to separate the environment from the "elite images" of the environment. However, findings have

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31 Michael Brecher, et. al., op. cit., p. 86.
suggested that only in the factors relating to the regional system and Taiwan can one distinguish the different impact of the environment from the "elite images" of the environment on recognition of China. Accordingly, no rigorous effort has been made to distinguish the two in this study.

In addition, the examination of various factors under this study is not necessarily in the chronological order. The contemporary setting of each factor immediately prior to and during the decision to recognize China is first examined, followed by references to past incidents which may have significant effects in changing the impact of the specific factor on the course of recognition.

The analysis of the external and internal environments of Canadian and Japanese decision-making are treated in two separate chapters. The "target country", China, is singled out for consideration in a chapter by itself in which China's foreign policy after the Cultural Revolution in general, and its policies toward Canada and Japan in particular, are discussed. A concluding chapter compares the impact of all the variables discussed in the preceding chapters on the Canadian and Japanese policies of recognition.
CHAPTER 2

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
As interactions between nation-states become more complex it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish the impact of the external and internal environments on foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, the fusion of national and international systems has increased to such an extent that virtually all national systems are "penetrated" to a certain degree by external elements from the international system.¹ This chapter, however, deals only with the variables which can be narrowly defined as conditions and relationships existing beyond the territorial boundaries of states concerned at three distinct levels: global, regional and bilateral.

¹ For the concept of a "penetrated" political system see James Rosenau "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1966, pp. 53-71.
I  Global System.

This section first examines the setting of the global system in the last two decades and then compares the elite images of the Canadian and Japanese decision-makers with respect to the global system and the Chinese nuclear threat to the global system. The United States emerged from the Second World War as the single dominant world power. However, the Soviet Union, with its rapid military and technological development, soon caught up with the United States and became another power pole in the international system. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the world community appeared to be divided into the Communist bloc and the Western bloc of non-Communist allies. However, this so-called bipolar international system was challenged at the beginning of the 1960s by the pre-war great powers, which had recovered their economic and military capabilities, and by the emergence of ex-colonial nations. In fact, one may argue that a "tight bipolar system", which non-bloc member nations and international organizations either disappear entirely or cease to be significant,\(^2\) did not exist even at the height of U.S. and Soviet international dominance. Indeed, some non-bloc neutral

states, such as India, played a significant role in world affairs in the 1950s.

Although it is generally agreed among political theorists that the international system has become a "very loose bipolar system" or a multipolar system, some scholars maintain that bipolarity persists as an underlying characteristic of the international system. The disagreement has largely resulted from different definitions of the power structure in the international system. Those who maintain that the continuity of the bipolar system still persists define power in the international system largely in terms of military capability — the power to do harm. For others, the concept of power in the international system is defined broadly to include factors such as military and economic capabilities, technological development and demographic change.

3 Ibid., pp. 300-301.


6 Ibid., p. 305.

By defining power in the international system in these terms, it is obvious that the international system has become a multipolar one since the early 1960s. Countries such as Japan and West Germany have emerged as major economic powers although their military power is still far behind the two super-powers and great powers such as China, Britain and France. Thus, the power structure of the international system has undergone gradual change in the last two decades. The admission of China to the United Nations in 1971 and Nixon's surprise visit to China did not change drastically the power structure in the global system, although they did change drastically the pattern of alliance in the international system.

Before the admission of China to the United Nations in 1971, China was already considered as a major military power in the international community. Despite the backwardness of its economy, China's vast and hard working population was generally regarded as a potentially menacing force. Indeed, China's position in the global system has been calculated since 1949 not on its

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present military or economic capabilities but on the potential of these capabilities. However, despite its potential power, Communist China was consistently rejected by the international community in more than two decades after it came to power in 1949. It was isolated by the U.S. policy of "containment by isolation". When the Sino-Soviet dispute intensified in the second half of the sixties, China appeared to have been rejected by both the Communist bloc and the non-Communist bloc. China's advocacy of a world revolution apparently alarmed the world and, hence, helped to create its own isolation from the international community.

The admission of China to the United Nations was significant because it formally ended the two decades of isolation of the Peking Government. Moreover, the Peking Government was officially regarded as a legitimate Government representing China. The U.S. policy of isolating the Peking Government and supporting the Taipei Government completely collapsed.

9 In terms of military capabilities, China is still far behind the U.S. and the Soviet Union and probably the United Kingdom; in terms of economic capabilities, China is ranked only as the seventh or eighth economic power.

10 For a more detailed discussion of China's attitudes towards foreign relations, see Chapter 4.
In fact, the U.S. concept of "containment of Communism" was already out-dated in the 1960s. The Communist bloc was no longer a monolithic organization aimed at conquering the rest of the world. Communist states were more concerned with their own economic developments than the world Communist revolution. The widening Sino-Soviet split from the late 1950s further weakened the monolithic structure of the Communist bloc. The Soviet Union apparently replaced the United States as China's number one enemy since the late 1960s. The Sino-Soviet dispute in the 1960s was thus significant in altering the polarity of the global system as well as in bringing about the subsequent change in the U.S. policy of isolating China.

Nixon's announcement of a plan to visit China in July, 1971, three months before China's admission to the United Nations, confirmed the abandonment of the U.S. policy of isolation. The U.S. rapprochement with China was amongst the first attempts of the Nixon Administration to improve U.S. bilateral relations with major actors, Communist or non-Communist, in the world community. Nixon's visit to China indicated that the world had entered a new era of co-existence among major actors, rather than co-existence between the Communist and non-Communist blocs. This change of pattern of alliance in the global system must have had
a significant impact on Japan's foreign policy, since Japan itself is a major power. To recognize China, Japan's giant neighbour and a great power in the global system, was an important first step for Japan in moving towards a more active participation in world affairs.

It appears that the global system had changed by a larger degree in 1971 than by 1968. However, it was the perception of the global system held by the Japanese and Canadian decision-makers which had an effect on the decisions. It seems that the Trudeau Government perceived a significant "change" in the global system, apparently not much less significant than that perceived by the Japanese Government. The perception of a Chinese nuclear threat, which has become a global concern since China's acquiring nuclear capability, also had a great impact on Canada's and Japan's decisions to recognize China.

The acceptance by some leaders of the thesis of "containment of Communism" was for a long time a factor negatively affecting Chinese recognition. Lester Pearson stated in 1951 that Canada "must recognize and pay tribute to the leadership being given and the efforts being made by the United States in the struggle against Communist imperialism, and realize that if this leadership were
not given we would have little chance of success in this common struggle." This reflected Pearson's belief in the existence of a bipolar global system in the 1950s. As late as 1964, Pearson seemed to maintain his image of a bipolar system as he apparently did not object to (though not necessarily approve of) the subsequent bombing of North Vietnam and the Canadian role as the "go-between" in the "common struggle" against "Communist imperialism", according to the previously unpublished portions of the Pentagon Papers.  

Since the global system was perceived, correctly or incorrectly, as bipolar by the Canadian governments, Canada's security was perceived as tied up with that of the U.S. and the Western allies in general in the pursuit of a policy of containing Communist expansion. Hence,  


13 Pearson stated in 1951 that Canada should abandon its independent position with respect to foreign policy "if it is more important to maintain unity (within the Western
there existed in Ottawa a latent hostility for China as one of the major Communist powers and an acceptance (for the sake of allied solidarity in an era of Cold War) of the U.S. concept of "containment by isolation". This acceptance of Chinese isolation as a part of allied Cold War policy ran contradictory to a consistent desire among Canadian leaders throughout the period 1949-1968 to end the isolation of China and to preserve a dialogue among states for the sake of world peace. In any case, the perception of the global system as consisting of Communist and non-Communist camps started to change in the 1960s and had all but evaporated by the Trudeau years.

Few Canadian leaders, on the other hand, ever expressed fear of a Chinese nuclear threat to Canada and generally regarded the threat as remote. Pearson said

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13 allies in the face of the common foe." Words and Occasions, op. cit., p. 105.

14 Former Prime Minister Diefenbaker questioned the morality of the Mao régime. He stated in 1957 that there would be no justification for the granting of recognition until the Communist government of China "expiated its wrongdoing under international law." See Hansard, November 1, 1957, p. 654.

15 One of the notable exceptions was Howard Green, Secretary of State for External Affairs in Diefenbaker's Cabinet. He told the House of Commons in March, 1954, that "if North America is ever invaded, it will be from Asia not from Europe and it will be the Red Chinese." See
in June, 1966: "the day when North America or Europe should be genuinely concerned about a nuclear attack by China is still many years in the future." However, while China was probably never seen as a direct threat to Canada, it was generally viewed by Canadian leaders as a potential threat to international peace and stability, a threat which was enhanced by China's acquiring nuclear capability.

When Pearson come back from the Commonwealth Conference in July 1964 he stated in the House of Commons that the policy of the countries of the West in refusing to extend diplomatic recognition to Communist China was "unrealistic and unhelpful." One month after China's first explosion of a nuclear device on October 15, 1964, Paul Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Pearson's Cabinet, urged Communist China to join the

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Hansard, March 30, 1954, p. 3477. However, Green's remark was made in 1954, ten years before China's first nuclear explosion. The statement was based on speculation and, thus, did not reflect a genuine concern, at the time it was made, with a Chinese threat.

16 Statements and Speeches, No. 66/30, p. 3. Pearson's address to the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, Scarborough, Ontario, June 25, 1966.

17 Hansard, July 17, 1964, p. 5602.
107 nations which had acceded to the partial Test Ban Treaty and stated that any discussion on disarmament could not be complete without the participation of a country of the importance of China.\textsuperscript{18}

Pierre Trudeau seems to be fully aware of the contemporary multipolar global system. Trudeau stated in May, 1968, that it was no longer realistic to think in terms of a monolithic Communist unity such as Stalin could impose.\textsuperscript{19} "Although it remained true," Trudeau added, "that there are some fundamental and far-reaching differences between us and the Communist countries, it is no longer true to say that the Communist world is monolithically and implacably hostile to us."\textsuperscript{20} Trudeau criticized the U.S. policies of non-recognition and of seeking to contain Chinese Communism through military means as being partly responsible for China's exclusion

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Hansard}, November 19, 1964, p. 10158.


\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}
from the world community. Consequently, the Trudeau Government was highly conscious of the possibilities for the broadening of contacts with all the Communist states. Trudeau's perception of the global system as multipolar was thus significant in motivating Canada's move towards recognizing the Communist government in Peking.

Like Pearson Government, the Trudeau Government did not regard China as a threat to Canada's security. The White Paper on Defence published in 1971 by the Canadian Government regarded the only direct external military threat to Canada's security as that of a large-scale nuclear attack on North America. This, it believed, would not happen so long as a stable strategic balance existed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, like the Pearson Government, the Trudeau Government also perceived the threat of an isolated China to world peace.

21 Ibid., p. 280.
22 Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 150.
24 Ibid.
Trudeau stated in May, 1968, that most of the world issues "will not be resolved completely, or in any lasting way, unless and until an accommodation has been reached with China." Thus, while Canadians may not have felt directly threatened, this broad concern for China's potentially disruptive effect on international peace and stability was a contributing factor to the decision to recognize China.

In comparison, while the Trudeau Government rejected the U.S. policies of non-recognition and containment of Communism in the late 1960s, the Sato Government was still tied to the U.S. policies, although it had apparently perceived the challenge of the multipolar world. Kiichi Aichi, the Foreign Minister in Sato's Cabinet, wrote in 1969 that the role of the United States in Pacific Asia was diminishing and that the impact of the Japanese economy on the multipolar world was greatly heightened. The multipolar nature


of the world demanded that Japan become involved more actively in the international community. However, the Japanese ruling elites were not willing to meet this challenge. The concept of an inward-looking "little Japan", free of unnecessary foreign entanglements, was apparently preferable to the instinctively feared and discredited alternative of foreign adventurism. As late as January, 1972, Sato stated in his annual policy speech that "no matter to what extent international relations have become multi-polarized, the importance of Tokyo's ties with Washington will not change in the slightest degree," implying that Japan's China policy was still tied to the U.S. China policy. This acceptance of the U.S. China policy partly inhibited the Japanese governments preceding the Tanaka Government from taking positive steps to recognize China, although Sato decided to recognize China after Nixon's announcement of his intention to visit China in July, 1971.

From the time of Japan's formal re-entry into the world community after its admission to the United

27 Ibid., p. 27.
Nations in 1957, Japanese administrations adhered to Nobusake Kishi's policy of seeking a bigger voice in the United Nations. It was a rule for the Foreign Minister to lead the Japanese delegation to the annual General Assembly meeting at the United Nations. Japan's effort at the United Nations was highlighted in October 1971, by its vigorous campaign with the U.S.-Japanese strategy to persuade wavering countries to keep Taiwan at the United Nations. Apparently, the Sato Government's futile attempt to keep Taiwan at the United Nations and the subsequent admission of China to the United Nations changed substantially the Japanese elite image of the global system, especially the perception of Japan's role in the world community.

Masayoshi Ohira, while he was Foreign Minister in Ikeda's Cabinet, had said in 1964 that "should a situation arise in which Communist China becomes a legitimate member of the United Nations with the blessings of its members, Japan will have to consider normalizing diplomatic relations with Communist China." The

Admission of China to the United Nations thus contributed partly to Japan's decision to recognize China. More significantly, China's admission to the United Nations changed the polarity of the global system. Nixon's visit to China in February, 1972, changed further the pattern of alliance in the global system. All these changes in the global system were apparently watched closely by the Japanese decision-makers.

Even before China's admission to the United Nations and before he came to power, Tanaka wrote in early 1970 that the fact that Japan "is situated at the meeting-point of East and West, or, to be more exact, of the United States, the Soviet Union and mainland China, constitutes a vitally important factor in formulating the foreign policy of Japan." 32

At the same time, Tanaka regarded the normalization of relations between China and Japan as a turning point in Japan's foreign policy in the contemporary multi-polar world. It is highly probable, therefore, that the awareness of the Tanaka Government that Japan could not avoid

involvements in the multipolar world prompted Japan to take more progressive steps to recognize China. Indeed, the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations was considered to be justified on the ground that it would "enlarge Japan's firm relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and other nations in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Southeast Asian countries."³³ Instead of tying Japan to the United States and other Western powers, the new Japanese Government seems to have realized that the chief diplomatic task before the nation in the current multipolar situation was to maintain an equivalent relationship with both China and the Soviet Union while retaining the Japanese-American alliance and close cooperative ties with all other nations. The change in the pattern of alliance in the global system was, therefore, a significant factor contributing to Japan's decision to recognize China.

Like the Canadian governments, the Japanese governments considered China as a threat to world peace. Former Premier Hatoyama believed in 1955 that to end

³³ The Japan Times, October 29, 1972. Foreign Minister Ohira explained the Government's China policy at the Diet one month after the recognition.
the isolation of China by normalizing Japan's relations with that régime would lead to world peace.\textsuperscript{34} Satō also believed that the ending of China's isolation and its involvement in international affairs would enhance the cause of world peace.\textsuperscript{35} However, unlike in the Canadian case, Japan's concern for ending China's isolation for the sake of world peace failed to become a significant factor contributing to the ultimate decision to recognize China, partly because Japan's China policy continued to be heavily tied to the U.S. policy of isolating China and partly because Japan tended to be more concerned about its own security in the face of the Chinese nuclear threat than Chinese threat to world peace.

Unlike Canadian decision-makers, Japanese decision-makers perceived a real Chinese nuclear threat to themselves. Sato warned the Diet in 1965 that "judging from the nature of the Peking régime, its possession of nuclear arms poses a threat to the security of Japan."\textsuperscript{36} In fact, two distinct attitudes did exist among the Japanese public

\textsuperscript{34} The Globe and Mail; January 5, 1955.
\textsuperscript{36} Morinasuke Kajima, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 18.
and political leaders. The "idealists" perceived China as essentially unaggressive but provoked by an aggressive United States. Some "idealists" even went so far as to suggest that Japan would be better off abandoning the United States and seeking its fate in some sort of identification with "the people" of China. The "realists", on the other hand, accepted the American alignment as a national necessity for security reasons at least for the foreseeable future.

The Japanese governments, however, inclined more to the views of the "realists". The Sato Government tended to rely almost exclusively on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as a guarantee against the Chinese nuclear threat. Sato told the press in January, 1965,

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38 Ibid., p. 120.

that because of the existence of the Security Treaty Japan had "not become nervous about China's nuclear test." Thus, judging from this point of view, we can conclude that Japan's concern about China's nuclear threat, and, hence its reliance on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was a deterring factor on Japan's moves towards closer relations with China, since the Peking Government had made it clear its demand for the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Treaty before the normalization of relations between Japan and China.

Another issue which is directly related to Japan's perception of the Chinese threat is Japan's defense buildup plan. The Sato Government maintained a formidable defense force and planned in 1968 to expand the force. The Tanaka Government's insistence on expanding Japan's defense force was partly motivated by the fear of Chinese nuclear development as well as the prospect of competing with China for Asian leadership. One writer predicts that "participation in power politics in Asia with China as its main rival will put enormous pressure on Japan to


41 For a more detailed discussion of China's attitudes towards Japanese recognition, see Chapter 4.

develop an independent nuclear force." However, this writer does not indicate and, indeed, it is difficult to judge, whether the Japanese defense build-up plan was a negative or positive factor affecting Japan's ultimate recognition of China.

China made clear its objection to the revival of militarism in Japan as late as 1971. Japan's defense build-up thus at one point an obstacle inhibiting Japan's effort to improve relations with China. In any case, it appears that China had objected more to the U.S.-Japan military alliance than to the expansion of Japan's own forces. Some Japanese leaders speculated that from the Chinese viewpoint "the arming of Japan perhaps should be welcomed in certain political contexts," implying that China might welcome Japan to become a balancing power against the impact of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in Asia.

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44 China's attitudes regarding these matters be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

The relative silence of the Peking Government on Japan's defense build-up a few months preceding Tanaka's China trip indicated that there might be some truth in this speculation. Thus, the negative effect of the defense build-up plan on recognition was neutralized or the plan may have had a positive effect by the time Tanaka came to power. It, thus, appears that Japan's fear of the Chinese threat to its own security which had motivated the Japanese governments to make preparations against it, unlike Canada's concern about China's threat to world peace, was largely a negative factor inhibiting Japan's effort to improve its relations with China and was neutralized only a few months before the normalization of relations between Japan and China. This partly explains the lack of active efforts taken by the Sato Government to establish diplomatic relations with China after the decision was made in 1971.

Conclusion

The power structure of the international system has been undergoing gradual change since the late 1950s from a bipolar to a multipolar system. Neither the Canadian nor the Japanese Government was thus confronted
with a drastic change in the relative power positions in the global system when they were considering positive steps to recognize China. But the Japanese Government was apparently confronted with a more drastic change in the pattern of alliances of the global system after the admission of China to the United Nations in 1971 and Nixon's visit to China in early 1972. However, the perception of the pattern of alliances of the global system of Canada's decision-makers changed significantly, though not as greatly as the perceptions of their counterparts in Japan.

The change in the environment in relation to the global system was highly significant in affecting the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China. Canadian governments preceding the Trudeau Government perceived a bipolarity in the global system and hence tied Canada's China policy to the U.S. policy of non-recognition and "containment of Communism". Similarly, Japanese governments were also tied up with the U.S. China policy. Trudeau's perception of a multipolar global system and accordingly his rejection of the U.S. policy of containing Communist China by isolation was significant in removing an impediment to recognition. In comparison, the inhibiting effect of U.S. China policy was already removed by the time the
Sato Government decided to recognize China by Nixon's announcement of his visit to China.

China's emergence as a major military power in the global system posed a threat to world peace. Canadian decision-makers did not perceive a direct Chinese threat to Canada, but they were consistently concerned about a Chinese nuclear threat to world peace. In fact, this was a constant and significant positive factor motivating Canada to recognize China. By contrast, Japanese decision-makers were more concerned about the Chinese nuclear threat to Japan than to world peace. The fear of the Chinese nuclear threat, which motivated the expansion of the Japanese defense force, was still a negative factor inhibiting a policy of recognition when the Sato Government decided to recognize China in 1971.
Both Canada and Japan are geographically Pacific powers. Most countries in Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia, are close neighbours of China. 46 Feelings of the people in Southeast Asian countries towards China are mixed. They fear the increase of insurgent activities within their own countries, which have been suspected to be supported by the Chinese Communist Government, but nevertheless, they acknowledge the permanent presence of the Peking régime. They realize that they have to live with their giant neighbour. To some, an isolated China is threatening to their national security. It seems that any move which could bring peace and stability to the region would be welcomed by all. 47

There appeared to be no significant change of attitudes among Southeast Asian countries towards the

46 Asian countries such as India and Pakistan are excluded from this discussion because they recognized the Peking régime in 1950 and their relations with China were not likely be affected by Canadian and Japanese recognition.

47 Noting Peking's admission to the UN and the impending rapprochement between the U.S. and China, Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo stated: "For the first time in a generation there exists a real possibility for peace in Asia." The Globe and Mail, November 29, 1971.
issue of recognizing China when Canada took the decision to recognize China in 1968. However, the softening attitude of the Chinese Government reflected in its foreign policy after the Cultural Revolution did encourage a trend in non-Communist Asia at the end of the 1960s toward trying to come to terms with Peking, a trend which was reinforced by the U.S. rapprochement with the Peking Government in the early 1970s. Although these countries remained cautious in their approaches to China and avoided taking any hasty steps towards recognizing China, their attitudes towards the issue of recognition were apparently more favorable in 1971 than in 1968. Thus, Japan appears to have enjoyed a more favorable response from these countries than Canada when it took its decision to recognize China.

Although geographically Canada is a Pacific power, Canada has never been seriously involved in Asian affairs (with the notable exceptions of its participations in the Korean War and in the International Control Commission in Indo-China). It is not a member of SEATO and, unlike the United States, has no defense obligations in the area. Its participation in the Korean War was regarded as an obligation to the United Nations rather than an obligation as

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a regional power in the Pacific. Similarly, Asian states have not paid too much attention to Canada. Little serious concern (if any) was expressed by leaders in Asian countries about Canada's move to recognize China. However, it is conceivable that at an earlier time, particularly in the 1950s, the anti-Communist attitudes of Asian states acted as a deterrent to Canada's moves towards closer relations with China. Canada's China policy changed at the same time that views of Asian countries themselves also began to change. Protests by these countries were mild or non-existent when Canada announced its intention to establish diplomatic relations with China in May, 1968.49 In short, the impact of Southeast Asian countries on the course of Canadian recognition was minimal.

Compared with Canada, Japan's position in the Far East is far more important. It has replaced the United States since the late 1960s as the most important trading partner for most of the countries in the region. However, it is precisely because of Japan's enormous economic power that it has become an object of envy and.

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49 For example, a reliable source informed the author that the Thai Foreign Ministry registered only a mild formal complaint in verbal form after Trudeau's announcement in 1968 that Canada intended to seek diplomatic relations with China. At the time of recognition, Indonesian Foreign Ministry officials, when the subject was raised with them, acknowledged that they understood the Canadian position while stating that Indonesia was
fear among the countries in the region. Some even feel that a growing Japan may be more difficult for them to deal with than will China.  

In late 1969 the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Adam Malik, express this growing concern toward Japanese power as follows: "Japan, through its big and overwhelming economy, cannot be but an object of envy, suspicion and fear among its Asian neighbours, especially since the experience of almost all the Asian countries with Japan during World War II was none too happy." Because of its closeness to and the importance of its economic relations with the region, Japan was bound to be more concerned than Canada about reactions from these countries to its rapprochement with China.

Indeed, Japan's hasty move to recognize China in the early 1970s raised suspicions of Japanese motivations. Some leaders from the region suspected that Japan's "China first" policy was designed to bring about

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not in a position to pursue a similar course at that time.


51 Ibid.
cooperation with China for the economic domination of
the region. 52 Nevertheless, responses from these coun-
tries to Japan's move were generally favorable. Prime
Minister Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia welcomed the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and
China and said it would help ease tension in Asian and
the world. 53 Officialdom in Jakarta and Bangkok believed
that the Sino-Japanese rapprochement would lead to a
tolerance of activities between the two giants in Asia
and bring stability to the region. 54 Even the South
Korean Government was not wholly against Japan's move. 55
The generally relaxed atmosphere in the region towards
closer relations with China may not have been a signifi-
cant factor contributing to Japan's move. Nevertheless,
it did mean that the attitudes of states in the region
ceased to be a negative factor inhibiting Japan's move
to recognize China.

52 "Japan Must Increase Aid to Asians", The Japan
Times, October 20, 1972. See also "Around Asian Capitals:
Japan-China Rapprochement", The Japan Times, October 2, 1972.

53 The Japan Times, October 8, 1972.

54 "Around Asian Capitals: Japan-China Rapprochement",
The Japan Times, October 2, 1972.

55 "Around Asian Capitals: Sino-Japan Ties", The
Japan Times, August 14, 1972.
In comparison, the attitudes of Asian states seems to have acted as a more negative factor in inhibiting Japan's than Canada's moves to recognize China in the 1950s and the 1960s. Asian leaders expressed little concern for Canada's policy in Asia, while they openly expressed their suspicions of motivations behind Japan's foreign policies. However, it is interesting to note that although the countries in Southeast Asia never openly expressed their concern about a Canadian rapprochement with China, leaders in Ottawa consistently perceived that Canadian recognition might arouse a negative response from these countries. Former Prime Minister Diefenbaker stated in the House of Commons in November, 1957, that Canadian recognition would remove a major incentive that had impelled countries in Asia to take their stand firmly against the onrush of Communism. 56 Howard Green, the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Diefenbaker's Cabinet, declared in January, 1960, that Canadian recognition would be a "heavy blow to friends of ours in Southeast Asia." 57

56 Hansard, November 1, 1957, p. 654.

The out-break of the Sino-Indian war in 1962 apparently reinforced this concern for stability in Asia. Green stated in November, 1962, that China's invasion of India was a further reason for Canadian non-recognition of the Peking Government and for voting against its admission to the United Nations. 58

Concern about the effects of recognition on the countries of Southeast Asia appeared to have remained an important reason for Canadian caution regarding recognition during the Pearson Government as well. Paul Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Pearson's Cabinet, suggested in a statement of May 22, 1964, that "the effect [of establishing diplomatic relations with China] on the stability of countries in Southeast Asia must be assessed with care." 59 John Holmes, a former senior Canadian diplomat stated in an article written in 1967 that fear of the consequences of the moral victory which China would gain in Southeast


Asia through a collapse of the American front of non-recognition was a powerful factor in dissuading Canada from altering its position towards China during the Pearson Government. Thus, according to Holmes, the elite image of the likely effects on Southeast Asian countries resulting from Canada's recognition of China was largely a reflection of the U.S. elite image rather than a reflection of a genuine Canadian concern. Indeed, this concern about the effects of Canadian recognition on the countries of Southeast Asia was probably "noise" created by some decision-makers to obscure other reasons for opposing recognition which were more difficult to express publicly such as the fear of endangering the U.S.-Canadian relationship.

Ironically, however, the concern for stability in Southeast Asia finally became a positive factor, moving Canada towards recognition of China in the late 1960s. During his visit to Tokyo on April 15, 1969, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp stated that "if Asian problems are to be solved, China must take part in their solution." This change in the elite image of the effect of recognition on Asian states apparently played some significant role during the course of Canada's decision to recognize China. At the same time, Trudeau's

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60 Ibid., p. 207.
61 Mitchell Sharp's address to Foreign Correspondents.
contention that Canadian policy - economic and political - towards China would be looked at "in the context of a new interest in Pacific Affairs generally" was also an important point of departure from policy of previous governments. 62

"Because of past preoccupations with Atlantic and European affairs," Trudeau said, "we have tended to overlook the reality that Canada is a Pacific country too." 63 Meanwhile, the relative de-emphasis of the Trudeau Government on relations with Canada's Western allies was illustrated by Canada's decision to reduce its obligations in NATO. Apparently, the change of elite image of the focus of Canadian foreign policy also must have played some significant role in moving Canada to establish closer relations with countries of the Pacific area, particularly China.

In contrast, the perceptions of Japanese decision-makers were largely in accord with the reality of the environment. They perceived the trend toward closer

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63 Ibid., p. 282.
relations with China in the Asian countries after the Sino-American thaw. But they also perceived the fear among some countries in the region of the future domination of Asia by a Sino-Japanese alliance. Japanese leaders reiterated, after they made the decision to recognize China, that the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations would aid peace in Asia. This Japanese contention was similar to the Canadian contention in 1968, when the Trudeau Government took its decision to recognize China. In addition, in order to assure countries in the region, the seventh item in the Japan-China joint communique regarding recognition stated that "neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia and Pacific region." 

Conclusion

While Canada was in the process of deciding to recognize China in 1968, there was no drastic change in the attitude of countries in Asia towards the issue.

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65 For the full text of the joint communique see Appendix II. Note that the seventh item did not state that the two countries would not join as an alliance to dominate Asia but only stated that "neither" of the two countries would do so.
of recognizing China. However, the Trudeau's Government belief that Canada's recognition of China might contribute to peace in Asia, by contrast to the belief of the preceding governments that Canada's recognition might arouse serious concern among Asian states, may have been a significant factor contributing to Canada's decision to recognize China. But since it is doubtful if the Canadian decision-makers had a genuine concern about the effect of Canadian recognition on Asian states, there does remain some doubt about the significance of this factor.

In comparison, Asian states were more concerned with Japanese than Canadian recognition. The attitudes of Asian states acted as a brake in the 1950s and the 1960s, inhibiting Japanese moves towards closer relations with China. Nevertheless, Japan encountered neutral attitudes among Asian states when it ultimately decided to recognize China. In short, the impact of the regional system on Japan's recognition of China was apparently more significant than its impact on Canada's recognition, partly because Japan is a relatively more important member of the regional system.
III Relations with the United States

The U.S. was a significant factor in determining both the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China. The two countries are both militarily and economically highly dependent on the United States. As far as trade is concerned Canada is more dependent on the United States than is Japan. More than two-thirds of Canada's total trade is with the United States, while less than one-third of Japan's total trade is with the United States. In addition, as Japan diversifies its international trade, it is becoming even less dependent on U.S. trade.66

In terms of military dependence, however, Japan may be more anxious than Canada to secure American military protection. A U.S. military force is stationed in Japan but not in Canada. The contracting global

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66 Japan's total trade with the United States has been reduced to less than 25% of its total trade since 1970. However, Donald Hellman contends that "despite Japan's sharply increased capacity for international action as a result of economic growth, dependence on the United States market will constrain any radical realpolitik manoeuvres." See Donald Hellman, "The Confrontation with 'Realpolitik'", in James William Morley (ed.), Forecast For Japan: Security in the 1970s, p. 140.
influence of the United States, reflected especially in
President Nixon's intention to reduce the U.S. defense obli-
gations in the Pacific region, may have caused anxiety among
Japanese leaders. It would be a grave shock to Tokyo if
the United States decided to pull out of Asia overnight. 67
In comparison, Canadians do not have to worry about
American military protection per se because the United
States has to include the whole North American continent
within its security network. 68 Nevertheless, Canadians
need U.S. military protection if they are to avoid building
an expensive defense system of their own. Given their
mutual dependence on the U.S. in these areas of economics
and defence, it is interesting to compare how U.S. policy
and attitudes affected their positions on the China
question and the extent to which each diverged from U.S.
China policy.

67 Opinion among political circles in Tokyo is
divided on the issue of maintaining the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty. The "idealists" prefer an unarmed, neutral state,
while the "realists" accept the American alignment as a
national necessity, at least for the foreseeable future.
See, for example, Lawrence Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia,

68 This is a common theme in the literature on U.S.-
Canadian relations. See, for example, R.J. Sutherland, "A
Defence Strategist Examines the Realities ", in J.L. Granat-
stein (ed.), Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945, Toronto:
The attitude of the United States Government towards China was extremely hostile in the 1950s. Chinese actions in Korea and Tibet were seen by Americans as evidence of Chinese aggressiveness, and that together with Mao's writing about world revolution and the general preoccupation in the U.S. with the risks of "international communism" (in an era when the Cold War was at its peak) led to a hostile attitude in the U.S. towards China. The U.S. regarded China as another aggressive Communist country which had to be contained in the same manner as the U.S.S.R. The United States Government imposed a policy of containment on China by military and economic embargo as well as diplomatic non-recognition. Trading of non-strategic goods to China by its Western allies was tolerated only reluctantly by the U.S. Government. Indeed, the degree of U.S. hostility towards China was reflected in the fact that no major Western ally recognized China after the Korean War until the French recognition in early 1964.

