The Pacifica Foundation, the "New York Times" and the propagation of a mature commercial ideology: Objectivity vs. subjectivity and the future of a journalism for the public (Lewis Hill)

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The Pacifica Foundation, the New York Times and the Propagation of a Mature Commercial Ideology: Objectivity vs. Subjectivity and the Future of a Journalism for the Public

by

Stephen Landry

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research through Sociology
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

2003

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Abstract

Combining the ideas of past and present media theorists and critics from a variety of disciplines, the thesis traces the general evolution of the prevailing system of mainstream news media— from a subjective model that once served to empower portions of the bourgeois public sphere of 18th and 19th century Europe to the current objective model that prevails within North America and much of Europe. The thesis then proceeds to briefly examine both the implications of the prevailing mature commercial ideology on a remaining public media system that is increasingly scrutinized through the lens of a dominant free market ideology, and the effects that the objective model of journalism has upon the general citizenry. To illustrate these ‘dual’ effects, the thesis focuses upon a comparative content analysis of New York Times and San Francisco Bay Guardian coverage regarding the relatively recent attempt at “mainstreaming” the programming at the five stations comprising the Pacifica Foundation— a US public news system founded more than fifty-years ago by pacifist Lewis Hill for the purpose of empowering local communities and groups through the subjective dissemination of information on a variety of issues. The thesis concludes with a renewed call for a responsible subjective journalism that would allow for the dissemination of myriad opinions concerning issues and events, and simultaneously allow for the creation of a newly-empowered public through a more inclusive public sphere that would facilitate the establishment of an ‘ideal’ democracy.
Dedication

The following thesis is dedicated to my wondrous partner M. Jane Howard, whose patience throughout the project has been the match for my motivational fire. Without her love and support, my efforts would have proven fruitless, and my life prove likewise.
Acknowledgements

At this initial stage of the project’s dissemination, I would like to acknowledge my general appreciation of the collective time, effort and tutelage of my thesis team.

Specifically, I would like to thank the ever-enthusiastic Alan Sears for his many suggestions, as they provided me with many additional angles from which to perceive the project’s theoretical base.

I would also like to thank Barry Adam for pointing in Gaye Tuchman’s direction, as this provided much needed focus on a significant portion of the theoretical portion of the project.

I also acknowledge my appreciation for Paul Boin’s last minute enlistment. Unfortunately, we did not get much time to meld minds, however, I have little doubt that they are quite similar—at least in regards to their critical bent.

Finally, but certainly not in reflection to her importance, I would like to thank the incredible Andria Turner. From the moment I first spoke with her on the phone prior to my arriving in Windsor in the Fall of 2001, I knew her beauty. Andria, Jane and I both wish you nothing but the best; after all, that is what you have been giving—undoubtedly from the moment you first drew breath.
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Introduction

It would be hard to overstate the impact of news media in shaping public opinion, on issues from healthcare to plans for war. With media such an influence on us, it is crucial that we understand who's influencing the media.

Janine Jackson, Peter Hart & Rachel Coen, “Fear & Favor 2002” (Extra!: April 2003), 18

North Americans now live in a highly complex media environment where newspapers are still immensely important vehicles for democratic communication. No other mass medium offers the same combined possibilities for accessibility, in-depth analysis, diversity of views, and sustained reflection on important political and economic issues.


In accordance with the neoliberal ideology of the mature commercial society that prevails within the United States (and Canada), citizens are largely disconnected and fragmented— it is the age of ‘rugged’, yet marginalized individuals. As will be noted below, this is due, in large part, to the massive centralization of power and institutional bureaucratization that accompanies the evolution of the mature commercial ideology. Furthermore, as this ideology blossoms, voluntary associations—erstwhile sources of collectivism and enlightenment—decline, or, due to bureaucratization, are rendered inaccessible. As a result, the enlightenment of the masses must derive from another source. The most capable source of said enlightenment is arguably the vast system of mass information media that prevails within the US (and Canada)—perhaps most effectively provided by newsprint. Unfortunately, this media system—including newsprint—is largely used by social power elites as vehicles of manipulation and mass marginalization; they are used to stifle the enlightenment of the citizenry, in efforts

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to ensure the sustenance of the status quo of the contemporary mature commercial society. They are also used to propagate the mature commercial ideology. Throughout the thesis, it will be argued that, in order to be a legitimate vehicle of true enlightenment and empowerment, a media system must be accessible to the myriad viewpoints on social issues— not merely the viewpoints of the elite. Indeed, as many theorists (Mills 1959; Habermas 1989; Horkheimer and Adorno 2001; Adorno 2002) have indicated, this is a necessary precondition for empowering the public sphere of ordinary citizens— by being informed of the variety of viewpoints on social issues and events. Unfortunately, with today's saturation of the mainstream media by corporate ownership, not to mention sponsorship, this precondition for an empowered public sphere may appear more a utopian ideal than a reality. In practice, all information is screened for content, and the news, and other products, disseminated fit predetermined formulas— those that assure the perpetuation of the societal status quo and the mental maps that prevail.

Although some information is disseminated by the news media, much more information is not. Of course, this should not be surprising, as all information that is generated on a daily basis cannot possibly be deemed newsworthy— much of it being relatively trivial and insignificant to the majority of the citizenry. However, according to many theorists (Herman and Chomsky 2002; Chomsky 1998b; Tuchman 1978; Parenti 1986; Winter 1997; Solomon and Cohen 1997; Hackett and Zhao 1998; Hackett and Gruneau 2000; et cetera), the information that is disseminated has an underlying purpose of opinion manipulation. Of particular note, Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (2002; Chomsky 1998b; Jhally 1997) suggest that, within the corporate owned mainstream news media, information is "filtered" in such a way that only allows for the delivery of
information/knowledge that maintains the status quo of the mature commercial society. In other words, said news media provide information that serves to shape public opinion in such a way that maximizes the possibility of keeping the present corporate/elite ideological power structure in place. The authors refer to this filtering system as the “Propaganda Model”. Understanding this filtering system that currently prevails in the corporate/commercial mass media, however, is not enough.\(^1\) One must also trace the evolution of the mainstream news media— from the system as a vehicle for empowering the public sphere to one through which the citizenry is manipulated and effectively stifled.

Some theorists, such as C. Wright Mills (1959) and Jurgen Habermas (1989), have taken a historical approach in tracing the evolution of the information mass media. In particular, they outline the once significant role of the system in informing the public sphere, and thereby sustaining a much richer democracy than those that prevail within contemporary Western society— specifically the US, followed closely by Canada and many of the remaining Western nations. Following the ‘lead’ of Mills (1959) and Habermas (1989), some theorists, such as Herman (1995; Herman and McChesney, 1997) and Robert W. McChesney (1997, 1999, 2002), emphasize the mature commercial media system that has emerged in correlation with the evolution and proliferation of a mature commercial ideology that has occurred within the US (and Canada). According to these theorists, the US is exemplary of a mature commercial society wherein a mature commercial broadcasting/media system prevails. Furthermore, they outline the negative effects that a mature commercial media system has on the public media system— in effect,\(^1\)

\(^1\) As will be argued in a subsequent section, this filtering model is also applied to the public media— albeit to a lesser degree.
as the systems fall prey to the commercial ideology that permeates much of Western (US) society, the evolution of the former necessitates the devolution of the latter.

Closely related to theoretical conceptions regarding the prevailing mainstream media system of contemporary Western (US) society, other theorists, such as Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno (2001; Adorno 2002), and, more recently, Herbert Schiller (1989), have focussed on the notion of the contemporary mass media system as part of an interlocking system of prevailing ‘culture industries’—all geared toward perpetuating the mature commercial ideology and its corresponding societal status quo. According to such theorists, particularly Horkheimer and Adorno (2001), the mainstream media system of the prevailing culture industry is a significant means through which the citizenry achieves a false sense of enlightenment. In essence, it is a system that gives the perception that it does indeed inform. Under such false notions, a pretext for disarming the public media system of its authentic informing, and thereby empowering, capabilities eventually emerges and gains legitimacy and general acceptance—permeating the public sphere it pretends to inform with (largely implicit) messages disseminated by the mainstream media system that serves as the primary information provider to the vast majority of the citizenry.

One significant example of the deleterious effects of a prevailing mature commercial media system on the system of public media is exemplified by the recently-rectified, and relatively long-term, crisis that occurred within the Pacifica Foundation. A public radio broadcasting system comprised of six affiliate stations and geared toward the enlightenment of small sectors of the public sphere, the Foundation was wrought with turmoil between executive management and staff and volunteer program
directors/coordinators. In brief, the executive committee—mainly professionals utilized for their management skills—began implementing changes in programming that were directed at gaining larger audiences—a commercial media objective; in a sense, they were attempting to mainstream the broadcast content offered by the network. In response, the largely progressive-minded staffers and volunteers were not willing to lose what little empowering/enlightening capabilities they possessed. Protests, bitter battles and court involvement ensued.

In rather broad terms, the proposed thesis will attempt to bridge the macro-theoretical approach emphasizing the significant role of the mass media in sustaining an informed and politically active public sphere with the micro-theoretical notion of particular methods of manipulation that prevail in the mature commercial mass media fare—specifically news fare. Of particular importance in the linkage between the broad and narrow theoretical views will be the above-noted concept regarding the evolution of the mature commercial (corporate) media system. Indeed, it is this very evolutionary process that sheds some discernable light on the developments that emerged within the *Pacifica Foundation* specifically, and those that are emerging within public media systems in general; a shift toward a commercial/corporate ideology is unavoidable within a state wherein a mature commercial society and corresponding media system prevail.

The general skeleton of the thesis will work from a broad theoretical level to one of greater specificity. After a brief introduction to the recently concluded crisis that occurred within the *Pacifica Foundation*, the first significant theoretical portion will be devoted to the notion of the mass media’s significance as a force for empowering the public sphere. Although great emphasis will be placed on the ideas of Habermas (1989),
his work will not inform the entire section. Some emphasis will also be placed on Mills (1959), who’s work regarding informed ‘publics’ was something that appears to have inspired Habermas’s own notion of the public sphere. Heavily relying upon the conceptualizations of Herman (1995; Herman and McChesney 1997), McChesney (1993, 1997, 1999; and in Borjesson 2002) and Schiller (1989), the next portion of the thesis will specifically focus on the evolution of the mature commercial media system and its negative impact on the public media system— a necessary devolution. Following this subsection, the project will commence with an analysis of the essential legitimating effect of news media techniques such as ‘professionalism’, ‘objectivity’, ‘balance’, ‘reliability’, ‘credibility’ and ‘concision’. Some of the manners in which these techniques affect the role of the so-called ‘liberal’ journalist and editor will then be addressed.

The next significant theoretical portion will address the propagandistic nature of communication. Specifically, the project will present the argument that commercial, or ‘objective’, news media tend, whether deliberately or through structural constraints, toward the dissemination of ‘egoistic’ propaganda, while alternative, or ‘subjective’, news media tend toward the dissemination of ‘altruistic’ propaganda. As the general model for the content analysis that follows, the project will then outline Herman and Chomsky’s (2002; Chomsky 1998b; Jhally 1997) “propaganda model” of news filtration. Finally, prior to the methodological portion of the thesis, some attention will be given to some theoretical conceptualizations regarding “active audience” theories. As a conclusion to deliberations regarding the active audience, the project will attempt to address the news media’s role in fostering a politically active.
Following a detailed outline of the chosen methodology, the thesis will conclude with a relatively lengthy dissemination of the results of the content analyses of the newsprint samples—comprised by contributions regarding Pacifica’s ideological ‘crisis’ from the mainstream *New York Times* and those from the alternative *San Francisco Bay Guardian*. Levels of analysis will include viewpoints on the ‘mature commercial ideology’, framed perceptions regarding Pacifica’s central management and its dissenters, ways in which each news medium depicts its alternative and finally, a variety of miscellaneous, yet significant, aspects of coverage provided by the competing newsprint media.
The *Pacifica Foundation*: Crisis of Public Enlightenment

[Lewis] Hill and his comrades molded a radical critique of the emerging [US] military-industrial complex and national security state, support for social justice and civil liberties, and an abiding personal taste for avant-garde culture into the basis for daily radio programming. Through the responsible use of broadcasting, the men and women who established the Pacifica Foundation in northern California in 1946 were certain that radio was an indispensable means to educate "people of goodwill" about the futility of war, and further that broadcasting could and must be used as a means to hasten the end of all social injustice.

From the Introduction of Jeff Land’s *Active Radio: Pacifica’s Brash Experiment* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)

When I was a Los Angeles-based correspondent for National Public Radio [NPR] in the mid-1980’s, I listened regularly to two kinds of radio: the all news stations [mostly for their vital traffic reports], and KPFK-FM, the Pacifica Network’s [Los Angeles] affiliate. On KPFK, I know I would hear voices and points of view not heard anywhere else. These included reports...about leftist rebel movements, brazenly partisan journalism about radical politics in the United States, as well as unusual, haunting [again, often politically charged] music that even public radio stations were not airing.

America Rodriguez review that appeared in the Autumn 1999 issue of *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*

As a relatively significant source of public sphere enlightenment in an age of a predominating mature commercial ideology and media system, the case of the *Pacifica Foundation* deserves more elaboration than afforded in the preceding introduction. Founded more than fifty-years-ago by pacifist broadcaster Lewis Hill, the *Pacifica Foundation* began with the Establishment of its flagship radio station, KPFA Berkeley; the Foundation now includes four other community-based radio broadcast stations: WBAI in New York; KPFK in Los Angeles; KPFT in Houston; and WPFW in Washington, DC. From the outset, it was the mission of the station to promote understanding among different groups of people. This was essentially achieved through its programming. It was believed that, by giving control of regular time slots to
community-based volunteers, the station’s programming would be able to reflect the cultural and political diversity of the larger community. Accordingly, the time slots would be used to deliver particular political/cultural messages. For instance, a radical feminist in charge of a particular time slot would use it to disseminate the ideas of a variety of radical feminists; a Marxist would use her/his time slot for the dissemination of Marxist ideas, et cetera. As such, the myriad viewpoints that permeate a community would be given a vehicle for expression. Furthermore, one particular program regularly aired by all stations—*Democracy Now!*, hosted by award-winning broadcast journalist, Amy Goodman—was/is renowned for its hard-hitting insights into contemporary social and political issues that provide angles that are vastly missing from the mainstream news media.

Although this programming format remained unimpeded for much of the stations’ existence, the above-noted evolution of the now-prevalent mature commercial ideology has made its impact. As with much else within contemporary US society, the Foundation began to be evaluated under a mature commercial ‘microscope’. This development was instigated, and subsequently necessitated, in 1996, when the (US) Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB)—a major single source of income for the foundation—put forth new funding criteria, developed “in the face of fewer Federal dollars and prodding from Republicans in Congress, who question taxpayer support for public broadcasting” (Adelson 1997). The new criteria was to be used in determining which public radio broadcasters would receive integral Federal funding, and how much they would receive. Depending on their technological abilities (bandwidth), public radio broadcasters were now required to reach a minimal percentage of the nation’s potential listenership, in order
to secure funding. Of course, the new requirement caused many broadcasters to consider their public appeal—perhaps consider their programming. In the case of the Pacifica Foundation, the new decree was of particular significance, considering the size of the size of their audience relative to their bandwidth. Rather than a potential audience of nearly fifty million (22 percent of US households), the actual listenership was 700 thousand.

The threat to Pacifica’s government funding at this time is not altogether surprising, as it is a development that reflects the workings of the broader mature commercial—or neoliberal—society that presently dominates within the US. In addition to dominating the economic and cultural spectrums, neoliberalist ideology also significantly dominates the political spectrum. As McChesney asserts (1999, 6), “neoliberalism is a political theory; it posits that society works best when business runs things and there is as little possibility of government ‘interference’ with business as possible. In short, neoliberal democracy is one where the political sector controls little and debates even less.” As a necessary result of the burgeoning of this ideological viewpoint, government funding for non-commercial broadcasting—already at a relatively low rate—is under attack. “Public broadcasting is subsidized to the amount of $260 million per year. Despite their small size, public arts and broadcasting funding are both under constant conservative attack. In a market and entertainment culture, these outlays are often regarded as unnecessary or a threat, and tend to be marginalized” (Herman and McChesney 1997, 142).

Moreover, one may think that such “conservative attacks” are being orchestrated by Republican politicos. However, It may be surprising, if not disconcerting, to some to realize that the 1996 amendment to the Telecommunications Act that brought about the
threatening requirement to maximize bandwidth—a neoliberal notion—came under a Democratic rule. Any shock and dismay, however, should dissipate when one realizes how wedded to corporate interests the two major parties are. As noted by Herman and Chomsky (Jhally 1997), both leading parties are primarily funded by corporate wealth; while Republicans do rely on corporate funds more than do Democrats, the difference in reliance is relatively negligible—prior to the 1996 election funding was $94 million and $75 million respectively. Therefore, as Noam Chomsky asserts, the two leading parties represent “two very virtually indistinguishable factions of the business party” (Jhally 1997). As such, both parties are eager supporters of the mature commercial, or neoliberal, agenda. Within the contemporary political/economic context, the only “liberal” political leanings that are still typically pursued by Democrats are those deemed non-threatening to the free market enterprise. Unfortunately, funding an ‘archaic’ broadcasting system without much of an apparent audience does not apply.

In effect, the new criteria put forth by the CPB began a long chain of events/actions that have only recently been resolved. In response to the new funding criteria, the Foundation’s central management—made up of ‘efficient’ professionals from fields not directly related to public broadcasting, such as lawyers, advertising executives, et cetera—began to implement some control over local programming, thus interfering with the traditional method employed within the Pacifica system. As noted, local management and volunteers had always maintained complete authority with regard to local programming. Pacifica management felt this programming was serving to fragment listenership. They continually asserted that their actions were necessary, in-order to
increase the popularity of the Foundation’s programming among the mainstream of listeners, and thus ensure their federal funding and growth.

Those who protested the actions of the Pacifica national board members— the local managers, volunteer programmers and listener members— called for a cessation of their interference in programming and their removal from the executive board. Taken from one of many websites in support of the concerns and tribulations of local staff and volunteers (http://home.pon.net/wildrose/remove.htm), their ‘official’ concentration of acts by the Pacifica Board was focussed on the following ten grievances:

(1) Installing armed guards from IPSA International, a corporate intelligence and security service, at KPFA, where journalists report on international corporate crimes and abuses;

(2) Conducting citizens arrests of peaceful demonstrators against the Board’s actions;

(3) Arresting KPFA Berkeley stations personnel for “trespassing”, and taking all regular programming off the air;

(4) Conducting closed Board meetings and refusing to make Foundation books and records available for reasonable inspection by members;

(5) Virtual elimination of local community affairs and news programming at KPFT Houston, contrary to the purposes stated in the Articles of Incorporation;

(6) Engaging in “union busting” tactics at WBAI New York, contrary to the purposes stated in the Articles of Incorporation;

(7) Purporting to amend the bylaws, by unlawful and dishonest acts, to create a self-perpetuating, self-selecting Board of Directors;

(8) Soliciting contributions from the public under false pretenses with intent to use such funds for purposes contrary to those stated in the Articles of Incorporation;

(9) Wasting Foundation assets and public contributions to carry out the above abuses and thereby threatening the Foundation with insolvency; and

(10) Imposing a “gag rule” on personnel at the five radio stations to prevent them from alerting the class members to these alarming and unlawful acts.
Theoretical Bridge: Spanning the Relationship between
the News Media and the Public Sphere

As noted in the introduction, there is no shortage of theoretical stances concerning the (commercial) mainstream media—whether primarily informational or pure entertainment media. Focusing on mainstream news media, the following section will attempt to organize the ideas of some of these academics into a coherent theoretical base that will adequately illuminate the framework and purpose of the project. Of particular note, the rather lengthy section will include brief summaries of the significant role informational media have/must play in fostering and sustaining an informed and empowered public sphere, the deleterious implications of a mature commercial society and media system that prevail within contemporary (US) North America, the professional news practices that define journalism of the mature commercial media system, the role of the ‘liberal’ journalist and editor within the mature commercial news entity, the notion that information dispensation—provided by both alternative and mainstream news media—is essentially propagandistic and Herman and Chomsky’s (2002; Chomsky 1998b; Jhally 1997) Propaganda Model of News, which is the general ‘backbone’ of the ensuing content analyses.

Publics, the Public Sphere and Empowerment: From Mills to Habermas

The most important feature of the public of opinion, which the rise of the democratic middle class initiates, is the free ebb and flow of discussion. The possibilities of answering back, of organizing autonomous organs of public opinion, of realizing opinion in action, are held to be established by democratic institutions. The opinion that results from public discussion is understood to be a resolution that is then carried out by public action; it is, in one version, the ‘general will’ of the people, which the legislative organ enacts into law, thus lending to it legal force. Congress, or Parliament, as an institution,
crowns all the scattered publics; it is the archetype for each of the little circles of face-to-face citizens discussing their public business.

C. Wright Mills in *The Power Elite*
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 298

As noted above, the mainstream news media play a significant role in disseminating integral information throughout society's public sphere. This is indelibly the case, regardless of the period of focus. Moreover, in an era of increasing centralization within the state, diffusion of the citizenry and the remarkable rate at which this democratic state model is undergoing globalization in general, the central role of the news media in informing the public dramatically increases. This is something of interest to many theorists, both past and present. Largely focusing on the ideas of C. Wright Mills (1959) and Jurgen Habermas (1989), the following section will address the notions "publics", the "public sphere" and the role media systems play in empowering/marginalizing the masses.

In his rather pivotal work, *The Power Elite*, Mills (1959, 298-324) devotes a chapter, "The Mass Society," to the integral role of the mainstream media in informing and thus empowering the members of contemporary democratic (American) societies. According to Mills, early American society was comprised of numerous pockets of public opinion, or publics, that served to inform its citizenry on issues of social importance. Within these innumerable opinion pockets, "[t]he people are presented with problems. They discuss them. They decide on them. They formulate viewpoints. These viewpoints are organized, and they compete. One viewpoint 'wins out'. Then the people act out this view, or their representatives are instructed to act it out, and this they
promptly do” (Mills 1959, 299-300). Within a democratic society of publics—voluntary associations, community and work organizations, et cetera—some groups or individuals may have more influence than others, however, one group or individual does not monopolize opinion. Furthermore, the system of publics succeeded through the inevitable interconnectedness of the discussion pockets. “Innumerable discussion circles are knit together by mobile people who carry opinions from one to another, and struggle for the power of larger command . . . Out of the little circles of people talking with one another, the larger forces of social movements and political parties develop; and the discussion of opinion is the important phase in a total act by which public affairs are conducted” (Mills 1959, 299). In other words, prevailing opinions of the various publics, regardless of size or apparent power, are diffused throughout the broader society of publics in general. Once this diffusion is relatively complete, an overreaching public opinion on a social issue ensues, resulting in the enactment of appropriate social policy. As democratic (US) society evolves, however, the publics are transformed into masses.

The centralization of the contemporary democratic state and a concomitant fragmentation of its citizenry have led to the decline of publics, as understood as voluntary associations, community organizations, et cetera. As such, decision-making power within society is also centralized, including the power to influence public opinion. In the evolutionary process of the mature commercial society, the historical assumption that public opinion, and the social action it produced, resulted from the rational debate within the web of interconnected publics, “has been upset by the great gap now existing between the underlying population and those who make decisions in its name, decisions of enormous consequence which the public often does not even know are being made
until well after the fact” (Mills 1959, 301). Within contemporary (US) society, the opinions of affluent groups prevail. Even where voluntary associations have persisted, they have not been immune to the centralizing tendencies of the larger society; they are generally controlled by a vastly centralized opinion elite and are therefore largely inaccessible to the general, yet notable, majority of their members.

Where the voluntary associations and community organizations have been rendered ineffective, the media systems—particularly the mainstream system, as it is so readily accessible—must ‘step in’ to empower the citizenry. In lieu of the dissipation of innumerable discussion circles, or publics, that served to inform members of an authentically democratic society on the wide range of existing public opinions on social issues, the prevailing media systems—particularly the news media—must serve this integral informational task. As James Winter (1998, 75) similarly emphasizes, “the basis of democracy is not simply one vote each, but an informed vote. After all, as has been demonstrated both historically and at present, to be uninformed is to be at the mercy of dictators and demagogues.” News media systems that appropriately replace the informative roles of waning voluntary associations and community groups would necessarily present a rich diversity of opinions on matters of social importance—regardless of popularity, or apparent feasibility of said opinions. Such systems would be accessible to the majority, for the purposes of expressing opinion and “answering back” opinions that are expressed by others. In the case that such media systems prevail, the effect of a decline in discussion circles could somewhat be offset; after all, the informed citizenry, who retain their ability to vote, could still effectively wield some control over the policy-making apparatus—albeit indirectly, at best. Unfortunately, a readily and
inexpensively accessible news media system that is truly open to the expression of a variety of public opinions, and that rivals the girth of the contemporary mainstream one, does not exist. Largely, this task is left to the much less accessible public and alternative news media.

As is the case with contemporary democratic (US) society in general, centralization of power has also defined the prevailing system of mainstream media. Access to the vast majority of the citizenry is denied, while the system is used to disseminate the narrow opinions of those socially/economically affluent members of society who control it. "[I]n the mass society of media markets, competition [of opinion], if any, goes on between the manipulators with their mass media on the one hand, and the people receiving their propaganda on the other" (Mills 1959, 305). In addition to disseminating the opinions of its relatively few elite controllers, the prevailing system of mass media gives the masses a false sense of reality and of themselves. Of particular note, Mills (311) introduces a notion of "psychological illiteracy that is facilitated by the (mass) media, and that is expressed in several ways." In addition to manipulating the ways that the citizenry understands reality and themselves, the varieties of mainstream mediated content, while numerous in appearance, offer little in the way of actually varying content; variation is, at best, superficial. Furthermore, the system of mainstream mediation— especially television— encroaches upon and ultimately transmogrifies the private spheres of the masses— sites of meaningful conversation and debate. Ultimately then, the system of mainstream mediation that has evolved, and now prevails, within the contemporary (US) democratic society apparently receives a 'failing grade' from Mills (1959). On the other hand, Jurgen Habermas (1989), while sharing
Mills' (1959) apparent woe over the prevailing state of contemporary mainstream media and the public it informs, has located a brief period wherein the information media served an empowering role for the citizenry.

Influenced by the work of Mills (1959), Habermas (1989), in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, embarks on a journey to map a detailed analysis of the evolution of what he deems the “public sphere.” More specifically, he traces the structural changes that had taken place in bourgeois Europe and had affected the public sphere. In doing so, he notes its various transformations— from one dominated by the totalitarian rule of divine royal authority, to one empowered and comprised of critical debaters, who were informed in salons, largely through a subjective, or partisan, print media fashioned after the novel and the “world of letters”, and finally, to one marginalized once again by the prevailing social and media systems that continue to dominate mature commercial democracies— perhaps to no greater extent than within the US— a conception that will be developed throughout the thesis.

In tracing the evolution of the public sphere, Habermas (1989, 5-11) first notes the role of publicity— or publicness of representation— concerning political authority. Prior to the original, positive transformation of the public sphere, and during the feudal era, publicity served to display the grandeur of the monarch, high church officials and the aristocracy. Specifically put, a display of publicity that was involved in representation “was wedded to personal attributes such as insignia (badges and arms), dress (clothing and coiffure), demeanor (forms of greeting and poise) and rhetoric (form of address and formal discourse in general)— in a word, to a strict code of ‘noble’ conduct” (Habermas
During this period, rulers did not need to legitimate their policies, or political decisions. They merely needed to look markedly superior to the common citizenry. With a legitimation system wherein one needs only to make a grand showing, authority is not concerned with public interests, and is, therefore, to be deemed a private authority. This situation, however, began to alter following the collapse of the feudal system.

With the evolutionary rise of the capitalist-commercial (mercantilist) economy, a new demarcation between public and private spheres began to take shape. During feudal times, the private and public realms were contingent on the aristocracy, and the distinctions were quite opaque—authority remained private and out of the reach of public concerns. Within the framework of the new economic realities, however, new and distinct lines between the private and public were more inclusive of society at large. In other words, "'private' designated the exclusion from the sphere of the state apparatus; for 'public' referred to the state that in the meantime had developed, under absolutism, into an entity having an objective existence over against the person of the ruler. The public...was 'public authority'" (Habermas 1989, 30). Furthermore, with the rise of private, rational individuals (merchants) in pursuit of monetary gain, the private realm was increasingly considered a realm that was excluded from the state. From this point on, the realm of private individuals strove to prevent the state from interfering in affairs that were deemed personal, and thus private; it is in this sense that public authorities were contrasted with their respective citizenries.

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In the early stages of the new economy, however, the portion of the public sphere’s private citizens who wielded social power was relatively limited. The relative few that wielded political clout were relegated to members of the commercial sector. While empowering members of the commercial sphere, the communications apparatus was an integral aspect that was relatively inaccessible to, and inconsequential for, the general citizenry. Whereas prior to the clear demarcation of public and private spheres, the print media were primarily used to inform the subjects of decrees, grandiose publicity events, et cetera, the print media that prevailed in the mercantilist stage was used to inform commercial traders of news of events relevant to their pursuit of personal profit. It is important to note, however, that this latter use of communications media was not entirely distinct from their former use. “The new sector of communications, with its institutions for a traffic in news, fitted in with the existing forms of communication without much difficulty as long as the decisive element—publicness—was lacking” (Habermas 1989, 16). In other words, without the financial wherewithal to sway public authority, or a communication system to politically unite them, the masses could not threaten the elite positions of occupied by public authorities and, subsequently, the merchant.

As the commercial economy evolved and broadened, however, so too did interests within the general public sphere. Matters of a commercial nature were no longer the concern of a few private profit seekers. They were of concern to a much larger sector of the public sphere— as property-owning consumers. As such, “[t]he economic activity that had become private had to be oriented toward a commodity market that had

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2 Indeed, as many have rightfully argued, Habermas’s enlightened bourgeois public sphere never really sheds its exclusivity; membership is essentially hinged upon one’s status as either an educated or property-owning male. Although Habermas notes the ‘trickle-down’-like effect that the bourgeois enlightenment has upon the general male population, his analysis essentially remains rather limited. This criticism, and others, will be addressed in more detail in an ensuing subsection of the thesis.
expanded under public direction and supervision; the economic conditions under which this activity now took place lay outside the confines of the single household; for the first time they were of general interest" (Habermas 1989, 19). Subsequently, this development led to a corresponding increase of general interest in print media, which informed public citizens on economic matters. In turn, with the broadening of general interest in print media, a solid foundation, upon which the political empowerment of the citizenry can build, was laid.

Although these information media did not originally contain much regarding substance, their readership was increasing throughout the public sphere. According to Habermas, this was largely due to the relatively high levels of literacy exhibited by a public sphere with a rational-critical bourgeois core: "a new stratum of 'bourgeois' people arose which occupied a central position within the 'public'. The officials of the rulers' administrations were its core—mostly jurists. Added to them were doctors, pastors, officers, professors, and 'scholars', who were at the top of a hierarchy reaching down through schoolteachers and scribes to the 'people'" (1989, 22-3). Indeed, in addition to property ownership, literacy was an integral requirement for admittance into the bourgeois public sphere.

The relatively high level of literacy within the bourgeois public sphere became rather significant, as the governing bodies of public authority began to use print media to announce and explain political decisions made in the 'best interest' of all members of society. In other words, public authority began to use the print media to legitimize its political decisions and authority before a public sphere united by the literary traditions and rational-critical faculties of its bourgeois core. In this sense, the public sphere began
to acquire significant political empowerment. As readership and a sense of unity and common concern broadened within this public sphere, political journals began to increase dramatically. At this time, “private people, come together to form a public, readied themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself before public opinion” (Habermas 1989, 25-6). The “publicum” of private citizens, together forming a “public”, could now use reason and the (media) press to compel the realm of public authority to legitimate itself and its actions—proving them to be in the ‘best interests’ of its private citizens. Of course, print media alone is incapable of fostering political enlightenment—at least not in the early stages of the public sphere. As venues wherein private citizens gathered to subjectively opine on novels and, eventually, highly partisan print disseminations regarding important political issues, salons, or, similarly, coffee and tea houses, were ideal for nurturing the public sphere’s political tendencies.

Significantly, salons were venues wherein private men developed and honed a collective consciousness of themselves as people with similar concerns. Although this sense of ‘collectiveness’ was not initially overt, it did discover its genesis within these salons. As the author suggests,

Transcending the barriers of social hierarchy, the bourgeois met [in the salons] with the socially prestigious but politically unimportant nobles as ‘common’ human beings. The decisive element was not so much the political equality of the members but their exclusiveness in relation to the political realm of absolutism as such: social equality was possible at first only as an equality outside the state. The coming together of private people into a public was therefore anticipated in secret, as a public sphere still existing largely behind closed doors. (Habermas 1989, 34-5)

The salons played a key role in emancipating public opinion. In times of antiquity, as well as in feudal times, a position as a respected (moneyed) property-owner and/or a member of the aristocracy were required, if one were expected to have his opinion heard (p. 31). However, with the evolution of the salons, rational-critical public
opinion was extended to include intellectuals—members of the enlightened, highly literate bourgeois class. Again, a relative, and initially apolitical, social equality existed within these venues, as individuals with common concerns and interests gathered to debate and inform one-another through such activities as literary and artistic criticism. It was within these locales where there was a mixing of rational thought. Indeed, the aristocratic frequenters of the salons began to emulate the bourgeois intellectuals, hitherto beneath the aristocracy in status. As a result, they became highly literate, and enlightened themselves in respect for their new ‘equals’. Unfortunately, being largely illiterate, the general citizenry was, at this point, excluded from these initial sites of empowerment.

As the subjective novel and, subsequently, politically-charged print materials were increasingly produced and more widely distributed, many of the illiterate portions of the population were drawn into this world of print—largely due to the humanistic nature of the bourgeois class at the core of the newly demarcated public sphere, who made it their express duty to better the lives of those lesser in status—a task that necessarily included bringing literacy to the citizenry. Furthermore, it is not altogether inconceivable that the citizenry was quite eager to join the ranks of the literate, considering the relative significance of print media within bourgeois society. It is perhaps at this point that one may perceive the significance of a growing and more inclusive sphere. By absorbing the erstwhile material ‘have-nots’ of society into the sphere of common interest with the bourgeois and emulative aristocracy, the potential political clout of the public sphere is immense.

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Much like their bourgeois/aristocratic predecessors, the new, common members of the public sphere first found their rational-critical empowerment through the various realms of artistic/cultural production. They discovered a common voice; a voice that could be legitimately put to the judging of art, theatre, the novel, et cetera—areas to this point considered ethereal realms above the serious criticisms of the commoner. “In the institution of art criticism . . . the lay judgement of a public that had come of age . . . became organized” (Habermas 1989, 41). This sense of empowerment was not merely important due to its linking of a more inclusive public sphere, but that the increased inclusiveness was marked by criticality and enlightenment. Once established and empowered, “the political task of the bourgeois public sphere was the regulation of civil society” (52). In opposition to the authority of the monarch, commands were subjected to written laws based upon the rationality already established in the intimate and subjective realms of letters and novels. Accordingly, this development affected a change in the general function of publicity. Once used by the sovereign to legitimate her/his rule through the ostentatious display of opulence and nobility, publicity was now used as a means to legitimate the sovereign’s political decisions in the newly empowered and critically reasoning public sphere.

Largely through the purposive subjectivity already established within the salons, political consciousness was thereby developed in the rational-critical public sphere of civil society, which demanded written laws based on naturally and rationally legitimate public opinion. Moreover, “the criteria of generality and abstractness characterizing legal norms had to have a peculiar obviousness for privatized individuals who, by communicating with each other in the public sphere of the world of letters, confirmed
each other’s subjectivity as it emerged from their spheres of intimacy” (Habermas 1989, 54). In other words, the written laws that emerged out of the empowered public sphere combined an abstractness and generality that were obvious to the private citizens of that public sphere who, through sharing subjectivity and enlightenment of reason in the world of letters and the fictional novel, as well as the political journalists to follow, knew what was necessary in a new, politically conscious legal institution. As the private citizens of the public sphere suckled from, and debated upon, print media fare, a common understanding of the social world prevailed. As a result, the Establishment of relatively non-debatable written laws, under which all members of the public sphere were (theoretically) deemed equal, could be achieved; the public sphere of private citizens, newly empowered through a broad critical awareness, were playing an integral role in shaping the institutions of society. Their political empowerment, however, was highly contingent upon the sources of their political awareness— the political journals they read, the related debates and ensuing consensuses formed within the salons and coffee houses.

As long as the rational-critical debate exercised within the salons was not directly subject to the mechanisms of the free-market— production and consumption— it remained political. However, as Habermas notes,

[A]s soon as and to the degree that the public sphere in the world of letters spread into the realm of consumption, this [political nature] became levelled. So-called leisure behavior, once it had become part of the cycle of production and consumption, was already apolitical, if for no other reason than its incapacity to constitute a world emancipated from the immediate constraints of survival needs. (1989, 160)

In other words, when the world of letters was appropriated by the world of consumption, this critical-debating arena vanished. Once leisure time became entrenched in the realm of production and consumption, it lost its political nature. The politically empowered public sphere of private citizens engaged in critical debate was vastly depoliticized when,
as a result of an increasing proliferation of an ideology of mature commercialism, it became a sphere of private persons merely consuming culture— even if in the public realm.

It had been assumed that the public sphere would evolve in the "world of letters". As the author puts it, "[T]he bourgeois ideal type assumed that out of the audience-oriented subjectivity's well-founded interior domain a public sphere would evolve in the world of letters. Today, instead of this, the latter has turned into a conduit for social forces channelled into the conjugal family's inner space by way of a public sphere that the mass media have transmogrified into a sphere of cultural consumption" (Habermas 1989, 162). The public sphere of private citizens became a sphere no longer empowered with rational critical means. It became a non-reflective, and therefore a vastly apolitical public sphere. The mainstream print media of the period had ceased to 'feed' the public sphere of private citizens the necessary 'fodder' for empowerment; they were effectively transformed from critical thinkers to mere consumers.

At that time, media of a consumer and advertiser concern began to supplant politically and culturally informative journals. As a result, the primary function of sociability is no longer focussed on literary and political debate. Non-reflective, non-debatable group activity replaced the critical reading within the private sphere; reading that was necessary for developing and preparing ideas for future debate with others who have formed their own ideas within their private spheres. Now ideas are pre-formulated and delivered en masse by those who control the media— the affluent; in effect, opportunity for individual reflection is stifled.
While public debate remained a part of the system, it was carefully orchestrated and offered to the citizenry in the form of consumer products; general members of the public sphere were not participators in such debates— they were merely their consumers (Habermas 1989, 163-64). Unfortunately, debate offered in this manner was, and still is, at best, limited in scope. These discussions were scripted according to their ‘sale-ability’— will they attract audience numbers, and thereby generate sales for advertisers? As a result, the information one received via the mainstream news media can only be enlightening, if at-all, in pre-determined ways. Again, those who determined the content also determined the amount and nature of any enlightenment offered; enlightenment that offered political empowerment to the citizenry— the power to upend an unjust social system— is unlikely.

Originally, the literary production was primarily concerned with the mere distribution of literary works— not with the profits that could be amassed from distribution (Habermas 1989, 165). This is not to suggest that distributors were not making money, rather the impetus was still the enlightenment of as much of the public as possible— perhaps a remnant of bourgeois humanitarianism. As the evolution of mature commercialism progressed, however, the essence of sale-ability entered into the equation as quintessential. Combined with waning humanitarian ideals that naturally accompanied the simultaneous waning of bourgeois society in general, the implications for the citizenry were significant. The relative enlightenment of the public sphere decreased substantially. As a result, media fare primarily geared toward profit margins had to adapt in order to be accessible to a far less enlightened public sphere— one requiring ‘low-brow’ entertainment, rather than ‘high-brow’ enlightenment. The once rational-critical
public sphere was now subjected to what one would consider 'light reading' (viewing, listening, et cetera). Accordingly, the predominance of this distractive nature of media yielded an unthinking, apathetic, consumer-minded public sphere—perfect for their new role as mere consumers in a maturing commercial society.

One significant medium that was deleteriously affected by the ideology of the newly prevailing market economy was the high quality intellectual journal. Because such journals required a certain level of intelligence, readership was proportionately limited to the minority of educated bourgeoisie who, as it were, had little concern for economic accessibility. The economic affluence of this relative majority of readership, when combined with an ever-increasing desire for profits that began to proliferate the core of production, led to a rise in the sales price of these journals. Naturally, this tended to alienate less economically-affluent members of the public sphere—even those who had the intellectual wherewithal to grasp their content and deliver the empowering information to other less economically-affluent portions of the citizenry—the lion's portion, as it was. It essentially denied them the materials they required to hone their rational-critical minds for active participation in the political sphere. In order to accommodate this large sector of the public sphere, less expensive, but also less enlightening, papers were created—the "penny presses" (Habermas 1989, 168). These were papers that relied heavily upon advertising revenue—a development that necessitated the publication of content deemed acceptable by corporate advertisers. As a result, the content was increasingly entertaining and distractive—decreasingly informative and enlightening. Perhaps most importantly, with its lack of social/political criticism, the content was supportive of the existing, unjust status quo.
The new style of journalism used by the advertiser-supported, mass-distributed, newspapers was an "objective" style (Habermas 1989, 170). This was in sharp contrast to the "subjective" literary style that, largely through partisan political journals, served to emancipate the public sphere. Indeed, it is largely in this sense that the evolution from objective publications to subjective publications became a devolution back to objective publications. Within the new, objective, publications, great pangs are taken to avoid stirring critical thought amongst the readership, or appealing to particular populations—integral for avoiding the alienation of potential readers. To the greatest possible extent, sales and profits must remain the driving force— the larger the audience, the greater the sales and the greater the advertiser revenue. Combined with the entertaining reporting style (content), objectivism served to facilitate the relaxation of the consumer, which tended to maximize sales. In effect, it created an environment of consumption for the consumer without involving rational-critical thought that, in turn, may have interfered with sales. Indeed, the Establishment of an uncritical, commercial environment was made easier with modern media. Accordingly,

With the arrival of the new media the form of communication as such has changed; they have had an impact, therefore, more penetrating (in the strict sense of the word) than was ever possible for the press. Under the pressure of the 'Don't talk back!' the conduct of the public assumes a different form. In comparison with printed communications the programs sent by the new media curtail the reactions of their recipients in a peculiar way. They draw the eyes and ears of the public under their spell but at the same time, by taking away its distance, place it under 'tutelage,' which is to say they deprive it of the opportunity to say something and to disagree. The critical discussion of a reading public tends to give way to 'exchanges about tastes and preferences' between consumers— even the talk about what is consumed, 'the examination of tastes,' becomes a part of consumption itself. (Habermas 1989, 170-171)

Perhaps the most successful medium to accomplish this uncritical environment for consumption is television— a medium that offers a great deal of direct advertising, while simultaneously drawing on a multiple of senses. It would, perhaps, follow that the
sensory ‘overload’ would interfere with the capacity to formulate rational-critical thought, relegating viewers to roles as mere consumers of images and words—messages that peddle a product and perpetuate the mature commercial ideology.

