The United Nations in Cambodia and El Salvador: Promoter of peace or accessory to revolution?

J. Taylor. Wentges

University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd

Recommended Citation
Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 4326.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/4326
NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.
THE UNITED NATIONS IN CAMBODIA AND EL SALVADOR:

PROMOTER OF PEACE OR ACCESSORY TO REVOLUTION?

by

J. Taylor Wentges

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
through the Department of Political Science in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts at the
University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

1993

© J. Taylor Wentges
The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ABSTRACT

THE UNITED NATIONS IN CAMBODIA AND EL SALVADOR: PROMOTER OF PEACE OR ACCESSORY TO REVOLUTION

J. Taylor Wentges

Over the past year, there has been a surprising number of large-scale United Nations peacekeeping missions that have run into serious problems (Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Somalia). While domestic politics, international relations, and history are central variables in these cases, little attention has been given to the character of U.N. peacekeeping, itself, as a factor in this instability.

Under the right conditions, flawed U.N. interventions can actually help to increase the potential for revolution. Looking at relatively homogeneous nation-states in particular, this revolutionary potential is highest when there is a conjuncture of the following elements: crisis of state resources, elite alienation and division, mass mobilization potential and an effective revolutionary movement. In countries with rigid and underdeveloped political and economic institutions, fundamental and rapid forces of change can accelerate the society toward this revolutionary situation (ie. conjuncture of elements).

The findings of this thesis suggest that a large-scale U.N. peacekeeping operation, improperly conceived and implemented, can become such a "force of revolutionary conjuncture." This is especially true with missions that exhibit the following
characteristics: 1. poorly trained personnel; 2. inappropriate national contingents; 3. deployment delays; 4. poor mandate enforcement; 5. large-scale misconduct of personnel; 6. compromised neutrality; and 7. ineffective command and control capabilities. Coupled with other de-stabilizing variables, therefore, such U.N. operations may unwittingly contribute to revolutionary outcomes.

These conclusions are developed through a comparison, between March 1992 and March 1993, of U.N. peacekeeping missions and the two state-focused elements of a revolutionary situation - crisis of state resources and elite alienation and division - within El Salvador and Cambodia. Although many key differences exist in these case studies, there are enough similarities to make one wonder why, after one year, El Salvador has moved away from, and Cambodia toward, a revolutionary situation. The answer partly lies in the way each mission's characteristics have influenced the peace, and in turn, have altered the potential for revolution.

The U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) has been largely successful in implementing peace, partly because of the overall absence of the above-mentioned characteristics. With the U.N. transitional Authority in Cambodia, the opposite generally has been the case. Consequently, El Salvador's peace-induced reduction in the state's resource difficulties and elite disaffection can be traced, in part, to the competence of ONUSAL. By contrast, the intensification of these two elements with the collapse of Cambodia's peace can, to a certain degree, be linked to problems within UNTAC.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMITATIONS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERMS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutions</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. BACKGROUND: EL SALVADOR AND CAMBODIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Missions</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison Rationale</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. PEACEKEEPING OBJECTIVES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEACEKEEPING OUTCOMES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. PEACEKEEPING MISSION CHARACTERISTICS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component Nationalities</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction Time</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. THE REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION: STATE COLLAPSE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis of State Resources</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Alienation and Division</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map of El Salvador (ONUSAL Deployment)</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map of Cambodia (UNTAC Deployment)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA AUCTORIS</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As my thesis supervisor, Professor David Wurfel has been a true 'accelerator' and 'facilitator' during this thesis-writing process. Accordingly, his careful and comprehensive guidance has been instrumental in shaping the content and style herein. As this is his final year at the University of Windsor, I am singularly honoured at having been accepted for supervision.

A special thank you goes to my second reader, Professor Bruce Burton, who has provided me with important additional insights and suggestions.

I am also indebted to Professor Barry Adam for the helpful and constructive comments he has given me. His academic and direct experience with El Salvador was particularly useful in this study.

On a personal note, I wish to thank the graduate class for their friendship and encouragement — in particular, Lizhu and Gurbeen. A warm thank you must also go to my parents, whose support is always appreciated.

Any errors of fact or interpretation in this thesis are exclusively my own.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the end of the Cold War, many new United Nations Peacekeeping operations have intervened domestically with mandates that have gone far beyond simply inserting U.N. forces between exhausted belligerents, and then waiting indefinitely for a political settlement. David Cox points out that United Nations missions have expanded dramatically into the areas of prevention of human rights violations, political advice, electoral assistance, sanctions, disarmament, political settlements, administration and repatriation.¹ Concomitantly, there has been much hope that many of the original disputes, amplified and distorted by foreign involvement, would finally end. However, in a good number of these new missions, conflict has actually intensified. Recently, fighting has escalated in Bosnia, Angola and Cambodia, and threatens to do so in Somalia. Indeed, The Economist observed that "as the year [1992] comes to an end, the high hopes that the world placed in the U.N., as its post-Cold War policeman and do-gooder, have come tumbling to the ground."²


commitments a contributing factor to this increased instability? Indeed, is the United Nations helping to foster unstable revolutionary situations? If so, under what conditions does this take place, and how can they be eliminated?

This paper will demonstrate that the character of a United Nations peacekeeping operation can facilitate the advent of a revolutionary situation. It facilitates this situation if it accelerates the emergence of the following elements: a crisis of state resources, elite alienation and division, mass mobilization potential, and a broad-based, united revolutionary opposition. Large-scale United Nations peacekeeping missions that have failed to fulfil their mandate can be a cause of such acceleration.

This failure tends to take place in U.N. missions that have: 1. poorly trained personnel; 2. inappropriate national contingents; 3. deployment delays; 4. poor mandate enforcement; 5. large-scale misconduct of personnel; 6. compromised neutrality; and 7. ineffective and inefficient command and control capabilities. Should an operation display any of these characteristics, the chances for its success will have been reduced. Coupled with other de-stabilizing factors, in turn, this can lead to revolutionary outcomes.

In order to explore the above-stated hypothesis, a comparison will be made using the case studies of El Salvador and Cambodia. This will be done in three steps. The first step involves an examination of the degree of success of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Next, the relationship between this extent of success and the seven character traits will be looked at. Lastly, zeroing in on one of the little-emphasized aspects of revolution theory this century - state collapse - the paper will explore the impact of the missions' success or failure on two elements of a revolutionary situation in particular - crisis of state resources, and elite alienation and division. It is hoped that, in doing so, a connection can be found between the character of a peacekeeping mission and the potential for revolution. Using this criterion, this study asserts that ONUSAL has been a good example of how to conduct a peacekeeping operation, whereas in the case of UNTAC, the opposite is true.

LIMITATIONS

Firstly, it must be emphasized that this paper focuses less on the impact of the U.N. vis a vis other causes, and more on the evaluation of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in comparison with a similar operation. Secondly, there is less emphasis on specific remedies for general U.N. peacekeeping flaws. The thesis is concerned more with simply identifying certain deficiencies - be they the fault of the U.N. or other circumstances - that can contribute to a revolutionary situation.

Lastly, the newness of this area of study - peacekeeping after the Cold War - necessarily involves methodological limitations. One does not have the luxury of looking at numerous, completed
missions, some possibly affording the researcher comparisons over a period of years, or even investigations of chronologically distinct cases within the same geographical area. Accordingly, this paper must be content with researching two ongoing case studies, in rather different settings and with a time frame of little more than one year. However, what this account lacks in historical armchair comfort and security, it makes up for by the urgency and import of its general prescriptive insights.

**TERMS**

Several terms are in need of explanation. United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his June 1992 report to the Security Council entitled *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, divides U.N. deployments into four categories. ¹ (1)"Peacekeeping" involves the consent of the parties concerned, stringent deployment rules of engagement, a U.N. command structure, and usually an open-ended mandate. (2)"Preventative diplomacy" concerns "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties," while (3)"peacemaking", via peaceful means, brings hostile parties to agreement once disputes have

arisen. Finally, Boutros-Ghali describes (4) "peacebuilding" as the "sustained and co-operative work to deal with underlying social, economic, culture and humanitarian problems. Within this essay, 'peacekeeping' will be interpreted broadly to include all forms of U.N. missions, including the more recent large-scale operations that include elements of each of these four classes of missions. The term 'classical peacekeeping', however, will indicate only Boutros-Ghali's first, more traditional mode of peacekeeping.

In addition, Allan James notes that peacekeeping can be further reduced to: 1. deployments at a border between two nation-states; and 2. deployments within a nation-state.\(^1\) This latter, internal context will be the primary focus of attention. Consequently, United Nations peacekeeping within this paper will refer to large-scale operations that involve mutually agreed upon separation of forces, preventative diplomacy, peacemaking or peacebuilding within a nation-state, and that are under direct U.N. military and political control.

Combining Jack Goldstone's and Charles Tilly's definitions, a revolution can be seen as a rapid, forcible, fundamental change in a society's political institutions and leaders, whereby the majority of the membership of these new institutions originate from outside the pre-revolutionary polity.\(^5\) Tilly's use of polity will

---


be modified to mean those elites operating within the rules of the current order (i.e. regime, supporting elites, parliamentary opposition). The terms regime and government will be used interchangeably to mean those controlling the formal levers of power within the polity.

A revolutionary situation describes circumstances wherein the potential for revolution in the near future is high. It is also defined by the presence of four elements: a crisis of state resources, elite alienation and division, mass mobilization potential, and a strong revolutionary movement (see Theorctical Framework - Revolutions, Chapter II).

Theda Skocpol's definition of state is useful here. Namely, the state consists of a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations, co-ordinated by an executive authority, with interests of its own. Compared with a regime or government, therefore, it has a more pervasive quality, and involves a somewhat greater sense of permanence. This is not to be confused with a nation-state - a United Nations-recognized, sovereign entity.

Elites, the influential groups and individuals within a society, can be divided into four categories. Governing elites are those within the formal structure of the state (i.e. bureaucracy,
political leaders). Supporting elites reside more within the informal corridors of state power (i.e. business). Opposition elites use the existing laws and institutions to oppose the regime in power, and are, therefore, still situated within the polity (i.e. parliamentary opposition). Finally, counter elites can be seen as those using extra-legal means to change political institutions and leaders (i.e. revolutionary leadership).

The term 'revolutionary movement' will also merge Goldstone and Tilly definitions. Accordingly, it will be thought of as an anti-state coalition that includes groups outside the existing polity and utilizes violence toward revolutionary ends. A revolution would therefore involve one or more counter elite-led revolutionary movements generating violent and significant change to the make-up of a society's governing, supporting, and opposition elites.
CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1. REVOLUTIONS

This essay will use a modified version of Jack Goldstone's analytic framework in determining the likelihood of a revolutionary situation. Simply stated, Goldstone contends that certain "new dynamic forces" can produce a conjuncture of three elements—a crisis of state resources, elite alienation and division, and mass mobilization potential. With this conjuncture one has a revolutionary situation, wherein the potential for revolution is high.

As examples of forces of revolutionary conjuncture, Goldstone stresses rapid population growth and price inflation. In themselves, these do not induce a revolutionary situation; they must be coupled with inflexible political and economic structures within a society. Consequently, Goldstone argues that instead of looking for universal causes, the political scientist must ask,

Are there any forces in this particular society that are straining the state's resources, alienating and dividing elites, or increasing the potential for mobilization of the populace against the existing regime?

Expanding on his crisis of state resources, Goldstone cites a

---, 42.
fiscal crisis and the inability of the state to accomplish major tasks. Using case studies as far back as the seventeenth century English Revolution, he explains that

Historically, when the revenues of a state become, over time, insufficient to pay the standing army and bureaucracy, award pensions and favors to supporters, and meet the costs of building roads, ensuring the supply of grain to cities, maintaining order, enforcing justice, and overseeing local administration, the authority of the state wanes.\(^5\)

Essentially, then, the state suffers a crisis in legitimacy, depriving it of the means to resist its adversaries, external or domestic.

Elite alienation and division are manifested in a conflict over the state distribution of power, exacerbated when the regime confines power to a small minority. All governments are, however, plagued to some degree by elite disaffection and divided loyalties. The key point to remember is that only if such elites are alienated to the point where they would act illegally to insert themselves into power does a coup d'etat or revolution become a possible outcome. To be more specific, extra-constitutional actions of this nature tend to take place when government-allocated resources become scarce, and when elites from among the polity (i.e. those acting within the existing rules of order) are denied access to sought-after power.

Division to the extreme of severe polarization must also be present. "A united elite, opposed to a government that is weak in resources, can simply stage a coup d'etat and then alter government

\(^5\)Ibid, 38.
policies."\textsuperscript{10} In other words, sufficiently alienated elite factions, unable or unwilling to acquire other elite support, tip the scales toward revolutionary outcomes when they are driven to seek alliances outside the polity.

Goldstone then sub-divides the final element, mass mobilization potential, into two elements—popular grievances and the ability of local communities to organize autonomously. In the author’s words,

\begin{quote}
A high mobilization potential is generally produced by the combination of adverse trends, such as shrinking access to land or falling real wages, and local community structures that give popular groups some freedom of action versus local authorities as well as a basis for organization in support of community goals.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

A revolution takes place within this revolutionary situation when a united, broad-based, anti-state coalition has the requisite ideology and organization to overthrow the regime and establish new political institutions. This revolutionary movement "typically includes significant elements of the elite and mobilized mass support."\textsuperscript{12}

In consolidating and building upon existing models of domestic insurrection, Goldstone has made several important contributions to revolution theory. Firstly, like Skocpol, he emphasizes the critical function of state breakdown. Goldstone would agree with Skocpol that "a fundamental trigger for the historical social

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid, 38
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, 40.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, 336.
revolution was the incapacitation of administrative and military
machineries." They both would also hold that revolutions are not
simply caused by internal, structural economic contradictions, as
Marx argued, but also by political factors such as elite division
or institutional unresponsiveness. However, compared with Skocpol,
Goldstone is less economically deterministic, correctly placing
more importance on the revolutionary movement and on the ability of
the state to reverse the revolutionary process (ie. through
reforms, greater coercion)." Further, he incorporates Chalmers
Johnson's and Samuel
Huntington's arguments that rapid social and economic change within
the context of rigid political institutions can lead to upheaval.
Goldstone breaks out of the circuitous modernization debate,
however, by uniquely isolating the role of population growth and
inflation. His framework, however, can be clarified and expanded
in certain parts.

First of all, the model does not adequately deal with the
issues of nationalism and ethnic struggles. In these conflicts,
for example, does one analyze the breakdown of the central state
structures or just collapse within the areas of contention? More
importantly, Goldstone's necessary alliance of alienated, radical
elites with revolutionaries would certainly have to be qualified.
Afterall, the Vietminh in Vietnam ousted the French without an


Moshiri, 34.
alliance with any segment of the French colonial elite, nor could one imagine members of Israel's elite fighting for the P.L.O. The Goldstone framework, therefore, can best be applied to domestic conflicts within homogeneous societies.

Taking a closer look at his forces of revolutionary conjuncture, Goldstone is essentially dealing with rapid, fundamental, potentially destabilizing change - "new dynamic forces" - in a background of rigid institutions. Although he limits himself to only a few examples of such forces, others can certainly be included. War, democratization, the early stages of modernization, military occupation, and large-scale humanitarian relief in the form of aid or United Nations peacekeeping are but a few examples. This would also permit a greater emphasis on international factors, an area that Goldstone, unlike Skocpol, gives little attention to.

When Goldstone talks of elite alienation and division, he is unclear as to which elites he means (i.e. governing, supporting, opposition, counter). This paper will assume he refers to elite alienation and division within the polity.