Washington expressed openly its regret at France's recognition of Communist China. Within minutes after the formal announcement by Paris and Peking of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the State Department of the United States called the action an "unfortunate step".69 The official Washington

reaction was generally considered mild in tone, but behind it, clearly, was a deep layer of bitterness at the French action. Washington apparently felt frustrated because intensive United States diplomacy was unable to prevent the French recognition. This reflects that the pattern of alliances in the global system was already undergoing significant change in the early 1960s; the United States was no longer able to dominate the foreign policy of its allies.

However, if the French recognition caused any bitter feelings in Washington, the effect was only temporary. The East wind was already blowing and Washington had been softening its attitude towards China even prior to the French recognition. Roger Hilsman, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, stated in December, 1963, that the United States was pursuing towards Communist China a policy of the open door: "We are determined to keep the door open to the possibility of change." The United States "open door"

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70 Ibid.

71 The U.S. State Department revealed that U.S. efforts to deter France from recognizing China began in mid-October, 1963. France had been approached a number of times to make sure that American views on such a move were clearly understood. Ibid.

72 For an extract of Hilsman's speech see Roderick
policy was developed further two years after Hilsman's speech. In early 1966, the U. S. Government announced that the ban on travel to China was being lifted for Americans in cultural, athletic, commercial, educational, public affairs and other fields. In February, 1966, the United States offered to let journalists from China enter the United States. Dean Rusk, the U.S. Secretary of State, said in March, 1966: "We should continue to enlarge the possibilities for unofficial contacts between Communist China and ourselves - contact which may gradually assist in altering Peiping's picture of the United States."  

Before becoming the President of the United States, Richard Nixon wrote in 1967 that the world could not afford to leave China forever in isolation: "The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change. The way to do this is to persuade China that it must change."  

Nixon fulfilled his words by taking a more

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Cont'd.


positive policy towards rapprochement with China once he became President in 1968. The U.S. China policy had thus undergone a substantial (though it had been gradual) change by the time the Canadian Government made its decision to recognize China in 1968. The U.S. was apparently no longer concerned about a Canadian action per se, in the sense of weakening the alliance and affecting Communist containment. However, the U.S. was probably still concerned about the effects of Canadian action on the long-term status of China, particularly China's admission to the United Nations at the expense of Taiwan. Judging from the U.S. attitude in 1968, on balance the U.S. probably had a neutral rather than negative effect on Canadian recognition.

However, the U.S. had not always been so restrained. John Holmes, a former senior diplomat in the Canadian foreign service, argued in an article published in 1965 that there was no evidence that normal diplomatic pressure by the United States on Canada's China policy was accompanied by anything which could properly be called threat or blackmail.\footnote{John Holmes, The Better Part of Valour, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1970, p. 215. This article first appeared under the title of "Canada and China: The Dilemmas of a Minor Power", in A.M. Halpern (ed.), Policies Towards China: Views from Six Continents, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965.} Nevertheless, he remarked
that the American Government had never failed to express to the Canadian Government its anxiety that Canada should not step out of line.\footnote{Ibid.}

John Holmes' remark can best be illustrated by the following two incidents when Canada attempted to diverge from U.S. China policy. When Ottawa appeared to be eager to negotiate with the Peking Government on diplomatic relations in the mid-1950s, the Canadian leaders were told very forcibly by the U.S. President and his Secretary of State at the White Sulphur Spring Conference of April, 1956, that they remained altogether opposed both to recognizing the Peking Government and to its admission to the United Nations.\footnote{James Eayrs, \textit{Canada in World Affairs : 1955-1957} (CIIA), p. 84.} According to another source, when Diefenbaker raised the topic of Canadian intention to extend \textit{de facto} recognition to China and likely Canadian support of the latter's admission to the United Nations during Eisenhower's visit to Ottawa in July, 1958, he was warned by the President that China's admission to the United Nations would cause the United
States to withdraw. These two incidents probably deterred the Pearson Government from taking any initiative to recognize China in the early 1960s.

A U.S. official has described the various exchanges between Ottawa and Washington on the subject of Canadian recognition as "conversations." Apparently, President Nixon and Prime Minister Trudeau held such "conversations" when they met for the first time in Washington in April, 1969. The U.S. Government was apparently cautious in criticizing Canada's move to negotiate with China. It is probable that the two countries had reached some kind of informal agreement before Canada started negotiating with China such as, perhaps, an agreement that Canada would insist on the independent territorial status of Taiwan, a point on which the Canadian Government held firm during the negotiations with the Peking Government. However,

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78 Peter Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 104.


80 In Washington, A U.S. State Department official said: "The U.S. Government would not like it very much, but it's your decision to make." Toronto Daily Star, December 10, 1968. General speaking, official U.S. reaction to Canadian action was low-keyed. When the Canadian Government instructed the Canadian Embassy in Stockholm in February, 1969, to contact Chinese representatives in the Swedish capital for negotiations on diplomatic recognition, the U.S. State Department commented: "We are very much concerned over the possible implications of such moves for the position of
it would be highly speculative if one concluded that the United States actually encouraged the Canadian Government to negotiate with China on diplomatic relations as a preparation for its own rapprochement with that régime. Thus, judging from the various exchanges between Ottawa and Washington on the subject of Canadian recognition, we return to the earlier conclusion that the U.S. impact on Canada's decision in 1968 was neutral.

The Japanese Government, in comparison, was confronted with a more drastic change of American attitudes towards China. President Nixon's announcement on July 15, 1971, of an official visit to China in the coming year astonished the whole world. Nixon's successful trip to China in February, 1972, apparently outpaced the Japanese Government's approach towards closer relations with China. Indeed, Japan had to re-adjust its China policy quickly in order to catch up to the rapidly changing American China policy.

Edwin Reischauer, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan

the Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) ... We are equally aware of the concern of other members of the Pacific community toward such developments." Toronto Daily Star, February 12, 1969.
from 1960 to 1966, remarked that American control of
Japanese foreign policy was a feeling which existed only
in the minds of those who assumed it. 81 However, it is
obvious that the American China policy served as guidance
for policies of the Japanese Government, at least in the
1950s and the 1960s. It was a rule for any new Japanese
Prime Minister to visit Washington before making any change
in Japanese foreign policy, particularly regarding relations
with China. 82 Although the U.S.-Japanese relationship moved
toward "partnership" rather than U.S. domination from the late
1950s on, 83 the relationship remained an unequal "partnership",
with the U.S. acting the role of big brother. Thus, Japan
was restrained from varying its foreign policy too widely

81 Edwin Reischauer, "Japan's Changing Focus", in
Elaine H. Burnell (ed.), Asian Dilemma: United States,
Japan and China, Santa Barbara, California: The Center
for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1969, p. 73.

82 For a more detailed discussion on the U.S. in-
fluence on Japanese policy toward China from the early
1950s until the mid-1960s see Shigeharu Matsumoto, "Japan
and China: Domestic and Foreign Influences on Japan's
Policy", in A.M. Halpern (ed.), Policies Towards China:
1965, pp. 123-164.

83 This new partnership was marked by the revision
of the U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty in 1960. The revised Treaty
deleted the clause permitting U.S. forces to intervene at
the request of the Japanese Government in large-scale riots
and disturbances; eliminated the requirement for Japan to
get prior consent from the U.S. for granting military rights
to any third party; and added an obligation on both parties
to settle dispute in accordance with the U.N. Charter.
from its bigger partner.

However, a new era of U.S. disengagement in the Far East since the late 1960s has changed drastically U.S.-Japanese relations. The Nixon Doctrine has awakened Japan to the fact that it can no longer rely on guaranteed U.S. military protection. Japan has been motivated to adopt a more independent foreign policy in this new era of U.S. disengagement in the Far East. Nixon's announcement in July, 1971, of his decision to visit China and his announcement a month later of the U.S. economic measures to balance the worsening deficit were a shock to Japan. The greatest shock was, indeed, the short time notice the U.S. Government gave to Japan before the announcements. Japan felt betrayed by its bigger partner and realized that no allies in the contemporary multipolar global system could be fully trusted. Japan had to stand up by itself if it was going to meet the


85 For a more detailed discussion regarding the concern with Japan's defenses amongst Japanese leaders and its impact on Japan's decision to recognize China see the discussion on the "Global System".

86 A Japanese official regarded the "Nixon Shock"
challenges of the new era. These drastic changes of the U.S. policies in the early 1970s must have been highly significant in prompting the Japanese Government to recognize China. The Japanese realized that they must "beat" the U.S. in the race of normalizing relations with China in order to avoid another U.S. "shock".

However, the impact of these drastic changes can only be properly assessed by examining the perceptions of the "Nixon Shock" by the Japanese leaders. Similarly, an adequate assessment of the impact of the U.S. factor on Canadian recognition can only be obtained by examining the attitudes of the Canadian leaders towards this factor. Mitchell Sharp remarked in 1972 that "the Canadian view of the United States in the 1950s and early 1960s was influenced in large part by the Cold War and by the conviction that U.S. leadership and active involvement in European and world affairs were essential for peace and security."^87 Pearson stated in April, 1951, that "Canada's hope for

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peace depends largely on the acceptance by the United States of responsibility for world leadership and on how that responsibility is discharged.\textsuperscript{88} This acceptance of U.S. world leadership could partly explain some of the Canadian leaders' thinking in the 1950s and early 1960s. For example, the common belief of the Diefenbaker and Pearson governments that Canadian recognition of China might deal a heavy blow to the anti-Communist front in Southeast Asia was reflection of the American elite image of the situation at that time.\textsuperscript{89} Indeed, because the maintenance of American power was regarded as a Canadian national interest rather than the obligation of a "satellite", Canadian decision-makers thought seriously before embarking on a step which might affect American prestige, even if they felt that American policy was wrong.\textsuperscript{90}

Despite the acceptance of the dominant U.S. world role, Canadian governments did diverge from U.S.

\textsuperscript{88} Pearson's speech to the Empire and Canadian Club in Toronto in 1951. See Lester Pearson, \textit{Words and Occasions}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{89} For a more detailed discussion of this perception see the previous section on "Regional System".

\textsuperscript{90} John Holmes, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 216.
China policy. When the Quemoy crisis broke out in January, 1955, Canada made no commitment to the defense of Taiwan. Pearson openly stated that the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu "are indisputably part of the territory of China" and tried to persuade the United States to release itself from these commitments.\(^{91}\) When the second Quemoy crisis broke out in 1958, the Diefenbaker Government was equally emphatic in arguing that U.S. intervention in the dispute between the two Chinese governments was a grave mistake and one which Canada could not support.\(^{92}\) However, these two incidents were merely Canadian reactions to the U.S. China policy rather than Canadian initiatives which diverged from American policy.

Both Liberal and Conservative governments stressed the importance of Canada's having a foreign policy independent from United States influence. Howard Green denied at an interview in November, 1961, that Canada had followed the United States on the issue of China and said vehemently: "If we disagreed with the U.S. we would disagree regardless of what they thought."\(^{93}\) However, the Diefenbaker Government

\(^{91}\) Ibid., pp. 62-72.
\(^{92}\) Robert Reford, Canada and Three Crises, (The Canadian Institute of International Affairs), Lindsay, Ontario: DeWolff-Deyell Ltd., 1968, p. 68.
\(^{93}\) Statements and Speeches, No. 61/16, November 14, 1961. Howard Green spoke at a CBC interview.
was cautious about "disagreeing" with U.S. China policy partly because of fear of a U.S. reaction against Canada's rapidly expanding China trade. The impact of the U.S. trade embargo policy against Communist China on American subsidiary firms in Canada was felt when the Ford Motor Company of Canada rejected inquiries regarding the possibility of selling vehicles to Communist China in December, 1957. 94 Ford, and other Canadian subsidiaries, declined to trade with China, fearing such action might put their parent companies in the United States in the position of violating the trade embargo law. Following the Ford incident, however, Diefenbaker secured assurances from the U.S. Government that it would not apply the U.S. regulations "in any way to the disadvantage of the Canadian economy." 95 Nevertheless, the U.S. concern with maintaining an embargo on China may partly explain Ottawa's hesitation about recognition. 96 Ottawa may have been

94 Robert Reford, Canada and Three Crises, Lindsay, Ontario, John Deyell Ltd., 1968, p. 55.

95 Hansard, July 11, 1958, p. 2141.

96 Another incident happened after the first wheat sales to China had been negotiated. A special type of pump needed for the loading of the grain was manufactured only in the United States and the company refused to sell any more to Canada in fear of violating the U.S. law. After consultation with the U.S. Government, an exemption was made to allow Canada to buy the pumps. Source: Robert Reford, op. cit., p. 56.
cautious in part not to irritate Washington by extending recognition to China, fearing that the latter might react by taking action against subsidiaries in Canada to the detriment of the Canadian economy. From this point of view, indeed, Canada's China trade could be argued as having been a negative factor inhibiting Canada's moves towards diplomatic relations with China.

Similarly, Pearson said in April, 1970, that Canada would have recognized China if the Canadian people had felt it was the right thing to do regardless of any vigorous reaction from the United States. However, Pearson's statement that in view of the fact that opinion was divided in Canada the Canadian Government was not going to take a step to which the U.S. was clearly opposed, was a clear indication of the negative impact of the U.S. on the Canadian policy of recognition. Indeed, according to one Liberal MP in the Pearson years, the fear of retaliation by the United States conditioned governmental attitudes on foreign policy, such as the recognition of China. "Instead of doing


98 Ibid.
things that they think are desirable or that the Canadian public may want done, our policy-makers do things that the American public or the American Government or powerful American pressure-groups want.\textsuperscript{99}

The Trudeau Government was quick to perceive the changing American attitude towards China. Mitchell Sharp remarked that the United States might have been "rather pleased that Canada was in a position to take some of these initiatives (Canada's recognition of China and its support for China's admission to the United Nations) for which they had not quite prepared their own people."\textsuperscript{100} Indeed, the U.S. factor which had been regarded as an obstacle during the previous governments appeared to be neutralized in determining Canada's China policy in the late 1960s.

Like his predecessors, Trudeau regarded the implications of U.S.-Canadian relations as an important factor to consider in the formulation of Canada's foreign


\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Hansard}, November 3, 1971, p. 9311.
policy. Trudeau once remarked that some 70 per cent of Canada's foreign policy was predetermined by the Canadian-U.S. relationship, so that the objective of the Department of External Affairs had to be to maximize her freedom of movement with regard to the remaining 30 per cent.\textsuperscript{101}

It was partly Trudeau's perception of limited Canadian manoeuvrability in its foreign policy under the shadow of its giant neighbour that motivated the Trudeau Government to take certain foreign policy initiatives. Great attention was given to the timing and the presentation of foreign policy decisions by the Trudeau Government, to ensure that the impression was not conveyed that Canada had been influenced in reaching them by U.S. pressure.\textsuperscript{102} The Trudeau Government apparently intended to "beat" the U.S. to recognition and thus reflect Canadian independence in foreign policy formulation. Thus, the timing of the Trudeau Government's announcement of May, 1968, to offer diplomatic recognition to China was well ahead of any U.S. measures to approach China in


this same regard. James Eayrs described this feeling of the Trudeau Government in the following manner:

It would in any event be a sorry day for Canada if we were to wake up one morning to discover that Mr. Nixon or Mr. Humphrey had beaten us to Peking. Perhaps the prospect of that indignity will spur the Prime Minister to action. 103

However, Canada's independent China policy was not a product of anti-Americanism. An independent approach to Canadian foreign policy was not "designed as anti-American or even as a counterbalance to the Americans," Trudeau stated. 104 The Trudeau Government perceived an increasing global interdependence and Canada's interdependence with the United States was perceived as only part of the larger issue of global interdependence. 105 An independent foreign policy and, hence, Canada's recognition of China, would thus bind Canada more closely to the wider global interdependence than the narrower interdependence with the United States.

By contrast, with the apparent Canadian interest in relations with China at different stages in the 1950s

104 Peter Dobell, op. cit., p. 150. Trudeau made this statement in May, 1971, when he was enroute to Canada from his visit to the USSR.
105 Mitchell Sharp, op. cit., p. 20.
and 1960s as related above, Japanese governments seldom attempted to diverge from the U.S. policy of non-recognition. There was no significant change in Japan's China policy in the 1950s and the 1960s. Yoshida and the subsequent Japanese Prime Ministers stressed the doctrine of "separation of economics and politics," implying that Japan would not diverge from the U.S. policy of non-recognition though Japan would expand its trade with China. One writer went so far as to suggest that even without direct pressure from the United States, Japan voluntarily restrained its action to prevent incurring American displeasure. It is probably true that Japanese governments tended to be extremely sensitive to repercussions from the United States which might have caused ruptures in the U.S.-Japanese defense partnership, as one writer suggested, and, indeed, that they viewed divergences in policy over China as the sort of action which might have affected the defense relationship.

106 Shigeharu Matsumoto, _op. cit._, pp. 128-140.
107 Michio Royama, "Why Should Japan Recognize China?" _The Japan Interpreter_, vol. 7, no. 3-4, Summer-Autumn, 1972, p. 258. This article is a translation; it was actually first published in Japanese in early 1971.
108 Shigeharu Matsumoto, _op. cit._, p. 155.
Unlike Canadian leaders, who tended to stress the independence of Canadian foreign policy from the United States, all prime ministers from Yoshida to the present have regarded cooperation with the United States as the keynote of Japanese foreign policy. Sato stated frankly in March, 1966, that the mending of the "unnatural rupture" in Peking-Tokyo relations hinged, in no small part, on a prior softening of attitudes between the United States and mainland China. Sato conferred in late 1964 with President Lyndon Johnson and the two leaders agreed to consult with each other before either nation promulgated a major switch in China policy. This could partly explain the bitter feelings among Japanese leaders against Nixon's major change in U.S. China policy in 1971, since Japan was merely informed at the last minute without any prior consultation. The Japanese leaders felt deceived, out-manoeuvred, and embarrassed.

The Japanese elite images of U.S. China policy changed dramatically after Nixon's announcement in July,

109 Ibid., p. 129.
111 Ibid.
1971, of his decision to visit China. Sato told the Diet a few days after Nixon's announcement of his willingness to go to Peking to discuss normalization of relations, including diplomatic recognition. But the Chinese Government remained silent on Sato's gesture.

The joint Sino-American communiqué, concluded after Nixon's visit in February, 1972, was a "profound shock to the leadership of the ruling party." The Japanese leaders were particularly shocked by the statement of the U.S. intention to withdraw its troops from Taiwan, and by the lack of any reference to Washington's treaty commitment to Nationalist China. Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda stated in June, 1972, that a solution to the problem of Japan's relations with China could be found regardless of who would be Prime Minister after the retirement of Sato, if Peking was prepared to engage in "really serious discussions." But the Chinese Government did not respond favorably to all these overtures by the Sato Government.

117 China's responses will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
Despite the "Nixon Shock", Sato reiterated that Japan's relations with the United States remained the "pivot" around which all Japan's international activities were carried out.\(^{118}\) Fukuda also stressed that all Japanese efforts to establish diplomatic relations with China must be based on close relations with the United States.\(^{119}\) Indeed, even Kakuei Tanaka, the new Prime Minister, said: "Our relations with the United States are as important to us as sunshine and air."\(^{120}\) After the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, Tanaka stressed that the keynote of Japanese foreign policy was to "firmly maintain the friendly relations between Japan and the United States."\(^{121}\) It thus appears that the Japanese Government's move to recognize China, like the Canadian move, was not an attempt to create a counterbalance to the U.S.

The change in images of Japanese decision-makers of U.S. China policy was highly significant in


\(^{119}\) Toronto Daily Star, March 27, 1972.

\(^{120}\) Toronto Daily Star, September 1, 1972.

\(^{121}\) The Japan Times, October 20, 1972.
the sense that it released Japan from an obligation not
to recognize China because of the U.S. policy of contain-
ing Chinese Communists and prompted the Tanaka Government
to re-adjust Japan's role to the new pattern of alliances
in the contemporary multipolar world. This awareness of
the Tanaka Government, which was strikingly similar to
the Trudeau Government's awareness of increasing global
interdependence, motivated Japan to try to maintain
equal dialogues with the United States, the USSR and
China.

Conclusion

The U.S. factor was important to both the Canadian
and Japanese recognition decisions since the two countries
were militarily and economically dependent on the United
States. Economically, Canada was more dependent than
Japan on its U.S. trade while militarily, Japan was more
dependent than Canada on U.S. protection. The U.S.
attitude towards China underwent gradual change from the
early 1960s until it was changed markedly by Nixon's
announcement of his decision to visit China in July, 1971.
Thus, the Canadian Government encountered only a modest
change in U.S. China policy from the 1950s and early 1960s
when it decided to negotiate with China on diplomatic recognition in 1968, while Japan was confronted with a major change in American China policy a year before it took progressive steps to recognize China. This more dramatic change of American China policy by the time of Japanese recognition suggests a greater U.S. impact on the course of the Japanese decision than on the Canadian decision to recognize China. However, the one year lag between the "Nixon Shock" and the actual step taken by the Japanese Government to recognize China indicated that there were some other important factors which delayed the Japanese move.

There was a strikingly similar pattern of behavior between Canadian and Japanese decision-makers towards the changing U.S. China policy. Canadian governments before the Trudeau era mostly reacted to the U.S. China policy without taking any initiatives to recognize China; likewise, both Sato and previous Japanese governments before the "Nixon Shock" felt that the United States must move before Japan could normalize its relations with China. However, the fact that Canada did take an initiative before there had been a dramatic change in U.S. policy and Japan only sometime afterwards suggests that there was also a significant difference in the pattern of behavior between the two countries.
IV. Relations with Taiwan

It is the policy of the Taiwan Government to break diplomatic relations with countries recognizing China. However, the Taiwan Government does not give up diplomatic relations without presenting protests or imposing diplomatic pressure, the degree depending on the relative impact of recognition by the country concerned on Taiwan's status. The effectiveness of Taiwan's defensive diplomatic measures depends, to a large extent, on the interdependence between Taiwan and the country intending to recognize China. Thus, since Taiwan's relationships (economic and military) with Canada and Japan were very different prior to their respective decisions to recognize China, Taiwan reacted differently to the Canadian and Japanese moves.

The influence of Taiwan on Canada's China policy was marginal in the 1950s and 1960s. The Taiwan Government presented no formal protests to the St. Laurent Government when it was inclining to approach China in the mid-1950s. Similarly, it did not present any formal protests to the Pearson Government after Canada's "One-China One-Taiwan" proposal at the UN in 1966. However, the Taiwan Government did protest a speech at the UN by Paul Martin in
1967, when he took a similar approach by cancelling a scheduled visit to Canada by Premier Yen Chia-kau.\textsuperscript{122} It is doubtful, however, if Taiwan could ever have had any significant influence on the leaders in Ottawa in their formulation of Canada's China policy. Since the Taiwan Government did not have sufficient persuasive power in the mid-1960s to stop the U.S. Government, its closest ally, from moving closer to China, it is obvious that it could not have much influence over the Canadian Government with whom its relations were never very important.

Indeed, Taiwan's reaction to the Canadian moves towards recognition clearly reflected her lack of influence on Canadian policy. After the Trudeau Government had contacted the Chinese Government for the negotiation of diplomatic relations in January, 1969, Ambassador Hsueh Yu-chi appealed to Taiwan-Canadian friendship by stating that "the Government and people of the Republic of China had nothing but friendship and goodwill toward Canada."\textsuperscript{123} "As to what Canada would do toward the

\textsuperscript{122} Taiwan's Premier had been invited by the Canadian Government to attend Expo '67.

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{The Globe and Mail}, January 28, 1969.
Republic of China, that was up to the Canadian Government and the Canadian people," Hsuëh added. This was very clearly a weak protest. As late as June, 1969, when Canada started negotiating diplomatic relations with China in Stockholm, protests from Taiwan were still weak. The Taiwan Government presented two protest notes to the Canadian Government through its embassy in Ottawa. However, no concern was expressed by politicians in Ottawa regarding protests from Taiwan. This suggests that these protests were not influential enough to arouse serious concern among politicians in Ottawa.

The passive nature of Taiwan's protests against Canadian overtures to China may partly be explained by its relatively weak bargaining power vis-à-vis Canada compared with China, as trade between Canada and Taiwan was relatively insignificant compared with Canada's trade with China. In addition, Taiwan was not in a position to threaten Canada with curtailment of its trade with)

124 Ibid.
125 Hansard, October 22, 1969, p. 11681.
126 Canada's annual total trade with China exceeded $150 million in the late 1960s, while its total trade with Taiwan was less than $60 million.
Canada as it enjoyed a favorable balance\textsuperscript{127} and deemed it important to maintain this position, since it was suffering an over-all trade deficit in the late 1960s. Indeed, the high dependency of Taiwan's economy on its foreign trade, which constitutes 50 per cent of its GNP, has led it to react passively in recent years towards many other diplomatic setbacks in addition to that in its relations with Canada.

By contrast with the Canadian case, Taiwan was relatively more concerned about Japanese moves towards rapprochement with China. Taiwan's relations with Japan were apparently more important than its relations with Canada. Japan was Taiwan's most important trading partner in the 1960s and has been replaced by the U.S. only since 1971. In addition, Japan was an important military base in the defence line for containing the Chinese Communists. A rapprochement between Japan and China was thus seen as weakening Taiwan's defence against attacks from the mainland.

Strong diplomatic pressure, instead of weak protest, was used by the Taiwan Government in the 1950s

\textsuperscript{127} Taiwan has been exporting an annual average of US$40 million of goods to Canada while importing only US$15 million of goods from Canada in the late 1960s.
and early 1960s to curb Japan's intention to move closer to China. When Peking and Tokyo concluded a trade agreement in March, 1958, providing the Chinese trade mission diplomatic privileges and the right to fly the national flag in Japan, Taipei reacted immediately and charged the Japanese Government under Kishi with the intention of establishing diplomatic relations with Peking under the guise of trade.128 The Taiwan Government demanded that the Peking trade delegates be denied the right to fly their national flag and to enjoy diplomatic privileges. When Tokyo showed no sign of yielding to Taipei's demand, the Taiwan Government suspended all commercial negotiations and contracts with Japan. The Taiwan Government mobilized its citizens at home and abroad, mainly those in Southeast Asia, to boycott Japanese commodities. The Kishi Government finally yielded to Taipei and denied the proposed trade mission of Peking the right to fly its national flag and to enjoy any privileges and official status.

This decision cost the Japanese Government the loss of virtually all trading relations with China for the succeeding four years. 129

Another example of the effectiveness of diplomatic pressure by Taiwan occurred in 1964 when the sale of a complete set of vinylon equipment to China was blocked by the Sato Government. Chiang Kai-shek had been threatening the termination of the Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty if the Sato Government violated the promise of the so-called "Yoshida Letter" 130 under which Japan's former Prime Minister Yoshida had in May, 1964, assured Taipei that the Japanese Government would not furnish any loans or guarantees from the Export and Import Bank for the export of plants on a deferred payment basis to Peking. 131 Sato yielded to Taiwan's pressure and refused to grant funds from the Export and Import Bank of Japan to finance the transaction on the grounds that that would have run counter to the "Yoshida Letter".

129 A specific incident which took place in May, 1958, in a Japanese department store at a Chinese exhibition sponsored by the Nagasaki branch of the Japan-China Friendship Association, was actually responsible for the severance of trade relations. Two Japanese walked into the store and tore up one of the Peking flags on display. Peking claimed the Nagasaki incident was staged by the Kishi Government. In retaliation, it broke off all its formal trade relations with Japan. Ibid.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
Taiwan was able to influence Japan's China policy in the 1950s and early 1960s partly because Japan was suffering an overall deficit and, thus, its trade surplus with Taiwan was more important than its trade deficit with China to its economy. The Japanese Government thus yielded to Taiwan's threats of suspending its trade with Japan in 1958. In addition, Japan was not prepared to risk the termination of the Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty, an action which would have irritated Washington. By contrast to the Japanese case, Canada was much less dependent economically on its Taiwan trade and was not tied to U.S. defence strategy in the Taiwan Strait. Canada was thus much less vulnerable than Japan to Taiwan's pressure.

However, Taiwan's influence on Japan's moves towards closer relations with China in the late 1960s and early 1970s was not much greater than its influence on the Canadian moves to negotiate with China. Taiwan's bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Japan began to deteriorate in the mid-1960s, partly because of Taiwan's increasing dependence on its trade with Japan. Taiwan almost doubled its imports from Japan in 1965 over the previous year.\textsuperscript{132} Henceforth it relied heavily on Japan for its

* Japan's trade with China was in deficit from 1950-1964 and had become in surplus only since 1965, while its trade with Taiwan was in surplus for most of the years in the 1950s and 1960s. In addition, Japan's total trade with Taiwan before-1964 was constantly larger than its total trade with China.

\textsuperscript{132} Taiwan imported $137 million and $217 million from Japan in 1964 and 1965 respectively.
supply of chemical products and other raw industrial materials. From 1968 Japan was absorbing more than one-third of the total trade of Taiwan and was supplying almost one half of Taiwan's imports. Thus, from the late 1960s it is doubtful if Taiwan could have afforded to suspend its trade with Japan to pressure it to tailor its China policy to Taiwan's wishes, as it had threatened to do in 1964.

In addition, Taiwan's deteriorating international status suffered a serious setback after China's admission to the United Nations in 1971. A general feeling prevailed in Taiwan after its expulsion from the United Nations that it was time to forget about justice and righteousness in international affairs, which the government officials had talked so much about, and to be more practical and realistic for the sake of survival in a deteriorating international environment.  

133 Taiwan's Foreign Minister Chow Shui-kai addressed the General Assembly before the vote on the Albanian resolution to seat Communist China and expel Taiwan: "The Republic of China is fighting for law and justice. It has done so many times before, often without allies and without outside aid. It is our firm conviction that right will eventually triumph over might and justice will sooner or later prevail over injustice." Windsor Star, October 26, 1972.

134 Ibid.
status in the world was undoubtedly lowered further by Nixon's China trip. The United States Government, without prior consultation with leaders in Taipei, dealt with the future of the Taipei Government and of the American Taiwan military base in talks with the Peking régime. One week before Nixon's trip to China, the Taiwan Government declared that it would "consider null and void" any agreement affecting its rights and interests that might be reached between Washington and Peking. However, it added that Taipei "trusts that the American President will live up to the solemn assurances" with regard to treaty commitments. It seems that the Taiwan Government, after these diplomatic setbacks, swallowed its pride and saved its greatest concern for matters that were clearly vital to Taiwan's survival as a sovereign entity.

These diplomatic setbacks conditioned the Taiwan Government to react pragmatically to crises. They led the Taiwan Government to realize its position was very weak and that such actions as severance of relations would

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do no good and would in fact do economic harm. Thus, it accepted the inevitable and reacted practically by doing nothing which could cause further harm, particularly the severance of trade relations. This attitude of the Taiwan Government can best be illustrated by its reactions to Japan's move to recognize China. The Taiwan Government was bitter at Tokyo's move towards diplomatic relations with China and warned repeatedly that Taiwan would retaliate if Japan normalized its relations with China. 138 The most common adjectives applied to Japan were "immoral" and "ungrateful" (recalling the generous actions of the Nationalist Government toward the Japanese at the end of World War II). 139 At the same time, however, the Taiwan Government was careful to keep anti-Japanese sentiment from reaching a point that would endanger the continuation of commercial and cultural relations with Japan when

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138 Premier Chiang Ch'ing-kuo, for example, warned that Japan's move to recognize China would be "tantamount to making Japan the enemy of all the Chinese people once again" and that could not be "tolerated" by the Government and the people of Taiwan. The Japan Times, September 20, 1972.

139 See, for example, editorials in the Central Daily News, Taiwan's official newspaper, especially the editorials on August 8 and September 18, 1972.
diplomatic ties were ended.\footnote{140} In addition, official talk of shifting Taiwan’s purchases from Japan to other markets was explained as being motivated by concern about the large trade deficit with Japan and not by political developments between Japan and China.\footnote{141}

It, thus, appears that, as in the Canadian case, Taiwan by the early 1970s was no longer a serious obstacle to Japan's move towards recognizing China. The Taiwan Government, of course, appeared to protest more strongly against Japanese than Canadian moves to recognize China. At the same time, however, Taiwan appeared cautious in both cases about keeping its protests from endangering its commercial and other relations with the two countries. Indeed, it seems that the Taiwan Government had anticipated the eventual normalization of relations between the two countries and Peking but it, nevertheless, presented strong protests (less strong protests in the Canadian case) intending less to block the Japanese and Canadian moves than to strengthen its bargaining position vis-à-vis Ottawa and Tokyo for commercial and other benefits after the two countries' recognition of China. Taiwan protested more strongly against Japanese moves than Canadian moves

\footnote{140}{The New York Times, September 24, 1972.}
\footnote{141}{Ibid.}
partly because Japanese recognition was likely to affect more seriously Taiwan's already deteriorating international status than Canadian recognition and partly because Taiwan hoped to be able to bargain for more benefits from Japan than from Canada after recognition. The Taiwan Government apparently hoped to gain more benefits from Japan than from Canada as a compensation for recognizing China since Japan had switched from a commitment to defend Taiwan against the Chinese Communist attack to a close relationship with the Communist régime, while Canada had never committed itself to the defence of Taiwan. However, it is doubtful if the Taiwan factor weighed any more heavily among Japanese decision-makers than Canadian decision-makers as a negative factor inhibiting recognition by the 1970s, though clearly it was at an earlier time a much more dominant negative factor in the Japanese than the Canadian case.