Within the maturing (US) commercial society, there was a distinct transformation in the distinction between the press as a dispenser of information and as a circulator of a commodity—a development that now prevailed. Furthermore, much like the evolution of the bourgeois public sphere, the evolution of the press involved three stages. In the first stage, prior to the public sphere’s full realization of political power, the press was run as a small business. The owner was an individual who sought modest monetary returns in the fashion of all small businesses within an early capitalist environment. Because this phase predated the public sphere’s evolution into a consumer-oriented sphere, however, massive profits through an expansive readership were not considered. The local press was simply involved in the printing of news information, primarily of a local nature.

In its second stage the press became a tool of the rapidly empowering bourgeois public sphere. In other words, the press was politicized. “From mere institutions for the publication of news, the papers became also carriers and leaders of public opinion, and instruments in the arsenal of party politics. For the internal organization of the newspaper enterprise this had the consequence that a new function was inserted between the gathering and the publication of news: the editorial function” (Habermas 1989, 182). It was the powerful editorial that found its voice in this stage, and that voice was almost uniformly for the empowerment of the public sphere—over and against the forces of public authority. In this stage the editor enjoyed great freedom. Although there is still some aim at making money, “... the commercial purpose of such enterprises receded
almost entirely into the background; indeed, violating all the rules of profitability, they often were money-losers from the start” (182). As noted above, the politically empowering content was the primary concern.

With the constitutionalization of the state— and legal recognition of the political public sphere as an entity not to be trifled with— newsprint accomplished the primary goal for which marked the second phase of its evolution. State regulations then began, thus allowing the press to become a mere trade, as opposed to a tangible reflection of a rational-critical public sphere. This transformation allowed advertising to step in. As a necessary result, prices of newsprint dropped substantially, which afforded easier accessibility for readers— regardless of their economic means. Moreover, the best way of achieving a large readership was, and is, to appeal to no specific (local) group of people or their particular political concerns. In refusing to appeal to particular groups, mass appeal was achieved. Politically empowering content was removed, leaving material of a more consumer-oriented nature.

Editors refusing to follow this pattern would soon go out of business, as the general citizenry would prefer the more affordable, advertiser-oriented papers. Even in non-profit-oriented, political publications the editors became bound by the agendas of the owners (Habermas 1989, 186). Prior to the legal recognition of the public sphere as a constituted political entity, the agenda of editors and owners was virtually identical. In general, they strived to establish the public sphere as a counterpart to the forces of public authority. Once this occurred, political agendas splintered, in a sense, leaving a multitude of individual and/or local agendas/concerns.
Within the United States, and to a lesser extent Canada, the process of media commercialization has gone a step further. Through the absence of public control (state-regulation), there has been a trend toward a concentration of media ownership. Indeed, it is within a mature commercial US that privatization has, arguably, occurred to the greatest extent. The control of publicist institutions by US private citizens prevented their government from regulating the media industry. In addition, Western governments are ensnared by a mature commercial ideology that upholds the importance of private citizens’ freedom to own and control private property in the absence of state interference. That original commitment by the US government set the stage for its unwillingness/inability to step in when vast commercialization and monopolization of the media industry began. Furthermore, the concentration of affluent media-ownership that has occurred within the US has, quite possibly, led to an increasingly threatening situation for the public sphere—the largely similar agendas of a decreasing number of wealthy individuals determine the content given the citizenry—content through which this citizenry shapes its opinions. There is an implicit, if not overt, agenda of maintaining the societal status quo.

During these later stages of the evolution of newsprint, price competition—a benchmark of free-market enterprise—was usurped by advertiser competition. This is a point of concern, as “competition via advertising that replaced competition via pricing is what...created a confusing multiplicity of markets controlled by specific companies offering brand name products...[whose]...exchange value is codetermined by the psychological manipulation of advertising” (Habermas 1989, 189-90). In other words, the commercial media were usurped to manipulate the citizenry for the purpose of selling
products that no longer have extrinsic values. They are valued according to the intangible ‘images’ projected by the advertisers. This is essential, as the creation of proper ‘images’ through psychological manipulation is integral in building a loyal clientele, or ‘brand loyalty’—necessary for succeeding financially. Once considered disreputable in a time when the media (newsprint) empowered the political public sphere, advertising evolved into a business/capitalist institution in its own right (190).

Just Criticisms of Habermas’s Exclusionary Public Sphere

As was briefly footnoted above, many critics have rightfully argued that Habermas’s (1989) enlightened and emancipated bourgeois public sphere of rational-critical debaters never really evolves into much more than an exclusive club. As such, membership essentially hinged upon one’s status as either an educated or property-owning male. Although Habermas (1989) does note a ‘trickle-down’ effect that a new, literacy-based enlightenment had upon the more general population—via the humanistic principles that characterized and guided much of 19th Century European bourgeois society—his analysis, in large part, develops into little more than an analysis of a relatively elite public sphere. Moreover, while his suggestion that the working classes subsequently developed an empowering public sphere through the use of subjective literature is supported by the work of such researchers as James Curran and Jean Seaton (1985), others, such as E.P. Thompson (1963), remain critical of his relative dismissal of the important formation of an 19th century working class public sphere.

In addition to Habermas’s (1989) general omission of the formation of a working class public sphere, he also ignores the significant gender relationships that prevail within the general public sphere, and the formation of a gay and lesbian public sphere—
respectively addressed through the works of Nancy Fraser (1989) and Jeffrey Weeks (1981, 2000). These particular criticisms of Habermas's (1989) denotation of the enlightened bourgeois public sphere are addressed below, as is the project's contention that, regardless of these legitimate criticisms of its exclusiveness and relative superficiality, Habermas's (1989) enlightened and empowered public sphere can effectively serve as a model for a new, more inclusive and broader public sphere.

As noted, Habermas's (1989) bourgeois public sphere outlines the enlightenment and empowerment of a social category of citizens—formally educated or landowning males—that could be considered relatively enlightened and empowered prior to the onset of much of the political activity that was generated within the salons and tea houses regularly frequented by this class. Moreover, the political opinions that prevailed within this public sphere doubtlessly conflicted with some of the particular political aspirations of those who were not included within that sphere. E.P. Thompson (1963) is one theorist who contends that analyses of the formation of politically conscious public spheres must address that of the working class—the largest single class entity of the 19th Century, and in possession of relatively little enlightenment and empowerment during that period. In his analysis of the development of a collective British working class consciousness, Thompson (1963, 711) emphasizes the importance of a general growth of literacy, or "articulate consciousness"—a notion that serves to support Habermas's (1989) assertion that there was a significant 'trickle-down' of literacy that occurred during the period. Moreover, this burgeoning literacy was largely directed at the consumption of the works of would-be status quo reformers:

The articulate consciousness of the self-taught was above all a political consciousness. For the first half of the 19th century, when the formal education of a great part of the
people entailed little more than instruction in the Three R’s, was by no means a period of intellectual atrophy. The towns, and even the villages, hummed with the energy of the autodidact. Given the elementary techniques of literacy, labourers, artisans, shopkeepers and clerks and schoolmasters, proceeded to instruct themselves, severally or in groups. And the books or instructors were very often those sanctioned by reforming opinion. A shoemaker, who had been taught his letters in the Old Testament, would labour through the Age of Reason; a school, whose education had taken him little further than worthy religious homilies, would attempt Voltaire, Gibben, Ricardo; here and there local Radical leaders, weavers, booksellers, tailors, would amass shelves of Radical periodicals and learn how to use parliamentary Blue Books; illiterate labourers would, nevertheless, go each week to a pub where Cobbett’s editorial letter was read aloud and discussed. (Thompson 1963, 711-12)

As the latter part of the quote suggests, whereas the sites of Habermas’s (1989) bourgeois public sphere’s political enlightenment and empowerment tended to be typically exclusive salons, coffee houses and tea houses, the working class public sphere’s political consciousness found genesis and expression in more inclusive site— the pub, where even the illiterate worker could go to partake of this relatively new-found collective, or class consciousness.

However, as the enlightenment of the British working class evolved, other “clubs” and sites for group gatherings were introduced, largely for the purpose of securing and broadening its relatively newly-acquired political empowerment. As Thompson notes, “At Barnsley as early as January 1816 a penny-a-month club of weavers was formed, for the purpose of buying Radical newspapers and periodicals. The Hampden Clubs and Political Unions took great pains to build up ‘Reading Societies’ and in the larger centres they opened permanent newsrooms or reading-rooms, such as that at Hanley in the Potteries. This room was open from 8 a.m. till 10 p.m” (1963, 717). Moreover, considering the ‘gruffer’ mannerisms that likely prevailed within this public sphere, it is perhaps fitting that Thompson includes the assertion that “[t]here were penalties for swearing, for the use of indecent language and for drunkenness” (717). Indeed, considering its omission from Habermas’s (1989) analysis, this was apparently not
something of particular importance within the public sphere meeting places of the relatively 'refined' bourgeois.

Finally, whereas Habermas's (1989) analysis appears to stress a general uniformity of political purpose that prevailed within the bourgeois public sphere, or at least does not indulge in an analysis focussed upon the variety that prevails, or the overlapping that occurs, within the general reading public, Thompson (1963) is careful to note that any conceptualization of the 19th century reading public, or public sphere, must account for the inherent diversity that then prevailed. Accordingly,

'It is a mistake to see it as a single, undifferentiated "reading public". We may say that there were several different 'publics' impinging upon and overlapping each other, but nevertheless organised according to different principles. Among the more important were the commercial public, pure and simple, which might be exploited at times of Radical excitement . . . but which was followed according to the simple criteria of profitability. (Thompson 1963, 719)

Perhaps of particular significance, the former portion of this citation tends to agree with the preceding account of Mills' (1959) notions regarding the important interconnectedness of the myriad publics that permeated early US democratic society, and fostered a political enlightenment that has since significantly eroded. It would doubtless be safe to assume that the interconnectedness of earlier British publics that Thompson (1963) refers to played a similarly significant political role. Moreover, Thompson's (1963) assertion that commercialism and the potential for profitability played a significant role within the British public sphere is a major part of Habermas's (1989) analysis of the public sphere that was established by the bourgeois, and then provided the model for the general citizenry. Indeed, the eventual (mature) commercial domination of the once-emancipated public sphere is a major part of the above-addressed
Habermas (1989) analysis, and, not surprisingly, plays a significant role in the analysis provided by this project.

As noted, a second noteworthy criticism of Habermas's (1989) analysis of the evolution of the bourgeois public sphere regards its exclusion of any profound consideration of gender relations that underpin such spheres. One such theorist that addresses this 'deficit' in Habermas's (1989) work is Nancy Fraser (1989). While she does not particularly direct criticism toward Habermas's (1989) work pertaining to the evolution of the 19th century bourgeois public sphere, Fraser (1989) does address some deficits of his *Theory of Communicative Action*—a theory that places some notable emphasis upon the significance of a public sphere of political activity and public opinion. Although Fraser (1989) keenly addresses many conceivable shortcomings of Habermas's (1989) general theory, for the purposes of this project, focus is placed upon her criticisms of his conceptualization of the political public sphere of empowering debate and enlightenment.

According to Fraser (1989), in order to gain a more profound understanding of the prevailing public sphere, one must analyze the citizen role that is, perhaps, at the heart of the public sphere of political enlightenment and empowerment, and come to some understanding of the significant gender implications associated with that role. Fittingly, the author asks, and then addresses, some imperative questions:

What of the citizen role, which [Habermas] claims connects the public system of the administrative state with the public lifeworld sphere of political opinion and will formation? This role...is a gendered role in classical capitalism, indeed, a masculine role—and not simply in the sense that women did not win the vote in the United States and Britain (for example) until the twentieth century. Rather, the lateness and difficulty of that victory are symptomatic of deeper strains. As Habermas understands it, the citizen is centrally a participant in political debate and public opinion formation. This means that citizenship, in his view, depends crucially on the capacities for consent and speech, the ability to participate on a par with others in dialogue. But these are capacities that are connected with masculinity in male-dominated, classical capitalism; these are capacities
that are in myriad ways denied to women and deemed at odds with femininity. (Fraser 1989, 126)

Although the notion of a male domination of such basic activities as speech and debate could conceivably be contended to be as comparable an over-generalization as Habermas’s (1989) notion that the bourgeois public sphere that eventually provided political emancipation for the greater citizenry was one of general prevailing equality, it does provide a plausible basis for criticism.

Moreover, the ‘masculine domination’ that Fraser (1989) suggests underpins Habermas’s (1989) conceptualization of the citizen role within the political public sphere is reflected in the role’s underlying military function. In her conceptualization, “another aspect of citizenship not discussed by [Habermas] is even more obviously bound up with masculinity. This is the soldiering aspect of citizenship, the conception of the citizen as the defender of the polity and protector of those—women, children, the elderly— who allegedly cannot protect themselves. As Judith Stiehm has argued, this division between male protectors and female protected introduces further dissonance into women’s relation to citizenship” (Fraser 1989, 126). Although this is another interesting criticism, it would appear one better directed at traditional conceptualizations of citizenship. However, while it would appear fitting to criticize Habermas for not broaching this topic in his extrapolation of the political bourgeois public sphere, one must keep in mind that this was not his intended project. If it had been, it would have altogether been another project—a feminist critique of the formation of political public spheres. Therefore, it would, perhaps, appear somewhat rash to dismiss his notions regarding the integral role played by rational-critical debate in ensuring an enlightened and empowered general public sphere.
A final angle of criticism to be addressed involves Habermas's (1989) omission of any analysis of the establishment of a gay and lesbian public sphere— a general criticism that could legitimately be raised by those concerned with the manifold alternative public spheres, or 'communities', that have long-permeated the social fabrics of many states. Of particular note, it is, perhaps, important to recognize that the perceived need to establish a gay and lesbian public sphere (hereafter referred to as “community”) differed somewhat from that which compelled Habermas's (1989) bourgeoisie. While the impetus of latter was a desire to establish themselves against the established public authority, and to comprise a generally-unified entity of public opinion capable of compelling that authority to act according to their collective will, the impetus of the former had/has broader ambitions. In addition to establishing itself as a legally-recognized entity capable of shaping the actions of government, the gay and lesbian community had/has a need to find equally accepted and respected space within the broader public sphere, or society. Indeed, this need to find equal, non-stigmatized, space has resulted in the unification of a group that essentially comprises distinct heterogeneity. However, as has been suggested, this unification is deemed necessary: “[I]t is because homosexuality is not the norm, is stigmatized, that a sense of community transcending specific differences has emerged. It exists because participants in it feel that it does and should exist. It is not geographically fixed. It is criss-crossed by many divisions. But a sort of diasporic consciousness does exist because people believe it exists” (Weeks 2000, 183).

Moreover, while the existence of sphere of a “distinct” homosexual existence in the West has been recorded for centuries, the notion of a relatively-cohesive community is somewhat recent. As such,
Despite the existence of distinct homosexual networks, meeting places, even nascent ‘communities’, for want of a better word, which are recorded in various European cities since late medieval times, it is only over the past century of so, coincident with the hardening of the binary divide, that distinctive homosexual ‘forms of existence’, with sexualized identities, communities and sexual political movements, have emerged. A sense of identity, shaped in a sense of community, and articulated through political movements, has been, I would argue, a dominant motif only since the late 1960's. (Weeks 2000, 184)

A major function of the community conceptualization is to provide and promote solidarity—essential for achieving social change. “Community stands here for some notion of solidarity, a solidarity which empowers and enables, and makes individual and social action possible. Sexual dissidence is ultimately dependent upon the growth that sense of common purpose and solidarity represented by the term community” (185-86).

Of course, an essential target for a unified community of citizens subjugated by the prevailing legal code is the political apparatus.

The mobilizing wave of political dissent that defined much of the 1960's for many marginalized groups was a major focus for the relatively recently-established, but unified gay and lesbian community. Although much of the groundwork had already begun, the 1960's represented a period of notable legislative gains for the community, and marked a period wherein a notable “political strategy” began to distinctly take shape. In particular reference to Britain,

[The ground was well prepared for reform by the 1960's, and it would be misleading to see the ‘permissive legislation’ as in any way an automatic response to social change. Nevertheless, it is possible to see elements of a political strategy at work, a strategy designed precisely to bring moral regulation into line with perceived social change as part of a wider political programme. And although the general approach crossed party lines, so that certain Tory Progressives can be associated with it as clearly as social democrats, it was amongst the ‘revisionists’ of the Labour Party, particularly associated with young theorists and politicians such as Anthony Crosland and Roy Jenkins, that moral reformism became central. (Weeks 1981, 265)
As suggested by the preceding, the political function of the gay and lesbian community, or public sphere, was very similar to that of Habermas's (1989) bourgeois public sphere—compelling the political authority to enact laws that reflect prevailing opinion.

While the political agenda, or strategy, of the gay and lesbian community is doubtlessly an essential characteristic of its function, it is not necessarily the primary function. Perhaps more significant, the community is concerned with changing the social conditions of those who it comprises. As such, "For the movements concerned with sexuality what matters more than a single set of goals or a defined programme is the symbolic focus of the activities of the movements themselves, their struggle to gain control over the conditions of life . . . They attempt to shape a new 'grammar' of everyday life rather than political programmes" (Weeks 2000, 189-90). In essence then, activities within the gay and lesbian public sphere are largely focussed upon bolstering solidarity and altering the status quo ways of conceiving social reality. “Consciousness raising, networking, carnival, festivals, candle-lit processions both affirm a sense of collective being and challenge conventional patterns of life, transmitting to the system a picture of its own contradictions. They illustrate both the complexity of power relations, and the possibility of subverting them” (190).

Although the preceding criticisms of Habermas's (1989) conceptualization of the 19th century bourgeois public sphere appear warranted, at least in the sense that they indicate his omission of myriad groups and relationships, they should not negate its selection as a template for emphasizing the significant role of a subjective model of journalism in politically empowering the general citizenry. Moreover, it is the contention of this thesis that a majority of groups within contemporary North American societies—
least the US and Canada—have achieved an adequate basis of formal autonomy, and
adequately comprise a public sphere, to be further empowered through a re-establishment
of the subjective model of journalism that served to empower and emancipate
Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere. These and other notions will be more adequately
addressed in proceeding parts of the paper—particularly within the conclusion, where an
elaboration of the above-noted conception of a more inclusive public sphere will be
addressed.

**Mature Commercial Society and its Culture Industries: Implications for the Public
Sphere**

It is the corporate world’s almost total rejection of social accountability, whatever arena,
that produces a national mood of futility and a steady unravelling of the social fabric.

Taken from the Introduction of Herbert Schiller’s *Information Inequality: The Deepening Social Crisis in America* (New York: Routledge, 1996)

As suggested by the respective works of the above noted theorists, particularly
Habermas (1989), modern American—and again, to a lesser, but similar extent Canadian—
society has evolved into a state of mature commercialism. As such, a free market
commercial ideology pervades the myriad institutions throughout. One such institution
is the system of mainstream mediation, which has been utterly usurped for the purposes
of inundating the citizenry with the mature commercial ideology and, to no lesser degree,
perpetuating the prevailing societal status quo. Furthermore, the mature commercial
ideology that has long been reified has a number of negative effects on arguably the only
remaining means for potential mass empowerment—the public media system. Largely
focussing on the work of Edward Herman (1995; Herman and McChesney 1997), Robert
McChesney (1997, 1999, 2002), and to a lesser extent Max Horkheimer and Theodore
Adorno (2001; Adorno 2002) and Herbert Schiller (1996; Nordenstreng and Schiller 1995), the following section will first attempt to shed some light on the various negative implications of a societal prevalence of a mature commercial ideology.

On a general level, the ideology of mature commercialism society eventually pervades the social institutions— from media to educational institutions, and from art to politics. This was a development deemed rather significant by critical theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno (2001, 120-68), who, in 1947, published an essay, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” addressing the deleterious social implications of a pervading commercial ideology within the US. Focussing specifically upon American cinema and radio— primary loci of entertainment of the day— the theorists address the usurpation of cultural institutions by an ideology of commercialism that had taken place in early twentieth-century America. Of course, their writings largely predated television. Had they not, this major medium of entertainment would have been included, as its major agenda has arguably been entertainment from the outset— including the information fare it produces. It should also be noted that the print media of present day America, regardless of particular mien, could largely be included within their theory. As one media critic notes, “Faced with a major competitor, television, [and print media] have stressed ‘fluff’ or light entertainment content, which television can produce more vividly and effectively than any printed medium” (Bagdikian 2000, 201). As such, the primarily entertaining cultural industries offer little in the way of meaningful, or legitimate enlightenment.

Furthermore, before all else, said institutions are business enterprises— a reality that subjects them to all of the rhetoric of market ideology and largely excuses them from
real culturally/socially enlightening responsibilities. “Movies and radio need no longer pretend to be art. The truth that they are just business is made into an ideology in order to justify the rubbish they deliberately produce. They call themselves industries; and when their directors’ incomes are published, any doubt about the social utility of the finished products is removed” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2001, 121). In place of cultural and social responsibilities, the culture industries adopt the correlative responsibilities of perpetuating the commercial ideology and maintaining the societal status quo.

The atmosphere that develops within the culture industries is one of pervading uniformity. “Not only are the hit songs, stars, and soap operas cyclically recurrent and rigidly invariable types, but the specific content of the entertainment itself is derived from them and only appears to change. The details are interchangeable” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2001, 125). Although Horkheimer and Adorno (2001) primarily focus on entertainment fare, homogeneity of content and format also pervades the mainstream informational media; television news broadcasts offer virtually identical coverage of, or slant on, news stories, and in remarkably similar order and time allotment; newsprint is also markedly similar, which is no small wonder, as they largely rely on few information-gathering centres to determine what exactly comprises the news on a daily basis— the New York Times being the leader amongst newsprint 'heavies' that frequently provide news coverage to other dailies.

Opinions on issues offered by news organizations are also largely similar—comprising positions supportive of the commercial ideology, and generally conservative in nature. This is, in large part, due to the limited variety of 'expert' opinions sought to shed light on contemporary issues. Columnist Clarence Page refers to this as “the
Rolodex Syndrome” (Lee and Solomon 1990). In practice, “there is precious little competition for new faces or viewpoints to illuminate old problems. In a pinch— and up against tight deadlines— editors and news directors are most comfortable with familiar names and faces ... As a result, the same spokespersons pop into public view again and again, where they often are spotted by other editors and producers who expand the circle of fame even more” (30). In effect, the social world is depicted through narrow, largely conservative and commercial friendly lenses. Although conservative domination of these positions is not as severe in newsprint media, liberal representation within these media is still woefully less than equal (Alterman 2003, 46). In lieu of personal experiences that are largely impossible, and alternative viewpoints that are, at best, rare, the largely conservative viewpoints that prevail provide the lenses that the consuming citizenry must also don. Of course, the conservative, commercial-friendly influence is not limited to mediated culture industries.

Apparently borrowing largely from notions first conceived by Horkheimer and Adorno (2001; Adorno 2002), Herbert Schiller (1996) addresses the impact that the prevailing mature commercial ideology has upon an array of cultural industries within the US. In accordance with the above-noted notions regarding the entertaining industries, Schiller (1996, Introduction) asserts that the “free-wheeling corporate enterprise system” that dominates the mature commercial society also tends to dominate the cultural industries— including news media, academic institutions, museums, et cetera. In reality, all must account for the bottom line; something even more significant, given the crisis in government funding that prevails when society is in the clenches of austere neoliberalism— perhaps the domestic apex of a mature commercial society. Furthermore,
the predominance of a free market ideology throughout the US (and Canadian) landscape contributes to a deepening social crisis. “It is the corporate world’s almost total rejection of social accountability, whatever arena, that produces a national mood of futility and a steady unravelling of the social fabric” (Shiller, 1996, Introduction). This is, perhaps, unavoidable, as the corporate interests of the relative few are almost invariably opposed to those of the general citizenry, or the environment; in effect, the general public good is ignored when necessary, or when profits are threatened.

In addition to perpetuating a prevailing sense of futility within the general public, the cultural industries are also important mechanisms for establishing and maintaining the ‘mythical’ superiority of the mature commercial ideology— they are implicitly utilized, or “invisible” mechanisms of social control, preventing potential threats to the societal status quo. Although he admits that the central locus of the edifice of social control “is embedded in the structure of the economy— the ownership of property and authority over the allocation of fundamental resources,” Schiller focusses “on another site of power, the culture industries: film, television, radio, music, education, theme parks, publishing, and computerization. These industries constitute no secondary sphere of influence” (1996, 2). In effect, whether in the form of entertainment, cultural ‘enlightenment’, education or news, the cultural industries are geared toward an exerted effort of extolling the desirability and inevitability of the mature commercial economic system; they secure the predominance of the ideology. This is the process one is inundated with throughout one’s life, regardless of the relative significance of particular industries, as all are, at base, geared to the same chore. First and foremost, perhaps, it is an ongoing process of review and selection conducted by the managers/controllers of the culture industries.
A major culture industry within society, the American education system represents a significant 'screening' site. As such, the selection and review process of the culture industries begins with the education system, where a structure has been implicitly set in place that essentially predetermines the types of individuals who will succeed and those who will not; those who are pegged for success are largely those who have a heritage of affluence. In large part, this selection process is made possible by a locally funded education system that prevails within the US. As a result, richer neighbourhoods will naturally be able to offer a better education than will poorer neighbourhoods. This is not, however, to suggest that the filtering system is completely rigid. “Though the system is reasonably efficient in keeping those from poor households— which necessarily includes a considerable fraction of the minority population along with the white working class— from climbing into the privileged classrooms of the well off, it is not a rigid and total exclusion. Some do gain entry, though the general rationale that ability is genetic, along with the never absent family income differential, serve nicely to exclude most of the poor and non-white youth from the advantages of a good education” (Schiller 1996, 4).

As Schiller further notes, these are also important sites wherein the citizenry is initially and continually conditioned to accept the free market ideology of the mature commercial society: “Along with screening there is the instruction, which when working well operates at all levels to produce acceptance and support of prevailing institutions and outlook.” (1996, 4). In other words, the prevailing ideological line is also fed to those who are not filtered for success in the mature commercial society— namely, the working class white and minority majority. As a result, society is largely comprised of a
successful few, who are virtually ‘grown’ in the ‘gardens’ of affluent whites, and a much larger remainder of the citizenry, who, regardless of their marginalization within the mature commercial society, take their ‘medicine’ nonetheless. Of course, conditioning the citizenry to accept such a social reality relies on the tireless and endless effort of many more culture industries. As daily sources of conditioning throughout the majority of one’s lifespan, the systems of information media—particularly the mainstream variety—are further major enforcers of the mature commercial ideology.

Because of its dependence on advertising revenues, market journalism values the attention of society’s affluent members— as noted above, those who have met the requirements of the initial screening and conditioning processes applied throughout the various levels of education, and who essentially owe their very affluence to the workings of the prevailing mature commercial social system for their very affluence. Indeed, as John McManus asserts, “Market journalism values the attention of the wealthy and young over the poor and old because news selection must satisfy advertisers’ preferences. In fact, rational market journalism must serve the market for investors, advertisers, and powerful sources before—and most often at the expense of—the public market for readers and viewers” (Schiller 1996, 12-3). Moreover, news media that rely heavily upon advertising revenue—particularly news print media, which must use this revenue to make up for the loss of readership revenue necessitated by the need to keep costs low in order to maximize sales—cannot afford to disseminate news that upsets the preferred affluent market. As Lippmann asserts, “A newspaper which angers those whom it pays best to reach through advertisements is a bad medium for an advertiser. And since no one ever
claimed that advertising was philanthropy, advertisers buy space in those publications
which are fairly certain to reach their future customers” (1997, 323-24).

Understandably, then, the type of news media fare that caters to the interests of
society’s affluent minority is also the type that meets well with the social viewpoints of
the highly affluent corporate owners, who largely use their media as virtual soap boxes
from which they can spread the word of the mature commercial ‘religion’. As such,
informational media fare will overwhelmingly value and deliver content that is congruent
with the mature commercial ideology. It is the role of journalists to create news fare that
will be adequately supportive of this overwhelmingly conservative ideology, regardless
of their personal viewpoints on issues. As this is overwhelmingly the case with
mainstream news media, it is difficult to locate traces of benevolent service toward the
public good. As McChesney suggests, “As newspapers have become increasingly
dependent upon advertising revenues for support, they have become anti-democratic
forces in society” (Hazen and Winokur 1997, 160). Of course, it could be suggested that
the public media could, and/or should, assume the responsibility of ensuring the public
good and enlightening the masses. Unfortunately, within a mature commercial society
dominated by a mature commercial media system, the public media system is more of a
casualty than a means of empowerment.

In his essay, “The Externalities Effects of Commercial and Public Broadcasting,”
Edward Herman (Nordenstreng and Schiller 1995, 84-115) outlines a number of ways
that a mature commercial society and prevailing media system negatively impact a public
media system that must struggle to survive.3 Herman (85) begins by noting that, from the

3 For a more recent, and perhaps more developed, analysis in this topic, refer to Herman and McChesney 1997,
where many of Herman’s conceptions regarding the deleterious effects of the mature commercial society and
media system are revisited.
1970's onward, the balance between commercial and public broadcasting in the West has steadily shifted in favour of the former, rather than the latter. Of significant importance in this shift, as perhaps indicated by the date he offers, is the maturing of a blatantly conservative neoliberal ideology—arguably the hallmark of a mature commercial society. “The conservative drift of politics over the past decade or so, which has fuelled the deregulation process, has also enhanced the political power of commercial media entrepreneurs and shifted the ideological balance from any public service emphasis to the free market and commercial imperatives” (Nordenstreng and Schiller 1995, 86). As noted above, this shift from a public service emphasis to one of commercialism parallels Habermas’s (1989) work on the transformation of the bourgeois public sphere. Again, Habermas (1989) indicated the demise of the once socially prevalent bourgeois ideology of humanism as a serious blow to the empowered public sphere. Quite understandably, it was at this point in time that the mature commercial ideology began to take root within modern Western societies. When this ideology is firmly entrenched, as is the case within the US, the public media system is viewed under the free market microscope.

Under such circumstances, the empowering effects of a public media on the public sphere are threatened. Although such concern should not suggest that the US public media system has been completely useful in this regard, Herman does note that, “while public broadcasting has never reached its potential, it has nevertheless contributed modestly to a public sphere of debate and critical discourse and has provided information and viewpoints essential to the citizenship role” (Nordenstreng and Schiller 1995, 86). In other words, regardless of whether one gives the US public media system an arbitrary “pass” or “fail”, whatever good it can do the public sphere continually declines, as the
commercial media society and system mature. In a broad sense, and much like all else within the mature commercial society, the public system is subjected to commercial discipline—profitability, market share, deregulation, et cetera.

As a requirement for state funding, conservative politicians and other administrators are increasingly focusing on the relative market share of public broadcasting. Unfortunately, as their ‘real’ market shares are modest at best, government funding is either decreasing or being frozen at present levels. In an age when the commercial media system is undergoing an increasing concentration of ownership by vastly affluent corporations, even funding that is remaining stable is, in effect, a reduction in real funding and a threat to future funding. Furthermore, the commercial giants can put vast amounts of money into products with a technical quality that can hardly be matched by their public media rivals. As a result, it is “difficult for public broadcasters to improve their product quality in competition with their commercial rivals, who have used their increasing ad revenues to enhance the stability of their programs” (Nordenstreng and Schiller 1995, 89). Unfortunately, these realities coalesce to create a situation whereby the public media lose some of their, already relatively meagre, market to the commercial media.

One option for generating greater funding, thereby enhancing the quality of products and ensuring the stability of market share is advertising. Indeed, as Herman (Nordenstreng and Schiller 1995) notes, this option should not be quickly dismissed as unthinkable. After all, advertising has traditionally been a part of public broadcasting systems within many Western European nations, with little negative impact on their public spheres. This is also an option that is increasingly being adopted within the US—
the PBS and, to a lesser degree, the NPR. As is the case within the US, however, the negative impact on the public sphere is great. The differing effects on the respective public spheres are a result of differing methods of implementing advertising. Within the European nations, governments have ensured through regulation that advertising is limited and that advertisers have no impact on programming. Furthermore, and perhaps of greater significance, advertising is not sought on a competitive basis. Of course, within a mature commercial society, this would be unthinkable, as competition is revered.

The very real effects within the US are deleterious. “When solicited under competitive conditions, public broadcasting’s use of advertising as a funding source quickly erodes its public service aims, as audience size and advertiser interest become controlling” (Nordenstreng and Schiller 1995, 86). Unfortunately, the government regulation employed by the European states that prevent advertiser hegemony over public broadcasting systems is unthinkable within the US; within a mature commercial society, deregulation is another part of the commercial discipline that negatively impacts the public media system. It is not merely its subjection to a commercial discipline that has rendered the public system relatively powerless within the US. An additional, yet no-less significant, manner in which a mature commercial media system impacts the public media system concerns an aspect of imitation— a notion that will be further developed below.

**Professional News Practices: Tools of Legitimation— Vehicles for Manipulation**

The genius of professionalism in journalism is that it tends to make journalists oblivious to the compromises with authority they routinely make.

*Robert McChesney, Into the Buzzsaw: Leading Journalists Expose the Myth of a Free Press* [Borjesson (Ed.) 2000, Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books], 369
Within a mature commercial society, the system of commercial (mainstream) news media have adopted techniques to legitimize the gathering and dissemination of news. Specifically put, in order to ensure that their fare is perceived as legitimate by the genera population that must rely on the information they provide to make sense of the world, the contemporary mainstream news media must adhere to such techniques as 'professionalism', 'objectivity', 'balance', 'reliable sourcing', et cetera. However, the need for utilizing legitimating techniques is a relatively recent phenomenon. The following will attempt to reveal some significant implications of these techniques for news dissemination.

During the initial stages of the evolution of the US model of democracy, the news media were distinctly partisan and more accurately reflected their roles as 'public 'watchdogs'. As McChesney asserts,

> The notion that journalism should be politically neutral, nonpartisan, professional, even "objective," is not much more than one hundred years old. During the first two or three generations of the [US] Republic, such notions for the press would have been nonsensical, even unthinkable. The point of journalism was to persuade as well as inform, and the press tended to be highly partisan...A partisan press system has much to offer a democratic society, as long as there are numerous well-subsidized media providing a broad range of opinion. (Borjesson 2002, 364-65; emphases added)

Furthermore, as Alterman (2003) notes, a strict adherence to the above-noted techniques of legitimization by contemporary news media largely remains a distinctly US (and Canadian) phenomenon. The democracies of Europe are not, and have never been, fuelled by a system of information media that is wedded to the rigid US brand of news gathering and dissemination.

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4 Of course, the phenomenon discussed cannot be limited to the US system of mass information media, as the Canadian system of news media has undergone a similar transmogrification, whereby ownership is concentrated in the hands of corporations and the mega-wealthy and advertising plays an increasingly powerful role in determining the content of news fare. However, for the purposes of the thesis, emphasis will be placed on the mature commercial news media system that prevails within the US.
The media of most nations do not profess much faith in the notion of *objective news-gathering*. Journalists in Europe, for instance, freely mix fact and opinion to *create a richer context* for their reports and trust readers and viewers to know the difference and make up their own minds. Newspapers are more explicitly ideological there and readers generally choose their paper according to the view that matches their own. By and large, those nation’s elite media offer . . . [a] . . . *more sophisticated journalism*. (Alterman 2003, 30-1; emphases added)

As suggested, the “more sophisticated” partisan, or subjective, style of journalism that continues to prevail within European democracies, and that was lauded by Habermas (1989) as the key to the emancipation of the European bourgeois public sphere, offers a “richer context” through which the consuming public are provided information that provides the basis for the formulation of a more enlightened, and therefore more empowering, public opinion on important issues and events. Unfortunately, developments that occurred within the evolution of the US news media system have precluded the prevalence of the empowering partisan, or subjective model.

As the US information media became increasingly controlled by the (economically) affluent, the subjective, or partisan, style of journalism became a non-viable means of disseminating the news—continued explicit partisanship of the news media would, necessarily, openly favour the class interests of those few that owned them. Therefore, a continuance of the partisan model could not be ‘trusted’ to offer a range of opinion that was representative of the entire citizenry. Furthermore, affluent owners who shared similar, largely conservative and status quo-supportive, viewpoints on issues were, and still are, not inclined to provide viewpoints that threaten their personal interests. To do so would not have been, and is not, in their best interests, and may serve to threaten their very affluency. Therefore, they had to develop journalistic techniques that would allow for the effective use of their news media for propagandistic (partisan) purposes to *implicitly* further their personal agendas— or at least protect their present levels of social
affluence—while explicitly appearing non-partisan enough to be trusted and purchased by the general public. The answer they sought was the professional technique of objectivity, or tacit neutrality. As McChesney asserts,

> It was widely thought that journalism was explicit propaganda in a war with only one side armed. Such a belief was very dangerous for the business of newspaper publishing, as many potential readers would find it incredible and unconvincing. It was in the cauldron of controversy, during the Progressive era, that the notion of professional [objective, balanced, et cetera] journalism came of age. Savvy publishers understood that they needed to have their journalism appear neutral and unbiased, notions entirely foreign to the journalism of the era of the Founding Fathers, or their businesses would be far less profitable. (Borjesson 2002, 366-67; emphasis mine)

Without the application of legitimating techniques, news fare offered by the affluently owned/controlled mass media risks appearing questionable to its mass consumers—regardless of the level of general acceptance of the (mature) commercial ideology throughout society. In a sense, journalism that represents a clear departure from the news-as-public watchdog style of partisan, or subjective, journalism can rely on such techniques to continue ensuring general public trust.

Rather than offering a means of true enlightenment and empowerment, such techniques, in effect, serve to misinform and marginalize the public sphere. Again, they are tools used by the affluent controllers of commercial media for the purpose of spreading their agendas, while appearing to merely disseminate news. At the very least, they are tools implicitly applied for the purpose of legitimately preventing the dissemination of information that may threaten the societal status quo. Furthermore, as this style of news reporting gains general acceptance within the public sphere— as is the case within the mature commercial society— it is eventually adopted by the public news media. Viewed by the citizenry as the only authoritative and desirable method of disseminating news, the public media must adopt this method, or risk being accused of
being unprofessional, unobjective, biassed, unbalanced, et cetera. In short, the public news media must either imitate, or risk being largely dismissed—a more than remote possibility.

Many of the above-noted techniques and the appeal to ‘professional objectivity’ are addressed by Gaye Tuchman (1978), in a conceptual framework she refers to as the “web of facticity” that pervades contemporary journalism. This scientific-like system of journalistic do’s and don’t’s outlined by Tuchman’s (1978) web is relied upon as a means of ensuring that a news medium’s credibility is protected; something of essential importance, if the medium is to have gain the trust of its consumers. As Tuchman suggests; “Credibility in the minds of the audience is the sine qua non of news” (1978, 83). It is also the formulaic means for reporters to achieve the appearance of objectivity or neutrality—a virtual impossibility, as selection of issues to pursue and the ways of writing about them are subjective in nature. As Bagdikian asserts,

‘Objectivity’ contradicted the essentially subjective nature of journalism. Every basic step in the journalistic process involves a value-laden decision: Which of the infinite number of events in the environment will be assigned for coverage and which ignored? Which of the infinite observations confronting the reporter will be noted? Which of the facts noted will be included in the story? Which of the reported events will become the first paragraph? Which story will be prominently displayed on page 1 and which buried inside or discarded? None of these is a truly objective decision. But the disciplinary techniques of ‘objectivity’ have the false aura of a science, and this has given almost a century of American journalism an illusion of unassailable correctness. (2000, 179-80).

As a result of an adherence to ‘objectivity’, news becomes rather stale and disarmed; it is filled with facts, but largely without passion—particularly for issues of legitimate significance to public, which are either blandly covered from a conservative, status quo-supporting perspective, or are entirely absent.

Essentially, Tuchman’s (1978) web—and the reliance on objectivity it necessarily entails—is a system of attaining the deemed ‘facts’, as opposed to engaging in deep
investigation. In effect, this is a style of news reporting with little meaningful use for the public sphere, as it “[strains] out interpretation and background despite the desperate need for them in a century wracked by political trauma. Recitations of facts about world wars, genocides, depressions, and nuclear proliferation are useful but inadequate” (Tuchman 1978, 180). Furthermore, this style of mere ‘factual’ reporting is also a tactic used to conserve time and money when covering leads/stories. Perhaps this should not be surprising; as noted above, within a mature commercial society, the ideals of efficiency and monetary constraint prevail.

In practice, the most efficient method of ensuring that something is ‘factual’ is to ensure that sources are credible. The more credible a source is deemed, the more ‘factual’ her/his information is assumed. In general, those members of society who occupy perceived authoritative positions will be used as sources more frequently than those who do not hold such positions. This method, however, also entails some deleterious effects, such as news media being used as vehicles for the dissemination of implicit, or, occasionally, explicit, agendas of those in authoritative positions. As Bagdikian notes (2000, 80), “the safest method of reporting news was to reproduce the words of authority figures, and in the nature of public relations most authority figures issue a high quotient of imprecise and self-serving declarations.” In this sense, news is “more official and Establishmentarian” (80). Furthermore, this method of news reporting serves as a credible explanation for the continual news sourcing from such social sites as

\[5\] Contrary to what is suggested here, the ‘web of facticity’ is not merely a unilateral means of assessing facts. In actuality, and depending upon the types of news items, there are varying methods of assessing facts. Although they are essentially similar, in that the use of authoritative sourcing and commonsensical facts are the primary methods, there are slight differences for each ‘type’ of story. For instance, whereas items focussing on crimes would source appropriate police precincts, stories focussing on economic matters would source respected business elites.
police precincts and government offices. All news items, however, do not originate from such ‘official’ sites. In such cases, the method of the ‘web’ dictates that the credibility of sources be weighed according to perceived level of knowledge. Those who are considered in more knowledgeable positions will be chosen to provide the definitive sourcing— their viewpoints will frame the story accordingly. This process of sourcing is of particular significance where “non-verifiable” facts are concerned, as such assertions made by ‘authoritative’ sources are generally assumed to be factual (Tuchman 1978, 92).

In many cases, and as is the contention of this thesis, particular viewpoints, or opinions, can be marginalized by limiting their expression via ‘authoritative’ sourcing; in lieu of authoritative sourcing, particular viewpoints are provided by those perceived as less authoritative— less ‘knowledgeable’. As a result of this practice, whether involving verifiable or non-verifiable facts regarding an issue, news stories tend to be largely shaped by those members of society who occupy high status positions— the social/political elite.