Another weakness is his treatment of grievances. Goldstone fails to discuss adequately the vital role of perceptions and expectations. Ted Robert Gurr, expanding on J.C. Davies' focus of rising expectations as a prime cause of revolutions, provides a more sophisticated framework for analyzing popular discontent. He emphasizes the psychological factor of relative deprivation - rising expectations and falling capabilities - as the basis for
mass grievances. Justifying the study of perceptions, he succinctly states, "Men are quick to aspire beyond their social means and quick to anger when those means prove inadequate, but slow to accept their limitations." Accordingly, using Gurr's approach, the population's expectations, as well as objective circumstances, should be inserted under Goldstone's sub-category of grievances.

For Goldstone, a revolutionary situation includes only the three elements of crisis of state resources, elite alienation and division, and mass mobilization potential. However, if one defines a revolutionary situation as a high potential for revolution, then it is imperative to also include the revolutionary movement as an essential element. Without this critical, broad alliance of disaffected, anti-state elites and mobilized mass support, the chances of a revolution taking place are very slim. Consequently, a fourth key element - the revolutionary movement - should also be included in the revolutionary situation.

Chalmers Johnson has written about accelerators as events that contribute to a revolution, although do not by themselves cause a revolution. More specifically, they are "events that rupture a system's pseudo-integration based on deterrence." Examples range from long-term events such as war and reforms, to short-term incidents such as assassinations and strikes. With Goldstone's


16Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 99.
framework, the forces of conjuncture (i.e. forces of rapid change) can be seen as essentially nothing more than long-term accelerators. In other words, they facilitate the creation of a revolutionary situation. To move from a revolutionary situation to a revolution, on the other hand, a more specific, short-term accelerator is required. This accelerator is the final spark, whether planned or spontaneous, that causes a revolution. Thus, Goldstone's approach can be interpreted as expanding on Johnson's earlier work with accelerators. This paper will limit itself, however, to discussion of revolutionary situations, and will not go beyond to explore the subsequent process to revolution.

A modified Goldstone framework, therefore, has six principal advantages. It recognizes that its application is limited to struggles of a non-ethnic nature, emphasizes the role of rapid change, expands on the definition of elites, partially synthesizes psychological and structural approaches, puts greater emphasis on the revolutionary movement, and differentiates between accelerators of revolutions and accelerators of revolutionary situations.

Relating this to our case studies, the theoretical framework of this paper will involve assessing how United Nations peacekeeping operations, as a revolutionary force of conjuncture (i.e. long-term accelerator), can serve to contribute to a revolutionary situation in the relatively homogeneous societies of Cambodia and El Salvador.

As mentioned in Chapter I, however, the focus within these two countries will be limited to the crisis of state resources and
elite alienation and division. While vital to any revolution, popular unrest and a strong insurgency are often mistakenly believed to be sufficient ingredients for upheaval, and are therefore given an undue amount of empirical attention. They forget, as David Wurfel explains, that revolutions rarely succeed in the absence of state collapse.17 It is for this reason, therefore, that the paper will confine itself to Goldstone's two innovative state-focused elements, leaving the more trodden path for others.

2. PEACEKEEPING

Over the past several years, there has been a great deal of discussion concerning reform of United Nations peacekeeping. This discussion has centred around seven main areas, the reform of which has been considered vital to the success of the new scope of U.N. missions: training, component nationalities, deployment speed, mandate enforcement, conduct of personnel, force neutrality, and command and control. As will be shown, peacekeeping missions lacking such reforms, risk becoming "forces of revolutionary conjuncture".

The inconsistencies in the levels of training within contingents have been widely criticized. The Secretary-General, himself, in his June 1992 report stated, "I recommend that

arrangements be reviewed and improved for training peacekeeping personnel."\textsuperscript{18} The discrepancies have arisen because some countries cannot afford the requisite training or they place people in the U.N. as patronage appointments. Donald Ethel, former head of Canada's contribution to the European Cooperation Commission Observer Mission in Yugoslavia, explains that

unlike Canada, some nations use the U.N. as an employment agency because they know the U.N. will pay well. As an employment agency, they sometimes assign inexperienced and sometimes poorly trained officers and units. In some areas they can become part of the problem - political and economic.\textsuperscript{19}

He then goes on to show how conscripted troops also pose a large problem. "You are sometimes dealing with a much less sophisticated organization there because they are told to be there, not usually willingly, conscripted into the area."\textsuperscript{20} Poorly trained contingents can seriously undermine the success of an operation by jeopardizing impartiality, command and control, and general relations with the population. To avoid this, Peter Langille considers it vital that peacekeeping training include instruction on the following topics:

- an introduction to the U.N. system, the U.N. charter, the U.N. command and control structures, an overview of U.N. peacekeeping activities, mission security and defence,...how to conduct yourself as a peacekeeper in a multinational contingent, neutrality, impartiality, cultural sensitivity,...and most important, some basic skills in conflict resolution, particularly mediation and mediation.

\textsuperscript{18} Boutros-Ghali, \textit{An Agenda for Peace}.

\textsuperscript{19} Donald Ethel, Committee Witness, \textit{The Study of Peacekeeping}, 16 June 1992, 14.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, 26.
negotiation.\textsuperscript{21}

In a related area, the national make-up of the mission must be considered with great care. Certain peacekeeping contingents' political or cultural backgrounds may be deemed offensive by one or more belligerent parties, thus endangering the objectivity of a U.N. deployment. For this reason, American and French troops became targets during their involvement in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The inherent bias of several nationalities engaged in U.N. activities in the former Yugoslavia - the confluence of Western, Islamic and Slavic cultures - has also received a great deal of criticism. Lewis Mackenzie argues,

It defies impartiality when an Egyptian battalion, which is Muslim, is brought in. The same is true with respect to a French battalion, which is Catholic, or a Ukrainian battalion, which is Orthodox. No matter how impartial you are in reality, the perception is frequently that you are siding.\textsuperscript{22}

With such partiality, the chances for a successful peacekeeping mission are significantly reduced. Professor Edith Klein of York University Department of Political Science sums it up well when she concludes, "One of the vital rules of negotiation is that both parties have to agree to the team that is doing the brokering or negotiating."\textsuperscript{23}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{21} Peter Langille, Committee Witness, \textit{The Study of Peacekeeping}, 25 Nov. 1992, 80.

\textsuperscript{22} Lewis Mackenzie, Committee Witness, \textit{The Study of Peacekeeping}, 24 Nov. 1992, 46.

\end{footnotes}
Another big problem is that often the U.N. arrives in a country far too late, thus dashed popular expectations, and allowing a heretofore manageable situation to reach uncontrollable levels. Queen's University's David Cox supports this view when he asserts that "the U.N. needs to be able to intervene earlier." 24 In the case of the current Somalia peacekeeping operation, Mohammed Sahnoun, former co-ordinator of U.N. relief effort in Somalia, harshly criticized the U.N.'s unnecessarily protracted deployment. "We were totally absent....The U.N. should have intervened and they didn't. It was a very long and tragic delay." 25

Even the U.N. Secretary-General is critical.

A long-standing problem which continues to hamper the effectiveness, if not the viability, of all operations is the time-lag that currently exists between the decision to create a new operation and the actual arrival of United Nations troops in the field. Under the current procedures, it can take three to four months for a peacekeeping mission to become fully operational....It takes that long for discussions to be concluded with troop-contributing states on the composition of the force; for the purchase and shipment of communication equipment, appropriate vehicles and other materiel; and for the transportation and deployment of infantry troops and military specialists from different countries. 26

It is therefore essential that the United Nations arrive quickly, while popular and international support, in addition to cooperation with and among the factions, is at its maximum.

24 Cox, 8.


Once the United Nations has been invited by domestic belligerents and the world community to oversee or manage a settlement, that mandate must be promptly enforced. As Mackenzie declares,

If you are to do something you better be able to enforce it....You have to have the capacity. Otherwise, it does not have a deterrent capability if there is no teeth in it. Sanctions would fall in the same category. It is not enough to say that we will impose sanctions. At some stage you have to have the ability to enforce them."22

Echoing this view, Cox contends that the U.N. needs "to flex enough military muscle to make would be warriors think twice about ignoring the United Nations."23 Boutros-Ghali, also believes that

under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international peace and security. While such action should only be taken when all peaceful means have failed, the option of taking it is essential to the credibility of the U.N.24

Without this early deterrent effect, at best a mission will encounter delays, and, at worst it will collapse altogether, as may be the case in the former Yugoslavia.

A further area of concern is that the presence of large numbers of personnel could overwhelm a country, adversely affecting its economy, local perceptions of the peacekeeping mission, and ultimately, playing into the hands of domestic factions wishing to overturn the U.N.-established order. The enormous amounts of spending money that a large force brings in can fuel inflation;

22Mackenzie, 34.
23Cox, 8.
24Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace.
corruption and profiteering, thus increasing the disparities between rich and poor. In this regard, Namibia's peacekeeping mission is often referred to as a good example of how an operation should be run. The Russian ambassador to Canada, Aleksandr Belonogov, agrees.

We had very acute debates on that because African countries wanted the operation [in Namibia] to last a longer period and wanted it to be composed of a much bigger military component. I think we made the right decision in having insisted on the limited scale and very short time for the operation. To my mind, that is the most successful United Nations operation I recall.\(^{10}\)

Equally distressing is the danger that the actual day-to-day conduct of personnel involved in a large mission will be equated, locally, with the actions of an aggressive occupation force. This is especially true with societies that have experienced a history of hostile, external intervention, and with peacekeeping troops that ignore local mores and customs. Canadian Senator Cools even warns that the United Nations is "going down a highly interventionist road and giving it a name and wrapping it and dressing it in a costume called peace."\(^{11}\) Essentially, the U.N. must take pains to ensure that a mission's size can be effectively absorbed economically and socially by the host country. Furthermore, especially in these larger missions, it must enforce professional and culturally sensitive conduct at all times. Not

\(^{10}\)Aleksandr M. Belonogov, Committee Witness, The Study of Peacekeeping, 2 June 1992, 24-25.

\(^{11}\)Cools, Senator, Committee Member, The Study of Peacekeeping, 16 June 1992, 25.
only will such reduced and restrained forces be well-received, but they will also be more manageable, indirectly contributing to success by decreasing deployment time (and therefore increasing enforcement potential) and increasing command and control efficiency.

It is also important for the United Nations not to be seen as favouring one side or the other. Strict, impartial enforcement of the settlement must always be maintained. Writing about the situation in Bosnia, Klein recognizes this need when he states, "The conditions for getting the U.N. operation back on track are continued impartiality, continued detachment." If this is not done, the mission may forfeit the essential co-operation of all sides. In addition, if the government appears to be the lopsided beneficiary of U.N. actions, the United Nations will be blamed for any government ineptitude, and the government will be blamed if the peacekeeping mission fails to achieve peace and prosperity.

There are effectively two ways of avoiding this appearance of partiality. First, it is necessary to pressure all sides equally into abiding by the peace agreement. Second, in drafting the peace agreement, the U.N. must try to give all sides a degree of real state power during the transitional phase, commensurate with their strengths, must itself try to shoulder a significant portion of state power, or must attempt a combination of both. In other words, to the advantage of non-governing factions and/or the U.N., it is important restrict control of the state apparatus by the

\[32\] Edith Klein, 13.
governing faction. At the same time, therefore, the United Nations will be levelling factional power while disciplining any and all treaty transgressors.

Paul Diehl and Sonia Jurado apply this principle to the forthcoming South African elections. They contend that any agreement must

limit the power of the white government during the election process, and make efforts to obtain the support of relevant sub-national groups. These steps may not guarantee the success of the U.N. operation, but their absence may represent a lost opportunity to achieve peace and stability in the southern cone of Africa.\footnote{Paul F. Diehl and Sonia R. Jurado, "United Nations Elections Supervision in South Africa?: Lessons from the Namibian Peacekeeping Experience," Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Occasional Paper, 1992, 13.}

Perhaps another appropriate example is the relatively peaceful and fair 1992 Philippine elections. Part of the reason for this was that during the voting and tabulation period, the army and police were placed under the temporary control of the non-partisan Commission on Elections. This type of impartial balance must also be utilized by the United Nations.

The final category in need of reform is the United Nations command and control capability. This is an area that has also been highly criticized. The Canadian Senate Subcommittee on Security and National Defence (the Balfour Committee) has even declared that "one of the worst aspects of U.N. peacekeeping is logistics support."\footnote{James Balfour and Gregory Wirwick, "Its Time to Bring Peacekeeping Up to Date," Globe and Mail, 19 Mar. 1993.} The problem arises in missions that are too large,
have too many contingents with different languages, military standards and cultures, and are staffed with incompetent and inexperienced officials. The Balfour Committee goes on to conclude,

Units may be drawn from more than thirty countries, each with its own operational standards, many of which are simply incompatible. The subcommittee emphasized the importance of standardizing U.N. military operations, based on the established continental staff system used by most troop-contributing countries.\footnote{Ibid.}

Accordingly, with poor organization, the timetable, enforcement, and general effectiveness and efficiency suffer. This, in turn, threatens the entire mission.

These seven characteristics – poor training, inappropriate national membership, protracted deployment, ineffective enforcement, large-scale misconduct, impartiality, and poor command and control – are the stuff that failed peacekeeping missions are made of. If an operation does fail, then the chances of a revolutionary situation occurring are increased.

This is so for several reasons. With respect to the elements related to state weakness or collapse, in particular, the renewal of overall instability results in much of the promised aid, investment and finance being withheld or withdrawn. Unfortunately, the regime in power usually has already boosted its spending in anticipation of these increased resources. Therefore, the cancellation of funds leaves the regime in a fiscal crisis, unable to keep the ambitious promises made during the peacekeeping
mission's initial, booming 'honeymoon' period. Corruption, however, earlier fuelled by the massive inflow of money, continues and intensifies as speculators and opportunists within the government scramble for the rapidly evaporating resources.

Elite alienation and division is also enhanced. This takes place as resource scarcity alienates those polity elites cut off from the pie during the exit of capital (i.e. army, government employees). In turn, this forces them to seek new alliances with other long-time polity elites who are also feeling disenfranchised. Additionally, these internal factions form coalitions with new polity elites who have recently gained access to the political process during the brief period of U.N.-sponsored openness. Their frustration at achieving only partial political entry makes them eager partners in an elite coalition, and, if so alienated, in a revolutionary coalition. The United Nations, therefore, can sometimes contribute to a revolutionary situation by exacerbating the shortage of resources, and sharpening the division and alienation within the state.
CHAPTER III

BACKGROUND: EL SALVADOR AND CAMBODIA

Before placing the cases of El Salvador and Cambodia in the above theoretical framework, it is first necessary to briefly examine the backgrounds of these two nation-states.

1. History

El Salvador’s political turmoil has largely centred around grave land inequities that originated in the mid-nineteenth century. When El Salvador, together with the rest of Central America, declared its independence from Spain in 1821, the country’s main export was the dye, indigo. However, by the 1850’s, indigo prices fell considerably, as cheaper European dyes entered the market. Consequently, El Salvador’s elite turned to coffee as a replacement and, in doing so, forced mestizo and Indian communal farmers off the prime coffee-growing land. By the early twentieth century, the semi-feudal hacienda system had expropriated out of existence most of the communal peasant land holdings.

Simmering anger over this erupted in 1932 with a largely uncoordinated peasant uprising, led by Augustin Farabundo Marti. This revolt was put down brutally by the reactionary dictatorship
of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez (1931-44), killing over 30,000 peasants, including Marti. (It is referred to this day, as La Matanza - The Slaughter).

