1972


John Roushorne
University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd

Recommended Citation
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/4131

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters' theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email (scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000 ext. 3208.
THE OPERATIONAL UTILITY OF THE  
ROSENAU PRE-THEORY: SELECTED  
INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS 1947-1961  

by  
John Roushorne  

A Thesis  
Submitted to the Department of Political Science  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree  
Master of Arts  

at the University of Windsor  

Windsor, Ontario  

May, 1972
© John Roushorne 1972

400214
Abstract

The principal motivation behind this study has been a desire to utilize a scientific construct in the analysis of foreign policy decisions. The research tool that has been selected for application is the extensive and varied works of Professor James N. Rosenau. An open-ended approach to the methodology has been adopted, drawing upon those constructs which are considered useful and eliminating or altering those which do not suit our purposes. A measure of comparability is provided by confining the analysis to foreign policy decisions by one country within one specific "issue area".

The theoretical discussion contained in Chapter I is by necessity an overview, drawing upon several hundred pages of Professor Rosenau's writing. As such there may be issues which are not explained to every reader's satisfaction. An attempt has been made to explain fully any modifications which have been made to the framework but time and space did not allow for the reproduction of all of Rosenau's explanations which can in any case be found elsewhere.

Chapter II is concerned with an analysis of three specific external actions of India from which a composite ranking has been developed, which should then be
useful in an analysis of any other action arising out of a similar set of circumstances.

Chapter III is a discussion of the circumstances surrounding two Indian policy decisions related to the border dispute with China and Chapter IV involves the ranking of variables from these decisions and a comparison of these rankings with the composite ranking of Chapter II.

In Chapter V an attempt has been made to draw conclusions from comparisons of all the developed rankings with the composite ranking and with Rosenau's proposed ranking for a country in the Indian situation. These conclusions are oriented towards future work that may be undertaken in this field. We have outlined the problems that have been encountered and made suggestions which it is hoped will further "The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy".
Acknowledgements

I wish to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Bruce Burton for his concern and helpful guidance over the two years that this thesis was progressing through various stages of development and I was progressing through various stages of frustration. I also wish to thank the other members of my committee Dr. Briggs and Dr. Lall, without whose constructive comments concerning the first draft, the thesis would have lacked both style and authenticity.

Most of all, however, I wish to thank my wife, Elizabeth, without whose counsel, cheerful manner, and gentle prodding, it would never have reached a stage where the other gentlemen could make their contributions.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I THE MODEL INTRODUCED</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II TESTING THE MODEL</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III THE BACKGROUND TO THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV THE MODEL APPLIED</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter I

The Model Introduced

James N. Rosenau’s, often referred to, sometimes maligned, but seldom applied piece of work, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy"\(^1\), forms an excellent base for research of the type to be undertaken here. This essay is an attempt by Rosenau to lay a foundation, on which a general theory of foreign policy can be constructed. It is a broad framework that Rosenau himself claims "is not much more than an orientation"\(^2\), but as such it is highly suited to our purposes. Being general it covers most of the possible alternatives and allows modification and increased emphasis where warranted.

In order to make vastly diverse data similar and then hopefully comparable Rosenau proposes his five sets of explanatory variables: idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal and systemic. He then rates the relative importance of the five in the various societal structures, which he claims make up the spectrum of states. He contends the

---


fundamental variations of states arise from geography and physical resources - large country - small country differentiations; state of the economy - developed underdeveloped; and state of the polity - open-closed. These divisions provide eight categorizations (e.g. small, country, underdeveloped economy, with a closed polity) in which he ranks his five sets of variables\(^3\), and which are briefly elaborated below.

**Idiosyncratic Variables**

Called individual variables in a modified version of this paper, (See Rosenau: The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy) these encompass all the various "idiosyncracies" or character traits of decision-makers. They include their values, talents, and prior experiences - all those factors which distinguish their foreign policy decisions or behaviour from those of other decision-makers.

**Role Variables**

Those factors arising out of the position or roles of the decision-makers within the system, which influence their external behaviour are considered to be role variables. They would be present irrespective of the idiosyncracies of the role occupants.

---

3. See Appendix I.
Governmental Variables

Those aspects of a government's structure which limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers are termed governmental variables. The degree of responsibility of the executive to the legislative or the influence of the bureaucracy, are examples of governmental variables.

Societal Variables

All of those non-governmental, internal aspects of a society which influence its external behaviour fall into the classification of societal variables. Factors such as the major value orientations of a society, its degree of national unity and the extent of its industrialization are classified as societal.

Systemic Variables

Rosenau includes "any non-human aspects of a society's external environment or any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence the choices made by its officials"\(^4\) within the systemic cluster. Such varied factors as geographical reality and ideological challenges from potential aggressors would be found within this category.

Through a judicious use of these five clusters, in an analysis of foreign policy actions, Rosenau claims that data may be "structured" and "processed" in a manageable and meaningful form. After the researcher has mastered this first step he will require "appropriate concepts for compiling them into meaningful patterns". To achieve this goal Rosenau proposes two additional conceptual structures: the penetrated system and the issue area. These become necessary because of: (1) - the theoretical need to reduce the rigid distinction between the national and international system; and (2) - the need to recognize "that the functioning of political systems can vary significantly from one type of issue to another".

The hypothetical result of the addition of the latter two categorizations is the chart that appears in Appendix II. The Pre-Theory has been expanded here to include the penetration and issue area concepts. The unstated inference is that this represents the "theory" referred to in the title of the article.

These then are Rosenau's categories for making dissimilar influences on foreign policy comparable. A few questions regarding the conceptual structure come immedia-

5. Ibid, p. 52.
ately to mind. Will Rosenau's rankings have utility within the political - social - economic setting we are concerned with? Are the categories narrow enough to be meaningful yet broad enough to avoid influencing and directing the data? These are questions that will bear further discussions after the application of the framework in Chapter II and IV.

Rosenau's concept of penetration is particularly interesting in that it takes only partial account of his broader theory of National - International Linkages, which he has put forth later in other places.7 A penetrated political system, by his definition is "...one in which non-members of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals."8 The key phrase for our purposes in this definition is "directly and authoritatively" for here Rosenau appears to fall prey to the "pit-fall" he is most trying to avoid: that of determining or limiting the type of theory that could be developed.

He has claimed that linkages may result, not only from

penetrative but, also from reactive and emulative processes. The behaviour, which results from reactive pressures, is occasioned by occurrences beyond the national boundaries of the society and usually takes the form of a defense mechanism against external occurrences. The emulative process comes into play when the behaviour is not only a response to an extra national occurrence, but takes on essentially the same form as that occurrence.\(^9\) As a vehicle for explaining external behaviour of states, these latter forms of linkage become very appealing to the foreign policy researcher. They are of fundamental importance, however, when considering the foreign policy actions of a new state with relatively little experience in foreign affairs, when one considers their impressionability (either pro or con) regarding other states and their actions. It would seem that any effective, general theory on foreign policy behaviour would have to take account of the linkage process.

After examining Rosenau's completed framework it becomes apparent that the general effect of the presence of penetration is to inflate the importance of the systemic variable and deflate the role variable. This is entirely rational and has a great deal of validation in past occurrence so there seems no reason to refute it in the Indian

---

case. The reactive process could have an entirely different effect on the framework, for while the external actions of other countries often enhance the significance of the systemic cluster they also tend, in the process, to alter the importance of the societal variables, or the role cluster, and in some cases both. Consider for example Neville Chamberlain's "appeasement" of Hitler at Munich. Given, that the general feeling in Great Britain at the time was against any moves that might result in renewed hostilities in Europe, the reaction to the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, that preceded the Munich agreement, could be said to have been a process enhancing the relative importance of both the role and societal clusters. Consider also, for example, election campaigns in the United States and their responsiveness to the Vietnam situation.

The emulative process causes a similar reaction in the variable clusters but for entirely different reasons. The spread of nationalism during this century and the post war desires for rapid industrialization are cases in point where societies have adopted a value or a goal from outside and have forced the decision-makers to espouse their aspirations. Like the reactive process, however, the emulative

10. See for Example Chapter II.

process can also, in certain situations, have a direct effect upon the decision-makers. The case of the Indian decision to invade Goa is illustrative of this and is discussed in Chapter II.

This discussion gives rise to the question: Does the Linkage Process affect the ranking of the five clusters of variables or does the process of the formulation of a Foreign Policy decision (i.e. the ranking and interaction of variables one with another) determine the type of Linkage Process that is present in a given situation. It was pointed out above that there appears to be a cause and effect relationship, between penetration and the ranking of specified variables. The relationship is not quite as clear with the other forms of linkage.

Consider for example the domestic Indian reaction to the Chinese annexation of Tibet. An event which was external to the Indian polity and would have little or no consequence for the vast majority of Indians caused widespread demonstrations and upheaval for India domestically. Is this, therefore, an example of the functioning of the reactive process or does this illustrate the action of the societal variable, as it is constituted within this framework, in the Indian polity? The latter can be easily validated or rejected by referring to Professor Rosenau's criteria for constituting the societal variable. Upon examina-
tion it becomes clear that there is no allocation made for external factors in the societal make-up and it becomes evident that the reactive process has had the effect of increasing the importance of the societal variable within the ranking.

This poses a considerable conceptual problem, for it is now apparent that the reactive process, when present, will possibly alter the relative importance of three sets of variables (societal, role and systemic). Further to this, it can also be reasoned that the emulative process will alter the relative importance of variables in a different manner. This conceptual problem becomes insurmountable within the context of this paper when one considers that there now exist four forms of linkage, and any combination of these, for which a different ranking of variables will be required. (The possibility of no linkage must also be taken into account.) Even assuming that an accurate ranking can be gained for each new factor the number of possible combinations makes the effort unrealistic.

The only course of action which still allows for an application of the framework seems to be: to undertake an analysis of the test cases in Chapter II, taking into account the presence of international linkages, and formulate a ranking of variables for a given type of situation. The very great assumption which must be made here
is that a permanence of linkage phenomenon will persist over time. The only justification for this lies in the omnipresence of linkage in all societies and the relatively short "time lag" between the test cases and the application in the border incidents.

The final consideration in the theoretical construct is Rosenau's concept of issue areas. Being by far the most complex and difficult to interpret of his structures, issue areas would tend to present the most difficulty to a researcher attempting a general inquiry into a state's behaviour. The most concise definition Rosenau provides, in fact, is marked by its unwieldiness. He conceives of an issue area as consisting of:

- a cluster of values, the allocation or potential allocation of which leads the affected or potentially affected actors to differ so greatly over the way in which the values should be allocated or the horizontal levels at which the allocations should be authorized that they engage in distinctive behaviour designed to mobilize support for the attainment of their particular values. 12

To this general definition, a method of differentiating between various types of issues, is added. The method he chooses to adopt is tangibility of ends and means. Developing a 2 x 2 matrix Rosenau is able to differentiate

---

four principal subtypes of issue areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ends</th>
<th>Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intangible</td>
<td>Status Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human Resource Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangible</td>
<td>Territorial Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non Hum. Resource Area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To avoid becoming completely ensnared in issue area differentiation - in a paper of this length - we have elected to confine the study to those decisions falling within one issue area. The combination of tangible ends with tangible means produces the "non-human resources area": a categorization that includes some elements of national security; and, all elements of territorial acquisition and national defense.

To reiterate, tangibility of ends and means is the method of differentiation and although there may be some overlap we will attempt to confine our analysis to those decisions where tangible ends are coupled with tangible means.

The ranking of variables will be determined via the three test cases in the following chapter and applied to the two border dispute decisions in Chapter IV. During the course of discussion and in the final analysis all rankings that are derived will be compared against the one

13. Ibid, p. 86.
stable and unchanging parameter that is available to us: Rosenau's ranking for a large country, underdeveloped economy, open polity, non-penetrated society, non-human resources area, type of system. In this manner it is hoped that as a minimum the conceptual structure will be partially validated and as a maximum objective that some light may be thrown upon the decision-making of the Sino-Indian Border dispute.
Chapter II
Testing The Model

The actions that have been chosen for discussion in this chapter include: the decision to use troops in Kashmir in 1947, the decision to send troops to Suez in 1956, and the decision to invade in 1961. They have been selected because they are major decisions of international significance and they provide a sampling of the time span of India's first decade of decision-making, leading to 1962. Two of the three: Kashmir and Goa, lie predominantly within the desired issue area (i.e. tangible ends and tangible means), while the third, Suez provides some measure of overlap between issue areas. The decisions also provide some degree of continuity regarding the degree of national-international linkage.