A third legitimating characteristic of the web of facticity, and closely related to the above-noted concept of objectivity, is the notion of “balanced coverage”— a practice that public broadcasters must also adhere to, as determined by the “Fairness Doctrine” put forth by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (hereafter CPB)— an integral source of funding. It is also a practice that effectively reduces the risk of potentially costly libel suits— again, anything that may interfere with profits is frowned upon by managers within the mature commercial media system. As Tuchman asserts,

[By] presenting both truth-claim[s] . . . the reporter may then claim to have been fair by presenting “both sides of the story” without favoring either [side]. Furthermore, by presenting both truth claims, the professional reporter theoretically allows the news consumer to decide who is telling the truth. Like doctors who offer a service by telling patients the probable success of different medical options, reporters absolve themselves of
Reporting the news in this manner, however, is problematic on at least two levels—the assumptions regarding viewpoints on issues, and the quality of provided coverage.

Journalism that typically adheres to the ‘balanced coverage’ model tends to provide, at best, two competing positions on issues. However, the assumption that there are only two viewpoints on issues is almost invariably false, as it disregards the varying viewpoints of a virtual plethora of the populace—primarily the marginalized. “The rule (of balancing news coverage by presenting two sides on issues) overlooks the fact that both sides may not be all sides, and that important but less visible interests, extending beyond the confines of the immediate issue, are habitually shut out of the news” (Parenti 1986, 218). In effect, news reporting in this manner tends to cater to the opinions of social elites, and, as a result, inundates the citizenry with their particular concerns. Moreover, the two viewpoints offered rarely tend to represent a balance of extreme viewpoints; in many cases the viewpoints are largely indistinguishable.

Regardless of the prevailing myth of a largely liberal media, a significant majority of viewpoints offered by ‘balanced’ journalism are also vastly conservative in nature. The secret to concealing the largely conservative nature of journalistic fare is to offer a (false) balance on issues. This is best achieved by providing space for viewpoints of “representatives of the Right and Center, the Left having long ago been banished from the mainstream news media” (Gans 2003, 29). In essence, the appearance of ‘balance’ involves “the willful mislabeling of some of those who are given public access via TV or print. In this charade, mainstream and often moderately conservative individuals are identified as the ‘left’ or at least as countervailing voices to the unabashed rightists.
When this is the practice, as it regularly is, the audience is deceived into believing it is watching, and hearing, a genuine clash of views, while nothing of the sort is occurring” (Schiller 1996, 16).

As noted above, an additional way that professional journalism’s rigid adherence to balance affects the news media is by limiting the quality of the content of news information. Perhaps rather obvious, the persistent concerns over appearing biased— not to mention the ever-present fear of undergoing libel suits— compels news agencies of the mature commercial media system to consistently avoid any appearance of side-taking. Of course, in effect, this necessitates a practice of never really digging beneath the surface, and therefore does little to enlighten the citizenry on the rich complexity that underpins most, if not all, issues. As a result, debate is largely limited to the present, and therefore superficial, aspects of issues and events— a prevailing mode that does little for the public sphere, as meaningful inquiry of a historical nature is avoided, as this level of analysis would potentially belie some of the claims asserted by sources, and thus give the appearance of bias. As a result, the dissemination of social issues and events are ahistorical and superficial at best— the ‘just the facts ma’am’ information disseminated is largely decontextualized.

To highlight, one need only review the present state of the documentary. Due to the rigid insistence on balance and fairness within the media, critical documentaries of old— erstwhile bastions of in-depth social analysis— have no place in the mature commercial or public media systems. “Fear of ‘fairness doctrine’ requirements of balance also made serious programs that took a stand on an issue a threat to broadcasters; and watering them down to obviate challenges for lack of balance made them lifeless.
Documentaries that appealed to sponsors were about travel, dining, dogs, flower shows, lifestyles of the rich, and celebrities past and present” (Herman and McChesney 1997, 144). Of course, this adherence to balanced programming does not apply to programming and documentaries supportive of the corporate agenda/viewpoint. As Lee and Solomon (1990, 86) note, “Documentaries on health and medicine, for example, are usually funded by pharmaceutical firms such as Eli Lilly, Squibb and Bristol Meyers. (Not surprisingly, these programs emphasize high-tech medical remedies rather than alternative health approaches.) This is not considered a conflict of interest by the CPB board. But when unions provided money for shows on labor themes, the CPB board frequently objected, citing ethical conflicts.”

Another dissemination-limiting aspect of professional journalism that bears mentioning concerns the journalistic “peg”, or “hook”. Essentially, news pegs are events that are deemed newsworthy, such as protests, press releases, released research findings, et cetera. Moreover, pegs play a major role in determining what social issues get journalistically scrutinized. Typically, in order for a specific issue to receive any sort of coverage, a newsworthy peg must be available in order to ‘headline’ (so-to-speak) the dissemination of that issue. Unfortunately, within the contemporary system of mainstream new media, there is an apparent lack of ‘newsworthy’ pegs (hooks) to ‘OK’ the dissemination of issues of interest to society’s marginalized. As McChesney notes, “crucial issues like racism or environmental degradation [fall] through the cracks of journalism unless there [is] some event, like a demonstration or the release of an official report, to justify coverage. And even then, for those outside power to generate a news
hook . . . is often extraordinarily difficult” (Borjesson 2002, 368).6 Of course, the intent of the latter part of this citation should not be misread as suggesting that pegs on which the dissemination of issues relevant to the downtrodden can be ‘hung’ are relatively non-existent, rather, it does suggest that pegs are closely tied to, and are an integral part of, Tuchman’s (1978) “web”. Due to the systemic reproduction of the methods of both perceiving and disseminating the news, certain events, such as issued statements regarding growing inequalities within US society, are not typically considered newsworthy— or, at best, decontextualized. As such, mainstream journalistic investigations into such issues are generally non-existent, or insignificant and relatively meaningless.

The decontextualization, or lack of deep investigation, that occurs as a result of the superficial coverage, necessitated by a rigid adherence to ‘balance’, does not merely affect news items concerning contentious issues. It is rather a phenomenon that naturally occurs with all journalistic endeavours. Decontextualization is a necessary result of the prevailing news practice of presenting daily social realities as mere “facts”. “Stories are frequently presented . . . divorced from the context of their production. This aspect of news is captured in the objectification of facts. A reporter may quote a source without indicating how a certain question prompted the source’s answer . . . A reporter may identify a fact without explaining how that fact was produced as a non-problematic detail or ‘particular’” (Tuchman 1978, 192). Although the knowledge gained from ascertaining facts as data is important for formulating some, albeit insufficient level of knowledge about one’s social world, it does not give news consumers a complete ‘story’. “Accurate

6 For a similar conceptualization of news “pegs”, refer to Herbert J. Gans (2003, 53).
facts are indispensable, but by themselves they can be misleading; a single dramatic event may be unrepresentative of the whole, or even contrary to the nature of the whole. Simple recitations of data seldom lead to public comprehension. Most naked facts are comparatively meaningless. Context is crucial” (Bagdikan 2000, 214).

A final notably important aspect of the web of facticity concerns popularly accepted understandings of the social world- common pre-conceptions concerning social ‘facts’. As Tuchman (1978, 86) asserts, facts included in news items are often chosen for their ‘self-evident’ value. Moreover, because they are commonly-held assumptions that rarely require in-depth verification, it is much less time-consuming and expensive for a news agency to focus upon such facts– increasingly important when the ‘bottom-line’ is of primary significance. Unfortunately, the end product is journalistic dissemination embedded in commonsensical notions, in addition to being proliferated by the opinions of society’s elite. Indeed, the news media do their part in perpetuating such common understandings.

As suggested by Tuchman (1978, 188-92) in a later chapter, this role is highlighted in her extrapolations of the notions of “indexicality” and “reflexivity”. Specifically, she highlights the consumers’ use of the news (media) product to order their social worlds in predictable and manageable ways. Essentially, this involves a process whereby the news consumer inherently places, or indexes, information reflective of actual events into preconceived categories of social reality. The limited styles of covering/relating social reality/events, however, serve to greatly limit the breadth and quality of such categories. In effect, the process is one that entails the perpetuation of elite viewpoints– a process facilitated by an increasing media-concentration under the
ownership of the mega-elite, and by the typical workings of the above-noted culture industries, bent on stifling an enlightened public sphere and ensuring the sustenance of the existing societal status quo. In a sense, ‘elite sense’ becomes ‘common sense’.

The notion of ‘common sense’ concerning the ways of understanding social ‘facts’ is also something that Winter (1997) addresses.7 In a chapter aptly titled “Media Think,” Winter (1997) places focus upon the notion that the essentially homogeneous mainstream news agencies are equipped with knowledge repertoires regarding understandings of the social world. Within these repertoires, there are certain notions that are never to be questioned, and some notions that can be occasionally questioned. As Winter (1997, 112) puts it;

...certain matters remain sacrosanct, and must never be questioned: not by columnists; not even on the letters page. These are what we might call “absolute truisms,” as contrasted with the somewhat lesser class of “blue-moon truisms,” which may be questioned once in a blue moon. While certain doctrines may occasionally be exposed to a little nibbling around the edges, others are so deeply ingrained that even a little nibbling would be too preposterous, too outrageous, and would certainly draw the condemnation of peers, superiors, and the public at large.

As the above citation suggests, those who write the stories, and those who determine what will be offered for public consumption, are narrowly constrained by this embedded commonsensical understanding of social reality. Generally speaking, “the ideals which journalists must hold dear are widely embraced by the public at large: the sanctity of the free market, the symbiosis between capitalism and democracy, the attraction of and necessity for advertising and consumerism, the view that businesses are good corporate citizens, et cetera” (Winter, 1997, 111). And as McChesney notes regarding the US mainstream news media, “U.S. professional journalism equates the

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7 Winter (2001) more recently addresses this concept in more depth in his book, Media Think, wherein he focuses upon both long standing media ‘truisms’, such as the unquestionably beneficial nature of nuclear power, as well as tendencies in media coverage of recent global events, such as the bombing of the former Yugoslavia and the real genocide in East Timor.
spread of 'free markets' with the spread of democracy, although empirical data show this with to be nonsensical" (Borjesson 2002, 368). Moreover, as early as the mid-1980's, media critics have been quick to note that a majority of corporate advertising has been engaged in promoting the mature commercial ideology— or selling the system. “Today, one-third of all corporate advertising is directed at influencing the public on political and ideological issues as opposed to pushing consumer goods. . . . led by the oil, chemical, and steel companies, big business fills the airwaves and printed media with celebrations of the ‘free market,’ and warnings of the baneful effects of government regulation” (Parenti 1986, 67). As a result of the power of such notions, reporting is framed in ways that uphold the prevailing pool of ‘commonsensical’ societal conceptualizations.

**Liberal Journalism? Various Roles within a Mature Commercial News Medium**

The anticipation that superiors might disapprove of this or that story is usually enough to discourage a reporter from writing it, or an editor from assigning it. Many of the limitations placed on reporting come not from direct censorship but from self-censorship, from journalists who design their stories so as to anticipate complaints from superiors. This anticipatory avoidance makes direct intervention by owners a less frequent necessity and leaves the journalist with a greater feeling of autonomy than might be justified by the actual power relationship.


As noted, within contemporary society, a prevailing public assumption is that journalists and the news media are, in general, overwhelmingly progressive, or supportive of a liberal agenda. As many theorists have revealed, however, this general assumption is largely the result of conservative (corporate) assertions, made for the purpose of pressuring news media to conform to a corporate agenda— regardless of one’s personal viewpoints (Winter 1997; Herman and Chomsky 2002; Chomsky 1998b; Parenti 1986; 8 Also refer to Gans (2003, 370).
Tuchman 1978; Alterman 2003; Gans 1979, 2003). Moreover, analysis of news content reveals the apparent success of corporate pressure tactics— in reality, there is a noticeable conservative slant in the way social issues are disseminated. The following will rather briefly attempt to address the manner in which journalists are constrained— both through internal and external means— while plying their trade within a mature commercial news medium.

The professional style of journalism practised within contemporary mainstream US (and Canadian) news media essentially upholds the prevailing ideologies of the mature commercial society. The role of the journalist becomes one of upholding the system— while some may begrudgingly do so, many gladly do so. For the former, some measure of conformity must be exacted, as they represent potential counters to the prevailing status quo— counters with a significant vehicle to share unconventional and, perhaps, ‘threatening’ viewpoints. For this reason, it is in the best interests of those in power to somehow diffuse this potential threat.

The best means of preventing the presence of conflicting points of view— or dissenting viewpoints, for that matter— is to ensure that the viewpoints of journalists and editors are similar to those of their owners. According to Schiller (1996), and as suggested above, this is the task of the culture industries of the mature commercial society. In addition to the conditioning process that occurs throughout one’s lifespan, the writer-to-be is inundated with a selection process that takes place in the various schools of journalism. Much like other educational institutions, through which individuals are socialized, schools of journalism tend to indoctrinate students with a prevailing mature commercial ideology. “In many journalism schools and colleges of communication,
journalism and advertising and public relations departments or programs coexist, if not happily, at least pragmatically. If for no other reason than proximity, most graduates of journalism schools find nothing remiss with a curriculum that embraces advertising, public relations, and journalism. It is the normal way of looking at the field” (Schiller 1996, 14). Moreover, many journalism programs and workshops are directly sponsored by large corporate entities. This is made even more significant when one considers the portion of journalism school graduates that proliferate the contemporary field. “One estimate in 1988, claimed that ‘roughly eighty-five percent of entry-level print journalists are journalism school graduates’” (Schiller 1996, 13).

While definitely helpful in putting some finishing touches upon the conditioning of the journalist, the important ‘training’ work provided within the various journalism schools may be unnecessary. Parenti suggests that the vast majority of journalists come from relatively affluent backgrounds, and will therefore likely embrace relatively elite perspectives prior to this stage of conditioning: “[W]e find that most journalists were raised in upper-middle class homes. Only one in five come from blue-collar or low-status white-collar families. Almost all have college degrees and a majority have attended graduate school” (Parenti 1986, 39). In accord with the above citation by Schiller, the latter part of this quote serves to bolster the notion that the vast majority of contemporary journalists are college graduates. In other words, they have survived the screening processes of various levels of educational institutions. Moreover, “[j]ournalists are exposed to the same . . . popular culture— and media— that socialize other Americans into the dominant belief system. They react to much the same news that inundates their
audiences . . . The Establishment biases they inject into the news reinforce their preconceived view of the world” (Parenti 1986, 37).

In effect, the inundating culture industries and popular culture of the mature commercial society have been largely successful in appropriately grooming the journalist throughout her/his lifespan. Indeed, as noted in the previous section regarding the inundating culture industries of the mature commercial society, progressive successes throughout one’s lifespan— from early schooling to retirement, and beyond— are a tribute to a successful grooming process. One’s successful completion of educational screening is more a testament to one’s adherence to the existing ideological order, rather than one’s inherent abilities. As such, further conditioning is unlikely necessary; a mere fine-tuning may suffice. Of course, it would probably be rather naive to assume that all who go through these processes are willing vehicles for powerful conservative elites. Furthermore, this does not account for journalists who do not enter the news profession via the extensive educational route.

For journalists who may not toe the conservative ideological line, societal status quo, et cetera, some level of censorship is rendered necessary. They must be taught the ‘proper’ methods of news reporting— of disseminating information to the masses. “Journalists,” notes Parenti, “are subjected to on-the-job ideological conditioning conducted informally through hints and casual inferences that masquerade as ‘professional’ advice” (1986, 42). Moreover, “Once you know the party and social affiliations of a newspaper, you can predict with considerable certainty the perspective in which the news [should] be displayed” (Lippmann 1920, 48). Those who may make the effort to report information in ways contrary to the prevailing ideologies that dominate
within the newsroom regularly find themselves checked by their superiors. In effect, journalists are greatly constrained in the stories they may pursue and submit. “Journalists who do not demonstrate “the right stuff” simply are not going to go anywhere. They won’t be promoted to editor, they won’t get the choice assignments, and they are lucky these days if they can even keep their job” (Winter 1997, 86).

Through the intimidation created by such an implicit, but real threat, most disagreeable journalists learn how to pursue the stories; they learn how to ‘properly’ disseminate the information in an agreeable way— if not in support of the prevailing social condition, at least in a neutral fashion. As such, sensitive social issues are typically neglected. “Reporters think twice before delving into sensitive areas. ‘They worry about the editing. They worry about being removed from choice beats, or being fired’” (Parenti 1986, 38). In short, they learn how to anticipate the reactions of superiors, who assign stories, decide what to print or air, and decide where to print or air it. As the citation that opens this portion of the project asserts, “The anticipation that superiors might disapprove of this or that story is usually enough to discourage a reporter from writing it, or an editor from assigning it. Many of the limitations placed on reporting come not from direct censorship but from self-censorship, from journalists who design their stories so as to anticipate complaints from superiors. This anticipatory avoidance makes direct intervention by owners a less frequent necessity and leaves the journalist with a greater feeling of autonomy than might be justified by the actual power relationship” (Parenti 1986, 36). As the latter part of the citation suggests, the self-censoring journalist is less likely to recognize the real censorship that is occurring— albeit at an implicit level. As a result, the legitimation of the news media as institutions free from powerful social
ideologies, is perpetuated in two additional ways—a lack of explicit censorship, and the mythical journalistic autonomy that ensues. Moreover, the prevailing perceived legitimacy of the journalistic enterprise can be bolstered by cases of explicit censorship that are made public and, thus, provoke outrage.

The implicit threat of rigid conformity is rendered more sufficient by the lack of unionism that pervades the (US and Canadian) journalistic profession—as is increasingly the case with most employment categories within a maturing commercial society. This should not be surprising, given the antithetical relationship between unionism and capitalism. As Schiller (1996, 12) suggests, “Previously, a strong union might have protected journalists . . . but the effects of continuous mergers and the general antilabor atmosphere of recent years have weakened this bulwark of journalistic autonomy.” As a result, journalists eventually cease pursuing and submitting anything of a non-conformative, or progressive nature; within the mature commercial news media system, there is no protective shield between largely conservative owners who control the ideological environment of the newsrooms and the journalists who may not share their viewpoints. Within this environment, the editors are no buffers; there is no journalistic kinship to be counted on when conflicts occur between the viewpoints of owners and the work of journalists.

Increasingly, the editors of the mature commercial society’s news media are little more than iron fists, sternly resting at the end of the rigid arms of the owners. In the present age of media concentration, editors are typically chosen for their management expertise; the editor-as-newsperson is becoming extinct—something that will certainly ensure the submission of any remaining editorial types who may not have heretofore felt
compelled to manage their newsrooms in ways overtly adherent to the viewpoints of their owners and other executives. Furthermore, editors and others within management are increasingly chosen for their agreeable points of view on social issues. As Otis Chandler, then publisher of the Los Angeles Times admits, “I’m the chief executive. I set policy and I’m not going to surround myself with people who disagree with me. In general areas of conservatism vs. liberalism, I surround myself with people who generally see the way I do” (Parenti 1986, 44). Of course, this form of implicit control also applies to the actions of owners.

After staffing the influential newsroom management positions accordingly, the owners will, when necessary, offer their ‘advice’ on preferable reportage. “Owners often make a show of not interfering in an editor’s independence, but the suggestions of powerful superiors are, in fact, thinly veiled orders, requiring circumlocutions in which commands are phrased as requests. Sometimes suggestions made by owners can be brushed aside by editors, but not too often. And if the owner insists, then the editor obeys” (Parenti 1986, 45). This sense of authority-from-above is perhaps highlighted by the words of David Radler, then president of the erstwhile Conrad Black news enterprise, Hollinger International, who rather arrogantly asserts, “I don’t audit each newspaper’s editorials day by day, but if it should come to a matter of principle, I am ultimately the publisher of all these papers, and if editors disagree with us, they should disagree with us when they’re no longer in our employ. The buck stops with the ownership. I am responsible for meeting the payroll; therefore, I will ultimately determine what the papers say and how they’re going to be run” (Winter 1997, 86). To further highlight,

Media owners, whether powerful families, individuals or corporations, seek to influence news content in many ways. Some seem almost quaintly overt, as when San Francisco
Examiner publisher James Fang reportedly told then-editor David Burgin (Washington Post, 3/18/02): ‘We bought the paper for two reasons, business and politics. I see 5 percent of the stories having to do with what the Fangs need, promoting the Fangs and our interests.’ (Days after Burgin made it clear he defined the editor’s role rather differently, he was fired.) (Jackson, Heart and Coen 2003, 20)

Understandably then, the editor’s self-censorship— in cases where it is required—corresponds with the self-censorship they subsequently instill in the reporters under their direction. As suggested above, however, as editors are largely hand-picked by an increasingly concentrated and conservative-minded corporate ownership, the need to instill self-censoring mechanisms into editors is understandably rare. In effect, editors increasingly tend to be members of society who share the ideologies and values of ownership and the mature commercial society. As a result, “[editors] deal with the news in reference to the prevailing mores of [their] social group” (Lippmann 1920, 49).

When blatant opinion-dispensation is practised, the vastly conservative, pro-mature commercialism viewpoints that increasingly pervade the editorial profession also have a more direct impact on the way social realities and issues are disseminated to news consumers. The “editorial”, “op-ed”, regular “column” and “news-analysis” items are not subjected to the code of objectivity that constrains other news pieces. As such, personal opinions on issues are readily offered by editors and, increasingly, other trusted news ‘pundits’— in many cases, devoid of the use of facts. Unfortunately, and as noted above, the present news environment is not conducive to possible dispensation of viewpoints from centre-left, due largely to the new locus of the journalistic ‘centre’— a development that renders any discussion of journalistic ‘bias’ more favourable for the conservative agenda. As Alterman (2003, 46) suggests, “Any discussion of bias is riddled with definitional problems, owing to the considerable degree of conservative success in moving the fifty-yard line deep into what not long ago was already their own
territory.” To further illustrate the effect to which conservative commentary has been successful, Parenti asserts that “Above the ordinary reporters stand the more prominent and influential columnists and commentators who are drawn from that portion of the spectrum ranging from arch-conservative to mildly liberal” (Parenti 1986, 41). In effect, the status quo, pro-corporate position is shamelessly spouted by those who the citizenry trusts as learned and wise—those who have ‘informed’ opinions on important social issues. Moreover, the very practice of affording regular news space to overtly subjective material serves to legitimize the largely ‘objective’ remaining bulk of the news product serving to further legitimate the (professional) journalistic enterprise.

As Tuchman (1978, 98-9) asserts, “labelling some items as other than ‘objective facts’ . . . reinforces the claim that most stories present facts, for it signals, ‘This news organization is seriously concerned with distinctions between factual and interpretive materials’.” The news consumer is necessarily left with the impression that the subjective items regularly offered, and labelled as such, are clearly demarcated distinctions from the rest of the items; although the demarcated items may— and largely do— offer similar viewpoints, the act of labelling them differently, in combination with noticeable differences in reportage styles, suggest they are authentically different— one openly disseminating opinion, while the other offering objective information.

Of course, the preceding should not suggest that all erstwhile progressive-minded journalists are happy converts, conservatively peddling status quo ideologies. Nor should it suggest that all mainstream news content is void of material critical of the prevailing conservative mature commercial ideology. As Winter (1997, 112) suggests, “there are always, to a degree, some exceptions and at least minor contradictions.”
notable exceptions, the commercial media are less than absolutely monolithic in the
document or ideology they present the masses. Nor would it be in their best interest to
appear as such. In order for the illusion of diversity to flourish, it is far more effective if
there are occasional stories or columns or even one or two journalists themselves who
represent dissenting views.” As suggested by the latter part of the citation, the
appearance of system-flexibility is imperative, as the appearance of utter rigidity would
risk exposing the system as the proponent for conservative, corporate-friendly and status
quo-sustaining viewpoints it already largely is.

Moreover, the notion of ‘perceived flexibility’ that Winter (1997) addresses is
integral to all institutions of the culture industry. In focussing on the apparent rigidity of
distractive media, Horkheimer and Adorno (2001, 128) note, “every detail is so firmly
stamped with sameness that nothing can appear which is not marked at birth, or does not
meet with approval at first sight . . . the paradox of this routine, which is essentially
travesty, can be detected and is often predominant in everything that the culture industry
turns out.” Those producers of fare that does not fit into this ‘routine’ meet with great
difficulty when seeking success within the industry. There are, however, slight
exceptions made, which serve to veil the actual rigidity of the industry. Of course, if the
allowed exceptions prove profitable, they are absorbed and no longer constitute
exceptions (Horkheimer and Adorno 2001, 120-68; Adorno 2002). In relation to the
selection processes that pervade the US educational culture industry, Schiller notes that,
“these mechanisms . . . are not always on automatic pilot and performing smoothly.
Though the system is reasonably efficient in keeping those from poor households– which
necessarily a considerable fraction of the minority population along with the white
working class— from climbing into the privileged classrooms of the well off, it is not a rigid and total exclusion. Some do gain entry” (1996, 4). As such, within the culture industries, including the mainstream news media, the appearance of complete rigidity is not necessarily the rule. Essentially then, if the industries expect to appear anything less than rigid supporters of the societal status quo, at least some flexibility is prudent.

The Propagandistic Nature of Communication: Egoistic Versus Altruistic Intentions

The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which was supposed to have died out with the appearance of [representative] democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in fact improved enormously in technic, because it is now based on analysis rather than rule of thumb...Within the live of the generation now in control of affairs, persuasion has become a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government.


[Sociological] propaganda is essentially diffuse. It is rarely conveyed by catchwords or expressed intentions. Instead it is based on a general climate, an atmosphere that influences people imperceptibly without having the appearance of propaganda; it gets to man through his customs, through his most unconscious habits. It creates new habits in him; it is a sort of persuasion from within. As a result, man adopts new criteria of judgement and choice, adopts them spontaneously, as if he had chosen them himself. But all these criteria are in conformity with the environment and are essentially of a collective nature. Sociological propaganda produces a progressive adaptation to a certain order of things, a certain concept of human relations, which unconsciously molds [sic] individuals and makes them conform to society.

Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 64; emphases added

Many theorists have been interested in the nature and effects of propaganda. Some focus on the State’s use of propaganda as tools to produce and promote desired behaviour amongst its citizenry, while others focus on its use by disruptive social forces for the purpose of deceitful agitation. Moreover, while some theorists are critical of its use, others appear to lend it support through their analyses. Prior to explicating a number of these conceptualizations of propaganda, however, its meaning must be defined— both
its ‘official’ definition, and the working definition that will lend itself to conceptualizing this portion of the thesis. According to the *Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, propaganda comprises, “Information that is often biassed or misleading, used to promote a political cause or point of view” (Soanes, 2001). For the purpose of analysis, however, the thesis will emphasize the “bias” component. As such, the working definition will be as follows: *Biased Information used to promote a political cause, point of view or way of life*. Using this working definition, the following section will address notion of a typical democratic government’s use of propaganda to shape or sway the opinion of the general citizenry, the mainstream information media’s role in this endeavour and the similar, yet decidedly distinct, use of propagandistic techniques by alternative information media.

As noted in a previous section, a properly functioning representative democracy must take account of the opinions of its citizenry when enacting policies. During earlier stages of the US representative democracy, this ideal was authentically accomplished—at least relative to the current state of its representative democracy. Formed through a process of rational-critical debate that occurred within the myriad interconnected publics that then permeated society, general opinions on issues were made apparent. It was then the duty of government representatives to harness these opinions for the purpose of enacting policies that were truly preferred by the general public they were elected to represent. If elected officials did not follow this distinct formula, they would risk being voted out on the ensuing election. This is the ideally operating representative democracy. This ideal, however, has been rendered largely unattainable within the contemporary representative democratic state.
Within a representative democracy that is saturated with, and dominated by, a mature commercial ideology, the publics that once prevailed are either long-extinct, or so (horribly) transmogrified into inaccessible bureaucracies that they cannot assist in the formation of authentic public opinions regarding issues. What does prevail within a mature commercial representative democracy, however, is a highly isolated, and thus marginalized mass of 'rugged individuals'. Within this state, the isolated citizenry increasingly relies on the informational media in order to make sense of an increasingly 'localized' global reality. As will be noted below, however, the easily accessible system of mainstream news media does little more than disseminate stereotypes and largely disconnected information that tends to further isolate the citizenry— from both themselves and analytical understanding of issues and events.

Of those theorists who undertake the analysis of propaganda, some suggest that a citizenry largely disconnected from any tangible understanding of social realities, or "environments", must not be permitted to enforce its opinion upon those who control the political agenda— regardless of the latter's 'official' subordination to that opinion. For instance, Walter Lippmann (1997, 225-26) suggests that this disconnected public must be distinctly led by those elect members of society, or elements of the "machine", who will 'naturally' have a better understanding of the public's best interest:

There are a number of important distinctions between the members of the machine and the rank and file. The leaders, the steering committee and the inner circle, are in direct contact with their environment. They may, to be sure, have a very limited notion of what they ought to define as the environment, but they are not dealing almost wholly with abstractions...I do not mean that they escape the human propensity to stereotyped vision...But whatever their limitations, the chiefs are in actual contact with some crucial part of that larger environment. They decide. They give orders. They bargain. And something definite, perhaps not at all what they imagined, actually happens.  

9 For more regarding the need to 'manufacture' the consent of the public, refer to Edward L. Bernays (1972).
Moreover, within a mature commercial representative democracy, sources of 'enlightenment' that may allow the general citizenry to attain a tacit understanding of the myriad environments are woefully lacking. According to Lippmann (1997, 248), this also necessitates the citizenry's "management"—a 'clear lesson', as it were:

The lesson is, I think, a fairly clear one. In the absence of institutions and education by which the environment is so successfully reported that the realities of public life stand out sharply against self-centered opinion, the common interests very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality.

As noted above, within the mature commercial society, fragmentation of the general citizenry, and the myriad opinions that flourish within that citizenry, is at an extreme—due largely to the decline of the publics, or public sphere, as sources of enlightening information and spurs of rational-critical debate. Moreover, under such conditions, organized and informed public opinion is difficult to locate. As such, a prevailing public opinion that is supposed to inform those elected to represent the citizenry, and to spur the enactment of policies that reflect that opinion, is deemed impossible in the mature commercial state. As Ellul (1968, 126; emphasis added) suggests, "The government cannot follow opinion, [therefore] opinion must follow the government. One must convince this . . . mass that the government's decisions are legitimate and good and that its foreign policy is correct. The democratic State, precisely because it believes in the expression of public opinion and does not gag it, must channel and shape that opinion." In essence, then, "The point is to make the masses demand of the government what the government has already decided to do" (132). This is largely the task of top-down, or egoistic, propaganda.

As suggested by the second citation that opens this portion of the thesis, another significant role of egoistic propaganda is to perpetuate the 'isms' that permeate society,
and to influence the behaviour of its citizenry in ways that best reproduce those beliefs. Accordingly, “[propaganda] is a matter of propagating behavior and myths both good and bad. Furthermore, such propaganda becomes increasingly effective when those subjected to it accept its doctrines on what is good or bad [for example, the American Way of Life]. There, a whole society actually expresses itself through this propaganda” (Ellul 1968, 65; emphases added). Effective propaganda for this purpose, however, must be delivered in inconspicuous fashion; the receiving citizenry must not tacitly realize they are being propagandized, but, rather, that they are forming their thoughts, preferences and beliefs on their own. As Ellul (63-4) asserts, “The important thing is to make the individual participate actively and to adapt him as much as possible to a specific sociological context.” For their part, the mature commercial, or mainstream, news media aid in effecting this task.

Largely necessitated by an ever-increasing emphasis on lowering costs, in order to maximize profits, the mainstream news media— in essence, business entities existing within the broader mature commercial society— are not willing to indulge in costly investigative reporting. As a result, the dissemination of ‘facts’ and viewpoints tends to be provided by the elite members of society, who are generally accepted, or suggested, as possessing some ‘inside’ knowledge regarding issues, events or the ‘environments’ that permeate society. Of particular note, the mainstream news media tend to serve as “collaborators” that are virtually co-opted by (high-ranking) government officials. As Herman (1992, 5; emphasis mine) asserts,

Media collaboration with the government in fostering a world of doublespeak is essential to its use and institutionalization, and this collaboration has been regularly forthcoming. . . . an important aspect of the process is simply following the double standard and doublethink implicit in the official agenda. This is done with such assurance and self-righteousness, along with the regular and matter-of-fact use of extremely biased sources—
mainly, government officials with a political “spin” to execute—that the public dependent on the corporate [news] media is easily swept along on the tide of doublethink. 10

As the citation suggests, government officials tend to rely on mainstream news media’s regularly forthcoming collaboration to manipulate facts in order to further their elite propagandistic agendas. Of course the mainstream news media can be relatively sure that they will not risk losing legitimacy with the general citizenry—of course, barring cases of glaring irresponsibility in the process of their collaboration. They simply can shift blame to ‘crooked’ officials who provide detected misleading, or false, information. Aptly put by McChesney, “[I]f chastised by readers, an editor could say, ‘Hey, don’t blame us, the governor (or any other official source) said it and we merely reported it’” (Borjesson, 2002, 367). As a result of this ‘structural’ reliance upon sourcing from official, or elite, members of society, egoistic propaganda has been permitted to flourish—a condition that continues to be perpetuated by the mainstream news media.

Perhaps the greatest perpetrator of egoistic propaganda—and a significant offshoot of both the fragmentation and isolation of the citizenry that pervades the mature commercial society, and the above-noted collaboration by the mature commercial news media in attempting to acquire ‘just the facts’—is the official publicist/public relations export, or professional propagandist. As Lippmann (1997, 345) notes,

since...the facts are not simple, and not at all obvious, but subject to choice and opinion, it is natural that everyone should wish to make his own choice of facts for the newspaper to print. The publicity man does that. And in doing it, he certainly saves the reporter much trouble, by presenting him a clear picture of a situation out of which he might otherwise make neither head nor tail. But it follows that the picture which the publicity man makes for the reporter is the one he wishes the public to see. He is censor and propagandist, responsible only to his employers, and to the whole truth responsible only as it accords with the employers’ conception of his own interests.

10 According to Herman (1992, 1), “Doublespeak” is “the misuse of words by implicit redefinition, selective application of ‘snarl’ and ‘pur’ words, and other forms of verbal manipulation.” This concept is similar to Orwell’s (1949) notion of “Doublethink”, which the author describes as a mental exercise whereby one taught to “forget a fact that has become inconvenient, and then, when it becomes necessary again, to draw it back from oblivion for just so long as it is needed.”
Moreover, from the time of professional, or objective, journalism's inception as the standard practice, the public relations gurus', or professional propagandists', messages have increasingly comprised the total of mainstream news' content. As McChesney asserts, "[T]he emergence of professional journalism was quickly followed by the Establishment of public-relations as an industry whose primary function it was to generate favorable coverage in the press without public awareness of its activities. By many surveys, press releases and PR generated material today account for between 40 and 70 percent of the news in today's media" (Hazen and Winokur 1997, 159).

Moreover, the public relations expert is utilized to render the 'democratic' state one favourable to society's elite. As asserted by "pioneering scholar of PR" Alex Carry, "The role of PR is to so muddle the public sphere as to 'take the risk out of democracy' for the wealthy and corporations" (Borjesson 2002, 369).

In light of the predominance of these forms of egoistic propaganda within the typical mainstream news media, the enlightenment and empowerment of a general citizenry that heavily relies upon them for important information appears rather unlikely. As such, it would appear that emphasis must be placed upon establishing, or incorporating, an alternative journalistic model— one that can better inform, enlighten and thus empower the general citizenry. One such alteration that presents itself as a natural alternative is the long-removed, openly subjective model of journalism.

If done with due diligence to responsible research and dissemination, the subjective model of journalism could be considered a welcome change that could incorporate some "truths" that are typically missing from the prevailing practice of objectively reporting the facts. As John Katz asserts, "Journalism can continue to preach
reference for informed opinion—truth based on research, accuracy, and fairness—while allowing writers and reporters to tell us the truth as they see it” (Hazen and Winokur 1997, 167; emphasis added). Moreover, the more insidious component of propaganda largely dissolves when the purposes of the journalist are made clear throughout the publication/article. This can be achieved by a subjective journalistic model.

Upon serious consideration, this alteration would appear plausible, if not entirely preferable. After all, the journalists who regularly write on specific topics, or within certain social and physical environments, are apt to have some measure of concrete knowledge of the inner workings of these topics and environments that would surely add integral context with which the reader can make better, perhaps personal, sense of the news item. Referring to this model as “news opinion” journalism, Gans (2003, 101) suggests that,

“[G]eneralist” opinion needs to be complemented by what I think of as “news opinion” I resort to this work purposely because the opinions have to come from, and be limited to, beat and other reporters who have already done the necessary legwork for their news stories and are informed about their subjects . . . Were they able to inject their opinions, they could apply their personal judgement to their reportage and analyses, enabling them to evaluate what they have reported. The result would be informed opinion.

In effect, this alteration would merely ‘officialize’ the inherent subjectivity of reporters that already tends to permeate throughout the construction of the news item. Moreover, the more insidious component of propaganda largely dissolves when the purposes of the journalist are made clear throughout the news item.

Another potential alteration to the objective journalistic model that could serve as a corrective to the prevailing egoistic propaganda is a renewed emphasis upon ‘unofficial’ viewpoints of members of the general citizenry. In referring to this model as “participatory news”, Gans (2003, 96) asserts that, “Participatory news . . . should rest on
the assumption that citizens are as relevant and important as public officials. Because citizens rarely attend public meetings, journalists must emphasize other, less public forms of citizen participation, such as stories about the topics of people's letters, e-mails, and calls to public officials. What citizens say to the White House, the leaders of the Senate and House, and to their own elected officials deserves regular reporting.” In essence, this type of reporting would represent a ‘bottom-up’ alternative to the typical ‘top-down’ model that now permeates mainstream journalism. Of course, in order to gain legitimacy and acceptance, this model would have to overcome long-established prejudices—both within the profession and the general citizenry—favouring the use of official sources to shape issues and events.

Perhaps the most significant alteration to the objective model of journalism that could be implemented is a renewed emphasis on investigative reporting, or “muckraking”—a significant part of the subjective journalism that prevailed prior to the domination of the contemporary model. In referring to the imperative nature of this form of journalism, chairman of the Committee of Concerned Journalists, Bill Kovach, asserts that, “A journalist is never more true to democracy— is never more engaged as a citizen, is never more patriotic— than when aggressively doing the job of independently verifying the news of the day; questioning the actions of those in authority; disclosing information the public needs but others wish secret for self-interested purposes” (Alterman 2003, 265). And as Alterman suggests, “Power requires watchdogs. Powerful people will often abuse their authority if they believe that no one is watching. That, in a nutshell, is why we need journalists” (256). In essence, ensuring the public accountability of those in positions of power—those who work the structural inadequacies of the objective...
journalistic model to disseminate egoistic propaganda— is also a significant component of a more subjective journalism that gives it a bottom-up nature.

Closely related to the above-noted ‘participatory news’, another bottom-up approach to the typical objective fare that is provided by what is commonly, though somewhat loosely, referred to as public journalism. As Robert Hackett and Yuezhi Zhao (1998, 202) suggest, “In important ways, public journalism challenges the regime of objectivity. It asks journalism to abandon a stance of detachment in order to actively reinvigorate public politics.” One significant way in which public journalism can reinvigorate public politics is through providing news that connects the citizenry to the larger issues behind many of the injustices it faces— or an essential alternative to the typical kind of story provided by the objective model of journalism that can better proximate solutions. As Susan Bales asserts, “A different kind of story is needed. Media advocates need to pioneer a new kind of talking, a values-based style of storytelling whose big story is about overcoming boundaries between people to engage in common problem-solving” (Hazen and Winokur 1997, 175). Moreover, this journalistic approach would more openly reveal how values are embedded in the journalistic commentary, and determine whether those values help the citizenry solve problems together, or break it down into individual problem-solvers— a community of individuals loosely tied together (176). Of course, as has been asserted throughout, the objective model does little to connect individuals to their problems, or to other members of their community. On the contrary, the detached reporting of disconnected facts that pervades objective journalism tends to perpetuate the evolution of the ‘rugged individual’— expected to accept sole responsibility for her/his misfortunes, and, if possible, their solutions.

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Of course, public journalism has not evaded criticism from industry insiders. On concern that has been circulated concerns the perceived credibility of public journalism. "Media risk their credibility when they become active players rather than observers and chroniclers" (Hackett and Zhao 1998, 203-4). Indeed, this risk appears more than a remote possibility, considering the level of legitimacy the objective model of journalism has accrued throughout the last century of the mature commercial society. As noted above, other media have been pressured to imitate this model, or be deemed undeserving of the citizenry’s trust. Another criticism of note concerns public journalism’s ability to engage in investigative journalism—the watchdog task. Specifically, “[a] more telling critique is made by upholders of the watchdog tradition. Some of them worry that public journalism extravaganzas may detract further from the already dwindling resources devoted to hard-newsgathering and investigative journalism” (204). The general notion appears to be a fear that resources will be focussed upon the ‘town hall’ sort of fare typically associated with public journalism. However, stereotypically painting public journalism fare with such a broad stroke is not constructive, and is a little misleading. As Hackett and Zhao suggest, “Such a criticism may be too sweeping. Public journalism means different things to different people” (1998, 205). Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that bottom-up, public journalism cannot provide a variety of styles of reporting to responsibly serve the citizenry. Perhaps the key to public journalism is its public nature—journalism for the public.