Although mild reform measures and hope for an end to the inequity and military rule existed during the 1960's, by the early 1970's, a rightist backlash of coffee and military elites reversed the trend. These interests installed Colonel Arturo Armando (1972-77) as president, ignoring the 1972 election victory by Christian Democratic candidate, Jose Napoleon Duarte. Fall-out from this resulted in opposition parties, the Church, unions, student groups and, for the first time since the Matanza, leftist rebel groups openly opposing the military regime. Response from the government was severe. Before a reform-minded coup toppled the dictatorship of General Carlos Humberto Romero on October 15, 1979, the death toll had reached 1000 a month.

Continued repression, however, prompted mass civilian resignations from the government in early 1980, including those of the three civilian members of the Junta. A second and third coup followed in 1980, with the latter junta involving Duarte.

During this period of instability in the late 1970's and early 1980's, several leftist parties responded by forming the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), and five Marxist guerrilla groups united to organize the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) - named for the 1930's revolutionary. This led to an increased military and para-military ('death-squad') counter-insurgency campaign, supported financially and militarily by the
United States.

Funding had been cut off by the Carter Administration during General Romero's rule, yet re-instated after the October 1979 coup. Nevertheless, widespread abuses, including the assassinations of Archbishop Oscar Romero in March 1980 and five U.S. churchwomen the following December, compelled Washington to suspend all aid to El Salvador. Ten days later, on December 15, 1980, the suspension was lifted. Ronald Reagan's inauguration in January 1981 dramatically escalated America's military and economic commitment to maintaining a stable regime in El Salvador. Annual military assistance, a mere $5.9 million\textsuperscript{36} in 1980, mushroomed to $86.3 million by 1984.

The civil war, commencing in 1980, continued for the next thirteen years, although by 1984, its intensity was reduced to a low level stalemate. A combination of rebel setbacks and increased pressure from Washington on the government eliminated the extreme death-toll of the early 1980's; yet abuses still continued. In 1984, Duarte was elected president and attempted to control the military and business interests. These efforts failed, and human rights violations briefly escalated again in 1989 with the election of the right wing government of President Alfredo Cristiani.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{36}Note: All dollar amounts will be quoted in U.S. currency unless otherwise stated.

Like El Salvador, Cambodia's troubles have been rooted in foreign exploitation and intervention. In contrast, however, domestic discontent has tended to have been fed less by land tenure issues, than by excessive corruption, repression and disruption caused by war.

Cambodia was reduced to a French protectorate in 1863, becoming a colony by 1884. In 1941, the country was temporarily occupied by the Japanese before returning to de facto French control again in 1945. After France granted full independence in 1953, Cambodia's King Norodom Sihanouk abdicated in favour of his father and became prime minister in 1955 and eventually head of state in 1960.

Wary of South Vietnamese, Thai and U.S. ambitions in Southeast Asia with the increasing tensions in Vietnam, Sihanouk declared neutrality in 1960. In 1965, fearing a U.S. plot against him, he severed all ties with the United States and tilted toward China, North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front (NLF) insurgency in South Vietnam in his sympathies. Thereafter, as the American involvement in Vietnam escalated, Sihanouk allowed the NLF to use Cambodian territory as a sanctuary from U.S. attacks. Reacting to this, the U.S. secretly started to bomb Cambodia in 1969.

Alarm over Sihanouk's increased pro-North Vietnamese orientation resulted in his overthrow by disaffected members of the elite and the aristocracy in a March 1970, U.S.-backed coup. Led by General Lon Nol, the new Khmer Republic was propped up by American assistance, and actively engaged NLF and North Vietnamese
army units militarily. With the virtual collapse of the country from U.S. bombing and ground intervention, government repression, and corruption, the stage was set for popular rebel groups, dominated by the Maoist Khmer Rouge, to commence serious resistance in 1971. By 1975, exacerbated by the near withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Indochina, the situation had deteriorated so badly that the Khmer Rouge (nominally led by Sihanouk until April 1976) easily toppled the Lon Nol regime in April of that year.

The Khmer Rouge, under the leadership of Pol Pot (real name Saloth Sar), immediately embarked on a mission to forcibly convert the whole of Cambodia into an agrarian-based rural commune, murdering perhaps up to a million\(^{38}\) Cambodians in the process. Furthermore, in 1977 and 1978, the Khmer Rouge instigated a series of border clashes with Vietnam. This, together with pogroms against Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia, eventually drove Vietnam to mount a full-scale invasion and subsequently overthrow the Pol Pot government in late 1978 and early 1979.

Vietnam occupied Cambodia for ten years, installing a puppet regime in Phnom Penh that, ever since, has been largely under the leadership of Hun Sen, a Khmer Rouge defector. During this decade of occupation, the Vietnamese and Cambodian armies waged a civil war against the Khmer Rouge-led Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) resistance forces. The other members of the

\(^{38}\)This figure is widely disputed. Some claim that the Khmer Rouge regime is wholly responsible, while others include deaths from U.S. bombing and Lon Nol repression.
(CGDK) included the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), a small Royalist faction led by Sihanouk; and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPLNF), a similarly sized, non-communist group commanded by former Sihanouk vice-president, Son San, and largely composed of elements from the Lon Nol regime. These factions, mainly operating in areas of western Cambodia, received most of their financial and military support from China (esp. the Khmer Rouge), the United States and Thailand. Although Vietnam withdrew in 1989, the civil war continued with little change of territorial Control.

2. United Nations Peacekeeping Missions

In 1990, the end of the Cold War, coupled with war fatigue and a great deal of pressure from the United States and the United Nations, forced the government of El Salvador and the FMLN to sit down and seriously discuss peace. The United Nations Group in Central America (ONUCA) had been in the region since November 7, 1989, yet its mandate was largely focused on Nicaragua, and was limited to overseeing agreements that ended external assistance to insurgent groups throughout Central America.\(^{33}\)

Therefore, the human rights agreements signed in San Jose, Costa Rica on July 26, 1990 by the government and the FMLN were a significant breakthrough. Following a further agreement on April

27, 1991, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador was established on May 20, 1991. ONUCA consisted of a humanitarian division of 51 civilians and 14 police officers, mandated "to monitor all agreements concluded between the two parties."40 When the final, comprehensive agreement was concluded in New York on December 31, 1991 and formally signed in Mexico City on January 16, 1992, ONUCA was replaced by a dramatically enlarged ONUCA mandate.

At an estimated cost of $58.9 million,41 a military division with an authorized strength of 380 and a police division with a staff ceiling of 631 were set up on January 20, 1992. Deployment commenced on February 7. New duties included the verification of disarmament and demobilization, aid in the set up of administration in former zones of conflict and enhanced human rights monitoring.42 This mandate was extended on October 31, 1992 for one month, and then increased again for another six months. The completion date, however, is expected to be in mid-1994, sometime after the presidential elections.43

In Cambodia, the peace process started in August 1989 with the

41 United Nations Chronicle.
first Paris Peace Conference. However, the results of these discussions were disappointing. There was disagreement among the four factions on virtually all major issues. Nevertheless, by the end of 1990, as with El Salvador, all sides started to become more flexible. The fact that the eleven-year war had taken a devastating toll on the social fabric and infrastructure of the country, the Vietnamese had withdrawn (a key CGDK, Chinese and American demand), and the Superpowers and China had begun re-evaluating their Cold War-inspired factional support, created an atmosphere congenial for peace.

On July 18, 1990, the U.S. announced that it would open direct talks with Vietnam on the Cambodia question. This led to the major breakthrough on September 9, 1990, when all sides agreed in Jakarta to the U.N. Security Council's endorsement of the so-called Australian proposal. Thereafter, the pace quickened. A cease-fire came into effect on May 1, 1991, final consensus was reached among the factions in Pattaya, Thailand on August 29, and the agreement was formally endorsed by all parties in Paris on October 23, 1991. The following March, UNTAC troops began to arrive.\(^4\)

The agreement stipulated that there would be a transition period that would start with the entry into force of this Agreement and terminate when the constituent assembly, elected through free and fair elections,...has approved the constitution and

transformed itself into a legislative assembly. During this transition phase, UNTAC was mandated to supervise disarmament and deployment, oversee civil administration, clear mines, help rebuild the infrastructure, organize refugee repatriation, monitor the cessation of foreign military assistance and, by May 1993, hold free and fair elections. It was the most ambitious U.N. operation to date. Implementing this mandate have been 22,000 United Nations military and civilian personnel, drawn from 31 countries, with an operating budget of over $2 billion. Mission completion is planned for 25 August 1993.

3. Comparison Rationale

A comparison between the U.N.'s success in El Salvador and its failure in Cambodia is not a perfect one. There are key, fundamental differences. However, there are enough similarities to make this an interesting and useful exercise, from which applicable conclusions can be drawn.

Looking at the dissimilarities to start with, El Salvador is a predominantly Roman Catholic country with 4.9 million people crammed into an area smaller than the State of Maryland. In

---


47 Booth, 2, 148.
The comparison, 8.3 million Cambodians — the vast majority Theravada Buddhist — occupy a sparsely populated region roughly nine times the size of El Salvador. This, in part, explains why land tenure is a far more important issue in El Salvador, and therefore has such prominent importance in the peace agreement (See Chapter IV). In this sense then, the U.N.’s job in Cambodia has been easier; UNTAC has only to return the country to its pre-war state in 1970. ONUSAL must in addition, however, try to deal with underlying inequities that go back more than a century.

Socio-economic differences also exist. Salvadorans are better educated (30.2% illiteracy, 1980)\(^43\) compared with Cambodians (80% illiteracy, 1992)\(^50\). One can speculate that this makes Cambodian people more susceptible to irrational, de-stabilizing propaganda. With respect to economics, as Pamela Constable notes, "El Salvador has traditionally high levels of productivity and civic organization, which caused El Salvador to emerge from the war stronger than expected,"\(^51\) making things easier for ONUSAL.

In El Salvador, ONUSAL has also been spared age-old ethnic hatred. UNTAC, on the other hand, has to cope with Khmer Rouge efforts to discredit the Vietnamese-backed government by

---


\(^49\) Booth, 148.


manipulating Cambodians' traditional fear of the Vietnamese.

Although internal root causes go back much further in El Salvador, Cambodia has suffered greater destruction. El Salvador's civil war essentially started in 1979, whereas Cambodia's tragic history commenced with U.S. carpet bombing in 1969, and continued uninterrupted through Pol Pot's genocide, the 1979 Vietnamese invasion, and the ensuing civil war. In fact, over a period of ten years, Cambodia had four radically different regimes, with each change bringing devastation.

ONUSAL has had other key advantages. During and after the Cold War, the government of El Salvador was more dependent on the United States than the Khmer Rouge was on the Chinese, its principal backer. This extra clout has been very important in pressuring Salvador's less cooperative right wing interests to accept the peace accords. For example, The Globe and Mail's 24 March 1993 editorial noted that, with respect to the dismissal of army officers guilty of human rights abuses, "Washington is withholding 11 million in military aid until there is full compliance." There is also the matter of U.S. control over $250 million in construction aid that the Cristiani government desperately needs. As The Economist reports,

U.S. officials in El Salvador have indicated that their country (the largest donor) intends to continue its aid, and to use its influence to insist that both sides comply


fully with the U.N. agreements.  

No such influence has existed over the Khmer Rouge. When all bilateral assistance was completely cut off, so too was foreign leverage. Further, unlike the Salvadorean government, the Khmer Rouge faction has had a key secondary source of supplies. The end of direct Chinese military aid has been greatly tempered by the quiet provision by Thai business and military elements of the essential safe-passage for Khmer Rouge logistics, blackmarket arms shipments and illegal trade in lumber and gems.

Consequently, what finally coaxed a wary Khmer Rouge to sign at Paris was, not so much external pressure, than its belief that enough disruption and delays would eventually torpedo the U.N. plan. Since the faction did not enjoy the FMLN's high level of popularity, to them, only a failed peace would serve to re-legitimate the faction in the eyes of regular Cambodians. Asia Survey's Frederick Brown in Asia Survey confirms this subversive attitude by pointing out, "The Khmer Rouge had devised a multi-track, long-term, political-military strategy to take advantage of this [peace] process."  

In fairness to UNTAC, therefore, it has had, from the outset, the more problematic task of standing alone against Khmer Rouge calculated belligerence. Throughout this paper, then, it is important to bear in mind that basic differences between the two

---


case studies have put greater obstacles in the way of UNTAC.

Having said this, parallels between the two cases are also quite numerous. Both are former colonies that have largely homogeneous, agrarian populations dependent on one or two key crops (El Salvador - coffee; Cambodia - rubber, timber). They also share the presence of rigid, authoritarian regimes and economic institutions that remain in the early stages of development. In addition, the two countries have also exhibited an historical vulnerability to dominant and proximate patron states. In this capacity, the United States and Vietnam, respectively, have had a prime role in exacerbating much of the conflict in El Salvador and Cambodia over the years.

The conflicts that the U.N. sought to end had been largely aggravated by the Cold War, having become proxy wars involving China, the Soviet Union and the United States in Cambodia's case, and the two superpowers, Nicaragua and Cuba in El Salvador's. These hostilities began at roughly the same time - around 1980, and quickly ground down to a decade-long stalemate. Although the government always controlled the majority of the territory, neither side could inflict a crippling blow.

The resistance groups also bear similarities. In both cases, serious insurgent activity commenced when an illegitimate right wing government came to power in the early 1970's (Arturo, Lon Nol). The FMLN and the coalition against the Phnom Penh regime were also established at around the same time - 1980 and 1981 respectively. However, it is important to point out that these
fronts have differed dramatically in their ideologies, organization, and amounts of external funding. The FMLN received far less external support than the CGDK did.

The Cold War thaw generated a nearly identical timetable for peace. El Salvador's and Cambodia's first accords in 1990 were separated by little more than a month. The final agreements came within several months of each other, and U.N. deployments started four weeks apart in early 1992. Furthermore, by spring 1993, both agreements were expected to have been more or less implemented.

With regard to the U.N. mandates themselves, both have dealt with crises that are of an internal nature within one nation-state, and both have gone far beyond the boundaries of classical peacekeeping by including elements of Boutros-Ghali's preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Although UNTAC's mandate is the more ambitious, with refugee repatriation, civil administration and the monitoring of the cessation of outside assistance, and ONUSAL has a special directive on human rights monitoring, the two cases share many novel elements. Both oversee disarmament, demobilization, mineclearing, elections, and general rehabilitation. To quote Boutros-Ghali,

Cambodia, El Salvador and Somalia are examples of a new generation of peace-keeping operations in which the United Nations has adopted a comprehensive form of conflict management.55

Yet despite these similarities and initial optimism, during this one year period of U.N. intervention (March 1992 - March

---

1993), the two countries took widely divergent paths - El Salvador away from, and Cambodia toward, a revolutionary situation. To be sure, during this period the United Nations was not the only determining factor. In El Salvador, American pressure on the government and the general cooperation of all parties were also important. Similarly with Cambodia, Khmer Rouge disdain for the Paris agreement, coupled with Thai support, should not be overlooked (See Chapter IV). This notwithstanding, implicit in this analysis is the assumption that actions taken by the United Nations in ONUSAL's and UNTAC's mission formulation and implementation stages were certainly as critical as other factors in shaping outcomes.

With this focus, and the preceding overview of the circumstances under which the United Nations found itself committed to El Salvador and Cambodia, it is necessary to illustrate exactly what the U.N. objectives and accomplishments were in these two settings.
CHAPTER IV

PEACEKEEPING OBJECTIVES

1. El Salvador

The United Nations-sponsored agreement of January 1992 had twenty-five major goals, the vast majority targeted for completion before the Spring of 1993. A cease-fire was to be in place by February 1, and a separation of forces by March 2. During the summer, these troops were to be concentrated in designated ONUSAL-monitored areas. In respect to the cessation of the armed conflict, the government had to reduce the armed forces by 50%, dismantle five rapid deployment counterinsurgency battalions, abolish the feared Treasury Police, National Guard and National Intelligence Department, and eliminate El Salvador's version of 'strategic hamlets', the system of Civil Defense Units. In return, the FMLN committed itself to 100% demobilization and disarmament by October 31. The Salvadoran government also promised to create a new State Intelligence Agency and a new Armed Forces Reserve System.

