The Toronto globe and mail and the defeat of the German Air Force.

Edward Jean. Elliott
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THE TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL AND THE DEFEAT
OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE

by
Edward Jean Elliott

A Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of History in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts at the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada
1976
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ABSTRACT

Reading The Globe and Mail, one is apt to think of the offensive against the German Air Force and its supporting industries as a campaign in which large numbers of bombers steadily demolished German aircraft production centres. The logical outcome of such an offensive was that there were fewer German fighters built to intercept the bomber formations. Together with the strategic bombing of the German oil industry, the counter-air offensive effectively defeated the Luftwaffe. Actually strategic bombing only produced an indisposition in the great industrial machine that fed the Luftwaffe. Despite Allied bombing, German aircraft production never fell below the March 1941 level of 1199 aircraft per month. The campaign against the German oil industry, however, was responsible for grounding many of the completed aircraft. Begun in May 1944, the offensive steadily reduced German oil production until, by April 1945, it was less than six percent of normal capacity. That the average man could think of the counter-air offensive as producing more than an indisposition in the German aircraft industry was due to the manipulation of facts by the Allied governments in their communiques and the publication of the communiques by The Globe and Mail.

For the purpose of this study, the offensive against
the German Air Force and its supporting industries has been singled out as an empirical study of the way in which The Globe and Mail perpetuated a false impression of the offensive to its readers. To undertake a study of this nature, it was necessary to investigate three separate areas. The first was the nature of censorship during the Second World War in both Canada and the United Kingdom. The second was the reporting of the strategic air offensive against Germany by The Globe and Mail. The third was the actual occurrence of events during the strategic bombing of Germany as related by the official post-war surveys and many of the original mission reports. When all the available material had been reviewed, the official version of the strategic air offensive was compared to the reports of the offensive that appeared in the newspaper, and conclusions were appropriately drawn.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Without the help of a large number of people, this thesis would have been impossible to write. Dr. John Mendelssohn, the head of the Modern Military Branch of the National Archives in Washington, D.C., offered many valuable suggestions and indicated a number of sources that I would have had difficulty in finding on my own. Mr. James N. Eastman, Chief of the Research Branch of the Albert P. Simpson Historical Research Centre at Maxwell Air Force Base, provided me with microfilm copies of Eighth Air Force mission records that enabled me to compare the actual records with the reports in The Globe and Mail. Ms. Janet L. Hargett, Assistant Director of the General Archives Division of the National Records Centre in Washington, D.C., furnished copies of the mission reports of the Eighth Air Force that dealt with the April 17, 1943 raid on Bremen. Dr. Werner Johe of the Forschungsstelle für die Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus in Hamburg supplied several articles from the Völkischer Beobachter which gave me the German view of several of the raids mentioned in this thesis. I am further indebted to the Interlibrary Loan section of the University of Windsor Library for attentive assistance.

I also owe thanks to many of my friends who provided
me with much helpful information. John Kelly, while he was working at the Public Archives of Canada, furnished material from the Mackenzie King papers. Courtney Nobbs supplied me with many articles dealing with German aircraft and operations on the western front.

I owe a special debt to my thesis director, Dr. Sautter, for guiding me through the laborious task of bringing the thesis from a single idea to the final written product. I am also grateful for the able assistance of Dr. Pryke and Dr. Keenleyside, the other members of my thesis committee, for their reading of the thesis, and their many valuable suggestions and criticisms.

The time and the environment in which this work was prepared were the direct result of personal sacrifices by Ms. Brenda Joan Luc, and by my mother, Mrs. Mary M. Elliott. Without their financial assistance and moral support, none of this would have been possible.
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INTRODUCTION

The average man considering the effects of the bombing of German industrial towns is apt to think of it as a campaign which went on for three years during which a force of 1,000 bombers regularly hammered away at all the enemy's main industrial centres. Actually only 45 per cent of Bomber Command's effort during the whole war was directed against German cities and this 45 per cent includes a number of heavy raids carried out towards the end of the war which were tactical rather than strategic in their aim and were designed to have a short term effect on the land campaign by blocking the communications of the German Army.


Reading The Globe and Mail, one is apt to think of the offensive against the German Air Force and its supporting industries as a campaign in which large numbers of bombers steadily demolished German aircraft production centres. The logical outcome of such an offensive was that there were fewer German fighters built to intercept the bomber formations. Together with the strategic bombing of the German oil industry, the counter-air offensive effectively defeated the Luftwaffe. Actually strategic bombing only produced an indisposition in the great industrial machine that fed the Luftwaffe. Despite Allied bombing, German aircraft production never fell below the March 1941 level of 1199 aircraft per month. Overall monthly production figures reached a

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1 Great Britain, Air Ministry, Air Historical Branch, Von Rhoden Studies, "The Battle for Air Supremacy over Germany (German Air Defence) 1939-1945," no date, p. 120.
high of 4352 aircraft per month in September 1944 and fell to 1867 per month in March 1945. The campaign against the German oil industry, however, was responsible for grounding many of the completed aircraft. Begun in May 1944, the offensive steadily reduced German oil production until, by April 1945, it was less than six per cent of normal capacity. That the average man could think of the counter-air offensive as producing more than an indisposition in the German aircraft industry was due to the manipulation of facts by the Allied governments in their communiques and the publication of the communiques by The Globe and Mail.

The Allied governments set up a system of furnishing information to the press which would maintain the type of war image that they wanted to convey to the public. More important than factual reporting of the war was sustaining the public morale, stimulating the war effort and maintaining a steady flow of facts and opinions calculated to further the policy of the Allied governments in the prosecution of the war. National security, rather than freedom of the press, was safeguarded, and items of news were suppressed or temporarily withheld to satisfy security regulations. Information about the war was supplied to the press in a series of military communiques which were carefully prepared

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2 Von Rhoden Studies, p. 122.
to present a favourable war effort. In the case of the
aerial offensive against the Reich, the military communiques
created the impression that the bombing was always success-
ful and damaging to the overall German war effort.

The difficulty for The Globe and Mail was that it had
no way of checking whether the claims of the success of
bombing raids were justified. It could not challenge—even
if it had been sceptical, which it was not—the official
version of events because it was totally dependent on the
military to learn anything at all about the war. Moreover,
censorship regulations demanded that it refrain from print-
ing any stories which would prejudice the efficient prosecu-
tion of the war.

The Globe and Mail was in favour of governmental cen-
sorship. It firmly believed that censorship of war news
stories was necessary if national security and the public
morale were to be safeguarded. The paper believed that the
people had a right to be informed of the Allied war effort,
and so it published what material was given to it by the
Allied governments. This reduced the role of the paper to
that of purveyor of Allied propaganda. The praise of the
Allied war effort in the paper's editorial and news columns
made it a cheerleader whose task it was to raise public
morale and sustain it at a high level.

For the purpose of this study, the offensive against
the German Air Force and its supporting industries has been
singled out as an empirical study of the way in which The
Globe and Mail perpetuated a false impression of the offen-
sive to its readers. The counter-air offensive, while only a part of the overall strategic bombing programme, was chosen as the subject of this paper because it was a campaign which involved both the British and American Bomber Commands. It spanned nearly the entire length of the war, and was crucial to the Allied invasion of the Continent in 1944. Because the offensive was directed primarily at an industrial system rather than the German civilian population, the question of the moral implications of bombing has been ignored. The counter-air offensive should be taken as an example of the way in which strategic bombing was portrayed in The Globe and Mail. Attention was paid to both the official histories of the strategic air offensive and to the actual records of the bombing missions to find out what actually took place. This information was then compared to the reports of the offensive that appeared in the newspaper, and conclusions were appropriately drawn. It was impossible to get copies of the original military communiques to compare the "approved" version of the counter-air offensive with that which appeared in the newspaper.

The thesis is divided into four chapters. These subdivisions represent the development of the counter-air offensive against the Reich. Within each chapter the reporting of The Globe and Mail is related to the events as they occurred in reality during the actual bombing of aircraft targets.

Chapter one of the thesis deals first with the subject of censorship that affected the nature of newspaper report-
ing in Canada during the war years. Censorship was the chief tool of the Allied governments to enforce their desire that the public be kept "properly" informed of the war effort. The Globe and Mail is then examined to determine its stand and the way in which it reported the offensive against the Reich. In the case of the counter-air offensive, the paper--on the basis of the military communiques--established a pattern of reporting that gave its readers the mistaken impression that the bombing was always successful and damaging to the overall German war effort. By giving its readers the numbers of planes involved on bombing raids, the number of tons dropped and the probable results of the bombing, the paper built up the image of an ever-increasing, ever-more devastating offensive against the German Reich, a description that did not match the actual bombing performance until late in the war.

The Globe and Mail assumed, and led its readers to assume, that every bomber that took off from its base in the United Kingdom completed its mission--save for those which failed to return--and that every bomb was correctly and accurately dropped on its target and did a great deal of damage. There was no consideration that the number of planes airborne did not necessarily represent the number of aircraft that actually carried out the mission. There was no appreciation of the very common inability of navigators to find their targets--most difficult at night without the appropriate navigational aids--nor the inability
of bombardiers to hit their assigned targets because of bombing error and the interference of German fighters and flak. In fairness to the paper it must be said that this difference between reports and facts was due more to the nature of the military communiques than to its reporting. Nevertheless, the paper perpetuated a distortion that was never corrected.

With all its claims of successful bombing by the Allied bomber fleets, The Globe and Mail, and again this is the fault of the Allied military communiques, overlooked the fact that the British and Canadian bombers were literally forced from the daylight skies over Germany in 1940 and made to resort to night bombing which was far less accurate. The difficulties of switching from a day to a night offensive, needless to say, were never recorded in the pages of the paper. Wartime secrecy prevented The Globe and Mail from learning of or revealing the discovery and use of radar devices and navigational aids which improved the accuracy and efficiency of bombing raids. The readers of the paper never learned of these, and came instead to believe that the improved bombing was due to the courage and determination of the bomber crews.

That full-scale bombing did not get underway until 1943, and did not actually achieve the devastation that was claimed for it by the paper until after July 1944, was not mentioned nor considered in The Globe and Mail. The Royal Air Force (RAF), the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF),
and the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) were continually hampered by lack of suitable bombing aircraft, and often had to conduct bombing missions with twin-engine bombers that carried small bomb loads. The bombing offensive was also hampered by the demands of other theatres for aircraft. Operation TORCH (the invasion of North Africa), to mention one such diversion, drew off vast numbers of aircraft that could have been used against the Reich, and diverted them to the support of the invading armies at Casablanca.

Chapter two deals with the Casablanca directive and the effect that it had on Allied strategic bombing during 1943. In 1943 it was decided to concentrate attention on the German Air Force and its supporting industries as a means of neutralizing the Luftwaffe before the Allied invasion of the Continent in 1944. Though machinery was set up for a combined bomber offensive against this target system, the Americans and the British continued to operate their strategic bombers in widely divergent manners. While the Americans devoted the bulk of their efforts to precision bombing of the German aircraft industry, the British conducted a general area bombing campaign against the German cities. This divergence of aims was not, of course, found in the pages of The Globe and Mail. Particular attention is focused on the contrast between the claims for the offensive by the paper and what the offensive actually accomplished. The bombings of Bremen (April 17, 1943) and Stuttgart (September 6, 1943) are examined to show the difference
between the reporting in the newspaper and what happened in reality during the actual bombing of the targets.

Chapter three deals with operation ARGUMENT and the offensive against the German aircraft industry from February to June 1944. Operation ARGUMENT, the concerted American assault against the German aircraft industry, set back German production for two months. It was not the end of the industry, though, despite the enthusiastic claims of the military communiques and The Globe and Mail, but rather the beginning of a programme of dispersal of the industry. The point of concentration here is the contrast between the claims of the paper regarding the offensive and what the offensive actually accomplished. In particular, the raids on Leipzig (February 20, 1944) and Friedrichshafen (March 18, 1944) are examined to show the difference between the actual missions and the way that they were reported in the newspaper.

The last chapter deals with the offensive against the German oil industry and the counter-air offensive during the last half of 1944 and the first quarter of 1945. Though an offensive against oil targets had been started by the British early in the war, it had been abandoned in 1942 as unprofitable. It was resurrected in May 1944 and by the end of April 1945 had succeeded in reducing German oil production to six per cent of its normal capacity. Without fuel, regardless of the number of German aircraft being produced, the German Air Force was grounded and thereby defeated. Here it can
be seen that the optimistic reports that the paper carried about the counter-air offensive were in almost direct contrast with what was going on at Allied headquarters. The raid on the synthetic oil plant at Merseburg-Leuna (July 20, 1944) is examined to show how the actual mission varied from the reporting of it in the newspaper.

The last section of the thesis draws together the material of the four chapters. A statement on the comparison of the reporting of The Globe and Mail and the official histories of the strategic offensive against the Reich concludes the argument.
CHAPTER ONE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA OFFENSIVE

When the Second World War began there was a trial and error process of wartime censorship as government, censors, and journalists worked towards a mutually acceptable system. From the beginning, the press was prohibited from publishing anything likely to prejudice the efficient prosecution of the war. It was up to the Allied governments, however, to determine what would endanger national security. In effect, this reduced the press to the role of purveyor of official government propaganda.

News relating to the Allied war effort was formulated by the service ministries in London and channelled through the Ministry of Information. For news stories going abroad, material was first censored in the United Kingdom and then again in Canada to meet the needs of the Canadian public. Once again, the emphasis was on national security and keeping the morale of the public high, and stories were altered or suppressed to meet government requirements.

Newspapers could not challenge the official version of events because they were totally dependent on the military for their communiques. As the official versions of events were designed to keep public morale high, the press became the cheerleaders whose duty it was to keep interest in the
war alive.

For the first seven months of the war, the reporting of *The Globe and Mail* was extremely optimistic. The paper ran stories on the strength of the Allied powers, on their unity of purpose and on the righteousness of their cause. The only discordant note the paper sounded was the lack of Canadian preparedness for the war, but even this died away after April 1940. The German invasion of Denmark and Norway that month changed the tone of the reporting in the paper. The enthusiasm and optimism of the early war reports gradually gave way to a mood of determination to see things through to their proper finish.

When the Germans invaded the Low Countries, the tone of the newspaper was at first one of indignation and later one of resolution to get tough with the Germans. With the fall of Holland, Belgium and, finally, France, the paper adopted the attitude of "wait and see what happens." It maintained that the Allies would eventually triumph over Germany, but that it would be a long and arduous road to victory.

What is missing from the reporting of *The Globe and Mail* during the early war years is the process of trial and error that brought the change from precision bombing by day in 1939 to general area bombing by night by the end of 1942. Missing also are the numerous directives that brought about this change. If there is one fact that stood out during this period, it is the fiction that the Royal Air Force
Bomber Command struck exclusively to the bombing of purely military objectives. Despite the claims of the newspaper that this was so, and that only the Germans practiced indiscriminate bombing, this policy was abandoned in October 1940 when the technique of area bombing was adopted. The Globe and Mail, and in this it was supported by Air Ministry communiques, nevertheless maintained until the end of the war that the British attacked only military objectives, and that, if German civilians were killed, it was only by accident.

Censorship in World War Two

During the first few months of the Second World War, two separate sets of censorship regulations governed the conduct of the press: The Censorship Regulations, invoked September 1, 1939, and The Defence of Canada Regulations, made and established by order in council on September 3, 1939. By Order in Council P.C. 2513 a Censorship Coordinating Committee was set up to direct and coordinate the censorship activities of the Government of Canada. The Acting Secretary of State was empowered to appoint two of the six members to handle press censorship matters. By Order in Council P.C. 2562 the sections and parts of The Censorship Regulations were made effective as of and from September 6,

1 Public Archives of Canada, Mackenzie King Papers, MG 26 J1, P.C. 2481.
1939.

Under the authority of The Censorship Regulations, the Minister of National Defence was given sweeping powers of control over "the offices, works and property of any cable, radio-telegraph, telegraph or telephone company or any radio apparatus...within Canada." He was empowered to assume "entire or partial control" over Canadian communications media, and to determine what messages would be passed on or prevented from reaching their destination. Prohibited matter was defined as:

(a) Any adverse or unfavourable statement, report or opinion likely to prejudice the defence of Canada or the efficient prosecution of the war;
(b) Any information with respect to the movements, numbers, description, condition or disposition of any of the armed forces of His Majesty or any allied or associated power...or any information...as is calculated to be or might be directly useful to the enemy;
(c) Any photograph, sketch, plan, model or other representation of any naval, military or air force work...of such a nature...to be or might be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy;
(d) Any report or statement intended or likely to cause disaffection to His Majesty or to interfere with the success of His Majesty's forces...
(e) Any report or statement intended or likely to prejudice the recruiting, training, discipline or administration of any of His Majesty's forces;
(f) Any report or description or purported report or description of the proceedings at any meeting of the Cabinet of Canada...

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2 Public Archives of Canada, Mackenzie King papers, MG 26 J1, vol. 301, Pierre Casgrain, War Activities of Department of Secretary of State, April 19, 1941.
3 Public Archives of Canada, Mackenzie King papers, MG 26 J1, P.C. 2481, pp. 2-3.
With such restrictions, it was difficult, if not impossible, to publish any kind of factual story about the conduct of the war. The maximum penalty for violating the censorship regulations was set at a "fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, with or without hard labour, or by both fine and imprisonment."

The Globe and Mail was at first in favour of the heavy terms of censorship that affected the stories it published. On September 20, 1939, it editorialized that censorship was necessary:

Newspapers are censored. What Canadian papers print is subject to the censor's ruling in both Europe and Canada. The purpose is to prevent the publication of news or information that might affect public morale and interfere with the exercise of full national effort to one end.

Two months later, however, the paper began to criticize the policies of those who controlled the censorship of newspapers by saying in an editorial on November 16th:

The censorship on operations in the field is tighter than ever before, and as it is a mechanical war less is being told about the devices employed. The enemy spy system probably operates more efficiently. On this account, for purposes of strategy and for other reasons, details eagerly desired by an interested public are not available....

We believe, however, that the Government should endeavour to take the people into its confidence more fully and meet the growing conviction that this country

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4 Public Archives of Canada, Mackenzie King papers, MG 26 J1, P.C. 2461, p. 5.
is lagging in attempt to measure up to war requirements... If it does not interfere with the prosecution of the war and contravene defence regulations, we urge the Government for its own security to keep the people better informed on its war effort. 6

While the paper realized that the problem of censorship was by no means an easy one, it criticized the Government for withholding pictures and stories in Canada that were being published in the United States. It reasoned that if something needed to be kept secret, that it should be censored, but that it could not be kept secret in one country when it was published in the newspaper of another. In its last editorial on censorship on December 11, 1939, the paper claimed that war publicity was imperative:

Short of disclosing military secrets or information likely to be of assistance to the enemy, there is no reason why anything that can be made available to Parliament cannot be published now. It is of the utmost importance that the morale of those on the home-front be maintained.

The prestige of the Government has suffered by failure to make public details of the Dominion's war activities. 8

When, on January 22, 1940, The Censorship Regulations were revoked by Order in Council P.C. 254, the paper stopped criticizing the Government's censorship policies.

Though The Censorship Regulations proved to be unwork-

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8 "War Publicity Imperative," The Globe and Mail, December 11, 1939, p. 6, col. 3.
able, they did set up the initial censorship structure that, with some modifications, was to remain in effect until the end of the war. Under P.C. 2481, the Postmaster General was charged with the prevention of the use of the mails for carrying prohibited matter. The Secretary of State was empowered to "prohibit the possession or distribution within Canada" of prohibited matter and in the case of newspapers and books could extend "such prohibition to past and future numbers, issues or editions." He was further empowered to appoint "a person to be censor of the writings, copy or matter printed, or the publications issued at any printing house, printing establishment or works." The censor was entitled to "examine, consider, approve or reject any writing, copy or matter printed or proposed to be printed." Any writings considered to be in violation of the censorship regulations were subject to seizure.

On September 3, 1939, Walter S. Thompson, the Director of Public Relations for Canadian National Railways, was named first Director of Censorship for Canada. His first step was to create a press censorship branch. The one-time newspaperman established the principle, followed by his successors, that press censors should be experienced newspapermen, well-known if possible to the press and acceptable to them. Within two months a headquarters staff had been set

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9 Public Archives of Canada, Mackenzie King papers, MG 26 J1, P.C. 2481, p. 4.
up at Ottawa and a branch office at Montreal primarily concerned with the French-language press. Regional offices were opened at Halifax, Toronto and Vancouver, each with a seasoned newspaperman in charge.

On November 1, 1939, Wilfred Eggleston, veteran member of the Press Gallery, was appointed Press Censor at Ottawa. The appointment of Eggleston, who became Director of Censorship in 1944 and held that position almost to the end of the war, completed the foundation of the Press Censorship structure. The interests of the French-language press were taken care of with the appointment in September of Claude Melancon as Joint Press Censor for Canada. He was succeeded in the spring of 1940 by Fulgence Charpentier.

Walter S. Thompson was taken away from censorship on December 8, 1939, to organize the Directorate of Public Information. The task of primary organization of press censorship was finished and the further task fell largely to the hands of Eggleston.

When on January 22, 1940, as stated, The Censorship Regulations were revoked, they were replaced by The Defence of Canada Regulations. The latter derived their legislative authority from the War Measures Act (Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927). Section three of the Act

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gave the Governor in Council the authorization to "make from time to time such orders and regulations...necessary and advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada." In terms of censorship this covered "the control and suppression of publications, writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of communications." The chief difference in the two sets of censorship regulations lay in the flexibility of interpretation of what materials required censoring. Whereas The Censorship Regulations were inflexible, The Defence of Canada Regulations were supplemented by many individual directives during the war, and remained the sole legislative tool of censorship until the end of hostilities.

A handful of press censors, spread over a half dozen Canadian cities, told the daily, weeklies and periodicals what not to print. Their directives were serially numbered confidential messages, usually brief. They might refer to specific incidents or situations and become obsolete within a few days or they might stand as a guide to procedure until some unforeseen development occurred. During the war some 200 directives were issued.

At the beginning of the war, news moved smoothly over

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12 Purcell, pp. 259-260.
the national leased wire network. New York, receiving
point for overseas news, became a highly organized clearing
house for the Associated Press and other news services with
an ample Canadian Press staff housed in the AP building in
Rockefeller Centre. The world's news, edited to the re-
quirements of Canadian readers, was a mere matter of minutes
removed from every daily paper in the Dominion.

The CP London bureau was located in the AP building
on Tudor Street and was able to draw on the teleprinters of
AP, Reuters and Press Association. Close contact between
London and New York clearing houses directed the separate
overseas services into a strong collective current flowing
into Canadian newspaper offices. The Canadian Press had a
well equipped London bureau to coordinate the supply of
agency news and to supplement it with staff reports of
British affairs of special interest to Canada. A defect in
one agency's report was repaired through another's strength
or, if necessary, by Canadian editing in London in the light
of information obtained from British and Canadian sources.

When war broke out in Europe, the Associated Press be-
gan to draw upon alternative cable stations in Copenhagen,
Brussels and Berne. German military operations rendered each
station useless in the end and London remained the main cable
relay from Europe.

It was in London that the censor's heavy hand first

13 Purcell, p. 261.
fell upon the news stories that were transmitted to Canada. The Ministry of Information was given the task of censorship under Regulation 39 of the British Defence Regulations of August 25, 1939. Organized into fourteen divisions, the Ministry had four groups that dealt with news, press relations, censorship, public relations, radio communications, literature and art, periodicals and pamphlets. The work of the Ministry was organized into a system of twelve regions corresponding with the regions under the Home Security Scheme, each with a Chief Regional Officer.

The responsibility of censorship rested with the governmental departments which were concerned with the subject matter. The departments exercised control over the news they gave out, and material or messages submitted by the press for publication. In the event of questions arising as to any particular censorship operation, the minister in charge of the department affected had to answer for it in Parliament.

15 The Home Security Scheme was an elaborate arrangement to coordinate local counter-invasion schemes with the needs of the military. Should the regions be cut off from the central government, the scheme allowed the Chief Regional Officers to act on their own authority and take whatever measures were deemed necessary for civil defence. Basil Collier, The Defence of The United Kingdom, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937), p. 103.
17 Ibid., p. 1861.
Sir Walter Monckton was named as the Controller of Censorship in 1939. The censorship division of the Ministry of Information dealt with the censorship of press matter submitted to it before publication in the United Kingdom and of press matter being sent abroad. The Press and Censorship Bureau held frequent discussions with representatives of the press regarding both the issue of news and press censorship. The censorship division was in close touch with the press through the Newspaper Proprietors' Association and other representative bodies to deal with censorship questions.

With regard to the Air Ministry, 31 journalists were appointed to the Administrative and Special Duties Branch of the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve for press duties at Command and Group Headquarters. Service press officers attached to the Home Commands acted as advisers to the Commanders in Chief and Air Officers Commanding on all press and publicity questions. They supplied the Air Ministry with news and articles, photographs taken by the RAF units, and they organized and conducted visits by press representatives to RAF stations. Those attached to the Royal Air Force in France were responsible for the administrative arrangements for war correspondents, for the organization of press facilities for them, for providing them with news and information

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19 Ibid., pp. 1425-26.
and for certain duties in connection with the field of censorship. Service press officers were not a direct part of the press department of the Air Ministry, and they had no direct relationship with the Ministry of Information, but they were available for the provision of special articles and information as was required.

On April 24, 1940, Prime Minister Chamberlain told the House of Commons that the rules governing censorship since October 9, 1939 had been changed. Henceforth the Ministry of Information would assume the functions of the Press and Censorship Bureau. Each department within the government remained responsible for the issue of its news either through the Ministry of Information or simultaneously through the Ministry of Information and its own organization. Subject to advice from the Ministry on general censorship policy, the Defence Departments were responsible for censorship decisions in all matters where it was necessary to prevent information from reaching the enemy. Questions on specific censorship decisions were to be addressed to the minister in charge of the department concerned with the subject matter. All other questions affecting censorship had to be addressed to the Minister of Information.

In order to strengthen the liaison between the Service Departments and the Ministry and to ensure that the Ministry's

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point of view was adequately presented, the number of senior service officers attached to the Ministry was increased, and representatives of the Ministry were appointed to the Service Departments. Existing arrangements by which the press had direct access to the departments remained undisturbed.