Kashmir (1947)

It is difficult to imagine an incident in human intercourse where the inexorable web of history led so surely towards a situation as was the case in Kashmir. The communal rioting throughout British India in the late forties; the lapse of the doctrine of paramountcy, held by the British over the Princely States; the historical and geographic position of Kashmir; and the inherent problems
of a state with a Muslim majority and a Hindu ruler: all played major roles in the course of the drama.

If blame for the situation in Kashmir is to be laid on anyone’s shoulders, however, it must fall upon Sir Hari Singh, the Maharaja, for his reluctance and delay in acceding to either of the Dominions. The then Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten of Burma, who later became independent India’s first Governor General, stated that

...Had he (Singh) acceded to Pakistan before the 15th August, 1947, the future government of India had allowed me to give His Highness an assurance that no objection whatever would be raised by them. Had His Highness acceded to India by August 14th, Pakistan did not then exist and therefore could not have interfered. The only trouble that could have been raised was by non accession to either side, and this was unfortunately the very course followed by the Maharaja.

The problem in Kashmir originated in small raids, allegedly moving both ways across the Pak-Kashmiri border, and was aggravated by the situation in a small North-Western territory called Gilgit. Previously administered by the British, Gilgit was turned over to the Maharaja in 1947; but he had no links whatever to the tribemen and


revolt, followed by wholesale desertions within the police
and "Gilgit Scouts" were quick in coming. Thus when the
Pakistani tribesmen invaded Kashmir on October 21, 1947
the rebels were already in possession of much of the nor-
thern part of the state.

Numbering thousands and comparatively
well-equipped, the tribesmen moved swiftly
down the Jhelum Valley Road. Faced with
only token resistance, they captured
Muzaffarabad and Uri immediately. Five
days later they sacked the town Baramulla
and seized Mahura where the power plant
for Srinagar and its surrounding areas
is located.

At this point the invaders were only a matter of a
few miles from Srinagar and the Maharaja was forced to
reassess his options. Independent action was not feasible
and the only place to turn for help was India.

Opinion among government leaders in India, which had
initially adopted a neutral stand over Kashmir's accession,
rapidly changed.

At the meeting of the Defense Committee on
26 October a long discussion ensued in the
course of which the Cabinet pressed for more
immediate action. Mountbatten maintained,
now that he was convinced that the Indian
leaders were determined to send troops to
Kashmir, disregarding the advise of their
own Chiefs of Staff and himself, that it

would be folly to send troops into a neutral country, since Pakistan could do the same and that would only end in war between the two newly formed Dominions.\textsuperscript{5}

Mountbatten has stated: "I had argued strongly that Kashmir must first accede, since otherwise this action by India would be illegal."\textsuperscript{6} Mountbatten also advocated the proviso that a plebiscite be held, as soon as order could be re-established, to determine the wishes of the people regarding accession. The Maharaja sought accession under these terms and on the 27th of October Indian troops landed outside Srinagar.

The Kashmir decision falls into Rosenau's "Non Human Resources Area". The ends of the action were clearly tangible - being the expulsion of the West Pakistani tribesmen. The means were just as clearly tangible - the allocation of men and resources for that purpose. This particular decision then falls readily into the desired issue area.

The Indian system can be considered to have a form of linkage operating upon it, in this instance. The form of "linkage" is reactive in essence resulting as a response to the action of the Pakistani tribesmen. It is important to note however that this decision would clearly be class-

\textsuperscript{5} Das Gupta, Y.B., \textit{Op. Cit.}, p. 103.

ified as "non-penetrated" in Rosenau's original theory for
the advice of the Chiefs of Staff (non societal British
officers) was rejected.*

This particular decision, then would be slotted into
Professor Rosenau's "enlarged pre-theory" under the large
country, under-developed economy, open polity, non-penetrated
system, non-human resources area, of the schema. Such a
positioning would yield a ranking of idiosyncratic, role,
 systemic, societal, and governmental. (See Appendix II)

In a situation where Rosenau theorizes that the idio-
syncratic variable would be of prime importance, the pre-
dispositions of men such as Nehru and Sardar Patel should
have been principal factors in the Indian decision. (Patel
was Nehru's deputy and wielded a considerable amount of
influence.) When examining the history, of India's battle
for independence and the period of partition, first impres-
sions would lead one to doubt their suitability for such a
part. Nehru had "already indicated his preference for
non-coercive adjustments of mutually antagonistic claims
everywhere in the world", and now "...within three months of
his assumption of power he was being forced to discard the
principles he had been proclaiming."7 Patel was largely
responsible for the vast majority of Indian states opting

* This interpretation places the emphasis on the
authoritative aspects of the definition for pene-
tration.
for accession to India through his statesmanship and Mountbatten claimed that it was Patel who provided him with the authority for committing the Indian government to accepting Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. 8

There is, however, another side to this discussion for Patel had indicated one day earlier, that he was willing to use force to compel Junagadh to come into India and insisted on using the army rather than a police force. 9 Nehru too ran slightly contrary to his philosophy in the Junagadh instance for he opposed referring the issue to the United Nations, agreeing with Patel that a show of force was needed in the face of aggression. 10 There is moreover, another more compelling fact which strengthens the idiosyncratic variable in this instance - the Congress philosophy of a secularist state.

"Kashmir is important to India as an element of strength for its secularist conception of the Partition. In post-partition India only Kashmir possesses a predominantly Muslim population with a Muslim leadership but with an ideology which rejects the two-nation theory and which is dedicated to the creation of a democratic state on secular foundations." 11

10. Ibid, p. 132.
That, Nehru accepted this viewpoint regarding Kashmir, can hardly be doubted, and in this light it can be seen that the idiosyncratic variable was a measure of some importance.

A final consideration in the importance of the idiosyncratic variable is the affect of the reports of mass murder and pillage on the decision-makers. V. P. Menon succumbed to this pressure on a visit to Kashmir to reconnoitre the situation when he flew two Pakistani girls out so that they would not fall into the hands of the invading tribesmen.

A variable which comes to mind when considering the possibility of a cluster not being stressed highly enough is the societal. The influence of the communal problems upon the thinking and actions of the average Indian was a strong societal element for this decision. The societal cluster includes all those non-governmental, internal aspects of a society that influence external action. Thus the manner in which a decision maker perceives the mood of the nation towards a particular type of action (if his perception is correct) is a factor which falls under the societal heading. There can be little doubt that the


Defense Committee and Cabinet realized that communal feelings through much of Indian society would provide them with support in any action designed to prevent an Indian State from being "conquered" by Pakistan. The question is: did the time element allow the influence of the societal cluster to be felt?

The feeling of "rightness" involved with any military action is a strong motivation towards that action. This feeling pervaded all sectors of Indian society - even in the upper levels of decision-making where the mood ran so strongly for immediate action that even Mountbatten realized it would be futile to try to oppose it and opted instead for a moderating position. An interesting convergence between differing patterns of thought appears to have developed here, for the secularist philosophy of the Indian leaders had combined with the very viewpoint in India that it was radically opposed to - communalism - to create a community of thought throughout India as to the action that had to be taken. Thus the societal cluster seems to be quite important, but in the light of closer analysis it can be seen that, it is variables that are closely associated to it (i.e. the Secularist - Communalist Alliance) that have the real importance.

The role variable in this instance and as it is con-

14. See above p. 3.
stituted within the framework must be ranked highly because of: the action of the societal variable upon the leaders, the appeal of a defenseless territory for aid in repelling an aggressor, and the form of group decision making that characterized the Indian process at that time. It seems a very remote possibility that any Indian leader would not have acted in the same manner, then, and provided aid to Kashmir.

The systemic variable appears to be fairly ranked in the original schema. The mean position is appropriate in this instance for the broad and convenient catch-all of the theory. Encompassing factors surrounding the state, it takes account of the antagonistic position of the Pakistani leadership, and the close geographical relationship of Kashmir to Delhi. The effect of a possible threat to their heartland, on the leaders of a newly independent state cannot be underestimated. 15

The governmental variable does not occupy a position of any importance in this decision. Even if India was a long established state with rigid decision-making apparatus it is doubtful that the governmental variable could have had any effect in stemming the tide arising from the influence of the others. This is of course a type of negative

15. V. P. Menon, Op. Cit., p. 394. The emphasis with this cluster must be placed upon the decision-makers perception of systemic factors rather than the dictates of reality as the analyst perceives it.
situation where the absence of rigid decision-making structures facilitated the decision that was reached but this could not be of significant importance to rank the governmental variable with the primary three.

At this juncture it is posited that the rankings which would best apply to the decision to send troops into Kashmir would be: Idiosyncratic Role Systemic Societal Governmental

**SUEZ (1956)**

The relevant action for the application of the Rosenau framework in this section will be the decision to send troops, in support of the U.N., to the Middle East in early November, 1956. At this time India had been a state, taking part in international affairs, for slightly more than nine years.

India had been exceedingly active prior to 1956 in the Asian realm. Prominent examples of this include: the first Asian Conference in New Delhi in 1949; the Geneva Conference of 1954; and the Bandung Conference of 1955. In a slightly different vein China and India had proclaimed "the five principles of peaceful coexistence" (Panch Sheel) in 1954, and she had carried on a continuous crusade against South African racism throughout the period.
The Indian concern throughout the first half of the fifties seems in fact to have been split (not necessarily evenly) between the plight of the oppressed non-white nations of the world, and world peace and stability (a concern that was directly associated with Indian well being). Suez is an excellent example of the violent fusion of these two concerns and thus provides a better than average case study for Professor Rosenau's Pre-Theory.

The origins of the Suez Crisis can best be placed at July 26, 1956 when President Nasser of Egypt announced his government's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. This act, which was to have far reaching consequences, reportedly stemmed from a need for funds to build the Aswan High Dam - funds that were initially "promised" by the West but then withdrawn. Western indignation over the action was widespread. The feeling of moral indignation that a nation as insignificant as Egypt would attempt such a thing was almost surpassed in some circles by the belief that Nasser had finally shown his true colours and revealed himself as the untrustworthy renegade he had been thought to be.\(^16\)

Opinion in India, however, was diametrically opposed to that in the West.\(^17\) Nehru in commenting upon the act


stated that the nationalization was 'symp tomatic' of the weakening of the hundred year hold of the European countries over Western Asia.\textsuperscript{18} India was one of the concerned powers invited to attend the 22 nation London conference on the Suez question on August 16. There she put forward a proposal - supported by Ceylon, Indonesia and the Soviet Union - rejecting the concept of international control, claiming Egypt was within her rights to nationalize and favouring a plan whereby Egypt would own and operate the canal, subject to some form of accountability to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{19}

An international situation of some concern escalated into the crisis stage at the end of October 1956. The Israelis had invaded Sinai and the British and French claimed the hostilities were endangering the canal. They sent an ultimatum to the Egyptian and Israeli governments calling on them to withdraw ten miles from the canal, on pain of armed intervention. The Egyptians stated that they could not accept such an ultimatum and consequently on "...the night of October 31 - November 1, the Anglo-French air forces began their attacks on the Egyptian aerodromes and air force".\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} Cited in \textit{Ibid}, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{19} Robertson, T., \textit{Crisis}, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1964, p. 93
Within India the shock of this action took on seismic proportions. "A tremendous outcry followed, even amongst normally pro-Commonwealth groups." 21 Even before the Anglo-French attack it was evident that India strongly disapproved of what was happening in the Middle East.

An official statement issued on the 31st Stated that the Israeli aggression and the Anglo-French ultimatum were a 'flagrant violation' of the United Nations Charter and opposed to all principles laid down by the Bandung Conference. 22

After the action of that night and the next day Nehru remarked: "After fairly considerable experience in foreign affairs, I cannot think of a grosser case of naked aggression than what England and France are attempting to do." 23

Between the 1st and the 15th of November nearly every time Nehru appeared in public he made a strong statement condemning the aggression on Egypt. 24 He was supported in this by all of the Indian political parties from the extreme right to the extreme left. 25

24. Among these were, Party Meetings in Hyderabad - The Hindu, 2.11.1956; The 9th General Conference of UNESCO- The Hindu, 6.11. 1956; and the meeting of the Colombo Powers in New Delhi on 12-14 November, 1956. At the Party Meetings in Hyderabad Krishna Menon also joined in the condemnation be terming the Anglo-French action, "Wanton Brutality".
Indian initiatives in the United Nations occurred principally within the 1st Emergency Special Session (1956) of the General Assembly, convened through the authority of the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution. All resolutions of the General Assembly were aimed at resolving the dispute. Some were moderately worded such as that of the United States, and some were a little stronger regarding the Anglo-French-Israeli position. The Indian sponsored 19 nation Asian-African resolution fell into the latter category. In all cases India supported the resolutions providing the image of concerned nation looking for a satisfactory settlement.

