Toronto dailies and the elections of 1957, 1958 and 1962 agenda-setting during the "Diefenbaker interlude".

Robert Stewart. Brown

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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RÉCU
Toronto Dailies and the Elections of 1957, 1958, and 1962: Agenda-Setting During the 'Diefenbaker Interlude'.

by

Robert Stewart Brown

A thesis
presented to the University of Windsor
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
The Department of Communication Studies

Windsor, Ontario, 1984

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ABSTRACT

Although the elections of 1957, 1958 and 1962 are among the most important in Canadian history, there has been little original research done on them in two decades. A content analysis of Toronto newspapers was done for two reasons:

1. To determine if traditional accounts (like Newman's "Renegade in Power") were accurate;

2. To see if agenda-setting of issues by the media could be documented;

3. To see if coverage of parties by the media would have any DIRECT result in voter outcome in the elections of 1957, 1958 and 1962.

According to the results of the content analysis, accounts of press coverage need extensive revision. Significant differences were found between newspapers in their coverage of parties and party leaders. Evidence of a charismatic John Diefenbaker dominating Canadian politics was not present. Nor was there evidence of the great themes which supposedly dominated the election campaigns, like the 'Northern Vision'.

The content analysis did not find a relationship between party coverage by the media, and voting results. It
did find a similarity between the media agenda of issues and the public agenda of issues, with economic topics dominating both agendas in 1958 and 1962. The importance of economic issues on the media and public agendas may provide a viable alternative to Diefenbaker's "charisma" as an explanation for the 1958 and 1962 elections.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have been fortunate in the assistance of my thesis committee, and would like to thank Professors Jim Winter, Walter Romanow and Ron Hoskins for the time and effort they have given—and for their patience with spelling mistakes.

I also thank Rob and Joan Mavrinac for their excellent company and excellent meals during the past few years; David Bongard, for his hospitality during my stay at the University of Toronto; to Iris Kohler, Joanna Beck and Pat Brooks, for preventing the destruction of the Wylbur terminal system. Last but certainly not least, I have nothing but praise for Sheila and Ann, who kept chaos outside the doors of the Department of Communication Studies.
## CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** .............................................................. iv

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** .................................................. vi

### Chapter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION .................................................. 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND THE DIEFENBAKER INTERLUDE. .... 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Stimulus-Response Model ........................................ 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Effects .................................................... 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Effects Re-evaluated ....................................... 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda-Setting ..................................................... 18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda-Setting in Canada During the Diefenbaker Interlude ....... 20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion .......................................................... 32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL PRESS, 1957-1962. .... 33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Partisanship .............................................. 34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television .......................................................... 39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diefenbaker's Relationship with the Press, 1945-1958 .............. 42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Deterioration of Media Relations, 1958-1962 .................... 55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualter and MacKirdy ................................................. 60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion .......................................................... 63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypotheses .......................................................... 64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. METHODOLOGY ..................................................... 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice of Toronto ................................................... 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Content Analysis ................................................. 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampling .................................................................. 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Coding Sheet ..................................................... 71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. RESULTS ............................................................ 74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of the Content Analysis ..................................... 74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis #1 .......................................................... 77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis #2 .......................................................... 84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis #3 .......................................................... 90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis #3a .......................................................... 98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table                                                                 | Page |
---                                                                   |------|
2. Types of Partisanship by Nation (in per cent)                      | 23   |
3. American Partisanship                                             | 25   |
4. Canadian Motivations for Vote Intentions, 1962-3                  | 27   |
5. Voting Influences, 1944/1962                                      | 28   |
6. Length of Articles                                                | 76   |
7. Differences in Newspapers' Treatment of Parties and Leaders       | 78   |
8. Means of Paper and Coverage, by Election                          | 80   |
9. Paper Partisanship, All Three Elections                           | 81   |
10. Papers and Assertions                                            | 83   |
11. Favourableness of Liberal and Conservative Coverage              | 87   |
13. Enumeration of names and titles                                  | 93   |
14. Statements Made by Politicians                                   | 96   |
15. Articles Where Leader and/or Party are Mentioned                 | 97   |
16. Favourableness of Conservative Leader and Party Coverage         | 100  |
17. Theme breakdown by election                                      | 103  |
18. Papers and Theme Types                                           | 104  |
20. CIPO Poll, October 1957                                          | 111  |
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>CIPO Poll, March 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>CIPO Poll, August 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Polls and Attitudes to Economic Competence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

While there has been little examination of the press during what Wegenstreif (1965) calls the 'Diefenbaker Interlude', it is not because the subject lacks importance. With the exception of Joe Clark's short eight month tenure in 1979, the Diefenbaker government has been the only federal Conservative government since the Bennett government of 1935. During the period, one man, John Diefenbaker, almost completely monopolized the national stage. It was also a time of unprecedented instability in Canadian political life. In the eight years between 1957 and 1965, Canada was the scene of five national elections.

In only one of these was a party able to secure a majority of seats in the House of Commons. In the rest...instability and uncertainty were the best that could be obtained as a result of two months' intensive campaigning on each occasion. (Wegenstreif, 1965: 2)

The first three elections—those of 1957, 1958, and 1962—were the most unusual. In 1957 the St. Laurent administration was brought down with nearly half its cabinet ministers defeated in a surprising upset. The Progressive Conservatives, who found themselves governing, had numbered scarcely more than 50 seats for 22 years. The 1958 election witnessed the largest majority to that point in Ca-
nadian history (208 of 265 seats). The Conservative loss of 92 seats in 1962 was exceeded only once. And the worst loss, the Conservative fiasco of 1935, with 98 seats lost, took place at the height of the Depression, with the Conservative vote and organization split between the Bennett Conservatives and the Reconstructionist Party of Stevens. For a united party, the Conservative setback in 1962 was unprecedented.

The role of the press in these elections certainly merits study. Canadian political scientists of the time dismissed media influence as an inconsequential variable. However, their minimization of press importance was based on contemporary American political science theory, which has since been revised (see Chapter III). Instead, the more recent agenda-setting theory of the media—which posits that the media issue agenda determines the public issue agenda—may provide a more relevant interpretation. Research will determine the media agenda of the Diefenbaker Interlude, using content analysis, and its relationship to the public agenda (from polls and voting results). Furthermore, an historical study of the media during this period is important in its own right. This thesis will begin such a study through a content analysis of the three Toronto daily newspapers (The Globe and Mail, Daily Star, and Telegram) during the elections of 1957, 1958, and 1962.
According to Defleur and Ball-Rokeach (1976), the interaction between societies and their mass media—although of central significance—has not captured much of the attention of research specialists and scholars. This is particularly true of the role of the media in history; anything beyond the 'immediate past' tends to be ignored. This study of the Toronto press during the Diefenbaker Interlude may help in a small way to redress the imbalance.
Chapter II

POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND THE DIEFENBAKER INTERLUDE.

Most agenda-setting research has concentrated on synchronic studies of public issues. Longitudinal or diachronic studies, delving into the past, have been rarer, with a few exceptions like Funkhouser's study of issues from the late 1960's (Funkhouser, 1973). During the Diefenbaker Interlude it was felt that due to selective exposure, selective observation and the '2-step' flow of information from opinion leaders, the media could not influence public opinion except in indirect ways, such as a rather limited influence on opinion leaders. Furthermore, eminent political scientists such as Campbell, Miller and Stokes (1960) pointed to political partisanship as the decisive influence on electors.

Agenda-setting has become widely accepted in the last decade, with the influence and existence of 'opinion leaders' in question, a noticeable decline in partisanship, and a rise in issue voting (Shaw and McCombs, 1977). The 'demonstrated' political partisanship and low public salience of issues during the Diefenbaker period would appear to make an agenda-setting study of that time questionable. However, there is evidence, which will be reviewed, to sug-
gest that the strong role of political party affiliation and weak public emphasis on issues, thought dominant in the American scene from the 1940's to the mid 1960's, did not apply to Canada. Therefore agenda-setting by the Canadian media was as possible then as it is now.

2.1 THE STIMULUS-RESPONSE MODEL.

The 'hypodermic needle' or 'stimulus-response' theory of media effects emerged from the study of propaganda during World War I. Because the commitment of total war put unprecedented burdens on the civilian population, each power initiated propaganda campaigns to induce unquestioning belief in the righteousness of its cause. There was a further complication: the Allies needed American intervention for victory, while Germany and the Entente wished for American neutrality.

Of all propaganda efforts, the British one was the most successful, with a secret and highly organized propaganda machine known to outsiders as Wellington House. It employed many of the Empire's foremost intellects, including John Buchan, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, and H.G. Wells. Both Wellington House and its American branch used weekly press surveys and mailing lists, and took advantage of German atrocities, real and imagined. Among other effects, the British propaganda effort was thought to have helped guide the Americans into a declaration of war against Germany in 1917. (Smith, 1972: 276-277.)
After the war, a flurry of memoirs and exposes showed how manipulation of rumors like the 'crucified Canadians' influenced the thinking of a naive public. DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach (1975: 155-157) give as an example the expose of Georgie Vierek, who detailed how a British propaganda official took a photograph of German soldiers being hauled off for burial, and pasted on the inscription of "German Cadavers on their way to the Soap Factory" under the German soldiers. Social scientists studied how propaganda via the mass media had 'duped' both friend and adversary; the most prominent of these researchers were Lippmann and Lasswell (Altheide and Johnson, 1980: 8-10). The 'stimulus-response' theory which resulted from this study was grounded in both 19th century theories of alienation and the early 20th century approach to psychology. Because an individual's behavior was governed to a great extent by inherited biological mechanisms which intervened between stimulus and response, human nature was thought to be fairly uniform from one person to another. The growth of mass society meant that there were few durable social influences to disrupt the influences of those inherited biological mechanisms.

Given a view of a uniform basic human nature, and a stress upon nonrational processes, plus a view of the social order as mass society, the instinctive S-R theory of the media as powerful devices seemed entirely valid: it stated that the powerful stimuli were uniformly brought to the attention of the individual members of the mass. These stimuli tapped inner urges, emotions, or other processes over which the individual had little voluntary control. Because of the inherited
nature of these mechanisms, each person responded more or less uniformly... The result was that the members of the mass could be swayed and influenced by those in possession of the media, especially with the use of emotional appeals. (DeFleur and Ball-Bokeach, 1975, 158-159).

The stimulus-response model conceded a virtually unlimited power to the media: those who control the media, and know how to use them effectively, can dictate the response of the audience. Its validity seemed to be confirmed by the rise of the German National Socialists, and the success of Nazi propaganda mastermind Joseph Goebbels in the 1930's.

2.2 LIMITED EFFECTS.

The 'Limited Effects' model of media influence became widely accepted in the 1940's following the publication of The People's Choice (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968), an examination of the 1940 American Presidential election. The study centered on a panel of 600 respondents in Erie County, Pennsylvania, who were repeatedly questioned during the election. As noted above, the 'Hypodermic Needle' notion of media effects had maintained that the public was extremely vulnerable to the mass media. However, Lazarsfeld et al. found that half of the people in the Erie County election knew in May for what party they would vote, (the election was in November) and clung to this choice throughout the campaign. Of those 50% undecided in May, about half made up their minds after they knew who the nominees were.
Furthermore, the voting behavior of 70%, regardless of whether they expressed an early vote intention, corresponded to voting habits of their social groups. "The predispositions of such people were so deeply rooted that they could not be readily converted by the opposition's campaign propaganda". Political partisanship was an important factor. Fully 81% of 'undecided' voters from Republican families, and 71% of undecided voters from Democratic families, actually voted for the parties of their families. (Lazarsfeld et al., 1968: 94-100).

Most people ignored political information through the media, according to Lazarsfeld et al.

At the peak of the campaign in late October, about half the population ignored stories on the front page of their newspapers or political speeches by the candidates themselves, and about 75% of the people ignored magazine stories about the election. In short, the flood of political material at that time, far from drawing any of these people, did not even get their feet wet. (Lazarsfeld, 1968: p. 121)

The political material distributed through the media did reach a small group of people, which tended to be exposed to all media equally. These people were the 'opinion leaders', distributed over all subsets of the population but with a disproportionate number of higher-income and higher-educated voters. A '2-step' flow of information was proposed—"ideas often flowed from radio and print to the opinion leaders and from them to the lesser active members of the population". However, this group was also the least
partial to selective exposure to information and selective observation of the information they were exposed to.

Out of the wide array of available propaganda, (the partisan observer) begins to select. He is more likely to tune in some programs than others; to go to some meetings rather than others; to understand one point in a speech than another. His selective attention thus reinforces the predispositions with which he comes to the campaign. (Lazarsfeld, 1968: 76)

Other researchers in the 1940's also cast doubt on the 'stimulus-response' model and supported a model of limited effects through the 2-step flow of information. Hovland, Lumsdain and Sherffield (1949) measured the importance of propaganda films used to indoctrinate American forces recruits. Comparing treatment (film viewing) and control groups, the authors found that the treatment groups failed to show increased motivation, as measured through attitudes toward the enemy, and serving overseas. (Hovland, 1949: 54-55).

Hyman and Sheatsely (1948) looked at data on public perception of foreign affairs gathered by the U.S. National Opinion Research Centre (NORC). The authors saw a "hard core of know-nothings" who would not be able to learn any information through advertising no matter how detailed or thorough the campaign.

All persons do not offer equal targets for information campaigns. Surveys consistently find that a certain proportion of the population is not familiar with any particular event—If all persons provided equal targets for exposure, and if the sole determinant of public knowledge were the magnitude of the given information, there would be
no reason for the same individuals always to show a relative lack of knowledge. Instead, there is something about the uninformed which makes them harder to reach, no matter what the level or nature of the information.

Support for 'limited effects' was continued in the 1950's by such works as *Personal Influence* (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1954), and *Voting* (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954, especially Chapter 13: 277-305). Berelson et al.'s examination of voters in the town of Elmira during the 1948 Presidential campaign virtually replicated the 1940 study of Erie undertaken in *The People's Choice*. By 1962 selective exposure--an essential component of the 'limited effects' model--was well enough documented to be included in the President's Science Advisory Committee corpus of established social science fact (Sears and Freedman, 1967). Campbell et al. (1960), reinforced the portrayal in *The People's Choice* of an electorate set in its ways, not overly influenced by political communication by the media.

In general, public officials and people involved in public relations tend to overestimate the impact that contemporary issues have on the public. They find it difficult to believe that the reams of newspaper copy and hours of television and radio time could be ignored by any normal person within the reach of these media. The fact seems to be, however, that the human perceptatorium is highly selective, and unless it happens to be tuned to a particular wavelength, the message transmitted over that wavelength will be received only as noise. (Campbell et al., 1960: 99).

Drawing upon surveys of the late 1940's and 1950's, particularly those done by the Michigan Survey Re-
search Center, Campbell et al. found the political party to be the governing independent variable of American politics. The overwhelming percentage of voters were consistent to their party, even those perceived as weak partisans. (Table 1). Voters acted according to family partisanship as well; if the voter's family was Democratic, for example, he was almost certain to be Democratic as well. The political partisan also would perceive information selectively.

Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favourable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, the more exaggerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be.

The influence of party identification is so great that only rarely would the individual develop attitudes that conflict with this allegiance. The independent voter was not "enlightened", but was less involved in politics, with a poorer knowledge of the issues, and a poor image of the candidates. (Campbell et al., 1960: 133, 141, 143).

This was not fertile ground for theories of media influence. Furthermore, attitudes towards the ideology of the voter were not sophisticated; not even a modicum of abstract thinking was done. This profile of the electorate was not calculated to "increase over-confidence in elections that presume widespread ideological concerns in the adult population." (Campbell et al., 1960: 249). For example, Key (1961) pointed to a survey done in 1940 examining readership of the Cleveland Plain Dealer in Erie County. Although the
### TABLE 1

**Party Identification and Presidential Vote, 1952-1959**

(from Campbell et. al., *The American Voter*, p. 139)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong Democrats</th>
<th>Weak Democrats</th>
<th>Independents</th>
<th>Weak Republicans</th>
<th>Strong Republicans</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>-93%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
paper, the most widely read in the county, had almost daily front page endorsement of the Republican presidential candidate, a survey done well into the campaign showed that 59% of the sample did not know which candidate the paper supported. A 1949 survey of readership in Albany County found that only 6% read papers very carefully, while 47% just skimmed the headlines, and 4% did not read news at all. Although the evidence is scant, it suggests that an extremely small proportion of the population follows political news in the press with care. And, those few who did follow the press tended to be the most partisan. (Key, 1961: 352-355.)

2.3 LIMITED EFFECTS RE-EVALUATED.

In the 1960's and 1970's new research cast doubt on the validity of the key hypotheses of the 'limited effects' model. Sears and Freedman (1967) critically reviewed the literature on selective exposure. They felt that selective exposure studies had to meet two criteria:

1. the correlation between audience preference and audience selection had to be well documented; and

\[\text{In addition, 4\% read "more than headlines, not much", 14\% read "sometimes carefully, sometimes not", 19\% read "carefully, skip some things", 3\% read "nationally careful, internationally not", 1\% read "internationally careful, nationally not", and 2\% were "not ascertained" (Key, 1961: 352).}\]
2. attitudes should be better predictors of (i.e., correlate more highly with) exposure than other variables.

Neither criterion was met; of the second criterion it was found that alternate predictors (like education) were more useful than selective exposure.

The authors also considered whether there was a general psychological preference for supportive information, which would be necessary for selective exposure. Turning to the literature, it was found that few studies obtained a clear preference for supportive information, while others showed preference for non-supportive information, or no preference at all. No information was found that could reasonably establish a link between cognitive dissonance and selective exposure.

Fault was found with the seminal studies of limited effects. Sears and Freedman stated that in the 'classic' Erie and Elmira studies, there was limited evidence for selective exposure by Democrats, but none by Republicans. According to Winter (1981: 12-13) The People's Choice had posited that Republicans were selectively exposed to newspapers, and Democrats to radio, because the Democratic Presidential nominee (Roosevelt) had a 'strong radio voice'. Yet when Lazarsfeld et al. controlled for information, the evidence for selective exposure disappeared. Becker, McCombs and McLeod (1975) reported that according to The
People's Choice 55% of media content during the 1940 campaign was pro-Republican, 25% was pro-Democratic, and 20% was neutral. Yet 34% of Republicans exposed themselves to Democratic content and only 55% exposed themselves to pro-Republican content—a seeming contradiction of selective exposure. The Erie and Elmira works, as well as that of Hovland et al. (1949) cited above, have been criticized for concentrating exclusively on short-term exposure with specific items or campaigns, and ignoring cumulative, long-term effects. (Lang and Lang, 1968).