In 1941, the Ministry of Information became the sole channel for the issue of all news and official communiques. The stated view of the Ministry was:

...to publicize and interpret Government policy in relation to the war, to help sustain public morale, and to stimulate the war effort, and to maintain a steady flow of facts and opinions calculated to further the policy of the Government in the prosecution of the war. 22

The key clause in getting information to the public was "that war news shall reach the public as fully and as quickly as is consistent with national security." "National Security must be safeguarded, and items of news, however interesting, must be suppressed or temporarily withheld if their publication would be of value to the enemy." It was the duty of all Departmental Ministers, from the sources of news at their disposal, to keep the Minister of Information fully supplied with all available news and information. The Service

23 Ibid., p. 1530.
24 Ibid., p. 1531.
Ministers, on the other hand, maintained the right to withhold the publication of any particular item of news when they believed that its publication would be contrary to the interests of national security.

To ensure rapid handling of news and official communiques, the three Service Departments each maintained in the Ministry of Information an officer of seniority and standing, who, except if matters of the highest priority were involved, could himself take responsibility for passing any particular item of news for publication. Each Service Minister agreed that important issues of policy which could not be decided by his representative on the spot would be referred to him for immediate decision or, if he was not available, to an official of the highest standing in his department specially designated to give decisions on his behalf. The Cabinet laid down that the right to veto was not to be exercised unreasonably and that a final decision on a news item or communiqué must not be unduly delayed. Only the Service Minister himself or, in his absence, the official designated to take decisions on his behalf was entitled to override the view of the Minister of Information in favour of the publication of a particular item of news.

The censorship of press messages going abroad was con-

26 Ibid., p. 1532.
fined to the interception of any information that would have been likely to be useful to the enemy in a military sense. Correspondents, however, were free to dispatch abroad extracts from anything that had been published in the United Kingdom, providing that such information was not calculated to create ill-feeling between the United Nations, or between them and a neutral country. Beginning in 1942, extracts from British publications which were submitted for cabling abroad were subject to the same rules of censorship applicable to material to be published in the United Kingdom.

The stringent censorship regulations enforced in both the United Kingdom and Canada effectively limited the type of news stories that would appear in both nations. Clearly the stories were altered to serve the needs of the Allied governments rather than the desire of the press to present a factual coverage of the war. The press became, in effect, both the purveyor of government propaganda and the cheerleader whose duty it was to maintain public interest in the war. With this in mind, it is now possible to turn to The Globe and Mail and see how it functioned in this role.

The Globe and Mail and The Development of the Area Offensive

In 1936 George McCullagh, a former financial writer for the Toronto Globe, bought first The Globe and then The Mail and Empire. Money to buy the two newspapers, which

were immediately combined as *The Globe and Mail*, was provided by millionaire mine-owner William Henry Wright. At the time of the merger the newspaper began a long-lasting support of the Conservative party. By mid-twentieth century it was a forthright Conservative news organ adamantly opposed to the prolonged ascendancy of Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent.

After spending a holiday in the English countryside in August 1939, George McCullagh, the publisher of *The Globe and Mail*, took the opportunity of presenting his views of the European crisis to the readers of his paper. After affirming that Britain would honour its commitment to Poland and that the British people were ready for war, McCullagh wrote:

> There is no doubt that the ultimate goal of the Axis powers is world domination from which no part of the civilized world is exempt... In this situation there should be a great warning to us in Canada to get on with the job of making democracy work, no matter what material and physical sacrifice may be required. Whether war is immediate or delayed, it is time that those in high places realized that we are in a changing era which calls for substantial sacrifices if the real privileges of democracy are to be preserved... It would seem... that the course of wisdom for the Canadian Government is to take people into their confidence and enlist the co-operation of industry and individuals and equip the nation so that we may make up for lost time and play our rightful part in helping [Britain] to preserve the peace of the world and Christian civilization as we know it.  

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McCullagh viewed the European situation with alarm because he believed that the King Government was not prepared to meet the crisis head-on as it should. He saw the Liberal Prime Minister as evasive, hiding behind "the worn-out excuse that if war comes Parliament will decide what Canada will do in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time."

During the last week in August, McCullagh criticized the Liberal Government for not realizing the seriousness of the European situation, and not preparing earlier for a possible outbreak of war. It was, he wrote,

appalling to realize that Parliament has so long deferred serious consideration of the possibility of failure of the peace talks and that after all the warning signs there is so little to mobilize....If peace is not maintained the Dominion will be obliged to embark on an elaborate defence scheme in the minimum of time. We have to accomplish in a short hectic period what should have been done in the last year.

In terms of the Royal Canadian Air Force, McCullagh was no doubt referring to the lateness of the actions of the Minister of Defence, Ian A. Mackenzie. For years the RCAF had been allowed to slip into a state of decline, so that by April 1939, the Minister of Defence could report to the House of Commons that

with regard to the air service...there were only 23 aircraft of service type in Canada. All were obsolescent except for training, and none were

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31 "If Zero Hour Strikes," The Globe and Mail, August 24, 1939, p. 6, col. 1.
suitable for active service under present day conditions. There were no air bombs in Canada available for immediate use. There were no aero-engines manufactured in Canada, and the development of an aero-engine industry to the point of production would take two years. 32

Although the Minister of Defence had asked for a total of $60,000,000 for National Defence, and had earmarked almost half of that amount for the RCAF, it was, as McCullagh said, undertaking a programme which should have been started a year earlier.

As war erupted in Europe, Canada undertook a programme of limited liability to the English cause. This was to be a war in which Canada's primary assistance to England would be in the form of economic aid. There would be no conscription crisis, no racial disunity, no hysteria, and no vast expenditure of blood and treasure as there had been in World War One. The Globe and Mail did not favour limited liability and accused the Canadian Government of letting down Britain shamefully by an "unnatural and undesired appeasement" of Quebec. Only by the united efforts of all Canadians, the


paper admonished, could the full weight of the nation be brought to bear in the struggle against nazism.

Although The Globe and Mail was displeased with many of the actions of the Liberal Government in its prosecution of the war, it found no fault with Canadian participation in the aerial offensive against Germany. One of Canada’s best resources, the paper believed, was “the special aptitude of Canadians” for service in the air force. The newspaper painted a picture of eager young Canadians flying fighters and bombers in the service of both the Royal Air Force and the Royal Canadian Air Force:

Canadian airmen have a record that warms the cockles of every British heart. They have the courage and stamina that defy a beating, once they have overcome the haze of the embryo stage and attained confidence.

In war, the paper argued, all the resources of the contending nations had to be engaged. The military airplane demolished the shield of the army against the invading forces. The entire nation had become, in effect, part of the battlefield, and every citizen was or might be in a combat area. With this in mind, The Globe and Mail gave enthusiastic support to the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP).

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38 "Canada’s Job is Plain," The Globe and Mail, September 27, 1939, p. 6, col. 1.
It may well be that this Dominion's most spectacular part of the destruction of Hitlerism will be her contribution to the Empire's air forces, in personnel, money, equipment and training fields.... The public will welcome the decision to make this Dominion the training ground for the air fighters of the Empire. Canadians take to the air as Britons take to the sea. 39

Be this as it may, Mackenzie King saw the BCATP as a form of military effort that would not be likely to lead to enormous casualties and a consequent demand for conscription. Though the Liberal Government featured the BCATP as Canada's greatest effort to help Britain, the delay in getting the scheme into action forced King to plan an expeditionary force, something he wanted to avoid in his desire to maintain national unity and a limited liability war policy.

If the newspaper was at times critical of the Liberal Government in Ottawa, it was never unkind to the British or their cause. There was something almost holy in the crusade that Britain was involved in, and The Globe and Mail was quick to sound the trumpet to enlist Canada in that cause. The paper believed in the doctrine of total war and recognized the fact that before war's end the civilian must be deprived of everything not essential to his continued existence as a functioning cog in the national war machine.

40 Granatstein, p. 58.
41 Ibid., p. 46.
Britons and Canadians were fighting for freedom, to resist aggression. The Germans were fighting for an unjust cause. They had started the war. They were fighting an aggressive war. The Allies were fighting only in the defence of their security, its well-being, and its sacred honour. The paper editorialized:

The spiritual and moral issues at stake involving the destruction of foreign nations of alien tongues seem far removed. Yet the issues are our most sacred possessions....It is better to defend our liberty on German territory than with bombing, murder, and pillage here....We shall keep our freedom or lose it. 42

On October 30, 1939, the paper quoted Prime Minister King as its authority for the call to the British Standard:

Mr. King summed up Canada's war aims in one sentence: "The time has come when to save our Christian civilization we must be prepared to lay down our lives." In fighting the expansion of Hitlerism and Germanism, Canada is striving to preserve sacred rights for herself and others. Canada's war aim is to help Britain and France save civilization from this terrible danger, and in doing so, save herself. 43

Having stated the propaganda line that the bombing of civilians was barbarous, The Globe and Mail sanctified Allied bombing by explaining that it was directed against "military objectives," a somewhat vague term usually thought to mean ammunition dumps, railway yards, airfields and industrial centres connected with making weapons of war. As most of these targets—certainly the factories and the railway yards—

42 "It is a Serious War," The Globe and Mail, October 7, 1939, p. 6, col. 1.
43 "Why Canada is at War," The Globe and Mail, October 30, 1939, p. 6, col. 1.
were surrounded by houses in which people lived, it was impossible to hit them without also hitting the surrounding houses, a fact that the newspaper conveniently chose to ignore. There was quite a difference between German and English aviators, the paper editorialized on October 3, 1939:

Could one imagine German aviators flying over England dropping leaflets instead of bombs? A waste of precious gasoline without spilling blood or destroying homes is to them, in view of their record, the height of folly. The British could have dropped bombs quite easily as sheets of paper on Berlin and Potsdam. They may eventually, but in the meantime they are giving the German people a break, an opportunity to learn what the war is about, and undoubtedly they get a kick out of the experience and the risk. 44

The air war, unlike the land and sea wars, with its individual victories, seemed to be a war of movement. It surged back and forth across the sky without regard for national boundary or military position. The Globe and Mail took advantage of this fact to announce victories—so many enemy planes shot down, so many industrial targets bombed, day after day. It was the one cheering note in an otherwise grim, unmoving war.

It had been axiomatic in air thinking that the "bomber would always get through." This did not mean all the bombers; it meant an effective number of them. When the war began, the Royal Air Force Bomber Command had only 200 bombers available for operations. These consisted mainly of twin-engined

Wellingtons, Whitleys and Hampdens whose range and bomb loads were small in comparison with the Halifax and Lancaster bombers that would appear in the later stages of the war. In this early stage of the war, bombs were in many cases inefficient weapons, weighing as little as 40 pounds and as much as 250 pounds, and often fell short of their designated targets. No effective means of long-range navigation was devised until March 1942, and in the interim navigators relied, apart from map reading, upon the astro-sextant and directional radio for guidance. As neither could be relied upon for accurate results and both required a high degree of skill in operation, navigation remained largely a matter of observation. The military communiques, and thus The Globe and Mail, made no mention of the difficulties of aerial navigation. It was merely assumed, most particularly by those in Bomber Command, that the bombers would find their targets and bomb them as assigned.

The bombers, however, did not always get through. When small formations of Wellingtons, operating in daylight over the North Sea, were engaged by the Luftwaffe and severely mauled, doubts began to surface about the feasibility of day-

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47 Webster and Frankland, 1:204-205.
light operations. The first major air battle of the war--
over Heligoland Bight on December 18, 1939--showed that un-
escorted bombers were no match for the enemy's fighter force.
On that occasion, 24 RAF Wellingtons were dispatched to bomb
naval targets in the Schillig, at Wilhelmshaven and in the
Jade Roads. German radar picked up the approaching bombers
and notified a nearby German fighter base. Me 109 and Me 110
fighters rose to intercept them and succeeded in destroying

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In its version of the air battle, The Globe and Mail
stated that the Wellingtons had engaged a large fleet of
Me 110's and shot down twelve of the enemy for a loss of
seven of their number. The paper made no mention of the
number of the RAF planes involved, but published a large
part of the Air Ministry communique from which the story
was drawn.

The British admit that the attack on the German
naval base failed in its first objective, but they
ridicule Germany's claim that 34 British bombers were
shot down...No official figures were given...of the
number of British planes engaged, but the Germans
mentioned 44, and as one British officer remarked
"that was about the only accurate figure in their
communique." 49

It was one of the few times that the Air Ministry admitted
that a bomber attack had failed. But the Heligoland Bight

48
Noble Frankland, The Bombing Offensive Against Ger-
many: Outlines and Perspectives, (London: Faber and Faber,
1965), pp. 53-54.

49
"Fierce Fight Ensues When Raid on Base Meets Stiff
battle had demonstrated that the bombers did not always get through—though this was never stated to the press for obvious reasons. Moreover, it had demonstrated that unescorted bombers were not capable of defending themselves against aggressive daylight fighters. In the light of tremendous casualties suffered in this and other daylight raids, the British began looking about for a viable alternative to daylight bombing. It was soon noted that the Whitleys of 4 Group had delivered leaflets over Germany at night and had suffered only negligible casualties in doing so. This made the prospect of night bombing very attractive. The outcome of this was an Air Staff directive on April 13, 1940, which stated that the operations of the heavy bombers were to be confined to night actions.

The Air Ministry's announcement that the raid of 18 December 1939 had not succeeded did not draw any comment from The Globe and Mail. It continued turning out articles of a rather optimistic nature showing that the Allies were doing everything possible to win the war in the shortest time. While the RAF was busy bombing naval targets, the paper printed a warning by Deputy Speaker and Chief Opposition Whip in the House of Lords, Lord Marley, that

The first German air attack on the civilian populations of Great Britain or France will be the signal for immediate bombing raids on the great industrial centres of the Rhineland, with their destruction "inevitable."

Webster and Frankland, 14212.
The Allies, he said, had confined their attacks to purely military objectives, and had refrained from bombing strategic industrial centres only because women and children have not yet been evacuated from them. 51

Although the paper called for an increased war effort on the part of the Canadian Government, it did not make any statement about strategic bombing.

The German invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940 moved The Globe and Mail to announce that despite German indiscriminate air warfare, the Allies would respect their pledge to restrict their bombing to military targets. "Even these must be spared if attack implies serious danger to the lives of the civilian population." Five days later, when it became apparent that the military situation was deteriorating, the paper did an about-face and wrote:

That Hitler has been beating the Allies to the draw is undeniable. Not only this, but he impounds for his war service the human and material resources of every yard of territory captured and has no scruples about the methods used. When the Allies forget the obstacles of international law, about which they are over-concerned, and head off the German gangster they will gain the respect they now seek by being too considerate of neutral feelings. 53

The editorial of May 4, 1940, was the turning point in The Globe and Mail's attitude towards strategic bombing. With

51 "Will Retaliate If Nazis Bomb, Marley Says," The Globe and Mail, January 24, 1940, p. 11, col. 8.
the German invasion of the Low Countries that month, the paper began to look upon bombing as merely another tool of the Allies to be used in their struggle against nazism. The more often and the harder it was used, the quicker victory would be in sight.

On May 15, 1940, the day after the bombing of Rotterdam, Bomber Command received orders to start bombing targets in western Germany. These orders were to change from day to day as the Allied position in France collapsed. Raids were alternately conducted on German ground forces, on the German synthetic oil industry, on communications links from the Reich to the front, and on various other "panacea" targets. The bombing was not a sustained or heavy effort, and specific objects of military significance were always the targets; the attacks were, however, conducted at night and on targets close to or in cities, exposing the civilian population of portions of northwestern Germany to their first bombardment. That the RAF was having difficulty in finding and correctly hitting its assigned targets is evidenced by the May 15, 1940 raid. On that occasion, 99 bombers were dispatched to attack oil and railroad targets in the Ruhr, but less than 25 of that number even claimed to have found their targets.


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This story was to set the trend for bombing reports for the duration of the war. Like every other bombing story, it gave an official Air Ministry communiqué as its source. This meant that only what the Air Ministry wanted known about a particular raid would be made public. The phrase "damage was extensive and covered a wide area" would become a hallmark of bombing reports just as would the phrase "it was the heaviest raid of the war." Like so many reports that were to follow it, the report of the May 15th raid maintained that the bombers had little trouble finding their assigned targets and successfully dropped their bombs. There was no mention, nor would there ever be, of the fact that the bombers often could not find their targets and often failed to place their sticks of bombs where they would do the most damage. There was only what the Air Ministry wanted the public to know.

The course of action taken by the Royal Air Force was determined by a series of directives passed down from the Air Staff to the Air Officer Commanding in Chief of Bomber Command. On May 30, 1940, the Air Staff directed Sir Charles Portal, the Commander in Chief of Bomber Command, to focus attention on German lines of communications. Bomber Command's remaining effort was to be directed at a continuous interruption and dislocation of German war industry, particularly

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56 Webster and Frankland, 4:111.
in those areas where the German aircraft industry was concentrated—namely Hamburg-Bremen, the Ruhr and Frankfurt areas. Portal was warned: "In no circumstances should night bombing be allowed to degenerate into mere indiscriminate action, which is contrary to the policy of His Majesty's Government." Had the directive been published, and no Air Staff directives ever were, the warning to Portal would have nicely reinforced the image of discriminating bombing policy that The Globe and Mail was presenting to its readers.

The German aircraft industry became a primary objective of Bomber Command in June 1940. Two directives, issued on June 4th and June 20th, ordered Sir Charles Portal to "dislocate the German aircraft industry by attacks on such bomber and fighter assembly factories as may be within your range." Although the attacks were only to "interrupt and dislocate" the aircraft industry, The Globe and Mail gave the impression that the bombing raids were crippling aircraft production. On June 20th, the paper claimed that "British planes have shattered objectives in nearly 20 cities of northwestern Germany and the Rhineland." Four days later, the paper wrote that two "violent explosions" were observed after the

57 Webster and Frankland, 4:112.
58 Webster and Frankland, 4:145.
59 Webster and Frankland, 4:113-115.
60 "British Retaliation Follows Quickly on Nazi Attack," The Globe and Mail, June 20, 1940, p. 1, col. 6.
attack on the Focke Wulf plant at Bremen and that the aircraft storage at Gottigen was heavily damaged. Similar stories followed almost daily.

Though The Globe and Mail claimed that the RAF was smashing hard at all its assigned objectives, the Air Staff, in the course of its review of Bomber Command operations to date, stated that the attacks on industrial objectives had been too dispersed and that, in consequence, few objectives had sustained sufficient damage to put them out of action for any length of time. A new directive was issued on July 13th, directing Bomber Command to devote a greater weight of attack to fewer targets with a view to complete destruction rather than harassing effect. Eleven days later, "concentrations of aircraft on occupied aerodromes" were added to the directive as part of Bomber Command's primary target system.

There was no indication in The Globe and Mail that strategic bombing had not wrought complete destruction on aircraft targets, nor was there any indication that the number of targets being attacked was now any fewer in number. On July 16th, the paper quoted the Air Ministry report of the previous day, saying that the "relentless night

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62 Webster and Frankland, 4:119.
63 Ibid., p. 121.
bombed of German aircraft factories, airbases and oil and storage depots was finally beginning to cripple the might of the German air arm." There was certainly nothing in the paper to indicate otherwise. The aircraft factory at Bremen had been repeatedly bombed, as had the aircraft works at Kassel, Rostock and Gotha. Each day new cities appeared in the reports on strategic bombing, and the list of bombed cities seemed endless. By July 29th, the paper was able to claim that there had been "161 raids carried out on German industrial centres, 229 on airdromes and 258 on military objectives...in the enemy's communications system" since April 10th. Moreover, the paper stated, the Dornier and Messerschmidt assembly plants had been partially demolished. Where the plants were was not disclosed. While the July 13th Air Staff directive had requested that Bomber Command limit the number of its targets, The Globe and Mail gave the opposite impression, saying that the British had barely scratched the surface of potential targets in Germany. Longer autumn nights, the paper intimated, would allow "the raiders to go further afield and still return before daylight."

A new directive issued on September 21, 1940, instructed Bomber Command to attack aluminum plants, and airframe and aero-engine industries to inflict long-term damage on the


German aircraft industry. Though *The Globe and Mail* was not privy to the Air Staff directive, its editorial of September 26th explained the course of action that the RAF was undertaking:

The conduct of the war by the present British government leaves nothing to be desired in the matter of vigour, and we should not care to see any change from the present shrewd cool-headedness to a wasteful and ineffective impetuosity....It is no gentlemanly reverence for the amenities of the cricket field that is keeping RAF bombers engaged in hammering at the primary centres of German military communications instead of flying nearly 600 miles over enemy held territory to bomb Berlin. On the contrary, it is the shrewdish kind of military common sense; and that will win us the war a great deal more quickly than a choleric lack of self control. **67**

It certainly seemed that the RAF was exercising a great deal of "military common sense," because the paper was able to claim by October 7th that strategic bombing had "materially **68** reduced" Germany's production of warplanes.

On October 4, 1940, Sir Charles Portal was made Chief of the Air Staff and was succeeded as Commander in Chief, Bomber Command, by Sir Richard Peirse. On October 30th, Peirse received a directive calling for an offensive against German oil production and morale. Heavy attacks on Berlin or towns in central and western Germany "with the primary aim of causing heavy material damage which will demonstrate

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66 Webster and Frankland, 4:125.
to the enemy the power and severity of air bombardment and the hardship and dislocation which will result from it were listed as secondary targets. Air Staff urged Peirse to adopt the German technique of opening raids with a fire-raising attack. Successive sorties, the directive continued, should then focus their attacks on the fires with a view to preventing the fire fighting services from dealing with them and giving the fires every opportunity to spread. The policy of attacking only military objectives in the towns was officially abandoned. This new technique was to become known as area bombing.

The October 30th directive would not have made the pages of The Globe and Mail, security reasons aside, because it would have placed the RAF on the same footing as the Luftwaffe as a champion of indiscriminate bombing. What appeared in the newspaper was an explanation that the attacks on Germany were increasing in ferocity because of the vigorous

69 Webster and Frankland, 4:129.
70 The Germans had used this technique quite successfully in their attacks on Coventry and other cities. KG.400 was made the German pathfinder force--it was replaced by II/KG.4 in November 1943--and fires started by its bombers guided others to the target. The problem, as both sides soon realized, was that the enemy often created dummy fires which led the following bombers astray. An additional, and more serious, problem was that the positioning of the pathfinder force fires depended on the navigational skills of the pathfinder force. If the pathfinder force missed the target and laid their fires incorrectly, the following bombers did also.
71 Webster and Frankland, 1:157.
personality" of Sir Charles Portal, who believed in dealing heavy blows to the enemy. But there was something new in the reports on strategic bombing. Now there were accounts of huge fires and increasing numbers of incendiaries in the bomber's payloads. Despite stories of fires being seen as far as 60 miles from the target, the paper insisted there was "no part in the RAF master plan for terror raids, reprisal raids and the haphazard bombing of relatively unimportant centres of population."

Oil and morale remained the primary target systems of Bomber Command until March 1941. Sir Charles Portal, who had to a great extent lost confidence in the RAF's ability to inflict serious damage upon the German oil industry, gave serious thought to mass attacks on industrial areas where submarines and their accessories or Focke Wulf aircraft were built. On March 9th, following a ruling by Churchill, Bomber Command was given nine submarine and four aircraft targets as the focus of the new offensive against U-boat and Focke Wulf construction sites.


73 See, for example, "Mighty Four Hour Raid Leaves Nazi Arms Plant an Inferno," The Globe and Mail, November 9, 1940, p. 1, col. 2.

74 "Bombing by Accident," The Globe and Mail, November 21, 1940, p. 6, col. 2.

75 Webster and Frankland, 4:134. The Focke Wulf FW 200 was a four engined bomber used in an anti-shipping role by the Germans.
Bremen, Hamburg, Kiel and Wilhelmshaven—four of the targets mentioned in the March directive—began appearing in The Globe and Mail’s reports on strategic bombing with increasing frequency. A new factor in the reporting was the mention of the RAF’s new superbomb: "the answer for an explosive more potent than T.N.T." It was not until July 18th, however, that the superbomb was more accurately described as a 4,000-pound high explosive bomb. Still, the superbomb was larger than the German 1,000 kilogram bomb, and the RAF appeared to be putting it to good use. With the large numbers of German cities feeling the weight of the new bomb, the paper gave the impression that the offensive was continuing in an ever-increasing, ever-more devastating manner.

There was nothing in The Globe and Mail to indicate that strategic bombing was not a success. On August 4, 1941, the paper editorialized:

The British Galahads of the air, continuing their deliberate policy of bombing enemy shipyards, submarine bases, munitions factories and railway yards, have certainly been doing everything they could to hamper the German war effort....The British RAF appears to bomb Berlin at will.

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78 See, for example, "Superbombs Blast Heart of Cologne," The Globe and Mail, May 5, 1941, p. 1, col. 7.
79 "Winning the War in the Air," The Globe and Mail, August 4, 1941, p. 6, col. 1.
The truth about the inaccuracy of the RAF bombing dawned slowly. In the first half of August, Mr. Butt, a member of the War Cabinet Secretariat, reported that on the basis of examination of photographs, operational summaries and other documentary material, only one-third of all attacking aircraft had got within five miles of their target. Over the Ruhr, only one-tenth actually got within five miles of their target. In full moon, two-fifths of the aircraft reported to have attacked their targets had got within five miles of them. Without a moon, this figure dropped to one-fifteenth. Thus many of the aircraft which, by Mr. Butt's test, were credited with successful attacks had in fact dropped their bombs in open country.

Though Sir Richard Peirse found this hard to believe, Sir Charles Portal accepted the figures and pointed out that this meant a need for improved navigational and bombing aids. Until such aids could be obtained, the existing bombing policy which called for selective and precise night attack was impracticable.

Accordingly, a new plan was drawn up which envisaged the destruction of 43 select German towns, most with a populace of over 100,000 and with a total population of some 15,000,000. Portal presented the plan to Churchill on September 25, 1941, and despite the Prime Minister's reservations, the plan was put into effect.

80 Frankland, p. 63.
81 Webster and Frankland, 1:182.
Although The Globe and Mail was not aware of the September directive, it promised its readers that the RAF would turn German cities into "hells of death and destruction" before 1941 was over. RAF casualties during 1941, however, were making serious inroads upon the existing force and constituted a threat to the future of Bomber Command. Churchill became alarmed at the losses Bomber Command was suffering and insisted that the bomber force be conserved and built up for the spring. Accordingly, an Air Staff directive was delivered to Bomber Command on November 13th, and the RAF reduced its operations considerably.