The Canadian sponsored resolution, to initiate a U.N. sponsored peace-keeping force in the area, was the most productive result of the Special Session. Arthur S. Lall, the permanent representative of India at the United Nations, swung the Afro-Asian group behind the Pearson resolution, contributing in large degree to its success.

Although India had supported the resolution calling for the establishment of a peacekeeping force, she did not feel obligated to contribute troops simply by virtue of

26. These resolutions may be found in the General Assembly Debates, 1st Emergency Special Session, 562-567th Meetings, pp. 30-119.
27. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Minister of State for External Affairs.
this resolution. Menon set out the conditions, in the General Assembly, under which India would participate. They included the complete withdrawal of the British and French forces and the withdrawal of the Israeli forces behind the original armistice lines, Egyptian consent for the presence of the force, assurance that it would in no way be construed as a successor to the Anglo-French forces and that the force would only be temporary, to deal with that emergency. 29

Thus when the Indian government was satisfied that its conditions would be met, it accepted the Secretary-General's invitation to contribute to the force on November 7, 1956. 30 The government's reasons for doing so mainly revolve around attitudes, world view, or in the extreme Nehru's "Weltanshauung". Support for the non-white world in the battle against neo-colonialism and the desire to protect Indian security and integrity have already been discussed in relation to the Suez crisis. In addition to these motivating factors, Nehru's commitment to the United Nations and Dag Hammarskjold and the expressed preference of Egypt for Indian troops on the U.N.E.F. can be considered reason for India making a contribution. 31

30. The Hindu, 7.11.56.
The Suez situation provides an example of the complexities involved with an overlap of issue areas. The convergence of Indian goals in this instance has already been noted above (support of non-white nations and desire for security), and if the Indian demands regarding her participation had not been met it would be difficult to make a supposition as to what course of action she would have adopted. The issue of a non-white nation having sufficient sovereignty to nationalize a foreign owned piece of capital falls directly within the "status area" of intangible ends combined with intangible means. With the satisfaction of the Indian conditions, however, this ceased as a consideration and the decision to send troops became an issue of security, both in regards to world peace and security, and to securing the effective operation of the canal—a vital economic lifeline to a developing India.

This decision like the previous one is characterized by a reactive linkage. There is no evidence of penetration—quite the contrary for India at this time had developed her posture of non-alignment to its probable apex and would not consciously tolerate foreign involvement in her decision making processes. The national-international linkage occurs then as a reaction to the Anglo-French-Israeli actions and the threat that they posed.

The idiosyncratic variable takes on a high degree of
importance in this instance, as with the previous decision on Kashmir. The principal decision-maker in the instance is Nehru, with Krishna Menon playing a supporting role. The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt was totally contrary to both his ideals and his policies, but even more so towards his ideals. Michael Brecher claims that his initial response of complete condemnation of the European powers was "instinctive" and a result of his "...unstated belief that violence is bad but white violence against non-whites is worse." When the United Nations decided to send a peacekeeping force to the Middle East and the Indian conditions for participation were satisfied, it became inconceivable, in the light of Nehru's commitment to the organization, that he would not support it.

This takes on even more manifest implications when it is strongly supported by the general population: the societal variable. It is difficult to conceive of an issue where all of the Indian political parties, considering their ideological diversness, agree; yet Suez was just such an issue and Nehru had the entire political and social elite behind his policies.

The systemic variable, must also be considered in the light of Nehru's idiosyncracies. If this "aggression"

had taken place outside the "third world" his reaction could hardly have been so vehement. Considering the policy objectives of the Indian Government through the early fifties, any 'Western' action within the 'non-white' geographical area having such explicit implications could only be expected to stimulate a conditioned response.

The governmental variable has also risen in importance since the Kashmir decision. The Indian decision-making structure had by this date matured and revealed itself as leaving Nehru great latitude in policy making. Decisions were no longer formulated in the Defense Council as they were in 1947.

The last variable to consider is that of role. This one quantity had been so minimized by the weight of Nehru's personality that it is difficult to conceive of another government leader making the decisions in India in 1956. Were any of Nehru's actions conditioned by his position? This, under the circumstances becomes a nil consideration.

The decision to send troops to the middle East, as can be seen from the historic narrative, was the natural culmination of Indian actions at the U.N. and the forces at work that were discussed above. The interaction of the variables ultimately produced the result under discussion.

The rankings that are posited for the decision to contribute to the United Nations Emergency Force are:
Idiosyncratic
Societal
Systemic
Governmental
Role

GOA: 1961

The decision to invade Goa in December 1961 marks a divergence in Indian foreign policy making. The guiding principle of peaceful resolution of international disputes was finally abandoned over the Goan issue after more than a decade of fruitless effort. Such a radical departure from policy provides an excellent opportunity to analyse those facts that were instrumental in the decision.

The facts behind the Goan situation are not completely clear even today. This is largely due to the highly emotional character of the problem and the copious amounts of propaganda put out by both sides. The latter problem becomes even more intense because all the relevant literature on the subject has its origins in either India or Portugal.

Some historical facts will doubtless prove beneficial in understanding the complexities of the problem. Just before India achieved independence on August 15, 1947 there were three colonial powers with possessions on the subcontinent: Britain, France, Portugal. The problem of the French possessions was resolved peacefully and all of the French enclaves were formally ceded to India by treaty on
the 28 May, 1956. This treaty was the product of years of negotiation and discussion. It was the end result that both sides had been working towards since the early fifties.

The Portuguese situation posed an entirely different problem for they refused to negotiate any transfer of property, claiming that the enclaves of Goa, Daman and Diu were part and parcel of Portugal proper. This had legalistic implications for if Goa was classified as an "oversees province" of Metropolitan Portugal then the Portuguese government did not have the legal Constitutional ability to cede it to someone else.\(^{34}\)

The dispute stagnated at this time; neither side making any progress, unless Portugal's managing to hold on to the territories for ten years can be termed progress. Throughout the fifties the only intercourse worthy of consideration between India and Portugal was confined to protest notes. The period was marked by sporadic violence on the borders occasioned by the presence of groups of satyagrahis,\(^{35}\) who periodically attempted the "peaceful liberation" of the enclaves. The physical violence, that


\(^{34}\) *Ibid*, p. 537.

\(^{35}\) A movement or philosophy founded in India by Gandhi for the peaceful attainment of National Goals. A satyagrahi is one who practises Satyagraha "truth-force, or the technique developed by Gandhi for social and political change, based on truth, non-violence, and self-suffering". Joan Bondurant, *Conques. of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967) p. 250.
people of Indian descent were subjected to by the Portugese, was one of the principal factors behind the escalation of feeling in India towards liberation by whatever means necessary. 36

Throughout the middle fifties, however, Nehru remained adamantly opposed to violence as a political tool. Statements like the following became very common place as Nehru continually found it necessary to justify his Goa position.

Here is a great country like India with dignity and self-respect, with power to deal with the situation swiftly if it chooses, but restraining its strength and restraining its power and holding on to peaceful methods, in fact checking its own people. 37

Towards the end of the 1950's the dispute began to heat up noticeably. Portugal's announcement, that she was consulting her N.A.T.O. allies over the problem, had caused considerable consternation in India where it was feared that the cold war was being introduced into South Asia. 38 The Indians claimed to have information that Portugal was talking to Pakistan concerning Goa. 39 The final and perhaps most compelling major factor in the escalation of the

dispute was the anti-Portuguese feeling that was rapidly gaining strength within India.

This resulted in heavy pressure upon the Indian government for action. One of the fundamental reasons for this antagonistic national sentiment was the continued Portuguese presence on the Indian sub-continent long after all the other colonial nations had departed. Another factor was the continued Portuguese insistence that Goa was an outpost of Christianity and Western civilization in Asia. 40

This sounded suspiciously like the old "white man's burden" rationale for colonialism reoccurring in the 1950's and could not have gained many friends in India. A third reason for the presence of this feeling was the presence of thousands of Goan refugees in India, most noticeably in Bombay, who were continually pressing for liberation. 41

The tone of official Indian statements was also changing during the latter months of the policy of 'peaceful adjustment'. The earlier pleas for the Portuguese to be reasonable and allow the Goans to rejoin 'the Indian nationality' now began to take second place to accusations concerning the "mounting reign of terror and repression" within Goa. 42 Earlier that year, "In August, 1961, Nehru

41. Brecher, India In World Politics, p. 133.
42. The Times, 12.18.61, p. 8, Text of note from Indian to Portugese Government.
for the first time and perhaps reluctantly said that he did not rule out the use of force". That the mood and policy of the Indian government seemed to be undergoing a transformation was observed by the world.

Why did Nehru follow a different policy in 1961 from the peaceful policy he had strongly advocated in 1954–55? Partly because it was a pre-election year, partly because diplomacy had not gained Goa for India, partly because of the increased number of newly liberated nations, now gaining increasing strength in the U.N. in September, 1961, Nehru attended a conference of neutral nations at Belgrade, where it is reliably reported that he found himself for the first time a relative conservative among the representatives of the newer states. To maintain a leading position in the neutralist world, perhaps he needed to take more positive action against Portugal, disliked by the African nations because of its hold over Angola. In this sense, India’s occupation of Goa reflected the shifting balance of world forces.

The interplay of variables in the Goan situation is far more complex than either of the preceding two decisions. This situation is more difficult to analyse because of the lack of objective information on the subject, compounded by the polemics involved with such an emotional issue. This is further compounded by a three way linkage pressuring the Indian system, and, some issue overlap.

44. Ibid., p. 319.
This being the case, the conclusions arrived at in this section are somewhat more subject to question but in the same light this section will reveal strengths and problems with the theory that a more simplistic decision would not touch upon.

The fundamental issue in this decision is again one of tangible ends combined with tangible means - the unification of the Portuguese colonies with the rest of the peninsula after 400 years of separation. The means become tangible as soon as the decision is reached to use the armed forces. There is, however, a degree of status involved with an imperialist power retaining possessions on territory which India had claimed. Since this is accounted for, in part, by of the discussion of "emulative linkage" below, the issue will not be discussed further here.

The linkage situation is extremely complex in this decision for all three types of process play some part. The reaction to the continuous Portuguese presence and insistence on maintaining that presence need hardly be repeated here.

The other forms are not as readily discernible. Emulation is definitely present in this decision as is illustrated in the quote on p. 35. The supposition that India had to take positive action against Portugal to maintain
its position of leadership in the neutralist world - particularly in independent minded Africa - has considerable rational justification. Even if it is denied that this was a factor it cannot be denied that the pressure was present.

Actual penetration is much more difficult to discern and can only be hinted at in the analysis. It is probable for instance that Nehru was confronted at Belgrade and at home by representatives of other countries who questioned why Goa was allowed to remain in Portugese hands. Penetration was present in other ways than the nebulous one outlined above. It had a negative effect in the presence of John Kenneth Galbraith and other Western ambassadors urging moderation. That the pleas for non intervention were all from the West could not have helped but emphasize the untenable position of Goa as a Western colony.

The idiosyncratic factors are considerably more complex in this instance, because of the presence of two decision makers: Nehru and Menon. Nehru remains the principle actor but the influence of Menon cannot be discounted. Nehru had for over a decade refused to contemplate violence towards Goa and the Portugese, and yet in

1961 he not only accepted the possibility of violence but his government mounted a full military attack upon the territories.

Nehru's idiosyncracies then did not lead him to this decision. Menon's however seem to differ slightly from Nehru's. The interviews Menon gave to Michael Brecher in preparation for the writing of India and World Politics indicate that he planned and executed the entire Goan episode himself receiving only acquiescence from Nehru.