The two-step flow of information, a second hypothesis important to the limited effects model, likewise has been re-evaluated by later research, and been found wanting. For example, Salceda, Read, Evans and Kong (1974) conducted a month-long campaign on the effects of pesticides, with an experimental community in Quincy, Illinois and control community in Decatur, Illinois. They found that of those respondents who remembered the key slogan, only 4% mentioned friends and group meetings as the primary source of exposure.

In 1970 Douglas, Westley and Steven challenged Hyman and Sheatsley's 'know-nothings', a concept-related to the hierarchical 2-step flow of information. They compared changes in an 'experimental' community following an information campaign on mental retardation, with a community where there was no such campaign. The percentage of 'know-noth-
ings' is less chronic than had been expected: 7% in the experimental community, compared with 33% in the control community. "This difference is significant both statistically and socially, in that it indicated that the so-called 'know-nothings' are less chronic than might have been thought". As a corollary, "the information campaign seems to have reached the great majority of the community's citizens."

Krause and Davis (1976) state that opinion leaders account for little of the flow of information. Even when they exist, they are no more likely than anyone else to attribute their ideas to the mass media. The flow of information is not hierarchical, but for the most part horizontal.

According to Patterson (1980) research of the 1950's, confident in the dominance of 'limited effects', treated the media only as an intervening and not as an independent variable. These studies— including Campbell et al. and Berelson et al. — concentrated on the relationship between issues and voting, and simply ignored the media role, rather than giving it proper discussion.

A final criticism of 'limited effects' is that it has not taken into account changes in media and voting habits. Since its initiation as a mass medium, television has increased its proportion of people's available free time more than any other activity or group of activities; at the expense of radio listening, newspaper reading, social visit-
ing, and work inside and outside the house. It is close behind sleeping and working as the most frequent pastimes in the U.S. (Robinson, 1981; Comstock, Chaffee, Katzman, McCombs and Roberts, 1978).

The strength of political partisanship, 'conclusively' proved by Campbell et al., is also in doubt. Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976) in The Changing American Voter looked at American election statistics between 1952 and 1976, and found that although older voters retained their party identification, younger voters tended to cross party lines more, or become independent of partisanship altogether. Voting by issue had become much more important, and levels of issue consistency and issue comprehension had risen. Yet when Nie et al. examined partisanship of the 1950's as explained by Campbell et al. (1960) and Key (1961), they found that the power of political parties and lack of issue salience had remained until the mid-60's. (See Chapter 2, "The American Voter in the 1950's"). This must be taken into account by anyone who does research on media and politics during the 1950's and 1960's.
2.4 Agenda-setting.

With 'limited effects' in question, a number of other models in media influence have emerged. One of those most relevant to political communication is agenda-setting. Although elements can be found as far back as Lippmann (1922), modern research is traceable to McCombs and Shaw (1972). The authors interviewed 100 undecided voters in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, during the 1968 American Presidential election. They found a "very strong relationship" between the emphasis placed on different campaign issues by the media, and the "judgment of voters as to the salience and importance of various campaign topics." Thus "the media appear to have exerted a considerable impact on voters' judgments of what they considered the major issues of the campaign." Since McCombs and Shaw, there has been a steady proliferation of papers on agenda-setting in research journals and on convention programs. (McCombs, 1979).

One early article, a study of American public opinion between 1960 and 1970 (Funkhouser, 1973) looked at the media agenda of important public issues, the public agenda of those issues (measured through Gallup Polls) and a reality index (for example, the extent of U.S. involvement in war in Vietnam was defined through number of troops and deaths in battle.) Funkhouser found that the correlation between media agenda and public agenda was stronger than between 'reality' and either agenda.
Coverage of the Vietnam war, campus unrest, and urban riots peaked a year or two earlier than those events reached their climaxes. Media coverage of drugs roughly paralleled the rise in drug use, and, except for the peak of coverage in 1966, the (media) attended to inflation somewhat in line with the situation. But coverage of race relations, crime, poverty, and pollution showed little if any relation to the actualities of the underlying issues, nor did coverage of the issues which never appeared as "most important"—smoking, science, population, mass media, and women's rights.

Stone and McCombs (1981) looked at time-frame for agenda-setting—that is, the total period under consideration, from the beginning to the completion of the data-gathering process. They found that, although time frame in studies had ranged between two-and-a-half weeks to three years, issues could be contained in a time-frame of two to six months. Winter (1981) who used the New York Times as his media agenda and Gallup surveys as public agenda, over a 28 year period, concluded that the peak association between media and public salience ranged from one to three months. McCombs and Shaw (1972) used a three-and-a-half week time-frame, which indicates that election studies may employ a shorter time-frame. Therefore agenda-setting is viable even in relatively short political campaigns, such as in Great Britain and Canada.
2.5 Agenda-setting in Canada during the Diefenbaker Interlude

Almost all political scientific literature on the Diefenbaker Interlude was written during the 1957-1965 period, during which time the 'Limited Effects' model held undisputed sway. Not surprisingly, the role of the media, when discussed at all, was believed to be minor at best.\(^2\)

The theory of opinion leaders was influential enough that Regenstreif, in *The Diefenbaker Interlude*, devoted a chapter to "Opinion Leadership and the Vote". Regenstreif thought that 'changers' (opinion leaders) were more important than the Canadian mass media and the 'general course of the campaign' itself. Indeed, the media were merely "another device available to opinion leaders, which they can use to communicate with each other and which they can employ in a manipulative way to the general public" (Regenstreif, 1965: 46) Another Canadian academic, J. Murray Beck of Queen's, believed opinion leaders responsible for the dire showing of the Tories in 1963.

Without a doubt the vocally strong anti-Conservative bias of almost all the opinion leaders of the community permeated and influenced all classes and conditions of voters in the metropolitan area (Beck, 1963).

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\(^2\) The only systematic study of newspapers of the time was co-authored by T.A. Qualter, whose best-known work is a book on political propaganda; propaganda studies have by their nature affirmed that the media influence behavior. (Qualter and Mackirdy, "The Press of Ontario and the Election", in Reisel, 1964). See Chapter 3 for further discussion.
Journalists may have believed themselves responsible for the fall of Diefenbaker; political scientists knew better.

It should be noted that the definition of 'opinion leaders' by Heijenstreif (and Beck) was far less sophisticated than that of American political scientists. Lazarsfeld and his school felt that the opinion leaders came from all groups and occupations, although a disproportionate number came from the more highly educated and the affluent. (Berelson et al., 1954: 93-115). Yet Beck and Heijenstreif narrowly viewed 'opinion leaders' as the high income and high education elite. So even according to the theory of the time, their assumptions about the media were suspect. But the greatest weakness of their approach was that it was not based on research; it was the result of ignoring the media as an independent variable. This lack of research reflected American political science thinking but was not paralleled by non-political science writing on Diefenbaker, as will be shown below.

The decline of the 'limited effects' model and consequent rise of the 'agenda-setting' theory of media effects make an agenda-setting study of media during the Diefenbaker Interlude a reasonable undertaking, but an objection can be made. As shown above, Nie et al. (1976) had re-examined and affirmed Campbell et al.'s conclusions on the power of partisanship and lack of issue salience during the 1950's. Thus, the model of limited media influence, while
no longer accurate today, may have been viable in the 1950's and early 1960's.

However, just because political partisanship was predominant in the United States does not make it dominant everywhere. It can be demonstrated that Campbell's arguments for the style of partisanship may not apply to Canada.

Nie et al. suggest that the situation was the result of uniquely American political events between the realignment of parties in Roosevelt's 'New Deal', and the social convulsions of the mid 1960's. (Nie et al., 1976: 174-194.) Since these events did not take place in other countries, it is possible that the high partisanship in the United States was limited to that nation.

Certain facts in Almond and Verba's classic *The Civic Culture* (1963) add some insight. Classifying their samples by 'type' of partisans, the authors found the 'open' and 'intense' partisans— the two types most involved in the political process— accounted for 92% of the American sample, but only 75% in Great Britain, 69% in West Germany, 67% in Mexico, and 34% in Italy. (See Table 2) ³

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³ Almond and Verba defined four types of partisanship. An 'open' partisan was indifferent towards interparty marriage but emotionally involved in election campaigns. An 'intense' partisan was concerned about marriage across interparty lines, and was emotionally involved in elections. An 'apathetic' partisan was indifferent about elections, while a 'parochial' partisan was concerned about interparty elections but indifferent about campaigns. See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 144-145.
## TABLE 2

Types of Partisanship by Nation (in per cent)

(from Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 155)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% who are</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>U.K.</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>open partisans</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apathetic partisans</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intense partisans</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parochial partisans</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total per cent

Total number (all admitted major party adherents or voters, omitting those who had no opinion on interparty marriage or on the emotions they felt at campaign time)

|       | 736 | 719 | 485 | 300 | 489 |
In other words, far from being a universal phenomenon of the 1950's, partisanship varied from country to country.

The period from 1952 to 1964 was summed by Nie et al. as one of 'no net change' in voting behavior.

There is no major alteration in the relative strength of the two parties [Democratic and Republican]. The proportion of Independents in the population remains stable. It is during this essentially static period that the first and most influential surveys based on voting studies were produced. It is not surprising that they concluded that party attachment was a lifetime commitment. (Nie et al.: 84.)

The durability of American partisanship during this time, can be seen in Table 3.
Table 3

American Partisanship

from Nie et al. (1976) p. 49
But Canada showed no evidence of similar stability; nor did it display the partisan patterns of its southern neighbour. Surveys conducted by Regenstreif in 1962 and 1963 on motivation for voter intentions list 8 specific reasons in 1962 and 13 in 1963 (See Table 4). These motivations varied between parties and between elections. Party identification varied between elections: 38 percent (for the total sample) in 1962, 33 percent a year later.

Additional evidence can be seen in a 1962 poll taken by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO). The poll, a replication of one done in 1944, found that party politics, as the greatest voting influence, had declined from 53 to 44 percent (Table 5). (The rising candidate as greatest voting influence increased from 36 percent to 39 percent, while other influences increased from 3 to 5 percent--an insignificant change when sampling error is considered.) Thus, stable longitudinal partisanship--the primary argument against agenda-setting during the period of the Diefenbaker Interlude--was a factor which applied to the United States but not to the same degree to Canada, where partisanship was declining and fluctuated between groups and elections.

Nie et al. also suggest that issue salience in American presidential elections depends on the issue positions of candidates. A mock election held by the University of Michigan found that "if the public is faced with candi-
### TABLE 4

Canadian Motivations for Vote Intentions, 1962-3

*(from Regenstreif, the Diefenbaker Interlude, p. 74.)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1962</th>
<th>Intention</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>P.C.</th>
<th>N.D.P.</th>
<th>S.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of cases</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association with specific groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will manage government well</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General domestic issues</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy issues</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General approval</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compared to others</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reasons</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>126</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1963</th>
<th>Intention</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>P.C.</th>
<th>N.D.P.</th>
<th>S.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of cases</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association with specific groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic issues</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will manage government well</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best for the country</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need stable government</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good local candidate</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should have their choice</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time for a change</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compared to others</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against nuclear warheads</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For nuclear warheads</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reasons</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>126</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Columns total more than 100 per cent because some respondents gave more than one reason.*
TABLE 5
Voting Influences, 1944/1962

CIPO Question:
"In an election, which influences your vote the most, the policies of a political party as a whole, or the kind of candidate the party has in your own riding"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party politics</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kind of candidate</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other influences</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
dates distinguished from each other on the basis of these issues it will vote on the issues; if the public is offered a more centralist choice, the vote will depend much more heavily on partisan identification." Nie et al. offer the examples of Goldwater and Johnson in 1964, Nixon-Humphrey-Wallace in 1968, and Nixon-McGovern in 1972, where "there would be a candidate whose position on the issues placed him on the left or right segment of the issue scale, while his opponent...would be in the center." (Nie et al., 1976: 319-344). Therefore these elections would be 'issue' elections.

In Canada during the Diefenbaker Interlude there was a clear difference between candidates. The Conservative standardbearer was a charismatic Prairie populist with unorthodox views: the first 'Red Tory'. St. Laurent and Pearson were centralist technocrats. CCF/NDP leaders Coldwell and Douglas represented the social democratic tradition. Low and Thompson of the Socreds espoused a right-wing ideology virtually unchanged from the 1930's. Thus the Canadian electorate, according to this model, would concentrate on issues rather than partisanship—and thus be more amenable to agenda-setting of public issues by the mass media.

Furthermore, Canadian elections of the late '50's and the early '60's may have been particularly sensitive to press influence, due to a political instability as evidenced
by riding patterns. According to Begenstreif (1965: 43), only 26% of the 265 Commons' seats remained in the same party, while 62% of seats changed between two parties and 12% alternated among three parties. By contrast, during the same period only 19% of seats changed parties in Great Britain. In the United States, 22% of 435 Congressional districts elected representatives from both Democratic and Republican parties in the 5 elections between 1952 and 1962. Thus, Canadian electors may have been more open than their American and British counterparts to the influence of press agenda-setting on politics.

Contemporary political scientists ignored the media in the Diefenbaker years, yet other sources gave them a more important role. Fisher (1958) opined that papers were insensitive to public opinion, though not necessarily in conflict with it. Peter Dempson, a journalist of the period, claimed that the press did not turn the people against Diefenbaker; all the newspapers did was point up the Government's shortcomings and mistakes, "which most people were aware of anyways." (Dempson, 1968: 122). (How people became aware of the government's shortcomings on their own was not explained.)

But this was a minority opinion. More representative was Patrick Nicholson, the Thompson chain's Ottawa correspondent, with close ties to the Conservatives. He claimed that there were three ways that John Diefenbaker, a
'man of the people', estranged himself from the people. The first was an uncharacteristic self-glorification that the Prime Minister 'appeared to bestow upon himself' while in office; the second was his alienation of Quebec; and the third was an incapacity in relating to an initially friendly press, which was at first willing to play along with the folk hero image. (Nicholson, 1968: 97). Newman (1963), a less sympathetic writer, observed that Diefenbaker was "more than a little like an inept suitor, whose passionate longing for the wilful siren he was so assiduously trying to court lacked both understanding and respect." His alienation of the press, Newman inferred, was at least partly responsible for a poor electoral showing in 1962 and 1963. (Newman, 1963: 236). A study of the Progressive Conservative leadership, (Perlin, 1980: 123) likewise stated that Diefenbaker's estrangement from journalists caused those journalists to vent their hostility in their columns, and that this cost Diefenbaker dearly in political support. Others who suspect the media of political influence during this period are Grant (1965: 7-8), Rutherford (1978: 107) and Bothwell, Drummond, and English (1981: 251).
2.6 **CONCLUSION.**

During the Diefenbaker Interlude the dominant model of political communication was 'limited effects' of the media: selective exposure, selective perception, selective retention, the 'two-step' flow of information, and strength of partisanship in politics, resulted in a minimal influence of the media on voting behavior. Not surprisingly, academic discussion of the press role in Canada during the 1957-1962 period was rather limited.

Yet in recent years the key tenets of the 'limited effects' model have been re-evaluated, and 'limited effects' discredited. With one of the more recent communication approaches, agenda-setting, the media agenda of issues is held to influence the public agenda of those issues quite dramatically. Canada was more 'issue-oriented' than the United States between 1957 and 1962, and therefore media influence in the three Canadian elections held during that time may be more important than was suspected by academics of that period; reputable if not definitive sources have suggested that the media indeed had a role. An agenda-setting study of the Diefenbaker Interlude could establish whether such conjecture has a basis in fact.
Chapter III


Unlike research on current topics—where much of the 'background' is well-known or readily available—longitudinal research often involves personalities and issues which have disappeared from the public domain, or have been distorted with the passage of time. Furthermore, Canadian politicians and media have undergone important changes. It is therefore necessary to supply the 'background' to place the content analysis research in context, and to prevent misunderstanding of material. Unfortunately, one cannot refer to an authoritative history; the Diefenbaker period, and the role of its press, have yet to be examined in any detail by historians. While original historical research is beyond the scope of this thesis, a summary of what sources exist could be of use.

According to these sources—which are surprisingly consistent on the important points—the Progressive Conservative leader was enthusiastically supported by the press in 1957 and 1958. Shortly after Diefenbaker was returned with a majority government in the 1958 election, a rift with the press developed, partly due to his inept handling of media relations. As one crisis succeeded another—the Accra
incident, the Coyne affair, economic problems—the rift widened until, in 1962, Diefenbaker felt he was being unfairly 'crucified' by the media. By 1963 his unfortunate relations with newspapers had become an election issue in its own right, and was a reason for his fall from power.

3.1 POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP.

Canada's national press was conducted on partisan lines well into the 20th century. Patronage was so accepted during Laurier's prime ministership that in 1905 the government published a confidential booklet listing the newspapers with which the King's Printer was permitted to deal. A supplement to the booklet began: "the Secretary -of State has added to the list of newspapers authorized to receive government patronage..." (Craick, 1956: 10, quoting P.A.C., Laurier Papers.) In 1923 Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King attempted to found an Ottawa daily newspaper which would print news with a purely Liberal slant. His failure was due to managerial problems, not public outrage. (Nichols, 1948: 175).

In Toronto, centre of English-Canadian journalism, political partisanship was never disguised with subtlety. When George McCullogh merged the Globe with the Mail and Empire in 1936, the newspaper began a long-lasting support of the Conservative Party. A similar bias was reflected in copy of the Telegram, owned and controlled by the Robinson
family. Toronto’s third daily, the Star, had been under the firm direction of J.E. Atkinson since Laurier’s time. He continued the Star’s tradition of Liberal support. The political attitudes of the Star and Telegram were associated with a bitter rivalry over circulation. The Telegram expressed unwavering loyalty to the British Empire and attacked the Star as "Joe Stalin’s local mouthpiece", while at the same time "pro-American, continentalist and even annexationist". (Kesterton, 1978: 85-90.)