The Canadian Government showed little sympathy for the Nationalist Government when it retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Canadians were neither personally nor emotionally engaged in the post-war effort to bolster the Kuomintang régime, and there was none of the feelings of having "lost" China which deeply affected American
thinking in the 1950s. Canada had long viewed the Kuomintang as corrupt and unresponsive to public needs and this was most likely a key factor in leading it to be ambivalent about the Kuomintang's survival in the late 1940s. There was little sympathy with the Nationalists' ambitions to reconquer the mainland and strong support for all measures by Washington to "leash" Chiang Kai-shek. 

In fact, the Canadian Government tended to disapprove of the Nationalist Government in Taiwan from the very beginning and intended in late 1949 to recognize the Communist Government in Peking as the legitimate government of China. The negotiations for diplomatic relations with China were interrupted by China's intervention in the Korean War in June, 1950. However, the Canadian Government never abandoned its intention of eventually recognizing China when the "appropriate" time came. Accordingly, no embassy was ever set up in Taiwan, though

143 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
a Taiwan embassy was stationed in Ottawa until Canada recognized China.

Despite the general lack of sympathy of Canadian governments (with the probable exception of the Diefenbaker Government (1957-1963) which was particularly strongly anti-Communist) towards the Taiwan Government and the apparently weak protest from Taiwan when Canada initiated the process of recognition, the existence of Taiwan was at the heart of the Canadian dilemma regarding recognition of China. This can be explained by two Canadian principles which had been held constantly by decision-makers of Canadian governments: the belief in recognition of governments with de facto power and the belief in the desirability of granting self-determination to the people of Taiwan.

Pearson stated in October, 1949, that Canada would extend recognition to the Peking Government if and when it showed itself to be "independent of external control by any other state" and exercised "effective control over

146 Virtually all available literature on Sino-Canadian relations agrees on this point. See, for example, John Holmes, op. cit., p. 201, and F.Q. Quo and A. Ichikawa, "Sino-Canadian Relations: A New Chapter", Asian Survey, (May 1972), p. 393.
the territory" which it claimed.\textsuperscript{147} Thus, since the Peking Government insisted on claiming the territory of Taiwan over which it never had any effective control, Ottawa was caught in a dilemma, for it did not seem possible to recognize China without accepting its false claim to Taiwan. The Pearson Government tried to resolve this problem in 1966 by proposing to seat both the Peking Government and the Taipei Government at the United Nations as members representing the respective territories over which they exercised effective control.\textsuperscript{148} However, this approach proved to be unacceptable to the two Chinese governments and this clearly inhibited any Canadian move to recognize China for the time being.

Canadian recognition was further impeded by its adherence to the principle of self-determination, for Canadian governments constantly reiterated that the future status of Taiwan should be determined by the wishes of the Taiwanes people.\textsuperscript{149} To have acknowledged Peking's claim to the territory of Taiwan would, thus, not only

\textsuperscript{147}Hansard, October 25, 1949, p. 1109.

\textsuperscript{148}Statements and Speeches, No. 66/47, p. 5. Paul Martin's address to the UN General Assembly on November 17, 1966.

\textsuperscript{149}See, for example, Pearson's statement in January, 1955. The Globe and Mail, January 25, 1955. See also Paul Martin's statement to the UN General Assembly on November 17, 1965, Statement and Speeches, No. 65/28.
have been a contradiction of the principle of recognizing de facto power, but also of the principle of self-determination for the people of Taiwan.

The Taiwan factor remained the main stumbling-block during the course of negotiations on diplomatic relations with China. The Canadian Government accepted the Peking Government as the legitimate government of China since it exercised effective control over the mainland; it assured the Peking Government that Canada's official relations with Taiwan would be severed when diplomatic relation with Peking were established, since Taiwan professed to be the legitimate government of mainland China. But, the Canadian Government firmly declined to adopt any position on the status of Taiwan. Mitchell Sharp made clear the Government's stand to the House of Commons in July, 1969:

We are not promoting either a "two-China" policy or a "one-China one-Taiwan" policy. Our policy is to recognize one government of China ... We do not think it would be

150 Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 12, December, 1970, pp. 414-417. The following accounts on the course of negotiation are largely based on this statement.

151 Ibid., p. 416.
appropriate, nor would it be in accordance with international usage, that Canada should be asked to endorse the position of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the extent of its territorial sovereignty. To challenge that position would, of course, also be inappropriate. 152

Sharp's stand remained virtually unchanged during the course of negotiations with the Peking Government and some of the exact words he used earlier were reiterated by Sharp when he announced Canada's recognition of China in October, 1970. 153 Canada's final position - that of taking "note" of Peking's territorial claim to Taiwan merely reflected Sharp's stand not "to challenge that position." Thus, Canada reserved its position on the status of Taiwan.

The Taiwan factor was, therefore, an obstacle to Canadian recognition not because of any diplomatic pressure from the Taiwan Government but rather due to the belief of Canadian governments that they should not accept claims to territory which were not borne out by the facts and in situations in which the peoples involved had not had an opportunity to express their political desires.

152 Hansard, July 21, 1969, p. 11384. (Underlyings are my own.)

153 Hansard, October 13, 1970, p. 49.
In contrast to the general lack of sympathy towards the Chiang Kai-shek régime among decision-makers in Ottawa, some conservative Japanese leaders had and continue to have a strong feeling of moral obligation towards the people and the government of Taiwan.\textsuperscript{154} Chiang Kai-shek's generous treatment of the Japanese on the question of war reparations was appreciated by some Japanese leaders. They thus felt obliged to maintain a close relationship with the Taiwan Government. However, this sense of moral obligation apparently did not have any significant effect in curbing Japan's moves towards closer relations with China.\textsuperscript{155}

While in the Canadian case Taiwan was an obstacle to recognition only because of certain Canadian "principles", Taiwan was a more serious obstacle to Japan because of Japanese commitments to defend Taiwan. The Japanese governments were bound by the Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty to share the


\textsuperscript{155} The impact of this moral obligation on Japan's China policy will be discussed in more detail in the variable relating to "public opinion" in Chapter 3.
obligation of defending Taiwan with the U.S. The U.S. military bases in Japan were occasionally used by U.S. fleets patrolling the Taiwan Strait. This practice was strongly protested by the Peking Government. In addition, the Nixon-Sato joint communiqué of 1969, in which Sato agreed to include Taiwan within the defense line of Japan, existed as an obstacle when the Tanaka Government was moving towards recognizing China because of the objection to this communiqué from the Chinese Government.\(^{156}\) Japan's involvement in the defence of Taiwan thus inhibited Japan's moves towards rapprochement with China. In order to achieve eventual normalization of relations with the Chinese Government which had effective control of the mainland, the Japanese governments cautiously removed or downgraded these obstacles directly related to the Taiwan Government.

Like Canadian decision-makers, the Japanese leaders were highly skeptical about Taiwan's claim to mainland China. Indeed, Japan rejected in 1951 the Nationalist Government's claim to mainland China. This policy was reflected in former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida's

\(^{156}\) The attitude of Peking towards Canadian and Japanese moves will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter IV.
letter of December 24, 1951, to John Foster Dulles, then an adviser to the U.S. Department of State. In the letter Yoshida indicated that the terms of the proposed peace treaty with the Nationalist Government would be applied to all territories which are now or which may hereafter be under the control of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.  

By this wording the Japanese Government deliberately left the door open for the future negotiation of a peace treaty with the Chinese Government which had actual control of the mainland.

Moreover, like decision-makers in Ottawa, some Japanese decision-makers tended to perceive the Taiwanese as a separate people from people in the mainland. Former Prime Minister Kishi said in an interview in early 1963 that "Taiwanese are different from mainland people and have no interest in the mainlanders' urge to return (to mainland China)". Kishi suggested that the Taiwanese


might rise with their own leader through independent movements. The Peking Government made clear its objection to any independent Taiwanese movements. The concept of an "independent Taiwan" among some Japanese thus existed as an obstacle towards closer relations with China.\textsuperscript{159}

At the same time, Japanese decision-makers were highly concerned about peace in the Taiwan Strait, fearing that any war in the Strait might involve Japan. Kishi's successor, Hayato Ikeda, made a remark in a press interview in September, 1963, that he believed the Nationalists' hopes of retaking mainland China were wishful thinking.\textsuperscript{160} Any such effort, he added, would create war which Japan would oppose.\textsuperscript{161} Indeed, as one writer remarked, Japan had been cautious not to tie its fate to that of Chiang Kai-shek - to become involved in a war that would be of no vital interest to Japan, but which would threaten it with utter destruction.\textsuperscript{162} Thus, Japan's concern for peace in the Taiwan Strait was not with defending Taiwan but rather with ensuring Taiwan was not aggressive and

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{160} Montreal Daily Star, September 30, 1963.

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.

did not risk Japanese security. One may even speculate that the Nixon-Sato joint communique of 1969 in which the security of Taiwan was regarded as a "most important factor" for the security of Japan was in fact a price given by the Sato Government to the U.S. Government for the return of Okinawa rather than a reflection of a genuine Japanese concern for the defence of Taiwan. It, thus, appears that Japanese decision-makers in the 1950s and 1960s were not willing to take up the obligation of defending Taiwan which might have been an obstacle inhibiting Japan's rapprochement with China.

Indeed, before the normalization of relations with China, the Tanaka Government was trying to disengage from any commitment to the defense of Taiwan. Despite warnings from the Taiwan Government that the scrapping of the Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty would mean the renewal of hostility between the two countries, Foreign Minister Ohira told the Diet in August, 1972, that the Treaty would "lose effect as a natural consequence" of the normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations. At the same time, Prime Minister Tanaka said the so-called "Taiwan clause" in the 1969 Japan-U.S. joint communiqué, in which Japan committed itself to the defense

163 The Japan Times, August 10, 1972.
of Taiwan, "should be operated in the light of the fact that the Taiwan Strait was changed," implying that the question of confrontation between China and Taiwan was basically a domestic problem of China which did not require the involvement of Japan. 164  A few days later, after the Honolulu summit meeting with Nixon, Tanaka said that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was primarily intended for the defense of Japan and indicated that he felt the American commitment to Taiwan was a matter between Washington and Taipei. 165 In this manner, Tanaka tried to free Japan from any defence commitment to Taiwan and, thus, downgrade the inhibiting impact of the Taiwan factor on Japan's China policy.

The Tanaka Government bowed to China's "three principles" for the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, i.e. China's demand that (1) the Government of the People's Republic of China be recognized as the only legitimate Government of China; (2) that Taiwan be recognized as an integral part of Chinese territory; and (3) that the Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty be abrogated. 166 In return, the Chinese Government

did not challenge the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. It is probable that the Tanaka Government traded the Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty for the preservation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The Tanaka Government, thus, weighed the Taiwan factor much less than the U.S. factor when it was approaching the Peking Government for the normalization of relations between the two countries.

The Tanaka Government anticipated strong protests from the Taiwan Government when it moved to establish diplomatic relations with China. Like the Trudeau Government, the Tanaka Government was prepared to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan at the time of the normalization of Japan-China relations.\footnote{167} Etsusaburo Shiina, former Minister in Sato's Cabinet, was appointed as a special envoy to Taiwan two weeks before Tanaka's China trip to explain Tokyo's policy of establishing diplomatic relations with

\footnote{167} Tanaka told the press on August 7, 1972, that the break was "inevitable". Tanaka said: "It is most desirable that we should obtain the understanding of the Republic of China about the circumstances in which we (Japan) are placed. However, there is no country which restored relations with the People's Republic of China and at the same time maintained diplomatic ties with the Republic of China. Japan is no exception to the rule." \textit{The Japan Times}, August 8, 1972.
China. However, the "very severe" stand against the Japanese move, as reported to Tanaka by Shiina, was ignored by the Japanese Government. The Tanaka Government merely regarded the Shiina mission as one of a series undertaken with all countries involved to explain its China policy prior to recognition.\textsuperscript{168} Ohira stated that the Government would normalize relations with China on its "own responsibility" while fully taking account of findings obtained through these consultations.\textsuperscript{169} Taiwan's appeal to "morality" and "gratefulness", by recalling the generous treatment which Chiang Kai-shek had accorded to the Japanese Government, was ignored. Morality lost its appeal in an era of Realpolitik. In response to Taiwan's moral appeal the Tanaka Government merely assured Taiwan of close economic and cultural relations after recognition.\textsuperscript{170} Protests from Taiwan were, thus, ignored by the Tanaka Government and might not have been weighed more heavily by Japanese

\textsuperscript{168} The Japan Times, September 21, 1972.

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{170} Shiina assured Taiwan leaders during his special mission of close economic and cultural relations between Taiwan and Japan after Japan's normalization of relations with China.
decision-makers than Canadian decision-makers in determining their policy of recognition.

The Taiwan factor is closely linked with the impact of some domestic interest groups on the two countries' China policies. Among the most vociferous opponents of Canadian recognition were Canadian residents of Chinese origin and Chinese students in Canada. Demonstrations and protest by these pro-Taipei groups were apparently encouraged and financially aided by the Taipei Government. For example, a delegation of spokesmen for Chinese communities across Canada tried in August, 1968, to dissuade the Government from extending diplomatic recognition to the Peking Government. The delegation warned that an exchange of embassies with Peking "would fling the door wide open to a flood of Communist agents to this continent." Another attempt was made by a group of Chinese demonstrators (approximately 200) led by leaders from the pro-Taipei Chinese organization in Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal, protesting against Canada's negotiations with China in Stockholm. in October,

1969. At the same time, a petition to Prime Minister Trudeau was signed in the fall of 1969 by a group of Chinese overseas students and scholars at Canadian universities (the majority of those who signed the petition came from Taiwan) protesting Canada's move. All the above efforts were ignored by the Canadian Government and had no impact on Canada's China policy. This reflects Ottawa's low regard for Taiwan as a negative factor inhibiting Canada's China policy.

Unlike the Chinese-Canadians who had emigrated from the mainland, most of the Chinese residents in Japan came

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172 The author made a trip to Vancouver (50,000 Chinese population) and Montreal (15,000 Chinese population) in the summer of 1969 and had contacts with Chinese student leaders and Chinese community leaders. The author was impressed by the generally strong pro-Taipei feelings among the Chinese community, although pro-Peking feelings were growing rapidly, especially among the younger generation. Chinese in Toronto (20,000 Chinese population) in general had the strongest pro-Taipei feelings compared with the Chinese in other Canadian cities.

173 The author was asked to be one of the sponsors of the petition, when he was the president of the Chinese Overseas Students' Association (COSA), University of Toronto. (The author refused to take any political stand because of the non-political policy of COSA). The author later learned that the petition was signed by three hundred Chinese overseas students and scholars, somewhat less than 10% of the total population of Chinese overseas students at Canadian universities. (A survey undertaken by a task force of COSA indicated that there were about 3500 Chinese overseas students at Canadian universities in 1969, including ethnic Chinese students from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia).
from Taiwan before 1945. 

Taiwan was a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945. Many upper-class Taiwanese were educated in Japan and intermarried with Japanese. It is conceivable that the Japanese Government wanted to maintain good relations with these influential Taiwanese businessmen because of their close relations with Japan, and because the Japanese people were increasingly favorably disposed, due to their close ties with the Taiwanese, to an independent Taiwanese state. However, since most of the Taiwanese businessmen took little interest in the political life of their homeland or the conflicting appeals of their pro-Kuomintang or pro-independence ("Taiwan for the Taiwanese") compatriots, their impact on the course of Japanese recognition of


China, like the impact of the Chinese ethnic groups on Canadian recognition, was negligible.

Conclusion

The Taiwan Government made it clear to both the Canadian and Japanese governments that it would break diplomatic relations with the two countries after their establishment of diplomatic relations with the Peking Government. Despite the differences in proximity and interdependence between Taiwan and these two countries, the existence of Taiwan was the main stumbling-block inhibiting the two countries' moves toward closer relations with China though for completely different reasons. It was a stumbling-block to Canadian moves because of the belief of decision-makers in Ottawa in the importance of the principles of extending recognition to de facto power and of self-determination for the Taiwanese, principles in conflict directly with Peking's territorial claim to Taiwan. On the other hand, Japanese moves toward closer relations with China in the 1950s and 1960s were partly inhibited by Japan's close economic ties with Taiwan and its defence obligation in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan remained a negative factor to Japan's
China policy in the early 1970s, though its significance was overridden by other positive factors.

Protests from the Taiwan Government were ignored by the Canadian Government partly because they were weak and passive in tone. Taiwan's protests to Japan's moves appeared to be much more vigorous. However, the Taiwan Government tried more to appeal to morality and gratefulness by recalling Chiang Kai-shek's generous treatment of the Japanese after the surrender of Japan in the Second World War than to threaten a curtailment of economic and other relations with Japan, as it once had done in 1958. Morality lost its appeal to the new Tanaka Government. Indeed, it is doubtful if the Tanaka Government placed greater emphasis on the protests from the Taiwan Government than did the Canadian Government. Indeed, it is probable that the Tanaka Government perceived that the Taiwan Government was more concerned about its economic relations than its diplomatic relations with Japan, knowing that it was impossible for it to stem the international tide of recognition of China.

Finally, pro-Taipei groups of Canadian residents of Chinese origin and Chinese students failed to influence Canada's China policy, though they were apparently supported
by the Taiwan Embassy in Ottawa. This reflects the weak negative effect of Taiwan's protests on Canada's China policy. By contrast, Chinese residents in Japan took little interest in Japan's China policy and, consequently, their impact on the course of Japanese recognition was negligible.

In short, the Japanese Government solved its Taiwan problem by ignoring the protests from Taiwan and withdrawing its defense obligation to the Taiwan Strait, while the Canadian Government solved its Taiwan problem by ignoring the protest from Taiwan and by adopting the 'take note' formula in establishing diplomatic relations with China, whereby it reserved its position on the status of Taiwan.
V Relations with the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet factor was significant in affecting both Canadian and Japanese China policies through the Sino-Soviet dispute which strengthened multi-polarity in the global system. In addition, it was also significant, in the Japanese case, because of Japan's bilateral relations with the U.S.S.R. This section deals exclusively with the impact of the Soviet Union's bilateral relations with Japan and Canada on the two countries' policies of recognizing China.

The Soviet Union, a dominant world power, is a close neighbour of Japan. However, it did not express concern regarding Japan's China policy in the 1950s and 1960s. The Soviet Union and Japan established diplomatic relations in 1956 without a formal peace treaty because of the territorial dispute between the two countries. The islands in dispute included the Kuriles, Southern Sakhalin and other islands. This dispute of territory had been and continues to be the major obstacle to closer relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union appeared to be softening its claim on the islands when economic relations with Japan were improving in the 1960s. It agreed in 1966 to return the two smaller islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, though it refused to return the two larger islands of Kunashiri and Eterofu.\textsuperscript{179} When the Sino-American thaw and Japan's move to improve its relations with China began in the early 1970s, Moscow appeared to be reasonably flexible regarding the dispute over the Kuriles islands. The Soviet Union agreed in January, 1972, to begin negotiations with Japan on a peace treaty.\textsuperscript{180}

At the same time, the Soviet Union was eager to seek Japan's co-operation in the development of the Tyumen oil fields in Siberia. The Soviet Union needed capital as well as technology from Japan. More significantly, from the Soviet point of view, the project included the transport of Tyumen oil to Japan which would involve the building of a pipeline of several thousand miles from Irkutsk along the Chinese border to Nakhodka, on the coast of the Sea of Japan.\textsuperscript{181} This new fuel supply would greatly increase the mobility of the


\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
Soviet army along the Sino-Soviet border and, thus, antagonize Peking at a time when Japan was seeking to improve relations with China. This Tyumen oil field project would, thus, delay Japan's move to normalize its relations with China. Apparently, the Soviet Union feared that any too-rapid rapprochement between Japan and China, unless counter-balanced by an improvement in relations between Japan and the USSR, would represent a serious blow to its efforts to isolate China, and could have a bad influence on other Asian countries that the Kremlin was wooing. 182

When the Tanaka Government moved to recognize China, Moscow appeared to be highly concerned. Some leaders in Moscow urged a quick signing of a peace treaty with Tokyo before the normalization of relations between Japan and China, 183 for, among Moscow's nightmares, that of a Tokyo-Peking axis is one of the worst. It was obvious that Moscow hoped to prevent, or at least to delay, a rapprochement between Tokyo and Peking, and to offset the Sino-American thaw with an improvement in its own relations

183 The Japan Times, August 20, 1972.
with Tokyo. However, Moscow could hardly have been an obstacle inhibiting Japan's move towards closer relations with China. Moscow is probably concerned with the development of the Tyumen oil fields more for rational economic reasons than political reasons. Indeed, Japan's realpolitik manoeuvres with the Soviet Union, such as the negotiation on joint development of the Siberian oil field, might have prompted the Japanese Government to establish closer relations with China as a bargaining leverage against the Soviet Union.

The Japanese leaders perceived the eagerness of the Soviet Union to prevent Japan from being too close to China. However, it was not just rapprochement with China that was sought by the Japanese leaders, but balanced improvement of relations with both the continental giants. The Japanese Government was particularly anxious to avoid getting mixed up in the controversy between Peking and Moscow by being on good terms with one and bad or indifferent relations with the other. Trying to avoid offending either the Soviet Union or China, the Japanese Government proclaimed its desire to improve relations with both China and the Soviet Union.

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184 Robert Guillain, op. cit.

185 Three weeks after the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, Ohira flew to Moscow to begin formal negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Ohira assured the Soviet leaders that the normalization of the Sino-Japanese relations was not intended to impair the interests of third countries. The Japan Times, October 25, 1972.
ironically, despite the Soviet attempt to delay Japan's move to normalize its relations with China, the Soviet factor may have been significant in motivating Japan towards taking more progressive steps to establish diplomatic relations with China.

By contrast, the bilateral relations between Canada and the Soviet Union were not significant in affecting Canada's China policy. Canada maintains a cordial relationship with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had tense relations with China, including serious border disputes in the late 1960s, when Canada was deciding to recognize China. Moscow was informed by Ottawa of Canada's decision to recognize China. However, the Soviet Union did not express any concern with respect to Canada's action. It, thus, appears that unlike the Japanese case, the impact of the Soviet factor on Canada's recognition of China was negligible.

186 When Mitchell Sharp was asked in the House of Commons in March, 1969, regarding the Soviet response to Canada's move to negotiate with China, Sharp replied in the following manner: "The Soviet was informed, as many other countries were, of our intention to have discussions with the Peking régime. But there was no reaction other than to thank us for the information." Hansard, March 5, 1969, p. 6249.
Conclusion

The impact of the Soviet Union’s bilateral relations with Japan on the latter’s China policy was negligible in the 1950s and 1960s, but became significant in the early 1970s. The Soviet Union was a positive factor motivating the Japanese Government towards normalization of relations with China because, ironically, of its eagerness to improve its relations with Japan and to delay Japan’s rapprochement with China. Japanese decision-makers were cautious to balance Japan’s bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and China. Thus, the Soviet Union’s eager wooing of Japan prompted Japan to speed up its process of normalizing relations with China. By contrast, the impact of Canada’s bilateral relations with the Soviet Union on Canada’s China policy in the last two decades was only negligible.
Conclusion

Having completed the examination of the different external variables, this section compares their impact on the course of the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China by using the mode of measurement set out in the introduction. Japanese decision-makers encountered a higher degree of change in external environmental factors than did their counterparts in Canada when the two countries were in the process of recognizing China. Table I shows that Canadian decision-makers encountered no "high change" of the environment while Japanese decision-makers were confronted with "high change" of the environment with respect to the "global system" and "relations with the U.S.". Canadian decision-makers were confronted with "low change" of the environment in relation to the "global system", the "regional system" and "relations with the U.S." while the Japanese decision-makers were confronted with "low change" of the environment in relation to the "regional system" and relations with Taiwan and the U.S.S.R.

Finally, the external environment with respect to the
### TABLE I

Change in External Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Change</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Low Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Global System</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Regional System</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Relations with the U.S.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Relations with Taiwan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Relations with the U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bilateral relations with Taiwan and the U.S.S.R. was virtually constant for Canadian decision-makers.

Table II also shows that variables in the external environment being examined in this study appear to have been more "significant" in affecting Japanese than Canadian recognition, with the exception of the variables relating to the "global system" and "relations with the U.S.". It appears that the external environment in relation to the "global system" was slightly more significance to Canada's China policy than Japan's.
TABLE II

Significant of the External Environment

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Highly Significant</th>
<th>Negligible</th>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Regional System</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Relations with the U.S.</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Relations with Taiwan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Relations with the USSR</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The U.S. factor was equally "highly significant" to the two countries' China policy, while the Taiwan factor was slightly more significant for Japanese than Canadian policy though it was almost equally "highly significant" for both. By contrast, the Soviet factor was "highly significant" to Japan only. Finally, the environment in the "regional system" was not significant for
Japan's China policy and was only of "negligible" significance for Canada's China policy.

By weighting the "change" and the relative "significance" of the various external environmental factors, it is possible to rank the relative "impact" of these variables on the two countries' decisions to recognize China as shown in Table III. It appears that the U.S. factor had the highest possible impact on the Japanese decision as well as considerable impact (though

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Regional System</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Relations with the U.S.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Relations with Taiwan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Relations with the USSR</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For the Scheme of weighting see Chapter I.
less than that on Japan) on the Canadian decision. The environment in the "global system" also had a high impact on the two countries' decision. By contrast, the environment in the "regional system" apparently had the least impact affecting both the Canadian and Japanese decisions. The Taiwan and the Soviet factors had considerable impact on the Japanese decision only, while their impact on the Canadian decision was only marginal. It, thus, appears that the external environment had more impact on the Japanese than the Canadian decision to recognize China. This analysis suggests that Japan was being "penetrated" to a larger extent than Canada by foreign influence regarding this specific foreign policy decision.

However, this still does not explain why there was a three-year lag between Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China. The key point in answering this question is the nature of the variables as impediments or stimulants to recognition as perceived by the decision-makers. Table IV shows that the external environment in relation to the "regional system" and the U.S. factor was perceived as unfavorable to recognition by the Canadian decision-makers before 1968, but was perceived as favorable (neutral in the case of the U.S. factor) to recognition in
TABLE IV

Characteristics of the External Environment with Respect to the China Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Japan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Global System</td>
<td>Positive</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Negative - before 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Regional System</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Negative - before 1968)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral (Negative - before 1971)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Relations with the U.S.</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Negative - before 1968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Relations with Taiwan</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Neutral - before 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Relations with the USSR</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Neutral - before 1971)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1968 when the decision to recognize China was made. Canada, thus, encountered little obstacle (with the exception of the Taiwan factor) when it made its decision of recognition.

By contrast, all variables in the external environment
before 1971 were perceived by Japanese decision-makers as unfavorable to recognition, and were perceived as favorable (with the exception of the Taiwan factor) when the decision to recognize China was made in 1971. Thus, the three-year lag between Canadian and Japanese decisions can partly be explained by the differences in perception of the nature of the external environment by the decision-makers in the two countries.

It is important to note, however, that the nature of the external factors did not suddenly overnight become positive to the decision-makers. The year of 1968 or 1971 was not necessarily a sharp dividing line between the positive and the negative nature of the factors. For example, the U.S. factor was probably neutralized in the mid-1960s when the United States began to extend overtures to China. The neutral nature of the U.S. factor was only felt more strongly in 1968 than before by the Canadian decision-makers and, thus, had a great impact on Canada's decision to recognize China.

Finally, it is interesting to note that Taiwan was perceived as a negative factor and regarded as (though for completely different reasons) significant by the decision-makers in the two countries during the course of decision-making. It was largely due to the change of
attitude of China to which the policy decision was directly related that the influence of the Taiwan factor was reduced in importance. The negotiations on diplomatic relations between the Canadian Government and the Chinese Government might have continued indefinitely if the latter had insisted on Canadian acceptance of its territorial claim to Taiwan. Likewise, the Japanese Government might not have decided to recognize China if the Chinese Government had insisted on the ending of all commercial and other relations between Japan and Taiwan. Thus, the attitude of the target country towards the external environmental variables may have affected the decision — as well as the outcome of the negotiations — on recognition.
CHAPTER 3

INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
The relative impact of the internal variables of the environment on the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China is compared in this chapter. The internal variables include domestic public opinion (including press opinion), inputs of economic interest groups and opposition elites, and the role of the bureaucracy and political tradition (i.e. values of governing elite) on the course of the decision-making regarding recognition. The comparison stresses aspects of the domestic environment which may have directly affected the two countries' decisions to recognize China rather than the effects of the domestic setting on the two countries' general foreign policy decision-making.
I  Public Opinion

This section compares specifically Canadian and Japanese public opinion, including press opinion, and their relative impact on the formulation of policies in the two countries with respect to the recognition of China.

For a time, relations with China, more than any other foreign policy issue, became, in the public eye, the criterion for measuring Canada's independence in international affairs. One writer has pointed out that Canada's relations with China were continuously the focus of most public concern regarding international affairs in the 1950s and early 1960s. Approximately one-third of the letters on foreign policy received by either the Department of External Affairs or the External Affairs Minister's office were on the subject of China. A Gallop poll conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion in 1959 showed that only 32% of the public was in favor of establishing diplomatic relations with


2 Maureen Appel, Canadian Attitudes to Communist China, (M.A. Thesis), McGill University, 1964, p. 57. Appel, however, did not indicate the proportion between the positive and negative responses.
China while some 44% of the public was opposed to recognition. However, the favorable public response had increased remarkably by the time of another poll conducted in 1964. The respective figures for those favoring and those opposed were 51% and 33% in the 1964 poll. From that point, the general public was fairly consistent in its opinions regarding the diplomatic recognition of China. In other words, polls never indicated an overwhelming majority favoring recognition.

Among the various interest groups in Canada, religious groups were the ones which manifested the most concern about diplomatic relations with China though the attitudes of different groups were contradictory. The Roman Catholic Church was strongly against the Peking Government during the early months of Communist control of the


4 Ibid.

5 Opinion polls conducted in 1966 and 1969 showed that almost the same percentage of the respondents favored recognition while the percentage of those opposed to recognition had dropped to 28%. Ibid.
mainland because of the imprisonment of Canadian missionaries in China. 6 However, the views of ex-missionaries (both Catholic and Protestant) tended to be divided. 7 For the most part, they regarded what was happening in China in sorrow rather than in anger. 8 Most of the ex-missionaries hoped that they could one day return to China when political stability was established in that country and were opposed to the policy of isolating China from the international community. In fact, the United Church of Canada consistently urged the need for understanding and tolerance, while the Catholic Church, apart from the period immediately after Communist ascendancy, did not put up a solid and active front against dealings with China. 9 It is difficult to assess the impact of religious groups, particularly the Catholic Church in Quebec on Canada's China policy. However,

6 The Globe and Mail, September 11, 1951. It was reported that there were 275 Canadians in China, mostly missionaries, and seven were in prison. The Canadian Government protested Peking's treatment of the missionaries through the British diplomatic channel.

7 John Holmes, op. cit., p. 212.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid. However, some writers have suggested that the denunciation of Communism by the Roman Catholic hierarchy explains in part the long delay in the recognition of the Communist regime in Peking. See Dale Thomson and Roger Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1971, p. 13.
one can speculate that, since Pearson himself was an Anglican and, hence, did not have strong personal links with the Catholic Church, Pearson might have been sensitive to negative reactions from Quebec Catholics. By contrast, since Trudeau himself is a Catholic and has strong personal links with the Catholic Church in Quebec, he may have been less sensitive to negative reactions from that source. Thus, the negative reaction from the Catholic Church in Quebec towards Canada's policy of recognition of China may have had more impact on the formulation of Pearson's China policy than on Trudeau's.