Even if it is not conceded that Menon planned and initiated the whole operation, his influence on Nehru must be accepted. Menon appears to have belonged to the school of Indian statesmen who preferred action over inaction. In this vein he must have tried to influence Nehru along the lines of "completing the unfinished business", and "placing national interest as the ultimate guiding factor in the country's foreign policy". The idiosyncratic factor cannot then be ignored.

The role variable also assumes larger proportions in

46. Brecher, Op. Cit., p.p. 130-2, This fact is somewhat tempered by an interview the present writer had with a high ranking Indian diplomat in 1970, in which Krishna Menon was described as the "supreme egoist" capable of making his "inept bungling" appear as someone else's mistake while his "molehill accomplishments become a mountain, through his glib tongue".

this instance. Goa was a problem that any Indian decision-maker would have been forced to act upon. The situation here is dependent upon the societal variable.

This factor is of prime importance in the Goan problem. The varied societal pressures have been discussed previously. It will be sufficient here to note that besides the general societal pressures on government, there appears to have been specific pressure applied to Krishna Menon through the Goan evacuees clustered in his home riding of Bombay.

Systemic factors also have a high incident of influence on the Goan decision. The first and by far the most important is the geographic location of Goa and the enclaves. Also of considerable importance is the strategic factor and finally the consideration of Asian-African opinion over the continued Portuguese presence 'within India'.

Even the governmental variable appears to have influenced this many faceted problem for as Beatrice Lamb pointed out above - it was "partly because it was a pre-election year". The Indian governmental structure, then, appears (in one author's opinion) to have contributed to the decision.

The difficulty in ranking the variables in this deci-
sion has become evident by now for all have contributed, although supposedly to varying degrees. The societal variable will be placed first because it has such a profound effect on the idiosyncratic, role and governmental variables. The systemic variable must be placed next, simply because of the manifest dimensions of its involvement and the rest follow in order yielding:

Societal
Systemic
Idiosyncratic
Role
Governmental

ANALYSIS

We now have available a normative ranking of variables for three decisions within the desired category. The existing problem then is to arrive at one general ranking from the three - a ranking that can be tested against the Indian decisions of the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962. Before obtaining the general ranking, however, there are certain trends, similarities and divergences from the Rosenau rankings that are worthy of note.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rosenau</th>
<th>Kashmir</th>
<th>Suez</th>
<th>Goa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
<td>Societal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>Systemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are a number of similarities that remain relatively constant throughout the four sets of rankings. The systemic variable is ranked third in all instances except Goa where it is ranked second. The second ranking in the case of Goa is easily explained by the high incidence of linkage in this case, yielding a greater stress on external factors. The governmental variable is likewise ranked fifth in all instances except Suez - where it is ranked fourth. The idiosyncratic cluster ranks first in every instance except Goa where it ranks third.

There are, however, some marked and interesting discrepancies within the four sets of rankings. The radical fluctuations of the role cluster would tend to place its high positioning in Rosenau Schema in considerable doubt. It is the "weak sister" of the framework in any case - one which is useless where the data is clearly defined and can be fitted in elsewhere; and, only achieves utility as a catch-all for non-conforming factors. Rosenau in fact has eliminated this variable from his most recent writings. 48

The role cluster clearly poses a problem, for if it only becomes useful in identifying and structuring the non-conforming data contributing to a decision, an unmeasurable variation has been introduced into the analysis.

If, in one decision a factor can be easily identified as belonging to one of the clusters and in a comparable decision a similar factor is not as easily categorized and the decision is made to place it within the role cluster, the decisions can no longer be accurately compared.

The close relationship of the role and governmental clusters could well provide a solution to this problem, for an incorporation of the role factors within the governmental cluster does not seem unwarranted. Surely it is superfluous to allot a distinct categorization to deal with those elements of decision making that the position of a government official dictates when we already have a variable dealing with governmental structure and action. Do all aspects of the role variable readily incorporate with the governmental? In the test cases it is apparent that they do - witness for example Kashmir, where any Indian decision-maker would have made the same decision.

The combination of the two clusters, at this stage, presents problems in itself - problems that are best left until the three rankings are combined to form the composite ranking later in this chapter.

The only other cluster which exhibited radical fluctuations across the four rankings was the societal. An examination of the test cases reveals that the Suez and Goa decisions were characterized by a time lapse allow-
ing for "societal" pressures to build whereas the Kashmir decision was made in the course of a few days and, the importance that could be subscribed to the societal cluster in this instance was predominantly latent in nature. There appears to be a defect, in the framework, in distinguishing between these types of decisions but it would seem appropriate to leave the discussion of this until more evidence has been accumulated and general conclusions are being drawn in Chapter V.

These complications create real and difficult problems for the organization of the rankings in the test cases, into a general ranking for later testing. A simplistic composite ranking can be derived by weighting the three categories according to rank and then combining them. (i.e. The most important variable in each decision would be assigned a five, the second most important a four and so on. By adding the values for each individual variable a composite ranking could be arrived at.)\(^49\)

Notwithstanding the above, and the earlier discussion of the role-governmental combination; a realistic value for the combined cluster cannot be obtained by simple mathematics. If the five variables are ranked in each

category and a composite for the five is arrived at the result is: Idiosyncratic
Societal
Systemic
Role
Governmental

The values that yielded this ranking are: idiosyncratic - 13, societal - 11, systemic - 10, role - 7, and governmental - 4. Combining the rankings of the role and governmental clusters would place the combined grouping on a level equal in importance to the societal and in the second position of the composite ranking. Since aspects of the role cluster are readily transferable to the governmental, however, they must have had some effect upon the ranking, of the latter. Thus the simple combination of their rankings results in an inflated value. This fact combined with the near identity of India's foreign policy and Nehru's foreign policy in the late 50's and the reoccurrence of a situation where fourth and fifth ranking was decided upon by which cluster was the least important, leads us to the decision that the combined cluster (to be referred to as governmental) would be ranked last - even with the addition of the role factors. The composite that results is: Idiosyncratic
Societal
Systemic
Governmental

This then is the ranking, that will be compared in Chapter IV, with two decisions relating to the border
dispute with China.

The reader should be cautioned that there are methodological problems inherent in this method of ordering that introduce a possibility of error into the composite structure. This form of ranking assumes that in each instance each variable is an equal amount less important than the one immediately above it in the rankings. The only feasible solution to this, however, is to rank the variables on a far larger scale and assign weights corresponding to their actual importance. Since the type of detailed empirical evidence, required for such an exercise, is not available in a study with our limitations we are forced to work with the simplistic framework.
Chapter III
The Background To The Sino-Indian Border Dispute

Although the Sino-Indian border dispute could be said to have existed for a decade prior to the outbreak of violent hostilities, most scholars today agree that the path to violence did not become inexorable until (in early 1960) two decisions by the Indian government became apparent and were formulated, respectively. The first decision can, in fact, be better described in the negative, as being 'the decision not to negotiate with the Chinese', and became evident on Chou En Lai's visit to India in April 1960. The second decision was the "forward policy" which evidence leads us to believe was formulated as a result of, or in reaction to, the visit of the Chinese delegation.

These decisions then, because of the close relationship to issues and time period of the test cases, become logical genesi for the application of the rankings to a foreign policy decision. If these decisions follow according to the pattern, that has been established, the dominant cluster of variables would be the idiosyncratic, followed by societal, systemic, and lastly governmental. To obtain some measure of the validity of this ranking a discussion of the factors which led to these decisions will be undertaken.
The dominant historical trends of a century are neatly summed up by Neville Maxwell in the prelude to the first chapter of "India’s China War".

Following the logic of power, empires in their expansive phases push out their frontiers until they meet the resistance of a strong neighbour or reach a physical barrier which makes a natural point of rest, or until the driving force is exhausted. Thus, through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, British power in India expanded, filling out its control of the peninsular sub-continent until it reached the great retaining arc of the Himalayas. There it came into contact with another empire, that of China. In the central sector of the frontier zone, where lay petty states and feudatories, there began a contest for dominance over these marcher lands that continues to the present day. In the north-west and the north-east, where no minor, independent polities existed to act as buffers, the British sought secure and settled boundaries with China: these they failed to achieve, and the failure was to lead in the middle of the twentieth century to the border war between India and China.1

Towards the end of the British Raj in India and prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, China was a weak, divided country with what military power she possessed occupied in fighting amongst themselves. The British were far more concerned about the growth of Axis power and the internal upheavals of the sub-continent than in the consolidation of the "natural fortress" that was India. After the

decade of war and the fervor of newly won independence, however, the situation had changed drastically within the sub-continent. Rather than one political entity, looking out from the fortress, independence had created two nations whose disparate elements had a long history of conflict that continued into the post-independence period. Rather than, what was once, the world's most potent military force residing within the walls, the decade of the fifties found strife and dissension. Rather than a weak and divided China beyond the walls of the Himalayas, the fifties dawned upon a strong and united China, boasting the world's largest army, standing on top of the walls - the Tibetan Plateau - looking down upon the Indian plains.

The unique coupling of Indian pacifist tradition with nationalist zeal that tended to produce military action in defense of "sovereign territory" could be expected to produce interesting developments under the circumstances. The developments were not to culminate in military action for more than a decade, but it was to prove a decade of easily traceable action and reaction.

The first Indian decision vis à vis the new situation in the north was the establishment, in 1951, of border patrol posts on or near the previously virtually undefended border. This was occasioned by reports that the Chinese were occupying positions south of the Himalayas in an effort
to consolidate their position in Tibet. These reports proved to be false but precautions were thought to be necessary.  

The first expression of public concern by the Indian Government was made by Nehru in Parliament on November 20, 1950. He disclosed that in the last 30 years, all maps printed by China had represented certain areas "which are in India, as not belonging to India". Giving a description of India's 1,300 mile frontier with Tibet, Nehru said, "Tibet is contiguous to India from the region of Ladakh to the boundary of Nepal and from Bhutan to the Irrawaddy-Salween defile in Assam. The frontier from Bhutan onward has been clearly defined by the McMahon Line, fixed by the Simla Convention of 1914. The frontier from Ladakh to Nepal is defined chiefly by long usage and customs." Specifically Nehru said, "Indian maps show the McMahon Line, and that is our boundary, map or no map." He added that India stood by the boundary and would not allow anyone to cross it.

The most controversial map issued by the Chinese was the October, 1951 map publication showing the N.E.F.A. as part of Tibet and therefore Chinese. On June 4, 1952 Nehru mentioned the map issue publicly again when he told


the parliament that he had received a satisfactory reply from the Chinese government to an inquiry about the Chinese maps. He said that Peking had assured him that the maps were old ones and that the new government had had "no time to make the necessary changes". This vague answer was the extent of the Chinese position on this point until 1958. The Indian government apparently chose to accept the statement at its face value until in 1959 events proved otherwise.

These differences were minor in the light of mutually expressed desires for co-existence and they passed without much comment in the euphoria of building towards Panchsheel. India and China had entered the "rose tinted" years of mutual trust and leadership of the "third world" culminating in the Bandung Conference of 1955. This was a period of comparative peace in the Himalayas. China had "peacefully liberated" Tibet in 1950 and then turned her attention, along with the rest of the world, to Korea. Tibet was an autonomously governed region of China, recognized as such by the trade agreement concerning India and the "Tibet region of China" of April 1954.

The Sino-Indian treaty of 1954 went further than merely recognizing Tibet as a part of China, however, for it stated in its preamble that:

the two governments being desirous of promoting trade and cultural inter-

course between the Tibet region of China and India, and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India based their agreement on the following principles:
1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
2. Mutual non-aggression.
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
4. Equality and Mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful co-existence.

These same five principles for living together were to have far reaching implications in the disputes to come, when each side made liberal use of them, to condemn the actions of the other.