In February 1942, Air Marshal Harris became Commander in Chief, Bomber Command. On February 14th, the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, sent a minute to Sir Charles Portal and Sir Norman Bottomley, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, to the effect that the policy of conserving Bomber Command was now at an end, and that, weather permitting, the offensive was to be resumed at maximum intensity without restriction. Moreover, the minute stated that RAF bombers would now be equipped with Gee, a

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82 "Predict German Cities Will Be 'Hells of Death',' The Globe and Mail, August 11, 1941, p. 1, col. 3.
83 Webster and Frankland, 1:186.
84 Webster and Frankland, 4:142.
85 Ibid., p. 143.
radio device which enabled navigators to accurately plot their courses from the United Kingdom to their assigned target in Germany. There were those, however, who had their doubts about Gee. Sir Arthur Harris expected no miracles from Gee; weather and the size of Bomber Command—Gee could handle only a limited number of aircraft at one time—made formidable problems. Air Staff was aware that the principle limitation that Gee suffered was the probable brevity of its effective life. Under the most fortunate circumstances they did not think it would be more than six months before the Germans learned to jam Gee. Still, for all its limitations, Gee was a valuable aid that would serve well until it was superseded by Oboe and H2S, radar devices for navigation and bombing that were introduced into regular service in December 1942 and January 1943 respectively.

The Globe and Mail had no way of knowing about the introduction of Gee or the February 14th directive. It editorialized on March 5, 1942, however, that the RAF would play a "mighty part" in the coming spring offensive.

Presenting his budget before the House, Sir Archibald Sinclair warned against underestimating British bombing of German territory or of minimizing the importance of the Air Arm in victory....Aachen and Munster, he said, are in worse condition than Coventry and Plymouth, while photographs show vast areas of destruction at Wilhelmshaven, Emden and places in the Ruhr. The raids, he declared, had already told on the German morale and slowed down

86 Webster and Frankland, 1:385.
87 Ibid., p. 386.
production. 88

The paper's reports on strategic bombing seemed to bear out what Sinclair said. The awesomeness of the bombing offensive was brought home by the paper's account of the bombing of Rostock on four consecutive nights from April 24th to the 27th:

Destruction and death tolls at Rostock were declared in German reports via Zurich to be far above those at Lübeck which was estimated to have been more than 40 per cent destroyed in the raid of March 28. 89

Six days later, the paper explained that the Wehrmacht had extended "a factual censorship" on dispatches concerning bomb damage to the Reich. Despite this, the paper was able to write that

between 7,000 and 8,000 were killed and more than 30,000 were rendered homeless in four raids on Rostock according to Swedish sources... Refugees pouring into Berlin belie the German propaganda claims of only 163 dead. 90

On May 6, 1942, The Globe and Mail wrote that German aircraft production was falling because of British bombing efficiency:

German war industry has been ordered to devote all its attention henceforth to turning out airplanes even to the detriment of tanks and other material. This news from Berlin confirms indications...that

88 "RAF to Play 'Mighty Part' in Spring War," The Globe and Mail, March 5, 1942, p. 2, col. 3.
90 "8,000 Killed in Rostock Raids; Berlin Residents are Jittery," The Globe and Mail, May 5, 1942, p. 1, col. 6.
mastery of the air is paramount consideration for the moment....

Figures declared to be trustworthy would indicate that peak aircraft production in the Reich was reached in June 1941, when 3300 were turned out. Now it has fallen to between 2700 and 2800. 92

This, though the paper had no way of knowing it, was not true. As table one shows, German aircraft production was well below the paper's figures, but it was increasing.

TABLE 1

German Aircraft Production
1941-1942

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total Production</th>
<th>Of This Fighters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>1104</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>1059</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1384</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>1304</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Great Britain, Air Ministry, Air Historical Branch, Von Rhoden Studies, "The Battle for Air Supremacy over Germany (German Air Defence) 1939-45," n.d., pp. 120-121.

This discrepancy of figures was not due to the over-zealousness of The Globe and Mail, but to Allied intelligence estimates of German aircraft production. A comparison of actual production with Allied intelligence estimates shows

how the paper could arrive at its figures.

TABLE 2

Comparison of Allied Intelligence Estimates of German Aircraft Production with Actual Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Single-Engine Fighters</th>
<th>Total Aircraft Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allied Intelligence Estimates</td>
<td>Actual Estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st half 1941</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd half 1941</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st half 1942</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd half 1942</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1575</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1725</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1820</td>
<td>1115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>1341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For the balance of 1942, Bomber Command focused its attention on the morale campaign. There were variations of target systems, such as the German synthetic oil industry in September, but in the main the attacks were confined to German cities. This was due to the belief of Air Marshal Harris who held that the destruction of German cities was the key to winning the strategic air war.

Throughout the development of the area offensive, The Globe and Mail assured its readers of two facts: (1) the strategic offensive against Germany was successful and (2) it had been conducted along the lines of honourable warfare. That the offensive was successful could be judged by two

93 Webster and Frankland, 4:152.
94 Webster and Frankland, 2:47.
items that appeared in the paper's reports: (1) the RAF hit an ever-increasing number of towns, and (2) the RAF hit those towns with ever-increasing and ever-more devastating bomb tonnages. It was not up to the paper to supply the burden of proof that the offensive was successful, but rather it was up to those who wrote the military communiques from which the paper drew its stories. The communiques rarely, if ever, admitted that a raid was a failure. On top of the communiques, and reinforcing them, were the statements by the Air Ministry, by the Secretary of State for Air or by the very men that flew the bombers that the raids were successful and that German industry and morale were suffering because of them. There was no doubt in the reporting of *The Globe and Mail* that the strategic air offensive was conducted on honourable lines. The paper, the military communiques, and the heads of state carefully nourished the image of a policy of discriminate bombing of military targets. If they had revealed that they had renounced discriminate bombing, then they would have been no better than the Luftwaffe. In fact, by their own claims that the RAF was more effective than the German Air Force, they would have had to admit that they were better than the Germans at indiscriminate bombing.

Though the issue of indiscriminate bombing gradually passed from the pages of *The Globe and Mail*, the idea of an ever-increasing, ever-more devastating bombing offensive did not. Throughout 1943, and for the remainder of the war, the paper—based on the military communiques—would claim
that the offensive was successful. An increasing number of articles, often supported by photographs of the targets under attack, claimed that the offensive was reducing aircraft production or affecting some other type of industrial production. When the Americans undertook strategic bombing, a new feature appeared in the paper. Once a month, and occasionally more often, the Americans stated that German production had been halted for a number of months because of their successful bombing raids. It was just one more proof that the offensive was a success.
CHAPTER TWO

CASABLANCA AND THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE

If there was one persistent theme in the reporting of The Globe and Mail in 1943, it was one of enthusiastic optimism. "Victory for the Axis Powers is now unthinkable," the paper claimed on January 1, 1943, and though the Axis was still strong, the paper argued, it could and would be defeated:

Germany is still economically formidable but past its production peak...There is little likelihood of German economic collapse in 1943.../but/ bombing damage and increased military activity in the case of Germany...will have immediate effects on war production. 1

In its reporting of the strategic bombing of Germany, the paper was apt to overestimate both the immediate and the far-reaching consequences of the RAF and USAAF raids. It claimed that the increased tempo of Allied bombing resulted in acute shortages of war materials to the German war economy, diversion of German fighters to the western front and loss of German air superiority over occupied Europe.

This sense of optimism also spread to the reporting of the Casablanca conference of January 1943. Though details of the conference were not released to the newspaper

1 "Output Peak Passed, but Reich Still Strong," The Globe and Mail, January 1, 1943, p. 7, col. 3.
for reasons of security, The Globe and Mail surmised that great things had come from this meeting of Allied leaders. Painting a glowing picture of the unity of purpose that the Allies had achieved, the paper stated that the conference had resolved the path that the Allies would take to final victory over the Axis Powers. In terms of strategic bombing, this unity would be found in a coordinated round-the-clock bombing of Germany.

What was missing from the reporting of The Globe and Mail in 1943 was the lack of unity in the planning of the strategic air offensive against Germany. This divergence of aims can best be seen in the Casablanca and TRIDENT conferences. The Casablanca conference had to define the role of the aerial offensive in the basic Allied strategic plans. First priority was given unequivocally to the war against the European Axis. To defeat the Germans, it would be necessary to invade the Continent in force. The combined bombing offensive became the prerequisite to such an invasion. But the work of the conference was done on the level of general policy; although it laid down guiding principles, it did not entertain specific plans. Even the directive for the bomber offensive provided only a general indication of policy and its target priority list gave only tentative direction.

It became the task of TRIDENT to translate the Casablanca

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decisions into terms of specific commitments and detailed objectives. Though TRIDENT made concrete proposals, a considerable separation between the objectives to be pursued by the RAF and USAAF was permitted to survive.

Missing, too, from the pages of The Globe and Mail for 1943 was the resilience of the German aircraft industry, the increasing ferocity of German opposition to Allied bombing raids, and, finally, the loss of American air superiority late in the year. What emerged from the reading of the paper during 1943 was an overwhelming sense of optimism and a distortion of the capabilities of the bomber offensive. With this in mind, two targets, Bremen and Stuttgart, may be selected to show how the actual bombing differed from the way in which it was reported in the paper.

Casablanca, TRIDENT and POINTBLANK

Word of the Casablanca conference was withheld for more than thirty hours after the conference had ended by censors in North Africa and London. When the story broke, The Globe and Mail ran it under a banner headline, proclaiming that the conference had "sharply boosted British hopes that the final blow at the heart of Hitlerdom would be struck in 1943." According to the story, the Allies had come to "complete agreement" on detailed plans for the defeat of the Axis Powers on all fronts. Though the paper cautioned its

3 Webster and Frankland, 2:24.
readers not to expect any sudden developments from Allied planning at Casablanca, it hinted that an invasion of Europe in 1943 would not be out of the question:

Military men agreed that July, August or September would not be too late for launching of the full scale smashes at Europe which both leaders pledged will come as soon as possible. 4

On page three of its January 27th edition, the newspaper said of the conference:

There has never been such an opportunity for reaching a clear understanding about coordinated action between two nations, nor with more certainty that the conclusions reached would be carried out. The final authority of each of the armed services and the civil administration of both countries was present. There can, therefore, be no misunderstanding nor doubt as to whether agreements reached almost on the field of battle will be overridden by higher authorities in London or Washington. 5

It must have seemed to those who read the newspaper that day that the Allies had made concrete plans that would culminate in an invasion of Europe in 1943.

On the 28th, The Globe and Mail spoke of the implications of the conference:

The world strategy conference has forestalled a new German peace offensive, observers said...It was expressed [in London] that the conference's clear statement that the United Nations have completed their strategy for a series of smashing blows, and are now getting ready to implement it, would spread a new wave of hope among the enslaved peoples of Europe.

Representatives of the Allied Governments said


new outbreaks of sabotage and general resistance to the Germans are certain. 6

Lest there be any doubt in the mind of its readers that the conference was a success, the paper wrote:

Quite obviously the chiefs of staff of all services in both Britain and the United States cannot meet together for ten days in a region behind a major battle zone and confer with each other and with active commanders in the field without reaching many more conclusions than were contained in the public statement....

The gathering of service chiefs and supply, together with the political heads of the two nations, must surely indicate either a great emergency or the realization of a great opportunity....The time obviously is ripe for action on the large scale of which Britain and the United States are capable. 7

Despite the praise and assurances of The Globe and Mail, the conference at Casablanca was not a success and Allied strategic unity was not secured, nor were definite plans for an invasion of the Continent in 1943 laid. The British and the American chiefs of staff continued to differ on their ideas of strategy for winning the war on land, sea and air. At best, the conference was a compromise situation with both sides giving some ground and coming to agreement that things would have to be worked out in the future at another conference. The conference did define the use of air power and allowed the strategists to lay out goals for the combined

8 Webster and Frankland, 2:12.
bombing offensive, but its work was done on the general rather than specific policy level.

The decision to launch a combined bomber offensive (CBO) was made at the conference and its role for preparing the way for a later military invasion of the Continent was defined. Strategic direction of both forces was conferred upon the British Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal, but the two commanders in the field, Sir Arthur Harris of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command and General Eaker of the United States Eighth Air Force, who maintained operational control over their separate forces, held different views on operational and strategic prospects. Whereas the strategy of the American Eighth Air Force was based upon precision bombing by day, the British Bomber Command advocated general area attack by night.

The directive to govern the operations of the British and American Bomber Commands in the United Kingdom opened with the statement:

Your primary object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. 11

As its primary objectives, the directive listed, in order of

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9 Craven and Cate, 2:307.
10 Webster and Frankland, 2:5.
priority, German submarine construction yards, the German aircraft industry, transportation, oil plants and "other targets in the enemy war industry." The directive concluded:

You should take every opportunity to attack Germany by day, to destroy objectives which are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on the German fighter force and to contain German fighter strength away from the Russian and Mediterranean theatres of war. 12

Despite the claims of The Globe and Mail that there could be "no misunderstanding or doubt as to whether or not the agreements reached...will be overridden by higher authorities in London or Washington," the directive issued at Casablanca had to be approved by the chiefs of staff of both Britain and the United States before it could be put into effect. This process was not immediately forthcoming, nor was complete agreement reached upon it by the British and American Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Globe and Mail, unaware of the delay in making the Casablanca directive an official policy for the American and British Bomber Commands, wrote on February 6, 1943:

The smashing air attacks which are being carried out by the RAF and the USAAF in co-operation are not making things any easier for the distraught enemy....

General Andrews' first public statement on assuming his command as Commander in Chief of the United States forces in the European theatre of war said that he planned to continue and intensify daylight bombing of German centres by the USAAF, and understood that

12 Slessor, p. 669.
"somebody else is taking care of disrupting German sleep."

The promise of an intensified air action is very gratifying, because it is quite clear that the Germans cannot endure heavy and persistent air attacks on their industrial centres at a time when their resources are strained to the limit in an effort to prevent an irretrievable disaster on the Eastern Front. 14

The paper assumed that the Casablanca conference had determined the role that strategic bombing would play in Allied plans for winning the war, and thus came to see post-Casablanca military operations as part of that role. As long as both forces were actively bombing the enemy, the paper claimed that the strategic bombing offensive was coordinated.

The machinery for a coordinated air offensive, however, was not yet operational. The British contribution to the combined bomber offensive, general area bombing of German cities, was nearly a year old. The idea of select precision attack as the American contribution had only been formulated at USAAF Headquarters in December 1942. Moreover, the Americans were still trying to determine the industrial objectives in Germany whose destruction would weaken the enemy most in the shortest time. It was not until March 23, 1943, that the American target systems were chosen and sent to the United Kingdom for coordination with the British authorities and the Eighth Air Force. The original list of twelve target systems was scaled down to 76 targets in six systems arranged as follows in the order of priority:

Submarine construction yards and bases
The German aircraft industry
Ball-bearings
Oil
Synthetic rubber and tires
Military transport vehicles

The list of primary objectives still had to be approved by
the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it fell upon General
Eaker to argue for their acceptance.

General Eaker presented the plan to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on April 29, 1943, stating that it provided for
the neutralization of a given percentage of each industrial
system as agreed upon in the Casablanca directive. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the plan providing
that provisions were made to counter the increased produc-
tion of German fighter aircraft. With this in mind, the
plan was altered as follows:

(1) Intermediate objectives
   German fighter strength
(2) Primary objectives
   German submarine yards and bases
   The remainder of the German aircraft
   industry
   Ball-bearings
(3) Secondary objectives
   Synthetic rubber and tires
   Military motor transportation vehicles

The new version of the plan, accepted by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, was codenamed POINTBLANK. It now remained for
Eaker and Portal to sell the plan to Churchill and Roose-
velt at the TRIDENT conference in Washington in May 1943.

15 Webster and Frankland, 2:15.
16 Craven and Cate, 2:367.
Though the combined bomber offensive was still in the planning stages, The Globe and Mail was writing that it was well under way:

The roaring procession of British and American heavy bombers across the English Channel...have caused the Germans to wonder if that time predicted last summer by Air Marshal Harris was not already here: "Soon we shall be coming over every night and every day, rain, blow or snow, we and the Americans....The time has come when hardly any part of Europe can be considered immune to the scourging of the Allied bombers....We have the word of the best Allied authorities that this is only the foretaste of what is to come....Great areas of a dozen of Germany's greatest industrial cities have been laid in ruins. Havoc has been done to transportation, one of the weakest links in the German war effort. 17

If the daily reports of the damage wrought upon Germany were not enough to convince the readers of the paper that the "coordinated" bombing offensive was a reality, the paper used General H.H. Arnold and Sir Charles Portal as the final authorities on the matter:

General Henry H. Arnold, chief of the United States Army Air Force, said /on March 31, 1943/ that American fliers "look forward to increasing co-operation with the RAF so that, wingtip to wingtip, we may fly to the destruction of our common enemies...." Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal replied that "we are ever conscious of the great help which the USAAF has given and is still giving us....It is with joy and pride that we share the fortunes of war with the USAAF on many fronts, and we look forward to flying side by side to the achievement of a common victory. 18

The Globe and Mail not withstanding, the POINTBLANK plan was

18 "With You Wing to Wing Soon, Arnold Tells Royal Air Force," The Globe and Mail, April 1, 1943, p. 3, col. 3.
still not in effect.

At the TRIDENT conference in May 1943, Churchill and Roosevelt met with the Combined Chiefs of Staff to review the POINTBLANK plan. It was here that POINTBLANK was made the prerequisite to OVERLORD, the projected invasion of Europe. Though it had been hoped that TRIDENT would resolve the question of divergent aims of the two bombing forces, the Royal Air Force was exempted from POINTBLANK planning. When the final version of the plan, known as the POINTBLANK directive, was issued on June 10, 1943, the separate functions of the two Bomber Commands were emphasized. The Eighth Air Force was allotted the "intermediate objectives" of German fighter strength, the four "primary objectives" of submarines, the remainder of the German aircraft industry, ball-bearings and oil, and the two "secondary objectives" of synthetic rubber and military vehicles. The Royal Air Force Bomber Command, on the other hand, would maintain its major aim in general disorganization of German industry and would make its bombing activities "as far as practicable to be complementary to the operations of the Eighth Air Force."

Under a separate directive of June 10, 1943, the Combined Operational Planning Committee (COPC) was set up. Comprised of representatives from the Royal Air Force Bomber and Fighter Commands and the VIII Bomber and Fighters Commands,

20 Ibid., p. 29.
the Committee was to be concerned with coordination and tactical plans for specific combined operations. It was in no way responsible for the conduct of operations, which remained the responsibility of the commanders concerned. It was an advisory body, not an executive body, and thus became a liaison between the two Commands.

The Globe and Mail, which was not privy to any of the POINTBLANK discussions, continued to print stories about the successes of the combined bomber offensive. On the day after the POINTBLANK directive was issued, for example, the paper wrote:

The statement of General Eaker...that his force has been doubled in the last three months and will be doubled again by the end of summer rather suggests that he and Air Marshal Harris...are cooking up something very unpleasant for the enemy in the near future.... General Eaker says that by the end of summer the USAAF will be able to share the load equally with the RAF and complete the work of bombing the German war industry out of existence.... The continual drain of aircraft, which is taking place faster than new production, is gradually whittling away the enemy reserves, and in another month or two he will have the greatest difficulty in affording effective support or protection for his land forces. 22

That the two bomber forces were going to operate according to widely divergent operational theories, was not considered nor mentioned in the paper. As long as the USAAF operated by day and the RAF operated by night, the paper maintained that the strategic air offensive was coordinated and suc-

21 Craven and Cate, 2:375.
cessful.

The Combined Bomber Offensive

On January 4, 1943, The Globe and Mail wrote:

The real reason that we are not pushing home our attacks in the air is that we do not possess enough aircraft to provide support for the military operations to which we are committed...and still maintain an adequate reserve in the British Isles to justify raids involving the use of 600 to 1000 bombers.

This was the only time that the paper ever became critical of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command during 1943. Hereafter its criticisms were reserved, and then only for a short time, to the American policy of daylight precision bombing.

The trouble is that the bombload is too light to be devastating and the range of the Flying Fortress engaged in daylight bombing is limited by the range of the fighters that escort them. This is clearly a waste of potential, because the Flying Fortresses have an immense cruising range and it is the reason why the American Army Air Corps has never penetrated deep into the heart of Germany....

It may well be that the Mosquito is the answer to the needs of precision strategic bombing by day and the time is ripe to convert all the heavy bombers to night bombing operations....

It cannot be said that the American Army Air Corps has fulfilled the bright promises made by General Arnold, General Spaatz or General Eaker...It is hoped, therefore, that modifications are quickly made in American aircraft design and tactics to permit the great weight of American production to be thrown into the campaign to paralyze Germany and prepare the way for the offensive.

Five days later, and thereafter, the paper called the diver-

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gence of bombing policies an "ideal combination" and had nothing but praise for both the USAAF and the RAP.

"The steadily rising tempo of the air war against Germany" was an oft repeated praise in the reporting of The Globe and Mail in 1943. Ever-increasing numbers of planes dropped ever-heavier loads of bombs and did ever-much more damage than on previous raids. The name of the city hardly mattered. Someone, usually a Canadian, somewhere, usually in a Halifax or Lancaster bomber, would describe the havoc laid upon the city in question:

There were explosions concentrated around the target. That place took an awful beating. I have never seen such a show since the Cologne job. I could see fires burning after we crossed the Dutch coast. 26

There were also, as if to lend credence to the remarks made by the aircrews involved, statements by officials in the Air Ministry (sometimes identified, sometimes not), commanders in the field or Ministers in Parliament. Sir Archibald Sinclair, the British Secretary of State for Air, for example, was quoted as saying in a speech before the British House of Commons:

The RAF, RCAF and other Empire air forces, now pushing their monthly bomb sowing rate to the high level of 12,000 tons, have wrecked two thousand German war factories, cut Nazi steel production by 1250

thousand tons annually and driven at least one million Germans from their ruined homes. 27

The Air Ministry, responsible for the release of press communiques from which news stories about the bombing of Germany were written, was apt to speak of the RAF raids as "heavy and concentrated" or, at worst, "only slightly less heavy than the attack upon ___." With such confirmations by leading figures or Ministries, who could doubt that what The Globe and Mail was printing was true?

While the RAF was delivering heavy raids against submarine facilities, the Eighth Air Force was dividing its efforts between submarine yards and aircraft industries. Compared with the anti-submarine campaign, the American efforts against the German aircraft industry were light. Although second only to submarines in order of priority, aircraft installations sustained little more than 15 per cent of the total bomb tonnage dropped by the American bombers. Of the seven attacks against aircraft targets prior to June 1943, only four can be considered successful and only three were of significant weight. Heaviest of all was the mission executed on April 17th against the Focke Wulf Flugzeugbau at Bremen, at that time believed to have been devoting its


28 The British U-boat offensive for 1943 began in January and was discontinued in April. Harassing attacks against submarine installations in France, however, were continued throughout the year. Webster and Frankland, 4:155.

29 Craven and Cate, 2:313.
entire facilities to constructing FW 190's.

It was in the reporting of the bombing missions that what The Globe and Mail often proclaimed as truth was quite the opposite of what actually happened. The problem was that the paper had no way of checking whether the claims of the success of the bombing raids were justified. It could not challenge—even if it had been sceptical, which it was not—the official version of events because it was totally dependent on the military communiques to learn anything at all about the war. In the case of the USAAF raid on Bremen, however, what the paper wrote about the mission was close to what actually happened. The reporting of later raids would not always be as close to the actual events as the paper claimed.

On April 19, 1943, The Globe and Mail wrote:

Heavy bombers of the United States Air Force, flying in strong force, smashed at the German Focke Wulf fighter plane factory at Bremen. More than 50 enemy planes were shot down en route, but the 800 mile round trip cost the United States 16 bombers. More than half of the Focke Wulf factory buildings were destroyed or heavily damaged in the raid, headquarters of the United States Army announced. Photographs taken during the attack showed exceptionally heavy damage to the two largest assembly shops, the announcement said. One hangar was "entirely destroyed," a firing range wrecked, and a boiler house and a paint shop severely damaged.

30 Craven and Gate, 2:313.
On page three of the same issue, the paper called the raid on Bremen "the most ambitious of the war" and compared it to the RAF and RCAF raids on Pilsen and Mannheim a few days earlier. Though it stated that the American losses were high, the paper used the Air Ministry's apparent satisfaction as justification for the losses:

Neither our absolute strength nor our relative superiority is being dissipated in these raids and the expenditure of equipment and life will be more than justified by their effect in weakening the enemy's power to resist us effectively. 32

An indepth study of the Bremen raid reveals many of the similarities between The Globe and Mail's version of the bombing raid and that of the official records. According to the Report of Operations for April 17, 1943, the 1st Bombardment Wing dispatched 116 B-17's to Bremen. Five aircraft, however, aborted the mission and one failed to take off. A German observation plane sighted the bombers when they were over the North Sea and radioed their position to the German fighter controller. The Germans thus had an hour's advance warning to organize and concentrate their defences. An estimated 150 German fighters engaged the B-17's.

34 Craven and Cate, 2:330.
and the Americans claimed 63 destroyed, 15 probably destroyed, 17 damaged for 17 of their own number lost. German figures, however, show losses for the day as five destroyed and five damaged.

The preliminary report of the raid, released on April 20, 1943, stated that approximately seven-tenths of the Focke Wulf works were severely damaged. Two large assembly shops, a large flight hangar, and a firing range were hit. All buildings, the report claimed, were damaged by blast. The report warned, however, that strike attack coverage was incomplete because of the loss of nine aircraft out of 27 carrying cameras and ten cases of cameras which failed to function.

It is interesting to note, by way of contrast with the reporting of The Globe and Mail, that the results of the raid were altered in the official records as time passed. Claims of enemy aircraft destroyed or damaged in action were adjusted from 63 destroyed, 15 probably destroyed and 17 damaged to 47 destroyed, 17 probably destroyed and 10 damaged. Even this, as has been shown, was still too high. Physical damage to the Focke Wulf plant, first given as

37 Craven and Cate, 2:333.
seven-tenths severely damaged, was adjusted to one half of the plant destroyed. Despite this reduction in the claims of damage to plant and opposing enemy fighters, the amount of damage inflicted on the plant was less than it would have been a year earlier. The Focke Wulf plant was in the process of dispersing its facilities to eastern Germany, and much less production was going on than usual. At this date, the Eighth Air Force was willing to admit that the confusion of an air battle resulted in higher combat claims than the number of Germans shot down, but they were reluctant to reduce those claims too drastically. This reluctance to modify reports also extended to damage done as a result of bombing. The Eighth Air Force had to justify its existence to its critics and thus had to stick to strong damage claims unless concrete proof could be presented to the contrary.