When in 1930 Telegram reporter Bert Wemp ran for Mayor of Toronto, he was enthusiastically supported by his paper and enthusiastically savaged by the Star. (He won.) By the late 1940’s and early 1950’s this political rivalry reached its highest (or lowest) point, when McCullagh took over the ‘Tely’ (1948) and Atkinson’s son-in-law H.C. Hindmarch ran the Star (1946). In the 1949 federal election, Peter Dempson, as a young Telegram reporter, covering his first campaign for the paper, was given advice by old hand Norman Campbell:

"Give them a gimmick-- a little twist", he explained, "If (Liberal Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent) is speaking and one or two people boo, play up the interruption. Pay little attention to the applause. If he draws a big crowd, but fails to arouse them write that up. If he attracts several thousand people to a meeting, but there are still empty seats, play up the angle that St. Laurent failed to pack the hall"...Campbell pointed out that the Toronto Daily Star, our main competitor, was using the same approach in reporting the activities of (Tory leader) Drew...I took Campbell’s words to heart...I got no complaints about the treatment my stories received after that. The
slanting got worse as we moved along. (Dempson, 1968: 62.)

In fairness to Campbell, his techniques were identical to those of Star reporters. According to the historian of that paper, "as the (1949) campaign advanced the Star became progressively more hysterical in its demands that Drew be beaten." By the end of the campaign the paper had as many as eight election stories on page one, all markedly unfriendly to the Tories, while ignoring the CCF. In the 1945 provincial election,

the Star's campaign was about as fantastic as one can imagine. Speeches of Conservatives were unreported, the Star acknowledging that they were delivered only to refute them. Few speeches by the leader of the CCF were reported except when the speaker said something good about (Ontario Liberal Leader) Thomson...the Globe and Mail complained that (Conservative) Premier Frost was being pictured as a murderer. Even the Star Weekly, which J.E. Atkinson had kept strictly neutral in politics, carried Liberal election stories. (Harkness, 1963: 365-370.)

By the time Diefenbaker assumed command of the Conservative leadership, newspapers were displaying their partisan affiliations less openly. Many of the political rivalries of newspapers were related to circulation rivalries, of which Toronto was only one example. The case of

Publisher McCullagh criticized both Dempson and Campbell for this after the election. "I want all of you, when covering a political meeting or any other such event, to be objective. I want our pictures to be objective and fair. I don't want any deliberate slanting of stories." (Dempson, 1968: 63-64.) The timing of this criticism makes its sincerity somewhat suspect.
Chatham, Ontario, was typical: although a small town, in the early twentieth century it could boast of two dailies, the Banner and Daily Planet -- one of which was Tory, the other Liberal. But from a peak of 138 in 1913, Canadian dailies had declined to 87 by 1945 (Kesterton, 1978: 71.) As a result of these closings and mergers, "virtually all these smaller cities have only one daily paper and, since it has readers belonging to all the political parties, its settled policy is generally to avoid political controversy as much as possible. A similar situation prevails even in many major cities -- Halifax and Saint John, for example". (Stevenson, 1957.) By the 1960's Stuart Keate could claim that today about ninety percent of the dailies subscribing to the Canadian Press describe themselves as independent, with the result that the reader is afforded a cross-section of opinion which enables him to arrive at a much more balanced judgement (Hamlin, 1962: 15-16.)

In Toronto, the death of Hindmarsh in 1956 resulted in a substantial change in editorial policy, especially a de-emphasis on partisan preferences. The death of McCullagh in 1952 and acquisition of the Globe by R. Howard Webster had produced a similar change of the Globe's editorial policy. John Bassett's takeover of the Telegram maintained the paper's pro-Conservative approach. (Kesterton, 1978: 85-90; Harkness, 1963: 383-384.)

These changes were reflected in the Parliamentary Press Gallery, as D. M. Fisher's 1958 analysis reveals. According to Fisher "it is hard to spot blatant partisanship
amongst the Gallery people today. There is certainly little deification of the political great." Some of his comments are worth mentioning. Although only 14 of 91 members were CP men, "any quick survey of the press in Canada makes one realize that the Canadian Press is the main source of lineage from Ottawa for almost all Canadian newspapers." There was a dearth of weekly or fortnightly reviews, and the only daily columnists were Robert Duffy of the Globe, Arthur Blakely of the Montreal Gazette, Judith Robinson of the 'Tely', and Patrick Nicholson of the Thomson chain, while Pat Whealen of the Windsor Star, Richard Jackson of the Ottawa Journal, and Charles Lynch of the Southam chain averaged two to four by-line columns a week. Most of the reporters were between twenty-five and forty years of age, with a minority having university training.

Fisher (1958) made out certain patterns in coverage of stories.

A well-thought out speech, supported by research, may not be good for a word on the wires, whereas a brief question to a minister on some oddity or

Fisher broke down the 80 active and 11 associate Gallery members down as follows: 14 Canadian Press, 4 British United Press; 9 French Canadians, 7 American correspondents; 4 other British, 2 Russian, 1 German, 1 French correspondent; 5 each for the Toronto Star and Ottawa Journal, 4 for the Ottawa Citizen, 3 each for the Globe, Telegram, Montreal Star and Southam; 2 for the Montreal Gazette; Winnipeg Free Press and Windsor Star; and a "number of oddballs". This breakdown did not substantially alter in the following years. ("Parliamentary Press Gallery", in Normandin, editor, Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1959-1965.)
quirk can usually raise a paragraph and a mention in the papers. The focus on personality is very sharp, that on substance is very weak.

Reporters concentrated on the doings of the front benches: departments and senior civil servants were ignored, while there was a "mild and general contempt" for the backbenches. The quality of reports was on the whole mediocre: literary accomplishments and "men of real genius" were few. Coverage was "neither vicious, extremely partisan nor deliberately deceitful." [Fisher, 1958.]

3.2 TELEVISION.

Television was still in its commercial infancy in the 1950's and does not appear to have been an influential factor in the 1953 election. Dalton Camp, an important media aide to both George Drew (Tory leader 1948-1956) and Diefenbaker, believed that Drew would have had an advantage with TV but was not given the opportunity.

Television was still a child; few Canadians had as yet seen it and some remained unaware of its existence. We thought Drew looked appealing and convincing on television. His speech was too richly coloured for radio, and he was as his worst in print, where headlines consistently reported that Drew "Blasts" and so on, or Drew "Hurls Charges" or Drew "Attacks" such and such. In the linear age, as McLuhan would say, headline writers shaped political images... Drew especially emerged as (a man) who spoke entirely in pejoratives, living a life of unrelenting belligerence, sounding alarms and taking apocalyptic views. Drew had been undone by print, just as St. Laurent had been created by it. (Camp, 1970: p.209.)
John Diefenbaker, like Drew, was good with television. In national broadcasts he 'came across' better than his rival, Liberal leader Pearson, who appeared awkward and at first possessed a noticeable lisp. (Stevenson, 1958.) 'Dief' was a relentless perfectionist in his television messages, which were usually shot numerous times until the Tory leader was satisfied. (Newman, 1963: 243.)

Yet there is not much evidence that television had extraordinary political influence in these early years. Dalton Camp remarked that the 1957 campaign may have "signalled the twilight of the absolute predominance of the press", but was "only the dawn of television as an influence in electoral campaigns." Camp and the other important media advisors of both sides were unprepared for it.

None of us clearly saw what was coming, which was a medium that would profoundly change politics, campaigning, reporting and politicians themselves. Perhaps, had any of us realized its potential and implications, we might have been frightened of it. Instead, we considered television a kind of extension of radio, which was important of course, but not nearly as important as the printed word. (Camp, 1970: 209-210.)

Kenneth McNaught claimed in 1958 that politics on TV was not only ineffectual but also boring. He laid the blame on CBC internal policy statements based on the Broadcasting Act, which "identifies impartially with the colour drab-grey".

To begin with, during election periods, free political time is divided between the parties, and programs which at other times bring together op-
posing points of view are eliminated. Normally the CBC discussion programs, press conferences, etc., are very effective, and often they reveal real differences between party points of view. Certainly they are by far the most interesting type of political broadcast and frequently the discussion they stir up continues long after particular shows. But not only does the CBC cancel its most effective political education programs during election time, it also takes special pains to ensure that the single-party election broadcasts will be as uninspiring as possible. It prohibits, specifically, "all political broadcasts incorporating any device which would be considered theatrical, such as dramatic skits". Furthermore, the use of the following is also prohibited: film clips, slides, music, animation, cartoons and still photographs (unless they show only "individual persons" who are "members of the party sponsoring the broadcast"). If these restrictions were imposed on public affairs broadcasts between elections there would probably be a mass-suicide of CBC talks producers within a month.

As a result,

Despite the comparative excitement of the last federal election (1958) and apart from one or two personalities it would be a bold person who would assert that television had done much by way of stimulating interest. We had a right to expect that this magical medium would roll back many of the effects of other technological changes in our society. Television planning, correctly conceived, could have recovered for us the day of the political debates and some of the nineteenth century excitement associated with those debates. Instead it has given us—at least during election periods—the horrors of the dull-slicked method that mesmerize us in so many other kinds of telecast. (McNaught, 1958.)

Things had not improved much by the end of Diefenbaker's tenure. Coverage of the otherwise fascinating events of 1962-1963 followed the general pattern of political broadcasting, which seems calculated to deaden our sense of politics. Free-time political broadcasts, run by the parties, regularly show us the appalling spectacle of boring politicians reading ghost-written
speeches from script in TV studios... (Fulford, 1963.)

Thus television— to be very influential a few years hence— was little more than an extension of other media during the Diefenbaker Interlude. As Camp (1970) said, newspapers remained the influential element of the press.

3.3 Diefenbaker's Relationship with the Press, 1945-1958.

Were one to believe John Diefenbaker in his somewhat vindictive memoirs, Lester Pearson and the Liberals were not as much a threat to the Chief's achievements as was an insidious press which combined servitude to the Liberals with toady ing to the Americans. Volumes II and III of One Canada show a suspicion of the media verging on paranoia.

One of the results of our huge majority (cf 1958) was that, generally speaking, the press became the Opposition; no matter what we did, however beneficial, the powerful press condemned us. The pundits, at least as they described themselves, regarded their words as possessing all the authority of having been uttered ex cathedra. There was never any policy declared by me on behalf of the Conservative Party which was not thoroughly canvassed, considered, and examined... To read the press for the period of my government, however, is often to read the opposite of what actually took place. (Diefenbaker, 1976: II, 228.)

To give just one example of his belief about reporter's motivations he described a supposed press ambush in 1961, when he was unveiling a statue in Winnipeg.

Occasionally... I had the last laugh. During the period of (Bank of Canada Governor) Ccyne's contest with my government, I was in Winnipeg to unveil the Sheuenko Monument on the grounds of the
Legislature. Someone had placed a sign of large dimension in praise of Coyne under the drape of the statue's base. The word got around. There was a covey of expectant photographers gathered, cameras ready, waiting for me to unveil the monument with this sign about Coyne. Their expressions when the drape was pulled away made me wish that I had brought a camera. One of the Winnipeg policemen, checking beforehand to make certain that the unveiling would go off without a hitch, had found the sign and removed it. (Diefenbaker, 1976: II, 228-229.)

Yet other memoirs and studies show a different picture, one in which Diefenbaker started his party leadership with press support and enthusiasm—support which left him only a few years after his election victory of 1958. When Diefenbaker was elected as a backbencher in the 1940's he was supposed to have gotten along famously with the reporters. As a distinguished trial lawyer with a well-documented reputation for protecting the underprivileged, he was respected not only by the press but by members of other parties as well.

John Diefenbaker in his Opposition days became something of a national institution—known across the country as the one Parliamentarian not afraid to stand up for the 'little man' against the establishment. (Newman, 1963: 26, 233.)

He also was supported for his independence.

Popular with the press, presumably admired by the Liberals ('Now, if only he were your leader instead of Drew', they would say), greatly in demand as a platform orator, Diefenbaker maintained a distance from his Parliamentary colleagues. (Camp, 1970: 145.)

He had a free and easy personal relationship with journalists. Peter Dempson joined the Press Gallery in 1945
when Diefenbaker was still an obscure but promising back-
dencher.

One of my duties was to report the activities of all Saskatchewan MP's for the (Regina) Leader-
Post, the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix and the Winnipeg
Free Press. I would cover their speeches in the
House of Commons, obtain their views on matters of
current interest to the Prairies, and seek their
comments when anything of a controversial nature
broke out. Invariably, John Diefenbaker was one
of the first members I would approach. He was al-
ways co-operative. He had a great appreciation of
publicity. He never hesitated to tip me off to
good stories for Saskatchewan consumption...In my
early days with the Telegram, I often called him
at his office, simply to chat. Usually he provid-
ed me with a story. (Dempson, 1968: 84.)

Patrick Nicholson believed that

thoroughly his long lone wolf years in the Oppo-
sition, John Diefenbaker had created and enjoyed a
warm relationship with the Press Gallery, such as
no other politician could boast in living memory.
He was always helpful in talking freely and frankly
with journalists to explain the significance of
his criticism of Liberal misdemeanours. He was
always grateful for any suggestions or information
which might help him. He was forever humbly ap-
preciative of any favourable material in print.
When he was away from Ottawa, he kept his memory
alive in the Press Gallery--and his name appearing in print--by sending to his journalist
friends vivid picture postcards with his own in-
teresting comments.

The great accumulation of goodwill among journalists that
Diefenbaker built up was sustained with the aid of his first
wife, Edna. "She was the best public relations officer
among the press which any politician on Parliament Hill had
ever had working for him, not excluding the legendary Mel
Jack." (Nicholson, 1968: 103-105.) When Diefenbaker suc-
cceeded the unpopular George Drew in 1956 as Leader of the
Opposition and of the Progressive Conservatives, the Press Gallery was delighted.

At the same time the media had been thoroughly alienated from certain excesses of Louis St. Laurent's Liberal government. Most prominent was the Pipeline Debate of 1956, when the Liberals used closure over a relatively unimportant matter; of the seven times closure had been used up to that time, all had been matters of national urgency. As debate progressed, "the pipeline itself became less and less important and the government's treatment of Parliament became the major issue". (Meisel, 1962: 9.) One legacy of the debate (in which the Speaker was compromised) was a bitterness amongst the press towards the government that it had not had before. (Johnson, 1964; Rutherford, 1978: 107.) After the Suez crisis a few months later, when Canada supported the Americans at Britain's expense, the Liberals completely lost whatever conservative media they had left. (Newman, 1963: 33-34.) Going into 1957, Liberal relations with the press "could, at best, be characterized as poor". (Regenstreif, 1965: 23-24.)

When Louis St. Laurent dissolved Parliament on April 12, 1957 and called an election for June 10, the press preferred Diefenbaker, although it thought that St. Laurent would easily win.

Despite the impact Diefenbaker was making, none of us gave him a chance of upsetting the Liberals. All of the press corps were convinced he would make sizeable gains. Drew had won only fifty-one
of the 265 seats in the 1953 election, so there was a lot of room for improvement. About 85 seats was the maximum we predicted for him. My own guess was '81. I thought I was being generous. (Dempson, 1968: 94.)

The Gallup poll showed the Liberals leading by a large margin, and all surveys conducted by newspapers, radio stations and professional research organizations had the Liberals victorious. Beck (1957) wrote afterwards that an examination of pre-election files of such Conservative newspapers as the Toronto Globe and Mail, the Montreal Gazette and Ottawa Journal indicated that their reporters had interpreted signs of political upheaval to mean no more than in substantial losses for the Liberals. "Mesmerized, like almost everyone else, by the feeling that the government was invincible, they were altogether too cautious."

There were major differences between the Liberal and Conservative electoral platforms. The Conservatives attacked Liberal monetary policy, claiming that the policy of 'tight money' through credit restraints such as interest rates was strangling the economy. Certain aid packages were promised to farmers; the Liberals were criticised for reducing exports to the 'Mother Country' (the U.K.) and increasing them to the U.S. The Conservatives also promised to increase old age pensions—the small Liberal increase having been savaged by the press—and establish a National Energy Board. (Newman, 1963: 49.) What Regenstreif (1965: 49) called 'style' issues (themes with moral and ethical conno-
tations) were mentioned more than 'position' (or economic) themes. The 'National Vision'—a platform which proposed a new National Policy based on the north—was put forward for the first time, as was a "Bill of Rights". The Pipeline Debate, the Suez Crisis, and other examples of supposed Liberal tyranny were frequently brought up. A certain amount of criticism directed at the Americans "appeared to be aiming at arousing the latent anti-Americanism which permeated Canadian opinion at the time." (Meisel, 1962: 43-61.) The old age of senior Liberal ministers was pointed out. Above all, the Tories emphasized the personality of Diefenbaker: PC posters claimed that it was 'Time for a Diefenbaker Government', with little mention of the party. (Regenstreif, 1965: p. 29.)

The Liberals cannot be said to have emphasized particular aspects of a platform, but instead justified the virtues of incumbency, and their technocratic expertise. Their management of the economy and of the government since 1935 was held to be sufficient reason for re-electing Louis St. Laurent (Bothwell et al., 1981: 190-193; Regenstreif, 1965: 10, 16-21). Jack Pickersgill, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, declared that the Liberals should be returned "not merely for the well-being of Canadians but for the good of mankind in general". In retrospect, says Peter Newman, "the Liberal pretension, in attempting to win an election simply by telling voters they really had no alter-
native except to elect Louis St. Laurent, appears to have been based on a serious lack of appreciation of the democratic process." (Newman, 1963: 53-54.)

The most important part of the campaign was the meeting appearances, not just for their own sake but because of media attention. It was here that Diefenbaker excelled. His speech, although incoherent when written down, went over well in crowds. (Nicholson, 1968: 217-218; Newman, 1963: 6.) St. Laurent, on the other hand, faltered, perhaps because of his advanced age (75).

Newspaper comments, even from friendly supporters, suggested that sometimes he seemed to be reading speeches with which he was not quite familiar. On occasion, when commenting on local personalities, he mispronounced their names.

Attendance at St. Laurent meetings was erratic, while Diefenbaker meetings were filled to capacity, and this was noted by the media. In addition, intemperate remarks by senior Liberal C.D. Howe and an incident at a rally involving the assault of a young heckler by Liberal officials, tainted the force of St. Laurent's campaign. (Meisel, 1962: 160-162.)