One other significant element of the Trade Agreement of 1954 is the lack of any mention of the boundary question. Neville Maxwell uses unpublished official papers to substantiate his claim that this omission marked the first occasion where the refusal to negotiate was evident. His principal source for this supposition is related to a request from Sir G.S. Bajpai, India's first Secretary-General and at that time Governor of Bombay, "urging that India should take the initiative in raising the question of the McMahon Line with the Chinese Government". The reply he received was the significant fact for it was couched in terms that the Indian Government was to use, (in published correspondence)

when referring to negotiations, down to 1962. If India were to open the question of negotiations it would force the Chinese to adopt one of two attitudes:

either the acceptance of a treaty signed by us with Tibet or refusal of it coupled with an offer to negotiate. The first is not altogether easy to imagine .... The second would not be advantageous to us. If on the other hand China raised the issue we can plainly refuse to reopen the question and take our stand, ...that the territory on this side of the McMahon Line is ours, and there is nothing to discuss about it. 7

This reply was unsatisfactory to Bajpai for as he pointed out the Chinese can hardly be expected to raise the question "...until it suits their convenience", and it would serve India well if she knew where she stood regarding the frontier prior to such an occurrence. His entreaties went unheeded however and the Indian delegation to the 1954 negotiations on trade "...made no mention of the boundary question, and indeed went out of their way to avoid the subject". 8 It is dangerous to consider the above information as totally factual and beyond question, but the absence of any denials from the Indian Government and the marked continuity in intent and usage with events occurring later, lend credibility to the unpublished

8. Ibid, p. 77.
material Maxwell has used.

Some possible conclusions, arising from the Sino-Indian Trade Agreement, seem to be evident at this juncture. 1) India was engaged with building up her domestic economy and not anxious to provoke any unsettled conditions along the frontier that would divert: a) attention, or b) resources from the task at hand. 2) She was already enmeshed in a territorial dispute with Pakistan and was not anxious to further damage her diplomatic posture with further bickering with a potentially close friend.

There is one final point of interest before leaving this time period. Any official Indian uneasiness over the North-West was, at best left unstated during this period and possibly not even considered. The official Indian Map of 1950 claimed the Aksai Chin area as being within India but there was no statement or justification regarding this, and seemingly no thought that there should be, within India. 9

The period between 1954 and 1958 found the two governments principally occupied with an exchange of diplomatic notes concerning minor intrusions by one side across that which the other side considered the border. None of these "infractions" were serious enough to warrant public disclosure and even the exchange of notes was kept from

the public to be revealed later.

"By 1958 the two no-man's-lands which the imperial era had left at opposite ends of the Sino-Indian frontier had been occupied, each side pre-empting the area which was important to it on strategic and practical considerations."10 The Indians had extended their influence into the North-East as far as the McMahon Line and into Tawang providing in most areas at least token administration and services. The Chinese, in the west, had undertaken a similar process (unknown to the Indians) in constructing the Sinkiang-Tibet motor road across the Aksai Chin. "Each side in extending administration into these new areas knew that the other had map claims to it; but each, for its own reasons, preferred not to raise the issue."11

Thus the situation in 1958 had progressed from the nebulous and largely uninhabited frontier zones of early 1950 to a state where only two options presented themselves. Each country could accept the respective occupation of the other negotiating minor differences of opinion concerning the delimitation of the boundary or, one or both countries could refuse to accept the "status quo" leading to a diplomatic deadlock.

Chou En-lai had outlined the Chinese position at

Bandung in 1955 when he said that although the borders had not been fixed with all China's neighbours, she was willing to undertake negotiations in all cases;

but, before doing so, we are willing to maintain the present situation by acknowledging that those parts of our border are parts which are undetermined. ... As to the determination of common borders which we are going to undertake with our neighbouring countries, we shall use only peaceful means and we shall not permit any other method. 12

The Indian position was likewise clearly stated, in statements by Nehru through diplomatic notes. The first clearly enunciated statement by Nehru concerning his reluctance to negotiate is contained in the exchange of personal notes between Chou En-lai and himself in 1958-9. 13

In his reply to Chou En-lai's letter Nehru also took the first step in a long process of twisting Chou's proposals for retaining the "status quo", by maintaining that he also considered maintenance of the "status quo" as the basis from which to begin negotiations; but, it seems Nehru's conception of the "status quo" varied considerably from accepted usage. Examine for example his rejoinder to Chou's proposal that "each side keep, for the time being, the border areas at present time under its jurisdiction". 14

In his reply Nehru said "I agree that the position as it was before the recent disputes arose should be respected by both sides ... and if any position has been secured recently, the position should be rectified". This particular letter closed in the hope that the two countries which had sponsored "Panchsheel" and placed it in its position of acceptance in world circles would not now allow boundary questions to injure their friendly relations.

These letters were the result of increased Indian presence in the Aksai Chin, due primarily to the discovery of the Sinkiang-Tibet Road, and the inevitable clashes that resulted between Chinese and Indian personnel. The Indian government was reacting to a stimulus and was now forced to recognize that the boundary, as they understood it, was not mutually acceptable.

Following shortly upon this increased tempo in diplomatic activity, the Tibetan Revolt was revealed, with all its sentimental and social implications, to the world. The deterioration of Sino-Indian relations due to this occurrence cannot be overlooked, for the revolt was to influence three of the four variables (societal, governmental and systemic) for any and all decisions undertaken with respect to the border, in the following five years.

From the beginning, of the revolt, the Indian government seemed to appreciate the delicacy of the situation, asking parliament and the Indian people to exercise moderation and not make statements that might be construed as interfering in the internal affairs of China. More than an appreciation of the situation was needed to soothe the troubled waters of the coming months, however, for it seemed that every time Nehru was forced to comment on Tibet, and many times when he did not; India managed to offend China in some way. Even this seemingly completely innocuous approach was considered in China to be an "...impolite and improper ... discussion of the internal affairs of a friendly country." The Chinese were obviously going to prove as sensitive about protecting themselves from external influences as India had ever been or might be.

Serious Chinese disapproval over Indian actions began with the rotten egg throwing incident in front of their Consulate General in Bombay, and culminated in the mishandling of the Dalai Lamas press releases from India.


** See statement made by the Chinese Ambassador to the Foreign Secretary, 16 May 1959. This was an extremely virulent attack based on the Chinese allegation that an external affairs official was handling distribution of these press releases and that Indian missions abroad were carrying copies of the releases on their official bulletins. This, claimed the Ambassador, made all the more plausible the Chinese argument that all of the statements were fabricated by the Indian government.
Some of the further diplomatic thrusts contained in the notes of this period are listed below. The assumption was made early in the revolt and adhered to through the aftermath that followed that the Tibetan rebels were incited and supplied from Indian territory, specifically in the area around Kalimpong. It was further contended that the spies, subversives and reactionary cliques operating out of Kalimpong could not do so without the tacit consent of the Indian government. The Peking government took further exception to statements made in Lok Sabha by "...responsible persons of many Indian political parties, including the National Congress, and not a few Indian publications..." who openly called Tibet a "country", termed the Chinese government's actions "imperialistic" and an act of "banditry". In addition to this suggestions were made, for tripartite conferences to the three countries and for submitting the question to the United Nations.

The Indian government thus found itself in an unenviable position. Placed on the defensive early by the Chinese diplomatic attack, they found themselves continually denying allegations and justifying their actions. The only diplomatic initiative attempted by India was to attack the language of the Chinese notes claiming they were "revert-
ing to the language of the cold war'.

While the diplomatic exchanges of early 1959 illustrated and possibly intensified the rift that was developing between the two countries, developments along the border were bringing them into a state of imminent physical collision. Chinese action against the Khampa tribesmen in Southern Tibet and the desire to stem the flow of Tibetan refugees to India brought large contingents of Chinese troops into the border areas along the McMahon Line. The latter objective necessitated the establishment of a better system of frontier posts and thus heightened the possibility of unintentional trespassing. 19

The first two armed clashes of the boundary dispute occurred, at Longju and the Kongka Pass, shortly after the Chinese moved their troops up to the border. The Longju incident was the result of troops from both sides claiming the area around Migyitun-Longju. The Chinese claim, strangely enough, was based upon the McMahon Line while the Indian claim was based upon geographical expediency. The Indians had established a border post and the Chinese "attacked in force" and arrested the Indian detachment.**

---


** McMahon had deviated from the high ground at this point to make allowances for leaving Migyitun, a location of religious significance, within Tibet. For a detailed description of this variance and the underlying reasons see Alastair Lamb's The McMahon Line (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966) p.p. 536-7.
The Kongka Pass incident was opposite to Longju in origin and staging but similar in outcome. In this clash the Chinese had set up a border post on the pass and the Indians were soundly routed when they became belligerent.\textsuperscript{20}

The reports of each incident naturally varied in accordance with which side was telling the story but the facts are not as important for our purposes as the subsequent reaction within India. The Indian press went immediately on the offensive in both cases. After Longju, \textit{The Times of India} suggested that the Chinese "border offensive" was designed to impress the people of the borderlands, including Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal, with their military strength. Other papers suggested that India's northern defenses were being tested.\textsuperscript{21} Similarly after the Kongka Pass incident, which one newspaper (\textit{The Times} again) termed 'the brutal massacre of an India police party', public opinion became aroused and began the shift from an attitude of distrust into one of open bellicosity.\textsuperscript{22}

This shift was aptly illustrated in Parliament, for public opinion in India was largely confined to the boun-


\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid}, p. 111.
daries of the political class.** Criticism of the government's frontier policy mounted and broadened, from the summer of 1959, until it was to occupy most of the time and all of the question periods in the fall. This was essentially, the awakening of the Indian Parliament to the fact that things were not exactly as they should be in the north. Nehru had succeeded in keeping the Indian public largely in the dark with respect to the boundary dispute and when news of the clashes along the border began to leak out the clamour was out of all proportion greater than the relative importance of two isolated events.

Gunnar Myrdal claims that the border problems were only the handle that Nehru's critics, both within and outside the Congress Party, used in attacking him for his social and economic policies "...which they had already done so much to obstruct and emasculate".23


** This, out of functional necessity, must be a western definition of public opinion. It is not suggested here that the non-political elements in Indian society had no opinion on the events that were taking place, but that their "opinions" did not weigh heavily in the minds of decision makers. This is largely due to two factors: poor communication of news material to the rural masses in order that they might be informed of happenings of public interest, and an inadequate communications link between constituent and representative when an opinion on a certain matter had been formed. This was compounded by the feeling amongst the political elite that the masses, especially those in the urban environment tended to overreact in any given situation. See Kothari, Politics In India, (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1970)
Neville Maxwell supports this argument by stating that the problems in the north gave "...Congress critics of Nehru occasion and courage to attack him directly, confident that so long as they spoke for the nation's security and territorial integrity they could (count) upon almost universal support in the House."\(^{24}\) Whatever the reasons for the critical attacks it seems certain that they did not clarify Nehru's perception of the frontier for he already considered the Chinese solely responsible for the dispute and the buffeting he sustained in the house and later in the press must have fed his resentment against them. This feeling was aptly summarized by Krishna Kenon in an interview with Michael Brecher where he said "Basically the action of the Chinese was such that it helped every anti-progressive element inside India and obstructed the reasonable progress of India and its peace policies."\(^{25}\)

It is important to note at this point that Nehru had not previously made any public statement, that India would not negotiate with China on parts of the border. As late as September 1959 he was telling the house that Ladakh was a different and complicated area where the frontier is far vaguer than in the East, where the McMahon Line clearly


marked it off. He went on to say, "I have to be frank to the House. It is not clear". The ownership to this piece of territory has been challenged for over a hundred years and "I cannot say what part of it may not belong to us and what parts may." 26 His correspondence with Peking revealed no such open mindedness, however, and one is led to believe that his public statements were more functional as arguments put forth to quell the demands of the parliamentary radicals than as a mirror of his personal thoughts on the subject.

It was shortly after this speech that Nehru was to adopt a different stance with regards to the North West, however. Dr. S. Gopal, director of the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs had returned from London with a report of the material, on India's northern borders, in the India Office and Foreign Office archives. He was given no brief and instructed only to examine the evidence and make an objective appraisal of the claims to ownership of the Aksai Chin. His report favoured the Indian side and apparently removed all further reservations on Nehru's part concerning Indian claims. 27


27. Ibid, p. 119. Maxwell's source of information is personal contacts which he had with Gopal over a period of years.
A point worthy of note at this juncture is:

If Nehru had decided that India's interests lay in a settlement with China and had instructed Gopal accordingly, the latter could have produced a historical justification for a compromise boundary line in the western sector - indeed in the MacDonald-McCartney line of 1899 one was already made.28

This point is sheer speculation, at this moment in time, but it is reasonable to assume that anyone with Nehru's experience in dealing with officials from "External Affairs" would realize, and might have planned on Gopal's enthusiasm for furthering the ends of his country, producing a favourable report for the Indian side.