Critical to national reconciliation was the mandated establishment of three neutral commissions - the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), the Ad Hoc Commission, and the Truth Commission. Composed of, and
representing, all political forces, COPAZ was to have broad powers
to supervise compliance with each of the agreements. The job of
the three-person Ad Hoc Commission would be to compose a
confidential list of members of the armed forces to be purged for
human rights abuses. By comparison, the Truth Commission was to be
a U.N. body, and had to prepare a public list of all major human
rights abusers. Unlike the Ad Hoc Commission, however, it could
make recommendations on criminal procedure. The agreement required
the government to carry out the Ad Hoc Commission's conclusions,
but not those of the Truth Commission.

The political participation and re-integration into society of
the FMLN was also a key objective of the January agreement. To
this end, a National Public Security Academy, consisting of a
student body of at least 20% former guerrillas and at least 20%
former members of the National Police, would be created. Graduates
from this academy were to form the basis of the new National
Civilian Police, with hopefully 5,700 police officers by 1994. The
help of this force, together with the deployment of a temporary
Auxiliary Transitory Police (composed of Academy recruits) and
ONUSAL's expertise, were to effect the restoration of public
administration in the former zones of conflict.

Lastly, several fundamental sections were included in the
accord. These dealt with the areas of human rights, judicial
reform, electoral reform, and most crucial, the issue of land

reform within the former zones of conflict.  

2. Cambodia

In the case of Cambodia, the agreement was not so detailed. On June 13, 1992, an estimated 200,000 troops were scheduled to start grouping together in a series of 117 U.N.-controlled cantonment sites, and on July 11, with the completion of this reorganization, phase 2 would commence. During this period, 70% of the cantoned soldiers would be disarmed and demobilized before the November 15 deadline, with the remaining 30% staying in the cantonments. Concurrently, all foreign assistance to all factions was to be terminated.

Within the transition phase, a Supreme National Council, composed of representatives from all four factions (6 Phnom Penh Regime, 2 Khmer Rouge, 2 FUNCINPEC, 2 KPLNP), would "embody the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia," and represent Cambodia abroad. However, it also specified that the key areas of foreign affairs, defence, finance, public security, and information would be placed under "direct United Nations' Control or Supervision."

The elections toward the end of this period required voter registration to be finished by December 1992. This is also the time by which the roughly 350,000 refugees living in Thai camps were scheduled to be repatriated. In addition, the U.N. had to

create an atmosphere conducive to repatriation and the holding of elections by protecting human rights, clearing mines, and helping to rebuild the infrastructure of Cambodia.\(^{59}\)

**PEACEKEEPING OUTCOMES**

1. *El Salvador*

Despite a series of delays and timetable revisions (June 12, August 19, October 30), to a remarkable extent, El Salvador has successfully implemented the terms of the Mexico City agreement. The cease-fire and separation of forces, established on February 6, 1992, has not seen one violation:\(^{60}\) the government concentrated its forces by June 17, and the FMLN did the same by August 30. Moreover, the Treasury Police and the National Guard were dismantled by March 2, the National Intelligence Department was disbanded on June 9, the disarming and disbandment of the Civil Defense Units was completed on June 30, and the army has been decreased in numbers by half. This reduction includes the Bracamonte, Belloso and Atlacatl rapid deployment battalions. The remaining two were expected to have been eliminated by February 1993. Although the New Armed Forces Reserve System has yet to be consolidated, the New State Intelligence agency was founded on June

\(^{59}\)Paris Peace Agreement.

The progress with regard to FMLN demobilization has also been impressive. They demobilized 20% of their troops on June 30, 40% by September 24, 60% by October 31, and, amid wild celebrations in the capital San Salvador, dismantled the last 20% of the guerrilla force on December 14, 1992. Perhaps more incredibly, the previous September first, the FMLN had even become a legal political party, swearing to respect the constitution and laws of El Salvador.62

Unfortunately, however, accompanying these peace results, has been an upsurge in reactionary, right wing violence. From January to May 1992, the ONUSAL Human Rights component received 105 complaints of executions, a third more than from the period August to December 1991.63 The Inter Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America also reports that from July to December 1992, there were 197 abuses of the right to life, 179 abuses of physical integrity, 121 abuses of personal liberty and 112 violations of due process.64 Salvaide calls these attacks "part and parcel of the right-wing's campaign to subvert the accords."65

---

62 Ibid.
64 The Inter Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America, quoted in Canadian Delegation to El Salvador, 10.
Optimistically, however, in line with the agreement, the three commissions were allowed to carry out their mandates, with the Ad Hoc Commission and Truth Commission submitting reports on December 22, 1992 and May 15, 1993, respectively. The Ad Hoc Commission's list included 102 names from the upper echelons of the armed forces. 76 were slated for discharge and 26 for a transfer to other functions. Encouragingly, on December 31, 1992, President Cristiani announced that 87 of the 102 would be removed from their duties via discharge, transfer or retirement. A further seven, however, would be merely appointed as foreign military attaches, and the remaining eight, including the minister and deputy minister of defense were to be left completely untouched. 66 Essentially, then, all but eight were to have been removed from positions where they could cause harm.

Considering the iron grip the military had on the country for the past century, this certainly must be cause for optimism. Such was indicated in the Secretary-General's letter to the Security Council one week later, on January 7. Although he demanded the discharge of the fifteen, he also perceived noteworthy improvement.

I am ready to accept as satisfactory the measures adopted and implemented by the Government of El Salvador with respect to 87 of the 102 covered by the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations, even though a number of them do not conform in all respects with those recommendations. 67

67 Ibid, 3.
It was also heartening that Defense Minister Rene Emilio Ponce resigned on March 12, 1993, three days before the Truth Commission report was made public, reducing those in effective power from eight to seven.\textsuperscript{68}

The Truth Commission's report determined that of the 22,000 human rights atrocities investigated, "the vast majority of abuses were committed by members of the armed forces or groups allied to them", including the assassinations of Romero and the U.S. churchwomen. Accordingly, it called for, among other things, the immediate dismissal of, and permanent ban on military or security positions for, all people found guilty of the worst violations. Several FMLN leaders were also accused of a number of mayoral assassinations.\textsuperscript{69}

Even though, in the wake of the report, the conservative National Assembly passed a blanket amnesty for all those implicated,\textsuperscript{70} Cristiani soon after announced that, based on the information in the Truth Commission report, he was finally willing to discharge the remaining 'Fifteen' by June 30, 1993.\textsuperscript{71} On May 1, acting on this promise, the president discharged Third Infantry Brigade commander Colonel Nelson Lopez y Lopez and Fourth Infantry Brigade commander Colonel Oscar Leon Linares.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{68} Globe and Mail, 13 March 1993.

\textsuperscript{69} Salaide, 19 March 1992, 1-7.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid, 5 April 1993, 1.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{72} Globe and Mail, 5 May 1993.
The situation in the former combat areas has also been advancing positively. Under the guidance of ONUSAL, the National Public Security Academy accepted its first 622 students on September 1, and an additional 357 on October 15 and 330 on November 16. With the graduation of the first class, units of the National Civilian Police were expected to be deployed in January, 1993. Filling the gap until then, Academy recruits in the Auxiliary Transitory Police commenced deployment in early October. As the Canadian Delegation to El Salvador (CDES) told the House of Commons Subcommittee on Development and Human Rights on February 24, 1993, "Programs which integrate ex-combatants from both sides into productive projects or institutions such as the new civil police force have shown early signs of success."*

The areas of judicial and land reform have been, as expected, moving more slowly. Although the majority of judicial reforms dictated by the agreements have been added to the constitution, the judiciary itself is still corrupt from top to bottom, and only the National Assembly can remove these judges. While right wing parties maintain their control there, reform is unlikely.

In August, COPAZ commenced reviewing the land inventory presented by the FMLN, and proposed to give plots of four hectares and credits of $15,000 to former combatants on both sides, and half

---

14 Canadian Delegation to El Salvador, 12.
of that to current non-combatant landholders. These so-called landholders are FMLN supporters who occupied land left by the original owners during the war.\textsuperscript{17} The U.N. has estimated that land reform will benefit 15,000 ex-soldiers, 7,500 ex-rebels and 25,000 squatters in the former zones of conflict.

The main problem, however, is money. Land must be bought from the current owners at fair market prices - prices that the U.N. currently can not afford.\textsuperscript{18} At the end of January 1993, only three of the 73 properties up for negotiation had actually been transferred.\textsuperscript{19} Despite this, the fact that presidential and legislative elections are less than a year away (March 20), is cause for hope that the log jam on land reform and judicial reform might be able to be broken.

All in all, despite right wing desperation attacks and the slow pace of reform, the climate in early 1993 was far better than that of January 1992. Speaking on human rights, the U.N.'s Independent Expert reported in November that "the cessation of hostilities itself eliminates an important source of violations of human dignity and establishes a climate more propitious to coexistence and mutual respect of the rights of individuals." He

\textsuperscript{17}Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras: Country Report, Economist Intelligence Unit, No. 4 1992, 27.


then concluded that "the situation regarding civil and political rights has improved."\(^{30}\) Boutros-Ghali also was optimistic.

The impeccable observance of the cease-fire and the ability of the FMLN to engage in political activities in advance of its full legalization as a party are an impressive demonstration of the will of both the Government and the FMLN to consolidate peace in their country. The peace process in El Salvador continues to give every sign of being irreversible.\(^{31}\)

2. Cambodia

Unfortunately, the same can not be said for Cambodia's attempt at peace. Firstly, since the signing of the Paris agreement, there have been numerous violations of the May 1, 1991 cease-fire. Starting in January 1992, the Khmer Rouge began capturing government areas in the central Kompong Thom province in an effort to establish contiguous 'liberated zones' into which it could direct refugees and soldiers' families. In March 1992, the province's strategic Highway 12 was cut off by the Khmer Rouge, with nightly exchanges of gunfire taking place ever since.\(^{32}\) Additionally, with the end of the rainy season, Hun Sen forces launched an offensive in January of this year near Pailin, Kompong Thom, Kratie and Siem Reap in a bid to recapture some of this lost territory.\(^{33}\)

\(^{30}\) United Nations, General Assembly, 13 Nov. 1992, 60.  
\(^{33}\) Time, 15 Feb. 1992, 12.
Related to these developments, was the failure of the U.N. to canton, disarm and demobilize the lion's share of the fighting forces. The immediate cause has been the Khmer Rouge's refusal to be cantoned and to allow UNTAC troops into their areas until:
1. Vietnamese troops, which the Khmer Rouge claim still remain in Cambodia, are removed, and 2. the SNC is given real power to govern the country during the transition. Consequently, Phnom Penh troops have also refused to canton most of their numbers, eliciting further Khmer Rouge obstruction. As of September 10, 1992, only 42,368 government soldiers, out of a total of about 150,000, had been grouped in cantonment sites. Sihanouk and KPLNF forces made up a remaining 10,000 assembled soldiers. 84 This left a staggering 140,000 troops unaccounted for, and the U.N. locked out of 15% of the country.

This deadlock has escalated tensions, and invective, between the Khmer Rouge and UNTAC. The Khmer Rouge has called the U.N. 'colonialist', and criticized the head of UNTAC, Yasushi Akashi, for his lack of common sense, courage, far-sightedness and political will. 85 In December, 1992, after the Security Council imposed a total ban on logging exports from, and petroleum imports into, Khmer Rouge territory, the Khmer rouge resorted to kidnapping U.N. personnel. Within that same month, they detained six military observers for three days, 31 soldiers overnight, and an additional


46 more who had come to aid the latter group. 86

With the United Nations unable to enter Khmer Rouge territory, most border check-points along the Thai-Cambodian frontier have also been inaccessible. Consequently, UNTAC is powerless to halt the flow of arms to the Khmer Rouge via Thailand. Thai business and military interests have paid handsomely for lucrative mineral and logging concessions within the Khmer Rouge areas of control. With these large profits, weapons have been bought on the black market. It has been estimated that in November of last year 57 Thai companies, 1,000 earthmoving vehicles and more than 100,000 Thais were involved in this enterprise. The Thai government has also "sold rights to 17 entry points to Thai companies, who in return have been given the right to tax logs into Thailand." 87 External arms transfers have been therefore continuing.

Ethnic violence against Vietnamese settlers - many whose roots go back generations in Cambodia - has also been on the rise since last summer. Eight Vietnamese were murdered in July, 14 in Koh K in October, and 13 along the Tonle Sap river banks in December. 88 1993 saw a further increase when 34 ethnic Vietnamese were killed in March, their houseboats having been raked with automatic gunfire. Another 29 were wounded. 89 Finally, out of fear of further violence, an armada of 200 boats, carrying 2000 Vietnamese, fled to

Vietnam at the end of March of this year.\textsuperscript{90} It is unclear who is behind these attacks, although many believe it to be the work of the Khmer Rouge.

Despite the growing violence and the Khmer Rouge's intransigence and election boycott, UNTAC decided to go ahead with an election on May 23-28. In view of the mounting instability in the country, the U.N. Security Council also agreed to hold presidential elections at the same time. This would allow Sihanouk to run for president (unchallenged in all probability) and, given his enormous stature among the Cambodian people, ensure a certain degree of stability should a weak coalition emerge from the constituent assembly elections. It was also decided, against Khmer Rouge wishes, that a voter would be considered any 18 year-old whose parents, or in the case of those born oversees, grandparents, were born in Cambodia. To the vexation of the Khmer Rouge, therefore, many ethnic Vietnamese could also vote.\textsuperscript{91} Further to the credit of UNTAC, voter registration has been completed in the 85% of the country that was accessible, enabling an astounding 4.7 million Cambodians to vote.\textsuperscript{92}

The Khmer Rouge has responded by a campaign to disrupt election activity in the months leading up to the May polls. Three weeks before the election, Khmer Rouge troops attacked a government post near Siem Reap's famous Angkor Wat ruins. Over the next

\textsuperscript{90}Globe and Mail, 30 March 1993.
\textsuperscript{91}FEER, 17 Sept. 1992, 18.
\textsuperscript{92}Maclean's, 1 March 1993, 33.
several days, for the first time, Chinese and French troops were attacked and a Japanese peacekeeper killed, bringing total war-related UNTAC deaths to fifty-six. The Globe and Mail reports that the terror campaign is being taken seriously, even in the regime stronghold of Phnom Penh. The tourists have left, hotel occupancy is down to 60%, and many locals are stocking up on food and converting their cash into gold.\(^3\)

Many believe, however, that the Khmer Rouge has not been the only one trying to sabotage the elections. The Phnom Penh government, its popularity and chances of winning a free and fair election severely eroded by dismal economic conditions and rampant corruption, has also been accused of doing much of the same. Accordingly, since FUNCINPEC is expected to win the election, fingers have been pointing at the government for the murder of at least 50 FUNCINPEC party workers between November 1992 and February 1993.\(^4\) As the Economist Intelligence Unit observes,

> With the CPP [governing Cambodian People’s Party] showing no willingness to submit to the verdict of free and fair elections, assassinations of its political opponents and harassment of their party offices and activities look certain to continue.\(^5\)

One of the few U.N. successes undoubtedly has been in the area of refugee repatriation. By February 1993, all 370,000 refugees had been returned to, or near to, their original homes.\(^6\) However,

\(^3\) Globe and Mail, 4, 5, 6, 11 May 1993.