Alternative journalism, or news media, is another model that adopts the task of providing information geared to assisting in the enlightenment and empowerment of the general citizenry. In general,
The alternative media can be defined . . . as ‘politically dissident media that offer radical alternatives to mainstream debate’ and that have a progressive orientation, broadly defined as the political and cultural project of sharing wealth, power, and status more equitably. Far from claiming to be objective, alternative media ‘avowedly reject or challenge established and institutionalized politics, in the sense that they all advocate change in society, or at least a critical reassessment of traditional values,’ and ‘they frequently represent groups who feel that their viewpoints and concerns are not sufficiently represented within existing local and national [mainstream news] media.’ (Hackett and Zhao 1998, 209)

As suggested, alternative media have a rather unabashed and explicit agenda of altering the existing societal status quo, and establishing a social order that is more just and attentive to the needs of the general citizenry, not those of the elite few that currently benefit. While they do attempt to manipulate the long-preconceived notions that prevail amongst the citizenry, or shape new ones that may not already exist, the journalism disseminated by alternative media provides a necessary counter to the egoistic propaganda disseminated by objective mainstream news media. Indeed, “[p]otentially positive alternatives to the regime of objectivity are especially likely to be found outside the dominant media, among the so-called ‘alternative’ media. Their very existence implicitly challenges the dominant news media’s claims to speak to and for everybody. Sometimes alternative journalists make that critique of mainstream objectivity quite explicit” (Hackett and Zhao 1998, 206). Moreover, a subjective model of journalism is more likely capable of undertaking the task of investigative reporting— an aspect of journalism woefully missing from the fare of objective media. As Scott Sherman notes, “With muckraking at a low, [news media] of opinion are often in the forefront of investigative reporting” (Hazen and Winokur 1997, 168). Subjective journalism’s ability, or willingness, to engage in authentic investigative reporting is of great significance, considering muckraking’s integral role in checking persons in positions of authority, and thus helping to sustain democratic ideals.
In concluding this portion of the thesis, it is important to make some general notes regarding the two above-described forms of propaganda that naturally permeate journalistic endeavours. First and foremost, it is important to recognize that both forms of propaganda are engaged in attempting to manipulate opinion. However, a primary, and significant, difference between what has herein been referred to as egoistic propaganda and altruistic propaganda is that, while the former is engaged in manipulating the opinion of the general citizenry for the purposes of obscuring and marginalizing, the latter is engaged in manipulating that opinion for the correlated purposes of enlightening and empowering. Moreover, while the former is undertaken for the purpose of safeguarding a societal status quo that best serves the interests of societal elites, the latter is undertaken for the purpose of altering it in ways that best serve the interests of as much of the general citizenry as is possible. In brief, then, as suggested throughout, while egoistic propaganda can be referred to as a ‘top-down’ model, altruistic propaganda can be understood as a ‘bottom-up’ model.

The Propaganda Model of News: Basic Blueprint for Analysis

[The democratic postulate is that the media are independent and committed to discovering and reporting the truth, and that they do not merely reflect the world as powerful groups wish it to be perceived. Leaders of the media claim that their news choices rest on unbiased professional and objective criteria, and they have support for this contention in the intellectual community. If, however, the powerful are able to fix the premises of discourse, to decide what the general populace is allowed to see, hear, and think about, and to “manage” public opinion by regular propaganda campaigns, the standard view of how the system works is at serious odds with reality.

From the Preface of Herman and Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon books, 2002)

While there are, undoubtedly, numerous works that adequately reflect the methods and implications of mainstream news media’s manipulation of the public sphere,
perhaps one of most poignant theories on the topic is co-authored by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky (2002; Chomsky 1998b; Jhally 1997). First published in 1988, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* attempts to address the manipulative nature of the mainstream news media. Particularly, the authors provide an outline of what they refer to as a "propaganda model", which they apply to the functioning of US mass media. As this 'model' provides the basic 'blueprint' for the project's comparative content analyses of ideologically and structurally competing newsprint media, the following section is devoted to introducing some significant notions with which it is associated, outlining the authors' relatively recent revisitation of the model as it particularly pertains to the news and addressing some general criticisms of the model.

In essence, the propaganda model features five "filters" that play key roles in determining media content that reach and manipulate the general citizenry. The filters include: *ownership filters; advertising filters; sourcing filters; flak filters* and *anticommunism filters* (Herman and Chomsky 2002, 2). With regard to the ownership filter, it is always important to question whether or not those who own and control the mainstream media may have agendas to push. If they do, then they will invariably use the resources at their disposal— the media— to smoothly indoctrinate the audience with content supportive of these agendas. As previously noted, the agendas of those who control the mainstream media tend to be inherently conservative in nature; as such, they seek to protect and perpetuate the societal status quo— a societal system that bestows upon them money and power.
Within mature commercial societies, the advertising filter takes on particular significance, as the concerns of ‘big business’ tend to predominate. Accordingly, the importance of advertising adopts great significance. Subsequently, the media must adhere to the concerns of the businesses that subsidize their industry; concerns largely focussed on creating an audience favourable to consuming principles. In a general sense, “advertisers will want . . . to avoid programs with serious complexities and disturbing controversies that interfere with the ‘buying mood.’ They seek programs that will lightly entertain and thus fit in with the spirit of the primary purpose of program purchases— the dissemination of a selling message” (Herman and Chomsky 2002, 17-8; emphasis added). As a result, programming or media that is politically or socially dissident are penalized—they are ignored by the massive store of advertiser funding.

The significance of the third filter, media-sourcing, lies in its related functions of news gathering and dissemination. If news gathering truly operated in an ‘objective’ manner, agencies would employ a plethora of means to investigate the multitude of stories that continuously present themselves. The citizenry would then receive knowledge resulting from the culmination of these varied means. This is not the reality of modern mainstream media, as it would cost large amounts of money to cover the news in such a profound manner. On the contrary, “economics dictates that [news media] concentrate their resources where significant news often occurs, where important rumours and leaks abound, and where regular press conferences are held” (Herman and Chomsky 2002, 18-9).

Another reason for depending on particular sites, when gathering information to report as news, is the ‘objectivity’ claim so prevalent within modern news media. In
order to appear objective, information must be presumed accurate (Herman and Chomsky 2002, 19). Information originating from such sources as police precincts and government agencies meet the presumption of accuracy. As a result of these practices, news is 'economically' gathered from a limited number of sites and is necessarily limited in scope. They also help account for the proliferation of such subjects as crime stories and political information of an 'official' nature. There is, however, another sourcing aspect of significance.

Within the mature commercial society, official sources are not the only integral providers of information. There is also a virtual proliferation of the 'expert.' As suggested by Mills (1959), a society within which the citizenry is uninformed and bereft of opinion relies on the opinions of those deemed 'experts'. Indeed, their 'informed' opinions help shape the opinions of the uninformed. When the voices of the experts are dissident, they tend to compete with official voices that 'toe the social line,' so to speak. How have the mass media solved this potential problem? Herman and Chomsky (2002) suggest they have successfully resolved this by "co-opting" the information experts and use their opinions as needed. In other words, the lion's portion of experts is essentially coopted by the mainstream news media, and often derive from conservative institutions, or "think tanks". In large part, their opinions are used to verify the agendas of those who control the media.

The fourth media filter of the propaganda model is the flak filter. As Herman and Chomsky note, "'flak' refers to negative responses to a media statement or program . . . it may take the form of letters, telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and bills before Congress, and other modes of complaint, threat, and punitive action . . . it may be
organized centrally or locally, or it may consist of the entirely independent actions of individuals" (Herman and Chomsky 2002, 26). In other words, powerful individuals and groups in society control media content via the threat of reprisals of some sort. Again, as social power in mature capitalist democracies tends to reside with those benefiting from the existing social order, content that may question the legitimacy of this order, and thus threaten its existence, is not given expression through the typical mainstream media fare—news or entertainment.

The anticommunism filter was, and is, perhaps, most critical in shaping (US) public opinion regarding foreign policy. Throughout the twentieth century and into the new millennium, the global ‘threat’ of communism, as a viable alternative to ‘free-market’ capitalism, provides legitimacy to, occasionally harmful, foreign policies of the US government. In other words, (US) interventions in foreign lands— even those that would otherwise be questionable— garner public support, simply because they purport to be in global defence of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’— notions that have, within the mature commercial society, become synonymous with capitalism. On the domestic front, the ‘anticommunism card’ can be played to help perpetuate the societal status quo. Specifically put, “[anticommunism] can be used against anybody advocating policies that threaten property interests or support accommodation with Communist states and radicalism . . . it therefore helps fragment the left and labor movements and serves as a [domestic] political control” (Herman and Chomsky 2002, 29).

At this point, it must be noted that this final filter does not evaporate with the demise of major communist states and the Cold War in general. On the contrary, in defending its continued significance, Chomsky suggests that a major purpose of this filter
was, and is, to create a general fear amongst the citizenry that “grave enemies are about to attack [them] and [they] need to huddle under the protection of domestic power” (Chomsky 1998ba, 41). Moreover, within the post-September 11 landscape, there has been a very applicable resurgence of this component of the filter, as the citizenry has been coaxed into a prevailing state of insecurity and distrust—successfully persuaded to accept, in return for protection, any policies that its government enacts to protect them from further potential (impending) onslaughts of terrorism. Indeed, the filter could very easily be referred to as the ‘War on Terror Filter’.\textsuperscript{11}

Significance is also retained by the ‘anti-communism’ filter, in that, in a more general sense, it represents the power of ALL dominant ideologies in generating popular acceptance of, if not support for, the policy-related actions of the government. As Jeffrey Klaehn (2002, 161) notes, “Ed Herman concedes that the filter perhaps should have been originally termed ‘the dominant ideology’, so as to include elements of the dominant ideology that are referred to at various points throughout \textit{Manufacturing Consent}; such as the merits of private enterprise, or the benevolence of one’s own government.” Within the mature commercial society, this ‘dominant ideology’ filter is, perhaps, most concerned with galvanizing public support for domestic and foreign economic policies that espouse, and attempt to further the progress of, a neoliberalist free market—perhaps the economic epitome of the mature commercial ideology. As more recently suggested by Herman and Chomsky (2002, Introduction), the elimination of anti-communism as

\textsuperscript{11} The essential threat has been redirected from anti-communism to anti-terrorism and all that it entails. As a result, the McCarthy-era indictments of those who would ‘threaten’ national security through espousing ‘communist’ ideals are replaced with indictments of those who will not rigidly adhere to enacted national ‘security’ measures. Of further note, this new form of indictments necessarily applies to the anti-corporate globalization efforts that have been gaining some steam of late, as these movements include a mobilization against domestic US curtailments of citizens’ right to disagree with government policies.
the final filter "is easily offset by the greater ideological force of the belief in the 'miracle of the market' [Reagan]. The triumph of capitalism and the increasing power of those with an interest in privatization and market rule have strengthened the grip of market ideology, at least among the elite, so that regardless of evidence, markets are assumed to be benevolent and even democratic . . . and nonmarket mechanisms are suspect."

The Myth of the Liberal News Media: Revisiting the Propaganda Model

Upon revisiting their original propaganda model, Herman and Chomsky have made some adjustments that better equip the model to analyze the content of the mainstream, and public, news media. As the analysis portion of the thesis is focussed on the content of newsprint, it is this model that presents itself as more directly applicable. Released in 1997, by the Media Education Foundation, and directed by Sut Jhally, their video The Myth of the Liberal Media: The Propaganda Model of News addresses the notion that the mainstream news media are liberal— as previously noted, a notion pushed by conservative members of (US) society. As Herman and Chomsky (Jhally 1997) note, the corporate 'powers that be' hide the true, conservative nature of the mainstream news media by asserting the opposite— that, on the contrary, the media are too liberal. Focus is then placed upon determining whether or not the media, particularly the news media, are too liberal. Through the above-noted application of the revised propaganda model filters, they reveal how this assertion is false, if not ludicrous.

Although many of the filters are largely unchanged, some of these changes do bear mentioning. The first news filter still refers to ownership of the media, but concentrates on corporate ownership. In an age of increasing concentration of the mainstream media by mega-corporations, an authentic heterogeneity of information that
may have been available at a time when ownership was spread out amongst a multitude of societal factions is effectively distinguished. As noted, one important consequence of the corporatisation of ownership is the saturation of media content with neoliberal, free-market ideologies—something that will be further addressed in a subsequent section.

With their “Propaganda Model of the News”, Herman and Chomsky (Jhally 1997) place more focus on the important role of journalists and ‘experts’ in shaping the news. Indeed, they create a separate filter for this phenomenon, aptly referred to as the “News-Shapers Filter.” Perhaps rather obvious, this filter refers to those who shape the ways in which the articles are written and disseminated. Essentially, it is a filter that determines how the writers of the articles indirectly offer their necessarily subjective opinions for the underlying purpose of shaping the subsequent opinions of those who read the articles. Although they concentrate on the news-deliverers reliance upon the official opinions of representatives of corporate “think-tanks,” the forthcoming analysis will also take into account other ways of shaping the news: namely, by establishing ‘frames’ through locating items within established metaphors, or commonsensical “media think”, by embedding viewpoints in value-laden terminology and through sourcing.

Finally, as will be more adequately addressed in the ensuing section devoted to outlining the chosen methodology, public opinion regarding the importance of news events can be “shaped” in another way. The presence or absence, and particular placement of news events within the news media can also determine how the general public perceives such events.12 In other words, the frequency and regularity of the appearance of news events within the media will often (mis)inform the public as to its

12 For more on this concept, one may refer to Winter (1997), Tuchman (1978), Gans (1979, 2003) and Alterman (2003).
true level of significance. In brief, items that are frequently addressed by news media will naturally appear more important than items that are absent, and, therefore, shielded from public scrutiny. Similarly, news items that are located in more accessible sections, or ‘spots’, will get the attention of a greater portion of the news consumers than will items that are relatively ‘buried’, or ‘hidden’. Furthermore, the prominently placed items will appear more significant.

Addressing General Criticisms of the Propaganda Model

As with theories in general, Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model does not elude criticism. The following section will outline the essential nature of noted criticism, and attempt to provide a suitable response. It is hoped that, in doing so, the model will be bolstered in ways that support its choice as the general framework for analysis.

As addressed by Klaehn (2002, 161), the Propaganda Model has been generally criticized “for its basic assumptions regarding political economy, for its view of the major mass media as purveyors of ideologically serviceable propaganda, and for overall generalizability.” However, in order to provide some mode of redress, the criticisms outlined by Klaehn (2002) will be more distinctly addressed. It is for this reason that the three general criticisms noted above will be extended to include

Perhaps the most vocal of the Propaganda Model’s critics suggest that it is entirely too dismissive of the citizenry’s capability to legitimately form opinion. To wit, “critics charge that the [Propaganda Model]’s overall view of media behaviour is in general deterministic and can be seen to be plagued by sociological reductionism. The phrase ‘manufacturing consent’ encapsulates a functionalist logic” (Klaehn 2002, 149). While this criticism may appear well-founded on the surface, it is, perhaps, undeserved.
The ‘manufacture of consent’ postulated by the Propaganda Model does not simply imply that the citizenry is composed of mere ‘empty vessels’ lacking agency to actively partake in the formation of their opinions and understandings. It does, however, suggest that within a contemporary social context that largely prevents first-hand attainment of knowledge of items, and that is rife with ‘rugged individuals’ isolated from one-another, ‘legitimate’ opinion formation requires a variety of opinion dissemination and general content. Through the processes of the prevailing mainstream media, however, consent is acquired through structural flaws that favour elite opinion dissemination and rely on advertising revenue. The former flaw constrains the informed formation of public opinion, and therefore tends to promote political apathy amongst the citizenry, while the latter constrains heterogeneity of content, which also serves to produce a prevailing social and cultural apathy. In effect, viewpoints that may be swayed, or the apathy in their lieu, tend to produce a dual effect of promoting and protecting the general interests of status quo elites.

Another criticism that has been levelled against the Propaganda Model is that it suggests that editors and journalists are powerless against the control asserted by society’s elites. However, control at this level is not typically achieved in overt fashion, rather, it is largely achieved in an unconscious manner. “The [Propaganda Model] assumes that the processes of control are often unconscious. Its basic argument in this context is that meanings are essentially ‘filtered’ by the constraints that are built into the system” (Klaehn 2002, 150; emphasis added). In effect, the truisms, or ‘mediathink’, regarding particular issues and subjects are systemically built into the mainstream media system, as was above-illustrated through such concepts as the “web of facticity”.

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Moreover, those involved in news dissemination learn the truisms through their submersion into the ideological pool—both within and without the newsroom. As has been noted above, much of this ideological adherence has already been achieved through ongoing contact with the other cultural industries—similarly dominated by status quo supportive ideologies.

Closely related to the above criticism, some critics suggest that “[i]n presuming that media personnel act in ways that effectively serve the interests of dominant elites, however, the ‘[Propaganda Model] can be seen to infer structural processes by appealing to psychological processes in individuals.’ At the same time, it can be seen to presume various ‘self-interested’ or ideological motives from structural patterns in news coverage” (Klaehn 2002, 151). Again, this notion does not appear to be at the heart of the Propaganda Model, as a journalist’s exposure to, and successful navigation through, the other cultural industries has largely rendered active conformity a non-issue. Moreover, those who may require some ideological ‘arm-twisting’ do not remain long in the profession.

Another criticism is that, while the Propaganda Model presumes that the mainstream media serve political ends in numerous and varied ways, it does not address the direct effects on the public. While this criticism is merited, it is important to note that this was not the initial intention of the model. As such, “Herman and Chomsky concede that the [Propaganda Model]) does not explain ‘everything’ and in every context. While it is true that the [Propaganda Model] does not ‘test’ effects directly, ‘it is important to note that this was not Herman and Chomsky’s intention in the first place.’ In fact, as highlighted earlier, ‘they deliberately state that their [Propaganda Model] is one that deals
with patterns of media behaviour and performance, and not effects” (Klaehn 2002, 153). Moreover, there are plenty of theorists who study media effects on audience. Perhaps the results of such analyses can be applied to the notions postulated by the Propaganda Model to create a richer context through which model can be understood, however, that is another matter, and one that is not entirely applicable to this project.

A fifth criticism of the Propaganda Model concerns its presumption of a ‘unified’ ruling class. Specifically, “It presumes that the ideas of a unified ruling class and ruling-class interests may be taken for granted as straightforward and relatively unproblematic” (Klaehn 2002, 154). Simply put, this is a misinterpretation, or misrepresentation, of the theory. Although the theory does postulate that members of the ruling class will hold vastly similar beliefs regarding integral, status quo-sustaining issues, it does concede that this ‘class’ will vary in matters that do not directly effect their privileged positions within society—such as means employed by government to achieve ends generally desired by that ruling class. If effect then, it should be conceived that, while the ruling class will be in agreement regarding the desirability of mature commercialism, or the free (neoliberal) market ideology, they will likely disagree on particular policies enacted to perpetuate that ideology. Ultimately, common goals and interests will override the specific disparities within the ruling class. Moreover, the common goals and interests are reflected in mainstream news dissemination and general content.

A final criticism of note is that the Propaganda Model depicts the entire mainstream media system as a rigid and homogeneous mass. This is untrue. As Klaehn asserts (2002, 155-56), “The [Propaganda Model] does not . . . argue that media are monolithic, or determined to the extent that they are entirely closed to dissent or debate.”
In reality, exceptions to the established ‘rules’ do find space, or air time within the mainstream news, and other, media. As noted in a previous section regarding mainstream media content in general, allowing for exceptions to established standards is essential. In effect, providing for exceptions serves the integral purpose of belying contentions that mainstream media content and coverage uniformity serves the interests of the dominant class—claims asserted through the Propaganda Model. Moreover, and equally as significant, the permitted exceptions serve to legitimate the media, and provide insiders with ‘evidence’—to themselves and the audience—that they are ideologically unbiased.

The Active Audience Argument: Reflexive Appropriation of Symbolic Meaning?

The relatively gloomy analyses of the mature commercial news media by theorists from the Frankfurt School, as well as those following their critical tradition, have been accused by some of portraying the media as being overly-negative and of underestimating the news-consumers’ ability to self-inoculate against potentially propagandistic points of view. Furthermore, both practices have resulted in narrowly limited viewpoints relating to the mainstream media’s function. It is their contention that these viewpoints miss the positive ramifications of the media—commercial or otherwise. These theorists focus on the importance of the symbolic transmission that the media consumers appropriate for the purposes of making sense of themselves and the social/global world wherein they reside. The audience members not only appropriate symbolic meaning from the mass media, they do so selectively; in other words, they are an ‘active audience’, picking and

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13 Although the majority of Frankfurt School theorists sharply criticize the commercial mass media, there are some who perceived some potential in the mediated forms. As shown in a previous section, Habermas’s (1989) emphasizes the politically empowering nature of subjective print media, utilized by the bourgeois public sphere to wrest power from the monarch. Another Frankfurt School theorist who was not entirely critical of the mass media was Walter Benjamin (1968), who believed that the modern visual media, such as film and television, developed and honed the human ability of sensual action/reaction, thus providing the impetus for future physical action/reaction for social change.
choosing meaning befitting the particular requirements of their personal and social circumstances. Focussing on some of the conceptions of John B. Thompson (1990), James Lull (1995) Mills (1959) and Gans (2003), the following subsection briefly reviews and assesses some of the contentions of social theorists who have a more positive outlook on the effects of the mass (and news) media. It concludes with a relatively brief discussion of journalism’s potential for politically ‘activating’ the public, and therefore contributing to the development and sustenance of an ideal democratic state.

In an essay entitled “Social Theory and the Media”, Thompson (1990, 27-46) briefly outlines the problems of such critical theories as those presented by adherents to the Frankfurt School tradition, and attempts to give a more realistic, comprehensive analysis of the effects of the mainstream media. It is his contention that an inclusive theory of the mainstream media would be best attained through combining a number of theoretical approaches, not through focussing on one particular aspect of various media (Thompson 1990, 28-9). The work of the critical theorists, although generally neglectful of particularly positive uses of the commercial media, gives good insight into the ways in which the mainstream media negatively affect the citizenry, and must be included in a comprehensive social theory regarding that media. The second theoretical tradition that should be included is that of ‘pure’ media theorists, such as Harold Innis and Marshal McCluhan, who’s theories tend to be more concerned with technological aspects of the mainstream media and how they impact media consumers and society. The final approach necessary for a comprehensive theory on mainstream media is the hermeneutic approach, which deals with the transmission and appropriation of symbolic meaning that take place between a ‘sending’ medium and ‘receiving’ individuals. This is the approach
that, perhaps, best represents a positive theoretical viewpoint on the mainstream media, and stands in relative opposition to the critical theories of those who find little by-way-of beneficial effects, aside from the heretofore untapped potential to empower the citizenry, and thus encourage political activity aimed at establishing societal improvements. It is also an approach that must be further analysed, primarily as a backcloth against which to place the previously reviewed, critical media theories.

Throughout much of history, human interaction—the exchange of information and knowledge—was conducted on a face-to-face level. Through this form of interaction, the transference of symbolic meaning is dependent upon individuals sharing the same spatio-temporal location—it is essentially a first-hand transfer of symbols. During this relatively extensive period, which pre-dates printing press technology, the institutions that manifested the greatest amount of symbolic power were the Roman Catholic Church and the courts of sovereign rulers. These institutions could manipulate the dispensation of symbolic information as they saw fit; in other words, they arbitrarily determined who would receive information, and what that information entailed. Their control over the transference of symbolic meaning was largely usurped with the development of the printing press, which had great potential for empowering the citizenry.

As interaction increasingly occurred in ‘mediated’ (letters, telephone, et cetera) or ‘quasi-mediated’ (radio, television, film, et cetera) forms, Thompson (1990), following the lead of other hermeneutic theorists, points to the social significance of the mainstream media in producing and delivering the symbolic meanings needed by individuals for constituting themselves and social reality. The media have, in a very real sense, become the primary tools through which one develops a sense of her/himself; indeed, they have
become key socializing forces of the mature commercial era. Moreover, the implications of this development of great significance, considering that mainstream media technologies have made it possible to reach great numbers in various spatio-temporal circumstances; to be more specific, the transference of symbolic meaning is no longer restricted to circumstances whereby individuals must share the same place at the same time. In this light, their ability to dispense a multitude of symbolic forms to such large numbers has great potential for empowering the citizenry through a ‘symbolic’ form of enlightenment. However, given the empowering potential of mediated forms, the next task of social theorists would appear to be ascertaining the citizenries use of them.

Depending upon their economic—money to buy the media technologies—and symbolic—their ability to understand the symbols being delivered—resources, individuals will use the information they receive in constructive ways. As mentioned above, they adopt the symbolic meanings to help them construct their personal identities; they use the information presented to help shape their beliefs, values, ideals, et cetera. The content presented to media consumers is not absorbed in its entirety, as if in arbitrary fashion. Hermeneutic theorists contend that the symbols are appropriated selectively, according to each individual receiver's personal requirements.

In his book, Media, Communication, Culture: A Global Approach, James Lull (1995) effectively presents these personal requirements. In a chapter aptly titled “The Active Audience”, he outlines the basic psychological concepts concerned in the active audience perspective— the audience “uses and gratifications” theory. Included are such concepts as needs, motives, gratifications and methods. Lull (1995, 98) admits that the theoretical community meets with difficulty when trying to pinpoint the root of the
audience’s individual needs, but generally “defer to conceptions of need grounded in psychological theories of motivation such as the self-actualization approach of Abraham Maslow or the psychosexual/psychosocial synthesis of Erik Erikson.” Accordingly, the ‘active’ audience will use the mainstream, and other, media to gratify these various needs in the following ways: to divert themselves from the stress or pain they experience; to gain knowledge of the proper conduction of personal relationships; to gain knowledge of and develop one’s personal identity; and for developing a knowledge of the social world—constructing social reality—through the surveillance of information provided (93).

The information delivered by the mainstream media not only allows for the development of the self, it also allows for the multitude of receivers to construct social realities, both locally and globally— a very significant utility, considering the rate at which globalization is occurring. This ability to construct the greater social reality is largely enhanced by the truly globalizing nature of the modern mainstream media—a development that has great political ramifications. More specifically, the nature of previously conceived public and private spheres has been drastically altered. Whereas the public sphere historically required the direct presence of interacting individuals— face-to-face interaction, as it were— the ‘new’ public sphere, as reconstituted by mainstream media technology, requires no such direct presence. According to Thompson (1990, 41), this development further empowers the citizenry, as the actions of political leaders are now subjected to a form of “global scrutiny.” Actions that would have once been out of the direct view of the citizenry, and thus relegated to the private sphere, are now subjected to their scrutiny within the broader, mass-mediated public sphere.
While on the surface the above assertions concerning the positive aspects of the modern mainstream media may appear quite logical and legitimate—there can be little doubt that audiences actively use the media in some positively, if not necessary ways—there are some apparent shortcomings that must be addressed. Firstly, the idea that the general citizenry will use modern commercial media to assist in their development of personal identities may be accurate (and probably is), but the question as to how free the individual is to develop a unique identity remains unaddressed. Horkheimer and Adorno (2001), for example, did not question the individual’s use of the mainstream media in the development of personal identity, but did point out that the formulaic and narrowly defined content of said media effectively restricts personal development to a limited number of ‘acceptable’ identities; in other words, identities that will unthreateningly fit into the existing (unjust) social system are those that are portrayed by the mainstream media as most acceptable/desirable.\(^{14}\)

A second criticism concerns the use of mainstream media in the formation of one’s understanding of external social reality. The active audience perspective appears to operate under the assumption that the system of mainstream media is an institution of symbolic power uninfluenced by other societal forces. Whereas this assumption may have held true in the past, prior to extensive commercial concentration and commodification, present circumstances put this assumption in doubt. The increasing ownership concentration of the mainstream media by corporate bodies, and the affluent members of society who control them, results in the manipulation of its content— the (ideologically conservative) corporate agenda of the affluent is disseminated to the

\(^{14}\) For similar conceptualizations regarding the media’s influence on the development of one’s personal identity, one may refer to Mills (1959).
citizenry. This manipulation affects the types of entertainment programs offered and the information delivered by the news media. Plots of programs are chosen and availed in ways that perpetuate the societal status quo. In actuality, news items offered for public enlightenment tend to manipulate public opinion in ways that serve to sustain the status quo.

Closely related to this is the fact that media enterprises are increasingly run as independent corporations, whereby the bottom line determines what content the citizenry receives. This has, perhaps, the most significance with respect to the information they receive as ‘news’. The corporatist need to cut costs results in information-gathering techniques that are far from ‘objective’. Media industries tend to use ‘official’ reporting from the same sources—those trusted for their ‘accuracy’, and who do not require expensive investigation on the part of the media industry. As noted above, on a national (US) level, for example, news presented by the mainstream media will regularly report ‘official’ information issued from such sites as the White House and the Pentagon. The notion that this information is not manipulated in such a way as to reflect positively on the actions of government, or presented for the purposes of mobilizing public opinion and support is at least questionable, if not blatantly naive.

*News Media’s Potential for Spurring Politicality: Passivity Versus Activity*

Within a mature commercial society, the rational-critical faculties of the general citizenry are greatly diminished—a notion that recurs throughout the thesis. Moreover, political activity—even at the very superficial level of election voting, which consistently hovers near the fifty-percent range for presidential election years and about a third for congressional elections—does not prevail as it once did—either within Habermas’s
emancipated bourgeois public spheres of Europe, or within earlier stages of US history. Perhaps even more disturbing are the voter-activity trends that are developing. "The proportion of 'upscale' voters in the total electorate has increased while there has been a sizable and continuing decline of voting by moderate-income and poor voters for more than a half century. Media researcher Robert McChesney has estimated that the richest fifth of the population now supplies half the voters in presidential elections" (Gans 2003, 12). Understandably, this development has significant ramifications for the state of 'legitimate' democracy, and must be addressed— if only on a relatively superficial level. For the purposes of this project, this ongoing development will be addressed in two general ways: ascertaining some level of understanding as to why it has occurred, and determining the role of the prevailing news media in facilitating and, potentially, rectifying it.

On a general level, the apparent lack of political involvement by moderate-to-low income earning portions of the US population indicates, at least, some level of prevailing apathy. Some may argue that these portions of the population have slipped, or been pushed, into an abyss of political passivity. For instance, Mills (1959) suggests that publics of rational-critical debate that once served to inform the US's citizenry have been usurped by a system of mainstream information (and other) media that are vastly inaccessible to the portion of the population comprising the middle-to-lower income earners. As a result, this majority of citizens are given information that does not tangibly, or meaningfully, relate to their lives, and is therefore of little use in provoking political involvement— even at its most superficial level. "The media provide much information and news about what is happening in the world, but they do not often enable the listener
or the truly to connect his daily life with these larger realities. They do not connect the information they provide on public issues with the troubles felt by the individual” (Mills 1959, 314-15). On the other hand, however, much of the information provided does connect to those 'upper' levels of the citizenry who do regularly engage in political activity, as advertiser concerns determine that much of that content be intended for these more economically affluent members of society.

In addition to providing information that does not meaningfully connect to the 'lower' portions of society the mainstream news media tends to focus on 'official' sources who are long-disconnected from these significant portions of the citizenry—of course, a significant notion that is explored throughout the thesis. Unfortunately, news of this format tends to be “top-down”, or Establishmentarian. As McChesney notes, “this reliance upon official sources gave those in political office (and, to a lesser extent, business) considerable power to set the news agenda by what they spoke about and what they kept quiet about. It gave the news a very Establishment and mainstream feel” (Boijesson 2002, 367). This being the case, news can also have the real effect of appearing as little more than a propagandistic tool through which established power—particularly governmental power—can attempt to accomplish hidden agendas through “official” statements that are disseminated verbatim by the mainstream media. “Officials of course tell mostly official news, enabling them to simultaneously hide self-interested actions and justifications of their actions behind the imprimatur associated with their offices” (Gans 2003, 46-7). Moreover, potential misuses of such power are difficult to locate within the framework of the 'publicist' model of journalism that prevails in the mature commercial society. “If these officials tell lies, journalists can suggest that they
have done so but only if they find other sources who allow themselves to be quoted to that effect— and these are not always available” (47).

It is somewhat difficult to succinctly ascertain the effects, if any, that this model of journalism has had, and continues to have, on the political activity of the US citizenry. Theorists such as Gans (2003) suggest that the system of journalism is merely one of many means that citizens attain information that helps them form political opinions and become politically active, and that it is quite ambitious to assume that its effects on prevailing political behaviour are of significant note. “At times, journalists can tell people what to think about, and perhaps even make them think, although thinking per se does not lead to [political activity] . . . journalists by themselves cannot make people act, nor can they make people’s actions have political consequences” (Gans 2003, 89). To say the least, such an understanding of journalism’s potential role in sustaining democracy is rather dismissive. Furthermore, although he does correctly indicate the importance of contemporary journalism’s role in ensuring that autocracy does not prevail, he fails to make the connection between the objective, officially-sourced model and the relative plutocracy that prevails within the US.

By focussing on the viewpoints of power elites, while largely avoiding expensive and time-consuming investigations of these viewpoints, contemporary journalism does little to dislodge the prevailing plutocratic-like power structure. Indeed, the journalism of the mature commercial society serves, if only by default, to bolster that plutocratic power structure. Perhaps the most effective means by-which journalism achieves this, intentional or unintentional, development is through the above-noted effect of politically marginalizing the middle-to-lower income earning majority of the citizenry. As
McChesney asserts, "[Contemporary] journalism produce[s] the range of elite opinion on those issues the elite [are] debating. This produces a paradox: Journalism, which, in theory, should inspire political involvement, tends to strip politics of meaning and promote a broad depoliticization" (Borjesson 2002, 369). As a result of focusing on issues and viewpoints that reflect elite interests, voter-turnout— a minor indicator of political activity, at best— tends to reflect the prevailing plutocratic power structure that it sustains; those whose interests are reflected in the agendas of the powerful sources who regularly comprise the ‘news’ have reason to vote, while the vast remainder of the citizenry does not bother to engage in this democratic political activity.

As noted throughout the project, within the mature commercial society, the news media must replace erstwhile sources of political empowerment that have long-since waned— many of which Gans (2003), when suggesting that contemporary journalism is but one source of political enlightenment, apparently continues to assume play significant roles in fostering political activity throughout the citizenry. Indeed, within an environment dominated by the ‘rugged individual’, and largely devoid of community groups and associations, there appears little else to inform, and thus spur political involvement of the majority of the citizenry. Again, the mainstream news (and other) media largely fail in this respect. In addition to limiting sourcing to those in established positions of power, the contemporary news media tend to merely reproduce information that derives from, and perpetuates, established metaphors.

As a result, the prevailing news media tend to stifle political activity. Working in virtual unison with the other cultural industries of the mature commercial society, the news media perpetuate the metaphors to such a continuous and successful extent that the
citizenry’s active rational-critical faculties are deadened. Because there is no ‘novelty’ in news-sourcing and the ways that the prevailing institutions depict social reality, information appears largely irrelevant. Again, the sense of disconnect felt by the already marginalized are further left disinterested in the news and politics— at least beyond a superficial level. In McChesney’s rather blunt words, and in contrast to Gans’ (2003) relative dismissal of journalism’s role in spurring a ‘true’ democratic process, “Journalism, which, in theory, should inspire political involvement, tends to strip politics of meaning and promote a broad depoliticization” (Borjesson 2002, 368).
Methodological Framework: Comparative Content Analysis

The following section deals with the various methodological choices made for the chosen research project. It will outline the reasoning behind the choice of a comparative content analysis as the best means of getting at the desired point, the rationale for choosing particular documents as units of analysis while omitting others, the chosen period of analysis and the sampling, categorizing and analysis of the data.

The Choice of Comparative Content Analysis

There are a number of reasons to opt for content analysis as the primary, or sole method of data analysis (Holsti 1969). It can strengthen the research project by being used as a secondary means of analysis, thus aiding in the nullification of potential biases inherent in specific methods of analyses. As it is essentially a non-obtrusive method of analysis, it may also be a preferable choice for research requiring limited 'obtrusion', or researcher saturation. However, the primary reason that content analysis was chosen for this research project is data limitation. When data is limited to mere documentation, content analysis emerges as the only viable means of data analysis. It is essentially for this reason that content analysis was chosen.

Moreover, according to Herman and Chomsky (2002; Chomsky 1998; Achbar and Wintonick 1996; Jhally 1997), two ideal methods of applying their propaganda model to the analysis of newsprint are either through comparing a single medium’s coverage of competing angles on certain issues, or through comparing a commercial newsprint medium’s coverage of a single issue with that disseminated by an alternative medium. For the purpose of this thesis, the latter has been selected. It is hoped that a comparison of commercial newsprint coverage of the recently-resolved Pacifica Foundation crisis with...
alternative newsprint coverage will reveal the inherent, yet largely veiled Establishmentarian agenda that Herman and Chomsky (2002; Chomsky 1998; Jhally 1997) suggest typically prevails within the commercial news media.

The Selection of Data for Analysis

Within the United States, the recently resolved crisis that besieged the Pacifica Foundation attracted attention on a number of levels. Coverage of the various issues and events surrounding this crisis can doubtless be found in a number of mainstream dailies, and in a number of cities throughout the nation. In some dailies and cities, however, the coverage can be labelled spurious, at best. On the other hand, coverage within the cities that 'house' the five Pacifica stations can be expected to be more extensive. It is for this reason that any analysis would be best served by focussing on the 'home' cities of the Pacifica Foundation—Berkeley, New York, Washington, DC, Houston and Los Angeles. Including such a vast pool of samples within the analysis would, however, constitute a rather daunting project, and be far too ambitious for the research project. In addition, and depending on the relative size of the major dailies operating within the 'home' cities, coverage may be 'borrowed'; in other words, there is a strong possibility that major dailies of smaller 'home' cities will merely reprint coverage disseminated by the dailies of larger cities— even the larger cities' dailies rely on reprinted material from leading national papers. Furthermore, as all papers rely heavily upon wire services for much of their printed materials, analysis of one leading national paper is deemed adequate for the purposes of this project.

In light of the preceding arguments, the sample of mainstream newsprint for content analysis will be composed of Pacifica-related articles contained in (arguably) the
leading daily within the US: the New York Times. Beyond its reputation as the leading national newspaper, selection of this daily is made in consideration of accessibility—of the various ‘home’ cities’ dailies, it is the only one with a readily accessible database. It is also deemed large enough to adequately provide novel, relatively sustained and in-depth coverage of the Pacifica situation; indeed, this daily largely determines the ‘news’ across most US information media, and much of its amorphous coverage can be found in many other dailies. Finally, as ownership and control of US dailies is increasingly monopolized by corporate entities, which ‘naturally’ share similar ‘visions’ of the world, it will be assumed that coverage of what constitutes ‘news’ is largely homogeneous across the entire spectrum of corporate owned information media. Therefore the selection of one corporate daily for analysis should suffice.

The choice of the New York Times content as the focus of the mainstream newsprint analysis also offers something that may, perhaps, be lacking in other US corporate print media—namely its reputation as the US’s ‘liberal’ news daily. Due to this reputation, one may expect their coverage to be as sympathetic to the Pacifica protesters’ position as possible, at least for a corporate-owned and financed information medium. On the other hand, regardless of its national reputation, it is a corporate owned information medium. As such, it will be interesting to ascertain, through comparison with an alternative newsprint medium, how rigidly their coverage adheres to the above-noted ‘rules’ of corporate news media coverage—or Winter’s (1997) “mediathink”—that prevail within the mature commercial information media. Combined with the mature commercial ideological impact upon the public media that was at the heart of the crisis within the Pacifica Foundation, these peculiarities are expected to make an analysis of
the Times’s coverage rather interesting. How does a corporate, yet reputedly ‘liberal’, newsprint daily cover an apparent attempt by executive forces to commercialize—make more overtly ‘mainstream’ and therefore ‘popular’—a grassroots public information medium? It is expected that an analysis of the expressly “objective” coverage offered within the pages of the Times will ultimately reveal an inherent, thinly-veiled bias favouring the free market, corporate agenda that dominates in the mature commercial society.

In order to facilitate my revelations of its presumed biases favouring Establishmentarian (pro-privatization, free market, et cetera) viewpoints, I have determined that the Times’s ‘objective’ coverage should be compared to, perhaps more overtly, ‘subjective’ Pacifica coverage offered by an alternative, “independently-owned and edited” newsprint medium. Two alternative newsprint media that immediately present themselves as viable choices are the San Francisco Bay Guardian and New York’s Village Voice. As the mainstream newsprint daily selected for analysis hails from New York City, perhaps the preferable of the two alternative newsprint dailies as a sample for comparative content analysis would hail from the same city. However, The Village Voice does not provide easily accessibility with regard to their back issues—specifically, they do not provide access to archived materials on their website. The Bay Guardian, however, does provide archived coverage. As such, this medium was chosen to provide the alternative newsprint sample for analysis. It is expected that coverage offered within this sample’s Pacifica-related articles will reveal particular angles on the ongoing crisis that are absent from the Times’s coverage. In particular, I expect that

\[15\] From the “Masthead” of the San Francisco Bay Guardian.
supportive of the cause of local programmers, staff and volunteers—will be largely absent from the ‘objective’ coverage offered by the Times, or, if included, will be either superficially or negatively covered. Moreover, I will focus on the absence of information that would better ‘inform’ their readers on this particular issue.

Finally, in addition to the above-noted deliberations regarding the ultimate selection of media to comprise my alternative and mainstream samples, I have also determined that the project would be better served by offering some degree of a city-based comparison of coverage offered by both alternative and mainstream media. In other words, I have determined that a comparison between contrasting newsprint media models should be conducted within both San Francisco and New York. Through this somewhat secondary comparative content analysis, it is hoped that variations of coverage that may be regionally-based will tend to reveal themselves, and thus provide for a richer understanding of the potential differences between the two general models of journalism. Although relatively achievable for the San Francisco region, or Bay Area, accessibility problems in the New York region hinder the project’s realization of this potentially important objective. More specifically, while many of the Bay Area’s mainstream newsprint media—such as the San Francisco Chronicle—offer archived articles that are readily available online, even if for a relatively small fee, alternative newsprint articles from the New York region are not so easily obtained. As noted, although New York’s alternative Village Voice—arguably the region’s most established alternative newsprint medium—does operate a relatively involved website, it does not archive its articles, and is therefore deemed of little use to this, or similarly devised, projects. Moreover, alternative ‘alternatives’ are not readily apparent. Of course, one may choose to include a
comparison of related mainstream-alternative newsprint coverage solely for the San Francisco region. However, I have deemed that proceeding in this manner would effectively render the comparative content analysis unbalanced, as there would be a relative over-representation of mainstream content within the analysis. I will therefore refrain from including a corresponding analysis of a Bay Area mainstream daily. As such, it is hoped that the ensuing omission of this secondary level of analysis will not substantially detract from the forthcoming results of the project.

The Period of Analysis

The *Pacifica Foundation*’s crisis ‘officially’ began in February 1996, when, in response to a resolution passed by the CPB, programming changes were implemented by management at KPFA Los Angeles— an act that resulted in protests by staff and volunteer programmers. In the winter of 1995-96 the CPB, an integral provider of funding for public radio, passed a resolution requiring public broadcasters to maximize their respective bandwidths; failure to comply would result in decreased funding. In essence, it was this ruling that prompted the above-noted programme changes— apparent attempts at homogenizing the content for the purpose of appealing to a broader, more amorphous listenership. However, coverage disseminated by the chosen newsprint samples does not begin until 1997; specifically, the Times’s coverage pertaining solely to the ongoing events within the Pacifica ‘family’ begins on May 12, while similar coverage provided by the Bay Guardian begins on March 6. In order to maximize my samples, the latter will comprise the lower limit of the comparative content analysis. Although the official crisis was resolved with a court ruling on July 29, 2001, I have chosen to include a relatively
brief period of time for journalistic-reassessment of the issue. As such, my upper limit of analysis will be January 3, 2002— the date of my most recent Bay Guardian article.