From mid-June to the spring of 1944, the main effort of the Eighth Air Force was directed against the German Air Force and its supporting industries. Its task was complicated by the fact that it lacked long-range fighter escort, and had to operate with a bomber force half of which had been operational for barely a month—the Eighth Air Force was still supplying the needs of the Twelfth Air Force in Africa—and could hardly therefore be considered experienced.

41 Webster and Frankland, 1:301.
42 Craven and Cate, 2:673.
During July the Eighth Air Force attacked Oschersleben, Warnemünde and Kassel. The attacks were not decisive, although the AGO Flugzeugwerke at Oschersleben was put out of operation for a month, nor did they cripple the aircraft factories. They did, however, speed up the dispersal of the German fighter aircraft industry, and they were among those missions of 1943 which, if they did not seriously reduce the flow of fighter aircraft, at least took up the slack in that industry and thus left it vulnerable to the devastating attacks of 1944.

The Globe and Mail did not write anything about the July raids against the German aircraft industry beyond the names of the targets. The news story of that month was the Anglo-Canadian bombing of Hamburg. To bring home the impact of Allied bombing, the paper wrote on August 7th:

Inhabitants of German cities, suffering from a raid psychosis, are now indifferent about their property, expecting it to "go up in smoke" with the next attack.

Official casualty totals can be multiplied three or four times without inaccuracy since only victims recognized during the most urgent salvage work are listed officially as dead. The stench in the street is proof that many are never found and listed.

It was not just Hamburg that was liable to fall beneath the weight of British and American bombs, but all of the Reich. On August 10th, the paper explained:

43 Graven and Cate, 2:673.
Allied air power has multiplied so quickly in the last year that the RAF and USAAF can concentrate enough aircraft over any given point in Western Europe to insure the delivery of a paralyzing bombing attack...

Considering the war in the air solely on the basis of strategic bombing...the type of overwhelming assault against industries, cities and ports is growing in importance. 45

The Globe and Mail not withstanding, the concentration of aircraft over a target was not enough to insure the delivery of a paralyzing attack. This was borne out by the American attacks against Regensburg and Schweinfurt in August.

On August 17th the American daylight bombers attacked the large Messerschmidt aircraft complex at Regensburg and the anti-friction bearings plants at Schweinfurt. Although 315 bombers attacked their targets and dropped 724 tons of bombs, an aggressive German fighter force claimed 60 aircraft, 46 19 per cent of the attacking bombers. The high cost of the Regensburg-Schweinfurt raids forced the Eighth Air Force to reduce the scale of its operations and resume the simpler task of bombing airdromes and aircraft factories in France, 47 Belgium and Holland. The Globe and Mail, however, was not aware of this and wrote of the mission:

The bombing was magnificent...a tribute to the efficiency of this bomber force of American planes and daylight fliers....The Allies are now able to penetrate deeply into Europe as compared to the comparatively short penetration German planes have made into Britain.

45 "Decline and War," The Globe and Mail, August 10, 1943, p. 3, col. 3.
46 Craven and Cate, 2:683.
We are really only in the beginning of the development of the destructive capacity of air power. 48

It was not until September 6th that the Eighth Air Force came out in force again. On that occasion, 407 bombers were dispatched to Stuttgart. Of this total, 69 B-24's were sent on a diversionary sweep over the North Sea; the remaining aircraft had been assigned to bomb aircraft and bearing factories in and around Stuttgart. Although weather frustrated this purpose, 262 of the bombers succeeded in bombing targets of opportunity. As in previous penetrations of German territory, the losses were high—this time reaching 45 aircraft and crews.

The Globe and Mail portrayed the Stuttgart mission somewhat differently than the official, postwar interpretation. On September 7, 1943, the paper stated:

Large numbers of American heavy bombers pounded Stuttgart [on September 6th] to climax one of the greatest daylight bombing offensives of the war. More than 70 enemy fighters were destroyed by the big American bombers in fierce air battles which developed on the eight hour, 900 mile flight to Stuttgart... Thirty-five American aircraft are missing....

"Flying Fortresses supported by Thunderbolts, left fires burning in Stuttgart and bombed other targets, including airfields at Orleans and Conches, in France," said a communiqué issued jointly by the Air Ministry and the United States Army headquarters. 50

The story of the Stuttgart raid made good reading, but un-

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49 Craven and Cate, 2:688.
fortunately it was not true.

During October the Eighth Air Force struck at Bremen, Marienburg, Anklam and Schweinfurt. Of all these missions, the bombing of the Focke Wulf plant at Marienburg on October 9th was the most spectacular. The Focke Wulf plant was almost completely destroyed by high explosive and incendiary bombs dropped with unprecedented accuracy. With the exception of Bremen, the raids were all deep penetrations into the Reich and were accordingly costly. The Luftwaffe had effectively made use of rocket projectiles, and in a large scale rocket attack coordinated with other fighter tactics, damaged or destroyed no fewer than 198 of the 291 B-17's dispatched to Schweinfurt on October 17th. Even The Globe and Mail acknowledged the effectiveness of the German air defence of Schweinfurt, but claimed that the amount of destruction wrought by the bombers was worth the toll of lives and planes the Germans claimed.

The fact was that the Eighth Air Force had lost air superiority over Germany, and it was obvious that superiority could not be regained until sufficient long-range escort became available. It was only on the shorter range attacks, when the bombers could be accompanied by supporting fighters,

51 Craven and Cate, 2:697.
52 Webster and Frankland, 2:39.
53 "Record Number of Bombers, 60, Lost During Daylight Raid on Schweinfurt City," The Globe and Mail, October 15, 1943, p. 1, col. 7.
that the losses had remained within bearable limits. As soon as the bombers began to exceed the range of the fighters, the casualties became insupportable.

The solution to this problem was first found in the P-47 Thunderbolt fighter. With the provision of external fuel tanks, the P-47's could escort the bombers as far as Aachen, whereas the earlier escorts, usually Spitfires, had to leave the bomber formations after they crossed the European Coast. In November 1943, the P-38 Lightning was reintroduced into the European theatre and brought into support of the Eighth Air Force bombers. Equipped with two 75 gallon wing tanks, the P-38 could accompany the bombers some 520 miles to the target. This still did not provide for complete escort of the bombers, however, and attention was turned to the P-51 Mustang as fighter escort. Equipped with two 75 gallon fuel tanks, the P-51 had an escort range of 600 miles. The addition of a further 85 gallon fuselage tank enabled the aircraft to cover 1474 miles. The problem of complete fighter escort was at last solved. Hereafter, Spitfires would escort the bombers to the coast where they would be picked up by the Thunderbolts. The P-47's would be relieved by the Lightnings near Aachen and Mustangs would pick up the bombers when the P-38's were forced to turn back.

The Eighth Air Force made no more deep penetrations in clear weather into Germany after October 1943. That

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Bearable limits was considered as three to five percent of the aircraft dispatched.
failure was, prior to December, the result of a command
decision based on the lack of escort and the need for re-
cuperating the bomber forces after its losses after October
14th. Although ARGUMENT, the concerted offensive against
the German aircraft industry, was being planned during
November as a coordinated series of missions between the
Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, the latter based at Foggia,
Italy, weather conditions forced its postponement until
February 1944.

But it was business as usual in the reports of strategic
bombing in the pages of The Globe and Mail. Quoting an un-
identified RAF commentator, the paper stated:

Half of Germany's leading cities have now been
severely damaged by Allied bombing...seventeen of them
so badly they are more of a liability than an asset to
the war effort...Fourteen additional cities...have
been severely damaged. 55

If the USAAF was appearing less frequently in the paper, the
RAF and RCAF were reported as being out nearly every night
wreaking havoc on German cities. Leipzig was bombed on the
night of October 22nd, Stuttgart on November 26th, and
again on December 3rd. On December 16th, the paper stated

55 "Seventeen Nazi Cities Wiped Out by Bombing," The
56 "Blast Leipzig in Heavy Raid," The Globe and Mail,
October 22, 1943, p. 1, col. 3.
57 "Twenty-two Thousand Tons of Bombs Hit Hun in Novem-
58 "RCAF Units Lose 15 Ships in Week," The Globe and
Mail, December 4, 1943, p. 3, col. 7.
that strategic bombing had cut fighter output in Germany to 650 aircraft a month.

All the information available here seems to prove that the mass RAP assaults at night and the precision daylight attacks by the USAAF are inexorably reducing the Nazi's ability to defend themselves in the air.

It has been learned that the Nazi aircraft industry, by a most strenuous effort, was only able to turn out 1250 bombers and 650 fighters in August and the same numbers in September. With the results of the summer campaign now catching up with industry there is no doubt that production fell even lower in October and November--when it was needed most. 59

While it was true that the three services had been busy bombing Germany, they had been bombing different target systems. Though elements of the German aircraft industry had been bombed during 1943, the damage done to it was not as great as the paper claimed.

That The Globe and Mail could state that tremendous damage had been inflicted upon the German aircraft industry was due to errors made in estimates of enemy aircraft production. Allied intelligence, having tended during 1941-1942 to overestimate German aircraft production, in 1943 was inclined to underrate the recuperative powers of that industry, especially in the critical category of single engine fighters. Against an estimated average monthly production of 595 single engine fighters for the first six months of 1943 and 645 for the last six months, actual production, as determined from German Air Ministry records, reached 753 and 851 per month.

60 Craven and Cate, 2:708.
respectively for those periods. It was natural for those who were making the evaluations to overstate the degree of destruction caused by the Allied bombing and to underestimate the ability of the Germans to recuperate from the attacks. But throughout 1943 the necessity for repeated precision attacks against major aircraft targets—with intervals of only a few weeks—was not generally appreciated.

It was by forcing the Germans to disperse their vital industries that the bombing of 1943 made its principle contribution, albeit one of qualified value in the long run for, though it probably caused more immediate delay in production than did the bombs themselves, it placed the high priority industries eventually in a better position to withstand strategic bombing attacks. As a result of both bomb damage and dispersal, production of single engine fighters actually declined slightly in the fall and winter of 1943, and the planned programme for fighter production was delayed as a result of the 1943 attacks by approximately three months.

The QUADRANT conference at Quebec in August 1943 was somewhat critical of the counter-air offensive. While it acknowledged that the daylight attacks were achieving success at striking at the vitals of the German aircraft industry, it complained of the slow rate of acceleration in the campaign. Sir Charles Portal, in a paper he laid before

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61 Von Rhoden Studies, p. 121.
62 Ibid., p. 122.
the conference on August 15th, stated that the whole POINTBLANK campaign was in the balance. Whereas, by his estimates, the German fighter force had increased by almost 22 per cent since January 1943, and that, in the same period, its strength on the western front had doubled, the Eighth Air Force was seriously behind in its expansion schedule. As approved at TRIDENT, that schedule called for 1068 aircraft in the VIII Bomber Command by August 15, 1943; actual strength on that date was 921, including 105 detached for service in North Africa. The Eighth Air Force could, he was confident, accomplish the primary objective of POINTBLANK of destroying the German Air Force if given the necessary time to build up its forces. But time was at a premium. He therefore urged the United States chiefs of staff to take all practicable steps to increase the striking power of the Eighth Air Force as much as possible during the succeeding two months.

While Sir Charles Portal was afraid that POINTBLANK was hanging in the balance because of the lack of Eighth Air Force bombers, The Globe and Mail was claiming that the offensive was rolling on relatively unchecked. On August 26th, it wrote:

Major General L. George, United States Air Transport Command Chief (/said/) "If round the clock operations now being carried out can be continued with a reasonable rise in tempo...the economic structure of Germany is going to fall by the end of this year."

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63 Webster and Frankland, 2:31.
64 Craven and Cate, 2:714.
General Arnold, the paper stated, declared that the daylight bombing campaign would be stepped up with far bigger bombers than the B-17's then in use. Whether the new bomber was the B-29, which was ultimately destined for use in the Pacific, or some other bomber, possibly of British design, was not disclosed. The statement by the British Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, that bombing attacks by the RAF and USAAF were "rocking German military power to its foundations" was proof enough for The Globe and Mail that the offensive was nearly as successful as might be expected.

Early in November, the progress of the CBO was again officially examined. In answer to a request from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for re-evaluation of the campaign, a committee appointed by General Eaker and Sir Charles Portal reported handsome progress toward the general disorganization of the German economy. The committee was, however, less confident about the damage inflicted upon the German Air Force and its supporting industries. This led the Combined Chiefs of Staff to question whether POINTBLANK could achieve its assigned objective within the time allotted. The peculiar urgency concerning the official estimates of the CBO at this point derived from the key position that the operation en-


67 "Greatest Blows From Air Yet to Fall Upon Germany," The Globe and Mail, October 14, 1943, p. 13, col. 4.

68 Craven and Cate, 2:714.
joyed in the structure of Allied strategy. It had been set up as a prerequisite to OVERLORD—the projected invasion of Europe—at the TRIDENT conference in May 1943. Although it was in a sense true that the success of POINTBLANK would determine the date of OVERLORD, there was a limit to how long the invasion could be postponed while awaiting the anticipated fatal weakening of the German Air Force. The target date for OVERLORD had been set for May 1, 1944. Would the CBO have done its work by that time? To this question both British and American planners gave an increasingly pessimistic answer as the weeks passed.

As was usually the case when the progress of the CBO came under discussion, talk centered mainly on the American force. Its task of destroying certain industrial plants of vital importance to the Germans was of such consequence to plans for mounting OVERLORD that attention was given chiefly to the problem of increasing the daylight bombing effort. Improvement in the speed and effectiveness of the bomber offensive could be sought in a number of directions. First of all, the operating force could be built up to the level prescribed in the CBO plan. Secondly, the efficiency of that force could be improved. Then, by revising target directives and by bringing about a closer coordination of effort between British and American forces, the time remaining before OVERLORD could be used to the best advantage. Finally, the day—

69 Craven and Cate, 2:716.
light operations from the United Kingdom could be supplemented from Mediterranean bases.

It remained then for Sir Charles Portal to somehow rectify the situation if the strategic timetable was to be maintained. Presenting his recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on December 3, 1943, he stated that the Americans, despite their operational difficulties, should not abandon POINTBLANK. He advised the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Eighth Air Force be given the greatest possible increase, and that General Eaker be ordered to proceed with the plan up to the limit which could be achieved without seriously overrunning the supply of replacement crews and aircraft. The future employment of Bomber Command in the attack on the Luftwaffe was not referred to, nor was any mention made of the need for long-range fighters. Though the two forces would continue to operate upon divergent views, the determination to persist with the attack on the German Air Force had been reaffirmed.

The Globe and Mail closed its reporting of the strategic bombing of Germany in 1943 by saying:

The end of 1943 will mark the finish of the first ten months of what the RAF considers to be the real bombing of Germany, a period in which...material progress has been made toward the principle objective: the reduction of German war potential to the point where the enemy will be unable to offer sustained re-

[70] Graven and Cate, 2:716.

[71] Webster and Frankland, 2:52.
sistence to a three way offensive from the east, south and west in 1944....

One of the principle lessons of 1942 was a change in RAF tactics from the bombing of single industrial plants at night, which proved uneconomical, to the persistent, methodical destruction of material property of all kinds in great industrial areas. 72

All things considered, according to the paper, it had been a good year for the Allies. Strategic bombing had caused acute shortages of war materials to the German war economy. Among these were manganese, oil, housing, manpower, steel, and most especially "vital materials necessary to unlimited aircraft production and maintenance." The increased tempo of RAF and USAAF bombing was said to have kept "thousands of people engaged in salvage and repair, manning defences and putting out fires, choking the transportation facilities with refugees and creating a serious problem of housing and relief." 73

Besides causing much damage within the Reich, the paper claimed, the round the clock bombing of Germany had forced the Germans to divert a greater percentage of fighters to the western front:

It is learned definitely that a high percentage of night fighters are concentrated in Western Europe across the Allied night bombing routes—perhaps as many as 350 or 400 of them.

The day fighter strength also is known to be heavy in Western Europe, particularly in Northern France, and 300 or 350 may be operating there. While it was true that the Germans were redeploying their fighter strength in the west, the paper went a step further and claimed that this step was stretching the German air defences to the limit. German losses in aircraft had been so heavy, the paper claimed, that the Germans had lost air superiority over their own territory. The shortages of vital materials to build and maintain aircraft made it certain, the paper explained, that the Germans would never regain parity with the United Nations and never regain air supremacy.

Certainly the reporting of The Globe and Mail gave a rosy picture of what Allied air power could do to the Germans. But the picture was too rosy. German aircraft production was not destroyed or lessened to any great extent. Aircraft production in Germany increased from 1491 aircraft per month in January 1943 to 1847 per month in December; an increase of some 9298 aircraft over 1942. Fighter aircraft production increased from 455 per month in January 1943 to 872 per month in December; an increase of some 4632 aircraft over 1942. German aircraft losses, moreover, were not as high as

75 "One Final Big Offensive by Luftwaffe Expected," The Globe and Mail, February 11, 1943, p. 3, col. 5.
78 Von Rhoden Studies, p. 121.
the paper claimed. Total German losses, including aircraft which could later be repaired, reached only 28.6 per cent of authorized strength, and these losses were offset by increased production. Furthermore, the German aircraft industry was not severely hurt by the bombing offensive as the paper had its readers believe. The industry had a sufficient cushion of reserve materials and stock to absorb the damage of bombing in 1943. Loss of materials, moreover, could be offset by supplies from outside the Reich, such as Swedish iron ore, Rumanian oil and French bauxite and alumina, to name just a few.

More important than the paper's claims of damage done to the Reich, was the impression that it created about the unity of purpose that guided the RAF and USAAF in their bombing of Germany. Though there were numerous articles claiming that the two forces were operating in unison, they continued to operate on divergent paths. The RAF clung steadfastly to the doctrine of general area bombing, while the USAAF adhered to its policy of precision bombing by day. The new year would bring no changes.

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Von Rhoden Studies, p. 115
CHAPTER THREE

OPERATION ARGUMENT AND THE OFFENSIVE
AGAINST THE GERMAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

When large numbers of German fighters continued to oppose the Allied bombers despite the strategic bombing of German aircraft production centres, The Globe and Mail did not question the validity of bombing damage claims, but suggested instead that German aircraft production had been underestimated in the earlier phases of the war. Undaunted by the increase in the number of German fighter aircraft, the paper stated that the counter-air offensive would still be won by the Allies. The campaign was just going to take longer than first anticipated to win.

Throughout the counter-air offensive the reporting of The Globe and Mail was extremely optimistic. The paper explained to its readers the purpose of the new offensive against the Reich by quoting a United States Army headquarters statement:

At stake, to a degree, is Germany's ability to resist the coming invasion. The ultimate objectives not only are to complete the domination of the air when the invasion comes with the resulting reduction in ground and naval casualties, but also the increased freedom for bombers to make precision daylight attacks on war industries and communications. 1

1 "2300 Tons of Bombs Hit City," The Globe and Mail, February 21, 1944, p. 1, col. 8.
In its reporting of the counter-air offensive, a number of items stand out in glaring contrast to the actual events. The paper consistently overestimated the destruction wrought upon the German Air Force and its supporting industries. This distortion dealt not only with production figures but also with German losses in the air and on the ground. On the other hand, the paper was correct in claiming that bomb tonnages were increasing steadily throughout the counter-air offensive.

There was a real difference between the events as they transpired and as they were recorded in the pages of The Globe and Mail. To understand how great that difference really was, it is necessary to compare two bombing missions with the manner in which they were reported in the paper. For this purpose the raid of February 20, 1944 on Leipzig and the March 18, 1944 raid on Friedrichshafen may be chosen. Leipzig was selected because, although its account in the paper closely corresponds with what actually happened, there still remains a difference in accounts. Friedrichshafen was chosen because it was not a successful raid and differs substantially from the account given of it in the paper.

Operation ARGUMENT

On January 28, 1944, the Air Ministry issued a directive to Air Marshal Harris, General Spaatz and Sir Trafford Leigh Mallory, the latter being the Air Commander in Chief for OVERLORD, stating that the remaining time be-
fore OVERLORD could best be utilized by maximum effort directed against "key installations in the German fighter aircraft industry and ball-bearing industries, and the towns associated with these industries." First priority was allotted to single and twin engine airframe and component production. Although 14 specific targets were laid out for the daylight offensive, only six targets were designated for the Royal Air Force. In accordance with Sir Arthur Harris' insistence that the time was ripe for an all-out attack on Berlin, the directive stated that when conditions were not favourable for attacks on the primary objectives that "RAF Bomber Command and the Eighth Air Force are to attack Berlin whenever weather and tactical conditions are suitable for such attacks."

The directive of January 28th was supplemented by a directive issued by the Air Ministry on February 17th. The overall mission of the CBO was there defined as "the progressive destruction and dislocation of German military, industrial and economic systems, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication and material reduction of German air combat strength." The purpose of this new mission was to reduce German air combat strength "in order to create the

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2 Webster and Frankland, 4:162.
3 Ibid., 4:163.
4 Ibid., 4:163.
5 Ibid., 4:164.
air situation most propitious for OVERLORD."
Together the
two directives set the stage for operation ARGUMENT. All
that was needed now was a break in the weather which had
been plaguing both forces since the end of October.

On February 19th the United States Strategic Air Force
(USSTAF) meteorologists predicted a continuous period of
 favourable weather for bomber operations. During the next
 six days the concerted bombing offensive which had been pro-
 jected since November 1943 became a reality. The plan, draft-
ed originally and repeatedly modified by the Combined Op-
 erational Planning Committee (COPC) under the codename ARGUMENT,
called for a series of coordinated precision attacks by the
Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces against the highest priority
objectives, most of which by February 1944 were situated in
central and southern Germany.

ARGUMENT was to be directed against the airframe and
final assembly phase of single and twin engine aircraft pro-
duction. It was assumed by COPC that the bombing of air-
frame manufacture would be reflected more rapidly in German
front-line strength than an attack on aero-engine manufacture.
The policy based on this assumption was coupled with one
giving an immediate high priority to the anti-friction bearing
industry which was believed to be so highly concentrated in
a small number of plants as to make the system highly vul-

6 Webster and Frankland, 4:165.
7 Craven and Cate, 3:30.
nerable. As finally worked out, ARGUMENT called for a combination of attacks against final assembly plants, anti-friction bearings and component parts manufacture. Thus, for example, bombing of the Erla assembly plant at Leipzig-Mockau, engaged in Me 109 assembly, was to be supplemented by bombing the Leipzig-Heiterblick component factory which supplied major parts for assembly at the Erla plant. Ju 88 twin engine fighter production at Bernburg was made to share the bombing attack with the fuselage factory at Oschersleben and the wing factory at Halberstadt, on both of which it depended. Likewise the Messerschmidt assembly plant at Regensburg-Obertraubling was to be bombed simultaneously with the component factory at Regensburg-Prüfening. This technique was not necessary at the Messerschmidt factories at Gotha and Augsburg where both final assembly and major component manufacture were carried out in the same factory.

The Royal Air Force struck the initial blow of operation ARGUMENT. On the night of February 19/20 a joint Anglo-Canadian force of 823 four engined bombers struck at Leipzig. Although the RAF and RCAF did their best to confuse the German fighter-controller by means of decoy courses and diversionary attacks, and although the bomber stream was headed for Berlin and only turned south at the last minute, German night fighters remained with the bomber stream and shot down 78 bombers. For their losses the RAF and RCAF were able to

8 Craven and Cat, 3:30-31.
drop 2556 tons of high explosives and incendiaries on their targets at Leipzig. Despite this, the Deutsche Kugellager Fabrik (DKF) works, the primary target of the attack, escaped with only minor damage.

The force assembled for the February 20th mission to Leipzig was the largest in the history of the Eighth Air Force to that date. Supported by 17 groups of USAAF fighters and 16 squadrons of RAF Mustangs and Spitfires, seven combat wings of B-17's and three of B-24's were dispatched on a jointly flow route to attack Me 109, Me 110, Ju 88 and Ju 188 components and assembly plants. Six additional combat wings of B-17's without fighter escort made a coordinated attack on the FW 190 assembly complex at Tutow and two targets east of Berlin. The main bombing force entered the German radar screen in time to prevent large numbers of German fighters from concentrating on the unescorted northern force. In order to facilitate fighter support, the combat wings of the main force flew at close intervals over the same route until it was necessary to diverge towards their respective targets.

Thanks to these precautions, to the excellent fighter

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9 USSBS European Target Intelligence report no. 3a(1638), Ministry of Home Security, Research and Experiments Department, Preliminary Attack Assessment: Leizig, 28 March 1944, p. 1.
11 Eighth Air Force Mission Reports, microfilm roll A5956, frame 0686.
escort, and to the fact that the RAF had bombed the city of Leipzig the night before, and had worn out much of the night fighter force, the bombers suffered relatively little from enemy attack. The Americans who, after their earlier attempts at deep penetrations into the Reich had been met by determined German resistance that resulted in heavy losses—operations on January 11th, for example, had cost 60 bombers out of a force of 651—were relieved. Although they had taken a risk and expected exceptional losses only 21 bombers and four fighters were lost.

The Globe and Mail devoted two days' coverage to the attack on the aircraft industry located at Leipzig. It began its report by relaying the "conservative" estimate of General H.H. Arnold that 25 per cent of the German fighter plane production capacity was destroyed in the biggest United States air mission in history. Arnold's statement was supported by one from the United States War Department which explained that "Arnold's figure of 25 per cent applied to fighter plane capacity 'as of February 20th'—one-fourth of what they had then is gone." The bombing of Leipzig was made even more impressive by the paper's statement that "coupled with the announcement ten days ago that as of November American raiders

13 Eighth Air Force Mission Reports, microfilm roll A5956, frame 0686.
had knocked out 43 per cent of German fighter-building capacity, current and projected, today's claim indicated great inroads on the German war plant."

General Arnold's "strategic achievement" was carried out by 2,000 planes which bombed fighter plane factories at Leipzig, Aschersleben, Bernburg, Halberstadt and other "undeclared places." In a separate article published the same day, readers of the paper learned that the USAAF raid on Leipzig had been preceded by a joint Anglo-Canadian raid that laid waste to "great stretches of industrial Leipzig" by dropping 2300 tons of bombs, "one of the greatest loads of explosives and incendiaries." The Anglo-Canadian raid, though it had cost 79 aircraft, 18 of which were Canadian, was deemed by the Air Ministry to be successful.