Thus, although the Liberals enjoyed an overwhelming support from the French press, they were not on such solid ground in English Canada. In Toronto, the Globe--founded by the first Liberal party chieftain--was, in John Stevenson's opinion, "the severest critic of the Liberal party in the whole country." (Stevenson, 1957.) It conducted a raging, tearing campaign against the Liberal Party
and "besought the voters to expel it (the Liberal Party) from office before it brought the country to irreparable harm. The Globe horrified its Liberal readers by its unstinting eulogies of Mr. Diefenbaker and his party and undoubtedly its wholehearted support helped them to win many seats in Ontario." (Stevenson, 1958.) The Tories were enthusiastically supported by the 'Tely', as usual, but not opposed by the Star. "Since (the Star's) policy recently came under a new direction, it has ceased to be a wholehearted admirer of the St. Laurent ministry and has not spared it sharp criticism", claimed Stevenson. The Liberals had traditional support of the Peterborough Examiner, the Sifton papers in the West, and the Kingston Whig-Standard, while the influential Windsor Star, nominally independent, had Liberal leanings. The Thompson chain leaned towards the Tories, and while the editors of the Southam papers (with the largest combined circulation) were allowed a free hand, all except the Ottawa Citizen had traditionally supported the Conservatives (Stevenson, 1957).

As the campaign progressed, media opinion clearly repudiated the Liberals

(The press) termed the Liberal campaign as smug and complacent, and ridiculed their claim to be indispensable. For their part, Liberals began to refer to "vituperation" by the press, accusing it of smear, invective and falsehoods—just as another party would do six years later. The Prime Minister's own reaction caused the comment that he sometimes spoke testily, if not with ill-temper. The Globe and Mail commented that he "seems to betray not only a special personal sensitivity to criticism, but also some odd notion that criti-
cism, and even reporting the news, are improper." (Nicholson, 1968: 48-49).

Both the media and public opinion (in the Gallup Polls) indicated a Liberal victory. Therefore editor Ralph Allen was on solid ground when he put the June 22 issue of Maclean's to bed weeks before publication date, and committed the biggest 'faux pas' in modern Canadian journalism. "For better or worse, we Canadians have once more elected one of the most powerful governments ever created by the free will of a free electorate". (Newman, 1963: 57-58; Dempson, 1968: 119). Allen's editorial, which congratulated the Liberals for yet another majority government, was inaccurate. The Liberals had 218,000 more votes than Conservatives, but most of the Liberal margin was "wasted" in huge pluralities in Quebec constituencies. They retained 105 seats, but the Conservatives doubled their representation to 111 seats. It was a minority (with another 25 CCF, 19 Social Credit, and 4 Independents) but sufficient for Diefenbaker to form a government.  

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6 The last Gallup poll predicted the Liberals would have 48% of the vote, and the Conservatives would have 34%. The actual vote gave the Liberals 41% and the Tories 39%. In the aftermath, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion claimed that "the failure to project the Conservative trend for the final campaign, after interviewing stopped, resulted in a national forecast which was low on Conservative, but on an all party average, within the four point margin of error set for itself by the Institute". Interviewing stopped June 1---two weeks before the election---and, according to officials, "the Conservative trend, reported in the semi-final Institute report, appeared to have lost some of its steam. (A) decision had to be made as to whether the trend would continue or not... Institute officials stuck to the policy of reporting standing as
The next election took place less than a year later. The new government had not wasted time in giving the impression of legislative activity. "Working at a tempo to which Canadians had not been accustomed, the Tory ministers in quick succession approved a series of popular measures. This included tax cuts, salary raises to public servants, and subsidies in housing, farm products and Nova Scotian collieries. The Tories "swamped the surviving Liberals with the momentum of their legislative drive." (Newman, 1963: 63-64.) By February 1, 1958, when Parliament was dissolved in preparation for polling on March 31, the Tories had a decisive advantage over their rivals.

This edge was increased by events noted by the media. Diefenbaker's performance during the 1957 Commonwealth Conference was well received internationally. (Newman, 1963: 60-61.) More important was the discrediting of the new Liberal leader in January 1958. Lester Pearson had used his first speech as Leader of the Opposition to ask the new Government to resign, in order to give power back to the Li-

they found them from field interviewing. Obviously, a more accurate forecast would have resulted if the policy had not been adhered to... Institute directors, while naturally anxious to bring their forecast as close to the actual outcome as possible, would adhere to the policy of reporting results as they found them, and not succumbing to the statistically unsound temptation to project trends over a period. ("Poll Within Margin on All-Party Basis", CIPO, June 15, 1957).

However, within the next election the Institute announced it planned to continue its national poll to "as close to election day as possible". ("Semi-Final Gallup Poll, CIPO, March 15, 1958")
berals without an election. The cause of this request has never been made clear; it certainly had no political utility. Unfortunately, he claimed as ground for the resignation demand that since Diefenbaker assumed office, the economy had slid into recession. In reply, Diefenbaker turned to a confidential report made by civil servants for the former St. Laurent government, warning of the coming economic downturn. Diefenbaker charged that the Liberals had hidden the report because of the 1957 election, and made a speech against Pearson that the media considered very damaging. "Diefenbaker tore his opponent to shreds in that devastating speech—tore him mercilessly, and left him ridiculed, disarmed, and indeed already defeated in the as yet unannounced election." (Nicholson, 1968: 79-82.) Since the speech took place only a week before commencement of the campaign, its aftermath carried on into the campaign, and gave substance to the Tory cry of 'Liberal arrogance'.

The election issues were similar to those of 1957 (the Bill of Rights, Liberal arrogance, etc.) with two major differences.

1. Because the polls showed a solid Conservative lead, the media were certain of a Tory victory (Stevenson, 1958).

2. Diefenbaker had owed much of his 1957 victory to the support of provincial Conservative administrations (especially Ontario), support which had not been giv-
en to his predecessor George Drew (Camp, 1970: 210).

In 1958 the influential aid of the Union Nationale government of Quebec was also given. Premier Maurice Duplessis had in earlier days been Conservative leader in Quebec, and there were unofficial ties between both parties. Quebec support for the Tories in the 1957 election was minimal because Diefenbaker had alienated the Quebec wing in the 1956 leadership convention. But by 1958 Duplessis had decided to use the best-oiled political machine in Canadian politics for the benefit of his old party. (Stevenson, 1957; Newman, 1963: 290-292.)

Then there was 'The Vision'. Diefenbaker has written that he had advocated "a twentieth-century equivalent of Sir John MacDonald's National Policy, a uniquely Canadian economic dream" before the 1957 election. But it was really the brain-child of his economic advisor Merrill Menzies.

Menzies thought Canada needed national goals and priorities together with some definitive developmental projects, such as a national energy policy with a grid that would cover both power and pipelines. He and Diefenbaker also wanted to build an inventory of all Canadian resources, so as to plan their development. Out of these ideas came the Royal Commission on Energy, the National Energy Board, the 'road to resources' program, and a conference called 'Resources for Tomorrow'. The government also became interested in the prospect of finding Arctic oil and gas. From Ottawa's perspective, of course, Arctic resources had one great advantage: because they were not in any province they were wholly under dominion control. To Diefenbaker in particular, a vision of national development was especially appealing because of the tradition of Sir John A. MacDonald, on whom the prime minister was increasingly inclined to model himself. (Bothwell et al., 1981: 201.)
The 'Vision' of a new National Policy, a minor part of the platform of 1957, was heavily emphasized in the following year, and was successful in combination with that other Diefenbaker technique, identification with the ghost of MacDonald.

There was little doubt that the Vision had struck a response in the national subconsciousness. Having inadvertently elected John Diefenbaker as their prime minister eight months before, most of the voters now seemed determined to commit themselves to him.

The Liberal response was not so much to forward alternatives (although Pearson suggested a tax cut and broader welfare measures) as to attack Tory proposals—for example, dismissing the 'Vision' as a plan for building roads 'from igloo to igloo'. (Newman, 1963: 71, 73-4; Stevenson, 1958.) Furthermore, Pearson's public appearances were judged inferior to Diefenbaker's. As a result, the favourable press of 1957 continued, from Liberal and Conservative sympathizers as well as independents. (Dempson, 1968: 99.) The March 31 election gave the Conservatives their record majority and reduced the Liberals to a rump even in Quebec, although they fared better than the CCF, which was nearly eclipsed, and the Socreds, who were entirely wiped out.
3.4 *The Deterioration of Media Relations, 1958-1962.*

It is difficult to understand the almost immediate disappearance of the positive media consensus on Diefenbaker: like most topics of the period, an adequate discussion will have to wait until the primary sources become available for historical research. Contemporary opinion does provide some information. A number of sources suggest that, because of the overwhelming nature of the Tory victory, the press took upon itself the task of becoming a sort of 'surrogate opposition.' "Gallery members would seize on the slightest rumor to write anti-Conservative reports to try and embarrass Diefenbaker. Because of his huge majority, it was considered fair game to attack his government." (Dempson, 1968: 99.)

As a result, says Dempson,

barbs directed at him personally would put him in a foul mood. He couldn't understand why the newspapers, which had been so friendly to him in the 1957 and 1958 campaigns, should suddenly start questioning some of his policies and actions. (Dempson, 1968: 99-100.)

The 'free and easy relationship and the ever-open door' which had characterized pre-1958 relations with the media was replaced by an entirely different set of rules.

(Diefenbaker) even began to call individual writers on the carpet in his office, and dress them down over petty little points which he testily rated as unjustified criticism. The alert and free-wheeling Press Gallery, accustomed to the dignified silence of criticized Liberal ministers, was shocked by this unbecoming reaction as much as it was offended by the interference...Thus Diefenbaker chipped away at the great accumulation of good-will among the journalists (Nicholson, 1968: 104).
Diefenbaker may have even considered press relations as a type of competition. Close aid Thomas Van Dusen reflected that his staff "was aghast" at Diefenbaker's propensity for "publicly removing strips from a reporter's hide" because of the damage done to press relations. Yet "later I realized the Chief enjoyed his run-ins with the press. He wouldn't have given up his sham battles with them for anything. He loved crossing swords in the only way open to him—face to face." (Van Dusen, 1968: p. 118.)

Perhaps because he had always maintained good personal ties with the media, Diefenbaker did not have an adequate media relations staff. He employed eight clerks to monitor newspapers. However, his Press Secretary from June 1957 (the former Ottawa bureau chief of British UP) was not granted sufficient authority to make his position effective, and when he resigned in February 1960 the post was left vacant. (Newman, 1963: 240-241.) Although speech-writer John Fisher was used "as a kind of interface between the prime minister and the press corps to keep peace" the lack of a press secretary exacerbated the difficulties. (Stursberg, 1976: I, 265.)

Diefenbaker's press relations between 1958 and 1962 were a list of one public relations disaster after another. From fall 1958 there was a string of clashes with Southam Press reporter Charles King, culminating in the celebrated incident of 1962 when the prime minister refused
to allow King on his campaign plane. In February 1959 Diefenbaker cancelled production of the Avro Arrow, resulting in 13,000 unemployed. Although the Liberals had secretly desired to do the same thing before the 1957 election, the announcement was badly handled, and cost the Tories "a very substantial loss of prestige and support". (Nicholson, 1968: 103.) Later in 1959 the cancellation of CBC's early morning show "Preview Commentary" led to a parliamentary inquiry where it was suspected that the show had been cancelled on Diefenbaker's orders—because he felt that the guest newspaper reporters on the show were against his government. (Peers, 1979: 193-208.)

In 1961 two Tory ministers condemned British policy at the Commonwealth conference at Accra, Ghana; the reaction among traditional Conservative supporters was so negative that the Prime Minister claimed the stories on the Conference were untrue, and part of a Liberal plot (one of the reporters, Christopher Young, was related to Pearson). "The Accra Incident marked a definite turning point in Diefenbaker's press relations. It clearly demonstrated to Ottawa correspondents that the Prime Minister had no compunction about using them in his political manoeuvres." (Newman, 1963: 240.) The campaign to fire Bank of Canada Governor Coyne over his 'tight money policy' in 1961 resulted in Coyne's departure, but the crudity of the persecution resulted in the press portraying Coyne as a "man of honour".
The Progressive Conservative government found itself with the reputation for 'arrogance', a quality criticized in the Liberals during 1957 and 1958. (Edmonds, 1961.)

The government had other problems. The economy was in bad shape when compared to the boom years of the mid-50's. Diefenbaker had contrived to alienate Quebec opinion because of a contempt for his French-Canadian MP's, and the victory of Lesage's Liberals in 1961 meant the loss of the Union Nationale machine. Diefenbaker's great election promises of 1957 and 1958 had not proven themselves; the 'Northern Vision' had not materialized, the Bill of Rights had shown itself to be without teeth; economic ties with Britain had declined rather than strengthened. Diefenbaker was criticized for inconsistency. Even his 'welfare statism', while successfully placating the rural populace, alienated traditional Tory support in central Canada.

(The Tory) six-year period of rule featured such items as increased old-age pensions, extended and enlarged unemployment insurance benefits, and heavy financial assistance to the provinces—most noticeably the Prairies and the Maritimes. With the economy in trouble and with the apparent indecision in high places, it was not difficult to charge the Conservatives with mismanagement. The six budgetary deficits "proved" that, particularly for the business community. (Regenstreif, 1965: 65.)

By the time of the 1962 campaign, therefore, most Press Gallery members were hoping for a Liberal victory. They had long ago soured on Diefenbaker. It was felt that the Tories would probably win— to do otherwise would in-
volved a loss of 75 seats, considered unlikely. Val Sears may have exaggerated this sentiment when he said, while boarding Diefenbaker's plane, "we've got to get cracking, fellows; we've got a government to overthrow", but Dempson, an eyewitness to the famous jibe, comments that it reflected the attitude of most Gallery members. (Dempson, 1968: 118-120.) The devaluation of the Canadian dollar to 92.5 cents U.S., shortly before dissolution, was a public relations fiasco—when combined with the unfortunate economy.

The press which had noted in 1957 that Diefenbaker had larger meeting audiences than St. Laurent now claimed the opposite in 1962. According to election aide Roy Pahish, Diefenbaker's press relations had deteriorated to the point that too much of his energy and time was spent sparring with the press. And so between a defensive campaign full of (economic) statistics, and fighting with the press over how many people were at Summerside and how many were at Windsor—it was just insane. (Stursberg, 1976: I, 262.)

Diefenbaker remained in power, but barely. The great gains of 1958 were wiped out; the Quebec caucus was decimated, and the Ontario and Toronto seats that remained had their majorities greatly reduced. The vote, as in 1957, came with a slight plurality to the Liberals, but riding distribution of the vote gave the PC's an edge in seats, while the two minor parties profited greatly.

It was the beginning of the end of Diefenbaker's tenure. In the Fall 1962 session of Parliament, little if any legislative work was done because of the indecision of
Diefenbaker (incapacitated by illness and the death or defeat of his closest advisors), as well as sabotage tactics of the Liberal front bench, which forced votes of confidence weekly and sometimes daily. By early 1963 many of the Conservative inner circle members were planning to remove Diefenbaker and find a new leader acceptable to the Socreds, who the Tories needed to survive the votes of confidence. (Nicholson, 1962.)

Perhaps it was not surprising that Diefenbaker grouped all his enemies together in one devious plot, and the press which had idolized him 5 years previous was an important component.

At Vineland on March 5 (1963) Mr. Diefenbaker referred to a conspiracy of great interests, national and international, having aligned themselves against him. His subsequent speeches did not elaborate on these interests more explicitly, but apparently the so-called "Bay Street Boys", the Toronto newspapers, and the American government and periodicals were intended. "Everybody's against me but the people", he told a typical meeting. "No, I haven't got the big Toronto papers with me, but a crowd like this makes it pretty plain that the people are reading other papers." (Beck, 1963)

3.5 Qualter and Mackirdy

Opinion about the press and the elections is fairly unified— with one exception. Qualter and Mackirdy's (1964) analysis of the 1962 election is the single systematic study of the press, and should therefore be carefully considered.
The authors decided to do a content analysis of Ontario papers because they were "disturbed by the mass of imprecision and unverified charges and countercharges". Eight papers were selected—the three Toronto papers, the two Ottawa papers (the Citizen and Journal), the Kitchener-Waterloo Record, the London Free Press, and the Hamilton Spectator. All articles having any connection with the election or a political party were selected between April 18 and June 18 (polling day) 1962.

The study's most interesting finding was the continued existence of strong partisanship in all papers. The Toronto Star and Toronto Telegram continued their old political affiliations with a vengeance. The Tely was committed to support the Progressive Conservative Party and at no time during the election was there any doubt as to where its sympathies lay. For the Telegram the election was basically a struggle between a Conservative government and a Liberal opposition, with two minor parties [the NDP and SC] doing little more than to confuse the issue.

Likewise the Toronto Star was as "unashamedly partisan" to Liberals as the Telegram was to the Tories—perhaps even more so. The Star "contained more unfavourable material...than any other paper, with 90 percent of it being anti-Conservative".

The Globe on the whole favoured the Conservatives over the Liberals, but the "partisanship was less marked than any other metropolitan newspaper". This, the authors remarked, befitted the Globe's claim to be Canada's only truly national paper.
Of the Ottawa papers, the *Journal* "provided a suitable counter to the *Citizen* for it was as partisan in its loyalty to the Conservatives as the *Citizen* was to the Liberals". The three papers representing medium size metropolises (The *Kitchener-Waterloo Record*, *Hamilton Spectator*, and *London Free Press*) were more concerned with local issues than with the election as a whole. Nonetheless they also continued older political traditions—the *Record* going to the Liberal side, *Free Press* and *Spectator* tending towards the Conservatives. Concentrating on the main parties, all papers virtually ignored the NDP and Social Credit.

If one assumes the material is accurate, it can be interpreted several different ways. The material previously presented in this chapter proposed a press fluctuation—with the press 'swinging' towards the Tories in 1957 and 1958, and swinging away from them in 1962. If this is correct, the swing away from the Conservatives could have taken the form of a degeneration into the old style partisanship. Alternatively, Qualter and MacKirdy's findings raise the possibility that newspaper non-partisanship did not take place at all, which would mean that a reinterpretation of press history at this time is in order.
3.6 **Conclusion**

After the 1962 election Raymond Varela remarked in *Saturday Night* that despite Diefenbaker's scathing remarks, there was no deep, sinister plot on the part of the press to destroy him or his Party. During the June (1962) election campaign Canada's press acted with responsibility, and with the best interest of the people at heart". (Varela, 1962.)