The strongest proponents of the recognition of China were, however, individual members of the informed public. For example, Chester Ronning, a long time sympathizer with the Chinese Communist movement and a former Canadian diplomat, said in October, 1966, that Canada should grasp the chance provided by its trade to establish diplomatic relations with China.¹⁰ Ronning argued that world peace could not be assured if

¹⁰ The Globe and Mail, October 12, 1966.
China were ignored. Ronning's vigorous advocacy of the establishment of diplomatic relations with China probably did not have decisive impact on the course of Canadian policy. However, his arguments doubtless aroused some public and governmental interest in view of the fact that he was widely regarded as one of Canada's few China experts. Another strong proponent of Canadian recognition was Escott Reid, also a former diplomat. Reid urged in 1967 that the Canadian Government lead a crusade for the ending of the isolation of China. He suggested that Canada's recognition could contribute to the "long laborious task of reaching a modus vivendi between the rest of the world and China." Again, Reid's outlook may have carried some public and government weight given his elevated status in government and later in public life. In addition, most of the academics proposed earlier Canadian recognition which may also have carried

11 Ibid.
12 Ronning spoke frequently on campus at Canadian universities as well as at national and international conferences on China.
14 Ibid., p. 180.
some public and government weight. 15

Japanese attitudes towards the China problem were much more complex than Canadian attitudes. Most writers agreed that Japan was closely tied to China by cultural affinities. Yoshikazu Sakamoto, for example, suggested that a sense of close cultural affinity with China made the Japanese the most pro-Chinese of all peoples. 16 These feelings of cultural affinity caused the Japanese to develop the view that they, of all people, best understood Chinese thinking and behavior. According to A.M. Halpern, underlying the urge toward a more positive approach to relations with China was the conception that the Chinese were reasonable and realistic in dealing with practical problems. 17 However, since very strong


cultural affinity existed only in pre-war Japanese "China hands", the cultural factor became with time less and less of a driving force behind the movement to restore diplomatic relations with China.\(^{18}\)

In addition to the feeling of cultural affinity, many Japanese had a sense of moral obligation towards China. This sense of moral obligation arose from the conviction that Japan must atone for past aggression, and since the war was fought on the continent, mainland China, rather than Taiwan, must be the beneficiary of that settlement.\(^{19}\) However, like cultural affinity, this moral viewpoint did not have the same persuasive power over younger Japanese with no wartime experience.\(^{20}\)

An opinion poll conducted in December 1968, showed that the Japanese public was moderately in favor of establishing diplomatic relations with China, while at the same time maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan.\(^{21}\) A significant minority (47\%) of public


\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid. See also Yoshikazu Sakamoto, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

opinion favored diplomatic relations with China, while only a small minority (17%) was opposed to such moves. It is interesting to note that the percentage of respondents who answered "Don't Know" (36%) was much higher than for Canadian respondents (20%) with respect to the China issue. This suggests that the so-called cultural affinity idea may not have been very significant in arousing the interest of the Japanese public in establishing closer relations with China. At the same time, when those in favor of recognition of China were asked if they wanted to continue diplomatic relations with Taiwan, an overwhelming majority (85%) favored such a policy position. It thus appears that the Japanese public was caught in the dilemma of favoring diplomatic relations with both the Peking and the Taipei Governments in the late 1960s when this was not, in fact, a practical solution. This casts doubt on the impact of public opinion on the formulation of Japan's China policy.

Significantly, as indicated in the same poll, a clear majority (74%) of university graduates favored

22 Ibid. There is no comparable data for the Canadian public.
diplomatic relations with China. However, the majority (81%) of those intellectuals who favored diplomatic relations with China also wanted to continue diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Intellectuals are generally respected in Japanese society. Their position in favor of establishing closer relations with China, thus, probably had a great impact on the thinking of the general public. However, their preference for diplomatic relations with both Peking and Taipei again meant that they exerted no strong pressure on the Government's formulation of its China policy.

In addition, Marxism has had a strong influence in Japanese universities and has provided a theoretical basis for the thinking of "progressive" intellectuals. Capitalism, on the other hand, has been regarded as the cause of war by these "progressive" intellectuals and, therefore, a common anti-American feeling has existed among

23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Donald Hellman, *Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics*, op. cit., p. 11.
them. China has, thus, been regarded as a "fighting friend" against the "common enemy of American imperialism" and a fellow "peace force" against American militarism. Most "progressive" intellectuals have regarded the Chinese Communist revolution as the model for Asian nationalist movements. Thus, many intellectuals who might be against a Communist government in Japan, nevertheless have accepted the establishment of a Communist government in China, because this government has successfully transformed China into a powerful and unified nation.

Yoshikazu Sakamoto, for example, believed that whether Japan liked it or not, China would become a great nation and all Japan could do was to find an accommodation with it. Thus, like the informed public in Canada, a strong pro-Peking feeling prevailed in informed public circles in Japan which may have carried some weight during the formulation of Japan's China policy.

27 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 392.
30 Ibid.
The Canadian press, on the whole, tended to favor recognition of the Peking régime, but one writer has noted that few newspapers or journals expressed carefully formulated and persuasive arguments in support of their stand.\textsuperscript{32} There was little difference between the English-language and the French-language press on the issue of recognizing China.\textsuperscript{33} It was only in the very early period after the Chinese Communist took over the mainland that the press was "neutral" on recognition. There was general agreement among the Canadian press that Canada, unlike Britain, could afford to wait for a more appropriate time to recognize China because Canada had no territory near China and had very little trade with it.\textsuperscript{34} However, there was some concern expressed by the press that the policy of non-recognition might throw the Chinese Communists directly into the arms of the Russians.\textsuperscript{35}

After the Peking Government proved that it had firm control over the mainland, the Canadian press

\textsuperscript{32} Maureen Appel, op. cit., pp. 113-114.
\textsuperscript{33} John Holmes, op. cit., p. 214.
\textsuperscript{34} See, for example, The Globe and Mail, October 26, 1949.
\textsuperscript{35} The Ottawa Journal, February 17, 1950.
moved quickly from its neutral position to a pro-recognition position which was then adhered to consistently throughout the fifties and the sixties. The Canadian press criticized the lack of an independent China policy on the part of Canadian governments and also what it viewed as submissiveness to U.S. China policy. 36 Even during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, when pro-China voices were generally quiet, the influential Globe and Mail pressed for Canadian recognition. Charles Taylor, the Globe and Mail's former correspondent to Peking, argued that a Canadian decision to recognize China might encourage other Western countries to follow suit, influence opinion in the United States, and indicate to the Chinese that the attitude in the outside world was not necessarily hostile. 37 In short, the Canadian press helped to create a generally favorable domestic climate for recognition of the Peking Government by the time the Trudeau Government decided to recognize that government.


37 The Globe and Mail, April 21, 1967.
in 1968.

The Japanese press, like the Canadian press urged the Government to normalize relations with China. Indeed, the Japanese press may even have played a more important role than the Canadian press in affecting the formulation of the policy of recognition. At the beginning of the seventies, a huge "press campaign" was underway by Japan's "big three" newspapers - Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, and Yomiuri Shimbun - urging recognition of China. Asahi Shimbun, with a daily circulation above six million, ran a series of long commentaries in January, 1971, titled "Now is the Time for Policy-change - Recognize China". The Sato Government was criticized by the "big three" for taking no steps to normalize relations with China. Thus, virtually all newspapers supported Tanaka's ultimate decision to normalize relations with China, although some newspapers warned that the Government should be cautious in its moves towards

To summarize, the press generally agreed that normalization of Sino-Japanese relations would contribute to peace and stability in Asia and in the world; would elevate Japan's status in the contemporary multipolar world; would mark the beginning of Japan's new "independent" diplomacy; and would put an end to the internal debate on the China issue which had divided the public and political parties. The view was strongly maintained in some quarters that diplomatic relations with Taiwan should be abrogated once Sino-Japanese ties were resumed. As in the Canadian case, the overwhelming support from the press for the Government's moves towards diplomatic relations with China helped to create a favorable attitude among the public and paved

41 The Sankei Shimbun, for example, emphasized that the normalization of Japan-China relations should not be achieved through Japan's acceptance of China's unilateral demands; the principle of mutual benefits and reciprocal concessions should be maintained. From the "Press Comments", The Japan Times, September 25, 1972.

42 The summary is drawn from the "Press Comments" of Japanese press in The Japan Times from July to September, 1972.

a smooth way for the Tanaka Government's recognition.

It is difficult, if indeed possible, to assess the efficacy of public opinion on government decision-making. Actions of decision-makers may reflect public opinion, but they are not necessarily the product of public opinion. Decision-makers may lead or follow public opinion and they may use public opinion as a bargaining lever vis-à-vis external pressures. Pearson, for example, stressed that Canadian public opinion on the China issue was too divided to be a lever vis-à-vis the negative impact of the U.S. factor. According to Pearson, it was precisely because there was a "very real division of opinion in Canada" on this subject of recognition that his Government was hesitant to take any action. 44 Pearson explained in April, 1970, his Government's inaction to recognize China in the following manner:

If you are not sure in your own country what you ought to do and you know that in doing it you would arouse a very strong and hostile reaction in the United States that is an additional factor which has to be taken into account in the decision you ultimately make. 45


45 Ibid. Pearson used the same argument in 1957 when
Pearson's explanation was either based on a misperception of public opinion or was merely an excuse for inaction. Although there was no strong pressure from the domestic sector on the Government for diplomatic relations with China, the domestic environment was clearly in general favorable to such moves by the time Pearson came to power and remained favorable during the rest of the Pearson years. Moreover, the probability of a "very strong and hostile reaction" from the United States was very remote indeed since the U.S. Government itself was by that time making overtures towards the Peking Government. The argument of divided public opinion, thus, appears to have been used by the Pearson Government as "noise" to confuse the issue of recognition. The fact that public opinion was deliberately misrepresented suggests that the Pearson Government was not much influenced by it in determining its China policy.

It is doubtful if the Canadian public had a greater impact on the Trudeau Government in the formulation

Cont'd.

45 public opinion was much more clearly divided. Perhaps (as is often the case), he was slow to detect the public change. Pearson said in 1957: "The advantages from recognition are surpassed by the disadvantages of having a first-class row with the United States over a matter on which public opinion in our own country is strongly divided." Quoted from Robert Reford, Canada and Three Crises, CIIA Lindsay, Ontario: John Deyell Ltd., 1968, p. 21.
of its China policy, although the Trudeau Government appears to be more in tune with public opinion than the Pearson Government was. Trudeau said in May, 1968, that his Government would search for "new approaches, new methods, new opportunities." 46 Trudeau added: "In that search we shall be seeking the views of Canadians, and particularly of those with expert knowledge, in the universities and elsewhere." 47 Struggling for an independent foreign policy is essential for casting off the dominating shadow of Canada's giant neighbour, or in Trudeau's words, "for the survival of Canada's as a federal and bilingual sovereign state." 48 Thus, recognition of China was a way of demonstrating Canada's independence in foreign policy, which had been consistently urged by the press and the attentive public. 49 Nevertheless, we cannot, therefore, conclude that the


47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 See, for example, Stephen Clarkson (ed.), An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, Toronto: The University League for Social Reform, 1968. The editor concluded that Canada should choose an independent approach towards its foreign affairs because of the changing international environment. The breakdown of the monolithic unity of both the Communist and Western blocs had given middle powers like Canada greater margins for independent manoeuvre, Clarkson suggested. p. 254.
Trudeau Government's initiative to recognize China was primarily motivated by the Canadian public, just because the Government's move corresponded with public attitudes towards the China issue. All that can be said with certainty is that the Trudeau Government, unlike its predecessors, did not use public opinion (which was constant with respect to the China issue from the early 1960s) as an excuse for a policy of non-recognition.

Post-war Japanese Prime Ministers, most of them ex-bureaucrats, have paid little attention to public opinion. The tradition of kansou mimpi (officials honoured, people despised) is still strong. 50 A long history of self-conscious aloofness among politicians and bureaucrats has kept government officials from close contact with the public. 51 Similarly, few Prime Ministers have trusted the press. Kishi once remarked that Japanese newspapers were so bad he only read the sports page, while Sato refused occasionally to answer reporters' questions on the grounds that the press was biased against him. 52

50 Donald Hellman, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics, op. cit., p. 13.
51 Ibid.
Nevertheless, Japanese decision-makers generally acknowledged the influence of the press, which was dominated by leftist editors and writers, in arousing a favorable attitude among the public towards closer relations with China.  

It is probable that Tanaka, who is not an ex-bureaucrat, pays more attention to the public opinion than his predecessors. Tanaka is generally considered as a more positive and more outward-looking leader and thus more approachable by the public and the press, than his predecessors. The Tanaka Cabinet enjoyed high popularity among the public and the press during the first few months in office. At the same time, a majority (63%) of the public agreed with Tanaka's plan to visit China. However, as in the Canadian case, we cannot assess accurately the efficacy of public opinion in the formulation of the Japanese decision to recognize


54 J.A. Stockwin, op cit., p. 81.

55 The Japan Times, September 10, 1972. An opinion poll conducted in early August, 1972, showed that the Tanaka Cabinet was supported by 46% of the public, a sharp increase over the 18% for the former Sato Cabinet. A 46% popularity rate is generally considered high in Japan. The ruling LDP enjoyed the same popularity rate in the 1972 general election.

56 Ibid.
China. Thus, we cannot compare precisely the relative impact of public opinion on the two governments' China policies, although we can conclude that the two governments were relatively free of domestic public pressure when they were in the process of changing their policies towards China.

Conclusion

The Canadian and Japanese publics were in general favorably disposed to the recognition of China, but there was never overwhelming support among the public in either country. The Japanese attitude towards the China problem was much more complex than the Canadian attitude, since most of the Japanese wanted to have diplomatic relations with both the Peking and Taipei governments, whereas in the Canadian case the public expressed little concern with the status of Taiwan. The attentive public in the two countries was more enthusiastic than the general public towards closer relations with China. However, above all domestic sectors, the press in the two countries appeared to be the most enthusiastic in urging closer relations with China. In comparison, the Japanese press may have been more influential in arousing public opinion than the Canadian press
because of its more persistent urging of recognition (partly due to the left wing nature of the press).

It appears that public opinion became generally more favorable to recognition by the time the Canadian and Japanese governments were deciding to recognize China, though the degree of change was slightly "higher" in the Japanese than the Canadian case. However, it is almost impossible to assess the impact of public opinion on the formulation of policies in the two countries.
II Economic Interest Groups

This section examines the impact of domestic economic interest groups on the formulation of Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China. Foreign trade is important both to Canada and Japan, constituting as high as 25% of Canada's GNP and 20% of Japan's GNP.\(^{57}\) However, some writers have tended to give less weight to trade as a positive factor moving Canada towards closer ties with China since trade with China at a substantial level had proven possible without recognition.\(^{58}\) Nevertheless, other scholars have maintained that Canada's recognition of China was motivated partly by her yearning for the promotion of trading relationships between the two countries.\(^{59}\) Increasing Canadian exports in the 1960s to China were, according to John Holmes,

\(^{57}\) The following figures on trade are based on the annually published *United Nations Statistical Papers*.


probably the decisive factor in creating what at least seemed to be a solid majority opinion in favor of recognizing the Peking regime.\textsuperscript{60} Similarly, there is also no general agreement among scholars regarding the relative significance of the trade factor on Japanese recognition. Some consider that the eagerness for China trade grew out of nostalgia for the pre-war days when the Chinese continent was Japan's foremost market, but that with time the enthusiasm waned as this trade lost its relative importance and Japan became less dependent on its China trade.\textsuperscript{61} However, some writers maintain that the enthusiasm for sharing in the China market never subsided and that there were, indeed, throughout the post-war years, pressures for improving Sino-Japanese relations from business circles.\textsuperscript{62}

It is true that China's trade may not be essential to Canada or Japan in the short run. Canada's exports to mainland China constitute less than 1% of Canada's total trade, while its imports from mainland China are negligible in percentage terms. Even Japan's trade with mainland China, a considerably larger amount than that between


\textsuperscript{61} See, for example, Michio Royama, "Why Should Japan Recognize China?", \textit{The Japan Interpreter}, Vol. 7, No. 3-4, Summer-Autumn, 1972, p. 260.

Canada and China, has never exceeded 3.5% of Japan's total trade during the post-war years. Nevertheless, China is the world's most populous nation and is progressing steadily towards being an industrialized state. China will likely become a major market for world trading nations within the next two decades on the basis of its present rate of economic growth.\(^{63}\) China has made clear its policy that it will not separate politics from economics. Thus, it is probable that Canadian and Japanese decision-makers were thinking of future potential trade with China rather than immediate benefits when they weighed the economic factor in determining their policies towards recognition of China.

Canadian attitude towards the recognition of China appeared to change significantly after successful Canadian wheat sales to China in the early 1960s. The proportion of the public favoring recognition increased from 32% in 1959 to 51% in 1964.\(^{64}\) When the Canadian public

\(^{63}\) It is estimated that China's GNP has been increasing by a 10% annual growth rate since 1970. See China Trade Report, January, 1972, p. 8.

\(^{64}\) For discussion on public opinion regarding recognition see pp. 133-134.
was asked in an opinion poll conducted in 1962 if it thought that Canada should or should not sell grain to China, a clear majority (65%) of the public answered positively. 65 Significantly, the poll also showed that leading businessmen (88%), trade union leaders (90%) and political leaders (65%) were all overwhelmingly in favor of selling grain to China. Thus, John Holmes is probably correct in suggesting that increasing Canadian exports in the 1960s to China helped to create a majority opinion in favor of recognizing that country.

Among the Canadian economic interest groups which were concerned about the China issue, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture was particularly prominent due to its interest in selling grain to China. As early as 1959 the Federation urged the Government to recognize China and argued that recognition would ease difficulties in selling wheat and other grains to that country. 66 However, this pressure from the Federation of Agriculture was not reinforced by similar pressure from other business interest groups. The Chinese were mainly interested in buying


wheat from Canada; markets in China for other commodities were too small to make China a focus of attention of the Canadian corporate world. Indeed, what interest there was in China from the business world tended to be negative in nature; there were, for example, occasional protests from textile manufacturers in Quebec through their representatives in Ottawa, 67 against Chinese textile imports, although China failed even to fulfill the $7 million quota allotted it for imports of textiles under the 1963 wheat sales agreement. Thus, the net impact of pressure from Canadian agricultural and manufacturing groups on the course of Canadian recognition was marginal. This suggests that the business community on the whole, may have been significant only in so far as it played a part in making public opinion move increasingly in favor of recognition.

Like the Canadian public, the Japanese public was also highly in favor of trade relations with China. An

67 See, for example, Maurice Allard's warning in 1966 that the textile industry in Quebec was faced with considerable and gradually increasing problems as a result of textile imports from Japan and China. Allard is a Conservative MP from Sherbrooke in Quebec. Hansard, April 26, 1966, p. 4315.
opinion poll conducted in 1958 showed that a great majority (82%) of the Japanese public favored increased trade with China, while only 3% was opposed to such a move. Subsequent polls conducted by the press showed that fewer than 5% of any sample ever favored a ban on trade with China, while a great majority wanted as much trade as possible. Thus, as in the case of the Canadian public, Japanese public support of trade with China may also have helped to create a generally favorable public opinion towards recognizing that country.

Unlike Canadian businessmen, Japanese businessmen were in general keenly interested in trade with China. Trade between China and Japan had been and continues to be carried on under the so-called "L-T Memorandum" trade agreement and the "friendly firms" informal agreement. "L-T Memorandum" trade was and is associated with big business, while the so-called "friendly firms" trade was and is largely small business trade closely related to


70 A long range trade agreement signed in 1962 between Tatsumosuke Takasaki and Liao Ch'eng-chih, the "L-T Memorandum" agreement is subject to renewal annually.
leftist organizations in Japan. From the signing of the "L-T Memorandum" agreement in 1962 to the 1970s, the proportion of total Sino-Japanese trade carried on under this agreement steadily decreased; it constituted merely 17% of total trade in 1969, a sharp decrease from 47% in 1963. On the other hand, the proportion of trade classified as "friendly firms" trade increased steadily in the 1960s and constituted 83% of total trade in 1969, a remarkable increase from 53% in 1963. This was apparently the result of deliberate actions taken by the Peking Government as a protest against the Sato Government and Japanese big business for having close relationships with the American "Military-Industrial Complex" and as a tactic to force the big business to support recognition. Thus, faced with having a declining proportion of the China trade some big businesses were anxious for recognition to improve their trade positions. However, it was an


72 Ibid.


open secret that some big Japanese companies which were out of favor in Peking had exported to China through dummy companies. On the whole, Japanese big business appeared to be satisfied to carry on a limited amount of trade with China in the late 1960s while maintaining trading relations with Taiwan at the same time. Apparently, the fear that trade with Taiwan, which was more important than trade with China to Japanese big business, might be jeopardized by recognition of China partly deterred big business to press for recognition in the 1960s.

However, the situation changed drastically in the early 1970s. Chou En-lai stated in October, 1971, that the so-called "friendly firms" list need not necessarily be limited to leftist firms and that China welcomed trade with all those businessmen who wanted to restore diplomatic relations between Japan and China. Big business, which was largely shut out of trade with China in the late 1960s because of its suspected association with the American "Military-Industrial Complex", was permitted by the Peking Government to resume business

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with China in late 1971 and early 1972 if the firms supported recognition. The softened Chinese attitude in the early 1970s reduced the fear among big business that the Peking Government might demand that it stop trade with Taiwan as a condition of recognition. Indeed, a "China boom" grew among Japanese businessmen from late 1971 and reached its peak in mid-1972.

Japan's Association for the Promotion of International Trade forecast in July, 1972, that trade between China and Japan in 1977 would amount to $5,050 million, or 5.6 times the figure for 1971, if the two countries' relations were normalized. It also pointed to the importance of China as a prime source of raw materials, such as oil and iron ore. The prospects of trade with China were enhanced by an almost 30% increase of trade between the two countries in the first half of 1972.

77 For example, Nippon Steel, Japan's largest steel producer, was shut out of trade with China in 1970 because of its suspected association with the "Military-Industrial Complex". It was permitted to resume business with China in late 1971. See China Trade Report, (January 1972), p. 9.


79 Ibid.
over that of the first half of the preceding year. It seems that China had by the early 1970s replaced Taiwan in terms of trade importance - at least with respect to potential - leading Japanese big business to shift from a pro-Taiwan to a pro-Peking point of view. Accordingly, business circles urged the Government to extend long-term export credits to China, in hopes that Sino-Japanese economic interflows would be stimulated by such offers of credit. A large number of Japanese trade missions, largely composed of representatives of big business, visited China in 1972, preceding Tanaka's China trip, for the purpose of increasing Sino-Japanese trade. Thus, it seems that Japan's "China boom" must have had a great impact in affecting Japan to move rapidly to recognize China in 1972.

80 The Japan Times, August 26, 1972.

81 For example, the Mitsubishi Group, Japan's largest business group, sent a trade mission to visit China in August, 1972. A 13-member high-powered economic mission headed by Yoshihiro Imayama, president of Nippon Steel Corporation, visited China in late August, 1972. A six-member mission of the Bank of Tokyo visited China in late August, 1972, and signed a Yen-Yuan Agreement to recognize the currencies of the two countries as official means of trade settlement.
Both the Canadian and Japanese decision-makers were highly concerned about their countries' China trade because they saw benefits of trade and the implications of trade for diplomatic relations. Pearson stated as early as 1949 that the promotion of trade could not be separated from the issue of recognition, implying that recognition would bolster Canada's trade with China. The first big Canadian wheat sale to China was concluded in December, 1960, and Canada's exports to China increased more than tenfold in the following year to a record $125 million. The Diefenbaker Government was hailed as having taken a realistic view towards relations with China by entering into such sales. In general, as suggested by John Holmes, this development of trade with China gradually created a more favorable atmosphere in Ottawa towards diplomatic relations with China.

Some writers argue that the motives behind the Trudeau Government's decision to recognize China were

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82 Hansard, November 17, 1949, p. 1928.
84 John Holmes, op. cit., p. 212.
largely commercial. The Trudeau Government stressed in *Foreign Policy for Canadian*, which was published by the Government in 1970, the high priority given to the policy theme of "economic growth". The paper on the Pacific stressed specifically the application of this policy theme to the Pacific area on the grounds that "both the developing and developed nations of the area look to increasing trade and investment to maintain and improve the standard of living of their peoples." China was mentioned, together with Japan, Australia and New Zealand, as one of Canada's important trading partners in that area. The establishment of the Canadian Embassy in Peking may thus have been seen as a way of developing "mutually advantageous trade exchanges." It appears that the Trudeau Government weighed

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85 Dale Thomson and Roger Swanson, *op. cit.*, p. 115
86 *Foreign Policy for Canadian*, Ottawa: 1970 (The general paper), p. 32.
89 *Ibid.*, p. 19. Although the Review was published in 1970, after the decision to recognize China, it was under preparation from the time Trudeau came to power in 1968 and was ready for print early in 1969. Thus, the review's reference to the recognition of China, as an example of Government's pursuit of the policy theme of "economic growth", was not necessarily included to provide post-facto evidence of the Government's commitment to the theme of economic growth, when in reality the decision to recognize was taken for other reasons.
more heavily than preceding governments the trade factor as a motivating force for recognition. Recognition of China was regarded by the Trudeau Government as one of the long-term means for expanding Canada's economic relations in the Pacific area. At the same time, there were signs indicating that the United States would relax its restrictions on trade with China. Indeed, one may speculate that one of the factors which motivated the Trudeau Government's recognition was the desire to expand its trade with China before the United States and other Western allies gained commercial footholds in that country.

By comparison, Japanese decision-makers were even more concerned about Japan's China trade than their counterparts in Canada because they saw greater benefits from the China trade. The post-war Prime Ministers were concerned with China policy in general and the problem of trade in particular. Former Prime Minister Yoshida stated in 1951 that "the Japanese Government desires ultimately to have a full measure of political peace and commercial intercourse with China which is Japan's close neighbour."  

90 President Nixon announced in July 1969, the U.S. Government's relaxation of trade and travel restrictions concerning China.

91 Shigeharu Matsumoto, "Japan and China: Domestic
Yoshida laid the cornerstone of the China policy, namely, the "separation of economic and politics", which succeeding Prime Ministers followed with adjustments required by changes in domestic factors and in international relations. 92

Both the Sato Government and the Tanaka Government perceived the importance of Japan's China trade. Despite harsh criticism by the Chinese and Japanese trade delegations as reflected in the Sino-Japanese Memorandum trade agreement for 1970, which severely condemned the Sato-Nixon communiqué of 1969 (which included Taiwan as an important factor for the defence of Japan) and the revival of Japanese militarism, 93 Sato stressed patience by saying that he would wait for a couple of years for Peking to get a better understanding of his country. 94 Indeed, trade could have become a great political force pushing the Sato Government toward recognizing China if the Chinese Government had not objected to Japanese big business associations with the American "Military-Industrial

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92 Ibid.

93 This point will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

Complex" in the late 1960s. In addition to the negative attitude of China, trade with China as a positive factor motivating recognition may also have been neutralized by the Government's as well as the big business' concern with its negative effect on Japan's trade with Taiwan.

Less than three weeks after coming to power, the Tanaka Government approved the use of funds of the Export-Import Bank of Japan to finance the export of vinylon to China. The Tanaka Government apparently perceived the long-term benefits of the Sino-Japanese trade and noted the existence of a "China boom" in business circles and acted accordingly. Thus, trade became a significant positive factor (probably even more significant than in the case of the Trudeau Government) moving the Tanaka Government towards recognition of China.

**Conclusion**

Both the Canadian and Japanese domestic environments were highly favorable to the development of trade relations with China. The favorable view of trade relations probably helped to create a public opinion favorable

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to the recognition of China in the two countries. Neither the Trudeau Government nor the Sato Government encountered any strong domestic pressure in the late 1960s to establish diplomatic relations with China on the grounds of gaining more trading benefits. Canadian businessmen were less enthusiastic than their counterparts in Japan to trade with China since the Chinese appeared to be interested in buying only wheat and other grains from Canada. The attitude of the Canadian business world underwent little change by the time the Trudeau Government decided to recognize China. By comparison, Japanese business circles also did not press strongly for government action to recognize China in the late 1960s because of the fear that their trade with Taiwan might be jeopardized by recognition of China. However, this "negative" view of the impact of trading interests on recognition subsided in the early 1970s, largely because of the change in China's attitude towards trade with big companies regardless of their trade relations with Taiwan.

The Trudeau Government's new emphasis on economic growth as the highest priority policy theme was significant in changing the focus of Canada's foreign policy. The Trudeau Government intended to bolster Canada's economic growth by expanding its trading relations with countries
in the Pacific area including China. Thus, trade became a significant positive factor moving the Trudeau Government to establish diplomatic relations with China not due to increasing domestic pressure, but rather due to the changing direction of the Government's foreign policy. By comparison, trade became a positive factor for the Tanaka Government due to the increasing domestic pressure from the big business groups. A "China boom" was created by the more favorable attitude of the Peking Government towards trading with big business in Japan. On the whole, the Japanese business community was more enthusiastic in pressing for recognition and, hence, was more significant in affecting the Government's policy of recognition than the Canadian business community.
III Bureaucracy

This section compares the role of the bureaucracy in the formulation of the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China.

In addition to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and the Cabinet, some writers on Canadian politics include the so-called "Under Cabinet", or senior civil servants, as an important component of the decision-making process. The "Under Cabinet" is normally regarded as including the deputy ministers and associates and assistant deputy ministers of important departments with external interests - External Affairs, Finance, National Defence and Trade and Commerce. This is the group to which responsible ministers turn, individually and collectively, for continuous advice and guidance on matters of foreign policy. The power of the "Under Cabinet" is enhanced by its relative permanence in the face of changes in government.


97 James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961, p. 34.

98 Ibid., p. 36. James Eayrs described this group of senior civil servants as "a bunch of mandarins who, by being all-round gentlemen, sort of crossword puzzle experts, have never got around to having enough expert knowledge in any one sector to develop or elaborate policy."
One writer has described this bureaucratic type of decision-making as a closed-circuit system which exhibits a preference for private diplomacy and muddling through in Canadian foreign relations. 99

According to one source, senior officers in the Department of External Affairs regarded the Peking Government's territorial claim to Taiwan as the main stumbling-block to Canada's recognition of China from the mid-1950s on. 100 Pearson's intimate relations with the bureaucracy, since he himself was a senior civil servant before becoming a politician, could, thus, probably explain in part his inactions with regard to recognition of China when he was in power.

Before Trudeau came to power, he realized that the federal bureaucracy had a great deal of power but that it lacked centralized political leadership. 101 One of Trudeau's first steps after the 1968 election was, therefore, to reorganize and expand the Prime Minister's Office, and the Privy Council Office. The Privy Council

100 Montreal Star, January 17, 1964.
101 Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 85.
Office, which was composed of senior civil servants, was given responsibility for co-ordinating government planning, in accordance with Trudeau's desire to give "added emphasis to planning and priorities". While the Prime Minister's Office, whose members were not civil servants and were specially chosen by the Prime Minister, were made responsible for injecting Trudeau's "own input" into a few selected areas that required the personal involvement of the Prime Minister. According to one source, the Prime Minister's Office grew from a staff of 44 under Pearson to 77 by April, 1970 under Trudeau, and the Privy Council Office grew from 150 to 210. Trudeau, thus, brought political leadership to the bureaucracy. One writer has suggested that Canada's decision to recognize China represented "abrupt departures engineered in the Prime Minister's Office and actively resented by

102 Ibid., p. 86.
103 Ibid.
at least some of the department brass.\textsuperscript{105} Apparently, Trudeau rejected the "muddling through" attitude of the bureaucracy and took the initiative to extend recognition to China into his and his Office's own hands.

The bureaucracy was probably even more powerful in Japanese than in Canadian decision-making throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, bureaucrats and politicians have always been closely associated in Japanese politics. Consistently, over 25\% of LDP members in the House of Commons have been former career bureaucrats who held high office in the national or prefectural governments.\textsuperscript{106} Former Prime Ministers Sato, Ikeda and Kishi were all once bureaucrats. This career mixing of public service and politics, thus, gives remarkable influence to the bureaucracy. The power of the bureaucracy in foreign policy decision-making has been enhanced by tight party discipline.\textsuperscript{107} Standing Committees on External Affairs of the Diet tend to reflect party and factional alignments, but, since party discipline is so rigid, the Standing

\textsuperscript{105} Walter Stewart, "Should We Haul Down the Flag in Addis Ababa?" Maclean's Magazine, (Toronto), December, 1969, p. 35.


Committees have no way to compromise viewpoints from different parties other than to approve automatically measures submitted to them by the bureaucracy. Moreover, the duration of Japanese cabinets is much shorter than that of Canadian cabinets. For an extreme example, Hayato Ikeda formed seven cabinets in four years. From 1950 to 1970 the average life of a cabinet was less than ten months. This lack of stability at the cabinet level, thus, increases the advantage of the experienced bureaucrats over inexperienced new cabinet ministers in the process of decision-making.

The power of the bureaucracy in Japanese politics is further strengthened by the close relationship between bureaucrats and businessmen. Government bureaucrats usually choose a second career after their early retirement at the average age of fifty. A large number of retiring officials (30% of them assume a new career) have gone into business, and generally they become members of boards of directors, often in large corporations.