While Parliament was awakening and being enlightened (however reluctantly by the government) the diplomatic exchange was heightening and growing increasingly vituperative in parts. The Chinese government seemed to have decided that it was time to lay down some firm positions of their own (presumably to form the basis for bargaining) and made use of a reply by Chou En-lai to Nehru's letter of March 22, 1959 to set these down in writing. In brief this reply totally repudiated the legality of the McMahon Line and stated that there could be no argument over the western sector since by established international law this area was Chinese by custom and usage.29

28. Ibid, p. 120.
This letter arrived in India in early September, shortly after Longju and about the time that Gopal's report was being considered by the Cabinet's Foreign Affairs Committee. Nehru's reply could be said to mark the turning point, from the Indian perspective, in relations between the two countries. There is little doubt that the Indians had assumed the Chinese would "come to their senses" and recognize the validity of their (the Indian) claims, but the compounded events of late summer 1959 were sufficient to destroy that belief. Nehru's final paragraph in his reply (which put forth counter arguments to Chou's) expresses succinctly his feelings towards the entire situation. Here he regretfully wrote that in 1954 he had hoped that the principal problems which history had bequested to India and China had been settled, but that now China had brought forward a problem which dwarfed in importance all that had been discussed earlier. 30

Chou En-lai replied to Nehru's letter on November 7 and advanced a proposal for avoiding further conflict by each side withdrawing 20 Kilometers, from the McMahon line in the east, and from the line of actual control in the west. He also suggested discussions between the two Prime Ministers in the immediate future. Nehru countered, claim-

ing that the terrain was too difficult to effect an
Indian withdrawal in the east but that if both sides
would issue instructions against further patrols, future
clashes would be avoided. His solution for the west
was that both sides should withdraw behind the line which
the other considered the boundary. This latter proposal
was totally unacceptable to the Chinese as it would mean
evacuating 33,000 square kilometers of territory. They
countered by letter asking Nehru if he would be willing
to apply the same principle to the N.E.F.A. This letter
closed suggested December 28 for a meeting between Nehru
and Chou. "Nehru's reply was curt, asking how the two
Ministers could reach an agreement on principles if
there were such complete disagreement about facts." 31

The last Chinese letter in this series was 23 pages
in length and was received after only 5 days. It con-
tained an abundance of new material supporting the Chinese
claims and advancing further ones. The most significant
aspect of this note, however, was that the suggestion for
a Prime Ministers meeting contained therein was accepted
and the Indian government proposed April 19, 1960 in New
Delhi as the time and place. The reason for this reversal
in policy is not entirely certain but both Van Eekelen (p.96)

and Maxwell. (p. 147) advance the theory that the impending visit of Krushchev, coupled with the need for Russian support or at least neutrality led Nehru to at least make a show of attempting a resolution.

Negotiations with China posed certain difficult domestic problems for Nehru, however, for he had maintained since November that "Chinese withdrawal from Indian territory" was a precondition for any negotiations. Critics now began to worry that he intended to compromise with China rather than evicting the villains who were "...soiling our motherland with their cancerous fingers". The government needed an out and Maxwell claims this was achieved by laying down a "semantic smoke screen". Nehru claimed his meeting with Chou came under the heading of talks instead of negotiations and he "...felt able to go on saying there was no prospect of negotiations with China even while his letter inviting Chou En-lai to New Delhi was being delivered". 32

One month prior to Chou En-lai's visit another event occurred which further cemented the Indian government in its position. One of the disputable items with Pakistan had been resolved in 1958 when Nehru had compromised over a small section of territory* and it was split between


* The Beribari Union between West Bengal and East Pakistan.
Pakistan and India. The action was challenged in the courts and the challenge upheld, because the boundaries of India are set down in the constitution and therefore a constitutional amendment would be needed to either cede or acquire territory. Even if Nehru was to come to some compromise agreement with Chou, then the settlement would require the same amendment. This would be extremely "touch and go" and thus made the Indian position even more intractable.\footnote{Ibid, P. 153.} When constitutional factors were added to political pressures, Nehru found himself totally committed to the course of action he had selected, and unless China was willing to surrender to all of India's demands Chou was about to make a futile pilgrimage.

The most significant result of the Prime Minister's conference was the, not entirely surprising, fact that when Chou left New Delhi for Katmandu, India and China had not moved one iota from their initial positions. Most of the contributing reasons for this, from the Indian side, have been previously listed. Suffice it to say here, that Chou En-lai maintained the position that if India was not prepared to make concessions in the west, China could make none in the east.

Krishna Menon stated his opinion of the reasons behind
the failure of the visit in interviews for Michael Brecher's book *India and World Politics*. Brecher quotes him as saying:

> The 1960 visit was spoiled by the fact that we had too many people involved ... On our side, inside the Congress and inside the country; public opinion had been aroused so that it was no longer possible to talk in terms of negotiations. And the Home Minister (Pandit Pant), who had by that time acquired a powerful influence over the Prime Minister was not in favour of negotiation.34

An extremely important sidelight to the "main event", however, was the further stops Chou made on his trip. In Nepal and then Burma, Chou finalized boundary agreements, that appeared to be mutually satisfactory, and appeared in treaty form some months later. Each agreement is interesting for similar and mutually exclusive reasons; the similarities being that in each case a small neighbour of China had settled its boundary without undue pressure. In both of these cases China went out of her way and made some rather large concessions to obtain an agreement.35

The individual case of Nepal was closer to the Sino-Indian Western Sector rather than the eastern, for it was largely without any form of delimitation such as the

McMahon Line and in fact Nepal had progressed through varying degrees of suzerainty with the "Middle Kingdom" up until 1911. The substance of the agreement with Nepal was completely flexible, as reported in the Peking Review, allowing for "adjustments made in accordance with principles of equality, mutual benefit, friendship and mutual accommodation".36 It also called for both Chinese and Nepalese troops to maintain positions no closer than 40 kilometers to the border. It seems possible that the Chinese were determined to prove that maintaining the "status quo" was a workable solution to boundary disputes.

China's ability to negotiate a peaceful border settlement with Burma is just as important for different reasons. The Burmese negotiations yielded substantial concessions of Chinese claims and acceptance of a large portion of the McMahon Line.37

There was and has been considerable speculation in the Western press and academic circles impugning Chinese motives as being based on a desire to embarrass India. Briefly, without becoming diverted from the purpose of the paper, this is not an item that can be resolved with any degree of certainty. It seems improbable, however, that the

Chinese would attempt such an extensive and expensive rouse, when they had stated numerous times that strategic exigencies forced them to look east. A settled border in the south-west was clearly in their best interest, as long as settling the border did not involve a major strategic loss. If this reasoning is valid, yet another factor comes to rest on the stack of evidence substantiating the Indian refusal to enter into negotiations, as opposed to "talks".

Shortly after the conclusion of the Prime Ministers conference the thoughts and philosophy underlying the "Forward Policy" began to exhibit themselves in Indian press and opinion. There were examples of its presence prior to this time, such as a Times of India editorial in October 1959 urging the government to exert an immediate Indian presence in Chinese held territories, before inactivity implied tacit acceptance.\(^38\) The occurrence of this philosophy became regularized after Chou's visit and moreover, it appeared that the government had adopted a like viewpoint.

Neville Maxwell cites several conversations, which he had with Indian government officials in the period following Chou's departure, to illustrate the currency of the idea in their minds. They include, reassurances that the

\(^{38}\) *Times of India*, October 11, 1959.
border would not lapse into tranquility, claims to the
origination of the thought, and Krishna Menon's statement
"that the policy derived from a situation". Maxwell,
himself, accepts and promotes this explanation when he says:

This forward policy, as it came to be
called, was not formulated in the nor-
mal processes of government; it
emerged in a kind of virgin birth out
of the situation in which the Indian
Government found itself at the
beginning of 1960.

If this analysis is valid, this decision promises to fol-
low closely the aggregate ranking of Chapter II.

A discussion of the rightness or wrongness, logic or
rational behind the policy would not further our purposes
here; nor would further narrative concerning its implemen-
tation. Some discussion of individual attitudes and per-
ceptions concerning the policy will be undertaken in the
analysis of the decision; but, if the reader wishes to
pursue this fascinating interaction of generals and poli-
ticians in a developing country, the books listed below
provide colourful and interesting reading.

The Indian government thus embarked upon the forward
policy and eventually upon a war. Some measure of analysis


** D.R. Mankekar, The Guilty Men of 1962, (Bombay: Tulsi
Shah Enterprises, 1968)
J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder, (Bombay: Thacker & Company
Ltd, 1969)
B.M. Kaul, The Untold Story, (Bombay: Allied Publishers,
1967).
of this fateful decision and of that which led to it -
India's refusal to negotiate will be undertaken in the
following chapter.
Chapter IV

The Model Applied

The ranking of variables which we now bring forward, from Chapter II, to apply to the two decisions - not to negotiate, and instituting the forward policy - is:

- Idiosyncratic
- Societal
- Systemic
- Governmental

Given the earlier decision to hold the issue area relatively constant and to treat the degree of International Linkage as a parameter, some measure of the validity of the methodology can be obtained through the application.

Prior to applying the ranking, however, some discussion of issue area and linkages concerning these decisions is in order to substantiate our claims. As in the test cases, we are confronted with a decision that can readily be categorized as non-human resources - the decision to implement the forward policy - and a decision which is difficult to categorize - the decision not to negotiate. Taking the latter decision first, neither ends or means can be classified as being completely, tangible or intangible. The nature of the decision itself, can be partly attributed with causing this dilemma, for it was only after a number of years that the existence of this
action became known, and it has never been explained exactly what the Indian government hoped to gain by its consistent adherence to it.

The decision not to negotiate, like the decision to send troops to Suez, seems to fall mainly in the non-human resources area. The conscious act of not allowing any situation develop, which might draw India into negotiations with China can be considered as a tangible mean even though it lacks characteristics which would allow us to place a monetary value on its tangibility. The maintenance of the "status quo" regarding the Indian borders in the north appears to be the tangible end of this decision. The classification as non-human resources appears to be quite nebulous for this issue but it also appears to be the only issue area of the four into which this decision could fall.

The decision to undertake the 'Forward Policy', however, is clearly a non-human resources issue. It is a case of combining tangible means - sending Indian troops into, what was claimed to be, North-East Ladakh - combined with tangible ends - establishing an Indian presence in the area that would refute the Chinese claim that the Aksai Chin was theirs by reason of "custom and usage".

The question of "linkage" is more nebulous and harder to define precisely. Both decisions were implemented during the time frame of the test cases, however, so exter-
nal factors acting upon the Indian political climate would be relatively constant between the test case decisions and the decisions leading to the border war. There are of course individual and specific linkages related to each decision, but there are also linkages related specifically to each other decision. That is to say that if a particular linkage exerts itself upon a decision it seems probable that another specific linkage will affect a similar decision within the same time frame, thus maintaining a degree of constancy with the linkage that is present. This theorization is fortified by the observation that when a strong linkage exerts itself upon a society it will usually cause a strong aberration from observed pattern.* Since these decisions appear to follow the pattern of Indian decisions we will assume the linkage to be constant, at least until some aberration appears.

If the composite ranking is valid, for the decision not to negotiate, the idiosyncratic cluster will have been the principal contributing factor to the decision. The idiosyncratic cluster is always the most difficult for

* Consider, for example, Nehru's decision to suddenly alter his established policy and "talk" to Chou En-lai in April 1960. Analysts (Van Sekelen & Maxwell are the ones cited here) agree that the only plausible explanation for this change in policy was the impending visit of Khrushchev to India and the desire to impress him with the fact that they (the Indians) were making an attempt to resolve the dispute. This is clearly an intrusion of a "human" external factor on Indian society causing a change in established policy; but as such, the change could not be explained by merely applying the ranking of variables to the decision.
which to obtain a reasonably accurate measurement. The major problem with this variable is the reliance which must be placed upon articulated images of the respective decision makers. It has already been noted that Nehru did not make news of this decision public until nearly one year after the latest date on which the decision could have been reached and, even then, insisted on playing upon the semantic distinction between "talks" and "negotiations".¹ Prior to these occurrences, however, Nehru made several statements which have greater relevance to this analysis. While he was telling Parliament and the press that no one could be sure which territory was India's and which was China's, he was carrying his hard line "right down the line" with China. The point was made in Chapter III that his public statements were more functional as arguments to quell radical demands than as a mirror to his private thoughts (p.63) and subsequent events would seem to support this view.