Nearly 50 identified factories were hit, in addition to 77 smaller works. Eleven other aircraft and engine factories and eight important engineering and armament plants and other allied industries were blasted.

Readers of the paper could almost visualize the extent of the damage inflicted on Leipzig by such statements as "the glow of very large fires could be seen through the clouds" and "flames sprang up from the Messerschmidt component factory like a huge inferno."

On February 22nd, The Globe and Mail printed a state-

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ment by Major General Frederick L. Anderson, the American Deputy for Operations to General Spaatz, that the Leipzig factories, which produced 38 per cent of Germany's single engine fighter aircraft, were "knocked out—perhaps even beyond partial repair." The Bernburg plant, which produced 30 per cent of Germany's twin engine fighter aircraft, was described by Anderson as being "left in the same condition."

In a separate article devoted primarily to the destruction of Brunswick, the paper described the attack on Leipzig as "eminently successful" on the basis of reconnaissance photographs. What made the bombing of Leipzig so important, the paper explained, was that it was an "essential part of the production combine that has produced more than half the German Me 109's since American bombers shattered two other principal construction centres...at Regensburg and Wiener-Neustadt."

The Globe and Mail based its reports on the Leipzig raid on a few statements and communiques from Allied headquarters in London and declared the raid a success. Some detailed investigation can determine whether the mission was actually the success that the paper claimed. Examining the newspaper version closely, a different picture emerges as to the results of the raid. When one reads that 2100-

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2650 tons of bombs were dropped by the USAAF on six aircraft centres in Germany by 1,000 planes, the image that is conjured up is far greater than the one that arises if the figures are examined in their correct proportions of bombers and bombs. This can be seen in table 3.

**TABLE 3**

Breakdown of Bomb Tonnages Dropped During the USAAF Operations on 20.2.44

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Aircraft</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Bomb Tonnages</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High Explosives</td>
<td>Incendiaries</td>
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<td>Tutow</td>
<td>200.2</td>
<td>39.9</td>
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<td>138</td>
<td>Rostock</td>
<td>196.5</td>
<td>121.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>Leipzig-Mockau</td>
<td>281.8</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Leipzig-Heiterblick</td>
<td>172.0</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Brunswick</td>
<td>186.0</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Gotha</td>
<td>190.8</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

SOURCE: USSBS European Target Intelligence report 2b(111), Tactical Mission Report no. 226, pp. 4-7 passim.

As it is difficult to comprehend the amount of damage done to an industrial target by high explosive bombs and incendiaries, it is necessary to look beyond the tonnages dropped and examine the actual records of the bombing itself.

The first photographs taken after the attack by RAF Bomber Command on the night of February 19/20 and the daylight attack by the USAAF on February 20th were obscured by smoke and snow. This made interpretation of the results of the two bombing raids difficult, but it was ascertained that "a certain amount of scattered residential and commercial damage [could] be seen throughout the south of the town."
Immediate Interpretation Report No. K 1879 disclosed that there were no heavy concentrations of damage anywhere among the targets. As this was the only reconnaissance data available following the mission, this was the reconnaissance finding referred to by The Globe and Mail which they claimed made the mission "eminently successful." On the following day, when new reconnaissance photographs were taken, it was learned that many of the buildings of the Erla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Allgemeine Transport Anlagen GmbH, and Junkers Flugzeug-und Motorenwerke A.G. at both Leipzig-Mockau and Heiterblick had received direct hits and that many of the buildings were on fire. Of 107 aircraft seen on the airfield at Leipzig-Mockau, 27 were listed as "probably damaged." As new reconnaissance photographs were received, it became apparent that a considerable amount of damage had been wrought on the intended targets.

On February 24th a supplement to Immediate Interpretation Report No. K 1879 confirmed that severe damage had been done to the main works of the Erla Maschinenwerke GmbH at Heiterblick. Considerable damage was done to the sub-assembly shop and dispatch centre, component erecting shop, two large machine shops and the Main Offices. In addition, considerable damage was seen in the Plagwitz area in the west of the city.

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19 USSBS European Target Intelligence report no. 3a(1638), Interpretation Report S.A. 1014, Attacks on Aircraft Factories at Leipzig on 20.2.44, 22 February 1944, p. 1.
where Stohr A.G. (the largest wool spinners in Europe) and Schelter und Giesacke A.G. (printing) were located. By March 3rd, a summary of the damage inflicted on Leipzig was drawn up. Listing ten targets struck by Eighth Air Force bombers at or near Leipzig, Interpretation Report No. K 1879 cited the Erla Maschinenwerke at Heiterblick as 75 to 95 per cent devastated. The Allgemeine Transport Anlagen (aero-engine manufacture), Erla Maschinenwerke at Mockau (assembly of Me 109's) and the A.T.A.G. assembly plant at Mockau (assembly of Ju 88's) were all said to have sustained damage to important buildings. It was not until March 28th, however, when the Ministry of Home Security's Research and Experiments Department issued its preliminary attack assessment, that the true extent of the damage at Leipzig was realized.

The Department stated that, on the basis of damage visible on aerial photographs and on the application of factors derived from British experience from detailed studies of visible damage to both British and German towns, about four per cent of the buildings in Leipzig were seriously damaged. A total of 6600 square feet of damage to buildings

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20 USSBS European Target Intelligence report no. 3a(1638), Supplement to Immediate Interpretation Report No. K 1879, Locality: Leipzig, 24 February 1944, p. 1.
22 USSBS European Target Intelligence report no. 3a(1638), Ministry of Home Security, Research and Experiments Department, Preliminary Attack Assessment: Leipzig, 28 March 1944, p. 1.
in the administrative area of Leipzig was visible. The total loss of factory production due to direct damage in factories, loss of stocks and other factors was given as 113,000 man-months. Total estimated loss for the entire city was 205,000 man-months. But for all the damage inflicted by the bombers, it was estimated that the rate of production would reach 85 per cent of the pre-attack level by the end of April 1944.

If the results of the attack on Leipzig were encouraging to the CBO planners, the attack assessment reports on the Erla Maschinenwerk at Leipzig-Heiterblick and Leipzig-Mockau, A.T.A.G. aircraft assembly plant at Leipzig-Mockau and the Junkers aircraft repair works at Leipzig-Mockau were even more encouraging. The attacks on the Erla Maschinenwerk were said to "probably result in the loss of nearly five months' output, or about 1,000 completed Me 109's." The resumption of any substantial flow of Erla components, the report went on, was not likely to occur before four or five months. Damage to the assembly hangars at the A.T.A.G. aircraft assembly plant would result in the loss of six weeks' output.

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23 Ibid., p. 2.
24 Ibid., p. 3.
25 Ibid., p. 4.
26 Ibid., p. 5.
27 USSBS European Target Intelligence report no. 3a(1638), Ministry of Home Security, Research and Experiments Department, Attack Assessment Report, Erla Maschinenwerke, 28 March 1944, p. 1.
Damage to the Junkers repair works buildings and their contents was so severe, the report stated, that "urgent requirements for material and equipment elsewhere may possibly lead to the abandonment of the site as a repair depot."

Thus from an examination of the official records, it can be seen that the accounts of The Globe and Mail and the actual events were similar in nature. The difference, and it is an important one, lies in the time in which the paper declared the raid to be a success and the time that it was actually seen to be one. Clearly the paper's claim was meant only for public consumption. As has been seen, the figures about aircraft production lost to bombing were highly overrated, and the proof of the destruction of the Leipzig was drawn from somewhere other than the actual reconnaissance photographs which were obscured by smoke and snow. The actual records took a month to discern that substantial damage had been wrought upon Leipzig, but they also stated that production could be resumed in as little as four weeks.

The mission of February 20th was the beginning of a series of strategic operations that came to be known as "Big Week." On the night of February 19/20 it all seemed a hazardous gamble on the long-range weather forecast. To the intense relief of USSTAF headquarters the gamble paid off. So, when the weather forecast for the following day indicated favour-

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USSBS European Target Intelligence report no. 3a(1638), Ministry of Home Security, Research and Experiments Department, Attack Assessment Report, Junkers Aircraft Repair Works, 29 March 1944, p. 1.
able conditions over Germany, an operation was enthusiastically undertaken. The feeling spread throughout USSTAF headquarters, and from there to the operational headquarters, that this was the big chance.

As on the previous day it was the Royal Air Force that struck the initial blow. On the night of 20/21 February Bomber Command bombed Stuttgart with 356 planes. The RAF dropped 1045.5 tons of high explosive bombs and 638.4 tons of incendiaries on the Vereinigte Kugellager Fabrik AG (VFK) 29 ball-bearing works and caused the destruction of millions of components and 20,000 finished units. The heaviest damage was inflicted upon the grinding department of the works. USSTAF planned to bomb the Lutter-M.I.A.G. factories at Brunswick, which manufactured components for Me 110’s, and also to attack half-a-dozen important airfields and storage parks in western Germany. It was hoped that the medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force and the heavy bombers of the Fifteenth would cooperate, but unfavourable weather prevented both from engaging in operations. Though the Eighth Air Force sent out

The German Anti-friction Bearings Industry, p. 67.

Ibid., p. 68.

Many airfields in Germany held dual roles. Besides serving as Luftwaffe stations, they also assembled aircraft (Leipzig-Mockau), did experimental work (Lechsfeld), and repaired and stored aircraft and parts (Landsberg and Gablingen).

The Ninth Air Force consisted of light and medium bombers and was based in the United Kingdom. It was formed early in 1942 and was merged with the Allied Expeditionary Air Force in 1943. It served more of a tactical than a strategic role.
924 bombers and 679 fighters, the strategic results were not encouraging. The large airpark at Diepholz was severely and accurately bombed, as were several other airfields, but the principal targets at Brunswick were covered with clouds. Though the bombardiers switched from visual to H2X "blind" bombing equipment, only 81 bombers were able to bomb Brunswick, but without damaging the aircraft factories directly.

The Brunswick raid, according to The Globe and Mail, was conducted by "nearly as many aircraft...as on February 20th when General Spaatz employed well over 2,000 planes."

The importance difference in accounts was not in the number of aircraft involved in the raid, but rather in the results of the mission. Whereas the official sources claimed the aircraft factories were not damaged, the paper wrote:

...most of the attacks were made in good visibility with good results.

Enemy opposition varied from weak to moderate, an indication of how severely the Allied offensive is affecting German defensive air power. Some formations, however, were attacked by swarms of enemy interceptors which slipped through the cordon of fighters.

As far as the paper was concerned, the United States Eighth Air Force had triumphed again.

Weather reports for the next day indicated good prospects for visual bombing over many areas, and special attention was focused on the high pressure area that was moving


south in such a way that the two top-priority targets—Regensburg and Schweinfurt—would be open for visual bombing attacks. It was decided that on February 22nd the Eighth Air Force would attack factories at Schweinfurt, Gotha, Bernburg, Oschersleben, Aschersleben and Halberstadt, and that the Fifteenth Air Force would attack Regensburg. To hold a number of German fighters in the north, and to make it hard for the Germans to detect the main force of the bombers until after it had formed over England, a small diversionary force, equipped with radar-jamming devices, would fly to Denmark and bomb the Aalborg airfield.

A number of things went wrong with these plans. The B-17's of the 3rd Bombardment Division, which constituted the Schweinfurt force, found it impossible to assemble because of the unfavourable weather over their bases, and were forced to abandon the mission. This decision, though justified under the circumstances, left the Fifteenth Air Force to face stronger forces than would have been met had the bombers of the Eighth Air Force been able to get as far as Schweinfurt. The B-24's of the 2nd Bombardment Division found it impossible to organize on the way inland and they were recalled to the United Kingdom. This left only the five combat wings of the 1st Bombardment Division which had been scheduled to attack Oschersleben, Halberstadt, Bernburg and Aschersleben. Oschersleben, the most important of these ob-

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Craven and Cate, 3136.
jectives, was obscured by cloud and passed over in favour of targets of opportunity. Many of the planes of the Halberstadt force encountered the same problem and adopted the same alternative. As a result, only 99 bombers out of a force of 466 dispatched by the Eighth Air Force dropped their bombs on their primary targets, and only 255 bombed any target at all. Fortunately the Fifteenth Air Force had better luck and was able to dispatch 183 bombers to Regensburg, where 118 planes bombed the Messerschmidt factory at Obertraubling.

Bombing results at the major targets were very uneven owing principally to the degree of visibility allowed the bombardiers. The 34 bombers that attacked Aschersleben's Motor Works (manufacturing Ju 88's and other products for the Junkers complex) were credited with causing a fifty percent production loss for two months. The Bernburg attack, also aimed at Ju 88 production, was one of the several effective missions which eventually damaged the assembly buildings to the extent of 70 to 80 percent. The 18 bombers that attacked Halberstadt, however, reported poor results. The Fifteenth Air Force split its forces, dispatching 65 bombers to the components factory at Regensburg-Prüfening and 118

36 Craven and Cate, 3:36-37.
37 The target at Bernburg was the Ju 88 and Ju 188 assembly shops and hangars. Forty-seven bombers were dispatched and reported good results. Aircraft Division Industry Report, section 4d(29), p. 2.
38 Ibid., p. 6.
bombers to the assembly plant at Regensburg-Obertraubling. Though the Regensburg-Prüfening force had to attack by pathfinder technique, the Fifteenth Air Force as a whole was able to report good results.

The German fighters made the bombers of both the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces pay more heavily on the 22nd than on the two preceding missions. On those two occasions the bombers, with excellent fighter support and other factors in their favour, had a relatively easy time of it, but on the 22nd the Germans successfully tried a new tactic against the Eighth Air Force. Instead of concentrating their efforts in the target area, where fighter escort was now usually provided, or even on the later stages of the flight toward the target, they attacked early in the penetration at a time when fighter cover was either thin or entirely lacking. In the course of the running battle that ensued the Eighth Air Force lost 41 bombers out of a force of 430 credited with making sorties. Part of the trouble arose from a widely spread-out bomber force; when many of the bombers turned away to seek targets of opportunity, the invading force lost what compactness it had maintained on the penetration and this made it hard for the two groups of F-51's acting as target area support to provide complete cover. The Fifteenth Air Force, also running into stiff opposition, lost 14 bombers, chiefly to twin engine fighters.

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40 Craven and Cate, 3:37-38.
Though the official reports claimed that the bombing results were uneven, The Globe and Mail wrote that the first coordinated assault from the United Kingdom and Italy was highly successful:

Fliers in one group said they were engaged in a four hour battle with enemy aircraft. The Germans used many rockets. Despite the opposition the bombers reported excellent results. Crews from one formation which attacked an aircraft factory said they destroyed three-fourths of the 70 to 100 planes parked on the ground beside the plant... A preliminary announcement left no doubt that the heavy new onslaught was designed to wipe out German fighter opposition to the Allies' ever increasing bomber fleets. 41

That the offensive was making remarkable inroads on the German war machine was borne out by a statement from Churchill:

The whole of this air offensive constitutes the foundation on which our plans for overseas invasion stand in the scales, and the degree of attack will reach far beyond the dimensions of anything yet employed or indeed imagined... We look for great restriction and dislocation of the entire German munitions supply, no matter how far the factories are withdrawn. In addition, the precision of American daylight attacks is giving exceptional results upon particular points, not only in clear daylight, but now with the development of navigational aids, through clouds. 42

Though Churchill had not mentioned either Oboe, H2S or H2X by name, he revealed that the Allies could now bomb their targets in almost any weather. Surely now, armed with the new aids, nothing could stop the British and American bombers. At least that was the message designed for public con-

41 "Hun Factories Bombed From Britain and Italy," The Globe and Mail, February 23, 1944, p. 1, col. 5.
sumption.

Prospects for visual attack by the Eighth Air Force on the 23rd looked so poor that no mission was planned. General Doolittle, now commanding the Eighth Air Force, welcomed the break in operations. His crews had been working under intense pressure for three successive days and they were tired. The long-range fighter escort units were even more exhausted, but presumably the German Air Force was tired too, and had weather promised an even chance for visual bombing, a mission would have doubtless been flown. The Fifteenth Air Force kept up the pace of the offensive by dispatching 102 bombers to Steyr, Austria, where they destroyed 20 per cent of the plant area at the Steyr Walzlagerwerke, then turning out between 10 and 15 per cent of the German ball-bearing production. Moreover, they managed to hit the power units at the main works, which interrupted the power supply for the bearing plant for two weeks.

The Globe and Mail made no mention of the fact that bad weather had kept the Eighth Air Force grounded, but wrote that "the campaign against the source of German air power had gone so far in four days that...every enemy shot down constituted a 'vital contribution' towards ending the war." As the Allies were shooting down 310 German fighters every 36 hours, the

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43 The German Anti-friction Bearings Industry, p. 63.
44 "Factories Attacked in Austria," The Globe and Mail, February 24, 1944, p. 1, col. 3.
end of the war in the air, according to the paper, could not be far off.

The weather over central Germany was ideal for another full-scale coordinated mission on the 24th. This time it was decided to strike hard at Schweinfurt's ball-bearing plants, believed to be the most important of their kind in the Axis countries. In addition to the five combat wings of the 1st Bombardment Division sent to Schweinfurt, three combat wings of the 2nd Bombardment Division were sent to Gotha to bomb the important Gothaer Waggonfabrik A.G., the largest producer of Me 110's, and five combat wings of the 3rd Bombardment Division were to bomb aircraft component factories in northeastern Germany and Poland at Tutow, Posen and Kreising, all producing FW 190's. Rostock was designated as the alternate target. Altogether 867 bombers were dispatched by the Eighth Air Force. For its part, the Fifteenth Air Force agreed to send 114 heavy bombers against the 45 Daimler-Puch aircraft component factory at Steyr.

Care had to be taken to prevent heavy fighter reaction to the northern force dispatched by the Eighth Air Force, since the extreme length of its flight prevented the use of the long-range fighter escort then available. It was hoped that by carefully timing the flight of the main force the enemy controller would be prevented from committing too many units to the task of intercepting the Tutow-Kreising-Posen

force. The actions of the Fifteenth Air Force against Steyr and of the main force of the Eighth Air Force were calculated to be mutually helpful in splitting the German defences.

These precautions apparently worked well for the northern force, although the overcast weather no doubt helped to discourage enemy fighters. The Schweinfurt-Gotha forces and those of the Fifteenth Air Force, however, ran into plenty of trouble. The 239 B-24's dispatched to Gotha suffered persistent and concentrated attack, especially in the target area, and lost 33 planes. The Schweinfurt force fared somewhat better, losing only 11 planes. The 87 B-17's of the Fifteenth Air Force that flew to Steyr (27 others became separated and attacked the Fiume oil refinery) experienced almost all the German interceptor tricks that had been worked out against the Eighth Air Force during the previous year--coordinated attacks by four to six single/engine fighters, rocket attacks and aerial bombs. Despite excellent withdrawal support by 146 P-47's and P-38's, the Steyr force lost 17 bombers.

Bombing at Gotha was especially accurate, and probably more important strategically than at Schweinfurt. Over 400

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47 Craven and Cate, 3:39.
48 It is hard to estimate the exact amount of damage at Schweinfurt on February 24th as the USAAF raid was followed that night by an RAF raid of greater intensity. Hilary Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, volume 3, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953), p. 26.
high explosive and incendiary bombs fell in the vicinity of the target and damaged almost every building in the very compact factory area. The eastern half of the plant, where aircraft manufacture was centred, was generally destroyed, although the machine tools only received slight damage. Most of the loss of machine tools resulted from fires. In fact, the loss of production following the raid resulted less from actual damage to the machine tools than from their inaccessibility. Much time and labour had to be expended clearing heavy girders from the machines caught under them. As a result of this mission the Gothaer Waggonfabrik A.G. lost about six to seven weeks production or the equivalent of about 140 aircraft. Recuperation was rapid, however, and in a little over two months the concern was operating at full capacity.

The Globe and Mail, writing of the February 24th mission, claimed that the Eighth Air Force had pounded Messerschmidt factories at Gotha and five ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt, achieving "excellent results." It was, the paper explained,

49 Physical damage studies point to the fact that machine tools and heavy manufacturing equipment of all kinds are difficult to destroy or damage beyond repair in bombing attacks. Heavy equipment may be salvaged and put back into operation in a relatively short time and with comparatively little difficulty. Electrical equipment associated with heavy tools suffers most severely. A good fire in the vicinity of such equipment will destroy motors, control equipment and so forth. In the long run, incendiary attacks proved to be more effective than high explosive bombs against machine tools. Aircraft Division Industry Report, pp. 9-10.

50 Craven and Cate, 3:39-40.
"the fourth day in a week [That] a major offensive has been continued against aircraft factories and related industries by the largest number of planes ever dispatched against the Reich." That the length of the offensive was beginning to take its toll on aircrew and aircraft was not mentioned, nor was there any statement that German aircraft production could be resumed in the future. It was, without question, another successful raid.

The weather on February 25th was so clear over the Continent that the Americans could choose almost any target they wished in German territory. The decision was made at USSTAF headquarters to launch a closely coordinated raid against Regensburg and the remaining high-priority objectives in southern Germany. While both the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces were directed to attack the Messerschmidt factories at Regensburg, the Eighth Air Force was, in addition, to attack the Messerschmidt parent plant at Augsburg, the VFK bearing plant at Stuttgart, and the Bachmann-Von Blumenthal plant at Fürth, manufacturing components and assembling Me 110's.

The mission promised to be a dangerous undertaking and a taxing day's work for both forces. Although the targets were fairly well concentrated, making it possible for the

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52 Infield, p. 187.
Eighth Air Force to move its huge force along a single line of penetration under a single comprehensive plan of fighter cover, the Fifteenth Air Force was not in such a favourable position. It lacked fighter escort of sufficiently long range to provide protection during the most distant phase of the penetration. It also suffered from the handicap of a relatively small force, being able to send only 176 bombers to Regensburg.

As it turned out, the German fighters concentrated relatively larger forces on the Fifteenth Air Force than on the Eighth Air Force, with the result that the Poggia based bombers lost 33 of their number on the Regensburg mission, or nearly 20 per cent of the attacking force. The Eighth Air Force, on the other hand, lost only 31 of its total force of 739 credited with making sorties. It was another proof of the fact, long conceded by American bombing experts, that a daylight bombing force could not hope to get through an aggressive enemy without excessive losses, especially when the enemy chose to concentrate on the weaker and more poorly protected force.

All forces were able to bomb their primary targets on the 25th and do so with generally good accuracy. Results were especially important at Regensburg and Augsburg, although the attack on Fürth was so destructive that the aircraft works

53 Craven and Cate, 3:41.
54 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
there were put out of operation for nearly a year. The effect of the bombing on the Regensburg complex was great. Plant records indicate that production fell from 435 planes per month in January 1944 to 135 per month in March 1944, the decline resulting entirely from bomb destruction. The Regensburg complex did not regain scheduled production levels again for four months. The main Messerschmidt plant at Augsburg underwent similarly drastic treatment. Blast and fire from over 500 tons of bombs destroyed approximately 30 buildings, reducing production capacity by about 35 per cent. The plant was, however, back in full production in little over one month.

The Globe and Mail called the coordinated raid on Regensburg "the greatest air assault in history." Surprisingly enough, however, the paper devoted greater attention to the joint Anglo-Canadian raid on Schweinfurt that had taken place the previous night. After stating that 1,000 planes had attacked "the most vital bottleneck in Germany's armament industry," dropping an estimated 2200 tons of bombs into "the smoking bearing plants," the paper quoted some anonymous bomber crews as saying that Schweinfurt resembled "a plowed field studded with diamonds." There was no mention in the

55 Girbig, p. 112.
56 Craven and Cate, 3:42.
article about the extent of damage to either Schweinfurt or Regensburg. It was simply assumed that the raids had been successful.

After the attacks of February 25th the weather turned bad—and remained so for the next month—and ended "Big Week." During "Big Week" the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces made a total of 26 attacks against airframe and aero-engine plants. Of these attacks, 12 were made against plants making Me 109 and FW 190 airframes, 11 against plants making other types of airframes, and three attacks were made against plants producing aero-engines. During February the Eighth Air Force dropped 2601 tons of bombs on airframe plants, 245 tons on aero-engine plants and 328 tons on components plants; 3174 tons in all. For the same period, the Fifteenth Air Force dropped 1242 tons of bombs. "Big Week" was not without its losses. The Eighth Air Force and the Fifteenth Air Force together lost 226 bombers and 28 fighters. Royal Air Force losses for the same period—though not for the same target systems—were 157 aircraft destroyed.

In its summation of "Big Week," The Globe and Mail wrote:

Germany has lost her last hope of maintaining a successful air defence as the result of last week's

57 Aircraft Division Industry Report, p. 81.
58 Ibid., p. 104.
59 Ibid., p. 103.
60 Girbig, p. 112.
heavy attacks on her airplane production plants by British, Canadian and United States bombers...

Germany's total monthly production of planes of all types was placed at 2500 when production was at a peak and it is now placed at 1230—a drop of 50.8 per cent.

German planes destroyed in combat were almost double the number of British and American planes downed. 61

The report made good reading, but it was not correct. Many of the aircraft plants had already begun dispersal of their facilities when the bombing began and were, therefore, less valuable targets than they otherwise would have been. Other plants undertook dispersal after the bombing attacks started in earnest and were able to regain production within two to four months. German aircraft production, despite the claims of the paper, had reached only 2427 aircraft per month by January 1944, with 1362 of that number being fighters. February production fell only to 1976, with 985 of that number being fighters. March production, far from being decreased by 50.8 per cent as the paper claimed, actually rose to 2577, with 1251 of that number being fighters. In terms of German aircraft destroyed, only 14.7 per cent of the authorized Luftwaffe strength was destroyed in January 1944 with 9.9 per cent damaged. This percentage rose to 20.5 and 15.1 respectively in February and 25.2 and 15.2 respectively in March. Though serious, the losses were offset by increased

62 Von Rhoden Studies, p. 122.
63 Ibid., p. 115.
production.

**POINTBLANK: March-May 1944**

By the end of February, with only three months remaining before D-Day, three overlapping phases of the air war were in progress. The general area attack on German industry was overshadowed for the moment by specific effort to undermine German fighter strength. The weight of the offensive, however, was gradually shifting to the coastal area and the rail network by which it was fed. Though POINTBLANK was to continue, it would not be in competition with OVERLORD. The air requirements of the invasion would have priority over the operations of the strategic and tactical bombers, and the arbiter of what those requirements would be was the Deputy Supreme Commander, Sir Arthur Tedder.