108 Ibid.
111 Ibid., p. 159.
In sum, as suggested by some writers, conservative dominance in Japan is the product of a triple alliance between the bureaucracy, business interest groups, and the Liberal Democratic Party. In terms of economic policies, the LDP is no match for the power of organized business. Organized business prefers a bureaucratic type of government under the LDP because of its high degree of continuity and stability and because of its close ties with the bureaucracy. This triple alliance constituted an almost invulnerable force for the carrying out of the government's policy of separating economics and politics with respect to the China issue in the fifties and sixties and, hence, in determining a policy of trade relations without diplomatic recognition. Unlike the Trudeau Government, the Sato and Tanaka governments apparently did not downgrade the bureaucracy during the process of change in Japan's China policy. The LDP's decision to recognize China appeared to be partly affected by the changed attitude of the organized business in late 1971. However, changes in business attitudes in Japan


113 Chitoshi Yanaga, Ibid.

114 Ibid., p. 68.
were bound to be reflected somewhat in the bureaucracy as well because of its closeness in thinking to that of the business community. Thus, Japan's decision to recognize China was also partly affected by the changed attitude of the bureaucracy, whereas in the Canadian case the bureaucracy was in a sense discarded in order to make a change in Canada's China policy.

Conclusion

The bureaucracy probably delayed the Canadian decision to recognize China in the 1960s. Trudeau downgraded the bureaucracy by injecting his personal leadership into the process of foreign policy decision-making. Thus, the influence of the bureaucracy on Canada's China policy was reduced not because of a change of attitude in the bureaucracy but because of its reduced role in the process of decision-making. The bureaucracy in Japan may, however, have been even more powerful than in Canada in the determination of Japan's China policy. It was probably a significant factor inhibiting Japanese governments in the 1960s from recognition of China. However, the bureaucracy seems to have been more favorably disposed to recognition in the early-1970s, when the Sato Government and the Tanaka Government changed the Japanese policy vis-à-vis recognition of China.
IV Opposition Elites

The influence of opposition parties on the formulation of foreign policy depends, to a large extent, on the strength of the Opposition in Parliament (or Diet in the Japanese political system). This section focuses specifically on comparing the characteristics of the party systems in Canada and Japan and the impact of the opposition parties on the process of decision-making with respect to the two countries' China policies.

Although there are four political parties in the Canadian Parliament, it is more appropriate to categorize Canadian federal politics as a two-party system rather than a multi-party system. Power has alternated between the Liberal and the Conservative parties while neither the New Democratic Party nor the Social Credit Party has ever come to power. The desirability of a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs is well accepted by Liberals and Conservatives and elections have seldom been fought on issues of foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{115} The impact of the two

\textsuperscript{115} Robert Reford, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 240.
minor parties on Canada's recognition of China was thus weakened by the remarkable continuity of Canada's China policy through various changes in governments up until 1968. They could not threaten the ruling party (either the Liberals or the Conservatives) in the area of international affairs, even if they held a balance of power because of the similarities in Liberal and Conservative outlook.

The backbenchers of the ruling party are seldom interested in foreign policy or in keeping themselves well informed on special problems of external policy. They are discouraged from speaking publicly on international relations. The ruling party backbenchers can only express their ideas in the parliamentary party caucus, but the caucus rarely spends much time on foreign policy questions. Indeed, Canadian decision-makers generally consider foreign policy as a matter exclusively for the executive to determine.

116 The continuity of Canada's China policy will be discussed in more detail in a later section of the chapter.

117 James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible, op. cit., p. 103.

118 Ibid., p. 114.

119 Paul Martin once remarked: "The conduct of the policy of the Government in foreign affairs is a matter that the executive determines. Once a position has been
party backbenchers on Canadian recognition was, thus, marginal.

Compared to the Canadian party system, the Japanese party system offered more alternatives to the electorate in terms of choices of a China policy. However, in terms of the impact of the opposition parties on the ruling party with respect to the formulation of China policy, the Japanese party system did not differ much from the Canadian case. Although there are two major parties and some minor parties, the Japanese party system is often described as a one-and-one-half-party system. The Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) has been in power, except for a brief period between 1947 and 1948, ever since the Second World War. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP), on the other hand, has never been able to command more than one-third of the electorate. As a result of the "permanent" majority of the LDP, opinions from opposition parties are usually ignored by the ruling LDP. Indeed, the various factions within the LDP are

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taken it is open to parliament to take issue with that policy. "Foreign policy cannot be pursued by any other way." Hansard, November 18, 1966.


more influential than the opposition parties in affecting
government foreign policy decision-making.

Factionalism is a unique characteristic of the
Japanese political culture. Each factional leader within
the party has a number of followers who follow his leadership rather than that of the president of the party. The
supremacy of the faction as the primary unit of political
loyalty in Japanese politics was demonstrated by the
resignation of the Kishi Cabinet in 1960. Kishi was
forced to resign because his faction and his brother Sato's
faction were isolated and criticized by other factions
of the LDP. Some writers have even suggested that
the Japanese party system can be considered as a multi-
party system, since each faction within the LDP as well
as the JSP can be considered as a "party" in its own
right. By contrast with Canada, faction politics
within the ruling party in Japan were the dominant "party"
influence affecting Japanese recognition, whereas in the
Canadian case, where no clear party factions exist, what
"party" impact there was came from the opposition parties.

122 Robert Scalapino, et.al., op. cit., p.141.
123 Ibid., p. 79
124 Since faction politics is largely a heritage of
political tradition in Japan, the impact of the factions within
the LDP on Government's formulation of its China policy is
discussed in more detail in the section on "Political Tradition".
There was no united view among Canadian Opposition parties with respect to the China issue. The New Democratic Party (NDP) had, along with the trade unions, consistently and sometimes vigorously advocated ending the isolation of China by Canadian recognition. The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), the forerunner of the NDP, argued in the early 1950s that Canada should recognize the Peking Government on the grounds of realism. T.C. Douglas, the leader of the NDP, stated in 1964 that Canada ought to be pressing for China's admission to the United Nations and ought to begin by extending diplomatic recognition to that country if it were prepared to accept and abide by the Charter of the United Nations. The NDP members welcomed overwhelmingly the Trudeau Government's


127 Hansard, July 17, 1964, p. 5614. At the same time, however, Andrew Brewin the NDP spokesman on foreign affairs, was opposed to recognizing China at the cost of sacrificing the freedom of the people in Taiwan. See, Hans d, May 22, 1964, p. 3051. Andrew Brewin expressed his concern about the future of the Taiwanese in the following manner: "... the Formosans (Taiwanese) should be given the right to choose by referendum or otherwise, what form of government they prefer .... I do not think it would be right or proper for us to say we will just hand over that country, which is independent, to the People's Republic of China." However, Brewin has often been on foreign policy questions to the right of his party, and this comment is not, therefore, necessarily representative of ND thinking.
decision to recognize China. When the negotiations on diplomatic relations with China were going on in Stockholm, one of the typical questions frequently posed by NDP members in the House of Commons was: "Can the Government assure the House that diplomatic recognition of Communist China will proceed as fast as possible?" 128

The strongest opponent of Canadian overtures to China was the Social Credit Party. It was opposed to the recognition of the Peking Government and its admission to the United Nations in the early 1950s, since it believed such moves "would give an impetus to the Communist drive in Asia." 129 Another concern of the Social Credit was expressed by Robert Thompson, the leader of the Party, who insisted in 1963 that the recognition of China was not justified as long as that recognition would mean "the obliteration of eleven million people who want to live in freedom on the island of Taiwan." 130 Social Credit Party members from Quebec were also worried that the establishment of diplomatic relations with China might encourage violent movements in Canada, especially the FLQ in the Province of Quebec, because of the support of revolutionary

128 See, for example, Hansard, May 21, 1969.
131 Hansard, October 22, 1970, p. 495.
movements by the Peking Government. However, the Social Credit Party did not want to isolate the Peking Government from the international community. Thompson argued that as soon as China was prepared to accept a two-China policy, it would be "for the betterment of the world that Red China be admitted to the conference tables." The Social Credit Party also did not attempt to obstruct the Trudeau Government's negotiations with the Peking Government.

The Conservative Party's early objection to Canadian recognition of the Peking régime was largely based on strong anti-Communist feelings. For example, the nationalization in 1949 of the Ming Sung ships, valued at $12 million at that time, by the Chinese Government was the focus of attack by the Conservatives. The Chinese Communists were, because of this action, not only charged with being "murderers", but also with being "robbers". One Conservative leader's anti-Communist feeling was so strong that he even

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133 The Conservatives are treated as an opposition party since the Liberals were the dominant ruling party during most of the period of the study (except the Conservative interlude between 1957-1963) and the party in power at the time of recognition.

134 Hansard, March 26, 1954, p. 3379. The remark was made by George Drew.
suggested the employment of Nationalist troops in Korea against the Chinese Communist forces. During the Pearson years, however, the Conservatives restrained themselves from commenting on the Government's policy towards closer relations with China. The Pearson Government was able to maintain large wheat sales to China and the two-way trade between China and Canada exceeded $200 million for the first time in 1966. It would have been political suicide for the Conservatives, given their strength in the prairies and the fact that they were the first to negotiate major wheat sales with China, to have obstructed the Government's trade policy with China. Indeed, one could hear only occasionally Diefenbaker reiterating his anti-Communist stand and his concern about the likely effect of Canada's recognition on Southeast Asian countries; apart from that, Conservatives were silent on the China issue.

When the Trudeau Government decided to recognize China, the Conservatives supported broadly the Government's China policy and criticized only very secondary matters.

135 Hansard, March 10, 1952, p. 247. The suggestion was made by Howard Green.

Opposition leader Robert Stanfield announced that the Conservative Party welcomed "vigorous action on the part of the Government to assist in bringing nearly a quarter of the human race within the community of nations."\(^{137}\) Stanfield did launch an attack on the Government's China policy in June, 1969, when he remarked that Mitchell Sharp's visit to Stockholm and his apparent pursuit of the Chinese Ambassador had made Canada look "foolish".\(^{138}\) Indeed, generally speaking, questions or criticisms posed by Conservative members, especially the Party leaders were of this nature; that is, designed to embarrass rather than obstruct the Government.\(^{139}\)

There were few outright rejections of the Peking Government among politicians in Ottawa. The

\(^{137}\) *Hansard*, June 23, 1969, p. 10516.


\(^{139}\) One of the typical blunt questions put forward by George Hees, a former minister in Diefenbaker's Cabinet, is cited as follows: "Why did the Government find it necessary to put Canada in the humiliating position of being snubbed openly and continuously for the last several months by a government which obviously could not care less about being recognized by Canada? ... Could the Prime Minister confirm the report that two days ago (June 15) the cousin of a third secretary of the Chinese Embassy at Stockholm spoke to the Secretary of State for External Affairs on the streets of Stockholm?" *Hansard*, June 17, 1969, p. 10244.
differences in viewpoint among political parties tended to pertain more to the pre-conditions or pre-requisites for the Canadian recognition rather than to differences over recognition per se. More significantly, despite Canada's vast area, there was no serious split of opinions among MPs from different regions with respect to the Government's China policy. 140 The Opposition MPs from the Western provinces (including British Columbia) urged the Government to strengthen Canada's trading relations, mainly wheat sales, with China, while the Quebec members warned the Government of the likelihood of increased Chinese subversion in Canada, especially in Quebec, after diplomatic recognition. Protest from Quebec against Chinese textile imports subsided in the late 1960s because China could rarely meet the $10 million quota set by the Canadian Government at the time of the 1965 wheat deal. Opposition members from Ontario and the Atlantic provinces were more concerned about the global ramifications of Canadian recognition and the admission of China to the United Nations. Nevertheless, Opposition MPs from the Western

140 The following account summarizes the findings of a content analysis on debates in the House of Commons during the period from 1966 to 1970. The content analysis was done by the author himself.
provinces and the Province of Quebec did not ignore the importance of bringing China into the world community for the sake of world peace. In fact, Opposition MPs who were more concerned about the implications of Canadian recognition on regional interests than on the international situation tended to ask for information relevant to their own interests without criticizing the Government's stand. Thus, regional interests were not an important inhibiting element during the course of Canada's approach to normalizing relations with China. The Trudeau Government was, thus, almost completely free from any Opposition restraints on its approach to China, although there was no overwhelming support for the Government's moves.

By contrast to their counterparts in Canada, the Japanese opposition parties were more united than their counterparts in Canada with respect to the recognition of China. The opposition parties, notably the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Komeito Party, advocated stronger ties with China. However, the pressure of the combined strength of the opposition parties failed to alter the Government's China policy because Opposition proposals tended automatically to be the reverse of Government policy on every issue and, thus, Opposition proposals were oversimplified and made too basically divergent from the
Government stand to be effective. However, this does not necessarily imply that the opposition parties in Japan did not have any impact on the Government's China policy. The fact that most of the supporters of the opposition parties came from the urban area and, hence, were more concerned with foreign policy issues than the rural supporters of the LDP probably enhanced the impact of the opposition parties on the Government's China policy.

The JSP had been a strong proponent of the seating of China in the United Nations and the establishment of diplomatic relations with China since the breakaway of the rightist Nishio faction in 1960 to form the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). The Socialists called for a policy of "positive neutrality", aimed at establishing peace and the independence of Japan. The essence of the Socialists' neutralism was the contention that, from the standpoint of Japan's proximity to the mainland and her historical relationship with China, it was not in Japan's interest to identify itself too much with the

141 Michio Royama, op. cit., p. 261.
United States. The influence of the JSP in the formulation of the Japanese policy of recognition was, however, weakened by ideological differences within its party factions. The mainstream of the JSP was until 1969 led by the strong pro-Peking Sasaki faction. This faction was, however, weakened after the 1969 election in which the Diet members of the Sasaki faction dropped from 44 to 17. The party after that pursued a moderate central-left policy on the China issue.

The respective numerical strengths of the other three opposition parties are much less than that of the JSP. Nevertheless, their impact on the formulation of China policy may not have been smaller than that of the JSP. From its formation in 1960, the DSP advocated a moderate "one-China, one-Taiwan" policy and a neutralist approach to foreign policy in general. Although the numerical strength

143 Masataka Kosaka, op. cit., p. 11.
144 Donald Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics, op. cit., p. 139.
146 Ibid.
of the DSP is less than one-third of that of the JSP, the DSP may have had a greater impact on the Government's China policy because it often supported the Government on other issues. The Komeito Party, once ambiguous about its stand on the China issue, became more pro-Peking in the late 1960s. Komeito adopted a platform in its Seventh Convention in January, 1969, calling for early recognition of China. Komeito had a strong party organization at the grass-roots level, and its strong pro-Peking attitude in the early 1970s, thus, probably aroused interest among the Japanese public. Thus, the change of the Komeito Party from its previous ambiguous stand to a strong pro-recognition stand may have been significant in affecting the Government's ultimate decision to recognize China. The Japanese Communist Party, on the other hand, because of ideological differences, said virtually nothing about the China issue after it broke with Peking in the Spring of 1967, although

the party maintained its policy of recognition of China.

The stands of Japan's opposition parties remained constant from 1969 to the time of recognition. Although there was almost a united voice generally favoring the recognition of China, the influence of Japan's opposition parties on the formulation of the Sato and Tanaka governments' China policies was probably only slightly greater than the influence of Canada's opposition parties on the Trudeau Government's China policy. It appears that the ultimate decisions to recognize China in the two countries were due more to the evolution of attitudes in the ruling parties than to the influence of the opposition parties.

Conclusion

The Canadian opposition parties were divided with respect to the China issue. On one extreme was the NDP which strongly advocated recognition of China from the early 1950s on; on the other extreme was the Social Credit Party which opposed recognition of the Communist regime in Peking throughout the 1950s and 1960s and remained highly suspicious of Peking's behavior in countries having diplomatic relations at the time of
Canadian recognition. Conservatives, who manifested no clear difference from Liberals on the China issue (except during the early 1950s), refrained from criticizing Government policy when it decided to recognize China. There was no attempt by the opposition parties to obstruct the Government's moves towards recognizing China. The Trudeau Government was, thus, free of restraints from the Opposition when it made the decision to recognize China.

By contrast, the opposition parties were more united in Japan and generally pushed for the Government's rapprochement with China from 1969 on. The JSP and JCP were constantly in favor of recognition, while the DSP tended to adopt a neutral "one-China, one-Taiwan" policy. The Komeito Party was ambiguous before 1969 with respect to the China issue but became strongly pro-Peking from 1969 on. Thus, the combined impact of the opposition parties in Japan may have been slightly greater than the combined impact of their counterparts in Canada on the formulation of the two countries' China policies, although this factor was less important than other internal environmental factors.
V Political Tradition: Values of Governing Elite

One of the important factors affecting the process of foreign policy decision-making is the influence of political tradition. It also has great impact on the formation of elite attitudes towards the specific issue concerned and, hence, on the ultimate policy decision with respect to that issue. This section compares the characteristics of the process of foreign policy decision-making and the elite attitudes of the governing elites with respect to China policy in Canada and Japan.

One of the most striking features of the Canadian attitude towards foreign policy is pragmatism. One writer has remarked that it is Canada's century-old pre-occupation with keeping Canada together by pragmatic steps that has shaped the style of Canadian foreign policy decision-making. Because of this "federalist style" of decision-making, Canadian decision-makers have often been "indecisive" and hesitant in taking

\[150\] Thomas Hockin, "Federalist Style in International Politics," in Stephen Clarkson (ed.), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 121.
initiatives regarding Canada's involvement in international affairs. Indeed, as another writer has remarked, Canadian decision-makers have often substituted style for the substance of policy and been inclined more to work within existing situations than to attempt their transformation to suit Canadian needs. Canadian governments preceding the Trudeau Government seldom if ever engaged in any long-term planning of Canada's foreign policy. One writer has suggested that there is a strong disposition to deal with external affairs in-a-work-a-day manner among Canadian decision-makers. Canada has had few if any opportunities for exercising important and sustained assaults upon major international problems. Its policy has nearly always been one of responding to the moves of others. Indeed, Canada has rarely been in a position to take the initiative in planning ahead for its external

151 Ibid., p. 123.


153 James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961, p. 151. See also Barry Farrell, The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy, Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1969, p. 74. Farrell suggests that the Canadian Department of External Affairs has not used "sufficiently the information and analysis available outside the Government" and that it lacks "the creativity and imagination to develop new short or long run policies."
endeavours.\textsuperscript{154}

The Trudeau Government has not departed from pragmatism regarding Canadian foreign policy decision-making. Trudeau stressed in May, 1968, in his first major foreign policy statement a "pragmatic" and "realistic" approach to Canada's foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{155} However, Trudeau's concept of pragmatism does not entail avoiding taking initiatives in foreign affairs. According to Trudeau, "realism" is the operative word in Canada's definition of foreign policy objectives.\textsuperscript{156} Thus, from a "realist" point of view, Canada can and should take initiatives in its foreign policy if such initiatives are in accord with Canadian needs and within Canadian capabilities.\textsuperscript{157} A long-term planning of Canada's foreign policy aiming at a "pragmatic" and "realistic" approach was, thus, launched a few months after Trudeau came to power. A general guidline to Canadian foreign policy titled \textit{Foreign Policy for Canadian

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\textsuperscript{154} James Eayrs, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 155.

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{External Affairs}, (July 1968), p. 281. The statement was issued on May 29, 1968.

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 279.

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 281.
was published by the Department of External Affairs in 1970. Thus, by laying a new emphasis on "realism" and by launching a long-term plan for Canada's foreign policy, the Trudeau Government slightly changed the traditional "pragmatic" approach of Canadian governments towards foreign policy decision-making. Trudeau's personal inclination to take a "realistic" approach to Canada's foreign policy, thus, played some significant role in the Canadian decision to recognize China. However, it may be an over-statement to argue that Trudeau's personal inclination was the most "decisive" factor affecting Canada's decision to recognize China. 158 After all, since the environment was in general increasingly favorable to Canadian recognition in the late 1960s, Pearson might have decided to recognize China at the same time as Trudeau did by simply "reacting" pragmatically to changes in environmental circumstances.

One striking characteristic of Canadian policy towards recognition of China is its continuity. As early as November 1949, shortly after the Chinese Communists took over the mainland, Lester Pearson, then the Secretary of State for External Affairs, defined

158 See, for example, Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972, especially pp. 75-76 and p. 116.
diplomatic recognition as an acknowledgment of a state that exists without implication of any moral approval.159 Pearson further stated that "before a government is granted recognition it must be shown to be independent of external control by any other state [and] it must exercise effective control over the territory which it claims."160 From that point forward, Canada left the door open for future recognition at the appropriate time. On the other hand, Canada consistently rejected the Chinese Communists' claim to Taiwan as they never had any control over that territory. In fact, the question of the status of Taiwan remained one of the main obstacles inhibiting the normalization of relations between Canada and China.

Pearson stated in the early 1950s that possible recognition of China had to be weighed in terms of Canada's own "national interest", which included maintaining world peace.161 This, too, was then an important consideration impelling Canadian governments in the 1950s and 1960s towards recognition. John Diefenbaker reiterated the same theme in 1960, when the

160 Hansard, October 25, 1949, p. 1109.
Conservatives were in power, that China's admission to the United Nations and Canada's recognition of China were of "importance in the cause of world peace". Prime Minister Trudeau again stressed the same theme when he announced on May 29, 1968, that "most of the major world issues will not be resolved completely, or in any lasting way, unless and until an accommodation has been reached with China."

The continuity in Canada's China policy can be best demonstrated by examining the three Canadian attempts to recognize China prior to 1968. Canada was on the point of following the example of Britain of recognizing China in 1950 when the out-break of the Korean War interrupted Canada's move. Pearson stated in February 1950, after his consultation with Commonwealth governments at the Colombo Conference with respect to recognition of China, that: "The fact that some governments have recognized the new regime in Peiping and others have not had created an awkward situation in the United Nations and other international

162 Hansard, February 11, 1960, p. 972.
163 Trudeau, op. cit., p. 280.
bodies; one which may become even more awkward in the not too distant future." Pearson's remark was an important guide to his Government's efforts in the mid-1960s to seat China at the U.N.

Canada was close to recognizing China for a second time in the mid-1950s when St. Laurent stated that it would be in the interest of peace and stability in the world to recognize diplomatically "whatever government happens to be in control of [mainland] China." However, China's new offense on the off-shore islands after the Korean War again interrupted Canada's hope of normalizing its relations with China. This incident also reflected the negative effect of the U.S. factor on Canada's China policy. The U.S. Government was highly concerned with the defense of the Taiwan Strait at that time and, hence any friendly attitude towards China would certainly not have been welcomed. Any movement in Canadian policy was out of the question for almost a decade with China continuing its offense against the off-shore islands into the late 1950s and attacking India in 1962.

164 Hansard, February 22, 1950, p. 133.
166 Howard Green, former Secretary of State for External Affairs in Diefenbaker's Cabinet, stressed in November, 1962,
Once China stopped its aggressions against its neighbours, the Canadian Government renewed for the third time serious consideration of recognition of the Chinese Communist régime. For the first time in 1966, Canada publicly proposed a "one-China, one-Taiwan" solution in the United Nations, in an effort to try to seat the Peking Government in the organization. Canada abstained that year on the Albanian resolution calling for the seating of mainland China and the expulsion of Taiwan. The Canadian abstention reflected Canada's view that mainland China should be seated in the United Nations, but not at the expense of Taiwan. 167 Canada's intention of normalizing relations with China in that year seemed so apparent to some that there was a rumour in November 1966 that Canada would recognize China in two months. 168 However, Canada's hope of normalizing relations with China vanished again when the Cultural Revolution erupted in China in the

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166 That China's invasion of India was one of the reasons for Canadian non-recognition of the Peking régime and voting against its admission to the U.N. The Globe and Mail, November 27, 1962. Green spoke at York University.


early months of 1967. Paul Martin stated with regret that the events in mainland China meant that the country did not "fully meet the criteria of recognition," implying that China did not exercise effective control over the territory which it claimed.

The Trudeau Government's decision to recognize China in 1968 was, therefore, not a departure from the policy of the previous Liberal governments. In fact, it could be said that the Trudeau Government merely initiated a fourth and final successful attempt to establish diplomatic relations with the Peking Government. It appears that governments preceding the Trudeau Government were not necessarily "unrealistic" in their approaches to the China policy. They "realized" the negative effects of the U.S. factor and other environmental obstacles.

Canadian governments have long adhered to the British tradition of extending recognition to de facto powers. For example, Canada, like Britain, recognized the U.S.S.R. long before the U.S. and also never severed relations with Cuba. Thus, in keeping with the Canadian inheritance of the British tradition regarding recognition it is not surprising that it was the traditional attitude which ultimately prevailed.

once the factors inhibited recognition (for pragmatic reasons which dominated over the tradition of recognizing states with de facto control) had diminished in importance in the late 1960s.

By comparison, the Japanese decision-makers appear to have been more cautious than Canadian decision-makers in their attitudes toward foreign policy. The cautious attitude of Japanese decision-makers can be partly explained by the collective style of Japanese decision-making. The process of decision-making in Japanese politics is influenced greatly by the high degree of faction or group emphasis and the concept of consensual authority.\(^{170}\) The President of the LDP (that is, the Prime Minister) usually consults factional leaders of his own party on important foreign policy decisions. It is a rule that at least tacit acquiescence of factional leaders is required on major decisions.\(^{171}\) The collective style of Japanese decision-making, thus, prevents bold leadership in attaining foreign policy goals.\(^{172}\) In other words, Japanese governments would

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171 Ibid.

172 Ibid., p. 157.
have naturally hesitated to take the initiative on major foreign policy question, such as the recognition of the Peking Government, in the face of a lack of consensus among factional leaders. Sato, who was known for his skillful manipulation of faction politics, was apparently cautious not to offend any factional leaders by taking steps towards relations with China. Thus, like the Pearson Government, the Sato Government hesitated in its China policy until 1971.

Despite this traditional collective decision-making process, an apparently bold leadership succeeded Sato in mid-1972. Tanaka was characterized as a "self-made man" by the press. "Tanakamania" of 1972 was compared to "Trudeau-mania" of 1968. Tanaka took dramatic steps towards closer relations with China and established diplomatic relations with that country in less than three months after coming to power. At first sight, therefore, it would appear that Tanaka broke the traditional process of decision-making by taking the initiative of recognizing China.

In reality, however, Tanaka is essentially a machine politician, who like his predecessors only operates on the basis of a consensus. He

173 J.A. Stockwin, op. cit., p. 82.
174 Ibid., p. 81.
decided to visit China only after the special Committee on Normalization of Sino-Japanese relations had agreed on the principles of negotiation with the Peking Government. Indeed, Takeda Fukuda might have followed the same steps and visited China at the same time as Tanaka did had he been elected President of the LDP. The change of cabinets in Japan, thus, like the replacement of the Pearson Cabinet by the Trudeau Cabinet, was not important in affecting the decision to recognize; it merely speeded up the ultimate establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Both Trudeau and Tanaka merely followed the "inevitable" step to recognize China. The only difference is that Trudeau decided to take positive step while Sato (not Tanaka) already made the decision to take steps to recognize China. Sato had already decided in January, 1972, that the Japanese Government would try to restore normal relations with China through ambassadorial level negotiations between the two countries, but the Chinese Government was hostile to the Japanese

175 See also J.A. Stockwin, op. cit., p. 85.
Government until Tanaka came to power in 1972.

It appears that neither the Canadian nor the Japanese governments (though to a lesser degree) departed from its traditional attitudes towards the China issue at the time of its decision to recognize China. Canadian governments preceding the Trudeau Government and Japanese governments prior to 1971 hesitated to take positive steps to recognize China largely because of the negative effects of other environmental factors. Both the Trudeau Government and the Tanaka Government were, on the other hand, able to seek rapprochement with China because the negative factors were removed or had subsided by the time of their respective decisions to recognize China.

By contrast, however, unlike Canada's Liberal Party, Japan's Liberal-Democratic Party encountered serious obstacles within its own party factions regarding its China policy. Faction politics is a Japanese political tradition for which there is no comparable phenomena on the Canadian side. The rest of this section examines the impact of faction politics within the ruling LDP on the party's ultimate decision to recognize China.

The "China lobby" which was strongly pro-Taipei was consistently more influential than the pro-Peking
group in affecting the Government's China policy until the early 1970s. There was no formal split of attitudes within the LDP until December, 1964, when a group of "mainstream" LDP members, including such senior party members as Fukuda and Ishii, formed the Asian Group. The group took a generally anti-Peking, pro-Taipei position. The group opposed the admission of China to the United Nations as long as the Peking Government persisted in its "aggressive" intentions; it also considered the security of Taiwan as directly related to the security of Japan and, therefore, insisted that Taiwan must be kept from a Communist take-over. The fact that the Asian Group was formed immediately after Sato came to power suggests that it might have been a deliberate step taken by the Sato Government to forestall trends towards recognition at a time when the U.S. was still very sensitive to any Japanese rapprochement with China.

In contrast to the above-mentioned group of pro-Taipei LDP members, a numerically smaller group known

177 Members of the "mainstream" factions support the dominant faction whose leader is the President of the LDP while members of the "anti-mainstream" factions are opponents of the dominant faction.


179 Ibid.
as the Afro-Asian Group, was founded in January, 1965,
by two "anti-mainstream" faction leaders, Fujiyama and
Matsumura. The group proposed that Japan support the
People's Republic of China's admission to the United
Nations, and that Japan encourage direct contact between
the two governments through ambassadorial talks and other
means. 180

The pro-Taipei Asian Group apparently had the
upper-hand in the 1960s as the Asian Group out-numbered
the Afro-Asian Group by a large margin. The members
of the Asian Group were also composed mainly of the main-
stream factions of the LDP, such as the Ishii, Fukuda and
Sato factions, while the members of the Afro-Asian Group
were composed mainly of the anti-mainstream factions of
Kono, Matsumura and Ono (see TABLE V). Given the compo-
sition and relative strength of the two groups it is,
thus, clear why the Government adopted the policy advo-
cated by the pro-Taipei Asian Group in the 1960s.
Moreover, splits within the factions supporting the
recognition of China (with the exception of the Matsu-
mura faction) further weakened the bargaining position of

180 Ibid., p. 250.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factions</th>
<th>Members of Asian Group</th>
<th>Members of Afro-Asian Group</th>
<th>Both Groups or Neither</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ishii</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuda</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miki</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sato</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujiyama</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawashima</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maeo</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ono</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kono</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsumura</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Haruhiro Fukui, *Party in Power*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, p. 256. (The factions are arranged in the order of the relative intensity of their support for the Taipei Government.)
the factional leaders with Sato, the President of the LDP, on the China issue. Thus, the factional situation in the LDP partly explains the Sato Government's policy of non-recognition in the 1960s.

An analysis of the occupational backgrounds of the Asian and Afro-Asian Group members helps to illustrate the attitudes among different interest groups in Japan towards the China issue. TABLE VI shows that a

**TABLE VI**

Occupational Backgrounds of the Asian and Afro-Asian Group Members, Members of House of Representatives (MHRs) Only, July, 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Members of Asian Group</th>
<th>Members of Afro-Asian Group</th>
<th>Members of Both Groups or Neither</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Politicians</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Servants</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>94</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
<td><strong>134</strong></td>
<td><strong>285</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

large number of former civil servants (34) belonged to the Asian Group, while only a relatively small number (8) belonged to the Afro-Asian Group. Since most of the party leaders and senior members of the LDP were former higher civil servants, it is clear that the Asian Group had the general support of the most influential LDP members. Similarly, it is clear that the bureaucracy was strongly against rapprochement with the Peking Government in the 1960s. Former businessmen were split between the two groups. An even larger number of former businessmen did not take sides. This was probably due to the preference of businessmen in general to maintain trading relations with both China and Taiwan. Finally, the former journalists tended to prefer the Afro-Asian Group, reflecting the general pro-Peking attitude of the press.

Pressures on the Japanese Government from the Diet members for normalizing relations with China started to grow at the beginning of the seventies. A multi-party Dietmen's League for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations was formed in December, 1970. It claimed a membership of more than half of the total Diet members (379 out of 738), including 95 LDP members.181

delegation of the League, headed by Fujiyama, visited Peking in September, 1971. In a joint statement with the China-Japan Friendship Association, signed in Peking, the Dietmen's League agreed to the Chinese position on the territorial integrity of China and the need for abrogating the Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty.\textsuperscript{182} This supra-partisan alliance of pro-Peking Dietmen undoubtedly had an effect on the Japanese Government in formulating its China policy.