**Sampling Process: The New York Times**

In order to locate Times articles devoted to coverage of the Pacifica crisis, I chose to access their website (http://www.nytimes.com). Using the keyword “Pacifica”, I performed a website search of all Times articles from 1996-to-present. Of the twenty-three search results, I was able to identify a sample of seventeen articles that, in primary respect, directly pertain to the Pacifica crisis that occurred within the above-noted period of analysis.\(^{16}\) Once I identified my Times sample, I was able to retrieve the articles— via micro fiche— from the Leddy Library, at the University of Windsor, Canada. This final step of obtaining virtual hard copies of the Times sample is deemed important for the purpose of determining the actual location of the articles— the significance of which will be made more apparent below.

Perhaps not surprisingly, during the above-specified time frame, articles focusing on Pacifica-related issues are not found in abundance within the pages of the NY Times. In general, they tend to appear as significant (mostly WBAI, New York) developments occur. It is for this reason that attempts will be made to incorporate all of the Times articles regarding the Pacifica crisis into the ensuing comparative content analysis— including relatively small items, such as “letters to the editor”, “national news briefs”

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\(^{16}\) Cited in an earlier portion of the thesis, one of the six articles that was not included in the analysis, “A Wider Public for Noncommercial Radio” (A. Adelson, February 10, 1997), was omitted because its subject matter focuses upon the 1995 changes made to the CPB’s criteria for radio broadcaster funding, and not the Pacifica crisis.
and small ‘blurbs’ borrowed from news wire services. However, due to limitations in providing in-depth analysis of the content of relatively short news items, I have determined that five articles— all under 300 words— will be excluded from the qualitative portion of the frame, or discourse, analysis. Moreover, as either “letters to the editor”, “national news briefs” or borrowed wire releases, I have deemed the five excluded pieces relatively unusable in the qualitative portion of the analysis. In general, the two basic reasons for this judgement are that “letters to the editor” are not offered, nor received, as typical journalistic endeavours, and “national news briefs” and borrowed wire releases are not attributed to writers. This step is deemed fitting, as the purpose of the qualitative analysis is to analyze attributed journalistic dissemination provided by the Times. Fortunately, this exclusionary measure only eliminates one article of more than 300 words from the Times sample—a “letter to the editor”. As such, the remaining eleven items of relatively substantial length will be included in both the quantitative and qualitative analyses. In sum, I quantitatively analyze the entire sample of seventeen, while the qualitative analysis focuses on the eleven articles of relative substantial length—over 300 published words— and those offered in a journalism mode.

17 As noted by Parenti (1986; see also Gibson and Zillmann, 2000), photographs represent an important means of manipulating the representation and comprehension of an issue. Unfortunately, only one of the newsprint media chosen for analysis—the NY Times—include photos (9) in its ongoing coverage of the Pacifica crisis. Therefore, it is not possible to include this level of comparative analysis within the project.

18 Of course, as news items that are relatively free from the shackles of ‘objectivity’, “Editorials” and “Op-Eds” are not entirely representative of typical journalism either. However, they are generally offered within the ‘news-body’ of newspapers. Furthermore, such items are provided by those within the profession who are believed to be in the possession of ‘informed’ opinions regarding issues, and therefore play a significant role in informing and shaping the opinions of many readers. As such, they are deemed suitable for the qualitative portion of the comparative content analysis to follow.

19 It should be noted that, while comprising various quantitative data on the articles, notice has been made of a consistent disparity between the published words per article and the actual words per article— including titles. Although this is of doubtless significance, due to the already multivariate levels of analyses chosen for the project, it will not be addressed.
As opposed to the strict focus on the numerical aspects of news coverage involved in the quantitative level of analysis, the qualitative level of analysis will focus on the content of those articles deemed sufficiently large— as above-defined. Largely, though not exclusively, in accordance with Herman and Chomsky’s (2002; Chomsky 1998; Jhally 1997) propaganda model of news, a number of aspects will be addressed. It should be noted, however, that due to the analysis being limited to newspaper articles, primary emphasis will be placed on the “news-shapers.” (“composing”) and “news-makers” (“sourcing”) filters. In large part, the reasoning behind this emphasis is due to the difficulty in pinpointing the inferences concerning the other filters— “owners”, “advertisers”, and sources of “flak”— without expanding the methodology beyond a content analytic approach; interviews and other methods of analysis would be required in order to make meaningful inferences regarding these filters.

Sampling Process: The San Francisco Bay Guardian

Due to a more limited medium availability of Guardian coverage of the Pacifica crisis, at least in comparison to that of the Times, materials comprising this sample will be retrieved from its website, at www.sfbayguardian.com. In order to maximize the results of the search, and thus not limit the potential sample, the choice was again made to use the keyword “Pacifica”, rather than the entire “Pacifica Foundation” phrase. As a result, the retrieval of four additional, and pertinent articles to add to the Bay Guardian sample was made possible. In total, a potential sample of fifty-six Bay Guardian articles that

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20 Due to these limitations of availability, it is impossible to access micro fiche versions of the Bay Guardian’s coverage, and thus the relative locations of their Pacifica related articles is indeterminate. It is for this reason that this aspect of the Bay Guardian’s coverage will not be included in the quantitative portion of the comparative analysis.
relate to the Pacifica crisis, and that appear within the specified critical period of analysis, was identified.

As is perhaps evinced by the quantity of articles comprising its respective sample, and perhaps not surprisingly, the Bay Guardian's coverage of the Pacifica crisis offers much more of an ongoing analysis than does the Times coverage. As such, while the entire Bay Guardian sample will be included in the quantitative level of analysis, I have deemed it too large to incorporate into the qualitative portion of analysis. Therefore, for the purpose of comparatively analysing the qualitative, or discursive, aspects of the Guardian's coverage, I have decided that, in addition to an adherence to the above-noted criterion of at least 300 words, the sample will be limited to articles attributed to a single author (a limitation not applicable to the sample of Times coverage), articles subsumed under the category entitled "News", and articles that are focussed on related events, rather than awards or other annual items.

Through the implementation of these limiting criteria, I have effectively narrowed the qualitative Bay Guardian sample to thirty-two. The twenty-four articles that were thus excluded from this portion of analysis include eleven that had no single attributable author (either editorials or postings by interest groups), seven that were not subsumed under the "news" category, three that were under the 300 word limit, two that were focussed on awards or other annual items and one that was entirely comprised of an interview.\footnote{Although those articles excluded from the qualitative portion of analysis for being under 300 words numbered eight in total, I have categorized the remaining five under various exclusionary categories. The logic for this being that these categories of numerical substance will be accounted for in the quantitative portion of analysis.} However, in order to account for the greater substance of coverage offered

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by the Guardian, those articles numbering at least 300 words not included in the qualitative sample for analysis will be noted in the quantitative comparison.

Sourcing and Shaping the News: ‘Crunching’ Numbers and Analyzing Discourses22

As noted above, news shaping refers to a number of techniques used by the writer and/or editor, either implicitly or explicitly, for the purpose of imbuing articles with meaning. In other words, news shaping involves implementing particular techniques—including the deliberate use of information sources—to bias news articles in ways that reinforce established societal viewpoints that reinforce and sustain the status quo. Using many of the preceding notions as a general backdrop, the following section is devoted to providing some outline of the chosen quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis.

Quantitative Component: Numerically Legitimizing Particular Viewpoints

As noted by Herman and Chomsky (2002; Chomsky 1998; Jhally 1997), an important method of lending legitimacy to certain viewpoints on issues is through a variety of numerical means. Perhaps the first, and most obvious, method employed by a news medium’s endeavour at manipulating the public’s viewpoint on a particular issue is through its inclusion or omission as a news item—the so-called ‘contingency factor’. In general, issues that are given a great deal of coverage will inevitably appear to be of utmost importance, while those that are relatively ignored will seem quite insignificant and unworthy of the citizenry’s critical reflection. Furthermore, in accordance with the propaganda model, one would expect a commercial news medium’s coverage of an issue that risks confronting ‘truths’ established by powerful elites, or that threatens prevailing...

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22 The use of “News Shaping” and “News Sourcing” at this point is not intended to suggest that notions contributing to this section will derive solely from the works of Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (2002; Chomsky 1998; Achbar and Wintonick 1996; Jhally 1997). As will hopefully be apparent in the material that follows, the ideas of a variety of media critics will be used. As the subtitle also suggests, a significant facet of this section will be a comparative analysis of the discourses created/perpetuated by the two news media.
power structures, to be relatively sparse. As for the intended project, expectations are that the NY Times coverage of the Pacifica crisis— an issue that risks confronting some of the significant rhetoric of free market (neoliberal) capitalism, or the mature commercial ideology that defines much of the Times’s raison d’etre— is relatively rare. In order to demonstrate the legitimacy of this expectation, I will perform a comparative numerical count of articles relating to the Pacifica Foundation issue.

A second quantitative, yet no-less significant, factor of note regarding newsprint media concerns the placement of items that are disseminated. As asserted by Kress and van Leeuwen (Bell and Garrett 1998), the particular layout of newspapers does much to reveal the (largely implicit) opinion-shaping agendas of those who deal in the news-dissemination business. As such, within the mainstream news media, issues deemed significant— largely those that perpetuate established ‘truisms’ of the mature commercial ideology— will find favourable exposure. In other words, they will be prominently published in the most important ‘spots’ (closer to the front page) in the most important ‘sections’ (generally the first sections-on-down). Conversely, items deemed relatively insignificant, for whatever reason, will not be so favourably exposed. If they are published at all, they will be found ‘buried’ in ‘back sections’ of the paper. Accordingly, I will expect to locate the Times’s coverage of the Pacifica situation in appropriately ‘buried’ areas.23

Closely related to the above-noted quantitative factors is the amount of coverage, or space, a news medium affords particular news items. Perhaps not surprisingly, issues and events that are deemed relatively insignificant— or that confront the viewpoints of the

23 Unfortunately, as the Bay Guardian sample does not derive from newsprint, this is one aspect that is unavailable for comparative analyses. However, this should not detract from the importance of an analysis of the various locations of Pacifica coverage provided by the NY Times.

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Establishment—will be given less column space than they, perhaps, deserve, while those that perpetuate such views— or are deemed relatively ineffectual to the truisms established by the prevailing cultural industries and those who preside over them—will be afforded more space. For the purpose of further highlighting the respective coverage of the Times and Bay Guardian, and of adding to the weight of the preceding tally of articles, I will compare the amount of coverage afforded by each newsprint medium. However, due to unavoidable variations between by two samples, I am not able to use the typical method of comparing ‘column inches’, as prescribed by Herman and Chomsky (2002). In lieu of this, I will perform a comparison of the actual size of Pacifica crisis-related articles appearing in the Times and Bay Guardian—including a comparison of the quantity of full-length (at least 300 words) articles versus relatively smaller articles (under 300 words). I will also calculate the mean words per article. I believe that these methods should provide adequate substitutions for the column inches.

Finally, as another important means of lending legitimacy to specific viewpoints concerning an issue, sources must be taken into account. Understandably, this is one of, if not the most significant means of numerically shaping issues that a medium cannot avoid covering—regardless of the potential risk to the established ideological/social order. In general, and as will be discussed in the subsequent discourse framing section, it is the contention of this project that journalists/editors can, and will, attempt to offer greater legitimacy to particular ‘factions’ through affording them greater relative space as sources of opinion. By preferably offering what discourse analysts often refer to as “footing” (Deacon, Pickering, Golding and Murdock 1999), journalists/editors are indelibly shaping articles in favour of particular factions. Furthermore, shapers of news
items can further add legitimacy to particular factions/viewpoints by giving citation space to ‘insiders’ who represent those viewpoints. Conversely, unpopular, contradictory, or status quo-threatening viewpoints will tend to be offered less space for citations, and, when cited, may tend to be provided by ‘outsiders’, who, although knowledgeable and passionate about an issue, are not directly involved. Under the presumption that actual citation space provides greater authority, or legitimacy, to source viewpoints, I will tally the citations provided by the Times and Guardian—on both a per article (300+ word articles and under-300 word articles) and total coverage level—with a particular distinction given to insider and outsider sourcing. In accordance with the dictates of the propaganda model, I would expect that the Times will offer noticeably greater, and more ‘legitimate’, citation/reference-space to the viewpoints of those who, in support of the rhetoric of the free market, are in favour of altering, or ‘mainstreaming’ the content of the Pacifica broadcasters.

24 Because of the general level of difficulty in determining the accuracy regarding indirect referencing of individuals and factions, I have decided to omit all but direct citations from the ‘footing’ analysis. In addition, because I have decided to limit this part of the analysis to written articles provided by journalists and news agencies, who must closely adhere to a professional sense of ‘fairness’ regarding sourcing, I have had to omit some of the articles. With respect to the Times’s coverage, articles that are omitted include letters to the editor (2 under 300, and 1 of 300+ words), pieces that are provided in an editorial form (1 of 300+ words), and photos that are not accompanied by written coverage (1 under 300 words)—leaving the Times footing sample totalling 12 (2 under 300, and 10 of 300+ words); regarding the Bay Guardian’s coverage, articles that I have chosen to omit from my footing analysis include all items that are simply not bound by the ‘balanced coverage’ mantra of professional journalistic practices, such as editorials, or other un-authored pieces (2 under 300, and 4 of 300+ words), authored pieces that take the general shape of editorials, or op-eds (1 under 300, and 14 of 300+ words), press-releases, or other forms of releases provided by insiders, or other concerned groups and institutions (2 under 300, and 3 of 300+ words), interviews (1 of 300+ words), listings of awards (1 of 300+ words), and pieces that do not directly focus upon the issue (2 of 300+ words)—leaving the Guardian’s footing sample totalling 24 (1 under 300, and 23 of 300+ words). I have also omitted citations provided by outsiders that are ‘neutral’, or do not appear to be supportive of one faction or the other. I have decided to include insider citations that are not directly related to the issue, but that do serve to enhance her/his image, and thus further legitimate their position regarding the issue. On the other hand, I have omitted the citations of insiders who do not appear supportive of either faction.

25 At this point, it must be noted that I expect similar biases to be prevalent regarding the Guardian’s use of citations/references—not to mention other means of expressing news biases. However, as will be made clear in a subsequent section of the thesis regarding the propagandistic nature of ALL news media, there must be a distinction between what I will refer to as egoistic propaganda—that used by those in power for the purpose of perpetuating that power through the marginalization of the public—and altruistic propaganda—that attempted...
Qualitative Component: Thematic Framing of Established Discourses

Perhaps the most significant facet of my comparative content analysis, the following section will attempt to utilize a variety of methods to uncover some of the more pervasive discourses that prevail within both Times and Bay Guardian coverage of the Pacifica crisis. I believe that focussing on the coverage of both corporate and alternative news media is crucial, as it is important to recognize that all such media are deeply laden with a variety of propagandistic purposes. As was briefly introduced above, however, it will be my contention that the quality of propaganda in which the two competing media forms are regularly engaged vastly differs in intended affects. While the propaganda of one media type— the corporate information media— attempts to ‘sell’ the mature commercial ideology, and closely-linked free market system, at all costs, while significantly disenfranchising, and thus disarming the individual of important enlightenment needed to upend a largely unjust societal status quo, that of the other media type— the alternative information media— attempts to reverse this process, and re-empower the citizenry in ways that will facilitate the Establishment of necessary societal changes (Parenti 1986). As such, I intend to include an explication of some of the discursive themes present in the ways the competing media cover the Pacifica issue— for instance, the Times’s general depiction of Pacifica’s Executive Board as authoritative, well-meant and level-headed, while depicting those protesting their manoeuvring as relatively ‘antiquated’ in their perceptions of public radio’s function.

As contended by news media analysts, one of the most effective ways a corporate news medium has of disseminating a particular bias in their coverage of events is through “framing”; indeed, many argue that professional news is almost always involved in, and by a variety of forces that aim to empower the public.
shaped by, an ongoing process of framing. Perhaps at its simplest, framing involves selection and salience. "To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman 1993, 52; emphasis added). Similarly, in providing some conclusionary points regarding their analysis of the particular layout of the front pages of newspapers, Kress and van Leeuwen assert that key functions of a newspaper are to provide salience, framing and evaluation regarding the myriad issues/events that continually occur around the globe: "[N]ewspaper[s] position genres such as opinion, report and advertisement in relation to each other, and provide them with different degrees of salience and framing, and thereby endow them with particular valuations" (Bell and Garrett 1998, 216; emphases added). In effect, then, successful framing can shape opinion without resorting to the more subjective methods employed by alternative news media—largely to the effect of rendering them illegitimate in the opinion of a general citizenry that has been successfully conditioned to trust the objective model only. In general practice, "framing is achieved in the way the news is packaged, the amount of exposure, the placement (front page or back, lead story or last), the tone of presentation (sympathetic or slighting), the accompanying headlines and visual effects, and the labelling and vocabulary" (Parenti 1986, 221; emphases again added). As such,

26 Although, the effective application of a frame-analysis to the task of revealing a pro-commercial dominant discourse that prevails within mainstream newsprint media will be my primary goal throughout the comparative content analysis underlying my proposed project, I will not progress without the assumption that alternative news media likewise frame their disseminations in support of dominant discourses that prevail within their sub-community. For more on the framing of discourses, refer to Hartley (1982), Parenti (1986), Fiske (1987), Entman (1993) and Altheide (1996).
one would expect to identify, within articles, specific phrasing that tends to be supportive or unsupportive of particular positions on issues.

One important method that a commercial news medium utilizes to frame an issue is through locating it within a predefined discourse— a process that tends to deflect the "local" or individuality from an issue, and thus disembodify it of a novelty that may serve to critically confront the status quo; the dominant ideology is thus protected. Perhaps the best way to do this is through the application of "cliches" or "metaphors". As Fiske (1987, 291) suggests, “a cliche is a piece of discourse that is frequently repeated because it bears a particularly close relationship with the dominant ideology . . . [and] . . . a metaphor explains the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar and is thus a conventionalizing agent.” In effect, mainstream news media tend to frame novel events and issues using discursive techniques through which they are “normalized”, and thus promote preconceived notions of reality (Bennett 1983, 1993). In relation to Pacifica coverage offered by the Times, one would perhaps expect to locate ‘normalizing’ cliches that lend implicit support to the executive committee, and are critical of the position of dissenters. For instance, a typical cliche that may be employed by the Times to discredit the dissenters’ position is to associate them with the long-established image of the ‘disruptive left’, or, perhaps more constructively, with the image of those who are averse to ‘progress’ or ‘change’ in general— in relation to the Pacifica issue, ‘progress’ refers to the ‘truism’ commonly held by architects of, and adherents to, the rhetoric of the (neoliberal) free market: mature commercialism is beneficial in nature.

Similar to the assigning of news issues to preformed and widely-accepted discourses, journalists and their (managers) editors will typically filter items and issues
through their established "sign-systems" (Hartley 1982). In effect, the dissemination of news does not merely represent the expression of novel events or issues, but rather reflects and perpetuates an image of similarly-categorized events or issues that combine to shape an image of social reality—generally in a status quo-sustaining way. Moreover, those who construct the news items have long been, and still are, constrained by these routine ways of viewing issues and events. As Lippman (1920, 36) asserts, "The pressure on the newspaper to adhere to [a] routine comes from many sides. It comes from the economy of noting only the stereotyped phase of a situation. It comes from the difficulty of finding journalists who can see what they have not learned to see. It comes from the almost unavoidable difficulty of finding sufficient space in which even the best journalist can make plausible an unconventional view." As a result of stereotyping the news, or having it accord with established sign-systems, actual events cease to represent reality—they are tools through which stereotypical reality is shaped by mainstream news media. As such, "it is not the event which is reported that determines the form, content, meaning or 'truth' of the news, but rather the news that determines what it is that the event means: its meaning results from the features of the sign-system and the context in which it is uttered and received" (Hartley 1982, 15). In the case of corporate news media, it would perhaps be expected that one important sign-system that must be rigidly adhered to focusses on the superiority of the free market, or mature commercial ideology, and, as such, dissemination of events or issues will be framed in ways that reflect and perpetuate the commonsensical, or 'mediathink' status of that system.

In large part, the commonsensical discourses, or sign-systems are framed through a relatively implicit, yet apparently somewhat simplistic, method of word-issue/discourse
associations that border on the perpetuation of societal myths (Lule 2001; Bignell 1997). Furthermore, as Bignell (1997, 26) notes, myths are almost always inextricably linked to the dominant ideologies—such as the superiority and desirability of a mature commercial society—that permeate the societal status quo. From these perspectives, one may assume that the dissemination of particular, or local, news items is never entirely independent from the more general discourses, or myths, that shape the topics/issues that permeate the broader societal context. As Teun van Dijk (1988, 75) asserts, “News style is controlled by the possible topics of news discourse . . . [and these] topics, by definition, control local meanings and hence possible word meanings and, therefore, lexical choice. The boundaries of topics and of possible lexical variance are set in advance, even when there is personal and newspaper variation in the description of the same things.” In other words, although there may be some variance in the way mainstream news media cover specific events or issues, the general structures of discursive sign-systems are constantly present; perhaps one should or would expect little else in an industry wherein a staunch professionalization has naturally resulted in a homogenization of information dissemination. In addition, due to the centrality of deadlines in professional, objective journalism, writing and editing must be fast, and, “to avoid [the time consuming effect of] too many grammatical errors, stylistic inappropriateness or semantic nonsense, the syntax and lexicalization must also be routinized” (76). Therefore, ‘routine’ becomes a central determining factor in mainstream, or professional, news gathering, composing and disseminating.

After having presumed that one may expect the dissemination of news to involve the implicit and/or explicit use of a number of normalizing metaphors, or cliches, that
serve as vehicles for framing, and thus reifying commonly-held, although often marginalizing, social sign-systems, or discourses, one must then choose a means through which these processes can be effectively unveiled within the texts that comprise my samples. As noted above, in order to achieve the unearthing of prevailing dominant discourses within the mainstream newsprint media, I have chosen to employ an analysis of ways in which news items are framed. As a relatively well developed and diverse means of analysis, I believe that this method offers the most viable option. In choosing an analysis of news framing, I will be able to adopt and apply the varied approaches of a number of respected theorists—some of whom have been mentioned above—to the project.

As was the case for the quantitative analysis, citations/references will occupy a significant position in my qualitative analysis. It will be my contention that citations/references— and their sources— are consistently chosen for the purpose of lending authority, and therefore legitimacy to particular positions regarding events or issues. Of course, as indicated above, the positions that must be legitimated are those that perpetuate the dominant social discourses. In addition to providing greater space for citations/references to those who express opinions that perpetuate dominant discourses, journalists and editors may add weight to these positions by citing individuals that are commonly accepted as authoritative and trustworthy. Conversely, positions that run contrary to dominant discourses will be given less authority; perhaps the best means of doing this is through citing sources that commonly held to be less reliable— or more ideologically subjective. In the case of the Times’s coverage of the Pacifica situation, one would, perhaps, expect that the sourcing of viewpoints favouring the mainstreaming,
or corporatisation, of the content disseminated by the five radio stations be gathered from ‘authoritative’ individuals— through emphasizing such aspects as their ‘expert’ credentials— while the sourcing of contrary viewpoints to originate from those with comparatively fewer credentials— such as ‘nameless protestors’.

Of course, the use of citations is made more significant in a news format that provides highly fragmented information on events (Bennett 1983, 1993). Due to a limited space allotment and general fear of balance that are indicative of the professional journalistic practices adhered to by mainstream news media, and perhaps to a lesser extent alternative news media, coverage of items is superficial and largely decontextualized. As a result, citations that are selected to express specific positions, or frame the greater context, of events and issues, are of greater importance in shaping the ways in which the citizenry receives information about, and interprets, those events and issues. As such, similar positions that are repeatedly given greater sourcing-credibility will almost inextricably play a significant role in swaying public opinion in favour of said positions. In other words, greater authority and credibility given to those who espouse dominant ideologies will naturally tend to perpetuate the dominance of said ideologies. Similarly, greater authority and credibility given to sources who express viewpoints that are meant to indirectly frame the context of articles will tend to succeed in appropriately framing said context.

A final, and perhaps most significant, means of interpreting the framing of news items concerns syntactic or lexical modifiers of noun phrases (Stubbs 1996; van Dijk 1988, 1998). Within news items, journalists and editors will tend to lend a little ‘colour’ to the raw data they provide through the use of modifiers that may serve to influence the
formation of readers’ opinions regarding particular issues. In other words, journalists and editors will modify phrases in ways that assign value to particular aspects of the issue they are disseminating. For instance, in the case of miners striking against their corporate employer, a journalist may choose to refer to one of the strikers as a “combative miner”, rather than simply a “miner”. In this case, the former provides additional information—“combative”—that modifies the noun—“miner”—yet, simultaneously evokes a value-judgement within the information receiver.

The use of value-laden modifiers within mainstream news is made more significant by the negative binary nature of Western language and discourses in general (Levi-Straus 1967; Derrida 1976, 1978). If one understands the dissemination of news to be a discursive form in-and-of-itself, which it is, then one would expect it to distinguish between a ‘right’ and a ‘wrong’ position on social issues/events. Furthermore, as propagators of society’s dominant ideologies, the mainstream news media should be expected to assign positive values to opinions that adhere to these ideologies, and, conversely, to assign negative values to opinions that are contrary to these ideologies. I expect this to be a recurrent theme with regard to the Times’s coverage of the Pacifica crisis.

Finally, another important method of framing a news item is the wording of the headline. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this method is that it is the original ‘shaper’ of receivers’ opinions. In effect, “[t]he function of the linguistic syntags of headlines is to draw the attention of the reader to the topic of each news story, and through the connotations of the linguistic signs to propose some of the social codes appropriate for understanding it” (Bignell 1996, 96). In other words, the headline will
draw on some commonsensical notions regarding an issue in order to predetermine the ideological ‘tools’ necessary for the proper deciphering of the story that follows. Perhaps even more significant, as noted by Parenti (1986), headlines are the domain of the editors, and, therefore, undergo a framing beyond the control of the individual journalists who compose the bulk of the news items. Of course, in cases where social discourses are ‘mature’ enough to be adequately dispersed throughout the general citizenry, this distinction will be of little importance— the editors and journalists will tend to share similar opinions on an issue. However, where social discourses are not yet mature enough to be widely accepted in uniform ways, there may be slight differences between the viewpoints of the editors— who are increasingly hired for their ideological sympathy, and their ability to manage journalists accordingly— and those of journalists. This being the case, the editors’ ability to apply the initial, and, arguably, most significant, framing of an issue is rendered (incredibly) significant.
Quantitative Analysis:
Numerically Contradicting Preconceptions

There are undoubtedly many preconceptions that attach themselves to the notions of 'objective'—or mainstream, professional journalism—and 'subjective'—alternative journalism. For the purposes of this project, and as noted above, I have decided to focus on the quantity of coverage, the location of coverage— for the New York Times only—and the notion of 'balanced coverage'. The following relatively brief section will attempt to disseminate and expound upon the results of previous analyses pertaining to these specific themes.

Quantity of Coverage: The Relative Impoverishment of Issue Dissemination

Due to a variety of structural deficiencies, such as the need for concision and general vastness of the pool of potential news items they must attempt to report on, in order to fulfill their duty as principal informers on the great many events that occur on a daily basis and the need to pursue somewhat novel events/issues to successfully compete with other like media, the 'objective' news media could not, and generally do not, offer substantial coverage of particular items—unless, of course, the items are deemed so significant that they and their competitors cannot avoid such coverage. The (subjective) independent or alternative media, on the other hand, are not so-limited.

The notion that a corporate news media is structurally, and perhaps ideologically, unable to offer relatively substantial space to issues/events that are anything less than nationally, or internationally, gripping—such as war, petulance, serial murder, et cetera—seems to be justified. Regarding the Pacifica crisis, the Times offered far less coverage—

27 For the purpose of retaining some uniformity, the following dissemination of the results of the quantitative portion to the project's comparative analysis will make use of actual numerical indicators, rather than their lexical counterparts.
measured by word-count—than did the Bay Guardian. In terms of total coverage, during the relatively lengthy period of analysis, the Times provided 17 articles—approximately 32% of the 54 articles provided by the Bay Guardian. Furthermore, the Times coverage was generally not as ‘meaty’ as that of the Bay Guardian; total words per article devoted by the Times numbered 648, while that devoted by the Bay Guardian numbered 872. It must be noted, however, that much of this approximately 35% difference resulted from the greater percentage of smaller articles (under 300 words) that comprised the entire Times sample—29% (or 5 of 17) versus the Bay Guardian’s 11% (or 6 of 54). As for the articles that did provide some ‘meat’ (deemed as articles providing 300 or more words), the difference between the coverage provided by the two information media decreases to approximately 11%—860 words per article (Times) versus 953 words per article (Bay Guardian). On the other hand, of the articles providing less than 300 words, the Bay Guardian offered a significantly greater number of words per article (approximately 38% more) than did the Times—224 versus 140, respectively. In sum, then, it is clear that the ‘subjective’ newsprint medium was able to offer much more general coverage of the Pacifica issue than was the ‘objective’ newsprint medium. This medium was also able to offer much greater substantive coverage via articles of 300 or more words.

**Footing: Which Newsprint Medium is Really ‘Balancing’ the Coverage?**

As noted above, the objective journalism of the mainstream news media is largely underpinned by a notion of fair, or balanced coverage. The logic applied through this notion suggests that issues covered by the professional news source must afford equal opportunity for the (usually two) sides involved to voice their opinions—particularly
through the practice of footing, or providing citation-space.\(^2\) Largely unconstrained by the yolk of objectivity, the subjective, or ‘partisan’ journalism disseminated through alternative news media is often assumed to frequently forego objectivity-related pretenses of balance, or fairness— at least at times best suited to furthering a usually not-so-hidden agenda. However, as one of the contentions of this paper, sourcing in a ‘balanced’ manner must be conceived in a manner beyond a mere numerical count of citation space offered to particular factions.

If one is concerned with judging the balance of opinion offered within articles, the ‘quality’ of the source must be taken into account. More specifically, the contention is that space provided for the citations of insiders’ viewpoints does much more in bestowing authority, or legitimacy to a particular faction’s stand on an issue than does providing space to the viewpoints of ‘outsiders’— regardless of the simple numerical ‘balance’. In addition, due to their evolution into profit-centred businesses, ever striving to achieve the lowest possible overhead, the mainstream news media— the New York Times, and others— have become overly-reliant upon the statements of ‘official’ sources. As such, they are now predisposed to seek sourcing from Establishmentarian representatives and other ‘official’ insiders— particularly those who can officially schedule times for the provision of their opinions regarding issues/events. Therefore, it would, perhaps, be expected that the Times would provide much more space to official, Establishmentarian citations emanating from official institutions— in this case, the central executive of the Pacifica Foundation. Based on an analysis of the results of the quantitative comparison of

\(^2\) I am focussing on a newsprint medium’s provision of space for the use of direct quotes— or citations— from representatives of particular sides of an issue because I believe that they bestow more authority than the journalist’s mere repeating of such opinions. The logic, then, assumes that a journalist’s use of direct citations from sources indirectly, or implicitly, suggests to the reader that these sources are trustworthy enough to directly provide their opinions, and thus shape the intent of the articles within which they appear.
coverage of the Pacifica crisis offered by the *New York Times* and *San Francisco Bay Guardian*, some of the preconceptions appear justified, while others a little misconceived.

Perhaps the most significant findings relate to the provision of citation space—footing—offered by the ‘objective’, ‘balanced’ *New York Times*, versus the ‘subjective’, ‘partisan’ *San Francisco Bay Guardian*. Upon first glance, the coverage provided by the two media appear, perhaps, to adhere to initial preconceptions; the balanced Times offers relatively equal footing space to both factions—approximately 41% of the citations found within the Times’s coverage is provided by those supportive of the Pacifica Protestors. On a per article basis, the executive faction provided approximately 3.17 citations, while the protestor faction provided 2.16 citations. Indeed, when one focuses upon the ‘meatier’ articles (300 or more words), this balance only increases—26 citations, or approximately 2.60 citations per article, provided by the protestor supporters versus 35, or approximately 3.50 citations per article, provided by those supportive of the Pacifica Foundation executive— an approximate 57% to 43% split in favour of the executive. However, this is somewhat misleading.

The apparent ‘near-balance’ disintegrates when one considers the sources—insiders versus outsiders—of provided citations. While exactly half (13) of the 26 citations provided by the protestors and their supporters derive from outsiders— or those not directly involved in the issue— not one of the 38 total citations provided by those supportive of the executive’s agenda/actions derive from without that executive. All of the latter’s citations derive from official, and therefore more legitimate, or reliable sources. Therefore, in terms of total coverage on a per article basis, the use of citations from insiders on the executive’s behalf outnumber that on behalf of the protestors by a
ration of approximately 3.17 to 1.08—an approximate 194% difference in favour of the executive position. Furthermore, this rather lopsided ratio decreases little when considering the meatier articles of 300 or more words: the Times allowed executive insiders approximately 3.50 citations, while only allowing protestor insiders approximately 1.30 citations—a difference of approximately 169%. Therefore, when considering the quality of sources, the ‘balance’ provided by the objective Times is largely a false one; the numerical balance is largely accomplished through utilizing outsider, or less legitimate, citations from the non-Establishmentarian position.

Turning to the ‘subjective’, or ‘partisan’, footing provided by the Bay Guardian, one’s preconceptions regarding an expected bias are, perhaps, fulfilled—at least upon initial analysis. Its provision of citation space to those supportive of the Pacifica protestors do, indeed, out-number its provision of citation space to those supportive of the Pacifica executive—by more than a 2 to 1 ratio (124 to fifty-three, respectably) for total articles—approximately a 5.64 to 2.41 citations per article, or approximately a 134% difference, in favour of the protest position. For the more substantive articles of 300 or more words, the numbers hardly alter: 120 citations from the protestor position versus 53 citations from the executive position, or approximately 5.71 citations per article to 2.52 citations per article, respectably—an approximate 127% difference in favour of the protest position. However, although not quite as remarkable as that of the Times, this initial numerical tally of the provision of citation space is also misleading.

When again considering the quality of source—insiders versus outsiders—the original apparent bias does abate somewhat. With regard to the 22 total articles comprising the sample, the Bay Guardian utilized 50 insider citations for the side of the
executive committee, while it utilized 88 insider citations for the protestor faction—an approximately 4.00 to 2.27 ratio, or approximately 76% difference, in favour of the protestors. For the meatier articles of 300 or more words, the gap decreases still: 84 citations (approximately 4.00 citations per article) provided by protest insiders, compared to 50 (approximately 2.38 citations per article) provided by executive insiders—a difference of approximately 68% in favour of the protest position. Therefore, when considering the 'officiality' of the sourcing regarding the Pacifica issue, the Bay Guardian actually provided a more balanced coverage, both for total articles—approximately 4.00 (protestors) to 2.27 (executive), or a 76% difference, versus approximately 3.17 (executive) to 1.08 (protestors), or a 194% difference—and those of a more substantive length of 300 or more words—approximately 4.00 (protestors) to 2.38 (executive), or a 68% difference, versus approximately 3.50 (executive) to 1.30 (protestors), or a 169% difference.

Moreover, when factoring in occasions where the Times and Bay Guardian journalists attempted, but were unable, to get comments from insiders (NC's), the numbers are even more remarkable. With sole regard for insider citations provided in the more substantive articles, the balance ratio on a per article basis appears as thus: Times coverage offers approximately 3.90 (executive) citations to 1.30 (protestors) citations—or a 200% difference in favour of executive insiders; Bay Guardian coverage in the more substantive articles offers approximately 4.14 (protestors) to 3.00 (executive), or a 38% difference in favour of protestor insiders.

Perhaps not surprisingly, journalists did not appear to meet with much difficulty when seeking opinions from insiders from the protestors' point of view—a mere three occasions. This far-greater tendency on the part of the Pacifica executive could perhaps reveal its intentions to keep the news media out of their 'dirty laundry', and avoid public scrutiny regarding their actions.
The results are perhaps even more interesting when controlling for articles that appear blatantly biased with regard to footing— a difference of 10 or more insider citations provided by one faction or the other. Under this criterion, one article of 300 or more words from the Times sample, and two articles of 300 or more words from the Bay Guardian sample were excluded. While both newsprint media, when controlled in this manner, provide more balance of insider citations for both the Pacifica executive and the protestors, it is the Bay Guardian that appears to prevail as the more balanced provider of insider opinion— particularly when providing for the occasions where comments from the executive insiders were not available or withheld. Again focusing on the more substantive articles, and on a per article basis, the controlled Times coverage provided a citation space ratio of approximately 2.78 (executive) to 1.44 (protestors), or a 93% difference in favour of the executive, while the controlled Bay Guardian coverage provided a citation space ratio of approximately 3.05 (protestors) to 2.42 (executive), or a 26% difference in favour of the protestors.

Moreover, by adding the ‘No Comment’ (NC) occasions into the balance ratio of the substantive articles, the controlled Bay Guardian appears to provide an almost astonishing balance— at least in comparison to the balance provided by that of the Times, which actually decreases. While the Times offers approximately 3.22 (executive) to 1.44 (protestors)— a difference of 123% in favour of executive insiders— the Bay Guardian offers approximately 3.21 (protestors) to 3.00 (executive)— or a mere 7% difference in favour of protestors insiders. Of course, this reveals little regarding the ‘quality’ of the coverage offered, but that is something that is more adequately addressed in an ensuing section of the paper.

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Location of Pacifica Coverage in the *New York Times*: A ‘Hidden’ Agenda?

As previously noted, one of the ways that a newsprint medium can bestow authority and importance to an issue is to provide prominent coverage (Parenti 1986). In other words, importance is allocated based on relative visibility, or where the article is located in the medium— in general, the closer to the front of the paper (section A), or the closer to the front of subsequent sections of the paper, the more significance an issue is provided, and thus, the greater attention will be given by the readership. Conversely, an issue can be marginalized in the same fashion— the less visibility given an issue, either through a lack of coverage, or its placement in lesser parts of the paper, the less importance is bestowed upon it, and the less attention offered it by the paper’s readership. Given the corporate-ownership, advertising and general structure— and mainstream— content— nature of the *New York Times*, one would, perhaps, expect that its coverage of an issue involving critical condemnation of an attempt at corporatizing and mainstreaming a public, advertiser-free information medium to be relatively sparse and, when it is present, to be well hidden.

Based on analysis, the above-confirmed sparse coverage of the Pacifica issue offered by the Times is indeed relatively hidden. Initial, or, perhaps, ‘early-warning’, coverage (2 articles) introducing the issue was relegated to the business section (section four), where one could expect little outcry from those who regularly peruse this section. Indeed, this section’s readership would conceivably be more interested in the ‘business’ implications of the issue, rather than the loss of public accessibility and hard-line journalism implications. Furthermore, the only article that appeared in a predominant position in this section was largely a publicity piece for the new director of the Pacifica’s
executive committee, Patricia Scott, extolling her virtues as a strong and efficient leader (Peterson 1997b). After an approximate one-and-one-half year absence of coverage, coverage began around the month of July, 1999, when the issue heated up with events concerning Berkeley’s KPFA station. Although all of these (6) articles appeared in the first, and premier section, they were relatively buried in obscurity– page 12 and beyond. The next major ‘stint’ of coverage (4 articles) offered the issue by the Times occurred between December 23, 2000 and January 17, 2001, when the issue began to affect New York’s WBAI station. With the exception of one article, which was buried (page 23) in the first section of the paper, these articles were covered in the second section– only one on the more prominent first page. Of final significant note, the concluding article published by the Times– that describing the official end of the issue, and largely a victory for the protestors– was buried deeper in the paper than had been previously realized, and again in the business section, perhaps returning to its ‘place of birth’, as it were.
Qualitative Analysis: ‘Top-Down’ Vs. ‘Bottom-Up’ Framing

As was addressed at an earlier point of the thesis, it is my contention that mainstream news media, and the New York Times in particular, whether willingly or not, act as vehicles for the ‘top-down’ viewpoints of established authority figures and representatives of powerful institutions—thus serving as propagandistic tools for those in power, and therefore playing a significant role in ensuring the replication of the societal status quo. Moreover, I contend that alternative news media, such as the San Francisco Bay Guardian, tend to emphasize the viewpoints of dissenters and those who wish to alter the status quo, or developments, in ways that will, perhaps, yield a more equitable social existence for the majority of the citizenry, and therefore provide more of a ‘bottom-up’ method of journalistic dissemination. However, much like their mainstream counterparts, alternative news media will often resort to propagandistic means to affect change— as opposed to mainstream news media’s tendency to deter change. Again, the significant difference between the propagandistic functions of the two media lies in their apparent purpose— or what I have referred to as ‘egoistic’ versus ‘altruistic’ propaganda functions. While the mainstream news media attempt to reproduce status quo power relations, and therefore function as egoistic propagandists, the alternative news media often attempt to change those power relations, and thus function as altruistic propagandists. Through the

Prior to the ensuing dissemination of the findings from the qualitative analysis, it is deemed essential to address two poignant points. Firstly, it must be noted that I recognize a potential pitfall of analysing media content. Namely, the notion that a researcher may often locate exactly what (s)he intends. In order to safeguard against this, I will endeavour to account for instances where I may be attributing undue meaning to arguably vague content. Moreover, the following will include brief subsections of analysis regarding the Times’s provision of space for the expression of viewpoints from ‘below’, as well as the Bay Guardian’s provision of space for the expression of viewpoints from ‘above’. Secondly, although, when referring to newspaper articles, the generally accepted method is to cite all necessary information within the text, and therefore to render an account within the works cited section of a formal paper, they will be cited in similar fashion as books and journal articles (name, date). In addition, they will be included within the ensuing works cited. It is believed that this will achieve a more suitable continuity with respect to the rest of the cited materials.
use of a variety of categories of qualitative analysis, the following section will attempt to reveal some of the ways that mainstream and alternative news media frame news items, and thus respectively yield news dissemination of an egoistic and altruistic propaganda.

The *New York Times* and Egoistic Propaganda

As was noted above, the primary purpose of the thesis is, in general, to reaffirm the significant role of news media in keeping a society’s citizenry properly informed, and therefore sufficiently equipped to adequately participate in the political process— a system of processes that are essential in an authentic democracy. Moreover, it is my contention that a subjective, and more ‘bottom-up’, journalistic approach is best to achieve the aforementioned purpose. However, contending that journalists working for mainstream news media are complicit in their dissemination of egoistic propaganda is not an underlying purpose of this particular endeavour. Indeed, such a contention would be foolhardy, at best. As was suggested earlier, however, in many, if not most, cases, pivotal underlying structural realities of mainstream news media, such as giving preferable treatment to voices of Establishment figures, largely determine the particular frame of provided output— regardless of the particular mien of their journalists. In reality, it is only in the lexical phrasing of nouns within news items, and their titles— or ‘auxiliary embellishments’— that journalists and/or editors are able to provide some level of explicit framing within their contributions— something that will be addressed accordingly. In large part, the following section will focus on a content analysis of NY Times contributions on a variety of themes— *All Hail the Mature Commercial Ideology, Management as ‘Benevolent’— Dissenters as ‘Disruptive’ and ‘Irrational’, Media on Media: The Relative Inferiority of Alternative, ‘Partisan’ News Media, Miscellaneous*
Observations of Significance: Part One and finally Provision of Space for the Expression of Viewpoints from ‘Below’.