\(^6\) Maclean's, 1 March 1992, 33.
even with this there have been major problems. Since none of the factions really kept records of where they laid all their mines during the twelve years of war, UNTAC has been unable to make a serious dent in the 600,000 or so mines strewn throughout the repatriation areas. 97 As a consequence, many of the returnees have not been given any land. To compensate, they received only food rations and some cash 98; but when the money and food runs out, poverty and crime will no doubt increase.

Lastly, 200 staff members from UNTAC's Civil Administration Component were eventually deployed between July 1 and July 15. Personnel were spread among the five key ministries, the national bank and 21 provincial offices. Specifically, each ministry and the bank had deployed between one and three experts. 99

It is clear that UNTAC has been beset by monumental difficulties. As early as September 1993, even the Secretary-General declared that "the present drift in the peace process cannot be allowed to continue without seriously impairing UNTAC's ability to carry out its mandate within the time-frame set by the Security Council." 100 Things did get worse, however, prompting a Far Eastern Economic Review editorial in December to conclude that "little more than a year after diplomats in Paris toasted a new

100 Ibid, 16.
peace plan for Cambodia, that agreement is coming apart at the seams."[10]
CHAPTER V

PEACEKEEPING MISSION CHARACTERISTICS

This section will examine the seven operational characteristics of training, component nationalities, reaction time, enforcement, conduct, neutrality, and command and control. Although the qualifying determinants outlined in Chapter III should certainly not be discounted, the large discrepancy in the success of ONUSAL and UNTAC can, to a certain degree, be traced to the nature of these characteristics.

1. Training

The quality of ONUSAL's personnel has been highly commended. Five of its nine contingents - Sweden, Ireland, India, Spain and Canada have a great deal of experience in peacekeeping and international diplomacy, while the remaining four - Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela - bring knowledge of Latin American culture, as well as a critical Spanish language ability. Commenting on the Police Division, Boutros-Ghali explains that it "consists mostly of specialists from countries experienced in the organization and operation of civilian police forces."

Lieutenant Commander Graham M. Day, a Canadian Naval peacekeeper in ONUSAL for six months, speaks highly of the Human Rights observers. "[They] were drawn from all walks of professional life, but were mainly lawyers, doctors and school teachers. Many came from Latin American countries with recent experiences of human rights abuses."\textsuperscript{102}

Others have observed that this professionalism has been a key reason for the impressive achievements in El Salvador. For example, the U.N. Independent Expert argues,

\textit{[ONUSAL's] deployment is unprecedented in the history of the international protection of human rights and has brought together highly trained professionals who are in a position to provide the Government with immediate assistance, thereby enabling it to make substantial progress in the observance and safeguarding of human rights.}\textsuperscript{104}

The CDES report in February of this year also determined that ONUSAL's "pragmatism, professionalism, and ability to offer its 'good offices' in times of crisis have been essential to the process."\textsuperscript{105}

In the case of Cambodia, the state of affairs with regard to the quality of the troops has been quite different. While with some of the contingents there has been a great deal of expertise and experience (ie. Australia, the Netherlands, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Canada), with other major detachments there has


\textsuperscript{104} U.N., General Assembly, 13 Nov. 1992, 63.

\textsuperscript{105} Canadian Delegation to El Salvador, 19.
not (i.e. Ghana, Bulgaria, Bangladesh, China, the Philippines). For example, reportedly, many of Bulgaria's 819 troops were conscripted shortly before arrival in Cambodia, and a large number in the 900-strong Ghana contingent cannot speak Khmer, English or French. Other difficulties concern the fact that numerous soldiers cannot drive - a crucial skill, considering Cambodia's abysmal state of public transport.

The Civil Administration Component has also had a great deal of trouble finding qualified advisors for the ministries. U.N. political officers are easy to come by, but the more essential tax specialists, customs officers and public security advisors are rare. Gerard Porcell, Director of the component, complains that

these type of people don’t exist within the U.N. system because it is the first time they have been called for. And, yes, we have difficulty finding people. Sure I can find people, recruit tourists, but I need the right people. \[166\]

The inexperience and unprofessionalism of much of UNTAC has not gone unnoticed by the Cambodians. They routinely criticize the inactivity, and unprofessional conduct. A Maclean's article observed,

UNTAC's image has also been tarnished by the boorish behaviour of some soldiers. Reckless driving has caused so many accidents that UNTAC officials have asked soldiers to contributed a fund that will compensate Cambodian accident victims. \[107\]

The Economist also sarcastically notes that "the United Nations has not brought peace and democracy to Cambodia, but its presence has

---

107 Maclean's, 1 Mar. 1993, 36.
improved the quality of the country's restaurants." Perhaps a recent Khmer language poem describes the UNTAC soldier best:

In the morning he jogs
In the afternoon he drives
In the evening he drinks

2. Component Nationalities

Another aspect of the ONUSAL contingent is that none of its component nationalities have been offensive to either the government or the FMLN. No 'socialist', 'right wing', or neighbouring countries are involved; nor are any major powers taking part. In other words, the absence of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Cuba, Britain, France, the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States has been advantageous for creating an impartial atmosphere. It might be argued that Spain, with its colonial legacy in El Salvador, came the closest to causing a problem. However, as Spain had granted independence more than 170 years ago, and was no longer a power, this issue was irrelevant. Given the history of external intervention in El Salvador, had ONUSAL consisted of members seen as neo-imperialist, or as neo-imperialist lackeys, the outcome may have been very different.

In comparison, the origin of three of the main contingents within UNTAC has helped to upset Cambodia's delicate balance of peace. With a history studded with Thai, Vietnamese, French and

---

109 Maclean's, 1 Mar. 1993, 34.
U.S. invasions, and the susceptibility of the peasantry to Khmer Rouge xenophobic propaganda, the U.N. should have been more careful with membership selection. Instead of putting, for example, inoffensive and very capable Brazilian and Egyptian battalions in the sensitive western areas, the U.N. chose Thailand, plus two white, recent colonial powers - Holland and France. Granted, the large size of the mission limited to some degree the amount of choice the United Nations had for experienced and appropriate troops. The fact remains, however, that this limitation proved harmful.

After all, it would be very easy for the Khmer Rouge to convince many Cambodians that these troops have been occupiers. The second in command of UNTAC is French, and the French contingent itself is composed of 900 legionnaires from the very regiment that fought in Vietnam. Furthermore, to the Cambodian peasant, a Dutch soldier with a gun bears an uncanny resemblance to a Frenchman or an American. It has also been reported that the 700 Thai engineers have been antagonizing the local population by displaying a certain superior attitude in the course of their duties. Sihanouk, himself, calls the Thai operation in Cambodia a general occupation, be it in the [Phnom Penh regime] zone, Khmer Rouge zone, Khmer People's National Liberation Front or Funcinpec [zones].

---

110 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, List of Cantonment Sites.

111 Economist, 5 Dec. 1992, 32.

Commenting on the above aspects of the peacekeeping, Shigeo Kimoto of the AMPO Japan-Asia Quarterly Review reminds us that U.N. peacekeeping operations are supposed to exclude soldiers from neighbouring countries and from permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. In Cambodia, the rules have been broken. The principle of maintenance of neutrality has been abandoned....France and Thailand are good examples of this. Consequently, these deployments have added to the sense of distrust felt by many Cambodians toward UNTAC, and toward the peace process.

3. Reaction Time

With regard to the expanded mandate of January 16, 1992, ONUSAL benefitted from a further advantage - prompt deployment. Virtually the entire military contingent was deployed at all verification sites by January 31, and on the actual day of the February 1 cease-fire, verification duties commenced. This speed is attributed to three main factors: 1) contributing nations reacted swiftly, 2) there was a co-ordinated transfer of personnel from the already existing ONUCA, including the Military Division commander, Brigadier-General Victor Suanzes Pardo of Spain, and 3) the mission strength was under a thousand, reducing logistical and financial barriers. Graham Day provides a telling personal account.

It was a surprise to all in ONUCA when, at Christmas

---


1991, the UN Secretary-General gave short notice to cease operations and to move all military observers into El Salvador. It took me but six hours to pack my kit, pay my bills and head to San Salvador, in a UN Toyota pick-up truck, to be part of the newly-created ONUSAL.

CDES, recognizing the value of this quick reaction time, points out that "ONUSAL has been integral to every step of the peace process, arriving even before a cease-fire had been arranged."\[115\]

UNTAC on the other hand, arrived more than four months after the agreement was signed, and took an additional few months to come up to full strength. In fact, by June 1993, a full nine months after the signing, only two of nine battalions were in place.\[116\] It took until July to establish the Civil Administration Component. "As in other areas, the U.N. was slow to get its experts to Phnom Penh and then hesitant to take decisive control."\[118\]

It was to prove a costly delay. The extra few months gave the Khmer Rouge additional room to grab more territory and to move refugees into these new locations. They grew bolder in their disruptive tactics, probing the U.N.'s resolve - much as a person might test the firmness of ice. More damaging, therefore, was the irreparable harm done to the credibility of UNTAC. When it finally did arrive, the brief window of opportunity had shut. Had full deployment taken place in November or December 1992, the Khmer

\[115\] Graham M. Day, 5.

\[118\] The Canadian Delegation to El Salvador, 19.

\[117\] Roberts, 129.

Rouge would not have dared to refuse the U.N. entry into its zones.

In February, French Ambassador Merimee warned in the Security Council, "Everyone is aware of the need to make the best use of the time remaining before the rainy season. Any delay would be harmful." As late as July, a similar admonition came from David Roberts in The World Today.

If the main body of the force does not arrive soon there are fears that the peace will not last.... UNTAC's work will suffer as mine clearance, refugee repatriation and other operations vital to the peace and election processes are hampered by the climate.

Naturally, one would expect a greater lag-time with UNTAC, given its novel size and complexity. One or two months is understandable; nine is not. This is especially true since, unlike ONUSAL, there was ample warning of factional agreement. In August 1991, it was clear what shape the peace would take in Cambodia. Preliminary mobilization could have been undertaken during these two months, with the first main body troops certainly arriving before December. If nothing else, however, this comparison illustrates to future U.N. missions the perils of delayed deployment.

4. Enforcement

A decisive factor in the compliance of the Salvadoran

---


120 Roberts, 131.
government and the FMLN has been the commitment of the United Nations to stand firm on all major aspects of the agreements. To be sure, however, the United States has also been instrumental. Any doubts that anyone may have had concerning the resolution of the U.S. to use its $11 million in military aid and other means to pressure for peace, were quickly dispelled on October 30, 1992. On this date, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Bernard W. Aronson, via satellite, issued a warning to would-be saboteurs.

The United States and the international community will use every possible law enforcement tool and investigatory tool to capture and fully prosecute anyone who commits violence against the peace process.\[21\]

Although only 'armed' with less than a thousand unarmed observers and the weight of world opinion, the U.N. has also been surprisingly assertive - and effective. Immediately after Cristiani announced fulfilment of most of the Ad Hoc Commission's report, Boutros-Ghali, still not satisfied, sent Cristiani a letter directing full compliance. To the Security Council, the Secretary-General informed,

The measures adopted in respect of the other fifteen officers do not comply with those recommendations and are thus not in conformity with the Peace Accords....I have therefore asked President Cristiani to take early action to regularize the position of the fifteen officers.

Concerning the Truth Commission report, the U.N. was equally forceful. Boutros-Ghali flatly refused the government's demand this winter for a one year delay in the publishing of the report.

Revealing the U.N.'s intolerance, one United Nations official candidly illuminated, "If Cristiani still has big cheeses who should have been purged and they then figure in the report, it would be quite embarrassing wouldn't it."\(^\text{122}\) Pressure from the U.N. report finally forced Ponce's resignation three days before the names were made public, and compelled the co-operation of Cristiani in its aftermath.

In El Salvador's corridors of power, the U.N. has certainly made its presence known. As Linda Hossie recognizes, "Most of the agreements have been fulfilled and the pressure from the U.N. and others has not let up."\(^\text{123}\)

Unlike in El Salvador, however, the U.N. in Cambodia has consistently backed away from antagonizing those who have contravened the Paris accords. Enforcement actions that were taken, tended to be unenforceable, to be token or to come too late.

Had the balance of a scaled-down, experienced, culturally inoffensive complement of 7000 to 10,000 UNTAC troops arrived by January 1993, and had they, as their mandate permitted, been largely concentrated throughout the critical western and central regions, the Khmer Rouge would have been caught of guard, unable to mount an effective response, and would have received little popular support. At a minimum, a quick arrival could have prevented the subsequent territorial advances, including the more nebulous Khmer


Rouge presence that extends itself during the chaotic 'no-man's-time' between 5:00pm and 6:00am. Consequently, a smaller, more competent operation would have been sufficient.

Instead, not only did all the contingents arrive late, but when they did arrive they were disproportionately concentrated in Phnom Penh and other cities with little or no Khmer Rouge activity. The author observed that even two weeks after the main body of UNTAC arrived in March 1992, there was virtually no U.N. presence in the sensitive - though largely government-controlled - Kompong Thom, Siem Reap, Battambong and Poipet areas. In contrast, at this same time, all the hotels and bars in Phnom Penh were already crowded with U.N. military and civilian personnel.

Although an early, pre-emptive U.N. deployment in Khmer Rouge territory would no doubt have entailed some casualties as peacekeepers defended themselves, it would have more than compensated for the dramatic reduction in overall deaths that successfully-implemented peace could have brought. Once entrenched in Khmer Rouge zones, continued strict enforcement would have ensured additional U.N. progress in repatriation, relief and restoration of order, further undermining Khmer Rouge credibility, and forcing them to canton. Interestingly, David Wurfel reports hearing that every time UNTAC's hawkish second-in-command, French paratrooper General Michel Loridon, made threatening overtures to the Khmer Rouge, they mysteriously became more conciliatory. 124

Even Akashi has admitted that unilateral entry into Khmer Rouge territory was within UNTAC's mandate. Since the agreement allows the U.N. free access to all parts of the country, he has argued that UNTAC has the right to send troops to Khmer Rouge areas.125 Nevertheless, Raoul Jennar, consultant for the European Research Centre and for various Cambodian NGO's, derides Akashi and other UNTAC leaders for issuing countless 'final' deadlines and 'definitive peace' declarations in the tradition of Chamberlain and Daladier.126 Cambodian specialist Ben Kiernan also supports this view. "The international community gave them [Khmer Rouge] valuable time to expand their military control, move into the political arena, store weapons, and make vast sums of money."127

By the Summer of 1992, the damage had been done. Any attack on the Khmer Rouge would have entailed heavy casualties since the U.N.'s moral authority and capacity for intimidation had long evaporated. Consequently, the U.N. decision at the end of November 1992 to impose lumber and petroleum sanctions was too little, too late. By then UNTAC and the Phnom Penh government had grown very unpopular. Considering also that the area of sanctions was in one of the most malaria-infested and landmined regions of the world, and that Thailand was not cooperating, the plan was flawed from the start.

5. Conduct

OUNUSAL's professionalism and relatively small size, together with the utilization of Salvadoreans, themselves, in police activities, have eliminated any adverse effect by U.N. personnel on the economy and the way of life in El Salvador. In short, ONUSAL has not overwhelmed and spoon-fed El Salvador like an occupying force. It has, instead, provided firm guidance, and helped the people to help themselves.