Though the reporting of *The Globe and Mail* between March and May 1944 was extremely optimistic about the results of the counter-air offensive, the paper continually cautioned its readers that the campaign was not yet over. There was no doubt that the Allies could overcome the recuperative powers of German industry, but it was going to take longer than originally anticipated to defeat the German Air Force. The second phase of the offensive to wipe out the Luftwaffe, according to the paper, was now at hand.

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Despite its earlier claims that the German Air Force and its supporting industries were so badly crippled that it would be impossible for Germany to maintain a satisfactory balance between losses and replacements, The Globe and Mail wrote on March 7th that the final proof of the success of the counter-air offensive still hung in the balance:

Any balanced reading of current claims of German losses must raise the question whether American claims ... do not reveal a far greater Luftwaffe fighter force than that of 1940 when it was numerically the strongest air force in the world...

As far as the American air force is concerned, the answer must be that the Germans are producing more fighter aircraft than the Allies have estimated. The combat test of Allied strategic air power has been met; that is, bombers can attack German targets by day or night without crippling losses. Qualitative results cannot be ascertained for months to come, and when they are arrived at, most authoritative sources believe they will be far greater than those now claimed. 65

Though the paper stated that the counter-air offensive would have to continue, there was not the slightest trace of doubt that it would be a success.

It was the Royal Air Force that struck the initial blow of the counter-air offensive in March. On the night of 1/2 March, 600 RAF and RCAF bombers attacked the VFK ball-bearing works at Stuttgart. On March 6th the Eighth Air Force struck at Oranienburg where components for the He 177 bomber were produced and where the aircraft itself was assembled, but no damage was actually done to the plant. On

March 15th USSTAF planned an attack on the Mühlenbau und Industrie A.G. plants at Waggum, near Brunswick, where Me 110's were assembled, and at Brunswick-Wilhelmstor where Me 110 components were manufactured. A heavy undercast, however, forced the Eighth Air Force bombers to attack their secondary targets in the industrial centre of Brunswick by aid of pathfinder technique. Results of the bombing could not be obtained because of the heavy cloud cover. Although The Globe and Mail admitted that the results of the day attack could not be ascertained, it stressed the fact that "a satisfying amount of damage" had been inflicted on the German fighter squadrons whose replacement rate was falling because of the success of the counter-air offensive.

On the night of March 15/16 the Royal Air Force struck again at Stuttgart. This time their target was the city proper and the airfield at Echterdingen. Dropping nearly 3,000 tons of bombs, the RAF and RCAF bombers destroyed or severely damaged nearly one-fourth of the airfield's large hangars, rendering them useless for two weeks. The bombers also destroyed Echterdingen's workshops and burned out the main buildings. The Globe and Mail wrote of the raid:

67 Eighth Air Force Mission Reports, microfilm roll A5986, frame no. 0123.
68 "Heavy Bombers Strike at Brunswick, Hanover; 36 Hun Planes Downed," March 16, 1944, p. 1, col. 4.
69 Great Britain, Air Ministry, Air Historical Branch, Reports of Physical Damage Resulting from Allied Air Attacks on Germany, 1944, (February, 1957), p. 116.
Forty planes, eight Canadian, were lost on the Stuttgart raid—the heaviest the RAF ever sent out. . . . The ability to dispatch well over 1,000 heavy bombers when the moon is hidden gave the German additional evidence of the tremendous strength of the Allied air forces working against them day and night.

At least thirteen Canadian Lancaster and Halifax squadrons were included in the night bombing force, and it became known that the RCAF bomber group is hurling on the Germans a bombload substantially in excess of the tonnage dropped by the Luftwaffe in any single raid during their heaviest attacks on British cities. 70

Though the March raids were not occurring with the frequency of the "Big Week" raids, the paper was writing to give the impression that they were just as successful.

On March 16th, 740 Eighth Air Force bombers were directed against targets within Oberpfaffenhofen (assembly plant for Do 217's and Me 410's), Lechfeld, Landsberg, Augsburg, Gablingen, and Friedrichshafen (assembly plants for Do 17's, Ju 88's, Do 217's, Me 410's and Do 335's, administrative and engineering offices of the Dornierwerke GmbH, seaplane works, experimental works for radio location apparatus and pilotless aircraft). Unable to bomb their primary targets because of heavy cloud cover, the bombers attacked the industrial centres of Augsburg and Friedrichshafen by pathfinder technique. Although 1670 tons of high explosive and incendiary bomb were dropped on the secondary targets, damage assessment could not be made because clouds obscured the results of the attack. 71

70 "Down 76 Nazi Fighters; 3,000 Tons of Bombs Hit Germany in Night Raid," The Globe and Mail, March 17, 1944, p. 1, col. 1.

71 Eighth Air Force Mission Reports, microfilm roll A5986, frame 0471.
There was a lull in the offensive on the 17th because of bad weather, but on the 18th the offensive was resumed against the same targets scheduled for the 16th. The Globe and Mail devoted a single article to the bombing raids of March 18th. It stated that an estimated force of 1,000 bombers and 1,000 fighters "hammered aircraft factories and fields" at Augsburg, Friedrichshafen and "other targets," shooting down 82 German fighters at a cost of 43 bombers and 10 fighters. Photographs, the article continued, showed many hits on the Friedrichshafen and Oberpfaffenhofen plants. There was no statement of damage inflicted on any of the targets save that "at least 79 of 145 planes on the ground were either destroyed or within the range of bursting bombs at Oberpfaffenhofen and airfields at Lechfeld and Memmingen." An unusual feature of this article was the absence of statements from official sources or foreign observers. Perhaps to make up for this, the paper concluded its article by stating that "in eight big attacks in five days more than 20 targets in Germany and France have shuddered to a total of more than 15,000 tons of bombs dropped by forces totalling more than 10,000 planes including the great formations of fighter planes."

The official reports show that the Friedrichshafen raid, like the raid of March 16th, was not a success. In

both attacks visibility was poor and pathfinder flares had to be used. Many aircraft could not bomb their assigned targets visually and went on to bomb secondary targets or targets of opportunity such as the airfield at Memmingen, Munich or the town of Pfullendorf. Of the attacking aircraft, 136 bombed the Dornier works at Oberpfaffenhofen, 161 bombed the Lechfeld airfield, 39 the Landsberg airfield, 74 the Dornier works at Friedrichshafen-Lüwenthal, 37 the Dornier works at Friedrichshafen-Manzell, 46 the Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH at Friedrichshafen, 30 the residential and industrial areas of Friedrichshafen, 92 the residential and industrial areas of Munich, and 34 the Memmingen airfield. As many of the targets were covered with cloud, good results were not obtained.

The first reconnaissance photographs of the bombing of Friedrichshafen were not promising. Few bursts were visible on any of the targets, and interpretation was made extremely difficult because the area was obscured by a smoke screen which was in operation at the time of the attack. Additional photographs were of little more value since they were also obscured by smoke. A number of hits could be observed in the target areas, but an accurate interpretation of the dam-

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74 USSBS European Target Intelligence report no. 2b(130), Tactical Mission Report no. 264, 31 March 1944, pp. 5-6.
75 USSBS European Target Intelligence report no. 3a(197), Interpretation Report no. S.A. 1196, Attacks on Targets at Friedrichshafen on 18.3.44, n.d., p. 1.
age could not be given as late as two days after the attack. As late as March 30th, no accurate assessment of the damage wrought by the March 18th raid had been made. A provisional statement as to the damage at the Dornier Metallbauten GmbH was given on the 30th, but it appeared that the heaviest damage was concentrated among the buildings against the waterfront of Lake Constance; most notable a large hangar and the seaplane basin were damaged.

On March 31st a provisional statement was issued on the damage done to the Maybach Motorenbau GmbH in Friedrichshafen. The damage amounted to little more than roof damage from a near miss on a large four-bay building and the gutting of one-third of a new building at the west end of the plant. At the Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH works to the north, damage was confined to one large hangar and one large workshop. A few scattered incidents of residential damage were also seen in the area. The situation was not cleared up when the Mediterranean Allied Photo Reconnaissance Command (MAPRC) issued its interpretation report the same day.

MAPRC reported that no clear idea could be gained from

76 USSBS European Target Intelligence Report no. 3a(197), Supplement to Interpretation Report S.A. 1196, Attacks on Targets at Friedrichshafen on 18.3.44, 20 March 1944, p. 1.
reconnaissance photographs as to the extent of damage done at Friedrichshafen. It reported that in comparison with photographs taken of Friedrichshafen on October 7, 1943, the photographs taken after the raid of March 18th revealed little damage to the Maybach Motorenbau GmbH and that the works appeared fully operative. The Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH light metal casting works showed signs of damage, but more importantly showed that progress had been made in the way of repairs and new construction since October 7th. The gear wheel factory, Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen GmbH, appeared fully intact and serviceable in the most recent photographs. The Dornier works, on the shore of Lake Constance, appeared to have suffered recent damage, but MAPRC was reluctant to make any statement as to the serviceability of the seaplane and flying boat assembly and bomber components factory.

As late as April 11th, assessments of the results of the raid on Friedrichshafen were still negative. Photographs taken that day revealed little damage could be seen at Friedrichshafen-Löwenthal and that no damage was visible at Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen GmbH.

80 Ibid., p. 2.
The Ministry of Home Security's Research and Experiments Department presented its attack assessment report on the Dornier works at Friedrichshafen-Manzell and Löwenthal-Allmannsweiler on June 7, 1944. The report stated that the raid of March 18th had caused some damage to the Dornier factory at Manzell, but the two largest and most important workshops of the plant were not damaged. The results of the Löwenthal-Allmannsweiler attack were not much better. Despite the heavy weight of bombs dropped on the target, the report went on to say, less than 20 per cent of the building area was seriously damaged. Both targets, the report concluded, would need to be bombed in the future lest they regain their full pre-attack value.

And so the raid of March 18, 1944 went down in history as a tactical failure. For all the bombs dropped on Friedrichshafen and its associated targets that day, very little was actually accomplished. The raids on the aircraft production centres did not cause any appreciable loss in production and it was not until the raids of April 24th and 28th that effective strikes were launched against the Friedrichshafen targets and production was seriously curtailed.

On March 19th, the Fifteenth Air Force struck at Wiener-Klagenfurt where Messerschmidt components were produced.

82 USSBS European Target Intelligence report no. 3a(197), Ministry of Home Security, Research and Experiments Department, Attack Assessment Report, Dornierwerke at Friedrichshafen-Manzell and Löwenthal-Allmannsweiler, 7 June 1944, p. 2.

On the 23rd and again on the 29th Brunswick was attacked by bombers of the Eighth Air Force. Both times the bombers were forced to use pathfinder techniques to bomb their targets and results could not be observed. Schweinfurt was bombed on the 24th, and although 60 Eighth Air Force bombers were dispatched to bomb the VKF ball-bearing works there, the bombers missed the bearing factories altogether. On the 30th the Fifteenth Air Force bombed Neunkirchen, damaging the factory building, power plants and assembly shops there. The RAF closed out the month by attacking Schweinfurt on the night of March 30/31. Though the British bombers dropped 104 tons of bombs on the VKF ball-bearing works and damaged some buildings, they left most of the machinery and productive facilities untouched.

The Globe and Mail wrote of the March counter-offensive:

The campaign against the German aircraft industry has reached the point where the Germans must decide whether to defend their factories or hoard their planes to meet the invasion....
If Germany attempts to frustrate attacks on its fighter industry by throwing a fighter screen against AAF and RAF heavy bombers and their escorts, it may suffer a rate of attrition beyond its capacity for replacement.
If it determines to conserve fighter strength by reducing Luftwaffe opposition to the bomber offen-

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85 The German Anti-friction Bearings Industry, p. 31.
87 The German Anti-friction Bearings Industry, p. 31.
sive, it will be at the expense of exposing to more effective aerial attacks those strategic target systems whose destruction will directly affect German military strength.

Clearly the Allied attacks had placed the Germans in a bad position, but the paper warned in the same article that the counter-air offensive had to continue because the tremendous recuperative powers of German industry would provide replacements for aircraft lost in combat and on the ground.

On April 17th, Sir Arthur Tedder, the Deputy Supreme Commander under Eisenhower, issued a directive outlining the role of the CBO prior to the invasion of the Continent. The directive stated that the "overall mission of the strategical Air Forces remains the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the destruction of vital elements of lines of communication." Though Tedder gave the destruction of German air combat strength as the immediate objective of the combined bomber offensive, he nonetheless maintained the functional divergence of the two bomber forces by assigning each separate roles.

The Americans were allotted as their primary objective the German Air Force, which they were to attack by all available means, including attrition in the air and on the ground. First priority was given to single and twin engine fighter

88 "Save Planes or Lose Factories?," The Globe and Mail, March 29, 1944, p. 13, col. 8.
89 Webster and Frankland, 4:167. For a comparison of this and the Casablanca directive, see above page 59.
airframes, airframe component production, and ball-bearing production. Second priority was given to installations supporting the German fighter forces. Third priority was given to the German bomber forces and the installations supporting them. The German communications system was listed as a secondary objective. Whenever the weather or tactical conditions were unsuitable for precision bombing, General Spaatz was invited to undertake blind bombing attacks on Berlin or other important industrial centres in Germany. These targets were to be selected with a view of inflicting casualties upon the German fighter force and dislocating the German communications system.

The role of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command was defined in a separate paragraph of the directive. "In view of the tactical difficulties of destroying precise targets by night, RAF Bomber Command will continued to be employed in accordance with their main aim of disorganizing German industry." As far as practicable, the directive stated, Bomber Command operations were to be complementary to the operations of USSTAF. "In particular, where tactical conditions allow, their targets will be selected so as to give the maximum assistance in the aims of reducing the strength of the German Air Force and disrupting enemy rail communications."  

90 Webster and Frankland, 4:168-169.  
91 Ibid., p. 169
While the Royal Air Force Bomber Command continued with its general area assault on German cities and began turning its attentions to attacks on German communications in France, the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces began a sustained offensive which lasted almost without interruption right up to the invasion. On April 2nd, the Fifteenth Air Force attacked the ball-bearing works at Steyr, damaging about 70 per cent of the factory buildings and destroying about two months production of stocks. On April 11th, the Eighth Air Force hit the two Heinkel works at Rostock, causing a temporary 100 per cent loss in production. Two days later, the Eighth Air Force struck at Augsburg, Lechfeld, Oberpaffenhofen and Schweinfurt. On April 19th the Eighth Air Force severely damaged the Fieseler aircraft works at Kassel. The RAF bombed Brunswick on the night of April 22/23 but caused little or no drop in aircraft production. On the following day and again four days later, the Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH at Friedrichshafen was attacked by the USAAF and the RAF respectively, causing a five weeks' loss in production. Schweinfurt was attacked by the RAF on the night of

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92 The German Anti-friction Bearings Industry, pp. 63-64.
93 Reports of Physical Damage Resulting from Allied Air Attacks on Germany, 1944, pp. 102-103.
94 Ibid., pp. 55-57.
95 Ibid., p. 21.
April 26/27, forcing the VKF ball-bearing works to reduce production for some days. In the course of the month 29 German aircraft plants were targets for heavy attacks. Along with these blows at replacement capacity went others at existing fighter strength. Planes were destroyed on the ground by widespread raids on German airbases and in the air when the fighters were tempted into battle over strategic targets.

In its summation of the April counter-air offensive, The Globe and Mail wrote:

The Anglo-American campaign to destroy the German Air Force...is nearing fruition after a year of histroy's most savage air fighting in which the Luftwaffe has suffered a major defeat...

A desperate German counter-plan to quadruple fighter production has been smashed and for three successive months the German fighter force has lost more planes than its plants could manufacture...

The offensive, while a success, is not yet a complete one...but it is reaching its climatic phase. 98

Though the article made good reading, it was not true. German fighter production, far from declining, was steadily increasing. From 846 fighter planes per month in April 1943, production had risen to 1520 fighter planes per month in April 1944. German fighter losses, it was true, were increasing from 13.7 per cent destroyed in April 1943 to 28.2 per cent in April 1944, but the losses were offset by increased

97 Reports of Physical Damage Resulting from Allied Air Attacks on Germany, 1944, p. 108.
99 Von Rhoden Studies, pp. 121-122.
production.

During May the principal targets for the CBO were plants associated with FW 190, Me 109 and Me 110 production. Brunswick was the objective of three day raids and one night raid by RAF and Commonwealth bomber formations. Components of the dispersed Wiener-Neustadt complex that produced Me 109 fighter aircraft were attacked on four separate occasions with only fair to good bombing results. The Junkers home office at Dessau was attacked on May 28th, and elements of the dispersed Bremen FW 190 complex at Kottbus, Sorau and Tutow were bombed on the 29th. For the month the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces dropped 5345 tons of bombs on the German aircraft industry.

Henceforward, until control of the bombing offensive was released by Eisenhower in September, the CBO would be directed towards support of the Allied invasion of western Europe.

The Globe and Mail, summing up the counter-air offensive activities in May, wrote:

The Allies are steadily destroying Nazi aircraft factories, thus implementing the promise of Mr. Churchill that "we intend to make war production in its widest sense impossible in all German cities, towns and factories...."

German fighter aircraft production has been one of the chief targets of the Allied bombers. No sooner has a destructive night attack been completed than the Americans launch a daylight attack which is devastating to Nazi production. The results of these round the clock assaults is that the German output is partly

100 Von Rhoden Studies, pp. 121-122.
102 Aircraft Division Industry Report, p. 103.
paralyzed. 103

Three days later, the paper editorialized:

Canadians, who are far removed from the European air blitzkrieg, may well wonder why it is necessary to repeat the bombing of...German cities...The answer is that the Germans...have considerable recuperative capacity.

British, Canadian and American bombers lately have concentrated on the destruction of the German aircraft industry. So successful have they been that they have reduced production output by one-fourth to two-thirds and prevented the construction of thousands of fighter planes...As this is not regarded as permanent, owing to the recuperative powers of the Nazis, the bomber offensive is maintained.

Manifestly, if the plan to destroy the German Air Force is realized, the German bombers which attempt to combat the Allied invasion force will have an insignificant fighter cover, and will be easy victims of the superior force the Allies can put into the air. 104

There was no doubt in The Globe and Mail that the counter-air offensive had been, and would continue to be, a success.

Whatever contingency plans the Germans had for increasing fighter production would be offset by the increasing weight of the Allied air offensive. Though the paper could not say when the offensive would reach its end, it was certain that the offensive would eventually destroy the German Air Force and its supporting industries.

The question naturally arises, how successful was the campaign against the German Air Force and its supporting industries? In a strategic sense the heavy attacks against the

103 "Allies Hold the Air," The Globe and Mail, May 15, 1944, p. 6, col. 2.
104 "Repeated Bombing is Needed," The Globe and Mail, May 18, 1944, p. 6, col. 2.
German airframe plants can be said to have been a failure because they produced only an indisposition in the great industrial machine that fed the Luftwaffe. But in a tactical sense the results were tremendously important. Hundreds of aircraft that might otherwise have opposed the Allied landings at Normandy were destroyed in production. In the intensive attacks that were aimed at the German aircraft industry between July 1943 and December 1944 some 18,000 aircraft of all types were denied to the Luftwaffe. Of that number, approximately 14,000 or 78 per cent were fighters.

A second question arises, namely, if the offensive was not a success, why then did the Air Ministry and the United States Army headquarters announce in their communiques that it was? Aside from the obvious reason of wanting to present a favourable picture of the offensive to the public, the Allied leaders based their impression of a successful offensive upon faulty intelligence estimates. As table 4 shows, Allied intelligence tended at the beginning of the war to overestimate German aircraft production. After the counter-air offensive had begun, Allied intelligence tended to overestimate the effects of the bombing and to underestimate the recuperative powers of German industry. With such intelligence estimates, it is easy to see why the Allies were able to believe that the offensive was such a success.

Aircraft production, at first glance, appears to have

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Aircraft Division Industry Report, pp. 5-6.
TABLE 4
Comparison of Allied Intelligence Estimates of German Aircraft Production with Actual Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Single-Engine Fighters</th>
<th>Total Aircraft Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allied Estimates</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st half 1941</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd half 1941</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st half 1942</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd half 1942</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st half 1943</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd half 1943</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st half 1944</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>1581</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Allied intelligence estimates were not given for beyond the first half of 1944.


been stimulated rather than retarded by the bombing attacks.

Table 5 shows how a comparison of 1943 and 1944 production figures for the first six months of each year support such an assumption.

TABLE 5
Comparison of German Aircraft Production Figures for the First Half of 1943 and 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1943 Total Production</th>
<th>1943 Fighters</th>
<th>1944 Total Production</th>
<th>1944 Fighters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1491</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>2427</td>
<td>1362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2168</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>2577</td>
<td>1251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>2071</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>2822</td>
<td>1520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2171</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>3358</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2314</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>3946</td>
<td>2378</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The great upswing in production that took place in the spring of 1944, however, was not the result of the bombing or efforts to increase production to circumvent the effects of the bombing, but, as table 6 shows, rather the result of plans and preparations laid nine to twelve months preceding the attacks.

**TABLE 6**

Projected Schedule of German Aircraft Production (1943)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Number and Programme Date</th>
<th>Production Schedule and Target Date</th>
<th>All Models</th>
<th>Single-engine Fighters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 April 1943 223/1</td>
<td>July 1943</td>
<td>894</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2575</td>
<td>993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January 1944</td>
<td>894</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3254</td>
<td>1356</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 1944</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4937</td>
<td>1646</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1943 223/1</td>
<td>January 1944</td>
<td>2822</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2946</td>
<td>1679</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 1944</td>
<td>3327</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3850</td>
<td>1421</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1943 224/1</td>
<td>January 1944</td>
<td>2933</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3238</td>
<td>83-84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 1944</td>
<td>1421</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5405</td>
<td>2822</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 December 1943 225/1</td>
<td>January 1944</td>
<td>1679</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2962</td>
<td>3327</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 1944</td>
<td>2822</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4811</td>
<td>1421</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It was not until after the fall of 1944, after the aircraft industry had ceased to be a primary target of the CBO, that production began to decline. Table 7 shows that although aircraft production was beginning to lag, it was still greater than that of 1943.

Airframes, engines and component parts were being man-
### TABLE 7

Comparison of German Aircraft Production Figures for the Last Half of 1943 and 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1943</th>
<th></th>
<th>1944</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Production</td>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>Total Production</td>
<td>Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2475</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>4319</td>
<td>2527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>2078</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>3890</td>
<td>2452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>2213</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>4352</td>
<td>3129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>2109</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>3793</td>
<td>2831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1867</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>3847</td>
<td>2948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>3281</td>
<td>2460</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Manufactured in increasing numbers in the vast network of dispersed and concealed factories. Some of these were discovered and the approaches bombed, but not sufficiently to make any great difference in the number of aircraft produced. The dispersal of aircraft plants tended to create its own problems. Production was disrupted because of the movement of machines, stocks and materials. Plant efficiency was reduced because of the dilution of management. The transportation system, already overtaxed, was subject to bombing and therefore not always able to move the components to final assembly areas. In the end dispersal defeated itself, because once the transportation system failed, it became impossible to keep the final assembly points fed with the necessary component parts and sub-assemblies to produce finished aircraft. After the failure of the dispersal system, the Germans tried to concentrate aircraft production in underground factories. Millions of man-hours were spent to prepare huge underground workings
such as those at Nordhausen and Neckar-Elz, but most remained unfinished when the war ended.

Though the attacks on the German Air Force and its supporting industries were a strategic failure, attacks against it would have been more effective in the end if they had been made further back in the manufacturing process rather than against final assembly points. Three vital points that were virtually ignored were the shops housing fuselage assembly jigs, the forge shops making crank shafts, and the manufacture of propeller blades. The bombing of any of the three would have seriously curtailed aircraft production.

Bombing in its various forms did have some important results. There were a number of new designs of German aircraft in the process of development, and the failure to produce these in sufficient quantity or not at all was undoubtedly due to the strategic air offensive. In particular, the models affected were the He 277 bomber which would have replaced the ill-fated He 177; the He 219 which held out great promise as a night fighter; the Ta 154, a design made out of

106 The Daimler-Benz installation at Neckar-Elz, near Heidelberg, is a good example of an underground operation. It was planned to produce crankshafts, cylinder heads and connecting rods there for the main plant at Genshagen. The problem was that the complex depended on the power supply of the local community and there were frequent power interruptions when local plants were damaged by bombing. Air attacks during the winter of 1944-45 disrupted supplies of raw materials and parts. Low-level attacks in the spring of 1945 on local rail and road transportation finally made work impossible. Aircraft Division Industry Report, pp. 36-37.

107 Ibid., p. 8
wood which was designed to cope with the Mosquito; the Do 335 which the Germans claimed would have been the fastest fighter to emerge out of the war; the Ta 152 which would have replaced the FW 190; and numerous jet designs, such as the He 162 and Ar 262, which were in the final stages of testing and production on a small scale.

As has been seen, the concerted offensive against the German Air Force and its supporting industries did not seriously disrupt the industrial machine that fed the Luftwaffe. In contrast with this is the reporting of The Globe and Mail. In its reporting of the counter-air offensive, a number of items stand out in glaring contrast to the actual events. First, of course, is the claim of destruction made by the paper against the German Air Force in the air and on the ground. As early as February 21st, the paper claimed that some 68 per cent of German fighter capacity had been destroyed. On February 28th, production for all types of aircraft was given as 50.8 per cent of peak production as a result of the February bombings. On March 29th, the paper claimed that single engine fighter production "had been cut two-thirds

108 Production of the Do 335 was severely curtailed by the air attack on March 18, 1944, which destroyed all the tools and jigs for assembly of its components. Instead of being able to deliver 1280 Do 335's by May 1945, the Dornier works were only able to deliver 330 by that date. USSBS 12: Dornier Works, Friedrichshafen and Munich, Final Report, p. 1.


below the January 1, 1944 level," twin engine fighter pro-
duction "slightly more," and bomber capacity "by one-third."

On April 18th the paper wrote:

Nearly 5,000 single and twin engine fighters have been denied the Luftwaffe since November 1, 1943, by damage to basic factories, assembly plants and replace-
ment areas by heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force in Britain and the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy. This does not mean that nearly 5,000 complete aircraft were knocked out, but that enemy production has been cut by this amount as the result of the bombing....