Nixon's announcement of his China trip and China's admission to the United Nations in 1971 apparently further strengthened the pro-Peking Dietmen group in advocating diplomatic relations with China. After these events even Fukuda, Miki, and Ohira (successor to Mao as the leader of his faction), influential factional leaders of the pro-Taipei group, favored the normalization of relations with China. However, the pro-Taipei group remained strong at the time the Tanaka Government decided to recognize China; it opposed a rapprochement with Peking "in a hurry" and demanded that Japan negotiate

with the Peking Government on diplomatic relations with no pre-conditions being set up by the Chinese. 183 Although the Executive Council of the LDP agreed on July 24, 1972, with the Tanaka Cabinet's attempt to normalize relations with China, there was no unanimous agreement on Japan's basic policy statement with respect to normalizing relations until September 8, due to strong resistance from pro-Taipei members of the party. 184 The pro-Taipei LDP members, thus, tried to block or at least delay the normalization of relations with China.

Despite the different attitudes among the factions within the LDP with respect to the China issue, it appears that all factions agreed on the eventuality of recognizing China. In fact, as one scholar has suggested, they disagreed only on the manner and timing and on the importance they attached to co-ordinating Japan's policies with Washington. 185 Judging from this point of view, the attitudes of the governing elites in Japan towards recognition were not much different from

183 The Japan Times, July 24, 1972.
184 The Japan Times, September 9, 1972. The pro-Taiwan Group demanded that the preservation of relations (except diplomatic relations) with Taiwan should be made explicit in the joint statement with the Peking Government on the establishment of diplomatic relations. The group finally gave in after Tanaka promised that he would personally discuss these matters with the Peking Government.
those of the governing elites in Canada. In other words, the Sato Government's decision in 1971 to recognize China and the Tanaka Government's step-up of the process of recognition in 1972 were not abrupt departures from traditional attitudes towards the China issue. As in the Canadian case, the attitude of eventual recognition of China ultimately prevailed, once negative factors militating against recognition subsided.

Conclusion

Canadian governments were pragmatic in their approach towards foreign relations. The Trudeau Government's initiative to recognize China was based more on a new emphasis on the need (for pragmatic reasons) to take initiatives in foreign policy than on a sharp departure from Canada's traditional pragmatic approach. There was a striking continuity in the thinking of Canadian governments about China and there was no evident split of opinion within the Liberal Party on the issue at any time. The Trudeau Government merely put into effect a policy which from 1949 was a logical one for the country to follow given its political traditions. Thus, the role of political tradition was particularly important.
in determining Canada's China policy.

By contrast, Japanese governments were also cautious in their approach towards foreign relations and this resulted in a traditional process of collective decision-making. Unlike the Liberal Party in Canada, which does not have formal factions, the factions within Japan's ruling LDP were split with respect to the China issue. The pro-Taipei group apparently had the upper-hand in the 1960s, which could in substantial measure explain the Sato Government's inaction with respect to normalizing relations with China. The situation reversed itself in the early 1970s when a supra-partisan group of Dietmen was formed which favored recognition. However, the Sato Government's decision in 1971 and the Tanaka Government's dramatic approach to China in 1972 did not break Japan's traditional process of decision-making and merely followed the long-held attitude of the eventual recognition of China. Nevertheless, by comparison, the degree of change of Japanese elite attitudes from a generally pro-Taipei one in the 1960s to a dominantly pro-Peking one in the early 1970s was apparently more marked than the change in the Canadian case.
Conclusion

This section compares the impact of the internal environmental variables on the course of the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China by using the mode of measurement set out in the introductory chapter. The Japanese decision-makers apparently encountered a higher degree of change than the Canadian decision-makers in most of the internal environmental variables, except in the environment in relation to the bureaucracy, at the time they were deciding to recognize China (see TABLE VII). However, neither the Canadian

TABLE VII

Change in Internal Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Change</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Public Opinion   Japan   Canada
2. Economic Interest Groups   Japan   Canada
3. Bureaucracy   Canada   Japan
4. Opposition Elites   Japan   Canada
5. Political Tradition   Japan   Canada
nor Japanese decision-makers encountered any drastic changes in the internal environment. The attitudes of the public and the opposition elites in the two countries only underwent modest changes at the time of the decisions. The environment with respect to the bureaucracy changed more dramatically for Canada because of Trudeau's downgrading of the role of senior civil servants in the process of foreign policy decision-making, while the attitudes of the economic interest groups changed more markedly for Japan because of the new "China boom" in Japan in the early 1970s. On the other hand, the environment with respect to the elite values changed more dramatically for Japan because of the change of the traditional pro-Taipei attitudes to pro-Peking attitudes - partly the result of changes in elite composition - within the governing LDP at the time the Japanese Government was deciding to recognize China.

The environment relating to political tradition was "highly significant" for the Canadian and, to a lesser degree, Japanese decisions (see TABLE VIII) because governing elites in the two countries acknowledged the desirability of eventually recognizing China, though they disagreed on the timing of recognition. Opinion from the public and economic interest groups regarding recognition were often
TABLE VIII
Significant of the Internal Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Highly Significant</th>
<th>Negligible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Public Opinion</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Economic Interest Groups</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Opposition Elites</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Political Tradition</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

acknowledged (though not necessarily listened to) by the decision-makers in the two countries, although Japanese decision-makers were probably more concerned than Canadian decision-makers with reactions from the business community because of Japan's substantial trade with China. The Japanese bureaucracy was probably more influential than its counterpart in Canada with respect to the China issue because of its close relations with the business community and politicians. Finally, opposition parties in the two countries did not have a significant influence on recognition partly because of their permanent minority positions.
By comparison, however, opinions from Japanese opposition parties with respect to recognition may have been more significant because of the grass-roots support of Japan's opposition parties which helped to create a generally favorable public opinion for recognition.

By weighting the "change" and the relative "significance" of the various internal environmental factors in the same manner as we have weighted the external environmental factors in the preceding chapter, it is possible to rank the relative "impact" of these variables on the two countries decision to recognize China as shown in TABLE IX. It appears that among the internal environmental

| TABLE IX |
|------------------|------------------|
| Ranking of the Relative Impact of Internal Environmental Variables |
|                   | Canada | Japan |
| 1. Public Opinion | 5      | 4     |
| 2. Economic Interest Groups | 5      | 2     |
| 3. Bureaucracy    | 4      | 5     |
| 4. Opposition Elites | 7      | 5     |
| 5. Political Tradition | 3      | 3     |

* For the scheme of weighting see Chapter I.
variables, the environment in relation to political tradition had the greatest impact on both the Japanese and Canadian decisions. By contrast, the environment in relation to opposition elites appears to have had the least impact on both the Canadian and Japanese decisions. Opinions from the public and economic interest groups appear to have had a greater impact on the Japanese than Canadian decision. Finally, the change of the role of the bureaucracy may have had a slightly greater impact on the Canadian than Japanese decision.

TABLE X indicates the characteristics of the internal environmental variables with respect to the China policy prior to and during the two countries' decision to recognize China. It is interesting to note that variables in the internal environment affecting the Canadian decision changed little at the time the decision to recognize China was made. The only significant change was the bureaucracy factor. Significantly, most of the domestic factors were positive (with the exception of the bureaucracy factor) prior to the decision, implying that Canada's hesitation to recognize China in the 1960s was caused more by negative factors in the external environment rather than domestic obstacles. However, Canada's
### TABLE X

Characteristics of the Internal Environment with Respect to the China Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Public Opinion</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Economic Interest Groups</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Opposition Elites</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Political Tradition</td>
<td>Positive (Negative - before 1971)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...hesitation to recognize China in the 1950s may also be explained in part by the divided nature of public opinion.

By contrast, the values of the governing elites which had great impact on Japan's decision to recognize China, were negative in the 1950s and 1960s and became largely positive only at the time the decisions was made. In addition, as in the Canadian case, the bureaucracy factor was negative in the 1950s and 1960s and only...
became \textit{neutral} at the time the decision to recognize was made. It, thus, appears that, unlike in the Canadian case, Japanese decision-makers encountered substantial domestic obstacles prior to 1971. Japan's decision to recognize China was finally made in 1971 when \textit{positive} domestic factors became dominant and \textit{negative} domestic factors subsided.
CHAPTER 4

THE IMPACT OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY ON CANADIAN AND JAPANESE RECOGNITION
Many China scholars believe that foreign policy decisions of Chinese leaders are more influenced by traditional pattern of behavior than by external stimuli. In this view, the contemporary Chinese leaders' perceptions of the global system are largely influenced by the traditional Chinese perception of the world.¹ John Fairbank argues that the traditional Chinese world view can hardly be called "international" because

¹ Some scholars place less emphasis on the impact of history on the contemporary Chinese leaders' behavior towards foreign relations. They argue that the traditional Chinese perception of world order was undermined in the twentieth century and that the contemporary Chinese leaders tend to act in terms of the nation-state system. See, for example, Benjamin Schwartz, "The Chinese Perception of World Order", in John K. Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 278-286.
Chinese leaders did not use concepts corresponding to the Western ideas of nation, or sovereignty, or equality of states each having equal sovereignty.\(^2\) China was regarded as the "centre" of the global system while nations surrounding China were considered as subordinates and under the mercy of China. In other words, the imperial government's foreign relations were merely an outward extension of its internal administration.\(^3\) The Chinese assumed themselves as superior, both racially and culturally, to other peoples.\(^4\) However, there is no general agreement among China scholars on the impact of the Chinese traditional world order on the conduct of contemporary Chinese foreign policy. Some scholars argue that the Chinese Communist leaders have placed heavy emphasis on the restoration of the traditional grandeur of China and, thus, have adopted an aggressive foreign policy


\(^3\) Ibid., p. 11.

with the goal of regional hegemony;\textsuperscript{5} while some argue that the Chinese leaders have an "inward-turned" passive sense of superiority which has resulted in a lack of interest in conquering, subverting, or even understanding other countries.\textsuperscript{6}

However, most scholars tend to agree that the pattern of China's foreign policy has been influenced greatly by the pattern of China's internal politics. According to one writer, a survey of the first twenty-years of Chinese Communist foreign policy has revealed a striking pattern of tension followed by relaxation, followed by returning tension, and that these alternative periods of foreign policy are related to changes in Chinese domestic politics.\textsuperscript{7} According to the same writer, the periods of Chinese foreign policy can be divided as follows: 1) THE TOUGH PERIOD (1949-1953), a period of tension in China's foreign policy which corresponded with


\textsuperscript{6}See, for example, Ross Terril, \textit{The 800,000,000 : China and the World}, \textit{The Atlantic Monthly}, January, 1972, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{7}Richard Walker, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 290-294. The following account of the stages of Chinese foreign policy is also based on Walker's article.
the Chinese effort to restore order, revive the economy, and solidify control over a vast and disparate China;
2) THE BANDUNG SPIRIT (1954-1957), a period of relaxation in China's foreign policy which corresponded with China's First Five Year Plan for economic development; 3) THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD (1958-1961), a period of tension which corresponded with China's desperate effort to speed-up its economic development; 4) WORLD PARTICIPATION AND STEPPED-UP TRADE (1961-1965), a period of relaxation, which corresponded with the somewhat relaxed atmosphere in China's internal politics after the disaster of the Great Leap Forward; 5) THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION (1966-1968), a period of great tension which corresponded to a period of political instability in China's domestic politics. During the periods of relaxation the Peking Government expanded its foreign relationships and, hence, welcomed foreign recognitions. For example, by 1965, some 52 foreign governments (including France) had recognized the Peking Government, compared with only 32 at the time of the Great Leap Forward. The 1965 figure did not increase during the Cultural Revolution which corresponded with a period of high tension in China's foreign policy.

There is no general agreement among scholars on the explanation of the relationship between Chinese interna

\footnote{Ibid., p. 294.}
politics and external behavior. According to one authority, the periods of China's adventurist foreign policy corresponded with the periods of imbalance between the capacities of and the demands in its economic development which in turn caused tension in the domestic political system. However, this is by no means the only possible explanation. Another possible explanation is changes of leadership within the Chinese Communist hierarchy.

An event which had an enormous effect on China's foreign policy was the outbreak of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution (1966-1968). During the peak year of the Cultural Revolution in 1967, China was almost completely "turned in" and paid little attention to foreign relations. This shift in Chinese attitudes towards foreign relations was probably a result of the dominant position of Lin Piao, who paid little attention to foreign affairs by contrast with


Chou En-lai who had consistently advocated the adoption of a soft line on China's foreign policy. China's relations with almost all foreign nations worsened during the Cultural Revolution. Almost all Chinese ambassadors were recalled by Peking in 1967, which made it virtually impossible for foreign nations to approach that régime by diplomatic means. At the same time, foreign diplomats in Peking were harassed by the Red Guards.\textsuperscript{11} The Peking Government even denounced the de Gaulle Government, which it used to regard as a counter-weight against American imperialism, for maintaining friendship with the Soviet "revisionists."\textsuperscript{12}

Prior to the Cultural Revolution the Sato Government was not considering any positive steps towards recognition of China and, therefore, was not affected by the Cultural Revolution. The Pearson Government, by contrast, was seriously considering rapprochement with China by bilateral means after the failure of its proposal to seat the two Chinese governments at the United Nations in 1966. The idea of extending recognition was dropped

\textsuperscript{11} On August 22, 1967, the Red Guards invaded the British diplomatic compound in Peking. The Charge d'Affairs, Donald C. Hopson, and a number of other Britons were beaten by the Red Guards.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, September 23, 1966.
because of the worsening internal situation in China in 1967, and, thus, the Cultural Revolution apparently did have an effect on the course of Canada’s relations with China.

However, the pattern of Chinese foreign policy hardly can be explained satisfactorily by internal Chinese developments alone. It appears that the Peking Government did as well respond to external stimuli which were independent of internal political developments and that it did act rationally by diplomatic means in many situations. While Brecher has mentioned the notion of "feedback", he does not refer to the bilateral relations of the "target" country with states other than the state (or states) which made the policy decision, though such relations may have had an indirect impact on the policy of the state (or states) being analyzed. In fact, Peking’s policies towards countries other than Canada

13 Paul Martin stated with regret that the events in mainland China meant that the country did not "fully meet the criteria of recognition." See Chapter 3, p.202.

and Japan may have had "feedback" effects on the two countries' decisions to recognize that régime. Peking's responses to external stimuli and their impact on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Canada and Japan can probably be best illustrated by examining China's relations with France, the Soviet Union, and the United States and this chapter, therefore, looks first at China's relations with each of these countries. China's attitudes towards Canada and Japan and the impact of these attitudes on the course of diplomatic relations with the two countries are also discussed and compared in this chapter.

Sino-French Relations

In January, 1964, China established diplomatic relations with France. France became the second major Western power after Britain to recognize the Peking Government. The French recognition may have been even more significant than the British recognition because of the fact that France was the first major Western power to exchange ambassadors with Peking. China's official newspaper, Jen Min Jih Pao, in an editorial greeted the
establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations as a major achievement of China's foreign policy and stressed that the Chinese Government had consistently stood for peaceful co-existence among all countries with different social systems.\footnote{15} This suggests that Chinese leaders were no longer confined (if they were ever) to the traditional perception of a self-centered Chinese Kingdom. The Chinese demonstrated that they were willing to establish relations with foreign countries on equal bases. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, especially the terms of the agreement on establishing diplomatic relations, was apparently watched closely by Ottawa. A joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France was issued on January 27, 1964, as follows:

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the French Republic have decided in mutual agreement to appoint their ambassadors within three months. \footnote{16}

The brief communiqué did not mention a word about the status of Taiwan. However, the Chinese Government issued a unilateral statement one day after the announcement

\footnote{15} *Jen Min Jih Pao*, January 28, 1964.

of the joint communique declaring that "recognition of the new government of a country naturally implies ceasing to recognize the old ruling group overthrown by the people of that country."\(^{17}\) China's unilateral statement stressed that it was with this understanding that the Chinese Government had reached agreement with the French Government on the establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of ambassadors between the two countries.\(^{18}\)

The French move was particularly attractive to the Canadian Government because of France's attempt to maintain formal relations with both the Communist and Nationalist governments which the Canadian governments had not contemplated.\(^{19}\) According to John Holmes, it had always been assumed in Ottawa that recognition of Peking would be accompanied by a withdrawal of recognition from the Nationalists as the government of China,\(^{20}\) but the French approach raised the possibility of a


\(^{18}\) Ibid.


\(^{20}\) Ibid.
"one-China, one-Taiwan" solution to the vexing problem of how to avoid foresaking Taiwan by the recognition of China. However, the French Government's failure to preserve its ties with the Taiwan Government (relations were severed by Taiwan) cast doubt on the possibility of Canada's negotiating recognition of China while preserving relations with Taiwan. Referring to France's recognition of China in early 1964, Paul Martin remarked in the House of Commons:

Recent developments have revived interest in what could be described as a "one-China, one-Formosa" solution. To achieve such a solution would require above all the cooperation of the parties immediately concerned; but a practical and equitable solution along these lines has not so far proved acceptable either to Peking or to Taipei. 21

Realizing that to negotiate recognition with China at that stage would have resulted in a severance of relations with Taiwan, it appears that the Canadian Government decided that as a first step to the establishment of relations, it should seek international acceptance (via the U.N.) of the idea of a "one-China, one-Taiwan" solution after which it might be possible to recognize China without such a step leading Taiwan to sever relations. Thus, the

Canadian delegation to the U.N. in 1966 proposed the seating in the U.N. of both the Peking and the Taipei governments as members representing the territories over which they exercised effective jurisdiction respectively. At the same time, Canada abstained for the first time on the Albanian resolution calling for the seating of the Chinese Communist Government and the expulsion of the Nationalist Government, a step which indicated that if a "one-China, one-Taiwan" solution was not possible Canada in the long-run would opt for China over Taiwan. It, thus, appears that while the French recognition of China did not motivate the Canadian Government to recognize China, it, nevertheless, stimulated Canadian activity on the issue which led ultimately to Canadian recognition.

The French recognition appears to have had much less impact on the Japanese decision to recognize China than on the Canadian. Nevertheless, the French recognition did raise some hot debates in the Diet concerning the state of Japan's China policy. As a result, a paper which was prepared within the Foreign Ministry under the

22 Statements and Speeches, No. 66/47, p. 5. Paul Martin's address to the U.N. General Assembly on November 17, 1966.
title "Materials for Diet Interpretation on the China Problem" was issued in March, 1964, explaining Japan's China policy. The paper reiterated the Government's stand of maintaining diplomatic relations and the Peace Treaty with Taiwan, but it stated that Japan could not avoid having "de facto relations of several kinds with mainland China," particularly trade relations based on the "separation of political and economic affairs". In addition, like the Pearson Government, the Ikeda Government suggested the best way to deal with problems involving jurisdictional dispute between the Nationalist and Communist governments was for the United Nations to take the lead in "giving them thorough consideration and producing an equitable proposal for settlement, based on world opinion." However, unlike in the Canadian case, the impact of the French recognition on the Japanese thinking on the China issue was only temporary. After Sato came to power in November, 1964, the Japanese Government did not take any step to raise the problem of Chinese


24 Ibid.
representation in the U.N.

Sino-Soviet Relations

The development of Sino-Soviet relations had a major effect on China's attitude towards relations with Japan. In the years of Sino-Soviet alliance, Japan's military alliance with the United States was regarded by Peking and Moscow as a threat to the two countries. After Khrushchev's visit to Peking in October, 1954, a joint declaration issued by Communist China and the Soviet Union invited Japan to normalize its relations with both China and the Soviet Union. The offer, which apparently aimed at weakening Japan's ties with the United States, was rejected by the Japanese Government. The joint efforts of Peking and Moscow to woo Japan ended in the late 1950s when the Sino-Soviet dispute started to escalate.

The escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the early 1960s benefited Japan's China trade. The Peking Government hoped to ease dependence on the Soviet

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Union by expanding its trade with Japan.\textsuperscript{28} This probably explains the sharp increase in the two-way trade between Japan and China in the early 1960s. The Sino-Soviet dispute, thus, prompted the Peking Government to move closer to Japan.

Another direct consequence of the Sino-Soviet dispute was the subsequent dispute between the Chinese Communist Party and Japan's Communist Party, which broke away from its alliance with the Peking Government in 1966 when the "neutralists" and pro-Soviet group within the party ousted the pro-Peking group. This incident had a significant impact in changing the tactics of the Peking Government towards relations with Japan in that it abandoned the JCP as its route to influence Japan and sought the support of the pro-Peking factions within the LDP. This tactic in time proved to be a more effective way of influencing Japan's China policy than relying on the impact of the JCP on Japanese politics.

Another effect of the Sino-Soviet rift on Sino-Japanese relations pertains to Chinese security preoccupations. According to one source, Premier Chou En-lai

\textsuperscript{28} The Globe and Mail, September 12, 1960.
said after the normalization of relations between Japan and China that he welcomed a "reasonable growth" of Japanese strength as a potential counterweight to the Soviet Union's "aggressive designs" in Asia. Chou added that he could conceive of circumstances in which China would come to Japan's aid militarily if Japan were attacked by the Soviet Union. It, thus, appears that the escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict which culminated in serious border disputes, prompted the Peking Government to normalize its relations with Japan (before Japan-Soviet normalization talks began) in order to create a form of anti-Soviet pact. Thus, the development of the triangular relations between China, Japan and the Soviet Union had a significant effect in pulling China closer to Japan.

Unlike the Japanese case, there was no development of any significant triangular relations between Canada, China and the Soviet Union. From this point of view, the developments in Sino-Soviet relations had little impact on the

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30 Ibid.
course of Canada's recognition of China, although they may account for the slow pace of Canada's diplomatic negotiations with China. Mitchell Sharp, for example, told the press in September, 1969, that "the Chinese are somewhat distracted from other business by the struggle (Sino-Soviet border disputes) now going on."\(^{31}\) The serious Sino-Soviet border conflict did, however, strengthen Ottawa's view that the isolation of China from the world community should be ended by recognizing that régime as soon as possible\(^ {32}\), since Canada felt that the international community was powerless to intervene so long as only one of the parties to the dispute was widely recognized by it.

**Sino-American Relations**

Unlike the development of Sino-Soviet relations where the impact was largely on Japan, the development of Sino-American relations had great impact on both the Canadian and Japanese moves towards recognizing


\(^{32}\) Mitchell Sharp, for example, said that Canada could do little regarding the Sino-Soviet dispute because Canada only had diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. *Ibid.*
well as on the Chinese attitude towards the two countries' recognitions. The Peking Government remained hostile to the U.S. Government until the beginning of the Sino-American thaw in mid-1971, some time after Canadian recognition. Canada, thus, was not inhibited by Chinese hostility for U.S. after 1968. China's tough line towards the United States had inhibited the Canadian and Japanese governments from moving closer to China in the fifties and the sixties.

In response to the U.S. overtures in the mid-1960s, the Peking Government accused the Johnson Administration of feigning a desire for better relations while preparing for war. It rejected proposals by the United States for exchanges of newsmen and scholars and other contacts between the Chinese and American people. The Peking Government said that normalization of relations was "out of the question" until the United States forces had left Taiwan. The Chinese response to the U.S. overtures was apparently closely watched by decision-makers in Ottawa. Paul Martin said in August, 1966, that Canada

34 Ibid.
welcomed signs that the United States was moving towards
greater contact with China, and he hoped that Communist
China would recognize the value of engaging in such con-
tacts. The negative response of the Chinese Communists
to the U.S. overtures may, therefore, have disheartened
the Pearson Government from taking positive steps towards
diplomatic relations with China.

However, the Peking Government apparently saw
Canada differently from the United States. Despite the
proximity of Canada and the United States, the Peking
Government made clear its willingness to separate
Canada from the so-called "U.S. conspiracy" against
China. For example, Canada was accepted by the Peking
Government as a "neutral" country to supervise the peace
in Vietnam in 1954. Equally significantly, the Chinese
Government attempted in 1964 to define a so-called
"intermediate zone" divided into two parts: "one part
consists of the independent countries and those striving
for independence in Asia, Africa and Latin America; it
may be called the first intermediate zone. The second

35 Statements and Speeches, No. 66/34. Martin
spoke at the Fourth Annual Banff Conference on World
Affairs, August 26, 1966.

part consists of the whole of Western Europe, Oceania, Canada, and other capitalist countries; it may be called the second intermediate zone. According to Peking, countries in the two "intermediate zones" were oppressed by the United States and, therefore, hoped to free themselves from U.S. control. Canada was seen as one of those countries seeking to throw off the American imperialist yoke. Thus, it was possible for the Peking Government to hold negotiations with the Canadian Government while still remaining hostile to the United States. Moreover, the Peking Government may have regarded negotiations with the Canadian Government on diplomatic relations as a stepping stone for future rapprochement with the United States. This may explain China's hard line in insisting on the Canadian acknowledgment of its territorial claim to Taiwan. A Canadian acknowledgment per se may not have been important to the Chinese, but it would certainly have helped to strengthen China's future bargaining position with the United States on the status of Taiwan.

The Peking Government tended to regard Japan, unlike Canada, as part of the "U.S. conspiracy" against

China. China was particularly concerned about the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The Peking Government claimed that the U.S.-Japanese military alliance was a grave threat to China and to the peace and security of all countries in the Asian and Pacific region, and it feared that the U.S.-Japanese military alliance would stimulate a revival of Japanese militarism. The Kishi and Sato governments, which renewed the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 and 1970 respectively, were charged by the Peking Government with being "reactionary" governments. The Nixon-Sato communiqué of November, 1969, which included Taiwan within Japan's defense line, was definitely a turning point for the worse in Sino-Japanese relations. An anti-Sato campaign in the Chinese official press then resulted, reaching its peak in 1970. Even Nixon's announcement of his intention to visit China did not help much to mitigate Peking's anti-Sato campaign. As late as September, 1971, the Sato Government was accused by the Peking Government

38 See, for example, The Globe and Mail, January 15, 1960 and June 24, 1970.


40 This had been a common theme in the Chinese official press since the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960.
of intending to "take over the baton from the U.S. imperialism and play the role of successor to the United States in Asia." It, thus, appears that the Peking Government is ambivalent in its view of Japan's military revival. It distrusts and fears Japan as a potentially imperialist nation, but it also harbours hope that as a fellow Asian state Japan can serve as an ally in defending Asia from alien Soviet (and U.S.) interference.

The Peking Government was also strongly against the stationing of U.S. military forces in Japan. After Nixon's announcement of his intention to visit China, the Peking Government hinted that it would demand withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japan as the price for better relations. The stationing of U.S. forces in Japanese bases was regarded by the Peking Government as a threat to its own security and as an obstacle to its efforts to liberate Taiwan. Chou En-lai once remarked that Japan would not become an "independent" country until the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Japanese bases, implying that China would not "recognize" Japan as a sovereign

country as long as U.S. forces were stationed in Japan. In short, the Peking Government remained hostile to Japan so long as the United States was regarded as the chief enemy in the late sixties, but the outlook on Japan changed after Japan assumed the role of a potential ally against the U.S.S.R. The Sino-American thaw in the early 1970s, thus, opened a new era in Sino-Japanese relations.

After a "new page" in Sino-American relations opened with the visit of the American table tennis players in April, 1971, Peking's attack on U.S.-Japanese military "collaboration" declined remarkably. The attack was instead launched at Japan's "military revival" and the "reactionary" Sato Government. However, the Chinese attack on the Sato Government was linked to the


44 The New York Times, April 15, 1971. Chou En-lai told the visiting American table tennis players that their trip to China had "opened a new page in the relations of the Chinese and American people."

45 See, for example, Jen Min Jih Pao, June 16, 1971. The Chinese official press published an article entitled "Blueprint of Japanese militarism to step up Arms Expansion and War Preparations". It repudiated the so-called "draft of the fourth military defence build-up plan" of the Sato Government.
United States again in the fall of 1971 when the United States and Japan cooperated to rally support for the Chinese Nationalists at the United Nations session considering the admission of Peking in place of Taipei. The Chinese press described the United States and Japan as having behaved "like ants on a hot pan" in their unsuccessful efforts to keep Taiwan at the United Nations. Indeed, Peking's attack on the Sato Government was linked so closely to its attitudes towards the United States that, had Sato remained in power, the normalization of relations between China and Japan might not have been possible before the agreement reached in February, 1973, between the United States and China to establish liaison offices in each other's country. The change in Japanese governments, thus, was significant in altering Chinese attitudes towards Japan and accordingly, in speeding up the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations so that it preceded the normalization of Sino-American relations. The Chinese Government did not necessarily see Tanaka's Government as basically different

from the Sato Government or regard the former as more independent of U.S. foreign policy. The Peking Government may have tried to save "face" by not dealing with Sato whom it had repeatedly condemned because of his "collaboration" with the U.S. The formation of a Japanese Government with any new leader may thus, have been significant in altering Chinese policy towards Japan.

China's Attitude Towards Canadian Recognition

During an interview with a Canadian journalist in 1958, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated that diplomatic recognition was a matter for Canada itself and that China could and was prepared to wait, presumably confident that China had little to lose by waiting.  

Moreover, Chen Yi added, recognition to be recognition meant "restoration of China's legitimate position in the United Nations and the renunciation of the Chiang Kai-shek régime in Taiwan." Chen Yi's statement probably deterred Canadian governments from approaching China for diplomatic relations because of its claim to

48 The interview was with Oakley Dalgleish, editor of The Globe and Mail. See The Globe and Mail, July 29, 1958.

49 Ibid.
Taiwan. However, China's establishment of diplomatic relations with France in 1964 suggested to Canadian decision-makers that Canada might get around the question of Taiwan in its negotiations with China on diplomatic relations. Equally significantly, the Chinese perception of Canada in 1964 as part of an "intermediate zone" different from imperialist U.S. suggested to Canadian decision-makers that Canada could recognize China at a time when China was still hostile to the United States. The Chinese attitude was, thus, significant in the sense that it reduced in importance the Chinese negativism towards the U.S. Thus, the Chinese attitude towards Canada from 1964 on was a significant factor contributing to the Canadian decision to recognize China.

According to one source, the Peking Government ignored for six weeks Canada's request to open official discussions leading to diplomatic recognition. The Cultural Revolution in China subsided in late 1968, while new leadership which emerged from the Cultural Revolution had still to consolidate its support in the Communist Party hierarchy, and during this period Chou En-lai, who advocated a soft line

towards foreign relations, was overshadowed by the pre-eminent position of Lin Piao who advocated a hard line towards foreign relations. Lin Piao made a speech in 1965 on People's War advocating world revolution against imperialists. The later development of Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution largely reflected Lin Piao's hard line policy towards foreign relations. Moreover, the Chinese leadership was apparently pre-occupied with the preparations for the opening of the Ninth Congress Meeting scheduled in April, 1969. However, once the negotiations started, the Peking Government indicated that it was serious about establishing diplomatic relations with Canada by its remarkable silence on the struggle of the separatists in Quebec in late 1969. In normal circumstances, any form of rebel movement against an established capitalist government would have been supported by the Chinese Communists. The Pearson Government, 

51 For another interpretation of Lin Piao's speech see John Gittings, "Does China Have a Foreign Policy?", in J.M. Robson (ed.), China: Co-existence or Containment? Toronto: International Forum Foundation, 1968, p. 77. Gittings argues that Lin Piao's speech was a declaration of faith, not a programme of action.

52 The Ottawa Journal, November 1, 1969. A report by Frederick Nossal in China. The rest of the paragraph is also based on this report.
for instance, was never treated as kindly as the Trudeau Government in this regard. During the Pearson years, all major Canadian strikes were criticized by the Peking Government over its official radio and press. China's more favorable attitude to the Trudeau Government was probably partly due to the quieting down of the Cultural Revolution in late 1968 which meant in general less criticism of Western capitalist states, but it also reflected the fact that China was serious about establishing diplomatic relations with Canada.

There was a rumour during the course of negotiations between Canada and China that the Peking Government was prepared to accept recognition only if Taiwan was sacrificed, but would in compensation purchase additional wheat from Canada rather than purchase wheat from Australia which was not yet ready to recognize China. 53 Although the Trudeau Government denied any such deal during the course of negotiations, 54 it is probable that the Peking Government tried to use wheat trade as a bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Ottawa.

In the mid-1960s, world wheat production was

53 Hansard, July 16, 1969, p.11284. The rumour was quoted by John Diefenbaker.

54 Mitchell Sharp declared in July, 1969,
increasing while the demand in traditional wheat markets was decreasing. World wheat stocks increased two-fold between 1966 and 1970. Canada's wheat stocks increased at an alarming rate from 1966 on and reached a new peak (24.5 million tons) in 1970. At the same time, Australian wheat stocks increased six-fold between 1968 and 1970. China was regarded as a major wheat market by both Canada and Australia so that when the wheat trade began declining in the late 1960s competition was keen between Canada and Australia to gain the upper-hand in the China wheat market. Appreciating the seriousness of the world wheat trade situation, the Peking Government appears to have attempted to pressure Canada during the process of negotiations by buying an almost equal amount of wheat from Australia in 1969 and 1970 as from Canada.

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54 that wheat had never entered into the negotiation on recognition. *Hansard*, July 16, 1969, p. 11284.