All Hail the Mature Commercial Ideology

Perhaps not surprisingly, coverage provided by the New York Times tended to focus on the importance of such free market catch-phrases—particularly, notions such as market share, efficiency, technological and organizational progress. Typically providing the bulk of item space to the Pacifica ‘Establishment’, much of the coverage offered by the Times naturally tends to be guided by an emphasis upon their vocalized concern over maximizing their audience penetration. Throughout the Times sample, phrases such as “minuscule penetration” (Peterson 1997b), “attract more listeners” (Nieves 1999b), “serve just a few people and their interests” (Scott 2000) and “broaden their stations’ audiences” (Blair 2001) appear with relative frequency, not to mention favourable placement, within the articles.31 While these notions do not, in-and-of-themselves, offer ‘evidence’ that the Times’s coverage is biased toward the position of the Pacifica Establishment, their relative placement and item-saturation do. They tend to occur early within the articles, and take up a much greater portion of total article space. As will be noted below, this is largely the result of framing the articles from an official Establishment standpoint—an above-noted structural flaw in the structure of mainstream news media.

Writing for the Business section, Iver Peterson appears to go the extra mile in ‘spelling out’ the issue, at least from a mature commercialist perspective—one particularly geared for the readership of the section of the paper for which he writes:

31 Moreover, the notion of ‘broadening audiences’ was also proclaimed within articles contributed by Scott (2000) and Worth (2001).
"The signals from Pacifica’s five stations...reach 22 percent of all homes, about 50 million potential listeners. Yet, barely 700,000 people tune in during any given week, according to Arbitron ratings" (1997b). Perhaps not surprisingly, by mentioning the Arbitron ratings, he (intentionally or unintentionally) serves the purpose of indicating ‘official’ nature of the network’s measured ‘success’, and thus legitimates expressed concerns of the central Pacifica Establishment. Indeed, an effective legitimation using statistical numbers appears in other Times items. Appearing in the National Report section of the paper, Times reporter Evelyn Nieves (1999a; emphases added) reports that, “Pacifica wanted to broaden its appeal and reach more than 200,000 of the six million potential listeners in its 59,000-watt channel.” Moreover, in a follow-up, this journalist virtually repeats the sentiment, although in the second article, she colourfully refers to the 200,000 listeners as a “stagnated” audience (Nieves 1999b).

Pacifica management’s contention that they have adequate reason to attempt to broaden audiences can also be bolstered through other reporting choices. As Jayson Blair (2001; emphasis added) notes, Pacifica management wish to broaden audiences, “based on studies that showed that listeners did not reflect the diversity in the areas served by the stations and were too old to sustain future operations.” That the “studies” were done by a ‘legitimate’ organization would perhaps be a safe assumption on the part of readers. In addition to referring to legitimating “studies”, this particular citation also covers two other typical components of the mature commercial ideology: the notion of ‘mainstreaming’ content— an ever popular strategy within the mature commercial media system to maximize market (audience) share— and “sustaining future markets”— a typical notion laden with the mature commercial ideology. Janny Scott (2000; emphasis mine) is
another Times journalist who provides article space for Pacifica management’s contention that they are merely, and perhaps honourably, attempting to ensure the future of the network, as she notes their “desire to broaden Pacifica’s audience and ensure the network’s future.”

In addition to providing space for statistical, or quasi-statistical, and goal-legitimating information, Pacifica management’s position of seeking broader audiences can be implicitly supported through the use of various associations/accusations. Although not as statistically-embedded as some of the above-noted citations, a relatively critical contribution by former KPFA music director, Charles Shere (1999), provides rather equal sentiment of the “waste” of KPFA’s signal: “[T]he powerful transmitter at the commercial frequency of 94.1 megahertz is wasted on Pacifica as it now operates.” And as Lynda Richardson (2001) writes in a “Public Lives” contribution almost entirely given to the dissemination of the position of Pacifica central management, new WBAI general manager Ultrice Leid asserts that changes are needed increase audience share and thus make the station more “relevant.” As this perhaps suggests, the programming and content at WBAI, not to mention KPFA, are not relevant, and must therefore be made so—an assertion reified by Scott’s (2000; emphasis added) contribution, which cites then vice chairman of the executive board Kenneth A. Ford as asserting that Pacifica “had a mission at one time and had a credible voice but now it has gone from being insignificant to irrelevant.”

Interestingly, reference to Pacifica’s (perhaps heroic) “mission” is also found in other articles from the Times sample, such as that provided by Peterson (1997a), where he provides integral space for Patricia Scott’s assertion that “we cannot fulfill our mission if people are not listening.” Moreover, Peterson revisits the notion in a follow-up article (1997b; emphasis mine), where he provides Patricia Scott another opportunity to justify the executive’s actions through reference to a conceivably ‘heroic’ “mission”; although this time the words are, perhaps, a little more suggestive and propagandistic: “we can’t fulfill our mission if we just keep talking to ourselves.” Interestingly, both of these latter citations relate the executives’ “mission” to their expressed need to maximize their audience share.

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Closely related to the final citation provided above, a second aspect of the ‘Mature Commercial’ theme explored through the analysis regards efficiency—both in terms of the network’s basic operation and its ability in getting the proper ‘progressive’ message to listeners. Again, as the Times articles typically provide greater space to the viewpoint of central Pacifica management, their contention that inefficiency prevails within the traditional operation of its stations tends to permeate the bulk of their articles. Using the words of Ultrace Leid, Richardson (2001; emphases added) reports that the conditions at Pacifica’s WBAI station were “depressing”, “suffocating” and “frustrating”, and that they “inhibited creativity”; moreover, the station itself was “badly managed” and “horribly organized.” Again, as this particular contribution represents little more than a publicity piece for Leid, her position and the words she uses to express that opinion proliferate, and therefore shape, the context of its dissemination.

This sentiment also proliferates elsewhere within the Times sample. For instance, again writing for the business section, Peterson (1997b; emphases added) emphasizes then executive director of the foundation Patricia Scott’s many efforts to technologically bring the foundation’s stations, or “anarchic or bureaucratic systems that are simply dysfunctional in today’s fierce competition,” into the technological present. As Peterson further notes, Scott has been appointed as something of a ‘saviour’, given a “mandate” to overhaul a “faltering” network through replacing “balkanized . . . patchwork scheduling with more conventional programming” (1997b).33 In a previous article, Peterson (1997a) notes that the central Pacifica management espoused the responsibility of redrawing “program schedules to discard some of the more arcane, narrowly focused material.”

33 Emphasis on central foundation management’s mandate to restructure the “faltering” system is something also found in Scott’s contribution, where she notes that, then executive director, Bessie Wash’s mandate is to “restructure the organization” (2000).
Moreover, prior to concluding his above-noted 29 December 1997 follow up with a relatively small amount of, apparently balancing, coverage dedicated to the counter contentions of those protesting the foundation’s initiatives, Peterson (1997b) is sure to suggest to his, likely pro-business, readership that the initiatives are working. The system— as an entity within the mature commercial society— is, indeed, beginning to prosper.

*Management as ‘Benevolent’ and ‘Knowing’— Dissenters as ‘Disruptive’ and ‘Irrational’*

Within the ‘umbrella’ of the mature commercial ideology— much like Western language in general, and many, if not most, ideologies that use it as a symbolic vehicle for expression— there is, perhaps, a natural dichotomy of understanding. More to the point, as the mature commercial ideology upholds some aspects as desirable, honourable, et cetera, it naturally portrays those that stand opposite them as undesirable, dishonourable, and so forth. In essence, and as noted within the preceding methodology section, this is the negative binary nature of Western language and its ideologies. Perhaps at its most general level, the mature commercial ideology presents a ‘management/labour’ dichotomy that favours the former component over the latter. Essentially then, while it is, perhaps, expected that the ideology upholds the position of management forces that adhere to the gauging criteria of the free market, it should, based on the dichotomous tendency of Western ideologies, also be expected that it discredits those who stand

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34 Interestingly, Peterson’s (1997a, 1997b) tendency to provide relatively minuscule ‘article-balancing’ coverage of the protestors’ position at the end the article prevails in both of his Times contributions on the issue.

35 As noted elsewhere, for the dichotomous nature of language, refer to Jacques Derrida’s *Of Gramatology* (1976) and *Writing and Difference* (1978). For a rather thorough application of the negative-binary, or dichotomous, nature of Western ideologies, one may be well-advised to peruse Edward Said’s groundbreaking thesis on the historical, and then largely-prevailing, Western perception of the ‘Orient’, or non-Occidental: *Orientalism* (1979).
against such ‘foresightful’ management—frequently represented by various disgruntled, 
often ‘irrational’, labour groups. The following will be given to attempting to locate this
dichotomy within the coverage provided by the Times sample, and, though somewhat 
superficially, record some of the poignant examples.

Throughout the Times sample, there are a notable number of examples that 
present and bolster an image of a benevolent, well meaning and, perhaps, wise 
management. Perhaps none are as apparently supportive of management as those 
provided by Richardson (2001) in her “Public Lives” piece that largely serves as a PR 
vehicle for central executive-appointed interim WBAI station manager Ultrace Leid. In 
Richardson’s (2001; emphases added) words, Leid’s appointment is evocative of the 
image of a “general who swooped in to take charge.” If nothing else, such wording 
perhaps suggests that Leid represents the acme of leadership— a ‘take charge’ kind of 
individual who merits her appointment as the ‘saviour’ charged with rescuing the Pacifica 
Network from the mess within which it is shrouded. Indeed, in highlighting her 
leadership credentials, Richardson reports Leid as asserting, in a “poised and relaxed” 
manner, “I look forward to being tested . . . in every moment that I’ve been tested, I’ve 
found that I’ve been equal or even superior to the task” (2001; emphases again added). 
Moreover, Richardson (2001; emphasis mine) gives readers the impression that, 
throughout the interview, Ms. Leid gave the position of central management in a 
“teacherly tone”; a choice of words that, perhaps, adds a great deal to a well-developed 
impression of Ms. Leid as an actor who knows what is best for the beleaguered network.

Another representative of central management that is given relatively substantial, 
largely positive or supportive, column space in the New York Times is one-time executive
director, Patricia (Pat) Scott. Although not as apparently supportive as Richardson's piece on Leid, Peterson's (1997a, 1997b) provision of space for Scott's position nonetheless effectively serves the executive's position. In particular, and perhaps not surprisingly, considering the audience he writes for, Peterson's contribution appears to represent Scott as an astute business manager under the siege of a "community that is strident about everything and objects to everything" (1997b; emphasis added). As was the point of some emphasis in the preceding subsection regarding the Times's coverage, Scott— and the executive committee in general— is portrayed as one striving to carry out what is depicted as a benevolent, if not heroic, "mission". In citing Scott, Peterson (1997a; emphases added) notes that, in general, "the mission and vision of Pacifica is to promote peace and understanding." Indeed, these are rather honourable. Moreover, in his follow-up piece, he gets a little more specific, by noting that Ms. Scott is "trying to rebuild the network by, for example, improving studios so that the sound of flushing toilets is no longer heard on the air and standardizing broadcast schedules in an anarchic culture" (Peterson 1997b; emphases mine). Considering his department, it is perhaps not entirely surprising that Peterson (1997b) adds the assertion that such a mission would be considered "basic" in other broadcast contexts.

While an adoption of the position of Pacifica central management that occurs in many of the related articles produced by the Times will naturally tend to exonerate their actions and motives from accusations of wrongdoing, it also tends to generate a negative image of their accusers— those protesting changes made by central management. Indeed, this latter tendency is much more evident within the Times sample than is the former. As

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36 Although this extraction would, perhaps, serve a more poignant purpose in the dissemination of Times material that discredits those who oppose management's position, it does well here in serving to emphasize Peterson's apparent support for the motives and actions of then Pacifica executive director, Pat Scott.
noted above, Iver Peterson (1997b) uses Patricia Scott’s assertion that the typical listenership of Pacifica network’s fare is “strident about everything and objects to everything” relatively early in his contribution, and thus possibly serves to shape the way that much of the remainder is interpreted by readers. Moreover, this portrayal of the dissenters is a relatively frequent occurrence in Peterson’s (1997a, 1997b) contributions. In addition to his utilization of the above-cited words of Pat Scott, Peterson (1997b; emphases mine) also makes reference to the typical community of Pacifica network listeners as being “proud of their contrarian nature,” and that they comprise some of the “most ardent arguers.” Moreover, Peterson (1997a) includes the assertions that Pacifica’s typical listenership as an “old radical audience”, most of which have “moved to mainstream fare.” Perhaps the latter citation is incorporated to suggest that those who prefer alternative news fare only do so for a period of time, at least until their ‘radical flames’ burn out, and the resulting ‘darkness’ is banished by the ‘light’ of mainstream news fare.

Of course, images of the dissenters as “contrarian” throwbacks to an earlier historical period of radical politics (read 1960's-70's) are not rare within the overall sample. For her part, when referring to dissenters, Scott (2000) also tends to focus upon their ‘contrarian’ nature. Making use of words and phrases like “defiant”, “too far on the fringe” and “refusing to honor”, Scott (2000) also tends to establish an image of a rebellious group of listeners who are unwilling to yield to authority. Within her two contributions regarding the issue, Nieves (1999a, 1999b) also provides content that serves to uphold the stereotypical images of protesters established by many of the other Times contributors comprising the sample. Specifically, in her original piece, Nieves (1999a;
emphasis added) makes effective use the phrase, “a hard core group of listeners” to
frame a ‘radical’ image of those protesting out of concern for the future of a monumental
source of alternative news. Moreover, this tendency only increased in her follow-up
contribution, as she referred to the protestors through the application of such words and
phrases as “old radicals”, “animosity”, “blocking traffic” and “unwillingness to change”
(Nieves 1999b; emphases mine). Considering the relative superficiality with which she
deals with the actual concerns of the protestors, such an image is rendered even more
effective in shaping the perceptions and opinions of those who consume the articles.37

Perhaps the most negative depictions of those protesting the actions of Pacifica
central management are provided by Richardson (2001) and former KPFA programmer,
Shere (1999). Again, it bears repeating that, as a Public Lives contribution devoted to the
position of central management-appointed interim WBAI station manager, Ultrice Leid,
Richardson’s piece amounts to little more than a platform for management, and thus
cannot really be used to colour the rest of the sample’s coverage. However, as it is
offered within the confines of ‘news’, it does have great potential in shaping readers’
perceptions of the greater issue. Moreover, while the bulk of the article is composed of
information supportive of Leid’s and management’s position, there is one particular
passage that provides an effective vehicle for creating a negative image of the protestors.
Within the passage, Leid is given the opportunity to create an image of the protestors as
violent ‘invaders’. As Richardson (2001; emphases added) cites, “[I]t became clear to
many of us that it was planned that the station would be seized and occupied . . . That was
the plan, and some cases, there were utterances about destroying equipment and doing

37 The relative coverage of the two competing viewpoints is something that will be addressed below in
analytical subsections respectively titled The Provision of Space for the Expression of Viewpoints from ‘Below’
and The Provision of Space for the Expression of Viewpoints from ‘Above’.
harm to the station. We are in a heightened state of awareness because of this crisis, which is a case of manufactured dissent.” Of course, based on the ‘rules’ of sourcing that permeate the mainstream journalistic endeavour, there is no need for Richardson (2001) to require some kind of ‘evidence’ for such claims. As such, the claims are recorded as ‘fact’. As a result, readers are provided an image of a particularly violent group of protestors who are willing to destroy the very equipment they had heretofore relied upon to disseminate their alternative news messages to the public. Moreover, in a little ironic twist- at least when considering the pivotal role that Herman and Chomsky’s (2002) notion of ‘manufacturing consent’ plays in the development of this project- Leid suggests that prevailing dissent is not ‘authentic’, but “manufactured” (Richardson 2001).

Finally, the single contribution provided by former KPFA music programmer Shere (1999) does little to erase or contradict the relatively negative image of the protestors and contemporary listener base that the other Times contributors establish. In a personal email that the Times acquired, and then reprinted in the form of an article, Shere (1999) refers to those who had established Pacifica’s current programming style as “special-interest apologists”. Moreover, he later asserts that the current listenership is comprised of those who are turned on by “rhetoric” that amounts to little more than “provocative” content. As Shere (1999; emphases mine) he specifically puts it, “A new generation, though, grown up among cultural divisiveness and splinter-group loyalties, was attracted to the sound of KPFA’s programs. Contentiousness is attractive to the young, and the rhetoric of the by now ironically-named Pacifica stations resonated with such diverse contemporary fingerprints as popular music and the prevailing mood of entitlement.” As is perhaps suggested by this statement, such a group is not truly
enlightened, but merely tunes in for the "Jerry Springer"-like quality of the programming offered by KPFA and the rest of the Network's stations. In this vein of thought, Pacifica's current listenership—those protesting central management's actions—may perhaps be perceived as little more than young 'hoodlums', devouring Pacifica programming in a similar fashion as they voraciously devour the rest of 'popular culture'.

*Media on Media: The Relative Inferiority of Alternative, 'Partisan' News Media*

While this project was still in its early conceptualization stage, it was suggested by a colleague that, given the right set of circumstances, it would be interesting to explore a mainstream news medium's portrayal of an alternative news medium's journalistic style. As it turns out, the Pacifica crisis offers just such a circumstance. Throughout the coverage comprising the Times sample, there is no apparent shortage of examples of judgements made on the style of reporting the news that then typified the Pacifica network and its broadcast 'family'—particularly KPFA in Berkeley and WBAI in New York. The following will attempt to pay homage to the variety of criticisms that are presented within many of the articles comprising the Times sample.

Beginning where the last subsection of analysis left off, Shere (1999) suggests that, due to the partisan nature of the, then current, programming format of the Pacifica stations, any kind of constructive discourse and dissemination is beyond the realm of possibility. As he (1999; emphasis added) asserts, "Escalating partisanship inevitably shoulders open-minded discourse aside." Similarly, Peterson (1997a, 1997b) informs his readers that the typical reporting style espoused by Pacifica's stations is far from the standards established by such 'professional' notables as his Times. At one point in his original piece regarding the issue, Peterson (1997a; emphasis mine) refers to Pacifica's
journalism as having a "long tradition of advocacy"—of course, a particular style tabooed on the world of 'acceptable' journalism.\textsuperscript{38} In his only follow-up, Peterson (1997b; emphases added) does not appear to back down from this stance, referring to the programming as "highly personal and often politically extreme", and later as expressing "increasingly strident personal and political views." Of course, typical readers—those who have been conditioned to trust the professional model of 'objective' reporting—could possibly conclude that such political, partisan journalism is not journalism at all—at least not according to any rules they have been taught. As such, readership sympathy with the protestors' cause may, understandably, be of a waning nature.

Another effective tactic for apparently discrediting the alternative news reporting style of Pacifica is to focus on some programming particulars—an act that also serves the purpose of discrediting the typical listenership. In her contribution, Scott (2000) appears to connect Pacifica programming, and perhaps its brand of journalism, to 'un-Americanism'. As she notes, due to its journalistic style and 'radical' programming, Pacifica was investigated by the \textit{House of Un-American Activities Committee}. She follows this with revelations that Pacifica programming not only caters to such generally disliked 'dictators' as Fidel Castro, but also "grills" President Clinton—a 'Democrat. It is, perhaps, not entirely improbable that such a depiction may dissuade readership support for the cause of those attempting to preserve such programming and journalism—after all, are not all 'true Americans' supposed to despise Castro? Even the mild progressives in support of the Clinton and other typical Democratic administrations would perhaps consider such 'rough' treatment of 'liberals' undeserving.

\textsuperscript{38} Similar to Peterson's indication of the non-objective quality of the alternative news reporting taking place within the Pacifica family, Janny Scott (2000) suggests that Pacifica's typical style of reporting is one of "aggression".

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Finally, another means of discrediting Pacifica’s journalistic style that appears in a number of the eleven articles that comprise the Times sample involves its depiction as odd, or even woefully disorganized. Perhaps not much of a devastating classification, Nieves’ (1999b) suggestion that the programming is “quirky” does, however, effectively place it squarely within the realm of the ‘abnormal’. Certainly a little more descriptive, and perhaps technical, Blair’s (2000) suggestion that the programming has a “free-form spontaneous style” has similar potential effects. For his part, in specifically referring to the local programming of KPFA, Shere (1999; emphasis added) goes a little further by framing it against the backdrop of ‘normal’, or organized programming styles that typify mainstream news formats: “KPFA was soon transformed into a number of special-interest groups, each speaking to its own membership. Even the formatting of the station gave in to this, as detailed descriptions of the content of programs gave way to generalized program ‘slots’ dedicated to generalized specialties concerning sexuality, race or ethnicity.” In effect, each of these particular examples potentially serves to place Pacifica’s brand of journalism outside of the ‘acceptable’ parameters heretofore established by the ‘objective’ model of journalism.

Of all of the efforts to reveal the “quirkiness” or disordered nature, of Pacifica’s typical journalistic operations, perhaps Peterson’s (1997a, 1997b) efforts appear to go beyond any objective journalist’s call of duty. In his original coverage, Peterson (1997a) quickly appears to set the frame by referring to Pacifica’s programming style as an “anything goes” model. In other words, the absence of an order typically found in the objective ‘professional’ model is quite apparent. In addition, he appears to consider the notion that typical Pacifica programming does not adhere to the constraints of time quite
worthy of note. In referring to the (KPFA) Berkeley station, he asserts that it was “a place where studio clocks were once banned as a way of freeing radio from time itself” (Peterson 1997a; emphasis added). Indeed, this information is apparently deemed significant enough to include in his follow-up piece, where he (1997b; emphasis mine) notes that “programmers refused to allow clocks in the studios ‘because they thought programming should end when it ended’.” While his original usage of the notion may effectively paint an image of a disorganized journalistic entity, the second usage may go a little further. To some, the usage in the follow-up may also suggest a relative inequality resulting from the disorganized practice. Particularly, it is conceivable that, in the process of allowing programs to end when they end, some programs would be bumped, or even scraped. In any event, regardless of the plausibility of the formation of the latter suggestion, the repeated inclusion of Pacifica’s typical defiance of time constraints does suggest a disorder that would never occur within a professional journalistic organization following an ordered and efficient existence akin to other entities within the mature commercial society.

**Miscellaneous Observations of Significance: Part One**

In addition to the three general emphases of analysis provided above, there are a number of other manners in which the content of Times contributions is perceivably framed. For instance, the amount of space provided for, and placement of, particular points of view can influence the general boundaries of consumption. Moreover, as was noted in an earlier part of the thesis, theorists such as Michael Parenti (1986) suggest that “auxiliary embellishments”—article headlines, eye-catching captions within the body of articles and accompanying photographs—serve quite well in setting the context of dissemination and
consumption. Finally, as was demonstrated within the above analyses, value-laden wording and phrasing also play significant roles in colouring the content of articles. Specifically, the lexical references chosen by Times contributors regarding the typical style of news dissemination, or political bent, of the Pacifica stations is deemed of particular interest. The following subsection will attempt to apply these notions to the Times sample.

As was suggested above, an integral, though relatively veiled, means a journalist has of shaping the tone of an article is by taking the ‘position’ of one faction or another regarding issues. In essence, the article takes the form of a ‘testimonial’ for the favoured faction, whereby those who represent that position are provided the better part of the article for giving their side of events and defending their position. In the articles that employ this format, the position of the protestors is largely used in an accusatory tone—a practice that, perhaps, could plausibly be perceived as constructing an ‘aggressive’ image of the protestors. Regardless of implicit or explicit intent on the part of those who utilize this style of item construction, in effect, it serves the purpose of providing space for the executive management’s defences. Perhaps the most pertinent example of such coverage is provided by Richardson’s (2001) piece. Again, although this style of coverage may be expected in what amounts to little more than an abbreviated biographical piece, as it is offered as nothing other than ‘news’, it is no less effective as a potential tool for manipulating the environment of consumption than the other, more journalistic, pieces.

Peterson’s (1997b) follow-up is, perhaps, another ideal example of a ‘journalistic’ item that offers a similar style of coverage—although not quite as blatant as Richardson’s

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39 Due to a variety of constraints on the project, time being one of them, emphases of analysis include headlines and captions; the analysis of photos is omitted.

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(2001) piece, as it is not a mere biography of a central, or executive, management player. Much of Peterson's (1997b) contribution presents, then executive director, Pat Scott's position. Moreover, much of what is presented is done so in a manner that allows for central management's response to the "attacks and recriminations" of her general "critics"—the specifics of which Peterson (1997b) only addresses in two specific places in the article. The first occasion is a relatively brief paragraph presented on the heels of somewhat lengthy introductory material outlining Scott's position and dilemma. This paragraph, which accuses Scott of being "authoritarian", may appear to be utilized in order to allow her space to answer the allegation—again, a platform for response. The second occasion where Peterson (1997b) devotes relatively substantial space for Scott's accusers is in the final nineteen lines, or ninety-nine of the 1,163-words comprising the article, where at least some indication of the actual concerns of those protesting central management's actions is provided. Of course, one could effectively argue that Peterson's (1997b) eventual provision of space for specific concerns of the protestor faction, though relatively minuscule, could be a means of achieving the appearance of balance—an essential chore in the professional world of 'objective' journalism. Regardless of the intent, real or imagined, providing 'balancing' space for a particular opinion at the conclusion, or more 'obscure' location, of an article is another way of marginalizing that opinion—a practice similar to the above-noted relegation of particular opinions, or issues, to more obscure locations within a newsprint medium. As is perhaps indicated by his original piece (1997a), this is a style of providing an appearance of

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40 Specifically, Peterson (1997b) provides space for the protestors' concern for the 'quality' of content that will be provided by a revamped, and ultimately more mainstream, programming schedule. Indeed, it is this concern for the news-consumption experience that protestors insist should override Pacifica central management's concern for dramatically increasing the Network's audience via a more politically 'palatable' message—one that is more akin to that provided by the comparatively mainstream National Public Radio (NPR).
balance that Peterson (1997a, 1997b) frequently employs. Indeed, within his original
devour, it is only in the final two paragraphs where any indication is made of the
concerns of central management’s critics. Better late than never? Perhaps, however
some indication of the dissenters’ concerns within the central body would allow for their
more prominent display, and perhaps catch the eyes of readers prior to the Establishment
of central management’s case, or of those readers who decide not to finish the entire
piece, and therefore do not get the opportunity to understand the protestors’ point of
view.

Perhaps even more revealing, the Times journalists’ employment of Parenti’s
(1986) “auxiliary embellishments”—headlines and eye-catching captions—to shape
Pacifica-related items tends to elicit some interesting observations. As the initial
components of articles that are viewed by readers, headlines are particularly integral in
setting the tone, or framing the context in which the articles are absorbed. Moreover, the
significance of article headlines increases substantially, when considering that some of
the newspaper’s readers will, in situations where time may be of the essence, undoubtedly
skip over some of the articles—reading only the headlines that are trusted to summarize
the content to follow. Indeed, it is during these reading occasions when the significance
of headlines achieves its zenith.

When considering Parenti’s (1986) above-noted assertions on how mainstream
news media cover protests, it is perhaps not surprising that headlines applied throughout
the Times sample tend to focus on the ‘violent’ or ‘combative’ nature associated with this
issue. Of the eleven articles that comprise the sample, eight of them clearly establish this
focus—often by utilizing words or phrases that aid in this focus (all emphases mine):

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In addition to the tendency to focus upon the combative nature of the issue, Times articles also tend to prefer focussing upon the actions of the protestors in headline construction. When focussing upon the seven articles that employ headlines emphasizing the actions of one faction, or the other, four—Shere’s (1999) “How a Little Antiwar Station Turned Combative”, Nieves’ (1999a) “Ever a Voice of Protest, Radio KPFA Is at It Again, but With a Twist”, Scott’s (2000) “A Voice of Protest Rises for Itself: WBAI Resists Superiors Who Say It’s Stuck in the 60's” and Blair’s (2001) “Hundreds Protest Firings AT WBAI-FM”—emphasize actions of dissenters. Moreover, while the latter headline is primarily descriptive, and therefore is deemed relatively benign, the particular wording employed by the former three articles—“Turned Combative” (Shere 1999), “Ever a Voice of Protest” (Nieves 1999) and “Superiors Who Say It’s Stuck in the 60’s” (Scott
2000)— contain phrasing that appears less than supportive, if not entirely critical, of the protestors. Specifically, the first suggests that local employees and volunteers of Berkeley’s KPFA station are “combative”, the second suggests that those of New York’s WBAI station are incessantly protesting, and the latter plants a seed of out-datedness. Although the latter of the three preceding headlines does not, in-and-of-itself, apply particularly damning wording to the cause of the protestors, it is equally as effective, considering that a significant portion of the content that follows is devoted to reifying the notion that the programming is, indeed, out of date and in need of a revamping of sorts.

Of the three headlines that emphasize the actions of central management (emphases mine)— Peterson’s (1997b) “Ruffling Left-Wing Feathers To Recharge Pacifica Radio”, Blair’s (2000) “Pacifica Foundation Locks WBAI Station Manager Out of Office” and Robert F. Worth’s (2001) “Pacifica, Owner of WBAI-FM, Settles Lawsuits”— not one is perceived as particularly damning, although the second headline (Blair 2000) may, in some light, be perceived as suggesting an authoritarian bent to central management. However, regardless of potential undertones that may be perceived, and considering the lack of further information that may indicate cause, the chosen wording is not particularly suggestive of undue aggression by central management. Moreover, the latter headline (Worth 2001) is merely descriptive of a simple ‘fact’, and has little perceived framing value. On the other hand, the wording of Peterson’s (1997b; emphasis added) follow-up piece, “Ruffling Left-Wing Feathers To Recharge Pacifica Radio”, is perceivably framed in a manner that alludes to the ‘commendable’ “mission” of Pacifica central management that, as noted above, pervades much of the Times’s
coverage of the issue. Specifically, their mission is to “recharge” a ‘faltering’, ‘outdated’ radio broadcasting system.

Of the four articles that do not emphasize particular actions of either faction—Richardson’s (2001) “A Firm New Boss at an Old Voice of the Left”, Baker’s (2001) “Vandalism Follows Event For Ex-Radio Employees: Motive for Anti-WBAI Graffiti in Question”, Peterson’s (1997a) “Clamorously, Pacifica Radio Dances Toward Mainstream” and Nieves’ (1999b) “The Battle for the Berkeley Airwaves Rages On”—most either emphasize the struggle or combative nature of the issue, and thus are not particularly supportive or critical of either faction. However, Richardson’s (2001) headline appears to be somewhat supportive of central management—by suggesting that their appointed WBAI interim station manager is “firm”, and thus perhaps responsible—while simultaneously critical of traditional local programming of WBAI—by referring to it as “an old voice of the left”.

In general, and much like the headlines that set the tone for the articles in which they appear, captions are used in a manner that emphasizes the superficial aspects of struggle, combat, and Pacifica's traditional dissenting nature. For instance, Shere's (1999) caption—"The fight to save KPFA is Berkeley's biggest protest in years, but the trouble had been brewing for decades"—does much in support his general assertion that KPFA's programming had been increasingly catering to 'fringe' or 'splinter' groups, and thus alienating those who would strive for 'democratic' discourse— the station's 'original' raison-d'etre. And Nieves's captioning of "'I haven't been arrested before, but for this it's worth it'"—by a nameless supporter, no less—adds to her contribution's emphasis on the "battle for Berkeley". Moreover, Baker's (2001) use of "[s]ome believe that an attack was incited by topics discussed at a fund-raiser" similarly emphasizes the general focus of his contribution. Indeed, regarding the latter example (Baker 2001), one may perceive an apparent attempt at sustaining a vagueness regarding the violence of note. Although the article does not establish any direct links to those supporting WBAI employees' position vis-a-vis central management, one would not surmise that from the caption, which is one of the original 'eye-catchers' that has the potential to largely shape the readers frame of reception.

Although its particular meaning remains somewhat vague to the researcher, the caption that is included in Nieves' (1999a) article—"A new team after Che Guevara and Allen Ginsberg"—appears to be used to emphasize Pacifica's traditional 'radical' bent by relating it to such notables as Guevara and Ginsberg— a manoeuvre that probably does not ingratiate the protesters' cause with typical, 'red-white-and-blue' readers, considering the former's historical association with radical revolutionary politics and activity long-
admonished and demonized by US officials, and long-targeted by US foreign policies in the Latin American region. Indeed, if patriotic socialization has done its ‘job’, an association with Guevara should be enough to elicit sufficiently critical reactions within readers.41 In a similar vein, Scott utilizes a caption to assert that Pacifica’s New York station, WBAI, is “A station that grills Clinton and allots hours to Castro” (2000). Of course, the allusion to Castro has similar potential for effectively rallying the ‘patriotic innards’ of readers—perhaps to the extent of inhibiting the formation of an association, or desire to associate, with the cause of Pacifica’s dissenters. Moreover, as was briefly suggested above, an allusion to the station’s relatively poor treatment of the nation’s long-established symbol of political ‘progressiveness’—the leader of the nation’s Democratic party—would probably do little to garner reader support for the cause of the progressive protestors—regardless of how little the political ideologies of the two ‘progressive’ entities resemble one-another.

In addition to the significant observations that have thus far comprised this subsection, note should be made on the manner in which the Pacifica stations’ typical brand of journalism is generally depicted within the Times sample. In what may appear a unified fashion, if not an intentional effort, the particular model of journalism traditionally practised by Pacifica’s stations is typically depicted through modifiers that involve some variation of “left” or (on one occasion) “radical”, rather than “alternative” or “progressive”. Of the seventeen occasions where either variations of “left” or “radical” modifiers are employed, sixteen refer to the former and one to the latter. Of the

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41 Of course, this is not intended to suggest that ALL readers of Times content are vessels appropriately galvanized with blind patriotism, however, if the culture(al) industries ARE sufficiently effective in inundating the public with the ‘proper’ frames of perception, as is asserted by such theorists as Herman, Schiller, Horkheimer and Adorno mind set, then a general distaste for all things ‘anti-American’ should prevail— and Guevara has been/is portrayed as just that.

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relatively meagre three occasions where the modifiers “alternative” or “progressive” are employed, two refer to the former and one to the latter. Is this imbalance coincidental? Perhaps so, however, critical analysis may shed some additional and necessary light on this particular facet of coverage. However, prior to offering any analysis of the Times journalists’ tendency to associate Pacifica’s journalism with the “left”, one must consider its prevailing connotations within the US.

Within the US, and over a period of generations (particularly the 20th century), there has been an ideological onslaught—primarily by the above-noted culture(al) industries—against all political and economic systems that are counter to the system of capitalist democracy that has flourished, and continues to flourish, within the US. Of course, as is now but a matter of record, through such efforts by the powerful opinion-shapers that control such ideological industries, the ‘enemies’ have been primarily defined as “socialism” and, perhaps by misguided extension, “communism”. Moreover, over the same general course of time, these ideological ‘enemies’ have effectively been categorized as “leftist” entities. Thus, it is perhaps no great leap in reasoning to conclude that the act of referring to a particular model of journalism as “leftist” is, by extension, an effort to portray that model as ‘un-American’, and therefore untrustworthy. Indeed, it is within this context of thought that the Times journalists’ general depiction of Pacifica’s typical journalistic model as “leftist” bears some analytical attention.42

Of course, as is the case with much material that comprises the Times sample of articles, value-laden wording and phrasing are not always provided directly by the

42 As will hopefully become more apparent in the ensuing qualitative analysis of the San Francisco Bay Guardian sample, the significance of this depiction is rendered even more noteworthy by the relative rareness with which the Bay Guardian journalists make the same ideological connection. There is a tendency on their part to refer to the typical journalistic style of the Pacifica stations as “alternative” or “progressive”.
Journalists, but are gleaned from direct citations of related players. The general tendency of depicting Pacifica’s model of journalism as “leftist” is no exception. Indeed, said journalists even use citations from the protestors’ supporters to bolster the “left” connection. Most notably, in two separate articles (Nieves 1999a; Scott 2000), former Pacifica news reporter and author of a work (1999) documenting the Pacifica Foundation, Matthew Lasar’s “leftist” associations are perceivably used to effectively bolster the ‘un-American’ image developed by much of the rest of the coverage.\(^4^3\) Although not employed extensively with regard to associating Pacifica’s progressive style with the ‘left’, as was documented above, such means of ‘colouring’ the content of articles are not rare within the Times sample. Moreover, this method of framing should not be perceived as detracting from its functionality for potentially shaping the various points-of-view of those who consume the articles that utilize such methods. On the contrary, employing this method may increase an article’s potential to shape said viewpoints, as it avoids the stigmatization associated with direct value-ascription provided by journalists, and thus further legitimates similar ‘professional’ (read mainstream) journalistic methods of ‘objectively’ reporting the news.

**The Provision of Space for Expression of Viewpoints from ‘Below’**

Contrary to what may have thus far been presented as a largely one-sided style of dissemination from an Establishmentarian perspective, The Times contributions do provide space for the expression of viewpoints from the dissenters— or from ‘below’. Of course, this should not be of much surprise, considering the mainstream news medium’s reliance on the professional, or objective, notion of providing ‘balanced’ coverage

\(^{43}\) For a similarly timed documentary of the Pacifica Foundation, one may refer to Jeff Land’s (1999) *Active Radio: Pacifica’s Brash Experiment.*

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regarding issues. Does this represent an ideal balance of coverage? As noted throughout the preceding content analyses of Times coverage of the Pacifica crisis, much of this balance is rendered problematic by the contributors' general tendencies regarding their provision of space—particularly regarding amount, placement and sourcing—for dissenting viewpoints. Regardless of these tendencies regarding their efforts to balance their contributions, however, the Times contributors do offer some necessary space for the points of view of those critical of the actions of Pacifica’s central management, or executive. Moreover, some of the Times contributors offer coverage that generally appears ‘objective’, and is therefore relatively impervious to criticism of its balancing effect. The following brief subsection will attempt to address this level of analysis.

Within some of the relatively briefer contributions that comprise the qualitative portion of the Times sample, coverage of both points of view regarding the Pacifica crisis tends to be somewhat decontextualized, and therefore marginalized. For instance, Baker’s (2001) piece relates to acts of vandalism that occurred after a New York event geared primarily to raise awareness of local Long Island issues, not the specifics of the then ongoing Pacifica issue. However, information relating to the issue that is included appears to barely scratch the surface, as it merely provides a brief (eleven lines) dissemination of its superficialities, such as the ongoing nature of the “struggle”. Although Worth’s (2001) brief contribution regarding the settlement of four lawsuits against Pacifica’s central management does go into more detail and includes some of the ‘voices from below’, it does so in summary fashion, and fails to include some level of analysis regarding the implications of previous actions of central management. However,
in a general sense, this particular contribution (Worth 2001) does not provide much 'ammunition' for critics from 'below'.

The 'just-the-facts-ma'am' style of journalism suggested above is a tendency that proliferates much of the Times contributions. Much of Scott's (2000) contribution follows much the same style. Of the instances where she does include some of the points of view from 'below', much appears in the service of allowing some of the involved actors to provide a relatively superficial narrative to the chain of events. Indeed, the only occasion where she includes some 'below-the-surface' level of the protestors concerns is when she refers to the 'programmers' suspicions that what the foundation really wants is to trade in the old audience and become a slightly more liberal version of National Public Radio' (Scott 2000). Although this does appear to go beneath the surface of the protestors' concerns, it just barely does so, as it does not include their reasoning regarding the negative implications of that potential development. Although Blair's (2000, 2001) contributions follow much the same 'just-the-facts-ma'am' format, he does achieve some level of 'balance' regarding the issue. As is the case with much of the Times contributions, while Blair (2000, 2001) does summarize events and general points of view from 'above' and 'below', he does so rather superficially, and does not really address the implications of central management's actions as perceived from 'below'. Moreover, of particular note regarding Blair's (2000, 2001) contributions, it is perhaps interesting that he was unable to contact (respectively) central management's communications director Bessie M. Wash and central management-appointed interim WBAI station manager Ultrice Leid for comment. Had he been able to do so, perhaps the contextualized and beneath-the-surface viewpoints from above may have been permitted
to colour these contributions, as they have coloured other contributions. Regardless of what may have been permitted to proliferate, as they stand, Blair’s (2000, 2001) contributions do deserve some relative ‘honourable mention’ regarding ‘balance’.

As noted on a number of occasions throughout the previous analyses, when information that does provide some context for the position of those from ‘below’ is included in Times contributors’ items, it is generally done so in perceivably marginalizing manners. Peterson’s (1997a, 1997b) contributions provide ample evidence regarding this general tendency. Again, as noted, much of his inclusion of the position from ‘below’ tends to be framed as accusations, and tends to provide central management with vehicles through which they can defend their position. Moreover, his inclusion of expressed concerns of protestors regarding the potential implications of central management’s actions tends to be relatively ‘buried’ at the end of his articles, and only briefly at that. Somewhat similarly, Nieves’s (1999a) contribution provides little more than a superficial summary account of the contentions from ‘below’. The only occasion where she actually cites one of these viewpoints, she perceivably uses it to frame the notion of KPFA’s position as a beacon for the Bay Area’s “left”. She does, however, provide approximately one-quarter of the article space for then executive director Lynn Chadwick’s position on the issue. In her follow-up contribution, Nieves (1999b) appears to include additional space for the position of protestors, however, much of this is in a descriptive fashion, as she recounts the scene at one of the KPFA street protests. Moreover, although she does cite a directly involved member (Bernstein) from ‘below’, she does so in relation to his new-found popularity after being fired form KPFA by central management. The only other occasion where she does provide citation space for
the expression of a viewpoint from ‘below’ (protestor Liam Kirshner), it merely alludes
to the ‘worthiness’ of the rally, not exactly why it is worthy. Surprisingly or not, this is
not the same treatment she provides for the expression of viewpoints from ‘above’, as she
makes clear reference to central management’s claims regarding “growth” and
“diversity”—as noted, both stated goals of their “mission”.

Finally, some note must be made regarding the ‘balance’ provided by Shere’s
(1999) contribution. Although this contribution, as an email reprinted as ‘news’, does not
follow a typical journalistic format, and therefore does not provide space for either
expressions of viewpoints from ‘above’ or ‘below’, it does provide some interesting level
of ‘balance’. While it does provide some of the more perceivably critical material
regarding the protestors, it also provides some of the more critical material regarding
central management. However, it is important to note that, while he is critical of central
management, his criticism appears to focus on its culpability in KPFA’s development into
the highly partisan and subjective beacon that the protestors are defending as essential for
authentic ‘enlightenment’. In his apparent opinion, previous central management had
been too indulgent in permitting the programming to be controlled by the “vociferous
numbers” of “special-interest apologists” (Shere 1999).