This is in dramatic contrast, however, to UNTAC. In Cambodia, the U.N. has created an unhealthy, artificial economic boom, confined primarily to the capital Phnom Penh. The phenomenal influx of 22,000 foreigners, each payed $180 a day\textsuperscript{128} in a country where a soldier earns under $10 month,\textsuperscript{129} has contributed to inflation, corruption and rural/urban disparities. The Economist reasons that "the free-spending habits" of officials "wheeling around in fleets of white vehicles...fed corruption in the capital and, in consequence, resentment in the countryside."\textsuperscript{130} The Far Eastern Economic Review agrees, expressing that a force of so many soldiers and officials "has added another twist to inflation. The U.N. is spending $300,000 a day to pay for bed and board -

\textsuperscript{128} Maclean's, 1 Mar. 1993, 33.

\textsuperscript{129} Indo-china: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia: Country Report, 1992-93, 86.

\textsuperscript{130} Economist, 14 Nov. 1992, 16.
affecting the economy much as caviar would a starving man."\[131\]

A great deal of irresponsible behaviour is also fuelling the resentment of the Cambodians. As an example, most of the beautiful French villas and mansions are used as homes or offices by UNTAC bureaucrats,\[132\] creating an image of imperial elitism. More alarmingly, many locals are incensed by the explosion of prostitution since the U.N.’s arrival, and the resultant incursion of hundreds of unwanted Vietnamese ‘taxi girls’. U.N. doctors reported in October alone 516 STD cases and 431 cases in November.\[133\] In addition, as of December, three peacekeepers have tested HIV positive.\[134\]

Intent that "the legacy of UNTAC in Cambodia should not be these modern-day diseases," over 150 Cambodians and UNTAC personnel placed an open letter to Akashi in the 11 October issue of the Phnom Penh Post. Deriding the "frontier...no-rules, anything goes attitude," the letter expresses grave concern over the "unacceptable behaviour of some male UNTAC personnel." It also draws attention to the fact that "HIV has reached an 'emergency' level of at least 75 percent among blood donors, a rate of infection that is comparable to the rate of neighboring


\[132\] Maclean's 1 Mar. 1992, 34.

\[133\] Maclean's, 1 Mar. 1992, 36.

In addition to the appalling behaviour, the POST reported that many of the signatories were also deeply upset at Akashi's comment on September 26 that "'18-year-old, hot-blooded soldiers,' on R & R in Phnom Penh had a right to have a few drinks and enjoy the 'young, beautiful beings of the opposite sex.'"

It is not surprising, then, that a confidential UNTAC report, dated January 18, and obtained by FEER, admits that Cambodians now see U.N. troops as "'mercenaries' who 'come here only to collect their salaries.'" With such cultural and economic callousness, UNTAC has been wearing out its welcome, and, at the same time, diminishing the chances for peace.

6. Neutrality

Insensitivity can also contribute to an atmosphere of impartiality. In El Salvador's case, harmful and insensitive conduct by large numbers of foreigners could possibly have fuelled a far greater right wing backlash.

Neutrality was also fostered by allowing the FMLN to participate in the new police force, essentially giving them a watchdog role over the new security forces. Had this not been done, U.N. training personnel could have been viewed as a re-packaged version of the American military advisor. In addition,

---


136 Ibid.

the inclusion of the names of top FMLN commanders in the U.N. Truth Commission's report, perhaps more than anything, has also helped ONUSAL maintain the balancing act.

The critical balance in Cambodia, on the other hand, had been upset not only in the mission implementation stage, with the large-scale misconduct of the troops, but during the formulation stage as well. The peace agreement largely overlooked the power of the 25,000-strong Khmer Rouge force, and its necessary role in any peace process. Instead of involving them in a new enforcement body, as was done in El Salvador, or giving them a real voice in government during the transition, they were largely pushed off to the side. As mentioned in Chapter II, although a peacekeeping force must in equal measure enforce the compliance of all factions, it can help to minimize this situation by eliminating the propaganda value of initial isolation. However, ideas such as a phased removal of key government officials or the creation of a watchdog committee were flatly rejected by UNTAC.\(^{138}\) Consequently, the SNC became little more than a hollow, sovereign shell, with virtually no power.

This state of affairs could have been salvaged had UNTAC, as had been hoped, exercised enough "control" over the key government areas, thus reducing the effective power of the Phnom Penh regime. However, to the U.N.'s disappointment, the Hun Sen government demanded the watered-down and ambiguous "control and supervision" phrase be put into the Paris agreement.

\(^{138}\)Economist, 14 Nov. 1992, 16.
Nevertheless, even within these limitations, UNTAC could have taken far more "control" than it actually did. In his September report, the U.N. Secretary-General explains how this term has been interpreted by UNTAC and the Phnom Penh government. He states that UNTAC's role involves "control a posteriori" (receipt of all documentation), "control a priori" (prior knowledge of all decisions and authority to change decisions) and "control by approval" (proposals for improvements). Consequently, with enough U.N. personnel exercising these functions, a serious reduction in government freedom could have been effected.

This did not happen. Each ministry received only a handful of UNTAC experts, making any sort of "direct control" impossible. In this regard, the Civil Administration's director gives a telling - if confusing - account of what exactly has been taking place in the ministries.

We don't actually control the ministries. In the Paris agreement the word 'ministry' is never mentioned. We control sectors or areas....What you have to realize is that we don't control the ministries as buildings per se but their whole area of Administration.

Therefore, with little changed in the power structures of Phnom Penh, most of the blame for Cambodian woes has fallen to the government. Since the Khmer Rouge had no stake in this administration, any aid to the Phnom Penh regime has implicated UNTAC in this government's mistakes, and further discredited U.N. neutrality. Even though UNTAC has been operating under heavy

---


treaty and organizational constraints (i.e., lack of available expertise), it is still true that greater "Transitional Authority" over both the Khmer Rouge and the government (and therefore greater perceived impartiality) was feasible. The Economist Intelligence Unit chronicles UNTAC's unwitting complicity well.

Its [UNTAC's] attempts to rescue the State of Cambodia from its economic crises and to strengthen it by means of budget and balance-of-payments support - repeatedly described as 'non-political' and genuinely believed by U.N. technocrats to be so - leave UNTAC vulnerable to PDK\(^{141}\) charges of partiality.\(^{142}\)

7. Command and Control

In the last category of command and control, there has been no criticism of ONUSAL's role. This has certainly been aided by the small size of the country and better infrastructure relative to Cambodia. However, one can certainly speculate that the presence of a low number of high-quality observers reduced the lines of communication, simplified logistics, and contributed to a general situation of efficiency. Consequently, a needless obstacle to a successful implementation of the ONUSAL's mandate had been eliminated.

Conversely, in Cambodia, the high number of military and

\(^{141}\) Party of Democratic Kampuchea (official name of the Khmer Rouge).

civiiian participants from over thirty countries has created a communications and logistical nightmare. One Malaysian major from an outlying battalion complained that he received little news from UNTAC headquarters and had to rely on The Bangkok Post for most of his information about Cambodia.\textsuperscript{143} The problem can be summed up as follows,

> When the U.N. is left to operating an end in itself you get the predictable outcome of collective leadership we see in Cambodia: lofty proclamations that become the basis for ill-conceived missions with no one responsible for the consequences.\textsuperscript{144}

Unquestionably, ONUSAL and UNTAC have had an impact (unavoidable or not) on the respective success and failure of their peacekeeping missions. Specifically, this influence has been affected by the degree of presence or absence of the above seven operational characteristics. In this respect, general reviews of the U.N.'s role in El Salvador have been extremely favourable. The human rights watchdog group, Americas Watch, has voiced satisfaction with the work of ONUSAL.\textsuperscript{145} CDES, in its report to the Parliamentary Subcommittee on Development and Human Rights, states that El Salvador is one of the few spots where the U.N. has

---

\textsuperscript{143} Commanding officer of Xo Dau Company of Malaysian Battalion Sector 8, interview by author, 28 July 1992, Battambong Province, Cambodia.

\textsuperscript{144} FEER, 3 Dec. 1992, 7.

been successful. It also remarks that "as one commentator (who has been critical of certain aspects of ONUSAL's work) told us, El Salvador is not just a 'test case' but a 'best' case."\textsuperscript{146} Even the conservative \textit{Economist}, not unknown for its criticism of the United Nations, lauded the U.N.'s work in the Central American country. ONUSAL is "one of the few clear successes United Nations peacekeepers have managed in recent years....By the standards of U.N. peacekeeping, it was a triumph."\textsuperscript{147}

UNTAC on the other hand, has also received its share of the blame for the collapse of Cambodia's peace. Ironically, no less an official than Civil Administration Component Director Porcell was reported by the \textit{Montreal Gazette} in February 1993 to have submitted his resignation over frustration with the U.N.

He criticized the United Nations' ability to take a tougher stand against the radical Khmer Rouge guerrilla faction and the Phnom Penh government's obstruction efforts to supervise five key ministries.\textsuperscript{148}

In a similar vein, Raoul Jennar calls U.N.'s first twelve months in Cambodia a "year of blunders, weaknesses and indecisiveness."\textsuperscript{149} Additionally, the prominent \textit{The Far Eastern Economic Review} states, "By any definition, including its own, the U.N.-organized effort has been a flop, and there is little prospect for better things

\textsuperscript{146} The Canadian Delegation to El Salvador, 7,19.

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Economist}, 19 Dec. 1992, 16,43.


\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Toronto Star}, 28 Feb. 1993.
tomorrow."\textsuperscript{150} \textit{The Economist} is even more damning. "As with the Americans in Vietnam, so with the United Nations in Cambodia."\textsuperscript{151}

In the cases of El Salvador and Cambodia, while other factors certainly cannot be discounted, and certain U.N. mission characteristics have been less avoidable than others, the relationship between the nature of the peacekeeping missions and their degree of success is evident. It remains to be shown, however, whether such outcomes have altered these countries' potential for revolution.

\textsuperscript{150} \textit{FEER}, 3 Dec. 1992, 7.

\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Economist}, 21 Nov. 1992, 38.
CHAPTER VI

THE REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION: STATE COLLAPSE

To this end, the following section will examine the two Goldstone elements directly related to the breakdown of a state-crisis of state resources, and elite alienation and division. It has just been described how U.N. mission characteristics have influenced the peace process in the two case studies. Therefore, should the presence or absence of elements of a revolutionary situation turn out to be related to the degree of success or failure of the U.N.-sponsored peace processes, a link between the character of ONUSAL and UNTAC peacekeeping missions and the potential for revolution will have been established.

1. Crisis of State Resources

The reader will recall Goldstone’s assertion that key indicators of a state resources crisis include a fiscal crisis and the inability of the state to accomplish major tasks. A state that is fiscally unsound and unable to do what it says it is going to do is severely weakened, and extremely vulnerable to overthrow. Looking at the case of El Salvador, based on these criteria, in the year following the peace agreement the state has clearly been
moving away from such a resources crisis.

The 1980's civil war had the effect of crippling the economy and drastically reducing the government's spending power. War-related losses to the government were estimated at more than $1 billion as non-productive activities such as speculation and racketeering proliferated, inflation rose, export diversification stagnated, and per capita income dropped. Furthermore, production and exports fell, resulting in exports paying for only half of imports by 1992. In general, as Forrest Colburn observes, "The violence of the 1980's was accompanied by an economic crisis."\textsuperscript{152}

The successful implementation of peace changed the above economic climate. This is hardly surprising for, as Pedro Nikken, the U.N.'s Independent Observer argues, "A climate of peace is bound to be more conducive to normal functioning of economic activities."\textsuperscript{153} Constable agrees, remarking that "once political stability has been fully restored, El Salvador appears poised to achieve real economic growth."\textsuperscript{154}

Predictably then, from a fiscal point of view, the government was in far better shape in early 1993 than early 1992. According to the International Monetary Fund, gross reserves, listed at $287 million in 1991, had risen to $366 million by the end of 1992. Additionally, between January and July 1992, compared to a similar


\textsuperscript{153}United Nations, General Assembly, 13 Nov. 1992, 60.

\textsuperscript{154}Constable, 106.
period in 1991, the inflow of foreign exchange increased a full 20%. With the end of the war, foreign aid has also been pouring in, with a total of $800 million expected over five years.

Other benefits have included a sizable savings from defence cuts (defence spending was 14% of the 1991 budget), an improved credit rating, the reduction of El Salvador's debt to $150 million following the U.S. write-off in December of $466 million, and declining inflation. Recognizing these trends, Business Latin America announced that 'plentiful capital and aid inflows following the end of the civil war are keeping reserves healthy and depreciation moderate.'

In addition to its new fiscal clout, significant progress has been made on several of the government's major objectives. Firstly, it has presided over an improved economy. In the course of a year, industrial production is up 7%, local interest rates are down 5%, imports have increased by half a billion dollars, and overall growth has 'accelerated during the third quarter of the year [1992].' In the new atmosphere of political stability, investor confidence is also paying dividends. Indeed, Business Latin America stated that 'recovery in investment after the cease-fire helped push GDP growth to an estimated 4.5% [from 3.5%] in

\[156\] Ibid.
Additionally, the Cristiani government promised during the 1989 election to implement a $900 million neo-liberal economic Reconstruction Plan "to rebuild roads, bridges and ports, and to provide emergency assistance to poor communities and refugees." During the war, this program had been impossible to carry out.

From January 1993 on, however, the sustained peace has allowed the government to make good on its commitment. On February 2, the first of three phases was initiated. On March 23, at a meeting of international financial institutions, coordinated by the World Bank, the government received commitments of $800 million for reconstruction. On September 1, a Value-Added Tax was successfully introduced. The Economist Intelligence Unit noted that "VAT has been on the agenda since President Cristiani's government came to power in 1989 and is seen as one of the crucial economic reforms." Lastly, as a part of these reforms, five banks have been privatized and the state-run monopolies for the export of coffee and cotton have been dismantled.

Certainly, had the peace not held, little of the above fiscal improvement or reforms could have taken place. Writing in

---

160 Salvaide, 1 Apr. 1992, 1.
162 Economist, 6 June 1992, 22.
reference to El Salvador, Colburn underscores this point. "Political instability is the most persistent obstacle to engaging in anything more than short-term commercial exchange or speculation." 163

Never was this truer than in Cambodia. The collapse of the peace process has accelerated inflation, corruption, and government spending and ineffectiveness, leading to a dire fiscal crisis and an inability to carry out basic services.

Prior to 1991, Cambodia had been receiving about $100 million annually from the Soviet Union. However, on March 12, 1991, the U.S.S.R. announced that aid would be cut by 80%, 164 and with the Soviet collapse at the end of the year, aid stopped altogether. 165 According to the World Bank, for basic rehabilitation to take place, at least $350 million would therefore be required. 166 To meet this need, on June 20-22, the Tokyo Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation of Cambodia pledged $880 million for the purpose of restoring roads, irrigation systems and health services, and to create livelihoods for returning refugees and demobilized soldiers. Part of this aid was also to be held back until after elections

163 Colburn, 72.


166 Ibid, 57.
were successfully held. The Economist Intelligence Unit reported that "resources on this scale would more than compensate the [State of Cambodia] for the aid it once received from the U.S.S.R. and Vietnam." \(^{188}\)

However, because of the resumption of the war, as of January 1993, only a bare $10 million of this money had arrived.

Most of the aid pledged at the donor conference in Tokyo in June 1992 has yet to be released by the donors....The Cambodian capacity to absorb aid in the current, insecure economic and political climate is very low and final disbursement for the projects that were approved has been proceeding at a snail's pace. \(^{189}\)

This turn of events has created a serious financial crisis for the Phnom Penh regime.