An examination of the 1957-1962 period shows that Varela's righteousness about press behaviour was not entirely correct. The press was not a model of consistency. In 1957 newspapers—the most important medium of the day—no longer had the open partisanship they had exhibited in the previous federal elections of 1949 and 1953. Correspondents were alienated from the St. Laurent Liberals and attracted to the personality of a favorite M.P., John Diefenbaker. The PC victory that year and triumphant landslide in 1958 coincided with overwhelming press support of their leader. But this consensus showed signs of strain by the first year of majority government, and did not survive national problems, Tory blunders, and Diefenbaker's ineptitude in managing the media. By 1962, harmony between press and those in power was a thing of the past; so was Diefenbaker's majority government. Although some might deny press influence, the apparent similarity between press opinion and public support makes this relationship worth looking into.
3.7 HYPOTHESES

In the second chapter it was shown that an 'agenda-setting' role of the media was possible in Canada during the Diefenbaker Interlude. The above historical overview indicated a correlation between press coverage of the three Diefenbaker elections covered and the resulting vote. However, this summary was based on contemporary accounts of journalists such as Peter Newman, and political scientists such as Peter Hegenstreif. While general editorial and Press Gallery attitudes were summarized, the media were not systematically examined. The one exception, by Qualter and MacKirdy, has results inconsistent with the other sources. What is needed is an analysis of the relationship of the media agenda, through content analysis, and the public agenda or Canadians, using such information as is available from Gallup polls and riding results.

Unfortunately such a study done on a national scale would prove prohibitive, due to the lack of media material: TV and radio records are incomplete or non-existent, and even newspaper sources for that period are difficult to obtain. Therefore the study has been limited geographically to the Toronto area (for reasons explained in the Methodology discussion) and to daily newspapers, because, as was shown in Section 3.2, newspapers were at that time still the dominant medium.
Based on the findings of chapters II and III, the following hypotheses will be tested:

1. That there will be no significant difference among any of the 3 Toronto papers in partisanship (coverage of political parties) during the 1957, 1958, and 1962 elections.

2. That the media agenda of Toronto, represented by party coverage in the Toronto dailies, paralleled the public voting agenda of Torontonians, represented by Toronto voting patterns in the 1957, 1958 and 1962 elections.  

   It will be assumed that the time lag between the media and public agenda occurred within the time-frame of nearly four months—the two month election period and the eight weeks prior to dissolution. It must also be assumed (based on Section 3.2) that the newspaper agenda did not differ significantly from the political agenda of the other media. (See p. 19 for discussion of time-frame.)

3. That the aggregate (all 3 elections combined) of the Toronto papers gave more quantitative coverage to Diefenbaker than to other political figures.

7 It was not possible to use Gallup polls because the only ones publicly available (in the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Newsletter) broke the polling results by province, not provincial regions. Since Ontario regions had rather diverse electoral characteristics (Rogenstreif, 1965: 157), a comparison using Gallup voter preferences could be misleading.
3a. That this coverage was 'positive' in 1957 and 1958, and 'negative' in 1962.

4. That the papers in the elections of 1957 and 1958 stressed 'style' issues, and in the election of 1962 stressed 'position' issues. Style issues are "fuzzy. They contain moral and ethical connotations such as 'democracy', 'liberty', and 'rights of Parliament', and are basically indirect and projective for the people involved." Position issues, on the other hand, are "basically tangible, with a concrete meaning. They deal with such aspects of policy as taxation, price controls, and unemployment, and have a high self-interest ingredient for the groups or individuals concerned." (Regenstreif, 1965: 49).

4a. That public opinion—measured through opinion polls—likewise reflected these issues.
Chapter IV

METHODOLOGY

4.1 CHOICE OF TORONTO

Toronto's dailies— the Globe and Mail, Daily Star and Telegram— are being studied for two reasons.

1. Toronto was easily the most important Canadian news centre. It was the only city with the range of opinions which three separately owned papers could offer. The Globe and Mail— predominately Conservative— was the closest Canada had to a national newspaper, while the Star and the Telegram did not attempt to conceal their partisan biases, Liberal and Conservative respectively. They were also three of the four largest English newspapers: of the 18 English dailies in 1962 with a circulation above 50,000, the Star was the largest (341,107), the Globe was third (223,979) and the Telegram was a close fourth (223,119). (The Vancouver Sun was second in circulation with 226,102). Of the total circulation of newspapers above 50,000, the Toronto papers accounted for over a third. (From statistics taken from Editor and Publisher Yearbook, 1963, in turn taken from Audit Bureau of Circulation figures dated September 30, 1962.)
Another possible choice of study, Montreal, was dismissed because of the city's unique circumstances. The English-Canadians of Montreal were very different, politically, from the rest of the province. The Diefenbaker sweep and corresponding decline--of great importance to the rest of the province--did not affect Montreal. The English-Canadians of the city had political priorities dissimilar to their French-Canadian neighbours. Finally, because of the way English and French were mixed in electoral ridings, it is impossible to come to any conclusions about the effects of English newspapers from election results. (Bejenstreif, 1965: 109-133.)

2. The area was a very large political unit: Toronto and the Yorks were served by a total of eighteen members of Parliament, and more than the number of M.P.'s in each of the seven of the ten provinces. In determining the influence of the press in elections, the

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6 City of Toronto ridings were: Broadview, Danforth, Danforth, Davenport, Eglinton, Greenwood, High Park, Parkdale, Rosedale, St. Pauls, Spadina, and Trinity. The York ridings were York Centre, York East, York Humber, York North, York Scarborough, York South, York West. These eighteen ridings were regarded as the complete extent of Metropolitan Toronto as a political unit. For example, see J. Murray Beck, "The Democratic Process at Work in Canadian General Elections", in Aitchison, 1963, Pp. 40-41. Outside of Ontario and Quebec, only British Columbia had more seats than Toronto and the Yorks, with 22 ridings. Saskatchewan and Alberta had 17 ridings each; Manitoba 14; Nova Scotia 12; New Brunswick 10; Newfoundland 7; and Prince Edward Island, 4.
large number of seats serves to reduce the importance of other factors, like the personality of local riding candidates. In a smaller area with one or two ridings there is always the possibility of a strong candidate who might have enough 'grass-roots' strength or charisma to triumph over national trends. For example, Winnipeg MP Douglas Harkness, a war hero who resigned from the Diefenbaker Cabinet on a matter of principle, won easy re-election in 1962 and 1963, largely on the strength of his own personality. Joseph Warner Murphy, a Tory frontbencher from Lambton West, survived for 17 years in a Liberal stronghold largely because of a firm grasp of constituency matters, and his defeat in 1962 had as much to do with personal problems as with the general decline of Tory fortunes. Similarly, the 1945 and 1979 defeat of two influential Saskatchewan Liberals, one a cabinet minister, were related to difficulties in their personal lives. (Brown, 1980). But with a large number of ridings in Toronto and the Yanks, the possibility of constituency idiosyncrasies influencing the broad electoral pattern is remote.
4.2 THE CONTENT ANALYSIS

4.2.1 Sampling

There were 2 constructed week samples for each election: one from the eight weeks between the dissolution of Parliament and voting day; the other from the eight weeks previous to the start of elections. (A constructed week sample is a sample stratified so that each day of the week is randomly selected from the sample frame: one Monday out of the possible Mondays, and so on.) Therefore, sampling, over a period of 16 weeks, consisted of 12 issue dates sampled per paper per election. Since none of the papers were published on Sunday, only dates from Monday to Saturday were sampled.9

For each sampled issue the front section was examined, because a brief pre-coding survey of the papers indicated that stories on national politics were most likely to be found on those pages.

Sampling was done of simple necessity: to examine every page of over 600 separate issues was beyond the scope of the present research.

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9 It turned out that the Toronto Telegram did publish a Sunday issue for a short time which coincided with the 1957 election campaign. It was an unsuccessful experiment and was discontinued after less than a year. To take this into consideration, 2 Sundays were randomly chosen—one from the 1957 pre-election period, and one from the election period—and issues of the 'Tely' from those dates were examined.
4.2.2 **The Coding Sheet**

There was one coding sheet used in the content analysis; due to the frequency of three elections in six years, most of the same people and issues re-occur in each election. Following a 'pre-coding' content analysis of around 35 randomly selected articles, a coding sheet was constructed which had six sections:

1. **DESCRIPTION OF THE ARTICLE.** The physical attributes of the article were enumerated. This included size of the article (in column inches); its headline size; the source (where the article came from, e.g. local staff, Canadian Press); 'content' (what type of article it was, such as analysis, editorial, letter to the editor); what page it was on; which newspaper (Globe, Telegram, Star); and date of the issue. Also, each article was given its own ID number.

2. **TREATMENT** OR PARTISANSHIP. This section attempted to find to what extent, if any, the article was in favour of or against the four political parties (PC, Liberal, CCF/NDP, and Social Credit) and their leaders, for a total of eight categories. For example, an article could be coded in its attitude towards the Liberal party as 'favourable coverage', 'neutral coverage', 'unfavourable coverage', and 'N/A' (not men-

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10 There was also a 'treatment' of the party overall, using a less specific and more 'qualitative' determination of bias (See Appendix 1 for further details).
tioned at all). The treatment attempted to take into account how the article would be read in normal circumstances: the reader would be more influenced by the headline and first few paragraphs, for example, than by the last part of an article. Hence, headlines had first priority— an unfavourable headline would result in an article being coded as 'unfavourable'. Next in priority came the first two paragraphs: if an article had a 'neutral' headline and the first or second paragraphs were unfavourable, the article was coded as 'unfavourable'. Then came the remainder of the article on the first page, and so on. Photographs were coded as separate articles. In any case where the determining of treatment was doubtful, the article was coded as 'neutral'. For further elaboration, see Appendix 1.

3. HORSEACE— how commentators (reporters, politicians, pollsters) thought the election was progressing. This had three sections: prediction (what type of victory, if any, was predicted, such as a Tory majority or a Liberal minority); campaign progress evaluation (how well the party and leaders were considered to be doing in the election); and 'source' (what sources the prediction or campaign progress came from, such as a poll or politician's forecast). These sections were filled out only if a prediction
or a campaign evaluation was made. (As it happened, not many were made.)

4. 'TIMES NAMES MENTIONED'—that is, how many times the name and title of a politician were mentioned in the article. There was a category for every type of politician, including individual categories for most of the Liberal and Conservative front bench. In the analysis, categories were 'collapsed' to be more general, e.g. Liberal cabinet minister/frontbencher.

5. STATEMENTS. If a politician made any sort of statement, that type of statement of coded—House of Commons speech, political meeting, and so on—as was the category of politician making it. If the statement was either a press conference or a political meeting, the location of the statement also was noted.

6. ASSERTIONS AND THEMES. An assertion has some kind of definite bias—"St. Laurent is kindly/compassionate/distinguished/grandfatherly". A theme is coded without regard to the bias of the writer or the speaker of the quote, like "national unity". Assertions were later recoded into the following categories: 'Pro-Tory, anti-Liberal'; 'Pro-Liberal, anti-Tory'; 'pro-Government'; 'anti-Government'; 'other'. There were 69 different themes. (See Appendix 2)
Chapter V

RESULTS

5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CONTENT ANALYSIS

The content analysis coded every article in the front section of the Toronto Globe and Mail, Star, and Telegram for sampled days during the election periods of 1957, 1958, and 1962. The total sample consisted of 469 Globe articles, 368 Star articles, and 352 Telegram articles. (39%, 31% and 30%) To determine total length (in column inches) each article was measured, and multiplied by a factor to classify it according to the 'regular' column width for the Globe and Mail of this period. Total length of all articles came to 12,971 column inches. Of this, the Globe had 35%, the Star 33%, and the Telegram 32%. Thus, while the Globe had more articles than the other two, all three papers had nearly the same total length for political articles. (The Globe's articles were slightly (but significantly) smaller—a mean of 10 column inches, compared to just under 12 for the Star and Telegram.

About half of the articles were 'regular' stories (enumerated as 'just story' in coding). Photos, editorial and op-ed stories, accounted for the rest. Most of the arti-

11 'Analysis' stories were 10% of the total: photos (enumere-
cles (76%) were written by the newspaper staffs or were letters to the editor. Only 17% was wire copy from Canadian Press, or reprints of other papers' editorials. This does not seem out of line considering that all 3 papers were large, independently owned dailies with bureaus in Ottawa and Canadian cities.

A concentration on the affairs of Toronto is hardly surprising. Most of the articles written by the newspaper staffs were written in Toronto. Of those 'statements' enumerated at political meetings or press conferences, 32% were from Toronto and 29% were from the rest of Ontario (the other major regions of Canada— B.C., the Prairies, Québec and the Maritimes— had between 9 and 12% each)

These descriptive characteristics of the sample do not show anything too unusual. However, evaluation of the hypotheses shows results that are somewhat more surprising.

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ated separately from articles) were 8%; editorials were 11%; letters to the editor were 14% and cartoons were 4%.
### Table 6

**Length of Articles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>4549.44</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Star</td>
<td>4278.55</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegram</td>
<td>4143.44</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12971.43</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(In a one-way ANOVA using the Scheffe test, F probability = .006)
5.2 Hypothesis 1

"That there will be no significant difference between all 3 papers in partisanship during the 1957, 1958, and 1962 elections."

Although most sources suggested that newspaper partisanship of previous days had declined by 1957 (See Chapter 3) the content analysis quite clearly shows that partisanship was a factor in all three elections. The study examined treatment of political parties and their leaders using a three point scale (negative, neutral, and positive treatment). Only when the party, or leader, was mentioned in some way was it coded. To assess statistically newspaper partisanship, a one-way analysis of variance was used with the Scheffe a priori, multiple range test. It was found that there were significant differences between all three papers for treatment of the Conservative party (F = .0000), Liberal party (p = .0000), Conservative leader (p = .0000) and Liberal leader (p = .0000). (See Table 7; individual percentages will be discussed later.) For the 'minor' parties (Social Credit, CCF/NDP) and their leaders, no groups were found to be statistically different. The lack of significance may have to do with the difference in Ns. For example, the Liberal party was discussed in 722 articles, or 61 percent of the total; the Socreds were discussed in 144 articles, or 12 percent of the total (Table 7).
### TABLE 7

Differences in Newspapers' Treatment of Parties and Leaders

Aggregate of all 3 elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>775</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF/NDP</td>
<td>.7687</td>
<td>293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>722</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socred</td>
<td>.5697</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative ldr.</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>449</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF/NDP ldr.</td>
<td>.5117</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal ldr.</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>322</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socred ldr.</td>
<td>.7558</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(one way ANOVA, using Scheffe test)
A further indication of partisanship is provided by one way ANOVA's of Conservative party, Liberal party, Conservative leader and Liberal leader for each of the three elections, again using the Scheffe a priori, multiple-range test \( p = .05 \). Out of a total of 12 separate analyses of variance (4 for each election) 9 were found to be significant at the .05 level (See Table 8). Of the three which were not significant at .05, two (Liberal leader treatment in 1957, and 1962) had means which were just outside the .05 level \( p = .07, .08 \). In only one case—treatment of the Liberal party during the 1962 election—were the means similar, and the differences not significant (See Table 8).

When one examines the aggregate crosstabulation of newspaper and partisanship frequencies the pattern is, to say the least, self-evident (Table 9). In treatment of the Progressive Conservatives, 9% of the Telegram's and 20% of the Globe's coverage is unfavourable; but 42% of the Star's coverage is unfavourable. This is hardly representative of unbiased reporting. Some 36% of Telegram coverage, and 38% of Globe coverage, is favourable to the Tories; only 13% of Star coverage is likewise favourable to the Tories. On the other hand, the Liberals fared well at the hands of the Star but were not so well treated by the others. Only 13% of Liberal coverage is unfavourable in the Star, compared to 34% and 35% for the Telegram and Globe. Results for coverage of Liberal and Conservative leaders were similar (although not identical) to coverage of the party.
### TABLE 8

Means of Paper and Coverage, by Election

#### 1957

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Globe</th>
<th>Star</th>
<th>Telegram</th>
<th>F. Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative ldr.</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>.0025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal ldr.</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>.0715</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1958

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Globe</th>
<th>Star</th>
<th>Telegram</th>
<th>F. Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative ldr.</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal ldr.</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Globe</th>
<th>Star</th>
<th>Telegram</th>
<th>F. Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>.8322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative ldr.</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>.0516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal ldr.</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>.0758</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X's are on a 100 point scale where 0 is negative and 100 is most favourable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Globe</th>
<th>Star</th>
<th>Telegram</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC Treatment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unfavourable</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>favourable</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal Treatment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>unfavourable</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>favourable</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>199</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC Leader Treatment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unfavourable</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>favourable</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>133</td>
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<td>Liberal Leader Treatment</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>40.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>30.3</td>
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<td>neutral</td>
<td>34.7</td>
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<td>favourable</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>99</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Assertions, when recoded to reflect partisan preference, show a similar pattern. In both Globe and Telegram, 56% of all assertions were 'Pro-Tory, anti-Liberal'; only 23% of the Star's assertions were similarly directed. Yet 67% of the Star's assertions were 'Pro-Liberal, anti-Tory'; 34% of Globe, and 36% of Telegram assertions were for the Liberals or against the Conservatives (Table 10).

Thus, three separate criteria show that Hypothesis #1 is not supported. Instead of having disappeared (as proposed in Hypothesis #1) political bias in the three Toronto newspapers still predominated. According to treatment of parties and leaders in all three elections (as an aggregate), treatment of parties and leaders in each elections, and assertions, the Globe and Telegram continued to favour the Tories and castigate the Liberals; the Liberal-oriented Star did exactly the opposite.

---

12 Assertions were recoded into three categories: pro-Tory, anti-Liberal; pro-Liberal, anti-Tory; and 'others'. Since assertions were tabulated using the SPSS MULT RESPONSE procedure—which does not have the capacity of statistical manipulation—a one way ANOVA of papers and assertions could not be done.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Globe</th>
<th>Star</th>
<th>Telegram</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pro-tory, anti-liberal</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pro-liberal, anti-tory</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>234</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3 HYPOTHESIS #2

"That the media agenda of Toronto, represented by party coverage in Toronto daily papers, paralleled the public voting agenda of Torontonians, represented by Toronto voting patterns in the 1957, 1958, and 1962 elections."