Today the Luftwaffe must draw upon aircraft in the pipeline, that is, those en route from factories to operational airfields, a source that is steadily diminishing....

Nevertheless, it is emphatically stated that, due to the campaign of the last five months, the Luftwaffe will be unable to maintain a serious aerial offensive since it will be unable to make up its heavy losses. 112

This seemed like a logical statement to make as the Allies struck again and again at aircraft targets, especially as there were no statements of reservation from Allied head-
quarters in London. The effect of the destruction wrought upon the German Air Force was apparent, as the paper pointed out on April 20th:

Allied losses have been steadily decreasing as a result of the Luftwaffe's weakness after three months of heavy attack on its factories and concentration areas and serious losses in the air. 113

Production figures were not the only figures that were

111 "Save Planes or Lose Factories?," The Globe and Mail, March 29, 1944, p. 13, col. 8.

112 "5,000 Hun Planes Cut Off by Bombings," The Globe and Mail, April 18, 1944, p. 1, col. 4.

misleading in The Globe and Mail. German fighter aircraft losses in combat and on the ground were similarly overstated. On February 22nd, German losses were given as 159 destroyed and 37 destroyed or seriously damaged on the ground. Two days later, the total of enemy aircraft destroyed was given as 310 for two days of combat. On the 26th this total had reached 510. By the 28th, 641 enemy aircraft were claimed as destroyed. A month later this total had risen to 1023. The April total of enemy aircraft destroyed by the USAF alone was given as 1282. The net result of such destruction, the paper claimed, was that:

Before the precision bombers began their concentrated attacks upon the German aircraft industry months ago, heavy losses inflicted upon the Luftwaffe in the air caused little reduction in its net strength. Losses were quickly replaced by new planes.

Now, however, fighter production capacity has been so reduced that each existing plane knocked down is a vital contribution. If these defences are destroyed, our casualties in the invasion will be reduced greatly, and war industries and communications throughout Germany will be left open to bombing without interference

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115 "Factories Attacked in Austria," The Globe and Mail, February 24, 1944, p. 1, col. 3.  
118 "Save Planes or Lose Factories?" The Globe and Mail, March 29, 1944, p. 13, col. 8.  
from fighter planes. 120

In April The Globe and Mail quoted an "RAF Commentator" as stating that much of Germany's aircraft production capacity had been smashed and that the German Air Force was down to using its reserves as part of its front-line strength. It was doubtful, the commentator stated, that much remained in the way of reserve aircraft. If the German Air Force was, as the "RAF Commentator" claimed, putting as much as possible into the "show window" of aerial combat, it was certainly taking its fair share of Allied bombers. This was something that the paper tended to play down by contrasting Allied losses against enemy losses or by claiming that they were less than those suffered during the Battle of Britain.

The Globe and Mail was right in claiming that the bomb tonnages were increasing steadily throughout the counter-air offensive. This can be seen by a comparison of the tonnages dropped during the first six months of 1943 and the first six months of 1944 as shown in table 8. Such figures, however, do not indicate the extent of tonnage directed against the German Air Force and its supporting industries. Though

120 "Factories Attacked in Austria," The Globe and Mail, February 24, 1944, p. 1, col. 3.
122 A typical example of this can be found in the reporting of the RAF-RCAP raid on Leipzig on 19/20 February 1944. "The loss of 79 bombers on February 19th was the largest ever suffered by the Allies in a single night or day, but far below the peak German loss in the Battle of Britain."
TABLE 8

Monthly Tonnages of Bombs Dropped by Bomber Command and the United States Eighth Air Force for the First Half of 1943 and 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1943</th>
<th></th>
<th>1944</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>USAAF</td>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>USAAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>4,345</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>18,428</td>
<td>10,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>10,959</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>12,054</td>
<td>16,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>10,591</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>27,698</td>
<td>19,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>11,467</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>33,496</td>
<td>22,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>12,920</td>
<td>2,555</td>
<td>37,252</td>
<td>32,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>15,271</td>
<td>2,330</td>
<td>57,267</td>
<td>54,204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The paper was right in saying that monthly bomb tonnages were increasing, it did not give the breakdown of tonnages in its monthly summarization of bombs dropped. Table 9 breaks down the bomb tonnages into their correct proportions of bombs dropped on the German aircraft industry.

TABLE 9

Comparison of Bomb Tonnages Dropped by the Allied Strategic Bombers During the Counter-air Offensive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tons on Aircraft Industry</th>
<th>Total Tonnage</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>1,060,000</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Air Force</td>
<td>47,671</td>
<td>691,470</td>
<td>6.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifteenth Air Force</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>545,000</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In terms of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces' tonnages, this can be further broken down for the exact tonnages dropped during the counter-air offensive (see table 10).
TABLE 10
Monthly Tonnages of Bombs Dropped by the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces During the Counter-air Offensive (1944)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eighth Air Force</th>
<th>Fifteenth Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2211</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>2802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>3992</td>
<td>1242</td>
<td>5234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>4272</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>4516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>6076</td>
<td>4148</td>
<td>10224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3235</td>
<td>2110</td>
<td>5345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1662</td>
<td>1180</td>
<td>2842</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This breakdown is important to the understanding of the counter-air offensive. With only the figures of The Globe and Mail to go on—which are gross tonnages indicating total bombs dropped—one gets a distorted view of the situation. One imagines far greater devastation wrought by 54,204 tons (total for June 1944) than by 2842 tons (total expended in the counter-air offensive for the same month).

Though the weight of the counter-air offensive would fall off as the strategic bombers were directed to targets in support of OVERLORD, USSTAF continued its attacks on the German Air Force with a policy of drawing it into aerial battles it could not afford to lose. Combined with the counter-air offensive would come a campaign against the German oil industry. It would be this combination of offensives that would lead to the final defeat of the German Air Force in 1945.
CHAPTER FOUR

OIL AND THE DEFEAT OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE

On May 10, 1944, The Globe and Mail wrote:

The reorganization of the Luftwaffe in the west is part of a German effort to strengthen the air force in the face of great losses in production through Allied bombing. All Allied air sources confirm that production of aircraft has been cut by precision bombing below the point where the Germans can carry on full scale air war and survive.

So the Germans are only defending their most precious targets when public opinion forces them to do so. They are making no attempt to defend the outer fringes of Europe or even large parts of the homeland. American daylight bombers meet heavy opposition only over the heart of Germany around Berlin, Brunswick and Regensburg.

Despite the enthusiastic claims of the paper, however, the counter-air offensive had not stopped German aircraft production. Operation ARGUMENT had, it is true, curtailed aircraft production for two months, but aircraft production continued in increasing numbers until the fall of 1944. Even with the September decline in production, more aircraft than ever before were reaching the Luftwaffe.

The reporting of The Globe and Mail during the last eleven months of the war reflected the optimism of the Allied governments that victory over the Axis powers was, at last, at hand. The statements coming from Allied headquarters in

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London and Washington gave the impression that the Germans could not hold out much longer. In fact, however, the threatened resurgence of the Luftwaffe was causing Allied leaders grave concern lest their bomber forces be swept from the skies over Europe. This fear spurred the air planners to devote greater attention to the counter-air offensive.

After ARGUMENT was concluded, USSTAF continued its attacks on the German Air Force with a policy of drawing it into aerial battles that it could not afford to lose. It was thus hoped that the German Air Force could be defeated by a policy of attrition. When this was not immediately forthcoming, Allied policy makers turned to oil as a means of reducing the German Air Force. Without oil, the German war machine, and especially the Luftwaffe, would grind to a halt.

The oil and counter-air offensives effectively defeated the German Air Force. Though the German aircraft industry, now dispersed into nearly 300 separate plants throughout the Reich, were able to complete aircraft, construction time was lengthened because parts could only be moved at night. Dispersed operations, moreover, reduced the size of the plants and shortened the production runs that otherwise would have been larger. The decline in the availability of aviation spirits and oil, as a result of increased attacks on oil targets, effectively grounded the completed aircraft.

\[\text{Aircraft Division Industry Report, p. 32.}\]
What is missing from the reporting of *The Globe and Mail* during the last eleven months of the war is the conflict of interest that existed between the makers of Allied bombing policy. This is most readily noticeable in the aims of the British and American commanders. Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory and Sir Arthur Tedder favoured transportation attacks. General Carl A. Spaatz favoured precision attacks against the German Air Force and its supporting industries and later against oil targets. Sir Arthur Harris opposed both oil and transportation and favoured a general area bombing of German cities.

Missing also from the reporting of the paper for the last eleven months of the war is the fact that many of the bombing raids were not successful. This can be seen, for instance, in the report on the Merseburg-Leuna raid of July 20, 1944. Unlike *The Globe and Mail's* version of the raid, the attack on the I.G. Farbenindustrie synthetic oil works at Merseburg-Leuna was in reality a failure.

**The Oil Offensive**

In the spring of 1944, the German oil industry was selected as a top-priority target system. In opposition to Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, who favoured an all-out assault on German communications, General Carl A. Spaatz, commander of USSTAF, was convinced that an attack on German oil production would have the most rapid and direct effects on the German war machine. Such a campaign, Spaatz reasoned, would
force the Germans to defend the oil targets with all their resources. This would both draw the German Air Force into combat (one of the aims of POINTBLANK), and dislocate its forces by tying them down in the defence of the oil targets. If the campaign was successful, and the increased size of the American and British bomber commands made that possibility very likely, German oil supplies would be reduced to such an extent that the German armed forces would be virtually immobilized.

Spaatz's argument not withstanding, Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory continued to press for the communications campaign. He was supported in this by Sir Arthur Tedder who, as Deputy Supreme Commander, was responsible for a bombing policy which could be applied to the three air forces involved in the OVERLORD operations, the USAAF, RAF Bomber Command and the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF). As the proposed oil campaign would not allow Bomber Command or AEAF to play a part in it, Tedder gave consideration to the communications campaign. Here he saw the means of neutralizing the German advantage of fighting upon interior and overland lines of communications over Allied exterior and overseas lines of communications. He envisaged and advocated a massive and

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3 Webster and Frankland, 3:24.
4 The AEAF was composed of the United States Ninth Air Force (tactical bombers and fighters) and the RAF Second Tactical Air Force and Fighter Command. It was formed in November 1943 and was designed to be used on tactical operations in support of OVERLORD. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
sustained offensive against key points in the railway system and against the railroad repair organization which was ultimately designed not only to isolate the Normandy area, or even to isolate France from Germany, but to dislocate the entire railway system of German Europe. He reasoned that such a move would later lead to the dislocation of German industry and thereby achieve the aims of POINTBLANK.

Though General Spaatz accepted Sir Arthur Tedder's decision on the communications campaign as a part of the "prerequisites to the success of OVERLORD," he appealed to Eisenhower that the results of the oil campaign would be more disastrous for Germany than attacks on her railways. Spaatz's argument was supported by Allied intelligence that revealed that although there were 87 German oil-producing targets, two-thirds of German synthetic oil production could be lost by the destruction of only seven targets. Eisenhower took Spaatz's argument and the Allied intelligence estimates under consideration and on April 19th authorized the Eighth Air Force to begin a limited offensive against German oil production. The campaign was delayed, first by the claims

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5 Webster and Frankland, 3:31.
6 Ibid., p. 33.
7 The 87 targets were made up of nine Fischer-Tropsch plants, sixteen hydrogenation plants, forty refineries, and twenty-two benzol plants. USSBS 109: Oil Division-Final Report, p. 87.
8 Webster and Frankland, 3:228.
of CROSSBOW—the V-weapons campaign—and then by a spell of bad weather, but finally got underway on May 12.

On that occasion, 935 Eighth Air Force bombers took off for targets which included the oil plants at Zwickau, Merseburg-Leuna, Brüx, Lutzkendorf and Böhlen. Though the Luftwaffe put up heavy opposition near Frankfurt, more than 800 of the bombers attacked and dropped 1718 tons of bombs on the targets. Brüx, Böhlen and Zeitz were temporarily knocked out of operation, while the ammonia works at Merseburg-Leuna stopped production completely.

Heavy OVERLORD commitments and weather conditions kept the Eighth Air Force away from oil targets for more than two weeks after May 12. By this time, however, the Fifteenth Air Force was well into the offensive. Its chief target was the cluster of crude oil refineries at Ploesti, in Romania, but it also looked after crude oil targets in Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia. Between May 5 and May 31, the Fifteenth Air Force dispatched almost 1500 sorties to Ploesti and achieved good bombing results.

The Eighth Air Force returned to the oil offensive on May 28 when more than 400 heavy bombers attacked synthetic oil plants at Ruhland, Magdeburg, Zeitz, Merseburg-Leuna and

\[9\] CROSSBOW diverted large numbers of strategic bombers from the task of bombing the Reich to the bombing of V-weapon sites in the Pas de Calais area.

\[10\] Oil Division-Final Report, p. 91.

\[11\] Craven and Cate, 3:177.
Lutzendorf. Results were good everywhere. The Leuna works were put out of production for six days, while the Braun-kohle Benzin A.G. at Zeitz was stopped completely. The following day, 224 Eighth Air Force B-24's were dispatched to Pölitz and damaged the synthetic oil works there very severely.

At the end of May, encouraged by the results of the oil campaign, Sir Charles Portal stated that "when OVERLORD is firmly established, we should at once consider directing against oil objectives such effort of the strategic air forces as can be spared from the task of continuing the neutralizing of the enemy's aircraft production and air forces." With Portal's support, General Spaatz dispatched a cable to the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces stating that the primary aim of USSTAF was now the denial of oil to the Luftwaffe. Spaatz ordered his forces to hit the oil plants as frequently, systematically, and severely as their strength permitted.

Spaatz's orders, however, were subject to the exigencies of OVERLORD, and it was not until June 20 that the first Eighth Air Force raid could be launched against an oil target. On this occasion, the Deurag-Nerag refinery at Misburg, five

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12 Oil Division-Final Report, p. 91.
13 Ibid., p. 95.
14 Craven and Cate, 3:178.
15 Webster and Frankland, 3:47.
16 Oil Division-Final Report, p. 1.
miles east of Hannover, was hit with 103 tons of high explosive bombs. The plant, with a monthly capacity of 27,000 tons of crude oil per month, was closed down until August 17th as a result of the bombing. The RAF was able to make four attacks on oil targets in June, but they were by no means promising. In only one of the four attacks, the June 12/13 attack on the Nordstern plant near Gelsenkirchen, did it appear that serious damage had been done to the target, and even there most of the bombs went wide.

The three unsuccessful RAF attacks notwithstanding, there was a feeling in Allied headquarters that the oil offensive held out great promise if only more effort could be devoted to it. This enthusiasm was reflected in the reporting of The Globe and Mail on June 24th:

The oil shortage is threatening the operational mobility of the German armies to a point where it may well shorten the war. . . .

Today current production is estimated by the Ministry of Economic Warfare at one-third the normal fifteen million to sixteen million gallons of refined products. Stocks are down to the irreducible minimum. . . .

But Germany's current oil drop, it is emphasized, is only temporary. It depends on how long her refineries can be kept from production and the intensity of the fighting. 19

The June 24th article in The Globe and Mail was the first indication that the paper was aware of the oil offensive.

17 Oil Division-Final Report, pp. 75-76.
18 The four RAF attacks were: June 12/13 (Nordstern), June 16/17 (Sterkrade), June 21 (Wesseling by day and Scholvenbuer by night). Webster and Frankland, 3:144.
19 "Nazis' Oil Needs Grow As Supplies Cut Short," The Globe and Mail, June 24, 1944, p. 13, col. 3.
Prior to that date, the paper had been concerned with the counter-air offensive and preparations for the invasion of the continent. It was not long, however, before the paper began to report optimistically about the results of the oil campaign.

Amongst the post D-Day dispatches that were published in The Globe and Mail was a statement by General H.H. Arnold on the effectiveness of the oil offensive:

There is evidence the Germans now are using their reserve gasoline supplies. The Allies in France... have found tanks and other vehicles abandoned for lack of fuel.... All of Germany's 55 synthetic and natural oil refineries have been hit, with production at each reduced to not more than one-third normal. 20

Though strategic bombing had not reduced German oil production to the extent that Arnold claimed, it had substantially cut monthly oil production from 734,000 tons per month in May to 438,000 tons per month in July.

There was now a definite need to define the place of the oil offensive in the employment of the strategic bombers. On July 9th the British Air Ministry announced the formation of a joint Anglo-American oil targets committee which was to keep the Axis oil position under review, to assess the damage inflicted upon it and to determine the priority of further attacks. Armed with expert and detailed advice which this

21 Webster and Frankland, 4:516.
committee produced, the British Air Staff was in a better position to follow the oil offensive and, therefore, also able to make recommendations about its direction.

The joint committee had more than enough material in the way of attack data to work with during July. Though in the main the RAF was attacking German cities and USSTAF was attacking rail centres, aircraft production sites and targets relating to OVERLORD, there were eighteen large scale and two small scale raids on oil targets. On the night of July 18th, RAF Bomber Command attacked the oil plants at Wesseling and Scholven-Buer with devastating effects and only negligible losses. Two days later, 145 RAF bombers were dispatched to Meerbeck where they dropped 817 tons of high explosive bombs on the Fischer-Tropsch works there. Though only 25.6 tons exploded in the plant area, 80 per cent of the plant was heavily damaged or destroyed. This was the knockout blow for Meerbeck and, except for a slight revival of three days in October, the plant did not produce again.

The Eighth Air Force, for its part, launched six full-scale attacks on oil targets within the Reich. The Fifteenth Air Force, also heavily involved in the oil offensive, made twelve full-scale attacks against oil targets in Germany, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia and Romania. If its list of

22 Webster and Frankland, 3; 49-50.
23 Ibid., p. 174.
24 Oil Division-Final Report, pp. 92-93.
targets were impressive, so were its results, with the majority of its targets successfully bombed.

The Globe and Mail gave the impression that the oil offensive was taking its toll on German oil production capacity. On July 13th, the paper wrote:

A senior United States air officer said that the American air offensive had decreased the strength of the German Air Force in France and had succeeded in curtailing oil production to the point of having an important affect on the mobility of the German ground forces.

The Allied objective of getting at their ground forces through their oil supply has been "achieved" in recent attacks on 64 oil installations, the officer said...

In the six months since the Americans began their two-directional attacks on Axis targets deep in Europe, 51 oil refineries and 13 synthetic oil plants...have been bombed. 26

Though the July RAF raids were not covered in the paper, the USAAF raids were. Unlike the accounts of raids on German aircraft production centres, articles on raids against oil targets were scanty in detail, often just giving the target names and dates. The impression of a successful bombing offensive, however, was, as the above illustration shows, the same.

Not all the bombing attacks against German oil targets were, however, successful. The Eighth Air Force raid on Merseburg-Leuna on July 20, 1944 was such a raid.

"Nearly 3,000 American warplanes," wrote The Globe and

25 Craven and Cate, 3:290.
26 "Mobility of Luftwaffe Cut by Reduced Oil Production," The Globe and Mail, July 13, 1944, p. 2, col. 5.
Mail on July 21, 1944, "smashed into Germany from Britain and Italy...and pounded at least ten important objectives in the Leipzig, Munich and Friedrichshafen areas, rounding out the greatest massed air assault ever mounted against the enemy." Quoting an anonymous air officer at Allied Supreme Headquarters, the paper called the bombing offensive which had begun on July 11 "a major offensive, greater than that which dealt the Luftwaffe a staggering blow in February... when the smashing of German aircraft factories and the slaughter of Nazi fighter planes in the air ensured Allied air supremacy over the beaches on D-Day." The Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces together dropped almost 5,000 tons of bombs on vital war targets, the paper claimed, bringing to 35,800 tons the total weight of bombs dropped during the first ten days of the offensive.

Citing more than 1,200 heavy bombers and 750 fighters as in the attacking force, The Globe and Mail listed Dessau, Eisenach-Stockhausen, Leipzig-Mockau, Gotha, Nüsselsheim and Merseburg-Leuna as Eighth Air Force targets. Friedrichshafen, Memmingen and Bad Wörishofen were given as Fifteenth Air Force targets. With the exception of the synthetic oil plants near Leipzig and at Merseburg-Leuna, the targets were described as airfields, components factories, aero-engine factories and assembly plants in central and southern Germany. Though the paper cited the bombing results of the Fifteenth Air Force as excellent, there was no mention made of the damage inflicted by the Eighth Air Force. Most of
the force from Britain, the paper went on to say, met no opposition from the Luftwaffe. Two Flying Fortress wings, however, were said to have been attacked by a large number of fighters. In the ensuing battle eleven Germans were shot down by American fighters and at least two more by the bombers.

Though in places there are only minor differences between the account of the July 20th raid in The Globe and Mail and in the official accounts of the mission, the results of the raid are at variance in the two versions. Though the newspaper did not make a statement concerning the results of the Eighth Air Force attack on Merseburg-Leuna, the official version states the attack was not a success.

Operation number 484, conducted by the Eighth Air Force on July 20, 1944, was directed against eleven high priority targets in central Germany. Although 1252 bombers and 756 fighters were dispatched, only 1200 bombers and 727 fighters completed sorties. Those bombers that completed sorties that day did not attack their targets as planned. Eight hundred and twenty-four attacked their assigned targets, 89 attacked secondary targets, and 291 attacked targets of opportunity. Three hundred and twenty-nine aircraft of the bomber force sustained damage and nineteen bombers failed to return.

28 USSBS European Target Intelligence Reports, 2b(187), Mission number 484, p. 15.
29 Ibid., p. 15.
For their effort, the bombers of the Eighth Air Force dropped 3687.4 tons of high explosives and incendiaries on their targets. Strike and reconnaissance photographs, taken during and after the mission, revealed that with the exception of the synthetic oil plants at Merseburg-Leuna and Leipzig severe damage had been inflicted on the airfields, aero-engine factories, aircraft assembly plants and marshalling yards. The Wintershall A.G. synthetic oil plant at Lutzkendorf, however, appeared to have escaped damage. The only fresh craters that were visible were in open fields on the side of the target.

The I.G. Farbenindustrie synthetic oil plant at Merseburg-Leuna was attacked by 155 B-17’s which dropped 375.9 tons of high explosive bombs. Not all the bombs that were dropped, however, fell in the plant area and at least 55 failed to explode. According to German records, only 600 bombs fell in the plant area while 1,000 bombs fell in the decoy plant some seven miles away. Damage to the Merseburg-Leuna works was described by plant authorities as breaks in the pipe system and damage to the Low Pressure, High Pressure
and Salt divisions of the plant. Total damage was estimated at 14.1 million Reichsmarks.

Reconnaissance photographs taken on the following day revealed damage to the hydrogen contact ovens, the Calcium Nitrate Plant, storage cylinders, gas holders, heat exchangers between the injector houses and hydrogenation stalls and the marshalling yards to the west of the plant. Despite the amount of damage done to the plant, the works were still in production of synthetic oil the following day. Interpretation Report K 2749, written three days after the attack, stated that though there was considerable damage to one of the contact oven houses and to two of the compressor houses, enough of the plant was operational for full synthetic oil production. In regard to the synthetic oil plants, therefore, the mission was a failure.

As far as The Globe and Mail was concerned, the oil offensive was a tremendous success. Prior to the Merseburg-Leuna raid, the paper ran two articles, supported by the testimony of an unidentified "senior United States air officer," that oil production was being curtailed in Germany. On the day following the raid, the paper published an

35 Ammoniawerke Merseburg GmbH, Leuna, Germany, p. 84.
36 Ibid., p. 115.
37 USBS European Target Intelligence Reports, 2b(187), Mission number 434, p. 10.
38 USBS European Target Intelligence Reports, 3a(1850), Merseburg, p. 1.
article stating:

German oil production was reduced by 50 per cent in June and the output of refined products from crude petroleum by Germany and her satellites by 40 per cent as the result of Anglo-American air attacks, it was disclosed in the House of Commons [on July 21] by Dingle M. Foot, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare.... Reduction in total Axis supplies from all sources is estimated at 25 per cent in May and 40 per cent in June said Mr. Foot. 39

Mr. Foot's statement was very close to that of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in their report at the end of July. The JIC reached the conclusion that "Germany will be unable to continue the struggle beyond December given intensive fighting on three fronts and the continued success of Allied air attacks." Though Mr. Foot and the JIC were correct in stating that German oil production was falling, they had overestimated the extent of the decline in production. Total German oil production from all sources for April had been 810,000 tons. In May, production fell to 734,000 tons. Total oil production for June was just 511,000 tons.

At the beginning of August the JIC stated that German consumption had exceeded production of oil by about 300,000 tons. They warned, however, that German efforts to restore oil production would change the situation unless the bombing was continued. In this proposal they were supported by the

40 Webster and Frankland, 3:50.
41 Webster and Frankland, 4:516.
British Air Ministry who suggested to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) that the oil campaign be given a higher priority to take advantage of the critical situation in the German war economy.

Spaatz agreed with both the JIC and the Air Ministry and dispatched the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces on 17 separate occasions to attack oil targets in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. In the main, the bombers achieved good results in their attacks and succeeded in closing down a number of oil plants. The Braunkohle Benzin A.G. at Zeitz was attacked on August 16th and put out of production for another six weeks. The Deurag-Nerag refinery at Misburg was bombed eight days later, closing the plant until September 1st. On August 27th 243 RAF bombers attacked the oil plant at Homberg. Damage to the plant was somewhat scattered, but in some places quite severe. The Fifteenth Air Force made an impressive showing by attacking and closing down the Floesti works in Romania.

Strategic direction of the Allied bomber forces was returned to Sir Charles Portal in September 1944. Later that month a new directive was drawn up which gave the oil

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42 Webster and Frankland, 3:51.
43 Oil Division-Final Report, p. 95.
44 Ibid., p. 76.
45 Webster and Frankland, 3:170.
46 Craven and Cate, 3:297.
campaign first priority in the new offensive. Second priority was given to the German rail and transport systems. The German Air Force and its supporting industries, which had previously been primary objectives, were to be subject to "policing attacks" but were given no fixed priority. The direct support of land and naval operations was said to be "a continuing commitment," and "important industrial areas" were to be attacked "when weather or tactical conditions are unsuitable for operations against specific primary objectives."

Despite this new directive of September 25th, Sir Arthur Harris continued to direct the majority of Bomber Command's efforts in general area attacks against German cities. In fact, only six per cent of Bomber Command's overall effort for October was devoted to oil targets. Sir Arthur Tedder shared Harris' dislike of the oil campaign and continued to press for a renewed campaign against communications.