The San Francisco Bay Guardian and Altruistic Propaganda

As the preceding qualitative analysis of the content of the New York Times articles has
hopefully revealed, at least to some significant extent, the project’s contention that the
effective role of mainstream news media, regardless of intent on behalf of their
journalists, is to tend to propagandize to the general public on behalf of an elite few who
occupy positions of relative power and authority, and who benefit from the current
societal status quo, can be accepted as generally true. However, its contention that alternative news media, such as the San Francisco Bay Guardian, propagandize on behalf of the general public for the general purpose of enlightening and empowering it in a manner conducive to upending the current societal status quo in favour of a social system more deserving of the label “democracy” remains to be demonstrated. Indeed, that is the purpose of the subsection that follows—to reveal the essential ‘altruistic’ nature of news content disseminated through an alternative, or ‘bottom-up’ journalistic model. As was the case in the preceding analyses of the Times’s Pacifica-related coverage, the categories that will comprise the analyses of Bay Guardian’s related coverage will focus upon the depiction of the rhetoric associated with the mature commercial ideology, depictions of the involved factions, the depiction of mainstream media and other observations of note. More specifically, the categories include: Material Objectives Over Content Matter: Confronting the Mature Commercial Ideology, Management as ‘Dictatorial’—Dissenters as ‘Heroic’: Framing Perceptions of Factions, Media on Media: The Relative Inferiority of Mainstream, ‘Professional’ News Media, Miscellaneous Observations of Significance: Part Two and Provision of Space for the Expression of Viewpoints from ‘Above’.

Material Objectives Over Content Matter: Confronting the Mature Commercial Ideology

In relative terms, Bay Guardian journalists devote comparatively less space to what I deem the “mature commercial component” of the Pacifica issue than do the Times journalists, apparently preferring instead to focus upon developing the various ‘characters’ involved in the ‘story’. They do, however, devote some space to broaching this particular aspect of the issue, albeit, at times, in a decidedly different manner and from a decidedly different position—from ‘below’. In similar fashion to some of the
coverage provided by Times journalists, some Bay Guardian journalists tend to report the suspected mature commercial agenda of central management without an apparent ascribed value-judgment– the ‘just the facts ma’am’ style embraced by the professional model of journalism. However, unlike much of the Times journalists’, largely singular, depictions of matters concerning the gauging rhetoric of the mature commercial ideology, Bay Guardian journalists do, on occasion, portray the mature commercial objectives of Pacifica’s central management as suspected efforts deserving of ridicule and contempt– an explicit usage of more subjective journalistic methods.44

As the Bay Guardian journalist who provides the bulk of in-depth and ongoing coverage regarding the Pacifica issue, Adam Clay Thompson (1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d, 1999e, 1999f, 1999g, 1999h, 1999i) is one contributor who tends to depict the suspected, or feared, mature commercial agenda of central management with sledgehammer-like subjective contempt. On one such occasion, Thompson suggests that Pacifica central management is ultimately attempting to “cash in the cash cow” (1999h). Of course, the suggestion refers to the above noted, relatively extensive, dollar value of Pacifica’s various bandwidths on the commercial (free) market. In similar fashion, in referring to the possible motives of the Foundation’s central management, Bay Guardian contributor, Daniel Zoll (2001) notes that the “agenda, critics suspect, is to commercialize the network, replace its radical politics with a more mainstream message, and possibly sell off one or more of the stations.”

44 Again, this should not be surprising, considering the inevitable tendency of journalists to identify with their subject matter. As was noted above, due largely to structural realities that prevail within the mainstream, or professional, news media, a ‘natural’ identification occurs between journalists and the official, or Establishment, figures who provide much of the sourcing for their articles. As a result, mainstream journalists tend to take the ‘place’ of said Establishment when reporting on issues or events. In contrast, alternative news media journalists, who tend to report on issues and events from the ‘bottom-up’, tend to take the place of the counter-Establishment figures who help shape the content of the articles they disseminate.
As is perhaps not entirely surprising, the reflection of critical sentiment regarding central management’s potential intentions to attract buyers for one, or more, of the lucrative stations is not a rare occurrence within the Bay Guardian sample. As labour activist and former KPFA presenter Steve Zeltzer (1999) asserts, this potentiality carries with it threatening repercussions: “[Mary Frances] Berry and others might be looking for offers to sell the Pacifica stations since they are worth hundreds of millions of dollars and this may in fact be their end game. Trade unionists, unions and all labor communicators should take note. A critical battle is going on for the soul of independent radio and the only voice of working people.” As this citation suggests, the mainstreaming of content for the very plausible purpose of increasing the Foundation’s perceived worth on the private (free) market effectively diminishes, or destroys, its worth as a source of bottom-up information and enlightenment for the general citizenry—those who comprise the largest portion of the US’s population.

In addition to the focus on speculations regarding central management’s possible intentions regarding the sale of the Foundation’s station(s), Bay Guardian contributors are more likely than Times contributors to note that a possible sale of one or more of the stations is, indeed, something that was discussed at official central management (executive) board meetings, rather than a mere shadow a potential conspiracy used to foster renewed solidarity amongst the protestors.\footnote{Of the various contributors of the Times sample, mention of the executive’s “discussions” regarding the value of some of the stations is mentioned once, in Blair’s (2000) original contribution, “Pacifica Foundation Locks WBAI Station Manager Out of Office”. Moreover, his relatively brief inclusion refers only to a ‘phantom’ email message that was mistakenly sent to San Francisco-based media watchdog group, Media Alliance, by “mistake”, and fails to put a name to the sender, or provide specifics as to what exactly the message comprised—hardly an extrapolation of a key, and real, event in the ongoing issue that is suggestive of legitimate concern on the part of those protesting central management’s actions.} In referring to the somewhat arcane event, recently-dismissed KPFA news program host and \textit{Flashpoints} producer, Dennis
Bernstein, plainly details that “Media Alliance had obtained a copy of a highly damaging e-mail from Pacifica [executive] board member Michael Palmer to board chair Mary Frances Berry in which Palmer discussed the possibility of selling KPFA or New York’s WBAI” (1999; emphases mine). This amount of detail is also reflected in the contributions of other Bay Guardian writers, such as David Bacon (1999a; emphases added), who notes that, although such plans were emphatically denied by the executive and its spokespersons, “the sale of Berkeley radio station KPFA . . . was precisely the subject of two day-long conference-call board meetings . . . On Tuesday, Berry first held a meeting of the board’s executive committee, in which various scenarios were floated regarding the sale of the license of the station in Berkeley, or possibly of New York’s WBAI. The following day, the full board debated the proposals.” Again, this sort of detail certainly removes the ‘shadow’ of a threat, or even ‘hear-say’, that essentially remains in the only Times piece that bothers to note the event at all.

As is the case with the Times contributions, the mature commercialist focus on audience (market) share is a point of some focus within many of the pieces by Bay Guardian contributors. Again, as is perhaps of little surprise, central management’s expressed intent to draw greater audience numbers is not addressed in the same manner as it generally is within the Times contributions. Of course, it again bears mentioning— as it frequently does and will— that much of the perspective on most, if not all, of the issues involved relies upon the position taken by the contributors. Much of the coverage offered

46 Other Bay Guardian journalists that make similarly detailed reference to the executive’s discussions of a potential sale of Berkeley’s KPFA or New York’s WBAI include Clay Thompson (1999b, 1999g), Zoll (2001), Bacon (1999b) and Solomon (1999b). In the case of Clay Thompson (1999b), the reader is treated to information as to the email’s authentication by its email server (IGC), and its confirmation by then Pacifica spokesperson Elan Fabbri. Moreover, Solomon (1999b) includes confirming citations from executive board member Pete Bramson.
by the Times journalists tends toward the points-of-view of central management, and therefore tends to offer ‘platforms’ from which it may defend its actions, while the Bay Guardian contributors tend to take the relatively ‘aggressive’ position of those protesting these actions. As a result, their actions and ensuing explanations are critically addressed, and often dismissed.

As the Bay Guardian’s most frequent contributor on the Pacifica issue, Clay Thompson (1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d, 1999e, 1999f, 1999g, 1999h, 1999i) provides a good portion of the critical angle on, among other topics, central management’s desire to broaden the audience shares of the Networks’ stations. As he suggests on one such occasion, changing the programming is a possible means the executive is implementing to “tone down” the station’s politics in order to seek out a “shinier, happier demographic” (Clay Thompson 1999g). Moreover, he goes on to suggest that, while “Pacifica has long contended that it intends to broaden its stations’ appeal with better-produced, more culturally diverse programming,” that programming “has yet to materialize” (1997g; emphases mine). And in putting a critical taint on central management’s contentions that their aim is to diversify programming to better reflect the diverse demographics of the external communities that are within the relative bandwidths of the stations, Mark Jacks (1999; emphasis mine) suggests that efforts to “change [KPFA’s] format to bring in a younger demographic, and take the edge out” would result in a situation whereby “our belief in free speech, social justice and equity, equal rights, and the opportunity for all to communicate, entertain, and educate will fall by the wayside.” Certainly a rather critical dismissal of central management’s contentions that

47 Although similar modes of coverage regarding central management’s expressed desire to increase the stations’ relative market (audience) share can be found in many of Clay Thompson’s contributions, due to some resolve concerning space, they will not be herein included.
intended changes will increase such things as social justice and equity by reaching out to more listeners through increased diversity in programming.

Closely related to the expressed intent to diversify the Foundation’s programming to better reflect the interests of younger audiences, central management also expresses a desire to revamp the programming to better reflect the communities of colour that receive the stations’ respective signals. However, as Ali Berzon (1999a; emphasis added) asserts, “[P]rogrammers say [then executive director] Berry is using the word diversity as a smoke screen,” as some of the minority programmers and staff who had provided programming geared toward minority groups within the local communities receiving their broadcasts had, by that time, left as a result of her ‘diversifying’ efforts with regard to programming. This is a sentiment that is also reflected in the work of other Bay Guardian contributors. Citing African American programmer, Nick Alexander, Clay Thompson notes that “Berry and Pacifica are using the diversity issue to divert attention from the democracy issue” (1999g; emphasis mine). Indeed, as Alexander is further provided space to assert,

> It’s hypocritical for them to speak of diversity when they fired [KPFA station manager] Nicole Sawaya, who was a woman of color who was creating slots for programs by people of color. A couple of years back [Pacifica] eliminated the third world department and the women’s department. Nicole was attempting to reverse the effects of that by opening up space for new programmers. She did a lot to promote people of color getting on the local advisory board. (Clay Thompson 1999g)

In a manner that is perhaps best dealt with in the Media On Media subsection to follow, but that does fittingly capture the condemnation of the programming changes being implemented by central management that generally prevails within the Bay Guardian contributions, Ben Samuels (2001; emphases added) asserts that “in an effort to increase audience share, [some members of central management] have replaced the
hard-left news and views Pacifica was founded on with watered-down, [National Public Radio}-esque programming.” Moreover, in a more succinct condemnation of “NPR-esque” and other ‘popular’ radio programming, he suggests that critics are met with “a crucial fight to keep the talk-radio airwaves from being completely over-run by mealy-mouthed Clintonian limousine liberals, invective-spewing Rush Limbaugh types, and puerile Howard Stern-style shock jocks” (Samuels, 2001; emphasis mine). Interestingly, as the emphasized portion of the latter extraction from his work suggests, those who deem themselves ‘true’ progressives—those that perhaps make up the lion’s portion of Pacifica listener-supporters—do not readily attach themselves to the ‘progressive’ politics of the US’s Democratic party—an indication that will perhaps be made more apparent in the subsequent subsection regarding Miscellaneous Observations of Significance.

As was the case with the Times sample, some of the Bay Guardian contributors also make note of central management’s use of official Arbitron ratings as a tool to measure their respective stations’ audience share-respective of their various bandwidths. However, contrary to the former’s contributors’ tendency to use the official ratings ‘guru’ as apparent evidence of central management’s contentions of a relatively minuscule audience share in need of vast increases if the Foundation is to “survive”, Bay Guardian contributors tend to note the gauge of ratings with little more than scornful dismissal, and that its use to determine the ‘success’ of traditional programming provides further evidence that the actions of central management suggest “that the bottom line has become too much of a priority” (Griswold 1997a). In general, perhaps in the best example of the manipulation of noun-phrasing employed by Bay Guardian contributors regarding the Arbitron ratings service is provided by Bacon (1999a), who quite bluntly refers to it as
“infamous”. Of course, such sentiment may not be surprising coming from one who is taking the ‘place’ of those at the ‘bottom’ of the issue.

Finally, prior to concluding this portion of the analysis, note should be made that, although it was a significant focus of the analysis of the Times contributors’ depictions of mature commercial ideological concerns, the notion of central management’s efforts at achieving efficiency through the Establishment of a system of strong central management within the Pacifica Foundation will not be addressed in this subsection. The central reason for its omission at this point is its greater significance as a level of analysis elsewhere. Particularly, central management’s efforts at, and success in, establishing a centrally-managed Pacifica Foundation is key in many of the Bay Guardian contributors’ apparent efforts at depicting them as authoritarian, unaccountable and largely anti-democratic. As such, such notions will comprise the bulk of the following subsection of analysis.

**Management as ‘Dictatorial’– Dissenters as ‘Heroic’**

As is perhaps expected, again, due largely to the contradictory ‘positions’ from which the two samples’ contributors report the Pacifica issue, the Bay Guardian’s contributors tend to provide depictions of the two factions that are seemingly far removed from those that tend to be provided by the Times contributors. Whereas the latter tend to depict central management figures as largely authoritative and perhaps even somewhat heroic in their expressed efforts to “save” the entire Network, the former tend to depict them as authoritarian and perhaps somewhat villainous in their plausible efforts to “sell” key components of the Network. Conversely, while Times contributors tends, though largely through the ‘words’ of officials representing central management, to depict dissenters of
central management’s actions as ‘professional protestors’ bent on irrational criticism of change, contributors comprising the Bay Guardian sample tends, largely through providing a sturdy ‘platform’ to express their concerns, to depict the dissenters as justified defenders of democratic principles and information programmes geared to local communities— a news format that was earlier suggested to be more enlightening and empowering for local news consumers. Beginning with typical depictions of central management as authoritarian and anti-democratic, the following subsection of analysis will attempt to reveal these tendencies within the efforts of the Bay Guardian contributors. However, as the framing of central management’s image appears to derive from a greater variety of foci, greater emphasis will be placed on this aspect of ‘perception-framing’.

As suggested, throughout much of the coverage provided by Bay Guardian contributors, there is a tendency to perpetuate the notion that central management’s various ongoing efforts concerning Pacifica constitute authoritarian, anti-democratic acts, rather than simple efforts to “save” the Network— as typically depicted within much of the Times sample. In some cases, contributors refer to central management’s actions against Berkeley’s KPFA and New York’s WBAI stations as a “coup”, or “take-over” that is sparking criticism from many.48 As Clay Thompson (1999h; emphases added) aptly asserts in particular reference to actions taken against KPFA staff and volunteers, “The Pacifica Radio Foundation’s apparent takeover of local progressive media beacon KPFA-FM has sparked nationwide condemnation.” Although this particular citation

48 To name but a portion of the sample that refers to actions taken against Berkeley’s KPFA station, contributors include Clay Thompson (1999b, 1999g), Chatterjee (1999), Jacks (1999) and Levine (1999). Of the articles that refer to central management’s actions against New York’s WBAI station, one may peruse Zoll (2001).
focuses upon the "condemnation" of those within the Foundation’s ‘family’ of staff and volunteers, it is not limited to those particular quarters.

As many of the Bay Guardian’s contributors— as opposed to their counterparts at the Times— are quick to note, a great deal of criticism of central management’s actions comes from many respected ‘others’— both academically and politically. In a letter signed by well-known US progressives— Chomsky, Herman and Howard Zinn— and presented at the “public” portion of a February 28, 1999, Pacifica Board meeting by radio activist Jeff Blankfort, the central board was urged “to celebrate Pacifica’s 50th birthday by a firm commitment to democratic forms of governance and participation” (Clay Thompson 1999d; emphasis added). Similarly, it may have been somewhat of a surprise to readers of the New York Times to learn that a number of local politicians in the Bay area were very much opposed to the “deceptive statements and thuggish actions” of Pacifica central management (Solomon 1999a). And as Bacon (1999a) notes, by 30 July 1999, no fewer than sixteen state legislators cosigned a letter addressing central management’s actions against staff and volunteers at Pacifica’s KPFA in Berkeley. Moreover, as is the focus of Berzon’s piece, Pacifica’s central management was called to a state legislature hearing requested by Democratic assembly member, Dion Aroner, and that “focused on the ongoing conflict between Berkeley radio station KPFA . . . and its parent foundation” (1999a). As is suggested by the article’s title, however, central management “skipped” that official hearing.

Of course, in noting that central management “skipped” the hearing, the piece does much to emphasize what is perhaps the central criticism of those condemning their actions: they are largely “secretive” and “inaccessible” to their local communities, and
therefore effectively render themselves far-less than democratically-accountable. Indeed, as noted by Belinda Griswold, the apparent secrecy of central management is a perceived problem dating back as far as early 1995: "In early 1995 the dissident listener group Take Back KPFA discovered that Pacifica, parent network of local listener-supported radio station KPFA, was conducting critical business during secret meetings" (1997b; emphasis added). And on April 9, 1997, the CPB issued a "blistering report on the Pacifica radio network's secretive ways" that particularly targeted the central (executive) committee's practice of insufficiently providing reasonable notice of public meetings, for not complying with Communications Act requirements for closed meetings, nor providing reasonable explanations for the requirement of closed meetings. (Griswold 1999c). In citing former KPFA development director, Griswold (1999c; emphasis added) notes that "the degree of secrecy is even deeper than we expected. The (CPB) inspector general was only given a small portion [of Pacifica's documents], and most worrisome was that he wasn't allowed to see the Executive Committee minutes, and that, we suspect, is the true ruling body." As is apparently clear to most, if not all, of the Bay Guardian's contributors, such "secrecy" on the part of those representing a "public" medium is far from acceptable.

Apparent in much of the dissemination provided by Bay Guardian contributors, is the notion that accountability on behalf of central management is a requisite that must be adhered to and, if necessary, enforced. Of the sample of thirty-two related pieces, the notion that central management must adhere to substantially more accountable and

49 For even earlier indications of the strife regarding KPFA, refer to Zeltzer's (1999) contribution that outlines central management's actions throughout the better portion the 1990's.
democratic management practices is notably rife. Without delving into the bulk of said articles, this overriding sentiment of central management's critics is perhaps best conveyed by a statement from media watchdog, *Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting* (FAIR), suggesting that the accountability of a public information medium's management is far more imperative than that of its mainstream counterparts: "*Pacifica should have open and accountable management processes.* Indeed as a *community radio network*, Pacifica owes it to the public to be *far more open and accountable than corporate, mainstream media outlets*" (Clay Thompson 1999e; emphases mine). Of course, it is perhaps unlikely that the Times contributors would, or perhaps could, include such statements by harsh critics of theirs and other such information media—regardless of the individual perceptions of said contributors.

In response to its critics, including those noted above, Pacifica central management has continuously asserted that the changes in management practices that essentially affected the extensively bemoaned decrease in its accountability to the particular local communities served by its five stations were implemented out of a necessity to adhere to CPB regulations governing public broadcast media, or risk a significant portion of its funding. Indeed, this assertion is true— at least in a very simplistic manner. As Clay Thompson (1999a, 1999d) notes, CPB officials had informed the Pacifica executive that their typical governing structure— comprised of two representatives from local advisory boards from each of the five stations and six at-large members, or 'professional' managers— did not conform to regulations requiring a separation between central governing/managing boards and local advisory boards.

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Some of the more notable articles that openly suggest that democratic accountability at the management level is absolutely necessary include Clay Thompson (1999d, 1999e, 1999g and 1999i), Solomon (1999a, 1999b), Bacon (1999a) and Samuels (2001).
However, as he further notes, according to interviews with the CPB vice president for radio, Richard Madden, there is nothing in the regulations that prevent the creation of a more democratic and accountable central managing board. As Clay Thompson (1999b; emphases added) asserts, “When we called the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, which gives Pacifica its federal money, they told us the network could certainly adopt a more democratic structure and obey its regulations—rather than taking the opportunity to excise any shred of accountability.” For instance, Madden suggested that the central governing board could be elected by the Network’s listener-supporters. As voters are individuals directly connected to the local communities served by the Network’s five stations, this would ensure that elected members of the central governing board have some wherewithal regarding the communities served by the Network. As such, at least a vicarious tie between the local and national levels would be maintained. Indeed, as Clay Thompson (1999a) further notes, even San Francisco’s KQED, an “unabashedly corporatist public TV and radio station, has an elected board” of twenty-seven members.

A final technique apparently employed by Bay Guardian contributors to frame a negative image of Pacifica’s central management, or executive committee, is through focussing upon their propensity to rely on the ‘Law’—either ‘rented’ or ‘official forces of the ‘Establishment’—to ‘aggressively’ confront their dissenters—largely comprised of peaceful protestors. As is depicted with relative frequency, those forces tend to act with rather cold over-aggressiveness—at least in depicted proportion to the particular contexts

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51 For more on this notion, refer to Clay Thompson (1999a, 1999d).

52 This somewhat diametrically-opposed notion that an entity that once embodied what would be generally considered the ‘Anti-Establishment’ should utilize the forces of the very ‘Establishment’ it had so vehemently opposed in the past is something that helps comprise the ensuing subsection referred to as Miscellaneous Observations of Significance.
involved. In many cases, the aggressive forces are comprised of private security guards employed by central management to enforce ‘security’ measures taken at Berkeley’s KPFA and New York’s WBAI stations in response to a perceived threat posed by those vociferously and vehemently protesting forced programming changes and dismissals.

In general, the presence of the private security guards from IPSA International is depicted with Orwellian–or perhaps ‘Koestlerian’, in honour of Orwell’s similarly-bent literary predecessor, Arthur Koestler–darkness, or ‘violence’, making it very difficult, if not impossible, for those fortunate enough to gain entry to perform their duties. As Bernstein (1999; emphases added) asserts, “IPSA’s hostile terminators were seizing control of the station. By the time programmers arrived at KPFA that Saturday afternoon, it was an armed camp. Workers who tried to enter the building were treated as strangers. Agents who refused to give their names told them to produce Ids and sign in . . . the new security measures made it impossible for most producers to do their work.”

And in referring to virtually identical actions later taken by central management at New York’s WBAI station, Zoll (2001; emphases mine) notes that the new security measures are a notable departure from what had previously been an open-door atmosphere: “Late on the evening of December 22 [2000], Pacifica executive director Bessie Wash arrived at WBAI with security guards and changed the locks at the station. The following day . . . only people whose names were on a list with front-desk security were allowed into the station, a change from the usual open-door policy at the building.” Although not as blatantly ‘colourful’ as Bernstein’s (1999) account, Zoll’s (2001) assertion similarly serves as an effective vehicle for depicting the ‘dark shadow’ of authoritarian rule
brought about by Pacifica’s central management—regardless of the particular ‘messanger’.

In addition to their employment and deployment of rented security guards, central management is also able to rely on the assistance of ‘official’ forces of the Establishment— the Berkeley Police Department. However, as is suggested by Bay Guardian contributors on two notable occasions, this should not be entirely surprising, considering the connections between Pacifica management and the Law. As Griswold (1997a) asserts, on the 21st of February, 1997, the Pacifica Network hired Burt Glass, a former spokesperson for the Justice Department’s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), as its full-time communications director. And in an almost uncanny fashion, in the midst of the KPFA-related battles between protestors and local law enforcement, Jeff St. John (1999) reveals that then Pacifica board chair Mary Francis Berry had previously served as the head of the selfsame Department’s civil rights division. Regardless of the real effect of these ties, such assertions effectively frame a real tangible connection between central management and those who enforce the law— and in this context, those who enforce central management’s policy decisions and actions.

Throughout the Bay Guardian sample, there are many references (Bernstein 1999; Campbell 1999; Chatterjee 1999; Clay Thompson 1999g) to what are depicted as instances of overly-aggressive and undue police behaviour towards staff and protestors. One of the more noted instances of police ‘enforcement’ involves veteran programmer and producer Bernstein’s forcible removal from KPFA—much of it accidentally broadcast live to listeners. As Pratap Chatterjee (1999) notes, “I burst into the small upstairs newsroom production studio to encounter a standoff. Two plainclothes ex-police officers

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53 Respectively, the two noted articles include Griswold (1997a) and St. John (1999).
stood poker-faced towering above Dennis Bernstein, producer and host of KPFA’s popular evening investigative news show who was sitting on the floor of the studio determined not to leave his post.” Providing even more colour to the scene than Chatterjee, programmer Davey D (1999; emphases mine) asserts that “[i]t was a scene straight out of an *Orwellian* novel when armed police officers snatched veteran radio host Dennis Bernstein off the air at KPFA Radio in Berkeley California.” Perhaps not surprisingly, Davey D is another contributor to the Bay Guardian that makes some reference to the “Orwellian” nature of the affair. In effect, such references tend to lend a dark touch of oppression to the issue—Pacifica central management as the “Big Brother” forces of the Establishment eager to enforce its will upon the ‘lesser-thans’ of the Network.

Closely related, some of the above-noted contributors also place some focus on the ‘violent’ nature of the protests. However, as opposed to the perceived general tendency of the Times contributors, Bay Guardian contributors tend to focus on the violent nature of the forces of authority as they confronted protestors. As Clay Thompson (1999g; emphases added) describes the scene at one of the more eventful protests outside of the Berkeley station: “The 400-person crowd cheered as the police pulled the protesters from the building and into waiting square-sided wagons . . . A brief sit-in around the protester-packed police truck evoked the spirit of Mario Savio. Then the cops dragged off the guys clinging onto the axle and drove away.” Although this description does perhaps frame an image of ‘violent forces of authority’, Sarah Campbell’s (1999) piece includes a description that makes such imagery appear rather opaque. While covering a similar demonstration, she notes that “[o]ne of the male guards
reached out and grabbed [protestor Karen Pickett] by the neck. The security team then placed her under citizens arrest and subsequently handed her over to the [East Bay Regional Police Department] police who placed her under arrest" (Campbell 1999; emphasis added). Of course, the perpetrator of such direct violence was not an ‘official’ police officer, however, as part of the same law enforcement presence, he is inextricably connected.

Perhaps not surprisingly, in the process of revealing, or establishing, central management’s reliance on the ‘Law’ as a means to subdue those who dissent to their actions, Bay Guardian contributors interestingly engage in parallel processes of establishing those very dissenters as veritable ‘freedom-fighters’— attempting to re-establish locally-determined democratic principles throughout the entire Pacifica network, and re-affirm the principal significance of locally-produced and focussed programming. Although not nearly as ‘involved’ as the portion of the project devoted to revealing some of the common means Bay Guardian contributors employ to frame an image of Pacifica central management as authoritarian and anti-democratic, the following remainder of this subsection will attempt to collect a body of citations and references that will reveal the contributors means of framing an image of the dissenters as self-preserving and just defenders of democratic principles— not to mention enlightening and empowering programming— threatened by central management’s actions and implemented changes.

Much of the coverage provided by Bay Guardian contributors frames an image of solidarity akin to honourable movements and demonstrations of previous eras. In referring to the atmosphere at one particular demonstration, Clay Thompson (1999g)
compares it to the nineteen-sixties by suggesting that it “evoked the spirit of Mario Savio.” Moreover, he further notes that the crowd was largely composed of “youngsters”—a fact that perhaps suggests that, contrary to much of the reporting of mainstream journalists, this particular issue has ignited a sense of solidarity amongst a newer generation of progressives (Clay Thompson, 1999g).54 In the same article, Clay Thompson (1999g; emphases added) further hints at a solidified body of protest by noting that “30 staffers and supporters were waiting to be hauled a couple blocks down the street to the Berkeley clink and charged with trespassing at the station they’d helped build. Around 20 were already waiting for them in jail.” The sense of solidarity that this image tends to convey pales in comparison to some of the images conveyed by Chaterjee (1999). Particularly, at one point in her contribution, she notes, “The following day a crowd of over 100 people confronted Berkeley police in an attempt to get arrested. Among these protestors were many people who have been guests on KPFA; a vote of confidence and support that was truly inspiring for us programmers who have been left without a voice and many of whom are threatened with losing their jobs” (Chatterjee 1999; emphases added). In effect, this image does not merely reflect the apparently overwhelming solidarity of the dissenters. It also effectively reveals the extent to which the issue had gained support throughout the general progressive community. Moreover, in addition to suggesting the level of solidarity within the particular sites of dissent, one Bay Guardian contributor (Kramer 2000) suggests the solidarity between dissenters miles apart. In reference to suggested attempts by central management to ‘reel-in’ popular and

54 As Clay Thompson also notes in this article (1999g), related coverage provided by the mainstream San Francisco Chronicle had suggested that the essential difference between the 1960’s ‘golden age’ of dissent and the demonstrations taking place outside of KPFA in the late 1990’s is one of ‘aging’—the protestors are “thirty years older”.

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award-winning WBAI journalist Amy Goodman, host of Pacifica’s *Democracy Now!*.

Genevieve Kramer (2000; emphasis mine) notes that “[h]undreds of Goodman’s listeners protested Oct. 25 [2000] at simultaneous rallies at KPFA and at Pacifica’s other stations in New York, Los Angeles, Houston, and Washington, D.C.” Again, whether surprising or not, the Times contributors do not provide this context, as it has the potential to belie the sense of ‘isolation’ that much of their coverage establishes, and perhaps inform their readers of the relative popularity and possible implications of the issue.

In addition to framing an overwhelming sense of solidarity amongst those dissenting the actions of Pacifica central management, Bay Guardian contributors tend to give expression to the notion that the protestors are on a democratic mission to battle the ‘forces of oppression’. In many cases, this expression is offered in the form of a ‘call to arms’ issued by those directly involved. This notion that the dissenters are faced with a ‘mission’ appears to be reflected by dismissed KPFA producer Bernstein (1999; emphasis added), who asserts, “This is not simply a labor-management dispute or a question of hate speech on the air. *What is at stake here is the future of community radio and the preservation of a sacred Bay Area institution, nourished by the voiceless and a platform for activists and progressives to speak the truth to power without fear of reprisal.*” And Norman Solomon (1999b; emphasis added) offers similar musings when he presents the question: “Can KPFA revive its tradition of free speech and fearless challenge to corporate power on the air? Can the station, after half a century, turn back the authoritarian forces eager to crush its most vibrant characteristics?” When included within the bodies of their respective news items, these citations serve well as devices for effectively creating an image of the protestors as embodying the characteristics.
As noted, Bay Guardian contributors are also given to providing space for veritable ‘calls-to-arms’ and warnings issued by those who are largely depicted as fighters for “media democracy”. In one particularly noteworthy case, Clay Thompson (1999i; emphases mine) provides article space for PoliceWatch’s Van Jones, who issues the following warning to the Pacifica executive, or central management at a Houston meeting: “Never underestimate the power of a proud people insulted . . . Your role in history is going to be confined to being remembered as the people who sparked a movement for democratic media in America.” Indeed, used rather effectively by Clay Thompson (1999i), this Van Jones warning is, in a very real sense, a ‘follow-up’ to a colourful ‘call-to-arms’ he had previously issued from a balcony at Berkeley’s KPFA station, where evening demonstrations– and arrests– were taking place. Again finding effective framing space in a Clay Thompson (1999g) contribution, Van Jones is cited as exhorting to a crowd of protestors gathered below: “Tomorrow there is no other place to be but here . . . This is our last stand. There are armed guards everywhere. They don’t plan to give KPFA back. We need to say ‘You will give KPFA back to this community.’ Morning picket if you can. Noon picket if you can. Tomorrow night at five if you are alive!”55 Perhaps a little over the top, the above citations– and particularly the latter one– are effectively used by the author to frame the tone of the article without directly engaging in personal value-judgements regarding the issue. As noted, this method of ‘indirect’ framing tends to be the mode of choice for the ‘professional’ and ‘objective’ journalists who contribute to such mainstream news media as the New York Times. Of course, as contributors to an alternative, less overtly-constrained, news medium, Clay

55 Similar ‘calls-to-arms’ can be found in Berzon (1999a, 1999b) and Campbell (1999).
Thompson and his journalistic colleagues need not resort to such ‘covert’ methods of framing. Indeed, as is hopefully revealed in the preceding analysis, they do engage in more direct and personal analysis of the issue, and thus rid themselves of the ‘false’ cloak of objectivity and enable themselves to provide a more contextualized version of events.

Finally, and in relation to the above-asserted notion of providing personal analysis to the issue, while many Bay Guardian contributors provide relatively ample space for information and citations that may affect perusals supportive of Pacifica protestors, some offer their own words of ‘defence’ for the dissenters’ motivations and actions. Of particular note, a contributor provides what amounts to a direct defence of KPFA broadcasters’ violations of the central management-imposed ‘gag rule’ preventing them to discuss the Pacifica crises on the air. In summarizing the noteworthy events at KPFA’s Berkeley station, Clay Thompson asserts (1999b; emphasis added), “Sure, they violated (KPFA’s) gag rule barring discussion of station business on the air. And sure, airing an institution’s dirty laundry can turn off listeners and come off as absurdly self-absorbed. But the staffers, knowing they were up against a highly questionable Establishment— their own— employed the only tool they had.”56 Of course, that “tool” is KPFA itself— a traditional medium for the “voiceless” and “a platform for activists and progressives to speak the truth to power without fear of reprisal”. Indeed, is that not an integral task that ‘journalism’ in general was, and is, meant to perform: public watchdog free from the constraining shackles of authority, or the ruling Establishment?

56 Notably, this citation can also be found in another piece (1999g) where Clay Thompson includes a summary, or “timeline”, of the KPFA-related events.
Media on Media: The Relative Inferiority of Mainstream, ‘Professional’ News Media

As is not unlike their counterparts at the Times, Bay Guardian contributors often offer depictions of the competing models of journalism— the alternative, or progressive, model versus the mainstream, or ‘objective’ model. However, perhaps not surprisingly, the depictions appear as polemic flip-flops of one-another. Whereas Times contributors tend to focus upon the aggressive, highly-personalized and partisan nature that typifies Pacifica’s— and doubtlessly other alternative news media – mode of information dissemination, Bay Guardian contributors tend to focus upon the bland, ‘toothless’ and often Establishmentarian nature of mainstream, or ‘mainstream-styled’, news media— a lot that necessarily includes the New York Times. Moreover, some noteworthy Bay Guardian pieces also focus upon the praiseworthiness of Pacifica’s typically brash role as a ‘watchdog’ and general source of enlightenment and empowerment. The following subsection will be devoted to attempting to give some ‘shape’ to the media frames presented by Bay Guardian contributors.

Although they do not apparently engage besmirching mainstream news media as often as they engage in the relative glorification of their own, some Bay Guardian contributors do provide some noteworthy examples of a decidedly anti-mainstream message. Of course, a common practice among journalists working for alternative, or progressive, news media is to emphasize the direct correlation between mainstream news media and the corporate prerogatives of the mature commercial ideology. In referring to central management’s efforts regarding Berkeley’s KPFA station, Solomon (1999a; emphasis mine) notes that “[p]owerful forces are straining to drag the station and the network down the one-way street of mainstream corporatization.” Moreover, closely
related to the notion of news media "corporatization" is an overwhelming concern for the concentration that it has increasingly been accompanied by in the maturing commercial media system and society. As noted in the theoretical portion of the project, this results in a situation wherein the news media are increasingly concentrated in the hands of fewer individuals who can control their content. This is something that programmer Davey D more than hints at when he warns of the concentration trend: "It speaks to a growing pattern in the media, where the ability to present information to the masses is being placed in the hands of a select few . . . Remember: He who controls the airwaves sets the tunes" (1999). Unfortunately, according to many Bay Guardian contributors, those "tunes" are relatively 'flat'.

In large part, according to some of this sample's contributors, the 'flatness' of the "tunes" provided by mainstream news media is due to a narrow focus of themes, insufficient 'back-up singers' and a significant lack of depth. As they are largely beholden to government officials for their news sourcing, mainstream news media are unable, or unwilling, to provide for themes that stray from the 'official' line. Indeed, according to Jacks, as a typical source of alternative news information, KPFA is able to offer a much broader and more refreshing variety of themes, as it is "unlike a CBS operation or a public radio station that is subservient to diktats from Washington D.C." (1999; emphasis mine). Moreover, in further extolling the relative virtues of KPFA in particular, he asserts that its relative accessibility for myriad opinions provides a variety of voices that makes its content comparatively richer, as many of these voices "... would never get a look on mainstream [news media]" (Jacks 1999; emphasis mine). As such, readers are perhaps left to conclude that the resulting rich content—via a healthy variety
of opinion—provided by alternative news media, such as KPFA, tends to render that of their mainstream counterparts bland. If there is any doubt as to this resulting negative binarism regarding content, Solomon is one contributor through whom some clarity can be (re)gained: “[KPFA’s] unabashed leftist politics and diverse cultural programs (clash) with the mainstream mush dominating the radio band” (Solomon 1999b; emphasis mine).

As is perhaps implied by Solomon’s words, public enlightenment and empowerment are unlikely to be attained through the “mainstream mush” that prevails on the radio airwaves. Unfortunately, as many contributors are quick to emphasize, such “mush” is not limited strictly to media that are typically referred to as “mainstream”.

Perhaps even more than their general critique of mainstream news media, Bay Guardian contributors—either directly or through the provision of citation space to others—tend to be rather eager to specifically condemn “mainstream-styled” public news media. One public medium that appears to provide substantial fodder for their relative wrath is National Public Radio (NPR). To some of the contributors, the content of NPR is largely indistinguishable from the “mush” that Solomon attributes to mainstream content. In referring to the vast criticism of Pacifica central management’s attempts at altering the programming format at KPFA, Samuels (2001; emphasis added) notes that “[c]ritics claim that leaders . . . have replaced the hard-left news and views Pacifica was founded on with watered-down, NPR-esque programming.” And in similarly referring to central management’s efforts, KPFA’s erstwhile programmer and host Bernstein suggests that their motive is “to dumb us down, to turn us into another NPR-type service” (Kramer 2000). As appears quite clear, although NPR is considered a public news medium and therefore, through previously established objectives, is primarily driven to cater to some
sense of the ‘public good’, it generally fails to gain, or perhaps retain, the respect of progressive journalists— not to mention those working for ‘public’ information media that remain independent, and who have a sense that the achievement of some level of ‘public good’ remains the primary goal of their work.

Although much of the Bay Guardian contributors’ criticism of “mainstream-style” public information media is focussed upon NPR, this entity does not represent the only public medium that attracts their condemnation. Serving the same general area as KPFA, TV and radio station KQED— or “San Francisco’s public-broadcasting behemoth”, as Clay Thompson (1999d) puts it— provides a second focus of scorn— though comparatively minimal. Although a public broadcasting entity, KQED’s content tends far from the ‘progressive’ variety that has historically defined such sources of information. As Take Back KPFA spokesperson Jeff Blankfort asserts, KQED “has no pretenses of being radical” (Clay Thompson 1999a; emphasis mine). Moreover, it is also suggested that this public broadcaster is much the same as any corporate-owned and controlled mainstream news media. Moreover, as Clay Thompson (1999a) directly asserts, KQED is an “unabashedly corporatist public TV and radio station.” As such, the reader perhaps is left with the impression that such ‘public’ entities are far inferior to such bastions of enlightenment as KPFA and the other public stations comprising the Pacifica Network.

Perhaps of little surprise to those expecting a rather “personal”, or comparatively subjective, account of the issue from an alternative information medium, Bay Guardian contributions are frequently given to extolling virtue upon Berkeley’s KPFA and the rest of the Pacifica Foundation— at least in their traditional capacity as vehicles for progressive, and often mobilizing, information dissemination. In some cases, virtue is
ascribed through yet another negative binarism that defines alternative news media by their journalistic antitheses—mainstream news media. As is often the case, the latter are inextricably linked to “corporate domination” or imperatives. In referring to Berkeley’s KPFA, Bacon (1999a; emphases added) asserts that it is a “non-commercial station” with a mandate to “promote free speech, providing a media voice for underrepresented communities, and broadcasting a political alternative to the corporate-dominated media.”

While this assertion effectively establishes the corporate domination of the vast proportion of US information media, it fails to particularly shed any discernible light on exactly how this “domination” effects the content of such media. Other Bay Guardian contributors, however, appear to be a little more forthcoming. For instance, Clay Thompson hints at a relative ‘abyss’ that prevails within the informational content that defines the system of corporatist information media, by suggesting that KPFA is “a beacon of alternative information in the corporate-media wilderness” (1999i; emphasis added). And as former Bay Guardian news editor Howard Levine (1999; emphases added) makes quite apparent through his efforts at praising KPFA’s traditional progressive role in the Bay Area, the content that typifies mainstream news media is beholden Establishment and corporatist imperatives: “KPFA as the first and often only source of important news and analysis . . . News I would trust. Analysis from a perspective based on peace and justice rather than realpolitik or corporate priorities.”

Moreover, in addition to offering an alternative informational content to that provided by mainstream, or corporate, news media, Solomon (1999b) suggests that KPFA— and doubtless similarly bent alternative information media— has traditionally provided a platform for a “fearless challenge to corporate power.”

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As is doubtlessly suggested by some of the above citations, Bay Guardian contributors’ general glorifications of KPFA and the *Pacifica Foundation* are not merely confined to engaging in processes of ‘anti-definition’. Some also note their importance in mobilizing and sustaining progressive movements. In particular reference to KPFA, Levine asserts (1999; emphases mine), “It was . . . the first place to turn to get the word, or to spread the word. It is not exaggerating at all to say the progressive movements in the Bay Area . . . would be far weaker, less visible, and more divided without the glue that has been KPFA.” And as Levine (1999) further suggests, activists who do not reside within KPFA’s bandwidth are “astonished and jealous” at how quickly those who use this vehicle to disseminate information are able to “mobilize demonstrations and marches.” Moreover, as is suggested by some Bay Guardian contributors, much of the locally produced material that is disseminated on KPFA’s airwaves is of high journalistic calibre, and is therefore generally well respected within the field. As a result, the bestowment of awards is not a rare experience at KPFA. Indeed, in particularly referring to 1998, KPFA presenter Davey D (1999) notes that KPFA’s locally produced programming had won over a dozen awards.\(^\text{57}\) In noting such journalistic success, Bay Guardian contributors go beyond merely contrasting the content of alternative news media with that of mainstream, or pointing to its higher quality as a vehicle for gaining knowledge. In effect, they are perhaps indicating that the journalistic field itself— that which also encompasses the mainstream variety— has attested to its relative merit.