As mentioned previously, each article coded was examined for its coverage of the four political parties--Conservative, Liberal, CCF/NDP and Social Credit. If the party was discussed in the article, it was coded as either unfavourable, neutral (bias undetected) or favourable. However, this approach has its limitations. It can find whether a party received a predominance of positive or negative coverages per election. But what it does not take into account is whether a party was ignored in an election while other parties were well covered. This can result in some rather interesting statistics.

For example, in 1957 the Social Credit party had more unfavourable coverage than favourable (37% to 8%, with 55% neutral). In 1958 unfavourable and favourable coverage was balanced (14% to 14%, 71% neutral). In 1962, the Sacred

---

13 The content analysis also determined 'predictions' of victory--Conservative, Liberal, Conservative majority, Liberal majority, Conservative minority, Liberal minority. However, only 29 predictions were found in all 1189 articles. Only 12 predictions were from polls, the rest were from politicians and were not overly reliable. As a result, that part of the content analysis was not examined. This certainly illustrates to what degree the use of polls in the press has grown in the past 27 years.
favourable coverage was five times that of unfavourable (2% to 11%, with 87% neutral). This could indicate a pattern of increasing positive/neutral coverage. But such an interpretation would be misleading, since only a few articles mention the Socreds at all—only 144 of 1189 articles, and only 41 of these discussed the Socreds in either a favourable or unfavourable fashion. The NDP did not do much better—being mentioned in only 293 of 1189 articles, with 116 in a favourable or unfavourable fashion. Thus, as Qualter and McKirdy (1964) previously noted, newspapers ignored the minor parties and concentrated on the Liberals and Conservatives. This discussion will therefore concentrate on the coverage of the major parties.

There is a certain awkwardness in analysing coverage of parties by changes in unfavourable, favourable and neutral frequencies: too many factors have to be taken into account over three elections. A more valid indicator of overall coverage is provided by the changes in means of party coverage for each election. For example, in 1957 the Conservatives had 27 articles with unfavourable coverage (coded as '1'), 66 articles with neutral coverage (coded as 2) and 65 articles with favourable coverage (coded as 3). The 'mean' of coverage is 2.18—or 59% when expressed as a percentage of 100, where 0% is totally unfavourable coverage, and 100% is totally favourable coverage.\(^\text{14}\) Hence, from

\[^{14}\] The mean was expressed as a percentage of 100 by formula \((N - 1) \times 50\), where \(N\) is the mean.
the mean one can tell that the Conservatives received predo-
minantly favourable coverage when the combined unfavourable,
neutral and favourable articles are averaged out.

Even with this adjustment, a direct comparison of
coverage and voting patterns cannot be made; for example,
there is no such thing as a neutral vote. But certain (ad-
mittedly general) comparisons can be made.

In 1957 the Progressive Conservatives scored a
substantial vote count in the Toronto area, with 53% com-
pared to the Liberals 30%.\(^\text{15}\) It was indicative of the Conser-
ervative upset throughout Canada, an upset that stumped poll-
sters and political analysts (Table 12). In the content
analysis party coverage, the Conservatives made similar
headway over the Liberals. The mean of Conservative cover-
age, 59 (a percentage of 100, as explained above) was much
more favourable than the Liberal mean of 35 (Table 11).

With the 1958 election—which provided Diefenbaker's
overwhelming majority—it is not surprising that the
Conservative vote in Toronto increased.\(^\text{16}\) But the rise (6
percentage points, to 59%) was not all that substantial when
compared to the 15 percentage point increase in Tory for-
tunes nationwide (Table 12). The content analysis results

---

\(^{15}\) Percentages were calculated by the author, by tabulating
the voting returns for the 18 Toronto area constituencies

\(^{16}\) However, due to uneven riding populations, this 6 percen-
tage point increase in voting enabled the Conservatives
to capture all 18 Toronto ridings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>( \bar{x} )</th>
<th>Vote (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 11**

Favourableness of Liberal and Conservative Coverage 1957, 1958, 1962

**Liberal Treatment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>( \bar{x} )</th>
<th>Vote (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \bar{x} \)'s are on a 100 point scale with 100 most favourable.
TABLE 12
Toronto Voting 1957, 1958, 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1957 election</th>
<th>1958 election</th>
<th>1962 election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>count</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>304,070</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>396,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>175,496</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>181,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>97,282</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>90,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>9,552</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>2,026</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>2,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>578,874</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>674,008</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
are rather curious. Instead of a Tory increase in favourable coverage, there is a decline in the mean (59.0 to 52.4) and a substantial increase in the Liberal mean (35.4 to 49.1). As a result, the means are nearly equal, with the Tory mean marginally greater. Since a mean of 50 is 'neutral', one can conclude that coverage of both parties was neither favourable nor unfavourable, but balanced.\(^{17}\)

The 1962 election contains even more ambiguous results: The election witnessed the disintegration of Conservative support in the Toronto area—a 22 percentage point tumble from 59 to 37%, putting them about half a percentage behind the Liberals; the NDP also gained. Yet one cannot find signs of a catastrophic decline of Tory fortunes in the content analysis of party coverage. The Tory mean, 50.9, is not all that different from the 1958 mean of 52.4, and not too far from the 1962 Liberal mean of 52.6. So, like 1958, 1962 coverage of the major parties was neutral. It is, however, very much a reflection of the 1962 Toronto vote, with the two parties nearly tied: the Conservatives with 36.7, the Liberals with 37.3.

Thus, there does not seem to be the consistent relationship proposed in Hypothesis #2 between paper coverage of parties, and electoral behavior. The strong electoral

\(^{17}\) The Liberal mean was calculated by eliminating the 'generically' favourable articles on the January 1958 Liberal leadership convention, which took place during the pre-election period. If these articles are included the Liberal mean for 1958 is 56.
showing in 1957 of the Conservatives, and weakness of the Liberals, was found in the articles covered. The virtual standoff of Toronto Tories and Liberals in 1962 was likewise found in 1962 newspapers, where nearly equal means reflected neutral paper coverage. However, paper coverage in 1958 showed a decline in Tory fortunes and a rise in Liberal coverage—when in fact the opposite occurred at the polls. Therefore the hypothesis is not supported 18.

5.4 HYPOTHESIS #3

"That the aggregate (all 4 elections combined) of the Toronto papers gave more quantitative coverage to Diefenbaker than to any other political figure."

There were three methods used to test this hypothesis:

1. Enumeration of names and titles. In the content analysis, every political figure was enumerated for the times his name was mentioned, and the times his title (the Prime Minister, Finance Minister, etc.) was mentioned. This included various ministers and front-benchers (each coded separately), party leaders, provincial politicians, MPs, and federal riding candidates. In the final program, these were recoded

18 Because the circulation of the Star was greater than that of the Telegram and Globe, means were proportionally weighted to see if that would make any difference in the relationship between coverage and vote. However, weighting the means was found to make little difference.
into 10 categories: Diefenbaker, Progressive Conservatives (including all federal Tories outside of the leader), Liberal leader (St. Laurent and Pearson), Liberals, Provincial Premiers, Social Credit Leader, Social Credit, CCP/NDP leader, CCP/NDP, and 'other'. The number of times a politician's name was mentioned, and the number of times his title was mentioned, were recoded into one variable.

2. Number of 'statements' made. Every statement (participation in political meetings, the Commons, press conferences, broadcasts) made by a political figure in the article was enumerated. The names of politicians were recoded into the above ten categories for the final results.¹⁹ (For more detail see Appendix 1, 'Coding Sheet Explanation'.)

3. General mentions of parties and leaders per article. As mentioned in the discussion of Hypothesis #1 and #2, whenever a political party or party leader was discussed, the leader or party was coded according to whether coverage was unfavourable, neutral or favourable. The very fact that the party or party leader

¹⁹ It was beyond the capacity of SPSS to use the 'MULT RESPONSE' procedure for this; as a result, enumeration of names and titles, and enumeration of statements, were manually tabulated, using a specifically designed coding sheet. This naturally limits statistical analysis and cross tabulations, since any breakdown of the data would also have to be manually tabulated. This study did cross tabulate 'names/titles' and 'statements' with newspapers. Chi-squares were done by hand when necessary.
was discussed (regardless of the direction of coverage) can be an indication of the importance of that party or person— for instance, if the Conservative leader is discussed more than the Liberal leader.\textsuperscript{20}

The results of these procedures support the hypothesis. Of the three procedures, the most exact measurement of quantitative coverage— and hence the most valid— was the enumeration of names/titles; and the tally of Diefenbaker names/titles was greater than that of any other political leader. Even when the tallies of the two Liberal leaders were combined, the frequency was less than that of their Tory opponent: 1971 mentions for Diefenbaker, 1801 for St. Laurent/Pearson. Using a single sample cell chi-square test, the differences were significant at .05 ($X^2 = 4.0$, d.f. = 1)

Yet perhaps more interesting is the degree to which the Conservative and Liberal leaders practically monopolized political discussion. Each leader had his names/titles mentioned almost as much as every other figure in his party combined. The other parties, and party leaders, were relatively ignored (Table 13).

\textsuperscript{20} It is true that quantity does not equal quality— there could be a high quantitative coverage of a leader, but if negative, such coverage would have a very different effect from positive coverage. It is to take this into account that Hypothesis #3a has been included.
**TABLE 13**

 Enumeration of names and titles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative ldr.</td>
<td>1,979</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>2,209</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal ldr.</td>
<td>1,855</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>2,107</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socred ldr</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socreds</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF/NDP ldr.</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF/NDP</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov. premiers</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>10,301</td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This pattern, a domination of press coverage by the national leaders of the two major parties, is repeated in the enumeration of statements. Again, the Conservative and Liberal leaders had been shown as participating in more activities than any other politician, although the two leaders had much lower tallies than the rest of their party members combined. This may have been because most of the statements (581 of 1056) were political meetings, like a candidate's debate or public speech. In many cases (such as "St. Laurent Addresses Maritime Problems", Toronto Star, April 23, 1957) the 'star' speaker would be the party leader, who would receive the majority of newspaper coverage. But the local candidates would also make speeches (the leader had to give them publicity, after all) and these speeches would be dutifully noted, thus gaining entry into the 'statement' section. For this reason, the 'time/names' tally may be a more valid indicator of coverage than statements.

Diefenbaker had more statements than any other figure but slightly less than the combination of St. Laurent and Pearson (121 to 136 statements) (See Table 14). On the other hand, some 38 of those Liberal leader statements took place at the leadership convention, when the convention, and not the unexpected general election, dominated the papers. In all other types of statements the Liberal and Tory leaders are virtually equal. Indeed, a chi-square test of Con-
servative leader and Liberal leader statements showed no significant differences at the .05 level. The CCF/NDP and Social Credit leaders, as in 'names/titles', are virtually ignored.

The third procedure, general mentions of parties and leaders, shows the familiar pattern of a domination of the major parties, and their leaders, with a neglect of the minor parties and their leaders (Table 15). But, as in the tally of names/titles, Diefenbaker was covered in more articles than the Liberal leader: 449 to 322 articles. This is significant at the .001 level using $X^2$ ($X^2 = 20.93$, d.f. = 1.)

Thus the hypothesis is supported. In two of three procedures to determine the extent of quantitative coverage—the enumeration of names/titles, and the general mentions of parties and leaders—there were significant differences between Diefenbaker and the Liberal leader, with Diefenbaker predominating. Yet it should be emphasized

21 Even when the 38 statements made during the Liberal leadership convention are removed from the analysis, the results are still insignificant. ($X^2 = .09$ with Liberal convention statements included, $X^2 = 2.42$ when convention statements are excluded, degrees of freedom = 1.)

22 As was noted in the discussion of Hypothesis #1, all 3 newspapers were politically partisan; therefore individual coverage is going to differ from the aggregate. Using $X^2$, there were significant differences at the .05 level in the papers' coverage of the Liberal and Conservative party, in the enumeration of names/titles, and in the enumeration of statements. However, there were no significant differences between papers in their coverage of the Liberal and Conservative leaders. In other words, the newspapers did not display individual biases when it came
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative ldr.</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal ldr.</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socred ldr.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socreds</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP/NDP ldr.</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP/NDP</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov. premiers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,056</td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative ldr.</td>
<td>449</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>775</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal ldr.</td>
<td>322</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>722</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socred ldr.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socreds</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF/NDP ldr.</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF/NDP</td>
<td>293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that these differences, while statistically significant, were not extraordinarily great. In the enumeration of names/titles, probably the most valid indicator of coverage, the Tory leader was 19.2% of the total; the Liberal leader's tally was 18.0%. And in the third procedure, statements, there were no significant differences between the two leaders. Perhaps more important is the near monopolization of coverage by the Tory and Liberal leaders (and parties) combined, with all other players shunted to the sidelines. This monopolization is evident in all three procedures, and is a confirmation of the findings of Qualter and MacKirdy (1964).

5.5. **HYPOTHESIS #3A**

"That this coverage [of Diefenbaker] was 'positive' in 1957 and 1958, and negative in 1962."

As with political parties, Diefenbaker's coverage was rated on a 3 point scale (unfavourable, neutral, favourable) from which a mean was calculated. In 1957 Diefenbaker's coverage was predominantly favourable, with a mean of 68.5. Furthermore, he was much more favourably covered than

to frequency of statements by the two leaders, and in enumeration of names and titles of the two leaders. Thus, since enumeration of names/titles is the most valid indicator of leadership coverage (see above discussion) Diefenbaker's domination was not due to favoritism by the Tory-biased papers, but as a legitimate indication of his paramount in newspaper discussion.

As in Hypothesis #3, means were changed to a percentage of 100 with 0% being completely negative coverage, 50%
the Conservative party, which had a mean of 59.0. However, by 1958 this positive bias had disappeared, with a change to 49.8, significant using a t-test at .001. Furthermore, it was a slightly less favourable mean than that of his party, which had 52.4. In 1962 coverage of Diefenbaker was slightly unfavourable, at 47.7, although the decline was not significant using a t-test at .05 (one-tailed probability = .30). Thus, the hypothesis is not supported: there was predominantly favourable coverage in 1957, but the change to more neutral newspaper coverage occurred in 1958, not 1962.

being-neutral, and 100% being totally positive coverage.
**TABLE 16**

Favourableness of Conservative Leader and Party Coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party X</th>
<th>Leader X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(means calculated as percentage of 100 where 0 = unfavourable, 50 = neutral, 100 = favourable)
5.6 **HYPOTHESIS #4**

"That papers in the elections of 1957 and 1958 stressed 'style' issues, and in the election of 1962 stressed 'position' issues."

Using Agenstreif's definition of 'style' and 'position' issues, all of the themes were categorized as 'style', 'position', or 'neutral' [those issues which could not be clearly classified as one or the other.] When broken down by election, a rather interesting pattern emerges—one different from the hypothesis. In 1957, 'style' themes were slightly more prevalent than 'position' themes and 'neutral' themes. (using $X^2$, the difference was significant

---

24 Style issues were: Parliamentary rights, the pipeline debate, the nuclear issue, closer relations to the U.S., social/economic equality, Canadian position in the Suez Crisis, anti-Communism, anti-Americanism, Confederation, 'Uncle Louis', the Northern Vision, the Canadian flag, national unity, independence of Canada from other nations, the Bill of Rights, reference to Sir John A., bilingualism, 'One Canada', Senate reform, the Coyne Affair, the Avro Arrow, and reference to the Emergency Powers Act.

Position issues were: employment, trade, increase in government assistance, pensions/pensioners, lack of prosperity/recession, taxation, devaluation of the dollar, inflation, development of natural resources, agricultural development, the tight-money policy, prosperity of the country, the cost of living, the Budget, the Defense budget, the national deficit, and the 'waste' of government spending.

Neutral issues were: the government record in office, attendance of political meetings, federal-provincial relations, federal-municipal relations, the Liberal Convention, heckling of meetings, minorities, the Norman
at .001) but the margin was not all that great: 39% for 'style' issues, 36% for position, with 24% neutral (Table 17).

However, by 1958 this near-equal distribution no longer existed. While the percentage of 'style' issues dramatically fell by .13 percentage points, the proportion of 'position' issues climbed (to 44%). The distribution remained more or less the same in 1962. Differences between the three theme types in 1958 and 1962 were significantly different at .001 using $X^2$ (Table 17).

Thus, unlike Regenstreif's assumption of 'style' domination of 1957 and 1958, one finds a near-equality of the three types of issues in 1957, but a domination of 'position' issues in 1958 and 1962.

Case, Immigration, defence policy, the lack of difference between Liberals and Conservatives, government harassment of the press, reference to local patronage, voter apathy, the indecision of the government, government misuse of government facilities, the fishing limit, election interest, Senate domination, government planning, and foreign affairs.

Themes were classified into the three areas according to their context in the historical research, and context determined through coding. For example, 'closer relations to the U.S.' contained the 'moral and ethical' connotations of style themes because of the anti-American feelings of the period (Heisel, 1962: 43-61).

There was a significant difference (at .01) between papers and theme types. While the Globe and Star theme types were virtually identical (with insignificant differences at .05) the Telegram had more neutral and style themes, and less position themes, than the other two (Table 18). However, the pattern is the same as the others: in all three newspapers, position was the most common theme, 'neutral' was second, and 'style' was the least common.
**TABLE 17**

Theme breakdown by election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type:</th>
<th>1957 (%)</th>
<th>1958 (%)</th>
<th>1962 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 16.7 \quad \chi^2 = 77.5 \quad \chi^2 = 65.2 \]

\[ p = .001 \quad p = .001 \quad p = .001 \]
TABLE 18

Papers and Theme Types

All Three Elections Overall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Globe (%)</th>
<th>Star (%)</th>
<th>Telegram (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Style</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style Position</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 15.58, \text{ d.f.} = 4 \]

\[ p = .01 \]

\[ N = 2119 \]
The variation of individual themes over the three elections clearly demonstrates the above pattern. In 1957 two of the three most numerous themes were 'style': Parliamentary rights and the pipeline debate. ('Pensions', the other most numerous theme, was a position issue.) By 1957 both had a fraction of their previous frequency, and were practically ignored in 1962. Employment was relatively unimportant in 1957, but in 1958 and 1962 was the most important issue. In 1962 'devaluation of the dollar', a position theme, appeared as an issue for the first time; it was, after employment, the most-mentioned theme.