Michael Brecher develops the theory that the Indian policy towards China was a sin of omission rather than commission. The world view of Indian leaders, particularly Nehru and Menon, was hyperoptic in the extreme. "Southern Asia, as a distinctive area or system of international

¹. See Chapter III, p. 67.
relations, is conspicuously absent from (their) perception." A reflection of this can be seen in:

India's policy of inaction and indifference in the region during the fifteen years following her initiative in the Dutch Indonesian colonial struggle at the Delhi Conference of 1949. India abdicated from any role of leadership or catalyst in the area and exerted her influence only in negative terms, to prevent intrusion by the great powers, as with the emphatic rejection of S.E.A.T.O.

Brecher then goes on to say:

The cost of inactivity was brought to Delhi's attention forcefully during the conflicts with China (1962) and Pakistan (1965) and Menon's penchant for formulae and conciliation was never applied to Kashmir and only when it was too late in the case of China.

Nehru and Menon both seemed to see the problem of the border as a passing phase, something that would iron itself out in the course of time, just as other legacies of colonialism had been solved without causing the Indian leader to divert his attention unnecessarily from the more important happenings in the world at large. The border problems were seen as a thorn in their sides but not the lance that they were eventually to turn out to be.

The importance of the idiosyncratic variable for this

---

3. Ibid, p. 316.
decision is summed up by Maxwell when he says that India was on a collision course "and it was set by Nehru and his advisors on their own judgment, not under the pressure of an aroused public opinion. Political pressure later made it extremely difficult for Nehru to change course, but it cannot be blamed or credited for having formed the Indian approach. For that Nehru must take responsibility." 6

If it is assumed that Maxwell's information is correct and the decision was taken in 1954, and remained as a conscious policy of the Indian government through 1962, it becomes very difficult to measure the effect of the societal variable on the decision. Reports of public reaction to events in the Himalayas, with the exception of the Chinese annexation of Tibet, are non existent in this period.

The exception is important, however, for public opinion on the Tibetan issue was the only yardstick the government was in possession of, by which to judge the reaction to negotiations with China that might involve giving up some territorial claims. The attitude of the Indian public towards China was not favourable at that time. W. F. Van Eekelen cites the remarks of several opposition party leaders to illustrate their anxiety concerning China. The Anglo-Indian representative may have expressed all of their

feelings by saying "...this cynical and unprovoked attack on Tibet has outraged the conscience of every self-respecting Indian". These statements combined with public reaction over Kashmir and the possessive nationalism that was known to pervade much of the population would be sufficient to advocate caution in any dealings with the border.

Since there is only one piece of evidence supporting the theory that this decision was made prior to 1955, it is considered an unwarranted assumption to accept it as factual. There is likewise little evidence to point at an actual date on which this decision was made, except that it was a guiding directive of Indian policy makers prior to 1959. Another considerable difficulty is thus added to the problems of analysis for, as is readily apparent, the factors present at a given time contributing to a decision, cannot be weighed if the time is not a known quantity. The margin of error is increased when a necessary assumption concerning the time frame of the decision is made. We are forced to make such an assumption, placing the date of the decision as late summer or early fall 1958, just prior to the first substantive evidence of it in Indian notes.

If, it were assumed that the decision not to negotiate with China was not made until Nehru publicly announced in the fall of 1959 that no negotiations could be undertaken with China until she had withdrawn from "Indian territory", there are many examples of the influence of public opinion.* An argument can in fact be made that it was Parliamentary pressure reflecting public opinion and the press statements universally praising the government for its refusal to meet the Chinese that motivated Nehru to make his statement on negotiations. It must be re-iterated here that India's refusal to negotiate her borders was substantively made known to China in Nehru's letters of the previous year. 8 His public announcement of this policy opened the door for public opinion to play its part in preventing him from retreating. It seems reasonable to suggest from the above that, even if the decision was made after 1954, public opinion and the societal variables would not have played a predominant part.

This is not to say that the societal variable was not important, in any case, for in any analysis of this sort some thought must be given to trying to understand the thought processes of decision makers. Periodic outbursts of antagonistic feeling in India towards China - princi-

*Some of these are related in Chapter III, p.p. 60-62.*
pally over happenings in Tibet - and the nationalist feeling noted in Chapter II regarding foreign occupation of Indian soil represent the type of issue that always holds a place of prominence in a politician's mind.

The systemic cluster ranks third in the order of the composite and it is immediately evident that it plays a major role in this decision for it is precisely geographical reality and a challenge from a potential aggressor - the key elements making up the systemic cluster - that present the "raison d'être" for this decision.

September 1957 brought word that the Chinese had built a road across what appeared to be Indian territory and this was confirmed in October 1958 by an Indian patrol sent to investigate. Chinese forces had not only occupied and were making use of "Indian territory", but were circulating the news of their achievements widely in their domestic press.

About the same time the world's "China Watchers" had become aware of a shift in Chinese foreign policy. The "national bourgeoisie" were no longer the allies of Communist China as they had been at Bandung and the "party line" dictated that "national liberation movements" were not enough - communist revolution was essential if the rightist leanings of the bourgeoisie were to be purged.  

This was not a philosophy which was to hold sway for a long period of time in China, but it was on its ascendancy in 1958 and must have been more than slightly disconcerting in India: the epitome of rule by the national bourgeoisie.

The governmental - role combination is perhaps the easiest of the variable clusters for which to obtain a relative value. The role elements continue to play a minor part in the decision for it cannot be conceived that many other Indian leaders, occupying Nehru's position would have adopted the same view towards the border. Leaders of other Asian countries were characterized by their myopic rather than hyperoptic view of the world. Their concern was primarily for the consolidation and security of their territories and newly won independence. The zeal with which they adopted the European "mode" of fixed and determined boundaries was in fact quite remarkable. Peter Lyon claims that the people of the newly independent Asian countries were, without exception, obsessed with their territory, seemingly because they realized that in a world of "European" international relationships, they had to adopt European standards to survive. "What were once rather remote frontier regions, areas of indeterminacy, zones of transit at most, have become defined and apportioned politically by stressing the importance of linear frontiers
as national frontiers."\(^{11}\)

Most of the countries of South Asia were willing to make concessions to achieve the ultimately satisfactory mutual boundary agreement with their neighbours.\(^ {12}\) India seems to be the only exception and she was to have problems in several areas. Opinions expressed in Parliament by opposition leaders and members of the Congress Party, not directly under Nehru’s control, express the same view, of the necessity of securing the borders, as is evident elsewhere in Asia. The logical conclusion becomes, then, that given an entirely different leadership some accommodation would probably have been made with China over the borders.

The governmental facet of the role-governmental cluster derives its significance from the fact that the Indian system was at this time dominated by one man. Nehru’s decisions were influenced almost entirely by his close advisors, a very little by the Congress Party at large and almost not at all by Parliament.\(^ *\) In a parliamentary system when such a situation develops and that one

---


* This holds true for most decisions which would be classified as normal in the western context i.e. the decision maker consults his advisors, weighs the alternatives, makes his decision and then either makes the substance of the decision public or awaits further developments. As will be seen in the decision to implement the "forward policy" the same does not hold true for "societal" instituted decisions.
man is virtually assured of public support for his decisions, the chances, that a given decision in foreign policy behaviour will be irrational, seem to increase geometrically.

From the above analysis it is readily apparent that the ranking of variables for this decision does not follow the composite order developed in Chapter II. The societal cluster retains little of the relative importance that it previously possessed, the idiosyncratic cluster has maintained its position of prominence, and the governmental variable would seem to have a greater input to this decision. A normative ranking which could be developed from this analysis would appear as:

Idiosyncratic
Systemic
Governmental
Societal

The decision to implement the "forward policy" was the product of some similar yet many dissimilar pressures and influences upon the decision makers. The same political pressures which prevented Nehru from reversing the decision not to negotiate contributed greatly to forcing the Indian government into some action on the border. The geographical considerations had progressed from their position of initial issue in the previous decision; for once news of the situation became public, the territorial and ideological issues became the chief stimulant to public opinion. The personal idiosyncracies of the decision makers
were no longer as important, for action was being demanded of them and they only had control of the type of action which they would take and not over the critical decision of whether to take action or not.

Much has already been said about press and parliamentary pressures confronting Nehru in late 1959 and that point will not be belaboured at this time. Some of the meagre statistical data on public opinion is of some use, however, for this decision. Albert Cantril conducted two surveys of Indian public opinion in 1962 and comparisons which he draws with a similar survey by Lloyd Free done in 1958 can provide us with useful data on pressures developing within Indian society. The two 1962 surveys were conducted prior to and after the "border war" and as such the first is more relevant for our purposes.

The obvious trends, as indicated through this comparison, can be divided into two groupings: decreasing concern over Indian world status and aspirations, and increasing concern, anxiety and realism towards military strengths.13 Items which decreased in importance, at a level of statistical significance, included ideological and moral leadership, world power status for India, and

social justice. The only item which increased according to the same restrictions was the fear of Chinese aggression. Falling into the latter group, however, are: a 78% increase in the feeling the better relations with China will not develop, an increase in the feeling that the west should hold the balance of military power, and an increase in the belief that India should procure her arms from the United States rather than Russia.

These figures do not deal with the specific issue of Indian action to regain lost border areas, but, they do indicate a concern with Indian security, a growing animosity towards China, and an increased affinity with the West. Looking at the four intervening years, the most probable stimulus to this change in attitude has to be the events of late summer and fall of 1959, just prior to Chou En-lai's visit to India in April 1960 and the decision to implement the "forward policy". Societal pressures can be categorically described as increasing considerably from those present when the decision was taken not to negotiate.

The reason behind this increase is found in the public knowledge that China had occupied "Indian territory"

15. Ibid, p. 31.
in the north. This decision was very similar to the Goan situation of a year later in that the systemic variable, through public awareness of a given situation, reacted with the societal variable to greatly influence a decision. It is the societal variable which exerts most of the pressure, but it is the systemic variable which influences the societal.

The systemic variable also accounts for external ideological pressures and the shift in China's foreign policy noted earlier in this chapter had by 1960 become a stated objective of furthering and promoting armed communist revolution throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. The unease that characterized Indian decision-makers in 1958 had by 1960 spread to all sections of the informed public causing them to demand some immediate action to let the Chinese know that India would be no pushover. 17

This pressure directed at Nehru by both Parliament and the press left him to take some action that would restore faith in the government's ability to cope with the situation. The purpose of this action would be to regain the lost territory but in the short run this could only be accomplished by war and India was not dealing here with the little Portuguese enclave of Goa. Nehru chose the long run explaining to press and Parliament that India did not

need to violate her tradition of peaceful settlement of disputes. She would establish a presence in the Aksai Chin by pushing forward where no Chinese posts blocked the path. This would impede the course of further Chinese advances and make the Indian diplomatic position much stronger by allowing them to make an actual instead of theoretical withdrawal along the lines of Nehru's proposals. 18

This course of action could not be carried out without the co-operation of the Chinese though, for unless they were willing to allow the Indians a free hand in strengthening their position the forward policy could only lead to armed conflict. Maxwell claims that it was almost as if the "satyagrahis" were marching again, armed with a confidence in the "moral unassailability" of their position, and the "belief that the world - including China shared that view". 19 Brecher also deals at some length with the view of Indian leaders towards China - the total disbelief that China could commit such a perfidious act as invading India. 20 Nehru was to make the ultimate blunder reinforcing this opinion in 1962, one week prior to

the Chinese invasion, when he announced that the Indian Army had been given orders to throw the Chinese out of the Indian territory they had occupied. It is a strange commander, of conventional forces, who tells the enemy his field orders before they are carried out.

The governmental variable has decreased in importance from the previous decision in close relationship to the amount that the societal variable has increased. Nehru still occupied the same position of pre-eminence but even the most powerful democratic leader must bow to a seeming groundswell lest it sweep him from power. The role element was not of much importance either for it is difficult to imagine anyone but Nehru exercising such blind belief in human goodness as to attempt the implementation of the forward policy.

The ranking of variables which results from the above analysis differs from the composite ranking of the test cases only in so far as the idiosyncratic cluster occupies a position of deflated importance. The societal cluster is the most important, followed by systemic, idiosyncratic and governmental clusters, yielding the following ranking:

Societal
Systemic
Idiosyncratic
Governmental

The rankings from the above analysis and the composite ranking from the test cases - that which was put forward as what ought to be - appear in comparison in the following table.

Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composite</th>
<th>Non-Negotiation</th>
<th>Forward Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
<td>Societal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td>Systemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus each of the decisions, that the composite was compared to, differed only with regards to the ranking of one variable cluster from the composite. In Chapter V we will examine the reasons behind this divergence, make comparisons with each of the other rankings discussed to date, and make recommendations from our findings towards building a more reliable tool of analysis.
Chapter V

Conclusions

Rankings of variable clusters have now been developed for five decisions by the Indian government between 1947 and 1961. The following table provides a measure of comparison that leads us to some interesting conclusions regarding: the reliability of the developed rankings, the appropriateness of the composite ranking for analytical purposes and the utility of Rosenau's rankings for this type of foreign policy analysis.

Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kashmir</th>
<th>Suez</th>
<th>Goa</th>
<th>Rosenau</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idiosyncratic Role</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic Role</td>
<td>Societal Systemic</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic Societal</td>
<td>Systemic Systemic</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic Role</td>
<td>Systemic Societal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Governmental</td>
<td>Governmental Role</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composite</th>
<th>Non Negotiation</th>
<th>Forward Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
<td>Societal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td>Systemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If this table is considered as an extension of that which was examined in Chapter II, the two new additions warrant examination as a preliminary to comparisons which can be drawn from the breadth of the table. In the preced-
ing chapter it was noted that the non-negotiation and forward policy decisions differed from the composite ranking only in so far as the ranking of one cluster of each decision was concerned. The societal cluster was deflated in the non-negotiation decision and the idiosyncratic cluster was deflated in the forward policy decision.

The decision, not to negotiate with China over the Himalayan borders, was a policy action, initiated by Indian decision makers and unknown to the general public until some time after the decision was made. The only societal input to this decision could thus, have been from the decision makers perception of popular opinion. Such a perception had already been established as being virtually non-existent, through the period in question. The societal cluster, therefore, was the least important of the variable clusters contributing to this decision.

The decision to implement the forward policy was largely a result of a totally different variable interaction. The two principal clusters of the composite ranking have virtually reversed their influence - from their relative positions in the non-negotiation decision. The societal cluster has risen in influence from fourth rank to first and the idiosyncratic cluster has fallen from first rank to third. This was due to societal pressure forcing a
decision upon the Indian leaders, leaving little or no room for individual choice in the decision making process.

We would appear to have been dealing with two fundamentally different decisions in the latter cases: the non-negotiation decision being almost totally lacking in input from societal variables and the forward policy decision being very nearly a product of societal input. The two differing rankings suggest that some provision must be made within the framework, taking account of variations such as these, perhaps in a restructured concept of issue areas.

The decision not to negotiate, it will be remembered did not conform exactly to the "non-human resources" issue area. Using Professor Rosenau's criteria for issue area differentiation (tangibility of ends and means) it was the non-human resources area, which was considered to be the most suitable category for this particular decision. There was, however, an element of doubt at the time - a doubt which has been further strengthened by the resultant rankings.

Returning to the table, comparisons of the rankings for the five decisions reveals similarities that suggest that this variation in decision type has been present throughout the period in question. For purposes of simplicity, if the role cluster is dropped from those rankings
in which it is contained, the Goan decision and the forward policy decision can be seen to be identical in ranking. The role cluster was of some importance in the Kashmir decision so rather than eliminating it we will use its value to elevate the governmental-role combination one rank, from the original governmental position, resulting in a ranking identical to the non-negotiation decision. The Suez decision which appears to fall somewhere between the two extremes is very similar to the Rosenau rankings for this type of decision - if we follow the original procedure and eliminate the role cluster from both - the only difference being the juxtaposition of the societal and systemic clusters. This would seem to indicate that the Rosenau ranking provides a "middle road" to the analysis of Indian foreign policy decisions; one that will be right about one third of the time and half right about two thirds of the time.

It was suggested above that a possible solution to this problem was a re-structuring of the issue area concept. Rosenau's concept of issue areas tends to weaken the framework through its generality. The categories are unmanageably large and the borders are indistinct, resulting in vastly diverse types of decisions falling into the same issue area and other types of decisions overlapping into two or more issue area. Tangibility of ends and
means, his method of deriving issue area categorizations, appears to be the chief problem in this instance, for often two very similar decisions appear in different issue areas. Consider Rosenau's own matrix, for example\(^1\) where he classes territorial area as the product of tangible ends and intangible means. Most of the decisions discussed in this paper have been in the non-human resources area (tangible ends x tangible means), yet they could also be classified as being territorial in nature. In any given decision component parts of either ends or means may be both tangible and intangible, and thus a value judgement must be made as to which issue area the decision will fall.

Michael Brecher would appear to have developed a more workable method of issue area differentiation when he claims that strategic and tactical decisions will fall into one of four issue areas: Military-Security, Political-Diplomatic, Economic-Developmental, and Cultural-Status.\(^2\) Brecher's criterion for classifying issues within issue areas is "substantive content" rather than motivations of the decision makers.\(^3\) The Military-Security issue area, then

---

1. Chapter I, p. 11.
"comprises all issues which focus on questions pertaining to violence, including alliances and weaponry". All of the decisions that have been discussed in this paper, would, if Brecher's criterion were applied, come within the Military-Security issue area. Since this would destroy the utility of considering a different construct, a modification to the Brecher method will be introduced and decision-maker motivation rather than substantive content will be our criterion for classification. The possibility of overlap has not been entirely eliminated here but it can be readily seen that most types of decisions can now be readily categorized.

This facility in categorization might have alleviated some of the problems with the rankings in this paper, had Brecher's issue areas been readily adaptable to the Rosenau schema. The decision not to negotiate with China would clearly fall into Brecher's Political-Diplomatic issue area, while the decision to implement the forward policy would be, just as clearly, Military-Security. Brecher's issue areas cannot be interchanged with Rosenau's, however, and this facility of distinguishing amongst issues is lost, while the framework remains in its present form.

Would an ability to make this application solve the

problems that have been encountered? It would go a long way towards this end, for clearly, the military-security area is more susceptible to public opinion and societal interest than the political-diplomatic. The problems of this paper would not be completely eliminated by such an ability, though, for the decisions of Chapter II are not as easily categorized through the Brecher method.

Kashmir would seem to be predominantly military-security in issue orientation but there are some elements of political-diplomatic issues inherent in this decision. Further to this the ranking resembled that of the non-negotiation decision which was political-diplomatic in orientation. The decision to invade Goa would also seem to belong to both types of Brecher's issue areas yet the ranking for Goa resembled the forward policy decision which was military-security in nature. The decision to send troops to Suez seems to be clearly political-diplomatic in nature, yet it bore a closer resemblance to Rosenau's ranking than either of the other two. This discrepancy suggests two possible conclusions: the decisions really belong to the same issue area as the border dispute decision, which their ranking suggests, or Brecher's method of issue area differentiation (modified) has no more validity, from an operational sense, than Rosenau's.

The implications of the former assumption would be
that certain elements in the analysis were over stressed at the expense of an accurate perception of the events. If, in the Kashmir situation, the considerations which led the Indian government to send troops to Kashmir were predominantly those pertaining to secularism, then this decision could well be said to be political-diplomatic in nature. If, in the Goan decision, the Indian government decided to invade because of popular pressure rather than because of a desire to maintain the Indian position of leadership in the "third world", then this decision would clearly be military-security in nature. Each of the above hypothesis are quite reasonable, in the light of the lack of any evidence as to exactly why the decisions were taken.

Suez, however, still remains a puzzle. A decision that would clearly be classed as political-diplomatic according to Brecher's issue areas, it was difficult to categorize using Rosenau's criteria. Yet the ranking of variable clusters was fairly close to that of Rosenau's framework. This situation is best explained through a discussion of the ranking itself rather than issue areas.

It will be remembered that the decision to contribute troops to the U.N.E.F. was largely a function of the idiosyncratic and societal clusters. The systemic cluster must be credited with some influence with regards to the economic
benefits of an open Suez Canal*, but the overriding factors in the decision were the antagonistic attitude of the Indian people to what was occurring in the Middle East and Nehru's individual conception of the problem. Thus there was a large gap, in relative terms, between the societal and systemic clusters. This gap probably removes Suez as far from the Rosenau rankings as the Kashmir and negotiation decisions, overcoming this particular problem.

This discussion has not cleared up the problem of the applicability of Brecher's issue areas to foreign policy decisions, however, for a desirable issue area construct is clearly one which can be readily used to categorize any particular decision. Through a process of working back to a decision we have been able to illustrate that the Brecher categorizations have some validity, but their operationability is severely limited by the inability to come to an accurate categorization without a careful analysis of all of the contributing factors to that decision.

If one characteristic of the framework has maintained its effect and utility throughout this paper it has been the concept of issue areas. In Chapter I Rosenau's con-

* Part of this factor can in fact be attributed to the societal cluster for a societies economic needs for foreign trade and capital are non-governmental, internal aspects of that society. Only the geographic significance of the canal could be classed as systemic.
ception of issue areas was described as unwieldy. At this point in time issue areas can still only be described as unwieldy, yet it is hoped that this discussion has revealed some of the problems in its unwieldiness. A method of differentiating between types of issues must be found that is accurate, straightforward and applicable to the varying types of decisions undertaken by states if a framework of this type is to achieve any degree of acceptability among researchers.

This brings us back to one of the other problems of the framework - the incomplete manner in which it accounts for the problem of international linkage. One of the hypothesis of this paper has been the necessity of considering the reactive and emulative processes along with the penetrative, if an accurate perception of a state's behaviour is to be obtained. The problem with these additions as stated on p. 9 is the unrealistic number of possible rankings which would result from combinations of these alternatives. A second conclusion of this paper then, recognizes the limitations of the framework regarding linkage and stresses the necessity of developing a method of accounting for the linkage phenomenon, hopefully without providing a ranking for each possible combination. If this were the only method that could be developed, it in itself would discourage research by its immense size.
The final point, we wished to discuss, was the applicability of the developed rankings for future research. The composite ranking’s utility is obviously limited to those decisions that could be classified as being both a diplomatic and a security question. The rankings developed for the decision not to negotiate with China and the decision to initiate the forward policy could be considered to have validity as examples of a political-diplomatic issue and a military-security issue, respectively if: the country whose foreign policy is being analyzed is a large country with an open polity and a developing economy, the country has a degree of linkage operating upon it commensurate with India in the 1950’s, and the decisions can be readily classified as belonging to one of the issue types above.

Thus if a situation satisfies all of these conditions the resultant decision should be effected by variables in accordance with the rankings below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political-Diplomatic</th>
<th>Military-Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
<td>Societal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td>Systemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The limited nature of and possible application of these rankings is of course extremely limited and only further illustrates the contention that a considerable amount of
work must be done with foreign policy research frameworks before they will achieve acceptability as a research tool.
An Abbreviated Presentation of Rosenau’s Pre-Theory of Foreign Policy, in Which Five Sets of Variables Underlying the External Behaviour of Societies Are Ranked According to Their Relative Potencies in Eight Types of Societies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geography and physical resources</th>
<th>Large Country</th>
<th>Small Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State of the economy</td>
<td>Developed</td>
<td>Underdeveloped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of the polity</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rankings of the variables</td>
<td>Role Societal</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Systemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
<td>Societal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrative examples</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

One Segment of the Further Elaboration of Professor Rosenau's Pre-Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Large Country</th>
<th>Underdeveloped Economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open Polity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Penetrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other areas</td>
<td>status area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>other areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>i i i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r r r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>so sy sy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sy g so</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>g so g</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i - individual variables  
g - government variables  
r - role variables  
so - societal variables  
sy - systemic variables
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


Dutt, V. P., *China And The World* (New York: Praeger, 1964)


Menon, V.P., *The Integration Of The Indian States*, (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1961)


Robertson, T., *Crisis*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1964)


**ARTICLES:**


Maxwell, N., "China And India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute", *China Quarterly* No. 43 (July - Sept. 1970)


GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND OTHER OFFICIAL SOURCES:

Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, White Paper, Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China.


The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962)


NEWSPAPERS:

The Hindu, Madras, (July, 1955; October, 1956).


The Times Of India, Bombay, (October, 1959)
VITA AUCTORIS


1969  Bachelor of Arts Degree, from The University of Windsor.

1969  Married Elizabeth Anne Pearson

1971  Accepted employment with the Canada Department of Labour, Labour-Management Consultation Branch.