\(^{57}\) It should be noted that this citation is not meant to suggest that awards have been limited to KPFA. For instance, *Democracy Now!* host Amy Goodman is a previous winner of the esteemed *Polk Award* for outstanding journalism.
Miscellaneous Observations of Significance: Part Two

As was the case with the New York Times sample, that comprising the work of the Bay Guardian contributors provides for a number of notable “observations of significance.” In addition to the themes covered in the three preceding analytical subsections, the work of the Bay Guardian contributors presents aspects of coverage that are deemed significant on at least three separate levels. Firstly, said contributors frequently engage in apparent efforts to intertwine the Pacifica Establishment— as represented by the central management (or executive board)— with the political Establishment— at least as represented by the “Clintonian” Democrats. And as was similarly the case with the Times sample, a second significant aspect of analysis concerns the above-noted “auxiliary embellishments”. For instance, whereas the Times contributors’ headlines tend to (albeit marginally) focus on the actions of the protestors, and therefore apparently establish a tone that sets much of the ensuing article space up for central management’s explanations or point of view of related events, Bay Guardian contributors’ headlines tend to focus on the actions of Pacifica’s central management, and thus set a tone that prepares their content for the protestors’ explanations and viewpoints of related events. Moreover, and perhaps not surprisingly, considering alternative information media’s reputation for being ‘subjective’ and ‘personal’, a notable portion of the related work of Bay Guardian contributors concludes with information that appears to attempt to garner additional support for the protestors, if not issue virtual ‘calls to arms’ in their support. Finally, and in direct comparison to the corresponding analysis of the Times sample, the chosen lexical referencing of the style of news dissemination, or political bent, of the Pacifica stations offers yet another interesting contrast between the two newsprint media.
Thus noted, the following analytical subsection will, in the above-suggested order, attempt to shed some light on these ‘significant’ observations.

In addition to the above-noted tendency to associate Pacifica central management with the Establishment through making some apparently poignant connections between some of its members and the US Department of Justice, Bay Guardian contributors also appear to suggest some other central management-Establlshment linkages. Not unlike some notable contributions comprising the Times sample, Bay Guardian contributors make apparently effective use of invoking the name of “Bill Clinton”. However, while those Times contributors who invoke his name perceivably do so for the purposes of establishing the ‘extreme radical’ nature of the protestors, Bay Guardian contributors appear to invoke the name to devalue central management’s claims of ‘authentic progressiveness’. Perhaps integral in the effectiveness of this ‘debasing’ process is a prior, or relatively concurrent, depiction of Clinton as a ‘soft’, ‘weak’ or ‘non’ progressive. Of course, it may be somewhat safe to assume that a substantial portion of the Bay Guardian’s readership already holds such notions as ‘evident’. However, if there are any remaining uncertainties regarding this ‘fact’, clarity can apparently be provided by such contributors as Clay Thompson (1999g; emphasis added), who, in drawing a “line” between the protestors and central management, appears rather eager to suggest just how ‘progressive’ Clinton and his party are: “[T]he station’s supporters and the network bosses find themselves on opposite sides of a seismic fault line between comfortable Clintonite liberalism and Berkeley radicalism.” As is perhaps suggested by this citation, the “comfortable liberalism” of Clinton and his version of the Democratic Party does not mesh well with the progressive anti-Establlshmentarianism of those

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protesting the actions of Pacifica’s central management. Once one receives the necessary ‘clarification’ regarding Clinton’s level of progressiveness— if this ‘truism’ was not indeed already well-ingrained— Bay Guardian contributors’ efforts at linking central management figures to this ‘weak liberal’ are perhaps rendered more effective in framing an image of said management as ‘weak’, pro-Establishment, liberals’, and thus anti-Pacifica— at least in its traditional journalistic capacity.

In general, these Pacifica central management-Bill Clinton/Clinton administration linkages involve noting particular members’ prior connections with the Democratic administration. Indeed, many of the noted linkages specifically refer to then executive director Mary Francis Berry’s former role as a “Clinton appointee”.$^{58}$ As Clay Thompson (1999g; emphases added) perhaps effectively frames the connection: “Berry is a consummate beltway insider. She served in the Carter administration and was appointed to head of the Civil Rights Commission by Bill Clinton.” In addition to mere suggestions that Berry is linked to Clinton and his Democrats, some Bay Guardian contributors provide a little more detail as to how this link has played out within the Pacifica Network. As Zeltzer (1999; emphases added) notes, it is a connection that has resulted in some relatively supportive actions on the part of a perhaps presumably gracious Berry: “Berry, a Clinton fan, supported a new policy for Pacifica in 1998 that barred programmers from encouraging attendance at rallies opposing the (then Clinton controlled) US blockade . . . on Iraq.” Of course, considering the ‘progressive’ community’s general distaste for the Iraq blockade, Zeltzer’s (1999) inclusion of such an apparent act of support on the part of central management would probably not gain them many supporters amongst those

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$^{58}$ Indications of Berry’s former status as a Clinton appointee can be found in Zeltzer (1999) and Clay Thompson (1999b, 1999g).
consuming his article. Perhaps that is precisely the point of including such information. Moreover, as seven-year veteran KPFA host Weyland Southon asserts, Berry is more than merely a little ‘helpful’ to the Clinton administration on occasion, she is a “straight-up government pawn” (Clay Thompson 1999g; emphasis mine). Similarly, in response to criticism levelled by Berry in response to an article he contributed to the Nation, Alexander Cockburn asserts, “I thought I’d make it clear that what Berry, [Patricia] Scott and [Marian Wright] Edelman have in common is their willingness in their public role as liberal black women to act as troopers in defense of white capitalist power” (Zeltzer 1999; emphasis added). Indeed, if there is any remaining uncertainty as to the ‘progressive’ community’s distaste for Clinton and his version of the Democrats, Cockburn’s act of indirectly associating them with “white capitalist power” presumably leaves little to the imagination.

In addition to the apparent task of specifically establishing rather derogatory linkages between Pacifica’s central management and the Clinton administration, Bay Guardian contributors also appear to display a particular propensity of suggesting that central management and the Democratic Party are somehow attempting to undermine the Pacifica Network’s radical tradition in the service of less than arcane ulterior motives. As cited by Clay Thompson (1999g), WBAI staffer and co-producer of Democracy Now! Errol Maitland suggests that central management are largely comprised of “ex-liberals who are out to destroy us and deliver us to the Democratic Party.” In almost identical fashion, Kramer (2000; emphasis mine) cites Bernstein as asserting that central management’s regarding Berkeley’s KPFA are attempts to “turn us into another NPR-type service that will perhaps be in the service of the Democratic Party.” Although both
citations provide effectively damaging suggestions of perhaps an indirect ‘take-over’ by the Democratic Party, Davey D’s (1999) contribution to the Bay Guardian goes somewhat further with this particular ‘innuendo’. As he, perhaps strategically, reports regarding central management’s actions relating to KPFA, “Many are whispering that it’s a move that’s being pushed by forces within the Democratic Party, which would love nothing more [than] to have consistent access to such a powerful station that happens to be the flagship for four other stations nationwide” (Davey D, 1999; emphasis added). Although such innuendo is not given as fact, it is not altogether improbable that it would gain the appearance of fact—particularly given the probable progressive nature of the Bay Guardian’s typical readership. Indeed, neither is it entirely improbable that the inclusion of such ‘conspiratorial’ information would provoke some level of critical internal deliberation on the part of any reader—regardless of political bent.

As noted in the introductory portion of this particular subsection, a second significant level of analysis presented by the Bay Guardian sample regards auxiliary embellishments. As was the case with the preceding analysis of the Times sample, interesting observations of this nature focus upon headlines and in-text captions, or, as is the case with the Bay Guardian contributions, subtitles that occur within the bodies of articles. Regarding the use of headlines, it should perhaps be restated at this point of the project that their importance as original shapers of article content is herein deemed relatively immense. As such, perhaps the first significant level of analysis concerns their particular focus— or which faction’s actions are emphasized. Whereas the Times contributors tend to focus—albeit rather marginally—on the actions of the protestors, Bay Guardian contributors tend to decidedly emphasize the actions, or assumed intentions, of
Pacifica central management.\textsuperscript{59} Of the thirty-one articles comprising the Bay Guardian sample, eighteen clearly emphasize the actions or intentions of central management. Moreover, Bay Guardian contributors that take this route with regard to headlining their articles tend to select wording that negatively frames said actions by focussing on their ‘violence’, or that which results from said actions. By far the greatest contributor to this category of foci, an honour that perhaps merits particular mention, Clay Thompson’s contributions include such typically-‘damning’ headlines as “Pacifica Power Grab: Network Executives Are Seizing Control of Pacifica’s Governing Board. That Could Spell Disaster for KPFA” (1999a), “Endgame at KPFA: The Pacifica Foundation Has Seized Control of KPFA. What Happens Now?” (1999g), “No Comment: Pacifica Grabs Power From KPFA and Its Audience” (1999d) and “Endgame at KPFA: What the Hell Is Pacifica Doing?” (1999b). Although the emphases are added, the ‘damning’ use of wording is an effective means of pre-shaping the content that follows. Moreover, of this ‘sub-sample’ of nineteen articles, only one utilizes a headline that includes wording that could be read by some as associating ‘violence’ to the protestors: Clay Thompson’s (1999e) “Fire Power: Pacifica Sacks KPFA Manager; Staffers Revolt.” Of course, the ‘violence’ associated could either be read in a positive or negative manner—depending on which side of the ‘fence’ one sits. After all, are not some revolts honourable?

Of the remaining twelve articles comprising the sample, only three utilize headlines that emphasize the actions of the protestors. These headlines include Clay Thompson’s (1999h) “On the Same Frequency: Workers at Other Pacifica Stations

\textsuperscript{59} Although the corresponding analysis of the Times headlines noted all titles within the text, such intricacy will not characterize the analysis of the Bay Guardian’s articles. For the most part, this is due to the comparatively large size of the latter’s sample. As such, actual titles will only be noted when they particularly add to the analysis. Moreover, all emphases within the ensuing headlines are added by the researcher.
Express Solidarity with Locked-Out KPFA Employees;” Travis Loller’s (2000) “Reporters Strike Pacifica Over Censorship” and Kramer’s (2000) “You Can’t Keep Goodman Down: KPFA Listeners Protest Pacifica’s Treatment of Democracy Now! Host.” Moreover, of these three headlines, only the latter two provide wording—“Reporters Strike Pacifica” and “KPFA Listeners Protest” respectively—that could be construed as associating ‘violence’ with their actions—at least the violence that tends to be associated with “strikes” and “protests”. However, while a similar emphasis on such lexical choices regarding the protestors is employed by the Times contributors, the result is effectively different.

The general reason for this difference is the contextual framing, or the chosen use of such words in relation to the protestors. For instance, when one compares Times contributor Nieves’s (1999a) “Ever a Voice of Protest, Radio KPFA Is at It Again, but With a Twist” with Kramer’s (2000) “You Can’t Keep Goodman Down: KPFA Listeners Protest Pacifica’s Treatment of Democracy Now! Host,” the difference between their use of similar words seems apparent. In Nieves’s case, her (1999a) use of “protest” is contextualized in a manner that perceivably suggests that those connected with Berkeley’s KPFA station are perpetual complainers, perhaps continually ‘whining’ about ‘something’, or ‘anything’. However, Kramer (2000) appears to contextualize the same word in a manner that emphasizes the notion that the protests are a response to ‘wrongs’ done by central management. This contextualization is perhaps not entirely surprising at this point of the analysis. As was noted above, much of the content of Times and Bay Guardian contributions are presented in such a manner as to provide relatively extensive space to for one faction or the other to respond to criticism, or to defend their claims.
While the former—whether as part of an explicit attempt to frame content or, as is suggested above, due to structural deficiencies that lead to an over-emphasis on Establishmentarian points of view—tend to allot the bulk of that space to ‘officials’ representing central management, the latter tend to allot a similar disproportion of space to the protestors and those supporting them.

Although the remaining nine articles do not particularly focus on the actions of one faction or the other, there are some interesting observations of note. In attempting to deal with the two samples’ use of headlines in a relatively even-handed manner, note must be made of other instances of Bay Guardian contributors’ choices of wording that associates ‘violence’, or notions with similar negative connotations, to the issue—not merely to central management or the protestors. Four of the remaining nine articles employ headlines that fit into this category—though perhaps rather tenuously. These include: Clay Thompson’s (1999) “Trouble in Texas: Pacifica’s Board Wanted to Discuss the Network’s Future in Secret. KPFA Staff and Supporters Wanted Them to Resign. Our Reporter Wanted an Interview with Pacifica’s Leaders. Nobody Went Home Happy;” Davey D’s (1999) “KPFA Is Blowing Up. Why?;” Samuels’s (2001) “Pacifica Execs Resign: KPFA Supporters Vow to Continue Protest Against Network ‘Corporatists’” and Randall Lyman’s (1999) “Pacifica Battle Rages; Next Front Will Be Board Meeting.” Of these headlines, perhaps only the latter two could be claimed to truly focus on a negative image of the ongoing issue. Moreover, Samuel’s (2001) headline appears to be ‘properly’ contextualized—at least in the sense that the ‘violence’ associated by its “vow to continue protest” is somewhat offset by the actions of “corporatists”. As for Lyman’s (1999) choice of wording: perhaps its lack of ‘proper’
contextualization— in a similar fashion as some of the headlines comprising the Times sample— provides some indication as to why this piece represents his sole Bay Guardian contribution regarding the Pacifica issue.

As suggested, a third significant 'miscellaneous' observation concerns Bay Guardian contributors' tendency to infuse their articles with 'post script' style information apparently employed to invoke support for the cause of the protestors. Of the total Bay Guardian sample, no fewer than six conclude with such additional information. These include Chatterjee's (1999) "Democracy Where?: Pacifica Kills Free Speech Radio;" Berzon's (1999b) "Mixed Signals: Pacifica President: One Hour of Dissent per Month;" Zeltzer's (1999) "Union-Busting, Labor, and Pacifica Radio" and Clay Thompson's (1999a) "Pacifica Power Grab: Network Executives Are Seizing Control of Pacifica's Governing Board. That Could Spell Disaster for KPFA," (1999f) "Bensky Bounced: Pacifica Sacks Longtime KPFA Host Larry Bensky" and (1999c) "Pacifica Network Fires Archivist." In their most benign form, the postscript style additions offer additional information regarding specific campaigns waged by external organizations against the actions of Pacifica's central management. In effect, concluding, yet separate, additions of this sort may perhaps provide further legitimation of the protestors' stance. For instance, Zeltzer (1999; emphases mine) provides an actual "postscript" that perhaps legitimates the actions of protestors by informing the reader of a statement of support recently issued by the CWA 9415, and supported by unions nationwide:

P.S.: The CWA 9415 issued a statement July 14 (1999) protesting "the actions of the Pacifica Foundation to silence free speech at KPFA." William Lucy, the Pacifica board's labor representative, is refusing to answer email and calls from union leaders from around the country.
In their most ‘personalized’ or ‘political’ form, the concluding tidbits amount to nothing less than apparent efforts on behalf of the contributors to mobilize support by urging readers to join the protests. Indeed, according to some of the contributors of this ilk, readers’ physical support is imperative for stemming the potential tide of ‘repression’.

As Chatterjee’s (1999; emphases added) contribution concludes,

> If you haven't joined us for the evening rallies yet, come down some evening to 1929 Martin Luther King Junior Way in Berkeley, and witness the terrifying image of steel chain and a padlock on the doors to free speech radio. Remember that this too can, and may well, happen to your freedom of speech someday in the not too distant future.

Of course, such overtly personal and political styles of writing are not so easily identified within the Times contributions, composed by journalists who have been trained to be objective, and who proceed on the road of professionalism. However, as has hopefully been revealed, although they do not employ such direct methods of framing their contributions, some framing nevertheless takes place—albeit in a decidedly different, top-down, manner that tends to be largely supportive of an Establishmentarian viewpoint regarding issues.

Finally, the lexical options of the Bay Guardian contributors regarding the style of news coverage, or political bent, of the Pacifica stations provide a relatively glaring contrast to the above-noted options of the Times contributors. While the latter rather overwhelmingly opt for wording of a “leftist” or “radical” nature, as opposed to that of “progressive” or “alternative”, the former opt for the “progressive” or “alternative” signifiers, rather than those of a “leftist” or “radical” nature. Of the forty-five clear occasions where some related reference is made, twenty-two refer to the stations’ style and mandate as “progressive”—by far the most popular moniker. Indeed, when combined with “alternative” (nine occasions), “liberal” (one occasion) and “independent” (one
occasion) references, the thirty-three occasions in which Bay Guardian contributors choose the more 'palatable' references to the style and mandate of the Pacifica stations represent a relatively significant portion of the total. Of the remaining twelve references, Bay Guardian contributors opt for monikers of the "leftist" variety on eleven occasions, and choose "radical" on one occasion. Although it may be somewhat surprising that Bay Guardian contributors opt for "leftist" versions on eleven occasions, however, on at least one occasion (Jacks, 1999), the selection is in reference to central management's perception of the traditional style of news dissemination practised by Pacifica's stations, and appears to be chosen as a vehicle to discredit that (mis)perception.

Indeed, Jacks's (1999) use of the vehicle may shed some interesting retrospective light on the related choice of monikers by Bay Guardian and Times contributors. As is perhaps suggested, the choice of monikers of a "leftist" variety tend to be made by those from an Establishment position, and not by those working directly within the Network, or other alternative news media. Moreover, as much of their disseminated points of view derive—again, largely a structural 'flaw'—from the 'official' Establishment, Times contributors are more likely to adopt the monikers used by said Establishment. And perhaps on a more explicit level, due to the profession's long-standing 'liberal' self-perception, said journalists are perceivably more likely to opt for monikers of the "leftist" variety when referring to their alternative counterparts, as referring to them as "progressive" would potentially diminish their (mis)conceptions of their own place within the political spectrum. Working within a system of news dissemination that is not required to rigidly adhere to structures that, implicitly or explicitly, emphasize official, or Establishment, points of view, Bay Guardian contributors are not so hindered. As such, it
is perhaps not surprising that the monikers of choice, when combined, tend to be overwhelmingly of a "progressive" or "alternative" nature.

**The Provision of Space for the Expression of Viewpoints from 'Above'**

As a decidedly more 'partisan' and 'subjective' newsprint medium, the San Francisco Bay Guardian does not bend to the constraints of mainstream news media, such as the New York Times. It may therefore be somewhat more acceptable for its contributors to provide coverage of the Pacifica issue in a manner that may perhaps slight the position and contentions of its central management (executive), and emphasize the points of view from 'below'—those protesting central management's actions. Indeed, as outlined above, this is a major component of what has herein been referred to as "altruistic propaganda".

However, under the umbrella of contemporary journalism, whether mainstream or alternative, the act of entirely omitting particular perspectives integral to the contextualization of an issue would not be acceptable for any news entity that purports to disseminate even minimally contextualized information regarding issues. For the most part, the contributions comprising the Bay Guardian sample are no exception. Although in some, if not many, cases the position of central management appears to be provided in a relatively condescending manner, its general essence is disseminated nonetheless. As the subtitle perhaps suggests, the following analytical subsection will attempt to briefly outline some of the tendencies regarding Bay Guardian contributors' provision of space for the expression of points of view from 'above'—or the expression of Pacifica central management's position regarding the ongoing crises inflicting the Network.

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66 Although the corresponding analysis of the Times's qualitative sample included the majority of its related contributions, due to its relative extensive numbers, Bay Guardian contributions comprising this analytical subsection will be chosen for their adherence to, and therefore ability to exemplify, general tendencies regarding their provision of space for the expression of central management, or 'Establishment', viewpoints.
Although many of the above-analysed contributions comprising the Bay Guardian sample are not, in general, presented as typical journalistic endeavours, most of them do provide space for the contentions of central management. However, in much the same, although reciprocal, manner, the inclusion of viewpoints from ‘above’ is relatively isolated, and appears to serve as a backdrop against which reprisals from ‘below’ may be directed, or disseminated. In general, however, most of the claims of central management are located within the majority of the contributions. For instance, although Clay Thompson (1999a-i) typically provides many personal interjections regarding central management’s actions, he does provide citations from their ‘official’ spokespersons—primarily Elan Fabbri—regarding their reasoning behind said actions. Therefore, although ‘objectivity’ is more clearly absent than it is within the Times sample, contextualization of the issue does not appear to suffer as much. Again, this appears to be a general tendency within the Bay Guardian contributions that appear to endeavour toward some level of typical ‘journalistic’ news dissemination. However, regardless of their perceived tendency to more adequately contextualize the viewpoints, Bay Guardian contributors do provide much greater space for the expression of contextualized viewpoints from ‘below’ than they do for the expression of contextualized viewpoints from ‘above’.

In addition to the above-noted tendency to provide more contextualized coverage from both perspectives, many Bay Guardian contributors were somewhat more limited than Times contributors in the amount of citation space for which they could provide a contextualized central management perspective. In general, this was largely due to

61 For a similar style of coverage also refer to such Bay Guardian contributions as Bacon (1999a, 1999b), Berzon (1999b), Griswold (1997c), Jacks (1999), Loller (2000), Lyman (1999) and Samuels (2001).
central managements express distaste with the journalistic perspective of the more openly subjective Bay Guardian contributors—particularly Clay Thompson. As he notes in one particular contribution, "Pacifica P.R. flacks no longer return my phone calls. When [executive board chair Mary Frances] Berry holds a teleconference [regarding central management's position], I'm not allowed on the line" (Clay Thompson 1999i). Moreover, within the same article, he describes one particular occasion where he attempted to get the official central management position. As Clay Thompson (1999i) describes the scene: "The meeting ended, and I stepped to the table. Berry was whisked out a back door within three minutes; I didn't get to ask her a thing. [Then executive director Lynn] Chadwick was around a little longer. ‘Quick comment for the print media, Ms. Chadwick?’ I asked. ‘Who do you work for?’ she spat back. When I told her the Bay Guardian, a look of nausea crossed her face. She grimaced and said maybe in five minutes . . . And then Chadwick hurried out the back door." Indeed other Bay Guardian had also met with similar difficulty in attempting to get some official contextualized information of central management's position regarding the Pacifica issue.62 Of the thirty-two contributions comprising the qualitative sample— a number of which did not attempt to attain context-rich information—Bay Guardian contributors were unable to acquire an official central management perspective on fourteen such occasions—compared with just four occasions on the part of Times contributors. As a result, much of the contextualized central management position is attained vicariously through "official" statements issued by their spokespersons and the PR firm they eventually employ for such matters.

Regardless of the tendency of Bay Guardian contributors to marginalize the position from ‘above’ through rather direct subjective means, they do, for the most part, provide space for the contextualization of that position— even if this is often achieved through “official” press releases. After all, being created and released by central management, the “official” releases do represent their position. This is in relative contrast to the above-noted marginalization of the position from ‘below’ perceivably exercised by Times contributors. Again, as was the general case, the Times contributors marginalized that position through their tendency to omit its contextualization.
Conclusion: Toward a More Enlightening and Empowering Journalism

North Americans now live in a highly complex media environment where newspapers are still immensely important vehicles for democratic communication. No other mass medium offers the same combined possibilities for accessibility, in-depth analysis, diversity of views, and sustained reflection on important political and economic issues.

Once again, Robert Hackett and Richard Gruneau (2000)

Regardless of the rather dubious recycling of the above citation found within the work of Hackett and Gruneau (2000), it seems particularly fitting that the concluding portion of the project begins in the same manner as did the introductory portion. As was the case with the onset of the thesis, this particular citation tends to provide an apt, yet brief, summary of the underlying emphasis of the foregone endeavour—namely the significance of the mainstream news media, and particularly newsprint, in providing a viable means of enlightenment and empowerment to a great portion of the citizenry. Moreover, within the contemporary global village of an increasingly individuated and isolated citizenry, some means of authentic enlightenment is crucial in order to overcome the authority of those in established positions of power— the social, political and economic Establishment.

As Habermas (1988) notes, throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, Europe’s bourgeois citizenry were able to overcome the all-encompassing political authority of the monarchies through their establishment of a public sphere. Largely accomplished through the merging of the subjective style of the novel with the dissemination of political news, the bourgeois public sphere found further empowerment through the highly partisan and subjective political journals that began to flourish. Meeting in salons

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and coffee houses, the public sphere of private citizens would meet to discuss current political issues and develop informed opinions. Indeed, according to Mills (1959) and McChesney (Borjesson 2002), this evolution of an enlightened public sphere was similar to that which occurred within the US in the late 19th century. As noted by the latter theorist, a highly partisan model of journalism was integral in creating a highly enlightened and politically active US citizenry— at least relative to today's standards.

And although some rightfully criticize Habermas’s (1988) rather narrow and exclusionary conceptualization of the bourgeois public sphere, the integral role played by a subjective, or partisan, journalism in providing enlightenment, empowerment and emancipation is unchanged. As was noted in an earlier portion of the thesis, regardless of its exclusionary nature, Habermas’s (1988) bourgeois public sphere can be adjusted within contemporary societies to be more inclusionary of other groups, such as working classes, gays and lesbians, women, ethnic minorities, et cetera. Moreover, although discriminatory practices remain an unfortunate reality within most societies, the strides that have been made toward a recognized, or officially legislated, equality by many groups may serve as a virtual springboard to the accomplishment of a more inclusive public sphere of enlightened and empowered citizens. Perhaps in some ‘postmodernist’ conceptualization, a new-found general public sphere cohesion may serve to create stronger group affiliation, or consciousness, than could decidedly smaller permanent group affiliations. As such, one could refer to the new entity as a more inclusive public sphere. Of course, regardless of its immediate plausibility, a more subjective brand of journalism remains essential as a source of enlightenment.
Unfortunately, as addressed by Habermas (1988), once a level of empowered independence from the monarchy was attained, the highly partisan political journals were eventually perceived as unnecessary, and fell out of significant circulation. Moreover, as McChesney (1999; Borjesson 2002) and Bagdikian (2000) similarly chronicle with regard the US, Habermas (1988) notes that in the wake of an ebbing political emphasis of newsprint arrived a highly commercialized news media fare. In place of political enlightenment and empowerment, the new information media emphasized market share, profitability, et cetera—‘natural’ developments within an evolving mature commercial society. Moreover, as a result of vastly increasing costs, largely due to improvements in technology, it became increasingly difficult for all but the highly affluent members of society—the “power elite”—to own and operate a (then) newsprint medium. As such, those who were once the focus of the “muckraking” performed by the highly partisan information media became the owners of said media. An understandably dubious development. However, in order to diminish concerns on the part of the general citizenry regarding the intent of the disseminated product, and thus protect potential profits, a new model of journalism was necessitated. That new, professional, model was ‘objective’ journalism—a model that promised to provide insurance that the agenda-disseminating function of the newsprint media that had proliferated the partisan journals would not be continued by those whose agendas were unlikely similar to the citizenry.

As has been revealed throughout points of the theoretical portion of the thesis, the journalistic techniques applied through the objective model are rather easily manipulated by those in power, in order to achieve specific agendas. As an additional result of the continually evolving mature commercial ideology, and its simultaneously increasing
proliferation throughout (North American) society and its (cultural) institutions, the emphasis on profit has rendered investigative, or muckraking, journalism too expensive and impractical. As such, an ever-increasing emphasis on ‘official’ sourcing now proliferates within mainstream news media. Moreover, in their endeavours to keep costs low, and in lieu of erstwhile investigative journalism, mainstream news media create ‘webs of facticity’ that determine the manner in which particular issues and events are disseminated. In essence, these ‘webs’ entail a process of mediathink, whereby those who work within professional news media develop certain ways of perceiving their subjects.

As Herman and Chomsky (Jhally 1997) assert through their Propaganda Model of the News, mainstream news media’s nearly exclusive reliance on official sourcing and their newsroom prevalence of mediathink represent two integral filters in determining the disseminated news product—respectively news sourcing and news shaping. Indeed, as is also the case with many of the above-noted theorists, Herman and Chomsky (2002; Chomsky 1998; Jhally 1997) contend that, as a result of news filters, true objectivity is not viable. This being the case, the objective model of journalism can be perceived as no-less biased than its subjective, or partisan, counterpart.

Due to the emphasis on official sourcing that is largely necessitated by some of the structural underpinnings of the contemporary model of objective journalism, biases that result naturally favour society’s power elite, or Establishment. Moreover, those who occupy this elite minority will tend to hold viewpoints that reflect and endeavour to sustain the existing societal status quo that bestows their privilege. When given the opportunity to express their opinions regarding issues, they will tend to do so in a manner

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that protects their self-interests. As such, one may deem their expression of viewpoints as egoistic propaganda. In catering to these viewpoints in order to inexpensively source their articles, objective journalism tends to serve as a vehicle for egoistic propaganda, or the expression of viewpoints aimed at influencing public opinion in a manner which protects the interests of the powerful few. On the other hand, subjective journalism does not serve such similar ends.

Subjective journalism's general freedom from many of the constraints of its objective counterpart—particularly the profit-driven heavy reliance on official sourcing—allows it to source its content as it sees fit. In general, due to their general distaste for the injustices and inequalities that exist within the status quo social order, journalists that comprise the newsrooms of subjective, or alternative, news media will tend to eschew the colouring of their contributions with the hue of official, or Establishment, viewpoints. When they include such viewpoints, the general purpose tends to be critically confronting their claims. In the process of their critique, subjective journalists will emphasize alternative viewpoints that reveal a different version of issues and events, and encourage conceptualizations of an alternative, or more just and egalitarian, social order. As such, in essential contrast to that of objective journalism, subjective journalism tends to serve as a vehicle for altruistic propaganda, or the expression of viewpoints aimed at influencing public opinion in a manner which serves to critically confront the existing status quo and establish a more fair and just society for all.

Although this demarcation of the propagandistic functions of the competing models of news media does appear a little clearer than is, in reality, the case, the preceding comparative content analysis of New York Times and San Francisco Bay
Guardian coverage of the Pacifica crisis reveals that, in large part, the general ‘propaganda’ thesis holds true. Whereas the bulk of the Times coverage tends to cater to the viewpoint of Pacifica central management, or its Establishment, and marginalize the position of those protesting their actions, that of the Bay Guardian tends to emphasize the viewpoint of the protestors, while marginalizing the position of central management. In essence, then, while the Times coverage tends to emphasize a ‘top-down’ perspective on the issue, and therefore serves as a vehicle for egoistic propaganda, the Bay Guardian coverage tends to emphasize a ‘bottom-up’ perspective, and therefore serves the purpose of altruistic propaganda. Whereas the former— and other similarly-bent mainstream news media— tends to emphasize the position of those in power, the latter— and other, subjective, or alternative news media— tends to provide space for the expression of viewpoints that critically confront those in positions of power. In effect, it is the latter model of journalism that retains the muckraking quality that had been a major function of journalism— regardless of its particular bent.

As was the case in bourgeois Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries, as well as within the young, yet burgeoning, American democracies, the more subjective brand of journalism that pervades alternative news media appears better suited to provide information, enlightenment and empowerment to the general citizenry. Unfortunately, the more subjective journalism of alternative news media is merely that: ‘alternative’. Because they are not nearly as economically sound as their highly profitable corporate counterparts, alternative news media are unable to provide dissemination fare—magazines, newspapers, et cetera— in large quantities. As a result, in comparison to that of mainstream news media, their audience shares are relatively minuscule. Moreover, a
minuscule audience does not translate into broad enlightenment—regardless of the quality of dissemination. In a very real sense, the enlightening content of the more subjective alternative news media is relatively ineffectual, as its consumers are already enlightened and not in need of the influencing nature of its altruistic propaganda—an essential case of ‘preaching to the choir’. Unfortunately, without efforts toward a similar corporatization as their mainstream counterparts, alternative media’s potential to offer similarly accessible news fare remains as minuscule as their relative audience share, and its enlightening and empowering brand of news dissemination will continue to enlighten the enlightened ‘choir’. As such, due to its mass accessibility, mainstream news fare remains the most viable means of achieving citizenry enlightenment and empowerment. However, in its current ‘objective’ format, the journalism of mainstream news media are not equipped with the tools to achieve this goal—regardless of the intent of those working within these media.

In order to better equip mainstream news media for the task of providing information that more adequately and authentically enlightens and thus empowers those from ‘below’, some alterations must be made, or at least permitted. However, this may, and likely will, prove a daunting task for media reformers, as many of the stifling aspects of the objective style of journalism are extremely embedded within mainstream news media. Moreover, objective journalism itself has long been established as the only ‘trustworthy’, and therefore acceptable model. Regardless of the initial plausibility of news media reform, Gans (2003) suggests some adjustments of the objective model of journalism that may alter its essential functioning as a dissemination vehicle for ‘top-down’ Establishmentarian perspectives on issues and events.

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Some of the more immediately applicable alterations presented by the author (Gans 2003) fall under the subtitles *Participatory News, Explanatory Journalism, Opinions* and "*News Opinions*" and *Multiperspectival News and News Media*. As one form of a ‘bottom-up’ model of journalism, “participatory news” focuses on the political ideas of the general citizenry, rather than narrowly focussing on those of the political Establishment. As such, citizens would, at least in theory, recognize some meaningful personal relationship with the political content, and thus with one-another. Moreover, this may spur a broadening of the citizenry’s political activity. Integral in the contextualization of journalistic items, “explanatory journalism” would allow journalists to answer the “why” question, and thus move beyond the ‘just-the-facts’ style of journalism necessitated by the objective model. This style of investigative reporting would also allow for the development of a more tangible connection between immediate issues and events and their broader societal causes. Through his emphasis on the potential journalistic importance of “news opinion”, Gans (2003) reaffirms the notion of the informed ‘beat reporter’. Through the process of regularly reporting at certain sites, and on certain issues, ‘beat’ journalists necessarily gain some beneath-the-surface level of knowledge. Moreover, this added ‘insight’ should be permitted to shape their disseminations, rather than be buried beneath the wall of objectivity. Finally, a journalistic model that focuses on “multiperspectival news” would, again in theory, provide column space for viewpoints that are virtually missing from the current objective model of mainstream news media. Moreover, the perspectives would be disseminated in a manner—language, style, et cetera—more easily accessible to those they represent. In a sense, this would exemplify an authentic ‘bottom-up’ model of journalism.
Regardless of the plausibility of such alterations, they all tend to share a notion of the necessity for a more subjective model of journalism that would permit a greater contextualization of issues and events, and permit a broadening of the citizenry's personal association with journalism. Thus noted, perhaps the immediate task is first to alter the general (mis)conception that subjective journalism is untrustworthy. In actuality, the more subjective style that permeates alternative news media is generally more trustworthy. This is largely necessitated by the virtual 'burden of proof' that is the task of journalists that disseminate information that goes against established viewpoints, or those that derive from Establishment sources. In other words, viewpoints that break with mediathink must go to greater lengths to establish their trustworthiness.

In place of the "balanced coverage" model that permeates objective journalism, a more subjective "balance of coverage" must be permitted to prevail within mainstream news media. Much like Gans's (2003) conceptualization of "multiperspectival news", this model would permit a broader dissemination of viewpoints. Moreover, combined with a rigidly responsible subjective style, the "balance of coverage" model of journalism would generate a greater contextualization of the news product. However, as was noted throughout the project, it is unlikely that current mainstream news media owners—society's elites—will be adequately moved by such reason and alter a system of news dissemination— and opinion manipulation— that has heretofore served their particular interests and agendas.

Perhaps the most plausible means of affecting mainstream news media change is through a resurgence of government regulation within the industry. Although any real effect may take a relatively considerable amount time, considering the deeply embedded
state of the mature commercial ideology and its emphasis on government deregulation, this starting point could be achieved through an intensification of the actions of such media-watch groups as the above-noted Media Alliance. These groups could combine with other watchdog groups and use their lobbying power to convince governments that regulation and change are essential and broadly desired. Moreover, if change is not immediately–a more than plausible possibility–then such groups could strive for future change by lobbying governments to integrate “media-awareness” awareness into their public education systems–a change that is beginning to take effect. At the very least, this would have the benefit of avoiding direct ideological conflicts of interest between governments and the commercial mass media. Moreover, as the bulk of the citizenry is educated accordingly, it may create a relatively large-scale outcry that insists upon government regulation of the mainstream news media. As they are technically beholden to the majority of voters, and must also seriously consider the vocalized interests and opinions of the general citizenry, government representatives would have to heed their cries–regulation would ensue. At this future point, the citizenry would receive what they ‘need’, not merely, as mainstream industry spokespersons put it, “what they want”.

Finally, many would-be critics could rather justifiably suggest that the preceding emphasis upon government regulation as a potential vehicle for the salvation of contemporary journalism is largely naive–at least in the absence of a similarly due consideration of the relative might of big-monied advertisers as important sources of news manipulation. After all, regardless of the success of (re)establishing a more investigative and informative journalistic endeavour through such means as government regulation, it is unlikely that the corporate owners of the mainstream news media will be
willing to risk the loss of important advertisers whenever the new subjective style of muckraking journalism reports information that is less than flattering. Moreover, while Gans (2003) suggests that the threat of ensuing public ‘ill-will’ acts, and will continue to act, as somewhat of a shield against this possible development, this contention remains to be demonstrated under authentic muckraking circumstances. Until such circumstances, the threat remains a real possibility. In addition, this potential threat of a loss in advertiser support in the face of particularly unflattering journalistic coverage does not diminish if regulations supported the division of mainstream news entities from other profit-driven components of their media ‘parents’. In what would essentially amount to acts of retribution, disgruntled advertisers could, and probably would, pull their support from other, more entertaining, divisions within the mainstream media behemoths. Given such potential developments, it would perhaps be most plausible if a renewed government regulation mandate could provide for some vehicle of ‘counter-retribution’ for corporate media owners. As such, perhaps under adequate committee reviews, or their equivalent, advertisers would have to demonstrate the justifiable context of their withdrawal of support. Within this context, if advertisers are determined to have withdrawn their support due to reasons related to news coverage, they could be fined by the erstwhile supported news medium owner. Although this may not prove perfect, it could provide some security for the corporate owners of news media—at least in the unlikely event that they are willing to pursue such alterations in the style of reporting the news.

Regardless of potential developments within the mainstream news media toward a more subjective, and therefore more informative and enlightening, dissemination of issues and events, at least some level of change appears essential. As it stands, however,
the enlightenment of the general citizenry appears as unlikely as mainstream news media’s corporate owners willingness to alter an undeniably profitable objective model of journalism— not to mention its integral role in sustaining the societal status quo that has heretofore bestowed power and privilege upon their elite ‘class’. In the interim, however, the more subjective, yet responsible, ‘watchdog’ style of journalism that prevails within the alternative news media must persist in disseminating its altruistic propaganda, and strive to reach and waken the minds of a broadened portion of the general public for the purpose of establishing some future form of a broad public sphere.
Appendix I: Tables

Table I: *Pacifica Foundation* Crisis: Total Coverage

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<th>Total Articles</th>
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Table II: *Pacifica Foundation* Crisis: Coverage in Articles of 300+ Words

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<th>Percentage of Total</th>
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<th>W/A (Approximate)</th>
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Table III: *Pacifica Foundation* Crisis: Coverage in Articles of Under 300 Words

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### Table IV: Footing:
*New York Times*

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<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footing: 300+ (10)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Footing/Article: 300+</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footing: Under 300 (2)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footing/Article: Under 300</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Table V: Controlled Footing:
*New York Times (Less 1 300+ Article)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pacifica Executive Board</th>
<th>Pacifica Protesters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insiders</td>
<td>Outsiders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Footing (11)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footing/Article</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footing: 300+ (9)</td>
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<td>Footing/Article: 300+</td>
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<td>Footing: Under 300 (2)</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Footing/Article: Under 300</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</table>
Appendix I: Tables (Continued)

Table VI: Footing:
San Francisco Bay Guardian

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Pacifica Executive Board</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insiders</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Footing (22)</td>
<td>50</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footing/Article</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Footing: 300+ (21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Footing/Article: 300+</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Footing: Under 300</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footing/Article: Under 300</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</table>

Table VII: Controlled Footing:
San Francisco Bay Guardian (Less 2 300+ Articles)

<table>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insiders</td>
<td>Outsiders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Footing (20)</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>Footing/Article</td>
<td>2.30</td>
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<td>Footing: 300+ (19)</td>
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<td>Footing/Article: 300+</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Footing: Under 300</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footing/Article: Under 300</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I: Tables (Continued)

Table VIII: Location of *New York Times* Articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Title</th>
<th>Publication Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clamorously, Pacifica Radio Dances Toward Mainstream</td>
<td>May 12, 1997</td>
<td>D-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruffling Left-Wing Feathers To Recharge Pacifica Radio</td>
<td>December 29, 1997</td>
<td>D-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever a Voice of Protest, Radio KPFA Is at It Again, but With a Twist</td>
<td>June 30, 1999</td>
<td>A-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show Host Is Arrested In Radio Station Protest</td>
<td>July 15, 1999</td>
<td>A-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest Grows at California Radio Station</td>
<td>July 16, 1999</td>
<td>A-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Battle for the Berkeley Airwaves Rages On</td>
<td>July 23, 1999</td>
<td>A-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity on the Air</td>
<td>July 28, 1999</td>
<td>A-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockout Will End At Berkeley Station</td>
<td>July 30, 1999</td>
<td>A-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How a Little Antisnkr Station Turned Combative</td>
<td>August 15, 1999</td>
<td>B-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Right to Be Heard</td>
<td>September 5, 1999</td>
<td>B-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPFA: Crossing Boarders</td>
<td>September 5, 1999</td>
<td>B-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Voice of Protest Rises for Itself: WBAI Resists Superiors Who Say It's Stuck in the 60's</td>
<td>December 23, 2000</td>
<td>B-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacifica Foundation Locks WBAI Station Manager Out of Office</td>
<td>December 28, 2000</td>
<td>B-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hundreds Protest Firings At WBAI-FM</td>
<td>January 7, 2001</td>
<td>A-23</td>
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<tr>
<td>A Firm New Boss at an Old Voice of the Left</td>
<td>January 17, 2001</td>
<td>B-2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vandalism Follows Event For Ex-Radio Employees</td>
<td>July 3, 2001</td>
<td>B-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacifica, Owner of WBAI-FM, settles Lawsuits</td>
<td>December 13, 2001</td>
<td>D-3</td>
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References


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Vita Auctoris

Stephen Landry was born long ago in 1968 in the river valley 'hamlet' of Saint John, New Brunswick. He graduated from Kennebecasis Valley High School in 1988. After more than a decade of mostly directionless academic toil at the University of New Brunswick, he finally received an Honours level BA in Sociology in 2001. He is currently a candidate for the Master's degree in Sociology at the University of Windsor. Although he had planned to graduate in the Fall of 2003, such plans have been postponed until the Spring of 2004.