There is an explanation for each of these changes. In 1957 the behavior of St. Laurent's government over the Pipeline Debate (and the related issue of Parliamentary rights) was discussed because the contentious Pipeline debate had occurred only months previous. In 1958 the Liberal government of the Pipeline debate was no longer in power, and major protagonists of the debate (St. Laurent, Speaker Lambert, and C.D. Howe) had departed Parliament. The issue no longer had any relevance. By 1958 effects of the economic recession (which would last until the Pearson government of 1963) were being felt: 'unemployment' had become an issue of importance. As a percentage of the labour force, unemployment had fallen in 1955-6 to around 3%, but rose in 1957

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20 By contrast, discussion of the Emergency Powers Acts—an equally controversial issue from 1954—accounted for only a few themes for the 1957 election coverage, and was not discussed at all in 1958 and 1962.
and continued to rise (except for a brief respite in 1959) until 1961, when it peaked at nearly 7.5%—a post-Depression high that would not be equalled until the late 1970's. (Bothwell et al., 1982: 10-13; Statistics Canada, 1972: Table 'B').

Devaluation of the Canadian dollar was something of an instant campaign issue. In Donald Fleming’s 1961 Budget, the Finance Minister had announced his intention to force the Canadian dollar to an exchange rate lower than its current parity with the American dollar. Among other things, this would give Canada a trade advantage. In March 1962 speculation on the dollar lowered its value to .95 American, and in May 1962 Fleming ‘pegged’ the dollar at .925 American, where it would remain until 1970. Unfortunately, the speculation on the dollar (initially encouraged by the government) along with indecision on what the pegged rate would be, and ill-timed comments by cabinet ministers, reduced confidence in the government’s handling of the devaluation issue, just as the 1962 campaign was getting started. The new pegged value became known as the ‘Diefendollar’ (Bothwell et al., 1982: 225-229).

Impact of the recession can be seen in the relationship between two opposing themes: ‘prosperity of the country’ (where it was argued that Canada was doing well) and ‘lack of prosperity’ (with an emphasis on economic malaise in the country). In 1957 there were more than twice
as many themes on Canada's prosperity than those on Canada's economic recession. By 1958 the ratio was reversed—there were four times as many themes on the recession than on supposed prosperity. Canada's economic downturn—and the economic stress it implied—had become established on the media agenda.

Therefore the hypothesis was not supported. The hypothesis had proposed that Regenstreif's 'style' issues were most numerous in 1957 and 1958, while 'position' issues were most numerous in 1962. In fact, the content analysis found that style issues were (marginally) more numerous than position in 1957. But by 1958 position issues were dominant; the pattern was unchanged in 1962. The rise in position issues in 1958 was mirrored by developments in the economy, and individual themes reflected the concern: unemployment, dollar devaluation (in 1962), and the economic recession rose in frequency as economic troubles increased.
### TABLE 19

Selected themes, 1957, 1958, and 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1957 (%)</th>
<th>1958 (%)</th>
<th>1962 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position issues:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment/unemployment</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recession/lack of prosp.</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollar devaluation</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign trade</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Style issues:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline Debate</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary rights</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Northern Vision'</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coyne Affair</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avro Arrow</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Americanism</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** percentage is out of total of themes for each election.
5.7 **HYPOTHESIS #1A**

"That public opinion—measured through opinion polls—likewise reflected these issues."

Due to the scarcity of public opinion polls in Canada during the Diefenbaker Interlude, it is difficult to find an exact connection between the themes mentioned on the elections and issues in the public agenda. Such polls as are available suggest there was such a relationship.27

There was no poll taken during the 1957 election. However, in the fall of 1957 a CIPO poll asked what respondents believed "to be the main problem facing the new government". Due to the nature of the wording certain impor-

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27 A study of Toronto dailies could be criticized as unrepresentative of the national temperament because it does not take into account Canadian regional disparities. It is true that the three elections in this period show important political differences across the country. Yet the English-speaking urban vote across Canada was surprisingly consistent—supporting the Conservatives in 1957 and 1958, and rejecting them in 1962. Toronto’s record is similar.

According to Regenstreif, sampled voter intentions for metropolitan areas of 100,000 and above supported the Conservatives with 47.7% in 1958, but decisively rejected the party with 25.1% in 1962. Voting intention of smaller urban areas from 30,000 to 99,999 was 51.1% for the Tories in 1958 and 25.8% in 1962. (No voting intentions for 1957 were available.)

Metropolitan Toronto likewise favoured the Tories with 50.8% in 1958%, but abandoned them in 1962 with a mere 36.7%. Since voting intent figures contained between 15-20% undecideds, all parties had lower figures than their actual vote, which accounts for much of the difference between the national metropolises and the To-
tant style themes from the election like the Pipeline Debate and Parliamentary Rights could not be considered. However, it is interesting to note that most of the answers were 'position' issues (pensions, taxation, unemployment, help for farmers, social security, foreign trade). The most preferred issue of the poll--pensions--was that most mentioned overall in the 1957 content analysis.

In March 1958 (during the election of that year) another CIPO poll asked "What do you feel is the single greatest problem facing Canada today?" A majority of the answers were 'position', with unemployment and economy problems accounting for 41% of the total. Likewise, as mentioned above, 'position' themes predominated in the content analysis of 1958--and the most frequently cited theme was 'employment'.

During the 1962 campaign, the 1958 question was again asked in a CIPO poll. 'Position' issues again predominated. The 'employment' issue by itself now accounted for

                                       

0ronto vote.

1963 results, (although not covered in this study) are similarly indicative of the relation of Toronto and urban voting. Of the 62 constituencies in Vancouver, Winnipeg, Toronto, Hamilton, Ottawa, and Montreal, the Conservatives could hang onto only two seats. In Toronto and the Yorks they were wiped out. (Regenstreif, 1965: 33, 37, 38, 55, 62.) According to J. Murray Beck, NDP candidate David Lewis lost his seat in York South "because of the almost complete defection of the normally Conservative vote in Forest Hill to the Liberals". (Beck, in Aitchison, 1963: 150). Thus the Toronto vote reflected the national urban trend. The region can be used as a general barometer of the English Canadian city.
TABLE 20
CIPO Poll, October 1957

"What do you believe to be the main problem facing the new government"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taxation</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployment</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>help for farmers</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social security</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign trade</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other problems</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can't think of any</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

118

(Some named more than one)
TABLE 21

CIPO Poll, March 1958

"What do you feel is the greatest single problem facing Canada today?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unemployment; depression</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign affairs; peace</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>export markets</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grain surplus; marketing farm products</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>too many immigrants;</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population problems</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cost of living; inflation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other problems</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>can't think of any</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Some named more than one answer
TABLE 22

CIPO Poll, August 1962

"What do you think is the single greatest problem facing Canada today?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems of the economy:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade; national debt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollar devaluation</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of war; nuclear arms; national defense</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other problems</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can't think of any</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
nearly half of the answers, with a grouping of "problems of the economy; trade; national debt; dollar devaluation" accounting for 16%. Similarly in the 1962 content analysis, employment was still the most frequent theme; the recession (equivalent to 'problems of the economy'), the dollar devaluation, and trade were also important.

Dollar devaluation—the second most prominent theme in the 1962 content analysis—may not have been the 'single greatest problem' but it was a problem well known to the public. In a Gallup poll taken before the June 1962 election, 90% of respondents said that they had heard or read something about the devaluation of the Canadian dollar. When asked "on the whole, do you think this will be a good thing for Canada, or not a good thing", 48% of respondents replied it would be a bad thing, 25% thought it would be a good thing, and 27% were undecided or had no opinion (CIPO Report, July 18, 1962).

Perhaps most important in both polls and content analyses is the relative insignificance of those issues normally emphasized in interpretations of the Diefenbaker Interlude. In explanation of Diefenbaker's landslide victory of 1958, Newman's classic interpretation points to the Prime Minister's charismatic espousal of his 'Northern Vision'. Yet the Northern Vision was a minor theme in the content analysis—less important than the low-key theme of federal-provincial relations, for example. Other elements of the
Diefenbaker platform— the Bill of Rights, reference to One Canada and national unity— each accounted for less than 1 percent of the total themes for that election. Likewise 'style' problems which supposedly plagued 'the Chief' in 1962 were not noticed in the articles sampled for that election. The Coyne Affair, the Avro Arrow scandal, anti-Americanism— nor were they frequent enough in the 1962 CIPO survey of issues.

Therefore the hypothesis is supported, according to what limited evidence is available. In 1957 there was no poll taken during the election, but a poll taken a few months later showed pensions— the most prominent issue on the media agenda— as the most important issue on the public agenda. In 1958 and 1962, 'position' (specifically economic) issues were the key elements of the press, and the public agenda.

Since these were not 'problems' facing Canada they were not included in the 1958 CIPO poll.
Chapter VI

CONCLUSIONS

The content analysis was conducted for two reasons: to test the 'historical' interpretation of the press between 1957 and 1962; and to determine the importance of 'agenda-setting' during the Diefenbaker Interlude. The results show some major gaps in the historical consensus, especially the supposed concern with social issues in 1957 and 1958; the 'Diefenbaker Charisma'; and Diefenbaker's domination of press coverage. While the content analysis found nothing definite to indicate a relationship between press coverage and voter behavior, it did show that agenda-setting for issues may have taken place during the period.

6.1 HISTORICAL FINDINGS

If one believes Peter Newman's classic interpretation of Diefenbaker's career, the Conservative leader's rise to power and subsequent fall can be almost entirely attributed to his own extraordinary abilities and weaknesses. The 'charisma' of the Saskatchewan politician charmed press and public in 1957; hitting hard against a Liberal regime weakened by aged leaders and a perception of 'arrogance', the Tories triumphed at the polls for the first time since the Depression.
In 1958, running against an ineffectual Lester Pearson, Diefenbaker was able to use his vision of the future—the 'Northern Vision'—to an unsurpassed Parliamentary victory. By 1962 this had changed. Ineffectual handling of the Coyne Affair, the scrapping of the Arrow, and the economy, coupled with an alienation of the press, had disillusioned the voters—with catastrophic results to Conservative fortunes.

In this concentration upon Diefenbaker (a sort of Canadian restatement of the 'Great Man' theory) Newman was supported by other journalists and political scientists of the time. Modern Canadian texts have relied on these older works. However, the results of the content analysis indicate that other interpretations should be looked at.

The finding of statistically significant differences between all 3 papers on political favouratism confirms Qualter and McKirdy's (1964) analysis of the 1962 election. The content analysis found paper partisanship in the 1957, 1958 and 1962 elections. Qualter and McKirdy saw traditional partisanship not only in the three Toronto papers, but also in all other Ontario dailies examined. This affirmation of political bias is an argument against Diefenbaker's capture of the media in 1957 and 1958, and alienation in

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29 The 'Great Man' theory was espoused by certain nineteenth-century historians, who argued that the course of European history was determined by the actions of a few individual figures of great importance, like Napoleon and Bismarck.
1962, since a paper partisan to the Liberals would disregard
the Chief's supposed charisma while a paper positive to the
Conservatives would support its leader regardless. In fact,
the examination of positive/negative coverage of parties in
the content analysis does not show the press turning on
Diefenbaker in 1962 (Hypothesis #3a), contrary to the ac-
counts of Newman, Dempson and Nicholson. The paper parti-
sanship result also leaves open the question of when (and
if) political partisanship declined among the Canadian me-
dia.

An enumeration of politicians' names and titles
was supposed to validate Hypothesis #3: Diefenbaker's domi-
nation of the press. But the name/title mentions show that
not one but two characters dominated press coverage—Dief-
enbaker and the current Liberal leader. It is true that
Diefenbaker did have more coverage than his Liberal rival.
On the other hand, Diefenbaker was Prime Minister for two of
three elections, and may have received the extra coverage as
a result of the prestige of his position (a well known media
variable in American Presidential campaigns, for example).

This claim against a Diefenbaker 'charisma' is re-
inforced by two other results:

1. In the number of 'statements' made by politicians,
Diefenbaker and the Liberal leader had virtually
equal coverage.
2. The positive/negative coverage of parties and leaders showed that Diefenbaker was more favourably received than his party only once, in 1957. In 1958 Conservative party and leader were evaluated equally—hardly what one would expect in a supposed prequel to Trudeauania.

And when themes are taken into account, further holes appear in the theory of Dief's charisma. The theme which supposedly dominated the 1958 election—the 'Northern Vision'—is barely mentioned in the articles selected. Other issues which were thought to hurt the Conservatives in 1962 were minor in the content analysis results: the Avro Arrow, and the Coyne Affair which, if one believes Newman and others, convinced the Canadian public of Tory administrative incompetence. Furthermore, the CIPO polls in 1958 and 1962 did not find these issues important enough to enumerate separately. The important issues were economic in nature, as will be shown in Section 6.2.

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The results of the hypotheses therefore indicate that accounts of press coverage need to be almost entirely revised, with economics more important than the "charisma" favoured by traditional accounts. In 1957 (and 1958, and 1962) newspapers were not free of the partisanship they had exhibited in previous elections, according to results of Hypothesis #1: the Globe and Telegram continued to be biased
in favour of the Tories, and the Star continued to be biased in favour of the Liberals. The 1958 victory did not coincide with an overwhelming press support for the Progressive Conservative leader, as is usually assumed— in fact, there was a significant drop in Toronto press support for Diefenbaker in 1957 and 1958. There is no statistical evidence of a dramatic alienation of the press from the Conservative leader between 1958 and 1962— in spite of the supposed conflict with the Press Gallery, national problems, Tory blunders, and Diefenbaker's ineptitude in media relations (Hypothesis #3a).

It was true that Diefenbaker had greater quantitative coverage than another political figure (Hypothesis #3)— but this may have been due to his position as Prime Minister in two of three elections. Evidence of an extraordinary personality dominating Canadian politics is not present. Nor is there evidence of the great themes which, according to Newman (1963) dominated the election campaigns: the 'Northern Vision', 'One Canada'— or Avro Arrow and Coyne Affair. None of these appear important in the content analysis (Hypothesis #4) nor in the public opinion polls (Hypothesis #4a).

The polls instead found economic issues prominent, such as unemployment, the recession, and devaluation of the dollar— which were similarly enumerated in the content analysis. This points to an agenda-setting role in the media;
and, as will be shown below, it is in agenda-setting, not in Diefenbaker's "charisma" or in conflicts with the Parliamentary Gallery, that the press is important in an historical analysis of the period.

6.2 AGENDA-SETTING

In Chapter II it was argued that the variables which limited agenda-setting during the 1950's--specifically a dominant, consistent political partisanship--were specifically American characteristics, and that there was evidence these characteristics did not apply to Canada. To determine the extent of agenda-setting during the Diefenbaker Interlude, two procedures were used: a comparison of newspaper party coverage to Toronto voting patterns; and a comparison of the media agenda (as defined by frequency of issues in the content analysis) with public opinion. Despite the inadequacy of public opinion polls during this time, there is some evidence that agenda-setting did occur.

Hypothesis #2 proposed a direct link between party coverage and voting results. The content analysis results failed to confirm this hypothesis for all 3 elections, but there were possible parallels between coverage and vote in two of the elections. In 1957 there was a similarity between the positive Conservative coverage and a rise in Tory fortunes at the Toronto polls. In 1962 the unenthusiastic neutrality in coverage of both Liberals and Tories was par-
alleled by an equality in votes for both parties (along with a drift to the hitherto moribund NDP). But in 1958 the content analysis showed an increase in Liberal favourable coverage, with a decline in Tory mean— while Toronto voters increased the Tory lead enough to capture all 18 seats.

The newspaper partisanship found in the content analysis as well as by Wualter and McKirdy (1964) may have made such a link between paper coverage and vote impossible. It had been hypothesized that partisanship was not a factor in newspaper coverage: partisanship was demonstrated by content analysis' results to have been a factor in all three elections. The Globe and Telegram supported the Tories, just as they always had; and the Star remained as inclined to the Liberals as always.

Yet other alternatives are also possible. In proposing a direct link between coverage and votes, Hypothesis #2 assumed that the time between newspaper coverage appearance, and its effect on voting behavior took place, within the period covered by the sample; that two month period ended at the election. However, as was discussed earlier (p. 19) this 'time-frame' has been shown to vary; it could range from a few weeks to several years. The 1958 peak in electoral voting for the Tories conceivably could have been a delayed response to favourable coverage in 1957— despite more neutral reporting done during 1958. Perhaps further analysis could uncover more evidence of media coverage and voter outcome.
This study also attempted to determine the relationship between media agenda and public agenda. Here results were not conclusive, but do show certain possibilities.

First, it was possible to show the time-frame between media agenda and public agenda in at least one issue. 'Devaluation of the dollar' was an issue which did not exist before May 2, 1962—when Donald Fleming devalued the dollar to 92.5 cents American. Yet it was a major issue in the 1962 media agenda—becoming the second most prominent theme. By mid June 1962, 90% of a Gallup poll's respondents stated that they had heard of or read of the devaluation, a little more than a month after the issue first appeared. Hence, it would be reasonable to assume that the time-frame of media and public issues would take place during the sample period.

In trying to determine the difference between the 1957, 1958, 1962 and 1963 elections, Regenstreif came up with the idea of 'style' and 'position' issues. In 1957 and 1958, Canadian voters were influenced by 'style' issues like "rights of Parliament" which are "basically indirect and projective for the people involved". This resulted in Conservative victory. In 1962 and 1963 things were going poorly for the economy, and 'position' issues like unemployment were important—issues that are "basically tangible, with a
concrete meaning". The change in issues was mainly responsible for the decline of Diefenbaker support in 1962 (Regensteif, 1965: 49-52). The content analysis results, however, point to 1958, not 1962, as the year that issues changed.

In the 1957 election, 'style' issues were slightly more prominent than 'position' (economic) issues in the media agenda. Unfortunately, as mentioned in the previous chapter, no poll was taken during the election, so it is impossible to know whether the public agenda favoured style or position issues. But in the 1958 and 1962 elections, Gallup Polls show the same importance of economic issues as the newspaper themes do. Furthermore, the top-rated media issue—employment/unemployment—was also the top-rated issue of the public opinion polls.