55 World grain production had been increasing since the mid-1960s due to the successful "green revolution" among the previously low production countries, notably India and Pakistan. Some highly industrialized countries such as Japan and Britain had become nearly self-sufficient by improved methods of cultivation.


57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

Although there is no conclusive evidence to support this view, the Chinese Government apparently rewarded Canada after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries by virtually buying all its wheat from Canada. There were no wheat contracts signed between China and Australia in 1970 and 1971. Thus, Canada's wheat trade benefited, at least temporarily, from recognition of China. One may speculate that China used trade as a bait and promised the reward of wheat deals with Canada prior to Canadian recognition and, hence, there is evidence of China itself being a contributor to the establishment of relations.

The Chinese appeared to be uncompromising at the beginning of negotiations. China demanded Canadian recognition of its territorial claims to Taiwan. It also wanted assurance that Canada would support its admission to the United Nations. The Canadian

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60 The two-way trade between Canada and China exceeded $300 million for the first time in 1971.

61 The Canadian Department of External Affairs released a statement in December, 1970, explaining the course of Canada's negotiations with China on diplomatic relations. The following account of the course of negotiations is largely based on this statement. For the text of the statement see External Affairs (Ottawa), Vol. XXII, No. 12, December, 1970, pp. 414-417.
Government accepted the Peking Government as the legitimate government which exercised effective control in the mainland; it assured the Peking Government that Canada's official relations with Taiwan would be severed when diplomatic relations with Peking were established. 62 The Canadian Government also assured the Peking Government that Canada's voting in the United Nations would be consistent with its recognition of the Peking Government. 63 However, the Canadian Government firmly declined to adopt the Chinese position on the status of Taiwan. The status of Taiwan, thus, remained the main stumbling-block during the course of negotiations.

However, as the negotiations dragged on for months, the Chinese side appeared to be impatient with the progress and, hence, was willing to compromise and accept the Canadian stand of taking "note" of China's claim to Taiwan. The Chinese side also assured the Canadian Government that Canadian personnel in any future Peking embassy would not be subjected to harrassment, such as other foreign diplomats had received during the

62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
Cultural Revolution. These compromising Chinese attitudes partly reflected the restoration of order in China after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. More significantly, the Chinese leadership appears to be favoring a more realistic approach towards China's foreign policy which was advocated by Chou En-lai than the "revolutionary" approach which was advocated by Lin Piao. This suggests that the preeminent position of Lin Piao was probably already in decline in 1970, a year prior to his ultimate downfall in the fall of 1971. Thus, Chinese willingness to compromise in negotiations resulted from the change of attitudes in the Chinese leadership and made the outcome of Canadian decision to recognize China a successful one.

China's Attitudes Towards Japanese Recognition

Most of the literature on Sino-Japanese relations prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations tended to treat China as the chief initiator of closer links. 64

China was generally portrayed as an impatient suitor eagerly courting Japan. However, one writer suggested that China adopted an ambivalent "approach-avoidance" behavior pattern toward the establishment of trade and political relations with Japan. According to this writer, China had mixed feelings towards Japan which, from the Chinese viewpoint, offered an extremely attractive source of commercial exchange, but appeared to be controlled by a hostile and militant political leadership. This is largely an adequate description of Chinese attitudes towards Japan.

Another writer also attributed the deteriorating relations between China and Japan during the first two years of the 1970s to China's sensitivity to Japan's "military revival". In addition to the fear of military alliance between the United States and Japan which has been referred to above, there was a genuine concern

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66 Ibid.

among Peking leaders about the "military revival" in Japan which suggested that Japan might have ambitions of hegemony throughout Asia. In a joint communiqué issued in April, 1970, by the Chinese and North Korean Governments, the main emphasis was on the threat of Japan. It warned that there must be "no illusions or wishful thinking of any kind about Japanese militarism."\(^{68}\) Chou En-lai stated in August, 1971, during an interview with American journalist James Reston, that it was a rule that military expansion follows economic expansion.\(^{69}\) Chou believed that with its present industrial capabilities Japan was fully able to develop its own nuclear weapons, including the means of delivery.\(^{70}\) Chou laid stress on Japan's $16 billion defense budget for the five-year period of 1972-76, a 150 per cent increase over the $6.5 billion spent on defense during the previous five years, as evidence of the revival of Japanese militarism.\(^{71}\)

Another source of difficulty in Sino-Japanese

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\(^{68}\) The Globe and Mail, April 13, 1970.

\(^{69}\) The Globe and Mail, August 10, 1971.

\(^{70}\) Ibid.

\(^{71}\) Ibid. See also Jen Min Jih Pao, "Blueprint of Japanese Militarism to step-up Arms Expansion and War Preparations", June 6, 1971.
relations was the Peking Government's assertion of sovereignty over the Tiao-yu Islands (or Senkaku Islands as the Japanese called them) in the East China Sea where a huge oil deposit was discovered in the late 1960s. The Peking Government accused Japan of attempting to annex the Tiao-yu Islands by force.\footnote{72}{New China News Agency, (Peking - News Release), May 25, 1971.} It is obvious that the Peking Government was interested in claiming the oil-rich islands for economic reasons. However, Peking appeared as well to be highly concerned also about Japanese plans to include the Tiao-yu Islands within Japan's defense network.\footnote{73}{Ibid.} The Tiao-yu Islands are closer to mainland China than to Japan proper and any stationing of Japanese defense force in the Tiao-yu Islands could, thus, have been regarded by the Chinese Government as a threat to China. In addition, the Tiao-yu Islands are close to Taiwan, and this led the Peking Government to suspect the Sato Government of a plan to set up a pro-Japanese puppet régime on Taiwan, which would be an independent Taiwanese Government.\footnote{74}{The New York Times, February 21, 1972. See also New China News Agency (dispatches), December 5, 1969, and February 20, 1971.} The Tiao-yu Islands
were, thus, both economically and strategically important to the Peking Government and, hence, the Japanese claim to these islands was an inhibiting factor in the development of a Chinese disposition in favor of diplomatic relations with Japan.

One scholar even suggested that China's fear of Japan might well have been one of the main motives for Peking's moves towards détente with the United States. In other words, the Peking Government may have preferred the U.S. presence in Japan, as a balancing force against a strong, and isolated militant Japan, although, at the same time, the Peking Government welcomed a "reasonable growth" of Japanese military strength as a potential counterweight to the Soviet Union (and the U.S.). This ambivalent stand could probably have contributed to China's "approach-avoidance" behavior pattern towards relations with Japan which has been referred to above. It also probably explains China's surprising silence on either the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty or Japan's Defense Force. Build-up Plan during the negotiations with the Tanaka Government on diplomatic

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relations. It, thus, appears that China's ambivalent attitude towards relations with Japan acted as a negative factor and inhibited the improvement of relations between the two countries in the 1950s and 1960s. However, it appears that China's strategy was to establish ultimate diplomatic relations with Japan. It changed its tactics towards Japan in response to changed external stimuli in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Peking withdrew its serious criticisms against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty after the Sino-American thaw and softened its objection to Japan's Defense Force Build-up Plan as the threat from the Soviet Union became more imminent. From this point of view, therefore, the pattern of Chinese foreign policy has been affected at least as much by external stimuli as by the domestic Chinese environment. Peking, thus, appears to be more eager for normalizing relations with Japan in the early 1970s than the 1950s or 1960s because of the changes in the external environment.

One of the most frequently used tactics by Peking in its relations with Tokyo was trade. While there is no conclusive evidence of China's use of trade as a bargaining leverage in negotiations with the
Canadian Government, there is little doubt that the Peking Government consistently applied trade as a tool in its dealings with the Japanese Government. Peking insisted on a policy of inseparability of politics and economics. The Peking Government, for example, suspended its trade with Japan after the Japanese Government's refusal to grant diplomatic privileges to the Chinese trade mission in 1958. 76

Chou En-lai announced in 1960 that China's trade with Japan could be arranged through either private trade contracts or government-to-government agreements. 77 Trade under private contracts was carried out between a Chinese state trading agency and a Japanese firm deemed "friendly" on the basis of its willingness to do business on Chinese terms and its acceptance of China's "Three Political Principles", which included: 1) not adopting any policy inimical to Chinese interests; 2) not joining any plot to recognize two Chinas; and 3) not hampering attempts to normalize Sino-Japanese relations. 78

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76 For a detailed discussion of the incident see Chapter 2, pp. 90-91.
77 J. Stephen Hoadley and Sukehiro Hasegawa, op.cit., p. 142.
78 Ibid.
under government-to-government agreements was based on
the so-called "L-T Memorandum Trade Agreement" which
was signed in 1962 providing a long-range plan for future
trade between Japan and China.

The friendly firms were named by Peking mostly
on the recommendation of Japanese leftist political
parties. The Chinese trade agency reportedly used
trade contracts as vehicles for political messages by
requiring Japanese business representatives to denounce
the "reactionary" and "militant" Sato Government. How-
ever, most of the "friendly firms" were relatively small
businesses which had little influence on the ruling LDP,
while big business, which had tremendous influence on
the Government's China policy, was associated with the
"L-T Memorandum" trade. The annual communiqués signed
between the Chinese and Japanese delegations on the Mem-
orandum trade laid stress on condemning the "reactionary"
Sato Government. This was demanded by China and

79 George P. Jan, "Japan's Trade with Communist China",

80 See, for example, New China News Agency, (Peking
made possible by the "non-official" status of the Japanese Delegation. 81

Sato was accused by the Peking Government of being too close to the United States. Although trade with China continued to increase steadily during his administration, the amount of the "L-T Memorandum" trade as a percentage of Japan's total trade with China declined relative to its trade with China through the "friendly firms". 82 This was apparently the result of deliberate action taken by the Peking Government as a protest against the Sato Government and Japanese big business for having close relationships with the American "Military-Industrial Complex". In addition, the Peking Government probably used this trade tactic to force the

81 However, the so-called "non-official" delegation was largely composed of government officials or ex-officials. It was referred to as "non-official" by the Sato Government because there were no diplomatic relations between Peking and Tokyo and because Sato tried not to irritate the Taipei Government.

82 The percentage of "L-T Memorandum" trade dropped to 10% in 1971 from 47% in 1963, while the percentage of friendly trade had increased to 90% from 53% during the corresponding years. See Sheldon W. Simon, op. cit., p. 2.
big Japanese business groups to increase pressure on their Government to expand China trade by recognizing the Peking Government. This tactic was probably effective as indicated by the increasing pressure from the big Japanese corporations on their Government to recognize China from the early 1970s.

In addition to the trade tactic Peking also used other more direct tactics to arouse domestic support for recognition. While the Chinese Government took virtually no action to woo support from the Canadian public and politicians, it consistently attempted to arouse domestic Japanese support for recognition. In 1960 at the time the Kishi Cabinet was overthrown as a result of domestic opposition to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the Peking Government demonstrated a good deal of confidence in the effectiveness of mass movements in Japan politics.  

The Peking Government utilized Japan's mass communications media to the maximum. For example, Japanese reporters stationed in Peking were allowed press interviews with leading Chinese officials more frequently than correspondents of other countries. Special facilities were also


offered for gathering information and transmitting news. This Chinese tactic of wooing the support of Japan's mass media in an attempt to arouse domestic Japanese support also proved effective and partly explains the leftist tendency of most of the Japanese press. The Japanese press tended to report "good" news concerning developments in China in order not to lose its special treatment from the Peking Government and, thus, was significant in forming a favorable public opinion for recognition.

However, the Peking Government soon realized that, despite the overthrow of the Kishi Cabinet, there was no change in the balance of power among political parties in Japan. The Chinese Government apparently concluded that the anti-Government united front in Japan could be neither as cohesive nor as powerful as would be necessary to overthrow the ruling LDP. The Peking Government, thus, changed its tactics by approaching senior members of the LDP. Anti-mainstream faction leaders such as Fujiyama and Matsumura were actively

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85 Ibid.
86 A.M. Halpern op. cit., p. 447.
cultivated by the Peking Government. Matsumura and Fujiyama were invited at different times by the Peking Government to visit China in the late 1960s and early 1970s. More significant was the Chinese wooing of Takeo Miki, an important pro-Taipei mainstream faction leader in the LDP. While attending the funeral of Matsumura in August, 1971, Wang Kuo-chuan, Vice-president of the China-Japan Friendship Association, held a series of meetings with leaders of Japanese political and business circles, including some LDP members who still had some reservations about supporting the recognition of China. Shortly after Wang's visit, Miki stated that China should be recognized as the legitimate government of China and that Taiwan should be designated as one of its provinces. The shift in Miki's stand apparently strengthened the position of the pro-Peking group within the LDP, contributing to the ultimate decision to recognize China.

Clearly, then, compared with its attitudes toward Canadian recognition, China was much more eager to normalize its relations with Japan. China never abandoned

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87 The Japan Times, September 2, 1971.
88 Ibid.
its strategy of ultimately establishing diplomatic relations with Japan. It only changed its tactics at times as it perceived the necessity of change in order to woo the support of the Japanese public, the press, economic interest groups, and politicians. Thus, China itself was not an inhibiting factor (with the possible exception of its objection to dealing with the Sato Government) to Sino-Japanese relations. The Peking Government's apparent hostility to the Japanese governments was merely a tactic used to force the Japanese governments to be less dependent on China's enemies, such as the U.S. and Taiwan, and, hence, more closer to China. In fact, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan was important to the Peking Government because it served to further isolate politically the Taiwan Government; it meant China's process of industrialization could be speeded up by borrowing Japan's technological know-how; and it meant that China's bargaining leverage against the Soviet Union could be increased.

Indeed, China's eagerness to establish diplomatic relations with Japan can best be demonstrated by its readiness to give up certain long-held principles during the process of negotiations on diplomatic relations.

The Chinese Government was satisfied with an apology from the Japanese side regarding Japan's re-
responsibility for causing enormous damage in the past to the Chinese people through war and did not demand reparations. Chou En-lai avoided discussion regarding the territorial status of the Tiao-yu Islands when Tanaka brought up the subject with him.\textsuperscript{89} The notable absence of any reference to Japanese "militarism" in the joint communique marked an important shift in Chinese policy towards Japan.\textsuperscript{90} More significantly, Japan gained uncontested continuation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and uncontested continuation of economic relations with Taiwan, both of which had been strongly objected to by the Peking Government.

Finally, the Chinese Government did not insist on Japan's accepting its territorial claim to Taiwan. The Japanese stand on China's territorial claim to Taiwan was somewhat similar to that taken by the Canadian Government. However, instead of adopting the Canadian formula to "take note" of Peking's claim, the Japanese Government

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Christian Science Monitor}, October 4, 1972.

\textsuperscript{90} For the text of the joint communique see Appendix II.
declared in the communiqué that it "fully understands and respects" the stand of the Peking Government. Once again, as in its previous dealings with the Canadian Government, the Peking Government showed the world during its negotiations with the Japanese Government that it was capable of acting rationally when it was confronted with the game of realpolitik in the contemporary multipolar world.
Conclusion

The Peking Government has proved itself capable of behaving rationally in its dealings with foreign countries. The Peking Government has, indeed, behaved rationally at least since the demise of the Cultural Revolution in late 1968. Peking's new active foreign policy has been also largely influenced by the American overtures and by its escalating dispute with the Soviet Union. China's positive response to the U.S. overtures from the early 1970s indicated the beginning of Peking's active participation in the multi-polar world. The contemporary Chinese leaders' perception of the global system is no longer bound by the traditional self-centered world view. The Peking Government apparently wants to avoid being isolated diplomatically since the threat from the Soviet border shows no sign of decreasing.

Indeed, one may conclude that it was largely due to Peking's response to the changing external environment that the Peking Government was eager to establish diplomatic relations with foreign nations from the late 1960s. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France had a significant impact in affecting thinking in Ottawa with respect to finding an acceptable formula for recognition of Peking, though it had much less impact on the course of Japanese
recognition. Judging from the processes of negotiations and the contents of the joint communiqués on the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Chinese Government was willing to compromise with both the Canadian and Japanese governments. This demonstrates that Peking was at least as eager as Ottawa and Tokyo to establish diplomatic relations with the two countries.

The softening Chinese attitude towards foreign relations with the phasing out of the Cultural Revolution was significant in affecting both the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China, though apparently less significant for the Canadian decision since that decision was made at the time China's attitudes were still not very clear. The change in Chinese attitude towards Japan was apparently more pronounced than the change in its attitude towards Canada. The Chinese Government was still strongly opposed to the U.S.-Japan "military collaboration" and the revival of Japanese "militarism" in the late 1960s when Canada was negotiating with China on diplomatic relations and, thus, remained a negative factor for Japanese recognition. The dramatic development of the Sino-American thaw in the early 1970s, however, apparently speeded up the normalization of relations between Peking and Tokyo. At the same time, the Chinese Government
appears to have been eager to normalize its relations with Japan in order to strengthen its bargaining leverage against the Soviet Union. However, it is important to note that Peking's attitude towards Japanese recognition was still a negative factor (though to a much lesser degree) because of its hostile attitude towards Sato at the time the Sato Government decided to recognize China. Chinese attitudes were highly favorable for Japanese recognition only when Sato stepped down. In short, since the issue of recognition involves cooperation on the two sides concerned, the Chinese attitude towards recognition was bound to be an essential variable in affecting the Canadian and Japanese decisions.

The weighting of the degrees of "change" and "significance" as well as the ranking of the impact of the China factor is dealt with in the following concluding chapter.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION
This case study demonstrates that the output of decision-making process is a compromise amongst all factors rather than the product of one or two dominant factors. Thus, all of the points raised in this study were relevant even if one can speculate that some were more important determinants than others. Amongst the variables which have been examined in this study, the global system and the U.S. factor in the external environment as well as the variable relating to political tradition in the internal environment had great impact on both the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China. The Chinese attitude towards recognition and the Taiwan factor in the external environment as well as the internal environment in relation to economic interest groups had great impact on the Japanese decision, but considerably less impact on the Canadian decision. The two internal environmental variables in relation to public opinion and the bureaucracy had some significant
impact (but not great impact) on the two countries decisions. Finally, the regional system and the U.S.S.R.
factor in the external environment as well as the internal environmental variable relating to the opposition elites had some significant impact on the Japanese decision but only negligible impact on the Canadian decision.

Although the Japanese Government was confronted with a more drastic change in the pattern of alliance in the global system after the admission of China to the United Nations in 1971 and Nixon's visit to China in early 1972, the perceptions of the global system of Canada's decision-makers changed markedly in 1968 and, hence, the degree of "change" in the global system was almost equal to the Canadian and Japanese decision-makers. The change in the environment in relation to the global system had almost the same impact on the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China. Both Canadian and Japanese governments were tied up with the U.S. policies of non-recognition and the "containment of Communism" prior to their decisions because of their perceptions of a bipolarity in the global system. Trudeau perceived the multipolar characteristics of the global system and, thus, he rejected the U.S. policy of containing Chinese Communist expansion and, hence, removed an impediment to recognition.
In addition, the Canadian view that a Chinese threat to the stability of the global system could be ended only by involving China in international affairs was a constant and significant positive factor motivating Canada to recognize China. By comparison, the removal of the inhibiting effect of U.S. China policy by Nixon's announcement to visit China rather than a change in perceptions of the nature of the global system had a great impact on the Sato Government's decision to recognize China. However, the fear of the Chinese nuclear threat to Japan's security (and to a lesser degree to peace in Asia), which motivated the expansion of Japanese defense forces in the late 1960s, was still a negative factor (though a subsiding negative factor) at the time the Sato Government made the decision of recognition because of the objection from Peking to Japan's defense build-up.

The U.S. factor was also important to both the Canadian and Japanese recognitions of China largely because the two countries were militarily and economically dependent on the United States. Canadian governments before the Trudeau Government disagreed with but, nevertheless, accepted the U.S. China policy of non-recognition and containment of China by isolation without taking any initiatives to recognize China; likewise, the Sato and
previous Japanese governments before the "Nixon Shock" accepted U.S. policy and generally felt that the United States must move before Japan could normalize its relations with China. However, the change in U.S. policy towards China had a greater impact on the Japanese than Canadian decision because Canadian Government encountered only a modest change in U.S. China policy from the 1950s and early 1960s when it decided to recognize China in 1968, while Japan was confronted with a major change in American China policy at the time the Sato Government made its decision. In addition, the fact that Canada did take initiatives before there had been a dramatic change in U.S. policy and Japan only sometime afterwards suggests that Japan's China policy was apparently more tied up than was Canada's with U.S. policy and, hence, more inhibited by the negative U.S. factor. Indeed, the U.S. was probably the most important factor affecting the Japanese decision.

Another factor which had great impact on both the Canadian and Japanese decisions was the influence of political tradition on elite attitudes. Canadian attitudes towards recognition of China were largely an inheritance from the British tradition of extending diplomatic recognition to any de facto power. The Trudeau Government merely put into effect a policy which from 1949
was a logical one for the country to follow once the inhibiting factors were either removed or had subsided, although Trudeau's new emphasis on Canadian foreign policy may also have had some significant effect on the ultimate decision. By comparison, the Japanese governing elites also acknowledged the eventuality of recognizing China from 1949 on, but disagreements amongst party factions (faction politics is a product of Japanese political tradition) apparently weakened the impact of this elite attitude towards recognition. However, the dramatic change in the Japanese elite attitude from a generally pro-Taipei one in the 1950s and 1960s to a dominantly pro-Peking one in the early 1970s was apparently more marked than Trudeau's new emphasis on "realism" and, hence, had a great impact on the formulation of Japanese recognition.

China's attitudes towards recognition by other states, the Taiwan factor, and economic interest groups had great impact on the Japanese decision, but only moderate impact on the Canadian decision. The Chinese Government was eager to improve its foreign relations after the waning of the Cultural Revolution in late 1968. The Chinese attitude towards recognition was still not clear (though there were some signs in mid-1968 that China would soon be
ready to "turn-out") at the time the Trudeau Government decided to recognize China and, hence, its impact on the Canadian decision was only moderate. However, the softening Chinese foreign policy in early 1969 probably encouraged the Canadian Government to approach Peking for negotiations on diplomatic relations. The Chinese willingness to compromise during the later stages of the negotiations reflected that Peking hoped to make a diplomatic break-through in its relations with Western states by establishing diplomatic relations with Canada.

By contrast, the Chinese attitudes towards its foreign policy in general and relations with Japan in particular had great impact on the latter's decision to recognize Peking. The Peking Government's attitude towards relations with Japan was ambivalent and was largely affected by its relations with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. China was hostile to Japanese governments as long as it remained hostile to the U.S. because of Japan's military alliance with the U.S. Thus, the dramatic rapprochement between China and the U.S. in the early 1970s had a great impact in changing the Chinese attitude towards Japan and, hence, contributing to Japan's decision of recognition. China feared the revival of militarism in Japan but, at the same time, it may have hoped that Japan could one
day become a balancing force vis-à-vis the Soviet threat. Thus, when Sino-Soviet dispute escalated from the late 1960s China was eager to normalize its relations with Japan in order to strengthen its bargaining leverage against the Soviet Union. The signs of a Sino-American thaw and the favorable Chinese attitude towards recognition, thus, partly motivated the Japanese Government to decide to approach China to normalize relations, although Peking remained hostile to the Sato Government.

Taiwan was another factor which had great impact on the Japanese decision and only moderate impact on the Canadian decision. Taiwan was a stumbling-block to Canadian moves not because of protests from Taipei, but, because of the beliefs of Canadian decision-makers in the importance of the principles of extending recognition of de facto powers and/self-determination for the Taiwanese, which were in conflict directly with Peking's territorial claim to Taiwan. The Trudeau Government, however, decided to recognize China despite the Taiwan factor and hoped to avoid taking any position regarding the status of Taiwan during the course of negotiations. Taiwan, thus, was not a very significant factor inhibiting the Canadian decision, though it was a stumbling-block during the
negotiations and, hence, was responsible for the delay in Canada's recognition.

By contrast, Japanese moves toward closer relations with China in the 1950s and 1960s were partly inhibited by Japan's closer economic ties with Taiwan and its defence obligation in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan protested more vigorously Japanese moves than Canadian moves towards closer relations with China. However, Taiwan failed to inhibit the Sato Government from deciding to recognize China. It is also doubtful if the Tanaka Government placed greater emphasis on the protests from Taiwan than did the Canadian Government. Nevertheless, Taiwan remained a significant negative factor to Japan's policy of recognition in the early 1970s, though its significance was overridden by other positive factors.

In addition to the Taiwan factor and the factor relating to Chinese attitudes, economic interest groups were another factor which had a substantial effect on the Japanese decision, but only moderate effect on Canadian recognition. Although the Canadian domestic environment was highly favorable to the development of trade relations with China, Canadian economic interest groups on the whole (with the exception of the Federation of Agriculture) were not very enthusiastic to trade with China since the Chinese
appeared to be interested in buying only wheat from Canada. The attitudes of Canadian economic interest groups had changed little by the time the Trudeau Government decided to recognize China and, hence, had only a moderate impact on the decision.

By contrast, Japanese economic interest groups were enthusiastic to trade with China. Although they did not press strongly for government action to recognize China in the late 1960s because of the fear that their trade with Taiwan might be jeopardized by recognition of China, they became a dominant force for recognition in the early 1970s when Peking changed its policy to trade with big Japanese companies regardless of their trade relations with Taiwan. Given the economic interest groups' strong ties with the political elites, it was no surprise that the existence of a "China boom" in business circles had a great impact on the Japanese decision to recognize China.

The two internal environmental variables in relation to the public opinion and the bureaucracy had a moderate impact on both the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China. Public opinion, including the attentive public and the press, in the two countries was in general favorably disposed to the recognition of China.
The Japanese attitude towards recognition was much more complex than the Canadian attitude, since most of the Japanese wanted to have diplomatic relations with both the Peking and Taipei governments, while Canadians expressed little concern with the status of Taiwan. It appears that the Japanese public had become generally more favorable to recognition than the Canadian public when their respective governments were deciding to recognize China and, hence, may have had a greater impact on the decision.

However, it is difficult to assess the impact of public opinion on the formulation of China policies in the two countries. For example, it is difficult to estimate the extent to which the Trudeau Government was motivated by public opinion in its move to establish diplomatic relations with China; likewise, we cannot conclude to what extent Sato's decision to recognize China or Tanaka's visit to China was motivated by increasing domestic support for such a move.

The bureaucracy was another environmental factor which had moderate impact on the two countries' decisions. The pro-Taipei attitudes of the Japanese bureaucracy and the hesitant attitudes of the Canadian bureaucracy probably partly delayed their countries' respective decisions to recognize China. The role of the bureaucracy in the process
of decision-making was downgraded by Trudeau and, hence, its influence on Canada's China policy was ultimately reduced. By comparison, the Japanese bureaucracy remained powerful but its attitude seems to have been more favorably (or at least neutrally) disposed to recognition at the time the decision was made.

The regional system and the U.S.S.R. factor in the external environment, and the Opposition elites in the internal environment, had moderate impact on the Japanese decision but only marginal impact on the Canadian decision. Countries in Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia, are classified as the regional system of Japan and Canada since both are Pacific powers. Although Canadian leaders preceding Trudeau occasionally stated their concern with the negative effects of Canada's recognition on Asian states, it is doubtful if this was a genuine concern rather than merely "noise" which helped to create an excuse for inaction towards the China issue. Hence, the regional system may not really have been an inhibiting factor regarding Canada's recognition. On the other hand, the Trudeau Government's belief that Canada's recognition of China might contribute to peace in Asia was probably a significant factor contributing to Canada's ultimate decision to recognize. By contrast, the impact of the Asian states on Japan's recognition of China was apparently more significant than
their impact on Canada's recognition, partly because Japan is a relatively more important member in the regional system. In addition, Japan appears to have encountered more positive attitudes than Canada among Asian states when it decided to recognize China.

The U.S.S.R. was another factor which had considerable impact on the Japanese decision but only negligible impact on the Canadian decision. Japan's bilateral relations with the Soviet Union in the early 1970s had positive effects on Japan's recognition of China because of the Soviet Union's eagerness to improve its relations with Japan and to delay Japan's rapprochement with China. In order to balance Japan's bilateral relations with the two Communist giants, Japanese decision-makers decided to speed up the process of normalizing relations with China due to increasing overtures from the Soviet Union. By contrast, the impact of Canada's bilateral relations with the Soviet Union on the Canadian decision to recognize China was only negligible.

Finally, compared to other internal environmental variables, the opposition parties probably had the least impact on both the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China. Since minor opposition parties in Canada and all opposition parties in Japan are in seemingly permanent minority positions, their impact on the formulation of foreign policies in their respective countries is marginal. The minor Canadian
opposition parties were divided with respect to the China issue while the Conservatives, who manifested no clear difference from the Liberals on the China issue throughout the 1960s, refrained from criticizing Government policy when it decided to recognize China. Thus, the Trudeau Government was free from any Opposition obstructions when it made the decision. By comparison, the opposition parties were somewhat united in Japan in favor of the Government's rapprochement with China. The change of attitudes of the Komeito Party from an ambiguous stand before 1969 with respect to the China issue to a strongly pro-Peking stand from 1969 on was probably significant in arousing public support for recognition of China because of the wide grassroots support of the Komeito Party. Thus, the combined impact of opposition parties in Japan may have been greater than the combined impact of their counterparts in Canada on the formulation of China policy.

Having completed the examination of various environmental factors, the findings indicate that Japanese decision-makers encountered a higher degree of change in the environmental variables than Canadian decision-makers prior to their reaching the decisions to recognize China. The difference in the degree of change is more obvious in the external variables (see TABLE XI). The findings suggest that
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Change</th>
<th>Low Change</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Global System</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Regional System</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Relations with the U.S.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Relations with Taiwan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Relations with the U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>China's Attitudes Towards Recognition</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Public Opinion</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Economic Interest Groups</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Opposition Elites</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Political Tradition</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the dramatic steps taken by the Japanese Government to recognize China were motivated more by external stimuli than internal demands (with the exception of the change in attitudes within the Japanese governing elite). By contrast to the Japanese, Canadian decision-makers did not encounter any high degree of change in either external or internal environmental factors.

The findings also suggest that variables in the external environment, especially variables in relation to the "Global System" and "Relations with the U.S.", were highly significant in affecting both the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China (see TABLE XII). By comparison, variables in the internal environment were less significant in affecting both the Japanese and the Canadian decisions, with the exception of the variables in relation to "economic interest groups" and "political tradition".
### Table XII

Significance of the External and Internal Environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly Significant</th>
<th>Negligible</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Global System
   - Canada
   - Japan

2. Regional System
   - Japan
   - Canada

3. Relations with the U.S.
   - Canada
   - Japan

4. Relations with Taiwan
   - Japan
   - Canada

5. Relations with the U.S.S.R.
   - Japan
   - Canada

6. China's attitudes towards recognition
   - Japan
   - Canada

7. Public Opinion
   - Canada
   - Japan

8. Economic Interest Groups
   - Japan
   - Canada

9. Bureaucracy
   - Japan
   - Canada

10. Opposition Elites
    - Japan
    - Canada

11. Political Tradition
    - Canada
    - Japan
The small differentiation in the degree of significance of the environmental variables affecting the Canadian and Japanese decisions suggests that the three year lag between the Canadian and Japanese decisions cannot be explained properly by differences in the significance of the environmental variables. It also suggests that the difference in ranking of the relative "impact" of the environmental variables is due more to the "change" in rather than the "significance" of the variables. Indeed, it suggests that the "change" in rather than the "significance" of the variables is the key factor in explaining the different timing of the Canadian and Japanese decisions to recognize China. TABLE XIII shows that almost all environmental variables being examined in this study (with the notable exception of the "Global System") had a greater impact on Japanese than Canadian recognition and, hence, it tends to support the first hypothesis referred to in the introduction; i.e. Japanese governments, on the whole, were subjected to more change in the environmental stimuli, especially external stimuli, than were Canadian governments.
TABLE XIII

Ranking of the Relative Impact of the External and Internal Environmental Variables *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Japan</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Global System</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Regional System</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Relations with the U.S.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Relations with Taiwan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Relations with the U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. China's Attitudes Towards Recognition</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Public Opinion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Economic Interest Groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Bureaucracy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Opposition Elites</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Political Tradition</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For the scheme of weighting see Chapter I.
The findings do not confirm the hypotheses \( H_2 \) and \( H_3 \) referred to in the introduction regarding the positivism and negativism of each variable being examined. In the Canadian case (see TABLE XIV), for example, only one variable, namely, the "regional system" was negative before 1968 and became positive at the time the decision was made. However, the impact of the regional system on the Canadian decision was only marginal. The variables in relation to the U.S. factor and the bureaucracy factor were negative before 1968, but were only neutral not positive when the Trudeau Government decided to recognize China. Since these variables had considerable impact on the Canadian decision, the change in these variables, though partial, was important in determining the ultimate Canadian decision to recognize China. The rest of the variables were constantly positive or neutral (with the notable exception of the Taiwan factor and probably the exception of public opinion in the 1950s).