Not only have aid inflows ($10 million) been unable to match Soviet aid ($100 million), but in expectation of these additional resources the government increased spending, consequently swelling the debt and generating hyper-inflation. According to UNTAC, inflation was estimated at 59% in March of last year, 130% in June and a staggering 191% by September. \(^{170}\) If that were not enough, in the first six months of 1992 alone, the government increased the money supply by 51% in an effort to compensate for the aid loss and


\(^{170}\) Ibid, 50.
to pay its civil servants and soldiers.\footnote{FEER, 15 Oct. 1992, 57.} "All agree that recent [State of Cambodia] spending, especially accelerated salary payments made to soldiers in September, has had a highly damaging impact on the riel [Cambodian monetary unit] and on prices."\footnote{Indo-china: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia: Country Report, No. 4 1992, 50.}

In addition, the World Bank has revealed that, because the Khmer Rouge did not disarm, the government also did not reduce defence spending. In fact, spending still remains at the pre-agreement level of 50% of the overall budget.\footnote{FEER, 15 Oct. 1992, 57.} This, too, has meant a heavy drain on resources.

The above financial problems have put the Hun Sen regime's ability to run the country in serious doubt. In particular, corruption, fed by a desperate scramble for the constricting spoils of aid, has undermined day-to-day operations of the government. For example, taxes - when they are collected at all - are rarely handed over and customs officials routinely accept bribes in exchange for not taxing lumber exports. The low, fixed wages of Cambodia's 200,000 soldiers and 150,000 civil servants have also forced "senior officials to routinely ask for backhanders to perform their duties." In addition, these officials have been engaged in what UNTAC calls a new form of privatization - selling
state assets and pocketing the profits.\textsuperscript{174} Furthermore, professors must frequently be bribed for credits, and medical attention is reserved for the wealthy who can afford to bribe officials controlling access to the state-run hospitals.

The Phnom Penh regime has, therefore, not been able to function effectively. The lack of promised funds, exacerbated by the resultant epidemic of corruption, has considerably weakened, and thus destabilized, Hun Sen's government. As the \textit{Globe and Mail} wrote in January 1993,

\begin{quote}
Its health, education and agricultural services have practically collapsed, partly because it has received no aid since the fall of the Soviet Union. Corruption among officials has increased. There is hyper-inflation.\textsuperscript{175}
\end{quote}

Although UNTAC had from the beginning the more challenging mandate, when one places the two case studies together, the contrast is still notable. With El Salvador, the sustained political stability has improved the fiscal strength of the government and given it the ability to realize a series of important promises. In Cambodia, the shattered peace has contributed to the de-legitimization of the regime by crippling it financially and undermining its ability to conduct even the most basic tasks. Over the course of 1992, therefore, El Salvador moved further away from a resources crisis, and Cambodia, closer.


2. Elite Alienation and Division

In the case of El Salvador, alienation and division has, to a large extent, been diffused. The right wing backlash, caused by the removal of the armed forces from its position of domination, has been tempered by the opportunities created for other elites by the more open political process and the strengthened economy. Peace has had much to do with this overall elite unity, which in turn has been key to continued peace and stability. As the CDES report notes, "Political inclusiveness of this sort is new to El Salvador,...[and] is a necessity if the peace process is to be fully realized."176

To illustrate this relative cohesion, governing (civilian and military), supporting (military, judicial and business) and polity (opposition parties, trade unions) elites will be looked at in more detail.

In general, President Alfredo Cristiani and the civilians in his cabinet have shown much support for the peace process. Despite the right wing reputation of his National Republican Alliance Party (ARENA), Constable argues that Cristiani, himself, has "emerged as a committed political moderate and pragmatist determined to steer a path between ideological extremes." He also reveals that the president was a strong supporter of U.N. intervention and "cajoled military officials when a breakdown in the talks seemed

176. The Canadian Delegation to El Salvador, 19.
imminent."\textsuperscript{177}

The civilian government, also, by supporting Cristiani's policies, has even been accused of being too left wing by certain reactionary elements in the Salvadorean establishment. It is indeed surprising to hear the CDES recount how Secretary of State Oscar Santamaria complained to the delegation about criticisms that the "government and \textsuperscript{178} MLN are inclined to by-pass the legislature or the newly-created Peace Commission, COPAZ, and make deals with each other." He defended the government's actions by arguing that it was merely "problem-solving rather than deals."\textsuperscript{179} The Economy Minister, Arturo Zablan, has also expressed approval of the peace process, voicing that "we are extremely optimistic."\textsuperscript{179}

Most of the internal opposition within the government has come from high-level military officers targeted by the Ad Hoc and Truth Commissions. Leading this opposition has been Defence Secretary Ponce and his deputy minister, General Juan Orlando Zapeda. With reference to the Truth Commission's report, Ponce called it "illegal, unethical, biased and insolent."\textsuperscript{180} Orlando Zapeda was equally antagonistic, stating,

I very much doubt the truthfulness or ability the Commission could have had to investigate the distinct cases in so little time....The [investigative] methods

\textsuperscript{177} Constaüle, 108.

\textsuperscript{178} The Canadian Delegation to El Salvador, 14.

\textsuperscript{179} Business Latin America, 1993, 25.

\textsuperscript{180} Globe and Mail, 27 Mar. 1993.
were not correct and the witnesses are not credible.\textsuperscript{181}

Most of these dissenters have already been removed from office. As mentioned earlier, of the 102 listed by the Ad Hoc Commission, 87 have been fired, transferred or retired and seven have been shunted to military attaché positions. Ponce tendered his resignation on March 12 and Cristiani has promised to discharge the remaining officers by 30 June 1993. The most severe elite opposition within the government, therefore, appears to have been stifled. Writing before the Truth Commission report was made public, \textit{El Salvador Peace Accords Watch} concurs.

The fact that the Truth Commission report must be released publicly will make it impossible for Cristiani to ignore.\textsuperscript{182} If Defense Minister Rene Emilio Ponce and the other fourteen officers named in the Ad Hoc report but not yet removed from their posts are also cited by the Truth Commission, it will be increasingly difficult for Cristiani to leave them in power.

Surprisingly, internal conflict within the supporting elites - military (those formally outside government), business and judiciary - has been far more restrained than expected. However, it would be wrong to discount it altogether, especially in the cases of the army and the judiciary.

With the armed forces largely having been forced out of the political process, reactionary military and para-military elements have renewed their efforts at disrupting the U.N. peace settlement. In particular, over the past year there has been a resurgence of

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid, 8 Mar. 1993.

\textsuperscript{182} Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), \textit{El Salvador Peace Accords Watch}, 1 Mar. 1993, 1.
death squad activity by such groups as the Maximiliano Hernandez Brigade, the Salvadoran Anti-Communist Front and the newly-created Frente Revolucionario Salvadoreno. 183 Constable writes that, essentially, "the extreme right was enraged by the accords, and threatened to sabotage them." 184 With regard to the Salvadoran Anti-Communist Front, Colburn recounts their "threat to unleash 'a truly bloody war' if peace is reached between the government and the FMLN." 185

Little of this has come to pass. Although there has been a notable right wing, extremist backlash, it has been mainly confined to a small minority and relegated to bravado and isolated attacks. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, middle-ranking officers - vital to any coup - have seen the peace as a means of breaking the control that the general-staff had on promotions to the senior ranks. Secondly, they have been angered at this class for ruining the army's reputation, and do not wish to suffer further humiliation or cut-backs.

Rebel leader Jorge Melendez, speaking of a possible return to military repression, believes that "they [the military] could not do it. Not long ago, they would have simply carried out a coup but now they are coming out to do politics." 186 The New York Times

184 Constable, 108.
185 Colburn, 71.
also reported last October, "Despite occasional rumours of plotting in the officer corps, Salvadorean officials and foreign diplomats generally dismiss the possibility of a coup d'etat as unthinkable." More to the point, Constable correctly declares, Many young officers welcomed the purge as necessary in rebuilding the image of the armed forces, and also as a means of eliminating high-ranking officers from the military academy class of 1966, known as 'Tambora'.

In contrast, resistance from the judiciary will remain a problem for the near future. Rife from top to bottom with judges that have backed the interests of the army and landed classes, peasants and workers have had little success in seeking convictions and compensation for state atrocities. Heading this corrupt judiciary is President of the Supreme Court Mauricio Gutierrez Castro, who has also declared himself a "pre-candidate" in the 1994 presidential election. In his opposition to judicial reform, he is considered to have "become one of the most powerful people in the country." Although the Truth Commission cited him for "unprofessional conduct", only the National Assembly has the power to remove him and to undertake sweeping reform of the judiciary. Consequently, feet-dragging within the courts will continue until at least after the election, when the next parliament will more than likely have the centrist numbers to

188 Constable, 109.
remove reactionary judicial elements.

What of business interests? The economic improvement that has accompanied the sustained peace has created significant opportunities for Salvadorean businessmen, especially in the non-traditional sectors that are benefitting from the government's new focus on export-led growth. As Business Latin America relates, "A cease-fire will allow businesses to operate in all parts of the country. During the war...more than 30% of the countryside was unsafe for business owners and employees."\[191\]

Economy Minister Zablan adds that

The most important thing is the confidence it [the peace] will generate and investments it could bring, both from Salvadoreans who have their funds out of the country and transnational companies wanting to invest here.\[192\]

This economic optimism and support for the Cristiani government's handling of the peace process is also echoed by Jose Antonio Quiros, president of El Salvador's Chamber of Exporters. "I am positive more U.S. business people will be attracted to the country now because of the political stability."\[193\]

Not only has the new climate of peace been good for business as a whole, but it has also weakened the stranglehold that traditional coffee interests had on power. Constable explains that "in the business world, moderate lobbying groups with ties to multinational investors are gaining ascendancy over the traditional


\[192\] Ibid, 25.

\[193\] Ibid.
reactionary groups linked to the landed oligarchy. As a result, the opportunities brought by a healthy economic environment should compensate for the sacrifices of economic reform, and help to counteract the cries from the coffee elites over land reform.

Overall, the reluctance of the army to intervene, together with the enthusiasm for peace and stability among the business community, has seriously undermined the ability of disruptive factions within the traditional military, judicial and business supporting elites to reverse the peace process.

This leaves the last group of polity elites - those excluded from real power, yet who still chose to dissent within the system, or at least to refrain from joining the FMLN guerrilla war. Here, perhaps, lies the area of greatest progress.

Under the umbrella of internationally-supported peace, centrist and leftist parties and trade unions have been allowed to campaign and organize against the Cristiani government. Although this has been accompanied to some degree by death threats and political murders, the process is still freer than it has ever been or expected to have been. In fact, CDES observes, "Our visit convinced us that, in the short term at least, political space is being opened to Salvadoreans of a wide range of political opinion, and at many levels of government." It then goes on to remark that "many political parties whose members were once driven underground or into exile, have returned to public life and are openly

---

194 Constable, 111.
preparing for the 1994 election.\footnote{The Canadian Delegation to El Salvador, 14,15.} Provided the peace process remains on track, it is clear that these opposition polity elites will have little cause to eschew peaceful change.

Essentially, then, there seems to be little serious thought of violence by the majority of elites within El Salvador’s polity. When looking for an explanation for this, although one certainly cannot ignore the importance of direct pressure brought to bear by the international community (ie. U.N. Truth Commission, threat of U.S. sanctions), peace, in its own right, has perhaps had more of a lasting influence on cooperation. Constable agrees.\footnote{Constable, 111.}

Despite the accumulated mistrust and inequities of Salvadorean society, virtually all leaders across the political spectrum seem determined to put the war behind them and inaugurate a new era for the country. While extremists on the fringes continue to paint apocalyptic scenarios, the mainstream actors of national life appear increasingly committed to working with their former adversaries.

In sum, the new openness - political, military and economic - has fostered an environment wherein elite interests and peace are not necessarily mutually exclusive. This, in turn, has kept the elite alienation and division to a minimum.

In dramatic contrast, Cambodia’s elites have descended into an increasingly complex labrynth of cross-factional fissures and alliances precipitated by, and adding to, the collapse of peace and escalating election uncertainty.

Before proceeding further, however, it is important to
determine where each elite group fits into the analytical framework. In the case of Cambodia, this is no easy task. Since the Paris agreements, there have been, in effect, two governments — the Supreme National Council and the Phnom Penh regime. One could, therefore, argue that all of the four factions that signed these agreements have been governing elites. One could equally maintain that three of the four — the Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC and the KPLNF — have been a revolutionary opposition since they still have armed wings and areas of influence. Consequently, it is difficult to decide upon a benchmark from which to compare subsequent internal division and dissent.

Bearing this in mind, the paper will use elite configurations existing on May 30, 1992 as the point of reference. On this date, the Khmer Rouge blatantly refused Yasushi Akashi and Force Commander John Sanderson personal access to its territory in western Cambodia, choosing for the first time to openly ignore the Paris treaty and remain solely a guerrilla force. Furthermore, at this stage the remaining three political factions, despite an uneasy co-existence, were still expressing support for the peace process, UNTAC, and by implication, the Hun Sen regime. They had also demobilized a significant portion of their forces by the fall. As a final point, instead of the largely ceremonial SNC, the government had by far the largest armed forces and controlled about 90% of the country. It is here, therefore — in early summer 1992 — that the pre-revolutionary governing, supporting and opposition elite labels will be applied.
Accordingly, Hun Sen's government will be the governing elite. FUNCINPEC, the KPLNF and the army will be the supporting elite; the various new opposition parties, the opposition elite. For our purposes, therefore, the revolutionary movement will involve only the Khmer Rouge. If enough elements from within the above groups were to see no other recourse but to break from this new U.N.-supervised polity and ally with the Khmer Rouge against Hun Sen (i.e. if elections failed), then, coupled with economic collapse, regime instability would have become critical.

Khmer Rouge success would also require elite division, in addition to alienation. That is to say, if all elites, including the army, were unified in their alienation, little more than a coup would be necessary to topple the government, install some new combination of polity elites, and maintain the Khmer Rouge in isolation.

Since the summer of 1992, there has been an overall elite shift in momentum away from the Phnom Penh regime and toward either the Khmer Rouge or the Sihanouk faction. Moreover, because the government is perceived to be the corrupt beneficiary of much of the peace agreement, this has also meant increased condemnation of UNTAC and the actual Paris accord.

In this alienation, given the national reverence for Prince Sihanouk, the Sihanoukists (FUNCINPEC) have become the most important non-revolutionary opposition. FEER reported in January that Cambodian diplomats believe that, given a fair election, "the principle rival of the Phnom Penh regime in the election is the
Sihanouk group."

Only over the past eight or nine months, however, has this shift become evident. Indeed, when the Prince returned to Cambodia after the signing of the accords, he described his relationship between himself and Hun Sen as one of father and son. The Economist Intelligence Unit, in September 1992, writing on Sihanouk's opposition to Khmer Rouge intransigence, noted,

Others, including Prince Sihanouk, have insisted that Pol Pot is preparing to return to power by force of arms. Analysts defending this view, point to a 1990 PUNCINPEC intelligence document in which Ta Mok, the NADK [National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge)] commander in northern Cambodia, apparently envisages the collapse of attempts to secure a negotiated settlement...leading to a resumption of civil war.  

Sihanouk also declared on March 7, 1992 that "all the problems are created by them. If there were no Khmer Rouge there would be no problems." Even as late as 2 October, in a letter to the Security Council, Sihanouk was publicly stating that "there is a close and fruitful cooperation between the SNC of Cambodia and UNTAC." In the letter, he even praised the Hun Sen regime's handling of repatriation, citing the "extremely dedicated help of the...Cambodian government agencies...to whom I once again pay tribute."