Sir Arthur Tedder's programme for a concentrated attack on rail centres, oil plants and canal systems (HURRICANE I) was not accepted by either the Combined Strategic Targets Committee (CSTC) or the Air Staff. Both groups believed that

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47 Webster and Frankland, 4:172.
48 Ibid., p. 173.
49 Webster and Frankland, 3:67.
such an offensive would compete with the oil plan, or confine it to the Ruhr, leaving out such important oil plants as Leuna and Pölitz which accounted for 1,200,000 tons of synthetic fuel per year. Moreover, the Air Staff felt that nothing should disrupt the oil offensive and that communications bombing should be confined to tactical operations near the military front. Both the CTC and the Air Staff had reason to be adamant in their beliefs. For a brief period in September it appeared that no German oil installations of any type were operating, and by the end of the month the evidence indicated that of the 91 still in German hands, only three were in full production and only 28 in partial production. The Germans secured less than 300,000 tons of oil from all sources in September, about 23 per cent of their monthly supply before the concentrated air attacks began. Their summer fuel expenditures had been enormous and their supplies were down drastically.

The readers of The Globe and Mail were informed of the crisis in the German war machine in two separate articles on October 4 and 13. Quoting Mr. Dingle M. Foot, Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Economic Warfare as its authority, the paper published a list of vital metals lost by the Germans since D-Day. Iron-ore, pig-iron, lead and bauxite supplies

50 Oil Division-Final Report, p. 88.
51 Webster and Frankland, 3:72.
52 Craven and Cate, 3:641.
were down to 40 to 60 per cent. Chrome, cobalt and wolfram
were almost cut off entirely. Nine days later, an article
appeared in the paper that was based on a speech made by
General H.H. Arnold at the Wings Club in Miami, Florida.
Arnold stated that even though the Luftwaffe had more planes
in 1944 than it had in 1939, that it was grounded for lack
of gasoline and oil. "Germany's present capacity for syn-
thetic fuels," he claimed, "is down to 30 per cent of normal."
Because the fuel shortage had reduced pilot training, Arnold
said, there was a shortage of pilots as well as lack of
fuel.

General Arnold's figure about German synthetic oil
capacity was far too high. By the end of September, Germany's
synthetic plants were producing only 14 per cent of their
normal capacity. German production from all sources for
September was 23 per cent of normal capacity. Recovery
was fairly rapid despite the bombings, and by the end of
October, synthetic production had reached 48 per cent of
normal capacity. Total production from all sources was 40
per cent normal capacity.

The Allied air leaders were aware of the recuperative
powers of the German oil industry, and a new directive was

53 "Vital Metal Supplies Lost by Germany, Commoners Told,"
The Globe and Mail, October 4, 1944, p. 13, col. 4.
54 "Germany Has More Airplanes Than in 1939, but Fuel is
55 Webster and Frankland, 4:515.
issued accordingly on November 1st by Sir Norman Bottomley and General Spaatz. First priority was issued to the oil industry again. Second priority was given to communications, with "particular emphasis on the Ruhr." Area bombing operations, the directive stated, were to be conducted only when weather or tactical conditions were unsuitable for attacks on either oil or communications. Moreover, the area attacks were "to be directed so as to contribute to the maximum destruction of the petroleum industry and the dislocation of the (main) target systems." Attacks upon the German Air Force and its supporting industries were not accorded a fixed priority.

German synthetic oil production for November was estimated by Allied intelligence sources at 31 per cent of the monthly average of the preceding spring, with most of the supply coming from the benzol plants. To check a possible increase in oil production, USSTAF dispatched the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces on twenty raids on oil targets during November. Gelsenkirchen was bombed four times, Hamburg three times and Sterkrade twice. The Deurag-Nerag refinery at Misburg was attacked on November 20 and successfully shut down. Five successive attacks prevented it from resuming operations except for eight days until the time of its capture in early April 1945. The Merseburg-Leuna works

56 Webster and Frankland, 4:178.
57 Ibid., p. 179.
58 Oil Division-Final Report, p. 76.
were bombed five times in November, but were able to resume production at 15 per cent of normal capacity in January. The Braunkohle Benzin A.G. at Zeitz was attacked by 285 Eighth Air Force bombers which dropped 263 tons of high explosive bombs in the plant area. Production was reduced from 300 tons daily to zero, and the plant did not reopen until December 19th. By the end of the month, all the synthetic oil plants were reported out of action and the crude oil refineries around Hamburg, Bremen and Vienna as functioning only on a small scale.

Whereas General Spaatz was in complete agreement with the November directive, Sir Arthur Harris opposed it on the grounds that it meant virtual abandonment of the area bombing campaign that had led to the destruction of 45 of Germany's 60 leading cities. He argued that all that remained was the destruction of Magdeburg, Halle, Leipzig, Dresden, Chemnitz, Breslau, Nuremberg, Munich, Coblenz and Karlsruhe. This, he claimed, more than anything else, would accelerate the defeat of Germany.

The difference of opinion over methods of operations did not make the pages of The Globe and Mail. Three days after Sir Arthur Harris made his views clear to Sir Charles

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60 Oil Division-Final Report, p. 91.
61 Ibid., p. 100.
62 Craven and Cate, 3:645.
63 Webster and Frankland, 3:82.
Portal about the oil offensive, the paper printed an article giving Allied war aims for the winter of 1944-45 as "an intensive...effort to blockade, bomb and starve Germany into internal submission...to defeat the Nazis this winter, or at least soften them up for a spring death blow." The article went on to quote a Ministry of Economic Warfare estimate that Germany had "reached the danger level through losses of sources to feed and equip the military and civil populations."

The Ministry of Economic Warfare estimate was not far from wrong. Total German oil production for November was only 337,000 tons. Of this, only 49,000 tons was aviation spirits. Production fell to 303,000 and 26,000 tons respectively in December.

Be this as it may, Sir Arthur Harris did not see the need for increased Bomber Command attention to the oil offensive. Writing to Sir Charles Portal on January 18, 1945, he described the oil plan as "another attempt to seek a quick, clever, easy and cheap way out." He insisted that real results would only come from the area destruction of

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64 "Bomb, Starve, Blockade Germany This Winter," The Globe and Mail, November 4, 1944, p. 15, col. 7.
65 Webster and Frankland, 4:516.
67 Webster and Frankland, 4:516.
68 Milward, p. 170.
69 Webster and Frankland, 3:92.
the remaining German towns. After stating that he had no faith in the selective bombing policies or the oil plan, he asked Portal if he should remain as Commander in Chief of Bomber Command since their opinions diverged so greatly on strategy and tactics. Sir Charles Portal was faced with either letting Harris go or backing down, and he chose the latter alternative. The outcome of his decision was that Sir Arthur Harris, despite any new directives, would continue to direct Bomber Command as he thought best in a general area bombing campaign against the German cities.

The Harris-Portal controversy did not make the pages of The Globe and Mail, nor was there any statement as to the relative merits of precision versus general area bombing techniques. Instead there were articles on why the war was taking so long to win. General Spaatz explained that German flak batteries made bombing targets both difficult and costly:

Heavy anti-aircraft guns...have been concentrated in unparalleled numbers around critical oil plants. One area of oil plants alone...is defended by more big guns than all of Greater Berlin.

A year ago losses to American planes were due one-fourth to anti-aircraft fire and three-fourths to German fighter craft....Today with the Germans coming up to fight again, the proportion of losses to ground guns and planes is about even. 72

Another article explained that German war production had been

70 Webster and Frankland, 3:93.
71 Ibid., p. 93.
underrated and went on to say that the Germans had cleverly moved their factories underground and into the remote areas of the German hinterland to escape the dangers of Allied strategic bombing. The strategic air war, nonetheless, did produce valuable results, the paper claimed, and

with many fighter plane assembly plants bombed out, the Luftwaffe is able to muster air opposition only sporadically or not at all.

Long-continued attacks on the enemy oil industry have forced the German air and ground forces to undertake the most drastic forms of rationing. 73

January 1945 was a period of unusual absorption with the land battle. Approximately three-fourths of the USSTAF effort went on tactical targets, and the RAF Bomber Command 74 was similarly taxed. The relatively small number of missions directed at strategic targets in January, however, were very successful in keeping oil production low. Bomber Command delivered several heavy blows upon Pößnitz, Brüx, Zeitz, and Merseburg-Leuna, which were coming back into production. For its part, USSTAF dispatched the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces on ten missions against oil targets in Germany and Austria and achieved good results. 75

During February 1945 the strategic air forces destroyed any serious possibility that Germany might unduly protract the war. The oil campaign, into which USSTAF and

74 Graven and Cate, 3:722.
75 Ibid., pp. 723-724.
Bomber Command poured 24,800 tons during the month, remained well under control with complete victory coming into view. The success of the oil offensive was reflected in an article published in The Globe and Mail on February 23rd:

With Germany's sources of natural or synthetic motor fuels lost or badly knocked out by air...the gasoline to drive motorized supply and troop caravans as well as tanks and mobile gun mounts is fast leaking away. It is upon her vast rail network and coal--and even wood--burning motive power that Germany must increasingly rely as the final clutch of the war in Europe takes hold....

How long Germany can stand the ever-increasing strain without an internal convulsion of some sort none can say. It seems clear, however, that this most devastating and far-spread Allied bombing attack, while directed at military targets, must have some affect on German public morale.

As March opened, the strategic air forces maintained the oil offensive along the lines set by February's operations. German oil supplies were adequate only for a fitful, uncertain defence, and the three Allied strategic air forces directed 36,000 tons at refineries and storage dumps during the month. The only setback occurred when the Germans recaptured some of the Hungarian oil fields from the Russians.

The oil offensive continued in April, and by the end of the month production was down to 30,000 tons per month or less than six per cent of normal capacity. For all

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76 Graven and Cate, 3:728.
78 Graven and Cate, 3:739.
intents and purposes, the oil campaign was over.

The Defeat of the German Air Force

On July 13, 1944, The Globe and Mail wrote:

In the six months since the Americans began their two-directional attacks on Axis targets deep in Europe...89 airplane factories have been bombed. The American force has destroyed 6109 German planes in the air and 1546 on the ground since January, with a loss of 3425...
The Americans' most recent industrial targets have included plants manufacturing jet engines of the type used in the flying bombs which the Germans are now sending against southern England...
The campaign against the German aircraft factories was so effective that the Germans were unable to recover from it... 80

Far from being in agreement with The Globe and Mail, Allied air commanders began to worry about the resurrection of the Luftwaffe. Though its opposition to strategic bombing had been feeble or non-existent during most missions, the German Air Force occasionally put up ferocious resistance to the heavy bombers, particularly around Vienna, Pölititz and Ploesti. General Spaatz soberly considered the possibility that the Luftwaffe might recuperate. There was some evidence that the German Air Force had some life left, and key members of his staff were concerned over the threat of jet-propelled fighters. They knew that the Me 163 could fly about 600 miles per hour at 25,000 feet, that an Ar 234 twin engine

79 Craven and Cate, 3:739.
80 "Mobility of Luftwaffe Cut by Reduced Oil Production," The Globe and Mail, July 13, 1944, p. 2, col. 5.
jet aircraft was likely to appear soon, and that the Me 262 could outfly any Allied aircraft then in production. General Doolittle, commander of the Eighth Air Force, feared that the jets might drive all the daylight bombers from the skies and accordingly warned General Arnold. Meanwhile, the strategic bombers attacked such German Air Force production centres as were identifiable. While USSTAF bombers had aimed only 2842 tons on aircraft targets in June, they would drop 7398 tons in July and 8442 tons in August.

The Luftwaffe gave its most stubborn resistance at German oil targets. On July 7, 1944, when the Eighth Air Force dispatched 1103 heavy bombers to attack synthetic oil plants at Böhlen, Merseburg-Leuna, and Lutzerndorf, and to aircraft factories in the Leipzig area, the German Air Force destroyed one complete squadron of bombers and damaged many more. In all, the Eighth lost 37 bombers and six fighters. On the same day, when the Fifteenth Air Force went after oil targets in Silesia, approximately 300 German fighters took on more than 1,000 B-17’s and B-24’s and shot down 25 of the bombers. On July 28th 569 B-17’s attacked the synthetic oil plant at Merseburg-Leuna. The 60 or so enemy fighters over the target did not cause serious trouble for the bomber fleets, but the disquieting feature of the mission

81 Craven and Cate, 3:304.
82 Ibid., p. 288.
83 Ibid., p. 291.
was the appearance of nine Me 163 jets. The long-feared 84 German jets had arrived.

The jets did not make a second appearance until August 16th. On that occasion the Eighth Air Force had dispatched 1090 heavy bombers to attack oil refineries and aircraft plants in central Germany. The returning bombers were intercepted by 200 German fighters which shot down 24 of their number. Amongst the enemy fighters were six Me 163's which made passes at both the B-17's and their P-51 escorts.

On September 11th, the jets made their third appearance. The Eighth Air Force, on that date, dispatched 1131 heavy bombers to synthetic oil plants at Ruhland, Böhlen, Brüx, Merseburg-Leuna, Lützkendorf, Misburg, and Magdeburg, a military vehicle plant at Chemnitz, engine works at Hannover and an ordnance depot at Magdeburg. Nearly 400 fighters were sighted by the bombers, and 125 broke through the P-51 escort to shoot down 20 heavy bombers. About 25 jets were amongst the German interceptors, but they refused combat. When the Eighth Air Force went after synthetic oil plants on September 12th and 13th, they were met by vigourous German fighter opposition and lost 45 bombers to the enemy.

The threatened resurgence of the Luftwaffe was thwarted,

84 Girbig, p. 155.
85 Ibid., pp. 157-158.
86 Craven and Cate, 3:301.
87 Ibid., p. 302.
or at least postponed, by the combined effect of the oil offensive and 96 raids on the aircraft industry during the summer. Captured German records revealed that approximately 500 aircraft were destroyed each week during the summer of 1944. Combat losses in the Luftwaffe (killed and missing) rose from 31,000 to 44,000 between May 31 and October 31, 1944.

The German fighter force once more became a serious menace to Allied air power in the last quarter of 1944. With the loss of her bases in France, Belgium and the Balkans, Germany concentrated her fighters in the Reich. Though German fighter missions were becoming sporadic as the amount of available aviation spirits declined, the Luftwaffe was still capable of turning out a spirited opposition to the strategic bombers. Fighting over short distances now that her forward fighter bases were gone, the Luftwaffe concentrated almost 85 per cent of its single engine aircraft in the western portion of the Reich.

The alarm felt at SHAEF and USSTAF over the German jets led Spaatz to place jet plants in a priority second only to oil that September. Though several suspected jet establishments at Kiel, Leipheim and Stuttgart were bombed with what seemed good results, later evidence showed no real interference with German production. The industry was too well dis-

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88 Craven and Gate, 3:304.
89 Ibid., p. 657.
persed and concealed. Spaatz soon dropped the priority rating, but determined to attack jet installations whenever and wherever they could be detected.

The Globe and Mail seemed to be aware of the new spark of life in the Luftwaffe. It tended, however, to downplay the menace of a revitalized German Air Force:

The enemy...is expected to fight bitterly in the air in defending German territory. None of those intimately connected with the forthcoming air offensive could on a walkover....

It has been estimated that the enemy commands at least 1200 first-line fighters long held back to meet the present emergency. Among them are novel types such as single and twin engined jet aircraft endowed with greater speed than most of the Allied machines they face. These curiosities are best suited for reconnaissance flights. So fast are some of them that they are not manoeuvrable enough for defence....

It is considered probable that a major air assault on the Reich will be hotly contended, but it certainly cannot be stopped.

While persistently holding to oil as the top priority and according the German aircraft industry no fixed priority, USSTAF did not ignore that target system completely. The tonnages dropped on it by the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces during September, October, November and December 1944 amounted to 2026, 3409, 356 and 350 respectively. Attention was also focused on airfields where German planes lay idle most of the time for lack of fuel. In November USSTAF intelligence

90 Craven and Cate, 3:659.
92 Craven and Cate, 3:662.
advised that it would be useless to try to demolish the 350 or more airfields available to the Germans, even if a number of aircraft were destroyed in the raids. Rather, left-over bombing effort should be used and applied only to selected bases in the west.

Still, the German air attacks were vicious. On November 21st, after three weeks of inactivity, some 400 German fighters intercepted B-17's in the Leipzig area. Successful P-51 fighter cover kept the majority of the German fighters at bay and as a result only five bombers were lost. Five days later about 550 German fighters engaged nearly 1,000 bombers near Hannover and brought down 25 of them. On November 27th almost 750 German fighters rose to do battle, but destroyed only 11 of the P-51's escorting the bombers.

During January 1945, General Arnold thought that it might be necessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to issue an overriding directive aimed at the reconquest of the German Air Force. USSTAF assessed the German fighter force as more formidable, confident, and aggressive than it had been since February 1944. Already the Germans had manufactured 700 Me 262's and 100 Ar 234's, USSTAF believed. There was a feeling that the German jets might upset the balance of air power if the war lasted beyond June 1945. General Spaatz,

93 Craven and Cate, 3:663.
94 Ibid., p. 664.
95 Ibid., p. 719.
unlike General Arnold, regarded jet fighters as more of a threat in the near future than the conventional Me 109's and FW 190's. General Doolittle urged that the strategic air forces concentrate on rooting out the jet plants, a stand which General Anderson strongly supported.

The deep uneasiness felt in Allied headquarters was reflected in the elevation of jet production to a first priority, coequal with oil. A new directive issued on January 15, 1945, called for the destruction of the jet production centres, training and operational establishments and appropriate storage units. The attack on the jet aircraft industry, when it was carried out, was made almost entirely by the Eighth Air Force. This was due not only to the nature of the target system, now so dispersed that only special daylight attacks could inflict damage on it, but also because British intelligence services did not consider the threat important.

On February 9th, when 1296 Eighth Air Force heavy bombers attempted to strike at high priority targets in central Germany, Me 262 jets made their first appearance in weeks. Though the jets were faster than the P-51 escorts, they brought down only one bomber at a loss of two of their

96 Craven and Cate, 3:666.
97 Ibid., p. 719.
98 Webster and Frankland, 4:182.
99 Webster and Frankland, 3:269.
own number. Six days later, the Fifteenth Air Force dispatched 263 B-24's to Regensburg and unloaded 559 tons on the jet airfield and adjacent Me 262 plant. Nearly 23 jets were destroyed on the ground and 19 were seriously damaged. Curiously enough, the Germans could not get their jets off the ground in time.

There was no indication in The Globe and Mail that the Allies were concerned about the appearance of the German jets. In fact, the paper gave the exact opposite impression to its readers. On February 5, 1945, the paper ran an article in which General Ira Eaker declared that all the German planes, except the jets, were obsolescent. The jets, however, were "inferior to the new American models" and were not able to successfully attack the Allied Mustangs, Thunderbolts and Spitfires. General Arnold, who felt that the more conventional designs were to be feared more than the jets, explained to the press on March 20th:

Germany's jet planes have failed to measure up to Nazi propaganda claims.... As a matter of fact, they have shot down very, very few of our fighters or bombers.... Although we were a bit apprehensive at first as to how many jet planes we would be able to shoot down, we have been able to shoot down many more than we expected.

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100 Craven and Cate, 3:729.
101 Ibid., p. 730.
During March the gasoline shortage was so acute in Germany that only the top ranking crews were allowed to fly. When the Eighth Air Force dispatched 1048 bombers against widely scattered targets in central and western Germany on March 3rd, more than 50 Me 262's and Me 163's attacked the formation and shot down six fighters and three bombers. During the night of the following day, the German Air Force launched operation GISELA. In carefully planned operations, the German night fighters slipped into the RAF bomber stream and brought down 75 bombers over Chemnitz.

There was little Luftwaffe opposition to the Allied air attacks until March 18th when the long hovering menace of a jet air force finally materialized. On that occasion the Eighth Air Force dispatched 1250 heavy bombers and 14 groups of P-51's to Berlin. During the attack on the city, jet fighters, attacking in formations as large as 36 aircraft, destroyed 24 bombers and five fighters. Plak was so heavy over the target that more than half the bombers were damaged, and 16 so badly that they crashed behind Russian lines instead of trying to return to England. The Eighth was prepared for jet attacks the following day and as a result lost only three bombers in the air battle over Leipzig. On March

104 Craven and Cate, 3:740.
106 Craven and Cate, 3:744.
107 Ibid., p. 744.
20th the jets attacked in a force of about 40 aircraft, but only two heavy bombers were shot down.

When the Fifteenth Air Force attacked the synthetic oil plant at Ruhland on March 22nd, it was met by about 40 jets which shot down three of the bombers. On the 24th, when the Fifteenth conducted its first assault on Berlin, the Germans sent up a force of jets to intercept the bombers, but only succeeded in bringing down two of them.

The last vicious Luftwaffe defence of a German target was encountered over Hamburg on March 31, 1945. Approximately 30 Me 262's intercepted the RAF bombers over the target, and were skillfully directed by ground controllers to stragglers and to formations not protected by fighter cover. The last group of Canadian Lancasters was ten minutes behind schedule in reaching the target and made its bomb run under heavy attack from the Me 262's. Eight bombers were lost.

The Globe and Mail wrote an appropriate article on the demise of the German Air Force. Quoting Major-General Orvil A. Anderson, deputy commander of operations of the Eighth Air Force, the paper stated that the decline of the Luftwaffe to a state of impotence was due to the strategic attacks on

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108 Craven and Cate, 3:744.
109 Ibid., p. 745.
110 Ibid., p. 746.
German factories and the virtual destruction of the German oil industry. Anderson's statement was based on fact. German aircraft production, which had weathered the severe bombings of the first half of 1944, only began to decline in September. From a high of 4352 aircraft per month in September, production levels fell to 1867 per month in March 1945. The majority of the aircraft produced were fighters, with 5757 produced in the first three months of 1945. It did not matter, in the end, that the Germans were still producing fighter aircraft, for they were rapidly running out of the fuel to fly them. Fuel production under German control steadily dropped during 1944 and 1945. From a high of 968,000 tons in March 1944, production fell to 303,000 tons in December. By April 1945, production was down to 30,000 tons per month or six per cent of normal capacity.

By the end of April the Allies were able to issue a joint statement that the strategic bombing campaign in Europe was over. What resistance they had from the Luftwaffe was sporadic and always more costly to the Germans. When the Allies entered Germany, they found literally hundreds of aircraft grounded for lack of fuel. German aircraft were scattered

113 Von Rhoden Studies, 4:122.
114 Webster and Frankland, 3:110.
across the Reich in caves, mines and forests. In the aircraft plants were designs for aircraft whose appearance could have changed the face of the aerial war. But it was all too late. Designs could not be completed, and even if they could have been, there would have been no fuel to fly them. The German Air Force, after nearly six years of war, was finished.
CONCLUSION

Reading The Globe and Mail for the war years, one is struck by the sense of optimism in the reporting of the paper that never dulled despite what was actually taking place on the field of battle. This was not entirely the fault of the paper for its stories were drawn from the heavily censored communiques issued by the Allied military and governmental authorities. What the paper printed was what the Allied governments wanted it to print.

What came across in the pages of The Globe and Mail during the war years was a picture of strategic bombing that was almost the opposite of what actually was happening. Reading the paper one is bombarded by names of cities, numbers of planes dispatched and lost—though the early communiques preferred to say missing or failed to return—and the tonnages dropped on various types of targets. In the main, the reporting of the strategic bombing was such that it often seemed that only the city names were changed and that the results were always the same. There were never any bombing failures, the worst thing that the paper would print was that the bombing results were satisfactory. This, too, was not the fault of The Globe and Mail, but rather the fault of the people who wrote the communiques that the stories were drawn from.
What is missing from the paper is the realization that the strategic bombing of Germany was not always a success. Moreover, the discussion of the difficult process of learning how and when to bomb a particular type of target is missing. Reading that a certain number of cities were bombed on a certain raid, one is inclined to think of masterful strategy and planning as well as a successful bombing mission—which is the impression The Globe and Mail perpetuated—rather than one specific target being hit—and sometimes the wrong one—and the remainder of the bombs falling on secondary and opportunity targets.

Missing also from the pages of the paper are the conflicts between the Allied leaders. One tends to believe, after reading The Globe and Mail, that there was always some overall master plan that was conceived and carried out in complete accord. One reads about the Allied leaders getting together at Washington, Casablanca or Quebec and thinks that these were the occasions where the master plan was pieced out. In reality it took months of talking and bargaining to reach a plan for the strategic bombing of Germany, and even then it was not carried out in unity. RAF Bomber Command and the United States Eighth Air Force often operated on widely divergent operational theories. In the end, despite the directives, Sir Charles Portal had to let Sir Arthur Harris have his own way and use Bomber Command as he saw fit.

Reading The Globe and Mail, one is apt to think of the offensive against the German Air Force and its supporting
industries as a campaign in which large numbers of bombers steadily demolished German aircraft production centres. The logical outcome of such an offensive was that there were fewer German fighters built to intercept the bomber formations. Together with the strategic bombing of the German oil industry, the counter-air offensive effectively defeated the Luftwaffe. Actually, strategic bombing only produced an indisposition in the great industrial machine that fed the Luftwaffe. Despite Allied bombing, German aircraft production never fell below the March 1941 level of 1191 aircraft per month. Overall monthly production figures reached a high of 4352 aircraft per month in September 1944 and fell to 1867 per month in March 1945. The campaign against the German oil industry, however, was responsible for grounding many of the completed aircraft. Begun in May 1944, the offensive steadily reduced German oil production until, by April 1945, it was less than six per cent of normal capacity. That the average man could think of the counter-air offensive as producing more than an indisposition in the German aircraft industry was due to the manipulation of facts by the Allied governments in their communiques and the publication of the communiques by The Globe and Mail.

It is only by examining the wealth of materials dealing with the strategic bombing of Germany that one can understand the depth of the distortion that the Allied governments created and The Globe and Mail printed as news in the years preceding the German collapse. The paper's coverage of the defeat of
the Luftwaffe, however, is only part of a larger whole. Other aspects of strategic bombing were similarly distorted by the Allied governments and that distortion was also perpetuated in The Globe and Mail. An in-depth look at the manner in which the entire air war was portrayed by the Allied governments would reveal the full manner in which the press was manipulated for the sake of keeping public morale high. That is beyond the scope of this paper, but it would be a valuable contribution to the understanding of the role of The Globe and Mail during the war years.
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