Compared to the Canadian case, there are with respect to Japan more variables which tend to support the hypothesis \( H_3 \) regarding the positivism and negativism of the variables. The variables in relation to the "Global System", "Relations with the U.S.", and "Political
|| Canada | Japan |
|---------|-------|
| 1. Global System | Positive | Positive |
| 2. Regional System | Positive (Negative - before 1968) | Neutral (Negative - before 1971) |
| 3. Relations with the U.S. | Neutral (Negative - before 1968) | Positive (Negative - before 1971) |
| 4. Relations with Taiwan | Negative | Negative |
| 5. Relations with the U.S.S.R. | Neutral | Positive (Neutral - before 1971) |
| 6. China's Attitudes Towards Recognition | Neutral | Positive (Negative - before 1972) |
| 7. Public opinion | Positive | Positive |
| 8. Economic Interest Groups | Positive | Positive |
| 10. Opposition Elites | Neutral | Positive |
| 11. Political Tradition | Positive | Positive (Negative - before 1971) |
"Tradition", support the hypothesis since they were negative before 1971 and became positive in 1971 (see TABLE XIV). It is important to note that all these variables had great impact on the Japanese decision. The "Regional System" and the "Bureaucracy" were negative before 1971 and became neutral not positive in 1971; the U.S.S.R. factor was neutral not negative before 1971 and became positive in 1971; and China's attitude towards Japanese recognition was negative before 1972 and became clearly positive only after Nixon's China trip. The above four variables, thus, partially support the hypothesis. These variables also had great impact on the Japanese decision. It, thus, appears that, unlike in the Canadian case, almost all variables which had a marked impact on the Japanese decision to recognize China support or partially support the hypothesis. The negative nature of these variables before 1971, thus, largely explains the three year lag in the Japanese decision to recognize China after the Canadian decision.

As in the Canadian case, the nature of Japanese "Public Opinion and "Economic Interest Groups" with respect to the China policy was constantly positive although it became more positive at the time the decision
was made. Unlike in the Canadian case, however, the impact of Japan's opposition elites was constantly positive to recognition vis-à-vis the neutral impact of the Canadian opposition elites.

Clearly, then, not all variables being examined were positive or indifferent to recognition when the decisions in the two countries were made. However, the "intensity" of positivism was higher than the "intensity" of negativism at the time the decisions were made. By weighting the "intensity" of positivism or negativism of each variable we can obtain the overall "intensity" of positivism or negativism of the environmental variables prior to and at the time the Canadian and Japanese governments decided to recognize China.

TABLE XV shows the non-adjusted (assuming that all variables are of equal "significance" for the decision of recognition) "intensity" of the positivism or negativism of the external and internal environments. It shows that Canadian governments before 1968 encountered negative impact from the external environment but positive impact from the internal environment on the formulation of the China policy. The "balanced" environmental impact was slightly negative for recognition preceding the Trudeau Government's decision to recognize China. By comparison,
TABLE XV

Non-adjusted Intensity of the Positivism OR Negativism of the External and Internal Environments *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before 1968</th>
<th>In 1968</th>
<th>Before 1971</th>
<th>In 1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Global System</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Regional System</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Relations with the U.S.</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Relations with Taiwan</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Relations with the U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. China's Attitudes Towards Recognition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>-20</strong></td>
<td><strong>+15</strong></td>
<td><strong>-60</strong></td>
<td><strong>+20</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before 1968</th>
<th>In 1968</th>
<th>Before 1971</th>
<th>In 1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. Public Opinion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Economic Interest Groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Bureaucracy</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Opposition Elites</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Political Tradition</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>+10</strong></td>
<td><strong>+35</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>+50</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>-10</strong></td>
<td><strong>+50</strong></td>
<td><strong>-60</strong></td>
<td><strong>+70</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The intensity of positivism or negativism is weighted as follows:

- Highly positive: 15
  - 10
  - 5
- Neutral: 0
  - -5
- Highly negative: -15
the Trudeau Government encountered positive impact from both the external and internal environments and, hence, since the overall "intensity" of positivism at the time the decision was made was so high, the Trudeau Government was motivated by the favorable environment to recognize China.

By contrast, TABLE XV shows that Japanese governments before 1971 encountered a much higher degree of negativism than Canadian governments before 1968 in the external environment and neutralism in the internal environment. Hence, overall they encountered a greater "intensity" of negativism regarding recognition than did Canadian governments. This high "intensity" of negativism in the environmental variables probably explains the Japanese policy of non-recognition before 1971. By comparison, the Sato Government in 1971 encountered a positive impact from both the external and internal environments and, hence, a high degree of overall "intensity" of positivism (considerably higher than the "intensity" of positivism encountered by the Trudeau Government) at the time the decision was made. It was no surprise, then, that the Sato Government decided in 1971 to recognize China.
Taking the "significance" of the environmental variables into account, it is obvious that in the Canadian case the environment was much more favorable for recognition in than prior to 1968. The adjusted "intensity" of positivism in 1968 was more than two times that of the non-adjusted "intensity", while the adjusted negativism prior to 1968 was about the same "intensity" of the non-adjusted negativism.

Similarly, in the Japanese case, the adjusted "intensity" of the positivism or negativism of the environmental variables indicates even more clearly that Japanese governments before 1971 were inhibited from recognizing China by the highly negative nature of the external environment. The internal environment, on the other hand, appears to have had a slightly positive effect on Japanese policy before 1971. However, it is important to note that, as in the Canadian case, the "intensity" of positivism in the internal environment was much higher (by a margin of almost three to one) than the "intensity" of positivism in the external environment at the time the Japanese Government decided to recognize China. This suggests that both the Canadian and Japanese governments were motivated by increasing
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CANADA Before 1968</th>
<th>CANADA In 1968</th>
<th>JAPAN Before 1971</th>
<th>JAPAN In 1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Global System</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Regional System</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Relations with the U.S.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Relations with Taiwan</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Relations with the U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. China's Attitudes Towards Recognition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>+40</td>
<td>-160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Public Opinion</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Economic Interest Groups</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Bureaucracy</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Opposition Elites</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Political Tradition</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
<td>+30</td>
<td>+85</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>+125</td>
<td>-155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The intensity of positivism or negativism is adjusted by multiplying the "highly significant" (1) variables by three, the "significant" (2 and 3) variables by two, and the "negligible" variables (4 and 5) by one. See TABLE XII for the weighting of the "significance" of variables. Note that the intensity is not adjusted by the relative "impact" of the variables, since, by weighting the intensity of the positivism or negativism of the variables, the element of "change" has already been included.
domestic support to recognize China when the negative external environmental factors subsided.

This case study suggests that it was not the Japanese Government, but rather the Canadian Government which was slow to take steps to recognize China, considering on a comparative basis the obstacles inhibiting the two countries from recognizing that regime. Since the overall effect of the environment was only slightly unfavorable for Canadian recognition before 1968, Canada could have recognized China long before Trudeau came to power. This suggests that there may be other environmental variables which have been overlooked in this study which had a significant deterring effect on the Canadian move towards recognition prior to 1968, or that the negative nature of certain environmental factors which were analyzed should have been weighted more heavily than the scale employed in this study allowed. One of the possible explanations may be that peculiar element in the Canadian psychological environment in the pre-Trudeau years which can be described as extreme caution and diffidence with respect to taking international initiatives. By contrast, the obstacles inhibiting Japanese governments before 1971 were so serious that had any government attempted to
recognize China, it would surely have been confronted with objections abroad and political instability at home.
APPENDIX I

Joint Statement
of the Government of the People's Republic
of China and the Government of Canada

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Canada, in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and equality and mutual benefit, have decided upon mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations, effective October 13, 1970.

The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Canadian Government takes note of this position of the Chinese Government.

The Canadian Government recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.

The Chinese Government and the Canadian Government have agreed to exchange ambassadors within six months, and to provide all necessary assistance for the establishment and the performance of the functions of diplomatic mission in their respective capitals on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and in accordance with international practice.

October 13, 1970.

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APPENDIX II

Joint Statement
of the Government of the People's Republic
of China and the Government of Japan

At the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited the People's Republic of China from September 25 to 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka were Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido and other government officials.

Chairman Mao tsetung met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27. The two sides had an earnest and friendly conversation.

Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, all along in a friendly atmosphere, on various matters between the two countries and other matters of interest to both sides, with the normalization of relations between China and Japan as the focal point and the two sides agreed to issue the following joint statement of the two Governments:

China and Japan are neighbouring countries separated by only a strip of water, and there was a long history of traditional friendship between them. The two peoples ardently wish to end the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between China and Japan - the realization of such wishes of the two peoples will open a new page in the annals of relations between the two countries.

The Japanese side is keenly aware of Japan's responsibility for causing enormous damages in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself. The Japanese side reaffirms its position that in seeking to realize the normalization of relations
between Japan and China, it proceeds from the stand of fully understanding the three principles for the restoration of diplomatic relations put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

Although the social systems of China and Japan are different, the two countries should and can establish peaceful and friendly relations. The normalization of relations and the development of good-neighbourly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples, and will also contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the safeguarding of world peace.

(1) The abnormal state of affairs which has hitherto existed between the People's Republic of China and Japan is declared terminated on the date of publication of this statement.

(2) The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.

(3) The Government of the People's Republic of China reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of China and adheres to its stand of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.

(4) The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan have decided upon the establishment of diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to adopt all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of functions of embassies in each other's capitals in accordance with international law and practice and exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.

(5) The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the peoples of China and Japan, it renounces its demand for war indemnities from Japan.

(6) The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to establish durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

In keeping with the foregoing principles and the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Governments of the two countries affirm that in their mutual relations, all disputes shall be settled by peaceful means without resorting to the use or threat of force.

(7) The normalization of relations between China and Japan is not directed against third countries. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

(8) To consolidate and develop the peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship.

(9) In order to further develop the relations between the two countries and broaden the exchange of visits, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of agreements on trade, navigation, aviation, fishery, etc., in accordance with the needs and taking into consideration the existing non-governmental agreements.

September 29, 1972.
APPENDIX III

Chronology

1949

October 1: The People's Republic of China was formed.

October 25: Pearson stated in the House of Commons that Canada would recognize China as a de facto nation if it had exercised effective control over the territory which it claimed.

1950

January 5: President Truman stated that the U.S. Government would not pursue a course that would lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China, and that the U.S. Government would not provide military aid or advice to Nationalist Chinese forces on Taiwan.

January 6: The British Government recognized China although only a Charge d'Affaires was appointed by the United Kingdom to Peking.

January 12: A UN resolution to replace the Chinese Nationalists by Communist China was defeated. The U.S. and Canada voted against the resolution.

June 25: The Korean War broke out.

June 27: President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to prevent either an attack on Taiwan by China or a Nationalist attack on the mainland.

September 19: An Indian motion to seat Communist China at the UN General Assembly was defeated. The U.S. and Canada voted against the motion.

October 25: Chinese "volunteers" entered the Korean War.
1951

February 1: A UN resolution, sponsored by the U.S., condemning Communist China for aggression in Korea, was passed by the General Assembly. Canada voted in favor of the resolution.

June 6: Pearson opposed the U.S. policy of a complete trade embargo against China, fearing that would leave the Chinese Communists without room to manoeuvre for peace in the future.

September 8: The Japanese Peace Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty were signed in San Francisco. The peace treaty terminated Japan's sovereignty over Taiwan, but did not specifically state that Taiwan was now a part of China.

September 18: Chinese Premier Chou En-lai declared that the San Francisco Peace Treaty was null and void.

1952

January: Prime Minister Yoshida stated that Japan was not prepared to enter into negotiations for recognition with China – a régime that had been named an aggressor by the UN.

April 24: Japan signed a peace treaty with Taiwan.

June 1: The first Sino-Japanese private trade agreement was signed in Peking.

July: Yoshida said in a Diet debate that the peace treaty with Taiwan recognized Chiang's legal domain as only Taiwan and that Japan would seek eventual ties with China.

November 9: Yoshida stated in an interview that Japan was not ready to conclude a peace treaty with either China or USSR.

1953

July 7: A trade agreement between Japan and Taiwan was signed, providing for an expansion of two way trade.

July 26: An Armistice was signed in Korea.

1954

March 25: St. Laurent stated in the House of Commons that Canada "should keep an open mind as to when if ever conditions may be such that it will be in the interest of peace and stability in the world to recognize diplomatically whatever government happens to be in control of the forces of China."
1954

May: A Conference on Korea and Indo-China was held at Geneva in which Canada participated. Pearson referred to this occasion as a good opportunity to observe the attitudes of the Peking Government towards foreign relations.

October 12: In a joint declaration in Peking on October 11, Moscow and Peking proposed the restoration of diplomatic relations and an increase in trade with Japan, but Acting Prime Minister Takemori Ogata rejected the move as aimed at weakening Japan's ties with the U.S.

December 2: The U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty was signed. The treaty defined the territory of Nationalist China as including Taiwan and the Pescadores. Notes subsequently signed in conjunction with the treaty committed Nationalist China to consulting with the U.S. with regard to any offensive action against the mainland.

December 10: Ichiro Hatoyama's Cabinet was inaugurated.

1955

January 4: Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama outlined a series of steps to develop closer relations with the Soviet Union and China, with the promotion of trade and travel as the first steps. He said that the recognition of China and the Soviet Union would lead to world peace.

January 10: The first Quemoy Crisis broke out.

January 28: Pearson stated that the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu "are indisputably part of the territory of China" and tried to persuade the U.S. to release itself from these commitments.

April 23: Chou En-lai offered to talk with the U.S. regarding the issue of Taiwan.

August 1: U.S.-China ambassadorial talks began at Warsaw.

August 25: Lester Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, suggested a review of Canadian recognition policy towards China.
1956

January : Pearson was irate over the Taiwan Government in the U.N. veto of the plan for admitting sixteen new members to the UN, a plan for which Canada's delegation had worked particularly hard.

February : Pearson wrote that Canada could "negotiate with Peking when necessary and desirable without implying approval of that régime or without weakening our opposition to Communism".

April : The U.S. and Secretary of State made clear their opposition to Canada's suggestion to recognize China during a conference at Sulphur Springs.

August 6 : China offered visas to U.S. correspondents.


October 19 : Japan established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union without any settlement regarding the Japanese islands occupied by the Soviet Union.

December 26 : Japan's new Prime Minister Tanzan Ishibashi indicated he planned a broad review of the country's relations with the U.S. in order to achieve a closer accord. Ishibashi stressed the need to create what he called a "spiritual association" between Japan and the U.S.

1957

January : Japan was admitted to the UN.

February 4 : Foreign Minister Nobusuke Kishi said he hoped for a relaxation of the embargo against trade with China.

February 25 : Nobusuke Kishi's Cabinet was inaugurated.

April 22 : A Socialist delegation, headed by Inejiro Asanuma, Secretary General of the Japan Socialist Party, and the Chinese Government issued a joint statement calling for resumption of diplomatic ties between the two nations and creation of a "collective security" arrangement between Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the U.S.
June 10: John Diefenbaker led the Canadian Progressive Conservative Party back to power after more than twenty years absence.

August 22: The U.S. granted visas for correspondents to go to China.

November 17: Mao Tse-tung, in Moscow, proclaimed that "the east wind prevails over the west wind".

December: The Canadian Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong was sent to mainland China for the first time.

March: The Taiwan Government was irate over Japan's private steel trade agreement with China. Taipei threatened a complete economic boycott of trade with Japan.

May 2: An anti-Communist Japanese youth tore up a Chinese flag at an exhibition of Chinese stamps in Nagasaki, Kyushu.

May 9: Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi denounced Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi for his "policy hostile to China". The next day China notified Japan of its suspension of issuance of export licenses and trade talks, thus bringing about a total suspension of Sino-Japanese trade.

August: The Canadian embargo list, regarding trade with China, was changed so that it would be similar to that for other communist nations which meant the easing of restrictions on trade with China.

August 23: The off-shore islands occupied by Taiwan were shelled by China.

August 26: The Diefenbaker Government warned the U.S. that Canada would take no part in any hostilities which might result from the Chinese bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu.

September 6: Premier Chou En-lai suggested resumption of Warsaw talks with the U.S.

October 23: Chiang Kai-shek renounced force as the principal means for recovering the mainland.
October 25: China started alternate-day bombardment of the off-shore islands.

March 9: Inejiro Asanuma, Chairman of the Japanese Socialist Party, said in Peking that U.S. imperialism is the common enemy of Japan and China.

January 5: Hayato Ikeda, the then Trade Minister in the Kishi Cabinet, stated that after the signing of a new security treaty with the U.S. Japan should work for improved relations with China.

January 14: In the first official reaction to the conclusion of revised U.S.-Japanese security pact, Peking accused Japan and the U.S. "imperialists" of preparing new aggression and of menacing Asian world peace.

January 25: Prime Minister Kishi said that Japan would wait for China to make the first move toward improving relations with its Asian neighbours. He was doubtful that any gestures toward China by the Japanese Government would be accepted in Peking.

February: China stepped up its verbal war against Premier Kishi and Japan's revised security pact with the U.S. The pact was condemned as "an out-and-out aggressive treaty of military alliance", which marked the revival of Japanese militarism under the aegis of U.S. imperialism.

April 22: China made its first ideological attacks on Soviet foreign policy.

May 10: A crowd of Chinese, estimated at more than one million, shouted anti-American and anti-Japanese slogans in a demonstration in Peking. They carried slogans and placards protesting the revised Japanese-U.S. mutual security treaty.

July 3: A statement known as the Japanese Foreign Ministry's "blue book on diplomacy" revealed the Japanese Government's intention to seek friendlier relations with China as part of Japan's new "good neighbour policy".

July 19: Hayato Ikeda became Prime Minister, succeeding Nabusuke Kishi. His Cabinet adopted a more flexible policy toward China and sought an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations.
September 6: The Warsaw talks between China and the U.S. on the issue of Taiwan become stalemated.

December: A Chinese trade mission arrived in Ottawa and bought $60 million worth of Canadian wheat.

January 30: Ikeda told the Diet that Japan would seek to improve relations with China and declared that the establishment of closer relations between Tokyo and Peking would be "our task this year".

April: A three year agreement was negotiated by Canadian officials in Hong Kong, for the sale of $362 million worth of wheat to China.

June: Prime Minister Ikeda visited Washington and had talks with President Kennedy. Ikeda was apparently persuaded by the U.S. Government not to take any major steps towards normalizing relations with China.

December 15: The question of granting China membership in the UN and expelling Taiwan was for the first time voted an important question requiring a two-thirds majority.

June 26: China was informed at Warsaw that the U.S. would not back an attack by Taiwan on the mainland.

June 27: President Kennedy reiterated the policy established by Eisenhower that the U.S. would take all action necessary to ensure the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores.

September: China's Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi told a visiting Japanese mission, headed by senior LDP Dietman Kenzo Matsumura, that he could "understand that it would be difficult for Japan, to break off relations with the Chiang Kai-shek regime". He added that China could also understand but could not approve of Japan's "being forced under American pressure to follow the American plot for the creation of two Chinas".

October 20: A major China offensive was launched along the disputed frontier with India which was a significant factor inhibiting the Diefenbaker Government from approaching China.
November 9: Tatsunosuke Takasaki, a senior Diet member of the Liberal-Democratic Party, and Liao Cheng-chih signed in Peking a memorandum on Sino-Japanese overall trade (known as L-T Trade), which led to a substantial increase in Sino-Japanese trade relations.

April 8: Lester Pearson led the Liberal Party back to power in Canada.

August 2: Further wheat sales to China were announced by Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Trade and Commerce.

September: In talks with visiting U.S. journalists in Tokyo, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda candidly remarked that he believed Taiwan's hopes of retaking China were wishful thinking.

October: The Japanese Government decided to return to mainland China a Chinese trade official who sought political asylum while visiting Japan. The Taiwan Government was irritated.

December: Taiwan's Government protested the extension of credit by the Japanese Export-Import Bank to Communist China. The credit had been guaranteed by the bank to finance the sale by a private Japanese company of a $20 million artificial fiber textile plant.

December 13: Roger Hilsman, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, made major China policy speech, indicating a major shift in U.S. China policy towards rapprochement.

January 27: France established diplomatic relations with China. On February 10, Taiwan broke diplomatic relations with France.

March: Premier Chou En-lai stated in an interview that the Chinese people "strongly demand an early restoration of diplomatic relations between China and Japan."

April 19: Kenzo Matsumura, senior LDP Dietman, and Liao Cheng-chih agreed in Peking to exchange news correspondents between the two countries and establish private trade offices between the two countries.
May 30: Former Prime Minister Shigru Yoshida visited Taipei at the request of Prime Minister Ikeda to seek an improvement in Japan-Taiwan relations. After returning from Taipei, Yoshida sent a letter to Taiwan leaders, promising not to let the Japanese Government use Japan Export-Import Bank credits to finance trade with China.

October 16: China for the first time exploded a nuclear device.

November 9: The Cabinet of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was inaugurated.


January: Prime Minister Eisaku Sato visited Washington. He asserted Japan's right to take a somewhat divergent line from the U.S. in dealing with China. He added that Japan "stands as a link between East and West - that is, in the sense of standing between the Communist and free countries."

February 7: American bombing of North Vietnam began, thus intensifying Sino-American hostility.

April 20: Kawashima, vice-president of LDP, met with Chou En-lai for two and a half hours in Jakarta. Japanese Government officials hailed the meeting as an important stepping stone towards improving relations between the two Governments. The meeting was regarded as the first "official" contact between the representatives of the two governments in ten years.

June: The U.S. terminated its program of economic assistance to Taiwan.

September 2: Lin Piao's "Long Live the Victory of People's War" was issued advocating a hard line on China's foreign policy.

October 28: Further Canadian wheat sales to China were announced.

December: The U.S. Government announced that its
Cont'd (December)
ban on travel to China was being lifted for
 Doctors and medical scientists. During 1966,
 scholars and writers were added to the list and
 in July, Americans in cultural, athletic, commer-
cial, educational, public affairs and other fields
 were allowed to visit China.

February 14 : The U.S. offered to let journalists
 from China enter the U.S. There was, however, no
 response from China.

March 13 : Vice-President Humphrey urged that the
 U.S. policy toward China be one of "containment
 without necessarily isolation;"

March : Premier Eisaku Sato's pro-American Govern-
 ment frankly admitted that the mending of the "un-
natural rupture" in Peking-Tokyo relations hinged
 on a prior softening of attitudes between the U.S.
 and China. Government officials stated that "the
 time is not ripe" for Japan to act as a "mediator"
 between Washington and Peking.

April 17 : U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk issued
 a statement on China policy saying that the U.S. wel-
 come broader contacts with China.

June 7 : Prime Minister Eisaku Sato advised the
 Chinese Communists to avoid "isolation" and get
 in tune with world trends for their own good at
 a dinner in honour of U.S. Secretary of State
 Dean Rusk. Rusk affirmed that the U.S. would
 retaliate "with whatever means would be required"
 in the event of an attack on one of the Asian
 nations allied with Washington.

August 8 : The Central Committee of the Chinese
 Communist Party announced a 16 point decision on
 the Great Cultural Revolution. One of the first
 Chinese to be purged was Kuo No-jo, head of the

October 27 : China tested its first guided missle-
nuclear weapon.

November 23 : Paul Martin, Secretary of State for
 External Affairs, proposed "one-China, one Taiwan"
solution to Chinese representation in the UN General
1966  Cont'd (November 23)
Assembly. No resolution was, however, presented by Canada. An Italian resolution to set up a study committee on the issue of China's membership was defeated. Canada abstained in the vote on the Albanian resolution to seat Peking in the UN and expel Taiwan.

1967  October 8: Taiwan's Deputy Prime Minister, Huang Shao-ku, arrived in Ottawa for an official visit. Mr. Huang reaffirmed his Government's desire to reunite Taiwan and the mainland.

November 27: Canada again abstained in voting on the Albanian resolution in the UN General Assembly.


May 2: Chinese correspondents were invited to cover the U.S. Presidential campaign. There was no response from China.

May 5: Prime Minister Trudeau announced Ottawa's intention to establish diplomatic relations with China.

May 14: Taiwan's Ambassador to Canada, Hsueh Yu-chi, expressed "distress" over statements by Prime Minister Trudeau about Canada's initiating bilateral discussions with China that might lead to diplomatic recognition.

May 29: External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp expressed hope that Canada could negotiate recognition of China without disrupting diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

August 12: Spokesmen for Chinese communities across Canada met External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp and tried to dissuade the Government from extending diplomatic recognition to China, but failed.

November 8: Pierre Trudeau led the Liberal Party to victory in a Federal Election with a clear majority.
December 18: External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp confirmed that the Canadian Government had decided to recognize China, but he said negotiations were being held up by a desire to hold discussions with the incoming U.S. administration. In Washington, a U.S. State Department official said that "the U.S. Government would not like it very much," if Canada recognized China but that it was Canada's decision to make.

February: The Canadian Embassy in Stockholm was instructed to contact Chinese representatives in the Swedish capital to set a time and place for negotiations aimed at establishing diplomatic ties. China's initial response was cool.

February 13: External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp and Taiwan's Ambassador Hsueh Yu-chi held talks on the China recognition issue.

March: Serious Sino-Soviet border clashes occurred.

March 17: A spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Stockholm stated that the Chinese Government was sympathetically considering Canada's proposal for an exchange of ambassadors.

April 1: Lin Piao's speech to the Chinese Communist Party's Ninth Congress reflected the ending of the Cultural Revolution.

April: Canadian and Chinese diplomats in Stockholm started preliminary talks.

April 9: Ottawa announced that China had agreed to full-scale negotiations with Canada over the question of diplomatic recognition.

May 19: China told the U.S. in a press policy statement that the price of improved relations was American abandonment of Taiwan and of the American policy of containment.

June 20: External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp, back from a 13-day tour of Scandinavian capitals, refused to put a time limit on Chinese-Canadian negotiations in Stockholm on diplomatic recognition. Sharp reaffirmed that talks would be prolonged, but progress was being made on substantive issues.
1969

July 21: The first relaxation of trade and travel restriction concerning China by the Nixon Administration was announced.

July 25: Nixon outlined his new Asian policy of a lower level of U.S. involvement and greater reliance on the U.S. Asian allies to maintain peace and stability in the region.

September 24: External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp said that China had asked Canada to support its effort to gain membership in the UN at the Stockholm negotiations.

September 25: Prime Minister Eisaku Sato said that the time was approaching when Japan would play the leading role in matters relating to Asian security, with the U.S. cooperating from the sidelines.

November 11: China was barred again from UN membership. Canada abstained on the Albanian resolution to seat China and expel Taiwan.

November 21: A Sato-Nixon communique was issued in which the U.S. agreed to return Okinawa to Japan in 1972. The statement also dealt with the defense of Taiwan and South Korea as part of the defense of Japan.

December 13: Sato said that Japan, like the U.S., wanted to have high-level official contacts with China.

December 19: The U.S. allowed foreign subsidiaries of American-owned firms to trade with China in non-strategic items. It also removed the $100 limit on purchase of Chinese goods by Americans for non-commercial use.

1970

February 17: Sato made clear that his Government contemplated no major changes in relations with China in the near future. However, Sato declared, "we are keeping our doors open, and are ready to try ambassadorial contacts at any place acceptable to both sides."

February 24: China charged the U.S. and Japan with promoting a movement for the independence of Taiwan.

April: The U.S. announced selective licensing of American-made components and spare parts for non-strategic foreign goods to be exported to China.

April 8: External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp said during a visit to Bonn that the ambassador of Nationalist China would lose his diplomatic standing at Ottawa, once Canada recognized the Peking régime.

May 20: Mao denounced U.S. intervention in Cambodia.

May 29: Trudeau returned to Canada after a 19-day tour of the Pacific with predictions that his trip would result in closer economic and political ties between Canada and that area.

June 14: At the end of a 12-day fact-finding tour of the Far East, former Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker said he was convinced Canadian recognition of China would seriously damage the anti-Communist cause in Asia.

June 23: In a front-page editorial, an official Chinese newspaper charged that the extension of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty posed a grave threat to the peace and security of the countries in the Asian and Pacific region.

September 16: Prime Minister Trudeau said in a TV interview that Canada's talks with China on diplomatic relations were still uncertain.

October 13: Canada announced its recognition of China. Taiwan broke diplomatic relations with Canada.

December 6: China asserted its sovereignty over the little Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, believed to have a rich reserve of oil. The Nationalist Government in Taiwan took the view that the islands belonged to Taiwan.

December 9: The supra-partisan Dietmen's League for Normalization of Japan-China Relations was inaugurated.
January 22: Sato reiterated his Government's desire to improve relations with China and referred to China for the first time as the People's Republic of China in an address at the Diet.

February 25: In his annual foreign-policy report to Congress, President Nixon proposed more trade and a "serious dialogue" with China, but maintained U.S. support for the Nationalists' retaining the China seat in the UN. For the first time an American President referred to the "People's Republic of China", thus using its official name.

March 15: The last U.S. restriction on travel to China was lifted.

March 21: A Chinese table tennis team arrived in Japan to participate in a world table tennis Championship.

April 7: Sung Chung, Secretary General of the Chinese table tennis team, announced that the U.S. table tennis team had been invited to visit China.

April 12: The Chinese Nationalist Ambassador to the U.S. expressed concern about the Nixon Administration's policy of improving relations with the People's Republic. He denounced Peking's invitation to the table tennis teams as "psychological warfare designed to divide friend from friend."

April 14: Premier Chou En-lai met the U.S. table tennis players in Peking.

April 14: The U.S. further relaxed its embargo on trade and commercial dealings with China, implying an intention to place trade with China on the same basis as with the Soviet Union and other communist states.

April 26: A fifty-member commission on the UN appointed by Nixon proposed a "two-Chinas" policy for the U.S.

June 10: The U.S., virtually ended the embargo on trade with China; all restrictions on the import of Chinese goods were removed, and only a selected list of strategic materials, similar to that applying to other communist nations, remained barred from export to China.
June 28: An economic and trade mission headed by Mr. Pepin, the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, arrived in Peking. The Chinese Government apparently agreed to buy more from Canada in new market areas, such as high technology goods, and to look to Canada first for wheat.

July 16: Radio Peking announced that U.S. President Richard Nixon had accepted a Chinese invitation to visit China. In response to the announcement Prime Minister Sato reaffirmed his Government's basic position that it wanted to improve relations with Peking but not at the cost of giving up its ties with Taiwan.

July 21: Sato expressed willingness to go to Peking to discuss normalization of relations, including diplomatic recognition.

August 2: The U.S. announced its support for the seating of China in the UN, but opposed Taiwan's expulsion.

September 18: A delegation of the Dietmen's League for normalization of Japan-China Relations visited Peking.

October 25: The 26th General Assembly of the UN voted to admit China to the world body.

February 21: President Nixon visited China.

February 27: A joint communiqué was issued at the end of Nixon's week-long visit. The communiqué surprised officials in Taiwan and came as a "profound shock" to the Japanese. Nixon pledged in the statement to reduce progressively U.S. forces and military installation on Taiwan, "as the tension in the area diminishes."

April 15: Takeo Miki, a senior member of the ruling LDP, visited China.

July 7: The Cabinet of Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka took office.

July 9: Premier Chou welcomed Tanaka's statement that he would promote the normalization of relations between China and Japan.
August 12: Premier Chou formally invited Prime Minister Tanaka to visit Peking.

August 15: Prime Minister Tanaka accepted Chou's invitation.

August 21: The first Canadian Trade Fair in Peking opened. It was the largest Canadian exhibition overseas ever organized.

August 31: Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and President Nixon began summit talks in Honolulu. The White House announced that President Nixon was convinced that Japan's moves to open diplomatic relations with China would not harm U.S. security interests in the Pacific. Japan's ambassador to the U.S. Nobuhiko Ushiba disclosed that Nixon and Tanaka had agreed that their two countries should evolve their China policies according to their own need.

September 8: The Liberal-Democratic Party's Executive Council gave its formal approval to a Government five-point policy for normalizing relations with China.

September 17: Special Japanese envoy, Etsusaburo Shiina, Vice-president of the LDP, arrived in Taipei and was confronted with demonstration by protestors opposed to Japanese moves to normalize diplomatic relations with China.

September 25: Prime Minister Tanaka visited Peking for talks with Chinese leaders on normalization of bilateral relations.

September 29: Premier Chou and Prime Minister Tanaka signed a joint communiqué agreeing to establish diplomatic relations between China and Japan. Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira said in Peking after the signature of the joint communiqué that the Japan-Taiwan treaty had been terminated upon the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China. Japan notified Taiwan of its decision to sever diplomatic relations with that country. The Taiwan Government broke relations with Japan hours after China and Japan announced the establishment of diplomatic relations.
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