---


199 Norodom Sihanouk, quoted in Kiernan, 2.

200 United Nations, General Assembly, Letter Dated 2 October 1992 from the Head of State and President of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia Addressed to the Secretary-General, A/47/496.
A cursory glance at Cambodia's history, however, reveals that Sihanouk is the consummate survivor. It comes as no surprise, then, that beginning last fall he started to row away from the sinking Hun Sen regime and its U.N. escort. Until this time, the government had actually been hoping to form an electoral alliance with FUNCINPEC. However, in November, Prince Ranarridh, Sihanouk's eldest son, and several Hun Sen officials met in Beijing. As the Economist relates, "It seems probable that something went wrong at that meeting and that the consequence was a surge in violence."\(^{101}\) Although he was to backtrack somewhat in later weeks, in a letter to Akashi on January 4, 1993, Sihanouk went on to issue a denunciation of the Phnom Penh government and the U.N. In the first formal break with the government since 1991, he declared,

In the light of the extreme gravity and persistent continuation of the crimes perpetrated against FUNCINPEC...I am obliged to cease to co-operate with UNTAC and the administration of the State of Cambodia."\(^{102}\)

Ranarridh then announced that hereafter the 1991 political alliance negotiated between FUNCINPEC and the ruling party was nothing more than a "piece of paper."\(^{103}\)

All past condemnation of the Khmer Rouge was conveniently forgotten (including the deaths of most of Sihanouk's family under the Khmer Rouge regime) and a conciliatory - almost fatherly - tone

---


\(^{101}\) Economist, 9 Jan. 1993, 34.

\(^{102}\) FEER, 14 Jan. 1993, 12.

was adopted. In fact, it now appears that after the elections virtually anoint him president, Sihanouk will ignore the constituent assembly results and include the Khmer Rouge in a 'government of national reconciliation'. Abandoning his former Phnom Penh allies, he stated in March that "as far as politics are concerned, I will play a conciliatory role and serve as a bridge between factions." Consequently, an *Economist* editorial properly warns, "There is a fear that the new president would cut a deal with the unelected Khmer Rouge and form a coalition government." 

For his change of heart, Sihanouk, in large measure, blames UNTAC. To him, the U.N. has been the cause of much of Cambodia's woes, both in its inability to pacify the Khmer Rouge, and in its failure to control the Hun Sen government. Analyzing UNTAC, itself, in a February interview with *FEER* the prince states, 

I have had enough...UNTAC is a terrible cocktail of races who do not even understand each other, who cannot even agree with each other. There is jealousy within UNTAC. There is anarchy. There are people in UNTAC who behave badly, and there are those who are correct....When the Cambodians see UNTAC behaving like that and waves of Vietnamese arrive in Cambodia, that creates a very bad effect. Now UNTAC is detested, hated.

For these reasons, Prince Sihanouk has even stated that he opposes UNTAC extending its mandate past August. 

---


The Khmer Peoples' National Liberation Front has also become disillusioned with the peace process, and has indirectly hinted at support for the Khmer Rouge. For example, in a surprise policy reversal, its November 7 edition of the KPLNF Weekly Bulletin aggressively criticized the Vietnamese "disease" in Cambodia. This veiled attack on the Vietnamese-installed government announced that a large part of the Cambodian territory has been lost. Its citizens are unemployed. The economy is collapsing....Indisputably, all this results from the Yuon [Cambodian pejorative for the Vietnamese]. The article then concluded, "The Yuon are an infectious germ" with a "plan for swallowing Khmer territory and committing genocide against the Khmers."\(^{208}\) Obviously, both the KPLNF and the Sihanoukists were through holding their noses on the Supreme National Council.

In taking a closer look within the Phnom Penh regime, one main fissure, and several minor ones, have been widening. The primary division has centred around the reform-minded, internationalist Hun Sen and the hard-line president of the ruling Cambodian People's Party, Chea Sim. The fact that the regime retreated from its planned economy and permitted UMTAC to intervene, is proof to many that Hun Sen had initially prevailed in this rivalry, long simmering since the early 1980's.\(^{209}\)

However, as the peace crumbled and Hun Sen's market economy experiment collapsed, Chea Sim supporters, feeling vindicated, no

---


doubt started to flex their muscles and resist the democratic momentum. Sorpong Peou writes that "by early 1992, long-standing hostility between Prime Minister Hun Sen and the powerful head of the National Assembly, Chea Sim, 'has further deteriorated.'"\textsuperscript{210} The resurgence of attacks on opposition parties last summer has also been interpreted as a sign of a power shift to ideological hardliners. In fact, Prince Ranarridh has levelled the fury of his attack specifically on Chea Sim for "orchestrating a campaign of violence."\textsuperscript{211} If Chea Sim were ultimately able to oust Hun Sen, the escalation of strong-arm tactics would, undoubtedly, create continued alienation and division.

As further evidence of elite alienation, on 17 July 1992, dissident leader and former Hun Sen transport minister Ung Phan merged his Liberal Social Democratic Party into FUNCINPEC.\textsuperscript{212} The 

\textbf{Economist Intelligence Unit} calls this political marriage highly significant in generational and ideological terms: Ung Phan, who represents younger, disillusioned functionaries in the CPP/SOC [Cambodia People's Party/State of Cambodia] state apparatus, seems to have decided that FUNCINPEC is the most promising liberal alternative to the CPP.\textsuperscript{213}

In broader terms, grass roots defection to the other parties has been quite pronounced. Whereas the 1991 membership of the CPP is thought to be around 40,000, the current figure for FUNCINPEC is

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{210} Peou, 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{211} FEER, 21 Jan. 1993, 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{212} Phnom Penh Post, 24 July 1992.
  \item \textsuperscript{213} Indo-China: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia: Country Report, No. 3 1992, 47.
\end{itemize}
put at a staggering 175,000, and the second place Democratic party, at 50,000. It is believed that many of these memberships must have been at the expense of the ruling party.\textsuperscript{211}

Turning to the government’s coercive bodies - the army and the national police - here, too, the seeds of alienation can be found. These forces are paid so little because of inflation that they must set up road blocks every few kilometres and demand money from passing vehicles. I had the opportunity to personally witness this practice of highway extortion first hand. Drivers of cars and trucks carry wads of small bills and literally throw several of them out the window at each so-called military checkpoint. The practice has become so institutionalized that the vehicles usually don’t even slow down. If conditions continue to worsen, there will be little cause for loyalty to a bankrupt regime, especially if the Khmer Rouge starts to offer economic inducements to Hun Sen defectors. Hence the armed forces are somewhat of a wildcard in the Cambodian elite jigsaw puzzle.

To add further confusion to the political landscape, not only has there been general alienation from the Phnom Penh government, but a certain degree of division has emerged between and within all the supporting elites. In the case of the KPLNF, over the past year, its two traditional wings have formally split, creating two distinct political parties. KPLNF president Son Sann has formed the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party, while General Sak Sutsakhan has taken what remains of the faction’s military forces to the

\textsuperscript{211}Ibid, No. 4 1992, 43,44,45.
Liberal Democratic Party. Observers generally predict that were
the election to be actually free and fair, these two parties,
together with the Democratic Party, would become part of a
FUNCINPEC-dominated coalition.

Even the royal family has not been spared the feuding. Had
the UNTAC been able to ensure a democratic election in an
atmosphere of peace and all-factional cooperation, Prince Sihanouk
no doubt would have become a largely symbolic president, presiding
over a relatively stable, de-mobilized country. The self-exclusion
of the Khmer Rouge, however, coupled with an increasingly corrupt,
unpopular and desperate government, has propelled Sihanouk into the
powerful role of national arbiter in order to guarantee stability.
Afterall, if a weak coalition comes to power, placing it in the
middle of Hun Sen's forces and the Khmer Rouge, only Sihanouk, as
a strong president, could summon the authority of Cambodian
nationalism to force cooperation.

This has been particularly irritating to Ranarriddh who, as
head of FUNCINPEC, expected to dominate his party in the new
government - his father reduced to a mere figurehead.
Consequently, "he [Sihanouk] is no longer on polite speaking terms
with his son, Prince Ranarriddh, just a year after he officially
appointed him his successor and put him in charge of his own
military faction." Sihanouk accuses him of betrayal.

Ranarriddh himself told me that a lot of diplomats already
go to him and say that [he] will be the master of
Cambodia. So they are selling the skin of the old bear

---

Sihanouk before killing him. But you see that I am far from being dead....It is very bad for Ranarrjdh....Will you trust a man who betrays his own father?216

Such pervasive division and alienation can only serve to benefit the Khmer Rouge. As Kathryn McMahon in the AMPO Japan-Asia Quarterly Review illustrates,

All the current political groups in Cambodia are divided among themselves as their various factions scramble for position and advantage. Only the Khmer Rouge is not in the process of internal disintegration.217

While alienation has not yet been sufficient to warrant elements of the divided polity elite actually allying militarily with the Khmer Rouge against the Hun Sen forces, there is ample evidence pointing to this possible eventuality. Should the election fail to dislodge the Phnom Penh regime from real power, perhaps the last peaceful option for other elites to gain power would have been eliminated.

Why has such pronounced alienation and division occurred from May of last year to the spring of this? Although it is difficult to explain motives, one can speculate that, essentially, it has centred around four main causes. In the first place, the resource crisis, engendered by the failure of peace, has dashed the hopes of elites expecting to benefit from the influx of foreign cash, and estranged those hit hard by shrinking privileges. Secondly, the brief taste of power given to new polity elites, such as Sihanouk and the KPLNF during the SNC's first few months of promise, has made the subsequent exclusion and harassment all that more

---

217McMahon, 28.
difficult to bear, and to accept. Another cause concerns the fact that elite re-alignment has been facilitated by increased public hostility toward the government in the wake of out-of-control inflation and naked profiteering. McMahon rationalizes that "the disparity between those few who have benefitted, often through corruption,...and the mostly nine million Cambodians is but one indication of the instability of the peace accords."\(^{218}\) Lastly, unable to rely on UNTAC to guarantee an open election, all groups have been scrambling to position themselves favourably in anticipation of post-election uncertainty and possible chaos.

As with the crisis of state resources, therefore, Cambodia's elite alienation and division over the past year owes much of its intensity to the breakdown of peace. Similarly, the absence of economic chaos and widespread right wing dissent in El Salvador points to the intensity of the breakthrough of peace. Since the state of the peace process in both countries has already been connected with the quality of each's U.N. peacekeeping mission, logically, these operation characteristics must have had a bearing on the magnitude of revolutionary instability.

\(^{218}\) Ibid, 24.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Before delving into any general findings, it is perhaps wise to pause and briefly examine exactly what evidence this analysis has yielded. Once this is completed, it will be but a short step to conclusions at three levels - the national case studies (El Salvador and Cambodia), the United Nations, and revolutions.

It is clear that efforts at forging peace in El Salvador have been largely successful. The cease-fire has held, the two sides have reduced or eliminated their forces according to the terms of the Mexico City agreement, a new joint-police forces has been established, and most of the serious human rights abusers have been removed from office. While there has been some expected right wing backlash, and the delicate issues of land reform and judicial reform still need to be resolved, the momentum for cooperation appears irreversible.

It is equally clear that such is not the case in Cambodia. By refusing to allow the U.N. into its territory, the Khmer Rouge has effectively derailed the peace process. This, coupled with the fact that fighting never really ceased and violence against ethnic Vietnamese and opposition parties has been dramatically escalating, leaves little hope that a peaceful transition will follow the May elections.
To be sure, other agents have had an impact on these outcomes. There would be no peace in El Salvador without American economic and political arm-twisting. Just as there would be no war in Cambodia had the Khmer Rouge cooperated, or, at least, had Thai elements cut off all rebel financial and military supply lifelines.

Likewise, the United Nations must bear an important part of the responsibility for success or failure. In El Salvador, a lean, efficient, well-trained peacekeeping force arrived promptly and conducted itself with due regard for the economic and cultural sensitivities of the Salvadorans. The force offended neither side politically with its national membership, and carried out its duties firmly, yet impartially.

In contrast, the peacekeeping mission in Cambodia was oversized and inefficient, with many contingents poorly trained, politically biased and lacking in the proper respect for the Cambodian way of life. It missed its chance to stand up to the Khmer Rouge when the balance of the operation arrived a full eight months after the Paris agreement was signed. UNTAC then made matters worse by intensifying inflation and compromising its neutrality. Consequently, whereas the character of ONUSAL has added to El Salvador's peace, the character of UNTAC has added to Cambodia's conflict.

What have been the repercussions of this increase in peace and conflict? Reconciliation in El Salvador has strengthened the state financially, improved the economy and generated a more effective government. Furthermore, it has diffused much of reactionary elite
discontent by providing greater opportunity for advancement in the military, and by creating a healthier economic environment for Salvadorean business interests. In Cambodia, however, the Phnom Penh regime has been destabilized by a combination of fiscal collapse, corruption and governmental paralysis. Moreover, the end of peace has shattered the always fragile SNC unity, and fostered an overall shift in factional momentum toward the Khmer Rouge insurgency.

Consequently, the evidence surrounding Goldstone's first two elements of a revolutionary situation - a state resources crisis, and elite alienation and division - suggests that from around March 1992 to March 1993 El Salvador has moved away from, and Cambodia toward, a revolutionary situation.

Therefore, together with other forces, the character of the United Nations peacekeeping missions has had an impact on the political stability of these two countries. The competent nature of ONUSAL has helped to foster a more stable, democratic system. Conversely, UNTAC's many weaknesses has helped to ripen the climate for violent change. Based on these case studies, several conclusions can be drawn.

I. El Salvador's nightmare during the 1980's seems to have finally ended. Evidence supports the prediction that the country will slowly pull itself out of the cycle of war, repression and injustice. The U.N. Secretary-General even calls the progress a
"negotiated revolution." In Cambodia's case, however, if current trends go unchecked, full-scale civil war may resume, resulting in the overthrow of the government or the partitioning of the country.

II. Extrapolating from the examination of El Salvador and Cambodia, the character of a United Nations peacekeeping mission has the potential to speed the emergence of a revolutionary situation. To avoid this, and with regard to missions that operate within a nation-state (as opposed to between nation-states) in order to keep, make and build the peace, the U.N. should observe the following guidelines. The peacekeeping force must be well-trained and include nationalities inoffensive to all parties. It must deploy promptly, firmly enforce the existing peace agreement, and not overwhelm the economies and cultural sensitivities of the host country. Lastly, its duties must be executed impartially and efficiently.

III. Although this study involves only two cases and looks at just two of Goldstone's elements - crisis of state resources, and elite alienation and division, it nevertheless serves to reinforce and build upon the overall modified Goldstone framework. A large-scale United Nations peacekeeping operation, such as ONUSAL and UNTAC, can act as a force of revolutionary conjuncture if it is improperly conceived and implemented. In other words, it has the potential to

---

rapidly alter the complexion of a society, and generate a crisis of state resources, elite alienation and division, mass mobilization potential, and a revolutionary movement. It can, therefore, unwittingly facilitate the creation of a revolutionary situation. If short-term accelerators also arise (i.e. in Cambodia's case: assassination of Sihanouk; election failure), then the U.N. may someday find itself party to an actual revolution.

In all probability, the United Nations will be asked in the near future to police comprehensive settlements in places like South Africa, Israel's occupied territories, Afghanistan, the former Soviet Union, Liberia and elsewhere. 7,500 troops have already been earmarked for Mozambique. The international body would do well to heed to lessons of El Salvador and Cambodia.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


---. Letter Dated 11 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to


---. List of cantonment sites.

---. Overall breakdown of deployment of forces. 28 July 1992.


VITA AUCTORIS

J. Taylor Wentges was born in 1964 in Montreal, Canada. He graduated from Queen's University at Kingston in 1990 with a B.A. (Honours) in Political Studies, and went on to receive his M.A. in Political Science from the University of Windsor in 1993. He has travelled extensively throughout Central America and East Asia.