In fact, the importance of economic issues (or Regenstreif's position issues) on media and public agenda may provide a viable alternative to Diefenbaker's 'charisma' as an explanation for the 1958 and 1962 elections. The switch from 'style' to 'position' issues between 1957 and 1958 has already been discussed. If the Canadian public had confidence in the new Tory government's handling of economic issues in 1958, this could have partly explained Diefenbaker's victory. Indeed, of respondents who thought employment was

---

30 'Position' issues in this study related entirely to economics, and may be considered for the purposes of this study as economic issues.
the greatest problem facing the country in 1958, 41 percent thought the Conservatives could best handle the problem, and only 26 percent believed the Liberals could best handle it (CIPO Report, April 9, 1958).

But by 1962 the economy was in deep trouble, and devaluation of the dollar was supposed to have severely limited government credibility. According to a May 19, 1962 Gallup Poll (less than a month before the election) the Liberals had increased their lead as the party that would 'do the best job of keeping the country prosperous', with 42% as opposed to the Conservative's 29%. With economic issues dominating the media and public agendas, this would reflect on voter outcome (See Table 23).

***************

Therefore the press has a role in the Diefenbaker Interlude much different from the irrelevant variable dismissed by political scientists (if not journalists) of the time. Regenstreif, Beck and other researchers of the 1957-1962 period were following American researchers of the 1950's who treated the media as an intervening, not an independent, variable (Patterson, 1980). However, in 1972 McCombs and Shaw demonstrated that the media had a considerable impact on what voters felt were major issues of the Nixon-McGovern campaign. Funkhouser (1973) found the correlation between media agenda and public agenda to be stronger than that between 'reality' and either agenda. Since the
TABLE 23
Polls and Attitudes to Economic Competence

March, 1958
(of those who named unemployment as the greatest problem facing the country)

Which party can best handle unemployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

May, 1962

"Looking ahead for the next few years, which political party, the Conservatives or the Liberals--Do you think, if in power, would do the best job of keeping the country prosperous?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Either one</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
early 1970's extensive research has amply demonstrated the existence of the agenda-setting process.

This content analysis could not support Hypothesis #2, which posited a relationship between Toronto parties and voting. Yet there is evidence in support of Hypothesis #4a, agenda-setting of public issues by newspapers; and it has been issue salience, not voting outcome, which has been the focus of agenda-setting research.

The top-ranked media issues in 1957, 1958 and 1962 were also the top ranked public issues in Gallup polls taken during or around the election periods. In 1958, media concentration on "position" or economic issues was paralleled by public concern about the economy—a pattern repeated in 1962. This has great importance in the interpretation of Diefenbaker's rise and fall—specifically, the enormous Conservative victory of 1958, and collapse of 1962.

It is, of course, the press that largely structures voters' perceptions of political reality. As we can see, the press can exert considerable influence on which issues made up the agenda for any particular election. Not only can the press influence the nature of the political arena in which a campaign is conducted but, on occasion, it can define (albeit inadvertently) an agenda whichaccures to the benefit of one party. To a considerable degree the art of politics in a democracy is the art of determining which issue dimensions are of major interest to the public or can be made salient in order to win public support (Shaw and McCombs, 1977: 15).

The concept of "valence issues" discussed by Campbell et al. (1960) may help explain the importance of economics in the Diefenbaker Interlude. A "valence issue" is
"simply a proposition, condition or belief that is positively or negatively valued by all the voters", as opposed to a "position issue", where voters simply take 'pro' or 'con' stands (Shaw and McCombs, 1979: 15-16).

For example, "nuclear war" and "reducing the deficit" are valence issues: no one is for nuclear war, and no one is against reducing the deficit. Abortion and capital punishment are "position issues" where people take pro and con stands. A certain percentage of the population will always be for capital punishment and a certain percentage will be against it, although the proportions may change over time. A valence issue can have important political consequences: in 1952, the Democrats were blamed for the valence issues of 'crime' and 'corruption', enabling the Republicans to win the presidency (Shaw and McCombs, 1979: 15).

Similarly, many of the economic issues prominent during the 1958 and 1962 campaigns were "valence" issues: no one is for unemployment, or the recession, or devaluation of the dollar. Thus, the prominence of economic issues in the media during 1958 and 1962 resulted in prominence of those issues in the public agenda. Public confidence in Tory handling of the economy in 1958, and lack of confidence in 1962, resulted in votes for the Tories in 1958 and against the Tories in 1962. Instead of an irrelevant variable, the agenda-setting role of the media was perhaps the most important factor in understanding the Diefenbaker Interlude.
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In view of the content analysis results, there are a number of areas that deserve to be looked at in further detail.

1. A long term study of the press agenda and public agenda. This work was handicapped by being done during election periods, when the frequency of issue polling in Canada was rather uneven. Perhaps construction of a content analysis around the polls that do exist may provide more specific results.

2. An investigation of the decline of press partisanship in Canada. Since partisanship still existed by 1962, it would be useful to find out just when it did decline (or if it did). It may have been in decline during the Diefenbaker years: although Toronto press behavior was straightforward, there were large percentages of 'neutral' articles. Perhaps the partisanship, although open enough to be detected, was less open than in previous elections.

3. Further examination of the relationship between paper coverage of parties and electoral outcome. Results were inconsistent in this study, but it was interesting that the 1957 election showed a newspaper negativity towards the Liberals (even the Star was less supportive than usual). The 1957 election was probably the most important of the three, because Liberal
support had disintegrated after 22 years of bedrock consistency. It was the start of a nationwide readjustment in political behavior. Perhaps a study of press coverage and major political upheavals may have more positive results.

4. A reinterpretation of the 1958 victory. At that time the economy was starting what is now called a 'downspin'—economic issues, not a call for a New Society or Northern Vision, were predominant concerns of the press and of the public. (Bothwell et al., 1982: p 115.) Rather than a study in 'Charisma', the Diefenbaker period could be the story of how Canada reacted to its first major post-war recession.

5. A qualitative/quantitative study of 'political dualism' in the press. During the late '60s, political correspondents liked to talk of about the 'dualism' of Canadian politics—not English/French, but Diefenbaker and Pearson, Trudeau and Stanfield. The results of the content analysis show quantitative dominance of coverage by Conservative and Liberal leaders—and disregard of other leaders. A study of later (and earlier) elections would find if the pattern was consistent.

6. Diefenbaker's relationship with the press. According to Newman and others, Diefenbaker's personal relationship with the press determined how the press
treated him. This may not be true. Newman (1963), Nicholson (1968), Dempson (1968) and so on were associated with the Parliamentary Press Gallery; the percentage of political stories they contributed was only a fraction of the political stories printed in each of the 3 papers examined. The demonstrated political partisanship of the newspapers makes certain of Diefenbaker's tantrums (towards the Star's Val Sears, for example) more understandable. Since many of the newspapermen of the time are still around, an historical study of this aspect could be undertaken.

Until now, our interpretation of this period depended upon contemporary journalists like Newman, subjective memoirists like Diefenbaker, and such out-of-date studies as that of Regenstreif. It is about time for a more comprehensive, analytical re-evaluation. While this study has outlined some of the problems and possible directions of research, much remains to be done.
Appendix A

CODING SHEET EXPLANATION
The coding sheet has 6 major sections:

A) DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLE (consisting of the following:)

I. size (eg. 12 column inches) of article.

II. Content: what type of article it is. There are 9 choices:

1. Opinion-- the personal opinion of somebody on a topic.

2. Analysis-- an 'in depth' analysis of a political situation, e.g., how a party is doing in an election.

3. Editorial

4. Regular Columnist-- a regular columnist with a byline, like Charles Lynch and Alan Potheringham today.

5. Letter to the editor

6. Cartoon (editorial cartoon).

7. photograph

8. the lead, front page story (with the lead headline)

9. just story-- most articles fit in here.

III. Source: where the article came from:

1. local staff-- stories that don't have other locations specified (eg. Ottawa staff), editorial, editorial cartoons.

2. Ottawa bureau-- stories written by a member of a paper that are specified as coming from Ottawa.

3. Other bureau-- stories written by a member of the paper from another location outside of Toronto and Ottawa.

4. CP-- the Canadian Press.

5. Other Canadian-- a Canadian source not one of the above, e.g. from the Winnipeg Free Press.

6. Reuters

7. AP-- American Press.

8. UPI-- United Press International. Also called BUP (British United Press) at this time.

9. another-- anybody else.
10. Letter to the editor

B) Treatment: there are two sections: 'Treatment A', and 'Treatment B'. The categories are:

- 9 if not mentioned at all (N/A)
- 1 if UNFAVOURABLE coverage
- 2 if NEUTRAL coverage
- 3 if FAVOURABLE coverage

Treatment B has two parts: how the party is covered, and how its leader is covered. Treatment A makes no distinction between treatment of a party and treatment of its leader.

Treatment 'A'

1. A 'favourable' story is defined as "a story that is OBVIOUSLY in favour of a party, its representative, or its policies.

2. "Obviously" is the operative work in coding such stories. Where there is doubt the story will be coded as 'N/A'.

Treatment 'B'

1. Headlines have priority; e.g. an unfavourable headline would result in an article being labeled as unfavourable to the leader or party treated. Thus, a headline unfavourable to Dief would result in the article being labeled as unfavourable to Dief, even if the remainder of the article was neutral.

2. Photos (with caption if any) will be treated as separate articles and coded appropriately.

3. The first two paragraphs of the body of the article are next in priority after headlines. Thus, if an article on Diefenbaker has a neutral headline (that is, it is neutral or does not mention Diefenbaker) and the first and/or second paragraphs are unfavourable, the article would be coded as unfavourable to Diefenbaker.

4. After the first two paragraphs, the coder looks at 1) the remainder of the article on the first page, and then 2) the rest of the article, if it is contained on another page.

5. Just because an article attacks (or supports) one party or leader does not mean it supports the other. Thus, if an article supports Diefenbaker and the Tories but says nothing about the Liberals, it will be considered as favourable to Diefenbaker and the Tories, but will not be considered as unfavourable to Pearson and the
Liberals.

6. If an article contains statements or quotations predominately favourable to one party or leader and unfavourable to the others, it will be coded as such. An article on, say, the nomination of a PC candidate in Toronto, where the bulk of the article consists of chastising the Liberals and NDP, and in praise of the candidate's party, will be coded as favourable to the PC's and unfavourable to the Liberals and NDP.

7. News which affects the party unfavourably will be coded as such. A piece of economic bad news will be coded as unfavourable to the government when it is mentioned as part of the campaign; similarly, good economic news would be coded as favourable to the government.

8. Any case where the labeling of the treatment is difficult or doubtful, code as neutral. If the coder 'thinks' but is not sure whether an article is pro-Tory, it is better to code it as neutral and 'err on the side of caution'.

C) HORSERACE— or, how people think the election is going.
This has two sections, PREDICTION, and CAMPAIGN PROGRESS.
For each section write in either 1— for not applicable— or 2, for applicable (in the coding sheet, they are abbreviated to N/A and Appl.)

PREDICTION

if they predict a Liberal government in general, code as 6
if they predict a Liberal minority government, code as 1
if they predict a Liberal majority government, code as 2

if they predict a Tory government in general, code as 6
if they predict a Tory minority government, code as 3
if they predict a Tory majority government, code as 4

if they don't predict anything—few do—write '1' beside N/A

CAMPAIGN PROGRESS

How well the party and leaders are supposed to be doing in the campaign. See coding sheet for what numbers to write down. If they don't specifically say how a campaign is going— and few will say specifically how a campaign is going— write '1' beside 'N/A'

NOTE: the only part of 'campaign progress' that requires explanation is 'main. loss' (short for maintaining loss) and 'main. lead' (short for maintaining lead). This is where the person who is talking about the campaign specifically says that
the party or party leader is CONTINUING to do badly or CONTINUING to do well.

SOURCES

That is, what source the above prediction and/or campaign progress came from. If there wasn't any prediction or campaign progress, ignore this altogether. If there are 2 sources, list the most relevant one. Thus, if a politician uses polls to predict something, use the source as 'polls', e.g. 'Diefenbaker says Gallup polls will give him a majority government.' If the politician just says his own opinion, code it as 'politicians'.

D) TIMES NAMES MENTIONED

That is, how many times the name and titles of a politician are listed. Just do it to politicians, not everybody. Write down the person's name in the 'Times Names Mentioned' line, then add up the times his name is mentioned, and the times his title is mentioned. Let's say that, in a brief article, L. St. Laurent is named 6 times, and his title is mentioned 3 times. You would write down his name -- St. Laurent -- then, in the space beside his name, write '44' (the code for St. Laurent); then write '06' in the 'name' box, and '03' in the 'title' box. (See below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Laurent</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Any time the name is mentioned, it is counted, e.g. 'The St. Laurent Ministry'. 'Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent' is enumerated for both title and name. Likewise 'Davie Fulton, the Minister of Justice', or 'Paul Martin (L, Windsor West)', or 'Joe Smith, Liberal Candidate for the riding of Horsetooth', or 'Igor Slosch, a Liberal delegate from Toronto'.

E) STATEMENTS

Basically, if any politician makes any sort of statement -- a speech in the House of Commons, a press release -- it will be coded under 'type' as follows:

1. meeting -- e.g., a campaign meeting
2. press release
3. Commons speech (NOT speeches in provincial legislatures -- they are coded under '6')
4. An official report or statement by the government, or the political party. ('A release by the Liberal party
said that...

5. press conference

6. Anything else, or unattributed

7. radio or TV broadcast, such as a CBC speech

8. phone or any other interview (as distinct from a press conference, above)

9. international conference (eg. Commonwealth) or leadership convention (eg. Liberal convention of 1957)

Then, there is a box beside the 'type' box on the coding sheet, write in the code for the politician's name ('44' for St. Laurent). In the large space beside it, write in the name ('St. Laurent'). If the 'type' of statement is either 1 (a meeting) or 5 (a press conference) you are supposed to write in the province it takes place in. The codes for each area are written on the coding sheet (eg. Toronto is 1, the rest of Ontario is 2, Quebec is 3).

For example, let's say that St. Laurent said something at a speech in Toronto at a meeting of the Rosedale Liberal Club. It would be coded like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>(meeting)</th>
<th>(code)</th>
<th>(name)</th>
<th>(location, since type 1 or 5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>St. Laurent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F) ASSERTIONS AND THEMES

Turn to the 'assertion' and the 'theme' sheets to see if the article discussed any themes or enumerated assertions.

Here's an example of an assertion, from the Feb. 3, 1957 Globe:

"A distinguished Canadian, Louis St. Laurent, who leads a country only 15 years older than he is, told the 1,400 guests of his birthday party..."

This would be coded under Assertion 36-- "St. Laurent is kindly/compassionate/distinguished/Grandfatherly".

NOTE: The assertion will be noted if the paper makes it in an editorial, if the author makes it in his story, if somebody in the story is quoted alleging the assertion, or denying the assertion.

An assertion has some sort of definite bias; a 'theme' is coded without regard to the bias of the writer or the speaker of the quote. Another example from the Feb. 3/57 Globe:
"St. Laurent told his guest that national unity remains the touchstone of the future of the country and the essential condition for the realization of the great material progress in the years to come."

This would be coded under Theme 26, "national unity", and the coder would put the code for the theme, 26, into one of the boxes in the coding sheet, under 'themes'.

Other theme examples:

"Minister of Health Martin pointed to the proud record of achievement of the past 22 years of Liberal administration, including the enactment of the welfare state".

-- coded under theme 01, 'the government's record in office'.

"Prime Minister Diefenbaker blamed the Liberal 'tight money policy' for the unfortunate plight of the unemployed in Canada" -- coded under theme 27, 'employment/unemployment', and theme 32, 'the tight money policy'.
Appendix B

THMES IN THE CODING SHEET

(1) GOVERN RECORD IN OFFICE
(2) 'UNCLE LOUIS'
(3) PROSPERITY OF COUNTRY
(4) LACK OF PROSPERITY— RECESSION
(5) CLOSER RELATIONS TO UNITED STATES
(6) NEED OF INDEPENDENCE FROM GREAT BRITAIN
(7) NORTHERN VISION
(8) ANTI-COMMUNISM
(9) ANTI-AMERICANISM
(10) THE 'ESTABLISHMENT'
(11) PARLIAMENTARY RIGHTS
(12) INDECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT
(13) AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
(14) DEFENCE BUDGET
(15) SOCIAL-ECONOMIC EQUALITY
(16) PENSIONS—PENSIONERS
(17) COYNE AFFAIR
(18) AVRO ARROW
(19) 1963 CABINET REVOLT
(20) NUCLEAR ISSUE
(21) PRESS HARASS OF THE GOVERNMENT
(22) GOVT HARASSMENT OF THE PRESS
(23) NORMAN CASE
(24) PIPELINE DEBATE
(25) DEVALUATION OF THE DOLLAR
(26) NATIONAL UNITY
(27) EMPLOYMENT—UNEMPLOYMENT
(28) HECKLING OF MEETINGS
(29) DEVALUATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
(30) THE BUDGET
(31) TIGHT MONEY POLICY
(32) CANADIAN POSITION IN THE SUEZ CRISIS
(33) CANADIAN PROVINCIAL-FEDERAL RELATIONS
(34) INDEPENDENCE FROM THE US; RELATION WITH THE US
(35) GOVT MISUSE OF GOVERNMENT FACILITIES
(36) OTHER
(37) EMERGENCY POWERS ACT
(38) ATTENDANCE OF POLITICAL MEETINGS
(39) ONE CANADA
(40) REFERENCE TO SIR JOHN A.
(41) TAXATION
(42) INCREASE IN PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
(43) FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(44) INFLATION
FLAG ISSUE
INDEPENDENCE
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS TO THE CIVIL SERVICE
LACK OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES
MUNICIPAL-FEDERAL RELATIONS
TRADE
CONFEDERATION
DEFENCE POLICY
LIBERAL CONVENTION, '57
BILINGUALISM
SENATE TYRANNY BY THE LIBERALS
BILL OF RIGHTS
IMMIGRATION
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
COST OF LIVING
GOVERNMENT SPENDING AS WASTEFUL
LOCAL PATRONAGE
MINORITIES
FISHING LIMIT
DON'T SPLIT THE VOTE
SENATE REFORM
THE DEFICIT
GOVERNMENT PLANNING
APATHY
INTEREST IN ELECTION
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